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obligations of his office. Dr. Mary Flia bethWalsh Instructor in Sociology, discussed with me the chapters as they were being written and carefully checked them for errors and questionable statements. Finally the many graduate students who have patiently followed my course in the history of social thought during the last seventeen years contributed not a little towards the shaping of the subject matter of this book. I have freely drawn on their dissertations for background material without being able to give specific credit in every case. The bibliography will reveal my indebtedness to many other scholars some of whom I have the honor of knowing personally and others of whom I know only through their works.

PAUL HANLY FURFEY

Pentecost, 1942.

PREFACE

To attempt to summarize the whole history of social thought in a single volume is perhaps a somewhat rash venture. It means that one must pass judgment on, dozens of disputed issues without having the space to give the arguments on both sides of the question. As a result one must speak somewhat dogmatically in a score of fields to each of which eminent specialists have devoted their lives. Working in such a limited compass one must select certain writers and certain movements for discussion and reject others without giving the reasons for inclusion or rejection. The salient points of the story must be emphasized but there is no room for the subsidiary details which place these salient points in their proper perspective. The mere necessity for brevity compels one to paint the picture in a somewhat impressionistic style.

My excuse for making the attempt is that social thought is an enormously important subject both theoretically and practically and that no one has previously written the history of social thought broadly conceived as it is in this volume. Previous works bearing a title similar to this one have given the subject a rather narrow and academic definition. A second reason is that even among these narrower treatments none has been written from the Catholic viewpoint. The existing works on the subject, or most of them, reflect a view of society which may be called naturalistic liberalism. To my mind this represents an objectionable bias. Their authors no doubt will find my

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own viewpoint equally objectionable. But at least we ought all to be willing to agree that it is an advantage to have different views presented so long as they are presented fairly. I have tried to be fair. I have tried to present divergent opinions justly and to discuss them without heat. I have tried to give the facts as I saw them and I have not consciously modified my judgments at any point because I felt that they would be likely to prove unpopular. This much can be demanded of a historian—and no more. Every realistic scholar knows that, no matter how fair he tries to be, unconscious prejudices will sometimes warp his opinions. For errors due to this cause I can only ask pardon in advance.

My necessarily difficult task has been very much lightened by the generous assistance freely given me by a number of distinguished specialists. With them I must share whatever merit the work may have while I must myself accept the responsibility for whatever mistakes may have crept in. Among the many scholars to whom my gratitude is due, the following deserve particular mention: Dr. Arthur W. Hummel, Chief of the Division of Orientalia, Mr. Edwin G. Beal, Jr., Assistant in the Japanese Section of the Division of Orientalia, and Dr. Horace I. Poleman, Director of Indic Studies, all of the staff of the Library of Congress and the following members of the faculty of the Catholic University of America, Right Rev. John M. Cooper, Professor of Anthropology, Dr. Martin R. P. McGuire, Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Rev. Edward P. Arbez, S.S., Assistant Professor of Semitic Languages and Literature, and Dr. Bernard G. Mulvaney, C.S.V., Instructor in Sociology. Rev. Wilfrid **Parsons, S.J.**, Professor of Politics, acted as ecclesiastical censor and by his -helpful criticisms went far beyond the

mum suggested in the last paragraph. This probability is heightened by recent discoveries. Beginning in 1926 workers connected with the Geological Survey of China discovered a remarkable series of early human remains in Chou K'ou Tien cave near Peiping (Peking). Up to the present, parts of some forty individuals have been found. They are recognized as belonging to a distinct type of early man to which the name *Sinanthropus pekinensis* or Peking Man has been given. Back in 1891 and 1892 Eugene Dubois of Holland discovered near Trinil, Java, human remains of a very early type. He proposed the name *Pithecanthropus erectus* for his find. More popularly it was known as the "ape-man of Java." For a long time it was disputed whether *Pithecanthropus* was man or ape or possibly an intermediate "missing link." Recent discoveries by Von Koenigswald, however, seem to have made it certain that *Pithecanthropus* was human. It is hard to place these early human remains in the geological time-series with exactitude, but it seems certain that they belong somewhere in the early Pleistocene period. Authorities estimate, that the Pleistocene began from three hundred thousand (Obermaier) to a million (Chamberlin and Salisbury) years ago with the weight of opinion inclining more and more toward the larger figure. It appears that both *Sinanthropus* and *Pithecanthropus* were human beings flourishing one or more hundreds of thousands of years ago.²

The argument could be pushed further. Other discoveries have been made which can be plausibly interpreted as human remains of a still earlier date. Enough has been said, however, to indicate that the age of the human race must be written in six figures. Incidentally, the Bible throws no light on the question. Conservative Catholic theologians and Biblical scholars are agreed that the antiquity of man

is a problem which must be attacked by purely scientific methods.³

The bearing of these facts on the history of social thought is evident. They give one the proper perspective. Human history, recorded by contemporaries, goes back about five thousand years. It covers only the last tiny fraction of man's story. Preliterate social thought, the subject of this chapter, covers a period, perhaps twenty times, perhaps a hundred times as long as that covered by all the rest of the book. Hence the importance of primitive social thought.

THE DATA FROM ARCHEOLOGY

It seems logical to turn to archeology as a first source of information about the early history of society. The science of archeology studies ancient man by means of his material remains. Here and there throughout the world buried and surface traces of prehistoric man have been discovered. Traces of his dwellings have been found together with his tools, his pottery, the bones of food animals, his objects of art, and the remains of his dead. From these it is possible to form some idea of early man's mode of life.

A time-scale in terms of years for early man is at present impossible. As a substitute it is convenient to distinguish various "ages" named principally from the type of material predominantly used during the age in question. The following list gives the principal ages which are usually distinguished. Note that the more recent ages are at the top of the list and the more ancient, at the bottom. This may seem illogical, but it represents the order in which remains are found in excavation. Naturally the lower layers are older than the upper. Thus the Lower Paleolithic is older than the Upper Paleolithic.

Age of Irpn
Age of Bronze
Eneolithic
Full Neolithic
Neolithic, Early Phase
Mesolithic
Upper Paleolithic
Lower Paleolithic
Eolithic (?)

It is impossible to date these ages with even approximate accuracy; but it is worth noting that the Lower Paleolithic was very much longer than the Upper Paleolithic and the latter was probably longer than all the ages which followed it put together. It is important to note that different areas did not necessarily pass through these stages at the same time. Thus, when men in one part of the world had advanced to the Neolithic, men elsewhere were still in the Paleolithic. In other words these "ages" are not ages in a strict chronological sense.

The earliest age in the above list is the Eolithic (from Greek *eos*, dawn, and *lithos*, stone). The existence of such an age has been postulated to account for certain crudely chipped flints called *eoliths* which have been found in various places. It is quite uncertain, however, whether these flints were chipped by man or nature and so the very existence of this period remains doubtful.

In the Lower Paleolithic (*palaïos*, old) chipped flints appear which are of definite human workmanship. Through out part, perhaps all, of this age man was acquainted with **the** use of fire. Burial with artifacts and food furnishes a proof of a belief in life after death. Throughout the latter part of the Lower Paleolithic, Neanderthal Man flourished,

a short, stocky type with retreating forehead and chin and broad nose. In the Upper Paleolithic, Neanderthal Man was rather suddenly succeeded by another type, Cro-Magnon Man. The latter was tall and had a high forehead, long head, and narrow nose. In appearance he was not unlike certain modern European types. The Upper Paleolithic saw considerable advances in technique. Tools were fitted with wooden handles. Flints were worked more skillfully. Implements were made of bone, and the needle, awl, chisel, necklace, harpoon, and spear thrower appeared. More remarkable still, the Upper Paleolithic had art (carving, etching, painting) throughout its whole duration. The technique was archaic, as one would expect, but the artistic quality of the work was by no means childish. It was excellent art by any standard. To believe that the men of the Ice Age were crude, half-human savages is evidently a grave error.⁴

In the Mesolithic (*mesos*, middle) deer horn supplanted reindeer antler and art followed simple conventional designs. The Neolithic (*neos*, new) was a time of rapid advance. The ice sheet had now definitely retreated. Modern races of man had appeared. In the Early Phase of the Neolithic Age man learned to domesticate the dog, to make pottery, and to use bow and arrow more commonly. In the Full Neolithic ground and polished stone tools are found. What is infinitely more important, however, is that at this time man domesticated cattle, swine, sheep, and goats and learned to grow first barley, wheat, pease, and lentils and then apples and beans. The dugout canoe was invented. Dolmens were erected, large horizontal slabs of stone on upright stone supports, probably for tombs. Menhirs, large vertical, undressed stones, were set up, probably for some

purpose in connection with religious worship. The Eneolithic (Latin *aeneus*, of copper or bronze) saw the introduction of copper and some bronze of low tin content. The Age of Bronze and the Age of Iron need not be considered here since they practically coincide with recorded history, at least in the Old World.

This brief review of prehistoric archeology does not throw much light on the history of social thought. However, one very interesting fact does stand out! If a line is drawn between the Neolithic, Early Phase, and the Full Neolithic, all prehistory falls into two distinct periods. In the earlier of these two periods man was dependent for his food on hunting and fishing and on gathering wild fruits, nuts, roots, aniseeds. He was a food collector. In the latter period he learned to control his own food supply by domesticating animals and by raising farm crops. He became a food producer. The new techniques offered possibilities of much more efficient self-support. Man was no longer forced, as earlier he had more commonly been, to move from place to place as the supply of game and edible plants were exhausted. Moreover, in most environments, he could live in larger groups, because more efficient methods of food production made it possible for a given area to support a larger population.)

Thus archeology at least throws some light on the *background* of social thought.) It reveals a very long prehistoric period in which man led a nomadic life in small groups, followed by a much shorter prehistoric period during which he could live in larger groups. In this latter period social organization tended to become more complex. The raw material of social thought was becoming more complicated.

THE DATA FROM ETHNOLOGY

It must be admitted that the data from archeology are rather meager as far as the history of social thought is concerned. There remains, however, an interesting possibility. In modern times and even today there are to be found tribes of men who do not have those cultural elements which we speak of as constituting civilization. Furthermore among these primitive tribes some are food gatherers in the sense described above and some are food producers. The former, in general, wander around in small bands and live by hunting, fishing, and gathering edible plants. The latter are agriculturalists or herdsmen and have a more complex culture.⁵ Can it be that the food gatherers existing in modern times represent a tarriance, at least in a general way, of the culture of early prehistoric times, while the food producers among these primitive tribes have retained a later form of prehistoric culture? If this should be the case it would provide a key to unlock much of the early history of the race.

It seems highly probable that this procedure is legitimate. In a recent monograph Dr. Cooper has summarized an impressive mass of evidence to this effect.⁶ This evidence is too complicated to be presented here even in summary form, but an example will illustrate the general line of reasoning. When America was discovered by Europeans the various tribes of Indians here showed a very wide variety of cultures, running all the way from rather complex civilization down to very simple and meager cultures. Moreover these did not seem to be distributed at random, but in a rather significant and regular fashion. The highest cultures were found in Central America and the adjacent parts of North and South America. Intermediate cultures occurred,

in general, in the regions nearest these, while the simplest cultures tended to occur in southern South America, in northern North America and in rather inaccessible places in between such as the rain forests of Brazil. Thus, in general, the tribes with the simplest cultures are precisely those farthest removed from the most civilized tribes, either in terms of actual mileage or in terms of inaccessibility.

Furthermore, among the marginal peoples of very simple culture living in widely separated places there are certain striking cultural correspondences. The marginal peoples of northern North America and of southern South America are separated by thousands of miles; yet these people have in common a hundred or more culture traits which were absent, or present only sporadically, among the Indians who inhabited the vast area in between. Examples mentioned by Cooper are: thread-tattooing, **the** ladder-shaped cradle, certain features of girls' puberty rites, a number of specific games, and a number of folklore motifs. A similar state of affairs exists in the Indonesian area among the Eta of the Philippines, the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, and the Andamanese of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. These three groups of Oceanic Negritos are very widely separated from one another and the various tribes of Eta are themselves widely scattered. In between live other peoples of a very different and more complex culture. Yet there is a remarkable correspondence of culture traits among the Eta, the Semang, and the Andamanese.

How can these correspondences be explained? There is only one plausible answer. (The ancestors of these marginal peoples once shared a more or less common culture, **Later** on a more advanced culture was developed in the intermediate areas; **but** the marginal peoples, precisely on account of **their marginal position, were left untouched by**

this cultural progress. They thus remained as relics of an older and simpler culture. Something like this happens in our own civilization. Up-to-date culture elements (good and bad) such as modern slang, modern dance music, modern hygiene, cosmetics, recent fashions, penetrate slowly into remote rural regions, so that these regions have in our eyes a curiously old-fashioned appearance. A visit to such places tells us often how our parents and grandparents lived. Of course the correspondence is far from absolute. Marginal peoples usually adopt at least some elements of a more advanced culture; they change also in response to changing environment or by reason of internal forces; but in a general way a study of marginal peoples can throw some light on the culture of an early prehistoric period, while the study of more advanced precivilized tribes throws a parallel light on a later prehistoric period.

THE MARGINAL PEOPLES

We turn, then, to the marginal peoples to get some idea of the social thought of man in the Paleolithic and earlier Neolithic. Of course we shall not find this thought expressed formally as such. (Yet these peoples do have very definite ideas as to how their society should function and this is genuine social thought.⁷)

The marginal peoples are not farmers nor herders. For their food they depend on hunting, fishing, and gathering edible plants. These activities compel them to move about a great deal. They are nomads and they do not have elaborate dwellings. Since their methods of getting food are relatively inefficient (as compared with the more advanced agricultural and pastoral tribes) they live in rather small groups. There is no complex political organization, no stratification of social classes; but one man is often recog-

nized as leader although he may have little real authority. The tribe has certain territory which it recognizes as its own. Among some of the marginal peoples certain types of kinship organization, namely, sibs and moieties, occur; but since these are more characteristic of more advanced tribes, they will be considered in the next section.

The prevalent form of marriage is monogamy, that is, the stable union of one man and one woman; but in most tribes there is frequent divorce.) Moreover polygamy is common. This usually takes the form of polygyny (one man married to more than one woman), but some of the marginal peoples practise polyandry (one woman married to more than one man). Incest is forbidden. Certain other marriage customs are very common, but perhaps not universal, among these tribes. One is the sororate. This means that a man may have as wives two or more sisters either simultaneously or successively. The former case would of course be a type of polygyny; the latter would mean marrying a deceased wife's sister. The levirate (Latin *levir*, brother-in-law) means that a man marries his deceased brother's wife or wives. Finally, primitive etiquette may impose certain parent-in-law avoidances.

The economic life of the marginals is simple, as one might expect from their simple material culture. Currency is absent, along with interest, rent, markets, and vocational guilds. Plain barter, however, is present and ownership of personal property. Land tenure in severalty is present irregularly.

Many older writers, influenced by the evolutionary hypothesis, imagined that these marginal peoples must be very-immoral and "savage" since they represent an early stage of human development. This view has been definitely discredited and abandoned. Indeed some of the more revolt-

ing customs found among the more advanced agricultural and pastoral peoples are absent among the marginals. In this category belong human sacrifice, cannibalism (except sporadically and then only in case of famine), and group marriage (more than one woman married to more than one man). The marginals do not engage in systematic predatory warfare, most of them are quiet and peaceful, some do not engage in war at all. .

(Marginal peoples have a definite moral code. They universally condemn murder, theft, and the insult and slander of one's own. They demand hospitality and sharing of food within their own circle. Blood revenge is, indeed, pretty general, but this merely represents a crude form of law enforcement. Alcoholic beverages do not occur, so inebriety is not a problem. Various degrees of sex freedom are tolerated outside recognized marriage. Suicide, infanticide, and abortion occur in some tribes and not in others. The moral code is not applied to those outside the tribe with the same rigor that is observed toward one's own fellow tribesmen. This double code is a manifestation of ethnocentrism or the tendency to overestimate the importance, rights, and privileges of one's own group. Among some of the marginals, but not all, religion serves as a sanction for the social code.

Some examples will help to make these generalizations more concrete. The Yaghan are the southernmost inhabitants of the globe. They live at the extreme tip of South America. Here the few dozen tribesmen who still survive earn their precarious livelihood by fishing, harpooning whales and seals, collecting shellfish, and gathering a few berries. To get this food they must be continually on the move, hence the single family is the ordinary social unit. **Even in the past, when the Yaghan were much more nu-**

merous, they seldom came together in large groups and the social solidarity among families in the same locality was only tenuous.

Marriage among the Yaghan is more commonly monogamous. The levirate and sororate exist, along with father-in-law avoidance. A few hours after the birth of a child the mother resumes her normal work, but the father goes to bed for some time on the theory that exertion on the father's part might injure the child. This strange custom; common in South America, is called *couvade* (French *couver*, to hatch). There are puberty initiations for both boys and girls. These include a period of seclusion during which the neophytes are required to prove their ability to suffer various forms of physical discomfort. The position of women is good and they have most of the rights of men, a fact possibly not unconnected with their economic importance; for the wife paddles the family canoe while her husband fishes and she does whatever swimming has to be done. Nevertheless the men have a secret society of their own from whose activities women are, in principle, excluded. Economic life is naturally simple, but the Yaghan barter marine products with the Ona immediately to the north.⁸

The Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert in South Africa will furnish another example. These short, reddish-yellow people are characteristically thin and emaciated, as well they might be, for they inhabit one of the most inhospitable regions of the world. They eat mostly animal food and under this head comes almost anything which could be called edible by any stretch of the imagination, including insects, worms, lizards, and even poisonous snakes. Of course they cut off the heads of the latter before eating them. The Bushman is a very clever hunter. He uses a bow

about five feet long and poisoned arrows two or three feet long. In hunting the ostrich he will disguise himself as one and imitate the movements of the bird so cleverly that he can approach his prey without attracting attention.

The Bushmen live in small groups, generally family groups. This is readily understandable, for it is estimated that in their habitat it takes forty to two hundred square miles to furnish food for each person. There is no definite tribal organization, but sometimes a group of families meet and appoint their most respected member chief. The latter, however, enjoys little real authority. Marriage involves a ceremonial capture of the bride by the groom. Polygamy is allowed but seldom practised, since a man would find it extremely difficult to support more than one wife. The position of woman is low. In spite of his low material culture the Bushman shows considerable ability in music, dancing, art, and story-telling. There is no evidence of initiations, secret societies, or developed religious rites.⁹

Compared to our own, the social thought of the marginal peoples seems very undeveloped. But it is worth noting that their social ideas are simple and uncomplex rather than savage or bestial.) Some of the most degrading features of primitive life are absent in this group. On the other hand the marginal peoples possess the main fundamental ideas which are basic in all society, prevalent monogamy, family responsibility toward children, private property, political sovereignty, and codes of social ethics. This is no small achievement.

AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL PEOPLES

These are peoples who depend for their basic food supply on farming, on raising flocks and herds, or both. They represent the most advanced cultures which preceded civ-

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ilization. Material for studying their social thought is much more abundant than in the case of the marginals. There are more tribes which fall within this classification and they have been, in general, better studied. (The presence of proverbs is a great help. However, it is a mistake to base a study of primitive social thought exclusively, or almost exclusively, on proverbs as some writers have done.¹⁰ First of all, proverbs are lacking among the marginals or, if they are present, there is always suspicion of borrowing. Besides, although proverbs are common in the Old World, they are almost, or quite, lacking in the Americas. To confine the study of social thought to proverbs is to omit an entire hemisphere. Finally, proverbs are not always the best available source material. Men may have very definite social ideas without putting them into proverbs. (It is better to study how primitive society actually functions. For all social phenomena(betray social thought.)

The outstanding feature about the government of these peoples is its great variety. Thus (there are practical democracies in which the chief has little real power. Examples are the Banks Islanders (Melanesia, western Pacific) and many North American Indian tribes. There are communities in which the chief has great prestige or great wealth, but little real authority, for example, the Buin of the Solomon Islands (east of New Guinea) and the Kai and Jabin of New Guinea itself. Oligarchies are also found as among the Yoruba of West Africa where the chief has great prestige while the real power is in the hands of the Ogboni, a society of old men. (There are aristocracies in the Marshall Islands (in Micronesia in the mid-Pacific) and in Hawaii. Here the common people cringe before a select nobility. Limited monarchies occur also. In New Zealand the chief is controlled by a landed aristocracy; in Samoa, by a sort of as-

sembly; among the Thonga, by his courtiers. Absolute monarchies are common in Africa. The Natchez Indians of the Lower Mississippi are another example. There are even temporary large empires of which an outstanding example was the (Zulu empire of Chaka in the early nineteenth century.¹¹

•One type of political organization is missing from the above list. Primitive peoples may have large empires which are not stable and stable empires which are not large; but large, stable empires are characteristic of civilized states alone. Another feature generally missing is the separation of powers. Among the primitives the legislative, judicial, and executive functions are normally merged. Indeed the legislative function is apt to be rudimentary, the government merely enforcing established custom. On the other hand the attitudes of the primitives toward authority, as shown by their proverbs, are curiously like our own. They recognize the necessity of social solidarity. Witness the somewhat homely proverb of the Masai (East Africa), "One finger will not kill a louse."¹² Authority, therefore, is necessary and the holders of authority must receive privileges. The Hawaiians say, "Like the large eyed images, they are recognized."¹³ Rulers are apt to be unscrupulous in dealing with one another; even blood relationship is no bar to violence. In reference to rulers the Ordos Mongols of Mongolia say, "The wolf knows no kin among his equals."¹⁴ But, say the Ashanti (West Africa), "the ears of a chief are as the ears of the elephant," that is, he hears all.¹⁵ So it is well to obey. "To obey is life; to disobey is death," the Hawaiians add.¹⁶

As every student of sociology realizes, social control is not exercised solely by formally chosen officials. Private individuals may enjoy great influence and prestige on ac-

count of their personal qualities, their wisdom, skill, courage, or presence of mind. It is not one's opinion of oneself which counts; for "a man's ways are good in his own eyes" (Jabo proverb, West Africa).¹⁷ Rather a man must first break his bad habits, then he will have friends. "Break the pond gate, so the fish can get in," say the Hawaiians.¹⁸ In judging others we must avoid rash judgments. The Lakhers (Burma) say that to urge impossible accusations or accusations without sufficient grounds is "to make a mole climb trees."¹⁹ Only the judgments of heaven are infallible. "The stars are indeed the spies of heaven."²⁰ Men must be ready to make allowances. The Hawaiians say, "No fishes are found in too clear water; so a too exigent man will have no friends."²¹ After all, even the worst have their good qualities. The Loyalty Islanders (Melanesia, western Pacific) say 'crooked coconut palm,' that is, even if the tree is crooked it can bear good fruit.²²

Sometimes these individual differences are recognized somewhat more formally. For example, bravery is always admired; but among the Crow bravery was measured particularly in terms of four standard exploits. These were, to steal a horse from the enemy's camp, to seize the enemy's weapon in a hand-to-hand fight, to touch an enemy with a weapon or bare hand, and to lead a successful military expedition. Other tribes place particular weight on other types of prestige. Among the northwest Indians and among the Hupa, wealth is the principal gateway to social prestige. Among the Banks Islanders the lavish disposal of wealth, rather than its mere possession, is considered honorable. In Polynesia rank is likely to depend on pedigree; in Africa, on office holding. Among the Maidu (California) "an aptitude for religious experience" was the qualification for prestige.²⁸ Slavery is quite common among primitive peo-

ple and this of course furnishes an extreme example of lack of prestige. As the Ashanti say, "A slave is [as a matter of course] guilty." ²⁴

Along with political power and personal prestige, kinship forms the basis for many intratribal alignments among primitive peoples. These alignments are often more complicated than the corresponding ones in our own society. Often there are different types of etiquette, right, and duty for each of a whole series of different types of relatives. The following kinship behavior patterns are selected from those which occur among the Fox Indians: Brothers are good comrades but they do not discuss sex or joke freely with each other. A younger brother owes a certain obedience to an older. The relation between sisters is somewhat similar. Between brother and sister there is real affection but still more restraint. There is reluctance to discuss either religion or sex. The relation between father and son is much like a brother-brother relation, but the father has real authority. Toward his daughter the father's relationship is somewhat similar. The mother may be more indulgent toward a son than the father may be; she may help him when the father wants to punish him. The duty of educating her daughter is incumbent on the mother; the father normally transmits his wishes through her. Between grandparents and grandchildren there is less restraint. Although obscenity is rigidly barred, it is allowable to talk over a love affair with a grandparent. Between uncle and aunt on the one hand and nephew and niece on the other there exists what is called a *joking relationship*. It is good form to tease one another in public and play innocent practical jokes. Among brothers- and sisters-in-law there is a more marked joking relationship. Here jokes may be very ribald. Rather similar is the relation between mother's brother's wife and

husband's sister's children. On the other hand there is no joking, but real respect, between parents-in-law and children-in-law.²⁵

Some of these standardized patterns recur rather often in widely different tribes. One is the avunculate (Latin *avunculus*, maternal uncle), that is, a special relationship between nephew and maternal uncle. The latter must instruct his nephews in ceremonial and traditional lore among the Hopi (Arizona). Among the Nandi (East Africa) he must consent to his nephew's circumcision. A somewhat parallel relation involving the maternal aunt is the amitate (Latin *amita*, maternal aunt). Another pattern involves parent-in-law taboos. A Yukaghir (Siberia) daughter-in-law must not look her father-in-law in the face. A third pattern is privileged familiarity. An example of this is the joking relationship mentioned in the last paragraph.

A very common kinship institution among primitive tribes is the (sib). This is a unilateral kinship group, in other words membership descends either exclusively through males or exclusively through females. In a tribe with father-sibs, if a man of sib A marries a woman from sib B, all his sons and daughters will be A's. If a son marries a woman from sib C, all his children will still be A's. But if a daughter marries a man from sib C, all her children will be C's, although she herself remains an A. There is nearly always an obligation to marry outside one's own sib. This is called exogamy (Greek *exo*, out of and *gamos*, marriage). Very commonly, but not universally, the newly married couple are expected to live with the man's parents where there are father-sibs and with the woman's parents where there are mother-sibs. Often members of one generation within a sib address one another as *brother* and *sister*. The sib may be important in regard to inheritance. In prim-

itive criminal law the members of a sib may be collectively responsible for the misdeeds of one of their members. Occasionally the sib has religious or magical functions. Often a sib is named after some animal or perhaps a plant or even some natural phenomenon which is called a totem (Algonkin Indian term). This leads to various practices. The eating of the totem animal may be taboo. There may be a belief that the members of the sib descended from their totem animal.

Marriage among agricultural and pastoral tribes takes all the forms previously described among the marginals, monogamy, polygyny, polyandry. In addition there seem to be occasional well authenticated instances of group marriage, as among' the Toda (Nilgiri Hills in southern India).²⁶ Polygyny may be carried further than among the marginals. Rich men endeavor to have several wives. From the husband's standpoint this is desirable because, among other reasons, it brings prestige and gives him several people to work for him. "It is awkward," say the Jabo, "to have only one wife."²⁷ In selecting a mate, love plays its part as in our own culture. The Hawaiians say, "Love excels a calabash of poi and fish."²⁸ But there are restrictions which are unfamiliar to us. Sib exogamy has already been mentioned. Where a tribe has only two sibs (in this case called moieties) this restriction is very serious since about half the otherwise eligible mates are ruled out. Marriage restrictions may exist also in the positive direction. Endogamy (Greek *endon*, within) is the obligation to marry within a certain group. Endogamy and exogamy may even coexist in the same tribe. The Toda are divided into two endogamous groups, the Tartharol and the Teivaliol and each of these is subdivided into exogamous subdivisions. Thus a Tartharol man must marry a Tartharol

woman but a woman of some other subdivision than his own.²⁹ The levirate and sororate further determine choice of mate. Cross-cousin marriage is another form of preferential mating. Cross cousins are the children of a brother and a sister, the children of two brothers or of two sisters being parallel cousins. Where this form of preferential mating occurs a cross cousin is looked upon as the natural or orthodox choice for a "good" marriage.

Financial considerations are apt to loom large in primitive marriage; but outright purchase is rare. It would be a very grave mistake to say that wives are regarded as mere chattels to be bought and sold except in rare instances. The position of women is, as a matter of fact, extremely variable. Within a single tribe her status may be very high in some spheres and low in others. It is hard to generalize where the data show such wide variation, but on the average woman's position is probably somewhat below that of man. She tends to have a somewhat lower status among pastoral peoples than among agricultural peoples. It is very interesting to note that her position is on the average better among the marginal tribes than among the tribes considered in this section. Therefore the degradation of woman is not particularly characteristic of a very rudimentary culture.³⁰

The position of woman is reflected in proverbs. The Nandi (East Africa) say, "A man does not slave for a woman."³¹ The Hawaiians have a proverb for the sensiteness of the gentler sex. "Woman is like a ripe banana leaf, when poked it tears."³² The Moros (Philippines) have a proverb for her elusiveness. "An eel caught by the tail is surer than a woman."³³ The Ordos Mongols remark on her vanity; "A good man always thinks of his friends; a woman thinks only of adorning herself."³⁴ The Fulah (West Africa) sum up what they conceive to be the proper

masculine attitude of prudence. "Woman is fire; if you must take some, take a little"³⁵

Generally speaking, children are well treated. Parents have a real and deep concern for their children. If you do not respect the child, he will not respect you," say the Jabo.³⁶ Maternal nursing is apt to last longer than in our culture, but infant mortality is usually high. Play is varied. The parental obligation of child training is recognized. "As we teach a child, so he learns," is the Jabo proverb.³⁷ But a certain tact is necessary. It is well to overlook some things. The Fulah say, "The head of a family should be blind and deaf; otherwise the family will certainly be destroyed."³⁸ Training may be given informally or systematically. Puberty ceremonies, which are found in many if not most tribes, have important educational value. Education covers vocational skills, tribal lore, and morals. An interesting example of the latter is furnished by the proverbs used by the Wanguru (East Africa) in training their young. Punctuality is inculcated by, "Through delay the snake missed the feet." Patience is taught by quoting, "Because of haste the rat bore young ones without eyes." Prudence is counselled in the proverb, "By making himself small the *ndezi* escaped from the trap."³⁹

Besides the embryonic state and the various kinship groups, there is another type of institution which often plays a large role in primitive society. This is the association, lodge, or club. Membership may be open to men, women, or both sexes, but the men's club is the most common type. Entrance requirements are quite varied. Among the Masai all the boys circumcised in the same four-year period form a unit and these age groups overshadow the Masai sibs in importance. (Wealth admits one to the men's club among the Banks Islanders and the more wealth a man

has, the higher the degree he can attain. Military prowess admitted a man to the Crow men's societies. The Pueblo societies had a religious significance. These various associations have names, often the name of some animal. Nearly always the members bear some distinctive mark, perhaps a scar received at initiation or a special headdress. Some times these societies have a function in law enforcement.

Primitive tribes have definite legal systems, but these often take forms strange to us and thus cause the erroneous impression that tribal life is anarchy. To begin with, the mere force of public opinion is likely to be a more potent influence than among us. In a small tribe where there is little privacy a man's fellows will know almost every detail of his personal history. If, then, he does not conform to tribal standards he will live in an atmosphere of constant disapproval. This can be an enormously powerful sanction. Then there are religious sanctions. A man may feel constrained to avoid antisocial conduct for fear of supernatural retribution.

Among many tribes the offended person, or perhaps a relative, will punish the offender personally. To us this may seem the very reverse of orderly justice; but if this is the recognized procedure and has the full approval of the tribe, it can be an orderly form of law enforcement. Richardson gives the following case: A Kiowa (Oklahoma) was out hunting with his wife. They met a Comanche and the two men started a life-and-death struggle. The Kiowa called to his wife to seize the Comanche's knife and kill him. This she refused to do; for the man was young and attractive. The Kiowa finally killed his enemy (the two tribes were at war) without his wife's help. On returning he told the incident in the smoking tipi. The woman's older brother asked, "Why didn't you kill her then?" The man said he

was afraid his wife's relatives would not believe the story. Thereupon the woman's older brother took his bow, found his sister, and shot her.⁴⁰ Thus a treasonable act which endangered a warrior's life was punished with the death penalty. Of course treason in war is a capital offense among ourselves, but the tribal procedure is apt to strike us as very informal.

Such incidents have led to the unwarranted generalization that among the primitives, offenses are felt as injuries to the individual (torts) rather than as injuries to the community (crimes). It is probably true that the primitives on the average lay more emphasis on torts than do we; but the majority of tribes recognize crimes as well as torts. Among the Plains Indians murder, contrary to our procedure, was a tort to be punished by the victim's relatives; but the tribal police punished as a crime against the tribe the conduct of one who should presume to start the communal buffalo hunt prematurely and thus endanger the success of the whole venture.

Sometimes primitive legal procedure may be quite formal. This is very typical of Africa. Here legal procedure may be curiously parallel to our own. There may be courts of first instance and courts of appeal. The trial may be very formal. Witnesses may be subpoenaed and examined. There may be a rather complicated body of law. The law of the Tswana (Bechuanaland, Africa) has recently been published and it fills a good-sized book.⁴¹

Certain aspects of primitive legal thought are apt to strike us as strange. Often the principle of collective responsibility applies. That is to say, all the members of the offender's group are held jointly responsible with him. Criminal motives may not be carefully examined, so that accidents may be punished like deliberate crimes. This, how-

ever, is not always the case. The Ifugao (Philippines) are known for the care with which they handle the question of criminal intent. Financial compensation is apt to play a large role in primitive law. Sometimes a murderer will be required to make a payment to the deceased's relatives and this is regarded as adequate satisfaction for the crime. Sometimes cases are settled by ordeal. Among the Chukchi (Siberia) this sometimes takes the form of a wrestling match. They believe that the wronged man will always win. Ordeals are characteristic of the Old World.

Like their law, the economics of the primitives may appear deceptively simple. This is far from being the case. After a very careful survey of the evidence, Herskovits recently concluded, "Except for the business cycle itself, practically every economic mechanism and institution known to us is found somewhere in the primitive world." ⁴²

If money be defined as a standard of value and medium of exchange which is not itself a consumption good, then the three principal money areas of the world are West Africa and the Congo, Melanesia and the North American West.⁴³ However, there may obviously be wealth without money. Anything regarded as valuable can constitute wealth. Trade can be carried on by barter. Some consumption good may be accepted in a given region as a standard of value and thus serve some of the functions of money even though it is not money in the technical sense. The use of blocks of salt in certain parts of East Africa will serve as an example. Money plays such an important role in our own economic thinking that we are apt to forget that there can be an economic system without money.

Ownership of some property in common, either by the whole community or by some other group, is frequent; but there is probably no instance of complete communism of

all property. In other words, probably all primitive tribes recognize some form of private property. The rights of the owner, however, are often limited by various social obligations. Thus among the Plains Indians a host is expected to treat a visitor with whatever provisions he has at hand. Hospitality is a primary duty and the man who would refuse to share his food would be despised. A Crow Indian who organized a raid was legal master of all the plunder; but if he refused to share with his followers the booty which was legally his private property, he would lose his standing at once. Thus the ownership of private property is often not an absolute and unlimited right.

Many tribes live at or near the subsistence level. Therefore practically all their production is absorbed in the mere maintenance of life. In technical language, there is no economic surplus. Other tribes are more fortunate. An economic surplus exists and its disposal is an interesting subject of study. Some of it will perhaps be devoted to the costs of government. Taxes will be levied and certain officials will be supported by the community. Some may be devoted to religious purposes, perhaps including the support of priests. Some may be retained in private hands and thus a genuine bourgeois class arises.

The phenomenon of the leisure class is by no means confined to our own civilization. Deacon states that the Malekulan (New Hebrides, western Pacific) "is typically bourgeois and commercially minded. He is preoccupied generally with the making of deals, with bargaining and exercising his sharp wits to getting the better of his economic rivals."⁴⁴ Thus the wealthy may become a class apart with they: own exclusive customs and even their exclusive sports. Thus pigeon-netting in Samoa was a sport

which only the rich could afford, like polo in our own culture.;

Proverbs often express the popular reaction. The Nandi comment on the ethics of business: "Trade has no sisters." ⁴⁵ That is, a man will even cheat his sister to drive a good bargain. But wealth, however acquired, gets results. The Moros say, "If you have wealth, you can even level a mountain; if you haven't, even your floor won't be straight."⁴⁶ Wealth brings friends. The Hawaiians say, "You are known when you have plenty," and "The gum will stick to the kukui tree."⁴⁷ However, with all its advantages, wealth does not make one noble. The Fulah say, "Riches confer no genealogy."⁴⁸

Warfare is rather common among the primitives, but it would be a mistake to conceive their existence as continuous war. War and peace alternate as among ourselves. The relations between neighboring tribes are often peaceful and friendly. The motives which lead primitive tribes to declare war include some rather strange to us. There is an area in southeastern Asia and the adjacent parts of Oceania where head-hunting is a motive. Human heads are required as a prerequisite for marriage or as proof of valor or for ceremonial purposes. The northern Plains Indians waged war for the opportunity of proving their valor by performing certain conventional feats. War was a sort of an exciting game waged according to known rules. Sometimes war is waged to avenge the murder of a tribesman. Economic reasons may be important when territory is needed to assure a food supply. Pastoral tribes in Central Asia fought over pastures. National prestige and the ambitions of a ruler are less common motives for warfare among the primitives than in our civilization because national con-

sciousness of an extreme sort and highly centralized political authority are less common among them.

Organization for fighting is likely to be rather simple, but there are exceptions. The Masai have what is practically a standing army. The Plains Indian societies had other functions but the principal purpose of many of them was to foster a warlike spirit. After a victory at least part of the vanquished are likely to be slain. The enslavement of conquered enemies is also common. The systematic torture of captives occurs in certain areas. It is interesting to compare two contrasting psychologies of war as expressed in two proverbs(The warlike Masai say, "Being defeated and dying are the same."⁴⁰ But the Hawaiians say, "When learning to be a soldier, learn how to orun. There he runs!"⁵⁰

GENERALIZATIONS

If existing primitive tribes be considered representative of precivilized society, then we can hazard certain generalizations about primitive social thought.(One is, that the social thought of precivilized man was extraordinarily rich. He lacked, indeed, certain features which are familiar in our own society. He did not have large, stable empires, written laws, coined money, or a business cycle. But he did have, at least in embryonic forms, the vast majority of social structures and institutions which civilized men have or have had. At least sporadically primitive man had monarchies and democracies, rather complex legal codes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, loans and interest, taxes, standing armies, education, religious sanctions for the moral code, and a hundred other features which are sometimes uncritically accepted as exclusive features of civilized society. His social thought might be less abstract than

ours, but it was extremely rich and varied. Before the dawn of civilization man had already attacked with more or less success most of the really basic questions which sociologists face today.

The externals of primitive society are often very different from our own and these superficial differences helped to throw early travelers off the track and to create the illusion that primitive society was more basically different from our own than it really is. Thus the myth grew up of the savage living happily in a condition of something like anarchy. Closer study has revealed that superficial differences often concealed basic similarities. It is probably true that recent research has tended to show the greater importance of the similarities and the lesser importance of the differences. Books on primitive society written a generation ago have a rather old-fashioned appearance in the light of more recent knowledge.

Another generalization comes to light as we compare the marginal peoples with the more advanced agricultural and pastoral tribes. The advance represented by the transition from the former to the latter is on the whole an advance from the more simple to the more complex and not an advance from a lower to a higher social morality. To say that the earliest human societies were groups of immoral and bestial savages is to make a purely gratuitous assumption, unsupported by anthropological evidence. In fact one might argue from the evidence with some plausibility that man degenerated somewhat in his social morality as he passed to the agricultural and pastoral stage.

(There is a certain epic quality about the prehistoric period. Human society exists today only because primitive man believed in humanity. Through countless thousands of years he kept the faith that it was better to live than to

die.) In the midst of unknown hardships he continued to reproduce the race. He learned the individual self-sacrifice that makes group life possible and taught the social virtues to his children. With painful slowness at first and then with increasing rapidity he mastered the techniques necessary to control his environment and then handed this cultural heritage down through the ages to us. If we strip away what is accidental and ephemeral from a modern textbook of sociology we shall find that a surprisingly large portion of the basic ideas must be credited to primitive man.

CHAPTER 3

THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST

THE DAWN OF CIVILIZATION

From the First Cataract at Aswan the Nile flows, between the Libyan and Arabian Deserts some 605 miles to the apex of the Delta and then another 146 miles through the Delta to the Mediterranean Sea. Along the narrow, but extraordinarily fertile Nile Valley stretched ancient Egypt which played such an important role in the history of the world. To the northeast and roughly speaking a thousand miles away lies the valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates. These two streams now unite and flow to the Persian Gulf in a river called Shatt-al-Arab, but in ancient times they emptied separately. The Tigris-Euphrates valley is called Mesopotamia (Greek *mesos*, middle and *potamos*, river, that is, *between the rivers*). It lies in modern Iraq.

In spite of their distance apart, Egypt and Mesopotamia should not be thought of as two completely separated regions; for they are connected by a narrow strip of fertile land which skirts the desert wastes of Arabia and runs in a giant semicircle from Mesopotamia round to Palestine. For this strip Breasted has coined the term, *Fertile Crescent*. The Fertile Crescent, in turn, is separated from the Nile Delta only by the comparatively short stretch of infertile land which lies between the Peninsula of Sinai and the Mediterranean. Through the Fertile Crescent cultural and commercial relations were established between Egypt and

Mesopotamia at a very early date. Thus the whole region forms a cultural unit.

Throughout the Neolithic and the Eneolithic this region was pulsating with a very active cultural life. By 3000 B. C. Egypt and Mesopotamia had developed a remarkable civilization. The term *civilization* is hard to define. Perhaps it is best to conceive it, not in abstract terms, but in terms of certain concrete achievements, such as writing, bronze, sculpture in the round, architecture in stone and brick, the arch, wheeled vehicles, astronomical records, accurate calendars, and the plow. By 3000 B. C. or shortly thereafter all these had appeared in Egypt and Mesopotamia.

It is easy to understand that these developments were epoch-making for social thought in a very literal sense. Writing made possible the compilation of written law codes, commercial documents, and recorded history. Bronze brought more efficient weapons and tools. The plow was a great aid to agriculture. Stone masonry and the arch were employed in impressive public buildings as cities took the place of villages. A distinctly urban culture developed. Gradually city-states grew into large, stable empires. It was the beginning of a new era in the history of social thought.

EGYPT

Various distinct cultural elements fused to form Egyptian civilization. During the Eneolithic two diverse cultures can be traced. The first flourished in Southern or Upper Egypt and has been unearthed at Ballas, el Amrah, and Negade. This was an indigenous, North African culture and may be dated—to hazard a very rough guess—about 7500-5000 B. c. Later a second Eneolithic culture appeared

in the north near the Fayum and has been found at Abusir el Meleq, Harageh, and Gerzeh. This was distinctly an invading foreign culture from the Fertile Crescent. Its date may be roughly estimated at 5000-3500 B. C. Later literary traditions and scattered archeological finds help to complete the story. In Upper Egypt a united kingdom was formed whose patron deity was Setekh (Seth). In the meantime two kingdoms had appeared in the Delta, one in the west worshipping the god Horus and one in the east whose patron god was Anzti (Anehti, Anedjti), later identified with Osiris. The worshippers of Horus gradually brought all Egypt under their sway and moved their capital to Heliopolis, near Cairo. The people living here worshiped the sun-god, Re, who was destined to play an extremely important role in Egyptian history. Finally the united kingdom fell apart into a northern and a southern kingdom and was only reunited about 3000 B. C. or a couple of centuries earlier, by a ruler whose name has been preserved in the Greek form Menes. (These rather tentative statements about the prehistory of Egyptian religion are very important because the social thought of Egypt was always very closely bound up with religious ideas.¹

From the unification of Egypt under Menes to the conquest of Alexander the Great it is customary to divide the country's rulers into thirty-one dynasties.² This is very convenient because dates are usually very uncertain, especially in the early period of Egyptian history, and it is often safer to locate an event by mentioning the dynasty instead of the year. Not much is known about the first two dynasties, but a brilliant period called the Old Kingdom began with the IIIrd Dynasty. The capital was now at Memphis near the apex of the Delta. Power was very highly central-

ized in the hands of the king or Pharaoh. In theory all land belonged to him. There were no written laws; for the law was simply the king's word.)

Under the IIIrd Dynasty pyramids appear, but the great pyramids date from the IVth Dynasty. These bear no inscriptions but the underlying thought can be inferred from later texts and it is very important from the standpoint of social thought. Various elements had now been fused into a state religion. The king was identified with Osiris who was himself both king and god. The wife of Osiris was Isis and Horus was his son. Seth, god of the South, revolted and killed and dismembered Osiris. But Isis and Horus collected the scattered members of Osiris and restored him to life. Now the king is assured of immortality through his identification with Osiris and in this the pyramid plays its role. His carefully mummified body is preserved therein while in the nearby tomb-chapel certain rites are carried out. The pyramids are enormous structures. The great pyramid of King Khufu (Cheops) at Gizeh was 481 feet high and the base was 756 feet square. To transport and put in place its 2,300,000 great blocks of limestone must have taxed the resources of the kingdom. Only a few relatives of the king and a few nobles shared the king's prerogative of immortality; but the common people were induced to cooperate in the task, not so much out of a love of the monarch as an individual as because the country's prosperity was associated with him. An immortal king would guard the welfare of the land in the next world. Thus there was a theological reason for the very central part which the king played in early Egyptian social thought.

The Vth and VIth Dynasties witnessed a decline in the royal prestige. In the meantime the priests of Re at Heliopolis had been developing an important social doctrine.

Osiris rose from the dead by the aid of Re, the sun god. The king must follow his divine model; but before he can be immortalized by Re he must be judged by a tribunal of the gods. If he has ruled justly he has nothing to fear. Justice is no longer identified with the king's whim. He must submit to an objective standard; he must have regard for social justice during life if he hopes for a happy immortality.³

With the decline in royal power came the advance in prestige of the nomarchs, that is, the rulers of the provinces (nomes) into which the country was divided for administrative purposes. A brilliant life developed at the nomarchs' courts. (They too began to look forward to immortality and to feel a sense of social responsibility. The nomarch Henku of the Cerastes-Mountain nome boasts in his tomb inscription: "I gave bread to all the hungry of the Cerastes-Mountain; I clothed him who was naked therein I never oppressed one in possession of his property, so that he complained of me because of it to the god of my city." ⁴

After the VIth Dynasty history becomes obscure; but it seems probable that the VIIth Dynasty is fictitious and that in the VIHth Dynasty a social revolution occurred. Certain obscure texts which seem to refer to this period speak of violence, lack of discipline, attacks on the king, the pillage of the royal tombs. Nobles are forced to work as servants or storekeepers. The newly rich are insolent. The state archives are seized, the king's secrets are divulged. It is a period of social leveling. With the decline of the monarchy, first the priests of Re and then the nomarchs had come into their own. Now the process is completed by the rise of the common people.⁵

The Xth and XIth Dynasties were a transition period.

It seems that the first king, Kheti, ruled over all Egypt but that under his son, Merikara, the kingdom began to disintegrate and that the remaining kings' power did not extend far from their capital at Herakleopolis. Hence this era is often called the Feudal Period. The common people had demonstrated their power and the king had learned his lesson. This is brought out by a curious document which purports to be the instruction of King Kheti for his son, Merikara. The latter is exhorted to be just. "Do justice, that thou mayst endure upon the earth. Calm the weeper. Oppress not the widow. Expel no man from the possessions of his father." Merit, not noble birth, is to be the qualification for office. "Distinguish not between the son of a noble and him of lowly birth. Take to thyself a man because of his capacity." ⁶

The XIth to XIIIth Dynasties form a brilliant period in Egyptian history, the Middle Kingdom, to be dated about 2160-1660 B. c. The capital was at Thebes in Upper Egypt and the local god of that place, Amon, became identified with Re as Amon-Re. The king was once more supreme but his supremacy no longer implied a sort of divinely sanctioned egotism as it had done under the Old Kingdom. Rather a system of state socialism developed. The common people were admitted to the civil service. Royal agents distributed to each family a piece of land to till or a trade to exercise according to the needs and capacities of the members. In return they paid the state a high tax which, however, was not devoted merely to the expenses of the court. Goods of all kinds were kept in royal storehouses and distributed to the needy in time of famine. The Bible describes the career of the patriarch Joseph as an Egyptian official under this system.

The XIIIth Dynasty marks the decline of the Middle

Kingdom. It was a period of foreign invasions! Under the XIVth to XVIIth Dynasties, say about 1660-1580 B. C., conditions seem to have been chaotic and the records are very confused. The invaders were the Hyksos. Recent discoveries in Palestine and Syria suggest that they may have had a sort of feudal empire there.⁷

In the meantime a discovery had been made which has a very important bearing on the history of social thought, namely, alphabetic writing. In the earliest systems of writing, Sumerian cuneiform and Egyptian hieroglyphic, each sign stood for a syllable or a word. In addition the Egyptians had signs for the various letters of their alphabet but, strangely enough, they did not use them alphabetically, but only as auxiliary signs. Recently inscriptions from the Sinai Peninsula have been identified as alphabetic writing. These probably go back to the nineteenth or eighteenth century B. C. After further development the alphabet passed through the Phoenicians to the Greeks and thus ultimately to modern Europe. Only one who has racked his brain over a cuneiform or other non-alphabetic text can properly appreciate the blessed simplicity of the alphabet. In the history of social thought it was an invention comparable in importance to the invention of printing.⁸

The XVIIIth to XXth Dynasties form the New Empire, about 1580-1085 B. C. During this period Egypt reached the apex of its power. It was a period of extraordinary brilliance but this brilliance has a certain soullessness. The very lifelike naturalistic art of the period should probably be judged inferior to the simpler art of the Old Kingdom. The famous campaigns of Thutmes III of the XVIIIth Dynasty extended Egyptian power through Palestine and Syria to the northern Euphrates. This empire remained secure **for** a long time, **but** early in the XXth Dynasty Palestine had

to be abandoned and Egypt was reduced to its former limits.

Perhaps the Empire's greatest contribution to social thought is in the field of international relations. In 1887 at Tell el-Amarna a collection of documents came to light. In all 366 were preserved. They proved to be the archives of the Egyptian State Department of the period. They show Egypt in active diplomatic relations with the other powerful states of the Near East, the Hittite, Assyrian, Mitannian, and Babylonian governments. We are introduced to a complicated international situation with embassies, alliances, treaties and indeed the whole complicated machinery of diplomacy much as we know it today.

After the Empire period had closed with the XXth Dynasty Egypt never regained its former importance. During two of the remaining dynasties (the XXVIIth and XXXIst) the Persians ruled Egypt. Twice it was briefly conquered by the Assyrians. During much of the balance of the period the country was divided under rival kings. Only in the XXVIth (Saite) Dynasty did Egypt regain something of its old glory. It never again ranked as a great power. But nothing can deprive Egypt of her honor as one of the great contributors to civilization in general and to social thought in particular.

THE SUMERIANS

Many a well educated man has never even heard of the Sumerians. Yet this folk played an enormously important part in the development of human civilization, a part equaled perhaps by the Egyptians and the Greeks, but certainly by very few other people. We find them established in Mesopotamia at a very early period.⁹ Here they developed a civilization while the Egyptians were develop-

ing theirs. In the exchange of culture elements it is quite probable that the Sumerians gave more than they received. For example, before the Egyptians worked out their hieroglyphics, the Sumerians had probably invented cuneiform writing, so called from the Latin *cuneus*, wedge, the characters being made up of little wedges. It was an incredibly awkward system compared to alphabetic writing, but it was a great achievement.

At the beginning of the historical period we find the Sumerians dwelling along the lower Tigris and Euphrates near the Persian Gulf. The process of centralization was much less rapid than in Egypt. The characteristic form of political organization remained for a long time, not the empire, but the small city-state. The ruler of a city-state took the title *patesi*; if he had united several city-states under his sway he became a *lugal*. The Sumerian civilization was characteristically commercial. A vast number of commercial documents (in the form of clay tablets) have been preserved.

Excavations have yielded a fairly full history of one of these early city-states named Lagash. Here, perhaps about 2600 B. c, ruled a man named Urukagina, first as *patesi* and then as *lugal*. He is interesting to us as perhaps the first individual social reformer known to history. On his accession abuses were rampant as he tells in his inscriptions. The priests of the local god, Ningirsu, had usurped power; apparently they had gained control of the office of *patesi*. They had appropriated for their own selfish purposes the property of the god. They charged excessive fees for their services and various functionaries demanded their share of the spoils. One example will illustrate this. A form of divination was practised by which the future was read by the shape which a few drops of oil took when poured out on

water. "When the chief diviner poured out oil, he brought five shekels of silver to the patesi, the prime minister took one shekel of silver, the chief soothsayer took one shekel of silver." Free men were made to do forced labor and were deprived of drinking water. "The freemen, the people who dwelt there, all of them worked in the estate of the lugal. He did not give them drinking water." There was injustice in law enforcement. "The sons of the poor made a fish pond. A man stole their fish. That man escaped." Urukagina set out boldly to reform these abuses. "The naked and the widow," he said, "the mighty man shall not oppress." The priests were put in their place. The excessive expenses of funerals were reduced. There is even some evidence that Urukagina freed the serfs. In any case he was a great social reformer.¹⁰

Possibly Urukagina made powerful enemies and weakened the city. In any case Lugalzaggisi of Umma conquered it and brought Urukagina's reign to a close. But soon he was himself conquered by Sargon, the first great leader of the Semites, a people whom we shall meet again presently. The Sumerians, however, were not yet destined to disappear from the stage of history. Some centuries later, about 2140-2030 B.C., they enjoyed a glorious revival under the Illrd Dynasty of Ur, the last great Sumerian dynasty. From the standpoint of social thought this brilliant period is chiefly memorable for the Sumerian law code which has been preserved, unfortunately in a very fragmentary state. There also exist a number of legal decisions from the same epoch. The significant thing for our purposes is that the Sumerians had a written code and a regular court procedure at this early date, many centuries earlier than the earliest Egyptian laws of which we have any trace. A comparison with

the later Code of Hammurabi (to be mentioned presently) shows that the Sumerians had a great influence on the latter. The Sumerian code is less thoroughly worked out than Hammurabi's, but it is also more humane. All in all the Sumerians impress us as a moderate, sane, and systematic people. Although they disappeared relatively early in history they set the tone for all subsequent social thought in Mesopotamia.

THE SEMITES

The term *Semites* is properly applied to those peoples who speak any of a closely interrelated group of languages called the Semitic languages. These include Akkadian (spoken by the Assyrians and Babylonians), Hebrew, Phoenician, the Canaanite dialects, Aramaic (Our Lord's native language), Syriac, Arabic, and various languages of Ethiopia. It used to be believed that all these peoples had a common racial origin, but this is extremely doubtful. The essential thing for our present purposes is that, besides sharing a common group of languages, they shared a common culture. Since many Semitic peoples played an important part in the world's history this common background is extremely important.)

In Mesopotamia Semitic culture was overlaid with Sumerian elements at a very early date, but from the Hebrews of the Old Testament and from the historical Arabs we can get some idea of primitive Semitic culture. The early Semites, then, appear to have been nomads. They moved about with their flocks and herds as grazing conditions dictated. Their tribal government was patriarchal. They were very conscious of blood relationship and showed intense social solidarity. The Semites loved freedom passionately. Within the tribe there reigned a sort of

social equality; but of course this was not shared by their slaves.

We have already seen that Sargon, a Semitic conqueror, overthrew Lugalzaggisi and established a powerful state in the lower Tigris-Euphrates valley. This Semitic domination was not destined to be permanent; but after the Sumerian IIIrd Dynasty of Ur and after the minor Semitic dynasties of Isin and Larsa, a new Semitic state was established which surpassed in magnificence everything that had gone before. This was the empire of the Ist Dynasty of Babylon. The most brilliant ruler of this brilliant dynasty was Hammurabi, who reigned about 1800-1760 B. C.¹¹ He is remembered for his famous law code.

The Code of Hammurabi was one of the great archeological finds of all time. It was discovered in 1901 by de Morgan at Susa whither it had been carried as booty by Elamite raiders. The Code was carved on a column of black diorite about six feet tall. About nine-tenths of the original inscription was intact. (The Code reveals a highly complex and centralized state. The Babylonian Semites had completely abandoned their old patriarchal, tribal government. But one can perhaps trace the influence of the characteristic Semitic love of freedom. At any rate it is a government of law and not of personal caprice. It is relatively democratic as compared with the contemporary Middle Kingdom in Egypt^t -

Three distinct social classes are distinguished in the Code. The *amelu* is the member of the highest class. The term might be translated *gentleman*. His characteristic privilege seems to be the right to hold real estate. If he was poor he might work in the fields himself. If rich, he might be a landed proprietor or engage in trade or commerce. The commoner was the *mushkinu*. Curiously enough, this

ancient term has passed through Arabic into modern French, where *mesquin* means *paltry* or *?nean*. Finally there was the slave, *wardu*, who could be bought and sold. A slave could buy his freedom and it is interesting to note that the temple had funds which could be loaned to slaves for this purpose. The clergy and the personnel of the king's palace stood outside these three classes and had privileges of their own.

There was a regular and somewhat complicated court systems The testimony of witnesses was used in trials but the more primitive procedure of oaths and ordeals still existed. Many of the punishments seem very harsh by our standards. A temple votary who even enters a beer-shop is to be burnt. A glaringly uneconomical or careless wife is to be drowned. Certain distinctions appear in the application of the laws to the various social classes. Offenses *against* members of the upper classes were punished with special severity, but so also were offenses committed by members of these classes, on the theory apparently that *noblesse oblige*.

Babylonia was on a money economy. Silver was the ordinary medium of exchange, but grain was used in certain cases. The economic system was elaborate and (economic legislation) was extensive. Capitalism, banking, written contracts, were well developed. Poor relief was very practical. Loans without interest were granted to the poor and the sick.

Marriage required a written contract. The wife could hold property in her own name, but she and the children could be sold into temporary slavery by a husband in order to pay his debtstDivorce was frequent and could be granted in favor of the wife as well as of the husband. Concubinage **was allowed under certain restrictions**. Property **could not**

be disposed of by wills but parents could dispose of their property during their lifetime and then had the right of being supported. If they died without doing so, the children could agree on a division of the property or else the court would take the responsibility of making the division.

After the time of Hammurabi the power of Babylon declined. The Ist Dynasty was succeeded by a long series of obscure dynasties. Only a great deal later, about 625-538 B. a, did Babylon have another brilliant period under the Chaldean or Neo-Babylonian Dynasty. This dynasty is familiar to readers of the Bible as the one which captured Jerusalem and took the Jews into their Babylonian Captivity.

One reason for the long eclipse of Babylonia was the rise of a rival Semitic power in the north. This was Assyria on the northern Tigris. The Assyrians strike us as a peculiarly ferocious people. Perhaps geography is partly responsible for this. Lacking natural boundaries and constantly threatened by turbulent nomads, the Assyrians felt they had to conquer or perish.

The first documents significant for our purpose come, not from Assyria itself, but from Cappadocia in Asia Minor where the Assyrians had a trading colony. The "Cappadocian tablets," as the documents are called, show that the Assyrians had an active and complex commercial economy which had extended to this distant outpost of empire by about 1920-1870 B.C.¹² From approximately the same place and date come three fragmentary tablets containing parts of a code referred to as the Old Assyrian Laws. They appear to deal with the local commercial court and its procedure.¹³

The Assyrian state went through several periods of prosperity and decadence. The Middle Assyrian Laws date

from a period of prosperity and must be placed somewhere from the fifteenth to the thirteenth century. They are preserved on three fairly good-sized tablets and a number of fragments. They do not seem to be parts of a unified code like the Code of Hammurabi. For example, the largest tablet is a collection of laws relating largely to women. It has been suggested that it is a sort of lawyers' handbook or, according to another view, perhaps a series of amendments to some existing code.

The laws which have been preserved deal with crimes, especially those involving women, with the duties and rights of women, with pledge for debt, with real estate, and some minor topics. Generally speaking, the laws impress one as harsh as compared with the other codes which have been mentioned. Besides the death penalty, there are a number of instances of mutilation as a punishment. Thus one alternative punishment for an adulterous man is that "the whole of his face shall be mutilated." For certain other offenses against a married woman,¹⁴ a man's finger might be cut off or "the edge of the blade of an axe shall be drawn along his lower lip and it shall be cut off." On the other hand (if the passages in question are not later interpolations) the code often takes ignorance or the absence of criminal intent into consideration and excuses certain offenders on these grounds.

Assyria reached the apex of its power during the last century of its existence, say, from 745 to 625 B. C. During this period the Assyrians were the dominant power in the Near East. Samaria, the capital of Israel, fell in 722. Sennacherib devastated Judaea, but could not take Jerusalem. Assurhaddon and Ashurbanipal invaded Egypt. With the death of the latter king, however, a dramatic decline set in and in 612 the capital, Nineveh, "city of blood, all full of

lies and violence,"fell before a coalition of Babylonians, Medes, and Scyths. The destruction of Assyria removed a great menace to the general peace and security. The prophet Nahum was able to taunt her, "Ninive is laid waste. Who shall bemoan thee? Whence shall I seek a comforter for thee? . . . Thy destruction is not hidden. Thy wound is grievous. All that have heard the fame of thee have clapped their hands over thee.'" ¹⁵

THE HITTITES

The Bible makes a number of references to the "children of Heth," but only during the last generation have archeological remains of this people been discovered and their writings deciphered. The Hittites as they are generally called, were a rather mixed group. Invading Indo-Europeans found a native people living in the interior of Asia Minor (the Proto-Hittites). The state which developed from these fused elements underwent Semitic influences. We have already spoken about Assyrian colonies in Cappadocia.' From the Semites the Hittites adopted cuneiform writing and other cultural elements.¹⁶

The Hittite Empire reached the apex of its power during the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries, contemporary with the Empire in Egypt and the Assyrians of the Middle Assyrian Laws. it is from this epoch also that a collection of Hittite laws has come down to us. (To be more accurate, it seems that the laws represent two redactions, one before, and one after, the great Hittite king who bore the extraordinary name, Shubbiluliuma, and who reigned early in the fourteenth century.¹⁷ from these laws and from various historical data we can form an idea of Hittite social thought as it was when the Hittites were at the height of their power.

Power was centralized in the king who was divine in origin and authority and who went to heaven as a god upon his death. But however powerful the king was, his authority was not arbitrary. He ruled through written laws. To understand the spirit of the Hittite code we must remember that the king had various peoples of diverse background under his sway. The object of the laws is to preserve public order in this very mixed empire. There is no intention of regulating minor customs in detail. As in most ancient codes the emphasis is on penal law, but the punishments tend to be surprisingly mild compared to those of the Semitic codes. The death penalty is restricted to a few major offenses and mutilation is not used as a punishment at all. One receives the impression that the Hittites were less highly sophisticated than some of their contemporaries, but they had an active agriculture, commerce, and industry, they were religious, and they had a deep respect for justice. All in all they impress us favorably.

THE PERSIANS

The Medes and Persians were (Indo-European peoples. That is to say, their language belonged to the same great family as Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, and nearly all the modern languages of Europe. According to Herodotus there were six independent tribes of Medes, and ten of Persians in their earliest period. These sixteen tribes lived in a sort of feudal regime under a warlike and turbulent aristocracy. They were conscious of themselves as forming a single nation, but this was a mere sentiment since they lacked political unity. This condition being unsatisfactory, the Medes and Persians were finally united under a single ruler. According to a later tradition this man's name was Deioces, a Mede, and the dates of his rule, 708-655 B. C. His second

successor was Cyaxares who is certainly a real historical person. He took part in the overthrow of Nineveh. His successor, Astyages, was deposed by a Persian, Cyrus the Great in 550. Thus a Median dynasty was replaced by a Persian dynasty as rulers of the united people. The latter, called the Achaemenid dynasty, was destined for a brilliant future.

To discuss the social thought of the Medes and Persians it is necessary to know something about their religion. In early times they practised a nature religion, worshipping the sun, moon, stars, and other aspects of nature. Opposed to these were certain malevolent forces, the *daevas*. By the eighth century one of the gods, Ahura-Mazda, was adored in preference to the others. In this religious atmosphere the great reformer Zoroaster (Zarathustra) made his appearance. Born about 660 B. C. in Media, he lived at the court of a certain Vishtaspa, king of Bactria. At the age of thirty he had a great religious experience. He believed that there had been revealed to him a higher form of religion which he must teach his fellows. He succeeded in converting King Vishtaspa but even after the prophet's death, about 585, Zoroastrianism remained a persecuted sect. The sacred book of Zoroaster's religion is the *Avesta* and the oldest hymns it contains are the *Gathas*.

Zoroaster was not only a religious teacher but a social reformer, which is the reason for mentioning him here. At the time of Dejoces the common people were being oppressed by the strong. A phrase occurs in the *Gathas* which is reproduced by Herodotus, "Injustice wars against justice." By creating a central political power, Dejoces tried to remedy the situation, but Zoroaster developed a religious basis for the reform and preached the importance

of divine justice. He spoke of the oppression of the laborer, and the ill-treatment of the priests. Curiously enough, he added cruelty to animals to his list of social evils. He prayed to Ahura-Mazda for just and powerful leaders, who would make the violence of the wicked return upon their own heads. As a sanction for his reforms, Zoroaster preached retribution in the future life. There is a particular judgment for each individual at his death and a general judgment at the end of the world. Thus Ahura-Mazda will finally restore the perfect justice which has been violated by wicked men in this world.¹⁸

From the time of Cyrus the Great the progress of the Achaemenids was brilliant in the extreme. They founded a Persian empire which was larger and more powerful than any of its predecessors. It extended from the frontiers of India to the Mediterranean and from the Caucasus to the Indian Ocean. Even Egypt was twice incorporated into the vast empire. Only the Greeks were able to resist successfully the expansion of Persian power.

It required considerable administrative genius to rule such a vast dominion, made up of so many subject peoples with different languages, customs, and racial backgrounds. The Achaemenids did this successfully because they were moderate and tolerant and willing to let subject peoples continue their own customs in so far as these did not interfere with the supremacy of the empire. The great king was an absolute monarch and his word was law. From the time of Darius the empire was divided into some twenty provinces, each under an official called a *satrap*. The satraps had wide freedom of action within their own provinces, subject of course to the higher authority of the king. A remarkable system of roads with inns and posting stations at

regular intervals made it possible for the king to keep in constant touch with distant provinces. A system of education which the later Greeks admired very much helped to preserve morale. The emphasis was placed on the old virtuous customs which had helped the Persians conquer their empire, plain food, riding, shooting with bow and arrow, the chase. Noble boys were given an opportunity to observe the government in action and thus learn political science by observation.¹⁹ It is significant that the Achaemenids were rather cold to the religion of Zoroaster. His vindication of the rights of the poor and the oppressed did not fit well with the theory of a despotic monarchy. The old nature religion of pre-Zoroastrian times enjoyed a revival and various religious elements were taken over by the court from conquered people. A broad tolerance replaced the religious enthusiasm of Zoroastrianism.

The power of the Achaemenid Persians eventually began to decline. Xenophon in his *Anabasis* tells how this decline was demonstrated dramatically by the retreat of the ten thousand Greek mercenaries who fought their way to safety from the heart of the Persian Empire and reached the Black Sea in 400. It remained for Alexander the Great to put an end to the Empire by defeating Darius III Codomannus, the final great victory being the Battle of Gaugamela near Arbela in 331. But although the Achaemenids thus disappeared ingloriously from history, their contribution to man's fund of social ideas had been great. (They first solved the problem of holding together under one rule an enormous empire of very diverse nations.) Learning from their predecessors, they developed a philosophy of divine-right monarchy which greatly impressed Alexander himself. The empires of the *Diadochi* or successors of Alexander learnt still more from this philosophy. Through them

it passed to Rome and so into **the** common heritage of European social thought.

THREE THOUSAND YEARS OF PROGRESS

The three thousand years from the predynastic Sumerians and Egyptians to Alexander the Great take in well over half of all the period for which contemporary historical records exist. During this period the great monarchies of the Near East made great contributions to social thought. The greatest contribution of all was civilization itself. Along with civilization came a number of separate inventions of which the greatest was undoubtedly the invention of writing. Writing binds men together both in time and in space. Historical records give a more vivid consciousness of the nation's past and preserve the experience of bygone ages for future generations. Written law codes may be looked upon as the crystallized social experience of the past. Again, writing overcomes difficulties of space. Written reports flow from distant provinces to the capital and written orders flow from the capital to the provinces. Thus civilization made large stable empires possible. A more orderly and systematic type of government developed.

Large stable empires created new problems. What sociologists call *social distance* increased. Various social classes tended to be more psychologically separated. A distant king tended to **be** more remote from his subjects in feeling as well as in space. Men began to think more and more seriously about **the** new problems which this situation created. **The concept of social justice began to be more fully developed. Sometimes this was thought out in religious terms as among the Egyptians and early Persians. Sometimes the emphasis was more on concrete, individual problems and**

from a long series of particular decisions, formal legal codes arose, as among the Sumerians and their successors in the Fertile Crescent.

Before the period covered in this chapter closed, two new approaches to the problems of social justice were being developed and these will be considered in later chapters. The Hebrews were viewing these problems in the light of their revealed knowledge of the one true God. Even considered from a purely naturalistic standpoint, the Hebrew Prophets surpassed all who had lived before them in their fierce love of social justice. Somewhat later the Greek philosophers applied human reason to social problems and argued more keenly and systematically than any of their predecessors. Thus the new reaches of social thought which had been opened up by the peoples considered in this chapter were developed and brought to greater perfection. But though their thought was improved and perfected by those who came later, the honor of accomplishing pioneer work belongs to the Egyptians, the Sumerians, the Babylonians, and the Persians. They will always retain an honorable place in the history of social thought.

CHAPTER 4

THE OLD TESTAMENT

FROM ABRAHAM TO MOSES

The Hebrews were Semites. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in the days of the patriarchs they led the same nomadic, pastoral life as "many other Semitic tribes. Only occasionally did they remain long enough in one place to raise crops or build houses.¹ For the most part they lived in tents and found their livelihood in their flocks and herds. It is important to remember that this free, independent life under patriarchal government represented a social ideal which the Hebrews never forgot.;

Abraham was born in "Ur of the Chaldees,"² the same Ur which has already been mentioned as the seat of a brilliant Sumerian dynasty. Since Abraham was quite probably a contemporary of Hammurabi, it is not surprising to find that such questions as the nature of a wife's dowry, the status of slaves and concubines, and the extent of paternal authority, were settled by principles very similar to those of Hammurabi's code.³ Here again the Hebrews reflect the common Semitic background. It was from this background that Hebrew social thought developed under divine guidance.

The social evolution of the Hebrews began a new phase when Jacob and his family entered Egypt at Joseph's invitation and established a community "in the land of Gessen,"⁴ somewhere in the East Delta. This migration is hard

6Q A HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT

to date, but it was probably during the time of the Hyksos domination and the Pharaoh who was so kind to Joseph probably belonged to one of the Hyksos (XVth to XVIIth) dynasties.⁵ Here "the children of Israel increased and sprung up into multitudes."⁶ They learned to adapt themselves to a sedentary life. Some of them must have become skilled artisans; for after the Exodus, Moses found no difficulty in obtaining the highly specialized workmanship necessary for the construction of the tabernacle. By living in close contact with the advanced urban civilization of the Egyptians the Hebrews profited from the culture of Egypt as they had already profited from the culture of Mesopotamia. Thus their national education progressed and the prophecy which was spoken to Jacob was fulfilled, "Go down into Egypt, for I will make a great nation of thee there."⁷

There was a danger that the Hebrews might have found life in Egypt so satisfying that they would allow themselves to be absorbed by the Egyptians and lose their national identity. The persecution which they suffered under the later Pharaohs was therefore a blessing in disguise; it forced them to consent to the Exodus. The identity of the persecuting Pharaohs is hard to establish. It seems certain that they belonged either to the XVIIIth or XIXth Dynasty, that is, to the prosperous period of the Empire.⁸ The persecution endured some time and gradually increased in intensity. The Egyptians forced the Hebrews to build the cities of Pit horn and Ramesses and ("they made their life bitter with hard works in clay and brick and with all manner of service."⁹ Hebrew midwives were commanded to put male infants to death. When the midwives disobeyed, male children were commanded to be drowned.¹⁰

At this point a great social leader appeared. Since the

problems of the Hebrews centered so largely around conditions of work, it is scarcely an exaggeration to call Moses "the first labor leader in history." Nourished in the royal court, his national consciousness was aroused by a concrete act of oppression. He slew an Egyptian whom he saw striking one of his fellow Hebrews. Forced to flee in consequence of this act he sojourned in the "land of Madian," in the Peninsula of Sinai. Here he had a chance to observe at first hand the ideals of freedom which characterized the desert. These were the traditional ideals of his own people. He had a chance to reflect also that social reform is not brought about by isolated rash deeds of violence, such as his killing of the Egyptian, but by systematic effort. He was ready for the divine vocation which was revealed to him on (Mount Horeb.¹¹)

The effect of Moses first interview with Pharaoh was merely to increase the persecution. The Hebrews were no longer to be furnished with the straw which was mixed with clay in the manufacture of bricks, but they were forced to seek it themselves. From the royal palace the order went forth, "Let them be oppressed with works and let them fulfil them that they may not regard lying words."¹² But the power of the Lord was not to be denied. Pharaoh was constrained by the plagues of Egypt to allow the Hebrews to depart under the leadership of Moses. Thus another phase of national development began)

It was necessary that the newly independent nation should have its own law, and Moses was God's agent in giving this law to the people.) It occupies most of the Pentateuch.¹³ Rationalistic critics see in the Pentateuch a combination of documents written at various times and all much later than Moses. Catholic scholars deny this and they have defended their position successfully.¹⁴ The Church admits,

however, that certain additions, modifications, and adaptations may have been made after the death of Moses by competent authority and recorded by inspired writers, so long as these were not serious enough to destroy the essentially Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch as a whole.¹⁵ In any case it is not surprising that "the civil provisions of the Law of Moses bear a considerable resemblance to the Code of Hammurabi and other Near Eastern codes. Moses, under God's guidance, could keep the customs of his people which were not incompatible with the revelation he was bringing to them. Besides, it would have been most confusing and demoralizing to the Hebrews if the Law had represented a complete break with the customs and regulations to which they had become accustomed over a period of many generations.

