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The Ideal of Human Unity

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THE
IDEAL OF HUMAN UNITY

BY

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PREFACE

The chapters of this book were written in a serial form in the pages of the monthly review, *Arya*, and from the necessity of speedy publication have been reprinted as they stood without the alterations which would have been necessary to give them a greater unity of treatment. They reflect the rapidly changing phases of ideas, facts and possibilities which emerged in the course of the European conflict. The earlier chapters were written when Russia was still an Empire and an autocracy, the later parts after the Russian revolution and when the war had come nearer to its end, but the dramatic circumstances of the issue, in itself inevitable, could not be foreseen. The reader may guide himself in regard to the references to contemporary conditions by observing that the first four chapters cover the close of the year 1915, the next twelve 1916, the seventeenth to the twenty-eighth 1917, while the remaining seven extend to July 1918. The rapid change of circumstances reflected will serve to bring home the swiftness of the evolution by which what was a hesitating idea and a doubtful possibility at the commencement has become a settled necessity awaiting speedy formulation.

Subsequent events have rendered certain speculations and balancings out of date, for they have been solved by the logic of events. Austria is a name of the past, the Empire of the Hohenzollerns has disappeared like a dream of the night, all Europe between the

Rhine and the Volga is republican. Finally, most important of all, the League of Nations has now been decided upon, the American idea having triumphed at least in principle, and is in travail of formation. But the main suggestions put forward in the book remain unaffected, or rather acquire a more pressing actuality. The two great difficulties which attend the incipience of this first stage of loose world-union will still be, first, the difficulty of bringing into one system the few great Empires remaining, few but immensely increased in power, influence and the extent of their responsibilities, and the greatly increased swarm of free nations which the force of events or the Power guiding them rather than the will of nations and Governments has brought into being, and the approaching struggle between Labour and Capitalism. The former is only a difficulty and embarrassment, though it may become serious if it turns into a conflict between the imperialistic and the nationalistic ideas or reproduces in the international scheme the strife of the old oligarchic and democratic tendencies in a new form, a question between control of the world-system by the will and influence of a few powerful imperial States and the free and equal control by all, small nations and great, European and American and Asiatic peoples. The Second is a danger which may even lead to disintegration of this first attempt at unification, especially if, as seems to be the tendency, the League undertakes the policing of the world against the forces of extreme revolutionary socialism. On the other hand, the conflict may accelerate, whatever its result, the necessity and actuality of a more close and rigorous system, the incipience at least of the second stage of unification.

The main contentions advanced in these pages also remain unaffected by the course of events,—the inevitability of the unification of the life of humanity as a result of those imperative natural forces which lead always to the creation of larger and larger human aggregates, the choice of the principles which may be followed in the process, the need for preserving and bringing to fullness the principle of individual and group freedom within the human unity, and the insufficiency of formal unity without a growth of the religion of humanity which can alone make it a great psychological advance in the spiritual evolution of the race.

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THE IDEAL OF HUMAN UNITY

CHAPTER I

THE surfaces of life are easy to understand; their laws, characteristic movements, practical utilities are ready to our hand and we can seize on them and turn them to account with a sufficient facility and rapidity. But they do not carry us very far. They suffice for an active superficial life from day to day, but they do not solve the great problems of existence. On the other hand, the knowledge of life's profundities, its potent secrets, its great, hidden, all-determining laws, is exceedingly difficult to us. We have found no plummet that can fathom these depths; they seem to us a vague, indeterminate movement, a profound obscurity from which the mind recoils willingly to play with the fret and foam and facile radiances of the surface. Yet it is these depths that we must know if we would understand existence; on the surface we get only Nature's secondary rules and practical bye-laws which help us to tide over the difficulties of the moment and to organise empirically without understanding them her continual transitions.

Nothing is more obscure to humanity or less seized by its understanding, whether in the power that moves it or the sense of the aim towards which it moves than its own communal and collective life. Sociology does not help us, for it only gives us the history of the past and the external conditions under which communities have survived. History teaches us nothing; it is a confused torrent of events and personalities or a kaleidoscope of changing institutions. We do not seize the real sense of all this change and this continual streaming forward of human life in the channels of Time. What we do seize are current or recurrent phenomena, facile generalisations, partial ideas. We talk of democracy, aristocracy, and autocracy, collectivism and individualism, imperialism and nationalism, the State and the commune, capitalism and labour; we advance hasty generalisations and make absolute systems which are positively announced to-day only to be abandoned perforce tomorrow; we espouse causes and ardent enthusiasms whose triumph turns to an early disillusionment and then forsake them for others, perhaps for those that we have taken so much trouble to destroy. For a whole century mankind thirsts and battles after liberty and earns it with a bitter expense of toil, tears and blood; the century that enjoys without having fought for it, turns away as from a puerile illusion and is ready to renounce the depreciated gain as the price of some new good. And all this happens because our whole thought and action with regard to our collective life is shallow

and empirical; it does not seek for, it does not base itself on a firm, profound and complete knowledge. The moral is not the vanity of human life, of its ardours and enthusiasms and of the ideals it pursues, but the necessity of a wiser, larger, more patient search after its true law and aim.

To-day the ideal of human unity is more or less vaguely making its way to the front of our consciousness. The emergence of an ideal in human thought is always the sign of an intention in Nature, but not always of an intention to accomplish; sometimes, she means only an attempt which is predestined to temporary failure. For Nature is slow and patient in her methods. She takes up ideas and half carries them out, then drops them by the wayside to resume them in some future era with a better combination. She tempts humanity, her thinking instrument, and tests how far it is ready for the harmony she has imagined; she allows and incites man to attempt and fail, so that he may learn and succeed better another time. Still the ideal, having once made its way to the front of thought, must certainly be attempted, and this ideal of human unity is likely to figure largely among the determining forces of the future; for the intellectual and material circumstances of the age have prepared and almost impose it, especially the scientific discoveries which have made our earth so small that its vastest kingdoms seem now no more than the provinces of a single country.

But this very commodity of the material circumstances may bring about the failure of the

ideal; for when material circumstances favour a great change, but the heart and mind of the race are not really ready—especially the heart—failure may be predicted, unless indeed men are wise in time and accept the inner change along with the external readjustment. But at present the human intellect has been so much mechanised by physical science that it is likely to attempt the revolution it is beginning to envisage principally or solely through mechanical means, through social and political adjustments. Now it is not by social and political devices, or at any rate not by these chiefly or only, that the unity of the human race can be enduringly or fruitfully accomplished.

It must be remembered that a greater social or political unity is not necessarily a boon in itself; it is only worth pursuing in so far as it provides a means and a framework for a better, richer, more happy and puissant individual and collective life. But hitherto the experience of mankind has not favoured the view that huge aggregations of mankind closely united and strictly organised are favourable to a rich and puissant human life. It would seem rather that collective life is more at ease with itself, more genial, varied, fruitful when it can concentrate itself in small spaces and simpler organisms.

If we consider the past of humanity so far as it is known to us, we find that the interesting periods of human life, the scenes in which it has been most richly lived and has left behind it the most precious fruits, were precisely those ages and

countries in which humanity was able to organise itself in little independent centres acting intimately upon each other but not fused into a single unity. Modern Europe owes two thirds of its civilisation to three such supreme moments of human history, the religious life of the congeries of tribes which called itself Israel and, subsequently, of the little nation of the Jews, the many-sided life of the small Greek city states, the similar, though more restricted, artistic and intellectual life of mediaeval Italy. Nor was any age in Asia so rich in energy, so well worth living in, so productive of the best and most enduring fruits as that heroic period of India when she was divided into small kingdoms, many of them no larger than a modern district, Her most wonderful activities, her most vigorous and enduring work, that which, if we had to make a choice, we should keep at the sacrifice of all else, belonged to that period; the second best came afterwards in larger, but still comparatively small, nations and kingdoms like those of the Pallavas, Pandyas, Cholas and Cheras. In comparison she received little from the greater empires that rose and fell within her borders, the Moghul, the Gupta or the Maurya,—little indeed except political and administrative organisation and a certain amount of lasting work not always of the best quality.

Nevertheless, in this regime of the small city state or of regional cultures, there was always a defect which compelled a tendency towards large organisations. The defect was a characteristic of

impermanence, often of disorder, especially of defencelessness against the onslaught of larger organisations, even of an insufficient capacity for wide-spread material well-being. Therefore this earlier form of collective life tended to disappear and give place to the organisation of nations, kingdoms and empires.

And here we notice first, that it is the groupments of smaller nations which have had the richest life and not the huge states and colossal empires. Collective life diffusing itself in too vast spaces seems to lose intensity and productiveness. Europe has lived in England, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, the small states of Germany—all her later civilisation and progress evolved itself there, not in the huge mass of the Holy Roman or the Russian Empire. We see the same truth again when we compare the intense life and activity of Europe in its many nations acting richly upon each other with the great masses of Asia, her long periods of immobility in which great wars and revolutions seem to be small, temporary and usually unproductive episodes, her centuries of reverie, her tendency towards an increasing isolation and a final stagnancy.

Secondly, we note that in this organisation of nations and kingdoms those which have had the most vigorous life have gained it by a sort of artificial concentration of the vitality into some head, centre or capital, London, Paris, Rome. By this device Nature, while acquiring the benefits of

a larger organisation and more perfect unity, preserves to some extent that equally precious power of fruitful concentration in a small space and into a closely packed activity which she had possessed in her more primitive system of the city state or petty kingdom. But this advantage was purchased by the condemnation of the rest of the organisation, the district, the provincial town, the village to a dull petty and somnolent life in strange contrast with the vital intensity of the *urbs* or metropolis.

The Roman Empire is the historic example of an organisation of unity which transcended the limits of the nation, and its advantages and disadvantages are there perfectly typified. The advantages are admirable organisation, peace, widespread security, order and material well-being; the disadvantage is that the individual, the city, the region sacrifice their independent life and become mechanical parts of a machine; life loses its colour, richness, variety, freedom and victorious impulse towards production. The organisation is great and admirable, but the individual dwindles and is over-powered and overshadowed; and eventually by the smallness and feebleness of the individual the huge organism inevitably and slowly loses even its great conservative vitality and dies of an increasing stagnation. Even while outwardly whole and untouched, the structure has become rotten and begins to crack and dissolve at the first shock from outside. Such organisations — such periods are immensely useful for conservation,

even as the Roman Empire served to consolidate the gains of the rich centuries that preceded it. But they arrest life and growth.

We see, then, what would be likely to happen if there were a social, administrative and political unification of mankind, such as some have begun to dream of now-a-days. A tremendous organisation would be needed under which both individual and regional life would be crushed, dwarfed, deprived of their necessary freedom like a plant without rain and wind and sunlight, and this would mean for humanity, after perhaps one first outburst of satisfied and joyous activity, a long period of mere conservation, progressive stagnancy and eventual decay.

Yet the unity of mankind is evidently a part of Nature's eventual scheme and must come about. Only it must be under other conditions and with safeguards which will keep the race intact in the roots of its vitality.

CHAPTER II

The whole process of Nature depends on a balancing and a constant tendency to harmony between two poles of life, the individual whom the whole or aggregate nourishes and the aggregate which the individual helps to constitute. Human life forms no exception to the rule. Therefore the perfection of human life must involve in itself the unaccomplished harmony between these two poles of our existence, the individual and the social aggregate. The perfect society will be that which most entirely favours the perfection of the individual; the perfection of the individual will be incomplete if it does not help towards the perfect state of the social aggregate to which he belongs and eventually to that of the largest possible human aggregate, the whole of a united humanity.

For the gradual process of Nature introduces a complication which prevents the individual from standing in a pure and direct relation to the totality of mankind. Between himself and it there erect themselves partly as aids, partly as barriers to the final unity, the lesser aggregates which it has been necessary to form in the progressive stages of human culture. For the obstacles of space, the difficulties of organisation and the limitations of the human heart and brain have necessitated the formation first of small, then of larger and yet larger aggregates so that he may be gradually trained by a progressive approach to

universality. The family, the commune, the clan, or tribe, the class, the city state or congeries of tribes, the nation, the empire are so many stages in this progress and constant enlargement. If the smaller aggregates were destroyed as soon as the larger are successfully formed, this graduation would result in no complexity; but Nature does not follow this course. She seldom destroys entirely the types she has once made or only destroys that for which there is no longer any utility; the rest she keeps in order to serve her need or her passion for variety, richness, multiformity and only effaces the dividing lines or modifies the characteristics and relations sufficiently to allow of the larger unity she is creating. Therefore at every step humanity is confronted with various problems which arise not only from the difficulty of accord between the individual and the aggregate but between the smaller integralities and that which now ensphères them all.

History has preserved for us scattered instances of this travail, instances of failure and success which are full of instruction. We see the struggle towards the aggregation of tribes among the Semitic nations, Jew and Arab, surmounted in the one after a scission into two kingdoms which remained a permanent source of weakness to the Jewish nation, overcome only temporarily in the other by the sudden unifying force of Islam. We see the failure of clan life to combine into an organised national existence in the Celtic races, a failure entire in Ireland and Scotland and only

surmounted through the crushing out of clan life by a foreign rule and culture, overcome only at the last moment in Wales. We see the failure of the city states and small regional peoples to fuse themselves in the history of Greece, the signal success of a similar struggle of Nature in the development of Roman Italy. The whole past of India for the last two thousand years and more has been the attempt, unavailing in spite of many approximations to success, to overcome the centrifugal tendency of an extraordinary number and variety of disparate elements, the family, the commune, the clan, the caste, the small regional state or people, the large linguistic unit, the religious community, the nation within the nation. We may perhaps say that here Nature tried an experiment of unparalleled complexity and potential richness accumulating all possible difficulties in order to arrive at the most opulent result. But in the end the problem proved insoluble or, at least, was not solved and Nature had to resort to her usual *deus ex machina* denouement, the instrumentality of a foreign rule.

But even when the nation is sufficiently organised,—the largest unity yet successfully developed by Nature,—entire unity is not always achieved. If no other elements of discord remain, yet the conflict of classes is always possible. And the phenomenon leads us to another rule of this gradual development of Nature in human life which we shall find of very considerable importance when we come to the question of a realisable human

unity. The perfection of the individual in a perfected society or eventually in a perfected humanity—understanding perfection always in a relative and progressive sense—is the inevitable aim of Nature. But the progress of all the individuals in a society does not proceed *pari passu*, with an equal and equable march. Some advance, others remain stationary—absolutely or relatively,—others fall back. Consequently the emergence of a dominant class is inevitable within the aggregate itself, just as between the aggregates the emergence of dominant nations is inevitable. That class will predominate which develops most perfectly the type Nature needs at the time for her progress or, it may be for her retrogression. If she demands power and strength of character, a dominant aristocracy emerges; if knowledge and science, a dominant literary or savant class; if practical ability, ingenuity, economy and efficient organisation, a dominant bourgeoisie or Vaishya class, usually with the lawyer at the head; if diffusion of general well-being and organisation of toil, then even the domination of an artisan class is not impossible.

But this phenomenon, whether of dominant classes or dominant nations, can never be more than a temporary necessity; for the final aim of Nature in human life cannot be the exploitation of the many by the few or even of the few by the many, can never be the perfection of some at the cost of the submergence and subjection of the bulk of humanity; these can only be transient devices.

Therefore we see that such dominations bear always in them the seed of their own destruction. They must pass either by the ejection or destruction of the exploiting element or else by a fusion and equalisation. We see in Europe and America that the dominant Brahmin and the dominant Kshatriya have been either abolished or are on the point of subsidence into equality with the general mass. Two rigidly separate classes alone remain, the dominant propertied class and the labourer, and all the most significant movements of the day have for their purpose the abolition of this last superiority. In this persistent tendency, Europe has obeyed one great law of Nature's progressive march, her trend towards a final equality. Absolute equality, indeed, may not be possible, as indeed absolute uniformity is both impossible and utterly undesirable; but a fundamental equality which will render the play of difference inoffensive, is essential to any true perfectibility of the human race.

Therefore, the perfect counsel for a dominant minority is always to recognise in good time the right hour for its abdication and for the imparting of its ideals, qualities, culture, experience to the rest of the aggregate or to as much of it as is prepared for that progress. Where this is done, the social aggregate advances normally and without disruption or serious wound or malady; otherwise a disordered progress is imposed upon it, for Nature will not suffer human egoism to baffle for ever her fixed intention and necessity. Where the dominant classes successfully avoid her demand

upon them, the worst of destinies is likely to overtake the social aggregate,—as in India where the final refusal of the Brahmin and Kshatriya class to call up the bulk of the nation so far as possible to their level, their fixing of an unbridgeable gulf of superiority between themselves and the rest of society, has been a main cause of eventual decline and degeneracy. For where her aims are frustrated, Nature inevitably withdraws her force from the offending unit till she has brought in and used other and external means to reduce the obstacle to a nullity.

But even if the unity within is made as perfect as social, administrative and cultural machinery can make it, the question of the individual still remains. For these social units or aggregates are not like the human body in which the component cells are capable of no separate life apart from the aggregate. The human individual tends to exist in himself and to exceed the limits of the family, the clan, the class, the nation; and, even, that self-sufficiency on one side, that universality on the other are the essential elements of his perfection. Therefore, just as the systems of social aggregation which depend on the domination of a class or classes over others, must change or dissolve, so the social aggregates which stand in the way of this perfection of the individual and seek to coerce him within their limited mould and into the rigidity of a narrow culture or petty class or national interest, must find their term and their day of change or destruction under the irresistible impulsion of progressing Nature.

CHAPTER III

It is a constant method of Nature, when she has two elements of a harmony to reconcile, to proceed at first by a constant balancing in which she sometimes seems to lean entirely on one side, sometimes entirely to the other, at others to correct both excesses by a more or less successful, temporary adjustment and moderating compromise. The two elements appear then as opponents necessary to each other who therefore labour to arrive at some conclusion of their strife, but each having its egoism and that innate tendency of all things which drives them not only towards self-preservation but towards self-assertion in proportion to their available force, they seek each to arrive at a conclusion in which itself shall have the maximum part, dominate utterly if possible or even swallow up entirely the egoism of the other in its own egoism. Thus the progress towards harmony accomplishes itself by a strife of forces and seems often to be no effort towards concord or mutual adjustment at all, but rather towards a mutual devouring. In effect, the swallowing up, not of one by the other, but of each by the other, so that both shall live entirely in the other and as the other, is our highest ideal of oneness. It is the last ideal of love at which strife tries to arrive ignorantly; for by strife one can only arrive at an adjustment of the two opposite demands, not at a stable harmony, a compromise

between two conflicting egoisms and not the fusing of them into each other. Still, strife does lead to an increasing, mutual comprehension which eventually makes the attempt at real oneness possible.

