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THE SOVIET IMAGE OF FUTURE WAR

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THE SOVIET IMAGE OF FUTURE WAR

By RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

*Author of "Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age"
and "Soviet Military Doctrine"*

INTRODUCTION BY GENERAL JAMES M. GAVIN

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TO MY SON ALEXANDER

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INTRODUCTION

Judging by the public expressions of many of the statesmen and military spokesmen of the West, our views of the Soviets appear to be compounded of wishful thinking, and responsiveness to economic pressures inherent in the free enterprise system. In addition, our expressed views appear at times to be reactive to Soviet stimulus. Thus, there appears to be a lack of general understanding, on the part of the West, of many fundamental problems of modern military technology. Among these I would include, for example, the interrelationship of a nation's economy and its warmaking capacity, the relationship of nuclear weapons and manpower requirements, the probable duration of nuclear war, and finally the nature of nuclear war itself—whether it is likely to be pre-emptive, and general or limited in its nature. These are difficult problems with which to deal, not because of their intrinsic complexity, but because we fail to be realistic in our analyses of them. And this failure on our part is carefully encouraged by the Soviets in their propaganda. While they say one thing, they practice another and they play on the fears of the West whenever they can.

“Know your enemy” is one of the oldest military maxims. It has been expressed in many different forms and it remains one of the essentials to the achievement of combat success. 2500 years ago Sun Tzu wrote: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Unfortunately, the enemy of free men today is far more difficult to understand than any threat that has confronted us in the past. When Winston Churchill referred

to Russia as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" he aptly emphasized the complex nature of Lenin's legacy to the world.

Due to the dynamic nature of modern technology, understanding one's enemy is critically important today. Technology is moving at such a mad pace that before man understands many of the things that come to his attention new things have accumulated upon his earlier knowledge. The technology from which he can draw upon to create his weapon systems is so extensive and so complex that it is difficult to anticipate or foresee the weapons that lie ahead. In addition, brainwashing, deception, and lies are now part of the modern military lexicon because they reflect the struggle for the control of the uncommitted minds of the world and the retention of those already committed. Significant in its impact on all of these is a nation's economic potential. An understanding of these, collectively, can mean life or death to a people. Men of voracity and greed, determined in their objectives and ruthless in their methods to achieve those objectives, may possibly enslave the earth itself. Such are the men who today sway the destiny of all the people behind the Iron Curtain.

Khrushchev has declared war upon us and in doing so he has declared war upon men wherever the spark of freedom burns in their souls. And while he suggests that this war is in the realm of economy, a war of economy is a war in every sense of that word. For a nation's capacity for war, its very capacity for survival against aggression, depends upon the inextricable relationship of all of its resources, including, of course, its economic resources. Fortunately, we are now becoming aware of this and, as the masters of the Kremlin pursue their aggressive course, zigzagging to accommodate

the subtleties of their many-pronged offensive, it is clear that their objective remains the same—world domination.

An adequate response to the Soviet challenge must begin with an understanding of the nature of the challenge. Raymond L. Garthoff has been studying the Soviets and writing about them for many years. One of his early significant texts, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, was written when he was with the Rand Corporation in 1953. It was, to my knowledge, the first authoritative and comprehensive treatment of the subject to be published in our country. Last year he published *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, which brought his earlier treatment of the subject up to date. It also drew the attention of the American public to him as one of the outstanding authorities on Soviet strategic thinking. Now, in this book, *The Soviet Image of Future War*, he addresses himself some of the most highly significant aspects of Soviet military thinking. In doing so he analyzes and presents his understanding of the many facets of their strategy, drawing freely upon Soviet military writing and thinking. His research has been quite extensive. Included in this book are direct translations of some of the latest, highly important Soviet military writings.

The economic dilemma that confronts the West is now generally well understood. Modern weapon systems are very expensive, so expensive, in fact, that the Department of Defense is unable to satisfy the needs of any of the services. The administration fears that if it spends more on arms it will contribute directly to inflationary growth and we will be getting a diminishing amount of defense for each dollar spent. And, as wages and prices spiral, our competitive ability to deal with the Soviet economic offensive dwindles. Ultimately, unless we find new solutions to the economic problems that beset us, we will be unable to provide sufficient

force to meet even a fraction of the needs of national policy. It has been such thinking, in part, that led us to the sterile and dead-end strategy of "massive retaliation." Dr. Garthoff discusses the Soviet views of the interrelationship of their economy and warmaking capacity. He quotes authoritative Soviet sources and his conclusions are sobering. By failing to appreciate the nature of the Soviet challenge we could well lose a war without a shot being fired. It would be lost in the realm of strategy—an essential ingredient in a successful strategy today is a winning economy. As one Soviet writer put it, "under equal economic potentials, the military economic potential of the socialist country is greater than that of a capitalist country." The Soviet Union is convinced that it possesses a superior potential in basic economic, morale, and military strength.

If war is a continuation of politics by other means (and the Soviets believe that it is) then its instruments—its war-making machines—must be as flexible and discriminating in application as the needs of policy itself. The Soviets take a realistic view of this and they maintain a military force that reflects this view. "Limited war" is an expression of our creation. To the Soviets, war is war, and it is as all-out or not as the needs of policy require. In fact, limited and discreet application of power is the classic Communist method and the Soviets are today prepared to wage limited war anywhere along its periphery. By threatening and bullying with their ICBMs, they can create sufficient apprehension to enable them to get away with power plays of considerable smaller magnitude. Their understanding of this is quite apparent in their writings; Dr. Garthoff develops this convincingly.

Somewhat wishfully, when we found ourselves wedded to "massive retaliation" as an exclusive strategy several years ago, we came to the conclusion that if war were to occur it

would be over in a few days at most. This had an economic appeal also in that it made stock-piling and similar prewar preparations unnecessary. At about the same time some Western statesmen came to the happy conclusion—happy economically speaking—that as we acquired more thermo-nuclear missiles we would need less manpower. The damage from this error is still felt by NATO and it may, even now, critically effect our survival prospects. Dr. Garthoff examines the Soviet views of both of these problems. Evidently the Soviets believe that a nuclear war may be of some duration. As a Soviet military writer stated last year: “The use of these weapons (IRBMs and ICBMs) by both sides will more likely lead to extending the duration of the war than to speeding it. Hence, while in the past major wars could be short or long, in our time all major wars inevitably assume a quite drawn-out character.” It is for this kind of war that they are now preparing or are already prepared. As for manpower, the Soviets have come to the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons implies need for greater manpower rather than less. This conclusion is particularly meaningful to us in relation to our coalition policy. The Soviets anticipate very heavy damage to their own economic system and they therefore plan to have sufficient force to enable them to take over the resources of other countries.

It is evident that our views on fundamental military problems differ. This in itself requires those of us in the West to study Soviet military thinking, planning, and achievement. Dr. Garthoff has made a splendid contribution to our understanding of the Soviets. It is a book that should be read by every American who is interested in the future survival of the free world.

LIEUT. GENERAL JAMES M. GAVIN (Ret.)

Cambridge, Mass.

PREFACE

This book seeks to probe and lay bare the concrete Soviet doctrinal prescriptions on the nature of modern war, and on the key factors which influence and determine its course and outcome. It analyzes the image of future war as it is seen by the military leaders and theoreticians of the USSR.

My earlier study, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, deals with Soviet military strategic concepts and doctrine for the employment of the various components of the armed forces. The present volume supplements and extends the earlier study by a more detailed analysis of the development and current state of thinking on the role of the basic economic, military, political and morale factors in war, and the evaluation of surprise, blitzkrieg, and preventive and preemptive strikes.

There exist a number of misconceptions and erroneous conclusions on these aspects of Soviet military doctrine. This fact, and also the importance accorded to these factors by the Soviets themselves, have pointed to the need for a thorough examination of these crucial aspects of Soviet military thinking. This study is offered as an attempt to meet this need.

The role of war and military strategy in Soviet national policy is treated in the first chapter, which seeks to place in perspective the detailed doctrinal investigation in the chapters following.

The flavor, as well as much of the substance, of current Soviet military thinking on the image of future war is presented in three significant Soviet discussions of military doctrine on the nature of future war, which are appended in

full translation. The authors have long occupied authoritative positions as spokesmen on official military thinking, and the articles are the most current, extensive, authoritative and useful discussions presently available.

The conclusions expressed in this study are solely those of the author; they do not necessarily represent official views.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

Washington, D. C.

CONTENTS

1

War and Military Strategy 1

2

Decisive Factors in Modern War 23

3

The Role of Surprise and Blitzkrieg 60

APPENDIX A

Soviet Military Science on the Character of
Contemporary War 86

APPENDIX B

On the Fundamental Factors Which Determine the
Course and Outcome of War 108

6

The Creative Character of Soviet Military Science 118

References 129

CHAPTER I

WAR AND STRATEGY

“The objective of military strategy,” according to a Soviet General Staff organ, “is the creation by military means of those conditions under which politics is in a position to achieve the aims it sets for itself.” Since in the first half of the twentieth century “military means” for improving the political position of states have led to two world wars and several lesser ones, we tend naturally to think of military strategy as planning for war. But it is necessary to reflect that military influence is exerted in other ways as well. As the potential employment of new weapons—now, quite literally, reaching out of this world—has become so physically effective as to become often politically ineffective, military strategy must more prominently serve political aims by measures short of war. Various forms of “peacetime” offensive pressure and defensive protection increase in importance: atomic blackmail and a flexing of missile muscles, deterrence by the threat of retaliation, counter-deterrence, and finally counter-counter-deterrence.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

One should begin by clarifying the aims of Soviet policy. It is often said that while Soviet tactics change, the fundamental objectives remain unchanged. World Communism is the aim of the Soviet leaders, in the sense of their aspiration. This underlies their basic and pervasive hostility to the West and their fear of freedom.

But is it useful merely to say that the Soviets are out to achieve World Communism? Could this not divert our attention from the more acute immediate challenges? Soviet policy has concrete aims which are operative now. The primary one is to maintain the security and power of the U.S.S.R. It is also an objective to expand influence and power beyond the Communist Bloc in furtherance of aspirations to world hegemony, insofar as this objective can be attained without risking the Soviet regime and state. The fundamental operative objective, underlying and guiding their political and military strategy, is: *to advance the power of the U.S.S.R. in whatever ways are most expedient so long as the survival of the Soviet power itself is not endangered.*

This statement of the Soviet objective may, at first glance, seem self-evident and of little practical importance. However, when it is applied to the current context of military and political power a number of interesting and significant corollaries are apparent. First, it means that the Soviet leaders have decided that deliberate initiation of general war would not be in their interest in the foreseeable future. Secondly, it means that the Soviet Union will seek to avoid serious risk of general war. Thirdly, it means that the Soviets will probably continue to pursue a policy of peaceful expansion of their influence and power. They will probably continue to attempt to identify themselves with ideals widely held in the world—ideals such as peace, disarmament, progress, and national liberation and independence movements—all of which they seek to contrast with alleged imperialist warmongering, arms race, reactionary policies, and colonialism. Finally, it is nonetheless true that within this gen-

eral policy they will be alert to exploit counter-deterrence* of Western strength when they consider the risks to be low, especially in cases where aggression can be indirect. While generally avoiding a belligerent posture, the Soviets will surely advertise their growing power, and we may expect boldly insinuated threats when they consider it appropriate. They *may* even come to decide upon deliberate initiation of limited wars, particularly in cases where indirect aggression could be masked to lull those in the world who are prone to overlook all but the most blatant Communist aggression.

It is not necessary for us here to analyze the respective roles of ideology and power politics in Soviet policy-making. For present purposes, for examining policy on war and peace and on the tasks of military strategy, there is no divergence or discrepancy. Both the Communist ideology and purely power-political considerations place the criterion of calculated risk, cost, and gain at the foundation of any strategic initiative. Communist doctrine almost certainly *does* inject unusually strong hostility and suspicion into Soviet policy-making, but Marxism-Leninism does *not* propel the U.S.S.R. toward the embrace of war or the witting assumption of great risks. Why should the Soviet leaders, confident in moving with the sweep of history, court disaster by a premature gamble?

* I use the term "counter-deterrence" to mean the neutralization of someone else's deterrent. The United States and the Soviet Union each maintain a strategic striking capability which serves as a deterrent to possible attacks upon itself by the other. This results in mutual deterrence, but not in strategic counter-deterrence because the deterrents both still function. But, even though the United States deterrent against a direct Soviet attack on North America would remain effective, if—as the Soviets expect—the same capability were no longer effective to meet certain lesser challenges not directly and mortally threatening the U.S., the Soviets would have achieved counter-deterrence of the American deterrent for such situations. The antidote, an additional U.S. capability for effectively dealing with such limited and local challenges, could then be described as a counter-counter-deterrent.

SOVIET STRATEGIC CALCULATION

In developing political and military strategies, the Soviet leaders are guided by their estimate of the world situation, of the balance of power between the Communist and Western blocs. Such estimates are made by all powers, but an important difference characterizes Soviet strategy. Marxism-Leninism claims monopoly on a uniquely scientific means of estimating the situation and of selecting the appropriate strategy. In Soviet terms, this estimating process is called "the calculation of the relation of forces," and Lenin once called it "the main point in Marxism and Marxian tactics." Without dwelling on the political role of this calculation, it may be worthwhile to point out in passing that the famous "general (Party) line"—there can *only* be one correct line or policy at any given time—is determined by the calculation of the relation of forces in that particular situation. This estimate forms the basis for decisions on war or peace, on advance or retreat, on direct or indirect offensive or defensive action.

The political "deviations" represent erroneous un-Marxist calculations: the "Left" deviation or "adventurism" is an underestimation of the hostile forces; the Right deviation or "opportunism" is an overestimation of the hostile forces. Adventurism is taking an unwarranted risk, one which the objective situation does not permit, while opportunism is overlooking and not seizing upon the potentiality for a gain or advance which the objective relation of forces does permit. Objectively, though not to the Soviets themselves, the technique has not proved itself to be "scientific." Early Bolshevik leaders who were convinced Marxists of roughly equal intelligence continued to disagree on issues of policy and strategy so long as any freedom to disagree was permitted.

But in the Soviet system, since supposedly there can be but one correct calculation, and one correct policy to accord with the relation of forces, policy errors cannot be admitted and differences of judgment cannot be allowed.

What are the "forces" which are calculated? Broadly, they are the elements which we implicitly include in our political concept of "the balance of power." Khrushchev himself has defined the relation of forces as "a broad conception which embraces political, economic and military factors."⁴ The relation of forces in the world arena was until recently described in terms of a "capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet Union, though ever since 1947 the Soviets have spoken of the socialist and capitalist "camps." By 1957, according to Khrushchev: "The launching of the sputniks shows without doubt that a serious change has occurred in the relation of forces between the countries of socialism and capitalism in favor of the socialist nations."⁴ More recently, at the XXI Party Congress, the Soviet leaders have claimed that the present shift in the world relation of forces is decisive and irrevocable.⁵ Soviet spokesmen have explicitly concluded that capitalist encirclement has ended and has been replaced by a rough parity of the power of the West and of the Communist Bloc.⁶ Thus, from a somewhat different angle, the Russians too have come to judge the present world situation as one of mutual deterrence of the two power blocs.

Under the prevailing balance of forces, the major role of Soviet military and political strategy is seen as deterring the West from launching war, and the next most important is counterdetering the West from effective reactions to Communist advances short of war. However, with their conception of the potentialities of various political, propaganda, economic, and military forms of advancing Soviet power

short of general war, they by no means see this as a stalemate respecting anything other than strategic nuclear military power. Moreover, confident in moving toward eventual superiority and ultimate victory, they are aware of the need to avoid an adventuristic strategy which would prematurely lead to total struggle at a time when victory was not assured by the alignment of forces.

The Soviets do not, of course, regard the relation of forces as static, though its calculation supposedly yields the correct strategy for any given moment. It is also an important Marxian principle that the future relation of forces can be affected and manipulated by the careful exploitation of latent potentialities in the present, and by efforts to prevent the opponent from utilizing his opportunities.

Now let us turn to the Soviet military strategy formulated within the estimates and policy lines we have discussed. "Strategy," as one Soviet general put it, "points out the objectives of the armed forces . . . these objectives must be realistic. They must correspond to the relation of forces . . ."

The Soviet calculation in military strategy is not essentially different than the estimate of the situation in most armies. Save for differences in terminology, the following statement from a Soviet military manual could have appeared elsewhere: "The relation of forces is clarified by the comparison of one's own capabilities with the forces and probable capabilities of the enemy."⁸ A difference is immediately evident, however, when one recalls examples such as the failure both of political and military strategy in the decision to wage a quick decisive war against Finland in November 1939, a failure which was due to ideological injections into the calculation. Or, to take a successful operation, the intentional non-action by General Chuikov's Army, while the Polish underground Home Army which had seized

Warsaw was slaughtered by the Germans, was a subtly calculated military move with a direct political objective.

As we shall see, the Soviet strategic concept and image of future war reflect the role of military strategy as a subordinate instrument of policy, which in turn is framed with particular ideological preconceptions, expectations, and aspirations. But again, we should recall that despite—or perhaps because of—these ideological influences in Soviet policy-making, questions of war and peace, and of the role of military strategy, are decided essentially on the basis of calculations of relative power and of relative risk.

Mutual deterrence has resulted from the acquisition of global thermonuclear striking power by the United States, and more recently by the Soviet Union as well. Mutual deterrence has been described as a “delicate balance of terror.” While this balance is indeed insecure, and by no means inevitably enduring, it is not fragile. The risks and consequences of a global thermonuclear holocaust are recognized by the Soviet leaders, and they strive to avoid any “adventurist” gamble. The importance in Soviet policy of the overall balance of power, the “relation of forces in the world arena,” militates against a preoccupation with purely military solutions. Soviet leaders are not poised to unleash their—and our—military power as soon as the theoretical probability of military victory crosses some calibrated balance of 50 percent or 70 percent or indeed perhaps even 90 percent. In the Communist view, history can not be made hostage to the mathematical probability computations of some “communivac.”

Thus total nuclear war—though not necessarily other, limited, forms of war—seems ever less likely as a rational tool for the Soviet Union to advance its position. Assuming that we maintain our strategic nuclear deterrent capability,

this may then be taken as a prediction that a Soviet "Pearl Harbor" attack is not likely in the foreseeable future, although by no means can we rest *assured* by this prediction. An irrational decision is always conceivable. But more dangerous, because more probable, is the possibility of a "war by miscalculation."

There are a number of possible ways in which a general nuclear war could occur by miscalculation. One very important one, often noted, is the possibility that local hostilities (nuclear or "conventional") might be expanded in the vortex of actions and reactions into a general nuclear war. Perhaps even more important is the case of miscalculation which could arise from the danger of one side incorrectly believing the enemy to be about to launch a surprise attack, and therefore launching a preemptive blow in order to seize the initiative and get in the first strike.

In short, we see that while general nuclear war is all too possible, it is not probable as a strategy fashioned to advance Soviet power. The flexibility in determining concrete Soviet objectives, depending upon concrete opportunities and limitations, evokes flexibility in their strategic thinking, doctrine, and plans.

There is another aspect of the relation of military strategy to Soviet policy which deserves at least brief reference. This is the influence of military strategy and military requirements on policy. A Soviet General Staff organ, intended for circulation only to selected officers, has stated: "The missions of strategy are set by politics, but political leaders must know the potentialities of strategy, in order to set tasks before it skillfully at each concrete historical stage." While there is *no* indication that difference over strategy either in the sense of strategic plans or of strategic doctrine was at issue between Zhukov and Khrushchev, there *is* reason to believe that Mar-

shal Zhukov exerted an increasingly authoritative voice on strategic aspects of policy matters in the months prior to his ouster. And, at present, the role of the senior strategic advisors is correspondingly more restricted.¹⁰

Let us now turn to the Soviet strategic concept and doctrine for employment of the armed forces in general war.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND DOCTRINE

Beginning in 1953, soon following the death of Stalin, and reaching a climax in 1955, a new doctrinal development occurred. It marked the initial belated reevaluation of the requirements, opportunities, and constraints of nuclear warfare for Soviet strategy. Since 1955, the new modified doctrine has evolved more slowly, and no significant new departures have been observed in the period since 1956. At present, Soviet strategic doctrine represents a revision—substantial in some respects, and negligible in others—of the traditional Soviet strategic concept, to meet the needs of the nuclear age *as the Soviets see them*. Let us review very briefly the course of this doctrinal revision, and then examine current strategic doctrine.¹¹

Incredible though it may seem, there is convincing evidence that the problem of evaluating the requirements of nuclear warfare was virtually ignored until after Stalin's death in 1953. One of the contributing factors was a security-secrecy mania which prevailed most intensively from mid-1947 until mid-1953, and which literally kept many Soviet military leaders from having anywhere near the knowledge of the potentialities of nuclear and other new weapons which any newspaper reader in this country could have had.

Beginning late in 1953 Soviet military doctrine and training began, at first slowly, to readjust to the needs of the new world of weapons. The doctrinal development occurred sim-

ultaneously in several ways, including an effort to stimulate military theory. Several new departures affected Soviet strategic thinking. Revised views came to recognize (1) the substantial effect on strategy and tactics of new weapons, (2) that the "laws of war" are equally binding on socialist and capitalist armies (though better understood by, and with objective potentialities still favoring, the former, in the Soviet view), and (3) that Soviet military history and thought had not always been infallible. These revisions were accompanied by a clarification of the scope of "military science" which redefined it to stress the *professional* nature of military science and strategy.

In effect, the new theoretical position tended to exclude from the competence of the Soviet military the basic question of peace and war—of the *objectives* of national strategy—and at the same time, by implication, to exclude from the competence of the Soviet political leadership the questions of strategic *concept* and doctrine, of how to wage a war. There is reason to associate this development, significant for strategic formulation, with the rise of Marshal Zhukov to the post of Minister of Defense in early 1955. Moreover, there appears to have been a decline in the vitality of Soviet military theoretical writings in the period since his ouster.

What is the Soviet strategic concept now, after more than six years of review and revision? The Soviet strategic concept, in the thermonuclear era much as before, continues to rest firmly on the belief that the primary direct objective of military operations is the destruction of hostile military forces, rather than the annihilation of the economic and population resources of the enemy. There have been revisions in its application to accord with contemporary weapons. But the Soviets unambiguously adhere to the classical military strategic concept that the essential role of combat operations

is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. With due deference to the potency of nuclear weapons, the priority objectives are the enemy's strategic nuclear delivery capabilities—an application to the current state of weaponry of the traditional concept of neutralizing the enemy's military power, rather than his military potential.

There are indications that the Soviet strategic concept is influenced by the acquisitive aims of Communist imperialism. Soviet political and police techniques would refashion the will of the population and exploit conquered economic resources, once the enemy's armed forces had been destroyed. And this the Soviets would much prefer to the inheritance of large acreage of radioactive rubble, a particularly relevant factor if one is considering the case of a deliberate Soviet war for conquest, and less relevant in a desperate struggle for survival.

The Soviets thus reject *reliance* on a strategy of nuclear bombing of the enemy's war-making capacity—his economy, industry and population—as the most effective means to attain victory. Such targets, as the Soviets even admit, would also be subjected to attack. But the fundamental strategic concept remains the decisive destruction of opposing forces and the seizure by occupation of the enemy's territories.

In keeping with this strategic concept and with national policy, Soviet military doctrine holds necessary the coordinated use of all forms of military power, *as expedient*. This means flexibility in selection among military means, as well as in selecting between military and political means. It also is reflected in Soviet belief in the principle of balanced and varied military capabilities. Under the impact of nuclear and other modern weapons, the application of this Soviet doctrine has been extended from the idea simply of a combined force operating on a theater battlefield, to include co-

ordinated operations on a global scale. Thus combined operations of balanced forces remains the basic doctrine governing the organization and combat employment of Soviet military capabilities, now more broadly construed than before in terms of missions and forces.

Complementing the reaffirmation of combined and balanced forces, Soviet military doctrine consistently continues to reject any strategy based upon predominant reliance on any particular weapons system—including the ICBM with thermonuclear warhead. This principle is deeply ingrained in the Communist precept to avoid “gambling” on any single or “easy” means to victory. Such overreliance on any weapon is condemned as “adverturistic.”

In evaluating the forces needed to implement their strategic concept, the Soviet military leaders see requirements to neutralize enemy missiles and bombers thousands of miles away, and at the same time to overcome infantrymen and tanks in all the vast reaches of Eurasia beyond the borders of the Sino-Soviet bloc. To meet these requirements, the Soviets do not consider that nuclear striking capabilities suffice. Victory, in their view, requires defeating the enemy's military forces in order to seize and occupy vast areas of land—and in the last analysis only a ground force can do this. Indeed, the Soviets believe that in a nuclear war this need may be even *greater* than in a conventional one. For one thing, the nuclear destruction of large numbers of troops will require very large reserves. Soviet generals have specifically said that the use of nuclear weapons requires larger numbers of men than before. For another, the Soviets may believe that industrial, economic and manpower resources of other countries seized by advance on land would compensate in part for the extensive nuclear damage to the Soviet

economic system. Moreover, such action insures an end to enemy recuperation and resistance in the area seized.