The state established by the Mosaic Law was theocratic (Greek *theos*, God and *kratein*, to rule). Whoever held the secular power was to remain quite conscious that he acted only as an agent of the Almighty. The citizens of this state were exclusively the Jews, the descendants of Jacob or circumcised foreigners. The members of certain nations, along with eunuchs and the illegitimate were permanently excluded and specified classes of offenders were excluded temporarily.¹⁶ There were certain inferior classes. First of all, there were slaves. An Israelite might be sold into slavery for debt or because he was unable to make a required restitution. This service, however, was only temporary and was subject to redemption. If a foreigner had become a Hebrew by circumcision and was reduced to slavery, he recovered his freedom after six years. There was no provision, however, for the eventual liberation of foreign slaves. All slaves had to be treated humanely. The alien who lived among the Hebrews was to be well treated, but the merely

temporary visitor had an inferior status. In particular loans at interest to the latter were allowed.¹⁷

Intermarriage with certain foreign nations was specifically prohibited as well as marriage with close relatives. The levirate was an important exception to the latter provision. Polygyny was tolerated and, under certain conditions divorce as well. Divorce was easier for the husband but there were circumstances which entitled the wife also to the privilege. The power of the father was considerable. He could sell his child into slavery, although he could not put his child to death on his own authority. The wife owed complete submission to her husband. The obedience of children to their father could be enforced by law under the severest sanctions. Parents owed their children a good religious education.¹⁸

Justice was ordinarily administered by secular courts, but more important cases were referred to ecclesiastical courts. (More than one witness was necessary in capital cases and false testimony was severely punished. The crude principle of collective responsibility had been abandoned. There was a fairly long list of capital offenses. In case of murder a kinsman of the deceased was to take the law into his own hands and avenge the crime (A general legal principle was the principle of talion, "eye for eye, tooth for tooth." ¹⁹

The salary of the laborer was to be paid before sundown. Loans with interest were forbidden with the exception, already mentioned, that such loans to strangers were allowed. There were definite restrictions on taking pledges for debt. A millstone could not be taken in pledge. A garment so taken had to be restored by sundown. A creditor could not enter a man's house to seize a pledge. In harvesting grain or gathering grapes, something must be left "to

the poor and the strangers to take." On passing through a grain field one might pluck some ears and eat them, as Our Lord and His disciples once did. It is very important to notice that such provisions imply that the right of private property is not absolute, but is limited by certain obligations toward one's neighbor. Indeed the whole Mosaic Law, even in its purely secular provisions, showed a great advance over existing codes. The social education of the Chosen People was progressing.²⁰

FROM JOSUE TO JEROBOAM

The chief development during this period was the evolution of the Hebrew monarchy/One factor in this evolution was undoubtedly contact with the Canaanites. Under the leadership of Josue the Hebrews had conquered Palestine, but the conquest was incomplete. As a result they lived side by side with the Canaanites for many generations. The relations between the two peoples were sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, but in the long run the Hebrews were much influenced by their neighbors. From them they doubtless learned a great deal about commerce, the military arts, and town life. It was difficult to maintain the purity of the Hebrew religion in the face of these foreign influences and no doubt their social ideals were also affected. The traditional organization of the Hebrews was by tribes and families, but it proved difficult to maintain this when the members of these tribes and families were scattered in different towns/A sort of "municipal oligarchy" developed in the towns and the traditional authority was weakened.

The needs of national defense in times of crisis made some sort of central authority necessary. Therefore temporary national leaders were appointed called *judges*, a

term which might perhaps be better translated *dictators* in the old Roman sense. When one of these "judges," Gedeon, overcame the Madianites he became a national hero and was offered an hereditary kingship. This he refused, but he continued during his lifetime to be a king in fact if not in name. Gedeon's ambitious son, Abimelech, was less scrupulous. He slew all his brothers except Joatham, who managed to escape, and set himself up as king. Joatham's protest on this occasion has been preserved. In a picturesque parable he criticized, not the idea of kingship in general, but the choice of a violent and unworthy man for the post.²¹

The people had to wait a long time before the kingship was finally established. Samuel, the last judge, was growing old. The unworthiness of his sons and heirs apparent was only too evident. Moreover, powerful enemies, Ammonites and Philistines, were threatening the very existence of the Hebrew state. In this critical juncture the people laid their formal request before Samuel, "Make us a king to judge us, as all nations have." Viewed in itself the request seemed reasonable enough, yet it represented an abandonment of the old Hebrew ideal of patriarchal simplicity in government. It was a request made under alien influences, a request for a king "as all nations have." Therefore the divine decision communicated to Samuel is understandable, "Hearken to the voice of the people in all that they say to thee. For they have not rejected thee, but me, that I should not reign over them."²²

Samuel accordingly anointed Saul as the first Hebrew king, but before he did so he gave the people fair warning of what they might expect. He drew a vivid picture of a typical oriental despot, his selfish rule and his arbitrary exactions, and concluded, "You shall cry out in that day

from the face of the king, whom you have chosen to your selves, and the Lord will not hear you in that day, because you desired unto yourselves a king." ²³

Samuel's dire prophecy was not immediately fulfilled. Saul, for all his faults, was no oriental despot. To the end he "preserved the democratic simplicity of a tribal sheik." ²⁴ David introduced more formality and more organization, but he was a popular and efficient king and gave the people little reason for complaint. His son, Solomon, on the other hand, was precisely the sort of a despot whom Samuel had predicted. Under him the last vestiges of the old patriarchal regime disappeared to be supplanted by a swarm of soldiers, business men, and bureaucrats. His ambitious building program called for a vast amount of forced labor, he demanded enormous sums for the upkeep of his luxurious palace, and he monopolized foreign trade for his own purposes. Aside from the scandals of his personal life, these things were enough to turn the people against him. ²⁵

Jeroboam, led a revolt against these conditions, but it proved abortive and he was forced to flee to Egypt. The death of Solomon, however, furnished the opportunity for which Jeroboam had been waiting. He returned from his exile and went to Sichem where Roboam, the son of Solomon, was waiting to be crowned his father's successor. Then a dramatic scene took place. Jeroboam seized this psychological moment to press the people's demands. "Thy father laid a grievous yoke upon us: now therefore do thou take off a little of the grievous service of thy father and of his most heavy yoke, which he put upon us, and we will serve thee." Roboam asked for time to consider these proposals. His elder counsellors advised moderation, but his younger friends told him not to compromise. He followed the latter and announced his decision. "My father beat you with

whips, but I will beat you with scorpions." It was a foolish course of action. The northern tribes renounced their allegiance and established a separate kingdom, the Kingdom of Israel, under Jeroboam himself as king. Roboam had to be content with the truncated kingdom of Juda in the south. Thus, about 931 B. C, the two separate kingdoms of Israel and Juda began their independent existence.²⁶

THE KINGDOM OF ISRAEL

Israel was founded in protest against arbitrary rule, but it was not long before her own kings began to adopt the same tactics. A classical instance occurred in the reign of Achab (874-853). The king wanted to make a garden out of a vineyard adjoining his palace and offered to buy it from the owner, Naboth. The latter, however, refused to sell, being attached to the place for sentimental reasons. This was a great disappointment to the king and he became much depressed. At this point Queen Jezabel entered the scene. She was the daughter of the pagan king of Tyre and a thoroughly bad influence on Achab. At her suggestion the judicial murder of Naboth was arranged and Achab took the vineyard. It was, of course, a shocking abuse of royal power and it did not remain long unrebuked. The prophet Elias bore to the king a terrible message of vengeance from the Lord "Thou hast slain, moreover thou hast taken possession. . . . In this place wherein the dogs have licked the blood of Naboth, they shall lick thy blood also. . . . The dogs shall eat Jezabel in the field of Jezrahel." It is pleasant to record that Achab repented and his punishment was somewhat mitigated. However, an important principle had been emphasized once more. Royal authority is to be exercised for the good of the subjects and not for the selfish purposes of the ruler.²⁷

A century later Israel entered upon a particularly brilliant period in the reign of Jeroboam II (789-749). Under his immediate predecessors Israel had suffered much from the depredations of the King of Damascus. But now Assyria was attacking Damascus and Jeroboam recouped his country's losses. Material prosperity followed military success and Israel prospered exceedingly.

Under these circumstances a strange figure appeared on the streets of Samaria, the capital of Israel. It was Amos of Thecua, a village of Juda some six or seven miles south of Bethlehem. He was no professional prophet, nor the son of a prophet but "a herdsman and a gatherer of sycamore figs."²⁸ As a herdsman he had had plenty of time for quiet reflection. From his occasional contacts with the world of affairs he had learned to form a shrewd estimate of the Assyrian danger. The assault of Assyria on Damascus was giving Israel a respite from the attacks of her traditional foe, but surely it would soon be Israel's turn. How selfish and shortsighted were the leaders in Samaria to mistake this temporary relief for real security and to yield themselves up to carefree luxury! Instead of consolidating their country's strength they were living selfishly and oppressing the poor. Amos' blood boiled. He left his herds and went to Samaria to denounce the injustice in plain and extraordinarily vigorous language.

In fiery words he addressed the negligent leaders, "Woe to you . . . that have confidence in the mountain of Samaria . . . you that sleep upon beds of ivory and are wonton on your couches, that eat lambs out of the flock and calves out of the midst of the herd . . . that drink wine in bowls and annoint yourselves with the best ointment and are not concerned for the affliction of Joseph!" Ironic contrast between their concern for the arts of luxury and

their unconcern for the welfare of the people! But the sin of the leaders was worse than indifference. They were actively oppressing the poor. Amos addresses them indignantly, "You that crush the poor and make the needy of the land to fail." Their wives are like fat cows in the rich pastures of Basan and they join in the work of oppression. "Ye kine of Basan that oppress the needy and crush the poor." This oppression shows itself in the law courts where the judge will condemn a poor man for a small bribe. "He hath sold the just man for silver and the poor man for a pair of shoes." Thus they "turn judgment into wormwood and forsake justice in the land." Underlying this injustice is a disgusting spirit of avarice. The shrewd business men of Samaria were impatient at the religious holidays which kept them from their unscrupulous trading, "saying: When will the new moon be over and we shall sell our wares, and the sabbath and we shall open the corn, that we may lessen the measure and increase the side and may convey in deceitful balances, that we may possess the needy for money and the poor for a pair of shoes, and may sell the refuse of the corn?"²⁹

A terrible punishment was in store for those who were guilty of these sins. The Assyrians would bring the punishment of the Lord. "Behold, I will raise up a nation against you, O house of Israel, saith the Lord the God of hosts, and they shall destroy you from the entrance of Emath even to the torrent of the desert." To the fine ladies of Samaria, Amos predicts a horrible retribution. "The Lord God hath sworn by his holiness, that lo, the days shall come upon you, when they shall lift you up on pikes and the last of you with fishhooks and you shall go out at the breaches one after the other." And again, "I will turn your feasts into mourning, and all your songs into lamentations: and

I will bring up sackcloth upon every back of yours, and baldness upon every head: and I will make it as the mourning of an only son, and the latter end thereof as a bitter day." After this destruction the few survivors will have the sad task of disposing of the dead. In that day the very name of the Lord will be a bitter memory which they will try to forget. "If there remain ten men in one house they also shall die, and a man's kinsman shall take him up and shall burn him, that he may carry his bones out of the house, and he shall say to him that is in the inner rooms of the house: Is there any yet with thee? And he shall answer: There is an end. And he shall say to him: Hold thy peace and mention not the name of the Lord." Thus Amos expressed the divine judgment on the seriousness of social evil. The Lord does not regard the oppression of the poor as a slight thing. It cries for vengeance in His sight.³⁰

Osee was a contemporary of Amos. He preached under Jeroboam II and also under his immediate successors. His message was the same as that of Amos, but very differently expressed. Unlike the latter, Osee spoke more in sorrow than in anger. In the opening chapters of his prophecy he tells of his experiences with an unfaithful wife.³¹ This unfaithfulness is an image of the unfaithfulness of Israel to her Divine Spouse. For her sins she shall be punished. "The Lord shall enter into judgment with the inhabitants of the land; for there is no truth and there is no mercy and there is no knowledge of God in the land. Cursing and lying and killing and theft and adultery hath overflowed and blood hath touched blood. Therefore shall the land mourn and every one that dwelleth in it shall languish." They are exhorted to repent. "Return, O Israel, to the Lord thy God; for thou hast fallen down by thy iniquity."³²

The leaders of Israel refused to profit by these warnings.

They went their mad way and the evil which Amos had predicted came upon them. In 722 Samaria fell before the assaults of the Assyrians. Thus Israel passed ingloriously out of history, a terrible object lesson about the effects of social injustice.

THE KINGDOM OF JUDA

The social history of Juda shows a certain parallelism with the history of Israel. In Juda as in the northern kingdom the middle eighth century was a period of material prosperity and the accompanying vices. Like Israel also, the Kingdom of Juda was terrified by the Assyrian menace. Indeed the fear of Assyria hung like a cloud over the whole Near East. There seemed to be no way of halting these terribly cruel and efficient warriors.

It was under these circumstances that the prophet Isaias appeared on the scene. His activity extended from the death of Ozias to the reign of Manasses. In other words he preached in Juda during the period immediately before and immediately after the destruction of Israel. There is some reason to believe that he was a nephew of King Amasias. In any case he was a man of culture and influence. An ancient tradition has it that he was martyred by being sawed in two by the order of Manasses. Whether this is true or not, he was certainly very courageous and outspoken.

In meeting the threatening international situation, Isaias advocated a prudent diplomacy. When Israel, in a last desperate effort to stave off the Assyrian menace, made an alliance with Damascus and attempted to force Juda to join them (Syro-Ephraimite War), Isaias advised King Achaz (735-728) to take a firm stand and refuse to join. The alliance was too artificial to endure. But Achaz lost his head

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and called on the redoubtable Tiglath-pileser HI of Assyria for aid. The latter proceeded to take Damascus (732). This was the situation when Achaz died and was succeeded by Ezechias (727-699). Since Juda was already committed to the Assyrian alliance, Isaias advised the new king to abide by it, but the latter became terrified when Samaria fell (722) and imprudently sought alliances with Babylon and Egypt. Under Sennacherib the Assyrians ravaged Juda to avenge this disloyalty. Jerusalem was besieged, but Isaias counseled confidence in God and the city was delivered by a miracle.

There was something fundamentally inconsistent about the attitude of the leaders of Juda. They were very indignant at the injustices of a foreign foe, yet they themselves were guilty of injustice in oppressing the underprivileged classes. Isaias was not slow to point this out. Justice at home was the first condition for a sound national defense. Without such justice the enemy's depredations would be merely a just chastisement for Juda's sins. With indignation the prophet addressed the privileged classes. "The spoil of the poor is in your house. Why do you crush my people and grind the faces of the poor? saith the Lord the God of hosts." This oppression took the form of judicial injustice; the judges would "justify the wicked for gifts." Land monopoly was another abuse. "Woe to you that join house to house and lay field to field until there is no more place. **Shall** you alone dwell in the midst of the earth?" In the meantime the affluent were enjoying a life of easy luxury, but their punishment would be therefore all the more **terrible**. "**The** harp and the lyre and the timbrel and the pipe **and** wine are in your feasts, and the work of **the Lord** you regard not, nor do you consider the works of his hands. . . . Therefore hath hell enlarged herself and opened her

mouth without any bounds." With bitter thoroughness the prophet enumerates the petty feminine vanities which have distracted the daughters of Juda from their duties, the "earrings and bracelets and veils, turbans, and step-chains, and sashes." The punishment for this was to be appropriate. "Instead of a sweet smell there shall be a stench, and instead of a girdle, a cord, and instead of curled hair, baldness, and instead of a rich robe, a girding with sackcloth." Isaias' denunciation of the oppressors was vigorously seconded by his contemporary, Micheas. Unlike Isaias the latter seems to have been a man of humble origin and probably spoke from bitter experience. The rulers, by violently oppressing the poor were practising a sort of horrible cannibalism. They "have eaten the flesh of my people and have flayed their skin from off them, and have broken and chopped their bones as for the kettle and as flesh in the midst of the pot." ⁸³

Isaias advocated prudent diplomacy and social justice, but his social thought went far deeper than this. As an inspired prophet he saw that the problems of society could not be cured by purely human means. There was need of a Messias to heal the ills of society. He would be a king, "the Prince of Peace." His empire would be universal and eternal. When He comes, "there shall be no end of peace." The social importance of the Kingdom of God is better understood when its fulfillment under Christ the King is considered in connection with the New Testament. At present, however, it is important to note how clearly Isaias saw that the coming Messianic kingdom was the only answer to social problems. There are many other Messianic prophecies scattered here and there throughout the Old Testament; but Isaias, by the clarity and depth of his message, deserves to be considered the Messianic prophet par excellence.⁸⁴

As the seventh century wore on the power of Assyria reached its apex and then began to decline. Some time before the fall of Nineveh in 612, the prophet Nahum sang the doom of the wicked city. In imagination he could already hear "the noise of the whip and the noise of the creaking of the wheel and of the galloping horse and of the bounding chariot" as the enemies of Assyria hastened to destroy her. He could see the "shining swords and glittering lances, a multitude injured, heaps of bodies, and corpses without end. They stumble on their corpses!" This just retribution was to come upon Nineveh for her avarice ("Thou hast multiplied thy merchants like the stars of heaven") which had led to a policy of rapacious conquest. In condemning Nineveh Nahum was of course condemning greedy commercial imperialism in all ages and places. It is a perfectly general principle.³⁵

The late seventh century saw the same social injustice which Isaiah and Micah had condemned at the end of the eighth. An important witness to this is the prophet Sophonias, apparently a nobleman who wrote, it seems, between 641 and 622.³⁶ The rulers and judges of Judah were rapacious. "Her princes are in the midst of her as roaring lions. Her judges are evening wolves; they left nothing for morning." Either a few years before or a few years after Sophonias, the prophet Habacuc meditated on the same social ills and asked himself how the Lord could permit them. He received the divine answer; the oppressors would receive a just retribution. "Woe to him that gathereth together an evil covetousness to his house, that his nest may be on high to escape the reach of misfortune. . . . Woe to him that buildeth a town with blood and prepareth a city by iniquity." Social injustice might bring a superficial prosperity, but ultimate punishment was inescapable.³⁷

After the fall of Assyria the chief menace to Juda was Babylon which was ruled by the aggressive Neo Babylonian or Chaldean dynasty. During this period Jeremias of Anathoth, whose ministry had begun about 627, rose into prominence. His was a peculiarly difficult brand of patriotism. For his conscience forced him to oppose the policy of the national leaders, although he was branded disloyal as a result. Juda was at this time pursuing a pro Egyptian policy in the hope that Egypt would counter balance the rising power of Babylon. But Jeremias, on the other hand, counseled appeasement toward Babylon, never a very popular policy with the nationalists, however necessary it may be.

Like Isaias, Jeremias taught the necessity of remedying internal abuses as an element in national defense. The prophet sought in vain among the common people for "a man that executeth judgment." He turned to the "great men" and found them still worse. "Among my people are found wicked men, that lie in wait as fowlers, setting snares and traps to catch men. . . . They judge not the cause of the orphan . . . they defend not the right of the poor." Like Isaias also, Jeremias looked forward to the Messianic kingdom as the only final answer to social problems. "Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord, and I will raise up to David a just branch; and a king shall reign with wisdom who shall execute judgment and justice on the earth."³⁸

The wise advice of Jeremias was disregarded. The Babylonians took Jerusalem in 587. Thus the Kingdom of Juda was destroyed. But the activity of the prophets makes its history glorious. In vigorous and unmistakable language they had pronounced the divine judgment against the injustice of selfish rulers, against the oppression of the poor by the luxurious rich, against war motivated by greed.

They had established the doctrine that the only solution for the ills of society is the reign of the supernatural Kingdom of God. Theirs was a glorious period in the history of social thought.

THE BABYLONIAN CAPTIVITY AND AFTER

Even before the fall of Jerusalem the deportation of the Jews to Babylonia had begun. One of the earlier exiles was the prophet Ezechiel. About half of his ministry of twenty two years antedated the fall of the Jewish capital. During this period he had a good deal to say about the social sins which were bringing punishment on his fellow citizens. In a vision he saw "five and twenty men," leaders in Jerusalem, and he accused them, "You have killed a great many in this city and you have filled the streets thereof with the slain." In punishment these men of blood would perish by the sword. The princes of the Jews had oppressed the stranger, saddened the orphan and the widow, committed unspeakable sexual offenses, taken bribes, practised usury, and shown themselves extremely covetous. No wonder the guilty city was suffering so horribly! After the fall of Jerusalem Ezechiel changed his tone. Chastened by adversity the Chosen People could now look forward to restoration and the consolations of the Messianic kingdom.³⁹

The exile involved much suffering at first, but gradually the Jews adapted themselves to their new environment, and some of them even rose to positions of influence. Among the latter was the prophet Daniel. Deported at the age of fourteen, he spent the balance of his long life in exile, entrusted with great dignities not only by the Babylonians but also by the Persians who succeeded them. (Daniel was an important Messianic prophet. Almighty Goa would en

dow the Messias with "power and glory and a kingdom and all peoples, tribes, and tongues shall serve him. His power is an everlasting power that shall not be taken away and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed."⁴⁰

When the Persians under Cyrus took Babylon, the Jews were at once allowed to return to their homeland. A great many took advantage of this permission and went back under the leadership of Zorobabel. The period which follows is one of the more obscure periods in Jewish history; but we do have some interesting details from the time of Nehemias who was sent to Jerusalem by the Persian king in 444 as governor. Nehemias found a grave economic problem. The poor were forced to borrow money from the rich and to pledge their fields, their vineyards, and even their children as security. When their mortgages were foreclosed they found themselves deprived of the means of subsistence and their lot was miserable in the extreme. Nehemias proposed a heroic remedy for this situation. He called a meeting of the prominent citizens and suggested that all debts be wiped out and all pledges restored. This proposal was accepted and the situation was thus remedied.⁴¹

The conquests of Alexander the Great brought Palestine under his sway. After his death the country passed into the hands of his successors, first the Ptolemies of Egypt and then (in 198 B. C.) the Seleucids of Syria. This brought the Jews into contact with the Greek culture of the Hellenistic age. They learned Greek and some of the last books of the Old Testament were written in that language. The revolt of Judas Maccabeus gave the Jews a last period of independence under the Asmonean Dynasty (168-63) which ended at the conquest of Pompey and the subjection of Palestine to Roman rule. This was the political situation of the Jews in New Testament times.

THE WISDOM LITERATURE

The **Old** Testament contains a number of books dealing reflectively with general religious and social principles, often in the form of proverbs. These are known collectively as the Wisdom Literature. Since these have much in common and since they do not belong to any one period of Jewish history, they are appropriately handled apart. Four books are important for our purposes, Proverbs, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and Ecclesiastes. Proverbs is a compilation of the fifth or fourth century before Christ containing a number of sayings by Solomon and by other sages after his time. Wisdom was written by an Alexandrine Jew in the second century before Christ. Ecclesiasticus was written by a certain Jesus ben-Sirach in Hebrew about 180 and translated into Greek about 130 B.C. Ecclesiastes belongs perhaps to the third century before our era.

The Wisdom Literature emphasizes the responsibilities of kings. A good king who turns a deaf ear to flattery and judges the poor in truth is a great blessing, while a bad king will be held responsible by God for his abuse of power. Family life is very important. A shrewish wife can make a man's life very miserable, but on the contrary a good wife is a great treasure. The detailed picture of the "valiant woman" which closes the Book of Proverbs is unforgettable. Child training is a responsibility which parents should gladly assume, because a good son is a glory to his parents. To bring about this happy result one must be firm with children and not hesitate to punish them when punishment is called for. Slaves also need to be treated with a firm hand, but a faithful servant should be treated "as a brother."⁴²

The Wise taught that money is not necessarily an evil. It may be a reward of virtue. It is a comfort and may be

legitimately striven for by thrift and hard work. Yet wealth has its dangers. "Gold and silver hath destroyed many" and has even perverted the heart of kings. The life of the business man has many temptations and "in the midst of selling and buying sin shall stick fast." So it is better to be poor and simple than "a rich man that is perverse in his lips and unwise." Therefore in the long run it is well to "labor not to be rich" and to set bounds on one's financial prudence. Indeed it is better to "have no fellowship with one richer than thyself." Since the Lord Himself is the advocate of the poor we must scrupulously refrain from oppressing them. On the contrary we must "reject not the petition of the afflicted," but be ready to help them with alms.⁴³

There is a great deal in the Wisdom Literature about the social virtues and vices. Friendship is praised when it is founded on supernatural motives. "He that feareth God shall likewise have good friendship." But false friends are to be shunned. Ambition is to be avoided. There is much advice about sins of the flesh. Not only impurity, but inebriety and gluttony are condemned. Laziness brings its own punishment. The book of Proverbs preserves the comment of an anonymous sage who passed by the ill-kept field of the slothful man. "Thou wilt sleep a little, said I, thou wilt slumber a little, thou wilt fold thy hands a little to rest, and poverty shall come to thee as a runner and beggary as an armed man."⁴⁴

The book of Ecclesiastes deserves treatment apart. It is the work of a disillusioned man who has tasted the pleasures of the world and found them bitter. "Vanity of vanities, said Ecclesiastes, vanity of vanities, and all is vanity." Sensual pleasure is vain, for "the eye is not filled with seeing, neither is the ear filled with hearing." Wealth fails to bring any fundamental joy. "A covetous man shall not be

satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall reap no fruit from them. So this also is vanity." Since the pleasures of this world are so vain, one might expect Ecclesiastes to conclude that he ought to throw himself with passionate enthusiasm into the pursuit of virtue. But this disillusioned sage was no enthusiast. His ethical goal, while of course theologically correct, was not very high. "Be not over just and be not more wise than is necessary." How badly the Jews of the third century before Christ needed the promised Redeemer, to perfect the Old Law and set before their eyes the Christian ideal of unbounded perfection! ⁴⁵

LATER JEWISH SOCIAL THOUGHT

It may be appropriate to add here a few words about the later social thought of the Jews; for this thought is closely bound up with the Old Testament. Under this category comes first of all the apocalyptic literature. An apocalypse (Greek *apokalyptein*, to reveal, disclose) is a book which contains or professes to contain a revelation of future events, particularly those concerned with the Messianic kingdom and the end of the world. The last book of the New Testament is a divinely inspired apocalypse, but there were also a good many non-inspired apocalypses current among the Jews in the century before and the century after Christ particularly. These constitute the apocalyptic literature. From them we learn that the Jews were confidently expecting a Messiah, but they had strayed considerably from the doctrine of the Prophets. They had forgotten what Isaiah said about the humble and suffering Messiah and they were looking forward to one who should solve their social problems by overcoming the pagans with military force and setting up a kingdom of great material prosperity. **Reading these apocalypses helps us to under**

stand why the Jews did not recognize the Christ when He came.⁴⁶

The rabbinical writings constitute another important category of Jewish literature. These were composed in Palestine and Babylonia at various times between the time of Christ and about the middle of the sixth century.⁴⁷ They take the form either of casuistical interpretations of (or supplements to) the Law of Moses (Halakah) or of speculative and imaginative lore of a non-legal character (Hag gadah). As might be expected, this literature follows the Mosaic Law rather closely, but certain modifications had been introduced. There was now a sharp social cleavage, not so much between the rich and poor, as between those learned in the Law and careful in observing it on the one hand and the common people on the other. The latter were contemptuously called the *people of the earth* ('amme ba-ares, a ba-ares, a phrase common in the books of Esdras for the heathen about Palestine). The learned were very sure of themselves and manifested a certain disdain for others, even (at least sometimes) for women of their own class. "Let the words of the Torah burn up but let them not be transmitted to women." There was a tendency to insist on minute points of the Law and to lose sight of more fundamental issues. Since the Scribes and Pharisees of the New Testament were part of this tradition, we are apt to look on Jewish social thought of this period as very degraded. It is only fair to note, however, that Our Lord's criticism was directed more against the actions of the Pharisees than against their teachings. "All things, therefore, that they command you, observe and do. But do not act according to their works; for they talk but do nothing." ⁴⁸

The Middle Ages found the Jews dispersed in Christian

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and Muhammadan lands. Generally speaking they found conditions more congenial in the latter. A brilliant group of scholars flourished in Muhammadan Spain from the tenth to the twelfth centuries including such names as Solomon ibn Gabirol (Avicebrol), Judah b. Samuel Halevi, and Maimonides. Joseph Qaro, born in Spain in a later period, was expelled from that country at an early age and died in Palestine. Confined to their ghettos the medieval Jews developed a close social solidarity. Almsgiving was encouraged, especially if it was of a constructive sort. Excluded from military service and from public administrative posts, they tended toward pacifism and a spirit of detachment from the public affairs of the country in which they happened to be living. Polygamy was abandoned but divorce was frequent. The position of the father in the family was supreme. Torture of witnesses was not practiced in Jewish courts and capital punishment fell into desuetude. Jewish life was an urban life and commerce and finance loomed large. Moralists frowned upon avarice, but the ideal of voluntary poverty was rare. The Jews accepted a considerable amount of economic regulation from their own community. The ideal of the just price was discussed. In economics there was a difference of opinion between the Spaniards such as Halevi and Qaro who favored the buyer and the French and German Jews who favored producers and distributors. With the dawn of modern times the Jews left their ghettos and their social thinking merged largely with the main currents of general European thought. However, even in modern times, the ideals of the Mosaic Law and the prophets still have their influence on the Jewish people.⁴⁹

CHAPTER 5

THE FAR EAST

EARLY CHINA

Occidental scholars no longer contend, as many once did, that early Chinese civilization represented a wholesale importation from the West. (The discovery of Peking Man, already mentioned in the second chapter, shows that men were living in China at a very early date. Recent Paleolithic and Neolithic finds prove that culture developed gradually in China over a long period of time, just as it did in Europe. It remains true, however, that the Chinese like other peoples learned from their neighbors. The remarkable early Chinese painted pottery shows suggestive resemblances to that of southern Russia. Later such items as bronze, wheat, the chariot, writing, and certain architectural elements appear in a relatively developed form and there is nothing to suggest that they were invented in China. But the Chinese were no mere passive borrowers. They stamped all these things with their own peculiar genius. For example, Chinese writing is wholly different from Mesopotamian cuneiform or Egyptian hieroglyphic. We conclude that the Chinese built their own civilization but that they were helped a great deal in the process by the example of their western neighbors.¹)

(The earliest dynasty for which we have unequivocal historical evidence is the Shang or Yin Dynasty which reigned in northern China, perhaps about 1500-1100 B.C.² Long

considered merely legendary, the Shang rulers emerged into the light of history with the discovery of the late Shang capital at Anyang in northern Honan Province. Sporadic finds were made at this site for a long time, but systematic excavation began in 1928. The Chinese at this early date had a system of writing, a highly sophisticated art and probably—one regrets to add—human sacrifice. The state was well organized, family solidarity was strong, and slavery existed.

About 1100 B. c. an invading people from the West overthrew the Shangs and established the Chou³ Dynasty. The invaders seem to have been racially and culturally somewhat different from the Shang people so that the new order marked a definite cultural change. At the head of the state was the *wang* or king. In theory all fensd belonged to him. In practice he distributed it to great nobles to hold and to govern and these fiefs tended to become hereditary. The great nobles parceled out their own territories on the same principle to lesser vassals who might continue the process still further. Below this land-holding aristocracy were the peasants who had little real freedom. At the bottom of the social scale were the slaves. In order to hold one's land it was often necessary to rely on force and holders of land found it necessary to have their private armies. It was much like the feudal system of medieval Europe.

We can trace back to the early Chou Dynasty a class which was destined to control the social thought of China throughout its history. This was the class of government officials. They were cultured men, trained in the liberal arts as well as in the duties of their positions. They did their work well and the ruling military class entrusted them with power and listened to their theories of government. One very important **theory held that the *wang* ruled by**

"the decree of Heaven." Heaven gave the king power that he might rule for the benefit of his subjects. If he failed to rule rightly he forfeited the decree of Heaven and another might legitimately displace him. Essentially, then, the *wang* was only a public servant. This important doctrine had a great influence throughout the whole subsequent history of Chinese social thought.⁴

As time went on the authority of the Chou kings gradually weakened. At the same time external enemies were threatening. In 770 B. C. a people called the Ch'uan Jung captured and sacked the royal capital and the kings were forced to set up a new capital in safer territory to the east. From this time on the real power was in the hands of the rulers of the great feudal states. These began to contend among themselves. Significantly enough, the last period of the Chou Dynasty is known to Chinese historians as *Chan Kuo*, the Warring States (403-221 B. C.).⁵ This intolerable confusion proved, however, a great stimulus to social thought. Chinese philosophy, always deeply concerned with social questions, entered its golden period.

THE HUNDRED SCHOOLS

Of course, there were not literally a hundred schools of thought, but the traditional term well expresses the richness and variety of the intellectual life of the period. As a matter of fact there are four schools important for our present purpose, all flourishing between the fifth and the third centuries before Christ and all very important for their influence on subsequent social thought. They are, the Confucian school, the Taoist school, the school of Mo Tzu, and the Legalist school.⁶

Confucius (K'ung Fu Tzu) is undoubtedly the Chinese social philosopher best known to the West. He has also

been the most influential of all thinkers in his native land. According to the traditional account he lived from 551 to 479 B. c. It is said that he entered the civil service and rose to a position of great prominence in his native state of Lu in the modern province of Shantung. The unworthy conduct of the ruler of Lu, Duke Ting, alienated Confucius and the sage fled from Lu and spent the rest of his life as a teacher, returning to his native state five years before his death. Mencius, a later follower, tells that Confucius was shocked at the disorder of his time. His paramount desire was to reestablish the order and good government of former days.

Confucius developed a psychological basis for his proposed reform. Let each citizen practise the virtue of *jen*, fellow-feeling, implying an attitude of benevolence toward other men founded on the consciousness of kind. From *jen* follows the *principle of reciprocal action*, a sort of negative golden rule. What we dislike in one man we should not display toward another. *Jen* expresses itself also in *li*, ceremonial or good taste. To a superficial reader this insistence on ceremony may appear a love of empty formalism and it cannot be denied that some members of the Confucian school have pushed the principle very far; but Confucius saw in *li* an important means of social control which was especially necessary in the unruly age in which he lived. Another reform which the sage advocated was the rectification of names. "If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success." ⁷ In other words the king should be a real king, so that the title *king* becomes really appropriate for him. The minister should be a real minister in the proper sense of the word. The father should be a real

father, and so on. The ideal society is to be brought about less by force than by the influence of good example. If the rulers themselves and the members of the ruling class practise the social virtues, their influence will lead others to do the same.

The two outstanding writers of the early Confucian school were Mencius (Meng Tzu) and Hsun Tzu. The former is said to have died in 289. He took an optimistic view of human nature. Every man has an innate desire for the good. Give this desire an opportunity to develop and human nature is capable of indefinite improvement. Mencius would bring about reform by the cultivation of *jen* rather than by social control through institutions. On the other hand Hsun Tzu, who lived about half a century later, had a distinctly low opinion of human nature. "The nature of man is evil; his goodness is only acquired training." Therefore external controls are emphasized. "Is not *Li* the greatest of all principles?"⁸ Mencius and Hsun Tzu are the leaders of two divergent schools of Confucian thought.

The classic of the Taoist school is the *Tao Te Ching*, a book traditionally ascribed to Lao Tzu, a shadowy figure whose very existence is doubtful. Modern scholarship assigns a relatively late date to Taoism. Perhaps it originated as late as the third century B. C. The *Tao Te Ching* teaches an uncompromising nature philosophy. In the field of theory this involved a good deal of speculation about a mysterious force, the *tao*. In practice it led to the conviction that Nature's way is always best. We should never interfere with Nature. Man's duty is summed up in the phrase *mu wei*, meaning "non-action" or better perhaps "doing everything by doing nothing."⁹ The same principle applied to government. The ruler should keep his hands off.

"So long as I do nothing, the people will work out their own reformation. So long as I love calm, the people will right themselves. If only I keep from meddling, the people will grow rich. If only I am free from desire, the-people will come naturally back to simplicity." ¹⁰

The same doctrine was developed by other members of the Taoist school. Chuang Tzu, who lived probably in the fourth century before Christ, asserted that horse breeders simply spoiled the nature of horses by training them and that similarly people would become honest and good if all artificial attempts to mold human nature were abandoned. His advice was, "Rest in inaction, and the world will be good of itself." ¹¹ In this connection* it may be relevant to mention Yang Chu (also of the fourth century) although he was an Epicurean rather than a Taoist. He shocked his contemporaries by saying that if he could benefit the whole world by plucking out a single hair, he would not pluck it out. At least his opponent Mencius credits him with this saying. These are, of course, extreme statements of the Taoist doctrine of *laissez faire*, but such sentiments have formed a persistent undercurrent in Chinese social thought. Perhaps they represent a protest of rural individualists against the complexities of urban life and a protest of thoughtful private citizens against too minute regulatory legislation.

A third school of thought was founded by Mo Tzu (Mo Ti). Long overshadowed by the official Confucianism, the doctrine of Mo Tzu is coming into its own in our day. Very little is known about his life. He seems to have flourished in the fourth century. His most characteristic doctrine is the doctrine of universal love. "Universal love is really the way of the sage-kings. It is what gives peace to the rulers and sustenance to the people. The gentleman would do well

to understand and practise universal love; then he would be gracious as a ruler, loyal as a minister, affectionate as a father, filial as a son, courteous as an elder brother, and respectful as a younger brother." Among other things this doctrine led to a vigorous condemnation of aggressive war. "The murder of one person is called unrighteous and incurs one death penalty. Following this argument, the murder of ten persons will be ten times as unrighteous and there should be ten death penalties; the murder of a hundred persons will be a hundred times as unrighteous and there should be a hundred death penalties. All the gentlemen of the world know that they should condemn these things, calling them unrighteous. But when it comes to the great unrighteousness of attacking states, they do not know that they should condemn it. . . . Now, if there were a man who, upon seeing a little blackness should say it is black, but, upon seeing much, should say it is white; then we should think he could not tell the difference between black and white. . . . Now, when a little wrong is committed people know that they should condemn it, but when such a great wrong as attacking a state is committed people do not know that they should condemn it. . . . Can this be said to be knowing the difference between the righteous and the unrighteous?"¹² Mo Tzu had more of what might be called a theology than Confucius. He taught that the Deity has intellect and will, whereas Confucius took an agnostic position. With such a background, it is not surprising that Mo Tzu preached an exalted ethical doctrine.¹³

As the period of the Warring States drew to a close the struggle became more ruthless and cruel than ever. It became evident that the ultimate victory would fall to the lot of whatever state proved most unscrupulous and systematic in prosecuting total war. Under these circumstances a

group of writers arose known as the Legalists. They are also called Realists because they advocated what we would call *Realpolitik*. Before this time human laws had been looked upon as an elucidation of the natural law-But the Legalists had a different view. To them law was a means of social control by which the state could most efficiently mobilize its resources for relentless warfare. Morality went by the board. Military efficiency became paramount. It was a sort of early Chinese Fascism.

Among all the contending states it was Ch'in, centering in the modern province of Shensi, which showed the strongest predilection for the new doctrines and the most prominent Legalists flourished there. It was in Ch'in that Shang Yang became minister about the middle of the fourth century and won an unhappy notoriety by his ruthless efficiency in putting the new doctrines into effect. The book which has come down to us under his name was almost certainly not written by him personally, but it is probably a good statement of his principles.¹⁴ The aim of the state is universal conquest. To accomplish this the people are to be kept in subjection. Agriculture and war are to be their sole occupations. Of the two, the people will naturally prefer agriculture. Therefore agriculture is to be made so unpleasant that war will be pleasant in comparison. In this system there was no place for virtue. Among the ten things which weaken a country, "virtue, moral culture, filial piety, brotherly duty, integrity" are enumerated. The bold suggestion is made that the wicked should govern the virtuous, so that the country will become strong.¹⁵ The people must live very frugally and all surplus wealth must be saved for war. Commerce must be stamped out. In order that these ideas be put into effect, the laws must be very detailed and must be clearly explained to the people.

Han Fei Tzu was a Legalist of the third century who also occupied a responsible position in the state of Ch'in. He worked out the theory of Legalism in consistent detail. Rather surprisingly he combined Legalism with Taoism, regarding law as a control which makes men conform to nature. He agreed with Hsun Tzu in regarding human nature pessimistically, but law is a force which can control men's evil tendencies. Therefore even a poor ruler can govern efficiently by means of law. Law is paramount and private virtue must yield to it.

By the aid of such principles Ch'in finally conquered the other Chinese states and its ruler became emperor of all China. But this emperor, Shih Huang Ti, became very unpopular. For one thing he earned the hatred of all succeeding generations of scholars by suppressing philosophy and ordering all books, with certain stated exceptions, to be burned. The dynasty which he founded lasted only from 221 to 206 B. c. and was succeeded by the Han Dynasty.

The first emperor of this dynasty was a commoner, Liu Pang, who gained the throne after an epic struggle with the nobleman, Hsiang Yu.¹⁶ The victory of a commoner was significant in various ways. For one thing it meant a break with the aristocratic traditions of the past. The new dynasty had to find its own philosophy of government. Wu Ti (140-86 B. c.) under whom the Han Dynasty reached its apex, showed marked favor to Confucianism. This meant a definite repudiation of Legalism and a revival of the traditions of an earlier period. The doctrine of Confucius was gradually coming into its own as the official philosophy of Chinese government.

From A. D. 9 to 23 there reigned an emperor, Wang Mang, who is very important for his attempted reforms. In the first year of his reign he abolished slavery and nation

alized the land. The confiscated land was to be divided into equal portions and distributed to farmers. He was later forced to withdraw these reforms. In the meantime he reorganized the currency and set up a most elaborate and interesting machinery to set an equitable price on commodities. He endeavored to stabilize the market by establishing an Equalization Office to buy up certain commodities when there was a surplus and sell them again when the price rose. He provided for loans without interest for certain purposes and for loans at low rates to be used by poor people as working capital. Not all these ideas were entirely new, but Wang Mang deserves the credit for trying to put them into practice. Unfortunately there were not enough honest and competent officials to put such radical reforms into operation and Wang Mang fell from power.¹⁷

The Han Dynasty finally fell in 220 A. D. Then followed a long, unsettled period during most of which China was divided under two or more rulers. The country was unified again, first under the Sui (589-618), and then under the T'ang (618-907) Dynasties. In the meantime, probably in the first century of our era, Buddhism had gained a foothold in China. Since the new religion was destined to have an important influence on Chinese social thought, we may appropriately interrupt our story at this point to discuss the background of Buddhism.

INDIA AND BUDDHISM

In 1924 Sir John Marshall announced the sensational discovery of an early advanced culture in northwestern India. This Indus Valley culture, as it is called, flourished for several centuries some time between 3000 and 2000 B. C. The find was truly revolutionary, for before this time scholars had felt sure that civilization first developed in

India after the Aryan invasion. From the buildings and the art of the Indus Valley culture we judge that it was a very advanced civilization. It certainly had relations with the culture of Mesopotamia. Inscriptions have been found, but thus far scholars have been unable to decipher them.¹⁸

The Aryan invasion occurred perhaps about 1500-1200 B. c. The newcomers were Indo-Europeans. That is, they spoke a language related to Persian and to most of the languages of Europe. Some information about the early Aryans is preserved in their sacred scriptures, the Vedas, of which the oldest is the Rig Veda, composed perhaps about 1000 B.C. They were an agricultural and pastoral people, acquainted with tanning, weaving, and metallurgy. They fought with bow and arrow and used war chariots. Their amusements included drinking, music, chariot-racing, and gambling. Their gods were the "bright gods" of nature, such as Varuna, the sky personified, Agni, the god of fire, and Indra, the god of thunder and battle. This religion is called Brahmanism and was in the hands of a priestly class, the Brahmins.¹⁹

Some time after the composition of the Vedas and before the time of Buddha, the characteristic Indian institution of caste developed, but at the latter date it had not attained anything like its present rigidity. Its origin is uncertain. The Aryans certainly had definite class distinctions, but so did other ancient peoples who never developed caste. The contrast between the fair Aryans and the conquered dark-skinned Dasyus was doubtless a contributing factor. But no one has been able to explain how or why the transition from the ordinary class system to a caste system was made.

The man who was destined to introduce a new religious current into India was born the son and heir of a rajah of

Kapilavastu, a tiny state in what is now Nepal. His personal name was Siddhartha and his Surname, Gotama (Sanskrit, Gautama), but he is more commonly called Buddha (Enlightened). The dates of his life are often given as 563-483 B. c, but the correct dates are probably earlier.²⁰ According to the traditional story the young prince became disgusted with the luxurious life of the court and sought salvation by a regime of severest asceticism. When this failed to bring the desired peace he finally found enlightenment through meditation. Gathering a group of disciples about himself, he founded his religious community, the Sangha.

(Buddha attacked both the theory and the practice of Brahmanism. After his time the old sacrificial system began to wane. He did not reject the doctrine of reincarnation according to which the individual after death is reborn into a higher or lower order of being according to his merits or demerits. Neither did Buddha reject the caste system which, however, was only partly developed in his day. He ignored the Vedic gods. Indeed it has been suggested that both Buddhism and also Jainism (a rival system founded by Mahavira, probably a contemporary of Buddha) represented a revolt of the military (Kshatriya) caste against the dominance of the priests.²¹ Buddha's teaching was less a religion or a theology than a system of ethics and herein lies his importance for social thought. For he taught his disciples to follow an excellent moral code which included the ordinary virtues with stress on truthfulness, respect for superiors, and kindness to animals. Evil desires cause suffering. By eliminating them the individual attains to a state of nirvana. In early Buddhism this term meant primarily happiness in this life.

After Buddha's death his religion grew slowly until the

time of Asoka (273-232 B.C.). This great king of the Maurya Dynasty was an enthusiastic convert who spread the doctrine far and wide. At last Buddhism had come into its own. As the years passed and the doctrine spread, it came into contact with foreign cultures, particularly the Persian and late Greek cultures to the northwest of India. Partly due to these influences and partly due to internal evolution a new form of Buddhism was evolved, commonly called Mahayana, in contrast to the more primitive and orthodox Hinayana form. The origins of Mahayana are obscure, but tradition connects it with the court of Kanishka, a monarch of the Kushan Dynasty who reigned in the first, or possibly in the second, century of our era. While not denying the existence of the historical Buddha, Mahayana taught the existence of countless Buddhas and also of countless Bodhisattvas, beings in a process of attaining Buddhahood. (The importance of Mahayana for social thought lies in its code of altruistic ethics. One must strive to further the happiness of all living creatures. Various sects gradually developed within Mahayana, some tending toward childish superstition and some, toward elevated metaphysical speculation. It was principally in the form of Mahayana that Buddhism spread across China and Japan,

Strangely enough, while Buddhism was making its triumphant progress across the rest of Asia, it was declining in its native India. Under the Gupta Dynasty (320-535) there was a revival of the old Brahmanism which, however, had become so changed in the process of time that it now deserves a new name, Hinduism. This was, and is, an extremely tolerant religion. Indeed it has been appropriately called "a parliament of religions"; for nobody born into the ethnic group is excluded so long as he will yield a formal respect to the Vedas and the Brahmins. Thus Hin

duism absorbed all the scattered religious currents of India and is still the religion of the country except where it has been displaced by Muhammadanism.

MEDIEVAL CHINA

During the troubled years between the Han and Sui Dynasties, that is, between 220 and 589, Buddhism grew rapidly in China. Mahayana bore a definite promise of a future life and perhaps this appealed to the Chinese during an age when life in this world was so grim. Then, too, Buddhism exalted the individual and reinforced the characteristic Chinese virtues of kindness and respect for human life. As time went on various sects appeared, of which the Ch'an sect (better known under its Japanese name, Zen) proved to be the most important. Ch'an Buddhism emphasized contemplation. Salvation comes by a sudden enlightenment; study, asceticism, good works, and rites are less important. The persistence of Taoism among the Chinese probably had something to do with the popularity of Ch'an. In any case the emperors of the eighth century recognized this school as the orthodox form of Buddhism.

Buddhism, however, never completely overshadowed Confucianism. The latter had the enormous advantage of being a system of thought which reinforced the traditional Chinese ideals of orderly government, while Buddhism was speculative and other-worldly. When China achieved unity under the Sui Dynasty (589-618) and strength and prosperity under the T'ang (618-907) the emperors turned naturally to the Confucian doctrines for a political philosophy. In 630 the Emperor T'ai Tsung ordered the erection of a temple to Confucius in all civil districts (*chou* and *hsien*) of the empire. The brilliant and outspoken Han Yu (768-824) typifies the reactions of **the scholar-official class**

to which he belonged. He deprecates the invasion of foreign thought and calls **for a return** to the traditional Chinese ways. "In ancient times the calamities of men were many; but the wise men came, and then the people were taught the way of mutual help and the means of livelihood. They gave them princes and teachers." ²²

Under the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) a great and original thinker appeared in the person of Wang An-shih (1021-86). Born in the scholar-official class, he rose in the civil service and became chief adviser of the Emperor Shen Tsung (1068-86). He professed to be a follower of Confucius, but actually the reforms which he proposed showed great originality, though they were not entirely new. He advocated a budget for state expenditures, a national monopoly of commerce to be administered socially, agricultural loans, an annual reappraisal of land for taxation purposes, taxation of *all* property, the abolition of the conscription of labor, a military reorganization with emphasis on local militia, a new method of supporting the cavalry, and a reorganization of the civil service examinations with emphasis on current problems instead of literary style. Needless to say, these proposals called forth an intense opposition. For a long time there was hot controversy between the followers of Wang An-shih and his opponents. Various parts of the program were tried, abandoned, and tried again. In the long run the conservatives triumphed; but their victory was not quite complete. Wang An-shih retained a certain influence.

The same scholars who opposed the ideas of Wang An-shih worked out under the Sung Dynasty a reinterpretation of Confucianism. They claimed, as **one** might expect, that **they were merely getting back to the true thought of Confucius. Actually they were considerably influenced by**

Taoism and the Ch'an variety of Mahayana Buddhism. This Neo-Confucian school, as it is called, gave Confucianism the form which was considered orthodox for centuries. The doctrines of this school received their final form at the hands of Chu Hsi (1130-1200), a brilliant synthesizer often compared, though incorrectly, to St. Thomas Aquinas. It is true, however, that like St. Thomas, Chu Hsi gave definitive form to the medieval thought of his culture. "In the entire history of mankind," says Laourette, "few thinkers have been so influential as he."²³

For his theory of knowledge Chu Hsi turned to the Ch'an theory of meditation and to the method called "the investigation of things." The latter was a doctrine contained in a little work called the *Ta Hsiieh* (Great Learning), a product of the Confucian school of Chou days. Chu Hsi's metaphysics were strange, subtle, and interesting, but not particularly relevant for our present purpose. The important thing from our standpoint is the ethical character of his teaching. He taught the existence of T'ai Chi (the Great Ultimate), but it is not clear whether he meant by this term a personal God or an impersonal law governing the universe. In any case, Chu Hsi placed a great emphasis on reason. Man's nature is good, but through neglect it is sullied by evil. Like a pearl in a bowl of dirty water or like a dusty mirror it can be restored to its original glory by observing the law of the mean which "avoids the extremes of both profligacy and asceticism. This essentially reasonable, if somewhat uninspired, doctrine proved more acceptable to the Chinese spirit in the long run than the dreamy mysticism of Ch'an Buddhism."²⁴

A famous historical work of the distinguished Sung historian, Ssu-ma Kuang, was abridged and reconstructed under the direction of Chu Hsi and published as the *T'ung*

Chien Kang Mu. This formed the basis in turn of de Maille's *Histoire generate de la Chine*, published in Paris in thirteen quarto volumes, 1777-85. The latter was a chief source of western histories of China for generations. Since Ssu-ma Kuang and Chu Hsi were conservatives, the West was led to believe that Chinese thought had stagnated in self satisfied inaction during the twenty-five centuries since the death of Confucius. Actually Chinese conservatism has been balanced by foreign innovations like Buddhism and by a long series of radical theorists and reformers like Wang Yang-ming and Wang An-shih. Even the official support which Neo-Confucianism received did not preserve it from caustic criticism. Ku Yen-wu (1613-82) blamed the empty theorizing of the Neo-Confucians for the helplessness of the Chinese in the face of the Manchu invasion. Under his influence a school arose called *Han Hsiieh* (Han Learning) because it sought a more valid interpretation of the classics in the writings of the authors of the earlier Han Dynasty. Yen Yuan (1635-1704) broke with both the *Han Hsiieh* and Neo-Confucianism. He despised book-learning and advocated practical activity. Tai Chen (1724-77) went further and developed a philosophy of his own, a sort of materialistic monism.

JAPAN

The origin of the Japanese is shrouded in mystery.²⁵ Racially and culturally they seem related to the Koreans and Tungusic peoples of northeastern Asia, perhaps also to the South Chinese, Malaysian, and even Polynesian tribes. The Ainu, who appear to be the aboriginal inhabitants of Japan, also doubtless added something. The early Japanese were grouped in clans (*uji*).²⁶ Attached to the clans were guilds of artisans and below them were the slaves. Each

clan with its artisans and serfs was a self-contained unit. Among these clans the imperial clan, with the emperor at its head, enjoyed a certain hegemony, but power was not so centralized as it afterwards became. If we interpret early legends correctly the first emperor, Jimmu, seems to have led his clan from Kyushu by the Inland Sea to the plain of Yamato and established himself there at about the beginning of the Christian Era.²¹

Chinese contacts were of revolutionary importance to Japan. These contacts first came through Korea. The Han emperors had conquered northern Korea in 108 B. C. Between 50 B. c. and A. D. 50 Chinese culture had penetrated southern Korea, as we know from excavations. Probably Japanese travelers had reached the Chinese colonies before the beginning of the Christian Era. Probably about A. D. 360 the Japanese Empress Jingo is said to have conquered Korea. If this is exaggerated we may at least judge that military operations led to more systematic contacts with the mainland at this time. About A. D. 400 scribes able to read and write Chinese came to Japan from Korea but for another two centuries the ability to handle the difficult Chinese script was probably confined to a small class in Japan. One of the Korean states named Paikche was friendly to Japan and sent over an image of Buddhar and some sacred writings in 552 and some learned men and Buddhist monks in 554.²⁸

At this time the imperial house in Japan was striving to attain a more complete authority over the country and a party at court saw in Chinese culture a means of reaching this goal. For China had had a long experience in centralized government. The court therefore encouraged the wholesale importation of Chinese ideas. In 593 the Empress Suiko ascended the throne and turned over the control of

affairs to Crown Prince Shotoku (Shotoku-Taishi). The latter issued his famous code in 604. This is a series of moral injunctions rather than a law code but it is significant for its novel emphasis on central authority. "In a country there are not two lords, the people have not two masters. The sovereign is the master of the people of the whole country, the officials to whom he gives control are his vassals." ²⁹

Much more definite was the Taika Reform promulgated in 646 under the Emperor Kotoku. This represented an effort to apply to Japan the system of the Chinese T'ang Dynasty. All land was nationalized, in theory at least. Local government was reorganized in a way to enhance the power of the central authority. The central government itself was reorganized also. A new system of taxation was instituted. To emphasize the intended break with the past a new capital was set up at Nara and the succeeding period, 710-84 is known as the Nara period.

The Taika Reform looked impressive on paper but it ran up against certain stubborn facts. After all, Japan was not China. The clan system had taken firm root in Japan and the clan chieftains resented the new centralization of authority. Concessions had to be made. The clan chieftains were allowed to keep their estates as salaries for the positions they occupied. Peasants, harried by taxes, were often glad to make over their lands to the great lords, thus losing their independence but escaping taxation. The elaborate central government was deprived of revenue by the growth of tax-free estates and loss of revenue sapped its efficiency.

The Nara period closed in 784. Ten years later the capital was finally established at Hcian, the modern Kyoto. The Heian period lasted until 1185 and was a time of transition from the imitation of China to the more genuinely Japanese period which followed. The Chinese system of

centralized imperial government had to be abandoned, but the clan leaders asserted their power in a peculiar way. They allowed the imperial line to continue in nominal authority, while keeping the real control in their own hands. By this method the Fujiwara clan dominated Japan from 866 to 1160. They married their daughters into the imperial house, while the head of the clan kept the real authority as *sessho* (regent) when the emperor was a child or as *kampaku* (civil dictator) when an adult emperor was on the throne. The Fujiwara were succeeded by the Taira and then by the Minamoto. The latter emphasized their independence by setting up an independent capital of their own at Kamakura, which gave its name to the Kamakura period, 1185-1333. It was an epoch of frank military dominance. This was followed by the disturbed Ashikaga period, 1336-1568, during which the Ashikaga clan chieftains found it impossible to repress recurrent civil wars and to pacify the country. What the Ashikaga failed to do was accomplished between 1568 and 1600 by three determined leaders, Nobunaga, Ieyasu, and Hideyoshi, who unified the nation by a liberal use of the mailed fist. Japan settled down into the Tokugawa period, 1600-1868, during most of which the government endeavored to exclude foreign influence.

Perhaps the best source of Japanese social thought during the later medieval period is to be found in the feudal law codes. The clans had developed private codes of their own, regulating the relations of clan members to their chief. These are known as *house laws*. The laws by which successful clans governed the country were based on these private codes. Thus in 1232 the code called *Jo-ei-shikimoku* was promulgated by the Ho jo clan which was in **the** as

cendancy during the late Kamakura period. It was less a formal law code than a collection of rules and maxims to be used by administrators and judges. Loyalty to parents and feudal masters was emphasized. This code was applied only to those directly under Kamakura rule, but it had an enormous effect on later Japanese legal thought. The whole Kamakura period was characterized by a love of justice which, if somewhat rough and ready, was at least efficient. With the weakening of central authority during the later Ashikaga period the country had to rely on the various clans for law enforcement, each in its own domain, and house laws became more strict and vigorous. The preservation of order by summary methods was emphasized more than the demands of impartial justice. It was during this period also that the position of women suffered a decline which was destined to be permanent. This spirit of severity was continued into the Tokugawa period. There was a sharp distinction in status between the ruling military caste (the samurai) and the commoners. For some offenses the samurai was punished more leniently, and for others more severely, than the common citizen. In general all the codes discussed in this paragraph owed something to China but something also to ancient Japanese institutions. Japanese social thought began with a wholesale importation of Chinese ideas. It ended with a synthesis in which purely native ideas played a very important part.³⁰

THE MODERN PERIOD IN CHINA, INDIA, AND JAPAN

The salient characteristic of the period has been, of course, the invasion of Asia by western culture. This invasion has not taken place without protest. In different degrees the old civilizations of Asia have reacted against the

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importations, endeavoring to synthesize them with their native ideas. What the final result will be, is a question which only the future can answer.

Chinese culture has twice successfully withstood the effects of a foreign invasion. Neither the Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty which dominated China from 1279 to 1368, nor the Ch'ing (Manchu) Dynasty which reigned from 1644 to 1911, was able to modify Chinese culture to any significant degree. Western culture, however, has been harder to repel. Portuguese traders reached China early in the sixteenth century and established themselves permanently at Macao, near Canton, about 1557. The Jesuit missionaries had a far greater influence. St. Francis Xavier set out for China but never reached the mainland, dying on the island of Shang-ch'an off Canton in 1552. But the great Matteo Ricci took up residence in China in 1582 and died there in 1610. He and his associates acquired great influence at the imperial court through their helpful scientific knowledge. During the eighteenth century Catholicism spread into every part of the empire, though held in check by sporadic persecutions. In 1807 Protestant missionaries first arrived. Throughout the nineteenth century the emperors fought a losing fight against the aggression of European powers; but culturally China still resisted. It was only at the turn of the century, or shortly before, **that** western ideas began to be widely **accepted**.

In 1905 the old civil service examinations were abandoned. **For centuries these examinations had provided** China with officials steeped in Confucianism and Neo Confucianism. **When the Republic was established in 1911, another bulwark against western ideas was removed. Returned students, who had absorbed western ideas directly in the Occident or indirectly in Japan, began to introduce**

new ideas into all departments of life. About 1916 a new intellectual movement developed (the "New Tide") which not only accepted western ideas but reexamined China's past with a fresh point of view. In 1917 the brilliant Hu Shih, at present Chinese ambassador at Washington, advocated the use of *pat lma*, the "plain speech" of the people, for scholarly writing, instead of the stilted literary style which had held sway for so many centuries. It was a change comparable to the abandonment of Latin for the vernacular by European scholars at the end of the Middle Ages.³¹

India has been more politically dominated by the West than has China. In 1498 Vasco da Gama reached Malabar and the Portuguese soon established trading posts. Other European powers followed. In the middle of the eighteenth century it looked as if France was destined to dominate India, but in 1757 at the Battle of Plassey she suffered a crushing defeat from the English under Clive. In 1773, Warren Hastings became the first governor-general. English dominance in India was never again seriously threatened by a European power (Like the Chinese, however, the Indians have reacted against foreign influences. In our own day Mahatma Gandhi has led a movement, not only for political, but also for cultural, independence. By the peculiarly Indian methods of passive resistance, non cooperation and civil disobedience, his followers have struggled for self-determination. Although the movement has been handicapped by disagreement between the native Muhammadans and Hindus, the British government has found it expedient to make some concessions.

Japan was closed to foreign contacts until the American, Commodore Perry, negotiated the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854.⁸² Treaties with other nations soon followed. The

Tokugawa dominance ended in 1868, and during the succeeding Meiji period (1868-1912) foreign ideas came with a rush. Japan was rapidly industrialized. In the first enthusiasm native culture and native institutions were even somewhat discredited. Liberalism and internationalism grew and developed. But finally a reaction set in. Particularly after her participation in the World War, Japan began to be conscious of herself as a great power. Population doubled between 1872 and 1935. This provided manpower for growing industries and for larger armies. In the early 1930's Japan embarked on a program of militaristic and imperialistic expansion. Manchuria was invaded in 1931 and the puppet state of Manchukuo was set up in 1932. In 1937 Japan invaded China without a declaration of war.

An interesting development in Asiatic social thought has been the introduction of western academic sociology. Shortly after the turn of the century Yen Fu began to translate Spencer, Mill, and other western classics into Chinese. The first chair of sociology was established at St. John's University, Shanghai, in 1905 and the first department of sociology at Shanghai Baptist College in 1913. About 1920 sociology began to be recognized in India as an independent academic discipline. As far back as 1880 Shoichi Toyama had begun to lecture on Spencer in Japan and in 1882 a translation of Spencer's *Principles of sociology* by Kotaro Noritake was published. A chair of sociology was established at the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1893.³³

The social thought of the Far East is certainly most instructive. There is no parallel in the West for China's more than thirty-five hundred years of continuous national culture. Then too, to a surprising degree, China has been governed in accordance with definite and well thought

out principles rather than mere expediency. There is much for us to learn here. As space is conquered by modern means of communication and East and West are brought into closer contact, one hopes that there will be an increasingly critical exchange of ideas from which both East and West will benefit.

CHAPTER 6

GREECE AND ROME

GREECE BEFORE THE GREEKS

Recent research has tended to undermine somewhat the unique position which historians once assigned to Greece. Enthusiastic humanists in Renaissance days used to believe that the Greeks had practically created their remarkable culture out of nothing. We know better now. We know that before the Greek people had migrated into the peninsula which bears their name, a high civilization flourished there and in the surrounding area. What the Greeks did was to inherit this culture, stamp it with their own peculiar genius, and then hand it on in turn to other peoples.

By about 3400 B. C. the Chalcolithic Age had begun in the great island of Crete, southeast of Greece. By about 3000 a new civilization had appeared, called *Minoan* after Minos, a king of Crete who figures prominently in Greek legend. Bronze appeared about 2400 and for the next thousand years the island enjoyed a long period of glory during which she dominated the Aegean area. From the few Cretan words which have been preserved in other languages it is known that the inhabitants spoke a language of unknown type which was neither Semitic nor Indo-European. The Cretans left inscriptions but, except for the numerals, scholars have been unable to decipher them. We must therefore fall back on archeology for some hints about their social thought.¹

The early Cretans seem to have been divided into clans and the clan chieftains shared the government of the island among themselves. At a later period the ruler of CnoSSOS apparently triumphed over his rivals and established himself as sole ruler. The palace at Cnossos has been excavated and it is very impressive. Crete had a characteristically urban economy. Industry and commerce were well organized, and a highly efficient merchant marine enabled the Cretans to sell their wares throughout the whole eastern Mediterranean. This commerce kept Crete in touch with the ancient civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia and there was a constant interchange of ideas. There was something very buoyant and cheerful about the Cretans, to judge from their art. Like the Greeks, they were devoted to gymnastics and also relished a peculiar form of bull-baiting. The women, whose costumes sometimes strike us as surprisingly modern, played a prominent part in community life. This Cretan civilization had its parallels on the mainland and the islands of the Aegean. When the Greeks entered Greece they found this civilization flourishing there and rapidly assimilated it.²

EARLY GREEK SOCIETY

The Greeks were an Indo-European people and their migration was part of the same great population movement which brought their cousins, the Aryans into India and the Medes and Persians into Iran. It was a slow process and covered many centuries. First came the Achaean Greeks about 2000 B. C. They were a rude pastoral people but intelligent and quick to assimilate. They profited by their contact with the pre-Greek cultures in Greece. A brilliant mixed civilization resulted, particularly at Mycenae. After the decline of Crete this city enjoyed the

leadership of the whole area from about 1400 to 1200 B.C. About 1200 the last great wave of Greek migrants began to arrive. This is traditionally called the Dorian invasion. The Dorians proved less assimilative than the Achaeans. They destroyed much of the old culture. Greece entered into a dark period from which it only gradually recovered.³

The centuries which followed the Dorian invasion saw many important social changes. Originally the Greeks had been organized into clans like so many early peoples. The clan chieftains exercised a patriarchal sway over their subjects. All this was radically changed when cities began to develop. The former clan leaders retained their dignity as aristocratic family heads, but one man had to be chosen king of the city in order to preserve unity. Below the kings and the aristocrats were the people, the *demos*. These ranged from well-to-do artisans with businesses of their own down through the wage workers and the unemployed to the slaves. The old aristocracy of clan leaders was thrown into the background by the king. This was a situation which the aristocrats refused to accept. They reacted vigorously and successfully. By 800 B. C. they had definitely won. The age of kings had given way to the age of nobles.⁴

The rule of the nobles proved to be a hard rule. The poet Hesiod, who wrote perhaps in the eighth century, gives a vivid picture of the sufferings of the people. With bitter resentment he protests against the bribe-devouring lords, the nobles who acted on the principle that might makes right.⁵ This is quite a different point of view from that of the earlier poet, Homer, whose sympathies were with the aristocrats.

From the middle of the eighth century to the beginning

GREECE AND ROME

of the sixth there was a great movement of Greek expansion which resulted in numerous Greek colonies scattered from the Black Sea to Spain. Commerce grew apace. Industries sprang up. The invention of coined money facilitated business. The more progressive Greek cities began to grow rich. The aristocrats were the first to profit from this prosperity because they had the necessary financial resources. But the aristocrats could not monopolize business. Enterprising men of the people took advantage of their opportunities and enriched themselves. A new middle class sprang up and the nobles had to share their power with the newly rich or absorb them by marriage into their own class.⁶

In the meantime the common people were growing more and more restive. The oppression by the aristocrats had become intolerable. The growth of business was beginning to create something like an industrial proletariat. Among the newly rich were some who opposed the nobles and sought allies among the common people. Some sort of reform was imperative. As it turned out, the reforms were carried out by two types of men, the lawgivers and the tyrants.

The people saw in written laws a protection against arbitrary procedure. Therefore a movement for written laws arose. The desired result was attained by appointing a lawgiver, a sort of temporary dictator with power to make the necessary laws, after which he retired again to private life. The movement began in the colonies and then spread to Greece proper. The first such lawgiver known to us is Zaleucus of Locri, about 663 B. C. Written laws proved a real benefit, but they did not solve the whole problem.

The word *tyrant* did not have quite the same meaning

among the Greeks as among ourselves. It meant a man who allied himself with the common people against the nobles and thus seized the supreme power in a city. The judgment of Greek writers was unanimously unfavorable to the tyrants, but after all these writers reflected the opinion of the aristocratic class. Actually their rule was not without its benefits. They banished the nobles and put an end to their oppressive rule. They divided great estates among the people. They undertook important public works. They tended to be peaceful in their relations toward other cities, for war might overturn their precarious power at home. In spite of these benefits the rule of the tyrants tended to be short. Many tyrants abused their power. Then too, they had to contend, with the constant machinations of the banished nobles. But the tyrants represented an important stage in the evolution of Greek democracy. By destroying the old order they made place **for the new.**⁷

(Among all the Greek cities (or better, city-states) Athens is the most important for our present purposes; for Athens developed the most powerful and best-known of the Greek democracies and it was here that the greatest Greek social thinkers wrote. Like other cities it passed through the age of kings and the age of nobles. In Draco (621) and Solon (594) Athens had its great lawgivers and in Peisistratus (561-527) **a typical tyrant. But these failed to give the people the sort of government they demanded. After the overthrow of the sons of Peisistratus who had succeeded him, the people found a leader in Cleisthenes. Under his leadership they obtained a democratic constitution in 508 and successfully defended it against the aristocrat Isagoras who called in the Spartans to help him.**⁸

Athens emerged from the Persian Wars (490-479) with

increased prestige and became the recognized leader of the Greek democracies. The stubborn opposition of conservative Sparta led to the exhausting Peloponnesian War (431-404). Unfortunately the Athenian democracy did not always function well at critical moments and demagoguery sometimes prevailed over sober thinking. Sparta triumphed and this gave the conservatives an excuse for criticizing democracy. It was the Athenian democracy also which approved the judicial murder of Socrates. One can hardly blame Plato for a certain prejudice against the government which put his beloved teacher to death.

THE CLASSIC SOCIAL THOUGHT OF GREECE

Meanwhile Greek philosophy had begun to develop. The first half of the sixth century saw the appearance of Ionic philosophy in the Greek cities of Asia Minor; the second half saw the rise of the Italian school. Neither of these schools made a significant contribution to social thought. Their importance lies rather in their introduction of a method of investigation which relied on human reason rather than on a mythological tradition. Later this method was applied by others to the study of society,

The first of the great philosophers was Socrates (about 470-399). It is hard to determine what he really taught. Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato, three men with very different viewpoints, have left us three very different pictures of the man and his teaching. The broad outlines, however, are clear. Socrates had his characteristic method. Sometimes he would buttonhole a chance listener and by means of acute questioning try to discover the truth amidst a mass of prejudices, meanwhile assuming an air of ignorance himself.⁹ Sometimes again, oblivious of his surroundings, he would retire into himself, becoming con

"templative almost to the point of ecstasy."¹⁰ The chief interest of Socrates was ethics. This reflected a general change of interest from cosmology to ethics which took place among Athenian thinkers about the middle of the fifth century. The characteristic ethical doctrine of Socrates was the proposition that vice is the ignorance of the good.¹¹

A still greater thinker was Plato (427-347).¹² Born of a very noble family, he was unfortunately associated as a young man with his great-uncle, Critias, one of the Thirty Tyrants. This fact, plus a general distaste for the contemporary Athenian democracy, made a public career impossible to him. He turned to poetry for which he seems to have had a real talent, but found his true vocation when, at the age of twenty, he fell under the spell of Socrates. After the judicial murder of the latter Plato left Athens. He studied under Euclid of Megara. He probably visited Cyrene and perhaps Egypt. In 388 he was in Syracuse. Finally about 387 he opened an informal school of philosophy at Athens. Twice again Plato visited Syracuse, hoping to persuade the ruler there to accept his political theories. He died in 347.

The *Republic* is Plato's greatest contribution to social thought and indeed, one of the greatest works in all literature. Written perhaps between 380 and 370 when Plato was at the height of his intellectual powers, the book has never ceased to fascinate and influence social thinkers.¹³ The work is cast in the form of a dialogue, the dramatic date being 411 or 410.¹⁴ Socrates is the principal speaker and serves as a vehicle for Plato's thought. The scene is the Piraeus, the port of Athens, some five miles from the city. A group of friends meet there after a religious festival and the conversation turns to the subject of justice.

Socrates offers to illustrate justice by first describing a just state because justice is more easily visible in a state than in an individual.¹⁵ He goes on to describe a very primitive community in which an idyllic simplicity reigns.¹⁰ When Glaucon objects that this is a way of life more suitable for pigs than human beings, Socrates begins again and describes a more elaborate and luxurious community)

Increasing size involves division of labor. The fundamental division creates three classes, the rulers—Plato calls them "guardians"—the soldiers, and the farmer-artisan class. Justice resides in the harmonious cooperation of these three groups, each performing its proper function.¹⁷ However, the guardians, the ruling class, receive most of the emphasis in the dialogue; for this group, although numerically insignificant, determines the tone of the whole community.

Here we come to the central thought of the *Republic*. For Plato's great contribution was his insistence that only the true philosopher is fit to rule. Only the man who has a deep insight into the essential function of a state and who constantly strives to bring the actual state into conformity with the ideal, can be safely entrusted with civil power. When Plato insists on this point he rises to unsurpassed heights of eloquence.

There are two kinds of knowledge," deep and superficial. Or rather, only the former deserves the name of knowledge (*episteme*); the latter is really not knowledge, but only opinion (*doxa*). The true philosopher sees the general in the particular. He is able to rise to the concept of abstract beauty, abstract justice. Secure in his grasp of abstract concepts, he has a firm basis for discriminating with certainty between concrete cases of justice and injustice. Those who are unable to attain to these general

ideas are not philosophers. They do not have real knowledge. Those who view many beautiful things but do not see the beautiful itself and are unable to follow the guidance of another thereunto who see many just things but not justice itself, and so on in all cases—such men, we affirm, have opinions on all things but no real knowledge of the things they opine." Plato coins a word for such men. They are not philosophers, lovers of wisdom, but "doxophiles," lovers of opinion.¹⁸

Plato illustrates his concept of deep knowledge by the famous simile of the cave. A group of captives are chained and fettered in an underground cavern in such a way that from childhood up they can look in no other direction but at a blank wall straight ahead of them. It is arranged that from time to time shadows are thrown on this wall, say, the shadow of a lily or the shadow of a horse, and so on with the shadows of all sorts of other things. The captives have never seen a real lily or a real horse, but they build up a pitiful science based on the shadows they see and they account that man wise who is skillful in discerning these shadows and who remembers their customary sequences. Now, continues Plato, suppose one of these captives is released and led from his cave to the real world. Gradually he becomes familiar with real things instead of shadows. He sees a real lily in all its beauty, a real horse in its sentient strength. Exulting in this new insight he returns to the cave and tells his former companions about his new knowledge. But these men laugh at him. They pride themselves on their knowledge of shadows and refuse to accept the existence of any deeper reality. Like consistent positivists they pride themselves on believing only what they can see. They look on the returned cap

tive as an idle dreamer and ridicule him. Such is the position of a philosopher in a society of doxophilists. The latter see and recognize concrete instances of beauty and justice but they are unable to rise to the conception of the abstract beauty, the abstract justice, of which these instances are but the shadow. They lack deep insight. What they call knowledge is only opinion. Because their thinking is unclear and superficial, they remain mere opportunists. They are unfit to govern because they have no real knowledge of the true function of a state.¹⁹

Along with this essential idea the *Republic* contains a great deal of miscellaneous social thought it is interesting to note that modern sociologists who treat this work are often so fascinated with these subsidiary ideas that they miss the principal point of the book. Thus they often discuss at length the doctrine of Plato that the guardians should have their property, their wives, and their children in common. This is indeed his theory, but it is quite subsidiary to the main thesis. (Plato suggested this communism to eliminate distractions which might interfere with the guardians' main duty of contemplation. The end in view was sound if the means were bizarre. After all, Catholic religious secure the same result by holding their property in common while wives and children are eliminated by the vow of chastity. One sometimes feels that, Plato's critics, from Aristotle down, are a bit unimaginative. A more serious criticism perhaps is Plato's lack of sympathy with democracy, but we must remember that Greek democracy was quite different from our own. On the one hand it was the democracy of a class with which slavery was not felt to be inconsistent. On the other hand, it was a peculiar form of extreme democracy which easily

degenerated into demagogy, something quite different from our modern democracy with representative government.²⁰

While the *Republic* represented Plato's social ideal, he recognized that it could never be realized until either philosophers became kings, or kings, philosophers.²¹ Pending this happy consummation we must be satisfied with a second-best state. Such a state is considered in two later works, the *Statesman* and the *Laws*. The *Statesman* contains an elaborate myth tending to show that the times are out of joint. Existing statesmen are much like their subjects in character and training.²² The true statesman could be trusted to rule without law. To bind him by set rules is as foolish as to refuse to let a physician change his prescription when the condition of the patient had changed.²³ But since such a ruler is hard to find, "it seems, we are obliged to come together and make written laws, following in the tracks of the true form of government."²⁴

The *Laws* was the last work Plato wrote. Indeed, we have the statement of Diogenes Laertius that he did not live to complete the final revision. As the title of the work itself implies, this last of Plato's dialogues places even more emphasis on the concept of law than did the *Statesman*. About a third of the book consists of specific laws on a great variety of subjects, the family, commerce, labor and industry, pure food, contracts, insanity, slavery, mendicancy, and testimony in law courts. Underlying these specific ordinances is a general theory of law. In its deepest sense law represents an effort to order the state in accordance with the dictates of reason. "We ought to manage both our households and our states by following in public and in private the guidance of that which is im

mortal within us, defining law as the ordinance of reason." ²⁵ Plato never abandoned the idealism of the *Republic* but in the *Laws* he showed how this idealism might be applied in an imperfect but attainable state.)