In the relations between the individual and the group, this constant tendency of Nature represents itself as the strife between the two equally deep-rooted human tendencies of individualism and collectivism, the engrossing authority, perfection and development of the State, the distinctive freedom, perfection and development of the man. The State idea, the small or the vast living machine, and the human idea, the more and more distinct and luminous Person, the increasing God, stand in perpetual opposition. The size of the State makes no difference to the essence of the struggle, need make none to its characteristic circumstances. It was the family, the tribe or the city, the *polis*; it became the clan, the caste and the class, the *kula*, the *gens*. It is now the nation. To-morrow or the day after it may be all mankind, but even then the question will remain poised between man and humanity, between the self-liberting Person and the engrossing collectivity.

If we consult only the available facts of history and sociology, we must suppose that our race began with the all engrossing group to which the individual was entirely subservient and that increasing individuality is a circumstance of human growth, of increasing Mind. Originally, we may suppose, man being gregarious, association being

his first necessity for survival and survival being the first necessity of all-being, the individual could be nothing but an instrument for the strength and safety of the group, and if we add to strength and safety growth, efficiency, self-assertion as well as self-preservation, this is still the dominant idea of all collectivism. This is the necessity born of circumstance and environment. Looking more into fundamental things we perceive that in Matter uniformity is the sign of the group, free variation and individual development progresses with the growth of Life and Mind. If then we suppose man to be an evolution of mental being in Matter and out of Matter, we must assume that he begins with uniformity and subservience of the individual and proceeds towards variety and freedom of the individual. The necessity of circumstance and environment and the inevitable law of his fundamental principles of being would then point to the same conclusion, the same process of his historical and prehistoric evolution.

But there is also the ancient tradition of humanity, which it is never safe to ignore or treat as a mere fiction, that the social state was preceded by another, free and unsocial. According to modern scientific ideas, if such a state ever existed, and that is far from certain, it must have been not merely unsocial but anti-social; it must have been the condition of man as an isolated animal, living as the beast of prey, before he became in the process of his development an animal of the pack.

But the tradition is rather that of a golden age in which he was freely social without society, not bound by laws and institutions but living by natural instinct or free knowledge, holding the right law of his living in himself and not needing either to prey on his fellow or to be restrained by the iron yoke of the collectivity. We may say, if we will, that here poetic or idealistic imagination played upon a deep-seated race-memory and that early man read his growing ideal of a free, unorganised happy association into his race-memory of an unorganised anti-social existence. But it is also possible that our progress has not been a development in a straight line, but in cycles, and that in those cycles there have been periods of at least partial realisation in which men did become able to live according to the high dream of philosophical Anarchism, associated by the inner law of love and light and right being, right thinking, right action and not coerced to unity by kings and parliaments, laws and policings and punishments with all that tyrant unease, petty or great oppression and repression and ugly train of selfishnesses and corruptions which attend the forced government of man by man. It is even possible that our original state was that of an instinctive animal spontaniety of free and fluid association and that our final ideal state is that of an enlightened intuitive spontaniety of free and fluid association, the conversion of the animal state into that of the gods. Our progress may be perhaps a devious round leading from the easy and spontaneous uniformity and

harmony which reflects Nature to the self-possessed unity which reflects the Divine.

However that may be, history and sociology tell us only—outside the attempts of religious or other idealism to arrive either at a free solitude or a free association—of man as an individual in the more or less organised group And in the group there are always two types, one which asserts the State idea entirely at the expense of the individual, —ancient Sparta, modern Germany, another which asserts the supremacy of the State but seek at the same time to give as much freedom, power and dignity as possible to the individuals who constitute it,—ancient Athens, modern France And to these we may add a third type in which the State abdicates as much as possible to the individual, boldly asserts that it exists for his growth and to assure his freedom, dignity, successful manhood, experiments with a courageous faith whether after all it is not the utmost possible liberty, dignity and manhood of the individual which will best assure the well-being, strength and expansion of the State. Of this type England has been until recently the great examplar,—England rendered free, prosperous, energetic, invincible by nothing else but the strength of this idea within her, blest by the Gods with unexampled expansion, empire and good fortune because she has not feared at any time to obey this great tendency and take the risks of this great endeavour and even often to employ it beyond the limits of her own insular egoism. Unfortunately, that egoism, the defects of the race

and the exaggerated assertion of a limited idea which is the mark of our human ignorance have prevented her from giving it the noblest and richest possible expression or to realise by it other results which the more strictly organised States have attained or are attaining. And in consequence we find the collective or State idea breaking down the old English tradition and it is possible that before long the great experiment will have come to an end in a lamentable admission of failure by the adoption of that Germanic "discipline" and "efficient" organisation, towards which all civilised humanity seems now to be tending. One may well ask oneself whether it was really necessary, whether, by a more courageous faith, enlightened by a more flexible and vigilant intelligence, all the desirable results might not have been attained in a new and freer method that would yet keep intact the *Dharma* of the race.

We must, again, note one other fact in connection with the claim of the State to suppress the individual in its own interest, that it is quite immaterial to the principle what form the State may assume. The tyranny of the absolute king over all or the tyranny of the majority over the individual—which really converts itself by the paradox of human nature into a hypnotised oppression and repression of the majority by itself,—are equally forms of the same tendency. Each, when it declares itself to be the State with its absolute "*L'Etat, c'est moi*", is speaking a profound truth even while it bases that truth upon a falsehood.

The truth is that each really is the self-expression of the State in its characteristic attempt to subordinate to itself the free will, the free action, the power, dignity and self-assertion of the individuals constituting it. The falsehood lies in the underlying idea that the State is something greater than the individuals constituting it and can with impunity to itself and to the hope of humanity arrogate this oppressive supremacy.

In modern times the State idea has after a long interval reasserted itself and is dominating the thought and action of the world. It supports itself on two motives, one appealing to the external interest of the race, the other to its highest moral tendencies. It demands that the individual egoism shall immolate itself to a collective interest that man shall live not for himself but for the group, the community. It asserts that the hope of the good and progress of humanity lies in the efficiency and organisation of the State; in the ordering by it of all the economic and vital arrangements of the individual and the group, of the "mobilisation," to use a specious expression the war has set in vogue, of the intellect, capacity, thought, emotion, life of the individual, of all that he is and has, by the State in the interest of all. Pushed to its ultimate conclusion, this means the socialistic ideal in full force and towards that conclusion humanity seems to be heading with a remarkable rapidity. The State idea is rushing towards possession with a great motor force and is prepared to crush under its wheels everything that conflicts with its force or

asserts the right of other human tendencies. And yet the two ideas on which it bases itself are full of that fatal mixture of truth and falsehood which pursues all our human claims and assertions. It is necessary to apply to them the solvent of a searching and unbiassed thought which refuses to be cheated by words, if we are not to describe helplessly another circle of illusion before we return to the deep and complex truth of Nature which should rather be our light and guide.

CHAPTER IV

What, after all, is this State idea, this idea of the organised community to which the individual has to be immolated? Theoretically it is the subordination of the individual to the good of all that is demanded; practically it is his subordination to a collective egoism, political, military, economic, which seeks to satisfy certain collective aims and ambitions shaped and imposed on the great mass of the individuals by a smaller or larger number of ruling persons who are supposed in same way to represent the community. It is immaterial whether these belong to a governing class or emerge as in modern States from the mass partly by force of character, but much more by force of circumstances; nor does it make an essential difference that their aims and ideals are imposed more by the hypnotism of verbal persuasion than by overt and actual force. In either case there is no guarantee that this ruling class or ruling body represents the best mind of the nation or its noblest aims or its highest instincts.

Nothing of the kind can be asserted of the modern politician in any part of the world: he does not represent the soul of a people or its aspirations: what he does usually represent is all the average pettiness, selfishness, egoism, self-deception that is about him and these he represents well enough as well as a great deal of mental incompetence

and moral conventionality, timidity and pretence Great issues often come to him for decision but he does not deal with them greatly; high words and noble ideas are on his lips, but they become rapidly the clap-trap of a party. The disease and falsehood of modern political life is patent in every country of the world and only the hypnotised acquiescence even of the intellectual classes in the great organised sham, the acquiescence that men yield to everything that is habitual and makes the present atmosphere of their lives, cloaks and prolongs the malady. Yet it is by such minds that the good of all has to be decided, to such hands that it has to be entrusted, to such an agency calling itself the State that the individual is being more and more called upon to give up the government of his activities. As a matter of fact, it is by no means the good of all that is thus secured, but a great deal of organised blundering and evil with a certain amount of good which makes for real progress, because Nature moves forward always in the midst of all stumblings and secures her aims in the end as often in spite of as by means of man's imperfect mentality.

But even if the governing instrument were better constituted and of a higher mental and moral character, even if some way could be found to do what the ancient civilisations by their enforcement of certain high ideals and disciplines tried to do with their ruling classes, still the state would not be what the State idea pretends that it is. Theoretically, it is the collective wisdom and

force of the community made available and organised for the general good; practically, it is so much of the intellect and power available in the community as the particular machinery of State, organisation will allow to come to the surface which uses that machinery but is also caught in it and hampered by it and hampered as well by the large amount of folly and selfish weakness that comes up in the same wave. Doubtless, this is the best that can be under the circumstances, and Nature, as always, utilises it for the best; but things would be much worse if there were not a field left for a less trammelled individual effort doing what the State cannot do, deploying and using the sincerity, energy, idealism of the best individuals to attempt that which the State has not the wisdom or courage to attempt, getting that done which a collective conservatism and imbecility would either leave undone or actively suppress and oppose. It is this which is the really effective agent of collective progress. The State sometimes comes in to aid it and then, if its aid does not mean undue control, it serves a positively useful end; as often it stands in the way and then serves either as a brake upon progress or supplies the necessary amount of organised opposition and friction always needed to give greater energy and a more complete shape to the new thing which is in process of formation. But what we are now tending towards is such an increase of organised State-power and such a huge irresistible and complex State activity as will either

eliminate free individual effort altogether or leave it dwarfed and cowed into helplessness. The necessary corrective to the defects, limitations and inefficiency of the State machine will disappear.

The organisd State is neither the best mind of the nation nor it is even the sum of the communal energies. It leaves out of its organised action, suppresses or unduly depresses the working force and thinking mind of important minorities, often of those which represent that which is best in the present and that which is developing for the future. It is a collective egoism much inferior to the best of which the community is capable. What that egoism is in its relation to other collective egoisms, we know and its ugliness is now being forced upon the vision and the conscience of mankind. The individual has usually something at least of a soul and the deficiencies of the soul he makes up for by a system of morality and an ethical sense, and the deficiences of these again by the fear of social opinion or, failing that, a fear of the communal law which he has ordinarily either to obey or at least to circumvent; and even the difficulty of circumventing is a check on all except the most violent or the most skilful. But the State is an entity which, with the greatest amount of power, is the least hampered by internal scruples or external checks. It has no soul or only a rudimentary one. It is a military, political and economic being, but only in a slight and undeveloped degree an intellectual and ethical; and unfortunately the chief use it makes of its undeveloped

intellect is to blunt by fictions, catchwords and recently by State philosophies, its ill-developed ethical conscience. Man within the community is now at least a half-civilised being; but his international existence is still primitive. Until recently the organised nation in its relations with other nations was only a huge beast of prey with appetites which sometimes slept when gorged or discouraged by events, but were always its chief reason for existence. Self-protection and self-expansion by the devouring of others were its *Dharma*. At the present day there is no essential improvement; there is only a greater difficulty in devouring. A "sacred egoism" is still the ideal of nations, and therefore there is neither any true and enlightened consciousness of human opinion to restrain the predatory State nor any effective international law. There is only the fear of defeat and the fear, recently, of a disastrous economical disorganisation; but experience after experience has shown that these checks are really ineffective.

In its inner life this huge State egoism was once little better than in its outer relations.* Brutal, rapacious, cunning, oppressive, intolerant of free action, free speech and opinion, even of freedom of conscience in religion, it preyed upon individuals

* I am speaking of the intermediate age between ancient times and modern. In ancient times the State had in some countries at least ideals and a conscience with regard to the community, though very little in its dealings with other States.

and classes within as upon weaker nations outside. Only the necessity of keeping alive and rich and strong in a rough sort of way the community on which it lived, made its action partially and crudely beneficent. In modern times, there has been much improvement in spite of deterioration in certain directions. The State now feels necessity of justifying its existence by organising the general economic and animal well-being of the community and even of all individuals. It is beginning to see the necessity also of assuring the intellectual and, indirectly, the moral devolopment of the whole community. This attempt of the State to grow into an intellectual and moral being is one of the most interesting phenomena of modern civilisation; even the necessity of intellectualising and moralising it in its external relations is being enforced upon the conscience of mankind by the present European catastrophe. But the claim of the State to absorb all free individual activities, a claim which it increasingly makes as it grows more clearly conscious of its new ideals and its possiblities, is, to say the least of it, premature and, if satisfied, will surely end in a check to human progress, a comfortably organised stagnancy such as overtook the Graeco-Roman world after the establishment of the Roman Empire.

The call of the State to the individual to immolate himself on its altar, to give up his free activities into an organised collective activity is therefore something quite different from the demand of our highest ideals. It amounts to the

giving up of the present form of individual egoism into another, a collective form of itself, larger, but not superior, rather in many ways inferior to the best individual egoism. The altruistic ideal, the discipline of self-sacrifice, the need of a growing solidarity with our fellows, of a growing collective soul in humanity remain; but the loss of self in the Sate is not the thing that these high ideals mean, nor is it by any means the way to their fulfilment. Man must learn not to suppress and mutilate, but to fulfil himself in the fulfilment of mankind even as he must learn not to mutilate or destroy, but to complete his ego by expanding it out of its limitations and losing it in something greater which it now tries to represent. But the deglutition of the free individual by a huge State machine is quite another consummation. The State is a convenience, and a rather clumsy convenience, for our common development; it ought never to be made an end in itself.

The second claim of the State idea that this supremacy and universal activity of the organised State machine is the best means of human progress, is also an exaggeration and a fiction. Man lives by the community, he needs it to develop himself individually as well as collectively. But is it true that a state-governed action is the most capable of developing the individual perfectly as well as of serving the common ends of the community? It is not true. What is true is that it is capable of providing the co-operative action of the individuals in the community with necessary conveniences, of removing

from its disabilities and obstacles which would otherwise interfere with its working. Here the real utility of the State ceases. The non-recognition of the possibilities of human co-operation was the weakness of English individualism; the turning of an utility for co-operative action into an excuse for rigid control by the State is the weakness of the Teutonic idea of collectivism. When the State attempts to take up the control of the co-operative action of the community, it condemns itself to create a monstrous machinery which will end by crushing out the freedom, initiative and serious growth of the human being.

The State is bound to act crudely and in the mass; it is incapable of that free, harmonious and intelligently or instinctively varied action which is proper to organic growth. For the State is not an organism; it is a machinery, and it works like a machine, without tact, taste, delicacy, intuition. It tries to manufacture, where what humanity is here to do is to create. We see this in State-governed education. It is right and necessary that education should be provided for all and in providing for it the State is eminently useful; but when it controls the education, it turns it into a routine, a mechanical system in which individual initiative, individual growth, true development as opposed to a routine instruction become impossible. The State tends always to uniformity, because uniformity is easy to it, natural variation impossible to its essentially mechanical nature; but uniformity is death, not life. A national culture,

a national religion, a national education may still be useful things provided they do not interfere with the growth of human solidarity on the one side and individual freedom of thought and conscience and development on the other; they give form to the communal soul and help it to add its quota to the sum of human advancement; but a State education, a State religion, a State culture are unnatural violences. And the same rule holds good in different ways and to a different extent in other directions of our communal activity.

The business of the State, so long as it continues to be a necessary element in human life and growth, is to provide all possible facilities for co-operative action, to remove obstacles, to prevent all really harmful waste and friction,—a certain amount of waste and fricition is necessary and useful to all natural action,—and, removing avoidable injustice, to secure for every individual a just and equal chance of self-development and satisfaction to the extent of his powers and in the line of his nature. To this extent the aim in modern socialism is right and good. But all unnecessary interference with the freedom of man's growth is to that extent harmful. Even co-operative action is injurious if, instead of seeking the good of all compatibly with the necessities of individual growth—and without individual growth there can be no real and permanent good of all,—it immolates the individual to a communal egoism and prevents so much free room and initiative as is necessary for the flowering of a more perfectly

developed humanity. So long as humanity is not full-grown, so long as it needs to grow and is capable of a greater perfectibility, there can be no static good of all independent of the growth of the individuals composing the all. All collectivist ideals which seek unduly to subordinate the individual, really envisage a static condition whether it be a present status or one it soon hopes to establish, after which all attempt at serious change would be regarded as an offence of impatient individualism against the peace, just routine and security of the happily established communal order. Always it is the individual who progresses and compels the rest to progress; the instinct of the collectivity is to stand still in its established order. Progress, growth, realisation of wider being, gives his greatest sense of happiness to the individual; status, secure ease to the collectivity. And so it must be so long as the latter is more a physical and economic entity than a self-conscious collective soul.

It is therefore quite improbable that in the present conditions of the race a healthy unity of mankind can be brought about by State machinery, whether it be by a grouping of powerful and organised States enjoining carefully regulated and legalised relations with each other or by the substitution of a single world-State for the present half-chaotic, half-ordered comity of nations,—be the form of that world-State a single Empire like the Roman or a federated unity. Such an external or administrative unity may be intended in the

near future of mankind in order to accustom the race to the idea of a common life, to its habit, to its possibility, but it cannot be really healthy, durable or beneficial over all the true line of human destiny unless something be developed, more profound, internal and real. Otherwise the experience of the ancient world will be repeated on a larger scale and in other circumstances, the new experiment will break down and give place to a new reconstructive age of confusion and anarchy. Perhaps this experience also is necessary for mankind ; yet it ought to be possible for us now to avoid it by subordinating mechanical means to our true development through a moralised and even a spiritualised humanity.