Subsequent chapters of this book examine in considerable detail Soviet military doctrine on the role of surprise and of the decisive factors in future war. Here we need only note the important conclusion that the Soviets have reviewed and modified their doctrine, *without* revising its fundamental assumption of a long and arduous war in which large armies are required. Consistent with this image of a long war, the Soviets describe the basic military, economic and morale potentials as "the decisive factors" in determining the outcome of war. An authoritative Ministry of Defense publication has stated: "In the strategic planning of war the correct employment of the troops must be estimated not only for its initial period but for its whole course."¹⁸ And in a rare specification of a Soviet strategic planning requirement, one Soviet general disclosed in 1957 that "strategy must establish the requirements of the armed forces for the first year of military operations."¹⁸ Subsequent requirements, he added, would be determined during the course of the war.

One of the important revisions of Soviet military doctrine, during 1954 and early 1955, was a recognition of the greatly increased importance of surprise in modern war with supersonic aircraft, long-range ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, as we shall see, the Soviets hold that surprise can be neutralized by a vigilant and prepared major power so that it will not determine the outcome of a war.

There was, however, a significant innovation in Soviet strategy and war planning associated with the increased importance accorded to surprise. At the beginning of 1955 the conclusion was adopted that mere repulse of an attempted surprise attack might be insufficient and that if an enemy were clearly *about* to attack the U.S.S.R., a preemptive strike

should be made.¹⁴ Since there has been some confusion on this point, let us be clear that the Soviets explicitly distinguished this preemptive strike from preventive war—it was to be undertaken only if the enemy should himself attempt to make a surprise attack. A Soviet preemptive attack is contemplated for a situation which is *not* a time of their own choosing or the result of a deliberate planned buildup for optimum Soviet position for war. It represents a time when they believe that they must act or forfeit the strategic initiative to us. In essence it is a desperate last-minute effort to seize the initiative from the enemy who is about to attack or in the process of doing so.

While this preemptive strategy has never been discussed in the open military press, except to be denied in propaganda, it has been referred to on a number of occasions in other authoritative sources. "Preventive war"—or simply deliberate initiation of hostilities—would not, of course, be discussed even in the type of limited sources which have discussed preemptive attack. But in considering available indications of Soviet military thinking, and the particular Soviet concept of preemptive attack adopted in 1955, it is wise not to confuse the two things.

We have discussed some basic aspects of Soviet strategy for a general war. The Soviet strategic concept is predicated on the fundamental principle that war, as an instrument of policy, may assume various forms. Limitations on theaters of conflict, or on use of nuclear or other weapons, are considered as questions involving calculated advantage, and calculated maneuver to establish the conditions which would induce the opponent *in his own self-interest* to accept the limitations.

The Soviets tend in their published writings to discount or deny the possibility of local and limited wars, particularly

limited nuclear war. But there are good reasons to doubt that such statements represent the real Soviet view or foreshadow future Soviet behavior. They want to deter the United States from initiating such wars, and even from preparing defensively for them. In seeking to maneuver the U.S. into positions of choice between massive but mutual devastation, or no effective response at all, they strive to deprive us of confidence that we have the alternative of limited nuclear reaction. But actual future Soviet initiative or response will be based on calculations of risk and gain. Limited wars, indeed, represent the classic form of Communist limited military action, for limited objectives, and at limited risk. The Korean War is a notable example.

Let us now turn to brief but essential reflection on the forces and capabilities envisaged and created in support of the Soviet strategy. We need not review in detail the inventory of Soviet military power. The general facts are well known: the emerging ICBM, a very large ground army, now equipped with excellent modern matériel; large air forces, including substantial tactical, airlift and naval supporting forces as well as enhanced air defense and long-range air power, and in the navy a moderate conventional surface force and a very large submarine fleet. The main point of interest to our present inquiry is the highly significant fact that the nature, size, composition, organization and deployment of the Soviet armed forces *all* reflect very clearly the Soviet strategic concept and doctrine. The view of extended campaigns even in general war, in addition to being reflected in military doctrinal writings, is supported by the corresponding Soviet capabilities in the strategic offensive, active and passive air defense, and powerful land-air-sea theater forces. For example, two-thirds of Soviet military aircraft continue to be assigned to support of the surface forces; and despite

limited reductions—well below those publicly announced—the Soviet Army still maintains at varying strength some 175 line divisions, including about 140 available for combat at any time.

In building the military capabilities to implement their strategic concept, the Soviets have been guided not by replacement of the capacities for conventional warfare, but by the addition to them of capacities for either general or limited nuclear war.

POSSIBLE VARIANTS OF FUTURE WAR

The Soviet image of future war is a product of their own doctrinal views, together with estimates of the enemy's plans and capabilities, as applied to various strategic contexts. There are differing images to reflect different possible future wars—wars of conquest and wars of defense, total war and limited wars.

Let us examine, first, the case of general or total war. The Soviets have come to hold an image of future general war divergent from that which is generally held in the West. Several aspects of the differing Soviet view deserve our attention.

First of these is the continued Soviet emphasis on massive and extended land campaigns, even in nuclear war. In Marshal Zhukov's still authoritative words: "Air power and nuclear weapons by themselves cannot decide the outcome of armed conflict. Along with atomic and hydrogen weapons, in spite of their tremendous destructive power, large armies and a tremendous quantity of conventional arms inevitably will be drawn into military operations."¹² It is clear that Marshal Zhukov and his colleagues and successors do not mean the mere masses of men which so often were the Red Armies of the last war. They do mean the large, modern,

atomically armed and prepared land and supporting air and sea forces which they now maintain, engaged in major campaigns in Europe and other theaters. We have noted earlier the Soviet emphasis on the continued need for balanced forces, and unwillingness to give a predominant role to any single arm—including the ICBM.

As the foregoing implies, the Soviets visualize a general war as one continuing well after an initial exchange of strategic nuclear strikes. The Soviets continue to assert both that a future major nuclear war would be long in duration, and, specifically, that blitzkrieg between super-powers is *not* a reliable strategy. As we have noted, they hold that surprise, greatly as it has increased in importance, cannot itself determine the outcome of a war against a major world power if that state has prepared for such a contingency and is vigilant. Of course, the Soviets do not regard this condition as one automatically or easily achieved; but they evidently intend to devote sufficient effort to defensive and retaliatory capabilities—and they expect us to do the same—to maintain preparedness on a level which in their view prevents sure victory by a sudden attack of either super-power on the other.

The Soviets do not ascribe to the view that mutual devastation spells mutual defeat. Soviet mobilization and dispatch of ground forces would in their view be much less critically disrupted than would ours by the initial and continuing nuclear exchange, due to their larger force-in-being and to its deployment. The mutual destruction of strategic air bases and cities would presumably consume the major part of the respective long-range air forces and missiles, and the Soviets evidently calculate that the continued efforts of these forces would in a strategic sense cancel each other out. The remaining Soviet armies are viewed as still able to defeat the

proportionately weakened enemy forces on the ground. Thus the Soviets apparently hope they could go on to win by occupying the Eurasian continent and shrinking the Free World to a devastated America. The Soviets visualize the role of the combined ground and supporting air team not as a subsequent "mopping-up" stage, but as a contemporaneous significant element in determining the outcome of the war. Airborne and armored forces are considered especially suitable for the nuclear battlefield.

Thus, in the long run, the basic economic and military potential of the Soviet bloc, especially that mobilized before hostilities, is counted upon to "win." This does not, however, mean that the Soviets are so certain of success, and so callous of costs and risks, that they would launch a general war in the foreseeable future. But the image I have drawn is that now held as the prospective course of a general nuclear war if one should eventuate.

This view of general war may not appear to reflect adequately what many of us would regard as a full appreciation of the implications of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Future Soviet views *may* come to be somewhat closer to ours, particularly as the pressure of procurement of exceedingly expensive emerging weapons systems compels further scrutiny of the allocation of the Soviet military budget, and as manpower demands outstrip the supply. Khrushchev may come to impose new ideas of his own. But there are also deep and compelling influences which make unlikely a total or a sudden change in the fundamental Soviet strategic concept and doctrine. In addition, limited war requirements contribute importantly to the need for large balanced forces.

We should next consider briefly a possible major war *without* the use of nuclear weapons. Now, a non-nuclear general war, in the fashion of World War II, seems indeed

quite unlikely. Particularly in the past five years the Soviets have shown signs of recognizing the decline of this possibility in view of American and NATO policy. Nonetheless, the continuing Soviet view was expressed by Marshal Zhukov in 1957 in reply to a question on whether nuclear weapons would *necessarily* be used in a future war. He said: "No one, including I, can answer now with completeness because all wars, major and small, arise, are waged, and end, under different political, geographical and economic conditions."⁶

There is one case of a major war in which the Soviets may sometime attempt to place the West in a position where we will *not* use nuclear weapons; a major Soviet challenge which they would deem insufficient to provoke us to all-out massive retaliation under circumstances of mutual deterrence. Thus, while it is not probable, the Soviets might sometime launch a non-nuclear attack on West Germany, or on Western Europe in general, if they had been led to judge mutual deterrence to be so strong a restraint on American action that we would withhold our nuclear fire in response to such a major *conventional* attack in which neither major protagonist was directly threatened. This might at the least present us—and the people of the area involved—with a most difficult choice. Whether or not this would lead us to fall in line with Soviet expectations, it would be sufficient if they came to believe that we would forego our nuclear retaliation. This dilemma, if it should ever come to pass, would derive from the contrast of continuing Soviet dual capabilities for nuclear and non-nuclear warfare, while the West tends to be increasingly geared only for nuclear war.

A major war with limited use of nuclear weapons is entirely possible. Restrictions born of mutual advantage would in this case limit the employment of nuclear weapons to "tactical" military targets, however these would be defined and

delimited. Such a war, the Soviets realize, is more likely than a major European *non-nuclear* war since the United States is not likely to engage in a major war without resort to its nuclear arsenal. On this type of war a veil is drawn over the Soviet image, for they do not publicly admit the possibility of limited nuclear war. In fact, the attempt to distinguish between strategic and tactical weapons or targets is declared propaganda and a ruse.

Several considerations underlie the Soviet refusal to admit publicly the possibility of limited nuclear war. First, to do so would seriously dilute their campaign for prohibition of *all* atomic weapons.

Secondly, and more basically, they realize that the prospect of a limited use of nuclear weapons would assist the West to redress the balance of power for wars other than a total one. It is, moreover, quite possible that, in the Soviet view, this might encourage us to start limited nuclear wars against the Communist Bloc.

Thirdly, it would wipe out any Soviet hope of a major non-nuclear war.

Finally, it would create an alternative to possible situations in which the United States might have to choose between a strategy of massive but mutual retaliation, and one of either Western inaction or likely defeat. The Soviets evidently would not like us to know with certainty that the alternative of limited nuclear war was available.

Now we come to the last type of possible future war—local wars, nuclear or non-nuclear. Again, this type of war is not much discussed by the Soviets—perhaps *because* this is the classic Soviet type of military action. Three circumstances greatly increase the possibility and danger of future local wars of Soviet aggression. One is American deterrence of the USSR from general war as a means of attaining Soviet

expansive aims. Secondly is the Soviet *counter-deterrence* of our retaliatory strength to prevent us from using this strength to deter or to respond to *limited* Soviet aggression. Calculated risk by the Soviets of American non-use of SAC in retaliation for local aggression may increase as Soviet offensive striking power increases and the ICBM becomes an important operational capability. Thirdly, if increasing American reliance on nuclear weapons continues, it may be an inducement to engage in conventional local wars under the cover of mutual nuclear deterrence, particularly by indirect aggression.

For this and other reasons alluded to earlier, we may conclude that the Soviets could have good reasons for not initiating the use of nuclear weapons in a local war. But in response to American initiation of their use, the Soviets would (with one or two possible cases of exception) almost certainly reply by localized nuclear counterblows. The danger of the expansion of such a war would exist, but they, as well as we, would gain from not expanding the limits too widely. They would calculate the risks and costs, and they would expect us to do the same.

If the Soviets should ever be convinced not only that they have deterred us from general war but also that they have "counter-deterred" us from meeting lesser overt challenges, there would be menacing possibilities for Soviet use of the stalemate born of mutual deterrence as a shield behind which threat and possible employment of the vast Soviet conventional forces could be used to expand Soviet control at what they could conclude was acceptable risk.

CONCLUSION

In the Communist view war is an instrument of policy. War, if resorted to, will include or restrict the use of par-

particular forms of military power, *as expedient to achieve Soviet aims, including self-preservation.* Strategic doctrine, and the military establishment, are fashioned to allow the Soviet national leadership flexibility in making such decisions under various future circumstances.

CHAPTER 2

THE DECISIVE FACTORS IN MODERN WAR

Surely nothing should concern us more than the Soviet view of the factors which will decide a future war. While there are many facets to this subject, a key one is the Soviet view of the essential nature of such a conflict. Will it be long and dependent on basic power potentials, or can it be quickly concluded? These matters are, of course, a key and integral part of the over-all Soviet strategic conceptions in the nuclear era.¹

On such sensitive matters, needless to say, the Soviets are hardly likely to disclose frankly their full position, but we are greatly assisted in divining their thinking by considering what they tell their own senior officers.

Before reviewing the development of current Soviet doctrine on the decisive factors in modern war, it may be useful to note as background a recent statement which presents succinctly the Soviet conclusion on the crucial question of the *duration* of a future general war. It appears in an article in the Soviet Army journal (equivalent of the *Military Review*) of June, 1958:

“Technology of course quickens the pace of things, and generally speaking the appearance of new technical means creates now certain possibilities for achievement of victory in shorter times than before. Nonetheless, the armed forces of the two sides, and the scale of the arena of armed conflict under contemporary circumstances, are so great that one could scarcely conclude a war in a short period. Even the

appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and IRBMs and ICBMs, *cannot* secure the swift destruction of such massive armed forces, and consequently not the conclusion of the war. *Moreover, the use of these weapons by both sides will more likely lead to extending the duration of the war than to speeding it.* Hence, while in the past major wars could be short or long, in our time *all major wars inevitably assume a quite drawn-out character.*"

This is the Soviet image of future war. What, then, in the Soviet view, are the key factors in determining its outcome?

Soviet military doctrine emphasizes a number of elements which are termed the "decisive" or "fundamental" factors (formerly termed "the permanently-operating factors") which, it is said, "decide the course and outcome of wars." These factors represent the elements of national power which the Soviets believe in the final analysis play the decisive role in war.

It may be useful to begin by a review of the evolution of Soviet thinking on these basic elements. The "permanently-operating factors" were compiled originally by Stalin in Order No. 55 of February 23, 1942.⁸ This thesis served thereafter as an effective expression of Soviet military doctrine until 1956, and was widely repeated in Soviet military writings and by military leaders such as Marshals Zhukov, Malinovsky, Konev, Vasilevsky, and Sokolovsky.

The five "permanently-operating factors which decide the course and outcome (or fate) of wars," in the precise words of Stalin, were:

- (a) the stability of the rear
- (b) the morale of the army
- (c) the quantity and quality of divisions

(d) the armament of the army

(e) the organizing ability of the command personnel

The permanently-operating factors were contrasted with transitory or temporary factors, which it was admitted might be significant at some stage of a war (especially at the beginning), and which might even affect importantly the course and outcome of the war, but which were *not* considered to be *decisive* in determining the ultimate outcome of a war. The most important of the transitory factors was surprise.

At the time the thesis of the permanently-operating factors was first presented, it clearly served the purpose of bolstering popular and military morale by assurance that the German successes, based upon the exploitation of temporary factors such as surprise, were transitory, and that the Soviets would ultimately win. And, in fact, the German expectations of the consequences of their surprise blow did turn out to have been exaggerated, and the Soviet (and Allied) basic strength *did* lead to victory. Again in the period from 1945 until Stalin's death in 1953, this thesis could be invoked for assurance that Soviet basic strength was not overwhelmed by the American monopoly, and later superiority, in atomic weapons. These considerations doubtless contributed to the propagation and the ingraining of the explicit doctrine of the decisive role of the permanently-operating factors, although in fact the factors had been dominant in Soviet doctrine long before Stalin enunciated them in his "thesis."

During the Stalinist postwar era virtually all serious Soviet discussions of military science and strategy, and most public and popular speeches and discussions of military affairs, cited the permanently-operating factors. Since, unlike most aspects of so-called "Stalinist" military science, this formulation was in fact apparently a contribution of Stalin himself, it was particularly moot whether the thesis

of the permanently-operating factors would survive the modifications of military doctrine in the post-Stalin era. Let us trace the evolution of Soviet views on the question since 1953.

Marshal Vasilevsky delivered the first post-Stalin pronouncement on military science in an article a few days after the dictator's death. It was, both in intent and in content, a memorial to Stalin. And in it Vasilevsky repeated the long-standard theme:

“The principle of the permanently-operating factors which decide the fate of modern wars, profoundly worked out by Comrade Stalin, is the key to a genuinely scientific materialistic understanding and use of the objective laws of war. This Stalinist thesis arms the Soviet people, its armed forces, with a clear and really scientific understanding of the necessary conditions which . . . in case of war, will secure victory over the enemy.”⁵

This statement may have been in part a reflex of the Stalinist period. But Vasilevsky—then the senior professional officer (Bulganin having reassumed the Ministry of Defense, and Zhukov having become the second of three “First Deputy Ministers”)—repeated twice a year later (February and May, 1954) that Soviet (no longer “Stalinist”) military science “is based upon the permanently-operating factors which determine the outcome of wars.”⁶

An article in September, 1953, by Major General Talensky, which opened a debate on the nature and laws of military science, made explicit for the first time the view that the permanently-operating factors were not *themselves* the laws of military sciences. This modification was intended to strengthen the viability of the concept of the permanently-operating factors, and to facilitate its transition into the emerging post-Stalinist military science. “We are far from minimizing the great significance in principle for military

science of the thesis of the permanently-operating factors," General Talensky explained. And in an italicized paragraph he emphasized that "*Victory in contemporary war is achieved by a decisive defeat of the enemy in the course of armed conflict . . . on the basis of superiority in the permanently-operating factors which determine the fate of wars . . .*" Continued Soviet restatements of the decisive role of these factors has undergone several other modifications. Early in 1954 it was usual for military experts to *contrast* Soviet recognition of these factors with a non-awareness of them in imperialist military doctrines. For example, two colonels writing in *Red Star* stated: "*In contradistinction to bourgeois military theory, Soviet military science is based on the recognition of the decisive role in the conduct and outcome of contemporary wars of the permanently-operating factors . . .*" The same point was made by Marshal Vasilevsky in the statement cited earlier and by other military figures in the same period.

During the following year an interesting shift took place, reflecting the increasing awareness of the need to study foreign military thinking." We have an excellent opportunity to judge this shift from a reprinting, with revisions, of an important article by a military professor, Major General Pukhovsky. General Pukhovsky's article, entitled "The Creative Character of Soviet Military Science" appeared first in the *Military Herald*, organ of the ground forces, in January, 1954. It was republished in February, 1955, in a collection of articles on various aspects of Marxism-Leninism in Soviet military science. A comparison of the relevant passage in the two printings is revealing.

In early 1954 Pukhovsky had written: "It is well known that bourgeois military thought, because of class limitations, *always regarded and regards the questions of conducting war only as questions of military art and in isolation from the eco-*

conomic and morale potentialities of the country. Only Soviet military science, with its thesis on the permanently-operating factors . . . placed these questions on a deeply scientific basis.”¹⁰

In early 1955, the passage was amended to read: “It is well known that contemporary bourgeois military science, *in studying military, economic and moral-political questions*, cannot give a scientific explanation of the laws governing war because it is based on an anti-scientific, idealistic world-view, and therefore its conclusions often are erroneous, adventurous. *Only Soviet military science*, guided by Marxist-Leninist theory and studying the experience of past and contemporary wars, *generalized the question of the permanently-operating factors*, which decide the fate of wars, *and scientifically formulated* them.”¹¹

Thus it would appear that the capitalists *ignored* the questions of the economic and morale potentialities of the country in 1954, “as is well known,” but in *studying* them in 1955, “as is well known,” failed to explain the basic laws underlying them. Moreover, the distinction credited to Soviet military thought is reduced to having “scientifically formulated” them. Nonetheless, this is not an idle or insignificant distinction in the Soviet view.

The statements cited above (except for the one by General Talensky) were not made in the course of the debate on the nature of military science. In that discussion, the idea of the universality of the laws of war had been debated and finally accepted. One important point developed in the debate was the conclusion that the thesis on the permanently-operating factors also “applies and has equal force for both contending sides. It is another question by whom and how this law is understood, and how it can be utilized for victory.”¹²

Another aspect of the thesis on the permanently-operating factors arose in the debate. Some of the participants, still wedded to the old Stalinist clichés, cited the thesis on these factors as the end-all of any question on basic laws of military science (and usually these persons were the ones who ascribed an innate and unique Soviet cognizance of these factors). In the final editorial (April, 1955) commenting on the debate, *Military Thought* decisively disposed of such a view: "It is easy to see that this is at least an avoidance of the question and not its solution, and at worst a voluntary or involuntary retreat from positions of Marxist materialism."¹³ But the thesis on the permanently-operating factors was not, itself, rejected by any means. To note one general restatement, the article on the factors in the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* volume that appeared in June, 1955, reiterated their continuing validity. The editorial in *Military Thought* (March 1955) also examined this question. It noted that the thesis on the permanently-operating factors was "often *approached* one-sidedly and in some cases even incorrectly," but it characterized the thesis *itself* as one which "retains its scientific value also at the present."¹⁴

Thus, "the thesis on the permanently operating factors, expressing the dependence of the fate of wars on the fundamental social-economic causes and conditions does not, of course, lose its definitive significance in contemporary wars. But it would be incorrect to ignore other factors which also play an important role in the achievement of victory in contemporary war."¹⁵

Although slavish and unthinking mere repetition of the thesis on the permanently-operating factors was criticized, the importance of the factors themselves definitely was not.

One change which occurred during the debate in 1954, and which was reflected in the revision of Pukhovsky's arti-

cle, was publicly expressed by Marshal of the Tank Troops Rotmistrov in March, 1955. Referring to some specified typical Soviet statements made in 1954, Rotmistrov commented that "from their discussions one can reach the conclusion that the permanently-operating factors are divined only by Soviet military science, and that the idea had not occurred to bourgeois military science. If that were the case we could rest assured; we, silent, would calculate the permanently-operating factors. . . . One cannot, of course, agree with this [view] . . . We must calculate on the basis that the bourgeois military figures, bourgeois military science, does not deny the significance of the permanently-operating factors. Can it really be only on the basis that bourgeois military science perhaps gives these things different names? The fact of the matter is not in names, but in the essence of the question. It should incidentally be said that the permanently-operating factors which decide the fate of wars have, to one or another degree, been considered also in the past by strategists seeking victory."¹⁰

The thesis on the decisiveness of the permanently-operating factors thus survived the partial "de-Sovietization" involved in admitting objective laws and partial bourgeois cognizance of the importance of these factors.

Another challenge arose in the reassessment of the role of surprise. The permanently-operating factors also continued through the revision of the importance of surprise to enjoy their position of being regarded as decisive in determining the ultimate outcome of wars, except under particular conditions. Those military theoreticians and publicizers who most prominently advanced the revised view on the role of surprise, such as Marshal of the Tank Troops Rotmistrov and Lieutenant General Shatilov, made quite clear that despite the attribution of much greater significance to surprise in

the thermonuclear era, the “permanently-operating” factors remain fundamental and decisive.

Thus Rotmistrov stated in March, 1955: “However, surprise cannot yield a decisive result, cannot bring victory in a war with a serious and strong enemy. . . . Consequently, *the permanently-operating factors, in the final analysis, have always decided and will always decide the course and outcome of wars.*”¹⁷ And General Shatilov reiterated in May, 1955: “Soviet military science, while taking into account the growing role of surprise, is far from inclined to underrate the role of *the permanently-operating factors, which decide the fate of wars.*”¹⁸

The volume of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in which the article on “The Permanently-Operating Factors of War” appears went to press in June, 1955; the author of the article is Major General Talensky. The article states: “Soviet military science does not deny the serious significance of the temporary factors: surprise, advantage in [prehostilities] mobilization, combat experience, etc., *but it relies upon the permanently-operating factors to which the decisive role belongs.*”¹⁹

Several months later Major General Boltin emphasized, in an article entitled “On Soviet and Bourgeois Military Science,” the things held in common by foreign and Soviet military thinking, but, nonetheless, he found great difference on the point of the decisive factors. Indeed, he even used the earlier phrase “in contradistinction to bourgeois military science” in describing Soviet reliance on these factors. He noted that while Soviet military science “understands the significance in contemporary war of the factor of surprise of attack and other temporary factors,” it “*relies on the well-known thesis of the permanently-operating factors which determine the outcome of wars . . .*”²⁰

In view of a prevalent misconception assuming this thesis to have been rejected on doctrinal grounds, it may be useful to note the frequency of reiteration of the thesis on the decisive role of the permanently-operating factors throughout and subsequent to the debates on military science. In the period 1953 through 1955 there were at least fifty-seven reaffirmations of this thesis.²¹ However, in the period following Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in February, 1956, reference to the thesis by the old name virtually ceased. The factors themselves *are* constantly reiterated and reaffirmed, simply not under the old rubric.