Whereas Plato combined in his nature the philosopher and the poet, Aristotle (384-322) was part philosopher and part scientist. Perhaps his family background had something to do with this; for his father was personal physician to the king of Macedonia. As a youth of seven teen Aristotle came to Athens and for twenty years he was a pupil of Plato. After the latter's death he left Athens and lived in various places, being for three years private tutor of Alexander the Great. Alexander succeeded his father as king of Macedonia in 336 and soon after Aristotle repaired to Athens and opened a school there where he taught until he was forced to leave the city in 322. He died the same year at Chalcis in Euboea. ²⁶

Aristotle is known to have written a number of works on society which have been lost. One of these was a collection of 158 constitutions. This is interesting because it seems to represent an attempt to apply the inductive method to political science. A fragment of this work, the part dealing with the constitution of Athens, was discovered in Egypt and first published in 1891. ²⁷ Our chief source for Aristotle's social thought is the politics which was still unfinished at the author's death. The work conspicuously lacks unity. In fact it seems to be a combination of at least three separate treatises, one on the state in general (books I-III), one on practical politics (books IV-VI), and an unfinished treatise on the ideal state (books VII-VIII).

"Man," says Aristotle, "is by nature a political animal." ²⁸ Therefore men desire to live together even when

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they have no need of mutual assistance. As a matter of fact, however, life in society does involve mutual assistance first of all in regard to the physical necessities of life but also in regard to the good life (*to zen kalos*). The good life is the chief aim of society.²⁹ Thus Aristotle committed himself to a high political ideal. The purpose of the state is to aid the virtue, and not just the mere physical existence, of its citizens.

Approaching the subject of practical politics, (Aristotle points out that the political scientist must be willing to consider, not only what state is best in the abstract, but what one is the best attainable under a given set of circumstances, just as a gymnastic trainer must consider, not only what exercises are best for the perfect athlete, but what sort is best for ordinary people.³⁰ The best feasible government "for most cities and for the bulk of mankind" ³¹ is a sort of a cross between aristocracy and democracy which leaves the middle class in control. This is an application of Aristotle's ethical doctrine of the golden mean.³² The middle class, equally removed from the extremes of wealth and poverty, is characteristically "most ready to obey reason." ³³

The ideal state, according to Aristotle, is certainly not the one proposed by Plato in the *Republic*. Having rejected Plato's solution Aristotle proceeds to discuss the ideal state on the principle that "the same life must be best both for each man individually and for states and mankind collectively."³⁵ This best life must be an active, life; but activity may be internal as well as external. A great thinker may be truly active through his internal processes of thought. In a parallel fashion states do *not* become great through wars of conquest; for *wara* means, not an end. "Those cities are not necessarily intctive which occupy

an isolated position and pursue a policy of isolation.')

³⁶ In discussing the details of the ideal state (Aristotle proposed no sensational innovations. It should be of moderate size, well situated, with an intelligent population. The farmer-artisan class should be excluded from citizenship. Education was to be the "best possible." The book ends rather abruptly, for Aristotle died before he could finish it. However, it is an extremely important work and has proved enormously influential.

THE HELLENISTIC AGE

Even before Aristotle died, the whole course of Greek social thought had been altered, not by a great philosopher, but by an extraordinarily successful general. In 334 Alexander the Great began his invasion of Asia. Before his death in 323 he had completely conquered the Persian Empire and had then pushed on eastward as far as the Hyphasis River in northwestern India. After the conqueror's death his vast empire fell to pieces. New dynasties sprang up, of which the most important were the Ptolemies in Egypt, the Seleucids in Syria, and the Antigonids in Macedonia.

(The new situation affected Greek social thought in various ways. The traditional background of this thought had always been the *polis* or city-state that is, a city like Athens or Sparta with the comparatively small area of surrounding territory dependent upon it. Plato and Aristotle always thought in terms of the *polis*. To them the ideal state was always the ideal city-state. After Alexander's conquest all this traditional background was swept away. The city-state lost its significance and the large monarchy now became the typical form of political organization.

The new monarchies differed from the old city-states in spirit as well as in form. The conquering Macedonians whom Alexander led into Asia had their own ideas on government. They were used to a ruler who was a general as well as a king, a conception quite different from Athenian democracy. The conquered peoples made an even more significant contribution. In Egypt the Ptolemies replaced a line of Pharaohs who were looked on as gods as well as kings. The Achaemenid kings of Persia whom the Seleucids succeeded were considered by their subjects the direct representatives of the Divinity. Before long the Greek Ptolemies and Seleucids were demanding divine honors for themselves. Thus the Greek world became accustomed to an extreme form of the doctrine of absolute monarchy.³⁷

The new order differed from the old also by being vastly more cosmopolitan. This tendency was facilitated by the development of a sort of international language, a variety of Greek called the *common dialect* or *koine*. This was the language of government and of the rapidly expanding international commerce. The conquered people found it necessary to learn Greek if they desired to engage in business or public life. Aided by a common language an exchange of ideas took place between Greeks and orientals. Each learned from the other. the resulting culture was distinctly mixed. It was no longer Hellenic (Greek) but Hellenistic. Since this culture was so obviously international, it tended to eliminate narrow provincialisms and to make men of different nations more conscious of their common humanity.

The Hellenistic age developed its own characteristic schools of philosophy. One of these was Epicureanism.

The founder, Epicurus (341-270), taught that pleasure is the only good. This doctrine is not so gross as it sounds; for he recognized a hierarchy of pleasures and those of the mind come first. The pleasantest life is the life dominated by a detached and philosophic calm. It is foolish to strive after money, power, and fame; but it is equally foolish to sacrifice oneself for a great ideal. Epicurus counseled abstention from public life. The social significance of his school was not great.

More important was Stoicism. Originated by Zeno of Citium (about 336-264) and fully developed by Chrysippus of Soli (about 280-206), Stoicism taught an essentially pantheistic view of the universe. The distinction between God and matter is not absolute; one universal life pulsates through all existence. Man's greatest happiness is virtue and virtue in the Stoic sense meant conformity to Nature. Man's intellect and will must be brought into conformity with the Godhead which permeates the universe. All the virtues are inseparably united. The Stoic sage possesses them all. He alone is free, he alone is the true king. He has eliminated passion and lives his life unperturbed and captain of his soul. Master of his own life, he may end it by suicide when he sees fit.

Stoicism was very cosmopolitan. Its early teachers were drawn from widely separated parts of the Hellenistic world and its doctrine furnished a philosophic basis for this attitude. All men are bits of the same universal Being, they all share the same universal Intelligence. Class distinctions and distinctions based on nationality are therefore unimportant. In spite of his marked self-sufficiency, the Stoic sage must not be indifferent to the welfare of mankind. In discussing the relative merits of various forms

of government, thestoics inclined now toward a mixed constitution, now toward the absolute monarchy which was so characteristic of their age.³⁸

REPUBLICAN ROME

As the Hellenistic culture reached its apex in the eastern Mediterranean, a new and vigorous people were making rapid strides in Italy. The origin of the Romans is somewhat obscure. Archeology has discovered remains of Paleolithic and Neolithic man in Italy. About 2000 B. C. an Indo-European people, closely related to the Greeks, began to appear in Italy. By 1000 they had spread to southern Italy and Sicily. About 900 the Etruscans, perhaps coming from Lydia, had established themselves north of the Tiber. In the eighth century the Greeks colonized southern Italy and Sicily.

The traditional date of the founding of Rome is 753 B. c. This is probably overexact, but in any case during the eighth century a small state grew up at Rome. The bulk of the population were Latins, descendents of the Indo European invaders, but there may have been an Etruscan, and even a pre-Italic admixture. Early Rome was ruled by kings, possibly Etruscan overlords. At the beginning of the sixth century (traditional date, 509 B. C.) the kings were expelled and a republic established.

The next two and a half centuries saw a political struggle between the two classes of Roman society, the patricians and the plebeians, and the gradual conquest of Italy. The struggle of the plebeians was successful. In 451-450 they secured written laws (the Twelve Tables) and one by one all the offices of the republic were opened to them. Thus Rome secured a democratic government. In the meantime

the conquest of Italy was proceeding and by 270 Rome was supreme in the peninsula.

By 201 Rome had eliminated Carthage as a serious rival. Then the Romans began their successful conquest of the Hellenistic East. This conquest had important results in the intellectual sphere. The Romans were brought into more intimate contact with Greek thought which they had already met in southern Italy and Sicily. In the meantime Greek thought itself was undergoing a change. Stoicism became less dogmatic, less theoretical, and more practical. It was influenced by the followers of Plato and Aristotle. These tendencies are represented particularly by Panaetius (about 185—110) and Poseidonius (about 135-50). The former of these did a great service to Stoicism by popularizing it among the Roman aristocracy.

The Romans were administrative geniuses, but poor philosophers. Their social theory is important, not because it was original, but because it was the thought of world conquerors. M. Tullius Cicero (106-43) may be taken as a typical representative of Roman thought at the end of the Republic. Wordy and conceited as he was, Cicero has a redeeming idealism and love of learning which endear him to us. As a youth he had studied philosophy at Athens and Rhodes and he professed himself an adherent of the New Academy (the contemporary followers of Plato). Actually his philosophy is quite eclectic with strong Stoic leanings. Cicero had no illusions about his own originality. Quite frankly the ideas were borrowed from others. As he wrote to his friend Atticus concerning his works, "They are done without much trouble. I furnish only the words, of which I have plenty." ³⁰

In point of time the first of Cicero's social writings is the

De republic, written between 54 and 51 B. c. About a third of the work has been preserved. It draws freely from Panaetius, Polybius, and Poseidonius. The leading idea is that the state must be founded upon justice and the welfare of the people. The best form of government is a mixed form combining monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements. Cicero considered Rome to be such a state. In the *De legibus*, begun between 52 and 48 B. C. and never completed, Cicero expounds a Stoic doctrine on the ethical basis of law and sketches an ideal law code. In the three books of the *De officiis*, a work written in 44, not long before his death, he discusses in succession, moral goodness, expediency, and the relation between the two. He argues eloquently that mere expediency must never be allowed to triumph over justice. Cicero's chief importance for our purposes lies in the fact that he stated the Stoic doctrine of the natural law in an attractive form and in Latin. The doctrine thus became accessible to many who might otherwise have overlooked it.⁴⁰

In 31 B. c. the Roman Republic came to an end and Augustus began his reign as the first emperor. Many causes contributed to this change. There had been marked social unrest, exemplified by the tragic careers of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, reformers of the late second century. The careers of men like Marius and Sulla had shown that an ambitious military leader could triumph over orderly government. The internal strife of the last century B. C. had made the people willing to accept almost any government which promised peace and stability. A more subtle factor, but doubtless one of the most important, was the influence of the East. As the Romans took over Hellenistic culture, they were inevitably affected by Hellenistic social thought and according to this thought absolute mon

archy was quite the normal thing.⁴¹ Finally the rise of Julius Caesar to supreme power had doomed the Republic.

THE ROMAN EMPIRE

The Roman Empire in the West lasted approximately five centuries (31 B. C.-A. D. 476). Its history is conveniently divided into five periods. First came two centuries of peace and prosperity, from the accession of Augustus to the death of Marcus Aurelius (31 B. C.-A. D. 180). Then followed a century of weakness and revolution, from the accession of Commodus to the accession of Diocletian (180-284). After a century of despotism (284-378), the Battle of Adrianople (378) marked the beginning of a century of barbarian invasions which closed in 476, the conventional date for the fall of the Roman Empire in the West.

When Augustus became emperor he was careful to preserve, as far as his purposes allowed him, the old republican forms. Even the title *emperor* (*imperator*) was a strictly republican term, meaning *general*. In theory Augustus ruled by concentrating in his person the powers of a number of republican magistracies. In actual fact he showed himself willing to share his power with the Senate to a considerable extent. Under his successors there was a constant tendency to concentrate more and more power in the hands of the emperor. It was not difficult to effect this concentration; for the senatorial nobility grew apathetic as time went on and the emperor began to choose his subordinates from the subsenatorial classes or even from former slaves who were therefore more dependent on his good pleasure.

The early Empire was a period of great strength and vigor. The armies suffered few important reverses on the

frontier while at home (Virgil and Horace marked the high point of Latin poetry.) At the same time certain elements of weakness were apparent. While the fortunate few grew very rich, large classes of the poor suffered in extreme misery. Easy divorce and a falling birth rate reflected the breakdown of family life. Enormous gladiatorial combats revealed an extreme cruelty and disregard for human life on the part of rich and poor alike.⁴² The social attitudes and informal social thought of the period in two widely different circles of society are well brought out in the works of Petronius and the younger Pliny respectively.

Petronius, a cultured and pleasure-loving member of Nero's circle, who committed suicide when he incurred the latter's displeasure (A.D. 66), is with probability considered the author of the *Satyricon*, a rambling picaresque tale which is preserved in fragments. The longest fragment contains the unforgettable tale of *Trimalchids Feast*. Trimalchio is a former slave who has become enormously rich in no very honorable way. He gives a dinner for his cronies and indulges his pride by the wildest extravagance. He gives his guests not water but wine in which to wash their hands.⁴³ Everything else is on a parallel scale. But Trimalchio, for all his wealth, is unspeakably boorish and vulgar. His life represents the entire upsetting of the traditional Roman standards of moderation and dignity.

At the other end of the scale is Pliny (62-about 113) as he reveals himself to us in his letters. Although somewhat vain and indecisive, he was admirably cultured and humane. He was loyal and tactful toward his friends, considerate toward his slaves and generous to the poor.⁴⁴ Pliny was systematic and intelligent in his almsgiving. He made over an estate worth five hundred thousand sesterces, with an annual income of thirty thousand, for the support of

dependent children.⁴⁵ When sent as imperial legate to Bithynia, Pliny could not bear to persecute the Christian without writing for special instructions to the emperor.⁴ But, though he carefully investigated the Christian doctrine, he lacked the spiritual insight to see the beauty of the new religion. Pliny had the broad humanitarianism of a Stoic, but also a Stoic distaste for religious fervor and enthusiastic self-sacrifice.

One of the noblest and most attractive representatives of pagan Rome and the last great Stoic writer was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius who reigned 161-180. By an unfortunate fate this large-hearted humanitarian was destined to leave his country in war during most of his reign, first in the Orient and then on the Danube frontier. In the twelve books of his *Meditations* (written in Greek) he set down his struggles to work out a satisfactory philosophy of life. He found his deepest consolation in consciously ordering his life in harmony with the great law of Nature. The social significance of all this is obvious. Here was a Roman emperor explicitly recognizing that his great power was to be exercised not for his selfish interest but in accordance with a higher law. It is unfortunate that he did not have more imitators.

The second of the four periods mentioned above opened in 180 with the accession of Commodus, the unworthy son of Marcus Aurelius. The next century was characterized by the periodic collapse of orderly government, increased pressure on the frontiers, and the breakdown of the economic system. It was a sterile period for literature; but there were important developments in Roman law. In 284 Diocletian became emperor and succeeded in restoring order. He did this by completely revising the Roman system of government. Therefore during this third period

the Empire became a frank despotism of-the oriental type; thus tendencies set in motion long before found their logical culmination. Diocletian also tried to salvage the economic system by an extreme form of government regulation. These vigorous measures were not long successful. The last period opened when the Visigoths crossed the Danube and defeated and killed the Emperor Valens in the Battle of Adrianople (378). For the next century barbarian hosts ravaged the Empire almost at will. Long before the last emperor, Romulus Augustulus, was deposed in 476 the Roman Empire of the West had ceased to have any real significance.

ROMAN LAW

The Romans were not great thinkers; but they were remarkably efficient administrators. Law was Rome's greatest contribution to social thought. Even now their legal principles remain remarkably influential. Wigmore publishes a series of maps showing the legal systems now in force throughout the world and it is interesting to see how all five continents are still dotted with the Roman system.⁴⁷ Roman law therefore deserves treatment apart.

Under the Republic there was no sharp distinction between the lawyer and the statesman in general nor between legal science and general politics. Generally speaking neither the advocates nor the judges were professional specialists in law. This represents about the same stage of legal development which had been reached by the Greeks. However, the first signs of a further evolution had already appeared in the person of the *jurisconsult*. This title was given to certain respected persons who were looked upon as repositories of special knowledge of Roman legal traditions. Before bringing his case before a tribunal, a trial

lawyer would discuss the matter with a jurisconsult. For the trial lawyer would usually be an orator rather than a trained legist and he would feel the need of the other's specialized knowledge.

(The first three centuries of the Empire were the golden age of Roman law. Augustus reorganized the court system; but he also did something still more important from the standpoint of the development of legal theory. He designated certain official jurisconsults and ordered that their opinions should be accepted as authoritative by the courts. Jurisprudence began to develop as a separate science and the law became professionalized. Great names begin to appear. The judge, Salvius Julianus, at the Emperor Hadrian's order, compiled about A. D. 130 the *edictum perpetuum*, "the first published code of practice in any system."⁴⁸ The jurist Gaius (second century) wrote, among other works, the *Institutiones* which proved popular as a textbook and influential on legal thought. During the next generation three great jurisconsults, Papinian, Ulpian, and Paul, were appointed praetorian prefect, an office next in dignity to the emperor himself. All three were remarkable men. Their writings helped put Roman law on a firm basis. In addition Papinian is remembered as a martyr to his professional ideals. It is said that he was put to death because he would not approve the Emperor Caracalla's murder of his brother, Geta.⁴⁹

The third period of Roman law was the period of codification which culminated in the work of the Emperor Justinian who reigned in the eastern Roman Empire, 527-565, half a century after the western Empire had fallen. Justinian's work found expression in four publications. The *Code* (published, 529, revised, 534) was a collection of all imperial legislation to date, considerably modified by

Justinian's own authority. Whatever legislation was not included in this *Code* was automatically repealed. The *Digest* (533) was a compilation of the opinions of the great jurisconsults which were thus given the force of law. Ulpian was the author quoted most frequently; Paul comes next. The *Digest* has been called "the most remarkable law-book that the world has seen."⁵⁰ The *Institutes* (533) was an elementary textbook on law. The *Novels* were a series of new laws passed between the last revision of the *Code* and Justinian's death. In all this work of codification the emperor was assisted by the technical skill and energy of the great jurist, Tribonian (died about 545).

With the codification of the Roman law the Graeco Roman contribution to social thought had definitely ceased. A new Christian culture had appeared long before and had now definitely superseded pagan thought. Indeed even Roman law, the distinctive contribution of pagan Rome, had been considerably influenced by Christianity. The future was to be a Christian future.

CHAPTER 7

THE NEW TESTAMENT

OUR LORD AS A SOCIAL AGITATOR

It is very illuminating to read the charges which the Jews brought against Our Lord as He stood on trial before Pilate. St. Luke has preserved for us the words of the indictment. "We have found this man perverting our nation, and forbidding the payment of taxes to Caesar, and saying that he is Christ a king," and again, "He is stirring up the people, teaching throughout all Judea, and beginning from Galilee even to this place."¹ Evidently, then, the leaders of the Jews looked upon Our Lord as a dangerous radical, a man who created trouble by "stirring up the people," that is, very literally, a social agitator. It was on this basis that He was condemned to death.

We know of course that this was not the deepest reason for the Crucifixion. The deepest reason was Christ's desire to redeem mankind. As the prophet foretold, "He was offered because it was his own will."² We know also that the charge that He preached against the imperial taxation was a barefaced lie. Yet the motives behind the indictment are clear enough. The immediate cause of Our Lord's death was the hatred of a selfish, overprivileged minority. These men felt that their position was threatened by His teaching; so they compassed His death.

The judicial murder of Christ was not due to any unpremeditated outburst of hatred. It was planned long ahead

of time. It was planned because there was a fundamental opposition between Our Lord and His enemies which extended throughout His whole public life. The story of this opposition is recorded in the Gospels in considerable detail and can only be briefly summarized here. Almost at the beginning of His public life Christ earned the hatred of His enemies by expelling a group of business men from the Temple. He made a very public scene and even used physical violence. The incident probably created a nation-wide sensation and was enough to make Christ a marked man. When the pious Nicodemus came to see Him, he found it expedient to come "at night." Hatred followed Our Lord to distant Capharnaum and when He forgave a paralytic's sins, the Scribes and Pharisees secretly classified Him as a blasphemer.³

Time only served to widen the breach. Already at the beginning of the second year of the public life, "the Jews were seeking the more to put him to death" because He disregarded their Sabbath rules and claimed to be the Son of God. The opposition now became more open. Christ's enemies no longer made a secret of their hatred as they had done at the absolution of the paralytic's sins. For example, they charged that He was in league with the devil. We no longer find Our Lord teaching in Judea except at the time of great feasts when the crowds were His protection. Otherwise He taught in Galilee.⁴

In the last year of Our Lord's life the hatred of His enemies was active and unconcealed and is shown by indications far too numerous to mention here. During this period He often found it necessary to avoid not only Judea but Galilee as well and we find Him with His disciples often entirely outside the Holy Land in Phoenicia, for example, or the Trans-Jordan. To this period also belongs

Christ's explicit and very terrible denunciation of the Scribes and Pharisees. He called them "hypocrites," "blind fools," "whited sepulchres," "brood of vipers." Finally He emphasized His repudiation of His enemies by a second cleaning of the Temple.⁵

It is important to realize that the enemies of Our Lord whose hatred cost Him His life were not the Scribes and Pharisees alone. They formed a much larger group whom St. John calls "the Jews" giving the word this special sense.⁶ The group included the Herodians, that is, the politically powerful members of the house of Herod and their followers. These are explicitly mentioned as plotting the death of Christ along with the Pharisees.⁷ Then there were the Sadducees, an aristocratic caste whose strength lay among the priests. On Tuesday in Holy Week both the Herodians and the Sadducees, evidently in connivance with the Pharisees, tried to ensnare Our Lord in speech.⁸ Since Christ had a good deal to say against the rich, many of whom must have been numbered in the above groups, the moneyed men of the time doubtless threw the weight of their influence against Him.

These were the men who put Christ to death as a social agitator. It is very important to remember that it was *as a social agitator* that they hated Him. From their own selfish standpoint this hatred was quite logical; for Our Lord preached a social system which was completely inconsistent with theirs. He came to found a new kingdom, the Kingdom of God, while they represented an opposition kingdom, the Kingdom of This World. There can be no truce between the two. In order to understand the social thought of the New Testament it is essential to understand what these two opposing social systems are and on what principles they are respectively based.

THE WORLD

The word *world* is used in the New Testament in various senses. Thus it may mean the universe or the whole earth or the inhabitants of the earth. But the word also has a special technical sense when it designates the totality of men who refuse to accept God's revelation or to obey His law. This last sense is the one under discussion in the present section.⁹

It is important to note that the world in this sense is not merely a category in the sense, for example, that all red haired persons constitute a category. The world is more than a category; it is a social whole with leadership which gives it unity. This leadership is furnished by Satan, "the prince of the world."¹⁰ The world is a real society, like any other human society; but it is difficult to grasp this fact because it is not a society with a visible organization like a state or a joint-stock company or an athletic club. The king of a human monarchy is a visible person. We can see the political machinery by which he rules his state. But the prince of this world is invisible to human eyes and the details of his organization escape us. But this does not make his kingdom less real. It takes a certain amount of imagination to grasp these facts, but unless they are grasped one cannot appreciate the social thought of the New Testament.

The world is evil. The three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are unknown to it. Therefore the world hates Christ. It is full of scandals and its cares distract one from God. The Holy Spirit will convict the world of sin. Indeed "the prince of this world has already been judged."¹¹ There is an essential warfare between the world and the Kingdom of God. *Essential* warfare is something unexampled in

human history. The nations war with each other, **but** there are always intervals of peace because, although the aims of various human states conflict now and then, they do not conflict essentially. Human states have some purpose of existence other than warfare. But on the contrary Satan's kingdom exists for the precise purpose of opposing the Kingdom of God. Therefore peace between the two, even at intervals, is not to be conceived.

It is consoling to realize that the ultimate victory of the Kingdom of God is certain. The life of Christ makes this inevitable, so that He could say, "Take courage, I have overcome the world."¹² However, this victory will not be finally realized until the Last Judgment. In the meantime the followers of Christ will suffer all sorts of tribulation. "If you were of the world, the world would love what is its own. But because you are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hates you."¹³ This provides a Christian philosophy of history which is beautifully worked out in the Apocalypse: What ever are the obscurities of this book the main message is clear. History is a titanic struggle between the Kingdom of God and the world. The latter will win partial and apparent victories, but the ultimate triumph will be God's.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD

We have already spoken of the Kingdom of God as **the** enemy of the world. It remains to analyze the concept more fully. The Kingdom of God is a real state under its ruler, Christ the King. Christ is king by the double title of creation and redemption.¹⁴ He has legislative, judicial, and executive powers.¹⁵ The Kingdom of God is a spiritual kingdom, but "he would err badly who would deny **that Christ the Man has any authority in the civil sphere since**

He obtained from His Father such an absolute power over created things that everything is subjected to His sway." ¹⁶ The kingdom which Christ rules is the Messianic kingdom foretold by the Prophets. It is to be identified with the Catholic Church, yet it is not quite coterminous with the visible Church since devout non-Catholics may be members when, through invincible ignorance, they do not realize their obligation of becoming members of the visible Church.

The doctrine of the Kingdom of God makes it impossible for the Catholic to accept the totalitarian state or any other form of state absolutism. It is true that Christ definitely recognized the authority of the state in its own sphere, commanding His hearers to render "to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." ¹⁷ But whoever dares to claim that the state can control completely the lives and morals of its citizens, by that very fact denies to Christ the King that "authority in the civil sphere" which the doctrine demands.

The Kingdom of God is a true society, yet it is unique among all societies. It is a kingdom, but it is much more besides. Therefore the similitude of the kingdom must be supplemented by further similitudes to bring out the full reality. One of the most important of these supplementary similitudes is that of the vine and the branches. ¹⁸ Christ is the vine; we are the branches. The branch ceases to have life if it is severed from the vine. Even so our real life, the supernatural life, the life of grace, is totally dependent on our union with Christ. The vine and the branches share one life; this common life makes the vine and the branches an organic unity. So also the one life which we share with one another and with Christ makes us all a single living whole. This unity is so intimate that Our Lord compares

it to the unity among the persons of the Blessed Trinity, praying to His Father "that they may be one even as we are." ¹⁹

The essential element which gives unity to the Kingdom of God is the common supernatural life shared by Christ the King and the members of His Kingdom. This common life is the divine life itself. "As I live because of the Father, so he who eats me, he also shall live because of me." ²⁰ This sharing of the divine life by human beings has enormously important consequences. It means that they are raised to an order of being entirely above human nature. A society made up of such members will not be a merely human society. This is a point of extreme importance. Man, as man, has certain human qualities. He has a body. He has intellect. He has free will. A human society made up of such individuals would have certain qualities which flow from the nature of its members. By their free will members could voluntarily adhere to such a society. By his intelligence a leader could guide the society toward freely chosen goals. One could follow out this line of reasoning and define the possibilities of a natural human society based on man's natural abilities. But the Kingdom of God is more than this. It is a society whose members have been raised by sanctifying grace to the supernatural order. Its members, by grace, can perform actions which lie entirely above the scope of human nature, just as the ability to read and appreciate Aristotle lies entirely above the scope of an earthworm's nature. For a man has no more right—less right, in fact—to share the divine nature than an earthworm has to share the human ability to reason.

This is the fundamental fact which sharply distinguishes the social thought of the New Testament from all merely human systems of social thought. Non-Catholic writers

almost always miss this point completely. They represent Christ as an attractive social leader Who like Mo Tzu taught the doctrine of universal love. They represent Him as One Who like Tiberius Gracchus upheld the rights of the underprivileged against a selfish minority. As a matter of fact He was all this but He was infinitely more. For He founded a society which quite transcends the possibilities of human nature, whose members share with Him a supernatural life, perform supernatural social acts, and are bound to one another and to Him by supernatural ties. This is the fundamental social doctrine of the New Testament. All the other social doctrines flow from it.

CHARITY

Members of the Kingdom of God, in virtue of their supernatural life, become capable of charity. Charity is literally a divine love. After the Last Supper Christ prayed to His Heavenly Father, "that the love with which thou hast loved me may be in them."²¹ This was the effective prayer of the Son of God. Therefore Christians share the love existing from all eternity among the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. Of course one may love God with a human love, as a pagan philosopher might. But this love is not charity. Charity is divine and supernatural. This divine love which binds us to God also binds us to one another. For the charity wherewith we love God is the same virtue as the charity wherewith we love our neighbor. This fact endows human relations with an unspeakable dignity. Unselfish human love is a noble and beautiful quality. A society whose members love one another with such a love is a noble and beautiful society. But think of a society whose members are bound together by a love which is not human but divine!

As we have just said, charity toward our neighbor is

the same virtue as charity toward God. This is logical enough, for when we love our neighbor with the love of charity we love him not precisely in so far as he is a mere human being but in so far as he reflects the divine perfection. From this fact it follows that we must see God in our neighbor. We must, in a sense, treat him as we would treat Christ. This is the explicit doctrine of Christ as recorded in the twenty-fifth chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel. Our Lord is describing the Last Judgment. All humanity is assembled to hear their eternal fate. On that day the blessed will be judged with these words: "Come, blessed of my Father, take possession of the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and you gave me to eat. I was thirsty and you gave me to drink; I was a stranger and you took me in; naked and you covered me; sick and you visited me; I was in prison and you came to me." These words will puzzle the just. When did they perform these services to Christ personally? The answer will be, "Amen I say to you, as long as you did it for one of these, the least of my brethren, you did it for me." In a parallel fashion the wicked will be condemned to "the everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels" because in refusing these services to their neighbor they were refusing them to Christ.

It is scarcely necessary to emphasize the corollaries of this doctrine. The simplest acts of kindness performed out of charity have a dignity, and a reward, which far transcend their seeming importance. On the other hand a person who insults the humblest human being assumes a terrifying responsibility; for he is insulting Christ. The callous indifference of the rich toward the suffering poor, the harsh insensibility of the white man toward the Negro, may be excused by worldly people as at most peccadilloes; but in

the eyes of faith they are shocking sins against Christ personally. The inevitability of this doctrine is clear enough from theology. Although charity and sanctifying grace are not identical,²² they are inseparable. Therefore one who has charity, and shows it by his acts, must inevitably be in a state of grace and fit for heaven. One who lacks charity, and shows this lack by his acts, is ready for hell.

All the human relations of the Christian must be governed by charity. The application of this doctrine to the Christian family is particularly important. The tiny society which is the family must reflect the qualities of the great Kingdom of God. The husband must love his wife as Christ loves the Church. To make this ideal more attainable Our Lord made marriage indissoluble and raised it to the dignity of a sacrament, providing sacramental graces to aid married people in living up to the duties of their state of life. These facts strike the keynote of the Christian attitude toward sex. It is certainly not true that Christianity teaches that sex is degrading. Otherwise Christ would not have raised marriage to sacramental dignity. It is true that Our Lord taught by His precept as well as by His example that unselfish celibacy is a higher good.²³ But, though celibacy is a still higher state, marriage remains a high and holy condition, a state of life in which many have attained to sanctity.²⁴

THE MASS

The doctrine of charity sets before us a very high ideal, but also an ideal which is difficult to follow. However, Christ showed the way by His own life of perfect charity and particularly by His death. "Jesus . . . having loved his own who were in the world, loved them to the end."²⁵ His death on the cross was the best possible proof of His

love. "Greater love than this no one has, that one lay down his life for his friends."²⁶ By dying on Calvary for the redemption of all men, even His enemies, Our Lord set before us an example of perfect charity.

The sacrifice of the cross was an historical event, something which happened many centuries ago. One might be tempted to feel that it was too remote an event to be a vital influence on generations born long after. This difficulty was forestalled by the institution of the Mass. In celebrating the first Mass on the night before He died, Christ consecrated the wine with these words. "All of you drink of this; for this is my blood of the new covenant, which is being shed for many unto the forgiveness of sins."²⁷ By these words the Mass is linked with the sacrifice of Calvary. The Body and Blood of Christ are present in the Holy Eucharist in the act of sacrifice. The sacred Blood "is being shed." The Mass, then, renews the sacrifice of the cross; for it is a true sacrifice in which "that same Christ is contained and is offered in an unbloody manner Who once offered Himself on the cross in a bloody manner. . . . For there is one and the same Victim. He Who then offered Himself on the cross now offers through the ministration of priests. Only the manner of the offering is different."²⁸

The social significance of these facts should be clear. The Mass renews Calvary. The sacrifice of Calvary was the greatest act of charity in all history. When the priest at the altar and the people kneeling around unite in the celebration of the Mass, this mystery becomes theirs. It is the priest's and the people's sacrifice, *meum ac vestrum sacrificium*, "my sacrifice and yours." One cannot worthily participate in the Mass except by sharing the intense charity of Christ which it represents. But the Mass is more than this. It is not only a perfect act of love reproduced before

our eyes. It includes Holy Communion, a great sacrament whose effect is to increase sanctifying grace and charity. The Mass is not a mere ceremony. It is not a mere formula of words. It is a true social action by which charity is multiplied. The more we meditate on the implications of the Mass, the more we must realize how much social doctrine it contains.

"THE CARE OF THIS WORLD AND THE
DECEITFULNESS OF RICHES"

We have spoken about the struggle between the world and the Kingdom of God. Much of this struggle centers about the use of such temporal goods as riches, honor, and pleasure. The teaching of Our Lord about these things is very clear and may be summed up in two propositions. In the first place, such things are good; they are not evil in themselves. In the second place, they are dangers which may easily distract one from the service of God. It is very necessary to attach due weight to each of these propositions. To emphasize one at the expense of the other is to misrepresent the Gospel teaching.

Riches, honor, and pleasure are good in themselves. There is nothing in the Gospels of that dour Puritanism which frowns on innocent amusements. This was not the spirit of Christ but rather the spirit of His enemies. "The Son of Man came eating and drinking and they say, 'Behold a glutton and a wine-drinker.'" ²⁹ Perhaps the best refutation of the Puritans is the wedding feast at Cana, always a difficult passage for Calvinistic divines to explain away. Here we find Our Lord, His Blessed Mother, and the disciples joining with a group of simple peasants in their merry-making. Not only so, but Christ made this the occasion for working "the first of his signs," the miracle of turn

ing water into wine lest the joy of the day should be dampened.³⁰ Wine can certainly be an occasion of sin. One might have expected that Christ would have frowned on its use. There is a lesson for us in the fact that He did not, but used His omnipotence to provide still more wine for His friends.

This, of course, is only one side of Christ's teaching. The other side is that the goods of this world must be used with circumspection, lest they distract one from the service of God. In the parable of the sower the seed sown among thorns represents "the man who listens to the word; but the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choke the word, and it is made fruitless."³¹ The goods of this world are not so much evils as troublesome distractions. A man is a fool to let himself be distracted by such trifles from more important objects.

In discussing the dangers of worldliness Christ lays a great emphasis on "the deceitfulness of riches." Therefore there is a considerable amount of economic doctrine in the New Testament. Our Lord imparted this doctrine not only by His words but by His example. He alone, of all men, was able to choose the circumstances of His birth and He chose to be born in a stable. Almost all we know about the long years of His hidden life is summed up in the comments of His fellow villagers when He revisited Nazareth during His public life: "Is not this the carpenter's son?" and "Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary?"³² These comments are brief enough, but they are very illuminating. Here were men and women who were thoroughly familiar with the external events of the hidden life and they saw in Christ only a plain working man. It was thus that the Son of God lived during by far the greater part of His life on earth. Presumably His life at Nazareth was not a life of

extreme destitution—that was reserved for the public life³³—but it was indistinguishable from the life of the average artisan. Certainly this is an emphatic lesson in detachment from worldly goods.

The teaching of Christ was no less clear. In the Sermon on the Mount He proclaimed the blessedness of the poor in spirit and taught that it is impossible to serve both God and mammon. Christians should not "be anxious about tomorrow" but should put their confidence in the providence of God who feeds the birds of the air and clothes the lilies of the field.³⁴ On another occasion He laid down the principle that "a man's life does not consist in the abundance of his possessions" and drove the point home with the parable of the rich fool who placed his confidence in his wealth and forgot the unpleasant fact of death.³⁵ In the parable of the unjust steward He taught the true use of riches. Wealth should be used in almsgiving. It is not an important thing in itself, but it is a test. The man who can use money in a spirit of detachment proves himself a worthy Christian. "He who is faithful in a very little thing is faithful also in much." The Pharisees "who were fond of money" sneered, probably saying that it was easy enough for a poor man like Christ to talk about detachment, but He proceeded to emphasize His lesson with the parable of the rich man and Lazarus.³⁶ Perhaps the most striking instruction of all was given when the rich young man sadly refused to follow the counsel of voluntary poverty. "With difficulty will a rich man enter the kingdom of heaven. And further I say to you, it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven." St. Matthew notes that "the disciples, hearing this, were exceedingly astonished." Indeed the passage has astonished many good Christians since then. One difficulty arises from

taking the passage too literally. It is obviously absolutely impossible for a camel to pass through a needle's eye and one might therefore infer that it is absolutely impossible for a rich man to be saved. As a matter of fact, however, Our Lord was simply using a proverbial expression of extreme difficulty. The true sense of the passage is that it is very hard, but not impossible, for a rich person to save his soul. The verses which follow the text prove that it is to be thus interpreted. However, at best, the passage is not particularly consoling to the wealthy.³⁷

That the rich can be saved is shown by the example of the virtuous Zacchaeus who was selected by the Savior to be His host. Zacchaeus was "a leading publican and he was rich." But he was a rich man of a very special quality as his words show, "Behold, Lord, I give one-half of my possessions to the poor, and if I have defrauded anyone of any thing, I restore it fourfold." Money is no great temptation to a rich man who can show that degree of detachment.³⁸

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF ST. PAUL

The Apostles, of course, did not teach a social doctrine which was independent of Christ's. They did, however, preserve a number of important teachings which are not recorded in the Gospels and under divine guidance they applied the Gospel teachings to concrete situations in ways which are illuminating for us. None did this more clearly than St. Paul. The great Apostle of the Gentiles was an altogether exceptional man. He was a courageous man of action who boldly took the leadership in the evangelization of the Gentiles; yet he was also a great contemplative in whose writings the mystics of all ages have found endless food for thought. He was a great theologian who handled the deepest mysteries of faith in a masterly manner. Yet

there was nothing cold or distant in this great intellectual. St. Paul was the most human of men who was never too busy to stop and sympathize with the little human worries of his friends. His was a very emotional nature. His epistles run the gamut of the emotions, joy, sorrow, fear, discouragement, anger. Yet this rich emotional nature, which might have betrayed a lesser man into weakness, was controlled by an iron will and directed to the one great goal of St. Paul's life, the love of God and man. Here was a man of broad human sympathies, one well fitted to transmit Christian social doctrine.

Undoubtedly St. Paul's great contribution to the development of social doctrine was his treatment of the Mystical Body. This was essentially the same doctrine taught by Our Lord under the figure of the vine and the branches. All Christians form one organic whole with Christ and draw their supernatural life from Him. St. Paul merely varied the figure. The organic whole which we form with Christ is compared to a human body of which Christ is the Head while we are the members. "We, the many, are one body in Christ." "You are the body of Christ, member for member." God made Our Lord "head over all the Church, which indeed is his body." ³⁹

The doctrine of the Mystical Body brings out very well the fact that in a good society there must be diversity of function. In the Church there will be leaders and followers. There will be some whose means permit generous alms giving, others whose intellects make them successful teachers, others who have a special aptitude for ministering to the sick. Each will play his different role, "just as in one body we have many members, yet all the members have not the same function." This variety of function is desirable, even necessary. "If they were all one member, where

would the body be?" A Church composed entirely of bishops would not be very feasible. "Nay, much rather, those that seem the more feeble members of the body are more necessary." The strength of the body lies not so much in the brilliant qualities of a few outstanding members as in the harmonious cooperation of all its parts.⁴⁰

The result of the fact of the Mystical Body is that we all affect one another. "If one member suffers anything, all the members suffer with it, or if one member glories, all the members rejoice with it." This fact should give each member a sense of responsibility. What I do affects my fellow members. My virtues give them cause for rejoicing; my vices sadden them. This should be a motive for practising virtue and avoiding sin. St. Paul says we should "speak truth each one with his neighbor, because we are members of one another." For one member of the Mystical Body to injure another by lying is as illogical as it would be for one member of a man's physical body to injure another. One must remember too that Christ, the Head, is part of the body and the sins of the members affect Him. St. Paul uses this fact as a motive for purity. "Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ and make them members of a harlot? By no means!"⁴¹

Above all, the doctrine of the Mystical Body is a motive for charity, and this charity must be all-embracing. There is no excuse for attaching importance to distinctions of race, sex, or social condition. "There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither slave nor freeman; there is neither male nor female. For you are all one in Christ Jesus." "In one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether slaves or free; and we were all given to drink of one Spirit."⁴² Conscious of the common

supernatural life which they share, Christians cannot afford to worry about the superficial differences to which the world attaches so much importance. Their mutual love must reflect the unity of the Mystical Body.

To the early Christians this doctrine was more than a beautiful ideal; they practised what they preached. The early community at Jerusalem is an outstanding example of this. "The multitude of the believers were of one heart and one soul, and not one of them said that anything he possessed was his own, but they had all things in common."⁴³ As a result it was said of them, "Nor was there anyone among them in want."⁴⁴ St. Paul gave an example of the same spirit by organizing a collection on a grand scale among the churches he had founded for the benefit of the needy Christians in Judea.⁴⁵

At first glance it may appear that St. Paul's attitude toward women was harsh. Wives were ordered to be subject to their husbands and women were to be silent in church. "Man was not created for woman, but woman for man."⁴⁶ However, there is another side to the story. The silence enjoined on women in church did not mean that they were not allowed to pray and prophesy there.⁴⁷ The sacredness of Christian marriage was a great protection for women; Jewish and pagan husbands were accustomed to divorce their wives for the most frivolous reasons, but the Christian wife had her very definite rights and she could not be divorced. There are many texts to prove that women played a prominent part in the early Church.⁴⁸

St. Paul emphasized Our Lord's doctrine about the wickedness of the world, the great enemy of the Kingdom of God. As a corollary Christians should refuse to participate in worldly activities. "Be not conformed to this world." This, however, does not mean that Christians can remain

entirely aloof from worldly people; for otherwise, as St. Paul justly remarks to his converts, "you would have to leave the world." Rather the principle is to preserve a spirit of unworldliness in the midst of worldly contacts, to "use the world as not using it to the full."⁴⁹

One indication of unworldliness is our attitude toward wealth. St. Paul sums up the Christian position with this advice: "Charge the rich of this world not to be proud, or to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in God, who provides all things in abundance for our enjoyment. Let them do good and be rich in good works, giving readily, sharing with others." Covetousness is a species of idolatry; it is unmentionable among Christians. Freedom from love of money is a necessary qualification for bishops and deacons. The correct principle is summarized in these words, "We brought nothing into the world, and certainly we can take nothing out; but having food and sufficient clothing, with these let us be content."⁵⁰

Since slaves are proclaimed the equals of free men within the unity of the Mystical Body, we might expect that St. Paul would demand the immediate liberation of all slaves. This, however, was not the case. The whole Epistle to Philemon is indeed a beautiful and tactful plea for the liberation of the latter's slave, Onesimus; but ordinarily St. Paul is content to leave things as they are. Slaves are exhorted to be obedient to their masters and the latter, to be kind to their slaves.⁵¹ To understand this attitude of St. Paul it is necessary to draw a distinction between the social ideal which he preached and his immediate practical program. There can be no doubt that slavery, as it existed in St. Paul's day, was inconsistent with the Christian moral ideal as implied by the doctrine of the Mystical Body, but this was an ideal which could not be reached immediately.

To preach the liberation of all slaves at once would have done more harm than good. St. Paul was content, therefore, to lay down the general principles which would ultimately make slavery impossible while as an immediate program he preached charity and mutual understanding between masters and slaves.

The leaders of the Jews accused St. Paul before the Roman procurator Felix of being "a pest and a promoter of seditions among all the Jews throughout the world."⁵² This might have been true from their standpoint, for St. Paul preached Christianity fearlessly in the synagogues. But he was far from being "a promoter of seditions" as far as the Roman Empire was concerned. On the contrary he ordered prayers "for kings and for all in high positions." Furthermore he demanded that Christians be "subject to princes and authorities, obeying commands." The motive of this obedience is the divine authority, "for there exists no authority except from God and those who exist have been appointed by God."⁵³ The Roman Empire of St. Paul's day had plenty of defects, but he had a deep respect for the authority of the state and he did not propose to remedy these defects by a civil revolution. Rather he preached a reformation of morals. Christianity was destined to progress like a seed growing secretly or like a leaven working slowly and invisibly. In the long run this method was successful. The Empire was Christianized not by brute force but by persuasion and the force of good example.

THE CATHOLIC EPISTLES

The epistles of Saints James, Peter, John, and Jude are known as the Catholic Epistles because they were not ad

dressed to particular churches or particular individuals like St. Paul's, but to the Church in general. *Catholic* means *universal*. These epistles contain some important social doctrine.

St. James lacks the theological profundity of St. Paul, but he has a certain homely wisdom which provides a very effective vehicle for practical social doctrine. Perhaps his greatest contribution is his denunciation of worldliness. "The friendship of this world is enmity with God." The corollary is, "to keep oneself unspotted from this world." Unworldliness must imply detachment from riches. St. James' criticism of the wealthy men of his day is forceful. "Come now, you rich, weep and howl over your miseries which will come upon you. . . . Behold, the wages of the laborers who reaped your fields, which have been kept back by you unjustly, cry out; and their cry has entered into the ears of the Lord of Hosts." The uncertainty of life should be a lesson to avaricious business men. "Behold now, you who say, 'Today or tomorrow we will go into such a city, and spend a year there, and trade and make money'; you who do not know what will happen tomorrow." St. James not only blames the rich themselves, but all Christians who show an undue esteem for money by exaggerated respect for men of means coupled with disrespect for the poor.⁵⁴

One way of showing detachment from money is by giving it generously to the poor. Fine words are not enough. "If a brother or a sister be naked and in want of daily food, and one of you say to them, 'Go in peace, be warmed and filled,' yet you do not give them what is necessary for the body, what does it profit?" To refuse to perform the works of mercy is to incur a terrible responsibility; on the other hand charity brings remission of sins. "Judgment is with

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out mercy to him who has **not** shown mercy; but mercy triumphs over judgment." ⁵⁵

St. John also preaches unworldliness. "If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him; because all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; which is not from the Father but from the world. And the world with its lust is passing away, but he who does the will of God abides forever." In bright contrast to the world is the Kingdom of God, the Mystical Body, whose law is love. Perhaps none of the Apostles spoke of love more eloquently than St. John, "the disciple whom Jesus loved." In moving words he preached charity toward God and toward one another. "Beloved, let us love one another, for love is from God. And everyone who loves is born of God, and knows God. He who does not love does not know God; for God is love." Fraternal charity is a test of our love of God. "If anyone says, 'I love God,' and hates his brother, he is a liar. For how can he who does not love his brother, whom he sees, love God, whom he does not see?" To fail in charity is a sort of living death. "He who does not love abides in death." ⁵⁶

Like St. James, St. John insisted that true charity should show itself in the works of mercy. Christian charity demands that we should set no limit on our love. How lacking **in** charity, then, are Christians who refuse alms to their brethren! "In this we have come to know his love, that **he** **laid** down his life for us; and we likewise ought to lay down **our** life for the brethren. He who has the goods of this **world and** sees his brother in need and closes his heart to him, how does the love of God abide in him? My dear **children, let us not love in** word, neither with **the tongue, but in deed and in truth.**" ⁵⁷

THE NEW TESTAMENT

THE UNITY OF NEW TESTAMENT SOCIAL THOUGHT

To understand the social thought of the New Testament it is important to realize its unity. It is not, as so many writers have represented it, a scattered series of maxims about miscellaneous social topics. It is a compact body of doctrine all of whose parts are intimately interrelated. The central thought which gives it unity is the doctrine of the social whole which Christians form, the Kingdom of God, the vine and the branches, the Mystical Body of Christ. This social whole is a true society, but it is a society of a supernatural sort, unified by the one common life which is shared by Christ and all Christians. By this common life Christians are elevated to the supernatural order and they practise supernatural virtues of which charity is the chief.

Over against this supernatural society is another society, the world, of which Satan is king. Satan's kingdom wars against the Kingdom of God which latter society is destined to be ultimately victorious. Christians, like good soldiers of Jesus Christ, will resist worldliness. They will be detached from riches, independent of the things of this world. This attitude calls forth the world's hatred and good Christians will always be persecuted by the world which put to death Christ the King. By their virtuous example and by their teaching Christians will influence human society for the better, but they will not win an immediate victory. The full triumph of the Kingdom of God must wait for the Last Day. Only then will the social ideals of the New Testament be realized in the Heavenly Jerusalem, in which the faithful shall reign in blessedness with the Lord God for ever and ever.

CHAPTER 8

FROM THE FATHERS TO THE MEDIEVAL SYNTHESIS

THE EARLY CHURCH

The social thought of the New Testament is a complete and well-rounded body of doctrine; but as time went on this doctrine had to be developed, defended against attacks, and applied to constantly changing social situations. As a result Christian social thought has never been static. Its development has kept pace with the changing times. Like an organism the social teaching of the Church continues to develop and grow.)

This development is not very noticeable in the first two centuries of the Church's history. There was no attempt to treat Christian social doctrine systematically. For the most part writers were content to quote particular New Testament teachings as need arose. In the *Didache* (about A. D. 80-100) the Church and the world are contrasted as the "way of life" and the "way of death." Pope St. Clement, writing to the unruly Corinthians probably in the last decade of the first century, urges them to remember the doctrine of the Mystical Body and adjust their differences. The *Shepherd of Hermas*, probably written about the middle of the second century, presents the Christian doctrine on riches in vivid allegorical language. The second-century apologists contrast the purity of Christian morals with the decadence of pagan society. Christians could boast that the

Empire had no more loyal subjects than they, but the boldness of the martyrs before their judges showed that they were clearly conscious of the limits of civil authority.¹

By the beginning of the third century Christianity had circled the Mediterranean with the probable exception of the extreme West.² With this expansion a certain formality of organization replaced the informality of early days. New problems arose. One of these problems concerned the status of rich Christians. How could their wealth be reconciled with the hard sayings of the New Testament about the dangers of money? The Empire was generally prosperous at the time and there were probably a good number of rich Christians in the thriving commercial city of Alexandria. Clement of Alexandria (about 150-215) attempted to solve the difficulty in a tract on the salvation of the rich usually cited under its Latin title, *Quis dives salvetur*? He discusses the Gospel incident of the Rich Young Man.³ The passage, says Clement, must not be understood too literally; rather we must search out its "hidden meaning." The counsel, "Sell what thou hast," must not be taken at its face value. "It is not what some hastily take it to be, a command to fling away the substance belonging to him and to part with his riches, but to banish from his soul its opinion about riches, its attachment to them." This readiness to explain away the literal sense in favor of some hidden meaning was characteristic of the Alexandrian Fathers. Clement does not seem to distinguish between the evangelical counsel of literal poverty which applied to some and the precept of detachment which applied to all. In other places he counsels generous almsgiving, simplicity of life, the prompt payment of wages, and condemns interest on money.⁴

The outstanding Christian writer of the mid third cen

tury was St. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage. Born about 210 of a well-to-do pagan family, he gave a striking example of unworldliness by distributing all, or nearly all, of his goods to the poor upon his conversion. After a brilliant career as bishop he was martyred in 258 during the Valerian persecution. The financial system of the Empire was becoming rapidly demoralized in St. Cyprian's time. Internal wars had destroyed commerce and depopulation was a pressing problem. With his characteristic energy the saint organized the resources of the Church for the relief of the poor. At the same time he inveighed against the selfishness of so many of the rich. "They think they possess resources when they are rather possessed by them, slaves of their own wealth." Christians should have a different philosophy of life. They should be unworldly by detachment from money, by abstention from gladiatorial games and the corrupt theater of the time, and by heroism in the face of persecution.⁵

At the beginning of the fourth century the African rhetorician Lactantius discussed the Christian social ideal. This ideal implies, not communism, but the reign of charity. Slaves must not be treated as slaves but as brothers. Militarism is to be condemned. By generous almsgiving the harsh inequalities between rich and poor are to be removed.⁶

The conversion of the Emperor Constantine in 312 and his proclamation of the freedom of the Church in the following year brought a great change in the status of Christian social thought. Christianity was no longer a proscribed religion and it began to have an obvious influence on public life. The economic problem loomed large at this period. The decline of the economic system had been temporarily halted by the vigorous measures of Diocletian and by the

peace which his reorganization of the Empire brought. But by the middle of the fourth century the situation had again become desperate. The masses were impoverished, while in sharp contrast a fortunate few still enjoyed large fortunes.

St. Basil (329-79) paints a touching picture of the poor man forced to sell his children into slavery or else see his whole family perish from hunger while at the same time the rich man lives in unnecessary luxury. What will the latter say on the Day of Judgment? He spends his money on useless extravagances while the poor are naked; he lets his grain rot while the poor starve. To the Rich Young Man he addresses the pertinent question, "If what you said was true and you have kept the commandment of love from your youth giving to each as much as to yourself, how, I beg, do you have this wealth of resources?" Just as large fish swallow smaller ones to be swallowed themselves in turn by still larger fish, so the rich oppress the poor only to be ruined by still wealthier men in the heartless economic strife of the day. The solution is generous almsgiving. St. Basil himself set a brilliant example. Outside his episcopal city of Caesarea he set up an institution for the sick and poor which was so large that it might well be called "a second city."⁷

St. Ambrose (about 340-97) repeats the message of St. Basil by whose writing he was much influenced. St. Ambrose is important less for the originality of his thought than for the power of his striking personality. He gave up a brilliant career in the civil service to enter the service of the Church. He set an outstanding example of charity, spending his ample fortune on the poor. In his tract *On Naboth* St. Ambrose says that the crime of Achab who slew Naboth to gain possession of the latter's field was be

ing repeated daily in his own time. "The story of Naboth is old in time but daily in practice. For who of the rich does not daily covet the goods of others? Who of the wealthy does not strive to drive off the poor man from his little acre and turn out the needy from the boundaries of his ancestral fields? Who is content with his own? What rich man's heart is not set on fire by a neighbor's possession?" He goes on to develop this thought in terms of the evils of his own day with a fiery intensity of conviction which can leave no reader unmoved.⁸

The most eloquent preacher of the Church in the East was undoubtedly St. John Chrysostom (died 407), priest at Antioch and later Archbishop of Constantinople. His forceful eloquence spared neither wealth nor position and made him many enemies. Even Catholic scholars have sometimes criticized his language as being unnecessarily provocative. His enemies brought about his banishment and the saint died in exile under harsh treatment. St. John has a good deal to say about the evils of wealth. "Riches are not sinful in themselves; but it is a sin to withhold them from the poor and use them badly." Of course the poor commit sin as well as the rich, "but no poor man commits as many crimes through want as the rich commit to gain more and to keep what they have." St. John made his thought very specific. Both at Antioch and at Constantinople he endeavored to show that the rich had enough superfluous goods to relieve the existing poverty of the masses.⁹

St. John Chrysostom was very much moved by the thought that in withholding alms from the poor we are withholding them from Christ. "*I was hungry and you did not give me to eat.* What heart would not be touched by these words, though it be a heart of stone? Your Lord is walking about hungry and you live sumptuously and, what

is worse, in the midst of your luxury you can bear to neglect Him. Yet He does not ask much of you, only some bread to relieve His hunger. While He is walking about freezing with cold, you in your silk garments do not even look at Him, you show no sympathy, but coldly hurry by." ¹⁰ Thus vividly did St. John Chrysostom present to the wealthy men of his day their duty to relieve the sufferings of the poor.

ROMANS AND BARBARIANS

In 376 the Visigoths crossed the Danube; in 378 they defeated the Romans in battle at Adrianople, slaying the Emperor Valens. In 410 something still more alarming happened; under Alaric the Visigoths sacked the city of Rome itself. To men of the fifth century this was an almost incredible event. For eight centuries no enemy had set foot in Rome and the city was considered impregnable. The sack of the city was a rude awakening. Men could no longer refuse to face the fact that the old order had changed, Rome was no longer unchallenged mistress of the western world. In their despair some blamed Christianity and "Rome has perished in the Christian days" was used as an accusation against the Church.

To meet this objection St. Augustine wrote his book, *On the City of God*. The author was a remarkable man. Born in 354 at Tagaste in northern Africa of a pagan father and a devout Christian mother, he completed his studies successfully and became a teacher of rhetoric at Tagaste, Carthage, Rome, and Milan. During his early years Christianity had little attraction for him. He adhered to Manicheism and was later influenced by Neo-Platonism. At the same time his personal life was marred by excesses. The tears of his mother, however, and the influence of St.

Ambrose at Milan finally conquered his turbulent spirit and he was baptized in 387. From this time on he was a changed man. Returning to Africa he became a priest and then Bishop of Hippo. His life was marked by holiness, great charity toward the poor, and ceaseless literary activity. He died in 430 while the city of Hippo was being besieged by the Vandals.

The composition of *On the City of God* occupied thirteen years (413-26). The first ten books are defensive. The misfortunes of Rome are not due to Christianity. The fall of empires is familiar enough in history and is adequately explained by the moral corruption which saps the power of states and which is encouraged by paganism. In deed the Romans might well thank the influence of Christianity that their fate was not worse. This answered the direct charges of his adversaries, but St. Augustine was not content to rest his case here. Therefore in the remaining twelve books he rises to a general philosophy of history in which the relations of worldly states to the Church in the divine economy are explained. The City of God (*Civitas Dei*) is contrasted with the Earthly City (*Civitas terrena*). Under a different figure it is the familiar Gospel contrast between the Kingdom of God and the world. St. Augustine considers in turn the origin, the development, and the ultimate fate of the two cities, devoting four books to each of these three topics. "The two cities have been made by two sorts of love; the Earthly City, by love of self even to the contempt of God, the Heavenly City, by love of God even to the contempt of self." The parallel development of the two cities is traced with numerous illustrations drawn from sacred and profane history. Finally St. Augustine treats the final destinies of the Earthly City and the City of God. The former finds its logical outcome in the punishments of hell,

while the latter reaches its consummation in the perfect society of heaven.¹¹

Salvian, a priest of Marseilles who flourished in the fifth century, faced the same problem as St. Augustine but found a somewhat different solution. In his tract *On the Government of God*, written between 439 and 451, he argues that the troubles of the time are not due to any in difference on the part of God. Rather they are divine punishments for the vices of the Romans, Christians as well as pagans. The invading barbarians are more deserving of God's favor because their morals are relatively pure in spite of their complete or partial ignorance of Christian truth. In spite of a tendency to exaggerate, Salvian is a valuable witness to the social conditions of his time.

With the definitive fall of the Roman Empire in the West, conventionally dated 476, the decline in intellectual activity became more marked than ever. Nothing else could be expected in view of the troubled condition of the time. The writings of the next few centuries therefore contain less social thought of a formal and systematic nature. But if men had little time in those troubled days to speculate about social theory, they at least had to have some sort of laws if organized society was to go on at all. In fact the foundation of the new mixed states of Romans and barbarians made questions of law acute and there was a considerable development of new codes. These codes are probably our best source of early medieval social thought.

One important principle very generally accepted at the period is the personality of the laws. That is to say, both Romans and barbarians were usually governed by their own laws, even though living side by side in the same kingdom. As a result two series of codes grew up together for **the** two classes of citizens. Naturally one was influenced by

the other and in the process the well-developed Roman law was bound to contribute more than the less formal and detailed laws of the barbarians.

Among the new barbarian kingdoms the one destined to have the greatest influence on European law was the Visigothic kingdom which centered in Toulouse (419-507) and afterwards in Spain (507-711). In 506 the Visigothic King Alaric II gave his Roman subjects a law code, the *Lex Romana Visigothorum*, often called the *Breviary of Alaric*. It was a codification of the Roman law, less scientific than the work of Justinian a few years later at Constantinople, but very influential for all that. In the meanwhile there developed a law code called the *Antiqua* for the Visigothic subjects of the kingdom. By the reign of Receswinth (649-72) the Roman and barbarian populations had fused to such an extent that it was possible to put into force a single code applying to both, the *Leges Visigothorum*. This was very strongly influenced by Roman law, including Justinian's code.

It is unnecessary to enter into details here, but in general the new kingdoms developed legal systems which were influenced by Roman law, some more, some less. The Lombards in Italy (568-774) were an exception in that they applied their own law to Lombards and Romans as well. But even in this case the influence of Roman law began to be considerable from about the middle of the seventh century. The important thing to remember is that legal studies remained alive even during the darkest period of the early Middle Ages and formed a bridge by which Roman ideas, mixed of course with Germanic elements, were transmitted to later medieval Europe and thus to modern times.

Parallel with this development of civil law there was a development of canon law, the law of the Church. Church

law was a gradual growth. Its immediate basis was custom, the acts of councils, and the decrees of the Popes. Naturally the Holy Scriptures were an important influence. In the development of canon law the prestige of Roman legal thought made itself felt and the former took over many principles and rules from Roman law. As time went on individuals tried to systematize the canon law and these private enterprises often gained the approval of official sanction. One of the strangest episodes in legal history is the general acceptance of the "False Decretals," a collection of genuine and forged laws which appeared about the middle of the ninth century and gained great prestige. Three centuries later all previous collections were superseded by the *Decretum* of the monk Gratian. Although this was the work of a private individual, it systematized the existing law of the Church in such a skillful and logical manner that it was soon accepted as official.

THE RESTORATION OF ORDER

Parallel with the development of civil and canon law there were certain events of a political nature which were destined to have a very important influence on the course of social thought. During his long reign Charlemagne (768-814) succeeded in bringing most of Christian Europe under his sway. He also conceived the bold idea of reviving the Roman Empire; for that was the real significance of his coronation at Rome by Pope Leo III in the year 800. In the Middle Ages the word *emperor* did not mean merely an unusually powerful king. It meant a successor to the Caesars with all that this implied. The monarchs of ancient Rome had been lords of practically the whole known civilized world. In a parallel fashion medieval theory demanded that the emperor should be the one supreme ruler

over the temporal affairs of Christendom, just as the pope was supreme in spiritual matters. Thus the one Christian people had two rulers, each supreme in his own sphere. The distinction which loomed large in men's minds was not the distinction between two societies, Church and state, but rather the distinction between the temporal and spiritual guidance of the one universal Christian people. In actual practice, of course, it seldom happened that an emperor was powerful enough to assert his authority over all Christendom. Nevertheless the theoretical ideal of the one emperor loomed large in medieval social thought.

The unified empire of Charlemagne did not long survive him and the ideal of the one empire suffered a consequent eclipse. Otto the Great of Germany (936-73), however, felt himself strong enough to revive the idea and he was, crowned emperor by Pope John XII in 962. From this time the Holy Roman Empire survived, at least in name, until **1806.**¹²

It was almost inevitable that conflict should develop between the emperors who claimed a universal authority over the temporal affairs of Christendom and the popes whose power over spiritual matters was equally wide; for there was naturally a certain territory in which the two authorities would appear to overlap. The controversy came to a head in the struggle between Pope St. Gregory VII (1073-85), often referred to by his baptismal name Hildebrand, and the Emperor Henry IV (1056-1106, crowned emperor, 1084). The crucial point at issue was lay investiture. Certain ecclesiastics, such as bishops and abbots, enjoyed temporal authority and as civil lords logically came under the authority of the sovereign. At the same time they were of course subject to the pope as Church dignitaries. By claiming the right to invest such persons with the in

signia of their office, the sovereign was in a position to control their election and thus to interfere in spiritual matters. The struggle between the pope and the emperor on this point was not completely decisive, but on the whole the former emerged victorious. The period ushered in by the pontificate of Hildebrand saw the papacy at the apex of its power.

The controversy occasioned an extensive literature in which partisans of the pope and the emperor set forth their respective arguments. The former group, the papalists, argued that the pope was concerned with the spiritual welfare of man which is a higher good than the temporal welfare with which the emperor was charged. The pope could brook no interference from the emperor and enjoyed a certain superiority over the latter. On the other hand the imperialists were fascinated by the Roman theory of empire. The emperor, they claimed, was supreme and must play his role free from ecclesiastical interference. In the heat of controversy there were naturally exaggerations on both sides. The whole question looms large in medieval social thought.¹³

It is significant that the struggle between the papacy and the Empire centered about investiture; for investiture is a feudal ceremony and feudalism furnished the framework about which medieval society was built. When the barbarian Germanic tribes overran Europe they found the leading Roman citizens typically established on great rural estates. Dependent on the lords of such estates were not only the slaves whom they owned but also the *coloni*, men technically free but economically dependent on their masters and prohibited by imperial legislation from leaving the land which they tilled. A point significant for the future was that this system combined land-holding with depend

ence on a powerful lord. In an age when central government was weak and disorder was widespread there was no place for the small landowner. To obtain security he was forced to place himself under some powerful man, giving up a measure of freedom in return for protection.

When the Germanic tribes conquered Europe they took over this system, but they also added features of their own. It was an old custom among the Germans that fighting men should place themselves under some powerful leader forming a band—Tacitus calls it a *comitatus*—about him. This arrangement engendered an honorable relationship between leader and follower who owed each other an extreme loyalty. As the Germanic tribes became settled they took over the theory of the connection of land-holding and personal dependence and applied it even to the nobility. Gradually this became the normal way of holding land. A powerful lord would give one of his noble followers a piece of land in return for certain honorable services of which the most important was service in war. Of course the piece of land so granted would not be merely a small farm. It would normally be a large estate tilled by serfs, the successors of the slaves and *coloni* of the late Roman Empire. The person receiving the land, the *vassal* as he was called, had a right to the protection of his lord, a very important advantage in an insecure age. As time went on the relation between lord and vassal tended to become hereditary. The land held by this system was called a *fief* and the system itself was known as the feudal system.¹⁴

Feudalism was the background of medieval social thought just as the city-state was among the Greeks and just as the national state is among ourselves. This latter point is important to remember. From the beginning of the

eleventh until well into the thirteenth century the feudal system was at its height and this period was precisely the vigorous age of medieval thought. The rise of national states implied the break-up of the feudal system and was contemporary with the decline of Scholasticism.

In the Middle Ages men did not think of themselves primarily as Frenchmen or Germans or Italians. Their most urgent loyalties were not national loyalties. Men were loyal to their feudal superiors and then to Christendom in general as represented by the Church and more vaguely by the Empire. Thus medieval loyalties were both narrower and broader than modern national patriotism. The latter sentiment, which seems so natural to moderns, would have been hard for the men of the Middle Ages to understand. An other idea which would have seemed strange to them is the idea of liberty in the modern sense. In medieval times when men talked about "liberty" they usually meant, not an abstract general ideal, but liberty from certain forms of oppression. It would perhaps be true to state that the place occupied by liberty in modern thought was occupied by justice in medieval thinking. Except perhaps in the service of the Church, men did not expect to rise far above the status in which they were born. The serf was content to remain a serf. But all men were very sensitive about their rights. The whole feudal system was a vast complex of mutual rights and duties. The stability of society demanded that these rights and duties should be scrupulously observed. Justice in the concrete was expressed by this observance and such justice was embodied in law. Law in turn did not mean the arbitrary enactment of some legislator (as it does to so many moderns) but rather the expression and the application of the necessary principles of natural law to

concrete instances. Order in medieval society rested superficially on the feudal system, but in a deeper sense it rested on the idea of justice.¹⁵

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE SCHOLASTIC AGE

Even during the worst confusion of the Middle Ages systematic education never died out. Under the Roman Empire there had been schools of rhetoric, often financially aided by the state, which were open to all who could pay tuition. These schools furnished the normal educational opportunity for Roman citizens. In Italy they continued during the Middle Ages. It is interesting to note that this tradition of lay teaching persisted in these schools and this tradition is connected with the fact that in the later Middle Ages the Italian universities were the leading centers of such secular subjects as law and medicine. In Gaul the rhetorical schools died out by the sixth century and their place was taken by institutions of a different character, cathedral schools and monastic schools in which the diocesan and regular clergy respectively were trained.

In the latter half of the seventh century the monks of Ireland were doing the best intellectual work in the western world. In the first half of the eighth century Anglo-Saxon monks were doing important intellectual work in England and the historical writings-of the Venerable Bede (d. 735) are good even by modern standards. Under Charlemagne there was a real renaissance of learning on the Continent. The great emperor had a genuine love of learning and there is something touching in his none too successful attempts to learn to write. His excellent palace school was distinguished by the presence of such scholars as the Anglo-Saxon Alcuin (735-804) and the Italian Paul the Deacon (eighth century, dates uncertain).

The disorders which followed the death of Charlemagne cut short this promising revival of learning but the cathedral schools and the monastic schools continued their work. By about the year 1000 a new intellectual movement was gathering momentum and this time the revival was destined to be permanent. Not only was scholarly work increasing in quantity; the quality also was improving. During the early Middle Ages learning was frankly derivative and scholars were content for the most part to collect and popularize such remnants of the learning of antiquity as they could find. But by the eleventh century men had outgrown this servile following of the ancients. They were thinking through afresh the fundamental problems of theology and philosophy. The outlines of the Scholastic system had appeared.

The new learning called forth a new organization of teaching and before the end of the twelfth century the first medieval universities had appeared, the direct ancestors of our great modern universities. As is true of the development of many other important institutions, it is hard to assign an exact date for the founding of the first of these institutions. As a matter of fact the universities just grew. The various masters teaching in Paris, for example, would unite for the benefit of their common interests much as the members of any trade would form a trade guild. They would naturally set academic standards for the admission of new members into their body and from this point organization continued until a recognizable university appeared.

Social thought did not occupy a very prominent place among the subjects studied at the medieval universities. Probably this is due to the character of the times. It is probably a valid generalization that social thinking is most active in times of social change. When society is in a stable

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equilibrium men are likely to take their social principles for granted. The later Middle Ages until, say, the second half of the thirteenth century, were such a period. However, there were two fields of medieval study in which social thought was prominent. One was law; the other was ethics and moral theology.

The study of law flourished in Italy for reasons mentioned above and Bologna became the leading center of legal studies. The essential improvement introduced by the Bolognese jurists was their return to the scientific study of the principles of Roman law as embodied in Justinian's code. They disregarded the modified Roman law which was embodied in the medieval codes and went back to the classical sources. The chief interest of the jurists at Bologna was the textual interpretation of Justinian's code. For this purpose they wrote glosses, that is, explanatory notes, for which reason they are known as the Glossators. Their creative period extends from the early twelfth to the mid thirteenth centuries. In the meantime the study of canon law also flourished at the universities. In fact the study of both civil and canon law proved so popular as a preparation for a successful career in Church or state that they probably had an adverse influence in the long run on more theoretical and scholarly studies. The rivalry between vocational courses and the liberal arts is no exclusively modern problem.

The Scholastic philosophers and theologians who studied social problems were themselves influenced by legal principles. The jurists already taught that political authority rests ultimately on the people, that this authority must be used by the ruler to maintain justice and not to serve his own whim, that civil and canon law are two coordinate and equally valid legal systems, and that customary law

has a natural basis. The canon lawyers taught the prece-
dence of the spiritual over the temporal authority and the
theory that authority is only rendered necessary by the na-
ture of man vitiated by sin. The Scholastics were also in-
fluenced by Cicero and Seneca among the pagan writers
on social questions and, among the Fathers, chiefly by St.
Augustine.¹⁶

One of the first of the Scholastics to write on social prob-
lems was Manegold of Lautenbach who flourished late in
the eleventh century. Superficially considered his *Book to*
Gebhard (Liber ad Gebehardum) is just one of the tracts
occasioned by the controversy between Pope Gregory VII
and the emperor. But the book is distinguished from similar
works because it rises to a general theory of civil authority.
Against the theory of the divine right of kings it opposes
the contractual theory. Authority is delegated to the ruler
by the people through a sort of contract. As a general rule
people must respect the ruler's orders, but if he clearly fails
to keep his part of the bargain, then they are free. "When
he who is chosen to restrain the wicked and defend the
good, has begun to nourish evil in himself, to oppress the
good citizens, and to exercise toward his subjects a most
cruel tyranny from which he ought to defend them, is it
not clear that he justly falls from the dignity given him and
that the people are not bound by his authority and domin-
ion, since he has taken the initiative in breaking the con-
tract (*pactum*) through which he was put in power?"¹⁷

The twelfth century saw the production of a considera-
bly more important work, the *Polycraticus* of John of
Salisbury. The author was born in Salisbury in England
between 1115 and 1120. He studied on the Continent un-
der the leading teachers of his time, enjoyed the friendship
of St. Thomas a Becket and of the future Pope Adrian IV,

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and died in 1180 as Bishop of Chartres. In his *Polycraticus* (a name which may be translated *The Statesman's Book*)¹⁸ John draws an analogy between the state and the human body. The soul is the clergy, the head is the prince, the heart is the senate, the sides (*latera*) are the prince's counsellors, the eyes, ears, and tongue are the governors of provinces, the armed hand is the army, the unarmed hand is the civil service, the feet are the farmers and artisans. The author has sage observations to make about these various ranks and takes the opportunity to satirize the evils of his day. John has nothing to say about a social contract. The authority of the ruler comes from God; still if he abuses his power the people may get rid of him. "It is sometimes proper that the tyrant, being a reflection of evil, should even be put to death." The *Polycraticus* teaches quite clearly that kings are subject to the Church and it is from the latter that they receive their power. "This sword the prince accepts from the hand of the Church."¹⁹

St. Thomas Aquinas is the greatest of the Scholastics in social theory as in other fields of thought. He was born of one of the most noble families of Italy at Rocca Secca about the beginning of 1225. His early education was under the Benedictines at Monte Cassino, after which he entered the University of Naples. In 1244 he joined the Dominicans not without violent opposition from his family. At Paris and then at Cologne he studied under St. Albertus Magnus (1206-80), a profound scholar who had a great influence on the young student. From 1252 to 1259 St. Thomas taught at Paris, receiving the degree of Master in the mean time. In 1259 Pope Alexander IV summoned him to Italy and he remained in that country until 1268 teaching in various places and acting as theological adviser to succes

sive popes. He taught at Paris 1269-72 and at Naples 1272-74. St. Thomas died March 7, 1274 on his way to the Council of Lyons whither he had been summoned by Pope Gregory X.

St. Thomas discusses social questions in various works. A tract *On Buying and Selling* (*De emptione et venditione*) was written in 1260. About 1268 he commenced a commentary on the *Politics* of Aristotle using William of Moerbeke's new translation, but the work was left incomplete after the commentary on the first two and part of the third books had been written. *On the Governance of Rulers* (*De regimine principum*) was addressed to the King of Cyprus, probably Hugo II, and seems to have been written about 1265-67. Only the first book and about three and a half chapters of the second book are the work of St. Thomas.²⁰ *On the Governance of the Jews* (*De regimine Judaeorum*) was written 1269-72 to the Duchess of Brabant in answer to various socio-economic questions. Finally the great *Summa theologica* gives the mature thought of St. Thomas on various issues of a social character. The second of the three parts of the *Summa* is particularly fertile in social doctrine. This part dates from the saint's last Paris period, 1269-72.