CHAPTER V

The problem of the unification of mankind resolves itself into two distinct difficulties; first whether the collective egoisms already created in the natural evolution of humanity can at this time be so modified or abolished that even an external unity in some effective form can now in the present stage of our moral and social progress be securely established; secondly, whether, even if any such external unity can be established, it will not be at the price of crushing both the free life of the individual and the free play of the various collective units already created in which there is a real and active life and substituting a State organisation which will mechanise human existence. And, apart from these two uncertainties, there is a third question whether a really living unity can be achieved by the mere economical, political, administrative unification, whether it ought not to be preceded by at least the strong beginnings of a moral and spiritual oneness. It is the first question that we shall now consider.

At the present stage of human progress the nation is the really living collective unit of humanity. Empires exist, but they are as yet only political and not real units; they have no life from within and owe their continuance to a force imposed on their constituent elements or else

to a political convenience felt or acquiesced in by the constituents and favoured by the world outside. Austria is the standing example of such an empire; it was, and to some extent still is, a political convenienee favoured by the world outside, acquiesced in until recently by its constituent elements and maintained by the force of the central Germanic element incarnated in the Hapsburg dynasty with the active aid of its Magyar partner. If the political convenience ceases, if the constituent elements cease to acquiesce and are drawn more powerfully by a centrifugal force, as is now actually the case, if at the same time the world outside ceases to favour the combination, then force alone remains as the one agent of an artificial unity. There is indeed a new politial convenience which the existence of Austria serves, but that is the convenience of the Germanic idea which makes it an inconvenience to the rest of Europe and deprives it of the acquiescence of important constituent elements which are drawn towards other combinations outside the Austrian formula. From that moment the existence of the Austrian empire is in jeopardy and depends, not on any inner necessity, but first on the power of the Austro-Magyar partnership to crush down the Slav nations within it and, secondly, on the continued power and dominance of Germany and the Germanic idea in Europe,—that is to say, on force alone. And although in Austria the weakness of the imperial form of unity is singularly conspicuous and its conditions, as it

were, exaggerated, still those conditions are the same for all Empire which are not at the same time national units. It was not so long ago that most political thinkers perceived at least the strong possibility of an automatic dissolution of the British Empire by the self-detachment of the colonies, in spite of the close links of race, language and origin that should have bound them to the mother country. This was because the political convenience of imperial unity, though enjoyed by the colonies, was not sufficiently appreciated by them and, on the other hand, there was no living principle of national unity, the Australian and Canadian regarding themselves as belonging to new separate nations rather than as limbs of an extended British nationality. Things are now changed in both respects and the British Empire is proportionately stronger.

Nevertheless, why should this distinction be made of the political and the real unit? It must be made because it is of the greatest utility to a true and profound political science and involves the most important consequences. Supposing an empire like Austria, a non-national empire, to be broken up as it threatens to break, it will perish for good; there will be no innate tendency to recover the outward unity, because there is no real unity, only a politically manufactured aggregation. On the other hand, a real national unity broken up by circumstances will always preserve a tendency to recover and reassert its oneness. The Greek Empire has gone the way of all

empires, but the Greek nation, after many centuries of political non-existence, again possesses its separate body, because it has preserved its separate ego and therefore really existed under the covering rule of the Turk. So has it been with all the races under the Turkish yoke, because that powerful suzerainty, stern as it was in many respects, never attempted to obliterate their national characteristics or substitute an Ottoman nationality. And these nations have revived and are naturally attempting to reconstitute themselves in the measure in which they have preserved their real national sense; the Serbian national idea attempts to recover all territory in which the Serb exists or predominates; Greece attempts to reconstitute herself in her mainland, islands and Asiatic colonies, but cannot now reconstitute the old Greece since even Thrace is rather Bulgar than Hellenic. So also we see Italy rebecome an external unity after so many centuries because, though no longer a State, she never ceased to be a nation.

So strong is this truth of a real unity, that even nations which have never realised an outward unification, to which Fate and circumstance and their own selves have been adverse, which have been full of centrifugal forces and easily overpowered by foreign intrusions, have yet always developed centripetal force as well and arrive inevitably at organised oneness. Ancient Greece clung to her separatist tendencies, her self-sufficient city or regional states, her little mutually repellent

autonomies, but the centripetal force was always there manifested in leagues, association of States, suzerainties like the Spartan and Athenian, and finally realised itself, first, imperfectly and temporarily by the Macedonian overrule,then by a strange enough development, through the evolution of the Eastern Roman world into a Greek and Byzantine Empire. So also we have seen in our own day Germany, constantly disunited since ancient times, develop at last to portentous issues its innate sense of oneness formidably embodied in the Empire of the Hohenzollerns. Nor would it at all be surprising to those who study the working of forces and not merely the trend of outward circumstances, if one result of the present war, near or more remote, were to be the fusion of the one Germanic element still left outside, the Austro-German, into the Germanic whole,—although possibly in some other embodiment than a Hohenzollern empire or a Prussian hegemony. In both these historic instances, as in so many others, the unification of Saxon England, mediaeval France, the formation of the United States of America, it was a real unity, a psychologically distinct unit which, first, tended ignorantly by the sub-conscious necessity of its being and afterwards with a sudden or gradual awakening to the sense of political oneness, towards an inevitable external unification. It is a distinct group-soul which is driven by onward necessity and uses outward circumstances to constitute for itself an organised body.

But the most striking example in history is the evolution of India. Nowhere else have the centrifugal forces been so strong, numerous, complex, obstinate; the mere time taken by the evolution has been prodigious; the disastrous vicissitudes through which it has had to work itself out have been appalling; and yet through all the inevitable tendency has worked constantly, pertinaciously, with the dull, obscure, indomitable, relentless obstinacy of Nature when she is opposed in her instinctive purposes by man, and finally, after a struggle enduring through millenniums, has riumphed. And, as usually happens when she ist thus opposed by her own mental and human material, it is the most adverse circumstances which the sub-conscious worker has turned into her most successful instruments. The beginnings of the centripetal tendency in India go back to the earliest times of which we have record and are typified in the ideal of the Samrat or Chakravarti Raja and the military and political use of the Aswamedha sacrifice. The two great national epics might almost have been written to illustrate it, for the one recounts the establishment of the unifying *dharmarajya* or imperial reign of justice, the other starts with an idealised description of such a rule pictured as existing in the ancient and sacred past of the country. And the political history of India is that of a succession of empires indigenous and foreign, each of them destroyed by centrifugal forces but each of them bringing the centripetal tendency nearer to its triumphant emergence. And it is a significant circumstance

that the more foreign the rule, the greater has been its force for the unification of the subject people. This is always a sure sign that the essential nation-unit is already there and that there is an indissoluble national vitality necessitating the inevitable emergence of the organised nation. In this instance, we see that the conversion of the psychological unity on which nationhood is based into the external organised unity by which it perfectly realises itself, has taken a period of more than two thousand years and is not yet complete, and yet the essentiality of the thing being once there not even the most formidable difficulties and delays, not even the most persistent incapacity for union in the people, not even the most disintegrating shocks from outside have prevailed against the obstinate sub-conscious necessity. And this is only the extreme illustration of a general law.

It will be useful to dwell a little upon this aid lent by foreign rule to the process of nation-making and see how it works. History abounds with illustrations. But in some cases the phenomenon of foreign domination is momentary and imperfect, in others long-enduring and complete, in others often repeated in various forms; in some instances the foreign element is rejected, its use once over, in others it is absorbed, in others accepted with more or less assimilation for a longer or briefer period as a ruling caste. The principle is the same, but worked variously, as always, by Nature according to the needs of the particular case. There is none of the modern nations in

Europe which has not had to pass through a phase more or less prolonged, more or less complete, of foreign domination in order to realise its nationality. In Russia and England, it was the domination of a foreign conquering race which rapidly became a ruling caste and was in the end assimilated and absorbed, in Spain the succession of the Roman, Goth and Moor, in Italy the overlordship of the Austrian, in the Balkans the long suzerainty of the Turk, in Germany the transient yoke of Napoleon. But in all cases, the essential has been a shock or a pressure which would either waken a loose psychological unity to the necessity of organising itself from within or would crush out, dispirit or deprive of power, vitality and reality the more obstinate factors of disunion. In some cases even an entire change of name, culture and civilisation has been necessary, as well as a more or less profound modification of the race. Notably has this been so in the formation of French nationality. The ancient Gallic nation, in spite, of or perhaps because of their Druidic civilisation and early greatness, were more incapable of organising a firm political unity than even the ancient Greeks or the old Indian kingdoms and republics. It needed the Roman rule and Latin culture, the superimposition of a Teutonic ruling caste and finally the shock of the temporary and partial English conquest to found the unequalled unity of modern France. Yet though, name, civilisation and all else seem to have changed, the French nation

of to-day is still and has always remained the old Gallic nation, with its Basque, Gaelic and Armorican elements modified by the Frank and Latin admixture.

Thus the nation is a persistent psychological unit which Nature has been developing throughout the world in the most various forms and educating into physical and political unity. The political unity is not the essential; it may not yet be realised, but the nation persists and moves inevitably towards its realisation; it may be destroyed, but the nation persists and travails and suffers but refuses to be annihilated. In former times the nation was not always a real and vital unit, the tribe, the clan, the commune, the regional people were the living groups. Therefore those unities which in the attempt at national evolution destroyed these living groups without arriving at a vital nationhood, disappeared once the artificial or political unit was broken. But now the nation stands as the one living group unit of humanity into which all others must merge or to which they must become subservient. Even old persistent race unities and cultural unities are powerless against it. The Catalonian in Spain, the Breton and Provencal and Alsatian in France, the Welsh in England may cherish the signs of their separate existence; but the attraction of the greater living unity of the Spanish, the French, the British nation is too powerful to be injured by these ipersistences. For this reason the nation in modern times is practically indestructible, unless it dies from within. Poland, torn asunder

and crushed under the heel of three powerful empires, has ceased to exist; the Polish nation survives. Alsace after forty years of the German yoke remains faithful to her French nationhood in spite of her affinities of race and language with the conqueror. All modern attempts to destroy by force or break up a nation are foolish and futile, because they ignore this law of the natural evolution. Empires are still perishable political units, the nation is immortal; and so it will remain until a greater living unit can be found into which the nation idea can merge itself obeying a superior attraction.

And then the question arises whether the empire is not precisely that destined unit in course of evolution. The mere fact that at present not the empire, but the nation is the vital unity can be no bar to a future reversal of the relations. Obviously, in order that they may be reversed the empire must cease to be a mere political and become rather a psychological entity. But there have been instances in the evolution of the nation in which the political unity preceded and became a basis for the psychological as in the union of Scotch, English and Welsh to form the British nation. There is therefore no insurmountable reason why a similar evolution should not take place and the imperial unity be substituted for the national. Nature has long been in travail of the imperial grouping, long casting about to give it a greater force of permanence, and the emergence of the conscious imperial ideal all over the earth and its

attempts, though still rude, violent and, blundering, to substitute itself for the national, may not irrationally be taken as the precursory sign of one of those rapid leaps and transitions by which she so often accomplishes what she has long been gradually and tentatively preparing. This then is the possibility we have next to consider before we examine the established phenomenon of nationhood in relation to the ideal of human unity. For two different ideals and therefore two different possibilites have been precipitated much nearer to realisation by the present European conflict,—a federation of free European nations, and on the other hand the distribution of the earth into a few great empires or imperial hegemonies. A practical combination of the two ideas is, indeed, the most tangible possibility of the not distant future. We must therefore pause and consider, whether, as one element of this possible combination is already a living unit, so the other also can be converted into a living unit and the combination, if realised, be made the foundation of an enduring new order of things and not merely a transient device without the conditions of a real stability.

CHAPTER VI.

We have to make a clear distinction, to start with, between two political aggregates which go equally in current language by the name of empire, the homogeneous or national and the heterogeneous composite empire. In a sense, all empires are composites, at any rate if we go back to their origins; but in practice there is a difference between the imperial aggregate in which the component elements are not divided from each other by a strong sense of separate existence in the whole and that in which such a psychological basis of separation is still in vigour. Japan before the absorption of Formosa and Corea was so much a national whole that we might well say it was only an empire in the honorific sense of the word; since that absorption it has become a real and a composite empire. Germany again would be a purely national empire if it were not burdened by three minor acquisitions, Alsace, Poland and Schleswig-Holstein which are not united to it by the sense of German nationality but only by military force. Supposing this Teutonic aggregate to lose these three foreign elements and acquire instead the Teutonic provinces of Austria, we should save an example of a homogeneous aggregate which would yet be an empire in the honorific sense of the word; since it would be a composite of homogeneous Teutonic nations or, as

we may conveniently call them sub-nations, which would not naturally harbour any sentiment of separatism, but rather, drawn always to a natural unity, would form easily and inevitably a psychological and not merely a political unit.

But such a form in its purity is now difficult to find. The United States are the example of such an aggregate, although from the accident of their being ruled by a periodically elected President and not a hereditary monarch, we do not associate the type with the idea of an empire at all. Still if the imperial aggregate is to be changed from a political to a psychological unit, it would seem that it must be by reproducing *mutatis mutandis* something of the system of the United States, a system in which each element could preserve its local independence and separate freedom and yet be part of a really inseparable aggregate. And this would be effected most easily where the elements are fairly homogeneous as it would be in a federation of Great Britain and her colonies.

Such a tendency to large homogeneous aggregations has shown itself recently in political thought, as in the dream of Pan-Germanic empire, a great Russian and Pan-Slavic empire or the Pan-Islamic idea of a united Mahomedan world. But such tendencies are usually associated with the control by this homogeneous aggregate of other elements heterogeneous to it under the old principle of military and political compulsion, the retention by Russia of her Mongolian subjects, the

seizure by Germany of wholly or partially non-Germatic countries and provinces, the control by the Caliphate of non-Moslem subjects. Even if such ambitions were absent, the actual arrangement of the world lend itself with difficulty to its remodelling on a racial or cultural basis. Vast aggregates of this kind would find enclaves in their dominion inhabited by elements wholly heterogeneous to them or mixed. Quite apart therefore from the resistance and refusal of kindred nations to renounce their cherished nationality and fuse themselves in combinations of this kind there would be this incompatibility of mixed or heterogeneous factors recalcitrant to the idea and the culture that sought to absorb them. Thus a Pan-Slavonic empire would necessitate the control of the Balkan Peninsula by Russia as the premier Slav State; but such a scheme would have to meet not only the independent Serbian nationality and the imperfect Slavism of the Bulgar but the quite incompatible Roumanian, Greek and Albanian elements. Thus it does not appear that this tendency towards vast homogeneous aggregates, although it has for some time played an important part in the world's history and is not exhausted or finally baffled, is likely to be the eventual solution; for even if it triumphed, it would still have to meet in a greater or less degree the difficulties of the heterogeneous type. The true problem of empire therefore still remains, how to transform the artificial political unity of a heterogeneous empire, heterogeneous in racial

composition, language and culture, into a real and psychological unity.

History gives us only one great and definite example of an attempt to solve this problem on that large scale and and with those antecedent conditions which could at all afford any guidance for the vast heterogenous modern empires, those of Russia, England, France to whom the problem now offers itself. The Chinese empire of the five nations, admirably organised indeed, yet is not a case in point; for all its constituent parts were Mongolian in race and presented no formidable cultural difficulties. But the imperial Roman had to face essentially the same problems as the modern minus one or two very important complications and he solved them, up a to certain point, with a masterly success. His empire endured through many centuries and, though often threatened with disruption, yet by its inner principle of unity, by its overpowering centripetal attraction, triumphed over all disruptive tendencies Its one failure was the bisection into the Eastern and Western Empires which hastened its final ending. Still when that end came it was not by a disruption from within but simply by the decaying of its centre of life, and it was not till then that the pressure of the barbarian world without, to which its ruin is wrongly attributed, could prevail over its magnificient solidarity.

The Roman effected his sway by military conquest and military colonisation; but once that conquest was assured he was not content with

holding it together as an artificial, political unity, nor did he trust solely to that political convenience of a good, efficient and well-organised government, economically and administratively beneficent which made it at first acceptable to the conquered peoples; he had too sure a political instinct to be so easily satisfied. And it is certain that, if he had stopped short there, the empire would have broken up at a much earlier date; for the peoples under his sway would have preserved their sense of separate nationality and once accustomed to Roman efficiency and administrative organisation would inevitably have tended to the separate enjoyment of these advantages as independent organised nations. It was this sense of separate nationality which the Roman rule succeeded in blotting out wherever it established itself and this not by the stupid expedient of a brutal force after the Teutonic fashion, but by a peaceful pressure. Rome first compounded with the one rival culture that was superior in certain respects to her own by accepting it as part of her own cultural existence and even as its most valuable part; she created a Græco-Roman civilisation and leaving the Greek tongue to spread and secure it in the East she introduced it everywhere else by the medium of the Latin language and a Latin education and succeeded in peacefully overcoming the decadent or inchoate cultures of Gaul and her other conquered provinces. Even this, however, might not have been sufficient to abolish all separatist tendency, and therefore she not only

admitted her Latinised subjects to the highest military and civil offices and even to the imperial purple, so that within less than a century after Augustus first an Italian Gaul and then an Iberian Spaniard held the name and power of the Cæsars, but she proceeded rapidly enough to deprive of all vitality and then even nominally to abolish all the grades of civic privilege with which she had started and extended the full Roman citizenship to all her subjects Asiatic, European and African without distinction.