The reason for the persistence of Soviet attention to the "decisive factors" is that they are meaningful as an expression of important elements deeply imbedded in current Soviet military doctrine for nuclear as well as non-nuclear war. Even though the thesis formulation itself has fallen into disuse, the major practical significance of the factors involved continues and will continue so long as the strategic concept is basically unchanged.²² The fundamental importance of these factors has not at any time even been questioned by any Soviet source. On the contrary, during the doctrinal revisions of 1953-1955 an attempt was made to revitalize the thesis so that it would be treated not merely as a formula, but as a practical guide in creative thinking on military affairs. Those who introduced modifications on its role and on related issues such as the role of surprise reaffirmed explicitly and unambiguously the continued role of the decisive permanently operating factors. As we shall see later, more recently (1956-1959) these factors have usually been spoken of simply as "the decisive factors in war." This illustrates clearly what has gradually happened to the thesis—modification in form, but not in essential content and influence. Such a change has occurred because of the fact that

the *formulation* of the “permanently-operating factors” was so closely associated with the name of Stalin, and particularly because it had become ossified into a stereotyped formula.

What, one may ask, is the practical significance of the doctrine of the decisive factors? Colonel Piatkin, a professor at the Frunze Academy, has indicated their importance as follows:

“The enormous significance, not only theoretical but *practical also*, of the thesis on the permanently-operating factors in war consists in the fact that it *shows on which main tasks the strength of the combatant state must be concentrated in order to secure victory in war*. That thesis is therefore the key to the understanding of the perspectives of a war and the means to gain victory.

“*But the potentiality must not be confused with reality*. Those are two different things. In order to convert the potentiality for victory into reality, it is necessary not only to know the objective laws of war, but also to be able to apply them with complete knowledge of affairs, with a calculation of the character and of all the requirements of contemporary warfare.”²⁸

If, indeed, a decisive significance is attributed to these factors and they are a basis for determining priorities in military development, their practical significance is readily seen to be immense.

As we have noted, it came to be realized by Soviet military experts in 1954 and 1955 that military doctrine had no monopoly on comprehension of the basic objective laws of war nor even on the *concept* of the decisiveness of basic morale, economic and military potentialities. Inasmuch as this very concept had previously been held to give Soviet military science a superiority over bourgeois military doctrines, the

changed appreciation raised the serious question of the possible disappearance of this superiority. A solution was found which, while conceivably sophistry, is more likely to represent the real Soviet view. The new point in military thinking was introduced into available published literature in the previously mentioned collection of articles on Soviet military science printed in early 1955. The following sentences, which had not appeared in the article by Major General Pukhovsky as it was originally published in 1954, were added to his article a year later:

"In the conditions of the socialist system, there exist all the realistic potentialities for the achievement of an advantage over the enemy in all the permanently-operating factors . . .

*"Soviet military science shows that victory in war is gained by that state which secures for itself for the whole course of the war a superiority in the permanently-operating factors which decide the fate of wars. . . ."*²⁴

The same point was reiterated by Marshal Rotmistrov in March, 1955: "We do not doubt that in the circumstances of our socialist economic system . . . there exist all the necessary potentialities for the achievement of superiority in the basic, decisive, permanently-operating factors. In that is our superiority, our strength, and our invincibility."²⁵

The Soviet Union is thus seen as possessing a superior *potential* in basic economic, morale, and military strength, a potential which must be realized by active Soviet policy measures. However, such statements should be read in the light of the traditional Bolshevik emphasis on distinguishing between potentialities, which are so to speak the raw material of history, and the manipulative role of proletariats and policymakers in converting these potentialities into real achievements. Colonel Piatkin made this point explicit in his earlier cited statement.

In a work on *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army* published in 1957, Colonel Zakharov explicitly stated: "Victory in war depends not only on the economic and morale potentialities, the quantity and quality of troops, and the armament of the army, but also on how well these factors will be utilized."⁸⁶ Specifically, this concept provides the doctrinal basis for the policy of priority to realizing the potentialities of the Soviet economic system in military strength.

The decisive (permanently-operating) factors were defined and interpreted by Major General Talensky in the *Encyclopedia* article in 1955 as the "economic, political, and military factors which decide the course and outcome of wars."⁸⁷ Though the "thesis" on the factors was soon thereafter dropped, the factors, much as interpreted by Talensky, have continued and presently continue to be reaffirmed. The first of the factors, "the stability of the rear," Talensky defined as "encompassing the economic, political and morale potentialities of a state."⁸⁸ And, as a number of Soviet spokesmen have indicated, "it is no accident that among the permanently-operating factors which decide the fate of wars, stability of the rear stands in first place."⁸⁹

The "rear" supplies the combat forces with the wherewithal to conduct military operations; basically this means the warmaking potential of the country. The main elements in this potential are industry and transportation.

"The history of wars," said Colonel Baz, writing in mid-1958, "teaches that only those states withstood the trials of war which showed themselves stronger than their opponents in the development and organization of the economy. Moreover, one of the fundamental laws of victory in contemporary war consists precisely in the fact that in its foundation contemporary war is an economic war. . . . Consequently, future war will in still greater degree than past world wars require in its

preparation and conduct a precise calculation of the economic potentials of one's own country and of the enemy."⁸⁰

In another 1958 article, entitled "Economic Potential and its Significance in Modern War," Lt. Colonel Strigachev presents the ideological basis for superiority in this particular fundamental factor "under equal economic potentials, *the military economic potential of the socialist country is greater than that of a capitalist country.*"⁸¹ But the Soviets go much further in claiming that such a superiority even *offsets a greater economic production*. According to Colonel Lev-
anov, "One cannot judge the economic potential of a country only according to the level of development of production or the strength of the production facilities and economic resources. It is essential to give attention also to the character of the economic and state structure, on which depends the effectiveness of the utilization of economic resources and the tempo of productive development, which has great significance in military affairs as well."⁸² Thus, he continues, "The socialist system of economy . . . gives our state an enormous superiority over any capitalist state in relation to the economic and morale potential of the country and to its utilization to achieve victory in war."⁸³ This view is regularly expressed by Soviet military writers.⁸⁴

Morale is the second key factor. In an article on "Morale Potential and Its Significance in Modern War," Colonel Sidorov states: "He who has the greatest reserves, the greatest sources of strength, the greatest endurance and popular steadfastness, is victorious in war. This Leninist principle is confirmed by the entire experience of wars in the [current] machine era. From this it is clear that for victory in modern war it is necessary to have a superiority over the enemy in the economic, morale, and military respects, that is, to command a higher economic, morale, and military potential."⁸⁵

If these statements reflect the true Soviet appreciation of the importance of morale, the question immediately presents itself: Who has the strongest morale, and why?

The Soviets have generally shown confidence that "The morale esprit of the armed forces of a state with an advanced social and political structure, conducting a just war, will always be higher than the morale of the armed forces of a state with a reactionary system, conducting an unjust, aggressive war."⁸⁶

While, as we have noted, the Soviets have admitted in recent years that "Contemporary bourgeois military science cannot fail to consider economic and morale potentials of the combatant sides along with the purely military potentialities,"⁸⁷ they consistently argue that only the U.S.S.R. is able properly to understand morale and its sources, and to utilize and maximize morale.⁸⁸ Accordingly, "Military figures of the capitalist countries also attempt to rely upon the morale strengths of their states, but their strategy cannot count upon the lasting morale support of the entire society because it does not express the interests of the people, is not inspired by the good aims of a just war. Such a strategy leads to an over-evaluation of the purely military factors, to adventurism in military art, to overestimating the role of one or another weapon, arm, or element of the armed forces."⁸⁹

It is of interest that the morale issue is thus related to the alleged Western over-reliance on "ultimate" weapons. Thus, too, Western "military ideologies" are said to grasp at deception and at the comfort of the individual soldier, rather than at the "true" political-ideological foundations for morale.⁴⁰ In one recent discussion, the present writer was singled out for attack for allegedly "crudely distorting the question of the sources of the high morale-combat qualities of the personnel of the Soviet army and navy. The American so-

ciologist [sic] Garthoff, for example, considers that the combat and morale qualities of the Soviet soldier are due to 'the traits of the Russian character,' his 'general love for Russia'. . . ."⁴¹ More precisely, though the Soviets preferred not to quote it, I had said that in World War II the Soviet soldier had generally fought well not *because* of the Soviet regime, but *despite* it.⁴²

There can be little doubt of the sincerity of Soviet concern over morale—the extensive indoctrination and surveillance both in the armed forces and in civilian life bears witness to the fact. The matter of Soviet views of "stability" of Soviet, American, and other populations and armies is, however, one on which the publicly stated line may or may not correspond to actual estimates. But regardless of unexpressed Soviet leadership apprehensions over the morale of the Soviet people—or even because there may be such—the importance of this factor in Soviet military thinking is clear.

The readjustment of Soviet military doctrine to fit the nuclear age—for this is what the modifications amount to—has but enhanced the importance of morale in Soviet eyes. In one of the earliest Soviet accounts to discuss this question specifically, Colonel Piatkin wrote: "It is necessary to underline that in the complex conditions of future war, with the employment of new powerful weapons, the moral-political and moral-combat qualities of the troops and the people in the cause of winning victory over the enemy will have still greater significance."⁴³ This judgment has been repeated frequently in the last five years. Military technologist Major General Pokrovsky has thus pointed out, for example, that "atomic weapons create a situation in which the morale factor acts still more strongly than in ordinary war."⁴⁴ The demands on the individual soldier and increased requirements

for steadfastness, endurance, and discipline in a nuclear war are clearly recognized.

The remaining three “permanently-operating factors” of the old thesis require less explanation. The “quantity and quality of divisions” has been interpreted less crudely than, perhaps, was Stalin’s original idea and the literal meaning of the phrase. Major General Talensky specifically indicated in his *Encyclopedia* article that it refers to “all arms and components of the armed forces,” explaining that the division is “the basic tactical formation, the unit of calculation in the general determination of the relation of forces.”⁴⁸ This determination of the “relation of forces” is the basic Soviet military-political strategic estimate of the situation.⁴⁹ It is, therefore, possible that this emphasis on counting divisions—and other combat forces in being—may exercise a larger role than in Western calculations.

The fourth factor, “the armament of the army,” is (again in General Talensky’s words), “one of the decisive factors determining the development of the means and forms of armed conflict.”⁴⁷ Facets of this factor have been dealt with by other authorities. In a monograph entitled “The Armament of the Army—One of the Permanently-Operating Factors Which Decide the Fate of Wars,” published in 1954, Colonel Kozlov discusses the subject at length.⁴⁸ Major General Lagovsky, in his 1957 work “Strategy and Economics,” also stresses this factor as well as the continuing decisiveness of basic economic potential.⁴⁹

These factors—“divisions” and “armament”—together with the ability of the officers corps (“the organizing ability of the command personnel”),⁵⁰ constitute military potential. The term military potential, in the words of Lieutenant General Krasil’nikov of the General Staff, “does not exhaust all of the potentialities of the country for conducting modern

war, but is only one of the important items [which compose] these potentialities. The ability of a country to conduct a war depends not only on military potential, but also on economic and political potentialities.”⁵¹

In addition to “divisions” and “armament,” General Krasil’nikov notes specifically two other elements of military potential: “cadre ground, air and sea forces,” and “trained reserves.” One may question the distinction between “divisions” and “cadres,” but apparently the latter means the cadre for mobilization of the reserves, in addition to combat-ready divisions (and other units) in being in peacetime.⁵² General Krasil’nikov states that the Soviet system is best both for “mobilization” and for “retaliation”; this reference may be related to the specification of “cadres” and “divisions” (forces in being). In any case, the major point is clear: *the Soviets believe there is a continuing need for a large combat-ready military force (“land, air, and sea”) as well as strong readily mobilizable reserves.*

In addition, in an article entitled “The Essence of Military Potential,” Colonel Petrov calls attention to the fact that “*The deployment of the armed forces, particularly under circumstances of the wide employment of nuclear weapons delivered by rockets and supersonic jet air power, is of serious importance to the military potential of a country.*”⁵³ Not only do the Soviets stress armed forces in being, but also appropriately deployed, and finally, supported by adequate reserves.

The thesis on the “permanently-operating factors which decide the course and outcome of wars” in its time provided a theoretical concept formulating the main elements of political, morale, economic, and military potential with which to guide the Soviet military leadership in establishing priorities of military development. But in recent years a review

of the usefulness of the formula has occurred. The formulation of the thesis itself has now been jettisoned, for two reasons: first, it was a codification made by Stalin and thus served to represent a support for the claims to a perfect Stalinist military science; and secondly, uncritical parroting of the thesis served to freeze the doctrinal significance of the basic economic, political, morale, and military factors into a stereotyped formula. Experiments with reviving the real doctrinal essence in 1954-1955 by calling for a dynamic approach to the thesis have more recently (1956-1959) been succeeded by discarding the familiar stereotype and concentrating on the basic factors themselves. This is clearly seen in the review of a book ("Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army," by Colonel Chuvikov, revised edition published in 1956) which neglected to keep pace with the evolution of Soviet military doctrinal formulation and repeated the old stereotype.⁵⁴ Writing in *Red Star* in February 1957, the reviewers (three colonels, all doctors of military science) stated quite frankly: "Thus the question of the conditions for achieving victory in contemporary war is presented in the book *in the old way*, as a question of five permanently operating factors. *It would be more proper to speak of the morale-political, economic, and military factors, and to attempt to illuminate comprehensively their place in the achievement of victory in war.* The author of the book to a notable degree absolutizes the permanently-operating factors."⁵⁵

In the following month *Red Star* published a key article by Colonel Baz, entitled "V. I. Lenin on the Fundamental Factors Which Decide the Course and Outcome of Wars." These new "fundamental factors" Colonel Baz cited are the old permanently-operating factors paraphrased and reformulated: the economic and morale basis of the rear, the morale of the armed forces, the quantity and quality of com-

bat technology, the ability of military men. Now, of course, they are attributed to Lenin (in the style of the new "cult of Lenin"), rather than to Stalin, the author of the old thesis.* Colonel Baz leaves no doubt as to the important purpose of the reformulation: namely, the freeing from the old stereotyped formula in order *more comprehensively to make use of the practical implications of the decisive factors*, and of certain other factors of increased importance, particularly surprise. "Nothing," he explains, "would be so dangerous for Soviet military science as a dogmatic interpretation of one or another question of the development of military affairs. *We have had attempts to boil all military theory down to the thesis of J. V. Stalin on the permanently operating factors which decide the course and outcome of wars. This thesis in its foundation does reproduce the Leninist ideas on the conditions for victory over the enemy.* However, it does not entirely exhaust the question of factors determining the course and outcome of contemporary war. One could, for example, show that it does not include such very important factors as the training of the troops, their organization, the military art, the state of military theory of the combatant armies, and others. One should also not fail to note that in present conditions the significance of the factor of surprise in particular has grown."⁵⁶

* The first attempt to shift the credit for the decisive factors partly from Stalin to Lenin had occurred as early as July, 1955, when a writer in the semi-classified journal of the Chief Political Administration said that: "Basing on *Leninist* theses . . . J. V. Stalin formulated the general thesis on the permanently operating factors which determine the course and outcome of war." The same article also credited both Lenin and Stalin with acute awareness of the importance of other factors, including surprise. Finally, the permanently operating factors were referred to as "Leninist theses on the basic factors of victory in contemporary war." (Major V. Zubarev, "V. I. Lenin and Military Science," *Propagandist i agitator*, No. 13, July, 1955, pp. 10-12. See also Col. A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, [September 20] 1957, p. 15)

The new more flexible formulation, begun in 1956, thus became more explicitly the successor to the old formula.

In 1957 Marshal Zhukov stated that "the success of war depends on a series of factors, in particular the technical level and condition of the arms of the armed forces [the quantity and quality of divisions; the armament of the army], the combat ability and mastery of the troops, the art of the supreme command, commanders, and operational-tactical officer cadres [the organizing ability of the command personnel], and the main thing—whether the people and the army recognize the just aims of the war because of which the government has led them into the given war [the stability of the rear; the morale of the army] . . . The factors which have been noted above display their decisive influence on the character of the war and the means of its conduct."⁵⁷

With these words Zhukov reiterated the elements which constituted the former permanently-operating factors and clearly expressed the continuing attention to these factors, as can be seen by comparison with the old formulation indicated in the bracketed insertions. On another occasion in 1957 Zhukov reiterated that "Success [in war] depends on a series of factors, in particular the technical level and quality of the armed forces, the morale, the combat training and mastery of the troops."⁵⁸

Other high officers have continued to make similar use of the paraphrased permanently-operating—"fundamental" or "decisive"—factors, with no change in the period since Zhukov's fall.⁵⁹ In 1957 and 1958 there were even six cases where the old formulation of the permanently-operating factors was explicitly and favorably used.⁶⁰ Two were in military books; none of the many reviews of these books objected to use of the term. One of the authors, indeed, was promoted

from colonel to major general soon after. But, in general, the old restrictive formulation is omitted.

In December, 1958, a particularly significant article by Colonel Sidorov returned to the use of the term "permanently-operating factor," adding newly stressed additional factors to the category. A pertinent passage summing up the Soviet view is worth our attention:

"The course and outcome of contemporary war depends more than ever before on the economic, morale, and military potentialities of the combatants. This conclusion of V. I. Lenin provides the key to understanding the decisive factors which secure victory in contemporary war. Soviet military science, basing itself on Leninist theses, has extensively revealed the role in war both of the permanently-operating factors, and of the temporary, transitory factors. This is, in particular, borne witness by the well known statement of J. V. Stalin, set forth in the Order of the Peoples' Commissar of Defense of 23 February 1942, speaking of such permanently-operating factors as the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the armament of the army, and the organizing ability of the command personnel.

"The thesis on the permanently-operating factors, which generalized Leninist ideas, was at that period a new word in Soviet military science. Under the influence of the cult of the individual, however, this thesis began to be turned into an infallible dogma. Military science, moreover, cannot at all restrict itself to the study of the factors listed. There exist also permanently-operating factors which are not decisive in some cases but can under certain circumstances acquire a determining importance. Among them, for example, are the factors of space or geography, and of time, and a number of others. In addition, one must not ignore factors which are

not considered as permanently-operating: surprise, advance preparations for opening military operations, and a favorable strategic position. These factors are not operative throughout the entire course of the war, but mainly in its initial period. Their role substantially changes depending on the level of development of military technology. Thus, as a result of the unprecedented progress of contemporary weapons, and above all of nuclear weapons, jet aviation, and missiles, surprise is now in effect already turning into a permanently-operating factor, and that circumstance must be taken into account by military science.

“Under contemporary conditions, the role of science and technology grows enormously; without them it would be impossible to advance any field of endeavor, including the military. Hence science too should be added to the list of permanently-operating factors determining the fate of war.”⁶¹

Thus we see that Soviet belief in the continued *vitality* and *decisiveness* of the basic economic-morale-military potentials led them to drop the old stereotyped thesis on the permanently-operating factors, so that consideration of the “fundamental” or “decisive” factors themselves, and of other important considerations such as geographical space and surprise, may be more fruitfully examined in military scientific investigations and more usefully applied to practical issues. For, as Major General Lagovsky has said: “All these potentials must be developed and strengthened by all measures since precisely they, in their interrelation, decide the outcome of military operations and consequently of the entire war as a whole.”⁶²

Since it is now clear that Soviet doctrine ascribes decisive importance to the basic military, economic and morale potentials, it is useful at this point to inquire into the *opera-*

tional significance of these factors in Soviet thinking and action.

In his key article in *Military Thought* in 1953, Major General Talensky indicated the importance attributed when he said: "Victory in modern war is achieved by a decisive defeat of the enemy . . . on the basis of a superiority in the permanently-operating factors which decide the outcome of wars, on the foundation of an all-sided utilization of the economic, morale-political, and military potentialities in their unity and inter-relationship."⁸⁸

In the discussion which followed General Talensky's article no one even sought to challenge this view. An Air Force colonel, for example, pointed out that "Only a state which . . . is capable of *creating and maintaining a stable superiority in the permanently-operating factors over the course of a long period* is in position to gain victory in contemporary war."⁸⁹ The official views expressed in an editorial closing the theoretical debate of 1953 to 1955 presented this same point in other words: "Marxism-Leninism places victory in war in dependence upon real, objective conditions, underlining that he wins the war who masters advantages in military, economic, and morale-political potentialities, and who is able to utilize these advantages in the armed conflict."⁹⁰

By themselves these terms of generality are not significant. The importance of the view reflected in these generalities is their influence on Soviet military strategy. The basic developments in military technology, political affairs, industrial progress, geographic-strategic changes—these are all specified—"determine the economic, morale, and military potentials" which "must be calculated in the working out of strategic plans."⁹¹ "Military strategy is based on a correct utili-

zation of the permanently-operating factors which decide the fate of wars.”⁶⁷

The economic aspect of strategic planning has grown considerably in Soviet military thinking in recent years. “Now, as never before,” according to Major General Lagovsky, “the potentialities of strategy depend upon the planned and accurate functioning of industry and transport.”⁶⁸ Still more fundamentally, the Soviets hold that “A strategic plan going beyond the limits of economic potentiality is adventurism. *Strategy not founded in an adequate economic base inevitably will suffer failure.*”⁶⁹ Expressing the same point several years ago, Marshal Vasilevsky declared: “One can have fine strategic and operational plans and still lose a war, if these plans are not economically supported. . . .”⁷⁰

It is evident that the Soviet view of the importance of economic potential in future war is informed by the conception of even nuclear war as a long extended conflict.

The importance of economic mobilization and support deserves brief elaboration here. It may be useful also to note its connection with the problem of morale, particularly for a war in which the enemy employs nuclear strategic bombing. We shall later examine further the problem of morale.

Wars, states Colonel Fedorov, “are now conducted primarily on the basis of that technology, munitions, and all other forms of supply which are produced by the labor of the people in the very course of the war. Hence the degree of labor exertion, self-sacrifice and enthusiasm exhibited by the people in their work to fill the needs of the front, directly and particularly influences the course and outcome of the war. In this, the masses in the rear experience numerous and destructive bombings by enemy aviation, which brings great difficulties and deprivations and makes particularly high demands on morale.”⁷¹

In short, despite the expectation of nuclear bombing, continued military production is anticipated. In fact, although the Soviets possess enormous stocks of weapons, in the light of the cost and rapid obsolescence of many weapons, they have even indicated that *wartime* production will remain primary since even nuclear war will be long and drawn-out. In the authoritative military theoretical volume of the Officer's Library, *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army* (1957), Colonel Levanov declares: "In contemporary war reserves of prepared military items do not have as decisive an influence on satisfying the needs of the front as do energy resources, productive capacities, and reserves of strategic raw materials and fuel."⁷³ Similarly, in another recent discussion, Colonel Tarasenko states "Under conditions of contemporary war one cannot secure regular supply of weapons, matériel and supplies only from prepared stocks and reserves. Now the needs of the front can be fully satisfied only as a result of full exploitation of the current military production. . . ."⁷⁴

Thus we see that the Soviets regard the industrial and transportation preparedness of a state as a key aspect of planning for the eventuality of a long war. As Lt. General Krasil'nikov of the General Staff has stated: "The level of military potential cannot be correctly determined without considering also the degree of preparedness of the industry of a country for mass production of modern armament and combat matériel, and of transport for obtaining uninterrupted supply of everything necessary for the front."⁷⁴

Finally, in a rare instance of specification of the Soviet strategic planning requirement, Major General Lagovsky has disclosed: "*The fundamental thing that strategy must establish are the requirements of the armed forces for the first year of military operations.*"⁷⁵ Subsequent requirements,

he added, must be determined during the course of the war.

There is evidence indicating that strong military concern for providing the industrial capacity for war-making influenced Soviet military leaders to support the coalition of forces headed by Khrushchev which deposed Malenkov from the premiership in 1955.¹⁰ At that time, the military were assured that attention would be devoted to heavy industry, and to maintenance of large state reserves of matériel and of products, in order to increase defense capabilities.

In view of the Soviet attribution to the United States of a proclivity for strategic bombing one would anticipate keen awareness of the problem of reducing the vulnerability of the Soviet economic war potential. Measures to protect the economy from hostile military action would, it is true, hardly be discussed fully and frankly even in the military press. And, in fact, the only reference prior to 1956 known to the present writer was the statement of Col. General of Aviation Nikitin (in 1949) that "Air power has become an effective means of action in the deep rear of the enemy, requiring a reexamination of the question of the distribution of industry." Nonetheless, serious discussions of "the military economy" (as the Soviets term the military and warring aspects of the economic system as a whole) would disclose no secrets in raising the problem of possible contingencies in which the economy could not be counted upon entirely for wartime availability. Yet such an awareness has been remarkably slow in penetrating Soviet military writings on the wartime role of the economy.

Soviet discussions of the conversion and mobilization of the economy for war and of the role of "the military economy" which were published in the period through 1955 failed to raise the problem of the vulnerability—and hence even the question of the full availability—of the economy in time

of war.⁷⁸ The possible effects of nuclear and thermonuclear bombing, by *either* side, were ignored as if such a threat did not exist. Discussion of conversion and organization of the economy for war proceeded apparently on the implicit assumption that the peacetime economy would pass relatively unscathed into a new and important career of military service. This represents a remarkable lack of attention to what would appear to be an obvious and dominating factor. While the earlier articles may be excused for this omission, a number of these discussions date from as late as 1955. To be sure, the fact that discussions of the role of the economy in war lagged so strikingly in grasping a simple appreciation of the danger of nuclear attack for the economic system does not reflect a lack of high-level Soviet concern for the strategic defense of the country.