St. Thomas teaches that society is natural. "It is natural that man should live in company with his fellows." This follows from the necessity of the division of labor, not only of physical labor but of intellectual work. The very gift of speech shows that man is a social being in a deeper sense than the ants and bees. This being the case, it follows that "there must exist among men some means of governing the group." Of all forms of government monarchy is the best because it is most unified and thus better adapted to secur

ing that "unity which is **called** peace." Similarly, tyranny is the worst of all governments because the misrule of one man is most efficient in its evil operation.²¹

It is clear that St. Thomas' "ideal government was not a despotic monarchy in which the exercise of authority would depend on the arbitrary whim of one man but rather a monarchy in which the king's power would be balanced by the participation of others in government. In the saint's own day the authority of the feudal kings was very definitely limited by their powerful vassals. We have also St. Thomas' explicit statement that in the ideal government "many rule according to their ability," that is, in various official positions under the king, while the common people play their part "in as much as the rulers can be chosen from the people and the election of rulers belongs to the people." St. Thomas believed in popular sovereignty but not in direct popular rule. Finally, he paved the way for a legitimate nationalism by his recognition of the state (*ciuitas*) as a perfect society.²²

Some of the most exalted pages of the *Summa* are devoted to charity. It is the most excellent of the virtues. In deed there can be no true virtue without charity. One of the effects of charity is peace. It is important to note that in Thomistic thought peace is not the mere absence of discord. It is something positive, not something negative. Even war can be justified only by the intention of attaining a truer peace. Another of the effects of charity is the performance of the works of mercy. The social importance of the doctrine of St. Thomas on charity is obvious enough.²³

St. Thomas defended the right of private property which, however, is a right limited in various ways. It is limited, for example, by the obligation of giving alms un

der various circumstances. The saint did not have a very flattering opinion of business. "Business (*negotiatio*) in it self involves a certain turpitude." It is an advantage to a city if it can be self-sufficient; for then it will not be dependent on trade. A city which must engage in much for eign trade is open to all sorts of vices. Greed is awakened, mutual confidence is destroyed, men grow soft in mind and body, and civic life is "necessarily" corrupted. As one reads this description one wonders what St. Thomas would have thought of our modern capitalistic civilization.²⁴

THE MEDIEVAL SYNTHESIS

The height of the Middle Ages, say, the eleventh, twelfth, and most of the thirteenth centuries constituted a distinct historical period with its own characteristic qualities which distinguish it from what preceded and what followed. In particular there were certain dominant ideas about the ideal society which were reflected (imperfectly, it is true) in society itself. These ideas formed a logical and self-consistent whole which may be called the medieval synthesis.

Most of the ideas which entered into the medieval synthesis have already been mentioned in this chapter; but it may be well to recapitulate them at this point, to try to view them as a whole, and evaluate them. In the ultimate analysis the medieval synthesis rested on two bases, the Catholic Faith and the feudal system. These two bases, however, were not regarded as being of coordinate importance. Christianity was something essential; an ideal society must be necessarily Christian. Feudalism, on the other hand, was accidental. It was the form of political organization which happened to prevail in **the** Middle Ages. It **was** **the** system to which **men were** accustomed and **the natural**

background for their social thinking. But men realized that it was dispensable; there could be a good society without feudalism.

The Catholic Faith taught that man finds his true fulfillment, not in this life, but in eternity. Men unite in society for spiritual as well as temporal ends. The service of God and the attainment of heaven require social cooperation. It did not occur to medieval people that religion should be a private affair. Therefore the Church existed, a great universal society; and as a society it taught its doctrine, administered its sacraments, and disciplined its members. Medieval social thought is unnecessarily puzzling to many moderns because they do not realize that in those days the framework of society was determined by the Church at least as much as by the political authority. For example, international law, social legislation, public poor relief, were every bit as much a concern of the ecclesiastical, as of the civil, rulers. i)

Secondly, there was the feudal system. This was an essentially hierarchical organization of society. From the emperor down to the meanest serf every man had his place and this place determined his rights and duties. It was a static society which did not leave as much room for individualism as democracy, for example, does. On the other hand it assured a certain stability and that is what men needed in the troubled days in which feudalism grew up. It is important to remember also that society was essentially agricultural and the prevailing economy was a barter economy. When town life and the use of money began to be important, medieval society began to lose its characteristic aspect.

How shall the medieval synthesis be evaluated? The answer depends largely on one's point of view. For those who

believe that man's destiny is simply to enjoy life in this world, the issue is already decided. The frankly other worldly viewpoint of medieval thought condemns' it in their eyes. But for those who believe that man has an eternal destiny there is much to be said for the medieval synthesis which accepted this fact as axiomatic.

Enthusiastic but unrealistic Catholics have often idealized the Middle Ages unduly. This is a mistake. There were grave defects in medieval society. A large proportion of the population were held in serfdom. The elementary nature of the economic system resulted in a low average standard of living. Technological progress was slow. The essential principles of public health were not well understood. The feudal system was not stable enough to prevent frequent wars. There were abuses in the Church itself. The purity of the Faith was sullied by widespread superstition and superstition in Catholic thought is as truly a sin as unbelief.

On the other hand the social idealism of the Middle Ages reached heights which have not been attained since those days. The modern period can boast no second St. Francis. The Poverello of Assisi had an enthusiastic love of the poor beside which the attitude of the best modern philanthropy appears prosaic and cold. However romantic and impractical his unworldliness may appear to modern eyes, the fact remains that he was able to put it into practice in his own life and to inspire others to do the same. Nor was such idealism accidental. It was based on ideas which were generally accepted. If the ordinary man was not able to attain to St. Francis' standard of sanctity, at least he was willing to recognize in theory that the life of St. Francis was more logical than his own because it was a better expression of their common faith. The reader of medieval history con

stantly runs across social idealism in unexpected places. St. Stephen, the powerful King of Hungary, hard-bitten warrior that he was, allows himself to be manhandled by a group of beggars to whom he was distributing alms. The noble St. Elizabeth of Thuringia crowns a life of charity by stripping herself of her possessions and performing the most menial services for the abject poor. St. Thomas Aquinas, rich, noble, and the greatest intellect of his age, turns his back on a brilliant career to become a begging friar. An age which could produce such idealism was a glorious age.

ISLAM

While the medieval synthesis was being developed in Europe another type of society originated in Arabia and before long spread throughout a wide area. This was Islamic society, made up of the followers of Muhammad. The prophet himself was born at Makkah (Mecca) about 571. After a childhood spent in poverty his marriage to the widow Khadijah at the age of twenty-five gave him a certain affluence. Muhammad now found the leisure for the solitary meditation he enjoyed and about 610 he convinced himself that he was the recipient of a special divine revelation which he was called to preach to the people. At first converts came slowly and persecution was their lot. In 622 the prophet decided to transfer his activities to the more congenial atmosphere of al-Madinah (Medina) and the years of the Muhammadan Era are reckoned from this event. Success was now more rapid and before Muhammad died in 632 his religion, Islam, had gained a wide acceptance among the Arabs.

The Koran is the sacred book of Islam. This curious volume is divided into 114 surahs (chapters) some of which

were composed at Makkah and some at al-Madinah. The former tend to be short and full of prophetic fire; they make up about two-thirds of the Koran. The latter are longer and contain a great many laws and regulations. The Koran borrowed freely from the Old Testament, also from the New Testament and to a certain extent from the Rabbinic writings and the Apocryphal Gospels. The description of heaven and hell shows parallels to the sacred books of Persia. The Moslems regard the Koran as a text book of law as well as theology; consequently its prescriptions are basic in Islamic social thought. The ordinary moral faults are forbidden, as are also gambling and the use of wine and pork. Polygamy is tolerated. Almsgiving receives considerable emphasis. Orphans are provided for and the manumission of slaves is encouraged. In general Islam fostered a sense of socialresponsibility, but only toward fellow, believers. It is worth remarking that the Koran is still the sacred book of about one-sixth of man kind.

After the death of Muhammad Islam spread rapidly. The prophet himself was succeeded in the leadership of Islam by the four "orthodox caliphs." Under the second of these, 'Umar (634-44), Syria, Persia, and Egypt were conquered. Then came a lull; but the Umayyad caliphs (661-750) who made their capital at Damascus resumed the conquests and by 715 all northern Africa and Spain had been subjugated with parts of northwest India and Central Asia. In 750 the Umayyads were succeeded by the 'Abbasids, the famous Caliphs of Baghdad. Under the new caliphate a change took place in the character of the Islamic state. The earlier conquests had been primarily conquests of Arabs over non-Arabs. Now, however, the bulk of the empire was for the first time converted to Islam and

religion rather than nationalism became the unifying force in the state. In the meantime the Arabic language spread throughout the empire, first as a learned language and then as the language of the people. Like many other conquerors in history the Moslems learned a great deal from the conquered peoples. From about the middle of the eighth to the middle of the ninth centuries a large number of Arabic translations appeared of Persian, Sanskrit, Syriac, and Greek works. Through these translations the Moslems became acquainted with Hindu astronomy and mathematics and with Greek philosophy and science.²⁵

After about 850 the original intellectual work of the Moslems themselves became important. Their activity was especially important in mathematics, astronomy, geography, philology, and law, as well as in Islamic theology. Their discoveries were gradually transmitted to Christian Europe and so passed into the general stream of European culture. For example, our modern "Arabic" numerals, really Hindu in origin, came to us through the Arabs. From the standpoint of social thought Islamic developments in law are particularly important (The basis of this law was of course the Koran and early tradition) But the principles to be derived from these were both too brief and too inelastic to suffice for a complicated and developing society. It therefore became necessary to extend these principles by the use of juristic reasoning. The Roman law was known to the Arabs through the subjects of the Eastern Roman Empire who fell under their sway and this law doubtless had some influence. Thus the Moslems developed a system of law which still ranks as one of the great legal systems of the world.)

Among the social thinkers of Islam the one best known to the West is undoubtedly 'Abd-al-Rahman ibn-Khaldun

(1332-1406). Although his life falls outside the chronological limits of this chapter he may for the sake of unity be appropriately considered here. The fame of ibn Khaldun as a social thinker rests on his *Muqaddamah*, a sort of foreword to a famous history which he wrote. Hitti goes so far as to call him "the real founder of the y."science of sociolog²⁶ Viewing society from the point of a historian, ibn-Khaldun was interested in the causes which lead to the rise and decay of states. In his analysis he gives due consideration to geographic and climatic factors, but he is no less aware of psychological forces and he emphasizes '*asabiyah*, the spirit of group loyalty which was so well developed among the early Arab tribes. According to his view social phenomena do not take place at random. Definite sequences are discoverable and these repeat themselves. A frequently quoted saying of his is that the past and future are as similar as two drops of water.²⁷ It is ibn-Khaldun's effort to derive general laws which entitle him to be considered not only a social thinker but specifically an embryonic social scientist.

CHAPTER 9

THE RISE OF BOURGEOIS NATURALISM

1274-1543

THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

It is difficult to trace in detail the causes which broke down the medieval synthesis. Many parallel movements were involved simultaneously and these movements were interrelated in a complex way, so that it is not always easy to distinguish cause and effect. However, recent historians tend to attach an increasing importance to economic factors and these factors may well serve as a logical starting point for our description. It is hard also to assign a definite date when the medieval synthesis began to dissolve. Great historical movements usually arise obscurely, gradually take shape, and then fade away just as gradually. To set a date for the end of medieval thought is frankly to be arbitrary, but dates are convenient and even necessary in cases like these. After all, a chapter has to begin and end somewhere. So we may take the death of St. Thomas in 1274 as the end of an era. Of course the new forces which destroyed the medieval synthesis were in motion long before that date, but it was toward the end of the thirteenth century that they began to be dominant.

Probably the most basic fact in the economic revival of the period was the development of interregional trade. It is hard to date this revival because **it was so gradual**. Even **during the worst confusion of the early Middle Ages such**

trade never wholly died out. But certain it is that during the period covered in this chapter interregional commerce grew and developed in a remarkable manner. This growth of trade was largely conditioned by political factors; as society became more stable communication became easier and more secure. However, technological progress also played its part. In classical times horses' harness tended to choke the animal, but by the tenth century a better form of harness and the shoeing of horses had been introduced, while from the twelfth century on better roads began to be built.¹ More sensational still was the era of discovery which began at the end of the fifteenth century. In 1492 Columbus discovered America. In 1497 Vasco da Gama began his famous voyage which traced a new route to the Far East. Thus vast new areas were opened up for colonization and commerce. The causes underlying these discoveries were obscure and complex but here again advance in technology helped. The mariner's compass was generally used in Europe by about 1400. Columbus and Vasco da Gama had a fairly good means of measuring latitude (the cross-staff or the astrolabe) but we cannot but marvel at the hardihood of these early navigators who sailed unknown seas with, no good way of measuring longitude, for the essential instrument, the chronometer, was not invented until

Medieval towns, in the early period, were little more than military camps or the residences of some bishop or some important noble and his court. But with the growth of commerce merchants flocked to the towns which lay on important routes and the towns grew. It is significant that the new class was called the bourgeoisie (French *bourg*, town). The growing towns needed an increased population on the farms to support them. All during the period

covered in this chapter the population of Europe continued to grow. Even the ravages of war and the terrible Black Death of 1348-49 were only temporary setbacks.

The growth of trade led to an increase in wealth. More over this new wealth was of a different character. In the Middle Ages the typical wealthy man was the rich land Owner. But now the demands of business led to an increase in coined money. Even so, the demand exceeded the supply. By the fifteenth century Europe was suffering from a money famine which was gradually relieved by the opening of new mines, by improved technological methods, and by the importation of gold and silver from Africa and particularly from America at the very end of the period considered in this chapter. In the meantime the shortage of coin was partly compensated for by the development of credit. The rise of modern banking dates from this period.

As every economist knows, a salient characteristic of currency, as distinguished from other forms of wealth, is its fluidity. The increase in coined money and the development of banking and credit made possible many forms of financial operations which could hardly have been carried out when wealth existed in less liquid forms. Men singly or in groups of partners launched vast business enterprises and often accumulated large fortunes. This was a genuine capitalism in the modern sense, although of course it did not pervade society as completely as it does in modern capitalist nations. This early capitalism also reflected the same spirit of bold enterprise, ruthlessness, and greed which is so familiar in modern times. Among the fields which early adopted the capitalistic form of organization were banking, international commerce, mining, and the textile industry. Probably the chief reason why the process did not proceed

further and more rapidly was **that the** supply of liquid capital was slow to accumulate.⁸

Late medieval capitalism was partly balanced by **the** craft guilds. Such guilds had a long history. For example at Ravenna they can be traced back continuously to the sixth century. It is almost certain that these very early guilds developed out of similar associations existing under the late Roman Empire. In the period now being considered the guilds had their greatest development. All the bakers in **a** given town, for example, or all the goldsmiths or all the furriers would form a craft guild. They would be given a monopoly of their particular craft and would be held responsible for training apprentices, setting just prices, and maintaining standards of quality. Catholic social thought has always been sympathetic to the guild idea. It encouraged widely distributed ownership and helped to develop a sense of social responsibility. However, the guilds finally yielded to capitalism. They were too local in their scope, too traditional in their methods, too limited in their resources. The craft guilds therefore either went down in the struggle with capitalism or themselves became groups of capitalists as was the case with the *Arte delta Lana* (cloth makers) of Florence.

THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL STATES

Feudal society was dominated by the nobility. As capitalism arose it was not likely that the new bourgeoisie would long tolerate the unquestioned dominance of an other class. It was easy for the bourgeoisie to gain control of the towns; that was their own special field. However, this was not enough. Men engaged in international business demanded control in a wider field. One early development

was the formation of leagues of cities. The most striking example was the Hanseatic League of North German cities which flourished from the middle of the thirteenth to the middle of the fifteenth centuries. The League was so powerful that it hardly fell short of being an independent state. These leagues of cities were important, but in the long run the bourgeoisie, the new middle class, attained its political objectives more effectively through representation in national assemblies. In Castile and Leon the cities began to be represented regularly in the Cortes in 1250. Not long afterwards there were similar developments in Germany, in Catalonia, and in Aragon. Representatives of the middle class in England (rural landowners rather than town dwellers in this case) entered Parliament in 1265. In France representatives of the towns were called to the national assembly of 1302. The new assemblies were in no sense representative of the common people. The latter testified their resentment by a long series of uprisings scattered throughout the period. "The common man was unrepresented, therefore he rebelled." ⁴

In England Parliament developed after centuries of vicissitudes into a truly representative body, but in France and then in Spain the national assemblies gave way before a new institution, the strong, centralized monarchy. There were various causes for this new development. During the Hundred Years' War a strong national spirit developed in France and England. A fluid currency facilitated taxation and enabled the king to build up a strong national treasury. The bourgeoisie tended to support the king against the nobility which hampered his power. The national assemblies themselves were centralizing influences. The revived interest in Roman law, which was the law of a well centralized empire, provided a theoretical basis for these de

velopments. The strong state, national in territory and nationalistic in spirit, which is so characteristic of the modern world, grew up in the period being considered.

Some of the most significant social thought of the time centers around this new nationalism. A very articulate spokesman was Niccolo Machiavelli. Born in Florence in 1469, Machiavelli held various political offices in the city during the period (1494-1512) when the Medici family was out of power, rising to a position of considerable prominence. The return of the Medici caused his downfall and banishment. During his period of enforced leisure Machiavelli capitalized on his political experience to write a number of works of which the best known is *The Prince*. After some minor political activity in his declining years he died in 1527.

The Prince is a rather shocking book. The author advocated the attainment and retention of power through the liberal use of force and deceit. Machiavelli believed in a strong army. "A prince should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other thing for his study, but war and its organization and discipline." Nor must the ruler be too scrupulous about using the power at his command. "A prince, therefore, must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful." But force must alternate with craft. "A prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when doing so would be against his interest." In short a prince is "often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion." ⁵

The real significance of Machiavelli lies not so much in the immorality of his principles as in the motives for this immorality. For the author of *The Prince* was an intensely patriotic Italian. His diplomatic dealings with France when

he was in the service of Florence showed him the advantages of a strongly centralized national state. France had been ravaging Italy during the Italian Wars and Machiavelli's patriotism was deeply wounded. He wanted to see a united Italy and it seemed to him that the only feasible way of attaining that result was through the action of some exceptionally able, crafty, and powerful leader. The end seemed so overwhelmingly important that the use of any means would be justified. When he gave vent to his own intense and quite immoral nationalism Machiavelli was expressing the spirit of his age. Herein lies his importance in the history of social thought.⁶

THE DECLINE OF ECCLESIASTICAL POWER

The rise of strong national states naturally had an adverse effect on the power of the Church; for the newer nationalism could brook no rivalry. This was brought out dramatically in the struggle between Philip the Fair of France and Pope Boniface VIII. The immediate cause of the quarrel was the taxation of Church property by Philip. The Pope forbade lay governments to levy such taxes or the clergy to pay them. The dispute called forth a polemical literature in which the respective rights of both parties were discussed and it is important in the history of social thought for this reason.

Pope Boniface reasserted the medieval theory in all its vigor. The spiritual and temporal power are symbolized by two swords but both are under the control of the Church. The former is to be wielded by her; the latter, for her. "If the earthly power goes astray it will be judged by the spiritual power." Finally, "to every human creature we declare, say, define, and pronounce as a matter strictly necessary for salvation, to submit to the Roman Pontiff."⁷

The case for the new nationalism was forcefully expressed by Pierre du Bois (about 1255-1322), a lawyer in the service of Philip the Fair. His principal works in the present connection were the *De abbreviatione* (about 1300) and the *De recuperatione* (about 1306), the latter being the more important. Pierre du Bois proposed that there should be another crusade. But before undertaking such a venture Christendom must have internal peace. How is this to be brought about? The answer is a little startling in its naive audacity. Let the king of France simply bestir himself and he can bring all Europe under his sway without too much trouble. The pope should realize that ecclesiastical meddling in political affairs saps the spiritual vigor of the Church; therefore he should be ready to hand over his temporal power to the French king. Pierre sketches an interesting picture of the king's function. The government is to be highly centralized in the hands of the ruler. But although the king has all power within his realm he is yet bound by law and must rule in the interest of the people. The work of Pierre du Bois, contrasting so sharply with the doctrine of Boniface VIII, shows how the secular spirit of nationalism was advancing.

At the very time the *De recuperatione* was written a situation was developing which humiliated the papacy before the French king in a way that must have gladdened Pierre du Bois' nationalistic heart. In 1305 the Archbishop of Bordeaux was elected pope as Clement V. The new pontiff soon moved his residence to Avignon where successive popes resided until 1378. The Avignon popes were very much under the control of the French monarchy and the period is often called the Babylonian Captivity of the papacy.

Among those who attacked the political power of the

popes at this time was the great poet Dante (1265-1321). He was a partisan of the imperial party and when the Emperor Henry VII made his expedition to Italy in 1310-13 to assert his power, Dante published the *De monarchia*. The main thesis of this work is that the emperor's power is independent of the papacy. The emperor receives his authority as the legitimate successor of the Roman emperors and not from the pope as the coronation ceremony might imply. The Roman Empire was divinely sanctioned as is proved by its striking success which could not have been unless God had willed it. Christ, by accepting His death sentence from a Roman official, approved the authority of Rome as legitimate! There is something curiously anachronistic about Dante's thought. In his day the real issue was not between the pope and the medieval empire but between the pope and the new national states.

One of the Avignon popes, John XXII (1316-34) had a famous quarrel with Emperor Louis IV (1314-47) which called forth an extensive controversial literature. The papal claims were set forth in a rather extreme form by Augustinus Triumphus (1243-1328). According to this enthusiastic proponent of the papacy, the pope has direct authority over all earthly states, kings and emperors rule only by his permission, their law is valid only by his consent.

John XXII had some difficulty with the left wing of the Franciscan order over the question of evangelical poverty and he condemned as heretical the proposition that Christ and the Apostles possessed no property "even in common."⁸ It is therefore not surprising that among his most doughty opponents was a Franciscan, William of Ockham (about 1300-49). William was summoned to Avignon in 1324 and punished for certain doctrinal errors. He fled to the court of Louis IV and defended the latter's position

against the pope in a series of tracts. The basis of Ockham's thought is essentially medieval in that he accepted the independent authority of pope and emperor each in his own sphere. But he objected strenuously to the papal assertion of authority over the Empire. The emperor receives his authority, not from the pope, but from the electors who represent the people and speak for them.

A more original and significant thinker was Marsilio of Padua (about 1270-1342). There were few dull moments in Marsilio's life. At various times he was a canon at Padua, a soldier of fortune, and Rector of the University of Paris. In 1324, together, it seems, with John of Jandun, he published the *Defensor pacis*. The book helped the authors to gain the favor of Louis IV and he loaded them with honors. The real significance of the *Defensor pads* lies less in its contribution to the contemporary controversy between pope and emperor than in its general social theory. Society originates from the necessity that men cooperate to fulfill certain needs. But human nature is not always ready for cooperation. Man is selfish and this fact leads to conflict. Reason teaches that there are certain selfish activities which are injurious to the common good and must therefore be restrained. On this fact Marsilio bases a rather utilitarian morality with little emphasis on divine sanctions. It is the function of the state to restrain those human activities which injure the common good and thus to preserve public order (*tranquillitas*). This public order is a rather broad conception. It implies the state's duty to supervise the division of labor—a distinctly socialistic idea. The legislative power resides in the whole community or an effective majority (*valentior pars*) thereof; but in practice in a large state the law-making-authority must be delegated. The laws passed by the legislative power are administered

by the executive (*pars principalis*). Marsilio's social theory leaves little authority to the Church. At times he seems to regard it as little more than a moral police force to supplement the authority of the state by the fear of hell. The *Defensor pacis* shows how far naturalism had penetrated social thought in the early fourteenth century.⁹

The residence of the popes at Avignon, so detrimental to the authority of the Church, came to an end in 1378; but almost immediately a still more tragic situation developed, the Great Schism which lasted from 1378 to 1417. During this period, first two, and then three, rival lines of popes existed and even loyal Catholics found it difficult to decide which represented the legitimate successors of St. Peter. During the confusion the thought quite naturally occurred that a general council would furnish the only feasible way of restoring unity. The Council of Pisa (1409) was conspicuously unsuccessful; it was this council in fact which was responsible for the third line of rival popes. The Council of Constance (1414-17) had better success. The Great Schism was ended in 1417 with the universal recognition of Martin V as pope. In the meantime, however, a new theory was gaining ground. A general council had cleared up a grave emergency in the presence of rival popes. Therefore it began to be suggested that a general council is superior to the papacy and is the ultimate source of authority in the Church. This *conciliar theory*, as it is called, is important in the history of social thought. It was a misapplication to ecclesiastical affairs of the orthodox doctrine that in the state the people are sovereign. Before it dissolved, the Council of Constance passed two decrees, one asserting the supremacy of a general council, the other providing for future councils at stated times. The only important council held under the latter provision was the

Council of Basel (1431-49). But by this time the conciliar movement had begun to collapse. Its real strength had been in the achievement of unity and when the prelates assembled at Basel proceeded to elect an antipope in 1439 they alienated what popular sympathy remained.

The mental struggles of a good Catholic face to face with the conciliar theory is shown in the life of Nicolas of Cusa. Born in 1401, he appears to have studied with the Brothers of the Common Life at Deventer, then at Heidelberg, Padua, and Cologne. He was an able canonist, a competent humanist, and a distinguished scientist.¹⁰ Nicolas attended the Council of Basel as advocate for one party in a disputed archiepiscopal election, remained to take a prominent part in its deliberations, and finally deserted the conciliar party to make his peace with the pope. He was made a cardinal, played an important part in winning Germany from the conciliar party, and finally died in 1464.

From the standpoint of social thought the principal works of this versatile man are his *On Catholic Concord* and *On the Peace of Faith*. The former was written in 1433 while he was still active at the Council of Basel; the latter in 1453 after he had made his peace with the pope. *On Catholic Concord* is a moderate statement of the conciliar theory. The pope indeed is the head of the Church, but his authority is partly of human origin, the result of historical evolution. "That primacy by which the Roman Pontiff is first among all the churches comes partly from men and the canon law."¹¹ A general council which meets certain conditions is superior to the pope, Nicolas contended, because it represents the entire body of Christians and spiritual leadership like leadership in the state rests on the consent of the governed. The author applies a somewhat analogous theory to the Empire and the emperor's

authority. *On the Peace of Faith* takes the form of a vision. Nicolas is shown the court of heaven where the sad condition of the human race is being discussed. The decision is to hold a sort of congress of religions to unify all men under one faith. The meeting is held, representatives of all the peoples of the world attend, explain their difficulties against the Church, and receive satisfying answers. The representatives disperse to bring the message to their respective peoples. The work is socially significant because it reveals the author's belief that unity can be attained through negotiation in a conciliatory spirit. Also it gives him the opportunity to make acute observations on the various national psychologies.

THE RENAISSANCE AND SECULAR THINKING

The rise of the bourgeoisie played its part in the development of the new national states with their fresh spirit of nationalism. As these states grew in strength the authority of the papacy declined. But this was not all. The bourgeoisie made a more direct, if more subtle, attack on the medieval synthesis through their influence in the realm of ideas. Nor is this surprising. The spirit of big business does not tend to other-worldliness. So the rise of early capitalism was accompanied by the advance of secular thinking.

The secular spirit of the age found its expression in the Renaissance, a brilliant literary and artistic movement which was roughly contemporaneous with the period discussed in this chapter. The Renaissance was by no means primarily due to the rise of the bourgeoisie. It represented, as modern scholars have come to realize, the flowering of artistic tendencies which were developing during the period of the medieval synthesis. It was enormously influenced too by humanism, the revived interest in the art, the

literature, and the whole spirit of pagan antiquity. Yet the Renaissance was largely conditioned by the new capitalism—and this in two ways. The bourgeoisie took over to a great extent the patronage of art and literature which belonged rather to the Church in the previous period. Quite naturally the tastes of the patron influenced the artist. Secondly the spirit of the new capitalism was essentially this-worldly. It found something congenial in the revived paganism. It encouraged an atmosphere of secularism. This was the atmosphere in which the Renaissance developed and from which it took its tone.

The secular spirit of the Renaissance shows up clearly in the literature it produced. There was a revived interest in human nature. Writers were interested in man, not as a child of God and heir to heaven, but as an individual struggling with the problems of this life. Petrarch (1304-74), the real father of the Renaissance, wrote about his Laura, a real flesh-and-blood heroine in contrast to the somewhat unreal ladies of medieval romance. As the Renaissance advanced and as men became more familiar with the writings of pagan antiquity* these works gained an increasing influence on the thought of the humanists. While remaining nominal Christians they began to seek their real philosophy of life in the classics. The Academy at Florence united a group of kindred spirits, admirers of Plato, and reached its most brilliant period when Lorenzo the Magnificent was in power (1469-92). Meetings were held at Lorenzo's palace in Florence or at his country villa. Philosophical questions were discussed in the manner of the Platonic dialogue, the anniversaries of Plato's birth and death were ceremoniously observed, and a vigil light was kept burning before his bust.

Not only did the content of Renaissance literature di

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verge from the medieval; the language changed as well. The Latin of the Middle Ages was abandoned for a Latin which consciously imitated the style of the classics or, more significantly still, writers began to use the vernacular, the language of everyday life, better adapted to the portrayal of the real emotions of real people. The "invention" of printing around the middle of the fifteenth century (of course it was really invented in China many centuries earlier) helped to bring the new literature to a wide reading public.

The art of the Renaissance reflects the secularism of the age just as clearly as the literature, if less explicitly. Artists began to seek their subjects in pagan mythology or from among the real men of their own day. When they did select religious subjects they portrayed them with a lack of genuine religious spirit. The Renaissance set the artistic standards which still prevail in the western world; but there is a growing tendency among critics to question the value of these standards and among artists to seek their models elsewhere. Renaissance art was emotional rather than deeply realized. It often lacked what the Germans call *Innigkeit*, inwardness. It was largely bourgeois in spirit.¹²

Among the men of the Renaissance who wrote on social topics the greatest is undoubtedly St. Thomas More (1478-1535). In many ways More was not typical of the Renaissance; it was scarcely typical for a humanist to be a saint. Yet in other respects he was the child of his age. He had the classics at his finger-tips, his thought shows few traces of Scholastic reasoning, and it cannot be denied that his masterpiece, the *Utopia* contains passages which one is surprised to find in the works of a saint.

More was a successful lawyer and statesman who finally rose to the post of lord chancellor of England. In 1515 he

was in **Flanders** on a diplomatic mission and it was there **that he began the** *Utopia* which he finished the following year. Flanders provides the fictional setting for the book. **In** the opening pages More tells how one Peter Giles introduced him to a great world traveller named Raphael Hythloday. Incidentally, Giles was a real person; Hythloday of course is an imaginary character. The book is in form a conversation between More and his two friends. **In the first part** of the work Hythloday sets forth various ideas **he** has picked up on his travels bearing principally on crime **and** punishment; in the second part he describes the land of Utopia itself.

The criminology of the *Utopia* is distinctly interesting. Hythloday considers the question why theft is so common in **England** in spite of the fact that thieves are punished by death. He answers that the death penalty is too severe a punishment for theft. Instead of putting minor criminals to death, the state might better employ them on public works. "Neither ther is any punishment so horrible, that it can kepe them from stealyng, which have no other craft, wherby to get their living."¹³ The social causes of crime are considered in some detail. The unemployed are almost driven to theft if no proper provision is made for them.

These interesting criminological doctrines are overshadowed by the description of the happy island of Utopia which gives the book its name. An extreme form of communism prevails in this blessed land. Under strict government regulation all useless expenditures are eliminated. Because the standard of living is simple and because all share the work, no one is overburdened with too much **labor and the** people have time for intellectual pursuits. **"A greate multitude of every** sort of people, both men

and women go to heare lectures, some one and some an other, as every mans nature is inclined." The inhabitants "detest and abhorre" war. Instead of fighting they try to circumvent their enemies by shrewd diplomacy. "They rejoyse and avaunt themselves, if they vanquishe and op presse their enemies by craft and deceite." If this fails, they hire foreign mercenaries, chiefly the Zapoteles who are "hideous, savage, and fyerce." If these are killed off it is no great loss to the world. "Nor the Utopianes passe not how many of them they bring to destruction." Only as a last resort do the Utopians themselves take up arms. There are slaves in Utopia, but they are only persons who have merited loss of freedom through their misdeeds. In addition "an other kinde of bondeman they have, when a vile drudge being a poore laborer in an other country doth chuese of his owne free wyll to be a bondman among them." But these are treated "almoste as gentellye" as free citizens and are not kept in servitude against their will. Marriage is held in high esteem, but divorce is allowed. The sick are treated with extraordinary care, but euthanasia is recommended for hopeless invalids.¹⁴

It is hard to know how seriously More intended the *Utopia* to be taken. In the closing paragraph he says that many things in Hythloday's narrative occurred to him which "semed to be instituted and founded of no good reason," but of course this is only a literary device. Hythloday's name itself bears a suspicious resemblance to the Greek *hythlos*, nonsense. More had quite a reputation among his friends, it seems, for jesting "with no change of countenance." It is clear enough also that the *Utopia* is intended to represent a successful social experiment conceived, on the principles of natural law and not in the light of Christian revelation. It is thus certainly not More's

absolute ideal. But all in all the book does give a good picture of a humanist conception of a good society. Though they eschewed luxury the Utopians were excellent business men and lived comfortably. They showed the spirit of good humanists in their love of learning. In their treatment of the Zapotes they were far from showing the universal spirit of love which Christianity demands. Utopia was a sane, reasonable, rather unidealistic, and quite bourgeois commonwealth.¹⁵

THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

It is important not to overestimate the significance of the Protestant Reformation. After all, the Protestants retained many or most of the traditional dogmas of the Church. It represented therefore a less complete break with the medieval synthesis than did the growing spirit of naturalism which rejected revelation altogether. One who examines the thought of the twentieth century impartially will readily admit that naturalism has been far more influential than Protestantism in the long run. Nor was religious revolt a novelty. The reformers of the sixteenth century were merely the most dramatically successful in a long line of dissidents which included the Albigenses of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Lollards of the fourteenth, and the Hussites of the fifteenth.

The Reformation was not exclusively a religious movement. In part it was due to the rise of the new centralized states. Both rulers and people resented any interference in their affairs from beyond their borders. Rulers welcomed the chance to nationalize church property and thus increase their power. It is significant that the various Protestant sects quickly divided into national bodies. It would be dishonest to deny that grave abuses existed in the Catholic

Church and that these scandalized pious people. But these abuses have often been exaggerated by partisan historians. At least ten canonized saints died between 1500 and 1517, the conventional date of the beginning of the Reformation.¹⁶ At the opening of the sixteenth century factors were at work which would have led in any case to reform from within the Church.¹⁷

The nationalistic tendency which entered into the Reformation made the movement less significant religiously but, to that extent, more significant socially. Protestants in different countries felt of course a moral unity with one another as fellow Christians. But they had abandoned the concept of a visible universal Church and this fact removed an important barrier to nationalism. Protestants recognized of course the subordination of national rulers to the law of God, but by denying the power of the papacy they denied the existence of a visible power on earth competent to interpret this law as between nation and nation. Protestant writers have represented the Reformation as an important step in the direction of human freedom. It is obviously true that the movement removed men from the control of Rome; but did they not at the same time fall under the more complete domination of the newer nationalism?

The question did not long remain purely theoretical. As the Reformation progressed the map of Europe became a curious patchwork. Groups of Catholics were living under Protestant rulers and groups of Protestants under Catholic rulers. Such rulers with mixed populations could scarcely dodge the issue of religious toleration. This issue implied a fundamental question about the power of the state. Did civil authority extend to the control of a citizen's

conscience? What were the limits, if any, to the power of the ruler over his subject?

Martin Luther (1483-1546) faced the question from the beginning of his career as a reformer, but his answer was inconsistent. At first he stood for religious freedom. It is wrong to use force to spread religion. If a ruler insists on trying to constrain his subjects they must resist passively, but not actively. In 1523 he was most emphatic in asserting that religion is entirely a personal matter. To try to control it by force is not only unjust but futile. Yet in this same year he called on the public authorities to prohibit the public celebration of Mass. In 1524-25 there was a very serious peasant revolt in Germany. In April, 1525 Luther wrote a pamphlet admitting the reality of the injustices which led to the revolt, but condemning the revolt itself on the principle that revolution against constituted authority is never justified. A month later he wrote another pamphlet in which he sided completely with the princes and in most violent language called upon them to suppress the revolt by the most extreme measures. From this time on Luther increasingly advocated the use of force in religious matters. In his last years he was fairly consistent in this view, though not completely so. On the whole then Luther's influence was distinctly on the side of state absolutism.

John Calvin (1509-64) shared none of Luther's scruples. He was quite clear in his belief that the state had the duty of spreading the true religion through the use of force. Nor was this a mere abstract theory; Calvin approved the execution of the heretic Servetus at Geneva in 1553. Men, according to Calvin, must obey their governments, be they just or unjust. Even under the most iniquitous tyrant men

have no alternative but obedience because evil kings, like all kings, derive their power from God. There was only one exception to this broad principle. If a ruler tries to impose the wrong religion on his subjects they must refuse to obey. There seems to be little room for civil freedom in such a system as this; yet Calvinism in its subsequent history was closely associated at times with movements in the direction of liberty. How is this to be explained? Partly perhaps by accidental factors. Partly, it may be, by democratic features in Calvinistic ecclesiastical organization; for the hierarchy was abolished and laymen took an active part in church management. Finally the early Calvinists, like the early adherents of many another religion, had a sweeping spirit of enthusiasm and a firm belief in their predestination which made them feel self-confident in the face of kings and princes. Still, the paradox remains that a religion whose founder taught an extreme form of state absolutism had a certain important influence in the opposite direction.

AN ERA OF CHANGE

Change is the dominant note in the era, 1274-1543. It was an age of transition. Historians differ as to the most appropriate year to select as a conventional division point between medieval and modern times; but all would agree that it should fall somewhere within this period. In 1274 the world was definitely medieval; in 1543 it was just as definitely modern.

Changes took place in all the principal fields of human activity. There was a shift from a rural, barter economy to an economy which was monetary and urban. National loyalties replaced feudal loyalties and a loyalty to the international society of Christendom. Many men transferred their allegiance from the universal Church

to sects organized on national lines. Gothic art gave way to the Renaissance. A keen interest in the classics replaced the medieval enthusiasm for Scholastic theology and philosophy even among Catholics. The power and prestige of the nobility declined and kings centralized their governments with the support or acquiescence of the powerful new bourgeoisie. Even warfare changed radically. The thirteenth century was the culminating period of medieval cavalry, the mounted knights and men-at-arms. Then infantry began to regain its importance and artillery developed rapidly.

Changes in social thought kept pace with these other developments. The keystone of the medieval synthesis had been supernaturalism. In medieval thought human society was oriented toward heaven. But by the sixteenth century a naturalistic view of life had made enormous progress. This remains true in spite of the devotion of the Catholic saints and the religious enthusiasm of the reformers. This growing naturalism meant a new orientation of society. As is the usual case with great historical movements, this growing naturalism is hard to explain adequately. But the more one studies its origins, the more the conviction grows that the influence of the bourgeoisie was very important. The bourgeoisie patronized the secularly minded writers and artists of the Renaissance. The bourgeoisie encouraged the nationalistic kings whose power circumscribed the authority of the pope. The whole spirit of the bourgeoisie was more congenial to the new secular thought than to medieval theology and mysticism. From the standpoint of social thought, therefore, the most significant development in the period 1274-1543 was the rise of bourgeois naturalism.

CHAPTER 10

THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM, 1543-1700

THE SCIENTIFIC MOVEMENT

The year 1543 was a banner year in the history of science. It saw the publication of Copernicus' great treatise *On the Revolutions of the Celestial Orbs* which placed the heliocentric theory on a firm foundation and of Vesalius' work *On the Structure of the Human Body* which marked the beginning of modern anatomy. Two years later Cardan published his *Great Art*, a treatise on algebra which played an important part in the history of mathematics. The discoveries of the age began an era of scientific achievement which has continued to the present and which is quite unparalleled in the history of the human race.

The great triumph of the astronomy of the period was the explanation of the solar system in terms of simple mathematical law. For ages the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies had fascinated and puzzled mankind. The ancient Greeks had worked out an explanation called the *Ptolemaic system* after Ptolemy, an astronomer of the second century of the Christian era; but it was not a very plausible explanation. The foundations of a new system were laid by the Polish priest Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543). He suggested that the earth turns on its axis and travels a great circle around the sun. Copernicus was not the first to propose these ideas, but he backed up his theory

with such a painstaking comparison with existing, astronomical data that the new system was justly named after him the *Copernican system*. Before further progress could be made there was need of more accurate observations. This need was met by Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) who with infinite patience accumulated astronomical data with the best instruments at his command. Using these observations his pupil, Johann Kepler (1571-1630), was able to propose the three important generalizations known as *Kepler's laws*. Finally a century and a half of glorious achievement in astronomy was crowned in 1687 by the publication of the *Principia* of Isaac Newton (1642-1727). Therein he gave a simple mathematical explanation of the solar system which remained unchallenged until the modern days of relativity.

Meanwhile a parallel development was taking place in the related science of physics. In this field the progress is harder to summarize. Suffice it to say that fundamental work was done in mechanics and optics and a beginning was made in other fields. The greatest name in the early period was Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), a stormy genius whose struggles with the Inquisition have often been recounted. Other important names are William Gilbert (about 1540-1603), Christiaan Huygens (1629-95), Willebrord Snell (1591-1626), and Rene Descartes (1596-1650). The ultimate achievement of the period was Newton's discovery of the law of gravitation, as important to terrestrial as to celestial mechanics. The discovery of four very important instruments belongs to the period, namely, the telescope, the microscope, the thermometer, and the barometer. In each case credit for the invention must be distributed among a number of persons.

The new advances in astronomy and physics often led

to long and involved arithmetical calculations. The most fundamental invention for facilitating these was the "Arabic" number system, borrowed from the Hindus by the Arabs and by them introduced into Europe in the twelfth century. During the period being considered calculation was further aided by the development of decimals by Simon Stevin (1548-1620) and of logarithms by John Napier (1550-1617) and Henry Briggs (1561-1630). Meanwhile pure mathematics continued to progress. The most important advances were the invention of analytic geometry by Descartes in 1637 and of the calculus later in the century by Newton and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) independently.

At the same time the biological sciences were developing. The work of Vesalius was followed up by a number of investigators who made contributions to the science of human anatomy. William Harvey (1578-1657) published his *Anatomical Dissertation upon the Movement of the Heart* in 1628 giving his proofs for the circulation of the blood. Jan Swammerdam (1637-80) was the real founder of entomology, the science dealing with insects. The newly invented microscope enabled Anthony van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) to discover the protozoa and bacteria.¹

This sensational advance in the physical sciences ultimately reacted on social thought in three ways, but two of these three effects did not become important until a much later period. Science provided a method of investigation which was ultimately applied to the study of human society from about the time of Auguste Comte (1798-1857) onward. Secondly, science provided the principles out of which modern technology developed and technology has profoundly modified the conditions of modern society, thus indirectly affecting social thought. This again was an

effect which was slow to develop. It did not become markedly apparent until the time of the so-called Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century and will be discussed in its proper place. An exception worth mentioning here was the invention of the pendulum clock probably by Christiaan Huygens about 1658—a direct application of a scientific discovery. Before this time clocks were so inaccurate that they were seldom, if ever, provided with a minute hand.²

The immediate effect of the new science on social thought resulted from its impact on the whole general background of thought and philosophy. It is hard for us in the twentieth century to realize what the new discoveries meant to contemporary men. For ages men had been seeking a rational explanation of the physical universe. In spite of some real progress, especially by the Greeks of the Hellenistic age, these efforts had not met with much success. Nature in general, like human nature, seemed arbitrary, irregular, and unpredictable. Superstitious men believed that natural phenomena were affected by the whims of gods and demons. Thunderbolts were tossed about by an angry Jupiter. Pious Catholics tended to see the constant direct intervention of divine Providence. But with the rise of natural science there was a great change of viewpoint. The bewildering motions of the planets were summed up in simple mathematical equations. As anatomy developed even the wonderful human body seemed less mysterious. It was an easy step to conclude that the whole universe was rather like a great machine. From seeing the direct action of God everywhere men rushed to the opposite extreme and could see no place at all in the universe for a personal God.

In the preceding period the rise of the bourgeoisie had

fostered a naturalistic spirit, but this early naturalism was emotional rather than intellectual. The early capitalists tended toward a distaste for religion, but they had no alternative explanation for the universe. The humanists found the secular spirit of paganism congenial. They often turned to Plato and the other ancients for a philosophy of life. This, however, was a return to the past; it added nothing new. The reformers weakened the authority of tradition; but they retained the traditional view of the nature of the universe. But in their fresh enthusiasm for science many felt that it had provided a completely new set of data on which a new philosophy could be built. This was not the only tendency at work during the period being considered as the balance of this chapter will show; but it was such a new and characteristic tendency that the rise of scientific naturalism can appropriately give its name to the age.³

PHILOSOPHY BECOMES "SCIENTIFIC"

Significantly enough the men who developed the new naturalism were generally not the scientists themselves. Usually they were thinkers who took their science at second hand. Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes remained convinced Catholics, whatever trouble they had with unsympathetic ecclesiastical opinion. The great Newton prided himself on his contributions to Protestant theology. But there were writers who used the new scientific results as a basis for a thoroughly naturalistic philosophy. Some of these applied their conclusions to society directly; the influence of others was indirect.

The earliest important school of thought belonging in this category arose in southern Italy in the late sixteenth century. These thinkers were thoroughly naturalistic and tended toward pantheism. The group included Bernadino

Telesio (about 1508-88) and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600). The latter was put to death as a heretic and thus became quite a hero among the opponents of religion. From the standpoint of social thought Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) is easily the most interesting of these men. There is some suspicion that Campanella was more than a theoretical social reformer. In 1599 a conspiracy against the government was discovered in Calabria and he was accused of having played a leading part in it. He was arrested and spent many years in prison, but the charge that led to his conviction was heresy rather than his possible political activities. About 1602 during his confinement he wrote a work called *The City of the Sun* describing a Utopian state; it was finally published in 1623. The community described is supposed to be situated on an island at the equator. Complete communism prevails, even wives and children being held in common. Since there is no private family life no one is troubled with avarice from which "self-love springs." The work is shared by all and each is given the task best suited to his abilities. There is no contempt for manual labor. "The occupations which require the most labor, such as working in metals and building, are the most praiseworthy among them." The system is so efficient that each works about four hours every day. Science is held in high esteem. The effect of the scientific movement on Campanella's social thinking is apparent not so much from the details of his Utopian state as from his naturalism which derived from his enthusiasm for the new science.⁴

Another man who admired the new scientific achievements and described a Utopian state was Francis Bacon (1561-1626), a brilliant if somewhat unscrupulous lawyer and politician who rose to be Lord Chancellor of England

and was created Baron Verulam and Viscount St. Albans only to be disgraced for corruption in office of which he pleaded guilty. He planned an ambitious work -{the *In stauratio magna*) on scientific method and the place of science in human affairs. Although only scattered parts of the work were completed it had an important effect in increasing the prestige of science at the expense of meta physics. In *The New Atlantis*, published in 1627, Lord Bacon describes an imaginary commonwealth whose inhabitants had attained a felicitous mode of life through their systematic cultivation of science and invention. They had a marvelous research institute called Solomon's House whose purpose is thus described: "The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible." Bacon planned, but never wrote, a second book describing the laws of the New Atlantis. But even in its present form the book stands as an interesting prophecy of the effect of science on modern life.⁵

Descartes belongs to this group, not because he contributed anything directly to social thought, but because like Bruno and Campanella and Bacon he reflected the impact of science on philosophy. Indeed he is possibly more responsible than any other single individual for the reorientation of philosophy in the seventeenth century. In his *Discours de la methode* (1637) Descartes asserts that previous philosophers had failed because they did not use the right method. A brilliant mathematician himself, he was much impressed by the method of geometry which proceeds from obvious principles (axioms) by rigorous reasoning to inescapable conclusions, and he proposed to do the same thing in philosophy. It is an interesting paradox that Descartes' method was deductive rather than in

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ductive. It was the method of mathematics in the experimental sciences and to this end scientific. Descartes himself failed to apply the best scientific work of his contemporaries, Galileo and Pascal. But by unnecessarizing the gap between mind and matter, between the subjective and objective worlds, he created a philosophy which was congenial to natural science. The mediating thesis between soul and body was still further broken, and science became more completely independent of philosophy. On account of his enormous influence on thought Descartes is justly considered by many to be the father of modern philosophy.

Baruch Spinoza (1632-77), a Dutch Jew who earned his precarious living by grinding lenses, carried Descartes' formal and mathematical method even further than Descartes himself. Spinoza was not wholly consistent in his philosophy and it has been differently interpreted by different students. To some he was a blatant atheist, to Heine he was a "God-intoxicated man." (His chief works from the standpoint of social thought are the *Ethics*, the *Theologico-Political Treatise*, and the unfinished *Political Treatise*. Only the second of these three was published during the author's life (in 1670). Spinoza belonged to a group of thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who revived and stressed the old social-contract theory. In a state of pure nature without civil society life is scarcely tolerable. Cooperation is lacking and "without mutual help men can hardly maintain life and cultivate the mind." Therefore a social contract is instituted, each ceding some of his own right to the community which acquires authority from this cession of rights. Thus it is brought about "that the universal natural right which each possessed,

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common and shall be determined by the will and no longer by the strength and dual." Spinoza looked on the social contract not as a historical fact but as a logical justification for civil authority. It is important to note how the social contract differed from the ideas as represented, for example, by Machiavelli and Lautenbach. According to medieval thought authority came from God; the implicit contract between ruler and people determined the conditions of the application of this power. According to the new theory the power itself originated in the contract. This was obviously an effect of the naturalism which affected Spinoza and his contemporaries so profoundly.⁶

ABSOLUTISM AND DEMOCRACY IN ENGLAND

The century and a half covered in this chapter witnessed an important struggle against royal absolutism in England. The net effect by the end of the period was to give the middle class an enormously increased voice in the government. This was not democracy in the modern sense, for the common people still had little power, but at least it was a significant step in the direction of democracy. The struggle between the crown and the middle class had an important effect on social thought and was in turn affected by it.

The Tudor monarchs (1485-1603) were never seriously hampered by Parliament in carrying out their plans. This, however, was partly due to the prudence of the rulers themselves who were careful to respect public opinion and to be moderate in their demands for money. It is important to add that especially toward the end of Queen Elizabeth's reign (1558-1603) the members of Parliament

showed an increasing freedom of speech in criticizing their sovereign.

The social thought of the Elizabethan period is reflected by Richard Hooker (about 1554-1600), an Anglican divine who wrote *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*.¹ The work was immediately occasioned by a controversy with the Punitans but Hooker rises above this issue to a general theory of the state. In his treatment of law he is still essentially medieval. He accepts the social-contract theory, but allows exceptions as when dominion is established by right of conquest. "For it is God who giveth victory in the day of war."⁸ From the social contract it ought logically to have followed that subjects have the right by rebellion to withdraw the power they have given the ruler. But Hooker never drew this conclusion. Rebellion was not an urgent problem in the England of his day. He was content to argue that the monarch should govern in accordance with the laws to which the nation had given its approval.

With the accession of James I (1603-25), the first Stuart king, the relations of crown and Parliament began to change radically. James has been called "the wisest fool in Christendom"; but the jibe is not quite just. Wise he certainly was in the sense that he absorbed an excellent education in Calvinistic theology and in the classics ("They gar me speik Latin ar I could speik Scotis"). But as a ruler James was less a fool than he has been represented. Before mounting the throne of England he had been notably successful in controlling the turbulent barons as King of Scotland, a separate sovereign state in those days. Indeed his very success in Scotland handicapped him in England. He never seemed to realize that he was dealing with a different set of conditions which called for more tact and pliability. The friction which soon developed between king and Par

liament kept growing worse. In 1621 the Commons spread on their journal the Great Protestation, declaring "that the liberties, franchises, privileges, and jurisdictions of Parliament are the ancient and undoubted birthright and inheritance of the subjects of England." James tore this page out of the journal.

The king had already developed his theory of divine right monarchy in two books of his Scottish period, the *Basilikon Dor* on (Greek for *kingly gift*) and *The Trew Law of Free Monarchies*. The king is "a little god," responsible indeed to the Almighty for his conduct but not to any earthly power. In particular, Parliament has no power over the king and its acts are legally binding only by the royal consent. No matter how tyrannical the ruler may be, the people have no alternative but to obey and accept him as "a plague for their sinnes." During his English period James published an *Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance* to defend himself from the charge of persecuting Catholics. It was their politics, he claimed, not their religion, which led him to take measures against them. In a long preface added to a second edition he points out to the monarchs of Europe that the papal claims were incompatible with their unqualified sovereignty. This was an interesting assertion of modern nationalism from the Protestant camp.⁹

James' son, Charles I (1625-49), was even less successful than his father in dealing with Parliament. He lost his head, first figuratively and then literally, the left wing of the Puritans took over the government, and the period of the Commonwealth (1649-60) began. As an experiment in popular government the Commonwealth was not much of a success, leading as it did to the practical dictatorship of Cromwell which did not seem so very different from the autocracy of the Stuarts, but at least it proved a stimulus to

social thought. The great poet John Milton (1608-74) who held an important post under the Cromwellian regime published a series of pamphlets in which he defended the execution of Charles I and argued for the continuance of the Commonwealth.

A more significant social thinker was James Harrington (1611-77). This man was a born aristocrat and a close personal friend of Charles I whom he seems to have attended on the scaffold. Yet if his origin and associations were royalist, Harrington was a republican by conviction. *The Commonwealth of Oceana*, his principal work, published in 1656, is usually classed with Utopian literature. Actually, however, it is a thinly disguised discussion of current possibilities. Thus Oceana itself is England, Emporium is London, and Olphaeus Megaletor is Cromwell. Harrington's real contribution was his insight into the economic factors underlying political events. He believed that land was the real source of power. The army is the immediate instrument of domination, but "an army is a beast that has a great belly, and must be fed." To control an army one must have the means of feeding it and this requires land. Where one man is sole landlord in a state, or nearly so, there will be an absolute monarchy. Class control of the land leads to a mixed monarchy. But where land ownership is so widely divided that no one man nor any single group can overbalance the people, there is a commonwealth. "As is the proportion or balance of domination or property in land, such is the nature of the empire." Harrington admits that the operation of this natural law may be hindered by the use of force and that it does not apply "in a city that has little or no land, and whose revenue is in trade"; nevertheless he considers it a very important principle. This, however, does not imply sheer economic

determinism. There are psychic factors as well. The nature of the government as expressed by its laws affects the character of the state. In this field Harrington especially advocated three practical devices, short terms for officials with rotation in office, election by secret ballot, and the separation of powers. It is important to note that the political theory of the *Oceana* is not utter democracy. It is a government in which the landowners are preponderant, but the landowners are to be a large representative group, not a small selfish class. Harrington was less a prophet than a man of the seventeenth century.¹⁰

When the Stuarts were restored and Charles II returned to England to accept the crown he met on the streets of London an old tutor of his and restored him to his favor. This man, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), had had a somewhat checkered career. Born the son of an Anglican clergyman and educated at Oxford, he had supported himself for the most part by acting as tutor and companion to young noblemen. The rise of the Puritans to power made England unsafe for him and for eleven years he lived in exile on the Continent. But his irreligious ideas made it dangerous for him to remain there and he returned to England and submitted to the Commonwealth. Restored now to the royal favor and granted a small pension (which was not always paid), he enjoyed his fame and lived to the ripe age of ninety-one.

The thought of Hobbes was closely related to the stirring political events which occurred during his long life, but it was also profoundly affected by the scientific developments of his time as was true of the thinkers discussed in the preceding section of this chapter. At the age of forty he happened on a copy of Euclid and was deeply impressed by it as a model of rigorous deduction. He admired con

temporary physics for its success in explaining physical phenomena in terms of simple mathematical laws of motion. He proposed to extend the same method to psychological and social phenomena. In this thoroughly materialistic world-view nothing exists but matter and nothing occurs but motion. There is no room for supersensible reality.

Hobbes' social philosophy was expressed principally in his *De cive* (1642) and his *Leviathan* (1651). Man is essentially selfish and a state of nature in which this selfishness is unrestrained is intolerable. An enlightened self-interest motivates the creation of civil society through the social contract. By this contract moral law arises; for in Hobbes' naturalistic ethics morality has no meaning apart from the state. The social contract, in this system, could never serve as a moral justification for rebellion; for rebellion is opposition to the sovereign power and it is precisely from this sovereign power that morality itself derives. It is interesting to note, however, another consequence which follows from this line of reasoning. If one government actually is overthrown by rebellion and another set up in its place, then after the accomplished fact this second government, by the very fact that it holds the sovereign authority, creates its own moral justification. Thus, while Hobbes' social philosophy furnished a powerful support to royal absolutism, it also justified the *de facto* government of the Commonwealth. .

The restored Stuarts proved unable to retain the throne, partly on account of their absolutism and partly for religious reasons; for James II (1685-88) was a Catholic. In 1689 the "Glorious Revolution" took place and the more pliable William of Orange was invited to become king. Essentially this meant that the seventeenth-century strug

gle between absolutism and republicanism in England ended in a compromise. The kingship was retained, but it was a kingship whose prerogatives had been radically reduced.

In 1690 John Locke (1632-1704) published his *Two Treatises of Government* for the purpose of justifying the Revolution. Locke felt strongly on the subject himself, since under the Stuarts he had found it necessary to flee to Holland for safety and remain in hiding there for over five years. The first of the *Two Treatises* was an argument against the theories of Robert Filmer and need not concern us here;¹¹ in the second Locke develops his general theory. Like Hobbes he accepts the social contract, but he differs from Hobbes in asserting that even before this contract man was subject to moral law. "The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it." From this natural law man learns that "no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions." This is an important point. In Hobbes' theory morality is a creation of the government and comes into being only at the social contract, while Locke held the medieval doctrine that the moral law is eternal and independent of governmental action. Thus he had a logical basis for justifying revolution. A tyrannical ruler fails to carry out his part of the contract, he violates the eternal principles of morality, and the people are justified in withdrawing their allegiance.¹²

ABSOLUTISM IN FRANCE

While the English kings were struggling vainly with an aggressive Parliament, the kings of France were quietly consolidating their power. To them, the States-General (the French equivalent of Parliament) was no great obstacle; from 1614 until the time of the Revolution (1789)

it did not even meet. After the fall of La Rochelle (1628) **the** Protestants (Huguenots) offered no political opposition, while the abortive rebellion called the *Fronde* (1648-53) showed that the power of the nobles need no longer be feared. No group remained which could effectively check the royal power.

In 1576 Jean Bodin (1530-96) published his work *Six livres de la republique* as a defense of the royal power.¹⁸ The book helps us to understand the centralization of the French monarchy. France was in the midst of the Religious Wars (1562-98) and Bodin belonged to the group called the *Politiques* who wanted peace above all and saw in a strong monarchy the best practical means of obtaining it. The great contribution of Bodin's book was its discussion of the nature of sovereignty. Unfortunately the term is nowhere defined with unmistakable clarity. It seems to mean an unlimited authority to make laws without restraint from anybody. Actually, however, Bodin does limit the sovereign authority in various ways. The ruler is bound by the natural law and must therefore keep his agreements and not violate private property. Again, the ruler must respect the constitution, the *leges imperii*. Bodin recognized two constitutional provisions which the king of France must observe, namely, the prohibition against alienating any part of the public domain and **the** so-called Salic law (against the succession of women to the throne). Obviously such limitations are not quite consistent with a really absolute sovereignty. The author is also a bit unclear on the origin and ultimate justification of sovereign power. Apparently **he** felt that it was inherent in the very nature of political association and **rested ultimately on God.**

French absolutism found its most typical expression in

the long reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715). Louis was trained in this theory from his earliest years. As a child he was taught to write in his copybooks such maxims as, "L'hommage est deub aux rois: ils font ce que leur plaist." Although Louis was not a brilliant man he took his vocation seriously and, on the whole, made a success of it. Under him French art and letters enjoyed a brilliant development. Perhaps his greatest mistake was to undertake a series of foreign wars for which there was no real justification. They seriously taxed the resources of his kingdom and were only moderately successful.¹⁴

Perhaps the best statement of the theory of seventeenth century French absolutism is the *Politique tiree de l'Ecriture Sainte* (*Politics Drawn from the Holy Scriptures*) of Jacques Bossuet (1627-1704). Bishop Bossuet was not only a brilliant man, but a hard worker. The latter fact gave rise to the pun on his name, *bos suetus aratro* (an ox broken to the plough). He had resigned his position as Bishop of Condom to become tutor to the dauphin and he wrote the book for the latter's instruction. As one would naturally expect, Bossuet sees in monarchy the ideal form of government. "We have established by the Scriptures that monarchy has its origin in the Divinity Itself." God governed the first men Himself as a king, he governed Israel through kings; among all forms of government, "He chose the hereditary monarchy as the most natural and the most enduring." In the presence of this divinely sanctioned authority the subject's one duty is obedience. "There is no justification for taking a stand against rulers for any cause whatsoever." The only exception occurs when the ruler commands something contrary to God's law. On the other hand, by the very fact that their office is so sacred, kings are bound to rule justly. "Let them therefore respect their

power; for it is not their power but God's and it must be used in a holy and religious manner." Bossuet pushed the royal authority about as far as a Catholic well could, but he did not of course maintain that kings are above the natural law nor that morality itself was a creation of the state. That ultimate impiety was reserved for materialists like Hobbes.¹⁵

Like Bossuet, Francois de Salignac de la Mothe-Fenelon (1651-1715) was tutor to a prince, the Duke of Burgundy, son of the former's old pupil. He was a born teacher and he seems to have had extraordinary success with his quite unpromising royal material. Like Bossuet also (and with an enormously better grasp of child psychology) he wrote special textbooks to aid his task. Fenelon was not an original theorist. An aristocrat by birth and temperament, he accepted the French monarchy of his day but he wanted to see it exercised by a monarch inspired with a real devotion to the welfare of the people. He hoped that his distinguished pupil would develop into such a king and the books he wrote for the latter's instruction were designed to give him breadth of view, an insight into political realities, and a grasp of political morality. It was a crushing blow to Fenelon when the Duke of Burgundy died in 1712 without succeeding to the throne.

THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL REVIVAL

With the decline of Scholasticism after the death of St. Thomas, theology suffered a parallel eclipse. The seriousness of the decline must not, however, be exaggerated. Saint Antoninus (1389-1459), the great Dominican Archbishop of Florence, was an important theologian and social thinker. A century later Francis de Victoria (about **1483-1546**) began a line of distinguished Dominican theologians

at Salamanca. Later, controversies with Protestants and the dogmatic discussions incident to the Council of Trent (1545-64) helped to stimulate a revival which was already under way. From the standpoint of social thought this revival bore its most important fruit in the works of two great Jesuit thinkers, St. Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) and Francis Suarez (1548-1617).

Catholics had always held that all civil power comes from God,'as indeed St. Paul explicitly states.¹⁶ Was not this, then, the same thing as the theory of the divine right of kings? St. Robert Bellarmine answers the difficulty in a very clear fashion. It is indeed true that "abstracting from the particular form of government, monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, political power considered in general is immediately from God alone." But this power resides in "the whole multitude" of the people, by whom it is transferred as a practical necessity to "one or a few" who do the actual 'ruling. The people are not free to dispense with government but they are free to choose its particular form. It is interesting to note that Bellarmine explicitly states that "if there is a legitimate reason the people (*multitudo*) may change a kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy and contrariwise."¹⁷

Suarez made many contributions to social thought. His *Defensio fidei*, written in answer to James I of England, discussed the relation of Church and state. His most systematic work on society, however, was his *Tractatus de legibus et Legislatore Deo* (*Treatise on laws and on God as Lawgiver*), published only in 1612, but based on lectures given at the University of Coimbra in 1601-3 on the second part of St. Thomas' *Summa*. The whole work gives a most penetrating analysis of law in all its aspects. To many moderns law is something more or less arbitrary,

imposed by custom or the whim of a legislator. But in the Middle Ages (and for Catholics in any age) law is something more than that. Law is not entirely arbitrary; it must be founded on reason. It is therefore fundamentally an application to particular circumstances of the eternal principles of the eternal law. In Suarez' day the modern theory had become common enough to need refutation; therefore his work served a timely purpose. In a most interesting passage Suarez considers the various forms of civil authority. It may take the form of a monarchy, an aristocracy, a democracy, or some combination of these. "From the standpoint of natural law men are not bound to choose one of these forms of government rather than another." Suarez, however, prefers a monarchy, "nevertheless the other forms of government are not bad and can be good and useful." Two centuries before the American Revolution both these Jesuit theologians laid down principles which would perfectly justify the modern democratic form of government.¹⁸

GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Thirty Years' War (1618-48) was an unusually destructive conflict. Under these circumstances it was quite natural that the principles governing the mutual relations of nations should appear particularly important. Of course the question was an old one. In the Middle Ages the papacy had claimed the right to intervene in international affairs and Catholic thinkers had pointed out the universal applicability of the natural law. If, then, Grotius has been called "the father of international law," he deserves that title less for the originality of his thought than for the actual historical importance of his great work.

Hugo Grotius (Huig van Groot) was born at Delft,

Holland, in 1583. A precocious child, at sixteen he was already a Doctor of Law. At twenty-one he wrote a treatise *On the Law of Prize* which, however, did not find its way into print until 1868. This early work shows that his characteristic views on international law were already developing in his mind. Becoming involved in the political struggles of his native land, Grotius was condemned in 1619 to lifelong imprisonment. In 1621 he escaped to France. The Thirty Years' War was now raging and he resolved to compose a thorough treatise on international law. The result was his masterpiece, *De jure belli et pacis* (*On the Law of War and Peace*). During his later career Grotius served for some time as Swedish ambassador at Paris. He died in 1645.

The fundamental principle of Grotius' work is the inviolability of natural law. This law is eternal and immutable and applies to the society of nations just as well as within a particular state. This law may be discovered by the individual conscience and is confirmed by the general agreement of the best minds and the practice of the more civilized nations. The real difficulty comes in finding this general agreement, but Grotius believed he could do so. He proceeded with his vast erudition to sift the best ancient and modern authorities including the Holy Scriptures and thus to build up what he considered to be a body of valid principles. He discussed in some detail the distinction between just and unjust war and the justice of various questions connected with war such as the treatment of captives and the status of neutrals. It is doubtful whether the work had any significant effect on actual international practice, but it certainly was a book of fundamental importance in the history of international law.

MERCANTILISM

Among the developments noted in the last chapter were the rise of nationalism, the growth of international trade, and the increased use of coined money. During the period now being considered these tendencies gave rise to a system of economic thought called mercantilism. The term is hard to define satisfactorily because it has been used by different writers to include such a vast variety of trends. In a general way, however, mercantilism is a doctrine which advocates the control of economic life by the state for nationalistic ends, particularly through the use of certain specific policies. These included, first of all, the establishment of a favorable balance of trade. The value of exports should exceed the value of imports so that the balance would have to be paid in actual money; for mercantilists stressed the importance of keeping in the country a large stock of the precious metals. In order to bring about a favorable balance of trade, foreign commerce should be encouraged more than domestic commerce. Since manufacture adds to the value of the raw material, industry should be encouraged so that the country can offer the greatest possible total value of goods for sale abroad. This policy led to a relative neglect of agriculture. In order to put these mercantilist theories into practice governments should not hesitate to control all departments of economic life by extremely detailed regulations.

Mercantilism as a national policy developed very gradually. The first indications of it can be traced back as far perhaps as the fourteenth century. By the sixteenth century it represented the settled policy of such rulers as Charles V of the Empire and Elizabeth of England. Mer

cantilism as a systematic doctrine, however, appeared only in the early seventeenth century. In 1613 an Italian, Serra, published a treatise on the subject. Perhaps the most representative of the mercantilists was Thomas Mun (1571-1641). In his book, *England's Treasure by Forraign Trade*, written about 1630 but not published until 1664, he discusses in some detail the various measures by which a favorable balance of trade can be established. It was in the seventeenth century also that mercantilist doctrine was most characteristically applied in national policy. In France, Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619—83), the great minister of Louis XIV, endeavored to stimulate industry and commerce and to secure a favorable trade balance by all sorts of minutely detailed regulations. In England, under the Commonwealth the first Navigation Act was passed in 1651. This helped the English to gain commercial supremacy over the Dutch, but it also inaugurated a policy which was an important cause of the loss of the American colonies. Toward the end of the eighteenth century mercantilism of the classical type disappeared, but it is interesting to note that the economic nationalism of our own day may be looked on as a sort of revived mercantilism.

Cameralism was the German equivalent of mercantilism. It differed from the latter, however, in several important respects. The cameralists developed their theories more systematically, often in bulky tomes, while the English mercantilists were typically writers of short pamphlets. The cameralists were relatively less concerned with foreign trade with a correspondingly greater emphasis on the efficient organization of home industry. Finally cameralism lasted longer than mercantilism. It flourished well into the nineteenth century.¹⁹

THE PERIOD AS A WHOLE

The century and a half covered in this chapter was a period of enormous expansive energy. From Europe colonies were sent out in all directions. Commerce flourished. The new national states consolidated their gains. Nor were the triumphs of the age confined to material progress; it was a great age also for the things of the mind. Not only did science make enormous strides, but literature flourished as well. It was the golden age of French and Spanish letters. In England Milton wrote his *Paradise Lost*, 1650-63. Shakespeare also lived and died within the period, though spiritually he was a child of the Renaissance which arrived belatedly in England. Rembrandt, possibly the greatest painter of all time, lived in the seventeenth century. Nor was he unique. He was only the outstanding artist of an age which also included men like El Greco, Velasquez, Van Dyck, Rubens, and Hals. Outstanding philosophers like Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke have already been mentioned in the course of the chapter. Finally, the rise of parliamentary government in England was a significant step in the direction of modern democracy.

In spite of these great triumphs one feels that the age was somehow lacking in a certain essential depth and that for this reason it compares unfavorably in some respects with certain other periods of the world's history. One can often sense this lack in baroque art. *Baroque* is a style which found its most characteristic expression in seventeenth century Italy although the term is often used in a broader sense. Such art tends to be very dramatic. The human figure is represented in striking attitudes. The composition is likely to be overcharged with movement, full of restless

detail. Baroque art is vigorous, exuberant, and arresting; but it lacks the deep impressive sincerity which, say, a simple Gothic carving may attain with no apparent striving after effect. As another example, consider the French prose of the reign of Louis XIV which was the classical age of the nation's literature. At first glance it seems strikingly different in spirit from baroque art. It is a supple, measured, dignified prose, excellently adapted to expressing the nuances of the writer's thought. Above all it is governed by good taste. But more deeply considered, it does have some thing in common with baroque. Both styles, the one French and the other Italian, the one in literature and the other in art, share a certain self-consciousness. The form, rather than the matter, is what arrests one's attention. Neither seems a natural medium for a man burning to communicate some deep and intensely realized truth.

There are exceptions obviously, but in a general way the culture of the age seems characterized by a certain lack of spiritual depth. The most typical achievements of the age dealt with control over material things, in science, in commerce, in exploration and colonization. The philosophy of Descartes or Hobbes or even of Spinoza is brilliant rather than penetrating. The compromise of 1689 in England was a sound, common-sense, typically bourgeois arrangement, it was a step toward democracy, but it was hardly the product of a glowing idealism. The social contract theory, at the hands of various men, was made into a plausible justification of monarchy or republicanism as the case might be, but placed beside St. Thomas' *Summa* it seems like a superficial ultimate basis for social morality. Mercantilist economic theory is only systematized national selfishness.

The signal triumphs and the signal failures of the age

are both based on its fundamentally characteristic naturalism. Mankind had moved one step further away from the medieval synthesis. By concentrating their energies on the things of this world men achieved a greater mastery over nature and a greater material comfort. But are these the things men live by? Was the simple worldliness of the age really satisfying to the human heart? These are questions best answered as our story progresses. The character of an age is best judged, not by its immediate achievements, but by its ultimate results.

CHAPTER II

THE AGE OF REASON, 1700-1769

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

(The most typical writers of the period covered in this chapter had an enormous confidence in the powers of human reason. Men's minds, they felt, had been held back by the dead hand of tradition or led astray by sentimentality. But now the unhampered use of reason would revolutionize philosophy and the arts and build a better world. It is important to note that these writers used the word *reason* in a somewhat special sense.) To them it did not mean the closely knit metaphysical reasoning of St. Thomas, nor even the formal logical procedure of Descartes. Rather it meant the analysis of the results of natural science in order to apply them to all other fields of human activity. The word *reason*, then, in their sense implied a starting point as well as a method. The starting point was to be furnished by the data of science along with all other facts which are positive and unquestionable like scientific discoveries. The method was to consist of clear, unsentimental reasoning from these facts. The movement which based itself on the use of reason in this special sense became known in German as the *Aufklärung*—a term which from about 1865 began to be translated as (*Enlightenment*.)

The Enlightenment, of course, was nothing essentially new. Indeed it was only a particularly logical development of the scientific naturalism of the preceding period. Again,

it was connected with the rise of the bourgeoisie, which was an old story by this time/For the leaders of the movement were mostly men of the middle class and it was this same class which formed the bulk of the reading public which eagerly devoured their works. Fundamentally, then, the Enlightenment was nothing new; but it did have its own peculiar characteristics, so that it may be logically treated as a movement apart. It had its own special forms of expression, its own prejudices, its own enthusiasms. In particular it had its own form of synthesis; for the Enlightenment tried to bring all human activities within its orbit. The form of government, the organization of society, the spirit of literature, even the manners of the polite world, all must be subjugated to reason. Of course the Enlightenment did not completely dominate the period. There were other currents of thought too numerous to mention. But at least the Enlightenment stands out as the most characteristic movement of the time and therefore the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century may be appropriately called the Age of Reason.¹

THE FRENCH WRITERS

(During this period the intellectual center of gravity of Europe was very definitely located in France. It is hard to account for this fact completely, but surely it was due in some measure to the French language itself. (The classical writers of the age of Louis XIV had given a great deal of attention to style. They had made of French a supple medium of expression, clear, precise, and well adapted to expressing all the subtle shades of a writer's meaning. The leaders of the Enlightenment, who called themselves *philosophes* (philosophers), used this language to set forth their ideas in an eminently readable way. The *philosophes*

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might not be profound; but they were never dull. What they lacked in depth they made up in grace, wit, and ease of expression. Whatever would be above their readers' intelligence, they excluded from their works as "pedantry. And their works were read!)

The most typical man of the Enlightenment, and for long the literary dictator of Europe, was Francois Marie Arouet_ (1694-1778), better Known as Voltaire.² His nature was a strange compound of servility and arrogance. With infinite pains he would ingratiate himself with the powerful, then he would destroy the whole effect by yielding to the temptation of turning an insulting epigram or, worse still, publishing some irritating book. As a result his career was very checkered. Twice he was confined in the Bastille, once he was exiled to England, for most of his life he was banned from Paris. On the other hand he once basked in the favor of Louis XV and was appointed royal historiographer. Again, he was invited to the court of Frederick the Great of Prussia and treated there like a prince. Voltaire was most at ease during his long periods of semiretirement at the country house of the Marquise du Chatelet at Cirey or on his own extensive estate at Ferney. After the death of Louis XV he was once more allowed to visit Paris which he had not seen for twenty-eight years. His entry into the city was the occasion for great rejoicing. He was feted and flattered, but the excitement was too much for the aged man and within four months he was dead.