The result was that the whole empire became psychologically and not only politically a single Graeco-Roman unity; not only superior force or the recognition of the Roman peace and good government, but all the desires, associations, pride, cultural affinities of the provinces made them firmly attached to the maintenance of the empire. Therefore every attempt of provincial ruler or military chief to start provincial empires in their own benefit failed because it found no basis, no supporting tendency, no national sentiment and no sense of either material or other advantage to be gained by the change in the population on whom the successful continuity of the attempt had to depend. So far the Roman succeeded; where he failed, it was due to the essential vice of his method. By crushing out, however peacefully, the living cultures or the incipient individuality of the nations he ruled, he deprived the nations themselves of vitality; and therefore, though he removed all positive causes of disruption and secured a passive force of

opposition to all disruptive change, his empire lived only at the centre and when that centre tended to become exhausted, there was no positive and abounding life throughout the body from which it could replenish itself. In the end, Rome could not even depend for a supply of vigorous individuals from the peoples whose life she had pressed out under the weight of a borrowed civilisation; she had to draw on the frontier barbarians. And when she fell to pieces, it was these barbarians and not the old peoples resurgent who became her heirs. For their barbarism was at least a living force and a principle of life, but the Græco-Roman civilisation had become a principle of death; and it had destroyed the living cultures by whose contact it could have modified and renewed its own being. Therefore it had to be destroyed in its from and its principle resown in the field of the vital and vigorous culture of mediaeval Europe. What the Roman had not the wisdom to do by his organised empire,—for even the profoundest and surest political instinct is not wisdom,—had to be done by Nature herself in the loose but living unity of medieval Christendom.

The example of Rome has haunted the political action of Europe ever since; not only has it been behind the Holy Roman empire of Charlemagne and Napoleon's gigantic attempt and the German dream of a world-empire governed by Teutonic efficiency and Teutonic culture, but all the imperial nations, including France and England, have followed to a certain extent in its footsteps.

But, singificantly enough, every attempt at renewing the Roman snccess has failed. The modern nations have not been able to follow Rome completely in the lines she had traced out or following them have clashed against different conditions and either failed or been obliged to call a halt. It is as if Nature had said, "That experiment has been carried once to its logical consequences and once is enough. I have made new conditions; find you new means or at least mend and add to the old where they were deficient or went astray."

The European nations have extended their empires by the old Roman method of military conquest and colonisation, abandoning for the most part the pre-Roman principle of simple overlordship or hegemony which was practised by the Assyrian and Egyptian kings, the Indian States and the Greek cities; yet this principle has also been somtimes used in the shape of the protectorate to prepare the more normal means of occupation. The colonies have not been of the pure Roman, but of a mixed Carthaginian and Roman type, official and military, and enjoying like the Roman colonies superior civic rights to the indigenous population but, at the same time and far more, commercial colonies of exploitation. The nearest to the Roman type has been the English settlement in Ulster, while the German system in Poland has developed under modern conditions the old Roman principle of expropriation. But these are exceptions.

The conquered territory once occupied and secure, the modern nations have found themselves brought up short by a difficulty which they have not been able to surmount as the Romans surmounted it,—the difficulty of uprooting the indigenous culture and with it the indigenous sense of nationality. All these Empires have at first carried with them the idea of imposing their culture along with the flag, first simply as an instinct of the conqueror and as a necessary adjunct to the fact of political domination and a security for its permanence, but latterly with the conscious intention of extending, as it is somewhat pharisaically put, the benefits of civilisation to the "inferior" races. It cannot be said that the attempt has anywhere been very prosperous. It was tried with considerable thoroughness and ruthlessness in Ireland, but although the Irish speech was stamped out except in the wilds of Connaught and all distinctive signs of the old Irish culture disappeared, the outraged nationality simply clung to whatever other means of distinctiveness it could find, however exiguous, its Catholic religion, its Celtic race and nationhood, and even when it became Anglicised, refused to become English. The removal of the pressure has resulted in a violent recoil, an attempt to revive the Gælic speech, to reconstitute the old Celtic spirit and culture. The German has failed to prussianise Poland or even his own kin who speak his own language, the Alsatians; the Finn remains unconquerably Finnish in Russia, the mild

Austrian methods have left the Austrian Pole as 'Polish as his oppressed brother in German Posen. Accordingly we see everywhere except in the dour and unteachable Prussian mind a growing sense of the inutility of the endeavour and the necessity of leaving the soul of the subject nation free, confining the action of the sovereign State to the enforcement of new administrative and economic conditions with as much social change as may be freely accepted or may come about by education and the force of circumstances.

The German, indeed, a new and inexperienced nation, clings to the old Roman idea of assimilation which he seeks to execute both by Roman and un-Roman methods. He shows even a tendency to go back beyond the Cæsars of old, to the methods of the Jew in Canaan and the Saxon in eastern Britain, methods of massacre and expulsion; yet being after all modernised and having some sense of economic necessity and advantage, he cannot really carry out this policy with any thoroughness or in times of peace. Still he insists on the old Roman method seeking to substitute the Germae speech and culture for the indigenous and since he cannot do it by peaceful pressure, he will try it by force. The attempt was bound to fail; instead of bringing about the psychological unity at which it aims, it succeeds only in accentuating the national spirit and planting a rooted and invincible hatred which is dangerous to the Empire and might well destroy it if the opposed elements were not too small in number and weak in force. And

if this effacing of heterogeneous cultures is impossible in Europe where the differences are only variations of a common type and with such small and weak elements to overcome, it is obviously out of the question for those Empires which have to deal with great Asiatic and African masses rooted for many centuries in an old and well-formed national culture. If a psychological unity has to be created, it must be by other means.

Certainly, the impact of different cultures upon each other has not ceased, rather it has been accentuated by the conditions of the modern world, but the nature of the impact, the ends towards which it moves and the means by which the ends can most successfully be worked out, are profoundly altered. The earth is in travail now of one common large and flexible civilisation for the whole human race into which each modern and ancient culture shall bring its contribution and each clearly defined human aggregate shall introduce its necessary element of variation. In the working out of this aim, there must necessarily be some struggle for survival, the fittest to survive being all that will best serve the tendencies Nature is working out in humanity,—not only the tendencies of the hour, but the reviving tendencies of the past and the yet inchoate tendencies of the future,—and also all that can best help as liberating and combining forces that shall make for adaptation and adjustment and for deliverance of the hidden sense of the great Mother in her strivings. But success in this struggle is worst and not best

served by military violence or political pressure. German culture for good or ill was making rapid conquests throughout the world before the rulers of Germany were ill-advised enough to rouse the latent force of opposing ideals by armed violence, and even now that which is essential in it, the State idea and the organisation of the life of the community by the State which is common both to German Imperialism and to German Socialism, is far more likely to succeed by the defeat of the former in this war than by its victory.

This change in the movement and orientation of the world's tendencies points to a law of interchange and adaptation and to the emergence of a new birth out of the meeting of many elements. Only those imperial aggregates are likely to succeed and eventually endure which recognise the new law and shape their organisation accordingly. Immediate victories of an opposite kind may indeed be gained and violence done to the law, but such present successes are won, as history has repeatedly shown, at the cost of a nation's whole future. The recognition of the new truth had already commenced as a result of increased communication and the widening of knowledge; the value of variations had begun to be acknowledged and the old arrogant claims of this or that culture to impose itself and crush out all others were losing their force and self-confidence when the old outworn creed suddenly leaped up armed with the German sword to vindicate itself, if it might, before it perished. The only result has been

to give added force and clear recognition to the truth it sought to deny. The importance even of the smallest States, Belgium, Serbia, as cultural units in the European whole has been lifted almost to the dignity of a creed; the recognition of the value of Asiatic cultures, confined formerly to the thinker, scholar and artist, has now been brought into the popular mind by association on the battle-field; the theory of "inferior" races, inferiority and superiority being measured by approximation to one's own form of culture, has received what may well be its death-blow. The seeds of a new order of things are being rapidly sown in the conscious mentality of the race.

This new turn of the impact of cultures shows itself most clearly where the European and the Asiatic meet. French culture in Northern Africa, English culture in India cease at once to be French or English and become simply the common European civilisation in face of the Asiatic; it is no longer an imperial domination seeking to secure itself by assimilation, but rather continent parleying with continent. The political motive sinks into insignificance; the world-motive takes its place. And in this confrontation it is no longer the self-confident European civilisation offering its light and good to the semi-barbarous Asiatic and the latter gratefully accepting. Even adaptable Japan has begun to return upon its first enthusiasm of acceptance and everywhere else the European current has met the opposition of an inner voice and force which cries halt to its

victorious impetus. The East is on the whole in spite of certain questionings and scruples willing and, where not wholly willing, forced by circumstances and the general tendency of mankind to accept the really valuable parts of modern European culture, its science, its curiosity, its ideal of universal education and uplift, its abolition of privilege, its broadening, liberalising democratic tendency, its instinct of freedom and equality, its call for the breaking down of narrow and oppressive forms, for air, space, light. But at a certain point the East refuses to proceed farther and that is precisely in the things which are deepest, most essential to the future of mankind, the things of the soul, the profound things of the mind and temperament. Here again all points not to substitution and conquest, but to mutual understanding and interchange, mutual adaptation and new formation.

The old idea is not entirely dead. There are still those who dream of a Christianised India, the English tongue permanently dominating if not replacing the indigenous languages or the acceptance of European social forms and manners as the necessary precondition for an equal status between Asiatic and European. But they are those who belong in spirit to a past generation and cannot value the signs of the hour which point to a new era. Christianity, for instance, has only succeeded where it could apply its one or two features of distinct superiority, the readiness to stoop and uplift the fallen and oppressed where the Hindu bound in the torms of caste would not

touch nor succour, its greater swiftness to give relief where it is needed, in a word the active compassion and helpfulness which it inherited from its parent Buddhism, where it could not apply this lever, it has failed totally and even this lever it may easily lose; for the soul of India reawakened by the new impact is beginning to recover its lost tendencies. The social forms of the past are changing where they are unsuited to the new political and economic conditions and ideals or incompatible with the increasing urge towards freedom and equality; but there is no sign that anything but a new Asiatic society broadened and liberalised will emerge from this travail. The signs everywhere are the same; the forces everywhere work in the same sense. Neither France nor England has the power—and they are losing the desire—to destroy and replace the Islamic culture in Africa or the Indian in India. They can only give what they have of value to be assimilated according to the needs and the inner spirit of the older nations.

We have had to dwell on this question because it is vital to the future of Imperialism. The replacement of the local by the imperial culture and so far as possible by the speech of the conqueror was essential to the old imperial theory, but the moment that becomes out of question and the very desire of it has to be renounced as impractiable, the old Roman model of empire ceases to be of any avail for the solution of the problem. Something of the Roman lesson remains valid,—those features especially that are essential to the

very essence of imperialism and the meaning of empire; but a new model is demanded. That new model has already begun to evolve in obedience to the requirements of tbe age; it is the model of the federal Empire. The problem we have to consider then narrows itself down to this, is it possible to create a securely federated empire of vast extent and composed of heterogeneous races and cultures? And granting that in this direction lies the future, how can such an empire so artificial in appearence be welded into a natural and psychological unit?

CHAPTER VIII

The problem of a federal empire founded on the sole firm foundation, the creation of a true psychological unity between heterogeneous elements, resolves itself into two different factors, the question of the form and the question of the reality which the form is intended to serve. The former is of great practical importance, but the latter alone is vital. A form of unity may render possible, may favour or even help actively to create the corresponding reality, but it can never replace it. And, as we have seen, the true reality is in this order of Nature the psychological, since the mere physical fact of political and administrative union may be nothing more than a temporary and artifical creation destined to collapse irretrievably as soon as its immediate usefulness is over or the circumstances favouring its continuance are radically or even seriously altered. The first question, then, that we have to consider is what this reality may be that it is intended to create in the form of a federal empire and especially whether it is to be merely an enlargement of the nation-type of human aggregate evolved by Nature or rather a new type of aggregate which is to exceed and must tend to supersede the nation, as that has replaced the tribe, the clan and the city or regional State.

The first natural idea of the human mind in facing such a problem is to favour the idea which most flatters and seems to continue its familiar notions. For the human mind is, in the mass, averse to a radical change of conceptionand accepts it most easily when it veils itself behind a habitual form of things or else a ceremonial, legal, intellectual or sentimental fiction. It is such a fiction that some think to create as a bridge from the nation-idea to the empire idea of natural unity. That which unites men most securely now is the physical unity of a common country to live in and defend, a common economical life dependent on that geographical oneness and the sentiment of the motherland which grows up around the physical and economical fact and either creates a political and administrative unity or keeps it to a secure permanence once it has been created. Let us then extend this powerful sentiment by a fiction, let us demand of the heterogeneous constituents of the empire that each shall regard not his own physical motherland but the empire as the mother or at least, if he clings to the old sentiment, learn to regard the empire first and foremost as the greater mother. A variation of this idea is the French notion of the mother country, France; all the other possessions of the empire, although in English phraseology they would rather be classed as dependencies in spite of the large share of political rights conceded to them, are to be regarded as colonies of the mother-country, grouped together in idea as France beyond the seas and educated

to centre their national sentiments around the greatness, glory and loveableness of France, the common mother. It is a notion natural to the Celtic-Latin temperament, though alien to the Teutonic, and it is supported by a comparative weakness of the race and colour prejudice and by that remarkable power of attraction and assimilation which the French share with all the Celtic nations.

The power, the often miraculous power of such fictions ought not for a moment to be ignored. They constitute Nature's most common and effective method when she has to deal with her own ingrained resistance to change in her mentalised animal, man. Still, there are conditions without which a fiction cannot succeed ; it must in the first place be based on a plausible superficial resemblance ; secondly, it must lead to a realisable fact strong enough either to replace the fiction itself or eventually to justify it ; thirdly, this realisable fact must progressively realise itself and not remain too long in the stage of the formless nebula. There was a time when these conditions were less insistently necessary, a time when the mass of men were more imaginative, unsophisticated, satisfied with a sentiment or an appearance ; but as the race advances, it becomes more mentally alive, self-conscious, critical and quick to seize dissonances between fact and pretension. Moreover, the thinker is abroad ; his words are listened to and understood to an extent unprecedented in the known history of mankind ; and the thinker tends

to become more and more an inquisitor, a critic, an enemy of fictions.

Is then, this fiction based upon a realisable parallel,—in other words, is it true that the true imperial unity when realised will be only an enlarged national unity? or, if not, what is the realisable fact which this fiction is intended to prepare? There have been plenty of instances in history of the composite nation and, if the former idea is to be preferred, it is such a composite nation on a large scale which it is the business of the federal empire to create. We must, therefore, cast a glance at the most typical instances of the successful composite nation and see how far the parallel applies and whether there are difficulties in the way which point rather to the necessity of a new evolution than to the variation of an old success. To have a just idea of the difficulties may help us to see how they can be overcome.

The instance most before our eyes both of the successfully evolved composite or heterogeneous nation and of the fortunately evolving heterogeneous empire is that of the British nation in the past and the British empire in the present,—successfully, but with a qualification, fortunately, but subject to the perils of a mass of problems yet unsolved. The British nation has been composed of an English-speaking Anglo-Norman England, a Welsh-speaking Cymric Wales, a half-Saxon, half-Gaelic English-speaking Scotland, very imperfectly, very partially of a Gaelic Ireland with a dominant Saxon-Norman colony holding it by force to the

united body but unable to compel a true union. Ireland was, until recently, the element of failure in this formation and it is only now and under other circumstances to its other members that her psychological unity with the whole is becoming possible and beginning to realise itself. What were the determining circumstances of this general success and this partial failure and what light do they shed on the possibilities of the larger problem?

In building up her human aggregates, Nature has followed in general principle the same law that she observes in her physical aggregates She has provided first a natural body, secondly a common life and vital interest for the constituents of the body, thirdly a conscious sentiment of unity and a centre or governing organ through which that common ego-sense can realise itself and act. There must be in her ordinary process either a common bond of descent and past association enabling like to adhere to like and distinguish itself from unlike or else a common habitation, a country, so disposed that all who inhabit within its natural boundaries are under a sort of geographical necesssity to unite. In earlier times when communities were less firmly rooted to the soil, the first of these conditions was the more important; in settled modern communities the second predominates; but the unity of the race, pure or mixed—for it need not have been one in its origin,—remains a factor of importance and strong disparity and difference may easily create

serious difficulties in the way of the geographical necessity imposing itself. In order that it may impose itself, there must be a considerable force of the second natural condition, that is to say, a necessity of economical unity or habit of common sustenance and a necessity of political unity or habit of common vital organisation for survival, functioning and aggrandisement. And in order that this second condition may fulfil itself in complete force, there must be nothing to depress or destory the third in its creation or its continuance; that is to say, nothing must be done which will have the result of emphasizing disunity in sentiment or perpetuating the feeling of separateness from the totality of the rest of the organism and thus making the centre or governing organ psychologically unrepresentative of the whole and therefore not a true centre of its ego-sense. Separatism, we must always understand, is not the absence of particularism, but the sentiment of the impossibility of true union.

The geographical necessity of union was obviously present in the forming of the British nation; the conquest of Wales and Ireland and the union with Scotland were historical events which merely represented the working of this necessity; but the unity of race and past association were wholly absent and had with greater or less difficulty to be created. It was effected successfully with Wales and Scotland in a greater or less lapse of time, not at all with Ireland. Geographical necessity is only a relative force; it

can be overridden by a powerful sentiment of disunion when nothing is done effectively to dissolve the disintegrating impulsion; so that even when the union has been politically effected, it tends to be destroyed, especially when there is within the geographical unity a physical barrier or line of division sufficiently strong to be the base of conflicting economic interests,—as in that which divides Belgium and Holland, Sweden and Norway, Ireland and Great Britain. In the case of Ireland, the British rulers not only did nothing to bridge over or dissolve this line of economical division and counteract the sentiment of a separate body, a separate physical country in the Irish mind, but by a violent miscalculation of cause and effect they emphasised both in the strongest possible manner.

In the first place, the economical life and prosperity of Ireland were deliberately crushed in the interests of British trade and commerce. After that it was of little use to bring about by means which one shrinks from scrutinising the political "union" of the two islands in a common legislature, a common governing organ; for that governing organ was not a centre of psychological unity. Where the most vital interests were not only different, but in conflict, it could only represent the continued control and assertion of the interests of the "predominant partner" and the continued subjection and denial of the interests of the foreign body bound by legislative fetters to the larger mass but not united through a real fusion. The

famine which depopulated Ireland while England throve and prospered was Nature's terrible testimony to the sinister character of this "union" which was not unity but the sharpest opposition of the most essential interests; and the Irish movements of Home Rule and separatism were the natural and inevitable expression of the will to survive; they amounted to nothing more than the instinct of self-preservation divining and insisting on the one obvious means of self-preservation.