Apparently the earliest Soviet discussion of the role of the economic potential to recognize the effect of possible nuclear devastation appeared in late 1956. Colonel Raitarovsky noted that "under conditions of the employment of new forms of weapons [i.e., nuclear weapons, and missile and other delivery systems] transport has to function under great tension," and that "such factors as the territory of a country and geographical distribution of production have great significance."⁷⁹ In 1957 and 1958 a few additional discussions raised this issue. As Major General Lagovsky noted in his important work on *Strategy and Economics* (1957): "With the probability of employment of the newest weapons against economic targets, defense of one's own economy against hostile actions assumes particularly great significance."⁸⁰

In his initial article on the subject, Colonel Raitarovsky did raise one key aspect of the problem, and further alleges Soviet superiority in preparing to face the implications of

this challenge. He asserts that the United States cannot disperse its industry (sixty per cent of which is, he says, concentrated in eight northeastern states) because of opposition by "monopolies."

"On the other hand," Colonel Raitarovsky confidently declares, "our country with its vast spaces and rich natural resources has the opportunity of dispersing its production to make it less vulnerable to [actions of] the enemy, without violating the principle of proximity of production to the sources of raw materials and regions of consumption. Only a socialist government can take on its shoulders such grandiose tasks as the creation in a short period, in the course of the next two or three five-year plans, of a third powerful metallurgical base in the east of the country, with a production [objective] of 15 to 20 million tons of iron per year."⁸¹

Whether the Soviets are really so sanguine about their ability successfully to avert devastation may be doubted, but the scope of the effort as outlined marks it as a serious one. Similarly, it is known that industrial expansion in the U.S.S.R. has for some time been ordered to follow dispersal and avoidance of present urban-industrial centers, in particular Moscow and Leningrad. More recently, in 1957 and 1958, the industrial reorganization and general decentralization of the Soviet economy into about one hundred "economic councils" has provided a much more viable basis for meeting the needs of nuclear war.⁸² Indeed, in November, 1957, Khrushchev himself declared: "The reorganization of the direction of industry which we have undertaken also creates a more autonomous management of industry. That, too, improves our *strategic* position."⁸³ He added that while this was "not the main aim of the reorganization, it is nonetheless a very considerable one."

It is not necessary here to examine the question of Soviet

views on the relative importance of attacking the enemy's economy, save to note that while raising the importance of this mission they have continued to hold to the strategic concept of victory ultimately through destruction of the enemy's armed forces rather than of his warmaking capacities.⁴

The second major component of power considered crucial for war is the *morale* potential. Pointing out that the economic factor "is only one aspect of the question of the decisive role of the rear in contemporary war," Colonel Baz recently stated: "Another no less important aspect concerns the ever growing dependence of the armed conflict and war as a whole on the state of morale both of the armed forces and of the whole population. The morale factor has always played a decisive role in wars. . . . Future wars will demand unprecedented intensity of all strengths, physical and morale, of all categories of personnel of the armed forces and of the population."⁵

Colonel Baz's evaluation reflects a long-standing Soviet concept: "The morale factor is considered in inseparable conjunction with the economic and other factors which decide the outcome of wars."⁶ "One can lose a war," as Marshal Vasilevsky once noted, "despite the existence of excellent strategic plans which are economically well supported, if the war aims are unfavorable for *maintaining the morale* of the people on a high level *for a long period of time*."⁷

We have seen earlier that the Soviets ascribe still greater importance to morale in nuclear war than ever before. One aspect of Soviet morale in a future war is of particular interest. It is, moreover, one which the Soviet leadership did not openly discuss until 1955. Would Soviet armies, would the Soviet soldier, fight as courageously and as well in a war on foreign soil as in defense of the earth of Russia? The question is not susceptible of definite answer, but it is pos-

sibly a very important one. The editorial in *Military Thought* for May, 1955, first broached this subject indirectly: "In further working out the questions of the morale factor in war it is necessary to attain an ability to calculate and to utilize realistically all its potentialities in the interests of the military art and the achievement of victory over the foe . . . [political instruction] *in the spirit of conducting active offensive operations directed toward the complete crushing and annihilation of the enemy*, assumes particularly important significance."⁸⁸

Very soon following this editorial, a Soviet military "specialist" on the role of morale, Colonel Kashirin, broached the issue in *Red Star* as follows: "The Soviet state is a peaceful state. . . . But that does not mean that if the imperialists unleash a war, attack the Soviet Union, that the Soviet armed forces cannot conduct military operations on the territory of the enemy. . . . Unfortunately, some of us often confuse two entirely different conceptions. This is explained by the fact that there exist among us military comrades of the opinion that in the case of an attack on us by imperialist aggressors our mission will be to defend, to repulse their attack, not to permit them to enter deep in our country—and only that." This view, he explains, is faulty and dangerous: "And if it is necessary to advance on the territory of other states, not in order to seize their territories, to suppress some people, but in order to destroy barbarous imperialist robbers, *to defend to the end the state interests of the U.S.S.R.* . . . this requires of the entire personnel of the Soviet armed forces high morale qualities."⁸⁹

It is, indeed, surprising to learn that some "military comrades" have been so naive and so bold as to maintain that in the event of war the Soviet armed forces should not attempt to advance into other countries. And it is revealing that the

justification is framed in terms of "the state interests of the U.S.S.R."—something no one is likely to question.

Following the use of Soviet troops to put down the Hungarian Revolution in November, 1956, the theme of advancing into other countries again became too sensitive to reach the open military press.

While the Soviets constantly proclaim their great superiority in morale, it is likely that their leaders are concerned over the problem of how the Soviet and Satellite peoples would act in war—especially in war initiated by the Soviet Union. It may be that despite their extensive and intensive efforts to propagandize their soldiers and general population they consider this to be an element in restraining them from war.

Now we reach the third major component of war-waging power—the direct military potential. As we have seen, military potential is defined by the Soviets to embrace the quantity, quality, deployment, and reserves of military manpower and weapons. In a recent (mid-1958) article "On the Nature of Military Potential," Colonel V. Petrov reviews these factors with especial stress on training and preparation of the officer cadres.* He also devotes attention to the level of military science as a relevant factor.⁶⁰

We have earlier noted the continuing Soviet emphasis on successive campaigns. "The fate of war cannot be decided by one or two engagements, no matter how grandiose a scale they might achieve. Contemporary wars assume a drawn-out character."⁶¹ Consequently, as Major General Talensky has recently stated, "Victory in war will now be achieved by means of determined armed struggle, by means of dealing the enemy blows mounting in strength, *and the organization*

* He notes that the ratio of officers to enlisted men in the Soviet armed forces has sharply changed and now stands at 1:5.8.

for that purpose of all the forces of the people and all the resources of the country."⁹² And, as he noted on another occasion, "under contemporary conditions no major war against an economically powerful adversary can be won unless it is possible *to step up the war effort continuously . . .*"⁹³

Thus we see again the importance of the economic potential for direct support of military operations. It is considered by the Soviets to be of such exceptional importance because of their image of a future nuclear war with large armies committed over vast territories for a long period of time. It is useful to cite a few statements illustrating Soviet attention to the industrial base for armaments:

"At the present time wars have a long, drawn-out character, they have an unprecedented scale in numbers of participants of the armed forces and the saturation of their matériel. They make tremendous demands on the armament and munitions supply and production and require high morale and combat qualities of the personnel of the army."⁹⁴

"Armament depends upon the level of development of productive forces achieved at any given time, the industrial might of a country which permits supplying new forms of armament to mass armies. Contemporary armies, gigantic in their scale, would be unthinkable in the absence of mass production of weapons."⁹⁵

"In contemporary war superiority over the enemy in artillery, tanks, aircraft of all types, automatic weapons, new weapons, and in general superiority in military technology as a whole, has important significance. In this connection mobilization and deployment of industry, especially of heavy industry, plays a decisive role."⁹⁶

Regarding transportation facilities it has been stated: "The concentration of a very large number of troops in definite sectors, with their large quantity of matériel, the necessity

of constant supply to these troops of all forms of goods and reinforcements, places the question of mobilization of all forms of transport particularly sharply . . .”⁹⁷

The other essential ingredient of the military forces is, of course, manpower. And first of all in terms of direct military potential, “The size of the population and its political-morale condition determine the possible limits of its military training reserves.”⁹⁸ Moreover, in strategic planning special attention is given to preparation of adequate reserves in expectation of a long war. Thus, in the 1957 volume on *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army* the military requirement for planning for a long war is stated as follows:

“In the strategic planning of war the correct employment of the troops must be estimated not only for its initial period but for its whole course. A genuinely scientific approach to the determination of the sizes of the first and succeeding strategic echelons, tempos of mobilization and strategic deployment, force levels of ready and reserve forces, reinforcement of combat field formations with fresh forces during the whole extent of the war is required. Hence Soviet military science attaches enormous significance to the working out of these problems. A correct decision on these problems determines the effectiveness of the employment of the quantity and quality of the armed forces in the interests of victory in war.”⁹⁹

Other authorities have stressed, in the words of Colonel General Kurochkin in *Military Thought*, that the possession and proper deployment of strategic reserves is “one of the most important factors for seizing the strategic initiative from the hands of the enemy.”¹⁰⁰

The Soviet “annual class” conscription system (and the practice of geographically and occupationally settling many discharged conscripts at the close of their service *by groups*) insures a strong reservoir of trained manpower reserves.

The Soviet conception of future war decided by economic, morale, and military potentials also leads them to plan on the basis of large, mass ground armies. In 1956 and 1957 Marshal Zhukov provided several clear statements of the Soviet view on the role of large ground forces. After denying that air and nuclear power is now the predominant type of armed force in war, he stated that mass armies are necessary even in general nuclear war: "Air power and nuclear weapons by themselves cannot decide the outcome of armed conflict. Along with atomic and hydrogen weapons, in spite of their tremendous destructive power, *large armies and a tremendous quantity of conventional arms inevitably will be drawn into military operations.*"¹⁰¹ This statement was not designed simply for Western consumption. Soviet military writing is replete with similar observations reflecting this significant conclusion of Soviet military thinking.¹⁰²

In fact, in the period since 1956 a number of Soviet military men have explicitly declared that "The use of nuclear weapons not only does not replace conventional armed forces, but on the contrary leads to their increase."¹⁰³ Writing in mid-1958, Colonel Baz proceeded to explain the Soviet reason for this conclusion: "Means of mass destruction are so termed because their employment causes great losses. The dispersal of troops with their subsequent swift concentration on the front line and in depth is the logical consequence and inevitable result of the appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and will be standard in future war. But the losses among the troops will just the same be very great. It is necessary to orient ourselves not on an easy war, but on an extremely severe war which will require throughout its whole course tremendous reinforcements for the armed forces. The possibility of great losses leads also to the substantial growth of reserves—strategic, operational, and tactical—which will

in future war in much greater degree than in previous wars be assigned to replace troops knocked out of the line. Thus one must not expect in future war with mass destruction weapons any lessening or reduction of armed forces by any means, but on the contrary their further increase."¹⁰⁴

Thus forces in being, sufficient to serve both as immediately available forces to seize the initiative on the ground for advance and as cadre for rapid expansion by integration of trained reserves, and large reserves to replace those destroyed in nuclear war, are a requirement established by Soviet doctrine in accordance with their image of future war as long.¹⁰⁵

While recognizing important changes in the weight of various factors in influencing the outcome of war, the Soviets do not believe either that military power or the outcome of war itself can be assured except through superiority in "the decisive factors." In the most recent statement available at this writing, Major General Lagovsky has authoritatively stated in the Spring of 1959: "Soviet military science considers, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, that the level of military power of a state is determined by the state of its economic, morale, and military potentials. *Only by commanding a superiority in the strengths issuing from the constant interactions of these potentials as a whole can one count on success in armed conflict.*"¹⁰⁶

Of necessity Soviet military doctrine and strategic thinking reflects the Marxist view of history, "victory cannot be won by any easy means."¹⁰⁷ Moreover, their basic philosophy of war as a means to political ends leads them to visualize their strategic objective in war as the conquest of other resources—not the reduction to radioactive ash of those of others and of themselves. But beyond the influences of their ideological dispositions and political objectives, their mili-

tary strategic concept sees victory won only through the destruction of opposing military power in what they calculate will be a long, hard, world-wide war requiring large ground armies, tense morale demands, and an all-encompassing economic effort.

The Soviets have not only developed their doctrine in terms of this view, but they have shaped the organization, composition, nature, size, and deployment of their armed forces accordingly as well. Soviet doctrine on the decisive factors in war is not only evidenced in their military writings, but is borne eloquent witness by the whole Soviet military establishment.

CHAPTER 3

THE ROLE OF SURPRISE AND BLITZKRIEG

The Soviets have in recent years come to recognize the increased significance of surprise in the nuclear-jet-missile era. This has tempted some to assume that the Soviets attach such a premium to surprise as to consider it to be the decisive factor and the basis for a "preventive" nuclear blitzkrieg. Let us review the development of Soviet military doctrine on the role of strategic surprise during the period from 1953 to 1959, in order to clarify this important matter by a detailed and documented account of this key aspect of Soviet strategic thinking in the nuclear age.¹

In the prewar period the Soviet military doctrinal view of surprise was not of great interest. Stalin had not yet laid claim to the title of military genius *par excellence*, nor had he uttered a dictum on the role of surprise. Moreover, nuclear weapons, guided missiles, supersonic aircraft, and intercontinental bombers did not yet exist.

The successful German surprise of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, led Stalin to declare that surprise, while important (indeed responsible for the then undeniable initial German gains), was a factor of transitory, temporary significance. This evaluation was not really at variance with the facts, as the war demonstrated. Stalin contrasted factors of transitory influence with what he termed "the permanently-operating factors," which, he said, "determine the fate and outcome of wars." These factors became the basic codification of Soviet military doctrine. Yet, despite the con-

sideration of surprise as a transitory factor, Soviet doctrine never denied its importance and desirability. A number of statements in the Stalinist postwar period clearly restated the importance of surprise.*

In September and October, 1953, two articles in the authoritative Soviet General Staff journal *Military Thought* dealt briefly with the role of surprise. In the first article (which opened a debate on military theory), Major General Talensky declared: "It is well known that the influence of surprise on the course of military operations can be significant. *But as a result of the correct actions of a commander, the effect of an enemy surprise attack can be to a greater or lesser degree paralyzed* by a system of measures, worked out by Soviet military science, in particular a system of operational and tactical security, and by high vigilance and combat preparedness of the troops, etc."

On efforts to counteract attempts at strategic surprise, General Talensky stated that "measures of a political nature on an international scale, and also appropriate organization by states threatened by attack of an aggressor, by the system of organization of the troops, by preparation of the country for war, by well organized tactical and strategic air defense, by an able and vigilant intelligence service, and the like."

But the October article in *Military Thought* noted, for the first time in Soviet discussions, the increased importance of surprise due to the nature of modern weapons.

"*Under current conditions,*" observed Colonel Nenakhov, "*the danger of surprise attack by the aggressors has not only not declined, but on the contrary has become still more sharp. What causes this? Above all, the appearance of new forms of armament of enormous destructive and devastating action which, in the hands of the aggressors, are a most dangerous means of attack, capable of bringing innumerable calamities*

to peaceloving peoples. This concerns similarly the development of aviation and other forms of military technology and delivery means. . . .

“Surprise of attack, of course, was and remains a transitory factor not deciding the fate of wars. However, as is well known from the experience of the war, surprise can bring great advantage to the aggressor and enormous loss to the victim of the attack. It would hence be unforgiveable not to take account of this factor and to underestimate it.”

In the first months of 1954 several military writers reflected a new recognition of the increased importance of the factor of surprise in contemporary warfare.⁵ But all these articles emphasized the fundamental decisiveness not of surprise, but of the so-called permanently-operating factors.⁶ To cite but one illustration, Colonel Piatkin, a professor at the Frunze Academy, declared in the spring of 1954: “Marxism-Leninism recognizes the significance of the temporary factors in war. The temporary factors influence the course of the war, especially in the beginning. In circumstances of the use of powerful atomic weapons, for example, surprise of attack assumes still greater significance. However, the temporary factors cannot give stable successes and determine the fate of a war as a whole.”

The period from September, 1953, to March, 1954, thus witnessed the introduction of a modified, but by no means sharply altered, doctrinal view of the significance of surprise in modern war. Surprise was recognized to have become more important—but *not* decisive—in the era of nuclear and even thermonuclear weapons. It is of interest that as early as October, 1953, thermonuclear weapons were specifically mentioned.

Later statements on surprise suggest that during 1954 the implications of the magnitude of destructiveness of the ther-

monuclear weapon impressed themselves further upon Soviet military men. In a collection of articles titled *Marxism-Leninism on War, the Army, and Military Science*, which went to press in early February, 1955, two of the statements originally published in early 1954 (by Major General Pukhovsky and Colonel Piatkin) were modified to raise still further the importance of surprise. Colonel Piatkin's article, cited above, was amended to add that surprise is "one of the decisive conditions for achieving success . . . *even in the war as a whole.*"⁸ Nonetheless, the revised articles both restated that surprise is a transitory factor, and General Pukhovsky even inserted a new statement that surprise attack "cannot cause a country which is attacked any serious harm if that country and its armed forces are always ready . . ."⁹ While it is unlikely that General Pukhovsky literally meant to say that a surprise nuclear blow could cause no "serious harm," it is clear that he meant to limit the increased importance of surprise to a status less than decisive.

A debate over the laws of military science, which extended through 1954, did not feature discussion of the role of surprise, although one of the participants did call attention to the increased importance of surprise with new weapons. And, as a result of the increased importance of surprise, he noted that: "To place one's stakes primarily or only on the temporary, transitory factors means to fall into adventurism. To place one's stakes only on the permanently-operating factors, ignoring the temporary but very important factors, means to be near-sighted."¹⁰ While the importance of both "permanent" and "temporary" factors was affirmed, the penalty for gambling on the temporary factors was still presented as much greater: "Adventurism" is a mortal sin in Bolshevism; being "near-sighted" is by comparison a venial sin. Thus, surprise was not considered a key in the debate. None-

theless, as we have observed, parallel with the published (but not public) debate over the laws of military science, the Soviet view on the role of surprise was undergoing modification.

A new departure in Soviet strategic thinking was initiated with the key article "On the Role of Surprise in Contemporary War," by Marshal of the Tank Troops Rotmistrov, which appeared in *Military Thought* in the issue which went to press on February 3, 1955. This article, we now know, was so significant an innovation that the editors of *Military Thought* had refused at first to publish it. It is not positively known what led them to change their judgment and to publish the article in February, 1955, but it was probably due to the intervention of Marshal Zhukov at a secret high-level meeting in January, 1955, in which he urged a new approach to the study of military affairs.¹¹ The editors of *Military Thought* themselves, in the March, 1955, editorial admitted in self-criticism that they had "held up without basis" the publication of this article, "thus displaying a lack of the necessary boldness in raising a new and timely question having important significance for a correct understanding of the character of contemporary war."¹²

Rotmistrov emphasized the greatly increased importance of surprise in the nuclear era. In terms later frequently paraphrased, he stated: "Surprise attack with the employment of atomic and hydrogen weapons and other contemporary weapons now assumes new forms, and is capable of leading to significantly greater results than in the past war. One may frankly say that under the circumstances of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons surprise is one of the decisive conditions for achievement of success, not only in battles and operations, but even in wars as a whole. *In certain cases surprise attack with the mass use of new weapons can provoke the quick collapse of a state whose capability for re-*

sistance is low as a consequence of the basic failures of its social and economic structure, and also of an unfavorable geographic location.”¹³

While Rotmistrov carried the argument on the increased importance of surprise further than the military writers in 1953 and 1954, this was not the major and indeed novel feature of his discussion. He went on to view the consequences of the increased importance of surprise *for Soviet strategy*, and concluded that repulse of an attempted surprise attack was insufficient—that a “preemptive” or “forestalling” strike* is necessary. In his own words, “since too often in past history aggressors have used surprise attacks on other states we cannot ignore these lessons of history, and *we must always be ready for preemptive actions* against the cunning of aggressors. . . . The duty of the Soviet armed forces is to not permit surprise attack of the enemy on our country, and in case an attempt is made, *not only to repulse the attack successfully, but also to deal to the enemy simultaneous or even preemptive surprise blows of terrible crushing power*. For this the Soviet army and navy have everything that is necessary.”¹⁴

Marshal Rotmistrov explicitly distinguishes the idea of a preemptive strike from “preventive war” against a hostile power. A preemptive strike is the last-hour seizure of the initiative (and surprise) from the enemy whom the Soviets know (presumably from intelligence sources) to be preparing for an imminent surprise attack.

“The growth of the role of surprise in connection with the changed character of contemporary war bespeaks the fact that when we must take up arms we must be able to gain the

* The Russian word, *uprezhdaiushchyi*, can be rendered either as “pre-emptive” or “forestalling.” It is an unusual term in Russian.

strategic initiative, using for that purpose the element of surprise in full measure. *Striving to seize and hold the strategic initiative must not be understood as intention to start a preventive war against the enemies of the USSR who are preparing to attack us.* The Soviet Union threatens no one and does not intend to attack first even when some government conducts provocative military policy, surrounding the territory of our country with a net of bases and feverishly coaching its satellites for war against us. But at the same time we must constantly bear in mind that too often in history aggressors have used the pretext of preventive war to justify pure aggression. Any attempt of this sort, no matter how masked, requires that the Soviet army give a deserved rebuff to any reckless aggressor. . . .”¹⁵

In establishing this concept of a preemptive strike, Marshal of the Tank Troops Rotmistrov apparently had opened a new operational consideration for war planning. Previously, the Soviets had presumably relied up the alternative contingencies of offensive war plans or defensive repulse of the enemy's initial attack followed by implementation of offensive plans. The publication of Rotmistrov's article was not the only sign of the official acceptance of his view on the need under present conditions for preemptive actions if the enemy was preparing for an attack.

The editorial of the same issue of *Military Thought* which contained Rotmistrov's article (February, 1955) fully accepted and endorsed his position. "Under present conditions," it stated, "as a consequence of the appearance of weapons of great destructive force and the unprecedented development of high-speed aviation and rocket [missile] technology, the significance of surprise in war has risen exceptionally. *Under these conditions preparedness and ability to answer blow for blow are alone insufficient on the part of states threatened*

by attack. In order that the aggressor would not gain the advantages from [attempted] surprise attack, and *to turn surprise against him*, the greatest vigilance, unity, mobility, and ability to overtake the enemy in initiative and to defeat him by crushing blows, is required."¹⁶

Finally, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Marshal Sokolovsky, publicly repeated this view. While not mentioning intentions for a preemptive strike, he repeated on February 23, 1955, almost word for word, the passage cited above, changing only the last sentence to read: "It is necessary to deny the aggressor the factor of surprise, not to be caught unawares."¹⁷ And *Military Thought* stated again explicitly in its following issue: "We cannot ignore the lessons of history, and *we must always be ready for a preemptive action* against the craftiness of the aggressors."¹⁸

Beginning at this time, in early 1955, the theme of the new significance of surprise—though without disclosure of the preemptive strategy—also began to receive wide and public attention. In the first six months of the year at least thirty-eight specific statements of the increased importance of surprise were made, and in the last six months ten additional statements appeared. Relatively few statements have been made since 1955. However, the sharp decline in publicity was presumably related to political and propaganda purposes, and it does not reflect a doctrinal change. Those statements which do appear continue to express the positions decided upon in early 1955.¹⁹

Among the Soviet military spokesmen noting the increased significance of surprise in war with modern weapons have been a number of marshals: Marshals of the Soviet Union Sokolovsky, Malinovsky, Vasilevsky, Konev, Bagramian, and Moskalenko, and Marshal of the Tank Troops Rotmistrov. It is, perhaps, of interest that no senior air force or navy

officers have to this day commented on the subject, although the military press of all services have noted the revised evaluation of surprise.

In the entire period, *The Herald of the Air Fleet*, organ of the Soviet air forces, contained but two brief articles on surprise, both in the April, 1955, issue. However, these two discussions were most explicit and detailed in commenting on the particular relevance of the increased role of surprise to strategic air attacks. One, an unsigned editorial article, stated: "It is well known to all that the imperialists do not conceal their intentions to start a new war by means of blows with atomic and hydrogen weapons on the vitally important centers of our country and the countries of peoples' democracy [the Satellites], with the objective of knocking out in a few days our main industrial centers, paralyzing transport, and demoralizing the population. The lackeys of imperialism openly declare this aloud and in print. Therefore in contemporary circumstances, when new means of combat, high speed aviation and rocket technology, have been developed, *it is insufficient merely to be prepared and capable of answering blow for blow to the warmongers. We must deny the aggressor the element of surprise, not permitting ourselves to be caught unawares.*"²⁰

In the same issue, Colonel General (then Lieutenant General) of Aviation Braiko, Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces, declared:

"The military leaders of the United States and England openly declare that they propose to start a war with surprise blows from the air, employing atomic and hydrogen weapons against our vitally important centers in the deep rear, calculating to knock out in a few days the main industrial centers, paralyze transport, and demoralize the population. . . . As before, the imperialist aggressors give first

place to the factor of surprise. Of course, under contemporary conditions as a consequence of the appearance of weapons of great destructive force, the unheard of development of speedy aviation and jet and missile technology, the factor of *surprise can have still greater significance than before, if the corresponding [defensive] measures which are capable of liquidating its influence on the outcome of the struggle are not taken.*

“The duty of the soldiers of the Soviet air forces is to *deny to the aggressor the element of surprise, to not permit him to catch us unawares.* It is necessary for us to be *ready to nip in the very bud the scheming plans of the warmongers, if they dare to try to enter upon their fulfillment.*

“The most important condition for resolving this task is to be in a condition of constant combat readiness.”²¹

While clearly raising the importance of surprise, Braiko also stressed the ability of corresponding defensive measures even to *liquidate the influence* of a surprise attack on the outcome of a war.