Voltaire was neither a profound nor a systematic thinker. In all his extensive writings (97 volumes in the editions of **Dalibon and Baudouin**) **there is no single treatise on the philosophy of society.** His thought, enormously influential as it was, **must be pieced together from his treatment of**

particular issues and his general attitudes. (Voltaire's social thinking sprang from a naturalistic world-view. Not that he did not believe in God; on the contrary atheism would completely demoralize society. "It is, then, absolutely necessary for princes and for peoples that there should be deeply engraved in their minds the idea of a Supreme Being, Creator, Ruler, Rewarder, and Punisher."³ But this was God as known to Natural reason, not the God of Christian revelation. For Voltaire continually scoffed at Christianity although, inconsistently enough, he made occasional gestures of conformity with the Church. He bitterly attacked whatever he considered to be religious intolerance. As reason reveals the existence of God, so also does it reveal the natural law. Using this natural law as his criterion Voltaire examined contemporary society and found it unjust in many respects. Perhaps the most worthy thing he ever did was to point out the injustices he saw around him, the antiquated legal system, the unfairness of trial methods, and the brutality of punishments. This was a task which exactly suited his essentially critical and destructive genius. He used all the resources of his raodant wit and his fluent style to ridicule whatever outraged his sense of right and wrong. But Voltaire was no extreme radical. In the abstract he would doubtless have preferred democracy, but he was content to accept monarchy as more practical for his own day, provided the ruler would govern in accordance with sound reason. He was always less concerned with the machinery of government than with the spirit animating a state.

A work which had an enormous importance as a vehicle for the thought of the *philosophes* was the famous *Encyclopaedia*, published 1751-72.⁴ This grew out of a translation of Chamber's *Cyclopaedia*, an English work, but it

was enormously modified and expanded so that it became a fresh achievement. (The man most responsible for the tone of the *Encyclopaedia* was Denis Diderot (1713-84), a materialist who gradually tended into atheism. Other contributors included Voltaire himself, the mathematician d'Alembert, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Turgot.) The publication of the work was much hampered by official censorship and this fact led to a disingenuous editorial policy; for the writers paid lip service to religion while subtly attacking it. As a contribution to scholarship the *Encyclopaedia* was somewhat uneven. There were articles of outstanding merit along with others written hastily by hack writers with the aid of considerable plagiarism. Diderot's articles on the various arts and trades, illustrated by numerous detailed plates, are especially interesting. They helped to create a better appreciation of the skill of the artisan and the dignity of labor. The *Encyclopaedia* spread a naturalistic view of society. Social causation was conceived as analogous to the operation of the natural laws of physics. Finally the work helped to popularize the concept of social progress.⁵) •

(Many of the men associated with the *Encyclopaedia* used to meet regularly to dine and discuss their ideas. Visiting celebrities were welcomed such as Adam Smith, the economist, David Garrick, the Shakespearean actor, Horace Walpole, the English politician, or Cesare Bonesana, Marchese di Beccaria (1738-94) who published a famous work on criminology which applied some of the ideas of the Enlightenment to that subject.⁶) Some of the men in this group published individual works, usually anonymously or pseudonymously, in which they expressed their ideas far more openly than they would have dared in the *Encyclopaedia* itself. There was Claude Adrien Helvetius

(1715-71), a wealthy retired state official, who published his book *De Vesprit (On Mind)* in 1758 in which he contended that man is just as subject to the law of self-interest as the physical world is subject to the laws of movement. The state should base its policy on this law of self-interest and force men by a system of rewards and punishments to act for the common good. Paul Heinrich Dietrich, Baron d'Holbach (1723-89), a German by birth but a naturalized Frenchman, was an outspoken atheist. In a series of books he attacked Christianity and religion in general. He was a rigorous determinist. All human acts follow from ineluctable law; therefore there is no more room for moral good and evil among men than in the physical universe. Holbach was mordant in his criticism of existing governments. For this reason he is often considered an important precursor of the Revolution.

A man who stood apart in several respects from the other contributors to the *Encyclopaedia* was Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-1755). A nobleman and well educated in the law, he held for twelve years the important office of *president a mortier* of the parliament of Bordeaux. In 1726 he retired, traveled extensively, and divided his time between Paris and his estate at La Brede. In 1721 his *Lettres persanes (Persian Letters)* appeared in which he satirized the abuses of the society of his day. In 1748 he published a much more important book, *Uesprit des lois (The Spirit of the Laws)*, the chief expression of his social philosophy. Montesquieu divides governments into three types, the republic, monarchy, despotism. Each of these has its characteristic spirit. A republic (which in external form may be either an aristocracy or a democracy) is characterized by *virtue* by which Montesquieu seems to mean a spirit of public service.

The spirit of a monarchy is *honor*, a chivalrous spirit of service in accordance with an accepted code, motivated by a desire for distinction. It was this which characterized the medieval monarchy of France and such a government is Montesquieu's practical ideal, though a republic would be theoretically preferable. The spirit of despotism is *fear*. People submit to such a system only because they are afraid. Not the least interesting thing about Montesquieu's work is his method. Instead of basing his treatment on abstract considerations, he examined existing states and states known to history and tried to pick out the essential characteristic which would classify them into types. Montesquieu was not consistent in the application of his inductive method, but his attempt to apply it makes him somewhat akin to modern social science. Another important contribution was his insistence on the separation of powers which he regarded as a useful check on despotism. This doctrine had an effect on the constitutional history of both France and the United States.

THE ENGLISH DEISTS AND HUME

During the latter years of the seventeenth century and until about the middle of the eighteenth there flourished in England a system known as *deism* which may be taken to represent the English phase of the Enlightenment. Deism means the acceptance of God as known to natural reason, and the rejection of revelation. Long before deism as a movement existed, Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1633) expounded the essential features of the system. The principal writers of the main movement were Matthew Tindal (1657-1733), William Wollaston (1660-1724), and Junius Janus Toland (1670-1722). The deists emphasized the moral aspects of religion and considered spe

cial forms of worship unimportant. They rejected the miraculous and the more highly theological doctrines of Christianity such as the Trinity and the redemption. Generally speaking their attitude toward the Bible was highly critical, but they often professed a respect for the life and teachings of Christ. The movement proved highly popular; it has been estimated that in the middle of the eighteenth century half the educated people of England were deists.⁷

The deists deserve mention in the history of social thought rather for the light they throw on the spirit of the time than for their specific contributions; but one at least deserves mention as a social thinker. Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751) was a precocious youth who early rose to prominence in public life, only to fall into comparative obscurity largely through his own lack of character; for he was a drunkard and a rake. Lord Bolingbroke was not important as a social theorist; his contribution was rather in the field of applied politics. In such books as *The Idea of a Patriot King* (1738) he called for a strong monarchy which should rise above the corruption of party rule—Bolingbroke hated the dominant Whigs and reign for the benefit of the people. For this reason he has been called "the founder of the modern Tory democracy."⁸

The deists based their system on natural reason. Even this foundation was attacked by the sceptical Scotchman, David Hume (1711-76). He denied the substantiality of the mind, which is only a succession of perceptions. There is no necessary connection between cause and effect. There is no valid way of arguing to realities beyond our experience. Hume attacked the social-contract theory as a justification for civil authority. The problem which interested him was not why men *ought* to obey the state, but why

they *do*, He answered that it was partly a question of habit, inculcated by education, and partly a matter of self interest. Men support stable government because they want to see their own lives and property protected. Hume represented almost the furthest possible reaction from the medieval synthesis. A genuine metaphysics of the Aristotelian variety had already been rejected along with revelation. But the *philosophes* and the deists had retained at least their confidence in the power of reason. Now Hume had attacked even this. The times were ripe for another reaction and it was not long in coming, as the next chapter will show.

THE SPIRIT OF COMMERCIALISM

In Chapter 9 the rise of capitalism was discussed. This development continued unabated. Early capitalism was mainly concerned with commerce and finance, but gradually it extended its control over industry as well. An important stage in this development was the rise of what is called the *putting-out system* (a rather awkward translation of the German technical term *Verlagssystem*). Under this system the capitalist bought the raw materials and gave them to domestic workers to be made into a finished (or partly finished) product at an agreed price. The worker thus became a wage earner dependent on the capitalist, but he did his work in his own home. This system was already in operation as far back as the twelfth or thirteenth century, but it continued to develop constantly. A second stage was the factory system itself. The transition was easy. The worker was already dependent on the capitalist for his wages. It did not represent a very radical change when he began to receive these wages for working in a factory instead of in his own home. There is a popular impression

that the factory system originated at the time of the so-called Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century. It is true that the system developed very rapidly at that time, but the system itself was much older. How far it had progressed by 1700 is shown by the factory built in about that year by Polhem at Stiernsund, Sweden. He had all sorts of machinery driven by water power to manufacture metalware of various sorts. It is important to remember also that certain types of production, such as shipbuilding, by their very nature had to be centralized at all periods. Along with capitalistic production came the usual problems of labor, unemployment, industrial hazards, child labor, questions of wages and hours, and the difficulties of unionization. In short the characteristic problems of capital and labor definitely antedate the Industrial Revolution.

As commercial and industrial enterprises grew it was necessary to develop new and more efficient methods of financing them. The early capitalistic ventures were largely financed by family firms such as the well-known Fuggers. In the meantime the partnership developed as a form of organization which could command more capital than a single individual could afford to invest. More significant still was the rise of the joint-stock company, the direct ancestor of the modern corporation. Many early colonization schemes were financed by such companies. In the seventeenth century the Dutch and English East India Companies became very powerful. In the opening years of the eighteenth century there was a typical boom and many joint-stock companies were formed, but there was a reaction in 1720 when John Law's company in Paris and the South Sea Company in London both collapsed. In the middle of the eighteenth century the most common form of business ownership was still personal; but the outlines of

the modern form of corporate finance were clearly discernible.⁹

The Age of Reason was characteristically an unidealistic period. In such an atmosphere a spirit of commercialism quite naturally developed as business progressed. Perhaps no one expressed this spirit better than Daniel Defoe (about 1659-1731). He is of course best known to the reading public as the author of *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), but he was a prolific writer and almost all his works (over 250 in number) have some social significance. *The Compleat English Tradesman* (1725-27) is a remarkable expression of the spirit of commercialism as it existed in the England which Defoe best knew. He preaches a great devotion to business. "The tradesman's pleasure therefore should be in his business; his chief companions should be his books." Of course he must attend to his religious duties, but not to such an extent "as to neglect the proper times and seasons of business." Irritating customers must always be treated with courtesy, even though one's family suffer as a result. "The provocations they have met with in their shops have so irritated some men, thst they have gone upstairs from their shop, and vented their passion on the most innocent objects, their wives, children, or servants, as they fell in their way." This is seen to be excusable when we consider "that he is intending to get money by those who make these severe trials of his patience; and that it is not for him **that** gets money to offer the least inconvenience to them by whom he gets it." The tradesman must of course be honest, but "there are some latitudes" which he must be allowed. "Custom, indeed, has driven us beyond the limits **of our morals in** many things, which **trade** makes necessary." **Defoe does not** apologize **for** his commercialism. **On the contrary it is the glory of England.** "The greatness of

the British nation is not owing to war and conquests, to enlarging its dominions by the sword, or subjecting the people of other countries to our power; but it is all owing to trade." ¹⁰

THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STATE

The social thought of the Enlightenment had some direct influence on contemporary government; for some rulers had been won over personally to the principles of the *philosophes* and they tried to put these principles into operation in their own realms. These monarchs are known as the *benevolent* or *enlightened despots* and included Frederick the Great (1740-86) of Prussia, Maria Theresa (1740-80) and Joseph II (1780-90) of Austria, Charles III (1759-88) of Spain, Catherine the Great (1762-96) of Russia, Gustavus III (1771-92) of Sweden, and the Grand Duke Leopold (1745-90) of Tuscany. All these rulers had a genuine interest in humanitarian reforms, but not, it must be added, to the extent of weakening their own power.

The most articulate was Frederick the Great. In his *Anti-Machiavelli*, published in the year of his accession, he laid down the principle that the king is only the first servant of the people and not their absolute master. Only four days after his father died Frederick abolished torture as an instrument of judicial investigation. He decreed religious toleration (though the Jews did not benefit from this principle) and reformed the law courts. He made the Prussian civil service a model of efficiency while none of his officials worked harder than Frederick himself. In only one respect did he depart conspicuously from the principles of the Enlightenment. By his wars he proved himself a great general and made Prussia a redoubtable power. But this militarism was directly opposed to the doctrine of the *philosophes*.

The power of the eighteenth-century rulers was considerably limited by the nobility and this limitation became more potent the farther east in Europe a state was situated. Even Frederick the Great was unable to liberate the serfs in the face of the opposition of the nobility. For many remnants of feudalism remained, particularly in eastern Europe. The bourgeoisie was indeed a privileged class. Mercantilist theory demanded that business be fostered to build a strong state. As long, then, as the government favored business, capitalists did not protest too loudly if they were not given a very direct share in government.

The army was the stronghold of the nobility. Fighting was the profession of the nobility in feudal times and it is not surprising to find that noblemen constituted the officer class of the large standing armies of the eighteenth century. These noble officers formed a very exclusive caste. They had their own peculiar conception of "honor" and their own means of enforcing it, the duelling code. The great standing armies, officered by an in-bred group and existing outside the ordinary framework of civil government, naturally had a great influence on national policy. They represented an important step in the development of modern militarism.

This militarism did not go unchallenged. The *philosophes* were very outspoken critics. Montesquieu was shocked at the economic waste caused by the upkeep of the armies of his day which he considered large, though they were tiny compared with what came later. Voltaire said that soldiers were hired murderers. No evil is as destructive as war. "All the vices of all times and all places together will never equal the evil brought about by a single campaign."¹¹ Turgot and Quesnay wanted standing armies replaced by a militia. Diderot inveighed against monarchies

in which the king preserves his power through the army and, in order to make the army strong, subordinates every useful and worthy thing, all the sciences and all the arts, to military efficiency. These protests, however, were of little effect. Eighteenth-century militarism continued to flourish until it was replaced by the more efficient militarism of the Napoleonic wars.¹²

THE PHYSIOCRATS

The economic thought of the Enlightenment is represented by the doctrine of the physiocrats. Some of the characteristic teachings of the school were anticipated by several writers such as Pierre de Boisguillebert (1646-1714), Marshal Vauban (1633-1707), and Richard Cantillon (d. 1734); but the real founder was Francois Quesnay (1694-1774). Born the son of a rural landowner, Quesnay became a physician and rose to eminence in his profession. He became royal physician, lived in the palace at Versailles, and enjoyed the favor of Louis XV. He developed an interest in economics rather late in life. It was only when he was in his sixties that he first published his characteristic doctrines in two articles in the *Encyclopaedia*, "Fermiers" (1756) and "Grains" (1757). He soon attracted disciples, one of whom was the Marquis de Mirabeau (1715-89), father of the Mirabeau who played such a prominent part in the French Revolution. Vincent de Gournay (1712-59), while perhaps not strictly speaking a member of the school, was an important influence.¹³

The fundamental economic doctrine of the physiocrats was that only those occupations are truly productive which add to the available quantity of raw materials. Thus agriculture and mining are productive, but manufacture and commerce are not. Manufacture merely gives new forms to

materials and commerce merely transfers them from place to place. Only the extractive industries add to the real wealth of the nation and the value of their product, minus the costs of production, is the net product (*produit net*), the real measure of the community's economic progress. Other occupations may be useful but they are non productive and economically sterile. Since the land is the real source of wealth the state should derive its revenue from a single tax imposed on land. Consistently with this viewpoint the physiocrats believed that the state should give less attention to manufacture and commerce (which were favored by the mercantilists) and more to agriculture.

The physiocrats differed from the mercantilists in an other important respect. The latter believed in a very close supervision by the government of the economic life of the country. On the other hand the physiocrats had a supreme confidence in natural law. They believed that the powers of government should be restricted. In particular the state should place no restrictions on economic activities. As long as the government preserves the fundamental rights of man, life, liberty, and property, it has done its full duty. It is no contradiction to these principles that Quesnay and many other physiocrats preferred an enlightened despotism. They saw in such a form of government the most efficient way of putting their ideas into practice. If a despotism is enlightened, according to their ideas, it will not interfere with natural rights.

The physiocrats never enjoyed a wide popular following. Their writings were too technical to attract a large reading public. But they did have influence. Turgot, the great finance minister of Louis XVI, was a follower of the school and tried to put some of their theories into practice. He failed to accomplish much because the king was not

firm enough in supporting him. More important in the long run was the influence of the physiocrats on Adam Smith who met Quesnay and other members of the school in Paris during his travels. Smith taught the doctrine of *laissez faire* in economics and this was doubtless due in some measure to the influence of his Paris friends. Thus the doctrines of the physiocrats passed into the main current of modern economic thought.¹⁴

THE REACTION AND ROUSSEAU

The works of the Enlightenment were a meager diet for the human mind. Men cannot subsist indefinitely on reason, especially when reason is conceived as narrowly as the *philosophes* conceived it. So the inevitable reaction set in. Even before the Age of Reason came to an end there were stirrings of revolt in certain quarters. With a vast sense of relief some men began to turn from reason to emotion, from the prim, artificial world of the Enlightenment to the great world of nature. There were some who felt suffocated by the stuffy air of the *salons* and began to breathe with satisfaction the fresher air of a more common and natural environment.

In English literature the prosaic poetry of Alexander Pope gave way to a frank sentimentality, an enjoyment of the picturesque, and a relish for the subtle, half-realized, moods which float across consciousness. Thomas Gray's *Elegy* appeared in 1751 and was a great success, and Gray was only one of a number of poets who wrote in the same strain. At the same time the sentimental novel was being developed by Samuel Richardson, Oliver Goldsmith, and Laurence Sterne.

The same reaction shows itself very clearly in two Protestant religious movements, English Methodism and Ger

man Pietism. Methodism was about as far removed from deism as one could imagine. Whereas the deists glorified reason, the Methodists reveled in sentiment. The preaching of John Wesley (1703-91) and still more of George Whitefield (1714-70) threw vast crowds into orgies of emotionalism. Pietism as a movement within the Lutheran Church arose under the influence of Spener in the latter part of the seventeenth century, but during the middle decades of the eighteenth century it was given a new direction by Count von Zinzendorf (1700-60) who founded a separate community, the Moravian Church. Zinzendorf denounced the Enlightenment but he and his followers were indifferent to dogma. On the other hand, like the Methodists, they gave full play to sentiment. Both movements, then, tended toward a highly emotional, non-intellectual form of religion—a fact highly symptomatic of the age.

The greatest name in the early reaction against the social thought of the Enlightenment was undoubtedly Jean Jacques Rousseau. He was born at Geneva in 1712 and grew up with little formal discipline or education; for his mother died in giving him birth and his father, an irresponsible character, abandoned him at the age of ten and fled Geneva to escape a legal process. An uncle took charge of the boy, sent him to school, and then apprenticed him, first to a notary and then to an engraver. These unsuccessful experiments ended in 1728 when Jean-Jacques, now almost sixteen, ran away and began an astonishing life of vagabondage. There must have been something remarkably attractive about this strange vagrant, for he always seemed able to ingratiate himself with important and influential people. Unfortunately, however, his sensitiveness and his boorish manners led to constantly recurring quarrels with

his patrons. **The** fashionable world seemed alternately to attract and repel him.

By 1749 Rousseau was known in Paris as a minor figure among the intelligentsia. He had written an opera, *Les Muses galantes*, and contributed articles on music to the *Encyclopaedia*; for Rousseau had a real, if untrained, musical talent. The *salons* had grown weary of him by this time. To an impartial observer he would have appeared an embittered and demoralized failure. But in this year 1749 something occurred which changed Rousseau's whole future. He read of a prize offered by the Academy of Dijon for the best essay on the effect of the progress in the arts and sciences on morals. Instead of giving the expected answer that the effect on morals had been good, Rousseau resolved to uphold the opposite thesis. His own demoralization, he felt, was due to the corrupt society in which he lived. Man is naturally good; the effect of so-called civilization has been to degrade him. Rousseau's impassioned eloquence poured forth in a torrent. The result was his prize winning essay, *Discours sur les sciences et les arts*. Its success was immediate. This was followed by a second *Discours* on the origins and foundations of inequality among men. Herein the author blamed inequality on the institution of private property and glorified without measure the primitive state of nature.

Rousseau's attacks on civilization naturally alienated him from the *philosophes*, but polite society lionized him. He had written at just the right time, when the reaction against the Enlightenment was beginning to make itself felt. Friends arranged for him to live at Montmorency in the country near Paris and here he wrote in quick succession what are perhaps his three greatest works. *La nouvelle Heloiss* (1761), *Smile* (1762), and *Le contrat social*

(1762). The first was a romantic novel, an important sign of the times. The second was a tract on education in the form of a romance whose author, by the way, seems to have placed his own five children in a foundling asylum immediately after birth. The third was a very important book in the history of social thought. It begins with a plea for individual freedom against the restraints imposed by society. "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains." But after the opening chapters the tone changes and the author develops a theory of the state which leaves little room for personal liberty. The source of this governmental authority is explained by a hypothetical social contract from which the book gets its name. This contract implies "the complete alienation of each associate with all his rights to the whole community." Its effect is to create "a moral and collective body" which can be called a "collective ego" (*moi commun*). The power of the state so formed is so absolute that those who refuse an external conformity to the civil religion may be justly punished by death. After this productive period Rousseau resumed an unsettled life. During these last unhappy years he appears to have been not quite sane. He died in 1778.¹⁵

Scholars have long puzzled over the inconsistencies of Rousseau's social thought. Did his anarchic love of freedom represent his real mind, or was it rather represented by the ordered discipline which he defended in the main body of *he contrat social* and elsewhere? This is a hard question to answer, but it is significant to note that Rousseau himself never was conscious of any inconsistency. Some inconsistency there certainly was, but perhaps it was not as glaring as a superficial view would suggest. Rousseau wanted mankind to return to the simple virtues of his hypothetical state of nature.) He was realistic enough to

admit that this could not be done by simply abolishing all government completely. The best feasible thing to do would be to create a society in which, while the state would protect the lives and property of the citizens, each "would nevertheless obey only himself."¹⁶ For this was Rousseau's idea of freedom—not "anarchy, but an obedience freely rendered to an authority which each recognizes as necessary. In this sense, then, each would "obey only himself," and yet the authority of the government would remain unquestioned. It was the conception of "liberty under law" which played such an important part in democratic theory before and after Rousseau.

The Enlightenment represented the logical culmination of the rationalistic naturalism which had been developing since the dawn of modern times. Thought could hardly proceed any further in that direction and it was not surprising that a reaction should set in. This reaction was aided, and also modified, by the economic changes involved in the so-called Industrial Revolution. The reaction, however, was not destined to be in the direction of the medieval synthesis. Rather it moved toward a new form of naturalism, less dryly intellectual than the old. New enthusiasms were developed as substitutes for the religious enthusiasms of the Middle Ages. But that is a story for future chapters to unfold.

CHAPTER 12

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH, 1769-1815

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

The most sensational occurrence during this half century was doubtless the French Revolution together with the wars which followed it; but far more important in the long run were the rapid economic changes of the period. It was the latter rather than the former which built the framework of modern society and determined the direction which social thought would take. (Arnold Toynbee popularized the term *Industrial Revolution* for the developments in industry which occurred at this period. Recent historians, however, have tended to discard the term; for it is now known that these developments were much less rapid and revolutionary than Toynbee supposed. There were well-developed factories with power-driven machinery long before the period described by Toynbee.² On the other hand, the growth of the factory system and the displacement of men by machines continues in our own day. However, it will do no harm to speak of an Industrial Revolution, so long as we remember that it refers merely to a period of rapid growth and not to a sudden and cataclysmic change.³

(The development of the factory system on a wide scale affected England before it affected the Continent and made itself felt in textiles more than in any other industry) In the course of the eighteenth Century a remarkable series of in

ventions greatly facilitated the whole textile process from spinning the yarn to bleaching and dyeing the goods. Water power no longer served as a satisfactory prime mover for the new factories, but the steam engine met the need. Steam power had already been used for pumping water out of mines and for supplying city water systems. Probably Thomas Newcomen (1663-1729) should be considered the real inventor of the steam engine. But his atmospheric engine (1712) was extremely wasteful and when James Watt (1736-1819) patented his separate-condenser engine in 1769 the improvement was so great and the ultimate effect on industry was so far-reaching that this date has been selected to mark the beginning of the period covered in this chapter. The new machinery needed more and better iron and the demand was met by improved metallurgical methods including the use of coke in blast furnaces by the Darby's at Coalbrookdale in the early years of the century and the development of the puddling furnace for making wrought iron and of an efficient rolling mill by Henry Cort (1740-1800). Finally a group of unsung heroes, of whom perhaps the greatest was Henry Maudslay (1771-1831), began to develop machine tools.⁴

It was a common mistake among the older historians to see in these great inventions the cause of the Industrial Revolution. Probably it would be truer to say that the Revolution caused the inventions. When an economic need arises, men apply themselves to develop the necessary machines and processes. It is interesting to note how frequently in history something was invented independently by two or more people at about the same time. Probably **the** old saying is profoundly true: (Necessity literally is **the mother** of invention.)

In **the** meantime agriculture was developing rapidly.

The growth of industry proved a powerful stimulus, for the new urban workers had to be fed. The significant changes of the period were two, the substitution of large scale for small-scale farming and the introduction of better agricultural methods. The medieval rural economy, surviving in large areas, involved common pastures, common woodlands, and a common system of planting individual holdings in common fields which were allowed to lie fallow one year out of every two or three. This gave way to the modern system of individually owned farms. At the same time a more intelligent system for rotating crops was introduced, improved agricultural tools were developed, better breeds of farm animals were produced, and farmers began to plant root crops and artificial grasses in areas where these had not been used before. Improved roads lessened the isolation of rural districts and aided commercial farming as much as they did the new industry.

The new developments in industry and agriculture involved a considerable amount of suffering among the poor. Small village farmers were dispossessed by enclosure acts which created large farms and they became agricultural laborers with uncertain employment or else migrated to towns to work in the new factories. The early factory system, uncontrolled by adequate legislation, was subject to many abuses. However, the effect of the economic changes of the late eighteenth century on the poor should not be exaggerated. There was much suffering among small farmers even before the new agriculture developed and there were acute labor problems even before the Industrial Revolution. The evils of the new factory system have sometimes been played up too dramatically. But even after due allowance has been made for exaggerations, it remains

true that the new economic developments bore heavily on the common people.⁶) "

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

A development as striking as the Industrial Revolution naturally stimulated a great deal of discussion. One very practical issue was the question of the proper relation of the government to the new industries. Under the old mercantilist system the state had tended to assume a considerable measure of control over economic life. Quite understandably the new capitalists resented this. A new school of economists arose, commonly called the *classical school*. These writers expressed on the whole the viewpoint of the growing capitalism and demanded that business should be left free to develop with a minimum of government interference. The classical economists made important contributions to technical economic doctrine, but many of their viewpoints were significant in the broader field of general social thought and call for consideration here.

Adam Smith (1723-90) is commonly considered the founder of the classical school. Educated at Glasgow and Oxford, he began to teach at Glasgow in 1751. Later he became tutor to the Duke of Buccleuch and traveled with his pupil on the Continent where, as already mentioned, he became personally acquainted with the physiocrats. In 1767 he settled at Kirkcaldy with a pension from the Duke and devoted himself to writing his masterpiece, (*An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, which was published in 1776.)

Smith believed in the advantages of the order of liberty on theoretical as well as practical grounds. There was a growing love of freedom in the late eighteenth century

which expressed itself most dramatically in the American and French Revolutions. Smith was in sympathy with this spirit. Then he was also aware that too much state regulation was inimical to business. So in general he advocated economic liberalism. He criticized mercantilism for unwarranted interference with foreign commerce. He believed that, generally speaking, private self-interest leads to a good economic order if the government does not interfere. But Smith was less extreme in his economic liberalism than some of his followers. He justified the Navigation Act, not on economic grounds, but as an aid to national defense.⁷ Banking should be subject to some regulation for the public good.⁸ It is particularly interesting to note Smith's comment on labor legislation: "Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen, its counsellors are always the masters. When the regulation, therefore, is in favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour of the masters."⁹ In these and in other ways Smith showed that he did not intend to push his doctrine of non-interference by the state beyond the point where it ceased to be socially desirable.

Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), another of the classical economists, is remembered chiefly for his theory on population. His treatise, [*An Essay on the Principle of Population*] was first published in 1798. Six editions appeared during the author's life, the last in 1828, and this fact gave him an opportunity to revise his theories considerably. (Malthus believed that population tends to increase much more rapidly than the food supply, the former in geometrical, the latter at most in arithmetical ratio.) If the process continues unhindered, famine will be the obvious result. This, however, is exceptional because other checks

besides famine come into play. Population checks in general are "resolvable into moral restraint, vice and misery." Vice lowers the birth rate. "Misery" which includes war, disease, and famine, shortens human life. Of the three general classes of checks, "we cannot long hesitate in our decision respecting which it would be most eligible to encourage." Malthus therefore advocated moral restraint and believed in "our obligation(not to marry till we have a fair prospect of being able to support our children.) Obviously this is something quite different from the modern doctrine of birth prevention by contraceptive means which sometimes goes under the name of Neo-Malthusianism. The theory of Malthus was not new, but it was stated forcefully and attracted attention. Doubtless it owed a considerable part of its popularity to the selfishness of the rich who were worried about their obligation of helping to support the poor in the teeming industrial towns.¹⁰

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was not one of the classical economists; but like them he believed in economic freedom, so he may perhaps be appropriately considered at this point. The son of a successful lawyer, he studied law, but instead of practising his profession he preferred to live on his means and devote himself to intellectual pursuits. Bentham's distinctive theory was utilitarianism. The greatest happiness of the greatest number, he believed, was the sole measure of right and wrong. When the individual injures the general happiness by pursuing his selfish pleasure, the state should intervene and restrain him. Governmental interference in the economic sphere is unnecessary; individual self-interest will automatically lead to a desirable state of affairs. There are few exceptions to this. Bentham made a deep impression on his age and his influence continued after his death.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The French Revolution like the Industrial Revolution proved a great stimulus to social thought. Even writers who were not professed social philosophers could scarcely overlook such a dramatic series of events. Therefore in order to understand the thought of the period it is necessary to keep the Revolution before one's eyes. In a book like the present one space is lacking to review even briefly the complicated sequence of events which led to the fall of the old regime, the rise of Napoleon, and finally the restoration of the Bourbons. There are, however, certain general facts which are too important to be overlooked even in a brief survey.¹¹

A point of view dear to the old-fashioned liberal accepted the French Revolution as a spontaneous and utterly unorganized revolt of the common man against special privilege and in the direction of social justice. In the light of recent research it is clear that this thesis must be modified in certain important respects. First of all, it is now known that the Revolution was less spontaneous than was once commonly supposed. This does not imply that the movement was the result of a deliberate and detailed plot, but it does imply that before the outbreak of revolt there existed in France a partially organized group sympathetic to radical political change. Part of this group consisted of lodges of Freemasons. A far more important part was organized into literary and social clubs scattered throughout France. Here was the nucleus of a potentially powerful political machine. When the States-General met in 1789 and rapidly changed itself into a national assembly this potential machine became an actuality under the leadership of a group of radical deputies who called themselves the

Club Breton. The resulting organization was the Jacobins and the Jacobins controlled the course of the Revolution until the fall of Robespierre in 1794, not necessarily because they represented the largest segment of public opinion, but because they were organized and because they used to the full all the methods of modern pressure politics, propaganda, direct and indirect interference with elections, and mob violence.

Since the Jacobins played such a determining part in the course of the Revolution it is extremely important to know what manner of men they were. Elaborate studies have thrown a flood of light on this question. It is now clear that they stood distinctly above the average economically. On the whole they were moderately successful business and professional men, members of the bourgeoisie. An extremely important conclusion follows from these facts. The men who gave direction to the French Revolution during its more radical phases were not drawn from the dispossessed poor. They were predominantly respectable middle-class citizens, seasoned with a sprinkling of Free masons, politically astute, freethinking, and jealous of the special privileges of the clergy and the nobility.¹²

As the Revolution proceeded the Jacobins were narrowed down by successive purges into a more and more radical group. However, they were not radical in the sense of being insurgent proletarians; rather they belonged to the lower strata of the bourgeoisie. It was this faction which engineered the Reign of Terror (1793-94). The Terror cannot be explained by the necessity of unifying France in the face of foreign and domestic enemies, although the country was at war and a royalist revolt had broken out in the Vendée in the spring of 1793. The Terror was a complex phenomenon in which ideology, hysteria, and

fierce personal antagonisms all played a part.¹³ Quite naturally a reaction set in. The result was the government of the Directory (1795-99), middle-class like the Jacobins but also comfortably conservative. The Directory was not as ineffective as historians have sometimes represented it, but it lacked brilliance. During a time of foreign war the administration was without unity. Moreover there were indications of a renewal of Jacobin influence and men feared a new Terror. Under these circumstances it became possible for Napoleon to seize power in 1799 and to dominate the history of Europe until the Bourbons were restored to the throne of France in the person of Louis XVIII.

Viewed superficially the French Revolution might appear to be a complete failure. In a quarter century France had painfully made her way from the Bourbons back to the Bourbons again. But a more careful examination shows that profound changes had actually taken place. A tradition of parliamentary government had been established. The state had become highly centralized, and so it remained, with a unified legal code, unified taxation, and a unified system of weights and measures. Education had been reorganized. A system of universal military service had begun. In the Middle Ages wars had been fought by a feudal military caste; in early modern times by mercenary armies with gentlemen as officers; but the French Revolution instituted the tradition of conscript service so fundamental to modern total militarism. The privileges of the nobility and of the Church had been abolished. Agriculture came definitely under the control of small peasant proprietors. The position of business was very materially improved; for the last vestiges of guild control had been removed and in its laws and its policies the government constantly tended to favor the business man. On the whole

indeed it was the bourgeoisie which profited by the Revolution and this is not surprising when we remember **the** dominant part which bourgeois leaders played in the movement. (The French Revolution was a complex phenomenon, but the most prominent common factor which runs throughout its course was the rise of the bourgeoisie and of bourgeois ideals.)

REVOLUTIONARY AND ANTIREVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT

Before the Revolution the official social thought of France quite understandably favored the existing state of affairs. Of course the *philosophes* protested against flagrant abuses, but as an immediate ideal they tended to prefer, or at least tolerate, an enlightened despotism. There were some, however, whose thought was a bit more radical and of these one of the most interesting was the brother of the well-known Condillac, Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709-85). He entered the seminary but on being ordained subdeacon he refused to go further. For a time he was secretary to the statesman Cardinal de Tencin, but he quarreled with the latter and resigned to spend the balance of his life in retirement. In an early work, published in 1740, Mably defended the conservative position, but the fourteen important publications written after his retirement from public life were of a very different tenor.

Mably taught that in his original state man was happy and all enjoyed equality. But man fell from this felicitous condition, an event associated with the rise of private property. The result was luxury, inequality, and moral degradation. The ideal would be to return to primitive communism, but Mably was a bit disconcerted at the practical difficulties which this would involve. Man has become so **corrupted** under the **present system** that a return would be

scarcely feasible. The best immediate practical program would be good government which would curb economic inequality and promote the practice of virtue. Mably favors a form of government which he calls *republican monarchy* in which the legislature would have the strictest possible control over the executive. In 1758 Mably wrote a treatise *Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen* which was not published until after his death. In this he both predicts a revolution and lays down the program which it ought to pursue. Subsequent events amply justified Mably's prophecy.¹⁴

The excitement and struggles of the Revolution itself were scarcely favorable to the composition of learned works on social thought, but the documents and discussions of the period do contain a considerable amount of significant material. For example *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* adopted by the National Assembly in 1789 is an important statement of the ideology of the revolutionists. It asserts the natural freedom of all men and the equality of their rights. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. There has been a good deal of controversy as to the antecedents, the meaning, and the significance of this short document.¹⁵ It has been interpreted both as an assertion of the power of the new centralized state and as a declaration of the individual's freedom from undue state interference.

During the Reign of Terror the revolutionary fervor reached its highest intensity. It is scarcely possible to do justice to the spirit of the period in the sober language of sociology. Something like a new religion developed with its saints and martyrs, its sacred books, its symbols, and its ceremonies. Underlying all this there was a definite ideology. The ideal government is indeed constitutional government, but before attaining this happy stage, France must

pass through a period of revolutionary government which is to purge away those nefarious elements which oppose the Revolution. By recourse to violent measures the revolutionary government is only forcing the citizen to do what is good for himself. The standard of right and wrong is the general will and it is this that the government expresses. In this line of thought there is a strange combination of individualism and collectivism which the reader has already met in Rousseau. Freedom is a precious natural right, but this freedom is most profoundly realized by submitting to the general will. No wonder that scholars have read opposite meanings into the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*. Possibly the truest judgment on the ideology of the Revolution is that it involved a fundamental contradiction which the revolutionists in the fervor of their enthusiasm refused to recognize.¹⁶

De Maistre and Bonald ably expressed the royalist reaction against the Revolution. Joseph de Maistre (1753 or 1754-1821) was born in Savoy which was not then a part of France. When the revolutionary armies invaded Savoy he left the country. Much of his writing was done in 1803-17 when he was ambassador at St. Petersburg. Viscount Louis de Bonald (1754-1840) was a Frenchman who emigrated during the height of the Revolution and survived to hold high office after the Bourbon restoration. There are important differences in the approach of these two writers, but their fundamental position is similar. They attacked the narrow concept of reason held by the *philosophes*. They were enthusiastically loyal to the Church and stressed the importance of Catholicism in civil society. Both favored a hereditary monarchy as the best form of government, but Bonald was more absolute in his preference than De Maistre. These two writers were important, **not** just

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because they were royalists, but because they were able to integrate their political theories, their philosophy, and their religion into a consistent system.¹⁷

As one might naturally expect, the stirring events in France had their repercussions across the Channel. An interesting radical movement developed in England during the latter years of the eighteenth century. The leaders included the stormy John Wilkes (1727-97), John Home Tooke (1736-1812), parson and politician, John Cartwright (1740-1824) whose brother Edmund is credited with the invention of the power loom, Richard Price (1723-91), a nonconformist minister, and Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), the discoverer of oxygen. These men, and others like them, were sympathetic to both the American and the French Revolutions. However, as far as England was concerned, they were by no means revolutionists. They had no wish to overturn the government. Their radicalism expressed itself in a desire to reform Parliament and make it a more truly representative body. What this reform meant in the concrete may be judged from Cartwright's pamphlet *Take Your Choice* (1776) in which he advocated the ballot, suffrage for all, annual parliaments, equal representation, and payment for members of Parliament under certain conditions.¹⁸

The excesses of the French Revolution led to a reaction in England. The thought of this reaction was expressed most intelligently by the statesman Edmund Burke (1729-97). He was a man of extraordinary intellectual ability. It is perhaps unfortunate from the standpoint of social thought that he was so immersed in the turmoil of parliamentary politics during the best years of his life that he never developed his ideas in systematic treatises. It must not be imagined that Burke was a hide-bound conservative.

His general position was conciliatory and reasonable as his attitude on the American Revolution demonstrates. But he had the penetration to see, much sooner than most of his compatriots, in what direction events in France were tending. As early as November, 1790, Burke published his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* wherein with extraordinary foresight he predicted the course of the movement down to the ultimate military dictatorship. This was followed by other vigorous tracts including his famous *Letters on a Regicidal Peace* (1796). Burke has been criticized for his failure to appreciate properly the real grievances of the French people under the old regime; still his comments on the Revolution are a remarkable proof of his acumen.

Perhaps the most intelligent reply to Burke was made by James Mackintosh, the genial Scotch physician and politician whose *Vindiciae Gallicae* was written as an answer to the *Reflections*. But even Mackintosh changed his mind as the Revolution progressed. In fact the revulsion of public opinion was so complete that even the moderate parliamentary reforms proposed by the early radicals had to be shelved. It was not until the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 that they began to be put into effect. In the meantime the forces of reaction controlled English policy without much opposition. Of course one factor which made this almost inevitable was the long series of wars which found England arrayed against the revolutionary armies. Belligerents are not generally sympathetic toward the political ideology of their enemies.

One radical thinker who never became conservative was Thomas Paine (1737-1809). After an unsuccessful agitation in his native England in favor of increased pay for excisemen, he migrated to America where his pamphlet

Common Sense (1776) helped to crystallize sentiment in favor of independence. After playing his part in the American Revolution, he returned to England, but the publication of his tract *The Rights of Man* compelled him to flee to France. Here he was elected a member of the National Convention. Paine, however, who was too radical for England was too conservative for France and narrowly escaped the guillotine. His last years were spent in America. Paine had little sense of social evolution. In his eyes the past was a pretty complete failure, dominated by tyranny. The only salvation of mankind, he felt, would be a complete break with the past. Revolution would usher in a golden age in which the natural rights of man would be guarded by written constitutions. He proposed a scheme of social legislation, remarkable for his day, with provisions for the poor, the aged, children, and the unemployed. Paine's opposition to revealed religion made him many enemies, but it would be unfair to deny his importance.

William Godwin (1756-1836) was another unchanging radical of the period. His best-known work is *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Political Justice and Its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness*, published in 1793. Godwin had an optimistic view of the perfectability of human nature, arguing that character is shaped by environment and can therefore be modified. He denounced the existing institutions which he considered responsible for social evil, namely, government, law, private property, sentiment (including friendship), marriage, and all promises. His ultimate social ideal was a state of anarchic communism in which all forms of organization would have disappeared. This extreme position was somewhat modified in later publications. Obviously Godwin's thought did not

represent a very practical program. His real significance lay in his trenchant criticism of existing social evils.

In Germany, as in England the French Revolution was greeted with mixed sentiments. Some like August Rehberg (1757-1836), the Hanoverian publicist, were unsympathetic from the start. But a large and representative group of German intellectuals greeted the Revolution with enthusiasm only to become hostile when the movement entered its more extreme phase. Friedrich von Gentz (1764-1832) belongs in this category. He studied law at Königsberg and then entered the Prussian civil service. He was steeped in the philosophy of the Enlightenment and he accepted the Revolution as a concrete example of these principles in action. For two years Gentz remained sympathetic. However, Burke's *Reflections* impressed him and later he published a translation of it. Gradually he became more critical until finally he was recognized as one of the three most capable and influential critics of the Revolution along with Burke and De Maistre. Still, Gentz was far from being an extreme conservative in his views. On the accession of Frederick William III to the throne of Prussia he addressed the king in a bold pamphlet arguing for freedom of the press. Even after entering the service of Austria and becoming the ally of the conservative Metternich he always retained his sympathy for the American Revolution. It is an interesting fact that Gentz always criticized the French Revolution from the standpoint of rationalism. He was as much a rationalist as the Jacobins, but he argued that the revolutionary government was unfaithful to the revolutionists' own ideal.¹⁹

No country of Europe was entirely unaffected by the thought of the Revolution. The typical sequence of events

began with enthusiastic praise from the liberals when the movement began. Sometimes this was followed by the rise of local revolutionary movements in imitation of the French model. Jacobin excesses often served to dampen the ardor of those who sympathized with the revolutionists. In the countries which France invaded local patriotism helped to alienate sympathy. The usual result was that rulers found themselves more firmly entrenched in power than before as an effect of the reaction (More important than its immediate effect on European politics was its more gradual and subtle effect on general social thought.) (The ideology of the Revolution included the doctrine that men are, in a certain limited sense, equal.) (This thesis undoubtedly had its effect in helping to remove some of the disabilities of the Jews, to abolish slavery, and to give women more equal legal and political rights.) The French Revolution marked an important epoch in the history of social thought,

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT

The previous chapter has already mentioned the literary reaction against the desiccated thought of the Enlightenment. As time went on this reaction gathered momentum and by the beginning of the nineteenth century the romantic movement proper had developed. The romanticists and their immediate predecessors had a deep devotion to unspoiled nature and this included an enthusiasm for the natural man unaffected by the artificialities of sophisticated society. They were usually sympathetic toward the French Revolution, at least in its earlier phases, looking on it as a great movement for the liberation of the human spirit. These writers were neither profound social philosophers nor particularly acute commentators on current events; but they reflected the spirit of the age with poetic

sensitiveness. Thus they provide an excellent index of the social thought of the period.

In England toward the end of the eighteenth century there flourished an obscure group of poets, novelists, and dramatists who criticized the existing order and predicted the dawn of a new day. They satirized the vices of the dominant classes and praised the virtue of unspoiled human nature. One such writer, to take an almost random example, was Mrs. Elizabeth Inchbald (1753-1821). The hero of her novel *Nature and Art* was wrecked in infancy on a tropical island and brought up by the savages. Being rescued at the age of fourteen he returns to England and there his simple virtues form an edifying contrast to the corrupt morals of fashionable society. This general viewpoint is fairly typical of the poems, plays, and novels written by this group.

The publication of *Lyrical Ballads* in 1798 is generally taken as the beginning of the romantic movement proper in England. The two authors of this memorable volume, William Wordsworth (1770-1850) and Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) along with Robert Southey (1774-1834) were the leaders of the movement in its early phase. The social thought of all three men followed a similar course. Their youth was radical. Coleridge and Southey planned to found a communist colony in America. The young Wordsworth in his *Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff* (not published until 1876) argued in favor of a democratic representative government. As they grew older, however, all three men turned conservative. Wordsworth came to oppose even such necessary innovations as Catholic emancipation and the Reform Bill. Coleridge in his maturity reached a better balanced system. Essentially conservative, he was yet prepared for moderate reforms and he had the

insight to see that poverty, unemployment and other abuses were inevitable as long as the economic system was governed by the principles of *laissez faire*. Southey in his conservative phase opposed Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform like Wordsworth; but like Coleridge he was deeply conscious of the sufferings of the poor and criticized *laissez-faire* economics.

The younger generation of English romanticists never became conservative as their elders did. They were more deeply imbued with the characteristic romantic love of liberty and less restrained by a reverence for tradition. The chief representatives of this younger group were Lord George Gordon Byron (1788-1824) and Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822). Keats, great as a poet, has little to say about society. Byron believed that man was naturally good but was corrupted by society. Therefore he was intensely devoted to the ideal of liberty which would free man from society's corrupting influences and leave him free to develop his natural goodness. Byron was active in defense of his ideals. As a member of the House of Lords he defended the Luddite rioters and at the time of his death he was taking part with the Greeks in their revolt against Turkey. Shelley, son-in-law of Godwin, was an intransigent radical. In his more extreme moments he defended anarchism, pacifism, feminism, and free love. However, he had a more moderate side. In an unfinished pamphlet, his *Philosophical View of Reform*, published only in 1920, Shelley announced a program which, though still radical, does make some compromises with reality.²⁰

In Germany the romantic movement proper was preceded by the period of Storm and Stress (*Sturm und Drang*). Perhaps the alternative title, the Age of Genius (*Geniezeit*), is more descriptive; for it is impossible to deny

the title of genius to such leaders as, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832), and Johann Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805). Herder's most important contribution to social thought was his concept of historical evolution; mankind, he believed, was progressing toward *Humanitat*, literally *humanity*, by which he meant a humane and intelligent goodness. Goethe occupied for many years various official posts in the little duchy of Weimar. His sympathy was with the ruling classes and he had little confidence in the common man. A more humane society would come through slow evolution under the guidance of intelligent rulers. Schiller had a great love for liberty, but his enthusiasm for the French Revolution was short-lived. In the long run he looked to the moral regeneration of the individual for the salvation of society.

In Germany the romantic movement itself produced no names as great as the heroes of the *Geniezeit* but it is not without its importance. The most important representative of the school in the present connection is Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829). In his youth Schlegel was sympathetic toward the French Revolution, an attitude which he later abandoned. His mature social ideal was influenced by a love of the Middle Ages. This respect for medieval culture was characteristic of romanticism; Schlegel himself became a Catholic. He sought in religion the principle of social order, emphasized the importance of agriculture, and advocated state control of the economic system in the face of the nascent capitalism.²¹

Preromanticism and romanticism itself were widespread European movements. The social thought of various countries was affected by the characteristic attitudes which these movements involved. In Denmark Jens Baggesen (1764-1826) expressed a moderate enthusiasm for the Rev

olution. In Sweden Thomas Thorild (1759-1808) was a great lover of liberty. In his eyes cities were hotbeds of vice. They should be burned, he thought, and people should be redistributed in small communities on the land. In France Francois-Rene de Chateaubriand (1768-1848) expounded the beneficent influence of the Church on human culture in his *Genie du christianisme* (1802). In a later work, *De la monarchie selon la charte* (1816) he advocated constitutional monarchy.

NEW ORIENTATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY

Toward the middle of the eighteenth century philosophy was in the doldrums. The rise of natural science had concentrated attention on the material world. Descartes had set up an unnecessarily sharp antithesis between the material and the spiritual. The Enlightenment had narrowed down the concept of reason unduly. Then Hume, following this line of development to its logical conclusion, descended into scepticism. It was high time for a reaction.

The man most closely associated with this reaction was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). It was Hume, as he confesses, who first woke him from his "dogmatic slumber." He resolved to put philosophy on a sound basis once more by establishing the validity of philosophic knowledge. In his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781) he did not do this very satisfactorily, but in his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (*Critique of Practical Reason*, 1788) he felt that he had discovered a valid defense against scepticism. By contemplating the grandeur of the moral law within us, the *categorical imperative* which bids us to live ethically, we can be certain of the freedom of the will, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. Kant therefore felt that the certainty which he sought was

to be found in the real or practical reason rather than in pure speculation.

It is easy to see from the foregoing that ethics looms large in Kant's thought. He formulated his fundamental principle when he said that man should always so act that the maxim implied by his conduct could without contradiction become a universal law. Man is a moral being owing unconditional obedience to the moral law within him. Man, therefore, must never be treated as a merely passive mechanical part of the social whole. Kant expressed this truth by saying that human beings must be treated always as ends and not as means. He placed a high value on the dignity of the human personality. In his *Idee zu einer all gemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (*Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitan Plan*, 1784) Kant saw in all history the working out of nature's plan to prepare a society in which man can live up to his dignity as a person, a society which is based not on the mere might of the rulers but on ethics. In such a society all men are truly free because the lawgiver must legislate in accordance with the general will and the general will sanctions no law which prevents each man from self-development in accordance with right ethical principles.

The most prominent of Kant's successors and a man very important in the development of social thought was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). While a student at the University of Tübingen he took part in radical demonstrations in favor of the French Revolution. In his maturity Hegel became thoroughly conservative. As Professor of Philosophy at Berlin he enjoyed the favor of the Prussian government and there was little in his later activities to recall his radical youth.

The two most important features of Hegel's thought for

the present purpose are his dialectic method and his philosophy of the national state. His dialectic is a fairly abstruse method the details of which need not be considered here, but his application of this method to history is important. Hegel was very well read in the history of western culture and he believed he could discover an inner necessity underlying historical development. He carefully distinguished between reality (*Wirklichkeit*) and mere existence (*Dasein*), between that which necessarily is and that which is merely accidental and transitory. Applying this method to history it is possible to pick out the necessary trends which give meaning to history. The course of events, therefore, moves under an irresistible compulsion. The successful heroes of history are simply those men who identify themselves with this inevitable trend. The patriotic Hegel was certain that the disunited Germany of his day would become a unified national state because the logic of events made that development inescapable.

To understand Hegel's exaltation of the national state it is necessary to realize the importance of the distinction which he drew between the state and civil society. The latter performs the merely utilitarian functions of organized social life such as preserving law and order and making the ordinary public services available to its citizens. The state is something beyond all these, something almost mystical, the essential reality which underlies national development and gives it meaning. To the state so conceived the individual is subordinated, yet paradoxically he finds his truest freedom in this subordination. Since the state is itself the embodiment of ethics it is not bound by any **superior moral law. It need not, for example, be faithful to treaty obligations. In this doctrine Hegel was close to Machiavelli whom he praises. Each in his own country and**

age desired national unity so ardently that he tended to believe that (the end justified the means.

The influence of Hegel was enormous and varied. His dialectic was absorbed by Marx and became a part of orthodox communism. On the other hand his exaltation of the state entered into the tradition of modern nationalism. Thus it is possible to trace the influence of Hegel in modern trends as different as Communism, Fascism, and conservative nationalism, to say nothing of his effect on the more technical aspects of modern philosophy and social thought.²²

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECULAR FAITH

The period considered in this chapter was, as its title implies, a period of revolution. The despotism of the eighteenth century, enlightened though it often was, proved oppressive in the long run, and the French Revolution was the sign of a reaction toward a greater personal liberty, even if it did not succeed in establishing an enduring democracy. The dryness and the excessive intellectuality of literature and philosophy during the period of the Enlightenment also provoked a reaction. Writers turned to romanticism and thinkers broadened their systems to give more attention to the non-intellectual elements in human nature.

One might have expected that the reaction would have been in the direction of the medieval synthesis. This was indeed the path which writers like De Maistre and Schlegel took. But naturalism was too deeply rooted in European consciousness for so radical a revision of viewpoint. Therefore the reaction away from the Age of the Enlightenment took another course. Without abandoning naturalism men turned to new goals, but goals which at first seemed more

satisfying than the ideals of the preceding period because they were less artificial—or so it seemed—and closer to the natural impulses of man. At the risk of oversimplification these may be reduced to three, capitalism, democracy, and nationalism. These new ideals were accepted with a sort of religious fervor, and they may be looked upon as constituting something like a new and naturalistic religion which we may call *the secular faith*.

The economic revolution broke the bonds of the old mercantile system and offered new avenues to wealth. The very human vice of avarice prompted men to embrace these fresh opportunities with enthusiasm. But the newer capitalism was something more than merely economic. It gradually developed its own ethics and became something like a way of life. In the exciting struggle for gain and the rewards which it brought, the capitalists found emotional satisfactions which an earlier age might have found in religion. Perhaps St. Thomas Aquinas was right when he saw a fundamental difficulty in reconciling commercialism with the good life.

Democracy as a political system for obtaining just government is not, of course, at all repugnant to Catholic thought. Indeed democracy in the broad sense of popular sovereignty, the doctrine that the people are the immediate source of the political power which comes ultimately from God, is fundamental in Catholic political philosophy. But the democracy of the French Revolutionary type was something special. It was almost uniformly anti-Catholic and quite understandably so; for it claimed to regulate all man's activities and, in its more enthusiastic moments, even took on the outward forms of a new religion. Its nearest equivalent in the twentieth century is probably Russian

Communism. This is obviously something more than an effort to secure social justice for the oppressed.

Nationalism had been constantly developing since the later Middle Ages, but at the beginning of the nineteenth century it acquired a new intensity. Patriotism, a reasonable devotion to one's own country and a loyal readiness to serve it, is a Christian duty. But nationalism goes far beyond that. It is an exaltation of the state above the moral law, a morbid willingness to further national interests regardless of the rights of others. Its spirit is expressed in the immoral slogan, so often uncritically accepted even by decent people, *My country right or wrong*. Immoral as this attitude is, it undeniably serves as an emotional outlet. The individual, unsuccessful perhaps in his own personal life, finds a vicarious satisfaction in the triumphs of his fatherland.

To create this secular faith out of old elements which now took on a new importance, was the most significant result of the revolutionary epoch. Men accepted the new secular faith with enthusiasm but as time went on they were forced to realize that the new conditions created by this faith brought new problems. With these problems the social thought of the nineteenth century was largely occupied.



CHAPTER 13

DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM, INDUSTRIALISM, 1815-1870

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

In 1814-15 the Congress of Vienna met to settle the affairs of Europe after the perturbations of the revolutionary epoch. It was a distinguished gathering. All the important diplomats were there, along with no less than six monarchs, the Tsar, the Emperor of Austria, and the Kings of Prussia, Denmark, Bavaria, and Wiirttemberg. Naturally it was a very conservative gathering. Its purpose was frankly to preserve the *status quo* against the threat of revolutionary movements. The same purpose underlay the Quadruple Alliance of 1815 concluded by Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain. Liberal historians criticize the Congress of Vienna and the alliances which followed it for their ultraconservative spirit, but one thing must be said in their favor. They set up a system of international relations which preserved the world for a century from the horrors of an all-European conflict.

The system was less successful, however, in repressing revolution; for the forces of democracy and nationalism were too vigorous to be denied. The liberal revolt which broke out in Spain in 1820 was suppressed in 1823 with French aid; but, what was vastly more significant, the enormous Spanish and Portuguese colonies in America from Mexico south to Cape Horn revolted and successfully established their independence by 1825. In France the July

Revolution (1830) substituted the bourgeois Louis Philippe for the reactionary Charles X. In the same year the Belgians proclaimed their independence from the Dutch king under whom they had been placed by the Congress of Vienna. In the meanwhile the Balkan states were responding to the growing spirit of nationalism by gradually achieving their independence from Turkey, the most striking development at this particular period being the Greek War of Independence (1821-30). In 1832 the threat of revolution in England was averted by the passage of the Reform Bill which extended the franchise and redistributed the seats in Parliament.

In 1848 the February Revolution in France led to the deposition of Louis Philippe and the creation of the short lived Second Republic (1848-52). This was the signal for a series of revolutionary movements which swept across Europe. Revolts in various German states brought about liberal reforms and the abortive Frankfurt Assembly unsuccessfully attempted the unification of Germany under a liberal constitution. Meanwhile Austria was torn by a number of revolts. The Slavic, 'Hungarian, and Italian subjects of the Empire struck for their independence and there was a general demand for liberal government. In England the Chartists vainly demanded the further reform of Parliament. The net result of all these movements was small. There was some liberalization of constitutions, but the entrenched forces of conservation were not greatly disturbed.

If the revolutionary movements of 1848 were in general unsuccessful, many of their objectives were attained a few years later. The independence and unification of Italy were completed in 1870. The Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) led to the unification of Germany and the restoration of republican rule in France after the reign of the Emperor

Napoleon III (1852-70). In England the Reform Act of 1867 and the Ballot Act of 1872 represented a partial achievement of Chartist aims. By 1870 the force of nationalism and democracy had made notable progress against the ultraconservatism represented by the Congress of Vienna.

DEMOCRATIC AND NATIONALISTIC THOUGHT

The various revolutionary movements which have just been reviewed took place under very diverse circumstances and led to varying results; yet underlying all of them certain common trends may be discovered. One trend was the desire for a more democratic form of government. In England this meant parliamentary reform. In Austria it meant a constitutional monarchy. To the successful party in the French February Revolution of 1848 it meant a democratic constitution similar in broad outline to that of the United States. In all these cases there was the common desire that the people, or at least a larger proportion of them, should have more influence in the government. Another trend was nationalist. In Germany and Italy this meant concretely the desire that the whole nation should have one central government instead of being broken up into a considerable number of separate states. In other places, for example in Belgium or among the minority peoples of the Austrian Empire, it meant that there should be a separate government and a separate independent state for each group which was conscious of itself as a national unit on account of a common language and a common ethnic origin. In the former case nationalism implied the union of a number of sovereign states into a single larger state; in the latter, the breaking up of a larger state into smaller sovereign units, but in either case the result desired was the same, the formation of a single national state for each nationality. Gener

ally speaking the proponents of democracy and nationalism were the same persons because it was felt that within a national state democratic reforms were more likely to succeed.

The program of the democratic reformers is often spoken of as *liberalism*, but the term sometimes leads to confusion. Strictly speaking, liberalism implies freedom (Latin *liber*, free) from the traditional power of some central authority. In politics, then, liberalism stands for popular freedom from the autocratic authority of a centralized government, for democracy as against the rule of a class or a monarch. In economics it means the freedom of trade and industry from unwelcome governmental control. In religion it implies the right of private judgment and private action as opposed to the control of an authoritarian church. In the early nineteenth century when the term began to be used there were numerous writers who demanded all these sorts of freedom and the term *liberal* fitted them well. But confusion enters when the term is applied to those who accept one article of the classical liberal creed, and reject another. For example, the typical American liberal of today opposes absolutism in government and the authority of organized religion; but he demands government regulation of business, which is precisely contrary to the program of economic liberalism. The term must therefore be used with a certain amount of caution.

During the middle years of the nineteenth century the most prominent social thinker in England was John Stuart Mill. Born in 1806, he was submitted to a most extraordinary course of education by his father, James Mill, friend and follower of Jeremy Bentham, and an important social thinker in his own right. John began Greek at the age of three and from that time on a most surprising amount of

information was crammed into his young head. But Mill had no real boyhood. In later life he once remarked somewhat wistfully that he had never learned to play cricket. From 1823 to 1858 he worked for the East India Company, retiring on a pension at the latter date. This full-time job did not seem to interfere seriously with his intellectual life, for the years of his most brilliant literary productivity preceded his retirement. James Mill was active in a group of thinkers called the *Philosophical Radicals* and his son did publicity work for them. Some of the members of this group served in Parliament where they were extraordinarily influential in the 1830's. John Stuart Mill himself was a member of Parliament from 1865 to 1868, but his career was unspectacular. He died in 1873.

Mill was a thoroughgoing liberal. He believed in "freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion." The individual must not be coerced either by law or by convention. With regard to freedom of action, Mill made a distinction. "The individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself." On the other hand "for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection."¹ In economics Mill was a liberal also, but in successive editions of his *Principles of Political Economy* he modified considerably his original *laissez-faire* attitude. In politics he was a democrat but worried much over the problem of minorities. Where the majority rules, how can the rights of minorities be safeguarded? In his *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861) he suggests extra votes for the educated plus proportional representation. Mill felt strongly

on the position of women. "The legal subordination of one sex to the other," he believed, is wrong in principle and deleterious in practice. "It ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other."² Mill represents nineteenth-century liberalism in a rather pure, but not an extreme, form.

Some of Mill's contemporaries were of a far more radical stripe than he. There was, for example, Francis Place (1771-1854), a London tailor whose shop was a favorite meeting place for radical thinkers. He took an active part in the early labor movement and was prominent in the agitation against taxes on newspapers and magazines which helped to hinder free speech by their economic effects. There was Place's friend, Thomas Hodgskin (1787-1869), who was discharged from the British Navy for insubordination and who revenged himself by writing a pungent *Essay on Naval Discipline* (1813). His work on the London Mechanics' Institute makes him important in the history of adult education. In political theory he pushed his doctrinaire individualism to the point of anarchy.

Count Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-59) was perhaps the most brilliant commentator on democracy in nineteenth century France. In 1831 he was sent to the United States by the French government to study the prison system. A more important result of the trip was his book *De la democratie en Amerique* (1835-40). He enjoyed a distinguished career in public service, retiring with the advent of Louis Napoleon. De Tocqueville was a democrat, but he was by no means blind to the defects of the system. Since all share the power equally in a democracy, the ideal valued in such a society must be something which all can appreciate. This will be material comfort. Money will be

overvalued and in the ensuing competition the rise of the moneyed man will cause grave inequality in the economic sphere which the working class will try to remedy by socialistic legislation. The remedy for the tyranny of the majority under a democratic government is to develop a strong sense of personal freedom and to insist that such freedom shall be respected by the government.

French nationalism was represented by Francois Guizot (1787-1874) and Louis Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877), both statesmen and both historians. Both glorified France in their histories and in addition Thiers, while in office, fathered a vigorously nationalistic foreign policy. Hippolyte Taine (1828-93), literary critic and historian, worked out a theory of race in his *Histoire de la litterature anglaise* (1864). Just as there may be varieties within a single species among the lower animals, so there are psychologically different races within the human species. After the Franco-Prussian War Taine wrote a history of modern France, *Les origines de la France contemporaine* (1875-93) which had an important effect on the development of nationalism.

The spirit of Italian nationalism is well represented by Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-72) who spent most of his life in exile plotting revolutions. His ideal was an Italy unified under a democratic government. His nationalism, however, was not narrow and selfish. What would be good for Italy would be good for the rest of the world. So he dreamed of a day when each people would have its own national state and all would live together peacefully within the family of nations. All this was to be inspired by a new religion which would supersede Christianity. Mazzini was influential in the promotion of nationalism among other national groups as well as his own.

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Nationalism in Germany found various spokesmen during this period. Hegel, already discussed in the previous chapter, did not die until 1831. Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860) was a man of the people. He wrote against serfdom and both his songs and his prose helped to rouse the German nation to resist Napoleon. For many years he was professor at Bonn. Arndt was deeply convinced that Germany would one day be a united nation. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852) was interested in German folklore and in physical education. The latter he regarded as a means of breaking down class lines and building up a common national spirit. Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861), the great jurist, emphasized the national aspects of law. Customary law, he believed, develops out of the spirit of the people, the *Volksgeist*. He bitterly criticized the *Code Napoleon* as a bond which helped the conqueror "to fetter nations." Savigny's disciple, Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808-81), compared the state to a human being. Its body is its constitutional organization; its soul, the national spirit. The Frankfurt Assembly of 1848-49 of which Arndt and Jahn were members was itself a vain attempt to put the principles of liberalism and nationalism into practice.

In Russia from about 1840 there was a bitter contest between the Westernists and the Slavophiles. The former were devotees of western culture while the latter praised the native culture of Russia. One of the first of the Westernists was Peter Yakovlevich Chaadayev (about 1794-1856). He admired Catholicism and felt that Russia had suffered by being isolated from the main stream of western culture. He was influenced in this viewpoint by Joseph de Maistre who, it will be remembered, had served as Sardinian ambassador at St. Petersburg. Alexander Ivanovich Herzen (1812-70) differed from the usual position of the

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Westernists in that he despised the historic culture of the West, but it was from the West that he accepted certain liberal ideas which he wished to introduce into Russia. Michael Bakunin (1814-76) had a stormy career as a revolutionary agitator and preached anarchism. The present political order was to be succeeded by a free federation of independent groups. Nikolay Yakovlevich Danilevsky (1822-85) was among the most prominent of the Slavophiles. He claimed to be able to distinguish certain historic types of culture. To Slavic culture the future belongs. He dreamed of the union of all Slavic peoples together with certain allied groups under the hegemony of Russia. Konstantin Nikolayevich Leontyev (1831-91) carried nationalism to extremes. He gave his loyalty, not to the Slavic race, but to Russia itself. His ideal was a simple life of the traditional Russian form under a strongly centralized monarchic government. Democracy, to his view, was a sign of national degeneration which must be avoided at all costs.³

While nationalism could be openly advocated in Russia, democracy could not. The lack of the possibility of free discussion makes the social thought of the Russian novel peculiarly important, for writers could put forward under the guise of fiction ideas and attitudes which would not have been tolerated if openly expressed. Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev (1818-83), poet and novelist, spent much of his life abroad. His *Sportsman's Sketches* (1852) is said to have played an important part in the propaganda against serfdom. In *Fathers and Sons* (1862) he painted his hero Bazarov as an atheist and nihilist. The reactionaries looked on the book as a glorification of revolution. On the other hand **the** revolutionists took it ungratefully as a caricature of their movement. Some of the later and extremer radicals, however, admired Bazarov and called themselves *nihilists*

after him. The term, by the way, was Turgenev's own. Fiodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky (1821—81) spent a hard life. He was an epileptic, suffered much from poverty, and was exiled for ten years to Siberia. His was a large and generous nature but he delighted in taking for his characters abnormal types, criminals, the diseased, the insane. By thus using extreme types he throws into relief the most dramatic struggles of which the human soul is capable. In *Poor Folk* (1846) he showed a warm-hearted sympathy for the poor and downtrodden. Dostoevsky was concerned with the problem of the adjustment of the struggling individual to society. He counseled a spirit of Christian charity and humility. Lev' Nikolaevich Tolstoy (1828-1910), in sharp contrast to Dostoevsky, enjoyed most of the good things of this life. He was a nobleman, rich, happy in his family relations, and extraordinarily famous even during his lifetime. Yet Tolstoy was acutely conscious of the incongruity between his easy life and his social ideals. In 1888 he renounced his property in favor of his wife and children. He tried his hand at manual trades. At the time of his death he had left home with the idea of seeking complete retirement in some obscure place. The core of Tolstoy's thought was ethical. He preached brotherly love and non-violence and repudiated war, nationalism, and revolution. His novels, *War and Peace* (1864-69) and *Anna Karenina* (1875-76) are considered among the greatest novels of all literature.

THE PROGRESS OF INDUSTRY

As was stated in the preceding chapter, the Industrial Revolution was not a sudden and radical change but a gradual growth. This growth continued throughout the period now being discussed. One stimulus to manufactur

ing was the development of inventions. The introduction of the daguerreotype in 1839 was *the* germ from which the photographic industry gradually developed. The first practical friction matches appeared in 1827. Goodyear introduced the vulcanization of rubber in 1839. The modern sewing machine dates from 1864 although less convenient machines were in use earlier. The Bessemer process of making steel appeared in 1856 and the open-hearth process followed very shortly. In the meantime improvements in the steam engine had made its application to transportation feasible. The Stockton and Darlington Railway was opened in 1825. The first ship to cross the Atlantic with the aid of steam accomplished this feat in 1819. In 1865 for the first time a greater tonnage of steamships than of sailing vessels was added to Lloyd's register.⁴

The growth of big business was greatly facilitated by the development of the modern corporation. A corporation is a fictitious legal person created by a charter granted by the state. It tends to be highly permanent. Also it enjoys the highly important privilege of limited liability; the owners are not liable for the *debts* of the business beyond the amount of their investment. In a partnership on the other hand each partner is liable to an unlimited extent for the debts of the partnership. In France corporations were provided for in 1807, but only in 1867 could they be formed without special authorization by the government. In England incorporation was made easy in 1844, but the essential feature of limited liability was not granted until 1855. It was only in 1870 that Germany allowed corporations to be organised freely. In the meantime the development of modern banking systems also vastly encouraged the growth of business.

The conditions of labor in the growing industries were often very bad indeed. In England in the early nineteenth century a fourteen-hour working day for young children with about an hour off for meals was considered good practice. In rush periods this limit was often exceeded, and it sometimes happened that children were worked nineteen and a half hours a day for weeks at a time. The first really effective law in any country against such abuses was the English law of 1833 which provided for enforcement through factory inspection. In the coal mines conditions were at least as bad as in the factories. Women and very young children dragged or carried heavy loads of coal through narrow subterranean passages often flooded with inches of water. Some abuses were eliminated by the English Mines Act of 1842 prohibiting the employment of women and girls underground.

The labor union is of course an important weapon of the workingman in his fight against exploitation. Early legislation was hostile to such unions. The English Combination Laws of 1799 and 1800 prohibited unions not only among workingmen but also among their masters. Opposition to these laws grew, however, and they were repealed in 1824. On the Continent events followed a similar course, although freedom came more slowly. The French *Lot chapelier* of 1791 prohibited combinations both of masters and of men and outlawed strikes and lockouts. The penalties against trade unions were not repealed until 1864 and full freedom did not come until twenty years later. German legislation also outlawed unions. Saxony was the first German state to repeal such acts (1861). The newly formed German Empire followed suit in 1872.

A marked feature of the Industrial Revolution was the

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rapid growth of towns. Between 1801 and 1831 such cities as Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, Manchester, and Glasgow at least doubled their population. Living conditions were often very bad. There was little space for common recreation. Even in 1844 only one town in Lancashire could boast a public park. The housing provided for the working classes was miserably poor and it was made worse by overcrowding, for the building of new houses did not keep pace with the growth of population. The water supply in these growing cities was grossly polluted and inadequate. Even London was not provided in all places with a continuous supply of water until about 1893.⁵ Sewerage systems were also slow in developing. Early sewers served principally to drain away rain water. In 1850 they were nowhere the principal means of disposing of human wastes. Only in 1865 was London provided with a modern sewerage system. Provincial towns naturally lagged behind. Such insanitary living conditions together with the comparatively undeveloped state of medical science naturally involved a great deal of disease. The average expectation of life at birth for males in England and Wales for the period 1838-54 was 39.91 as contrasted with 55.62 for the period 1920-22.⁶

The Industrial Revolution brought many blessings, but these blessings were inequitably shared among the various social classes. To the fortunate few it brought added wealth and many added comforts. But to the working classes it brought little for which they could be grateful. The injustice of this contrast was too patent to escape comment. Much 'of the social thought of the nineteenth century is therefore concerned with criticism of the secular dogma of industrial capitalism.

CRITICISM OF THE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM IN ENGLISH
LITERATURE

The Industrial Revolution developed first in England. The characteristic social changes which it brought about first appeared there. It is not surprising, then, that the movement left its mark on nineteenth-century English literature. The writers of the period for the most part did not belong to the working class. In general they advocated the reform rather than the destruction of the capitalistic system. But just for this reason they are important in the history of social thought; for they criticized bourgeois society from a different standpoint from that of the working class radicals.

Charles Dickens (1812-70) belonged to the lower middle class, his father being a clerk in the naval service. However, he learned the sufferings of the working class at first hand when his father was imprisoned for debt and he had to take a job in a blacking warehouse at six shillings a week. However, the family fortunes were restored through a small legacy, Dickens was enabled to complete his education, and eventually he became a reporter. The striking success of *Pickwick Papers* (1836-37) firmly established his reputation. Throughout his writings there runs a prominent strain of social criticism. He vividly depicted the evils of imprisonment for debt, the wretchedness of the slums, the iniquity of the law's delay, and the neglect of the children of the poor. In all these areas his influence was important in bringing about reforms. Dickens' view of society has been criticized for superficiality; but Dickens was a novelist, not a social philosopher. He knew the life of the poor and their problems far better than most academic so

cial thinkers and by expounding the wrongs of the under privileged in his fluent, vivid prose he rendered a fine service.

As a young man Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) thought of becoming a minister. He gave up this ambition, but all his life he preached a non-dogmatic Gospel of renunciation and devotion to duty. He denounced what he called *Mammonism*, the spirit which estimates all human values in monetary terms. "We have profoundly forgotten everywhere that *Cash-payment* is not the sole relation of human beings; we think, nothing doubting, that it absolves and liquidates all engagements of man."⁷ Carlyle was profoundly dissatisfied with the state of affairs which this spirit of Mammonism bred in his contemporary England. He saw insincerity in public life and injustice in the economic world. His indignation at these abuses made him, in a sense, a radical; yet the remedies he proposed were those of the ultraconservatives. His ideal was the strong man, like Abbot Samson in his twelfth-century monastery, "abstemious, reticent, rigorous."⁸ He would have nothing to do with democracy. His ideal was* a sort of benevolent despotism in which the best and strongest should hold the power. He carried this view so far that he even defended slavery.

It is as an art critic that John Ruskin (1819-1900) is most commonly remembered, but he was important also as a critic of society. Indeed the two interests were closely connected in Ruskin's opinion. A people's art, he believed, expresses their national character and has direct social significance. The art of a great civilization is the expression of a deep view of life. Ruskin examined his contemporary England and found it wanting in this respect. A mad worship of money and a lack of respect for human dignity had produced an ugly civilization. Ruskin had the courage of

his convictions. He had inherited a fortune of some two hundred thousand pounds and his writings brought him an average of about four thousand annually; yet he gave his money away generously in support of various projects of social reform in which he was interested and died a comparatively poor man. Both in his writings and in his life Ruskin taught that the reformation of society must begin with the reform of the individual.⁰

Like Ruskin, Matthew Arnold (1822-88) was conscious of the intimate connection between aesthetic culture and society. Son of the famous "Arnold of Rugby," he received the best education that England could offer. He was a distinguished poet and served for ten years as professor of poetry at Oxford. Arnold was profoundly antagonistic to the industrial civilization of his day which was controlled by the somewhat uncultured middle class, the "Philistines" as he called them. Yet he realized that the middle class controlled society. If society is to be reformed this class must be educated, not superficially, but in a deep sense. They must learn a new scale of values by intellectual contact with the great minds of all time. On account of his interest in the education of the bourgeoisie Arnold accepted, though unwillingly, a post as inspector of schools and held it from 1851 until a couple of years before his death. His influence in this post was considerable.