In human life economic interests are those which are, ordinarily, violated with the least impunity; for they are bound up with the life itself and the persistent violation of them, if it does not destroy the oppressed organism, provokes necessarily the bitterest revolt and end in one of Nature's inexorable retaliations. But in the third order of natural conditions also British statesmanship in Ireland committed an eqally radical mistake in its attempt to get rid by violence of all elements of Irish particularism. Wales like Ireland was acquired by conquest, but no such elaborate attempt was made to assimilate it; after the first unease that follows a process of violence, after one or two abortive attempts at resistance, Wales was left to undergo the peaceful pressure of natural conditions and its preservation of its own race and language have been no obstacle to the gradual union of the Cymric race and the Saxon in a commom British nationality. A similar non-interference, apart from the minor problem of the Highland clans, has resulted in a still more rapid

fusion of the Scotch race with the English. There is now in the island of Great Britain a composite British race with a common country bound together by the community of mingled blood, by a settled past association in oneness, by geographical necessity, by a common political and economic interest, by the realisation of a common ego. The opposite process in Ireland, the attempt to substitute an artificial process where the working of natural conditions with a little help of management and conciliation would have sufficed, the application of old-world methods to a new set of circumstances has resulted in the opposite effect. And when the error was discovered, the result of the past Karma had to be recognised and the union has had to bee ffected through the method demanded by Irish interests and Irish particularist sentiments, by Home Rule and not under a complete legislative union.

This result has reached beyond itself; it has created the necessity of an eventual remodelling not only of the British Empire but of the whole Anglo-Celtic nation on new lines with the principle of federation at the base. For Wales and Scotland have not been fused into England with the same completeness as Breton, Alsatian, Basque and Provencial were fused into the indivisible unity of France. Although no economical interest, no pressing physical necessity demands the application of the federative principle to Wales and Scotland, yet a sufficient, though minor particularist sentiment remains to feel the repercussion of the

Iresh settlement and to awake to the satisfaction and convenience of a similar recognition for the provincial separateness of these two Celtic countries. And this sentiment is bound to receive fresh strength and encouragement by the practical working out of the federative principle in the now inevitable reorganisation of the colonial empire hitherto governed by Great Britian on the basis of Home Rule without federation. The peculiar circumstances both of the national and the colonial formation and expansion of the races inhabiting the British isles have indeed been such as to make it almost appear that this empire has throughout been intended and prepared by Nature in her workings to be the great field of experiment for the creation of this new type in the history of human aggregates, the heterogeneous federal empire.

CHAPTER VIII

If the building up of a composite nation in the British Isles was from the beginning a foregone conclusion, a geographical and economical necessity only delayed in its entire completion by the most violent and perverse errors of statesmanship, the same cannot be said of the swifter but still gradual and almost unconscious process by which the Colonial Empire of Great Britain has been evolving to a point at which it can become a real unity. It was not so long ago that the eventual separation of the Colonies and the evolution of Australia and Canada at least into young independent nations was considered the inevitable end of the colonial empire, its one logical and hardly regrettable conclusion.

There were sound reasons for this mental attitude. The geographical necessity of union was entirely absent; on the contrary the distance created a positive mental separation, and each colony having a separate physical body seemed predestined on the lines on which human evolution was then running, to become a separate nationality. The economical interests of the mother-country and the colonies were disparate, aloof from each other, often opposite as was shown by the adoption by the latter of protection as against the British free-trade policy. Their sole political interest in the empire was the safety

given by the British fleet and army against foreign invasion, and they did not share and took no direct interest in the government of the Empire or the shaping of its destinies. Psychologically, the sole tie was a frail memory of origin and a tepid sentiment which might easily evaporate and which was combated by a definite separatist sentiment and the natural inclination of strongly marked human groupings to make for themselves an independent life and racial type. The race-origin varied, in Australia British, in South Africa predominantly Dutch, in Canada half French, half English; but in all three countries habits of life, political tendencies, a new type of character and temperament and a culture, if it can be so called, were being developed which were as the poles asunder from the old British culture, temperament, habits of life and social and political tendencies. On the other hand, the mother-country derived no tangible political military or economical advantage from these offshoots, only the prestige which the possession of an Empire in itself could give her. On both sides therefore all the circumstances pointed to an eventual peaceful separation which would leave England only the pride of having been the mother of so many new nations.

Owing to the drawing together of the world by physcial Science, the resulting tendency towards larger aggregates, changed political world-conditions and the profound political, economical and social changes towards which Great Britain has

been moving, all the conditions now are altered and it is easy to see that the fusion of the Colonial Empire into a great federated nation or something that can plausibly go by that name is practically inevitable. There are difficulties in the way,—economical difficulties, to begin with; for, as we have seen, geographical separation does tend towards a divergence, often an opposition of economical interests and an imperial Zollverein, natural enough between the states of the German Empire or a Central European Confederation such as is now being plannedby one side in the great war, would be an artificial creation as between widely separated countries and would need constant vigilance and tender handling; yet, at the same time, political unity tends to demand economical union as its natural concomitant and seems to itself hardly complete without it. Political and other difficulties also there are which might become manifest if the practical process of unification were rashly and unwisely handled; but none of these need be insuperable or even a real stumbling-block. The race difficulty which was at one time serious and menacing in South africa and is not yet eliminated, need not be more formidable than in Canada; for in both countries there is the English element which, whether a majority or minority, can by friendly union or fusion attach the foreign element to the Empire. Nor is there any such powerful outside attraction or clash of formed cultures or incompatible temperaments as make so difficult the real union of Austro-Hungary.

All that is needed is that England should continue to handle the problem with a right instinct and not commit anything like her fatal American blunder or the mistake she committed but fortunately receded from in South Africa. She has to keep it always in mind that her possible destiny is not that of a dominant country compelling all the parts of her dominions to uniformity with her or to perpetual subordination, but that of the centre of a great confederation of States and nations coalescing by her attraction into a new supra-national unity. Here the first condition is that she must scrupulously respect the free internal life and will, the social, cultural, economical tendencies of the colonies while giving them an equal part with herself in the management of the great common questions of the empire. She herself can be nothing more in the future of such a new type of aggregate than a political and cultural centre, the clamp or nodus of the union. Given this orientation of the governing mind in England nothing short of some unforeseen cataclysm can prevent the formation of an empire-unit in which Home Rule with a loose British suzerainty will be replaced by Federation with Home Rule as its basis.

But the problem becomes much more difficult when the question of the other two great constituent parts of the Empire arises, Egypt and India,—so difficult that the first temptation of the political mind, supported as it will be by a hundred prejudices and existing interests, will be naturally to leave the problem alone and create a

federated Colonial Empire with these two great countries as subject dependencies. It is obvious that such a solution if arrived at cannot last and, if obstinately persisted in, will lead to the most undesirable results, if not to eventual disaster. The renascence of India is as inevitable as the rising of tomorrow's sun and the renascence of a great nation of three hundred millions with so peculiar a temperament, such unique traditions and ideas of life, so powerful an intelligence and so great a mass of potential energies cannot but be one of the most formidable phenomena of the modern world. It is evident that the new federated empire unit cannot afford to put itself in permanent antagonism to this renascent nation of three hundred millions and that the short-sighted statesmanship of those servants of to-day and its interest who would stave off the inevitable future as long as possible cannot be allowed to prevail. This has indeed been recognised in principle; the difficulty will be in the handling of the problems that will arise when the practical solution of the Indian question can no longer be put off.

The nature of the difficulties in the way of a practical union between such different aggregates is obvious enough. There is first that geographical separateness which has always made India a country and a nation apart even when it was unable to realise its political unity and was receiving by invasion and mutual communication of cultures the full shock of the civilisations around it. There is the mere mass of its population of three

hundred millions whose fusion in any sort with the rest of the nations of the empire will be a far other matter than the fusion of the comparatively insignificant populations of Australia, Canada and South Africa. There is the salient line of demarcation by race, colour and temperament between the European and the Asiatic; there is the age-long past, the absolute divergence of origins, indelible associations, inherent tendencies which forbid any possibility of the line of demarcation being effaced or minimised by India's acceptance of an entirely or predominantly English or European culture. All these difficulties need not nceessarily mean the insolubility of the problem; on the contrary we know that no difficulty can be presented to the human mind which the human mind, if it will, cannot solve. We assume that in this case there will be both the will, and the necessary wisdom; that British statesmanship will commit no irreparable error, that from the minor errors which it cannot fail to commit in the handling of such a problem, it will retreat in time as has been its temperament and habit in the past, and that, accordingly, a little sooner or a little later some kind of psychological unity will be created between these two widely disparateaggregates of the humanrace.

The question remains under what conditions this is possible and of what nature the unity will be. It is clear that the governing race must apply with a far greater scrupulosity and firm resolution the principle it has already applied elsewhere with such success and

the departure from which has always after a certain stage been so detrimental to its own wider interests. It must allow, respect and even favour actively the free and separate evolution of India subject to the unity of the empire So long as India does not entirely govern herself, her interests must take a first place in the mind of those who do govern her, and when she has self-government, it must be of a kind which will not hamper her in her care of her own interests. She must not, for example, be forced into an imperial Zollverein which under present conditions would be disastrous to her economical future until or unless those conditions are changed by a resolute policy of stimulating and encouraging her industrial development, even though that will necessarily be prejudicial to many existing commercial interests within the empire. No effort must be made to impose English culture or conditions upon her growing life or make them a *sine qua non* for her recognition among the free peoples of the Empire and no effort of her own to defend and develop her own culture and characteristic development must be interfered with or opposed. Her dignity, sentiments, national aspirations must be increasingly recognised in practice as well as in principle. Given these conditions all her political and economical interests and the care for her own untroubled growth will bind her to the empire and time will be given for the rest, for the more subtle and difficult part of the process of unification to fulfil itself more or less rapidly.

The unity created can never take the form of a Indo-British nation; that is a figment of the imagination, a chimera which it will never do to hunt to the detriment of the real possibilities. The possibilities are first, a firm political unity secured by common interests; secondly, a sound commercial interchange and mutual industrial helpfulness on healthy lines; thirdly, a new cultural relation of the two most important sections of humanity, Europe and Asia, in which they could exchange all that is great and valuable in either as equal members of one human household; and finally, it may be hoped, in place of the common past associations of political and economical development and military glory which have chiefly helped in building up the nation-unit, the greater glory of association and close partnership in the building of a new, rich and various culture for the life of a nobler humanity. Such, surely, should be the type of the supra-national unit which is the possible next step in the progressive aggregation of humanity.

It is evident that this next step would have no reason or value except as a stage which would make possible by practical demonstration and the creation of new habits of sentiment, mental attitude and common life, the unity of the whole human race in a single family. The mere creation of a big empire-unit would be a vulgar and even reactionary phenomenon if it had not this greater issue beyond it. The mere construction of a multicoloured Indo-British-Egyptian-Colonial unity

arrayed in armour of battle and divided by commercial, political and military egoism from other huge unities Russian, French, German, American, would be a retrogression, not an advance. If at all, therefore, this kind of development is intended —for we have only taken the instance of the British Empire as the best example of a possible new type, —then it must be as such a half-way house and with this ideal before us, that it can be accepted by the lovers of humanity who are not bound by the limitations of the old local patriotism of nation against nation. Always provided that the political administrative means are those which are to lead us to the unity of the human race,—for on that doubtful hypothesis we are at present proceeding.

CHAPTER IX

But the progress of the imperial idea from the artificial and constructive stage to the position of a realised psychological truth controlling the human mind with the same force and vitality which now distinguish the national idea above all other group-motives, is a possibility not a certainty. It is even no more than a vaguely nascent possibility and so long as it has not emerged from this inchoate condition in which it is at the mercy of the much folly of statesman, the formidable passions of great human masses, the obstinate self-interest of established egoisms, we can have no surety that it will not even now die still-born. And if so, what other possibility can there be of the unification of mankind by political and administrative means? That can only come about if either the old ideal of a single world-empire be, by development not now apparently possible, converted into an accomplished fact or if the opposite ideal of a free association of free nations overcome the hundred and one powerful obstacles which stand in the way of its practical realisation.

The idea of a world-empire imposed by sheer force is in direct opposition, as we have seen, to the new conditions which the progressive nature of things has introduced into the modern world. Nevertheless let us isolate these new conditions from the problem and admit the theoretical possibility

of a single great nation imposing its political rule and its predominant culture on the whole earth as Rome once imposed hers on the Mediterranean peoples and on Gaul and Britain. Or let us even suppose that one of the great nations might possibly succeed in overcoming all its rivals by force and diplomacy and afterwards, respecting the culture and separate internal life of its subject nations, secure its sway by the attraction of a world-peace, of beneficent administration and of an unparalleled organisation of human knowledge and human resources for the amelioration of the present state of mankind. We have to see whether this theoretical possibility is at all likely to encounter the condition by which it can convert itself into a practical possibility, and if we consider, we shall find that no such conditions exist, on the contrary all are against the realisation of such a colossal dream.

It is commonly supposed that the impulse which brought Germany to her present struggle with the world was rooted in even such a dream of empire. How far there was any such consious intention in her directing minds, is a question open to some doubt; but it is certain that, if she had prevailed in the war as she had first expected, the situation created would inevitably have led her to the greater attempt; for she would have enjoyed a dominant position such as no nation has yet possessed during the known period of the world's history; and the ideas which have recently governed the German intellect, the idea of her mission, her race superiority, the immeasurable excellence

of her culture, her science, her organisation of life and her divine right to lead the earth and to impose on it her will and her ideals, these with the all-grasping spirit of modern commercialism would have inevitably impelled her to undertake universal domination as a divinely given task. The fact that a modern nation and indeed the nation most advanced in that efficieney, that scientific utilisation of science, that spirit of organisation, State-help and intelligent dealing with national and social problems and ordering of economic well-being which Europe understands by the word civilisation,—the fact that such a nation should be possessed and driven by such ideas and impulses is certainly a proof that the old gods are not dead, the old ideal of dominant Force conquering, governing and perfecting the world is still a vital reality and has not let go its hold on the psychology of the human race. Nor is there any certainty that the present War will kill these forces and this ideal; for the war will be decided by force meeting force, by organisation triumphing over organisation, by the superior or at any rate the more fortunate utilisation of those very weapons which have constituted the real strength of this great aggressive Power. The defeat of Germany by her own weapons would not of itself kill the spirit now incarnate in Germany; it might well lead merely to a new incarnation of it in some other race or empire and the whole battle would then have to be fought over again. So long as the old gods are alive, the breaking or

depression of the body which they animate is a small matter; they know well how to trasmigrate. Germany overthrew the Napoleonic spirit in France in 1813 and broke the remnants of her European supremacy in 1870; the same Germany became the incarnation of that which it had overthrown. The phenomenon is easily capable of renewal on a more formidable scale.

Nor is the present failure of Germany any more a proof of the impossibility of this imperial dream than the previous failure of Napoleon. For the Teutonic combination lacked all the necessary conditions except one for the success of so vast an aim. It had the strongest military, scientific and national organisation which any people has yet developed, but it lacked the gigantic driving impulse which would alone bring an attempt so colossal to fruition, the impulse which France possessed in a much greater degree in the Napoleonic era; it lacked the successful diplomatic genius which creates the indispensable conditions of success; it lacked the companion force of sea-power which is even more necessary than military superiority to the endeavour of world-domination and by its geographical position and the encircling position of its enemies it was especially open to all the disadvantages which must accompany the mastery of the seas by its natural adversary. The combination of overwhelming sea-power with overwhelming land-power can alone bring so vast an enterprise into the domain of real possibility; Rome itself could only hope for something like a

world-empire when it had destroyed the superior maritime force of Carthage. Yet so entirely did German statesmanship miscalculate the problem that it entered into the struggle with the predominant maritime power of the world already ranked in the coalition of its enemies. Instead of concentrating its efforts against this one natural adversary, instead of utilising the old enmity of Russia and France against England, its maladroit and brutal diplomacy had already leagued these old enemies against itself; instead of isolating England, it had succeeded only in isolating itself and the manner in which it began and conducted the war still farther separated it morally and gave an added force to the physical isolation effected by the British blockade. In its one-sided pursuit of a great military concentration of Central Europe and Turkey, it had even wantonly alienated the one maritime Power which might have been on its side.

It is conceivable that the imperial enterprise may be renewed at some future date in the world's history by a nation better situated, better equipped, gifted with a subtler diplomatic genius, a nation as much favoured by circumstances, temperament and fortune as was Rome in the ancient world. What then would be the necessary conditions for its success? In the first place, its aim would have small chances of prospering if it could not repeat that extraordinary good luck by which Rome was enabled to meet its possible rivals and enemies one by one and avoid a successful

coalition of hostile forces. What possibility is there of such a fortunate progress in a world so alert and instructed as the modern where everything is known, spied on, watched by jealous eyes and active minds under the condition of modern publicity and swift world-wide communication? The mere possession of a dominant position is enough to set the whole world on its guard and concentaite its hostility against the power whose secret ambitions it instinctively feels. Therefore such a fortunate succession would only seem to be possible if in the first place it were carried out half unconsciously without any fixed and visible ambition on the part of the advancing power to awaken the general jealousy and, secondly, by a series of favouring occurrences which would lead so near to the desired end that it would be within the grasp before those who could still prevent it had awakened to its possibility. If, for instance, there were a series of struggles between the four or five great Powers now dominating the world, each of which left the aggressor broken without hope of recover and without any new power arising to take its place. it is conceivable that at the end one of them would be left in a position of such natural predominance gained without any deliberate aggression, gained in resisting the aggression of others as to put world-empire naturally into its grasp. But with the present conditions of life, especially with the ruinous nature of modern war, such a succession of struggles, quite natural and possible in former

times, seems to be beyond the range of actual possibilities.

We must then assume that the Power moving towards world-domination would at some time find inevitably a coalition formed against it by almost all the Powers capable of opposing it and this with the sympathy of the world at their back. Given even the happiest diplomacy such a moment seems inevitable. It must then possess such a combined and perfectly organised military and naval predominance as to succeed in this otherwise unequal struggle. But where is the modern empire that can hope to arrive at such a predominance? Of those that already exist Russia might well arrive one day at an overwhelming military power to which the present force of Ger-many would be a trifle; but that it should combine with this force by land a corresponding sea-power is unthinkable. England has an overwhelming naval predominance which it might so increase under certain conditions as to defy the world in arms; but it could not even with conscription and the aid of all its Colonies compass anything like a similar force by land,—unless indeed it created conditions under which it could utilise all the military possibilities of India and Egypt. Even then we have only to think of the formidable masses and powerful empires that it must be prepared to meet and we shall see that the creation of this double predominance is a contingency which the facts themselves show to be chimerical.