The only commentator who openly discussed the strategic threat was Marshal Bagramian (in May, 1955). His statement is of interest also because he referred quite clearly to the *deterrence* value of preparedness, the frustrating of any “desire” to launch a surprise attack: “As we know from the history of warfare and of the military art, surprise in dealing a blow to an enemy secures certain advantages in warfare to the attacking side. At the present stage of the development of military affairs and technology, *the role of surprise grows even more, since an unexpected blow can be dealt not only to troops deployed on the front but also to strategic targets, and to important political and industrial centers located far from the front line.* Therefore the sacred duty of every sol-

dier is to nip in the bud any desire of the aggressors to carry out a surprise attack on our Soviet Motherland."²²

A number of other statements also emphasize the point that the military experts of the "imperialist" powers, in particular of the United States, "ascribe to surprise a fundamental significance and make of it the *only* guarantee of victory in war" (Marshal Rotmistrov's words).

"At the basis of 'preventive' war," explains Colonel Der-evianko, "lies the expectation of the most complete exploitation of the results of a mighty surprise blow, especially by air power using mass destruction weapons. Surprise is considered the decisive strategic factor, and the surprise employment of hydrogen and atomic weapons is viewed as the chief condition for the successful beginning of a "lightning" war."²³ Although "one must not underestimate the great harm that an attacking aggressor could deal" with nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, "the aggressor's reliance on surprise of attack on the countries of the socialist camp is faulty, and under the conditions of our vigilance it cannot bring the imperialists success, since the fate of wars is decided in the final analysis by the permanently-operating factors."²⁴ In short, vigilance and preparedness for a forestalling blow is considered the antidote to a surprise thermonuclear attack.

The earlier cited two ambiguous references in the Air Forces' journal to the need "to deny the aggressor the element of surprise" were the only public hints at the Soviet conclusion on the importance of preemptive initial Soviet blows to be made if an enemy strike was clearly about to be launched. *Military Thought*, not publicly available, was however quite explicit in reiterating this view, and pointing to the practical problems in implementing a preemptive strategy: "The task is to work out seriously all sides of this ques-

tion [of surprise] and above all to elaborate ways and *means of warning of surprise attack* by the enemy *and of the dealing to the enemy of preemptive blows on all levels*—strategic, operational, and tactical.”²⁶

Thus it is clear that the Soviets are seriously concerned with devising methods of dealing a preemptive strike, but did not believe they had yet fully succeeded by mid-1955. The most specific measure which has been indicated is simply absolute readiness to act as soon as the warning of impending enemy attack is received. This need for constant readiness has been featured in virtually all of the numerous public statements on surprise in recent years, and it also was specifically given in each of the few non-public references to the need for preemptive action. The only statement in available issues of *Military Thought*, other than the article by Rotmistrov and the editorials earlier cited, appeared in May 1955 in an article by Colonel General Kurochkin, head of the Frunze Academy. He spoke of the necessity of maintaining “a condition of complete combat readiness, and to be able to deal preemptive blows on the enemy who is preparing for an attack. Only in this way can surprise attack be averted.” He continued by calling attention to the need that: “The events of June, 1941, must not be repeated.”²⁶ The editors further stated in the same issue that the “biggest mistake” of prewar Soviet military doctrine was that “it had not worked out the questions of averting a surprise attack.”²⁷

Several leading marshals then having a major degree of responsibility for the national defense claimed in the spring of 1955 that the Soviet Union already had the wherewithal to deal with any attempted surprise attack. While noting the effectiveness of new weapons, Marshal Vasilevsky, for example, was emphatic on the achievement of an appropriate defense posture: “It is well known that in the arsenal of the

imperialist aggressors perfidy and surprise of attack are especially favored weapons. In connection with the appearance of high speed jet aviation and weapons of mass destruction, the significance of the factor of surprise has notably grown. Bearing in mind the dangerous and crafty habits of the imperialists, the Soviet Union has drawn the corresponding conclusions. *It now possesses all that is necessary in order, in the event of the unleashing of a new war, to deny to an aggressor those advantages which timely [advance] preparation for an attack, surprise and perfidy of that attack, could give him.*"²⁸

Marshal Konev also assured the nation that Soviet armed forces were fully prepared "to elude any eventuality and provocation and prevent the possibility of surprise aggression from any quarter."²⁹ Soviet power was said to be not only adequate for defense, but similarly for the preemptive strike, if necessary. As Marshal Moskalkenko stated at the same time, "We must be constantly on guard, to be ready . . . to ward off a surprise attack and to deal a crushing blow to any group of enemies who attempt to destroy the Communist structure."³⁰

All of the numerous Soviet statements on surprise—with one possible exception—have clearly referred to a *defensive* concern of the Soviets over the consequences of, and hence deterrence or if necessary "preempting" of, any possible American surprise attack. The apparent exception was a statement made by Lt. General Shatilov (then Deputy Head of the Chief Political Administration) in an address in May, 1955. General Shatilov noted the new significance of surprise, and the alleged imperialist proclivity for use of surprise nuclear attack. But then he departed from the usual pattern to state:

"Knowing the savage character of the aggressors, we can-

not leave without attention the plans they are preparing. The Soviet Union threatens no one and does not intend to attack anyone, but those who think that they will meet with unpreparedness to repel aggression or passivity on our part will be bitterly disappointed. It would pay the immoderately war-like generals and admirals of the imperialist camp to remember that atomic weapons as well as suddenness of action are double edged weapons, and it is hardly sensible to jest with them.

“The Soviet people well remember and strictly observe the injunction of their great teacher, V. I. Lenin. He wrote: ‘Anyone would agree that an army which did not *prepare to employ every kind of weapon, and means of struggle, which the enemy had or might have had*, would be stupid and even criminal.’”⁸¹

Both in the passage cited and elsewhere in his speech, General Shatilov avered Soviet readiness “to repel” with “a crushing rebuff,” and avowed explicitly that the USSR “does not intend to attack anyone.” It would appear that he intended by his description of surprise as a “double edged weapon” to threaten that under certain unstated circumstances (presumably and probably the “preemptive strike”) the Soviet Union would itself take advantage of surprise.

In discussing the increased importance of surprise, and the need for constant combat readiness to avert surprise by a preemptive blow, the Soviets do not carry to an extreme their *own* reliance on surprise. While well aware of the great significance of surprise, the Soviets nonetheless state, in the words of Major General Pukhovsky, “The use by an enemy of the factor of surprise cannot cause a country which is attacked any serious harm if that country and its armed forces are always ready to rebuff the enemy.”⁸² In this context it is clear that while aware of the greatly increased effectiveness

of surprise, the Soviets do not regard the possibility of surprise itself as sufficient foundation to justify launching a war against a vigilant major opponent.

Marshal Rotmistrov, the most vigorous proponent of the new significance of surprise, noted that while surprise may under certain conditions be necessary and even a decisive condition, it is never a *sufficient basis* for success. In his key article on the subject in *Military Thought*, February, 1955, he stated: "*Surprise attack by itself still does not and cannot provide complete victory in war or an operation. It only creates a condition which must be skillfully exploited, developing the effect achieved by unexpectedness, or decisively parrying it if the enemy makes an attempt.*" Further, he explicitly noted that the permanently-operating factors remained decisive: "While considering surprise as one of the most important conditions of achieving success and recognizing its ever growing role, it is necessary to note that this circumstance in no measure contradicts the thesis on the permanently-operating factors which decide the fate of wars. They continue in contemporary circumstances to have primary significance for achieving a complete victory over the enemy."³³

Similarly, in subsequent articles in *Red Star* and *The Military Herald* in 1955, Rotmistrov declared (after repeating that surprise with new weapons can under some circumstances be "one of the decisive conditions for achieving successes"): "*Surprise cannot, however, yield a conclusive result, cannot bring victory, in a war with a serious and strong enemy.*"³⁴

Not even one statement has ever contradicted this view, and it is clearly the Soviet doctrinal position. Thus, for example, in late 1957 Marshal of Aviation Vershinin declared that "a lightning annihilation of the Soviet Union by air strikes is excluded from possibility," because "our country is not an

island or a mere point on the globe, but has enormous territory over which our vital resources are dispersed.”⁸⁵ The importance of such geographical factors has, if anything, increased. For example, one of the Soviet articles appended to this study, in discussing this factor, concludes that “space will not lose its significance in future war.”

In an important recent statement, Major General Talensky—the first to have raised the reevaluation of surprise, five years earlier—has declared that surprise attack is “characteristic of political and military adventurism.” The *importance* of surprise, according to General Talensky, is that it is “a factor providing great advantages to the one who uses it, and permitting in some cases a certain degree of offsetting of other factors, which determine the outcome of a war . . .” But it does not rank as one of these decisive factors nor ever, evidently, offset them entirely. Thus the view of the role of surprise in modern war adopted in 1954 and 1955 has since remained stable. To sum it up, let us cite one other key passage from General Talensky’s recent discussion: “One cannot doubt that in the future, too, it will not be possible to base one’s calculations on surprise attack alone. *In the nuclear era as before, the outcome of war will be decided by the whole complex of economic, social, political, and military factors, and not by the factor of surprise alone.*”⁸⁶

Early in 1958 the Soviets returned to the themes of preemptive attack and preventive war—this time in the public press. During the first half of that year several radio broadcasts, articles in *Red Star*, and items in the civilian press protested violently that, in the words of Marshal Malinovsky: “Our peaceloving policy does not permit any kind of ‘preventive war,’ ‘preemptive blows,’ or ‘surprise attack’ about which some foreign slanderers are trumpeting.”⁸⁷ The fact that the Minister of Defense himself saw fit to make such de-

nials in *Pravda* bears witness to the high level attention given to the public disavowals not only of preventive war but also of preemptive action. Why should the Soviets have felt compelled to issue public denials of preventive war, and especially of preemptive action?

The first reason for this stand was that several articles in the West had disclosed the 1955 Soviet statements cited earlier in our discussion. Lieutenant General Krasil'nikov, on *Radio Moscow*, attacked *US News and World Report*, saying: "The periodical employs unworthy methods. It uses out of context individual phrases and paragraphs from articles by Soviet military men which were published in the Soviet press in the last two or three years, distorts their meaning, and does not even stop at crass invention. . . . The periodical asserts that a doctrine of preventive war is now the basis of a new strategy of war."⁸⁸

In *Red Star* General of the Army Kurasov, a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, explained: "The advent of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their use on a large scale against troops and objects in the rear provoked various interpretations on the significance of surprise attack in future war, and on the measures of counteraction to that attack. This aroused some military authors to occupy themselves with study of the significance of the factor of surprise in contemporary war. In the process the theoretical expressions in the press of individual authors on measures to disrupt the surprise attack of an aggressor were interpreted in the Western press as a call to preemptive war."⁸⁹

There is validity in the Soviet objection that they had not endorsed the concept of preventive war, and were in some instances misquoted. But, as we have shown, they are falsifying when they deny at the same time their position on preemptive action to meet an opponent's attempt at surprise at-

tack. This leads us to the second aspect of the recent Soviet denials.

Beginning in January, 1958, the Soviets opened a new campaign charging the United States with entertaining ideas of preventive war.⁴⁰ Many of these articles and broadcasts have singled out the secret Gaither Report as allegedly proposing preventive war. Yet, in the terms that one of them described the alleged recommendation of the Gaither Report—"going so far as to call for 'a military policy of striking an enemy before he makes an attack' . . ."⁴¹—it counsels tactics of preemptive action, rather than calling for premeditated preventive war. So we see that in order to impugn the US by glossing over the important differences between preemptive warfare and preventive war, the Soviets have been impelled in turn to deny any interest of their own not only in preventive war, but also in preemptive strikes.

So far as we know, there are no grounds for believing the Soviets have actually lessened their interest in providing for the contingency of preemptive action in the event that they believed they were imminently to be attacked. At the same time, while the possibility of a Soviet preventive war (or more simply, Soviet initiation of war) by surprise attack can certainly not be excluded from serious attention, it is not possible to conclude from the Soviet writings on the subject—as some American writers have attempted to do—that the Soviets evince an interest in preventive war. Soviet military writings, while obviously they can never prove a reliable indicator of Soviet plans to start a war, do provide us some insight into judging the doctrinal background to such Soviet decisions.

Surprise is considered by the Soviets to be no recipe for blitzkrieg victory, even with the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. For example, while Rotmistrov wrote in

Military Thought that "surprise attack with the mass use of new weapons can *in certain cases* provoke the quick collapse of a state whose capability for resistance is low," he carefully specified the necessary causes for this low capability for resistance in terms which clearly exclude either the Soviet Union or the United States. While the United States might, in the Soviet view, be weakened by "basic failures of its social and economic structure," it certainly does not suffer from the other condition he specified, "an unfavorable geographic location."⁴ Rotmistrov thus allows the possibility of successful nuclear surprise blitzkrieg, but only against weaker powers. Another Soviet writer (in 1957), concluding that the Soviet bloc would be seriously hurt but could not be defeated by an American surprise thermonuclear attack, wrote: "Strategic surprise today, thanks to the [possible] use of thermonuclear weapons, has become extremely and unprecedentedly dangerous. Any other evaluation would be blind and naive. But from this fact follows *not* the victory of [capitalist] militarism, but only the very great cost of the victory over militarism."⁵ "Counting on surprise," as the Soviets recognize, "is the main argument for a blitzkrieg."⁶ But, as we shall see below, the Soviets continue to reject the conception of *reliance* on a blitzkrieg attack.

In rejecting surprise thermonuclear attack as a reliable foundation for a strategy, the Soviets do not deny the importance of gaining surprise. As we have seen, they would seek to acquire the initiative by a preemptive strike if the United States were to attempt a surprise attack; it is also clear that in any general nuclear war which the Soviets would unleash they would seek maximum attainment of surprise. But it is also a key aspect of Soviet thought that surprise cannot assure victory, which is determined only in a long war

on the basis of superiority in basic morale, economic and military potential.

“Adventurism,” or the taking of unnecessary risks, is a cardinal sin in Bolshevism. The Soviets evaluate any attempt of a great power to destroy another great power by a “lightning blow,” even with powerful modern nuclear and other weapons in a surprise attack, as adventuristic. Hence, “Adventuristic anti-scientific theories of ‘atomic blitzkrieg,’ ‘lightning’ and ‘air’ wars, etc., are alien to the military science of the socialist state.”⁴⁵ As Lt. General Gritchik once put it: “blitzkrieg can lead only to a blitz collapse. . . .”⁴⁶

A powerful military attack may not be an adventuristic “lightning” blow only if, when carefully calculated on the basis of the respective strength (potential and in being) of the enemy, it yields not only a probability of success, but involves no serious risk of disaster. Blitzkrieg in a general nuclear war, despite the much greater power of a surprise strike, necessarily involves unassumable risks. In a non-nuclear or a limited war, Soviet military doctrine does favor a “salient thrust” deep penetration of combined forces (with strong armored and supporting air components); but only with the requisite reserves and superiority of forces.⁴⁷ In a unique reference to the only available illustration of a Soviet strategic operation of this nature, a Soviet colonel has declared of the Manchurian campaign of August-September, 1945: “That was an example of a genuine lightning war, not at all like the myth of ‘lightning’ war which was created by the German General Staff.”⁴⁸

In contrast to the concept of blitzkrieg, Soviet military doctrine has long held that “Victory in modern war is achieved by a decisive defeat of the enemy in the course of armed conflict by means of successive blows of increasing strength . . .”⁴⁹ This particular statement was made by Major General Talen-

sky in his article in *Military Thought* in September, 1953, which opened the debate on laws of military science. Talensky also stated at that time that offensive operations of "successively mounting efforts" were "the basic character of armed conflict."⁵⁰ In the debate on military science several participants took issue with the view that consecutive blows of *mounting* strength were a law of war. Colonel Voronin pointed out that while this was true for the Soviets in World War II, it was not for the Germans, whose attacks became progressively weaker in the course of the war.⁵¹ More importantly, Colonel Kapralov noted that while the system of increasing strength of attacks proved itself in the defeat of the Germans, "that does not mean that the forms and methods of conducting recent warfare can be unalterably transferred into warfare of the future."⁵² And the article in April, 1955, which closed the debate mentioned as one point raised by Talensky and still an open question precisely the idea of "consecutive blows increasing in strength."⁵³

While it remains a question whether *mounting* strength of blows is always necessary or desirable, there is no uncertainty about the continued rejection of the "one-blow" (including "first blow") theories. "The outcome of contemporary war," Soviet military men insist, "cannot be decided by one engagement;" thus "Victory in war is achieved not by one, two, or several engagements, but by the achievement of a series of military campaigns and operations."⁵⁴ And, in the words of Lt. General Tsvetkov, "The ultimate result of the armed conflict—the complete defeat of the armed forces of the enemy—can be achieved only as the conclusion of frequently repeated blows, each of which is distinguished by objective, scale, and character of forces used, by scope of time and space, and by results."⁵⁵

Lieutenant General Krasil'nikov, of the General Staff, has

summed up well the Soviet view of blitzkrieg in the following passage: "Some military figures in the United States, exaggerating the potentialities of atomic weapons and aviation, continue to assert that the fate of a war can be decided by powerful, concentrated 'lightning' air attacks against the rear of a hostile country and against the main groupings of its armed forces. The operations of land and sea forces in this case would be relegated to an essentially auxiliary role—to finish off an enemy already shattered by air attacks, and to occupy a disorganized country by means of airborne or other rapid operations. With contemporary means of air attack such a method of waging war can be successful against an enemy defenseless in the air and against an individual country with relatively small territory or a small group of such countries. But *against a large country well-armed with modern military weapons*, and especially against a coalition of such countries, *such a means of waging war cannot yield victory and can lead only to enormous mutual destruction and sacrifice.*"⁵⁶

Rejection of the concept of blitzkrieg by surprise attack has been reiterated dozens of times in recent years, and continues to represent the current Soviet view.⁵⁷

Soviet analysts frequently criticize American military thinking for overreliance on strategic surprise, blitzkrieg, and on nuclear weapons as well. In the period prior to about 1957, Soviet military commentators often drew attention to what they regarded as an American lack of recognition of the consequences of Soviet retaliation in any attempted U. S. blitzkrieg by surprise nuclear attack.⁵⁸ Even now the Soviets declare that the aim of the imperialists is "surprise attack in the hope of attaining a blitzkrieg victory. It is an adventurous tactic—surprise attack with contemporary weapons of destruction will be answered by a massive retaliatory

blow.”⁵⁰ However, while both for propagandistic motives and for reasons of real fear of such an attack this view is expressed, recently some Soviet men have concluded that American strategists and military theoreticians now have come to recognize in part the problem of bilateral thermonuclear strikes. And, consequently, they believe that many Westerners “have begun to understand that placing one’s stakes on a decisive strategic effect from wide scale use of nuclear weapons does not decrease, but rather increases, the adventurism of the imperialist military doctrine” with its reliance on surprise and blitzkrieg.⁵¹ Nonetheless, the Soviets believe, in Major General Boltin’s words in mid-1958, that “The most avid imperialists, blinded by their furious hatred of the socialist world, continue to dream of a new ‘blitzkrieg’ against the countries of the socialist camp and of a destructive Third World War intended to destroy Communism by military force,” despite the fact that “the imperialist doctrine of a blitzkrieg atomic air war against the USSR is obviously untenable.”⁵¹

The Soviet rejection of blitzkrieg is, of course, concomitant with their view that major wars are necessarily long contests ultimately decided by the sum of the military, economic and morale potentials of the adversaries.

The doctrinal rejection of a blitzkrieg is almost certainly also a reflection of calculations not made public. The Soviets, in considering a possible blitz thermonuclear strike on the United States (in particular on SAC bases in the US and abroad, but also against other air bases, naval aircraft carriers, and other army and navy forces) must calculate on the possibility, if not probability, of a sufficiently strong force escaping the initial blow to retaliate against Soviet air bases and cities. Moreover, they would still not be in a position to occupy North America. A super-Pearl Harbor attack is rea-

sonable only if there is expectation of defeating the United States by the initial attack itself. Every tenet of Soviet military doctrine is opposed to the conclusion that such a venture would lead to quick victory. Surprise, even if achieved, is not believed to be decisive in the sense of sufficient, and attainment of a real blitzkrieg is not believed feasible in a contemporary major war between the two great powers.

Just as blitzkrieg is not adjudged a feasible strategy for the Soviet Union, it is not considered a winning strategy for the West. Concretely, in considering the threat of an American blitzkrieg, they may estimate that even though powerful SAC forces might precede or evade their planned preemptive action and strike Soviet air bases (and cities), the Soviet Army would be able to operate effectively in driving the United States and allied military forces from the Eurasian continent and denying to the enemy any opportunity to occupy the USSR. Destruction would be great, but it would be mutual, with bilateral effects. Thus a long war or negotiated peace would still be the outcome of any enemy attempt at blitz action.

In summary of this discussion of the role of strategic surprise and blitzkrieg in post-Stalinist military thinking, we may note six conclusions.

1. The Soviet reevaluation of surprise in 1954 and 1955 represented a significant modification of Stalinist doctrine. The new view has remained essentially unchanged since 1955. The advent of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and high-speed long-range delivery means, particularly jet aircraft and missiles, has led the Soviets to recognize the greatly increased potency of a surprise attack. Surprise is now recognized to be a critical factor in modern war. The premium attaching to successful surprise is recognized to have risen greatly.

2. Despite this much increased importance of surprise, the change is not absolute. In Soviet doctrine, surprise has *always* been recognized as advantageous, it has *never* been regarded as decisive. Strategic surprise continues to be considered a factor which does not ensure and decide the outcome of major wars. In practical terms, this means that Soviet doctrine considers that surprise is not a reliable basis upon which complete victory can be anticipated, much as the advantages of surprise have increased. Under certain circumstances it may even be a necessary condition for success; but *it is never a sufficient basis for success* in a war between prepared super-powers. Surprise does not provide the basis for achieving a blitzkrieg victory.

3. The "imperialists" not only are aware of the increased importance of surprise but exhibit a predilection for surprise attack, and it is thus a likely enemy strategy if he should deliberately unleash a war.

4. The danger of an enemy surprise attack can be substantially neutralized by a high degree of vigilance and high level of constant combat readiness for a Soviet preemptive strike. Preparedness can thus frustrate and foil any enemy attempt at a quick victory by a surprise attack. Launching or preparing to launch an intended initial surprise blow by the enemy is no guarantee of *achievement* of surprise, and the Soviets profess themselves able to prevent the success of any attempted surprise attack by defensive and preemptive action.

5. In a general nuclear war launched by the Soviet Union, considerable efforts would be exerted to maximize the great advantages of surprise of the attack, especially by Soviet long-range missiles. The Soviets will not be led to initiate war simply because they believe they can achieve surprise, for it is not in itself decisive. On the other hand, if for any defensive or expansive reason they do decide to launch a

general war, they will certainly seek the gains of surprise to bolster their presumed superiority in the ultimately decisive factors.

6. We cannot rest assured that the Soviet leaders will not some day launch a massive surprise assault upon us in their effort to gain mastery of the world. Soviet military doctrine does *not*, however, encourage them to rely upon surprise attack itself to yield a quick and easy victory. *If* the United States were ever to let its whole military strength so decline that the Soviets believed they could win at acceptable cost on the basis of their picture of all the requirements of modern war, including both a blunting of our strategic nuclear capabilities and a defeat of all our other military forces, there would be serious danger of a Soviet attack. Clearly our responsible duty is to prevent such a situation from ever coming about, by energetic attention to building our deterrent capabilities. But we do not find in Soviet military doctrine a proclivity to underestimate the difficulties of winning a future war, or a predilection to overestimate the fruits of a surprise attack.

APPENDIX A

SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE ON THE CHARACTER OF CONTEMPORARY WAR

This article by Colonel I. Baz appeared in the chief Soviet Army journal *The Military Herald* (*Voennyi vestnik*), No. 6, June, 1958.

To foresee, to define correctly the character of a future war and its basic features and peculiarities is one of the most important tasks of military science. The successful conduct of a war and achievement of victory is impossible without appropriate prior preparation of the armed forces and of the whole country in peacetime. The general theory of armed conflict must provide the answer to the question for which kind of war to prepare. The development of the military art, the operational, tactical and political training of troops, the structure and organization of the armed forces, material-technical supply—the whole of military construction cannot but take this answer into account and must fully conform to it.