THE SOCIALIST PROTEST

While English men of letters were criticizing the evils of industrialized society, a far more radical attack was being prepared by the socialists; for the socialists protested, not against the evils of the system, but against the system itself. Count Henri de saint-simon (1760-1825) is generally considered the founder of the movement. He was a

French nobleman with ambitious ideas. After a brief, but highly successful, career in the army he retired and amassed a fortune. Then he turned to intellectual pursuits and having lost his money, died in penury Saint-Simon was very much alive to the economic changes of his day. He wanted to see the new industry so organized that all would share its benefits. This happy result was to be accomplished by a sort of benevolent dictatorship of technicians and business men; for, unlike later socialists, he did not emphasize the class struggle. In his *Nouveau Christianisme* (1825) the duty of aiding one another in a spirit of mutual love becomes the central doctrine of a "new religion,"

The next Stage socialism is represented by four men, Fourier, Owen, Cabet, and Thompson, who proposed to reform society by setting up small idealistic communities which would illustrate an excellent form of economic organization and influence others to follow their example. Francois Marie Charles Fourier (1772-1837) was the son of a merchant. At the age of five he was punished for telling the truth about some goods which his father had for sale. This and similar incidents disgusted him with the current economic system. He proposed as the unit of society a group called a *phalanx* (*phalange*) consisting of some 1600 persons cultivating about 5000 acres of land. All would live in a common building, the *phalanstere*. In the phalanx labor would be attractive because it would be pleasantly varied and suited to the talents and interests of each. Each member would be assured enough to live on, but beyond this minimum there would be special rewards for special contributions, menial and necessary labor being more generously rewarded than pleasant work. Fourier's theories were actually tried out in various places. The Brook Farm experiment is well known to Americans.

The distinctive thing about Robert Owen (1771-1858) was that he succeeded as an industrialist before he became a social theorist. Leaving school at nine, he became at nine teen the manager of a cotton mill with five hundred employees. A decade later he was part owner and manager of the mills at New Lanark in Scotland. Here he demonstrated that it was possible to realize a profit on the business and yet give his employees excellent working and living conditions. New Lanark created a sensation. People came from far and wide to visit it. The experiment having proved a success, Owen turned his attention to wider fields and endeavored to interest Parliament in advanced factory legislation—but not very successfully. Nor was he successful in his attempt to organize a national federation of labor unions. His influence was more lasting on preschool education and on the cooperative movement. The Rochdale Pioneers of 1844, often mentioned as the first modern cooperative, were inspired by his ideas. The most significant of Owen's contributions, as far as the development of socialism is concerned, was his project for "villages of cooperation." These were to be, self-supporting, combining agriculture and industry, and exchanging their surplus products with others. Underlying this conception was Owen's theory that character is formed by environment. Man would be reformed by placing him in the midst of a better socio-economic system. Some Owenite communities were actually founded—one in the United States at New Harmony, Indiana, by Owen himself.

Etienne Cabet (1788-1856) was exiled from his native France for radical criticism of the government. In England he became interested in Owen's theories. In his *Voyage en Icarie* (*Voyage to Icaria*, 1842) Cabet describes his ideal communistic community in which the abolition of private

property will purge men of selfishness and greed. Like Owen he tried out his ideas practically in America—with only moderate success.¹⁰ The Irishman, William Thompson (about 1785-1833), was another Utopian socialist influenced by Owen. The capitalist, he believed, exploits the worker. The latter must free himself from this exploitation, first, by forming trade unions and cooperatives and, ultimately, by forming independent communities in which the means of production will be held in common.

The earliest socialists were clearly Utopian, but the next generation of leaders showed a different spirit. The class struggle had sharpened in the meantime and these younger leaders placed themselves at the head of an aroused proletariat. The February Revolution of 1848 in France brought two men of this type to the fore, Blanc and Proudhon. In his *Organisation du travail* (1839), Louis Blanc (1811-82) criticized capitalism. As a substitute he proposed social workshops to be created and supervised by the state in which the means of production would be owned in common. This system would gradually supersede capitalism. In order to conciliate the proletariat the French government gave Blanc a chance to try out his scheme after the February Revolution, but the experiment was a failure as the government intended it should be. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-65) held labor theory of value. The value of an object is exactly equal to the amount of labor expended in producing it. In contrast to the usual view among the early socialists, Proudhon tended to reduce the role of the state in his proposed economic reform. (He dreamed of a day when man would be so perfect that government would be unnecessary)

With the establishment of the authoritarian Second Empire in 1852, French socialism rapidly declined. Hereafter

the leadership of the movement passed to the Germans. Johann Karl Rodbertus (1805-75), a scholarly Prussian landowner, played an important part in the development of the theoretical side of socialism. Since labor alone produces economic goods, labor should receive the full value of the product. Actually, however, the capitalist and land owner unjustly arrogate to themselves part of what is due to the laborer. Moreover the proportion which labor receives is decreasing continually. The resulting decreased purchasing power of wage earners causes underconsumption and recurring economic crises. Rodbertus dreamed of a day when land and capital would be taken over by the state, but as an immediate reform he advocated state regulation of the economic system in various ways with a view to increasing the share of the national income received by labor. Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-64) made no strikingly original contributions to the theory of socialism, but he was extraordinarily successful in organizing the working class in Germany. There was something rather incongruous about this; for Lassalle was an intellectual, a man of fashion, and a *bon vivant*, hardly the sort of man one would picture as a successful labor organizer.

(The man who gave their classical form to the fundamental doctrines of modern socialism and communism was Karl Marx. Born of a Jewish family at Trier in 1818, he studied at Bonn and Berlin and was much influenced by the dominant Hegelian philosophy. He received his doctorate in philosophy in 1841 and thought of a university career. Marx, however, was already too radical to be a professor. He worked on a left-wing paper until it was suppressed, then in 1843 he went to Paris. Here he met Friedrich Engels (1820-95), a man of similar views, who became his faithful friend and intellectual associate. Being expelled

from France, Marx and Engels went to Brussels where they published in 1848 their *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei* (*Communist Manifesto*), an important document in the history of social thought. During the revolutionary years 1848-49 Marx was in Germany editing a radical paper. Having been expelled, he finally settled in London where he spent the remainder of his life doing intellectual work and keeping in touch with the radical movement. In 1867 he published the first volume of *Das Kapital* (*Capital*), the only volume to appear during his lifetime. Marx died in 1883.

(Marx taught the materialistic interpretation of history. Institutions and ideals change from age to age as a result of economic forces. From this viewpoint Marx tried to explain the historic evolution of the current capitalistic society. His critique of capitalism was severe. The system is nothing but an organized way of exploiting the worker by which capital withholds part of what is the laborer's due. There is an essential opposition between the industrialists and the proletariat. The course of historical evolution is such, however, that the proletariat will inevitably win out in the long run. There was nothing strikingly original in the thought of Marx. However, the doctrines of socialism were presented in a systematic way with a good deal of erudition. Moreover it held out the comforting doctrine that the proletariat was bound to triumph. This assurance came at a psychological moment when the organized working class was becoming conscious of its strength)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT

It was quite natural that Catholics should react against the secular faith which so largely dominated nineteenth-

century thought. The earliest writers of the period to do this, men like De Maistre, Bonald, and Schlegel, proposed a more or less literal return to the past; but this, after all, was somewhat unrealistic. Social problems cannot be solved by simply turning back the clock. What was really needed was the application of Catholic principles to contemporary social and economic conditions. This was the problem which the Catholic social movement of the nineteenth century successfully faced.

In France under the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe (1830-48) the doctrines of *laissez-faire* economics were very widely accepted. Against this position a group of Catholic writers protested vigorously. These men included Olympe Philippe Gerbet (1798-1864), afterwards Bishop of Perpignan, Louis Veuillot (1813-83), the great journalist, and Jean-Baptiste Lacordaire (1802-61), the distinguished Dominican preacher. The most important member of the group, however, was probably the Vicomte de Villeneuve-Bargemont (1784-1850). At first a believer in liberal economics, he abandoned the system as he became familiar with the misery existing in industrial France. At Lille, for example, almost half the population were classified as indigent. To remedy conditions like these he advocated a thoroughgoing system of social legislation. What added weight to these proposals was the fact that Villeneuve-Bargemont had held important public offices. He was no mere theorist with his head in the clouds.¹¹

While still a student at Paris, Frederic Ozanam (1813-53) founded the St. Vincent de Paul Society as a practical expression of a layman's interest in the problems of the poor. Later as Professor of Foreign Literature at the Sorbonne he became interested in the role of the Church in

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medieval society. The Church was a civilizing and stabilizing influence in the age of the barbarian invasions. The nineteenth century was also a period of social change when new groups were coming into power and Ozanam looked to the Church to play her part once more in helping to make the necessary adjustments.

After 1848 the Catholic social movement in France became markedly more conservative. There were many reasons for this. There had been radical excesses during the February Revolution which alienated moderate opinion. Then too, Louis Napoleon, first as President and then as Emperor, showed himself a skillful politician. By making minor concessions to the working class he dulled their sense of grievance. He wooed the Catholics by giving the clergy more voice in education and by keeping French troops at Rome for the protection of the Pope. Moreover, Pope Pius IX (1846-78) in his Encyclical, *Quanta cur a* and in the *Syllabus of Errors* which accompanied it (1864), as well as in earlier statements, condemned certain radical excesses—a fact which somewhat illogically served to drive some Catholics toward a rather extreme conservatism.¹²

It is not altogether surprising, therefore, to find that some of the outstanding Catholic social thinkers of the period, such as the Frenchman Frederic Le Play (1806-82) and the Belgian Charles Perin (1815-1905), while they criticized *laissez-faire* economics in some respects, were not particularly friendly to social legislation. What is perhaps more surprising is that the Comte de Chambord (1820-83), a Bourbon of the Bourbons and legitimist pretender to the French throne, was frankly hostile to the unregulated rule of the capitalists. He proposed the revival of the guilds with the right of workers to organize to secure their rights. The Vicomte de Melun (1807-77) who had been much

interested in the organization of private charity before 1848, became after that date an influential advocate of social legislation. In the meantime the cotton mills at Val des-Bois founded in 1840 and managed by the Harmel family attracted attention as an interesting, if somewhat paternalistic, experiment in the Christian organization of industry.

The greatest name in the contemporary Catholic social movement in Germany was Baron Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler (1811-77). After studying law he entered the civil service of Prussia but resigned in 1838 as a protest against the imprisonment of the Archbishop of Cologne. He studied for the priesthood and was ordained in 1844. He was a member of the Frankfurt Assembly and distinguished himself there. In 1850 he was consecrated Bishop of Mainz. Bishop Ketteler vigorously assailed the evils of the capitalistic system. Considerably influenced by Lasalle at first, he proposed that the workingmen should be organized into cooperative associations to free them from the domination of the capitalist. Later he came to believe that social legislation, rather than cooperatives, was the most feasible solution to the social problem. Bishop Ketteler had an enormous influence on the social Catholic movement, not only in his own country, but throughout Europe.¹³

By 1870 the outlines of the Catholic social program were clear. It was widely recognized that capitalism in its current form violated justice and that the *laissez-faire* economics which attempted to justify it could not be squared with Catholic principles. The excesses of capitalism needed to be curbed by social legislation. The workers had a right to organize to better their condition. There was interest in the medieval guilds as examples of the social control of

production. Not all Catholics accepted this program. It had yet to be expounded by the Holy See as the official doctrine of the Church. This was to be the great work of Pope Leo XIII in the succeeding period.

CHAPTER 14

THE ERA OF "PROGRESS," 1870-1914

THE MITIGATION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE

The period which followed the revolutionary movements of 1870 and which preceded the World War of 1914-18 was a time of comparative peace. It was not punctuated by recurrent revolutionary movements like the hundred years which preceded it. The reason for this happy state of affairs was not far to seek. The century had been devoted to the dogmas of the secular faith, nationalism, capitalism, and political liberalism. The fulfillment of these principles had been thwarted by the dominant classes who were tenacious of their privileges. Hence, the revolutions. But by the opening of the period now being considered the objectives sought had been in large measure attained. The old tensions had been eased and a feeling of satisfaction settled over Europe. Men felt that progress had been made and this feeling grew as the period went on. Men dreamed that this progress would continue indefinitely. They were about to enter the Promised Land. It took the catastrophe of the World War to rouse Europe from this complacency.

To begin with, nationalism was triumphant. The unification of Germany and Italy and the *Ausgleich* (compromise) of 1867 which gave partial autonomy to Hungary were important victories for the principle. The Congress of Berlin (1878) recognized the complete independence

of Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro from Turkey and created a new state, Bulgaria. Thus old national aspirations were realized. Unfortunately the Congress was not consistent in applying the principle of nationality and new tensions were created which served as the immediate occasion of the first World War.

The class which profited most from the revolutionary movements was of course the bourgeoisie, for the liberalism which triumphed was a bourgeois liberalism. It was the same class again which reaped most of the benefits of the Industrial Revolution. The common people had not come into their own. The natural result was class conflict and the development of this conflict was reflected in the history of socialism. However, the dominant class was prudent enough to be willing to make timely concessions. Indeed the period under consideration has been appropriately called the Era of the Benevolent Bourgeoisie. The franchise was gradually extended here and there and the worst abuses of the factory system were curbed by social legislation. Thus the class conflict was mitigated or at least its growth was restrained. The latent evils of the contemporary capitalism did not greatly trouble the conscience of Europe.

By 1871 nearly all the states of Europe had constitutions of a more or less liberal character. The most conspicuous exceptions were Russia and Turkey. The existence of constitutions was a step in the direction of democracy, but only a step; for the franchise was very generally restricted in such a way that the great mass of the common people were excluded. However, as just stated, the franchise was gradually enlarged. The case of the English Parliament will serve as one illustration of the trend. The act of 1832 greatly extended the franchise, gave a fairer distribution

of seats, and reformed the manner of voting. Again in 1867-68 the franchise was extended and the seats redistributed. The introduction of the secret ballot in 1872 was a further victory for the democratic principle. Finally in 1884 the ideal of manhood suffrage was practically attained.¹

The Continental (as distinguished from the English) variety of democracy was distinctly anticlerical. It is important for Americans to remember this, for they are apt to forget that Continental democracy has had a different background from their own and therefore to be surprised that the Church has not been more favorable to it. In France, for example, between 1871 and 1907, a long series of anti-Catholic laws was passed. Catholic education was seriously hampered, many religious were driven from the country, the Concordat of 1801 was denounced without consultation with the pope, and complete separation of Church and state was decreed. In one form or another the same thing happened under "liberal" governments elsewhere on the Continent. The type of democracy which descended from the French revolution had become a sort of a religion to some of its more enthusiastic adherents and they regarded Catholicism as a rival faith which must be persecuted. Of course there was no opposition at all between the Church and the idea of democracy itself.

During this period a considerable amount of social legislation was adopted in the principal countries of Europe. Existing labor legislation was codified and made more stringent. In addition newer principles gradually found favor, such as minimum-wage laws at least for women and children, employers' liability, and social insurance against sickness, old age, and unemployment. There was a definite swing away from the old *laissez-faire* attitude. It is note

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worthy that even the conservatives played a part in the adoption of such laws. In the 1880's Bismarck secured the passage in Germany of a notable series of acts embodying the principle of social insurance. In England the conservative Disraeli courted the working classes by legislation favorable to trade unions and by health and housing laws.

In the meantime a number of humanitarian movements were gradually alleviating the lot of the common people. Serfdom was abolished in Russia in 1861. The final abolition of slavery in Brazil took place in 1888. Gradually the punishment of crime became less inhumane. In England some two hundred offenses had been punishable by death in the late eighteenth century; by 1861 the number had been reduced to two. During the period now being considered, the development of the indeterminate sentence, probation, and the socialized court made for a more humane treatment of the offender. The more systematic treatment of poverty and associated problems, now known as social work, had its vague beginnings in the 1860's and continued to develop during the period.² Among its other accomplishments, the movement succeeded in gathering a great deal of factual material about the problems of the underprivileged and in focusing public attention on them.

SCIENCE AND "PROGRESS"

The average man might be rather indifferent to the progress of pure science, but he could scarcely fail to be affected by the application of scientific technology to everyday life. After 1870 such applications came with a rush. In 1876 the telephone was invented and was very soon put to practical use. The electric light, the motor, and the generator, long known in the laboratory, were perfected rapidly and became practically important when the first

public electric power stations were opened in the 1880's. The 1870's saw the development of the phonograph and practical typewriters. The modern newspaper depends on wood-pulp) paper which became commercially practicable in the 1860's and the linotype which was patented in 1885. Refrigeration for the long-distance transportation of fresh meat became feasible about 1880. In 1889 Edison brought motion-picture apparatus, to the practical stage and commercial exhibitions began in 1895. A successful internal combustion engine made its appearance in 1876 and made possible the development of the automobile. When Henry Ford introduced his Model T car in 1909 the automobile came at last within the reach of the ordinary citizen.

The average man was affected also by the growth of scientific medicine, essentially a product of this period. The work of Louis Pasteur (1822-95) with microorganisms put the germ theory of disease on a firm foundation. Various important results followed. Effective methods of treating specific diseases were discovered as when Pasteur himself successfully inoculated against rabies in 1885. Again, public-health work was placed on a scientific basis and the terrible epidemics which had periodically decimated Europe began to be controlled. The application of the new theory to the prevention of infection during surgical operations was largely due to Lord Lister (1827-1912). This, plus the use of anaesthesia from the 1840's on, completely revolutionized surgery. In addition, other medical discoveries too numerous to mention put medicine on a new basis, reduced disease and suffering, and greatly extended the average length of human life.

The man who was fifty years old, or older, in 1914 could personally remember the introduction of these various de

velopments. Looking back to his boyhood he could recall the days when there were no telephones, no automobiles, no electric lights, and when a major surgical operation was practically equivalent to a death sentence in popular opinion. No wonder he felt that he was living in the age of progress. If he happened to be an intellectual he could easily work out a theory of progress for himself. Science, he might feel, was a new and superior approach to knowledge radically different from old-fashioned theology and philosophy. It is characteristic of science to be cumulative. Facts once proved scientifically are permanent acquisitions for mankind. As science develops, man attains a fuller and fuller power over nature. Conditions of life become more and more pleasant and luxuries become commonplace. The same scientific method, which is proving so fruitful in technological advance, can be applied to social problems as well. Crime, poverty, and other ills of society, can be conquered by the same general methods of scientific investigation and treatment which have already proved so effective in the treatment of disease. This was a comforting, optimistic view and there were only a few sceptics unsympathetic enough to criticize it.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF "PROGRESS"

This rough-and-ready theory of progress had been dressed up in the meantime in a scientific and philosophical garb. In 1859 Charles Darwin (1809-82) published *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*. The theory of evolution therein expounded was by no means new; but Darwin had painfully accumulated scientific evidence for his view and the work made a profound impression. It was rapidly popularized by writers like Thomas Huxley (1825-95) in England and Ernst Haeckel (1834

1919) in Germany. The aggressive attitude of such men is reflected by the sobriquet "Darwin's bulldog" applied to Huxley. Darwin made an important contribution to biology, but the scientific aspects of his theory need not concern us here. What is significant for the present purpose is the fact that the theory of evolution exactly suited the popular mood and began to be applied in all sorts of fields outside of biology. If man had evolved from the lower animals then the course of the human race must be ever onward and upward. The progress of science and technology was only what might be expected. The evolution of society from the evils of autocracy to the happy state of democracy was a natural development. Progress was a law of life.

Herbert Spencer was perhaps the man who best reflected the mood of the age by integrating evolutionary theory and social thought. Born in 1820, Spencer received little formal education. As in the case of Rousseau, this made for originality, if not for erudition. From 1836 on he tried his hand unsuccessfully at teaching, engineering, and journalism. In 1848 he secured a position as subeditor on the staff of *The Economist*, a position which brought him into contact with the leading intellectuals of his day. In 1853 he resigned and from then until his death in 1903 he supported himself by his writing, with the timely help of some small legacies. He never married. Spencer was vain, opinionated, and contentious, but no one could question his great intellectual power, his sincerity, and his hatred of cant.

Spencer's thought was dominated by the concept of evolution which he conceived as a general law controlling the universe. He had devoted considerable attention to the subject and had elaborated his theories in some detail even before the appearance of *The Origin of Species*. When the book was published, however, he welcomed it and coined

the popular phrase, "the survival of the fittest," to describe Darwin's doctrine of natural selection. Spencer applied the evolutionary concep to society. Society is not deliberately made; it grows. It is therefore like an organism. Spencer was not satisfied with a mere analogy, however; he went further and asserted that society actually *is* a kind of organism. Of course there are obvious differences between a usual biological organism and human society. The former has a body of definite physical shape whose parts stand to one another in a fixed spatial relationship, while in the latter the individual parts, the men making up the society, are not bound together physically into a body with definite contours. Such differences, however, did not appear to Spencer to be essential. Society remains an organism in spite of them.

If society is an evolving organism, then logically it must follow the course prescribed by evolutionary theory and become more and more highly organized, the parts becoming increasingly interdependent and increasingly dominated by centralized authority. This is certainly the course demanded by biological analogy. Spencer, however, hesitated to follow out this line of reasoning. His own temperament was strongly individualistic and he had an ardent love for personal freedom. So another line of thought appears in his writings, one which can hardly be reconciled with the organic theory. According to this other line of thought (in which Spencer probably felt more at home) the individual has certain natural rights and the course of history tends to an increasing recognition of these rights. The Church, once a coercive institution, is now a mere voluntary association. The state, now coercive, will one day lose its authoritarian character. Industry is marked by the free interplay of individuals without centralized control and

the society of the future will be of this industrialized and individualistic type. It is noteworthy that the concept of some sort of progress was involved in both lines of thought which Spencer somewhat inconsistently followed out. He never questioned the law of progress.³

NATIONALISM BECOMES EXPANSIVE

The theory of progress was very congenial to the spirit of European nationalism. Men of Europe looked toward Africa, Asia, and the Pacific islands and felt a certain smug satisfaction. The lesser breeds inhabiting these regions, they felt, represented lower rungs on the evolutionary ladder. They had failed to "progress" as much as Europeans; therefore they were inferior. This comforting doctrine received support from the theories of certain anthropologists. Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-81) was an American whose *Ancient Society* (1877) was popularized by Marx and Engels and attracted a wide European audience. Morgan taught that culture evolved through three stages, savagery, barbarism, and civilization. By correlating an immense mass of material he worked out a comprehensive scheme of evolutionary progress.⁴

What could be more cheering than this to the nationalists? The more primitive people scattered throughout the world were mere degraded savages. The ancient cultures of Asia, such as the Chinese culture, were indeed more advanced, but they had failed to keep pace with European progress. Of course each Englishman or Frenchman or German or Italian felt that his own nation represented the very apex of this progress, the highest stage of evolutionary advance.

In the 1870's a new imperialistic movement began. By 1890 the British Empire had added four and one-quarter

million square miles to its extent; France, three and one-half million; Germany, one million; Belgium, nine hundred thousand; Russia, five hundred thousand; and Italy, one hundred and eighty-five thousand.⁵ The details of this colonial expansion were often sordid enough. Nations equipped with the latest instruments of war conquered, on flimsy excuses, the territory of peoples unable to defend themselves. The conquerors were actuated partly by economic motives as they sought sources of raw materials or new markets for their products. But probably even stronger was the motive of national pride. It was pleasant to be able to boast that one's country's flag waved over distant lands inhabited by exotic peoples. It was easy enough in the light of the theory of progress to rationalize the injustices involved. For were not the conquerors bringing the benefits of civilization to "backward" peoples? If the latter were ungrateful for the advantages they were receiving, that was due to their lack of insight. After all, it was really better for them to be forced to progress than not to progress at all.

In England the high priest of imperialism was Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936). Having been born in Bombay, he knew at first hand what a British colony was like; but since he was English by ancestry, education, and sympathy, he found it easy to interpret what he saw from an imperialistic standpoint. Kipling had a vivid dramatic sense. Few have equaled his mastery of the short story. In both his verse and his prose he was able to communicate to the reader a vivid sense of the strange, exotic atmosphere in which he was reared. Thus he helped Englishmen living at home to be more conscious of the reality of their far-flung Empire. But Kipling not only presented the British Empire as a fact; he justified it with an almost religious earnestness.

Being a superior race, the English must take up "the white man's burden" with humility and high purpose. Their power is a sacred trust which Providence has given them for the benefit of the backward peoples whom they have been called to rule.

Military force was of course the instrument of imperialism. As long as such force was employed exclusively in out-of-the-way parts of the world the serenity of European thought was not greatly disturbed; but the disquieting possibility remained that the nations of Europe might turn against one another in a general conflict. That, certainly, lay in the logic of nationalism. The real triumph of the principle would be the assertion of national superiority, not over the backward people of the colonies, but over other civilized nations. Optimists tried to persuade themselves that a general European war would be impossible. Modern men were too civilized for such an eventuality. No nation would dare to take the initiative in a war which would be so horribly destructive. Besides the world was securely organized on a commercial basis and commerce made for peace. As the fateful year 1914 approached, however, such assurances began to have a hollow sound. Diplomats hastened to try to put their own nations in a favorable position through alliances, while armament factories worked overtime.

While the average man contemplated the possibility of a general war with horror, a noisy minority did not hesitate to glorify militarism. It is a tragic fact that rulers, politicians, generals, and diplomats can gain power and prestige from war and it is precisely this group that make the decisions between war and peace. Then, too, there are always some over-nationalistic intellectuals to whom war in the abstract appeals. Thus the German historian Heinrich

von Treitschke (1834-96) saw in recurrent wars "the beauty of history," while the English J. A. Cramb (1862-1913) wrote, "In war and the right to war, man has a possession which he values above religion and above social comforts: in war man values the power which it affords life of rising above life, the power which the spirit of man possesses to pursue an ideal."⁶

The necessity of presenting a united front to the enemy, made nations intolerant of minority groups living within their borders. Indeed the spirit of nationalism itself aligned the dominant group in each state against all their fellow citizens who differed from the majority in race, culture, or religion. Germany, Russia, and Hungary attempted the Germanization, Russification, and Magyarization respectively of the minority peoples within their borders, while England showed scant sympathy for the efforts of the Catholic Irish toward self-determination.

One of the peculiar effects of nationalism was the development of the Aryan myth. Strictly speaking the Aryans were simply the primitive speakers of the tongue from which the Aryan or Indo-European languages are derived. This language group includes Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and most of the modern languages of Europe. Some culture traits associated with the early speakers of these languages have been assigned by hypothesis to the primitive Aryans. At the hands of the myth-makers, however, the Aryans became the tall, blond, long-headed race which lives in northern Europe, of which the Germans are typical representatives. Curiously enough this myth received much of its early impetus from the Frenchman, Comte de Gobineau (1816-82). His *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (*Essay on the Inequality of the Races of Man*) attracted

more attention when it was republished in 1884 than when it was originally published in 1853-55. He taught the superiority of one race over another, particularly the superiority of the pure Aryan stock from which, he held, the French nobility descended. The expatriate Englishman and naturalized German, Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927), carried the theory further still. By a curious standard of classification he claimed for the Teutonic Aryans men like Dante and St. Paul. He glorified the Teutons of the Reformation for rescuing Christianity from Rome. Naturally he saw in the Teutons the only hope of Europe. Although the myth reached its widest popularity in Germany, it was not without influence in England. For were not the Anglo-Saxons Aryans and Teutons? In his work, *The Expansion of England* (1883), John Robert Seeley (1834-95) comforted British imperialists with his reflections on the racial superiority of the Anglo-Saxons.

Since the Jews were clearly not of the Aryan race (Hebrew is a Semitic, not an Aryan, language), anti-Semitism was an obvious corollary of the myth. Prejudice against the Jews has a long history, extending back to pre-Christian times.⁷ However, in a time of exacerbated nationalism it was particularly hard to forgive the Jews their characteristic sin of being different. In Germany Adolf Stocker (1835-1909) combined anti-Semitism with an enthusiasm for social reform. Another German, Paul de Lagarde (1827-91), found time amidst his oriental studies to exalt national exclusiveness. He would form a national German religion purged of all Semitic and Roman elements. In France Edouard Drumont (1844-1917) raised a great hue and cry over the Jews. Though few in numbers, he claimed, they were able by their shrewdness to exercise

control over the press, the economic system, the army, and the government. The prejudice which he stirred up had an unfortunate effect during the unhappy Dreyfus affair. Rather curiously, the same spirit of nationalism which had produced anti-Semitism also produced a nationalist movement among the Jews themselves. This was Zionism which aimed to establish in Palestine a Jewish national state. The most prominent leader of the movement was Theodor Herzl (1860-1904).

Nationalism, imperialism, militarism, racism—all these tendencies implied a selfish struggle for power through the use of force. This, too, could be justified by the evolutionary theory of progress. For if, in Spencer's phrase, evolution involved the "survival of the fittest," it included as a corollary the disappearance of the weaker and less fit. The ruthlessness of the struggle which brings progress is expressed in the writings of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900). This rather morbid genius was a professor of classical philology at the University of Basel, but was compelled to resign on account of ill health. For the last twelve years of his life he was hopelessly insane. Nietzsche modified his philosophy considerably in the course of his life, but the main outlines of his thought are clear. He was occupied with the problem of cultural advance and he believed that this would be accomplished by the *superman* (*Übermensch*). The superman has a morality of his own. It is his role to subjugate the humble and weak man who worships the Crucified God. Nietzsche dreamed of a day when the process of eugenic selection would develop a class of supermen who would dominate a class of slaves. The cooperation of the two classes would produce a great society which would live a "superhuman life" of unexampled grandeur.

LITERARY REALISM AND SOCIAL CRITICISM

One might have expected that an age so devoted to the dogma of progress would have been characterized by a buoyant optimism. Actually, this was far from being the case. For this period was the golden age of "realism." It was the object of this movement to present life and nature as they really are without distortion and without idealization; it was a reaction against romanticism. In the abstract there was no reason why realistic literature should tend to pessimism, but as a matter of fact it did tend definitely in that direction. The brutal, sordid, and unpleasant aspects of life were constantly emphasized. Thus the realistic literature characteristic of the period reflected a mood which one might not logically expect in the era of "progress." ⁸

The realistic writers were widely distributed throughout Europe. In France Emile Zola (1840-1902) expounded the history of a pathological family, the Rougon-Macquart, in no less than twenty volumes. The Goncourt brothers, Edmond (1822-96) and Jules (1830-70), wrote pessimistic stories about unfortunate and abnormal people. In Norway Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906) was writing his sad dramas, while in Sweden Johan August Strindberg (1849-1912), a melancholy psychopath, wrote his own sufferings into his novels and plays. The German Hermann Sudermann (1857-1928) exploited the dramatic possibilities of social pathology, and the Austrian physician Arthur Schnitzler (1862-1931) emphasized sex. By about 1880 the greatest Russian novels had been written, but Anton Pavlovich Chekhov (1860-1904) remained to write of the vulgarity of efficiency, while Maxim Gorky (1868-1936) continued his coldly realistic tales. The Spanish radical and free thinker Vicente Blasco Ibanez (1867-1928) was at the

height of his vigor and was writing realistic novels; his war stories which later won him fame in the United States were yet to come. Unhappy peasants in southern England found their interpreter in Thomas Hardy (1840-1928), George Meredith (1828-1909) attached sentimentality, and George Bernard Shaw (1856-) reflected in his plays the mood of a disillusioned generation.

On further consideration it is perhaps not so difficult after all to understand the pessimism of the age of "progress." One can think of at least two good reasons which help to explain it. For one thing, progress was conceived in materialistic terms. Therefore it failed to satisfy the deepest aspirations of the human heart. Man is quite naturally grateful for creature comforts and these comforts were multiplied during the machine age. But advanced manufacturing methods do not produce a philosophy of life. On the contrary, absorption in material things easily distracts one from more subtle but more important issues. Not only was the nineteenth century distracted from the eternal truths of Christianity, but it failed to find a philosophy as deep and valid as that attained by such great pagans as Plato and Aristotle. For want of deep insight into life, men found themselves defenseless before the persistent problems of human existence. This lack of a firm philosophy bred with particular hardship on the weak, the unstable, and the underprivileged—a fact which leads us to the second point. For the cold, remorseless struggle for progress was cruel to those who failed to win out. An age which overvalued material success had little understanding or sympathy for those who could not meet its standard. In the fight for worldly success there must be few victors and many vanquished. The despair of the "unsuccessful" masses hung

over the age like a cloud. The contribution of the realistic writers to social thought lay in their ability to see this pertinent fact and make others see it.

THE WORK OF POPE LEO XIII

The application of Catholic social doctrine to post Industrial Revolution conditions had been accomplished in broad outline by 1870. Bishop von Ketteler and the great French Catholic writers had made their notable contributions. Moreover, Pope Pius IX had made important pronouncements on certain immediate issues. He had condemned communism, socialism, and some of the errors of extreme liberalism. But much work remained to be done. The whole field of Catholic social doctrine had to be covered in a systematic manner and expounded authoritatively. This important work was brilliantly accomplished by Pope Leo XIII.

Gioacchino Vincenzo Pecci, the future Leo XIII, was born in 1810 at Carpineto, a town in the Monti Lepini, not very far from Rome. He studied at Viterbo under the Jesuits, then at the Collegium Romanum and the Accademia dei Nobili Ecclesiastici, and was ordained on the last day of 1837. A few weeks later, Monsignor Pecci—he had already been named a domestic prelate—was called upon to assist in the civil government of the papal possessions, first at Benevento and then at Perugia. Before his thirty-third birthday he was named papal nuncio to Brussels with the rank of archbishop. Here he broadened his horizon by observing at first hand the workings of a constitutional monarchy. After three years he returned to Italy as Archbishop of Perugia. During his thirty-two years in this office he distinguished himself among other ways by his interest in so

cial reform. In 1853 he was created cardinal and in 1877 he was called to Rome to fill the important administrative post of *camerlengo*.

Cardinal Pecci was elected on February 20, 1878 to succeed Pope Pius IX and he took the name, Leo XIII. He was already sixty-eight years old. Few expected him to live long. Yet the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII lasted for twenty-five years and it was among the most distinguished in the history of the Church. In dealing with secular governments the Pope pursued a reasonable and conciliatory policy which met with considerable success. Notably in Germany the anti-Catholic policy of Bismarck (the *Kulturkampf*) was terminated in a way rather satisfactory to the Church. In 1885 Pope Leo successfully arbitrated a dispute between Germany and Spain in regard to the Caroline Islands. In the controversy over the Knights of Labor in the United States he took a position favorable to the workman. It must not be inferred from the foregoing that the Pope was simply a successful diplomat. Himself a man of simple piety and austere life, he did notable work in encouraging the spiritual life of the Church. His death on July 20, 1903 was mourned by both Catholics and non-Catholics who recognized him as a truly great man.

Pope Leo XIII was a man of great intellectual gifts and broad culture. The composition of Latin verses was a favorite recreation of his. He was sympathetic toward modern science and provided the Vatican Observatory with excellent instruments and a first-class staff. He opened the Vatican archives to scholars. His Encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879), encouraged the revival of Catholic philosophy and the Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* (1893) performed a similar service for Biblical studies. Pope Leo was never afraid to face the truth, confident that the Church would

always profit in the long run thereby. This attitude, plus his wide experience in various administrative positions, equipped him to make a notable contribution to Catholic social thought.⁹

The contribution of Pope Leo may be summarized as a balanced criticism of the dogmas of the secular faith together with a practical program for meeting the issues which these dogmas involved. He examined democracy, nationalism, and capitalism and carefully separated from the accretion of modern errors that which was valid and in accordance with Catholic doctrine. Pope Leo explicitly recognized democracy as a legitimate form of government. "Those who are to rule the state can in certain cases be elected by popular choice and judgment. . . . Due regard being had for justice, a people is not forbidden to select that form of government which best suits their spirit or the institutions and customs of their forbears."¹⁰ And again, even more emphatically: "Neither is it blameworthy in itself for the people to have a share, greater or less, in the government: for at certain times and under certain laws such participation may not only be of benefit to the citizens, but may even be of obligation."¹¹ Of course in approving democracy the Pope was merely repeating the traditional teaching of Catholic writers, but what had been merely an academic question in the Middle Ages was a very live issue in his day.

Pope Leo made it clear, however, that the Church did not approve all the vagaries of nineteenth-century democratic theory. He could not agree that democracy was the *only* possible form of just government. All forms of government, he taught, "if wisely and justly administered, are capable of insuring the welfare of the state."¹² Nor could he admit that the people are the ultimate source of civil

power. If the people were the absolutely ultimate source of authority then it would be easy to argue that there are no limitations on the power of a government deriving its power from the people. The Church teaches that all civil authority comes from God. The people may rightly choose their form of government. In a democracy they may choose their officials. Yet the power of these officials is not ultimately due to the people. It comes from God and must therefore be administered in accordance with His law. The people cannot give the government the right to rule unjustly.

The only way to insure just government in a democracy is to educate the people themselves in Christian principles. Pope Leo emphasized this in addressing the bishops of the United States. "In a free state, unless justice be generally cultivated, unless the people be repeatedly and diligently urged to observe the precepts and laws of the Gospel, liberty itself may be pernicious." ¹³ The Pontiff was acutely conscious of the dangers arising in his own day from the combination of popular government and widespread irreligion.

Pope Leo recognized patriotism as a virtue so exigent that it may legitimately demand the sacrifice of life itself for the sake of national defense. But patriotism has its limits. When it is pushed beyond these limits, it degenerates into the vice of nationalism. For one thing, loyalty to country is restricted by the greater loyalty we owe the Church. "We are bound to love our native land from which we received the enjoyment of this mortal life; but we needs must love the Church still more, to whom we owe the eternal life of the soul." ¹⁴ Loyalty to the state can never justify the infraction of the moral law. "If the laws of the state are manifestly inconsistent with the law of God . . . then

indeed to resist is a duty; to obey, a crime." ¹⁵ Although his pontificate was a time of comparative peace, Pope Leo clearly foresaw the danger of a general war which excessive nationalism involved. "Obsessed by mutual suspicions nearly all nations continue to arm themselves in emulation of one another." ¹⁶ As a preventive against war, the Pope urged the regulation of international relations by the principles of morality. In the Caroline Islands affair, already mentioned, he showed how the application of such principles might resolve a tense situation.

The best known of all the writings of Pope Leo XIII is doubtless the Encyclical *Rerum novarum* of May 15, 1891, in which he discussed the problems created by modern capitalism. After calling attention to the seriousness of the existing situation, the Pope proceeds in this Encyclical to condemn the remedy proposed by the socialists, namely, the abolition of private property. But while defending private property, Pope Leo is careful to call attention to its limitations. For the right of possession is limited by the duty of assisting others in their need. The Catholic position, then, is equally removed from the socialists who would deny the right of ownership and from the *laissez-faire* economists who refuse to limit the right in any way for the good of society. Against the latter school of thought the Pope asserted that a wage contract accepted by a working man under conditions of free competition is not necessarily just. For he may be constrained by economic necessity to agree to an unjustly low wage, in spite of his "right of securing a sustenance."

In discussing the solution of the problems raised by capitalism Pope Leo stresses the right of labor to organize. Since economic organization was later much more fully developed by Pope Pius XI, the subject will be treated

more at length in connection with the latter Pontiff's thought. Here it is sufficient to quote the very broad principle which Pope Leo laid down: "Workingmen's associations should be so organized and governed as to furnish the most apt and suitable means of attaining the object proposed, namely, that the individual members should better their condition to the utmost in body, mind, and property." The Pope broke sharply with *laissez-faire* economics on the subject of social legislation. Here again it is enough to quote the general principle, since this principle is comprehensive enough to justify any sort of sane social legislation for which there is a real need. "If the general good or the interest of particular groups has suffered or is threatened with an injury which cannot be remedied or avoided otherwise, public authority must intervene."

In interpreting the program of Pope Leo XIII many commentators have properly stressed the role of working men's associations and of social legislation, but have overlooked another element which is at least equally important, namely, the social effect of the individual Christian life lived in accordance with religious principles. This latter is a true form of social action and is recognized as such by Pope Leo. "If human society is to be cured, only a return to Christian life and institutions will cure it."¹⁷ It is easy to see why the practice of virtue is of coordinate importance with the reform of institutions; for, as the Pope stated, "since social good must be of such a nature that its acquisition makes men better, this social good must be founded chiefly on virtue."¹⁸ This being the case, it is a shortsighted program of social reform which emphasizes only such means as labor organization or social legislation, neglecting the importance of the practice of the Christian virtues as a remedy for social ills. Speaking of the evils of the class

struggle, Pope Leo says, "These are ills for which it is useless to seek a remedy in legislation, in threats of penalties to be incurred, or in any device of human prudence." ¹⁹

All the virtues are important, of course, but charity is the most important of all. In the concluding paragraphs of the *Rerum novarum*, Pope Leo points to this great virtue as the chief means for effecting the reformation of society which he so ardently desired. "The desired well-being is to be expected chiefly from a great outpouring of charity." The main source of charity is, of course, the Holy Eucharist. Therefore in one of his last messages the great Pope, "being," as he said, "so soon to depart from this life," directed the attention of the Catholic world to the Eucharist as the great remedy for social ills.²⁰ The argument, after all, is simple. Almost all social problems are caused or aggravated by a lack of charity; their remedy, then, is to be sought in the Blessed Sacrament instituted by Christ in order "by awakening charity towards God to promote mutual charity among men."²¹ With this sublime message the career of Pope Leo XIII as a social teacher was practically closed. It was a career of which he might be justly proud. To him, more than to any other single individual, is due the solidity and the vigor of the modern Catholic social movement.

CHAPTER 15

THE UNITED STATES TO 1914

DEMOCRACY—THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION

Beyond a doubt democracy has been America's distinctive contribution to the history of social thought. Not that the system is an American invention—this is far from being the case. The history of the Greek democracies had never been forgotten and the theoretical justification of the system was a commonplace of Catholic thought. But the American experience has been unique in that no other country has ever enjoyed a democracy which has endured so long, has governed such a large population, and which has, on the whole, functioned so well.

The United States has served as a sort of vast laboratory in which the democratic system has been tried out and found workable. Its elements of strength and weakness have been discovered and the necessary methods have been worked out to make the system function. Other nations have freely, drawn on this experience and thus the techniques of democratic government have passed into the common heritage of the race.

American democracy has worked well, but it has not worked perfectly. It has always had to struggle against powerful antidemocratic forces. There have always been men selfish enough to want to sabotage the system for their own private ends. Historically, then, the ideal has never been fully realized in this country. Therefore, in order

to understand it, American democracy must be isolated from those antidemocratic elements which have thwarted it, and thus studied in a pure state. Even so a scientist studying a chemical compound to determine, say, its specific gravity, its boiling point, its viscosity, must study it in a chemically pure state and not as it occurs in nature mixed with other compounds.

THE PERIOD OF BEGINNINGS

The struggle between democratic and antidemocratic forces is evident from the very beginning of the colonial period. On the one hand, monarchy, usually a rather absolute monarchy, was the accepted system of European government in the seventeenth century when the first colonies were founded. The Stuart kings, who granted the earliest colonial charters, thoroughly believed in absolutism and the colonists remained their subjects. On the other hand, immigration to the colonies was a selective process. The men most likely to come to America were precisely those dissatisfied with absolute government at home. Many of the early comers were Puritans and it was this group who under Cromwell had revolted against Stuart absolutism. Later, men of other countries sought the New World as a refuge against religious or political oppression. Again, although remaining legally subjects of the British king, the colonists were too far away in those days of slow communication to feel his authority very much in matters of detail and thus a certain amount of self-government was almost forced on them by circumstances. Thus Americans were educated toward democracy as well as toward independence.

In New England a controversy between democracy and class rule was waged in the peculiar language of Puritan

theology. For these early New Englanders drew no sharp distinction between theology and social thought. In their eyes the Bible was a textbook of practical politics. "There is undoubtedly a forme of civil Government instituted by God himself in the holy Scriptures," wrote John Eliot (1604-90).¹ If few would carry the principle as far as Eliot did, yet most accepted it in a less extreme form.

The Puritan colonists considered themselves refugees from despotism, yet their own government was far from democratic. John Winthrop (1588-1649), colonial governor, had been a man of means and position in England as well as a sincere and devout Puritan. As a result the form of government he favored was a sort of benevolent aristocracy on theological principles. John Cotton (1584-1652), minister, was a gentleman and a good-scholar, but his prejudices were aristocratic and so he came to approve some of the more arbitrary acts of the New England oligarchy such as the persecution of the Quakers.

The antidemocratic tendencies of the Puritan aristocrats did not pass without challenge. There was, for example, the eloquent pulpit orator, Thomas Hooker (about 1586-1647), whose liberal views on civil and ecclesiastical government led him to migrate with his congregation to Connecticut. Then there was the even more outspoken Roger Williams (about 1603-about 1683) whose pungent criticisms of the oligarchy led to his flight to Rhode Island in mid-winter, 1636. Williams was something more than a mere rebel; he was a thinker of considerable power who had developed his own system of democratic theory. To begin with, he criticized the union of church and state as it existed in Massachusetts. Had not Christ Himself drawn a clear distinction between "the things that are Caesar's" and "the things that are God's"? Having thus marked out

the sphere of the state, Williams proceeded to base the authority of the latter on a social compact—and not in theory only; for he put his doctrine into practice in Rhode Island, from which safe distance he wrote to John Winthrop and pointed out the latter's "great and lamentable" errors with no lack of frankness.

It was not merely against the Puritan oligarchs that the early democrats had to contend. They also had to oppose the arbitrary rule of the governors sent out from England. When Sir Edmund Andros levied a tax through his council without consulting the General Court, he found a worthy opponent in John Wise (1652-1725), minister of the second church of Ipswich, Massachusetts. The cleric was jailed and fined as a result of his opposition. Wise is also notable for injecting some democratic theory into the ecclesiastical controversy as to whether the ministers or the church members in general should rule the Puritan church. It was Presbyterianism against Congregationalism. He saw in this an analogy to the issue between aristocracy and democracy in the civil sphere and came out emphatically for the latter.

THE REVOLUTION

As the seventeenth century gave way to the eighteenth, theology became less important and economics became more important as factors in the background of American social thought. Economics largely determined the class structure of colonial society.² The privileged class included some royal and proprietary governors who owed their prestige to their position, but the bulk of the group consisted of wealthy landowners and merchant capitalists. In Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina an aristocratic planter class developed during the seventeenth century, de

pending for their labor first on indentured servants and later on Negro slaves.³ A somewhat similar culture was shared by the large landowners of the Hudson valley. In the northern cities such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, a growing capitalist class were conspicuous for their ample scale of living. This privileged group of large landowners and prosperous merchants would very gladly have adopted in the colonies the English system whereby a corresponding class controlled the government. In the colonies, however, this aspiration met with determined opposition. The self-reliant small farmers together with the artisans and many small traders from the cities were determined to share in the control of affairs. As a result there existed a sharp class conflict from the late seventeenth century onward, sometimes taking the form of armed insurrection as in the case of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia (1676) or Leisler's Revolt in New York (1689-91), but more usually appearing in a less dramatic manner as, for example, in the case of the currency conflicts in Massachusetts during the late 1730's or in Rhode Island after 1740.⁴

The two conflicting groups were brought into temporary conformity by the policy which Britain pursued from 1763 onward. The French and Indian War which was the American phase of the European Seven Years' War was successfully concluded in that year and England no longer needed the colonies' help against the French menace in America. Also the ambitious and inflexible George III (1760-1820) was on the throne. So a policy was adopted which involved essentially the exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of the mother country. It was an unfortunate decision from the British standpoint. The colonial aristocracy was injured in the pocketbook, an exceedingly

sensitive spot. The colonial masses, who had long nursed grievances against any sort of arbitrary rule, were even more ready for decisive action. Such was the immediate background of the American Revolution; but one must not forget that there were more fundamental long-range causes at work. The colonies had already developed their own culture, their own economy, their own tradition of self-government. It needed only a definite issue to precipitate an immediate break.

In theory independence from Great Britain need not have involved the erection of a democracy in the colonies. An American kingdom was altogether conceivable or the country might have accepted an aristocratic form of government. Two immediate issues faced the Americans as soon as they had declared their independence. The government of the individual states had to be regularized and some form of national government had to be set up to wage the common war and to provide afterwards for whatever joint action should prove necessary or desirable. The question of democracy against autocracy thus became a very immediate issue which could not be evaded even under war conditions. On this issue various groups crystallized. The loyalists formed an important segment of the aristocratic class who opposed the Revolution. By their action they lost all political influence and in large numbers they left the country. Thus the nation was purged of the most recalcitrant antidemocratic elements. Other aristocrats accepted the Revolution from motives of expediency or because they were angry with the British economic policy toward the colonies. They remained to form a conservative wing in the new nation. Among the democrats, there was a moderate group who favored a government of limited powers provided with proper checks and balances and

a radical group who stood squarely for popular rule to be assured by giving supremacy in the government to a popular house of the legislature elected on a broad franchise. By 1780 eleven of the states had adopted written constitutions while the remaining two (Rhode Island and Connecticut) had modified their colonial charters in lieu of a constitution. There was a considerable difference in the governments thus set up. Broadly speaking, the conservatives triumphed in seven states, Virginia, South Carolina, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, and New Hampshire, while in the remaining six states the form of government tended toward democracy.⁵ The nation as a whole was governed somewhat irregularly by the Continental Congress until the Articles of Confederation, adopted by Congress in 1777, were finally ratified by all the states in 1781 and thus became operative and regularized the national government. The Articles were a triumph for the democratic group which favored a decentralized government. Since the various schools of thought which were active during this period of constitution making are very important in the history of American democracy, it is worth while to review briefly the thought of some typical representatives of the various viewpoints.

The loyalists or Tories can be well represented by the fiery and courageous Jonathan Boucher (about 1738-1804).⁶ Born in England, he migrated to America where he tutored the step-son of George Washington. He was ordained a minister of the Anglican church and served in various parishes in Maryland and Virginia. The growing movement toward revolution impelled him to study political philosophy. His study reinforced his prejudices. All revolution is wrong; it is an impious act of disobedience against God's authority as represented by the government.

He preached this unpopular doctrine to his American congregations with a pair of pistols lying on his pulpit. Finally he returned to England and published his American sermons under the title, *A View of the Causes and Consequences of the American Revolution*.

Typical of the conservatives who threw in their lot with the Revolutionists was the wealthy Philadelphia lawyer, John Dickinson (1732-1808). He had studied law in London and admired the British constitution very much. Only on the issue of taxation did he break with the English colonial policy. His energetic defense of the American position on this point brought him great popularity. But Dickinson with his orderly legal mind and his aristocratic background could not fully sympathize with democracy. Therefore his course was somewhat vacillating. In the Continental Congress he voted against the Declaration of Independence, but soon afterwards he enlisted in the colonial army. He bitterly opposed the operation of the very democratic Pennsylvania constitution, but on the other hand it was he who drafted the democratic Articles of Confederation. To men like Dickinson the choice between loyalty to England or to the colonies was a difficult one. Those who, like him, threw in their lot with the colonies helped to keep democracy from going to extremes.

George Mason (1725-92), a wealthy Virginia planter, will serve as a representative of the moderate democrats. He played a large part in drafting the Virginia constitution and later on he participated in the convention which drew up the Constitution of the United States. The latter document, however, was not democratic enough to satisfy him. Although himself a slave owner, Mason advocated the limitation of the slave trade and **the** eventual abolition of slavery. He opposed the centralization of powers and was a

consistent advocate of bills of rights as a feature of constitutions. It is notable, and a bit surprising, that a man like Mason, an aristocrat by breeding and manner of life, should have been an outspoken democrat in politics; yet he was but one of a distinguished group of such men which included Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and Richard Henry Lee.

The fiery Samuel Adams (1722-1803) is an excellent example of the radical democrat. His ability to refrain from letting sleeping dogs lie amounted to something like genius. Whenever Governor Hutchinson and the Boston Tories succeeded in lulling the populace into a temporary contentment with British rule, Sam Adams could always be depended on to rouse them again. He was a born agitator, endowed with tireless energy and a keen publicity sense. He engaged in a thousand controversies and constantly—whatever the immediate issue—he pressed home his point that the people, the common people, are fit to rule. While cautious and moderate democrats talked about the rights of property, Sam Adams preached the rights of the people. He was one of the early representatives of a long line of homespun democrats who felt that government is safer and sounder, the more the people participate in it.

By these men and by men like these, conservatives, moderates, and radicals, the American democracy was founded in a spirit of compromise and mutual concession. It was an achievement of which they might well be proud. The accomplishments of the American Revolution certainly compare favorably with those of the French Revolution which followed shortly. The American colonists founded a democracy which has endured ever since and in founding it they avoided the excesses which alienated the general sympathy from Jacobin France. There was no Reign of Terror on this side of the Atlantic. Moreover, American

democracy never acquired **the** strong antireligious bias which was so characteristic of the European Continental variety. An essentially sane and workable democracy has been the great American contribution to the history of social thought.

DEMOCRACY GETS UNDER WAY

On May 25, 1787, a group of grave gentlemen met at the State House in Philadelphia and began their task of drafting a constitution for the United States. There were weighty reasons for replacing the old Articles of Confederation by a stronger constitution. The existing national government possessed few powers and depended on the good will of the states for the effective use of these. It was to be feared that the result of the Revolution would be, not one united nation, but a group of thirteen quarreling states.

These, however, were not the only thoughts which occupied the grave gentlemen in Philadelphia. A great many of them shared the feeling that radical democracy had gone too far and needed to be curbed. There was too much loose talk, they felt, by radical democrats in state legislatures. Shays's Rebellion, a left-wing agrarian outbreak in western Massachusetts, had only recently been suppressed and the leaders remained unpunished. A strong central government seemed to be the best practical way to control such tendencies and men of property looked toward Philadelphia hopefully.

The constitutional convention deliberated in the utmost secrecy with sentries pacing up and down before the doors to keep out the curious public. When the completed document was finally submitted to the states for ratification it stirred up immediately a great storm of controversy. El

bridge Gerry (1744-1814), a member of the convention, refused to sign the constitution and came home to Massachusetts muttering about "the *dark, secret and profound intrigues*, of the statesman, long practised in the purlieus of despotism" which had produced a constitution which appeared "contradictory to the first principles which ought to govern mankind." ⁷ Of a more judicial temperament was Richard Henry Lee (1732-94) of Virginia who refused to serve at Philadelphia. He objected to the haste and secrecy with which the document had been drafted. "This has been the custom of tyrants, and their dependents in all ages." He criticized the proposed constitution for "that strong tendency to aristocracy now discernable in every part of the plan." While repudiating aristocratic rule, Lee had no sympathy with left-wing democracy. His sympathies were with "the weight of the community; the men of middling property, men not in debt on the one hand, and men, on the other, content with republican governments, and not aiming at immense fortunes, offices, and power." ⁸ He objected to the constitution because he felt that it did not give the weight of the power to this class, as it should have done, but rather to the rising class with aristocratic tendencies.

The Federalists, as the advocates of the new constitution began to be called, were somewhat alarmed at this opposition and they began to organize their campaign carefully. In this campaign Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804) rendered yeoman service. There could be no question about his antidemocratic tendencies. During the constitutional convention he had advocated a national government headed by a president serving for life with an absolute veto on legislation. Members of the Senate should also serve for life. Governors of states should be appointed by the national

government and should each have an absolute veto power as regards legislation in his own state.⁹ Hamilton now girded himself for the fray. Together with Madison and Jay he wrote a series of papers called *The Federalist* persuasively setting forth the arguments for ratification. After a spirited contest the Federalists won out, but one very important democratic result arose from the activities of the ratifying conventions. The original constitution lacked a bill of rights. This fact called forth a great deal of criticism and the Federalists had to promise that a bill of rights would be added in the form of amendments. This promise was carried out and the first ten amendments, which went into effect December 15, 1791, certainly strengthened the Constitution in a democratic direction. Opposition subsided and the new centralized government was generally accepted.

Throughout the early years of the new government which the Constitution had established, the Federalists had pretty much their own way. Hamilton's influence was important. As Secretary of the Treasury under Washington he submitted four famous reports outlining a policy which strongly favored the capitalist class. But opposition gradually arose and finally crystallized about the person of Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) who became the third President of the United States in 1801. Along with Benjamin Franklin (1706-90), Jefferson had stood out as one of the two leading American exponents of the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Although born to the aristocratic class, he had absorbed the spirit of agrarian democracy which flourished in his native up-state Virginia. His residence in France in the diplomatic service (1784-89) confirmed his democratic hatred of tyranny. It was Jefferson who drafted the Declaration of Independence with its doc

trine of natural rights and it was he who, as President, insisted on a democratic simplicity which delighted the common people.

When Andrew Jackson (1767-1845) was inaugurated in 1829 another conspicuous democrat had attained the presidency. Jackson was no intellectual like Jefferson but he had an unshakable conviction that the people should rule and he stuck to this conviction through thick and thin in spite of his own rather autocratic temperament. Thus his administration marked an important stage in the development of American democratic thought.

The New Englander, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82), perhaps the most philosophically minded American of his generation, made his own peculiar contribution to democratic theory. Many influences contributed to the formation of Emerson's mind. Although he resigned his position as a Unitarian minister with the weakening of his religious belief, he retained more than a little of the austere, moralizing spirit of Boston Protestantism. A European trip broadened his intellectual horizon and brought him the friendship of Carlyle. Finally, he chose as his permanent residence the town of Concord whose inhabitants were proud of the fact that it was the cradle of the American Revolution, and it was Emerson who celebrated this fact in his "Concord Hymn" about the "embattled farmers" who had "fired the shot heard round the world." With such a background it is not surprising that Emerson should have been devoted to liberty of a rather strongly individualistic variety nor that he should have justified his belief by appeal to moral principle. He tended to minimize the powers of the state and to exalt the rights of the individual. He was out of sympathy with capitalistic economics. So Emerson, with his fine sense of moral values, revolted against the practicalities

of the moneyed men and the cheap compromises of the politicians and preached his spiritualized Yankee individualism.

American democracy, as already stated, has always had a fight on its hands against internal antidemocratic forces. During the early period the most threatening of such forces was the ambition of a privileged class to establish themselves as an American aristocracy. Their attempt failed. After all, the atmosphere of the nineteenth century was unfavorable to aristocracies and the trends were in the other direction. However, there were other antidemocratic forces which arose at one time or another to threaten the American ideal. These may pretty well be reduced to three, slavery, *laissez-faire* capitalism, and imperialistic nationalism. With these three issues the most significant social thinking in the United States was immediately concerned.

THE SLAVERY ISSUE

It is difficult to think of anything which contradicts the American ideal more directly than slavery. It is "self evident," according to the Declaration of Independence, "that all men are created equal" and are endowed by God with certain "unalienable rights" among which is "liberty." But if American slavery cannot be reconciled with the democratic ideal by any stretch of the imagination, it can at least be understood historically. Slavery in this country was not a direct importation from Europe where slavery had given way to serfdom; and serfdom, to peasantry. It arose rather in the course of Portuguese and Spanish exploration and colonization. The Portuguese had exploited African slaves before America was discovered. Thence the evil passed to Latin America and so to the English colonies. In 1619 the Jamestown colonists bought twenty Ne

groes from a Dutch privateer. Some time was to elapse, however, before the status of American Negroes was shaped by law and custom into institutionalized slavery. In this process economic factors were important. A plantation economy developed in the South for the raising of tobacco, rice, indigo, and particularly cotton. On these plantations slave labor proved profitable. On the other hand slaves were less economically desirable in the North, the land of small farms, commerce, and industry. However, as late as the outbreak of the Revolution there were some fifty thousand slaves in the colonies north of Maryland. In any case the history of slavery affords no evidence for the existence of a superior moral sense north of the Mason and Dixon line. Northerners did not develop scruples against slavery to any great degree until they discovered that it was not economically profitable. Yankee skippers did not hesitate to line their pockets with the profits of the utterly unspeakable slave trade. Racial injustice was quite strong in the North. The treatment of the Negro was—and is—something about which all Americans, and not merely Southerners, can well blush.¹⁰

After slavery had established itself as an institution in the South and had died out in the North, it became an inter sectional issue. Certain Northerners took a self-righteous pride in pointing out the southern injustices to the slaves. Sectional pride, however, was not their only motive. Early nineteenth-century humanitarianism plus a real love of democratic ideals inspired the abolitionists of whom William Lloyd Garrison (1805-79) serves as a striking example. There is something moving in the spirit of this man which made him declare at the age of twenty-six: "Urge me not to use moderation in a cause like the present. **I am in earnest—I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I will**

not retreat a single inch—AND I WILL BE HEARD." At least the enemies of Garrison could not charge him with forgetting this resolution. He hated slavery with a consuming hatred. To him the issue was clear and simple. Slavery was an evil and should be abolished. In Garrison's eyes it was no excuse that slavery was legal under the constitutional government of the United States. He answered this argument by condemning the Constitution as "a covenant with Death and an agreement with Hell" and burning a copy of the document before a sympathetic audience at a Fourth of July celebration in 1854. Garrison certainly helped to focus the country's attention on the antislavery issue but he also helped to arouse fierce antagonisms which made a rational solution difficult.

In the early period decent Southerners were shamefaced about the slavery which existed among them. They admitted that the institution was unjust and regretted its existence. Patrick Henry, for example, wrote in a letter to a friend: "Would any one believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own purchase! . . . However culpable my Conduct, I will so far pay my devoir to Virtue, as to own the excellence and rectitude of her Precepts and to lament my want of conformity to them."¹¹ In the face of northern criticism, however, the South tended to take a less reasonable position and to seek a theoretical justification for slavery. A poetical work entitled *The Hireling and the Slave* by William John Grayson (1788-1863) will illustrate this tendency. As one might guess from the title, the poem contrasts the hard lot of the factory hand with the comparatively pleasant life of the slave on a southern plantation. If Grayson leaves realism behind in his idealization of plantation life, he makes some telling points in his criticism of the factory system and its attendant evils. He is ef

fective also in some of his thrusts at northern politicians who espoused the Negro's cause for purely political reasons.

In the abstract the Civil War was not necessary to solve the problem of slavery. The evil might have been abolished peacefully as was the case in Brazil. After all, who could imagine that slavery would have persisted into the twentieth century in a civilized country? But in the United States the problem was complicated by another issue. The South appealed to the old doctrine of states' rights. As the controversy sharpened passions were aroused and in both the North and South men were in no mood for working out their differences in a reasonable and conciliatory spirit. And so the war was fought.¹²

The military victory of the North was decisive, but the victory of the democratic principle as applying to Negroes remained in doubt. Between 1865 and 1870 the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments were indeed written into the Constitution to abolish slavery and guarantee Negro rights, yet not even the use of military force during the Reconstruction period could force the southern states to accept the former slaves as full citizens of a democracy. It must be admitted that the task was rendered unnecessarily difficult by the iniquities of the carpetbag governments. In any case, when President Hayes withdrew the last Federal troops from the South it was really a defeated army which marched northward. Then again the South won important victories in the courts which have often proved a last refuge for conservatism. The most important of these decisions was probably the decision of the Supreme Court in 1883 which hamstrung the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875. On the basis of the fourteenth amendment this law

had aimed to give Negroes equal rights with whites in hotels, theaters, and public conveyances.

As Gabriel acutely remarks, the decisive thing that happened in 1883 was that the North acquiesced in the Supreme Court decision with a minimum of protest.¹³ What really happened was that North and South had entered into a tacit compromise on the two issues over which the Civil War was fought. The South had yielded on the principle of states' rights and from this time on the supremacy of the national government and the unity of the nation were never seriously challenged. On the other hand, slavery having been abolished, the North yielded to the southerners the privilege of handling race relations in their own way. It would hardly be inaccurate, then, to say that both the great Civil-War issues were settled finally in an anti-democratic sense, for since colonial days the doctrine of states' rights had been traditionally associated with democracy.

The realistic historian can hardly admit that the Civil War introduced a democratic theory of race relations into American social thought. The abolition of slavery did indeed bring the Negro one definite gain, the liberty of moving freely from place to place. There is no modern equivalent of a fugitive slave law. Yet in most other respects the Negro's position has been little improved. Quite generally he has been denied the right to vote and has received unequal treatment in the courts. Discriminatory legislation has been passed against him. He has been deprived of equal educational opportunity. He faces economic discrimination. He has been denied anything savoring in the least of social equality. The great mass of white America either remains profoundly indifferent to the Negro's plight or else

accepts the theory of Thomas Nelson Page (1853-1922) regarding the "absolute and unchangeable superiority of the white race" and the corresponding duty of exercising a benevolent and paternalistic control over the colored population.¹⁴ Thus a peculiar antidemocratic theory of race relations has been integrated with democracy in American social thought—and few citizens are conscious of the glaring incongruity.

CAPITALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

About the middle of the nineteenth century the United States entered on a period of unprecedented industrial growth. Between 1849 and 1914 the value added by manufacture increased from 464 million dollars to 9858 million.¹⁵ The increase, then, was about twenty-one fold. During the same period the increase in population was roughly fourfold. Industry was growing five times as rapidly as population. The growth of manufacture was symptomatic of a general economic development of a capitalistic variety which extended to transportation, mining, commerce, and finance. The result, of course, was an enormous increase in wealth. From 1850 to 1912 the estimated total national wealth grew from seven to one hundred eighty-six billion dollars; at the same time the amount per capita increased sixfold.¹⁶ These new riches were by no means equally shared throughout the whole population. An undue proportion found its way into the hands of a few very wealthy men who rose to positions of enormous influence.

The new multimillionaires rationalized their acquisitiveness into a philosophy which afterwards became known as *rugged individualism*. According to this philosophy, the new capitalism was not only a blessing to the capitalists themselves, but also to the public at large. Capitalism was

developing the resources of the country and raising the general standard of living. Economic power was indeed being concentrated in the hands of a comparatively small group of men, but these men were worthy of their trust. For had they not achieved their success by intelligence, hard work, and thrift? The rugged individualists endeavored to show that *laissez-faire* capitalism was a corollary of American democracy; for democracy implies freedom and capitalism had arisen in the United States under conditions of minimum governmental interference. The great mass of the people tended to acquiesce in this philosophy, at least at first. One reason for this fact was the hope that each poor boy secretly cherished that he too might rise from relative poverty to great wealth, like Rockefeller or Carnegie or Hill. The system seemed not unjust when it held out the golden promise of equal opportunity for all. Finally the Supreme Court added its august blessing. The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution provided that no state should "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." This amendment had been adopted during the Reconstruction era with the obvious purpose, as it seemed, of safeguarding Negro rights. But the Court discovered that the word *person* included corporations which are, after all, legal persons and that the governmental regulation of business might deprive these legal persons of their property without due process of law.¹⁷

As time went on doubts began to arise about the democratic nature of the philosophy of rugged individualism. To an increasing number it began to seem a positively anti democratic system. For the policy of governmental non interference gave freedom to the capitalists, but hardly any useful freedom to the common people. Discontent

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grew during the era of the great trusts, a period which may be dated from 1882 when the reorganization of the Standard Oil Company, the first important trust, took place. What made the situation more alarming was the failure of early efforts to curb the power of the capitalist class. In 1890 the Sherman Act was passed to break up the trusts, but it was not very effective, the immediate cause being the attitude of the Supreme Court and the lack of vigor of the prosecuting attorneys. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 failed for a long time to control the railroads. Agrarian discontent crystallized in the Greenback movement of the 1870's and 1880's and the Populism of the 1890's, but met with no great success.¹⁸ The early history of organized labor was somewhat discouraging. The Knights of Labor, organized in 1869, began to collapse after the Haymarket affair of 1886 with which they were unjustly associated in the public mind. A more permanent organization appeared when the American Federation of Labor was founded in 1881.¹⁹ But the failures of the Homestead strike in 1892 and of the Pullman strike in 1894 were discouraging. The control* of the economic system by the great corporations seemed unshakable.

Discontent with the system gave rise to several new currents in American social thought. There was, for example, the single-tax theory of Henry George (1839-97). Born in Philadelphia, George migrated to San Francisco where he devoted himself to journalism without marked success. He was fascinated by the paradox of poverty in a land of plenty. Meditating for a long time on the problem he became convinced that the root of the evil was the prevailing system of land ownership. By right, ownership of land belongs to all the people of the country and not to

individual owners. As a remedy for the existing situation George proposed, not confiscation, but a single tax to be levied on land alone; thus the unearned increment which individual owners unjustly derive from the land would be restored to the people, the rightful owners. In 1879 George published his theories in a book, *Progress and Poverty*. The single-tax movement enjoyed considerable prominence both in the United States and abroad and continued to flourish for some time after George's death.

Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) was a critic of the economic system with a very different background from George. Whereas the latter was an academically unsophisticated popular writer and the leader of a movement, Veblen was a trained economist with none of the gifts of a popular leader. In Veblen's eyes history was dominated by the conflict between the diligent and the predacious, the hard-working producer and the rapacious individual who deprives him of the fruits of his toil. In *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899) he submitted the culture of the contemporary capitalist class to a searching analysis. Veblen developed his own peculiar terminology. He talked of *pecuniary emulation*, his name for the tendency to measure success in terms of money, or *conspicuous consumption*, the tendency to glorify lavish spending as something honorable. He was essentially a critic rather than a constructive thinker, his suggestions for reform being rather vague. But Veblen's pungent criticisms of the American success-ideal found their mark and his influence in the long run was considerable.

Another attack on the evils of capitalism came from a group of fiction writers who exploited the dramatic possibilities of the evils of the situation. The more prominent

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members of this group included Frank Norris (1870-1902), Jack London (1876-1916), and Upton Sinclair (1878-). Norris did his most effective work in presenting the sufferings of the wheat farmers "at the hands of the railroads and grain speculators. London, a restless adventurer, preached class war in his stories. Sinclair, during the period under consideration, achieved prominence with his novel, *The Jungle* (1906) which was an incisive study of the Chicago stockyards.

The spirit of social criticism represented by such writers as those mentioned gradually began to make itself felt. Under Theodore Roosevelt's administration (1901-9) a great anthracite coal strike was settled by arbitration, the miners receiving a ten per cent wage increase, in 1903 a Department of Commerce and Labor was set up, and in 1906 the Hepburn Act made possible the effective regulation of railroad rates. The early years of Wilson's administration (1913-21), before the international situation had distracted the President's attention, saw some important measures passed, including an income-tax law, the Federal Reserve Act, the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission, and the Clayton Act which was a more effective antitrust law. At least equally important was a mass of social legislation passed by the individual states in the opening years of the twentieth century. This included workmen's compensation laws, laws on child labor, the protection of women in industry, mothers' assistance acts, and safety and health codes. As the period being considered in this chapter drew to a close, the antidemocratic theory of rugged individualism was still widely held, but it was no longer unchallenged. The opposing democratic theory of the social control of capitalism by labor organization and social legislation was making rapid headway.

THE SPIRIT OF NATIONALISM

It may not be apparent immediately why nationalism is an antidemocratic tendency, but a little consideration should show the reasons. Nationalism tends to favor a strongly centralized government, remote from popular control, as against a distribution of power among local units of government, more accessible to the will of the people. This is the more likely to be the case, the more militaristic the state becomes—and nationalism uniformly tends to militarism. An army can be run efficiently only by a unified command and the more a state tends to become like an army, the more its government tends toward dictatorship. Even the most democratic countries have been taught by experience that their democracy must be somewhat modified in war time. Again, nationalism normally expresses itself in imperialistic adventures and it is seldom found expedient to extend full democracy to the colonies except in those cases in which the colonials are of the same race and language as the mother country. Finally, nationalism whips up to a high degree the consciousness of unity among the dominant national group. In this mood men are seldom ready to recognize the full democratic rights of minority groups who differ from the majority in race, language, or religion.

Nationalism was surprisingly slow to develop in the United States. Until the end of the colonial period there was no single American government to demand a nationalistic loyalty. Men thought of themselves rather as citizens of New Jersey or Virginia or Rhode Island, as the case might be, than as Americans. The persistence of these local loyalties even after the Revolution is strikingly shown by the reluctance of so many to accept the Constitution which

gave more power to the national government at the expense of the states. During the War of 1812, when the country had a tough fight on its hands, the attitude of New England was apathetic to say the least. In 1813 the Massachusetts Senate resolved that in such a war "waged without justifiable cause, . . . it is not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military and naval exploits which are not immediately connected with the defence of our sea-coast and soil."²⁰ Even more surprising was the action of the New Englanders who met in convention at Hartford even before the war was over to discuss their grievances and consider the possibility of secession. Of course such actions were denounced as disloyal, but the significant thing is that they could occur at all or, if they did occur, that they were not met by an absolutely overwhelming storm of protest.

During the Civil War it was the turn of the South to espouse the antinationalist cause. In doing so they explicitly claimed to stand for democratic principles against excessive nationalism. In his inaugural address as President of the Provisional Government, Jefferson Davis (1808-89) pointed with pride to the action of the seceding states as a democratic procedure. "It illustrates the American idea," he said, "that governments rest on the consent of the governed." The North, of course, was committed to the principle that the national government should prevail over the will of the individual states, but even in the North there was a lack of national loyalty which strikes a later generation as surprising. The draft of 1862 was practically a failure. The stronger act of 1863 met with widespread resistance. The draft riots which terrorized New York City for days was only the most dramatic of a long series of disturbances.

It was only at the end of the Reconstruction period that both North and South fully accepted the principle that the citizen's first political loyalty is due the nation rather than the individual state. From this point on national spirit was a steady growth. With the easy victory which the country won in the Spanish-American War of 1898 it began to take on an imperialistic tinge; for the war and associated events gave the nation a far-flung empire in distant parts. The most distinguished prophet of the new imperialism was Theodore Roosevelt to whom it fell during his administration to organize the new territorial acquisitions. Furthermore, he strengthened the navy, sent it on a world tour, broadened the Monroe Doctrine, and began the Panama Canal. Roosevelt, like European imperialists of his day, had a high conception of the duty of stewardship incumbent on the more civilized nations toward the "backward" peoples of the earth. He felt that such peoples were benefited by contact with the more advanced civilizations even though they lost their independence in the process.²¹ It was quite consistent with this paternalistic attitude that the Supreme Court held in a decision handed down during Roosevelt's administration that the provisions of the constitutional Bill of Rights do not apply fully to the inhabitants of the insular possessions.²²

It is instructive to study the growth of nationalism in the United States from the days of the Revolution to the end of the period now being considered. As time went on, it had acquired a species of religious significance. In fact one might say that it had in a sense replaced as a cohesive force the strong Protestant religious feeling of the early period. In those early days a man might take his stand on states' rights and oppose, not merely the policies, but the authority itself of the national government, even in time of war, with

out losing status; but too outspoken scepticism on fundamental religious beliefs would lead to general ostracism as it did in the case of Tom Paine in spite of his great services to the country. In the later period the case was exactly reversed. Ostracism became the penalty for public criticism of the dogmas of American nationalism while one might freely question the most sacred doctrines of Christianity without forfeiting respectability. The religious character of nationalism is shown also by the wide acceptance of the principle implied by the misquotation, "My country, right or wrong."²³ Obviously this implies that the policy of the government is a norm of morality superior to ethics or religion. Finally, the religious character of nationalism is shown by the bitterly anti-Catholic spirit of various nativist movements. There could be no reasonable doubt of the thoroughly patriotic attitude of Catholics throughout American history; yet, in the spirit of Pope Leo XIII, Catholics have been bound to admit that nations, like individuals, are subject to the law of God interpreted by the Church. They could not consistently say, "My country, right or wrong." Therefore the more unreasonable nationalists turned on the Church with a species of theological hatred.

CONCLUSION

The American democratic ideal has been challenged by a long line of antidemocrats, the Puritan oligarchs, the colonial aristocrats, the Revolutionary "loyalists," the extreme Federalists, the racists, the *laissez-faire* capitalists, and the imperialistic nationalists. After the period considered in this chapter it continued to be challenged by the last three groups and by the Communists. But in spite of these varied and persistent attacks the validity of the ideal

itself remains unshaken. Indeed, the animus behind these attacks serves to convince the thoughtful American more than ever of the worth of the ideal. For each attack sprang from the selfishness of a particular interest-group and an unwillingness to face problems in a spirit of open-minded justice. For democracy is founded on the principle that all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights" and the system necessarily remains unintelligible to those who are unable to recognize such rights in their fellow men.