Given even inferior numbers a nation might conceivably prevail over the coalition of its opponents by a superior science and a more skilful use of its resources. Germany relied on its superior science for the successful issue of its enterprise; and the principle on which it proceeded was sound. But in the modern world Science is a common possession and even if one nation steals such a march on the others as to leave them in a position of great inferiority at the beginning, yet experience has shown that given a little time,—and a powerful coalition is not likely to be crushed at the first blow,—the lost ground can be rapidly made up or at least methods of defence developed which will largely neutralise the advantage gained. For success, therefore, we should have to suppose the development by the ambitious nation or empire of a new science or new discoveries not shared by the rest which would place it in something like the position of superiority over greater numbers which Cortes and Pizarro enjoyed over the Aztecs and Peruvians. The superiority of discipline and organisation which gave the advantage to the ancient Romans or to the Europeans in India is no longer sufficient.

We see, therefore, that the conditions for the successful pursuit of world-empire are such that we need hardly take this mode of unification as within the bounds of practical possibility. That it may again be attempted, is possible; that it will fail, may almost be prophesied. Certainly

we have to take into account the surprises of Nature, the large field we have to allow to the unexpected in her dealings with us. Therefore we cannot pronounce this consummation an absolute impossibility. On the contrary, if that be her intention, she will suddenly or gradually create the necessary means and conditions. But even if it were to come about, the empire so created would have so many forces to contend with it that its maintenance would be more difficult than its creation and either its early collapse would bring the whole problem again into the field for a better solution or else it would have, by stripping itself of the elements of force and domination which inspired its attempt, to contradict the essential aim of its great effort. That however belongs to another side of our subject which we must postpone for the moment. At present we may say that if the gradual unification of the world by the growth of great heterogeneous empires forming true psychological unities is only a vague and nascent possibility, its unification by a single forceful, imperial domination has passed or is passing out of the range of possibilities and can only come about by a new development of the unexpected out of the infinite surprises of Nature.

CHAPTER X

We have had to dwell so long upon the possibilities of the Empire-group because the evolution of the imperial State is the dominating phenomenon of the modern world; it governs the tendencies of the later part of the nineteenth and earlier part of the twentieth centuries very much as the evolution of the free democratised nation governed the age which preceded ours. The dominant idea of the French Revolution was the free and sovereign people, and by the force of circumstances and in spite of the cosmopolitan element introduced into the revolutionary formula by the ideal of fraternity, this idea became in fact the assertion of the free, independent, democratically self-governed nation. That ideal has not wholly worked itself out throughout the Occidental world; for central Europe is only partly democratised and Russia has only just begun to turn its face towards the common goal; and there are still subject European peoples or fragments of peoples. Nevertheless, with whatever imperfections, the democratic idea has practically triumphed in all America and Europe, since even in Germany and Russia the complete liberation of the people is only a question of time. Equally it seems certain that eventually the remaining subject peoples in Europe will either be liberated or acquire at least a modified autonomy. The Asiatic nations have equally accepted

this governing idea of the nineteenth century, and though the movements of democratic nationalism in the eastern countries, Turkey, Persia, India, China, have not been fortunate in their first attempts at self-realisation, the profound and widespread working of the idea cannot be doubted by any careful observer. Whatever modifications may arrive, whatever new tendencies intervene, whatever reactions oppose, it can hardly be doubted that the principal gifts of the French Revolution must remain and be universalised as permanent acquisitions, indispensable elements in the future order of the world,—national self-consciousness and self-government, the freedom and enlightenment of the people and so much social equality and justice at least as is indispensable to political liberty; for with any form of fixed and rigid inequality democratic self-government is incompatible.

But before the great nineteenth century impulse could work itself out everywhere, before even it could realise itself entirely in Europe, a new tendency has intervened and a new idea seized on the progressive mind of humanity. This is the idea of the perfectly organised State. Fundamentally the ideal of the perfectly organised State is socialistic and it is based on the second word of the great revolutionary formula, equality, just as the movement of the nineteenth century centred round the first, liberty. The first impulse given by the great European upheaval attained only to a certain political equality and an incomplete social levelling which still left the one

inequality and the one form of political preponderance which no competitive society can eliminate, the perponderance of the haves over the have-nots, the inequality between the more successful in the struggle of life and the less successful which is rendered inevitable by difference of capacity, unequal opportunity, the handicap of circumstance, and environment Socialism seeks therefore to get rid of this inequality by destroying the competitive form of society and substituting the co-operative. The co-operative form of human society existed formerly in the shape of the commune, but the restoration of the commune as the unit would imply practically the return to the old city state, and as this is not now possible with the larger groupings and greater complexities of modern life, the Socialistic idea could only be realised through the rigorously organised national State. To eliminate poverty, not by the old crude method of equal distribution but by the holding of all property in common and its management through the organised State, to equalise opportunity and capacity as far as possible through universal education and training, again by means of the organised State, is the fundamental idea of modern Socialism. It implies the abrogation of all individual liberty. Socialism still clings indeed to the nineteenth century ideal of political freedom; it insists on the equal right of all in the State to choose, judge and change their own governors, but all other liberty it is ready to sacrifice to its own central idea.

The progress of the Socialistic idea would seem therefore to lead to evolution of the perfectly organised national State providing for and controlling the education and training, managing and governing all the economic activities and for that purpose as well as for the assurance of perfect efficiency, morality, well-being and social justice ordering the whole life, external and internal, of the individuals composing it,—doing in fact by organised State control what earliar societies attempted by social pressure, rigorous rule of custom, minute code and Shastra. This was always an inherently inevitable development of the revolutionary ideal. It started to the surface at first under pressure of external danger in the Government of France by the Jacobins during the Reign of Terror ; it has been emerging and tending to realise itself under pressure of an inner necessity throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century ; it has emerged not completely but with an astonishing approach to completeness by the combination of the inner and the outer necessity during the present War. What was before only an ideal towards which some imperfect initial steps alone were immediately possible, has now become a realisable programme with its entire feasibility established by a convincing, though necessarily hasty and imperfect, practical demonstration It is true that in order to realise it even political liberty has had to be temporarily abolished ; but this, it may be argued, is only an accident of the moment, a concession to tempora:y

necessity; and what is now being done by governments which the people have consented to invest with an absolute and temporarily irresponsible authority, may be done, when there is no pressure of war, by the self-governing democratic State.

In that case the near future of the human group would seem to be the nation, self-governing, politically free, but aiming at perfect social and economic organisation and for that purpose giving up all individual liberty into the hands of the organised national State. As France was in the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century the great propagandist and the experimental workshop of political liberty and equality, so Germany has been in the end of the nineteenth and begining of the twentieth ceutury the great propagandist and the experimental workshop of the idea of the organised State. There the theory of Socialism has taken its rise and there its propaganda has been most effective so that now a full third of the nation has committed itself to the new gospel; there also the great socialistic measures and those which have developed the control of the individual by the State for the common good and efficiency of the nation have been most thoroughly and admirably conceived and executed. It matters little that this has been done by an anti-socialistic, militarist and aristocratic government; the very fact is a proof of the irresistible strength of the new tendency, and the inevitable transference of the administrative power from its present holders

to the people is all that is needed to complete its triumph. Throughout the recent decades we have seen the growth of German ideas and the increasing tendency to follow the German methods of State interference and State control in other countries, even in England, the home of individualism. It is a mistake to think that the defeat of Germany in the present European war will mean the defeat of all her ideals any more than the defeat of revolutionary and Napoleonic France by the European coalition, and even the temporary triumph of the monarchic and aristocratic system prevented the spread of her new ideas over all Europe. German militarism and junkerism may be destroyed, but the collapse of her anti-socialistic Government will only hasten instead of delaying the more thorough development and victory of that which has been working behind them and forcing them to minister to it, the great modern tendency of the perfectly organised socialistic State, while the evident result of the war in the nations opposed to her has been to force them more rapidly towards the same ideal.

If this were all, the natural development of things aided by the frustration of the German form of imperialism would lead logically to a new ordering of the world on the basis of a system of free organised nations associating together more or less closely for international purposes while preserving their independent existence. Such is the ideal which has attracted the human mind as a yet distant possibility since the great revolutionary ferment set in; it is the idea of

a federation of free nations, the parliament of man, the federation of the world. But the actual circumstances forbid any hope of such ideal consummation in the near feture. For the nationalistic, democratic and socialistic ideas are not alone at work in the world ; imperialism is equally in the ascendant. No European people at the present moment except Switzerland and the three Scandinavian kingdoms is a nation confined to itself. Each is a nation free in itself but dominating over the human groupings who are not free or only partially free. Even little Belgium has its Congo, little Portugal its Colonies, little Holland its dependencies in the eastern Archipelago ; even the little Balkan states aspire to revive an "empire" and to rule over others not of their own nationality, while each undoubtedly cherishes the idea of becoming supreme in the peninsula. Mazzini's Italy has now its imperialistic ventures and ambitions in Tripoli, Abyssinia, Albania, the Greek islands. This imperialistic tendency is likely to grow stronger by the present war rather than weaken. The idea of a remodelling even of Europe itself on the strict principle of nationality which captivated liberal minds in England at the beginning of the war is hardly practicable and, even if it were effected, there would still remain the whole of Asia and Africa as a field for the imperialistic ambitions of the Western nations and Japan. The disinterestedness which has led a majority in America to decree the liberation of the Philippines and restrained the desire to take

advantage of the troubles of Mexico is not possible to the mentality of the Old World, and it is doubtful how long it can stand even in America against the rising tide of imperialistic sentiment. National egoism, the pride of domination and the desire of expansion still govern the mind of humanity, however modified they may now be in their methods by the first weak beginnings of higher motives and a better national morality, and until this spirit is radically changed, the union of the human race by a federation of free nations must remain a noble chimera.

Undoubtedly, a free association and unity must be the ultimate goal of our development and until it is realised the world must be subject to constant changes and revolutions ; every established order, because it is imperfect, because it insists on arrangements which come to be recognised as involving injustice or which stand in the way of new tendencies and forces, because it outlasts its utility and justification, must end in *malaise*, resistance and upheaval, must change itself or be changed, or else lead to cataclysms such as periodically trouble our human advance. But the time has not come when the true principle of order can replace those which are artificial and imperfect. It is idle to hope for a federation of free nations until either the present inequalities between nation and nation are removed or else the whole world rises to a common culture based upon a higher moral and spiritual status than now obtains. The imperial instinct, being alive and dominant and stronger

at present than the principle of nationalism, the evolution of great Empires can hardly fail to overshadow for a time at least the tendency to the development of free nationalities. All that can be hoped is that the old artificial, merely political empire may be replaced by a truer and more moral type and that the existing empires driven by the necessity of strengthening themselves and by an enlightened self-interest may come to see that the recognition of national autonomy is a wise and necessary concession to the still vital instinct of nationalism and can be used so as to strengthen instead of weakening their imperial strength and unity. In this way, while a federation of free nations is for the present impossible, a system of federated empires and free nations drawn together in a closer association than the world has yet seen is not altogether impossible; and through this and other steps some form of political unity for mankind may at a more or less distant date be realised.

The present war has brought up many suggestions for such a closer association, but as a rule they have been limited to a better ordering of the international relations of Europe. One of these is the elimination of war by a stricter international law administered by an international court and supported by the sanction of the nations which shall be enforced by all of them against any offender. Such a solution is chimercial unless it is immediately followed by farther and far-reaching developments. For the law given by the Court must

be enforced either by an alliance of some of the stronger Powers, as, for instance, the present coalition of France, England and Russia dominating the rest of Europe, or by a concert of all the European Powers or else by a United States of Europe or some other form of European federation. A dominating alliance of great Powers would be simply a repetition in principle of the system of Metternich and would inevitably break down after some lapse of time, while a Concert of Europe must mean, as experience has shown, the uneasy attempt of rival groupings to maintain a precarious understanding which may postpone but cannot eventually prevent fresh struggles and collisions. With such imperfect systems the law would only be obeyed so long as it was expedient, so long only as the Powers who desired new changes and readjustments not admitted by the other did not consider the moment opportune for resistance. The Law within a nation is only secure because there is a recognised authority empowered to determine it and to make the necessary changes and possessed of a sufficient force to punish all violation of its statutes. An international or an inter-European law must have the same advantages if it is to exercise anything more than a merely moral force which can be set at nought by those who are strong enough to defy it and who find an advantage in the violation. Some form of European federation, however loose, is therefore essential if the idea behind these suggestions of a new order is to be made practically effective, and

once commenced such a federation must necessarily be tightened and draw more and more towards the form of a United States of Europe.

Whether such a European unity can be formed or whether, if formed, it can be maintained and perfected against the many forces of dissolution, the many causes of quarrel which would for long try it to the breaking-point, only experience can show. But it is evident that in the present state of human egoism it would, if formed, become a tremendously powerful instrument for domination and exploitation of the rest of the world by the group of nations which are at present in the forefront of human progress. It would inevitably awaken in antagonism to it an idea of Asiatic unity and an idea of American unity, and while such continental groupings replacing the present smaller national unities might well be an advance towards the final union of all mankind, yet their realisation would mean cataclysms of a kind and scope which would dwarf the present catastrophe and in which the hopes of mankind might founder and fatally collapse rather than progress nearer to fulfilment. But the chief objection to the idea of a United States of Europe is that the general sense of humanity is already seeking travel beyond the continental distinctions and make them subordinate to a large human idea and that a division on that basis would therefore be a reactionary step of the gravest kind and likely to be attended with the most serious consequences to human progress.

Europe indeed is in the anomalous position of being at once ripe for the Pan-European idea at the same time under the necessity of overpassing it. Recently the conflict of the two tendencies was curiously exemplified by the speculations of a leading English journal on the nature of the present European struggle. It was suggested that the sin of Germany in this war was due to its exaggerated egoistic idea of the nation and its disregard of the larger idea of Europe to which the nation-idea must now be subjected and subordinated; the total life of Europe must now be the all-engrossing unity, its good the paramount consideration and the egoism of the nation must consent to exist only as an organic part of this larger egoism. In effect, this is the acceptance after so many decades of the idea of Neitzsche who insisted that nationalism and war were anachronisms and the ideal of all enlightened minds must be not to be good patriots but good Europeans. But immediately the question arose, what then of the increasing importance of America in world-politics, what of Japan and China, what of the renewed stirrings of life in Asia? The writer had therefore to draw back from his first formula and to explain that by Europe he meant not Europe but all nations that had accepted the principles of European civilisation as the basis of their polity and social organisation. This more philosophical formula has the advantage both of bringing in Ameria and Japan and thus recognising all the actually free or dominant nations in the circle of

the proposed solidarity and of holding out the hope of admission to others whenever they can prove, after the forceful manner of Japan or otherwise, that they too have come up to this European standard.

Indeed, though Europe is still strongly separate in its own conception from the rest of the world,—as is shown by the often expressed resentment of the continual existence of Turkey in Europe and the desire to put an end to this government of Europeans by Asiatics,—yet as a matter of fact it is inextricably tangled up with America and Asia. Some of the European nations have colonies in America, all have possessions and ambitions in Asia, where Japan alone is outside the shadow cast by Europe, or in Northern Africa which is culturally one with Asia. The United States of Europe would therefore mean a federation of free European nations dominating a half-subject Asia and holding parts of America and standing there in uneasy proximity to nations still free and necessarily troubled, alarmed and overshadowed by this giant immiscence. The inevitable result would be in America to bring together more closely the Latin Centre and South and the English-speaking North and to emphasise immensely the Munro doctrine with consequences which cannot easily be foreseen, while in Asia there could be only one of two final endings to the situation, either the disappearance of the remaining free Asiatic States or a vast Asiastic resurgence and the recoil of Europe from Asia. Such movements

would be a prolongation of the old line of human development and set at nought the new cosmopolitan conditions created by modern culture and Science; but they are inevitable if the nation-idea in the West is to merge into the Europe-idea, that is to say, into the continental, rather than into the wider consciousness of a common humanity

If therefore any new supra-national order is to evolve sooner or later as a result of the present upheaval, it must be an association embracing Asia, Africa and America as well as Europe and it must be in its nature an organisation of international life including in itself a number of free Nations such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United States, the Latin republics and a number of imperial and colonising nations such as are most of the peoples of Europe. Either the latter would remain as they now are free in themselves but masters of subject peoples who, with the advance of time, would become more and more intolerant of the yoke imposed on them or else they would be, by an ethical advance which is as yet very far from being accomplished, partly centres of free federal Empire, partly nations holding in trust races yet backward and undeveloped until they arrived at the capacity of self-administration, as the United States now hold the Philippines. In the former case, the unity, the order, the common law established would perpetuate and be partly founded on an enormous system of injustice and exposed to the revolts and revolutions of Nature and the great

revenges by which she finally vindicates the human spirit against wrongs which she tolerates for a time as necessary incidents of human development. In the latter, there would be some chance of the new order, however far in its beginnings from the ultimate ideal of a free association of free human aggregates, leading peacefully and by a natural unfolding of the spiritual and ethical progress of the race to such a secure, just and healthy political, social and economic foundation as might enable mankind to turn from its preoccupation with these lower cares to that development of its higher self which is the nobler part of its destiny.

CHAPTER XI

We thus see that if we consider the possibilities of a unification of the human race on political, administrative and economic lines, a certain sort of unity appears not only to be possible, but to be more or less urgently demanded by a growing spirit and sense of need in the race. This spirit has been created largely by increased mutual knowledge and close communication, partly by the development of wider and freer intellectual ideals and emotional sympathies in the progressive mind of the race; and this sense of need is partly due to the demand for satisfaction of these ideals and sympathies, partly to economic and other material changes which render the results of divided national life, war, commercial rivalry and consequent insecurity and peril to the complex and easily vulnerable modern social organisation more and more irksome both for the economic and political human animal and for the idealistic thinker. Partly also it is due to the desire of the successful nations to possess, enjoy and exploit the rest of the world at ease without the peril incurred by their own formidable rivalries and competitions and rather by some convenient understanding and compromise among themselves. The real strength of this new tendency is in its intellectual, idealistic and emotional parts; its

economic causes are partly permanent and therefore elements of strength and secure fulfilment, partly artificial and temporary and therefore elements of insecurity and weakness; the political incentives are the baser part which may end by vitiating the whole result and lead to a necessary dissolution and reversal of whatever unity may be presently accomplished.