Soviet military science possesses incomparably greater potentialities for correctly defining the character of future war than does the military science of any capitalist country. Our military theory is based on Marxism-Leninism, developed in the decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which determines the military policy of our socialist state and directs its military construction in conformity with the requirements of Marxist-Leninist science. Marxism-Leninism not only arms our military theory strictly and thoroughly with a scientific methodology but also with a uniquely scienti-

fic teaching on war and armies, whereas bourgeois military science is based upon one or another of the variants of idealistic or vulgar-materialistic philosophy and sociology. The character of war is always, but particularly in the contemporary epoch, so greatly dependent on economic, political, and morale factors that it can be predicated correctly only on the basis of a military science that relies on a dialectical-materialist analysis of these factors, which is incompatible with bourgeois philosophical and sociological views of war and of social phenomena in general.

This does not mean that the military theoreticians of bourgeois countries can in no measure approach the solution of this problem. It is known, for example, that some characteristic features of the First and Second World Wars were also correctly foreseen in bourgeois military literature, but on the whole it did not truly reflect the character of these wars.

If we speak about the First World War, then it is well known that Kaiser Wilhelm II, in accordance with the conclusions of German military science of the day, counted on ending it in the same year in which it was begun, even "before the leaves fall." The prolonged character of the First World War was also unanticipated by the English, French, Russian and other bourgeois military sciences.

As for the Second World War, it must be remembered first of all that many bourgeois military writers and theoreticians (Liddell-Hart, Fuller, Aloizi, de Gaulle, Douhet, Zoldan, Von Seeckt, Helders, and others), as is evident from their works published in the period between the First and Second World Wars, envisaged a future war in terms of the more or less brief operations of a limited number of small professional armies. The political and military leaders of Hitler Germany and their military theoretical troubadours (Guderian, Eimansberger, and others) also adhered to the point of view of a

brief war, the decisive role in which was assigned to the air and tank forces.

The facts show that only our Soviet military thought was capable of correctly foreseeing the character of the Second World War, its basic features and peculiarities. This is explained above all by the fact that in its prognoses and conclusions our military science was guided by Marxist-Leninist theory.

How great the force of foresight of the character of a future war on the basis of Marxism may be judged by how accurately Engels already had predicted the prolonged nature, tremendous scale and several other characteristics of the First World War. In his introduction to Sigismud Borkheim's brochure in 1887, Engels spoke prophetically about a future war: "This would be a universal war of unprecedented scale, unprecedented force. From eight to ten million soldiers will kill one another and in the course of doing so will strip Europe clean in a way that swarms of locust could never have done. The devastation caused by the Thirty Years' War telescoped into three or four years and spread over the entire continent, famine, epidemics, the universal ensavagement of the troops and of the masses brought about by acute need, the hopeless jumbling of our artificial trade, industrial and credit mechanism; all this ending in general bankruptcy; the collapse of old states and their vaunted state wisdom, a collapse of such magnitude that crowns by the dozens will roll around in the streets and there will be no one to pick up these crowns; the utter impossibility of foreseeing how all this will end and who will emerge victorious from this struggle. Only one result is absolutely beyond doubt; universal exhaustion and the creation of conditions for the final victory of the working class." (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. 16, Chapter 1, pp. 303-304). In many respects the First

World War was precisely what Engels had predicted it would be more than a quarter of a century before it began!

Equally well known is the exceptionally true prognosis which Engels made in the course of the Franco-Prussian War, astonishing his contemporaries. A no less well-known example of foresight on the basis of Marxist analysis is the prediction by Lenin of the hopelessness of the Russo-Japanese war for Tsarist Russia. Only Marxism provides opportunities for such remarkable foresight.

In defining the character of future war Soviet military science has invariably proceeded and proceeds from the propositions which were formulated by Lenin in his article "The Fall of Port Arthur," written in 1905. "The times," wrote Lenin, "when wars were fought by mercenaries or by representatives of castes half alienated from the people have irretrievably receded into oblivion. Wars are fought now by the peoples,—even Kuropatkin, on the evidence of Nemirovich-Danchenko, has now begun to understand that this is the truth, not just on paper." (*Works*, Vol. 8, p. 34).

Later, generalizing the experience of the First World War and the Fatherland War of the young Soviet Republic against the imperialist intervention and the Russian counter-revolution, Lenin developed and made concrete this proposition as a result of which Soviet military thought received a series of fundamental Leninist formulae. The most broadly generalizing one of them, disclosing the chief fundamental in the character of contemporary wars, states that war is an all-sided trial of all the material and spiritual forces of each people.

Clausewitz developed the view that each war is absolutely individual, has nothing in common with other wars. But history shows that wars of a given epoch (or of a given period within an epoch) are not only distinguished from

one another but also have much in common, inasmuch as the very same economic, political, morale, technological and other conditions, although they are developing in a quantitative respect, continue to exist and to act. Only a qualitative change of all the factors on which the character of war depends leads to its radical change.

Wars are now conducted by the peoples. This is so universal that it is true of all significant wars of our times despite all the differences between them. A future war, if it cannot be averted, will also be a war in which the actors will be not only armies and navies but whole peoples with all their material and spiritual resources. This proposition applies in equal measure to a just war and to an imperialist reactionary unjust war, because in our times even such a war cannot be conducted solely by the forces of the troops alone.

It should be emphasized that, as facts testify, throughout the entire course of the twentieth century this objective law, diffusing its action over all wars of contemporary times, has been displaying a tendency toward exerting ever-growing influence on the character of war.

This was expressed first of all in the gigantic growth of the numerical size of armed forces, also, incidentally, predicted by Engels. Thus, all told, in the First World War the countries of both belligerent coalitions called to the colors around 70 million persons and in the Second World War around 110 million persons. The provisioning of such large armed forces demanded a tremendous quantity of arms, ammunition, uniforms, rations, etc., for the production of which enormous masses of people were needed in numbers exceeding by many times those entering the armed forces. In practice, directly or indirectly, all or nearly all the population of many countries—in the first place, the U.S.S.R.,

U.S.A., England, and Germany—took part in the Second World War. Thus, the war was indeed conducted by the peoples. A future war, if the imperialists unleash it, will undoubtedly to a greater extent than ever before be conducted by the peoples—the entire population to a man, including women, old people and youth.

In close connection with this objective law is another lawful regularity flowing from the economic and political development of society in our epoch. This concerns the expansion of the territorial and strategic scale of contemporary war.

The armed forces and technical means of combat of contemporary war, being far more numerous than at any time in the past and possessing maximum ranges unprecedented in history, can no longer be kept within the limited spatial boundaries which characterized past wars. The mass multi-million-man contemporary armies need immeasurably more space than the armies of the past. And the greater the numerical size of armies and the maximum effective range of the technical means of combat the greater is the territorial and strategic scale of the war.

The Second World War brought into the sphere of military operations far greater territories than the First World War; in Asia and Africa—over five times, in Europe—seven times! This doesn't even count the operations of the air forces against the rear areas in the Second World War.

The tremendous territorial scale of contemporary wars is also explained by the sharply growing number of countries participating in them. This is explained by those changing economic and political conditions as a consequence of which both world wars were conducted by unprecedentedly large coalitions. In the First World War 38 states took part, in the Second, 48. The number of states actively participating in armed conflict has grown even more significantly: from

19 in the First World War to 30 in the Second World War. One can also judge the territorial scale of modern wars by the fact that up to 60% of the whole population of the earth lived on the territories of countries participating in the First World War, and more than 80% of the whole population of the earth in countries participating in the Second World War!

It can hardly be doubted that a third world war, if it breaks out, will by its territorial scale surpass both world wars and may embrace the territory (and water surface) of the entire earth.

The expansion of strategic scale as a characteristic phenomenon of contemporary wars may be judged by the fact that the extent of the three strategic fronts of the First World War—the Western, Eastern, and Caucasian—did not exceed 4000 kilometers. And the extent of only two strategic fronts of the Second World War—the Soviet-German and the Asiatic (including in the latter the Soviet-Japanese front) comprised 12,000 to 14,000 kilometers!

All these lawful regularities also throw light on the question of the length of contemporary wars, creating a scientific foundation for its correct solution. The first and second world wars each lasted four or five years. This is explained by the fact that the mass multi-million armies with their numerous technical means naturally demanded no little time in order to carry out decisive military operations against the equally massive armies of the opponent. Technology of course quickens the pace of things, and generally speaking the appearance of new technical means creates now certain possibilities for achieving victory in a shorter time than before. Nonetheless, the armed forces of the two sides, and the scale of the arena of armed conflict under contemporary conditions, are so great that one could scarcely conclude a war

in a short period. Even the appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and IRBM's and ICBM's, cannot secure the swift destruction of such massive armed forces, and consequently not the conclusion of the war. Moreover, the use of these weapons by both sides will more likely lead to extending the duration of the war than to speeding it. Hence, while in the past major wars could be short or long, in our time all major wars inevitably assume a rather drawn-out character.

All such lawful regularities of contemporary war as the mass character of armies, the tremendous territorial and strategic scale of armed conflict, its comparatively long duration, being closely interrelated, are different expressions of the more general law mentioned above which was formulated by Lenin, that wars are now conducted by the peoples.

These lawful regularities are intensified by the decisiveness of the objectives pursued in wars of our times. The most decisive aims are advanced in those cases where wars are fought by countries with opposing economic and political systems. Very indicative in this respect are the wars of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789, and especially the wars which were launched against our socialist state by the forces of international imperialist reaction in 1918-1920 and 1941-1945.

The decisive character of military action in the Second World War on the part of Hitler Germany and the Soviet Union is explained above all by the irreconcilable antagonistic contradictions between fascism and socialism. The attack of Hitler Germany upon the Soviet Union, as is known, had as its aim the seizure of our lands, the restoration of the power of the landlords and bourgeoisie, the destruction of the national culture, national statehood and national independence of the free peoples of the U.S.S.R., and their conver-

sion into slaves of the German Fascist monopolists. It was a question of the life and death of the Soviet state, of the life and death of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., of whether the peoples of the Soviet Union would be free or fall into slavery. This predetermined the decisive character of the conduct of the war both on the part of Fascist Germany and on the part of the Soviet Union, the tremendous strain of the military struggle, unprecedented in history, and its extremely severe character.

Naturally, a new war against the Soviet Union, if the imperialist forces succeed in unleashing it, will also be distinguished by the decisiveness of the aims on both sides.

The Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries are not interested in aggressive war. In socialist society there are no classes or social groups which would be interested in such a war and in the arms race connected with it. Any kind of striving for gain, for the seizure of foreign territories or markets is organically alien to it. Guided by the Leninist principle of peaceful co-existence of states with different social-political systems and by the instructions of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. on the possibility of averting wars in the contemporary epoch, the Soviet Union, the Chinese Peoples' Republic and the other countries of socialism are doing, and are firmly resolved to do, everything necessary for preserving peace and the security of the peoples. We are not afraid of peaceful competition with capitalism, and we know that the great superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist one will be all the more fully revealed precisely under conditions of peaceful development.

But neither are we afraid of war, for we are fully confident of our strength. The socialist world disposes of sufficient means for its defense, for curbing the aggressors.

And one can be firmly confident that if reckless imperialist adventurers should succeed in throwing mankind into a third world war, then capitalism would find in it its grave.

The First World War already made possible the detachment from the capitalist world of such a great power as Russia, transformed as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution into the first socialist state. The Second World War ended for the capitalists with serious new losses—it led to the loss by them of China and a number of other countries of Asia and Europe. It cannot be a subject of doubt that a third world war, which a new attack of the imperialists on the U.S.S.R. would inevitably be transformed into, would as a result of the actions of that law lead to the destruction of the capitalist system as a whole.

Each side in such a war would exert maximum will and strain in its efforts to mobilize and bring into action all the economic, political, morale and strictly military potentialities and resources. Under such conditions there would hardly be many countries which would not sooner or later be drawn into the war. The war, undoubtedly, would bear a broad coalition character.

From what has been said it would be incorrect to conclude that the possibility in the future of any kind of war other than a world war is excluded. It is known that in the post-war period a number of small, local wars have already taken place, such as the wars in Korea, in Vietnam, and in Egypt. Wars of a similar type and dimension may also take place in the future. In one or another part of the globe there may spring up civil war (as, for example, in Cuba), national-liberation war (as there was in Indonesia and Malaya, and as there is now in Algeria), the intrusion of imperialists' troops into small countries (as, for example, the attack of England upon Yemen and Oman). One also must not

consider improbable wars between two or more bourgeois states: imperialism is war, and this is all the more true in relation to contemporary imperialism, which generates wars of the most diverse types and scales. But for imperialism wars of tremendous scale, world wars, are the most characteristic and typical. Although there were large wars in other epochs too, world-wide wars are the specific product of imperialism.

On the other hand, it is necessary to bear in mind that in our time peace is indivisible and each local, small war has a tendency to become the prologue to a world war, sooner or later transforming itself into a world-wide military conflagration. The theory of the apologists of militarism advocating so-called "small nuclear wars" has nothing in common with the truth and is calculated to defraud and demobilize the strength of the peace-loving forces for prevention of a new world war.

The possibility of transforming a small war into a large-scale war is as old as wars themselves. It has always existed. But at the present time this possibility is especially great, in particular as a consequence of the mass saturation of the armed forces with various long-range and super-long-range weapons which permit the delivery of powerful blows to distances of hundreds and even thousands of kilometers. The presence and abundance of such weapons was already a peculiarity of the Second World War, but then they were limited within the framework of air forces. In future war, along with aviation (which has also in every respect grown immeasurably since the time of the Second World War) missile weapons will be used on a large scale, and both aviation and rockets will carry atomic and hydrogen bombs over enormous distances.

Such military-technical potentialities will allow powerful

force to be brought to bear in war not only at the front but on an opponent's rear in all its depth. Correspondingly, the obliteration of the boundaries between the front and the rear which was already a characteristic of the Second World War will in a future war receive much greater development.

The role of the rear in wars of our time has grown gigantically and continues to grow. Already in the First World War and particularly in the Second World War the rear acquired decisive significance. The course and outcome of a future war, victory in which is utterly unthinkable without a highly organized rear, strong in morale, and economically and technically powerful, will depend to an even greater extent on the rear. Therefore, from the very beginning of a future war both sides will aim at destroying the work and paralyzing the rear of the opponent, and, on the other hand, at organizing the reliable air, airborne, atomic, chemical, and bacteriological defense of the rear, which will demand the allocation of a significant part of the armed forces and of military equipment for these purposes. Accordingly, for military science and the military leadership there arises the extremely complex task of correctly allocating the armed forces and military equipment for the conduct of combat at the front, for operations against the opponent's rear, and for the defense of one's own rear.

The appearance of new military-technical means also causes a sharp intensification of such a characteristic feature of contemporary war as the extension of armed conflict to air space and the underwater sphere. This tendency received very great development already in the Second World War. A future war will in the fullest sense become, so to speak, a three-dimensional war, that is a war conducted in the three elements.

The evolution, or more properly the revolution, which

armed forces are now experiencing in connection with the rapid development of military technology insures unprecedented depth and tempo of operations of all scales. Contemporary armed forces possess the greatest potentialities in the history of war for the conduct of military operations of maneuver which the scale of contemporary war, as well as the decisive character of its aims, demand. But along with the broad maneuver character of armed conflict in a future war, there undoubtedly will also be a place for positional forms; as offense presupposes defense as its inevitable and necessary concomitant, so also do maneuver forms of military operation include positional forms without which they are in large measure impossible. The maneuver character of military operations may find its greatest manifestation in the initial period of a war.

It is well known that in capitalist countries there are various kinds of nonsensical "theories" of lightning atomic-hydrogen war against the U.S.S.R. It is significant that these theories, designed chiefly for ideological preparation for war, have by no means received great recognition even from many bourgeois military figures and leaders. From their statements it is evident that although the beginning of a war is also conceived by them first of all in the form of a series of sudden powerful nuclear blows, they do not consider it possible to win it against a well-prepared and strong opponent either in blitzkrieg fashion or with the help solely of means of mass destruction.

It is necessary at the same time to take into account that contemporary means of attack, first of all aviation and missiles, atomic, thermonuclear, and chemical weapons, facilitate the possibility of implementing a sudden attack and render it especially dangerous. Seizure by an opponent of the strategic initiative under contemporary conditions is

fraught with exceptionally serious consequences for the country undergoing a sudden attack. That is why the greatest vigilance and high combat readiness is demanded from our troops. Fulfilling the tasks posed by the Twentieth Congress of the Party, our armed forces and the whole Soviet people are called upon to watch vigilantly the intrigues of the enemies of peace, to take the necessary measures for strengthening the defense might of our socialist state, to keep our defense on the level of modern military science and technology, and to guarantee the security of our Motherland.

The appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons is considerably changing the face of war, but, of course, war cannot and will not be only an atomic-hydrogen war. Use of these weapons not only does not abolish the conventional armed forces, but on the contrary leads to their augmentation.

The means of mass destruction are so termed because their application causes tremendous losses. Dispersal of troops, with their subsequent rapid concentration at the front and in depth, is the logical consequence and the inevitable result of the appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons and will be a characteristic feature of a future war. But the losses of troops may still be very great. It is necessary to be oriented not toward an easy war, but toward an extremely hard war which during its entire course will demand tremendous reinforcements for the armed forces. The possibility of great losses will also lead to a significant growth in reserves—strategic, operational and tactical—which in a future war to a far greater degree than in former wars will be required to compensate for casualties. Thus in a future war in connection with the appearance of means of mass destruction one must not at all anticipate the fading away or reduction of the armed forces but in fact their further growth.

The imperialists would like to do without mass armies

since they cannot seriously count on high morale among the popular masses and the armies of their countries. The unprecedented calamities of a future war will undoubtedly strengthen the mighty anti-war movement in imperialists' states. In the final analysis, this is what lies at the root of the striving of many bourgeois military ideologues to replace the man by the machine, the soldier by the weapon and, on the other hand, to conduct war in the form of short, quick lightning operations in order not only to take the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries unawares, but also to prevent arousing the toiling masses and the armies of their countries against a war. It was precisely this motive, the desire to overcome the dependence of the conduct of war on the toiling masses, that in its time after the First World War dictated the appearance, like mushrooms after a rain, of various types of bourgeois theories on the conduct of war by small armies, armed with tanks (according to some authors) or airplanes (according to others). And it is precisely this motive that now dictates various kinds of theories by bourgeois military writers on the winning of war by means of lightning application of atomic and hydrogen weapons, like the theory of "instantaneous atomic war," the theory of "pushbutton war," etc.

It is true that the third world war to a much greater degree than the first or the second world wars will be a war of machines, a war of motors, a war of electronics, radio and radar technology, and automatic devices. It is true that a future war will to a significant degree be an atomic-hydrogen war, and perhaps a chemical and bacteriological one, too. It is true that a contemporary war is a war of the physical, chemical and biological sciences, of the technical sciences, of science in general, but it is also true that a third world war like all past wars but to a still greater degree will be first

and foremost a war of man. His role in war will not only not diminish, but will become even more significant.

It is known that equipment without man is dead. And equipment has now received such wide distribution in the armed forces and will be used on such a great scale in war that its use and support will demand millions of people. Other millions of people are employed in the production of equipment and in everything that is necessary for its production. Thus, equipment does not displace man but on the contrary involves more and more new masses of people in war.

Correspondingly, the relationship between man and technology in a future war will not in principle be different than in the last world war. The famous Marxist position on the primacy, the leading position of man in this relationship, of his decisive role, will remain in force. The law in accordance with which man himself above all has a decisive influence on the course and outcome of war will under contemporary conditions act with greater force than ever before.

This only correct posing of the question certainly does not signify any kind of underevaluation of technology. Military technology is the immediate material basis of the combat power of the armed forces. There can be no doubt that the tendency inherent in all military history towards the growth of the role and significance of military technology in armed conflict operates at the present time with special force. It must be said frankly that victory in a contemporary major war against a strong opponent, all other things being equal, presupposes the achievement of military technological superiority over him.

In connection with this it is necessary to remember still another proposition of Marxism-Leninism—the proposition on the dependence of the military art on military technology. Military tactics, wrote Lenin, depend on military technology.

From this it follows that without achieving superiority over an opponent in military technology it is impossible to achieve superiority over him in the military art, in methods of conducting military actions, and in war in general. The sudden upheaval or even revolution which is now taking place in military affairs is conditioned to a significant degree precisely by the stormy quantitative and qualitative development of military technology. Therefore, insufficient attention to military technology, to its study and mastery, any underestimation whatsoever of its significance, is tantamount to a total misunderstanding of the character of a future war fraught with extremely serious, catastrophic consequences for an army.

Important as never before under modern conditions are the instructions of Lenin who said: “. . . He who has the highest level of technology, organization, discipline and better machines gains the upper hand; the war taught us this and it is very well that it did. It is necessary to learn that one cannot live in contemporary society without machines, without discipline—one must either conquer the higher technology, or be crushed.” (*Works*, Vol. 27, p. 167).

The influence of military technology is all the greater since it demands from the armed forces technical literacy, technical culture. It is not enough to possess military equipment; it is also necessary to have the appropriate human material.

As early as 1905, when the development of military technology was far below the contemporary level, Lenin stressed that contemporary war “requires a high quality of human material just as well as of contemporary technology. Success in contemporary wars is impossible without soldiers and sailors who possess initiative and awareness. No amount of staying power, no amount of physical strength, hardiness or unity in mass struggle can tip the scales in an epoch of rapid-firing, small caliber arms, machined cannon, complex

technical installations on ships, extended order in land engagements.” (*Works*, Vol. 8, p. 35). And Lenin agreed with those “who laughed, seeing how tens and hundreds of millions of rubles were thrown away (by the Tsarist government—Baz) for the purpose of procuring and constructing magnificent battleships and spoke of the uselessness of this expenditure in the face of ignorance of contemporary ships and the absence of people with the knowledge to use the newest improvements in military equipment.” (*Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 35-36). Even before Lenin, Engels wrote that in a future war a high level of intelligence will be demanded of the soldiers. Even greater demands are placed on the personnel of the armed forces by contemporary technology.

Attaching great significance to questions of supplying the Soviet armed forces with combat equipment, the Communist Party and the Soviet government are taking all measures to insure that our weapons and all of our equipment are constantly on the level of the very latest achievements. Thanks to the constant concern of the Party and government, to the efforts of the whole Soviet people, our armed forces are supplied with all kinds of modern military equipment and armaments, including atomic and thermonuclear weapons and missiles. The entire personnel of the Soviet army and navy are systematically and persistently mastering their combat equipment.

The intensive and steadily increasing pace of equipping the army, which is proceeding on the basis of the development of the natural and technical sciences, raises the dependence of the armed forces on the rear and increases ever more greatly its role in the course and outcome of a war. If in a former age nothing depended so greatly on the economy as the army and navy, at the present time this dependence

both in peacetime and wartime has attained especially great degree and significance.

The history of war teaches that only those states pass the test of war which prove themselves to be stronger than the opponent in the development and organization of their economy. Moreover, in this is included one of the basic laws determining victory in contemporary war, which is fundamentally an economic war, a war of factories and plants, of transportation and power systems, of scientific research institutes and technical laboratories. In full conformity with this, a future war in the course of its preparation and conduct will demand to an even greater degree than during past world wars a precise accounting of the economic potentialities of one's own country and that of the opponent.

But this is only one side of the question of the decisive role of the rear in contemporary war. The other, no less important, side concerns the ever-growing dependence of armed struggle and the war as a whole on the morale condition of the armed forces as well as of the entire people. The morale factor has always played decisive role in wars. The entire history of war teaches that only those states passed the test of war who proved to be stronger than their opponent in the morale of their troops, in the staying power and unity of the people during the entire drawn-out course of the war.

This historical law acts with special force under contemporary conditions, when war is characterized by the extreme decisiveness of the aims pursued in it and by the decisive character of the armed conflict connected with it, by the acuteness of its violence. A future war will demand from all categories of personnel of the armed forces and from the entire population an unprecedented exertion of its strength, moral as well as physical. One cannot count on success in it without having already in peacetime a high

morale potential, the level of which is determined above all by the social-economic and political system of the country, the political content and aims of the war being fought by it, the attitude toward it of the popular masses.

Formulating one of the main laws determining success in war, Lenin said that in every war victory in the final analysis is conditioned by the spiritual state of the masses who spill their blood on the field of battle. In other words victory in the final analysis depends upon the morale condition, on the endurance of the toiling masses, inasmuch as it is precisely they who will spill their blood on the fields of battle and struggle, and now also in the rear since it has now come within range of the blows of an opponent. Therefore, another Leninist formula on this question states: He who has more reserves, more sources of strength, a broader base of support among the masses, is victorious in war.

Thus, a primary condition of victory in a future war is the presence of a strong, morally-firm rear without which is unthinkable the supplying of the front with the work of the rear and the high morale combat quality of the troops, which determine the successful conduct of armed conflict. That is why a future war can only intensify demands for an obligatory accounting of the morale-political potentialities both of one's own country and of the opponent's country.