Democracy has been America's lesson to the world. Not the least valuable part of the lesson has been the necessity of a constant struggle against antidemocratic forces if the system is to be preserved. It is not a foolproof system. It can survive only if men are willing to preserve it through constant effort. Eternal vigilance is the price of democracy.

CHAPTER 16

THE RISE OF ACADEMIC SOCIOLOGY

THE ROLE OF SOCIOLOGY

It is a mistake to confuse the broad field of social thought with the much narrower field of academic sociology. The former includes all thinking concerned with human group life. It is as old as the race. It may be implicit as well as explicit. Thus a law code, a myth, a campaign speech, a novel, a cartoon, even an established custom, may imply a definite view of society and thus serve as source material for the historian of social thought. Sociology, on the other hand, is much narrower. Theoretically it might be defined as a systematic attempt, by planned thinking and investigation, to formulate generalizations about society. As the term is ordinarily used, however, it is generally given a still narrower meaning; for the definition just given would include, for example, the work of Aristotle, and Aristotle is not usually spoken of as a sociologist. In practice, then, sociology means the organized attempt to study society and generalize about it which originated with Auguste Comte and which has now become an academic subject.

The distinction between social thought in general and academic sociology in particular is therefore quite clear. Anyone who thinks about group life at all makes his contribution, perhaps unconsciously, to the social thought of his time; he may be a labor leader or a business man or a politician. But sociology has become an academic subject.

THE BEHAVIORISTIC SCHOOL

As the inadequacies of the philosophico-scientific school became increasingly apparent, a strong reaction set in. The older writers had paid little attention to the collection of original data; the reaction against this attitude led to a great emphasis on facts gathered by the most objective and critical methods available. The older writers had been prone to formulate generalizations, too frequently on the basis of their preconceived ideas; now the only generalizations which were acceptable were those demanded by the observed facts. This reaction was much influenced not only by the methodology of the natural sciences in general, but specifically by the methodology of the physical sciences. Sociologists looked enviously at the achievements of such sciences as physics. The conclusions of physics seemed to possess an authority and a definiteness which sociology lacked. It was tempting to conclude that sociologists could parallel the achievements of the physicists by adopting their methods. Certain writers did not hesitate to draw this conclusion, arguing that scientific method was applicable in essentially the same way to human behavior and the motions of inanimate matter. "The formulation of social laws," said L. L. Bernard, "is subject to the same general principles as is the formulation of physical and chemical laws. There is no difference in the form of a social and a physical or a chemical law."⁷

The methodology of this group is clearly formulated by George A. Lundberg in his *Social Research* (1929).⁸ After outlining briefly the field and method of science in general, the author goes on to argue that sociology does not require an essentially different method. The data of sociology are indeed complex, but this complexity "tends to disappear

with closer study." Certain uniformities begin to emerge and these may become the basis of scientific laws. If the "time-honored conception of the person as a free agent" be brought forward as an objection, it may be dismissed as one of "these quaint metaphysical survivals." It is true that the exact sciences are quantitative and sociology has hitherto been so to only a slight extent, but this only means that sociology is a young science. In the days of prescientific physics bodies were described as *hot* or *cold*. Only after the development of the thermometer could temperature be accurately measured. As in physics, so in sociology, exact measurement only gradually replaces qualitative description; but fundamentally it is just as possible in the one field as in the other.

This general approach, described by Lundberg, is closely similar to the viewpoint of the school of psychology known as *behaviorism*. This school has, indeed, had an important direct effect on sociology. Therefore it seems not illogical to call the sociologists discussed in the present section *the behavioristic school*. It is only fair to add, however, that not all workers whom we are classifying under this heading would accept the full theory of behaviorism. After all, one can use behavioristic methods without being a behaviorist. All who use exact, objective methods to describe overt activities are using behavioristic methods; but only the orthodox behaviorists and their allies would insist on stopping there.

It will be impossible, in the space available here, to discuss even briefly the concrete contributions of the behavioristic school. To do so would be practically to review the whole content of sociology as it is usually taught in modern American colleges and universities. It will suffice for the present purpose to mention the principal forms

which their methodology has taken, the general fields to which they have been applied, and the trend of the results attained. Speaking in a general way and making due allowance for exceptions, one may say that the behavioristic approach has tended to take three specific forms, statistical analysis, case work, and cultural analysis.

Statistical analysis represents the purest application to social phenomena of the methods of the exact sciences. It is typical of the physicist, for example, to collect his data in the form of measurements of weight, length, temperature, time, and the like, and then to submit these data to mathematical analysis in the hope of formulating physical laws in mathematical form. It is the goal of the statistical sociologist to do the same with his own material. The attempt is not as hopeless as might appear at first glance. After all, much social material is available in numerical form. There are, for example, population figures, birth rates, morbidity rates, death rates, and the like. The test movement has furnished a means of measuring a variety of human traits with some approximation of accuracy. Rating scales can serve the same purpose. In a word, there are a number of social phenomena which may be counted or measured.

The real difficulty which the statistical sociologist encounters lies less in the collection of numerical data than in their mathematical analysis. The physicist is often fortunate enough to find that the relation between two variables which he is studying is expressible by a rather simple curve or—what comes to the same thing—by a rather simple equation. This gives him ground for further mathematical speculation which may usually be checked by experiment. Thus mathematics may be a great aid to the physicist in formulating briefly his experimental results and in suggesting further experiment. The sociologist is seldom, if ever,

so fortunate. Human society is very complex and this fact is reflected in the complexity, the apparent lack of order, which the unprejudiced student will still discover when he examines social data expressed numerically. In the hope of bringing some order into this apparent chaos, mathematical statisticians have developed special methods of analyzing such data, such as various forms of correlation, curve fitting, and factor analysis. These methods can be made to yield interesting results. The weak point is that the methods themselves rest on certain assumptions of which statistical sociologists are too often unaware. The point is too technical to be developed here, but one may assert with assurance that the definite and accepted results which rest solely on the elaborate mathematical analysis of social data are extremely meager.⁹

Social case work developed out of philanthropic efforts to improve the condition of the poor. Taking shape gradually during the latter half of the nineteenth century, case work finally became a standardized technique for gathering reliable information about those such as the poor, the delinquent, the mentally ill, who were being aided by social agencies. Social workers learned how to check their subjective impressions by collecting verified facts. Knowledge based on painstaking research took the place of impressions based on emotional attitudes and a new body of knowledge began to be accumulated concerning poverty, family relationships, crime, delinquency, and the social effects of disease, feeble-mindedness, and mental illness. Closely related to social case work is the social survey, a systematic investigation of the social problems and resources of a community. Research workers have applied case-work techniques to the study of all sorts of special problems such

as race relations, housing, immigrant adjustment, recreation, parent-child relationships, and a variety of other topics. Thus the case-work method, originally developed from the immediate practical purpose of aiding the poor, gradually became a powerful research instrument for accumulating sociological knowledge.

The study of culture, as a form of sociological research, has been borrowed from anthropology. The word *culture* in this special sense includes all that is handed down from one generation to another, not by physical heredity, but by social transmission. When the anthropologist talks about the culture of a primitive tribe, therefore, he refers to the sum total of the beliefs, customs, arts, laws, attitudes, and knowledge which has become traditional in the tribe. In the hands of the anthropologist it is a very fruitful concept. For a long time sociologists have realized the importance of the culture concept in their own field. To quote one example, Sumner emphasized it in his *Folkways*. It was much later, however, before research workers in sociology began to gather first-hand cultural data on their own account. An important milestone in the progress of cultural sociology was the publication (1918-20) of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* by William I. Thomas (1863-) and Florian Znaniecki (1882-). The authors of this work undertook to study the culture of the Polish peasant for the light it furnished on the attitudes and behavior patterns of the Polish group. Since that time sociologists have studied the cultural patterns of different urban areas and the different cultures of Negroes and whites, as well as of the various social classes. The importance of cultural factors in delinquency is beginning to be understood. At the close of the period being considered, cultural anal-

ysis was still a less familiar technique to sociologists than either statistical analysis or the case-work approach, but its importance seemed to be steadily increasing.

Both case work and cultural analysis represented a less rigid application of behavioristic ideals than did the method of quantitative measurement and statistical analysis. Indeed, as will be pointed out presently, they implied in some measure a recognition of a non-behavioristic approach. Yet many, or perhaps most, sociologists who used these techniques were not conscious of this implication. Dominated by a preconceived deterministic philosophy, they tried to investigate human social behavior by purely objective methods and to explain it through a narrow conception of heredity and environment. They were not much interested in the importance of conscious choice and they relegated free will to the realm of "quaint metaphysical survivals." Perhaps one way of expressing the difference between the statistical sociologists on the one hand and the case workers and culture-analysts on the other would be to say that, whereas both groups borrowed their methodology from the natural sciences, the former were specifically imitating the physical sciences, while the biological sciences furnished the model for the latter. Yet both were fundamentally behaviorists in that they overlooked (or at least underemphasized) the role of conscious purpose in human society.

THE INTEGRATIVE SCHOOL

The most valid criticism of behavioristic sociology is negative rather than positive. On the whole the sociologists belonging to that school rendered a distinguished service by collecting an enormous mass of proved facts. Naturally there were imperfections in their work. That is inevitable

wherever the human element is present and it is particularly excusable in a young science whose techniques are only gradually being perfected. A more serious criticism is the systematic bias which led the behavioristic sociologists to overlook the importance of conscious purpose and to restrict themselves as a matter of principle to the study of external behavior. What these sociologists studied, they studied well. Their defect was that they omitted other matters which called for at least equal attention. In this negative sense they laid themselves open to criticism.

Inevitably there was a reaction against this one-sided attitude. This reaction was slow to take definite shape. At first it took the form of a vague feeling of dissatisfaction or expressed itself in a possibly unconscious modification of purely behavioristic methods. Particularly as case work began to feel the influence of psychiatry around 1920, social workers found themselves more and more trying to understand a client's point of view by putting themselves imaginatively in his place, by endeavoring to view society through his eyes, to penetrate the inner world of his consciousness, and to relive his experiences. This, of course, was a process logically inconsistent with the dogmas of behaviorism. In a parallel fashion the cultural sociologists refused to limit themselves to a perfectly detached observation of external behavior and began to study the internal motivation, the attitudes, the viewpoints of persons representing divergent cultures. The broader viewpoint of the cultural sociologists was particularly apparent when they used the method called *participant observation*. This method implies that one becomes, so to speak, a temporary member of the culture one is studying. To understand the life of hoboes, the sociologist puts on some old clothes, mingles with hoboes, and becomes for a time a member ,of

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their group. This certainly represents an earnest attempt to view the life of another culture from within.

While American research workers were thus groping their way toward a less narrow methodology than that proposed by behaviorism, certain German writers were preparing a more sophisticated formulation of the new viewpoint. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) drew a distinction between the natural sciences and the *Geisteswissenschaften*, a term which may be somewhat inadequately translated *mental sciences*.¹⁰ The mental sciences, contended Dilthey, must have their own method because the fact of the freedom of the will makes their subject matter quite different from the subject matter of the natural sciences. This method will take account of our ability to understand (*verstehen*) social phenomena because we ourselves participate in them and thus have an opportunity for direct insight which we do not have when we observe the phenomena of the material world external to us. The elaboration of this viewpoint led to the development of a sociology called *die verstehende Soziologie*. The phrase is difficult to translate. Literally it means *understanding sociology*, that is, a type of sociology which emphasizes our power to understand (*verstehen*) social facts in the sense just explained. The names most closely associated with this school are Max Weber (1864-1920) and Werner Sombart (1863-). In addition to developing the theory of "understanding" as a sociological technique much along the lines of Dilthey, Weber emphasized a particular way in which this may be applied, the *typological method*. This consists in abstracting from masses of data certain common **features which constitute a type. Thus he studied feudalism, charismatic authority, and bureaucracy as types of political sovereignty. The typological method thus pro**

vides a way of arriving at generalizations along the lines of *die verstehende Soziologie*. Sombart has applied the same method to social economics.¹¹

A closely allied school is made up of men like Theodor Litt (1880-) and Alfred Vierkandt (1867-) who have applied to sociology what is called *the phenomenological method*. Like the proponents of *die verstehende Soziologie* they emphasize the importance of placing one self in the place of another mentally and viewing social experience through his eyes. This process has been called *Einfühlung* (German *ein*, in and *fühlen*, to feel). This is an expressive term, for it implies that the observer may *feel* himself *into* another's consciousness (if the expression may be permitted) in order to understand the latter's viewpoint. A practitioner of participant observation, for example, should feel at home with such language.

To sum up what has been said so far—the integrative sociologists differ from the behaviorists on two points: (1) They propose to broaden the *subject matter* of sociology by including internal viewpoints and motives as well as external behavior. (2) They propose to broaden the *method* of sociology by employing a mental process which they describe by such words as *verstehen* and *Einfühlung*. If the integrative method is to be generally accepted these somewhat vague terms must be more clearly defined and they must, above all, be justified as valid methods of attaining truth. How is this to be done?

To solve this problem the integrative sociologists might well turn to the eternal philosophy, the *philosophia perennis*, of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The present writer has elsewhere pointed out that these great thinkers were thoroughly familiar with a mental process which he designated by the term *noesis* which seems to be not greatly different

from what is implied by the verb *verstehen* or what Vierkandt called *ideational abstraction* (*ideierende Abstraktion*).¹² What is here called *noesis* is called by St. Thomas *intellect* (*intellectus*) and he distinguishes it from the discursive reason (*ratio*). However, since the Angelic Doctor is not always consistent in his use of these two terms, it seems advisable to use the unambiguous term *noesis*. In the technical language of the Scholastics, *noesis* and discursive reasoning are not two distinct powers (*potentiae*) of the soul, but two distinct habits (*habitus*).¹³

By *noesis* the human mind is able to see the general in the particular, to abstract a general truth from a mass of accidental circumstances. Thus it comes about that, under favorable circumstances, one may come to the knowledge of a truth "immediately and without investigation,"¹⁴ What does this mean for sociology? It means that, although certain generalizations are to be attained as the behaviorists contend by methods analogous to those of the natural sciences,¹⁵ there are other instances in which the mind immediately apprehends a truth upon the studious contemplation of a mass of social data. This fact by no means excuses the sociologist from the laborious work of gathering facts. Before contemplation one must, after all, have something to contemplate. But once the facts are accumulated, the generalization sometimes comes by direct insight rather than from the process of discursive reasoning.

An example may help to clarify the preceding paragraph. Suppose a sociologist is faced with the problem, How does it feel to be a hobo? To the integrative sociologist this is a legitimate problem, whatever the behaviorist with his narrower viewpoint may think.¹⁶ The investigator, then, who wishes to answer this question will accumulate all the facts he can about hoboes. He will observe

them and talk to them. Perhaps he will try participant observation and temporarily become one of them. After months of this painstaking work he will sit down and spread his data mentally before him. He will turn the question over in his mind as he contemplates the facts. He will put himself imaginatively in the hobo's place (*Einfühlung*). Finally he arrives at his answer to the question, not by composing a chain of syllogisms, not by statistical analysis, not precisely by mere marshaling of facts, but by a certain direct vision, by insight, in a word, by noesis. A behaviorist would dogmatically exclude such a process from sociological research, at least if he were faithful to his principles. But why? After all, the question is significant and the method of answering it is valid. It is approved by common sense and by Thomistic philosophy—which is a sort of systematized and sophisticated common sense.

One great advantage of the integrative method is that (whether all its proponents realize it or not) it renders logical the reintroduction of ethics into sociology, whence it had been banished by the behaviorists. For the mind may attain to first principles of the moral order by a process parallel to the one we have been discussing.¹⁷ This, certainly, is a great advantage. For the behavioristic attempt to make sociology a completely non-ethical science leads to practical absurdities. How, for instance, could one write a textbook on criminology without once betraying any opinion on the desirability or undesirability of such crimes as murder and rape? How could one discuss the efficiency of law-enforcement agencies and yet remain neutral on the fundamental question whether laws ought to be enforced at all? How could one define a social problem without implying some ethical standard? Perhaps, after all, race prejudice, poverty, and unstable family life are desirable.

Without a standard of right and wrong how could one prove that they are not? What actually happens, of course, is that behavioristic sociologists constantly assume ethical standards in their writings without admitting that they do so. Because their implied ethics is merely assumed, instead of being explicitly discussed, it is often a very naive and vulgar ethics and their works suffer as a result.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that integrative sociology, in the form that it takes among the recognized leaders of the movement, represents an unconscious return in the direction of the *philosophia perennis* of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The movement cannot completely fulfill its promise without drawing nearer and nearer to the Thomistic position. This is certainly an encouraging sign. One may dare to hope that as sociology develops and as it becomes more influential in society, it may also become more and more philosophically sound. Of course one must add that a sociology inspired by right philosophy does not represent the ultimate ideal from the Catholic viewpoint. To reach the deepest view of society, the data of revelation must be taken into account and then theology must be called into play. Yet a thoroughly sound sociology based on thoroughly sound natural principles would be no small boon to the human race.¹⁸

CHAPTER 17

THE GREAT DISILLUSIONMENT, 1914-1939

THE MOOD OF DISCOURAGEMENT

An outstanding best seller of the period between the two World Wars was *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (*The Decline of the West*) by Oswald Spengler (1880-1936). In this work Spengler taught that history is not the story of the rise and victorious progress of one great civilization which has passed triumphantly from the ancient through the medieval to the modern period. Rather history is the tale of the rise and fall of a number of distinct civilizations, each of which has its own individual development, its own beginning and end. Civilizations have a life-cycle of their own, just as organisms do. In their youth they are religious and intuitive; in their old age, rationalistic and urbanized. Decline and extinction are inevitable for a civilization just as old age and eventual death are inevitable for the individual man. No more than human beings, can civilizations escape the grave.

Our distinctive western culture, said Spengler, was born about A. D. 900. About the end of the eighteenth century it began to decline. Like the Romans in the age of Augustus we enjoy a superficial prosperity, but we are near the end of an era. Our machine technology which we regard as a permanent acquisition of the race will one day vanish and be forgotten. Our skyscrapers will be explored by curious archeologists like the ruins of Memphis and Babylon. Our

civilization is marching inevitably to its doom and nothing can halt this destined fate.

The great popularity of Spengler's ponderous and gloomy prophecy was evidence enough that he had somehow reflected the spirit of his age. It was a very different spirit from that which prevailed during the preceding era with its rosy faith in evolutionary "progress." The generation which assumed the task of rebuilding Europe after the most destructive war of history was weary and disillusioned. There was indeed a wave of optimism during the prosperity of the golden 1920's, but the optimism was not wholly convincing. Thoughtful men were still worried. So when depression succeeded prosperity, when democracy continued to recede in the face of totalitarianism, the feeling of disillusionment and discouragement deepened. The history of social thought in the period between World Wars is the story of a generation seeking a more realistic social philosophy after the easy faith in "progress" had been shattered.

THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

Before the catastrophe of 1914-18 the worshipers at the shrine of "progress" found it easy to believe that man was too civilized to consent to a general war. Thus in a book published in 1908 Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919) discussed "the long march upward" and expressed what was probably the general opinion in these cheering words: "After unnumbered years of such storm and stress, we of to-day have become more civilised, more peaceable; the arts of peace, not those of war, our occupation." The war was a bitter disillusionment to those who held this optimistic faith. After more than sixty-five million men had been engaged, after more than eight and a half million of them

had died in the conflict, to say nothing of the vast number of civilian deaths due more or less directly to the war, after the immense destruction of property, the violent hatreds, the mass diversion of human energy from the wholesome pursuits of peace, it was hard to retain one's faith in the comforting dogma of progress. A machine civilization had given a more complete control over nature and raised the standard of living, but man's tragic urge to destructiveness had also been seconded by the machine.

Obviously enough, the progress of civilization had not made war impossible; that naive faith was no longer tenable. Yet was it not possible that some clever form of international organization would achieve the same result? At the Peace Conference the idealistic Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) came forward as the chief prophet of this new hope. The chief means which Wilson proposed for insuring a new era of peace was the organization of a League of Nations. The idea was accepted and the League was launched with a purpose expressed in the preamble of its Covenant: "The High Contracting Parties, in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations."

These were brave words! It would be interesting to know with what feelings the statesmen of Europe subscribed to them, disillusioned diplomats as they were. But

Wilson at least seems to have taken them at their face value. As he presented the draft of the Covenant to the Peace Conference, he stated cheerfully: "Many terrible things have come out of this war, gentlemen, but some very beautiful things have come out of it. Wrong has been defeated. . . . The miasma of distrust, of intrigue, is cleared away."² People back in the United States, following the Peace Conference in the daily press, were less certain than their President that the millennium had arrived. The peace treaty which committed the United States to the League was decisively rejected by the Senate, November 19, 1919. The following year the Democratic National Committee, persuaded by Wilson, asked the people to regard the presidential campaign as a "solemn referendum" on American participation in the League. The overwhelming defeat of the Democrats at the polls was considered by neutral observers to be a decisive rejection of Wilson's position by the people.⁸

There can be little difference of opinion among thoughtful people as to the desirability of international cooperation in the interests of peace. As far back as 1888, Pope Leo XIII had used the phrase *societas civitatum* and his words could be interpreted without too much violence as a proposal for a future League of Nations.⁴ But one might doubt whether the League as actually constituted was a good means of obtaining international security. Since the creation of a world state was unacceptable, the League was left without any effective way of enforcing its decisions by physical coercion. It had to depend, therefore, largely on its moral authority. Here was a weak point. For the League, as originally constituted, was little more than a congress of the victorious nations and these same nations seemed to many to have been guided more by vindictiveness than by

abstract justice in framing the peace treaties after the war.

In spite of its obvious weaknesses, the League accomplished no small amount of good. In a number of instances serious international tensions were eased which might otherwise have led to war. Examples are the settlements brought about in the controversy between Sweden and Finland over the Aland Islands (1921), in the Greco-Bulgarian frontier incident (1925), and in the Turco-Iraqi boundary dispute (1926). When Austria and Hungary were threatened with economic disaster in 1922, the League supervised international loans and thus solved a situation which might have had serious consequences. A varying amount of success has been achieved in protecting the rights of minorities and of mandated territories as provided for in the Peace Treaty. The League has acted as a clearing house for the exchange of information between countries. In addition, two bodies closely associated with the League, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Labor Organization, have accomplished some thing in their respective fields.

The real weakness of the League became apparent, however, when it attacked problems which involved the vital interests of major powers. To begin with, it failed to check the armament race. The Peace Treaty had disarmed Germany "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." The Covenant laid down the principle that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety," and gave the League the responsibility for planning disarmament. Yet in 1934, the year in which the last of a series of disarmament conferences broke up at Geneva, world armament expenditure had already reached an annual total of 4.9 billion dol

lars, as compared with 2.5 in 1913.⁵ In the meantime the Axis powers had begun to defy the League successfully. When Japan took Manchuria in 1931-52, when Germany repudiated the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty in 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia in the same year, the most strenuous efforts of the League to prevent these developments were vain. The outbreak of the second World War in 1939 marked the utter breakdown of all that the League stood for. In spite of Wilson's idealism, the miasma of distrust and intrigue had evidently not been entirely cleared away.

THE VICISSITUDES OF CAPITALISM

The failure to secure a stable peace was only one of the reasons why the disillusioned interwar generation found it hard to regain the old faith in evolutionary progress. An other reason, perhaps equally important, was the perturbation of the economic system. In broad outline the story may be summarized as a tragedy in four acts: (1) a minor boom immediately after the war, (2) a minor depression in the United States, 1920-21, with a more serious and more prolonged depression abroad, (3) a major boom which lasted to 1929 and which found its most typical development in the United States, (4) a major depression of world magnitude from 1929 on. These episodes from economic history had a profound influence on the course of social thought. In some countries the vicissitudes of capitalism encouraged the rise of the totalitarian state. Elsewhere they led to the attempt to control capitalism by increasingly stringent government regulation. Nowhere, probably, did men see capitalism in quite the same light in 1939 as in

In the United States capitalism probably never seemed

more secure and triumphant than during the prosperity of the golden 1920's—more accurately from about 1922 to 1929. Those were happy days indeed! From 1921 to 1929 the total production of the United States increased over 63 per cent.⁶ The growth of the mass-production industries was especially striking. For example, the number of passenger automobiles increased from 9.3 to 23.1 millions between the years just mentioned.⁷ The latter figure represented one car for each 5.3 inhabitants and people began to remark contentedly that everyone in the country could take an automobile ride at once. It was never stated where the people would go on this hypothetical ride. Perhaps it was just to be a picnic and indeed the national psychology began to resemble that of people on a picnic. Lavishly the American people spent their new high wages and salaries until there was no more money to spend, and then—they kept on spending; for the installment plan offered a convenient method of mortgaging the future. Few worried about the future. It was America's golden age and there would always be plenty of money!

Serious economists speculate whether it was just another boom or whether, after all, America had entered on a new economic era different in kind as well as in degree from all that had preceded. The Committee on Recent Economic Changes seemed to incline toward the latter alternative. "The shiftings of psychological attitude, here indicated, seem to suggest that something distinctly different from our former experience is taking place. . . . The strength and stability of our financial structure, both governmental and commercial, is of modern growth."⁸ There was a certain unconscious irony in these words; for they were written in 1929; and in October, 1929, the crash of the stock market marked the beginning of the most dis

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astrous depression in recent economic history. The total market value of the shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange was eighty-seven billion dollars on October 1, 1929; on March 1, 1933, it was nineteen billion.⁹

The depression was not without its salutary effects. For one thing, it led men to question the secular dogma of *laissez-faire* capitalism as it was widely held in the United States. A national examination of conscience revealed the following faults: Even in 1929, at the climax of prosperity, the plant capacity of the country was capable of producing nineteen per cent more goods than it actually did produce.¹⁰ Factories stood ready to produce one-fifth more goods, but they did not produce them. Why? Because even in that golden age many of the people lacked purchasing power. A careful and conservative study estimated that at 1929 prices the "basic necessities" for the average family would cost about two thousand dollars a year; some sixty per cent of American families were below this income level in 1929!¹¹ This was a queer state of affairs. At the height of prosperity the average family was poor; it lacked the basic necessities. On the other hand about 0.8 per cent of the families received almost 21 per cent of the income which all families received.¹² Obviously this was social injustice. Less obviously, but just as truly, it was bad economics. The recipients of large incomes saved a great part of their money and sought to reinvest it. The savings thus made available for investment were much larger than the legitimate needs of the country—about twenty-one billion dollars larger during the period 1923-30 according to one estimate. At the same time these savings were withdrawn from consumptive channels and plant capacity was standing idle!

In retrospect the prosperity of the golden 1920's did not

seem so prosperous after all. Yet the economic system—if it could be dignified with the name of *system*—was extraordinarily refractory to change. A large proportion of the nation's business was controlled by giant corporations. Moreover, this control tended to be more marked at precisely the most strategic points of the American economy, that is to say, in such branches as electricity, gas, communication, mining, manufacturing, finance, and transportation, on which other branches depend for their prosperity. There was a marked tendency, also, for the giant corporation itself to be controlled, not democratically by the whole body of stockholders, but rather by a minority of them or by the officers of the company (minority control and management control). It was quite usual, then, for a small group of men to determine the policy of an enormous corporation and the men who controlled various corporations tended to cooperate. It would hardly be overstating the case to say that an oligarchy of extremely powerful men controlled the American economy and that this oligarchy had been responsible for an unjust distribution of the national income during prosperity and for untold suffering during the worst depression in recent history. The antidemocratic nature of *laissez-faire* capitalism should have been evident to every fair-minded and thoughtful man.¹³

Not a great deal was done about the depression under the Hoover administration (1929-1933). It seems not unjust to classify Hoover as a follower of *laissez faire* in spite of his protestations to the contrary.¹⁴ A new chapter opened with the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. With his usual gift for happy phrasing, Roosevelt popularized the term *New Deal* to describe his policy. Until the end of the period being considered, the New Deal

constituted the frame of reference for American social thought.

It is hard to describe and evaluate the New Deal, it had so many ramifications. It may promote understanding to analyze it into the three R's, Relief, Reform, and Recovery. The relief program represented the first significant attack by the national government on a problem traditionally considered a matter for state and local governments or for private charity. The program involved an intelligent attempt to aid the needy without robbing them of self-respect by creating work for them instead of handing out doles. Work, often of a remarkably high quality, by unemployed writers and artists was an interesting by-product. Moreover, the Social Security Act (1935, amended 1939) included measures to forestall some of the common causes of poverty. All in all, the relief features of the New Deal deserve high commendation.

The reform program attacked some of the worst abuses which had grown up under the regime of rugged individualism. For example, the Federal Securities Act (1933) and the Securities Exchange Act (1934) were leveled against outstanding evils of the securities market. The Public Utility Act (1935) contained provisions against the abuse of holding companies in this field. The Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) attacked the problem of low wages and long hours in industry. These and similar measures certainly deserve high praise; yet the New Deal failed to attack, or attacked only timidly, some of the worst evils of the economic system. Little was done about the control of prices and production by the financial oligarchy except through the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) which proved a failure. The distribution of the American income remained inequitable. Although the President maintained a

benign attitude toward the Negro, he did **nothing radical** enough to alienate any considerable bloc of southern votes. Yet the status of the Negro constituted a serious economic, as well as social, problem.

The recovery program of the New Deal is difficult to evaluate. Certainly efforts were made to raise prices, to increase credit, to revive foreign trade, and to increase purchasing power among the working class. Certainly there was a considerable economic recovery from the low point reached in 1933. But whether this measure of recovery was because of, or in spite of, the New Deal, was a point bitterly debated by partisan economists. Probably the truth stands between these two extremes and the New Deal deserves a goodly share of the credit for lifting the country out of the depths of the depression. At least it is certain that the recovery program was not *completely* successful. An unbalanced budget paid for the New Deal activities and the national debt rose from 19.5 billion in 1932 to 40.4 billion in 1939. The previous maximum had been 25.5 billion in 1919 after the first World War. Again, unemployment which stood at 13.2 million in 1932 was still 10.2 in 1939.¹⁵

Critics of the New Deal pointed out that President Roosevelt kept a keen eye on the political realities in the midst of his reforming ardor. Reforms were more likely to come when he could count on the support of politically influential organized groups. Organized labor received more prompt and effective aid than did unorganized labor. Commercial farmers marketing the great staple crops, especially cotton, corn, and wheat, were better cared for than tenant farmers, while sharecroppers, subsistence farmers, and farm laborers received only a little attention. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that a vigorous foreign policy in the Far East (and less openly in Latin America)

was exactly what would please American investors with interests in these areas—and they were an influential group. The Administration policy during the second World War lies, of course, outside the chronological limits of this book. Some have spoken of a *Roosevelt Revolution*; but actually the New Deal was far from revolutionary. It was a politically realistic attempt to make American capitalism workable by patching up some of its worst defects. As far as it went the New Deal was commendable, but the most fundamental evils were scarcely faced.

THE RISE OF TOTALITARIANISM

If under the New Deal the United States made no sharp break with old-fashioned capitalism, the same could not be said of certain foreign countries in which the interwar period saw the rise of a new form of political and economic organization, the totalitarian state. This term describes a state organized under a highly dictatorial and centralized government supported by a single political party which allows no opposition.

Russia was the first to adopt totalitarian government. Old Russia suffered from a great many political and economic evils and these were aggravated by the World War. As a result a revolution broke out in March, 1917, and a provisional government of liberal hue was established. This, however, was not radical enough to satisfy the extremists. The Bolsheviks, a well organized and extremely determined minority, managed to seize power in November, 1917. Peace with Germany and her allies was patched up by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918) and by the end of 1920 the Bolsheviks had triumphed over their enemies (who were aided by the Allied Powers) and firmly established their authority.

What was the nature of the new government thus set up? It was a dictatorship, pure and simple, although it was occasionally found expedient to pay some lip service to democratic ideals. It was completely dominated by the Communist Party, a hand-picked group which never comprised very much more than one per cent of the population. The Party, in turn, was controlled by a dictator, first Lenin, then Stalin. Opposition was ruthlessly stamped out by a highly efficient secret police. Death faced even the most prominent Party leaders if they ventured to deviate from full loyalty to the dictator as was shown by the spectacular purges of 1936 and 1938 when such powerful figures as Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Rykov were convicted and put to death. When the peasants refused to cooperate with the dictatorship they were brought into line with a weapon which Chamberlin calls *organized famine*. It seems to be true that the Soviet government allowed some three or four million people to die in the famine of 1932-33. The government could have prevented this loss of life, but it preferred to starve the peasantry into submission.¹⁶

Underlying the Communist policy was a philosophy of militant atheism which recognized no morality but expediency. Said Lenin, the great prophet of Communism: "Morality is that which serves the destruction of the old exploiter's society. . . . We do not believe in eternal morality."¹⁷ As a natural consequence the Communists persecuted Christianity whose moral code was a standing rebuke to them. "For the first time in history," said Pope Pius XI, "we are witnessing a struggle, cold-blooded in purpose and mapped out to the least detail, between man and 'all that is called God.' Communism is by its very nature antireligious."¹⁸ An organized effort was made to spread these ideas in other countries. This effort was not

without results. When able, Communism "has striven by every possible means, as its champions openly boast, to destroy Christian civilization and the Christian religion" while in Spain, so far as it was possible for the Communists to do so, "every vestige of the Christian religion was eradicated, even though intimately linked with the rarest monuments of art and science."¹⁹

In the economic field the Russian government pursued a varying policy. First there was an attempt to put into operation the ideals of pure communism. Then from 1921 to 1928 the New Economic Policy, as it was called, represented a partial concession to capitalism. In 1928 the government felt itself strong enough to revert to more or orthodox communistic ideals and the first of a series of Five-Year Plans was inaugurated. Under centralized control Russia has made considerable economic progress and modern technology has made rapid strides in a land traditionally backward in this respect.

Italy was the next to adopt totalitarian government. The postwar years found the country badly demoralized. Italy's military exploits during the war had not been exactly brilliant and she was shabbily treated at the Peace Conference. The pride of nationalistic Italians was badly wounded. Under these circumstances Benito Mussolini (1883-), a determined and resourceful ex-Socialist, came forward with his program of Fascism. While others hesitated, he acted. By the end of 1922 he had made himself dictator. The resulting Fascist government showed the usual totalitarian pattern of party domination, vigorous propaganda, and the violent repression of criticism. To say that violence was less widespread and systematically cruel than in Russia, would hardly be a great compliment. In 1929 the Lateran Treaty between the Vatican and the Fascist gov

ernment was ratified. Important concessions were made to the Church, but one may well believe that they were motivated by shrewd policy rather than by a genuine love of Catholicism; for Fascism, like any form of totalitarian government, is basically impossible to reconcile with Christian doctrine.

Some of the economic features of Italian Fascism are suggestive. The electoral law of 1928 introduced the novel experiment of a national legislative chamber in which representation was based on economic, instead of territorial, units. However, since the dictator and his party retained all real power, the experiment was more interesting theoretically than practically. Another interesting Fascist experiment was the corporative organization of society which involved giving organizations of employers and employees an official status along with responsibility for economic planning. A balanced criticism of the system is given by Pope Pius XI in his great Encyclical, *Quadragesimo anno*, without mentioning Italy by name. The scheme is commendable in so far as it involves the "peaceful collaboration of the classes, repression of Socialist organizations and efforts, the moderating influence of a special ministry." Its big defect is that the bodies it creates are not really free but are only the tools of a dictatorship.²⁰ A final evil of Italian Fascism as a whole is its militant nationalism, deliberately fostered by Mussolini, which led to the Ethiopian war of 1935-36.

Germany began the postwar period auspiciously enough from a governmental standpoint when the Weimar Constitution of 1919 set up a genuine democracy. This democracy failed to endure for various reasons. Germany suffered from particularly grave economic difficulties. The burden of reparations payments was added to the financial

burden of the war. The inflation of 1923 destroyed the value of the mark. When the world depression of 1929 and after reached Germany the country was particularly unprepared to meet it. To make matters worse, the statesmen of the Allied Powers missed the opportunity to support the democratic government by timely concessions and thus short-sightedly played into the hands of the extremists. The present writer who spent the academic year 1931-32 in Germany will never forget the mood of utter discouragement which prevailed among all classes at the time. Drowning men, it is said, will grasp at straws and the German people grasped at the golden promises which Adolf Hitler was dangling before their eyes. In 1933 Hitler came into power.

The usual concomitants of totalitarian rule now began to appear in Germany. Civil liberties disappeared in the face of organized terrorism. Systematic propaganda drove out freedom of thought and teaching. State control replaced freedom of enterprise in the economic sphere. Under Nazi domination the economic system began to function efficiently. Unemployment was reduced almost to the vanishing point and production grew by leaps and bounds. Returning prosperity, however, brought only a rather small improvement in the living standards of the people, for the increased productivity of German industry was devoted for the most part to the construction of a huge war machine. Thus Hitler was enabled to pursue the aggressive and truculent foreign policy which ultimately touched off the second World War.

A characteristic feature of German totalitarianism is the systematic persecution of the Jews. Anti-Semitism, as explained in a previous chapter, was quite characteristic of the intensified nationalism of the late nineteenth cen-

ture. It was not surprising, then, that it should be so rife in Germany where nationalism was whipped up to a high pitch. Added to this was Hitler's personal prejudice, along with the convenience of having a scapegoat on which to blame the country's tribulations. The old Aryan myth provided a convenient rationalization for German racism.

On July 20, 1933 Pope Pius XI arranged a Concordat with Germany, but this did not bring harmony between the Church and the Nazi state. In his Encyclical, *Mit brennender Sorge*, March 14, 1937, the Pope stated that he had consented to the Concordat "in spite of many serious misgivings" and complained of "theories and practices which, if officially approved, must destroy all confidence and render valueless any word that might also be pledged in the future." He went on to speak of "concealed and open persecution" and to condemn the attempt to substitute "the myth of blood and race" for the Christian revelation. "Every true and lasting reform," the Pope added, "has proceeded from the sanctuary."

Russia, Italy, and Germany provide the classic examples of totalitarianism, but the same tendency has appeared in various forms and in different degrees in a number of European states. The new constitution of 1935 gave Poland a form of semitotalitarianism often called a "conducted democracy." In Yugoslavia, King Alexander proclaimed a dictatorship in 1929; he was assassinated in 1934. Metaxas made himself dictator of Greece in 1936. In Latvia, Ulmanis became virtual dictator in 1934 and Estonia began a similar experiment under Paets in the same year. The turbulent history of Rumania and Hungary showed totalitarian currents. In 1932 Salazar became supreme in Portugal and established a regime for which many competent Catholic observers had high praise; yet it would perhaps not

be too harsh a judgment to call it a benevolent dictatorship. The Spanish Civil War (1936-39) can justly be blamed on the Communists whose outrages rendered the position of the Catholics intolerable, outrages which were quite commonly passed over by the non-Catholic press in a "conspiracy of silence."²¹ Yet if the Spanish Communists accepted military aid from Russia, their opponent, General Franco, did likewise from Germany-and Italy and his alliance with these totalitarian dictatorships made his position suspicious. The government which he instituted seems to bear a certain analogy to that of Fascist Italy.²² The trend all over Europe during the period being considered was thus strongly in the direction of the totalitarian state.

THE UNDERLYING EVIL

War, depression, dictatorship—no wonder the era of "progress" was succeeded by a period of disillusionment and discouragement! Yet there was no reason why a thoughtful man should have been unduly surprised at the trend. The developments of 1914-39 might have been predicted by one who took a long-range view of world history—or at least they were not hard to interpret after the event. To appreciate the drift of general history and of the history of social thought, go back to the height of the Middle Ages before the medieval synthesis had begun to disintegrate, say, to the early thirteenth century. In those days there was a general acceptance of a divine law, known by reason and revelation, and providing an unquestioned norm of morality for individuals and for peoples. However far public and private morality may have strayed from this norm at times, at least a standard existed about which there could be no confusion. There could be no question of nationalism, for nations in the modern sense did not exist.

There could be no question of capitalism, for a simple agrarian economy prevailed.

The major trend in social thought for the next five centuries was the gradual weakening of the supernatural world-view which characterized the medieval synthesis. Probably no factor was more important in bringing this about than the rise of bourgeois capitalism with its emphasis on material things. In the meantime nationalism was growing steadily at the expense of the internationalism represented by the Holy See. Wonderful developments in natural science gradually intoxicated the minds of men and they vainly tried to find in science a complete philosophy of life. This view was carried to extremes in the eighteenth century during the Age of Reason.

The philosophy of the eighteenth century was peculiarly cold and dry and unattractive. It failed to satisfy the aspirations of the human heart. It would have been logical to turn back to the supernatural—not blindly, by attempting a literal resurrection of the medieval synthesis—but intelligently, by achieving a new synthesis between the unchanging dogmas of Christianity on the one hand and the new science, the new economic life, the legitimate new currents of national life on the other. But men refused to follow this course. At the end of the eighteenth century a new capitalism, characterized by a rapidly developing factory system, had produced a new bourgeois class. At the same time the French Revolution generated a fanatical nationalism. Finally, both the American and French Revolutions, influenced not inconsiderably by English parliamentarism, focused the attention of the world on democracy. Influenced by these diverse currents, Europe groped blindly toward a new faith to replace Christianity. The dogmas of this new secular faith were capitalism, national

ism, and a certain interpretation of democracy. Its dominant emotion was an intoxicating feeling of progress. Its theology was the positivistic sociology which stemmed from Comte.

The new secular faith, however, contained within itself the seeds of corruption. This fact became only too painfully apparent to the disillusioned world of 1914-39. For the secular faith recognized no eternal norm of morality and it tainted what it touched. Consider democracy, for example. Democracy is not only a thoroughly legitimate system of government, and traditionally recognized as such by Catholic thought, but under modern conditions it is doubtless the best feasible form of government. But decent democracy absolutely must be founded on a recognition of human rights. Popular rule plus a popular non recognition of moral obligation can be a dangerous combination. This was only too likely to be the case after the secular faith had replaced Christianity in the hearts of many citizens, as the history of certain fiercely anticlerical popular governments plainly shows. Again, modern technology and the modern factory system are things good in themselves and adapted to the legitimate end of promoting human comfort, but when they become the tools of a selfish capitalist class which recognizes no law but the jungle law of brute might, then they are turned into a malign and dangerous force. Finally, a reasonable love of one's country is not only thoroughly legitimate, but a positive duty which, by Catholic teaching, may even require the sacrifice of the citizen's life in national defense. But when nationalism is erected into a secular dogma, when the nation is exalted above religion, when the national will becomes a norm of right and wrong, then nationalism becomes an evil monster

spawning a horrible progeny, militarism, imperialism, racism.

After 1914 a conflict among the dogmas of the secular faith became apparent. In the struggle it was the dogma of nationalism which won out. When capitalism fell into depression, the simplest solution seemed to be to allow the national government to take over the control of the economic system, retaining, perhaps, the outlines of capitalism. When democracy seemed too little unified to permit the efficient mobilization of the armed state, the spirit of nationalism moved men to renounce democracy for dictatorship. Thus the totalitarian state came into being, a form of government in which democracy and capitalism were overwhelmed by nationalism with its accompanying militarism, racism, and imperialism.

If the lesson taught by the history of modern social thought is to be understood, then it is necessary to grasp one fact of absolutely primary importance: The modern totalitarian state is not an accidental phenomenon; it is not a product of forces arising within the twentieth century. It is the logical culmination of evil trends which have been at work for centuries. It is useless, therefore, to look upon the individual dictators as personal devils. As individuals they are not important. They are significant, rather, as signs of the times. They are significant because with ruthless logic they have put into execution the merciless nationalism which represents the secular faith in its most modern form. An important corollary follows. To destroy totalitarianism it is not enough to unseat this or that dictator or to overthrow this or that government. As totalitarianism has been the product of a long-term development of false social philosophy, so in a parallel fashion lasting reform can

only spring from the correction of deep-seated errors about the nature of society and the basis of morality.

THE ONE TRUE REMEDY

Amid the general turmoil and confusion, while vain panaceas were being preached from the housetops, while fanatical dictators were climbing into power and passions were rising to a white heat, a remarkable series of pronouncements emanated from the Holy See, outlining in clear and dignified language the only possible solution for the problems of the modern world. The popes of the period were remarkable men. The gentle and saintly Pius X died during the first month of the World War, his kindly heart broken by the tragedy. He was succeeded by Pope Benedict XV who was remarkable for his consistent peace efforts. It was a misfortune of world significance that his offer of mediation and his proposals for a just and lasting peace, made in 1917, were rejected. In 1922 Cardinal Ratti succeeded as Pope Pius XI. Most of his life had been spent in the seclusion of quiet scholarship. The world was hardly prepared, therefore, for the astonishing grasp of practical economic and social questions which the Pope showed in his great Encyclicals. Utterly fearless and outspoken, yet reasonable and conciliatory, he took his place as one of the greatest leaders the Church had ever known. It was a great compliment to Pope Pius XI that the College of Cardinals broke a long custom and elected as his successor the papal Secretary of State; for the latter was known to be a convinced admirer of the policies of the deceased pontiff. It was a great compliment to the new pope, Pius XII, that he did not disappoint expectations.

The pronouncements made by the popes of the period

form a unified body of social doctrine; for the same general problems were faced by all of them, the same general principles were invoked, and the same general line of attack was suggested. The social teaching of these popes can therefore be treated as a unit. Thus viewed, this body of doctrine shows three salient characteristics. It is realistic in its analysis of the evils of modern society. Instead of stopping at a superficial explanation of them, it traces them back to their fundamental cause. Finally, it offers very concrete and feasible solutions.

First of all, then, the papal pronouncements showed a refreshing realism in facing the facts. There was no sympathy for the prophets of "progress." "They spoke of progress," said Pope Pius XII bluntly, "when they were going back." ²³ At the very time when the optimistic friends of *laissez-faire* capitalism were making light of the depression and cheerfully predicting that prosperity was "just around the corner," Pope Pius XI told the unpleasant truth: "The whole of humanity is held bound by avarice and by the economic crisis, so fast, that the more it struggles the harder appears the task of loosening its bonds." ²⁴ When, on the eve of the second World War, militaristic statesmen were presenting the impending conflict as a crusade for justice, the Holy See disagreed sharply. "It is by force of reason, and not by force of arms, that justice makes progress. . . . Nothing is lost with peace; all may be lost with war." ²⁵ To those who recounted enthusiastically the achievements of the new dictatorships, the Holy See conceded that such governments could attain "material successes apt to arouse wonder in superficial observers," but added that "the moment comes when the inevitable law triumphs, which strikes down all that has been constructed upon a hidden or

open disproportion between the greatness of the material and outward success, and the weakness of the inward value and of its moral foundation." ²⁶

In their analysis of the causes of this distressing situation, the popes were content with no superficial explanation. They sought the fundamental cause and found it in the materialistic philosophy which had taken possession of the modern world and which recognized no firm norm of social morality. "From the immense vortex of error and anti Christian movements there has come forth a crop of such poignant disasters as to constitute a condemnation surpassing in its conclusiveness any merely theoretical refutation. . . . Before all else, it is certain that the radical and ultimate cause of the evils which We deplore in modern society is the denial and rejection of a universal norm of morality as well for individual and social life as for international relations." ²⁷

Since the cause of the evil lay, not in any fortuitous combination of unfortunate circumstances, but in a fundamentally wrong world-view, the remedy must needs be equally basic. Both the lives of individual men and the institutions of their society needed to be reformed in accordance with Christian principles. As Pope Pius XI put it, "Two things are most necessary, the reform of institutions and the correction of morals." ²⁸

The reform of institutions might well begin with the reform of the state. Here the evil was twofold. Where *laissez-faire* economics prevailed, the government, faithless to its duty of protecting the weak, would give free rein to the exploiting classes and thus become their ally. The *Quadragesimo anno* of Pope Pius XI written in 1931, noted "a certain degradation of the majesty of the state which is becoming a slave, delivered and bound over to the service

of human passion and greed, whereas it should be enthroned like a queen and supreme judge, above all party contention and intent solely on the common welfare and on justice." The *Summi pontificatus* of Pope Pius XII, written in 1939 and referring to the totalitarian states, criticizes the civil authority which "puts itself in the place of the Almighty and elevates the State or group into the last end of life, the supreme criterion of the moral and juridical order." In either case the remedy is fundamentally the same. The state must be guided by right moral principles. Then it will neither degrade itself into the servant of a class, nor exalt itself into a sort of a divinity.

International society also must be governed by the principles of morality. "Not only our acts as individuals but also as groups and nations must conform to the eternal law of God." ²⁹ This is the only remedy for the problem of war. What this would mean in the concrete is shown by the peace proposals of Pope Benedict XV, already mentioned. The Pope proposed, among other things, the reciprocal restitution of occupied territories, the mutual condonation of indemnity claims, a diminution of armaments, and a system of compulsory arbitration of future international disputes. The proposals fell through, principally due to the opposition of the Allied Powers. The Pope had suggested a negotiated peace, while they were intent on a peace imposed by themselves as victors. This unconciliatory spirit was responsible for the vindictive Versailles Treaty and it foredoomed the League of Nations to failure. The wisdom of Pope Benedict XV stands out in clearer light as the years pass.³⁰

The reform of economic institutions is discussed most fully in the *Quadragesimo anno*. This important document covers a broad field, too broad to be summarized

here. However, the occupational-group system, the most striking "reform of institutions" proposed in this Encyclical, is far too important to be passed over. What the Pope advocated was a truly democratic reorganization of the economic regime. Within each industry or service the employers and employees would be organized into an occupational group. Under the general supervision of the state (which would represent the interests of the public at large) these groups would be endowed with authority for planning and regulation, each within its own occupational sphere. Thus the system is equally removed from the anti-democratic planned economy of the totalitarian state where planning is imposed by a dictatorial government and from the antidemocratic unplanned economy of *laissez-faire* capitalism which opens the way to domination by a selfish capitalist class.³¹

The family is one more institution standing urgently in need of reform. It was quite in accord with the naturalistic spirit of the times that marriage should be widely regarded as a purely human institution on the theory "that the laws, institutions and customs by which wedlock is governed, since they take their origin solely from the will of man, are subject entirely to him."³² From this fundamental error a whole series of evils flowed, contraception, divorce, unfaithfulness, irresponsibility toward children, and other ills. In sharp contrast the Church proposes to reform family life in accordance with the unspeakably high ideal of Christian matrimony, a sacrament instituted by Christ.

It must constantly be borne in mind that the reform of institutions is only half the papal program. Institutions, after all, are built by individuals and reflect the spirit of the latter. It is vain to expect good institutions from bad citizens. "Our teaching," says Pope Pius XI, "on the reform and

further improvement of the social order can certainly not be **put** into effect without the reformation of morals, as history clearly proves." ³³ Therefore social reform must begin with a spiritual renovation. "This social reconstruction which is so ardently desired must be preceded by a renewal of the Christian spirit. . . . Otherwise all our efforts will be wasted and we shall be building, not on rock, but on shifting sand." ³⁴

It is important to remember that the reformation of morals is a true and very necessary technique of social action, because without it there can be no real reform of nations nor of society in general. Moreover, it is a form of social action which each individual can put into practice immediately, without waiting for some special organization to take the initiative. For everyone who practises the Christian virtues, everyone who reforms himself, contributes by his own personal life and by his influence on others to the reformation of morals, and hence to the reconstruction of the social order. This form of social action has been called *personalistic* social action. It is a very practical and a very necessary form.

The Encyclicals do not speak of personalistic social action by that name, yet they constantly urge it by implication when, after condemning the social vices and praising their opposite virtues, they call for the reformation of morals as a fundamentally important means of reforming society. Thus when the Pope praises patriotism, but adds that it "nevertheless becomes the occasion of many outrages and excesses when it oversteps the bounds of justice and right and grows into an excessive nationalism," ³⁵ he gives an important cue to the Catholic personalist. The citizen who takes this principle to heart will do his conscientious duty as a true patriot, but he will proudly hold aloof from

those whose motto is *My country right or wrong* and will even refuse to obey when conscripted in a war which he knows with certainty to be unjust. In voting and in discussing national policy he will remember that "safety does not come to peoples from external means, from the sword" but rather that the "forces that are to renew the face of the earth should proceed from within, from the spirit."³⁶

The Catholic personalist will bear in mind that "as God's sun shines on all that bear human countenance, so does His law know no privileges or exceptions."³⁷ Acting on this principle, he will refuse to participate in any attitude or activity that savors of race prejudice. Therefore he will act toward a Negro or a Jew exactly as he would act toward a white man or a Gentile under similar circumstances. Pope Pius XI called upon Catholics to practise detachment from worldly goods as a defense against Communism. This, after all, is extremely logical; for according to the Communist ideal, society "would have only one mission: the production of material things by means of collective labor."³⁸ The Catholic who shows by his life that he is detached from the things of this world is making the strongest possible protest against such materialism.

Above all, the Christian personalist must remember that his supreme duty is an all-embracing charity. Nothing shows more clearly the consequences of a gross materialism than the growth of a malign hatred which separates class from class, race from race, and nation from nation. For, once man had adopted a selfish and crude materialistic philosophy, there remained no secure foundation for the duty of loving one's neighbor. The one supreme remedy for this tragic condition is Christian charity, the virtue "which teaches us to see in those who suffer Christ Himself, and would have us love **our brothers as Our Divine Saviour**

has loved us, that is, even to the sacrifice of ourselves, and, if need be, of our very life." ³⁹ It is only the practice of such charity which can save and reconstruct society in our own discouraged and disillusioned generation.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

INTRODUCTION

The field of social thought is extraordinarily broad and the present textbook can pretend to be no more than a very brief introduction to it. The student who wishes to deepen himself in the subject must therefore be prepared to do a considerable amount of collateral reading. The present bibliographical essay is being written with the needs of such a student in mind. Extremely technical books written primarily for the specialist are omitted. On the other hand such merely popular treatments as are inadequate from the standpoint of modern scholarship are likewise excluded. Books written in foreign languages are not mentioned except in cases where no reasonably good substitute in English exists. An effort has been made to select books with good bibliographies which may thus serve as an introduction to still wider reading.

While the most objectionable books have been omitted, the student must be warned that the viewpoint of some of the authors differs widely from that of the Church. The serious student cannot entirely avoid such books, but in consulting them he must bear in mind the ecclesiastical regulations concerning forbidden books.

HISTORIES OF SOCIAL THOUGHT AND OF RELATED FIELDS

There is no single work, either by a Catholic or a non Catholic, which covers exactly the ground of the present volume. The best single reference, on the whole, is a series of volumes edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw under various titles, all of which begin with the words *The social and political ideas of . . .* . Chronologically the series runs from *The*

Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers (London, Harrap, 1923) to *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age* (London, Harrap, 1933). All these volumes are scholarly, well written, and properly concerned with the historical background. Their chief limitation is that, except for one chapter on colonial America, only European thought since the Middle Ages is considered and that even within this field the treatment is selective rather than comprehensive. Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Boston, Heath, 1938) is a repertory in two stout volumes of variegated information, much of which is with difficulty obtainable elsewhere. Unfortunately the work is poorly integrated, often inaccurate, and quite surprisingly biased.

A number of one-volume treatments have been written primarily as college texts. The most comprehensive of these is, E. S. Bogardus, *The Development of Social Thought* (New York, Longmans, 1940), a great improvement over his *A History of Social Thought* which it supersedes. While Bogardus' method is to give brief treatment to a considerable number of writers, the authors of two books have preferred to treat fewer writers somewhat more at length, gamely, J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory* (New York, Century, 1923) and Charles A. Ellwood, *A History of Social Philosophy* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1938). A briefer survey is, W. G. Beach, *The Growth of Social Thought* (New York, Scribner, 1939). A thoughtful and scholarly history of academic sociology is, F. N. House, *The Development of Sociology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936). Another account of academic sociology, Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, Harper, 1928), covers the subject on topical rather than chronological lines. The student should not overlook, E. R. A. Seligman and Others, "Introduction. Part one. The Development of Social Thought and Institutions," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 1:3-228, which, under the modest form of an introduction to an encyclopedia, actually

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constitutes a history of social thought longer than some of the full-length books which have been mentioned.

A good deal of information about the history of social thought may often be gleaned from Histories of allied subjects. From among a considerable number of texts, the following may be mentioned as representative: for philosophy, William Turner, *History of Philosophy* (Boston, Ginn, 1903), a Catholic text and, Friedrich Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Berlin, Mittler, 1923-28), a more elaborate treatment; for economics, Lewis H. Haney, *History of Economic Thought* (New York, Macmillan, 1936); for politics, George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, Holt, 1937), an excellent manual; for law, J. H. Wigmore, *A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems* (Washington, Washington Law Book Co., 1936) which covers a wide field in a somewhat sketchy manner. Many social thinkers have a literary importance and histories of literature give sketches of their lives and works. For most of the literatures of Europe, good recent histories are available in English.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Since there is an intimate relationship between social thought and its general historical background, the student of the former must constantly study the latter. A standard reference in English consists of the three Cambridge histories: *The Cambridge Ancient History* (New York, Macmillan, 1923-39), *The Cambridge Medieval History* (New York, Macmillan, 1911-36), and *The Cambridge Modern History* (New York, Macmillan, 1902-26). The thirty-three thick volumes which make up these histories were written by distinguished scholars; unfortunately for the historian of social thought, their viewpoint was a bit narrow, emphasizing political and military history rather than social and economic conditions and general culture. Enormously better from this standpoint is the series edited by William L. Langer entitled, *The Rise of Modern*

Europe (New York, Harper, 1934-)• When completed, it will cover European history from the later Middle Ages. Of the twenty volumes projected, seven have been published to date. It can be highly recommended. For the ancient and medieval period it should be supplemented by an excellent French work (there being nothing at all comparable in English) which gives adequate attention to social and economic conditions, Gustave Glotz (ed.), *Histoire generate* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1925-). It is often convenient to seek historical facts in histories devoted to particular nations. Unfortunately for the student who reads only English, the best of these are generally written in their respective native languages. Lack of space prevents listing even the most important national histories, but an exception must be made in favor of *The Oxford History of England* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934-), a model work from our present viewpoint.

It is often advantageous to study particular aspects of the historical background in special histories devoted to these subjects. Such works, written by specialists, often give a more competent treatment than do books written by general historians. Among the works which the present writer has found useful the following especially deserve mention: for economic conditions, Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (New York, Harper, 1936); for military history, O. L. Spaulding and Others, *Warfare; A Study of Military Methods from the Earliest Times* (Washington, Infantry Journal, 1937) and W. A. Mitchell, *Outlines of the World's Military History* (Harrisburg, Military Service Pub. Co., 1937), the former being stronger on historical background, the latter, on technical military information; for agriculture, N. S. B. Gras, *A History of Agriculture in Europe and America* (New York, Crofts, 1940); for education, Paul Monroe, *A Textbook in the History of Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1932); for art, Helen Gardner, *Art through the Ages* (New York, Harcourt, 1926); for music, Percy Scholes, *The Oxford Companion to Music* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1938),

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arranged as an encyclopedia, but useful for history. Even fashion has its relevance for the present purpose. See, Elizabeth Sage, *A Study of Costume from the Days of the Egyptians to Modern Times* (New York, Scribner, 1926).

REFERENCE WORKS

In the present field no single work of reference is as useful as the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1930-35). Written by thoroughly competent scholars, it contains articles on most of the writers and movements considered in the present book. Its advanced liberal viewpoint involves a discernible bias here and there. For broader treatments of certain subjects *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* is invaluable. The latest complete revisions are the ninth edition (1875-89), the eleventh (1910-11), and the fourteenth (1929). Except where up-to-date information is essential (for example in science and technology), the eleventh edition is more useful than the somewhat popularized fourteenth, while even the ninth has not been entirely supplanted by later editions.

A convenient one-volume biographical dictionary is Lippincott's *Universal Pronouncing Dictionary of Biography and Mythology* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1930), particularly useful for pronunciation. The best larger work for American biographies is the *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York, Scribner, 1928-35), a thoroughly scholarly work. The best one-volume equivalent is, Wheeler Preston, *American Biographies* (New York, Harper, 1940). For lives of English men there is a large and excellent work, the *Dictionary of National Biography* (reissue, London, Smith, Elder, 1908-9, later supplements by Oxford Univ. Press). An excellent compendium of this, the *Concise Dictionary of National Biography* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1939) makes a convenient desk book. An important German work is the *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie* (Leipzig, Duncker, 1875-1910). For living writers see *Who's Who in America* (Chi

cago, Marquis, issued biennially) for Americans and *Who's Who* (New York, Macmillan, issued annually) for English men. Equivalents in other languages for the works mentioned in this paragraph are conveniently listed in, I. G. Mudge, *Guide to Reference Books* (Chicago, American Library Association, 1936) and supplements (1939 and 1941). This work is useful in many other ways as a reference book on reference books.

The student of social thought will find use for a number of other reference works of various sorts. To locate places, J. P. Goode, *School Atlas* (Chicago, Rand McNally, many editions), a thoroughly scholarly work, is usually sufficient for contemporary information. It should be supplemented, for past history, by some such work as, W. R. Shepherd, *Historical Atlas* (New York, Holt, 1929). William L. Langer (ed.), *An Encyclopaedia of World History* (Boston, Houghton, 1940) is an authoritative compendium of all history in a single volume. A critical bibliography of historical works, giving adequate attention to social history and the history of thought is, G. M. Dutcher and Others (eds.), *A Guide to Historical Literature* (New York, Macmillan, 1931). Its chief defect is that it appeared eleven years ago

SOURCE MATERIAL

Sooner or later the serious student of social thought will want to read at first hand the classic writers in his field. The bibliographies in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* form probably the best source for locating editions. It is worth noting that good and inexpensive editions of many important works (in translation when the book was originally written in a foreign tongue) are published in *Everyman's Library* (New York, Dutton), *The World's Classics* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press), and *The Modern Library* (New York, Modern Library). It is often convenient to seek older works in certain well-known collections which give text or transla

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tion or both. Among these are the following: for ancient Egypt, J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt* (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1906-7), well-indexed translations, now somewhat antiquated but not superseded; for the Far East, *Sacred Books of the East* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1879-1910), scholarly translations; for Greece and Rome, *The Loeb Classical Library*, published by the Harvard University Press, giving text and translation for the principal pagan classics and some Christian works; for the Fathers, J. P. Migne, *Fatrolgiae cursus completus*, consisting of a *Series Latina* (Paris, Migne, 1844-80) and a *Series Graeca* (Paris, Migne, 1857-66), giving the Latin Fathers in the original text and the Greek Fathers in text and Latin translation, also the Vienna Corpus and the Berlin Corpus or more fully, *Corpus scriptor inn ecclesiastic orum Latinorum* (Vienna, Hoelder-Pichler Tempsky, 1866-) and *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* (Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1897-), far more critical but less inclusive than Migne; for many medieval writers, *Monumenta Germaniae historica* (Hanover and Berlin, Weidmann, 1826-).

PRIMITIVE SOCIAL THOUGHT

Easily the most useful reference in this field is, Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, Boni and Liveright, 1925), a book which conceals vast scholarship under a simple presentation. One aspect of the same subject is treated more thoroughly in, Melville J. Herskovits, *The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples* (New York, Knopf, 1940). For background the student would do well to read some good textbook of general anthropology such as, Franz Boas and Others, *General Antloropology* (Boston, Heath, 1938) or Robert H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* (New York, Farrar, 1940). Further study must involve getting acquainted with the periodical and monographic literature of the field. One should read with a good bit of scepticism the statements about primitive society in the usual histories of social

thought. Hasty generalizations, based on insufficient knowledge, are only too common in such books.

THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Joyce O. Hertzler, *The Social Thought of the Ancient Civilizations* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936) considers the Near East as well as China and the Old Testament. It is convenient as a repertory of classified texts but the social thought is poorly integrated with its historical background. The chapter on ancient China is better skipped; the author does not seem to realize that Chinese history has been radically rewritten in the last thirty years. Much better, even judged as histories of social thought, are the volumes in Glotz' *Histoire generale* covering this period. The archeology of the Near East has been making rapid strides in recent years. The student must accept with caution statements made in all but the most recent books. Two scholarly summaries of recent developments are, Elihu Grant (ed.), *The Haverford Symposium on Archaeology and the Bible* (New Haven, American Schools of Oriental Research, 1938) and W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1940). A more popular work on the earliest period is, Patrick Carleton, *Buried Empires* (New York, Dutton, 1939), entertainingly written but possibly a bit unguarded in some of its statements.

THE BIBLE

The prime requisite is a good edition of the sacred text. The old Rheims-Douay Version, in use among English-speaking Catholics for centuries, can no longer be considered a satisfactory translation. The excellent version of the New Testament recently prepared by the Catholic Biblical Association of America fills a longfelt need. The Old Testament is now being translated by the same body. The *Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures* is an alternative translation of merit; to date **the** entire New Testament and some half dozen books of the

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Old Testament have been published. Father Spencer's translation of the New Testament can also be recommended. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that the best translation is no more than a poor substitute for the original text. Without some knowledge of Greek and Hebrew one cannot read intelligently the works of serious Biblical scholars. The present writer has found useful the Greek New Testament text of Merk, and for the Old Testament, the Massoretic text (Hebrew) of Kittel and the Septuagint (Greek) of Rahlfs.

As a general introduction to the Scriptures there is perhaps nothing to equal, H. Lusseau and M. Collomb, *Manuel d'etudes bibliques* (Paris, Tequi, 1930-36). In seven volumes these authors give a general introduction to Biblical studies, an introduction to each of the Sacred Books, and a commentary on all the most important passages. They are at the same time completely Catholic and thoroughly abreast of modern scholarship. The two following series of commentaries on the separate books enjoy an enviable reputation: the *Etudes bibliques*, uncompleted, representing the school of the Dominican, Father Lagrange, and *The International Critical Commentary*, liberal Protestant, to be used with caution. A simpler series is the *Cambridge Greek Testament*, also Protestant, usually rather unobjectionable. Excellent modern lives of Christ are, Jules Lebreton, *The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ Our Lord* (London, Burns, 1935), Leonce de Grandmaison, *Jesus Christ, His Person, His Message, His Credentials* (New York, Sheed, 1935-37), and F. Prat, *Jesus Christ, sa vie, sa doctrine, son oeuvre* (Paris, Beauchesne, 1933). For the doctrine of St. Paul, F. Prat, *The Theology of Saint Paul* (London, Burns, 1926-27) is unsurpassed. For extra-Biblical Jewish thought nothing is better than, Joseph Bonsirven, *Le Judaisme palestinien au temps de Jesus-Christ* (Paris, Beauchesne, 1934-35). Finally, a good Biblical atlas is almost indispensable; none is better than, Hermann Guthe, *Bibelatlas* (Leipzig, Wagner, 1926).

Easily the best among Catholic treatments of the social thought of the New Testament are the two following works by Igino Giordani, // *messaggio sociale di Gesu* (Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1938) and // *messaggio sociale degli Apostoli* (Florence, Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 1937). Both are being translated. Other Catholic works on the subject include, Leon Garriguet, *The Gospel and Our Social Problems* (New York, Wagner, 1925), Alphonse Lugan, *Social Principles of the Gospel* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), a partial translation of the French original, and H. Schumacher, *Social Message of the New Testament* (Milwaukee, Bruce, 1937). There are many non-Catholic treatments, but they have little to add to the works mentioned. J. C. Husslein, *Bible and Labor* (New York, Macmillan, 1924) is a suggestive discussion of a special topic in the Bible as a whole. The following non-Catholic works may be consulted for their treatment of the Old Testament, Louis Wallis, *Sociological Study of the Bible* (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1912), good on the early Hebrews, and C. F. Kent, *The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus* (New York, Scribner, 1917), a convenient repertory of texts but often objectionable from the Catholic standpoint.

THE FAR EAST

The work of the student unfamiliar with Far Eastern languages who is studying this area is enormously simplified by three excellent critical bibliographies: for China, H. C. Fenn and L. C. Goodrich, *A Syllabus of the History of Chinese Civilization and Culture* (New York, China Society of America, 1941); for Japan, Hugh Borton and Others, *A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan in English, French, and German* (Washington, American Council of Learned Societies, 1940); for India, the bibliographies included in, *Indie Studies in America* {American Council of Learned Societies, Bulletin No. 28, Washington, 1939}

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The history of the Far East has been radically revised in recent years, due to sensational archeological discoveries and to a critical reworking of historical texts. The older histories (and, alas, some of the more recent ones) must be read with caution and should be avoided by the beginner. The following may be safely followed: for the Far East as a whole, G. Nye Steiger, *A History of the Far East* (Boston, Ginn, 1936), simply written, but scholarly; for the recent history of the area, H. M. Vinacke, *A History of the Far East in Modern Times* (New York, Crofts, 1941); for China, K. S. Latourette, *The Chinese; Their History and Culture* (New York, Macmillan, 1934) and C. P. Fitzgerald, *China; A Short Cultural History* (London, Cresset, 1935); for Japan, G. B. Sansom, *Japan; A Short Cultural History* (New York, Century, 1931) and R. K. and Jean Reischauer, *Early Japanese History* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1937), the latter being technical but extremely valuable for its maps, genealogical tables, and glossary; for India, V. A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923) and H. G. Rawlinson, *India; A Short Cultural History* (New York, Appleton-Century, 1938).

There are very few general treatments devoted specifically to the social thought of China, Japan, and India. A considerable amount of relevant material is scattered through the general histories mentioned above. A number of monographs and periodical articles of importance are listed in the three bibliographies already mentioned. Since much Asiatic social thought has a religious background, the student can learn something about the former from the latter; see, C. N. E. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism; An Historical Sketch* (London, Arnold, 1921), a standard work. Perhaps the only work specifically devoted to the social philosophy of a Far Eastern country which deserves separate mention is, Liang Ch'i Ch'ao, *History of Chinese Political Thought during the Early Tsin Period* (New York, Harcourt, 1930)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

GREECE AND ROME

An invaluable reference work is, A. F. von Pauly, *Realen cyclopadie der classischen Alterthwmsvissenschaft* (Stuttgart, Metzler, 1894-), usually cited as Pauly-Wissowa, Wissowa being one of the revising editors. This encyclopedia contains thoroughly authoritative articles on all the persons, institutions, and movements which would be likely to interest the student of social thought, along with excellent bibliographies to guide further reading. A good one-volume equivalent is, Friedrich Lubker, *Reallexikon des klassischen Alterthtws* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1914). For historical background a good elementary manual is, A. A. Trever, *History of Ancient Civilization* (New York, Harcourt, 1936-39). It should be supplemented by the volumes on the period in Glotz' *Histoire generate*, by *The Cambridge Ancient History*, and by two works of M. I. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1926) and *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1941).

There is no satisfactory work on classical social thought as a whole. J. B. Gittler, *Social Thought among the Early Greeks* (Athens, Univ. of Georgia Press, 1941) is essentially a book of readings with some introductory material. A good deal may be gleaned from books on political thought such as, W. A. Dunning, *A History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval* (New York, Macmillan, 1936) and Ernest Barker, *Greek Political Theory; Plato and His Predecessors* (London, Methuen, 1918). The sections on the classical period in the general histories of social thought previously mentioned are usually much better than those treating any other period or people before the year 1500; even so they leave much to be desired. On the whole, the best treatments of the social thought of the great classic writers will be found in standard histories of philosophy such as Karl Praechter, *Die Philosophic des Alter*

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turns (*Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. by Friedrich Ueberweg, Berlin, Mittler, 1926) and Theodor Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (London, J. Murray, 1901-12).

THE EARLY CHURCH

For this and for all periods of Catholic thought a reference work of unsurpassed excellence is A. Vacant and E. Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique* (Paris, Letouzey, 1909-), unfortunately still uncompleted. *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, Cath. Enc. Press, 1907-22) is the best equivalent in English. Though a first-rate work, it is far from equaling "Vacant-Mangenot" in the latter's special field. A work specifically on the early Church is F. Cabrol and H. Leclercq, *Dictionnaire d'archeologie chretienne et de liturgie* (Paris, Letouzey, 1907-), broader in scope than its title would indicate. For the general background of ecclesiastical history there is nothing better than A. Fliche and V. Martin (eds.), *Histoire de l'Eglise* (Paris, Bloud & Gay, 1934-). For discussion of individual writers see the articles in Vacant-Mangenot and the two following works: Gerhard Rauschen and Berthold Altaner, *Patrologie* (Freiburg, Herder, 1931) and F. Cayre, *Patrologie et histoire de la theologie* (Paris, Desclee, 1927-30). The latter work covers not only the Fathers but also the theologians down to St. Francis de Sales. Archeology and epigraphy throw some light on early Christian social thought. See the articles in Cabrol-Leclercq and also the following special works: Orazio Marucchi, *Manuale di archeologia cristiana* (Rome, Desclee, 1933) and C. M. Kaufmann, *Handbuch der altchristlichen Epigraphik* (Freiburg, Herder, 1917).

There is no comprehensive book on early Christian social thought; but see the following articles: Paul H. Furfey, "Social Action in the Early Church, 30-180 A. D.," *Theol. Studies*, 2:171-97 and 3:89-108 (May, 1941 and February, 1942) and the same author, "Christian Social Thought in the First and Second Centuries," *American Cath. Soc. Rev.*, 1:13-20 (n.d.). Among works devoted to special topics see especially the fol

lowing: Otto Schilling, *Reichtum und Eigenwm in der alt kirchlichen Literatur* (Freiburg, Herder, 1908), Ignaz Seipel, *Die wirtschaftsethischen Lehren der Kirchenvater* (Theologische Studien der Leo-Gesellschaft, 18, Vienna, 1907), Andre Baudrillart, *La charite aux premiers siecles du christtanisme* (Paris, Bloud, 1903), and G. Uhlhorn, *Die christliche Liebes thatigkeit* (Stuttgart, Gundert, 1882-90).

THE MIDDLE AGES

The Cambridge Medieval History gives the facts of medi eval history and contains copious, if somewhat uncritical, bibliographies. Briefer works are, the third volume of, Edward Eyre (ed.), *European Civilization, Its Origin and Develop ment* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1934-39), a Catholic treatment, and two volumes by J. W. Thompson, *An Eco nomic and Social History of the Middle Ages* (New York, Century, 1928) and *Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages* (New York, Century, 1931), the period covered by the two books being divided by the year 1300. These should be supplemented by the following readable and scholarly studies: Eileen Power, *Medieval People* (Boston, Houghton, 1932), Prosper Boissonade, *Life and Work in Medieval Europe* (New York, Knopf, 1937), and Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1939). A convenient reference work on medieval authors is, Marian Edwardes, *A Summary of the Literatures of Modern Europe . . . from the Origins to 1400* (London, Dent, 1007).

Specifically devoted to social thought is, Bede Jarrett, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages, 1200-1 \$00* (Boston, Little, 1926), the work of a distinguished Dominican. See also the same au thor's *Mediaeval Socialism* (New York, Dodge, 1914). The standard treatment of the closely related field of political thought is, R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval "Political Theory in the West* (New York, Putnam, 1903-36), six informative volumes. Social thought is handled incidentally in general histories of medieval philosophy such as, Maurice

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de Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York, Longmans, 1935-38). There is a considerable monographic literature on various aspects of St. Thomas' social philosophy; lack of space prohibits mentioning them here. A more comprehensive work is, Otto Schilling, *Die Staats- und Soziallehre des hi Thomas v. A.* (Gorres-Gesellschaft, Sektion f. Rechts und Sozialwissenschaft, 41. Heft, Paderborn, 1923). Mention must also be made of Gerald B. Phelan's convenient translation of St. Thomas' *De regimine principum* (New York, Sheed, 1938) with a useful introduction.

Jewish, Islamic, and Byzantine social thought stand somewhat aside from the main medieval current. For the background of these see the following works: S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1937), P. K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs* (New York, Macmillan, 1940), and Charles Diehl, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1925).