Still a result of some kind is extremely possible in the near or more distant future. We can see on what lines it is likely to work itself out, if at all,—at first by a sort of understanding and initial union for the most pressing common needs, arrangements of commerce, arrangements of peace and war, arrangements for the common arbitration of disputes, arrangements for the policing of the world; and all these will naturally develop by the pressure of the governing idea and the inherent need into a closer unity and even into a common supreme government which may endure till the defects of the system established and the rise of new ideals and tendencies inconsistent with its maintenance lead either to a new radical change or to its entire dissolution into its natural elements and constituents. We have seen also that such a union is likely to take place upon the basis of the present world somewhat modified by the changes that must now inevitably take place, international changes that are likely to be adjustments rather than the introduction of a new radical principle and social changes within the nations themselves of a much more far-reaching

character. It will take place, that is to say, as between the present free nations and colonising empires, but with an internal arrangement of society and administrative mould progressing rapidly towards a rigorous State socialism and equality by which the woman and the worker will chiefly profit. For these are the master tendencies of the hour. Certainly, no one can confidently predict that the hour will victoriously prevail over the whole future. We know not what surprises of the great human drama, what violent resurgence of the oppressed nation-idea, what collisions, failures, unexpected results in the working out of the new social tendencies, what revolt of the human spirit against a burdensome and mechanical State collectivism, what growth and power of the new gospel of philosophic anarchism reasserting the human yearning for individual liberty and free self-fulfilment, what unforeseen religious and spiritual revolutions may not intervene in the very course of this present movement of mankind and divert it to quite another denouement. The human mind has not yet reached that illumination or that sure science by which it can forecast securely even its morrow.

Let us suppose, however, that no such unexpected factor intervenes. The political unity of mankind, of a sort, will then be realised. The question still remains whether it is desirable that it should be realised thus and now and, if so, under what circumstances, with what necessary conditions in the absence of which the result gained can only

be temporary as were former partial unifications of mankind. And first, let us remember at what cost humanity has gained the larger unities it has actually achieved in the past Those unities were in the past the nation and now the natural homogeneous empire of nations kin in race and culture or united by geographical necessity and mutual attractions and the artificial heterogeneous empire secured by conquest, maintained by force, by yoke of law, by commercial and military colonisation, but not welded into true psychological unities. Each of these principles of aggregation has given some actual gain or some possibility of progress to mankind at large, but each has brought with it its temporary or inherent disadvantages and inflicted some wound on the complete human ideal.

The creation of a new unity, when it proceeds by external and mechanical processes, has usually and indeed almost by a practical necessity to go through a process of internal contraction before the unit can indulge again in a new and free expansion of its inner life; for its first need and instinct is to form and secure its own existence. To enforce its unity is its predominant impulse and to that paramount need it has to sacrifice the diversity, harmonious complexity, richness of various material, freedom of inner relations without which the true perfection of life is impossible. In order to enforce a strong and sure unity it has to create a paramount centre, a concentrated state power, whether of king or military aristocracy or plutocratic class, to which the liberty and free

life of the individual, the commune, the city, the region or any other lesser unit has to be subordinated and sacrificed. At the same time there is a tendency to create a firmly mechanised and rigid state of society with a hierarchy of classes or orders in which the lower is appointed to an inferior place and duty and bound down to a narrower life than the higher, such as the hierarchy of king, clergy, aristocracy, middle class, peasantry, servile class which replaced in Europe the rich and free existence of the city and the tribe or the rigid caste system which replaced in India the open and natural existence of the vigorous Aryan clans. Moreover, as we have already seen, the active and stimulating participation of all or most in the full vigour of the common life which was the great advantage of the small but free earlier communities, is much more difficult in a larger aggregate and is at first impossible. In its place, there is the concentration of the force of life into a dominant centre or at most a governing and directing class or classes while the great mass of the community is left in a relative torpor and enjoys only a minimum and indirect share of that vitality in so far as it is allowed to filter down from above and indirectly affect the grosser, poorer and narrower life below. This at least is the phenomenon we see in the historic period of human development.

The small human community in which all can easily take an active part and in which ideas and movements are swiftly and vividly felt by all and can be worked out rapidly and thrown into form

without the need of a large and difficult organisation, turn naturally towards freedom as soon as they cease to be preoccupied with the first absorbing necessity of self-preservation. Such forms as absolute monarchy or a despotic oligarchy, an infallible Papacy or sacrosanct theocratic class cannot flourish at ease in such an environment; they lack that advantage of distance from the mass and that remoteness from exposure to the daily criticism of the individual mind on which their prestige depends and they have not to justify them the pressing need of uniformity among large multitudes and over vast areas which they elsewhere serve to establish and maintain. Therefore we find in Rome the monarchical regime unable to maintain itself and in Greece looked upon as an unnatural and brief usurpation, while the oligarchical form of government, though more vigorous, could not assure to itself, except in a purely military community like Sparta, either a high and exclusive supremacy or a firm duration. The tendency to a democratic freedom in which every man had a natural part in the civic life as well as in the cultural institutions of the State, an equal voice in the determination of law and policy and as much share in their execution as could be assured to him by his right as a citizen and his capacity as an individual,—this democratic tendency was inborn in the spirit and inherent in the form of the city State. In Rome the tendency was equally present but could not develop so rapidly or fulfil itself so entirely as in Greece because of

the necessities of a military and conquering State which needed either an absolute head, an *imperator*, or a small oligarchic body to direct its foreign policy and its military conduct; but even so the democratic element was always present and the democratic tendency was so strong that it began to work and grow from almost prehistoric times even in the midst of Rome's constant struggle for self-preservation and expansion and was only suspended by such supreme struggles as the great duel with Carthage for the empire of the Mediterranean. In India the early communities were free societies in which the king was only a military head or civic chief; we find the democratic element persisting in the days of Buddha and surviving in small States in those of Chandragupta and Megasthenes even when great bureaucratically governed monarchies and empires were finally replacing the free earlier polity. It was only in proportion as the need for a large organisation of Indian life over the whole peninsula or at least the northern part of it made itself increasingly felt that the form of absolute monarchy grew upon the country and the learned and sacerdotal caste imposed its theocratic domination and rigid Shastra as the binding chain of national unity.

As in the political and civic, so in the social life. A certain democratic equality is almost inevitable in a small community; the opposite phenomenon of strong class distinctions and superiorities may establish itself during the military

period of the clan or tribe, but cannot long be maintained in the close intimacy of a settled city State except by artificial means such as were employed by Sparta and Venice. Even when the distinction remains, its exclusiveness is blunted and cannot deepen and intensify itself into the nature of a fixed hierarchy. The natural social type of the small community is such as we see in Athens, where not only Cleon, the tanner, exercised as strong a political influence as the highborn and wealthy Nicias, and the highest offices and civic functions were open to men of all classes, but in social functions and connections also there was a free association and equality. We see a similar democratic equality, though of a different type, in the earlier records of Indian civilisation; the rigid hierarchy of castes with the pretensions and arrogance of the caste spirit were a later development, in the simpler life of old difference or even superiority of function did not carry with it a sense of personal or class superiority; and at the beginning, the most sacred religious and social function, that of the Rishi and sacrificer, seems to have been open to men of all classes and occupations. Theocracy, caste and absolute kingship grew in force *pari passu* like the Church and the monarchical power in mediaeval Europe under the compulsion of the new circumstances created by the growth of large social and political aggregates.

Societies advancing in culture under these conditions of the early Greek, Roman and Indian

city States and clan nations were bound to develop a general vividness of life and dynamic force of culture and creation which the later national aggregates were obliged to forego and could only recover after a long period of self-formation in which the difficulties attending the development of a new organism have had to be met and overcome. The cultural and civic life of the Greek city of which Athens was the supreme achievement, a life in which living itself was an education, where the poorest as well as the richest sat together in the theatre to see and judge the dramas of Sophocles and Euripides and the Athenian trader and shopkeeper took part in the subtle philosophical conversations of Socrates, created for Europe not only its fundamental political types and ideals but practically all its basic forms of intellectual, philosophical, literary and artistic culture. The equally vivid political, juridical and military life of the single city of Rome created for Europe its types of political activity, military discipline and science, jurisprudence of law and equity and even its ideals of empire and colonisation. And in India it was that early vivacity of spiritual life of which we catch glimpses in the Vedic, Upanishadic and Buddhistic literature which created the religions, philosophies, spiritual disciplines that have since by direct or indirect influnce spread something of their spirit and knowledge over Asia and Europe. And everywhere the root of this vitality and dynamic force which the modern world is only now in some sort recovering, was amid all

differences the same; it was the complete participation not of a limited class, but of the individual generally in the many-sided life of the community, the sense each had of being full of the energy of all and of his being free to grow, to be himself, to achieve, to think, to create in the undammed flood of that universal energy. It is this condition, this relation between the individual and the aggregate which modern life has to some extent restored in a cumbrous, clumsy and imperfect fashion but with much vaster forces of life and thought at its disposal than early humanity could command.

It is possible that, if the old city states and clan-nations could have endured and modified themselves so as to create larger free aggregates without losing their own life in the new mass, many problems might have been solved with a greater simplicity, direct vision and truth to Nature which we have now to settle in very complex and cumbrous fashion and under peril of enormous dangers and wide-spread convulsions. But that was not to be. That early life had vital defects which it could not cure. In the case of the Mediterranean nations, two most important deductions have to be made from the general participation of all individuals in the full civic and cultural life of the community; for that participation was denied to the slave and hardly granted at all in the narrow life conceded to the woman. In India the institution of salvery was absent and the woman had at first a freer and more dignified position than in Greece and Rome; but the slave was soon

replaced by the proletariate, called in India the Shudra, and the increasing tendency to deny the highest benefits of the common life and culture to the Shudra and the woman brought down Indian society to the level of its Western congeners. It is possible that these two great problems of economic serfdom and the subjection of woman might have been attacked and solved in the early community if it had lived longer, as it is now being attacked and in process of solution in the modern State. But it is doubtful; only in Rome do we glimpse certain initial tendencies which might have turned in that direction and they never went farther than faint hints of a future possibility.

More vital was the entire failure of this early form of human society to solve the question of the inter-relations beween community and community. War remained their normal relation. All attempts at free federation failed and military conquest was left as the sole means of unification. The attachment to the small aggregate in which each man felt himself to be most alive had generated a sort of mental and vital insularity which could not accommodate itself to the new and wider ideas which philosophy and political thought, moved by the urge of larger needs and tendencies, had brought into the field of life. Therefore the old states had to dissolve and disappear, in India into huge bureaucratic empires of the Gupta and the Maurya to which the Pathan, the Mogul and the Englishman succeeded, in the West into the vast military and commercial expansions achieved by

Alexander, by the Carthaginian oligarchy and by the Roman republic and empire. The latter were not national but supra-national unities, premature attempts at such larger unifications of mankind as could not really be accomplished with any finality until the intermediate nation-unit had been fully and healthily developed.

The creation of the national aggregate was therefore reserved for the millennium that followed the collapse of the Roman empire; and in order to solve this problem left to it, the world during that period had to recoil from many and indeed most of the gains which had been achieved for mankind by the city States. Only after it was solved could it return to the effort to develop not only a firmly organised but a progressive and perfected community, not only a strong mould of social life but the free growth and perfection of life itself within that mould. This cycle we must briefly study before we can consider whether the intervention of a new effort at a larger aggregation is likely to be free from the danger of a new recoil in which the inner progress of the race will have at least temporarily to be sacrificed in order to concentrate effort on the development and affirmation of an external unity.

CHAPTER XII

We have seen that the building of the true national unit was a problem of human aggregation left over by the ancient world to the mediaeval. The ancient world started from the tribe, the city-state, the clan, the small regional state—all of them minor units living in the midst of other like units which were similar to them in general type, kin usually in language and most often or very largely in race, marked off at least from other divisions of humanity by a tendency towards a common civilisation and protected in that community with each other and in their diversity from others by favourable geographical circumstances. Thus Greece, Italy, Gaul, Egypt, China, Medo-Persia, India, Arabia, Israel, all began with a loose cultural and geographical aggregation which made them separate and distinct culture-units before they could become nation-units. Within that loose unity the tribe, clan or city or regional states formed in the vague mass so many points of distinct, vigorous and compact unity which felt indeed more and more powerfully the divergence and opposition of their larger cultural oneness to the outside world but more nearly and acutely their own divergences, contrasts and oppositions. Where this sense of local distinctness was most acute, there the problem of national unification

was necessarily more difficult and its solution, when made, tended to be more illusory.

The solution was in most cases attempted. In Egypt and Judaea it was successfully found even in that ancient cycle of historical evolution, but in the latter instance certainly, in the former probably the full result came only by the hard discipline of subjection to a foreign yoke. Where this discipline was lacking, where the nation-unity was in some sort achieved from within,—usually through the conquest of all the rest by one strong clan, city, regional unit such as Rome, Macedon, the mountain clans of Persia, the new State instead of waiting to base firmly its achievement and lay the foundations of the national unity deep and strong, proceeded at once to overshoot its immediate necessity and embark on a career of conquest. Before the psychological roots of the national unity had been driven deep, before the nation was firmly self-conscious, irresistibly possessed of and invincibly attached to its oneness, the governing State impelled by the military impulsion which had carried it so far, attempted immediately to form by the same means a larger empire aggregate. Assyria, Macedon, Rome, Persia, later on Arabia followed all the same tendency and the same cycle. The great invasion of Europe and Western Asia by the Gaelic race and the subsequent disunion and decline of Gaul was probably due to the same phenomenon proceeding from a still more immature and ill-formed unification than the Macedonian. All became the starting-point of

great empire-movements before they had become the key-stone of securely-built national unities [illegible]. These Empires therefore could not endure. Some lasted longer than others because they had laid down firmer foundations in the central nation-unity, as did Rome in Italy. In Greece, Philip, the first unifier, made a rapid but imperfect sketch of unification, the celerity of which had been made possible by the previous and yet looser Spartan domination; and had he been followed by successors of a patient talent rather than by a man of vast imagination and supreme genius, this first rough practical outline might have been filled in, strengthened and an enduring work achieved. One who first founds on a large scale and rapidly, needs always as his successor a man with the talent or the genius for organisation rather than an impetus for expansion. A Caesar followed by an Augustus meant a work of massive durability; a Philip followed by an Alexander an achievement of great importance to the world by its results, but in itself a mere splendour of short lived brilliance. Rome, to whom careful Nature denied any man of commanding genius until she had firmly unified Italy and laid the basis of her empire, was able to build much more firmly; neverthless she founded that empire not as the centre and head of a great nation, but still as a dominant city using a subject Italy for the spring-ing-board to leap upon and subjugate the sur-rounding world. Therefore she had to face a much more difficult problem of assimilation, that

of nation-nebulae and formed or inchoate cultures different from her own, before she had learned the art of true unification on a smaller and easier scale in the welding into one living organism the elements of difference and community offered by the Gallic, Latin, Umbrian, Oscan and Græco-Apulian factors in ancient Italy. Therefore although her empire endured for several centuries, it achieved temporary conservation at the cost of energy, of vitality and inner vigour; it accomplished neither the nation-unit nor the durable empire-unity; and like other ancient empires it had to collapse and make room for a new era of true nation-building.

It is necessary to emphasise where the error lay. The administrative, political, economic organisation of mankind in aggregates of smaller or greater size is a work which belongs at its basis to the same order of phenomena as the creation of vital organisms in physical Nature. It uses, that is to say, primarily external and physical methods governed by the principles of physical life-energy, although its object is to deliver, manifest, bring into secure working a supra-physical, a psychological principle latent behind the operations of the life and the body. To build a strong and durable body and vital functioning for a distinct, powerful, well-centred and well-diffused corporate ego is its whole aim and method. In this process, as we have seen, first smaller distinct units in a larger loose unity are formed; these have a strong psychological existence and a well developed body

and vital functioning, but in the larger mass the psychological sense and the vital energy are present but unorganised and without power of definite functioning, and the body is a fluid quantity, or a half-nebulous or at most a half-fluid, half-solidified mass, a plasm rather than a body. This has in its turn to be formed, organised, given both a firm physical shape and well-defined vital functioning and a clear psychological reality, self-consciousness and mental will-to-be.

Thus a new large unity is formed; and this again finds itself among a number of similar unities which it looks on first as hostile and quite different from itself, then enters into a sort of community in difference with them, till again we find repeated the original phenomenon of a number of smaller distinct units in a larger loose unity. The contained units are larger and more complex than before, the containing unity is also larger and more complex than before, but the essential position is the same and a similar problem presents itself. Thus in the beginning there was the phenomenon of city-States and regional peoples co-existing as disunited parts of a loose geographical and cultural unity, Italy or Hellas, and there was the problem of creating the Hellenic or Italian nation. Afterwards there came instead the phenomenon of nation-units co-existing as disunited parts of the loose geographical and cultural unity first, of Christendom, then, of Europe and with it the problem of the union of this Christendom or of this Europe which, though it was

attempted by Charlemagne and conceived by Henry IV of France and afterwards by Napoleon, has never been achieved. Before it could be solved, the modern movement with its unifying forces has presented to us the new and more complex phenomenon of a number of nation-units and empire units embedded in the loose but growing cultural unity and commercial close-connection of mankind, and the attendant problem of the unification of mankind already overshadows that of the unification of Europe.

In physical Nature vital organisms cannot live entirely on themselves; they live either by interchange with other vital organisms or partly by that interchange and partly by devouring others; for these are the processes of assimilation common to separated physical life. In unification of life, on the other hand, an assimilation is possible which goes beyond this alternative of either the devouring of one by another or their continued separate distinctness which limits assimilation to a mutual reception of the energies discharged by one life upon another. There is instead an association of units subordinating themselves to a general unity which is developed in the process of their coming together. Some of these indeed are killed and used as material for new elements, but all cannot be so treated, all cannot be devoured by one dominant unit, for in that case there is no unification, no creation of a larger unity, but only a temporary survival of the devourer by the digestion and utilisation of the

energy of the devoured. In the unification of human aggregates, this then is the problem, how the component units shall be subordinated to a new unity without their being killed.