The Communist Party has always shown and is showing indefatigable solicitude for the inculcation, development and strengthening of the high morale-combat qualities of Soviet troop personnel. The decision of the October [1957] plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which aims at a basic improvement of party-political and all educational work in the armed forces in the spirit of the historic decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the Party, in the spirit of immovable

Leninist foundations and traditions, is a new clear indicator of this concern.

From all that has been said it is clear that contemporary war is not confined to armed conflict alone. At present, war embraces in a single complex the armed struggle (at the front and in the rear), and the economic, technical, scientific, morale, political, psychological, diplomatic war, etc., that is, a war of the whole country with all its material and spiritual resources. This law of contemporary wars will attain its greatest development and will act with special strength in a third world war, if it is not averted. It will be a universal war unprecedented in scale which will be characterized by unprecedentedly extensive and intensive use of all forms and methods of struggle and above all by a combination of armed conflict with a war of economic-technical and of moral-political strength and resources, the artful, skillful utilization of which will be just as indispensable a condition for victory as artful, skillful employment of the armed forces.

We conclude with that with which we began this article. The basic law of contemporary war, formulated by Lenin, states that war is now conducted by the peoples. It is precisely by this law above all that the determination of the character of a future war must be guided. We have noted above only some of the most essential of its characteristics, without attempting to examine everything relating to the question, but from what has already been said it is perfectly evident that the basic position of historical materialism and Marxism-Leninism concerning the decisive role of the popular masses in history as a whole will act in a future war with special strength.

The millions of toilers, the masses, are the true creators not only of civil history but also of military history. It is

precisely the masses in the final analysis who decided the fate of the first and the second world wars. Undoubtedly they will decide the destiny of a third world war if the dark forces of imperialist reaction should unleash it. And this means that a third world war cannot but lead to the defeat of the imperialist states, to the complete and final fall of capitalism as a whole.

APPENDIX B

ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE COURSE AND OUTCOME OF WARS

This article, by Colonel I. Korotkov, appeared in the official Air Forces' newspaper *Soviet Aviation*, on August 12, 1958. It was introduced as an official response to inquiries from various officers for a definitive answer to the question of the decisive factors in war.

Contemporary war is an extraordinarily complex social phenomenon. It is, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, a comprehensive trial of the material and spiritual strengths of peoples.

Marxists, analyzing contemporary warfare, have most completely and comprehensively clarified the factors which determine victory in war. In the works of V. I. Lenin are numerous expressions of the factors influencing the course and outcome of war and determining the path to achievement of victory.

Basing himself on the Leninist propositions, J. V. Stalin in February 1942 formulated the thesis on the five permanently-operating factors which decide the fate of war: the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the armament of the army, and the organizing ability of the command personnel.

This thesis was advanced with the objective of mobilizing and organizing all the strengths of the people and of the army for the defeat of the foe. It played an important role in the cause of securing our victory and was a substantial contribution to Soviet military science.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to realize that the factors de-

termining the fate of wars are not something set and given once and for all. The significance of particular factors can substantially alter depending upon the situation, the development of weapons and of methods of combat. In connection with the appearance of atomic, missile and other new weapons the character of contemporary war is radically changing. One must not fail to consider also the very important circumstance that as a consequence of World War II there occurred radical changes in the alignment of forces on the international arena. Socialism went beyond the bounds of a single country and was converted into a world system.

Therefore, the factors determining victory over an enemy must be considered with account taken of the special features of contemporary war, and of the new historical situation.

The course of military events and the attainment of victory in war depend upon many factors. One can provisionally divide them into two groups: the social-political and the military.

Among *the social-political factors** are: economic power of a state (or coalition of states), the social and state structure, the policy of the ruling class and its party [sic], the morale of the people of the country (or group of countries), and the international situation.

All these factors are studied by the social-political sciences, and their conclusions are considered by military science.

Let us look briefly at the first group of factors.

The economic power of any state is mainly determined by the general volume of industrial production. If one looks at this factor as applied to our country, it is necessary to say that the Soviet Union as a great industrial power of the world

* Italicization is in the original. The only additions are clarifying notes given in brackets—RG.

surpasses all the capitalist countries of Europe, and is confidently overtaking the United States, in the production of iron, aluminum, electrical power, machine-building, and coal mining. Our socialist agriculture has also achieved substantial successes.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people directs all its efforts to meeting the basic economic tasks established at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU [February, 1956]—in an historically very short period to overtake and outstrip the most developed capitalist countries in per capita production. The successful fulfillment of the directives of the plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the further strengthening of the collective farms and the development of the chemical industry has great significance for the attainment of this objective.

Our country now is not alone; it is part of a mighty world socialist camp. The world socialist system, the leading force of which is the Soviet Union, has over one fourth of the territory of our planet, almost thirty-five per cent of the population of the globe, and about one third of the world industrial production. In rate of growth of industrial production the socialist camp as a whole, and each of its component countries individually, has already overtaken the most developed capitalist countries.

The socialist economic system has immeasurable advantages over the capitalist system. First among these advantages is the fact that its economic foundation is the social ownership of the means of production. This permits the workers of the socialist countries to develop their productive strengths according to a plan, to utilize to the maximum the achievements of contemporary science and technology. The socialist system does not know the depression crises which are characteristic of capitalism.

The close economic cooperation among the Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist camp is an important condition for the further successful development of their economies. It is founded on mutual confidence and friendship, and opens broad potentialities for the best utilization of the productive and raw material resources, for the combination of the interests of each country with the interests of socialist cooperation as a whole. In this lies a most important advantage of the countries of the socialist system over the system of the imperialist states.

The geographical disposition of strengths, and above all of heavy industry, has tremendous significance for strengthening the economic power of a state. This must particularly be calculated at the present time when the annihilation of productive forces on an enormous scale is possible.

In assessing the economic power of a country or group of countries it is necessary to consider the presence of natural resources (useful minerals, forests, fertile soil, etc.) and how they are being exploited, and also the condition of all forms of transport, on which the use of the natural resources in the interests of victory in war will to a large degree depend.

At the present time economic power is determined in substantial degree by the level of development of science and technology. As is well known, the United States of America has fallen behind our country in working out a number of important problems of contemporary science. We were the first to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union first created the intercontinental ballistic rocket, and has already launched the third artificial satellite of the earth.

Speaking of the economic power of the country, it is necessary to stress that the growth and utilization of material potentialities in both peace and war depends above all on the

social and state structure of the country.

The socialist state and social structure has immeasurable advantages over the capitalist structure. Life has convincingly demonstrated that the Soviet social and state structure is not only the best form of organization of the economic and cultural advance of the country in the years of peaceful construction, but also is the best form of mobilization of all the strengths of the people in repulsing an enemy in wartime. However, the objectively favorable conditions created by the Soviet social and state structure still do not by themselves lead to victory over the enemy. The correct political leadership of the Communist Party, and the unanimous support of this policy by the masses, have a decisive significance for victory.

In the prewar years our Party, achieving the program of peaceful socialist construction, took account of the threat of an attack by the imperialists on the USSR. The Party did all that was necessary for the military defense of the Soviet Motherland.

In the years of Great Fatherland War [World War II Soviet-German campaigns] the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, basing themselves on the great advantages of our socialist structure, were able to mobilize our people in the struggle with the enemy so that in a short time the economy was rebuilt on military lines. The Party conducted gigantic organizational work on the front, in the rear, and inspired the workers, peasants and intelligentsia to self-sacrificing labor in the name of victory.

In the postwar years the Communist Party, continuing the course of the predominant development of heavy industry, is taking the measures which assure a new upsurge in the whole economy, the systematic growth of the popular wel-

fare and the strengthening of the defense capability of the country.

Emphasizing the decisive role of the masses in the development of society, Marxism-Leninism attributes an exceptionally important place in war to *the morale factor*. The political condition of the people and of its armed forces, the degree of political consciousness, the solidarity, steadfastness, discipline, the will power to overcome difficulties, confidence in the government and in the military leadership, and belief in victory all find their expression in this factor.

In contemporary war, despite the use of nuclear weapons and missiles, the role of man is not reduced but on the contrary it is enhanced. Advantage will be on the side of that state, people and army which conduct a liberation war and implicitly have faith in the political and military leadership of the country.

In the Soviet state political and military leadership rests in the Communist Party. It determines the direction of the whole spiritual life of Soviet society, it arms Communists and non-party members with the knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, and it unmasks the reactionary essence of bourgeois ideology and conducts a ceaseless struggle against it. The Leninist idea of the defense of the socialist fatherland and the policy of the Communist Party inspire the Soviet people and army, mobilize them to strengthen the defense capability of the country and to raise their vigilance against the intrigues of international imperialist reactionary forces.

The all-conquering teachings of Marxism-Leninism form the basis of the unity of ideology of the countries of the socialist camp. The Communist and workers' parties inspire the workers, including soldiers, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and the brotherhood of peoples, and they clarify the tasks of socialist construction in accordance with

the basic interests of all countries of the socialist commonwealth. The talks in Peiping between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung [in July-August, 1958] bear new witness to the further strengthening of the unity and brotherly friendship of the peoples of the socialist camp. The complete unity of views of the Communist Parties and Governments of the USSR and China has the greatest historical significance, and serves as a serious warning to warmongers.

In the face of the ever growing threat of aggression on the part of militaristic imperialist circles, the USSR and European peoples' democracies were compelled to create the Warsaw Pact, which has a defensive character and which serves the security of the peoples of Europe and the maintenance of peace in the whole world.

The international situation has a tremendous influence on the course and outcome of wars. In some cases it can decisively influence the course and outcome of a war. For example, it is well known that the demands of the progressive forces of the world played a great role in stopping the aggression of the imperialists in Indochina, in Korea, and in Egypt.

The military factors are the next group of elements determining wars. These include: the quantity and quality of personnel, arms and combat matériel; the art of command and the organizing ability of the commanders; and the factors of surprise, space, and time.

V. I. Lenin, while emphasizing the dominant role of man in warfare, at the same time pointed out that in war he who has the greatest material, organization, discipline, and best equipment, emerges victorious. Now, when the technical equipment of the ground armies, air forces, and naval fleets has grown so extraordinarily, *a superiority in the quantity and quality of armaments, and combat and auxiliary equip-*

ment has become one of the important conditions for victory.

The capability of a state to produce weapons and military matériel is largely determined by the presence of an adequate number of scientific and engineering cadres and qualified workers in the country. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government have made, and continue to exert, great efforts to prepare such cadres in the future too at a faster rate than in the capitalist countries.

One of the characteristic features of contemporary wars is the use of large masses of armed men. Consequently, *the numerical strength and combat capability of the armed forces* continues to be one of the factors for victory in war. The mobilization potential of a country depends on the size of the population, its physical condition, and its annual birthrate. These indices in the last analysis are determined by the social and state structure, the level of development and the character of the economy, and the policy of the ruling class.

The quality of the armed forces depends upon a high morale combat spirit of the men, their being equipped with the latest weapons and matériel, the ability to handle this matériel, their combat experience, military traditions, and the national traits of the army. Hence it is most useful to consider the morale of the troops not as a separate factor, but as a qualitative aspect of the armed forces determined in the final analysis by the general morale and political condition of the nation.

The art of command and the organizing ability of the command personnel play a tremendous role in warfare. Everything else being equal, that side will emerge victorious which has the best prepared and most talented strategists and commanders. No army can be an organized force without a command element capable of leading the troops well. The

commanders are a most important foundation of the combat capability of the armed forces.

The Soviet armed forces have an officers corps which has had tremendous combat experience, gained during the Great Fatherland War [World War II]. Our commanders and political workers study earnestly, and master equipment. In the army, the air forces, and the navy there is annually an increment to the officer corps of men prepared in the military academies and schools in accordance with the requirements of contemporary war.

The Communist Party rears military leaders, and all the personnel of the armed forces, in a spirit of supreme loyalty to the Soviet Motherland, in the spirit of friendship among the peoples of the USSR, and proletarian internationalism. The historic decree of the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the improvement of party-political work in the Soviet army and navy [accompanying the ouster of Marshal Zhukov] is a clear example of this.

Space exercises a serious influence on the fate of military conflicts. Despite the possibility of employment of nuclear weapons, and missiles and supersonic aviation, when any point in any country is endangered, space will not lose its significance in future war.

Large territory permits dispersal of industry and the population to protect them from atomic destruction. In this respect our country, and other countries with a relatively low population density, are in a favorable situation in comparison with the Western European countries, where the population density is very high.

The role of *surprise* has especially increased in contemporary wars. The operativeness of this factor may manifest itself in an unexpected attack, the employment of new weapons of mass destruction on a mass scale, unforeseen man-

euvers, etc. The perfection of means of attack (long-range missiles, supersonic aircraft, airborne troops, armored and mechanized forces, and the equipment of the navy with the newest matériel) makes surprise operations more dangerous.

The influence of *the time factor* has also considerably increased. It underlies calculations of one's own plans, and those of the probable enemy. Calculations of time and space are fundamental to all military operations. Concentration of forces and weapons in a definite place, the initiation of military operations, the utilization of weapons and combat matériel, the combined action of all the components of the armed forces—all this is accomplished in a time frame set forth in directives, orders and instructions by commanders.

In respect to the growth of mobility of all the armed forces and the increase in destructive power of weapons, the outcome of operations will depend in still greater degree than ever upon the ability to utilize the factor of time. For example, to be tardy with retaliatory strikes can in many instances mean defeat not only in the operational but also on a strategic scale.

Reviewing the factors which determine the course and outcome of war, it is important to stress that each of them operates not in isolation, but in close interrelation. The degree of influence of various factors may change in the course of a war. It is, therefore, necessary to estimate in due time and correctly both one's own potentialities and those of the probable enemy. In this evaluation, it is necessary always to proceed from the fact that our socialist social and state system, as distinct from the capitalist one, provides inexhaustible potentialities for multiplying all the factors of victory. Our task consists of realizing those potentialities skillfully and fully.

APPENDIX C

THE CREATIVE CHARACTER OF SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE

By Colonel P. Sidorov, in *Sovetskii flot* (Soviet Fleet), periodical organ of the Soviet Navy, December 11, 1958.

The irresistible attractive power of Marxism, said V. I. Lenin, consists in the fact that it unites inseparably in itself both the highest scientific quality and revolutionariness. Soviet military science, built on the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism, embodies all the main aspects of this living and constantly developing teaching. This is manifest in the very essence of Soviet military science, its creative active character, its hostility to stereotypes and dogmatism.

Soviet military science, by its class Party essence, is distinguished by very principle from bourgeois military science. It is bred in the socialist social and state structure, and it serves the cause of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the first time in history has a military science appeared which teaches how to utilize the means of armed conflict in the basic interests of the toilers, breaking the chains of the exploiting system. Precisely in this fact are the social-economic and political foundations of the military science of the Soviet state, providing its advanced nature.

V. I. Lenin, the creator of the Soviet state and of its armed forces, pointed out as early as the first days after the October victory that "without science one cannot build a contemporary army" (*Works*, Vol. 30, p. 370). Calling upon our cadres in the study of military affairs to utilize all the achievements

of bourgeois military-theoretical thought, Lenin at the same time stressed that Marxists must be able to strike away the reactionary tendencies in the interpretation of facts and events. He gave a deep foundation to the most general laws of armed conflict and thereby laid the cornerstone for Soviet military science.

The Leninist contribution to our military science is not restricted to the development of its philosophical foundations, but extends also throughout all aspects of its content, in particular to those aspects which examine the role of the economic and morale factors in armed conflict. V. I. Lenin convincingly demonstrated that wars are now conducted by the peoples, and that the relation of the peoples to a war determines its course and outcome. He is victorious in war who has the largest reserves, the greatest sources of strength, the greatest staunchness of the people.

“In contemporary war . . . economic organization has a decisive significance,” noted Lenin (*Works*, Vol. 25, p. 335).

The course and outcome of contemporary war depends more than ever before on the economic, morale, and military potentialities of the combatants. This conclusion of V. I. Lenin provides the key to understanding the decisive factors which secure victory in contemporary war. Soviet military science, basing itself on Leninist theses, has extensively revealed the role in war both of the permanently-operating factors, and of the temporary, transitory factors. This is, in particular, borne witness by the well known statement of J. V. Stalin, set forth in the Order of the Peoples Commissar of Defense of 23 February 1942, speaking of such permanently-operating factors as the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the armament of the army, and the organizing ability of the command personnel.

The thesis on the permanently-operating factors, which

generalized Leninist ideas, was at that period a new word in Soviet military science. Under the influence of the cult of the individual, however, this thesis began to be turned into an infallible dogma. Military science, moreover, cannot at all restrict itself to the study of the factors listed. There exist also permanently-operating factors which are not decisive in some cases but can under certain circumstances acquire a determining importance. Among them, for example, are the factors of space or geography, and of time, and a number of others. In addition, one must not ignore factors which are not considered as permanently-operating; surprise, advance preparations for opening military operations, and a favorable strategic position. These factors are not operative throughout the entire course of the war, but mainly in its initial period. Their role substantially changes depending on the level of development of military technology. Thus, as a result of the unprecedented progress of contemporary weapons, and above all of nuclear weapons, jet aviation, and missiles, surprise is now in effect already turning into a permanently-operating factor, and that circumstance must be taken into account by military science.

Under contemporary conditions, the role of science and technology grows enormously; without them it would be impossible to advance any field of endeavor, including the military. Hence science too should be added to the list of permanently-operating factors determining the fate of war.

Thus Soviet military science, guided by Marxist-Leninist theory, reveals the objective laws of contemporary armed conflict and teaches our military cadres how to use them correctly in the interests of gaining victory over the enemy, always taking into account the changes in military affairs caused by the progress of combat technology.

The calculation and utilization of the potentialities of the

combatant sides by military science are based above all on the basic thesis of Marxism-Leninism on the deciding role of material conditions in armed conflict. "Nothing so depends on economic conditions," said Engels, "as the army and navy. Armament, composition of forces, organization, tactics, and strategy depend above all on the degree of production and means of communication at a given time." At the same time, the consciousness, degree of organization of the masses, their relation to the war, the morale condition of the armed forces—in short, the morale factor—also has a decisive significance on the course and outcome of armed conflict.

The influence of the economic and morale factors on the course and outcome of wars naturally cannot be ignored by bourgeois military science. But bourgeois military science, being in the service of the imperialists, is not interested in discovering the objective laws operating in the capitalist world, since these clearly reveal the inevitability of the fall of capitalism, laying bare its flaws and its anti-scientific essence. Moreover, there are many obstacles caused by the reactionary political tenets of imperialism. Hence bourgeois military theory is not in a position to utilize many objective laws of war.

The military theoreticians of the capitalist states, in drawing various conclusions in common with conclusions of Soviet military science, as a rule attribute completely different and clearly unscientific content. During recent years, especially since the war in Korea, the question of the significance of the morale factor in armed conflict and of the decisive role of man in war have been widely discussed in military circles in the West. The American journal *Military Review* states: "Despite the fantastic progress in the development of weapons, the role of man in any type of war will always be most impor-

tant." But bourgeois military science evaluates this role from a false, idealistic position.

Contemporary bourgeois military theoreticians openly slander the working masses, depicting them as a "blind mass," devoid of intelligence and will, possessing only destructive instincts which it is necessary to develop and use for their own ends. These reactionary, idealistic views have found their expression in a number of official manuals and regulations of the armed forces of capitalist states, and in particular in the U. S. Army *Field Regulations*. In Chapter 3 of this manual, it is said that the conduct of the soldier in battle is determined more by instinct than by reason. Many Western military theoreticians assert that the morale-political condition of the troops does not depend upon the aims of the war, but is mainly determined by the subjective qualities of the military cadres. For example, "Soldiers can fight very well and for the most unjust aims," writes the English military journal *The Army Quarterly*.

All the absurdity of such discussions is evident to any unbiased person. While formerly small and well-trained troops made up of professional mercenaries, motivated by greed and spoils, could win victories against weak opponents, in the epoch of mass armies the situation is entirely changed. The character of a war has ever more significant influence on its outcome. And not by accident mass heroism is a phenomenon compatible only with armed forces which are imbued with the idea of defense of freedom and the independence of peoples. The history of the just wars of the era of imperialism, and especially the Civil [1918-1920] and Great Fatherland [1941-1945] wars of the Soviet people, bear witness to that fact with sufficient clarity.

Soviet military science takes into account in all its conclusions the advantages which the high morale esprit of Soviet

soldiers gives to our armed forces. Their unsurpassed spiritual qualities are bred by the progressive character of the social and state structure of our country, by the deep awareness of the noble and high aims of defense of the Socialist Fatherland. Of invaluable significance in the forming of the outstanding combat morale qualities of the personnel of the armed forces has been the ideological-political and organizational work of the Communist Party. The decisions of the October [1957] plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU were once again convincing proof of the tremendous attention which the Party devotes to raising the political consciousness of the defenders of the Motherland, and to inculcating high combat morale in them.

The high [political] consciousness of the Soviet people and of their armed forces has direct influence on the development of Soviet military science. "For the first time in the history of world conflict," said V. I. Lenin, "elements have entered an army not bearing official set views, but guided by ideas of struggle for liberation of the exploited." (*Works*, Vol. 26, p. 421). Thanks to this, Soviet military science has the opportunity to enrich its theses and conclusions with fresh data to a substantially greater degree than the military science of the bourgeois states.

Let us, for instance, take the history of the development of the Soviet military art, which is a most important component of military science. The creation by the Communist Party of new command cadres in the Soviet armed forces has left its mark on all fields of the Soviet military art. M. V. Frunze noted that "the Red command personnel brought into the army boldness, initiative and determination . . . [ellipsis in the article] these characteristics of maneuverability, determination, and an offensive orientation were related not only to the objective conditions of the combat operations, which

no one denies, but they were at the same time related to the fact that at the head of the Red Army were elements imbued with the active ideology of the working class.”

The command cadres, brought up by the Party on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, discovered a profoundly creative approach to the solution of the complex questions of the organization of operations and battles also during the Great Fatherland War. The Soviet military art in that period discovered the most appropriate operational and tactical methods for the breakthrough of a deeply echeloned enemy defense line. In offensive operations the most varied powerful deep frontal blows were applied, which after breaking the enemy defense were rapidly extended with the aid of mobile shock groups and which led either to the encirclement and complete liquidation of the hostile troops, or to their defeat and pursuit to great depth.

The Soviet naval art correctly served the missions of the navy during the war, and the navy reliably secured the flanks of the land forces, gave fine support to troops operating on coastal sectors, made landings, effected operational troop transfers, and successfully interdicted enemy maritime transport. During the course of combat operations at sea many problems were creatively resolved, including the group employment of submarines, combined action of aviation and submarines, mass use of torpedo boats and aviation against communication lines, and others.

In the postwar period the advanced, creative character of Soviet military science was manifest in the solutions of the problems of the development and employment of rocket weapons, both on tactical and strategic scales. The Soviet Union first in the world created an ICBM, which can be launched against any point on the globe, and on the basis of which were launched for the first time in the history of

mankind artificial earth satellites. The development of rocket weapons substantially depreciates the value both of the system of American military bases surrounding the Soviet Union, and also the strategic air power of NATO.

Soviet military science, in accordance with the requirements of creative Marxism-Leninism, has waged and will continue to wage a relentless struggle against any and all fixed canons which hamper the advance of military affairs. It has resolutely broken with the views generally held by bourgeois theoreticians, which reduce the military art to strategy and tactics, and it worked out anew the theory of the operating art [a category between strategy and tactics, akin to the French "grand tactics"—RLG].

The dogmatism which frequently manifests itself in a number of works of bourgeois military figures, opposing any kind of reexamination of "traditional" views on the fundamental elements of the military art, and particularly on the principles of strategy, is organically alien to Soviet military science. In an American encyclopedia, for example, it is said that strategy "is essentially unchanging, and its principles, few and simple, remain without alteration." American military literature usually lists nine such "eternal principles" of the military art: expediency [this should read: the objective—RLG], simplicity, unity of command, the offensive, maneuver, mass, economy of force, surprise, and security. "These principles," wrote an American military theoretician, "are invariable. They are the same in our day as in the time of Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Caesar, and Napoleon."

In contradistinction to bourgeois treatment of the principles of the military art, as allegedly once and for all time unchangeable and independent of the concrete historical conditions of the conduct of armed conflict, Soviet military science

considers, in accordance with the requirements of the dialectical method, that the principles of the military art change along with changes in the conditions of armed conflict. Moreover, the very same principles, while apparently formulated identically for various historical conditions, contain concrete substance corresponding to new situations.

The whole history of the military art bears witness to changes undergone by various theses of military art which formerly seemed unchangeable. Napoleon, for example, considered that one could not concentrate more than a single army on any given theater of military operations. However, in wars of the twentieth century several armies have operated in one theater. Clausewitz proceeded from the idea that war could be ended by the concentration of all strength in one strategic echelon. Now not one but several strategic echelons are prepared for the conduct of war. Moltke the Elder thought that the errors committed in the strategic deployment at the beginning of a war could not be corrected. However, as the experience of contemporary wars has shown, this principle has clearly become obsolete due to the growth of the economic-technical, morale, and consequently military potentialities of large states. All this convincingly disproves the views of the bourgeois theoreticians who attempt to convert into dogma the principles of military science.