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

There is no completely satisfactory history of science in English. Probably the least unsatisfactory are, W. C. Dampier Whetham, *A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion* (Cambridge, University Press, 1929) which hardly lives up to its title, and W. T. Sedgwick and Others, *A Short History of Science* (New York, Macmillan, 1939). It is generally more satisfactory to refer to special histories of the individual sciences. See the bibliography in Sedgwick and add the following excellent recent reference, E. T. Bell, *The Development of Mathematics* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1940). The nearest thing in English to a comprehensive history of technology is, A. P. Usher, *A History of Mechanical Inventions* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1929). On special periods see the following: Albert Neuberger, *The Technical Arts and Sciences of the Ancients* (New York, Macmillan, 1930), Franz Feldhaus, *Die Technik der Antike und des Mittelalters* (Potsdam, Athenaion, 1931), Abraham Wolf, *A His*

tory of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the 16th and 17th Centuries (New York, Macmillan, 1939), and the same author's *A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, Macmillan, 1939), the last two volumes being more comprehensive in subject matter, as their titles indicate. The following are good treatments of particular developments: for engineering, W. B. Parsons, *Engineers and Engineering in the Renaissance* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins, 1939), R. S. Kirby and P. G. Laurson, *The Early Years of Modern Civil Engineering* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1932), and A. P. M. Fleming and H. J. Brocklehurst, *A History of Engineering* (London, A. & C. Black, 1925); for the steam engine, H. W. Dickinson, *A Short History of the Steam Engine* (New York, Macmillan, 1939), an excellent book; for the development of machine tools, J. W. Roe, *English and American Tool Builders* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1926); for the ship, S. C. Gilfillan, *Inventing the Ship* (Chicago, Follett, 1935), a work important not only for its treatment of this special subject but also for the light it throws on the general phenomenon of invention. Samuel Smiles, *Lives of the Engineers* (London, Murray, 1874-99) is an interesting old work which manages to convey to the reader something of the romance of engineering's heroic period.

CURRENTS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

The history of formal philosophic thought has become by now pretty well systematized. The modern period may be studied in, Harald Hoffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy* (New York, Macmillan, 1900) or in the volumes of Ueberweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie* which apply to these centuries. Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), *The Dictionary of Philosophy* (New York, Philosophical Library, 1942) is convenient for ready reference, though disappointingly brief. For the more informal currents of thought see, Preserved Smith, *A History of Modern Culture* (New York, Holt, 1930-34), covering the

period, 1543-1776. Smith is excellent for factual material but not without a certain naturalistic bias in his interpretations. An alternative work covering the whole period from the Middle Ages to the present is J. H. Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Boston, Houghton, 1940). There are several good works on the thought of the Age of Reason. For a general treatment, besides the second volume of Smith, see, Ernst Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung* (Tubingen, Mohr, 1932). Carl L. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1932) gives a somewhat novel but suggestive interpretation of the *philosophes*. Their Catholic opponents are discussed in, R. R. Palmer, *Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1939). Their attitude toward the social sciences is treated in, Rene Hubert, *Les Sciences sociales dans l'Encyclopedie* (Paris, Alcan, 1923). A vast amount of material on all aspects of nineteenth-century thought is collected in, John T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1914-30).

DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM, AND RELATED TRENDS

The general question of monarchy and democracy is competently handled in its practical aspects in general histories and in its theoretical aspects in histories of political thought. For political theories during the modern period see especially, W. A. Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu* (New York, Macmillan, 1938) and the same author's *A History of Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer* (New York, Macmillan, 1936). Among works treating particular countries and periods the following deserve mention: W. F. Church, *Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth Century France* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1941), Kingsley Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (London, Benn, 1929) A. V. Espinas, *La Philosophie sociale du XVIII siecle et la Revolution* (Paris, Alcan, 1898),

G. P. Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution* (New York, Longmans, 1920), Reinhold Aris, *History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1936), and Crane Brinton, *The Political Ideas of the English Romanticists* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1926).

Probably the best short introduction to the history of early socialism is, Thomas Kirkup, *A History of Socialism* (London, Black, 1913). See also, F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *A Survey of Socialism* (London, Macmillan, 1929). Two important books on the Catholic social movement in Europe are: Parker T. Moon, *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement in France* (New York, Macmillan, 1921), broader in scope than its title indicates, and Georgiana P. McEntee, *The Social Catholic Movement in Great Britain* (New York, Macmillan, 1927). An excellent annotated bibliography which will serve as an introduction to the somewhat scattered literature on nationalism is, K. S. Pinson, *Bibliographical Introduction to Nationalism* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1935). The best introductory treatment of the subject is, C. J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York, Macmillan, 1926). The closely related subject of militarism is competently handled in, Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism; Romance and Realities of a Profession* (New York, Norton, 1937).

ACADEMIC SOCIOLOGY

This subject is competently handled in general histories of social thought. Most of these works are, indeed, histories of academic sociology rather than of social thought in the broader sense. In addition there are a few special studies of sociology in particular countries or regions. Among these the following may be mentioned: J. F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology; A Contribution to the History of Sociological Thought and Theory* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1915), T. F. Abel, *Systematic Sociology in Germany* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1929), and Alfredo Povina, *Historia de la sociologia latinoamericana* (Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica,

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1941). A rather similar work is, Howard W. Odum (ed.), *American Masters of Social Science* (New York, Holt, 1927). For a more extended bibliography see, R. M. MacIver, "Sociology," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 14:232-47.

THE UNITED STATES

To appreciate the social thought of the United States it is of course first necessary to understand the historical background. The best long collaborative history is, Albert B. Hart (ed.), *The American Nation* (New York, Harper, 1904-18), somewhat uneven and in parts antiquated. The best long history by a single author is, Edward Channing, *A History of the United States* (New York, Macmillan, 1905-25), extending only to 1865. There are many good single-volume textbooks. J. S. Bassett, *A Short History of the United States, 1492-1938* (New York, Macmillan, 1939) is one of these; it is convenient as a reference book for verifying facts and it contains good bibliographies. A. M. Schlesinger and D. R. Fox (eds.), *A History of American Life* (New York, Macmillan, 1927-) is a long and still uncompleted series full of facts on living conditions, social movements, manners, fashions, sports, and other matters of interest to the social historian. Among histories of special periods, the following are particularly useful: O. P. Chitwood, *A History of Colonial America* (New York, Harper, 1931), Curtis P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization; A History of American Colonial Life* (New York, Crofts, 1938) which emphasizes, possibly overemphasizes, economic factors, James G. Randall, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (New York, Heath, 1937), an admirably impartial treatment of a controversial period, and L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, *The United States since 1865* (New York, Crofts, 1939), an excellent work. An authoritative military history is, M. F. Steele, *American Campaigns* (Washington, U. S. Infantry Association, 1922) which, however, does not cover the World War. An excellent economic history is, C. W. Wright, *Economic History of the United States* (New York, McGraw

Hill, 1941). James T. Adams (ed.), *Dictionary of American History* (New York, Scribner, 1940) and C. O. Paullin and J. K. Wright, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States* (New York, American Geographical Society, 1932) are convenient and authoritative reference books.

On American social thought, conceived broadly as it is in the present volume, there is nothing better than, V. L. Partington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, Harcourt, 1927-30), a thoroughly admirable book. Somewhat more specialized is, R. H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought; An Intellectual History since 1815* (New York, Ronald, 1940). Percy H. Boynton, *Literature and American Life* (Boston, Ginn, 1936), is much broader in scope than the conventional history of literature; for recent authors it can be supplemented by, F. B. Millet, *Contemporary American Authors* (New York, Harcourt, 1940). Current trends in sociology are adequately handled by George A. Lundberg and Others, *Trends in American Sociology* (New York, Harper, 1929), now a bit out of date. Formal philosophy has some importance as background material; a good book is, H. G. Townsend, *Philosophical Ideas in the United States* (New York, American Book, 1934). U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Religious Bodies: 1936* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941) contains not only statistics, as one might expect, but also authoritative information about the history, organization, and doctrine of American churches. For American political thought see, E. R. Lewis, *A History of American Political Thought from the Civil War to the World War* (New York, Macmillan, 1937) and R. G. Gettell, *History of American Political Thought* (New York, Century, 1929).

THE MOST RECENT PERIOD

It is extremely difficult to get a balanced view of the most recent historical developments. Historians are too near the events they describe; they lack proper perspective. Then, too, a great deal of important information is stored in secret ar

chives and is unavailable to historians. It is wise, therefore, to accept with a certain reserve the conclusions of even the best writers in the field. However, whatever must be said of interpretations and judgments, at least the bare facts become clear not long after the event. A cautious study of recent history is therefore profitable to the student of social thought. V. L. and M. H. Albjerg, *From Sedan to Stresa; Europe since 1870* (New York, Van Nostrand, 1937) is a reliable study of the period indicated by the title. For the most recent history, J. H. Jackson, *The Postwar World, 1918-1939* (Boston, Little, 1939) is valuable for his survey of general trends. For a more detailed presentation of the facts, the following two works are of about equal merit: F. L. Benns, *Europe since 1914* (New York, Crofts, 1941) and W. G. Langsam, *The World since 1914* (New York, Macmillan, 1940). The latter has a supplement published in April, 1941. Finally, a good book on Russia deserves mention, W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921* (New York, Macmillan, 1935).

IN CONCLUSION

The reader will have noticed that the present bibliography contains relatively few books which treat exclusively of social thought as such. This reflects a real lack in the literature. Whereas the historian of many subjects can draw on a large literature of monographs and periodical articles, the historian of social thought must seek his material among the most diverse sources. However, there seems to be a growing interest in the subject. One can hope that in the years to come there will be an increasing amount of research in this important field. Indications already point in that direction. The near future will probably bring an increasing understanding of the course of social thought and of the factors' which have helped to shape it.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

¹ For a convenient summary see, Carl J. Warden and Others, *Introduction to Comparative Psychology* (New York, Ronald, 1934).

² For other discussions of the scope of social thought see, Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Boston, Heath, 1938), vii-x, Walter G. Beach, *The Growth of Social Thought* (New York, Scribner, 1939), 1-6, and Emory S. Bogardus, *The Development of Social Thought* (New York, Longmans, 1940), 3-5.

CHAPTER 2

¹ Stephen Richarz, *The Age of the Human Race in the Light of Geology* {*Publications of the Catholic Anthropological Conference*, vol. 1, no. 2, Washington, 1929}.

² Franz Weidenreich, "Some Problems Dealing with Ancient Man," *Amer. Anthropol.*, 42: 375-83 (July-Sept., 1940).

³ The fifth chapter of Genesis gives a list of the patriarchs with the age of each when he "begot" the next one on the list. In Biblical genealogies, however, this need imply no* more than that one man was an ancestor of the other. For example, when we read, "Malaleel lived sixty five years and begot Jared," we may interpret, "Malaleel begot a son who was an ancestor of Jared." For a fuller discussion see, H. Lusseau and M. Collomb, *Les livres historiques de l'Ancien Testament* (Paris, Tequi, 1934), 416-21.

Leo Frobenius and Douglas C. Fox, *Prehistoric Rock Pictures in Europe and Africa* (New York, Museum of Modern Art, 1937).

⁶ In ordinary usage the word *culture* means a refinement of taste which enables one to appreciate intellectual or aesthetic values. Here, however, the word is used in a technical anthropological sense and means those "capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (Tyler). In this sense *culture* includes particular ways of hunting, fishing, making tools or building houses, as well as folklore, etiquette, religious beliefs, in fact all those habits, skills, and attitudes which one generation may hand down to another.

⁶ John M. Cooper, *Temporal Sequence and Marginal Cultures* {*Catholic University of America Anthropological Series*, no. 10, Washington 1941}.

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⁷ The broad outlines of marginal culture are conveniently summarized in Cooper, *Temporal Sequence*, 63-66.

⁸ A good brief account of the Yaghan (and Ona) is given in Robert H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* (New York, Farrar, 1940), 393-405. John M. Cooper, *Analytical and Critical Bibliography of the Tribes of Tierra del Fuego and Adjacent Territory* (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 68, Washington, 1917) is more than a mere bibliography. A very full recent study is Martin Gusinde, *Die Feuerland-Indianer* (Modling b. Wien, Anthropos, 1931-39).

⁹ A convenient summary on the Bushmen will be found in Wilfrid D. Hambly, *Ethnology of Africa* (Chicago, Field Museum, 1930), 114-22. Standard monographs are, S. S. Dornan, *Pygmies and Bushmen of the Kalahari* (London, Seeley, 1925) and I. Schapera, *The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa, Bushmen and Hottentots* (London, Routledge, 1930).

¹⁰ For example, Bogardus, *Development of Social Thought*, 11-25. Howard Becker in Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought*, 3-42, when he cites any authority for his rather bold generalizations, generally cites proverbs. Both these authors seriously underestimate the complexity of primitive man's thought. For example, Bogardus says: "[Primitive man's] vocabulary was scanty; his ideas were few." Shakespeare, who is often cited for his extraordinarily rich vocabulary, is said to have used 20,000 different words, while Thomas Bridges' Yaghan dictionary contained about 32,430 words. Yet the Yaghan are a very primitive marginal tribe! See John M. Cooper, "Primitive Languages," *Primitive Man*, 1: 17-23 (July-Oct., 1928).

¹¹ Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, Boni and Live-right, 1920), 358-96.

¹² A. C. Hollis, *The Masai; Their Language and Folklore* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1905), 244.

¹³ Henry P. Judd, *Hawaiian Proverbs and Riddles* (Bishop Museum, Bulletin 77, Honolulu, 1930), 35.

¹⁴ Joseph Kler, *Ordos Mongol Proverbs* (Unpublished manuscript in the possession of the Department of Anthropology of the Catholic University), 4.

¹⁵ Robert Sutherland Rattray, *Ashanti Proverbs* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1916), 115.

¹⁶ Judd, *Hawaiian Proverbs*, 37.

¹⁷ George Herzog, *Abo Proverbs from Liberia* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1936), 137.

¹⁸ Judd, *Hawaiian Proverbs*, 11.

¹⁹ N. E. Parry, *The Lakhers* (London, Macmillan, 1932), 540.

²⁰ Judd, *Hawaiian Proverbs*, 10.

²¹ Kler, *Ordos Mongol Proverbs*, 1.

²² E. Hadfield, *Among the Natives of the Loyalty Group* (London, Macmillan, 1920), 310.

²³ Lowie, *Primitive Society*, 338-57.

²⁴ Rattray, *Ashanti Proverbs*, 121.

²⁵ Sol Tax, "The Social Organization of the Fox Indians" in Fred Eggan (ed.), *Social Anthropology of North American Tribes* (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1937), 241-82.

²⁸ W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas* (London, Macmillan, 1006), 515-21. Where group marriage occurs, it is apt to be associated with polyandry.

²⁷ Herzog, *Jabo Proverbs*, 146.

²⁸ Judd, *Hawaiian Proverbs*, 28.

²⁰ Rivers, *Todas*, 34.

⁸⁰ John M. Cooper, "The Position of Woman in Primitive Culture," *Primitive Man*, 5: 32-47 (April-July, 1932).

⁸¹ A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi; Their Language and Folklore* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909), 129.

⁸² Judd, *Hawaiian Proverbs*, 34.

⁸⁸ John M. Garvan, *Moro Proverbs* (Unpublished manuscript in the possession of the Department of Anthropology of the Catholic University), 46.

⁸⁴ Kler, *Ordos Mongol Proverbs*, 14.

⁸⁸ Henri Gaden, *Proverbes et maximes peuls et toucouleurs* (*Travaux et Memoires de VInstitute d'Ethnologie*, 16, Paris, 1931), 16.

⁸⁶ Herzog, *Jabo Proverbs*, 170.

⁸⁷ Herzog, *Jabo Proverbs*, 169.

⁸⁸ Gaden, *Proverbes*, 40.

³⁹ Charles T. Dooley, "Child-training among the Wanguru. HI. Moral Education," *Primitive Man*, 9: 1-12 (Jan., 1936), 8-9.

⁴⁰ Jane Richardson, *Law and Status among the Kiowa Indians* (*Monographs of the American Ethnological Society*, no. 1, New York, 1940), 44.

⁴¹ 1. Schapera, *A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1938).

⁴² Melville J. Herskovits, *The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples* (New York, Knopf, 1940), 448.

⁴⁸ Herskovits, *Economic Life*, 217.

⁴⁴ A. Bernard Deacon, *Malekula* (London, Routledge, 1934), 17.

⁴⁶ Literally, "It-has-not the-trade sisters." Hollis, *Nandi*, 130.

⁴⁶ Garvan, *Moro Proverbs*, 38.

⁴⁷ Judd, *Hawaiian Proverbs*, 27 and 21.

⁴⁸ Gaden, *Proverbes*, 103.

⁴⁹ Hollis, *Masai*, 240.

⁵⁰ Judd, *Hawaiian Proverbs*, 41.

CHAPTER 3

¹ Alexandre Moret, *Histoire de VOrient* (*Histoire genhale* ed. by G. Glotz, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1936), 47-63, 86-118, Hermann Ranke, "The Beginnings of Civilization in Egypt" in W. Norman Brown (ed.), *The Beginnings of Civilization in the Orient* (Supplement to the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Baltimore,

1939), 3-16, Samuel A. B. Mercer, "Etudes sur les origines de la religion de l'Egypte," *Jour. Soc. Or. Res.*, 13: 1-100 (Jan.-April, 1929).

² The division comes from Manetho, a native Egyptian who wrote in Greek in the third century B. c.

⁸ Moret, *Orient*, 239-42.

⁴ James H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt* (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1906-7), 1: 126-27.

⁵ Moret, *Orient*, 254-58.

⁶ Alan H. Gardiner, "New Literary Works from Ancient Egypt," *Jour. Eg. Archeol.*, 1: 20-36 and 100-6 (1914), 26, 27.

⁷ William F. Albright, "The Present State of Syro-Palestinian Archaeology," in Elihu Grant (ed.), *The Haverford Symposium on Archaeology and the Bible* (New Haven, American Schools of Oriental Research, 1938), 1-46.

⁸ John W. Flight, "The Present State of Studies in the History of Writing in the Near East" in Grant, *Symposium*, 111-35.

⁹ The historic period in Mesopotamia was preceded by four cultures which are (beginning with the earliest), Tell Halaf, al Ubaid, Uruk, and Jemdet Nasr. Writing appeared in the Uruk stage and is almost certainly Sumerian. Perhaps the Sumerians were present in the preceding al Ubaid period. They were present then perhaps from 3500 B.C. and perhaps earlier. See Theophile J. Meek, "The Present State of Mesopotamian Studies" in Grant, *Symposium*, 158-87 and E. A. Speiser, "The Beginnings of Civilization in Mesopotamia" in Brown, *Beginnings of Civilization*, 17-31.

¹⁰ George A. Barton, *The Royal Inscriptions of Sumer and Akkad* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1929), 85. In the interest of clearness I have modified this very literal translation slightly, especially in regard to word order.

¹¹ For this date, based on recent evidence, see the important article by W. F. Albright, "New Light on the History of Western Asia in the Second Millennium B.C.," *Bull. Am. Sch. Orient. Res.*, 77: 20-32 and 78: 23-31 (Feb. and April, 1940).

¹² For the date see the article of Albright just cited. For the first excavations of the tablets see, F. Hrozný, "Rapport préliminaire sur les fouilles tchécoslovaques du Kultepe," *Syria*, 8: 1-12 (1927). For the relations of the Assyrians to the Hittites see, F. Hrozný, "Assyriens et Hittites en Asie Mineure vers 2000 av. J.-C.," *Arch. Orient.*, 4: 112-17 (1932)'

¹³ Both the Old Assyrian Laws and the Middle Assyrian Laws are translated and discussed with very full references to the literature in G. R. Driver and John C. Miles, *The Assyrian Laws* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935), 388-89, 384-85

¹⁴ The nature of these offenses is obscure.

¹⁵ Nah. 3: 1, 7, 19.

¹⁶ Louis Delaporte, *Les Hittites* (Paris, Renaissance du Livre, 1936)

¹⁷ Moret, *Orient*, 574, Edouard Cuq, *Etudes sur le droit babylonien*,

les his assyrievnes et les lois hittites (Paris, Geuthner, 1929), 462-67. For the text of the laws see, F. Hrozný, *Code hittite* (Paris, Geuthner, 1922).

¹⁸ Moret, *Orient*, 706-713. A. V. W. Jackson; *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1898) reprints all the passages in the classics which mention Zoroaster's name and is still useful as a convenient summary of the prophet's life.

¹⁹ J. B. Bury and Others (eds.), *Cambridge Ancient History* (New York, Macmillan, 1923-1939), 4: 184-201.

CHAPTER 4

¹ Gen. 26:12, 27:28 (crops), Gen. 19: 1-2, 33: 17 (houses).

² Gen. 11: 31.

³ Details in H. Lusseau and M. Collomb, *Les livres historiques de Ancien Testament* (Paris, Tequi, 1934), 555-57.

⁴ Gen. 47: 1.

⁵ Lusseau and Collomb, *Livres historiques*, 562-66.

⁶ Ex. 1:7.

⁷ Gen. 46: 3.

⁸ The Biblical and profane evidence is excellently summarized in Lusseau and Collomb, *Livres historiques*, 590-611.

⁹ Ex. 1: 11, 14.

¹⁰ Ex. 1: 16, 22.

¹¹ Ex. 2: 11-12, 2: 15, 3: 2-4: 17.

¹² Ex. 5:7,9.

¹³ Greek *pente*, five and *teuchos*, implement, book. The first five books of the Bible are so called.

¹⁴ There is a very competent summary of the critics' objections and the Catholic answers in Lusseau and Collomb, *Livres historiques*, 14-97.

¹⁵ Rescript of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, 27 June 1906.

¹⁶ Deut. 7: 3, 23: 3, 23: 1-2, Ex. 31: 14, Lev. 7: 21.

¹⁷ Ex. 22: 3, Lev. 25: 39-40, 47-54, Ex. 21: 2-6, 20, Lev. 19: 34, Deut. 10: 19, 23: 20.

¹⁸ Deut. 7: 1-3, 25: 5-10, 21: 15, 24: 1-4, Ex. 21: 10-11, 21: 7, Deut. 21: 18-21, 4: 9-10.

¹⁹ Deut. 16: 18, 17: 8-13, Num. 35: 30, Deut. 19: 18-19, 24: 16, Num. 35: 19, Ex. 21: 23-35.

²⁰ Deut. 24: 15, 23: 19-20, 24:6, Ex. 22:26-27, Deut. 24: 10, Lev. 19: 9-10, Deut. 23: 25, Mt. 12: 1.

²¹ Jdgs. 8: 22-23, 9: 7-20.

²² 1 Kgs. 8: 5, 7.

²³ 1 Kgs.8: 11-18.

²⁴ Charles F. Kent, *The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus* (New York, Scribner, 1917), 18.

²⁵ 3 Kgs. 5: 13-16, 4: 7, 22, 23, 27, 28, 10: 28-29.

²⁶ 3 Kgs. 12: 4, 14. For the chronology see, Lusseau and Collomb, *Livres historiques*, 868-69.

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²⁷ 3 Kgs. 21: 19-23.

²⁸ Am. 7: 14. For the translation see, A. van Hoonacker, *Les douze petits prophètes* (Paris, Gabalda, 1908), 26970.

²⁹ Am. 6: 1, 4, 6, 8; 4: 1, 2; 6: 5; 7: 8; 5-6. I have ventured, here and in other places, to amend the Douay Version very slightly where there seemed to be a sound reason for doing so.

⁸⁰ Am. 6: 15; 4: 2-3, 8; 10: 6; 0-11.

³¹ Scholars dispute whether this experience was a historical fact or merely symbolical. The evidence is well summarized in H. Lusseau and M. Collomb, *Les livres prophetiques* (Paris, Tequi, 1934), 78-82.

⁸² Os. 4: 1-3, 14: 2.

⁸⁸ Isa. 3: 14-15, 5: 23, 5:8, 12, 14, 3: 10-20, 24, 10: 1-2. Mich. 3: 3. A. van Hoonacker, *Het Boek Jsaïas* (Brugge, Sinte Katharina, 1932).

⁸⁴ Isa. 9: 6, 51: 4, 11-12, 9: 7. P. F. Ceuppens, *De prophetiis messianicis in Antiquo Testamento* (Rome, Collegio Angelico, 1935).

⁸⁵ Nan. 3: 2-3, 16.

⁸⁶ Lusseau and Collomb, *Livres prophetiques*, 267.

⁸⁷ Soph. 3: 3, Hab. 2: 9, 12.

⁸⁸ Jer. 5: 1, 4-5, 26, 28, 23: 5. Albert Condomin, *Le livre de Jeremie* (Paris, Gabalda, 1920).

⁸⁹ Ez. 11: 1, 6, 10, 22: 7, 10-13.

⁴⁰ Dan. 7: 14.

⁴¹ 2 Esd. 5: 1-13. It is disputed whether Nehemias came before Esdras or vice versa. I have followed the former chronology. Lusseau and Collomb, *Livres historiques*, 1000-16.

⁴² Prov. 16: 12, 29:4, 12, 14, Wis. 6: 1-11, Prov. 21:9, 19, Eccus. 25: 22-36, 26: 1-24, Prov. 31: 10-31, 13: 24, 19: 18, 29: 15, Eccus. 30: 1-13, 33: 25-33, prov. 29: 21.

⁴³ Prov. 10: 5, 15, 12: 27, 19: 7, 22:4, Eccus. 13: 12-13, 25-32 Prov. 30: 7-9, Eccus. 8: 3, 26: 28-27: 3, 14: 1-21, Prov. 19: 1, 23: 4, Eccus. 13: 2, Prov. 22: 22-23, Eccus. 4: 4-6.

⁴⁴ Eccus. 6: 5-17, 7: 4, 9: 4, 8-9, 11, Prov. 6: 20-35, 7: 6- 23: 27-28, 23: 29-35, Eccus. 37: 32-34, Prov. 24: 30-34.

⁴⁵ Eccus. 1: 2, 8, 5: 9, 7: 17.

⁴⁶ See the two articles by J. B. Frey, "Apocalyptique" and "Apocryphes de l'Ancien Testament" in L. Pirot, *Dictionnaire de la Bible, supplement* (Paris, Letouzey, 1928-), 1: 326-54 and 1: 354-460, M. J. Lagrange, *Le messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris, Gabalda, 1009), and J. Bonsirven, *Le Judaisme palestinien au temps de Jesus-Christ* (Paris, Beauchesne, 1934-35)

⁴⁷ For a critical discussion of these sources see, George F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1932-40), 1: 125-78.

⁴⁸ Jer. Sotah, ch. 3, halakha 4, Mt. 23: 3. For an excellent account of Jewish social thought of the period see, Moore, *Judaism*, 2: 112-97, 267

⁷⁵⁴⁹ For a good brief exposition of medieval Jewish social thought see,

Salo W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1937), 2: 106-17.

CHAPTER 5

¹ Herrlee G. Creel, *The Birth of China* (London, Cape, 1936), 38-53, Carl W. Bishop, "The Beginnings of Civilization in Eastern Asia" in W. Norman Brown (ed.), *The Beginnings of Civilization in the Orient* (Supplement to the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Baltimore, 1939), 45-61, Wolfram Eberhard, "Early Chinese Cultures and Their Development" in *Smithsonian Institution Annual Report for 1937*, 513-30.

² Chinese chronology before the ninth century B. C. is very uncertain. I have followed the conservative dating of C. P. Fitzgerald, *China; A Short Cultural History* (London Cresset, 1935). See also, Carl W. Bishop, "The Chronology of Ancient China," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 52: 232-47 (Sept., 1932) and Herrlee G. Creel, *Studies in Early Chinese Culture* (Baltimore, Waverly, 1937), xvi-xxii.

⁸ Pronounced Jo, Western scholars use an approximation of the Mandarin dialect in pronouncing Chinese names. Chinese words are written in our alphabet (or *Romanized*, to use the technical term) in a bewildering number of ways. The standard system for scientific purposes is the Wade system. In this the sounds are pronounced somewhat as follows: *ch*, *k*, *p*, *t* are as in English while *ch-i* in *jade*, *k* = *g*, *p*-*b*, *t*-*d*, *ai* = *y*, in *by*, *ao* = *ow* in *how*, *ou* = *o* in *go*, *ei*-*ay* in *bay*, *hs* = *sh*, *u* = *French u*, *e* is as *e* in *her* and the remaining vowels are approximately as in Latin. For a good discussion of phonetics and Romanization see, Bernhard Karlgren, *A Mandarin Phonetic Reader* (Stockholm, Norstedt, 1918), 6-65.

⁴ Creel, *Birth of China*, 367-80.

⁶ The period is well handled in Henri Maspero, *La Chine antique* (*Histoire du monde* ed. by M. E. Cavaignac, Paris, Boccard, 1927).

⁶ Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *History of Chinese Political Thought* (New York, Harcourt, 1930). J. J. L. Duyvendak, "Etudes de philosophie chinoise," *Rev. Philos. de la France et de l'étranger*, 110: '372-417 (Nov.-Dec, 1930).

⁷ *Analects*, bk. 13, ch. 3 in James Legge, *Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1893), 263-64. On the "rectification of names" see, Feng Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy* (Peiping, Vetch, 1937), 59-62.

⁸ Homer H. Dubs, *The Works of Hsiintze* (London, Probsthain, 1928), 301, 224.

⁹ K. S. Latourette, *The Chinese; Their History and Culture* (New York, Macmillan, 1934), 1: 77.

¹⁰ Lionel Giles, *The Sayings of Lao Tzu* (London, Murray, 1905), 38.

¹¹ H. A. Giles, *Chuang Tzu, Mystic, Moralist and Social Reformer* (London, Quarich, 1926), 131.

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¹² Mei Yi-pao, *The Ethical and Political Works of Motse* (London, Probsthain, 1929), 97, 99-100.

¹³ F. L. H. Pott, "The Teaching of Micius," *Journal N. C. B. Royal Asiatic Soc.*, 56: 32-50 (1925).

¹⁴ J. J. L. Duyvendak, *The Book of Lord Shang* (London, Probsthain, 1928), 131-59.

¹⁵ Duyvendak, *Book of Lord Shang*, 109, 200.

¹⁶ The struggle is interestingly told in Homer H. Dubs, "Han Kao Tsu and Hsiang-Yu," *Jour. N. C. B. Royal Asiatic Soc.*, 67: 58-80 (1936).

¹⁷ Hu Shih, "Wang Mang, the Socialist Emperor of Nineteen Centuries Ago," *Jour. N. C. B. Royal Asiatic Soc.*, 59: 218-30 (1928).

¹⁸ Ernest Mackay, *The Indus Civilization* (London, Dickson and Thompson, 1935), a competent popular account.

¹⁹ H. DeW. Griswold, *The Religion of the Rigveda* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1923).

²⁰ C. N. E. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* (London, Arnold, 1921), 1: xix.

²¹ Hermann Jacobi, *Gaina Sutras {Sacred Books of the East*, vol. 22, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1884), xiii.

²² Han Yii, "An Enquiry into a Scheme of Life" in Evan Morgan, *A Guide to Wenli Styles and Chinese Ideals* (London, Probsthain, 1912), 68-79.

²³ Latourette, *The Chinese*, 1: 260.

²⁴ J. P. Bruce, *Chu Hsi and His Masters* (London, Probsthain, 1923).

²⁵ H. Nishioka and W. E. Schenck, "An Outline of Theories Concerning the Prehistoric People of Japan," *Amer. Anthropol.* 39: 23-33 (Jan. March, 1937).

²⁶ Japanese is usually written in our alphabet according to the so called Hepburn system. For practical purposes it is sufficient to remember that in this system the vowels are pronounced as in Italian and the consonants as in English. As in French, there is no marked syllabic stress. For a comparison of the Hepburn and alternative systems see, E. O. Reischauer, "Romaji or Romazi," *Jour. Am. Oriental Soc.*, 60: 82-89 (March, 1940).

²⁷ For a map of this migration see, G. B. Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (New York, Century, 1931), 27. This book is easily the best history of Japan in English and contains an excellent critical discussion of the early period.

²⁸ For an interesting account of the adaptation of the Chinese script to the very different Japanese language see, G. B. Sansom: *An Historical Grammar of Japanese* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928), 1-68. On early dates see, Emile Gaspardone, "La chronologie ancienne du Japon," *Jour. Asiat.*, 230: 235-77 (April-June, 1938) and R. K. and Jean Reischauer, *Early Japanese History (c 40 B.C.-A.D. 1167)* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1937).

²⁹ Sansom, *Japan*, 71.

³⁰ The principal codes of the period considered are translated by

John C. Hall in *Trans. As. Soc. Japan*, 34 (part 1): 1-44, 36 (part 2): 3-25, 38 (part 4): 269-33141 (part 5): 683-804 (1006, 1908, 1911, 1913).

⁸¹ The second volume of Latourette, *The Chinese*, contains an excellent discussion of the effect of European culture on China.

⁸² Foreign influences, however, were not as rigidly excluded as is sometimes supposed. See, for example, Charles R. Boxer, *Jan Compagnie in Japan: 1600-1817, An Essay on the Cultural, Artistic and Scientific Influence Exercised by the Hollanders in Japan from the 17th to the 19th Centuries* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1936).

⁸³ Leonard Hsu, "The Sociological Movement in China," *Pacific Affairs*, 4:283-307 (April, 1931), Li Mon, "Le mouvement sociologique dans la Chine contemporaine," *Revue Int. de Soc.*, 40: 64-68 (Jan.-Feb., 1932), Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Boston, Heath, 1938), 1135-74.

CHAPTER 6

¹ Dates from, Gustave Glotz, *Histoire grecque. Tome I. Des origines aux guerres m\u00e9diques* (*Histoire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale* ed. by G. Glotz, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1938), 31-33.

² A. J. B. Wace in *Cambridge Ancient History* (New York, Macmillan, 1923-39), 1: 589-99 and 2: 431-48.

⁸ On the Achaeans see, J. B. Bury in *Cambridge Ancient History*, 2: 473-86; on the Dorians, H. T. Wade-Gery, *ibid.*, 2: 518-41.

⁴ Glotz, *Des origines aux guerres m\u00e9diques*, 118-50, Louis Brehier, "La royaut\u00e9 hom\u00e9rique et les origines de l'Etat en Gr\u00e8ce," *Rev. Hist.*, 84: 1-32, 85: 1-23 (Jan.-Feb., IVlay-June, 1904).

⁶ Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 38-39.

⁶ Julius Beloch, "Die Grossindustrie im Altertum," *Zeitschr. f. Sozialwiss.*, 2: 18-26 (1899), Paul Guiraud, *Le main-d'oeuvre industrielle dans l'ancienne Gr\u00e8ce* (Paris, Alcan, 1900), Pierre Waltz, "Les artisans et leur vie en Gr\u00e8ce. Le si\u00e8cle d'H\u00e9siode," *Rev. Hist.*, 117: 5-41 (Sept.-Oct., 1914).

⁷ Glotz, *Des origines aux guerres m\u00e9diques*, 238-50.

⁸ F. E. Adcock in *Cambridge Ancient History*, 4: 2682, E. M. Walker, *ibid.*, 4: 137-72.

⁹ Plato, *Apology*, 21 B-24 B.

¹⁰ Plato, *Symposium*, 174 D-175 C.

¹¹ On Socrates in general see, Theodor Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (New York, Scribner, 1901-5), 2: 45-118 and Karl Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums* (*Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. by Friedrich Ueberweg, Berlin, Mittler, 1926), 129-50.

¹² On Plato's philosophy in general see, Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, 2: 240-397 and 3: 1-272, Praechter, *Philosophie des Altertums*, 178-341, and Leon Robin, *Platon* (Paris, Alcan, 1935).

"Paul Shorey, *Plato, The Republic* (Loeb Classical Library, New York, Putnam, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1930-35), I:xxv.

¹⁴ August Boeckh, *Gesammelte klerne Schriften* (Leipzig, Teubner,

¹⁵ 1858-74), 4: 437-49. Plato, *Republic*, 368 D - E.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 369B-372 D.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 433 A-434 C.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 479 D-480 A.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 514 A-517 A.

²⁰ On Greek democracy and democratic thought see, Valerian von Schoeffer, "Demokratia" in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopadie der classischen Altertumsnuissenschaft. Supplement. I. Heft* (Stuttgart, Metzler, 1903), 346-74.

²¹ Plato, *Republic*, 473 C-D.

²² Plato, *Statesman*, 275 C.

²³ *Ibid.*, 295 C-E.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 301 E.

²⁵ Plato, *Laws*, 713 E-714 A.

²⁶ On Aristotle's philosophy in general see, Praechter, *Philosophie des Altertums*, 347-401 and A. Gercke, "Aristoteles," in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopadie*, 2: 1012-54.

²⁷ See a convenient short summary by E. M. Walker, "Constitution of Athens," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (13th ed.), 7: 16-18.

²⁸ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253 A, 1278 B.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1278 B.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1288 B.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1295 A.

³² He cites his *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1101 A.

³³ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1295 B.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1261 A-1264 B.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 1325 B.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1325 B.

³⁷ Pierre Roussel, *La Grece et VOrient {Peuples et civilisations* ed. by L. Halphen and P. Sagnac, Paris, Alcan, 1928), 481-84.

³⁸ For an elementary discussion of Stoicism see, Arthur K. Rogers, *A Student's History of Philosophy* (New York, Macmillan, 1907), 137-59. For more technical information see, Praechter, *Philosophie des Altertums*, 410-31 (especially 430-31) and 475-83. The general political thought of the period is well summarized in George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, Holt, 1937), 123-58.

³⁹ Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, 12: 52, 3.

⁴⁰ W. S. Teuffel, *Geschichte der romischen Literatur. Erster Band* (6th ed., revised by W. Kroll and F. Skutsch, Berlin, Teubner, 1916), 404-21, Praechter, *Philosophie des Altertums*, 471-75, Sabine, *History of Political Theory*, 161-67.

⁴¹ Jerome Carcopino, *Histoire romaine. Tome II. La republique romaine de 133 a 44 avant J.-C.* {*Histoire generale* ed. by G. Glotz, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1937), 593.

⁴² For a balanced view of social conditions with copious references to

the sources see, Ludwig Friedlander, *Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire* (New York, Dutton, 1928-36).

⁴⁸ Petronius, *Satyricon*, 34.

⁴⁴ Pliny, *Letters*, 7: 28 (devotion to friends), 8: 16 (kindness to slaves).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 1: 8, 7: 18.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 10: 96, 97.

⁴⁷ John H. Wigmore, *A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems* (Washington, Washington Law Book Company, 1936), 1144-46.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 422.

⁴⁹ See the articles on Gaius, Papinian, and Ulpian in, John Macdonell and Edward Manson (eds.), *Great Jurists of the World* (Boston, Little, 1914), 1-44.

⁶⁰ James Bryce, "Justinian I," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (13th ed.), 15: 596-602.

CHAPTER 7

i Lk. 23: 2,5.

2lsa. 53:7.

⁸ Jn. 2: 13-17, 3: 2, Mt. 9: 2-8, Mk. 2: 1-12, Lk. 5: 18-26.

⁴ Jn. 5: 16-18, Mt. 12: 24, Mk. 3: 22, Lk. 11: 15. Note that we are assuming that the public life lasted a little over three years. See, H. Lusseau and M. Collomb, *Les Evangiles* (Paris, Tequi, 1932), 332-36. Some Catholic scholars would make it a year shorter. See, Ferdinand Prat, *Jesus Christ* (Paris, Beauchesne, 1933), 1: 483-88. The opinion of a few that it lasted only a little over one year seems hard to defend.

⁵ For the denunciation of the Scribes and Pharisees see, Mt. 23: 1-39, Mk. 12: 38-40, Lk. 20: 45-47. For the second cleaning of the Temple see, Mt. 21: 12-13, Mk. 11: 15-17, Lk. 19: 45-46. Some Catholic commentators admit only one cleaning of the Temple but, it would seem, without sufficient ground. See, Lusseau and Collomb, *Les Evangiles*, 718-20.

⁶ Jn. 2: 18 and about 17 other places.

⁷ Mk. 3:6.

⁸ Mt. 22: 15-33, Mk. 12: 13-27, Lk. 20: 20-40. There is a large literature on the Pharisees and Sadducees but see especially, H. L. Strack and Paul Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch* (Munich, Beck, 1922-28), 4: 334-52. On the Herodians there is a rather controversial article by B. W. Bacon, "Pharisees and Herodians in Mark," *Jour. Bib. Lit.*, 39: 102-12 (1920).

⁹ The word *world* in the English versions of the Bible translates two Greek words, *aion* and *kosmos* which in the Latin Vulgate are *saeculum* and *mundus* respectively. For practical purposes the distinction between these two terms is not important. See, Paul H. Furfey, "Social Action in the Early Church, 30-180 A.D. I. The Church and the World," *Theol. Studies*, 2: 171-97 (May, 1941), 189-91, and the references given there.

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¹⁰ Jn. 12: 31, 14: 30, 16: 11.

¹¹ Jn. 17: 25, 1: 10, 14: 17, 15: 18, 19, Mt. 18:7, 13: 22, Mk. 4: 19, Jn. 16: 8-11.

¹² Jn. 16: 33.

¹³ Jn. 15: 19.

¹⁴ Pope Pius XI, Encyclical, *Quas primas*, Dec. 11, 1925.

¹⁵ For the legislative power, Council of Trent, Sess. 6, can. 21; for the judicial power, Jn. 5: 22; for the executive power, Encyclical, *Quas primas*.

¹⁶ Encyclical, *Quas primas*,

¹⁷ **Alt. 22: 21.**

¹⁸ Jn. 15:5-7.

¹⁹ Jn. 17: 11.

²⁰ **Jn. 6: 58.**

²¹ Jn. 17: 26.

²² A small minority of theologians (for example, Duns Scotus, Molina, Bellarmine) have held the contrary. For references see, J. van der Meersch in *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique*, 6: 1610.

²³ **Mt. 19: 10-12.**

²⁴ One is tempted to question the good faith (or the intelligence) of those who quote Tertullian as an authority on the early Church's attitude toward women and sex, as does B. J. Stern in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* 15: 444; for Tertullian broke with the Church over precisely such points. One might as well quote Earl Browder as an authority on true Americanism!

²⁵ Jn. 13: 1.

²⁶ Jn. 15: 13.

²⁷ Mt. 26: 27-28.

²⁸ Council of Trent, Sess. 22, cap. 2.

²⁹ Mt. 11: 19.

³⁰ Jn. 2: 1-12.

³¹ Mt. 13: 22.

³² Mt. 13: 55, Mk. 6: 3. Sec. E. F. Sutcliffe, "The Divine Carpenter," *Irish Theol. Quart.*, 11: 147-63 (April, 1916), Igino Giordani, // *messaggio sociale de Gesu* (Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1938), 245-49.

³³ Mt. 8: 20.

³⁴ Mt. 5: 3, Lk. 6: 20, Mt. 6: 24-34.

³⁵ Lk. 12: 13-21.

³⁶ Lk. 16: 1-31.

³⁷ Mt. 19:16-26, Mk. 10:17-27, Lk. 18: 18-27.

³⁸ Lk. 19: 1-10.

³⁹ Rom. 12: 5, 1 Cor. 12: 27, Eph. 1: 22-23.

⁴⁰ Rom. **12:4-8**, 1 Cor. 12: 12-31, Eph. **4: 11-13**.

⁴¹ 1 Cor. 12: 26, Eph. **4: 25**, 1 Cor. 6: **15**.

⁴² Gal. 3: 28, Col. 3: **11**, 1 Cor. **12: 13**.

⁴³ Acts 4: 32. This text does not necessarily imply absolute communism. The Christians at Jerusalem possessed private property and were

free to dispose of it. St. Peter, speaking to Ananias about the latter's field said, "While it yet remained, did it not remain thine; and after it was sold, was not the money at thy disposal?" (Acts 5: 4). The sense of the text is that, although the Christian "possessed" property, he did not regard it entirely "as his own" but was willing to dispose of it for the benefit of the poor.

⁴⁴ Acts 4: 34.

⁴⁵ 2 Cor. 8: 1-9: 15, 1 Cor. 16: 1-4.

⁴⁶ Eph. 5: 33, Col. 3: 18, Tit. 2: 5, 1 Cor. 14: 34, 1 Tim. 2: 12, 1 Cor. 11:9.

⁴⁷ 1 Cor. 11:5.

⁴⁸ Rom. 16: 1, 3, 2 Tim. 4: 19, Phil. 4: 2, Acts 12: 12,9: 36,16: 14,17: 34, 21:9, 17: 4, 12, 1 Tim. 5: 3-16.

⁴⁹ Rom. 12: 2, 1 Cor. 5: 10, 7: 31. The last of these quotations is taken from the Westminster Version of the New Testament, whereas all the other quotations in this* chapter are from the new translation published by the Catholic Biblical Association of America.

⁶⁰ 1 Tim. 6: 17-18, Eph. 5: 5, 5: 3, 1 Tim. 3: 3, 8, 6: 7-8.

⁶¹ Eph. 6: 5-9. Col. 3: 22-4: 1, 1 Tim. 6: 1-2, Tit. 2: 9-10.

⁶² Acts 24: 5.

⁶³ 1 Tim. 2: 1-2, Tit. 3: 1, Rom. 13: 1.

⁶⁴ Jas. 4: 4, 1: 27, 5: 1, 4: 13-14, 2: 1-7.

⁶⁵ Jas. 2: 15-16, 13.

⁶⁶ 1 Jn. 2: 15-17, Jn. 21: 7, 1 Jn. 4: 7-8, 20, 3: 14.

⁶⁷ 1 Jn. 3: 16-18.

CHAPTER 8

¹ For the relevant texts see, Paul H. Furfey, "Social Action in the Early Church, 30-180 A.D.," *Theol. Studies*, 2: 171-97 and 3:89-108 (May, 1941 and Feb., 1942).

² See the map which forms the frontispiece, of, J. Lebreton and J. Zeiller, *Ueglise primitive (Histoire de VEglise* ed. by A. Fliche and V. Martin, Paris, Bloud & Gay, 1938).

⁸ Mk. 10: 17-31.

⁴ Clement of Alexandria, *Quis dives salvefur?* 5, n, 16, *Paedagogus*, 2: 3, 3:6, 3: 11, *Stromota*, 2: 18. The economic aspect of the social thought of the Fathers is well handled in, Ignaz Seipel, *Die wirtschafts ethischen Lehren der Kirchenvdter* (Vienna, Mayer, 1907).

⁸ St. Cyprian, *De lapsi*§, 12. See also, Timothy V. Kennedy, *The Social Thought of Saint Cyprian* (Unpublished M A. dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1941).

⁶ Lactantius, *Epitome*, 38, *Divin. instit.* 5: 16, 5: 6, 6: 12.

⁷ St. Basil, *In illud Lucae* 12:18, 4, *In divites*, 4 and 1, *Horn. VII in*

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Hexaemeron, 3, St. Gregory Nazianzen, *In laudem Basilii Magni*, 63.

⁸ St. Ambrose, *De Nabuthae*, 1. Translation from, M. R. P. McGuire, S.- Ambrosii *De Nabuthae*; A Commentary with an Introduction and Translation (Washington, Catholic University of America, 1927).

⁹ St. John Chrysostom, *In Ep. I ad Cor.*, 13: 5, *In Ep. II ad Cor.*, 13:4, *In Matt.*, 66: 3, *In Act. Apost.*, 11:3.

¹⁰ St. John Chrysostom, *In cap. XXV Genes.*, 50: 2.

¹¹ St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 14: 28. See also, John N. Figgis, *The Political Aspects of S. Augustine's "City of God"*¹¹ (London, Longmans, 1921).

¹² The epithet *Holy* was added in the twelfth century.

¹³ R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West* (New York, Putnam, 1903-36). The fourth volume deals with theories of the relation of papacy and empire from the tenth to twelfth centuries.

¹⁴ On the rise of the feudal system see two articles by Paul Vinogradoff in the *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, 2: 630-54 and 3: 458-84.

¹⁵ For a good treatment of the medieval concepts of law and liberty see, Bede Jarrett, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages, 1200-1500* (Boston, Little, 1926), 1-30, 94-121.

¹⁶ Maurice De Wulf, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York, Longmans, 1925-26), 1: 180-82.

¹⁷ Manegold of Lautenbach, *Liber ad Gebhardum*, 30.

¹⁸ E. F. Jacob, "John of Salisbury and the 'Polycraticus,'" in F. J. C. Hearnshaw (ed.), *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers* (London, Harrap, 1923), 58.

¹⁹ John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus*, 8: 17, 4: 3.

²⁰ St. Thomas Aquinas, *On the Governance of Rulers (De regimine principum)* (Trans. by Gerald B. Phelan, New York, Sheed, 1938).

²¹ St. Thomas, *De regimine principum*, 1: 1-3.

²² For St. Thomas and popular sovereignty, see his, *Summa th.*, I-II, Q. 105, A. 1 c. Dr. Wilfrid Parsons remarks that the Thomistic ideal was not dissimilar to the American conception of republican government. See his article, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Popular Sovereignty," *Thought*, 16: 473-92 (Sept., 1941), 475. For the state as a perfect society see, *Summa th.*, I-II, Q. 90, A. 3, ad 3um.

²³ St. Thomas, *Summa th.*, II-II, Q. 23, A. 6, A. 7; Q. 29, A. 3; Q. 40, A. 1, ad 3; Q. 32.

²⁴ St. Thomas, *Summa th.*, II-II, Q. 57, A. 3; Q. 32, A. 6; Q. 77, A. 4c; *De regimine principum*, 2:3.

²⁵ For details see, Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs* (London, Macmillan, 1940).

²⁶ Hitti, *Arabs*, 568. This view is confirmed in Nathaniel Schmidt, *Ibn Khaldun, Historian, Sociologist and Philosopher* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1930), 27-33.

²⁷ Ibn-Khaldun, *Prolegomenes; texte arabe (Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliotheque Imperiale, t. 16, Paris, Didot, 1858)*, 9-10.

CHAPTER 9

¹ Richard Lefebvre des Noettes, *Vattelage, le cheval de selle a travers les iges* (Paris, Picard, 1931).

² On medieval trade see, Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (New York, Harper, 1936), 148-66, Edward P. Cheyney, *The Dawn of a New Era, 1250-1453* (New York, Harper, 1936), 1-36, and J. H. Clapham, "Commerce and Industry in the Middle Ages" in *Cambridge Medieval History*, 6: 473-504. On navigation see the article by W. R. Martin in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (13th ed.), 19: 284-98.

³ Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, 196-98, Cheyney, *Dawn of a New Era*, 37-63.

⁴ Cheyney, *Dawn of a New Era*, 141. On the assemblies see, *ibid.*, 64 109 and C. H. McIlwain, "Medieval Estates," in *Cambridge Medieval History*, 7: 664-715.

⁵ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 14, 17, 18.

⁶ F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Nicolo Machiavelli" in his *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renaissance and the Reformation* (London, Harrap, 1925), 87-122.

⁷ Pope Boniface VIII, Bull, *Unam sanctam*, Nov. 18, 1302.

⁸ Pope John XXII, Constitution, *Cum inter nonnullos*, Nov. 13, 1323.

⁹ J. W. Allen, "Marsilio of Padua and Mediaeval Secularism," in Hearnshaw, *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers*, 167-91. Pope John XXII condemned some errors of Marsilio of Padua and John or Jandun in his Constitution, *Licet iuxta doctrinam*, Oct. 23, 1327.

¹⁰ On Nicolas' scientific work see the note on page 37 of E. F. Jacob, "Nicolas of Cusa" in Hearnshaw, *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renaissance and the Reformation*, 32-60.

¹¹ Nicolas of Cusa, *De concordantia Catholica*, 1: 17.

¹² Graham Carey, *The Majority Report on Art* (Newport, Stevens,

¹³ The *Utopia* was written in Latin, but the sixteenth-century flavor is preserved in Raphe Robinson's translation of 1551 which is here quoted from the *Everyman's Library* edition, page 29.

¹⁴ Thomas More, *Utopia* (*Everyman's Library* edition), 56, 91, 92, 94, 95, 83-84.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 114. On the difficulties raised by the treatment of religious questions in the *Utopia* see the article by P. Janelle in Vacant-Mangenot's *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique*, 10: 2472-82. We are told that More's most intimate friends often took him seriously when he was simply jesting. See, Thomas Stapleton, *Tres Thomae*, Part III (1588), translated as, *The Life and Illustrious Martyrdom of Sir Thomas More* (New York, Benziger, 1928), 132.

¹⁶ See the list in, Paul A. Kunkel, *The Theatines in the History of Catholic Reform before the Establishment of Liutheranism* (Washington, Catholic Univ. Press, 1941), 4.

¹⁷ This view is growing among impartial non-Catholic scholars. See, for example, Henry S. Lucas, *The Renaissance and the Reformation* (New York, Harper, 1934), 621-90.

CHAPTER 10

¹ A convenient summary of the scientific developments mentioned will be found in, Preserved Smith, *A History of Modern Culture* (New York, Holt, 1930-34), 1: 17-143 and 2: 27-120. See also, W. T. Sedgwick and Others, *A Short History of Science* (New York, Macmillan, 1939), Henry Crew, *The Rise of Modern Physics* (Baltimore, Williams and Wilkins, 1935), and R. C. Archibald, *Outline of the History of Mathematics* (Oberlin, Mathematical Association of America, 1941).

² There is some uncertainty whether Huygens invented the pendulum clock. The honor is disputed by Robert Hooke, Ahasuerus Fromanteel, and others. See, W. I. Milham, *Time and Timekeepers* (New York, Macmillan, 1923), 142-44, 88.

⁸ J. H. Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Boston, Houghton, 1940), 244-48, Smith, *Modern Culture*, 1: 144-76, 398-424.

⁴ *Ideal Commonwealths* (New York, Colonial Press, 1901), 148, 165. For an excellent bibliography see, P. Mandonnet, "Campanella" in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique*, 2: 1443-47.

⁵ *Ideal Commonwealths*, 129. An excellent short life of Bacon will be found in the article by Fowler in *Dictionary of National Biography* (New York, Macmillan, 1885-1900), 2: 328-60.

⁶ Baruch Spinoza, *Tractatus politicus*, 2: 15, *Tractatus theologico politicus*, 16.

⁷ Four books of this work were published in 1594; the fifth, in 1597. After Hooker's death three more books were published, but it is doubtful how far they were the work of Hooker.

⁸ Richard Hooker, *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, 8:2.

⁰ H. M. Chew, "King James I," in F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (London, Harrap, 1926), 105-29.

¹⁰ *Ideal Commonwealths* f 186, 187. For a short but penetrating analysis of the *Oceana* see, G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York, Holt, 1937), 496-508.

¹¹ Filmer had died in 1653 but the book which Locke was answering, *Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings Asserted*, was not published until 1680.

¹² John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 2: 2, paragraph 6.

¹³ Revised Latin edition (*De republica libri sex*), 1586, English translation by Richard Knolles (*The Six Books of a Commonwealth*), 1606.

¹⁴ There is a good brief account of Louis and his court in, David Ogg, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (London, Black, 1931), 281-322.

¹⁵ Jacques Bossuet, *La Politique*, 2: 2, conclusion; 6: 2,4; 6: 2, 2; 3: 2,4.

¹⁰ Rom. 13: 1.

¹⁷ St. Robert Bellarmine, *De membris Ecclesiae Militantis*, lib. 3, *De laicis*, 3: 6.

¹⁸ Francis Suarez, *Tractatus de legibus et Legislatore Deo*, 3:4, 1.

¹⁹ For a good brief summary of mercantilism and cameralism see, L. H. Haney, *History of Economic Thought* (New York, Macmillan, 1936), 111-65,

CHAPTER II

¹ An excellent study of the thought of the Enlightenment is, Ernst Cassirer, *Die Philosophic der Aufklärung* (Tubingen, Mohr, 1932). The best convenient guide in English is the second volume of Preserved Smith, *A History of Modern Culture* (New York, Holt, 1934). Smith is reliable in his statement of facts, but not unprejudiced in his interpretations. A briefer, but more balanced, interpretation will be found in W. L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire, 1740-1763* (New York, Harper, 1940), chapter five. On the Catholic opponents of the *philosophes* see, R. R. Palmer, *Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1939).

² The name Voltaire is probably an anagram of Arouet L.j. (*le jeune*), v and j being considered interchangeable with u and i.

⁸ F. M. A. de Voltaire, *Dictionnaire philosophique*, article, "Athee, atheisme."

⁴ *Encyclopedic, ou dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts, et des metiers*.

⁵ An important study is, Rene Hubert, *Les sciences sociales dans l'Encyclopedie* (Paris, Alcan, 1923).

⁶ *Dei delitti e delle pene*, 1764.

⁷ An excellent brief summary of deism will be found in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (13th ed.), 7: 933-37.

⁸ F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke," in his *The Social and Political Ideas of Some English Thinkers of the Augustan Age* (London, Harrap, 1928), 210-47.

⁹ There is a good summary of these developments in, Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (New York, Harper, 1936), 335-83.

¹⁰ Daniel Defoe, *The Compleat English Tradesman*, vol. 1, ch. 10, 5, 8, 19, 25.

¹¹ F. M. A. de Voltaire, *Dictionnaire philosophique*, article, "Guerre."

¹² On the spirit of militarism in the eighteenth century see, Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York, Norton, 1937), 30-95, Dorn, *Competition for Empire*, 80-121. On the technical side of warfare at this period see, O. L. Spaulding and Others, *Warfare* (Washington, Infantry Journal, 1937), 528-40.

¹⁸ Gournay is said to have originated the maxim, *Laissez faire, laissez passer* from which *laissez-faire* economics takes its name.

¹⁴ Perhaps the most useful summary of the school in English is Henry Higgs, *The Physiocrats* (New York, Macmillan, 1897)

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¹⁵ J.-J. Rousseau, *Le contrat social*, I: I, I: 6, 4: 8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1:6.

CHAPTER 12

¹ In his posthumous work, *The Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England* (1884).

² Polhem's machine shop at Stiernsund has already been mentioned. Another famous example was Lombe's silk mill at Derby (1718). Both these factories were driven by water power. An excellent review of eighteenth-century technology, replete with illustrations, is, A. Wolf, *A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, Macmillan, 1939). Toynbee thought of the Industrial Revolution as covering thirty or forty years around 1800.

⁸ H. L. Beales, "The Industrial Revolution," *History*, N.S., 14: 125-29 (July, 1929), Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (New York, Harper, 1936), 415-18.

⁴ All these developments are explained in the work of Wolf just cited. The best work on the steam engine is, H. W. Dickinson, *A Short History of the Steam Engine* (Cambridge, University Press, 1939). On the development of machine tools see, J. W. Roe, *English and American Tool Builders* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1926).

⁵ R. C. Epstein, "Industrial Invention, Heroic or Systematic?" *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, 40: 232-72 (Feb., 1926).

⁶ The facts are conveniently reviewed in, M. Dorothy George, *England in Transition: Life and Work in the Eighteenth Century* (London, Routledge, 1931).

⁷ Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations* (Modern Library edition), 420-31.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 313.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹⁰ T. R. Malthus, *Essay on Population*, 4: 1. It is interesting to note that moral restraint made its first appearance as a "check" in the second (1803) edition.

¹¹ For the present purpose the two most convenient summaries are perhaps, Crane Brinton, *A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799* (New York, Harper, 1934) and Geoffrey Bruun, *Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814* (New York, Harper, 1938).

¹² Crane Brinton, *The Jacobins; An Essay in the New History* (New York, Macmillan, 1930), Augustin Cochin, *Les sociétés de pensée et la démocratie* (Paris, Plon, 1921).

¹⁸ Brinton, *Decade of Revolution*, 158-63, 293-302.

¹⁴ A convenient summary of Mably's thought will be found in, F. J. C. Hearnshaw (ed.), *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great French Thinkers of the Age of Reason* (London, Harrap, 1930), 228-49.

¹⁵ For a convenient summary of these controversies see the article by Brinton in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 5: 49-51.

¹⁶ Brinton, *Decade of Revolution*, 142-63, contains a good account of the revolutionary cults and ideology.

¹⁷ A convenient review of royalist thought is, Charlotte T. Muret, *French Royalist Doctrines since the Revolution* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1933).

¹⁸ For a good brief summary of the early English radicals see the article by G. S. Veitch in, F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *The Social and Political Ideals of Some Representative Thinkers of the Revolutionary Era* (London, Harrap, 1931), 24-47.

¹⁹ G. P. Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution* (New York, Longmans, 1920).

²⁰ On the thought of the romanticists see, Crane Brinton, *The Political Ideas of the English Romanticists* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1926).

²¹ See again, Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*. The *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* has brief, but usually competent, articles on the more important romanticists.

²² The technically philosophical elements in the thought of Kant and Hegel may be conveniently studied in, Harald Hoffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy* (New York, Macmillan, 1900).

CHAPTER 13

¹ John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (*The World's Classics* edition), 65, 115.

² John Stuart Mill, *The Subjection of Women* (*The World's Classics* edition), 427.

³ A convenient summary is, J. F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1915).

⁴ A short account of the principal inventions and their dates is given in W. T. Sedgwick and Others, *A Short History of Science* (New York, Macmillan, 1939), 457-71. R. S. Kirby and P. G. Laurson, *The Early Years of Modern Civil Engineering* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1932) discusses railroads, canals, raw materials, and other engineering topics. An excellent book on the development of the ship is, S. C. Gillfillan, *Inventing the Ship* (Chicago, Follett, 1935). Unfortunately there exists no satisfactory general history of technology.

⁵ Kirby and Laurson, *Early Years of Modern Civil Engineering*, 191.

⁶ A vivid description of nineteenth-century living conditions may be found in, F. S. Taylor, *The Century of Science* (London, Heinemann, 1941).

⁷ Thomas Carlyle, *Past and Present* (*The World's Classics* edition) 152.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁹ This aspect of his thought is developed in, Sister Mary Corita O'Brien, *The Personal Element in the Sociological Ideas of John Ruskin* (Washington, Catholic Univ. Press, 1939).

¹⁰ A fuller account of Cabet will be found in, S. A. Piotrowski,

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Etienne Cabet and the *Voyage en Icarie* (Washington, Catholic Univ. Press, 1935).

¹¹ Sister Mary Ignatius Ring, *Villeneuve-Bargemont, Precursor of Modern Social Catholicism* (Milwaukee, Bfuce, 1935).

¹² Another factor in the situation was the existence of a group of Catholics, particularly in France, who defended a type of liberalism inconsistent with Catholic social doctrine and were rebuked by the Holy See. A very full treatment of the movement by C. Constantin is given in the article, "Liberalisme catholique," in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique*, 9: 506-629.

¹⁸ An excellent book whose scope is actually broader than the title implies is, P. T. Moon, *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement in France* (New York, Macmillan, 1921).

CHAPTER 14

¹ A convenient brief summary of the progress of constitutionalism will be found in, Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900* (New York, Harper, 1941), 50-59.

² Philip Klein, "Social Work, General Discussion," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 14: 165-73.

⁸ See the stimulating short outline of Spencer's thought in, F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age* (London, Harrap, 1933), 53-83.

⁴ Robert H. Lowie, *The History of Ethnological Theory* (New York, Farrar, 1937), 54-67.

⁵ Hayes, *Generation of Materialism*, 237-38.

⁶ These and other quotations are collected in V. L. and M. H. Albjerg, *From Sedan to Stresa* (New York, Van Nostrand, 1937), 645. On militarism in general see, Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York, Norton, 1937).

⁷ On anti-Semitism in classical times see, S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1937), 1: 143-50.

⁸ Sometimes *realism* is applied to the earlier and less extreme phases of the movement and *naturalism* is used as a designation for the later and more extreme phases. See, W. A. Nitze and E. P. Dargan, *A History of French Literature* (New York, Holt, 1938), 623.

⁹ A good brief review of the life and work of Pope Leo will be found in the article by G. Goyau in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de theologie catholique*, 9: 334-59. Most of his important statements which are valuable for social thought will be found in *The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII* (New York, Benziger, 1903). See also, Eduardo Soderini, *The Pontificate of Leo XIII* (London, Burns, 1934).

¹⁰ Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical, *Diuturnum*, June 29, 1881.

¹¹ Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical, *Immortale Dei*, Nov. 1, 1885.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical, *Longinqua oceani*, Jan. 6, 1895.

¹⁴ Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical, *Sapientiae Christianae*, Jan. 10, 1800.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Pope Leo XIII, Apostolic Letter, *Praeclara gratulationis*, June 20, 1804.

¹⁷ Encyclical, *Rerum novarum*, May 15, 1891. On the importance of the virtues as elements in a Catholic social program see, P. H. Furfey, "Personalistic Social Action in the 'Rerum novarum' and 'Quadragesimo anno,'" *American Cath. Soc. Rev.*, 2: 204-16 (Dec, 1941).

¹⁸ Encyclical, *Rerum novarum*.

¹⁹ Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical, *Mirae caritatis*, May 28, 1902.

⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹ *nlbid.*

CHAPTER 15

¹ Quoted by Vernon L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, Harcourt, 1927-30), 1: 82. Parrington's treatment of the whole period is brilliant.

² On colonial class structure see, Curtis P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (New York, Crofts, 1938), 304-28.

⁸ For an interesting history of the rise and development of "high society" in America see, Dixon Wecter, *The Saga of American Society; A Record of Social Aspiration* (New York, Scribner, 1937). It is probably not true, as sometimes stated, that Cavaliers fled from England to Virginia in considerable numbers and gave an aristocratic tone to the society of the colony. For a brief discussion with further references see, O. P. Chitwood, *A History of Colonial America* (New York, Harper, 1931), 88.

⁴ Nettels, *Roots of American Civilization*, 320-54, 516-42.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 665.

⁶ The first syllable of the name rhymes with cow.

⁷ Elbridge Gerry, "Observations on the New Constitution," in P. L. Ford (ed.), *Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States Published during its Discussion by the People 1787-1788* (Brooklyn, publisher not given, 1888), 7, 14.

⁸ Richard Henry Lee, "Letters from the Federal Farmer," in Ford, *Pamphlets*, 282, 285, 321.

⁹ James Madison, *Journal of the Federal Convention* (ed. by E. H. Scott, Chicago, Albert, Scott, 1894), 175-87.

¹⁰ One of the best and most impartial treatments of the condition of the slaves will be found in the second chapter of, J. G. Randall, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (Boston, Heath, 1937).

¹¹ Quoted in S. E. Morison and H. S. Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1930), 126.

¹² Was there still a possibility of avoiding war after Lincoln's inaugu

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ration? For a dispassionate discussion of this vexed question see, Randall, *Civil War and Reconstruction*, 227-41.

¹³ R. H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought* (New York, Ronald, 1940), 136.

¹⁴ Thomas Nelson Page, *The Negro; The Southerner's Problem* (New York, Scribner, 1904), 292.

¹⁵ U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1932* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1932), 730. The figures for the former year include "factories and hand and neighborhood industries" while those for the latter year exclude "hand and neighborhood industries and establishments with products valued at less than \$500." In interpreting these figures it is important to bear in mind the varying purchasing power of the dollar.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 271.

¹⁷ For an excellent brief discussion and further references see, L. ill. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, *The United States since 1865* (New York, Crofts, 1939), 195-201.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 295-320.

¹⁹ It was originally known as the "Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada." The name was changed to the present one in 1886.

²⁰ Quoted in, Edward Channing, *A History of the United States* (New York, Macmillan, 1905-25), 4: 558.

²¹ For a justifying quotation and a general discussion of Roosevelt's position see, Gabriel, *American Democratic Thought*, 351-54.

²² For a general discussion and legal references see, Hacker and Kendrick, *United States since 1865*, 371-72

²⁸ In April, 1816, Stephen Decatur proposed the toast at Norfolk: "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." Popular usage has omitted one clause and changed the plural to the more individualistic singular.

CHAPTER 16

¹ A convenient summary of Schaeffle's thought will be found in, Albion W. Small, *General Sociology* (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1905), 157-79.

² For a good treatment of "social Darwinism" see, Floyd N. House, *The Development of Sociology* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936),

⁸ Note the long and very sympathetic exposition of Ratzenhofer in Small, *General Sociology*, 183-394.

⁴ There is a convenient presentation of Novikov's ideas in tabular form in, Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, Harper, 1928), 315.

⁶ It is rather interesting to compare McDougall's somewhat dogmatic

discussion of the instincts which are present at birth and which determine social behavior with Watson's failure to find any significant evidence of such instincts in a series of infants whom he carefully examined. See, William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (Boston, Luce, 1921) and John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1924). To read parallel passages from these two books is a valuable lesson in the danger of theorizing without first examining the facts.

⁶ Small, *General Sociology*, 197. The quotation occurs in a passage in which Small is interpreting Ratzenhofer, but this conception of interest is the former's, not the latter's.

⁷ L. L. Bernard, "Scientific Method and Social Progress," *Am. Jour. Sociol.*, 31: 1-18 (July, 1925), 9.

⁸ A second edition of this work (1942) falls outside the chronological limits of the present work which considers the history of social thought to 1939 only.

⁹ For the mathematical justification of the statements made somewhat dogmatically in the text, see the following references by Paul H. Furfey and Joseph F. Daly (coauthors): *The Interpretation of the Product Moment Correlation Coefficient* {*Catholic University of America Educational Research Monographs*, Vol. 8, no. 4, Washington, 1934), "Product-Moment Correlation as a Research Technique in Education," *Jour. Educ. Psychol.*, 26: 206-11 (March, 1935), "The Correlation Coefficient as an Index of Relationship," *Jour. Exper. Educ.*, 3: 166-69 (March, 1935), "The Subjective Element in the Measurement of Relationship," *Jour. Educ. Psychol.*, 27: 307-9 (April, 1936), "A Criticism of Factor Analysis as a Technique of Social Research," *Am. Soc. Rev.*, 2: 178-86 (April, 1937).

¹⁰ For a short but illuminating discussion of this term see, Carl Brinkmann, "Geisteswissenschaften," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 6: 600-2.

¹¹ There is a good brief review of *die verstehende Soziologie* in House, *Development of Sociology*, 393-402. It is perhaps not irrelevant to point out that the growth of *Gestalt* psychology offers interesting parallels in a kindred field. See, Paul H. Furfey, "Psychoanalysis, Behaviorism and the Gestalt," *Thought*, 4: 237-53 (September, 1920).

¹² Paul H. Furfey, *Three Theories of Society* (New York, Macmillan, 1937), 104-22. Note that in this book the term *phenomenological method* is used in a very different sense from that of Litt and Vierkandt. See also, Paul H. Furfey, "A Foreword to Sociology," *New Scholasticism*, 9: 187-208 (July, 1935).

¹⁸ For the distinction between *ratio* and *intellectus* see, St. Thomas Aquinas, *Conrm. Sent.*, Lib. II, Dist. 24, Q. 3, A. 3, ad 2um. For the classification of noesis as a *habitus* see, St. Thomas Aquinas, *De verit.*, Q. 15, A. 1, c. For the whole question of noesis in St. Thomas see two excellent monographs, Paul Wilpert, *Das Problem der Wahrheits-sicherung bet Thomas von Aquin* (*Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philoso*

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phie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Band XXX, Heft 3, Münster, 1931) and Alfons Hufnagel, *Intuition und Erkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin* (Veröffentlichungen des katholischen Institutes für Philosophie, Albertus-Magnus-Akademie zu Köln, Münster, 1932).

¹⁴ "Subito et sine inquisitione." St. Thomas Aquinas, *De verit.*, Q. 16, A. 1, c.

¹⁵ Even in this instance noesis plays its part; but the point need not be pressed.

¹⁰ Compare the chapter "How It Feels to Be Lower Caste" in a recent sociological study of the Negro, Allison Davis and John Dollard, *Children of Bondage* (Washington, American Council on Education, 1940), 237-55.

¹⁷ The point is developed in, Furfey, *Three Theories*, 127-28.

¹⁸ These various points are further elaborated in, Furfey, *op. cit.*

CHAPTER 17

¹ Andrew Carnegie, *Problems of To-day* (New York, Doubleday, 1908), 175.

² In W. C. Langsam, *Documents and Readings in the History of Europe since 1918* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1939), 54.

⁸ On the general question of intervention or isolation for the United States, see two excellent recent books, D. F. Fleming, *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1938) and, Edwin Borchard and W. P. Lage, *Neutrality for the United States* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1940). As the titles imply, the two books take opposite sides.

⁴ Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical, *In plurimis*, May 5, 1888.

⁶ For a discussion of armament figures with references to sources see, W. C. Langsam, *The World since 1914* (New York, Macmillan, 1940), 231-32.

⁶ In terms of 1939 dollars from 42.0 to 68.6 billion. See, National Resources Planning Board, *Our National Resources; Facts and Problems* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), 6.

⁷ President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933), 173. The figures given include private cars, cars for hire, taxicabs, and busses.

⁸ Committee on Recent Economic Changes, *Recent Economic Changes in the United States* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1929), 11.

⁹ For good brief treatments of the history of the depression and the governmental efforts to cope with it see, C. W. Wright, *Economic History of the United States* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1941), 975-1008, and, L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, *The United States since 1865* (New York, Crofts, 1940), 671-777.

¹⁰ E. G. Nourse and Associates, *America's Capacity to Produce* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1934), 422.

¹¹ Maurice Leven and Others, *America's Capacity to Consume* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1934), 56.

¹² *Ibid.*, 54, table.

¹³ ^r or an excellent brief discussion of these points see, M. E. Walsh, *American Social Problems* (New York, Appleton-Century, 1942), 110-26.

¹⁴ " R. L. Wilbur and A. M. Hyde, *The Hoover Policies* (New York, Scribner, 1937), 13-14, 20, 32.

¹⁵ Unbiased unemployment statistics are very hard to get. The figures in the text are those of the American Federation of Labor and may be taken as representing a middle-of-the-road position. See, Corrington Gill, *Wasted Manpower* (New York, Norton, 1939) for an excellent discussion of the complicated problem.

¹⁶ William H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age* (Boston, Little, 1935), 82, 88.

¹⁷ William H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921* (New York, Macmillan, 1935), 1: 136.

¹⁸ Pope Pius XI, Encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris*, March 19, 1937.

¹⁹ ⁿ *Ibid.*

²⁰ See the commentary on this portion of the Encyclical in, Oswald von Nell-Breuning, *Reorganization of Social Economy* (Milwaukee, Bruce, 1936), 254-57.

²¹ The expression occurs in the *Divini Redemptoris*.

²² The attitude of the Spanish Catholics during the Civil War is well set forth in, *The Spanish Situation; A Survey* (Washington, National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1937).

²³ Pope Pius XII, Encyclical, *Summi pontificatus*, October 20, 1939.

²⁴ Pope Pius XI, Encyclical, *-Caritate Christi compulsi*, May 3, 1932.

²⁵ Pope Pius XII, Radio address, *Un' or a grave*, August 24, 1939.

²⁶ Encyclical, *Summi pontificatus*.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Pope Pius XI, Encyclical, *Quadragesimo anno*, May 15, 1931.

²⁹ Pope Pius XI, Encyclical, *Ubi arcano Dei*, December 23, 1922.

⁸⁰ The papal peace proposals with excerpts from the American reply are given in, John Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations* (London, Burns, 1935), 215-19. The book is an excellent treatment of its subject.

⁸¹ See again the commentary in, Nell-Breuning, *Reorganization of Social Economy*. The National Catholic Welfare Conference has published a number of excellent pamphlets on the subject. They are authoritative and specific.

⁸² Pope Pius XI, Encyclical, *Casti connubii*, December 31, 1930.

⁸⁸ Encyclical, *Quadragesimo anno*.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Encyclical, *Ubi arcano Dei*.

⁸⁶ Encyclical, *Summi pontificatus*.

⁸⁷ Encyclical, *Mit brennender Sorge*.

⁸⁸ Encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris*.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

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