It would, however, be profoundly mistaken to take a nihilistic attitude toward all the theoretical conclusions of bourgeois military science. Decaying capitalism still commands substantial resources. Resisting the victorious march of socialism it does not spare means for the arms race and the development of military matters. Bourgeois military theoreticians attentively analyze the experience of recent wars, including the combat operations of the Soviet armed forces. Following a number of books on the Soviet Army, there

recently appeared in the West a book by J. Meister on the operations of the Soviet navy during the Great Fatherland War. The author of the book calls for a careful study of the operations and battles in which vessels and formations of our fleet participated.

The leading military figures of the Western powers attempt to compensate for the weakness of the military organizations of those countries, which stems from the defects in the capitalist system itself and in particular from the inadequate level of morale potential, by strengthening the matériel of their armies and navies with modern weapons and careful military technical training of the troops. Hence, while not overestimating bourgeois military science, one must not underestimate it either. The conduct of an army which is not prepared to use all the weapons, means and methods in combat which the enemy has or can have, would be unreasonable or even criminal, V. I. Lenin has said. "The most dangerous thing in war is to underestimate the enemy and to be content with the fact that one is stronger." (*Works*, Vol. 31, p. 150). These statements by Lenin always were and always will be fundamental for Soviet military science.

Historical experience teaches that the most real criterion of actual military science, the truth of its conclusions, are the final results of a war. The victories of the Soviet armed forces over the foes of our Motherland in 1918-1920 and 1941-1945 are convincing evidence of the advanced, creative character of Soviet military science.

The Soviet people and its soldiers now are preparing for an historical event in the life of our state—the XXI Congress of the Communist Party. At that notable time, when the creative initiative and self-activity of wide masses develops with particular force, there stands before our military cadres the task to advance with still greater steadfastness and cre-

activity all branches of military affairs in accordance with the achievements of contemporary science and technology. Successfully solving the most complex theoretical questions dictated by the experience of the war and the development of the forms and means of armed conflict, our military science will make a worthy contribution to the cause of the further strengthening of the defense capability of the Motherland.

CHAPTER I

1. Col. S. Kozlov, "Some Questions on the Theory of Strategy," *Voennaia mysl'* (Military Thought), No. 11, November, 1954, p. 23; italicized in the original.

2. V. Lenin, *Selected Works*, New York, n.d., Vol. VII, p. 353.

3. N. Khrushchev, *Pravda*, January 15, 1958.

4. *Ibid.*

5. See N. Khrushchev, *Radio Moscow*, January 27, 1959 and A. Mikoyan, *Radio Moscow*, January 31, 1959.

6. A. Mikoyan portended the change in his speech to the XX Party Congress in February, 1956, and was the first to make it explicit in *Pravda*, March 12, 1958. N. Khrushchev followed in an interview with *Figaro* on March 19, broadcast on *Radio Moscow*, March 19, 1958. Perhaps significantly, the two newspapers to develop the theme in full articles were both military organs: see Col. Ya. Dziuba, "Does Capitalist Encirclement Exist?," *Sovetskaia aviat-siia* (Soviet Aviation), August 16, 1958; and Capt. 2nd Rk. B. Demidov, "Does Capitalist Encirclement Exist?," *Sovetskii flot* (Soviet Fleet), September 4, 1958.

7. Major General M. Galaktionov, *Strategicheskaiia tsel'* (The Strategic Objective), 1944, pp. 128-129.

8. *Obshchaia taktika* (General Tactics), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1940, Vol. I, p. 16.

9. "On Some Questions of Soviet Military Science," editorial, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 3, March, 1955, p. 6.

10. For a fuller discussion of these questions, see Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, Praeger, New York, 1958, Chapter II.

11. For detailed treatment of current doctrine on the "decisive" military, political, and economic factors and on the role of surprise, see the following chapters of this work. For a comprehensive review of the application of Soviet military doctrine see *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*.

12. Col. V. A. Zakharov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii* (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1957, p. 262.

13. Maj. Gen. (then Col.) A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika* (Strategy and Economics), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1957, p. 194.

14. See Chapter 3 for details.

15. Marshal G. Zhukov, *Pravda*, August 7, 1956, and see Zhukov, *Pravda*, February 13, 1955.

16. Marshal G. Zhukov, cited in *Krasnaia zvezda* (Red Star), March 23, 1957.

CHAPTER 2

1. The reader's attention is invited to the author's recent comprehensive study *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (Praeger, New York, 1958), espe-

cially to Chapter 4 on "Strategic Concepts and Doctrine for the Nuclear Era." The present work examines in greater depth the specific subject of doctrine on the decisive factors in modern war.

2. Col. I. S. Baz, "Soviet Military Science on the Character of Contemporary War," *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1958, p. 22. Italics added.

3. J. V. Stalin, *O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza* (On the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union), 5th edition, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1947, pp. 43-44.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Marshal A. Vasilevsky, "J. V. Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR," *Pravda*, March 9, 1953.

6. Vasilevsky, "In Defense of the Security of the Soviet Motherland," *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 23, 1954; and "A Great Lesson of History," *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 9, 1954.

7. Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, "On the Question of the Character of the Laws of Military Science," *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 9, September, 1953, pp. 30 and 31. Italics in the original for the entire sentence.

8. Cols. S. Mazhorov and I. Tikhonov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 28, 1954.

9. See Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 69-71.

10. Maj. Gen. N. Pukovsky, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 18.

11. Maj. Gen. N. Pukhovsky, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, 1955, pp. 99-100.

12. As stated by Col. G. Sapozhkov, cited in *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 37.

13. *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 4, April, 1955, p. 20.

14. Editorial, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 3, March, 1955, p. 4.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 5. See also Major V. Zubarev, *Propagandist i agitator*, No. 13, July [4], 1955, p. 10.

16. Marshal of the Tank Troops P. Rotmistrov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 24, 1955. The point is repeated by Col. A. Stokov, "Lenin's Elaboration of the Basic Issues of Soviet Military Science," *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 22, 1955.

17. *Ibid.* See also Rotmistrov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 2, February, 1955, p. 21; and Rotmistrov, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 11, November, 1955, p. 93.

18. Lt. Gen. S. Shatilov, "A Great and Noble Theme," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 28, 1955.

19. Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, "The Permanently Operating Factors of War," *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, second edition, Vol. 34, [June 20] 1955, p. 257.

20. Maj. Gen. Ye. Boltin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 30, 1955.

21. Over two dozen such statements from 1955 alone could be cited.

22. See Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 61-91.

23. Col. A. Piatkin, "Some Questions of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of War," *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 3, March, 1954, p. 24, and in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, 1955, p. 70. The latter source, cited here, omits a quotation from Stalin, but otherwise the two are identical.

24. Maj. Gen. N. Pukhovsky, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi*

nauke, 1955, pp. 100 and 101. See also Pukhovskiy, *O sovetskoi voennoi nauke*, [November 16] 1953, p. 82.

25. Marshal of the Tank Troops P. Rotmistrov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 24, 1955; and see esp. Maj. Gen. [then Col.] A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, [September 20] 1957, p. 193.

26. Col. V. A. Zakharov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [May 20] 1957, p. 265.

27. Maj. Gen. N. Talenskiy, *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, second edition, Vol. 34, [June 20] 1955, p. 255.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 255-256. See also Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, pp. 287-288, for further elucidation of the Soviet conception of "the rear."

29. Col. V. Petrov, "On the Stability of the Rear as a Permanently Operating Factor Deciding the Outcome of Wars," in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, 1955, p. 109; and see Maj. Gen. [then Col.] A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, [September 20] 1957, p. 15; Col. G. Shabaev, "The Role of the Morale Factor in Contemporary War," *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, July 16, 1957; et al.

30. Col. I. Baz, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1958, p. 28.

31. Lt. Col. V. Strigachev, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, April 26, 1958; italics in the original.

32. Col. I. N. Levanov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [May 20] 1957, pp. 212-213.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

34. For a few other recent examples, see Maj. Gen. [then Col.] A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, [September 20] 1957, pp. 5-42; Lt. Col. V. Strigachev, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, April 12, 1958; Col. F. Khrustov, *Sovetskii flot*, November 22, 1957; Col. S. Mazhorov and Capt. 2nd Rank I. Punanov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 22, 1958; and Col. P. Kashirin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, September 24, 1957.

35. Col. P. Sidorov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 3, 1955. See also Col. G. Shabaev, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, April 26, 1958.

36. Maj. Gen. N. Talenskiy, *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, second edition, Vol. 34, [June 20] 1955, p. 256.

37. Col. B. Belyi, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [May 20] 1957, p. 275.

38. Col. G. Shabaev, "The Role of the Morale Factor in Contemporary War," *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, April 26, 1958; Col. N. Sushko, "War and Ideology," *Sovetskii flot*, May 23, 1958; Col. V. A. Zakharov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii* [May 20] 1957, pp. 275-276; et al.

39. Col. P. Kashirin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 3, 1955; and see the references in the note above.

40. See Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 137-138, for discussion and references.

41. Col. V. Kulish, "The Falsification of Military History as a Means of Ideological Preparation for Aggression," *Sovetskii flot*, July 9, 1958.

42. See Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, p. 227, and in general pp. 230-240.

43. Col. A. Piatkin, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 3, March, 1954, p. 21 (see also p. 27).

44. Maj. Gen. G. Pokrovsky, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, 1955, p. 170. There have been many similar statements; for a few recent examples see Col. I. Baz, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1958, p. 28, and Col. G. Shabaev, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, April 26, 1958.

45. Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Second edition, Vol. 34, [June 20] 1955, p. 256.

46. See Chapter 1 of this book, and see R. L. Garthoff, "The Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Policy-Making," *World Politics*, Vol. IV, No. 1, October, 1951, pp. 85-111.

47. Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, second edition, Vol. 34, [June 20] 1955, p. 256.

48. Col. S. Kozlov, *Vooruzhenie armii—odin iz postoianno deistvuiushchikh faktorov reshaiushchikh sud'bu voiny*, Voenizdat, Moscow, [March 30] 1954, 47 pp.

49. Maj. Gen. [then Col.] A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, [September 20] 1957, *passim*. See also Maj. Gen. G. Pokrovsky, "Armament in Modern War," in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, 1955, pp. 158-171.

50. See Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, pp. 35 and 202-207, for an explanation of this term.

51. Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, "What is Military Potential?" *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 20, 1955. See also Col. V. Petrov "On the Essence of Military Potential," *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, May 20, 1958.

52. *Ibid.*, See also Col. V. Petrov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, 1955, p. 109.

53. Col. V. Petrov, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, May 20, 1958.

54. Col. P. A. Chuikov, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, Voenizdat, Moscow, second edition, [June 28, and September 14] 1956, see pp. 134-157.

55. Cols. V. Gorynin, P. Derevianko, and V. Seregin, "Shortcomings of a Book on an Important Theme," *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 19, 1957.

56. Col. I. Baz, "V. I. Lenin on the Fundamental Factors which Decide the Course and Outcome of Wars," *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 6, 1957.

57. Marshal G. Zhukov, on February 4, 1957, in *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 23, 1957.

58. Marshal G. Zhukov, on March 16, 1957, in *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 20, 1957.

59. See, for example, Col. I. Baz, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1958, pp. 24-29; Col. V. Petrov, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, May 20, 1958; Col. P. Pankrashkin, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, February 7, 1958; Col. F. Khrustov, *Sovetskii flot*, November 22, 1957; Col. P. Kashirin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, September 24, 1957; *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [May 20] 1957, pp. 209-281; Col. I. Nenakhov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, September 14, 1957; Lt. Col. L. Korets, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, July 16, 1957; Cols. V. Gorynin, P. Derevianko, and V. Seregin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 19, 1957; Col. G. Fedorov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 22, 1957; Col. N. Sushko, *Sovetskii flot*, March 22, 1957; Col. I. Baz, *Krasnaia zvezda*,

March 6, 1957; Marshal K. Meretskov, *Izvestiia*, February 23, 1957; and D. Kondratov, *Sovetskii flot*, January 6, 1957.

60. Col. B. A. Belyi, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [May 20] 1957, p. 255; Maj. Gen. [then Col.] A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, [September 20] 1957, p. 15; editorial, *Pravda*, July 6, 1958; V. Shragin, *Radio Moscow*, July 7, 1958; Maj. Gen. D. I. Kornienko, *O roli moral'nogo faktora v sovremennoi voine*, Znanie, Moscow, [September 2] 1958, p. 20; and Col. P. Sidorov, *Sovetskii flot*, December 11, 1958.

61. Col. P. Sidorov, "The Creative Character of Soviet Military Science," *Sovetskii flot*, December 11, 1958.

62. Maj. Gen. [then Col.] A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, 1957, p. 34.

63. Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 9, September, 1953, p. 31.

64. Col. E. Chalik, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 9, September, 1954, p. 31.

65. *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 4, April, 1955, p. 18, and see p. 22.

66. Col. S. Kozlov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 15, and see p. 28.

67. Col. A. Strokov, *Istoriia voennogo iskusstva*, Vol. 1, [October 17] 1955, p. xxviii.

68. Maj. Gen. [then Col.] A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, [September 20] 1957, p. 195. See also Col. I. Baz, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1958.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

70. Marshal A. Vasilevsky, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 23, 1954. See also Col. G. Fedorov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 22, 1957.

71. Col. G. Fedorov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 6, 1954, and reprinted in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, [February 3] 1955, p. 33.

72. Col. I. N. Levanov, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [May 20] 1957, p. 209.

73. Col. N. Tarasenko, *Sovetskii flot*, June 15, 1957. See also Col. F. Dankovtsev, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 35.

74. Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 20, 1955.

75. Maj. Gen. [then Col.] A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, [September 20] 1957, p. 194.

76. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, 1958, pp. 22-24; and Garthoff *The Role of the Military in Recent Soviet Politics*, RM-1638, The RAND Corporation, March 1, 1956, esp. Chapter 1.

77. Col. Gen. of Av. A. Nikitin, "Soviet Aviation," *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 2, February, 1949, p. 57.

78. See Lt. Col. M. Shirokov, "Problems of the Mobilization of the Economy in Contemporary War," *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1954, pp. 46-58; Col. A. Lagovsky, "Economic Potential and Its Role in Contemporary War," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 1, 1955; and Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, "What is Military Potential?" *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 20, 1955.

79. Col. M. Raitarovskiy, "On the Role of Economic Potential in Contemporary War," *Sovetskii flot*, September 28, 1956.

80. Maj. Gen. [then Col.] A. Lagovsky, *Strategiia i ekonomika*, [September

20] 1957, p. 195; and see Col. S. Mazhorov and Capt. 2nd Rank I. Punanov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 22, 1958.

81. Col. M. Raitarovskiy, *Sovetskii flot*, September 28, 1956.

82. N. S. Khrushchev, "The Further Management of Industry and Construction," *Pravda*, February 16, 1957; Khrushchev, "On the Further Improvement of the Organization of Administration of Industry and Construction," *Pravda*, March 30, 1957; and *Pravda*, May 8, 1957. See also the good analysis by N. Galay, "The Military Significance of the Soviet Economic Reorganization," *Bulletin of The Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Vol. IV, No. 6, June, 1957, p. 21-29.

83. N. S. Khrushchev, Interview with H. Shapiro, in *Pravda*, November 19, 1957.

84. See Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, 1958, pp. 71-91, and 170-190.

85. Col. I. Baz, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1958, p. 28.

86. Col. G. Shabaev, "The Role of the Morale Factor in Contemporary War," *Sovetskaiia aviatsiia*, April 26, 1958. See also Col. I. Baz, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 6, 1957; Marshal G. Zhukov, *Pravda*, March 20, 1957; and Col. P. Sidorov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 3, 1955.

87. Marshal A. Vasilevskiy, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 23, 1954.

88. Editorial, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 14.

89. Col. P. Kashirin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 28, 1955.

90. Col. V. Petrov, *Sovetskaiia aviatsiia*, May 20, 1958.

91. Col. I. N. Leyanov, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [May 20] 1957, p. 210.

92. Maj. Gen. N. Talenskiy, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 2, February, 1958, pp. 21-22.

93. Maj. Gen. N. Talenskiy, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 1, January, 1957, p. 43.

94. Col. Z. Osipov, *Zabota Kommunisticheskoi partii ob ukreplenii aktivnoi oborony SSSR*, [October 24] 1953, p. 8.

95. Maj. Gen. G. Pokrovskiy, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, [February 3] 1955, p. 160.

96. Maj. Gen. E. Razin, *Istoriia voennogo iskusstva*, Vol. 1, [June 16] 1955, p. xxviii.

97. Lt. Col. M. Shirokov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 47.

98. Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, "What is Military Potential?," *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 20, 1955.

99. Col. A. V. Zakharov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [May 20] 1957, p. 262.

100. Col. Gen. P. Kurochkin, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 19; see also Col. V. Petrov, *Sovetskii flot*, September 20, 1956.

101. Marshal G. Zhukov, *Pravda*, August 7, 1956. See also a similar statement by Zhukov cited in *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 23, 1957.

102. The writer has encountered similar views in scores of articles in the Soviet press in recent years.

103. Col. I. Baz, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1958, p. 25; Col. G. Shabaev, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, April 26, 1958; and Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [November 28] 1956, pp. 148-151.
104. Col. I. Baz, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1958, pp. 25-26.
105. See Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 149-166, for the role of land power in Soviet strategy.
106. Maj. Gen. A. Lagovsky, *Roľ ekonomicheskogo faktora v voine* (the Role of the Economic Factor in War) *Znanie*, Moscow [March 23] 1959, p. 32.
107. Col. Gen. A. Zheltov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 23, 1955.

CHAPTER 3

1. The reader's attention is invited to the author's recent comprehensive study *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (Praeger, New York, 1958), especially Chapter 4 on "Strategic Concepts and Doctrine for the Nuclear Era." The present discussion examines in greater detail Soviet doctrine on surprise.
2. See R. L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Free Press, Ill., 1953) p. 274 for several examples. See also especially Col. Gen. V. Popov, "Some Questions on Surprise," *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 12, December, 1951, pp. 17-31.
3. Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 9, September, 1953, pp. 37-38.
4. Col. I. Nenakhov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 10, October, 1953, pp. 7 and 14.
5. See Maj. Gen. N. Pukhovskiy, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 18; Cols. S. Mazhorov and I. Tikhonov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 28, 1954; Marshal A. Vasilevskiy, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 23 and May 9, 1954; Col. A. Piatkin, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 3, March, 1954, p. 23; and Cols. A. Strokov and I. Maryganov, in *O sovetskoi voennoi nauke*, [June 30] 1954, p. 54.
6. This point is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this work.
7. Col. A. Piatkin, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 3, March, 1954, p. 23.
8. Col. A. Piatkin, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, 1955, pp. 69-70, and Pukhovskiy, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, p. 107.
9. Col. A. Piatkin, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, 1955, pp. 69-70, and Pukhovskiy, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, p. 100.
10. Capt. 3rd Rank V. Avramenko, cited in *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 44.
11. See Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 67-69.
12. Editorial, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 3, March, 1955, p. 4.
13. Marshal of the Tank Troops P. Rotmistrov, "On the Role of Surprise in Contemporary War," *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 2, February, 1955, pp. 18-19.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
16. *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 2, February, 1955, p. 12.
17. Marshal V. Sokolovskiy, *Izvestiia*, February 23, 1955.
18. Editorial, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 3, March, 1955, p. 5.

19. For example, see Major Gen. Ye. Boltin, *Sovetskii flot*, June 6, 1957.
20. "The Great Strength of Leninist Ideas on Defense of the Socialist State," editorial, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 4, April, 1955, p. 8.
21. Lt. Gen. of Aviation P. Braiko, "Soviet Aviation in the Great Fatherland War," *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 4, April, 1955, p. 19.
22. Marshal I. Bagramian, "The Historic Victory of the Soviet People," *Oktiabr'*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 114.
23. Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955.
24. Col. V. Vasilenko, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, [February 3] 1955, p. 213.
25. *Voennaia mys'*, No. 5, May, 1955, pp. 12-13. See also *Voennaia mys'*, No. 3, March, 1955, p. 5.
26. Col. Gen. P. Kurochkin, *Voennaia mys'*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 18.
27. *Voennaia mys'*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 13.
28. Marshal A. Vasilevsky, *Izvestiia*, May 8, 1955.
29. Marshal I. Konev, *Pravda*, May 9, 1955, and *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 10, 1955.
32. Maj. Gen. N. Pukhovskiy, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine, armii, i voennoi nauke*, p. 100. This statement was added in the 1955 book; it had not appeared in the article as originally published; cf. *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 18.
33. Marshal of the Tank Troops P. Rotmistrov, *Voennaia mys'*, No. 2, February, 1955, pp. 25-26, and p. 21.
34. Rotmistrov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 24, 1955; and Rotmistrov, "Surprise in the History of Wars," *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 11, November, 1955, p. 94.
35. Marshal of Av. K. Vershinin, *Pravda*, September 8, 1957.
36. Maj. Gen. N. Talenskiy, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 8, August, 1958, pp. 68 and 69.
37. Marshal R. Malinovsky, *Pravda*, May 9, 1958. See also Maj. Gen. N. Talenskiy, "Problems of Military Strategy and Foreign Policy," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 3, March, 1958, p. 34.
38. Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, *Radio Moscow*, March 9, 1958.
39. Gen. of Army V. Kurasov, "On the Question of the Preemptive Blow," *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 27, 1958.
40. See N. Bulganin, "Letter to President Eisenhower" *TASS*, January 8, 1958; M. Baturin, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 1, January, 1958 [to press December 20, 1957], p. 99; *Radio Moscow*, January 23, 1958; Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, *Radio Moscow*, March 9, 1958; Col. Gen. F. Golikov, *New Times*, No. 17, April, 1958, cited in *TASS* broadcast on *Radio Moscow*, April 23, 1958; Gen. of Army V. Kurasov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 27, 1958; and *Radio Moscow*, July 10, 1958.
41. M. Baturin, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 1, January, 1958, p. 99.
42. Marshal of Tank Troops P. Rotmistrov, *Voennaia mys'*, No. 2, February, 1955, p. 19.
43. V. Skopin, *Militarizm*, Voenizdat, Moscow, second ed., [October 5] 1957, p. 502; first ed. [August 3] 1956, p. 431. Italics added.

44. See, for example, Col. D. Z. Muriev, in *Bloknot agitatora*, No. 34, December, 1956, p. 28.
45. Col. I. Maryganov, *Peredovoi kharakter sovetskoï voennoi nauki*, [October 30] 1953, p. 37. See also on adventurism of surprise attack blitzkrieg "The Problem of Surprise Attack," *Novoe vremiia*, No. 28, July, 1958, p. 1; and Col. Ye. Khomenko, *O voínakh spravedlivykh i nespravedlivykh*, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1954, p. 32.
46. Lt. Gen. N. Gritchín, "On That Which the American Atomaniacs Should Not Forget," *Pravda*, January 7, 1955.
47. See Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, pp. 103-106.
48. Col. I. Maryganov, *Peredovoi kharakter sovetskoï voennoi nauki*, 1953, p. 110.
49. Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, *Voennaia mysľ*, No. 9, September, 1953, p. 31. See also Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, pp. 141 and 153; Col. I. Maryganov, *Peredovoi kharakter sovetskoï voennoi nauki*, [October 30] 1953, p. 32; and Col. V. Petrov, in *O sovetskoï voennoi nauke*, [June 30] 1954, p. 115.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
51. Col. V. Voronin, cited in *Voennaia mysľ*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 40.
52. Col. A. Kapralov, cited in *Voennaia mysľ*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 45.
53. Editorial, *Voennaia mysľ*, No. 4, April, 1955, p. 21. More recently, Maj. Gen. Talensky has reiterated the continuing need for a series of operations of mounting force; see his articles in *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 1, January, 1957, p. 43, and *ibid.*, No. 2, February, 1958, pp. 21-22.
54. Col. F. Dankovtsev, *Voennaia mysľ*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 39; and Col. A. Stokov, *Istoriia voennogo iskusstva*, Vol. 1 [October 17] 1955, p. xxix.
55. Lt. Gen. A. Tsvetkov, *Voennaia mysľ*, No. 3, March, 1955, p. 52.
56. Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, [November 28] 1956, p. 155.
57. For some recent examples, see Maj. Gen. D. I. Kornienko, *O roli moral'nogo faktora v sovremennoi voine* (On the Role of Morale in Contemporary War), Moscow, [September 2] 1958, *passim*; Capt. 1st Rank V. Kulakov "Ideology of Aggression and Military Adventures," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 24, 1958.
58. For example, see Marshal K. Moskalenko, *Slaviane*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 11; and see Lt. Gen. N. Gritchín, *Pravda*, January 7, 1955.
59. "The Problem of Surprise Attack," *Novoe vremiia*, No. 28, July, 1958, p. 1; and Capt. 1st Rank V. Kulakov "Ideology of Aggression and Military Adventures," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 24, 1958.
60. Capt. 1st Rank V. Kulakov, "The Reactionary Essence and Aggressive Character of the Military Ideology of Imperialism," *Sovetskii flot*, March 8, 1958. For further discussion of Soviet views on American strategy, see Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 119 ff.
61. Maj. Gen. Ye. Boltin, *Trud*, May 9, 1958. See also Maj. Gen. A. Lagovsky, *Rol'ekonomicheskogo faktora v voine* (The Role of the Economic Factor in War), *Znanie*, Moscow, [March 23] 1959, pp. 18-19.