The weakness of the old empire-unities created by conquest was that they tended to destroy the smaller units they assimilated, as did Rome, and to turn them into food for the life of the dominant organ. Gaul, Spain, Africa, Egypt were thus killed, turned into dead matter and their energy drawn into the centre, Rome; thus the empire became a great dying mass on which the life of Rome fed for several centuries. In such a method however the exhaustion of the life in the subject parts must end by leaving the dominant voracious centre without any source for new storage of energy. At first the best intellectual force of the conquered provinces flowed to Rome and their vital energy poured into it a great supply of military force and governing ability, but eventually both failed and first the intellectual energy of Rome and then its military and political ability died away in the midst of the general death. Nor would Roman civilisation have lived even for so long but for the new ideas and motives it received from the East. This interchange, however, had neither the vividness nor the constant flow which marks the incoming and return of ever new tides of thought and motives of life in the modern world and it could not really revivify the low vitality of the imperial body nor even arrest very long the process of its decay. When the Roman grasp loosened, the world which

it had held so firmly constricted had been for long a huge decorous death-in-life incapable of new organisation or self-regeneration; vitality could only be restored through the inrush of the vigorous barbarian world from the plains of Germany, the steppes beyond the Danube and the deserts of Arabia Dissolution had to precede a movement of sounder construction.

In the mediaeval period of nation-building, we see Nature mending this earlier error. When we speak indeed of the errors of Nature, we use a figure from our human experience and psychology; for in Nature there are no errors but only the deliberate measure of her paces traced and retraced in a prefigured rhythm, of which each step has a meaning and its place in the action and re-action of her gradual advance. The crushing domination of Roman uniformity was a device, not to kill out permanently, but to discourage in their excessive separative vitality the old smaller units, so that when they revived again they might not present an insuperable obstacle to the growth of a true national unity. What the mere nation-unity may lose by not passing through this cruel discipline,—we leave aside the danger it brings of an actual death like the Assyrian or Chaldean as well as the spiritual and other gains that may accrue by avoiding it,—is shown in the example of India where the Maurya, Gupta, Andhra, Moghul empires, huge and powerful and well-organised as they were, never succeeded in passing a steam-roller over the too strongly

independent life of the subordinate unities from the village community to the regional or linguistic area. It has needed the pressure of a rule neither indigenous in origin nor locally centred, the dominance of a foreign nation entirely alien in culture and morally armoured against the sympathies and attractions of the cultural atmosphere to do in a century this work which two thousand years of a looser imperialism had failed to accomplish. Such a process implies necessarily a cruel and often dangerous pressure and breaking up of old institutions, for Nature tired of the obstinate immobility of an age-long resistance seems to care little how many beautiful and valuable things are destroyed so long as her main end is accomplished; but we may be sure that, if destruction is done, it is because for that end the destruction was indispensable.

In Europe, after the Roman pressure was removed, the city State and regional nation revived as elements of a new construction ; but except in one country and curiously enough in Italy itself the city-state offered no real resistance to the process of national unification. We may ascribe its strong resuscitation in Italy to two circumstances; first to the premature Roman oppression of the ancient free city-life of Italy before it had realised its full potentialities and, secondly, to its survival in seed both by the prolonged civil life of Rome itself and by the persistence in the Italian *municipia* of a sense of separate life, oppressed but never quite ground out of existence as was the separate

clan-life of Gaul and Spain or the separate city-life of Greece. Thus, psychologically, the Italian city state neither died, satisfied and fulfilled, nor was broken up beyond recall; it revived in new incarnations. And this revival was disastrous to the nation-life of Italy though an incalculable boon and advantage to the culture and civilisation of the world; for as the city-life of Greece had originally created, so the city-life of Italy recovered, renewed and gave in a new form to our modern times the Art, Literature, thought and Science of the Graeco-Roman world. Elsewhere, the city unit revived only in the form of the free or half-free municipality of mediaeval France, Flanders and Germany; and these were at no time an obstacle to unification, but rather helped to form a subconscious basis for it and in the meanwhile to prevent by rich impulses and free movement of thought and art the mediaeval tendency to intellectual uniformity, stagnation and obscuration.

The old clan-nation perished, except in countries like Ireland and Northern and Western Scotland which had not undergone the Roman pressure, and there, as we have seen, it was as fatal to unification as the city-state in Italy; it prevented Ireland from evolving an organised unity and the Highland Celts from amalgamating with the Anglo-Celtic Scotch nation until the yoke of England passed over them and did what the Roman rule would have done if it had not been stayed in its expansion by the Grampians and the Irish seas. In the rest of Western Europe, the

work done by the Roman rule was so sound that even the domination of the western countries by the tribal nations of Germany failed to revive the old, strongly marked and obstinately separative clan-nation. It created in its stead the regional kingdoms of Germany and the feudal and provincial divisions of France and Spain; but it was only in Germany, which, like Ireland and the Scotch highlands, had not endured the Roman yoke, that this regional life proved a serious obstacle to unification. In France, it seemed for a time to prevent it, but in reality it resisted only long enough to make itself of value as an element of richness and variation in the final French unity; and the unexampled perfection of that unity is a sign of the secret wisdom concealed in the prolonged process we watch through the history of France which seems to a superficial glance so miserable and distracted, so long an alternation of anarchy with feudal or monarchic despotism, so different from the gradual, steady and much more orderly development of the national life of England. But in England the necessary variation and richness of the ultimate organism was otherwise provided for by the great difference of races forming the new nation and by the persistence of Wales, Ireland and Scotland as separate cultural units with a subordinate self-consciousness of their own in the larger unity.

The European cycle of nation-building differs therefore from the ancient cycle which led from the regional and city-State to the empire, first in

its not overshooting itself by proceeding towards a larger unification to the neglect of the necessary intermediate aggregate, secondly, in its slow and ripening progression through three successive stages by which unity was secured and yet the constituent elements not killed nor prematurely nor unduly oppressed by the instruments of unification. The first stage progressed through a long balancing of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in which the feudal system provided a principle of order and of a loose but still organic unity. The second was a movement of unification and increasing uniformity in which certain features of the ancient imperial system of Rome were repeated, but with a less crushing force and exhausting tendency; for it was marked by the creation of a metropolitan centre which began to draw to it, like Rome, the best life-energies of all the other parts, secondly, by the growth of an absolute sovereign authority with the function of imposing a legal, administrative political and linguistic uniformity and centralisation on the national life and, thirdly, by the establishment of a governing spiritual head and body which served to impose a similar uniformity of religious thought and intellectual education and opinion. This unifying movement too far pursued might have ended disastrously like the Roman but for a third stage of revolt which broke or subordinated these instruments, feudalism, monarchy, church authority, as soon as their work had been done and substituted a new movement directed towards the diffusion of the national life through a strong and

well-organised political, legal, social and cultural freedom and equality. Its trend has been to endeavour that as in the ancient city, so in the modern nation, all classes and all individuals should enjoy the benefits and participate in the free energy of the released national existence.

The third stage of national life enjoys the advantages of unity and sufficient uniformity created by the second and is able safely to utilise anew the possibilities of regional and city-life saved from entire destruction by the first. By these gradations of national progress, it has been made increasingly possible for our modern times to envisage the idea of a federated nation based securely upon a fundamental and well-realised psychological unity and move towards a partial decentralisation through communes and provincial cities which will help to cure the malady of an excessive metropolitan absorption of the best national energies and facilitate their free circulation through many centres and plexuses. At the same time, we can contemplate the organised use of the State now consciously representative of the whole conscious, active, vitalised nation as a means for the perfection of the life of the individual and the community. This is the point which the development of the nation aggregate has reached at the moment when we are again confronted with the wider problem of the imperial aggregate and the still vaster problems created by the growing cultural unity and commercial and political interdependence of all mankind.

CHAPTER XIII

The three stages of development which have marked the mediaeval and modern evolution of the nation-type may be regarded as the natural process where a new form of unity has to be created out of complex conditions and heterogeneous materials by an external process which shall mould the psychological condition of men into new forms and habits under the pressure of circumstances and institutions rather than by the direct creation of a new psychological condition which shall develop its own appropriate and serviceable social forms. There must be in the nature of things first some kind of looser yet sufficiently compelling order of society and common type of civilisation to serve as a framework or scaffolding within which the new edifice shall arise. Next, there must come a period of stringency which shall make for unity and centrality of control and perhaps culminate in a general levelling and uniformity under that central unity. Last, if the new organism is not to fossilise and stereotype itself, if it is to be a living and vigorous creation of Nature, there must come a period of free internal development as soon as the formation is assured and the unity has become a habit of life, so that this freer internal activity no

longer brings with it the peril of disorder, disruption and arrest of the secure growth and formation of the organism.

The form and principle of the first looser system must depend upon the past history and present conditions of the elements which have to be welded into the new unity. But it is noticeable that both in Europe and Asia there was a common tendency, which we cannot trace to any close interchange of ideas and must therefore attribute to the operation of the same natural cause and necessity, towards the evolution of a social hierarchy based on a division according to four different social activities,—spiritual function, political domination and the double economic function of production and interchange and labour or service. The spirit, form and equipoise worked out were very different in different parts of the world according to the circumstances, but the initial principle was almost identical. It was everywhere the attempt to provide a large effective form of common social life marked by fixity of status through which individual and small communal interests might be brought under the yoke of a sufficient religious, political and economic unity. It is notable, too, that the Islamic civilisation, with its dominant principle of equality and brotherhood in the faith and its curious institution of a slavery which did not prevent the slave from rising even to the throne, was never able to evolve such a form of society and failed in spite of its close contact with political and progressive Europe to

develop strong and living nation-units even after the disruption of the empire of the Caliphs.

But even where this preparatory stage was effectively brought into being, the subsequent stages did not necessarily follow. The feudal period of Europe with its four orders of the clergy, the king and nobles, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has a sufficiently close resemblance to the Indian fourfold order of the sacerdotal, military and mercantile classes and the serfs. The latter system took indeed its rise in a rather different order of ideas more prominently religious and ethical than political, social or economical; but still, eventually, the dominant function of the system was really social and economical and there seems at first sight to be no reason why it should not have followed, with whatever differences of detail, the common evolution. Japan with its great feudal order under the spiritual and secular headship of the Mikado and afterwards the double headship of the Mikado and the Shogun evolved one of the most vigorous and self-conscious nation units the world has seen. China with its great learned class uniting in one the Brahmin and Kshatriya functions of spiritual and secular knowledge and executive rule and its Emperor and Son of Heaven for head and type of the national unity succeeded in becoming a united nation. The different result in India, apart from other causes, was due to the different evolution of the social order. Elsewhere that evolution made for a secular headship, within the nation itself

a clear political self-consciousness and either the subordination of the sacerdotal class to the military and administrative or else their equality or even their fusion under a common spiritual and secular head. In mediæval India, on the contrary, it made for the dominance of the sacerdotal class and the substitution of a common spiritual for a common political consciousness as the basis of the national feeling. No lasting secular centre was evolved, no great imperial or kingly head which by its prestige, power, antiquity and claim to general reverence and obedience could overbalance or even merely balance this sacerdotal prestige and predominance and create a sense of political as well as spiritual unity.

The struggle between the Church and the monarchical State is one of the most important and vital features of the history of Europe. Had that conflict ended in an opposite result, the whole future of humanity would have been in jeopardy. As it was, the Church was obliged to renounce its claim to independence and dominance over the temporal power. Even in the nations which remained Catholic, a real independence and dominance of the temporal authority was successfully vindicated; for the King of France exercised a control over the Gallican Church and clergy which rendered all effective interference of the Pope in French affairs impossible, and even in Spain, in spite of the close alliance between Pope and King and the theoretical admission of the former's complete spiritual authority, it was really the

temporal head who decided even the ecclesiastical policy and who commanded the terrors of the Inquisition. In Italy, the immediate presence of the spiritual head of Catholicism in Rome was one of the great moral obstacles to the development of a politically united nation; the passionate determination of the liberated Italian people to establish its King in Rome was really a symbol of this sentiment that a self-conscious and organised nation can have only one authority admitted in its midst and that must be the secular authority. The nation which has reached or is reaching this stage must either separate the religious and spiritual claim from its common secular and political life by individualising religion, or else it must unite the two by the alliance of the State and the Church to uphold the single authority of the temporal head, or it must combine the spiritual and temporal headship in one authority as was done in Japan and China and in England of the Reformation. *Even in India the people which first developed some national self-consciousness not of

*How natural is this tendency and how indicative of an inner necessity is shown by the curious modern phenomenon of the Kaiser Wilhelm II's claim to be the vicegerent of God for the German nation as well as its military, political and administrative head and the practical admission of this claim even by cultured Germans who have no religious faith; they accept him at least as an almost mystic symbol and head of German culture and spiritual unity as well as of their military and political greatness. The need of a newly formed nation-unity to feel its entire spiritual and eternal oneness in a visible centre and symbol is the root of this apparent extravagance.

a predominantly spiritual character, were the Rajputs, especially of Mewar, to whom the Raja was in every way the head of society and of the nation, and the peoples which having achieved national self-consciousness came nearest to achieving also organised political unity were the Sikhs for whom Guru GovindSingh deliberately devised a common secular and spiritual centre in the Khalsa, and the Mahrattas who not only established a secular head representing the conscious nation but secularised themselves, the whole people indiscriminately, Brahmin and Shudra, becoming for a time a people of soldiers, politicians and administrators.

In other words, the institution of a fixed social hierarchy, while it seems to have been a necessary stage for the first tendencies of national formation, needed to modify itself and prepare its own dissolution if the later stages were to be rendered possible. An instrument good for a certain work and set of conditions, if it is still retained when other work has to be done and conditions change, becomes necessarily an obstacle. The direction needed was a change from the spiritual authority of one class and the political authority of another to a centralisation of the common life of the evolving nation under a secular rather than a religious head or, if the religious tendency in the people be too strong to separate things spiritual and temporal, under a national head who shall be the fountain of authority in both departments. Especially was it necessary for the creation of a political self-consciousness; without which no separate nation-unit

can be successfully formed, that the sentiments, activities, instruments proper to its creation should for the time take the lead and all others stand behind and support them. A Church or a dominant sacerdotal caste cannot form the organised political untiy of a nation; for it is governed by other than political and administrative considerations and cannot be expected to subordinate to them its own characteristic feelings and interests. It can only be otherwise if the religious caste or sacerdotal class become also as in Tibet the actually ruling political class of the community. In India, the dominance of a caste governed by sacerdotal, religious and partly by spiritual interests and considerations, a caste which dominated thought and society and determined the principles of the national life but did not actually rule and administer, has always stood in the way of the development followed by the more secular-minded European and Mongolian peoples. It is only now after the advent ol European civilisation when the Brahmin caste has not only lost the best part of its exclusive hold on the national life but has largely secularised itself, that political and secular consideration have been able to come into the forefront, a pervading political self-consciousness has been awakened and the organised unity of the nation, as distinct from a spiritual and cultural oneness, possible in fact and not only as an unshaped subconscious tendency.

The second stage of the development of the nation-unit has been, then, the modification of the

social structure so as to make room for a powerful and visible centre of political and administrative unity. This stage is necessarily attended by a tendency to the abrogation of even such liberties as a fixed social hierarchy provides and the concentration of power in the hands, usually, of a dominant, if not always an absolute monarchical government. By modern democratic ideas, kingship is only tolerated either as a figure-head, a servant of the State life or a convenient centre of the executive administration, but is no longer indispensable as a real control; but the historical importance of a powerful kingship in the evolution of the nation-type, as it actually developed in mediaeval times, cannot be exaggerated. Even in liberty-loving, insular and individualistic England, the Plantagenets and Tudors were the real and active nucleus round which the nation grew into firm form and into adult strength; and in Continental countries the part played by the Capets and their successors in France, by the house of Castile in Spain and by the Romanoffs and their predecessors in Russia is still more prominent. In the last of these instances, one might almost say that, without the Ivans, Peters and Catherines there would have been no Russia. And even in modern times, the almost mediaeval role played by the Hohenzollerns in the unification and growth of Germany has been watched with an uneasy astonishment by the democratic peoples to whom such a phenomenon was no longer intelligible and seem hardly to be serious. But we may note also

in the new nations of the Balkans that the seeking for a king to centralise and assist their growth, with all the strange comedies and tragedies which have attended it, becomes perfectly intelligible as a manifestation of the sense of the old necessity. In the new formation of Japan into a nation of the modern type, the Mikado has played a similar role, the instinct of the renovators bringing him out of his helpless seclusion to meet the inner need, and the recent attempt of the brief dictatorship in China of to-day to convert itself into a new national monarchy may be attributed quite as much to the same feeling in a practical mind as to mere personal ambition. It is a sense of this great role played by the kingship in centralising and shaping the national life at the most critical stage of its growth which explains the tendency common in the East and not altogether absent from the history of the West to invest it with an almost sacred character; it explains also the passionate loyalty with which great national dynasties or their successors have been served even in the moment of their degeneration and downfall.

But this movement of national development, however salutary in its peculiar role, is almost fatally attended with that suppression of internal liberty which makes the modern mind so naturally, though unscientifically harsh in its judgment of the old monarchical absolutism and its tendencies. For always it is a movement of concentration, stringency, uniformity; to universalise one law, one rule, one central authority is the need it has to

meet, and therefore its spirit must be to enforce and centralise authority, to narrow or quite suppress liberty. In England, the period of the New Monarch from Edward IV to Elizabeth, in France the great Bourbon period from Henry IV to Louis XIV, in Spain the epoch which extends from Ferdinand to Philip II, in Russia the rule of Peter the Great and Catherine were the time in which the respective nations reached their maturity, formed fully and confirmed their spirit and attained to a robust organisation. And all these were periods of absolutism or of a movement to absolutism and a certain foundation of or attempt to found uniformity. It was really in another form the now reviving idea of the State and its right to impose its will on the life and thought and conscience of the people so as to make it one single, undivided, perfectly efficient and perfectly directed mind and body.

It is from this point of view that we shall most intelligently understand the attempt of the Tudors and Stuarts to impose both monarchical authority and religious uniformity on the people, the real sense of the religious wars in France, the Catholic monarchical rule in Spain with its atrocious method of the Inquisition and the oppressive will of the absolute Czars in Russia to impose also an absolute national Church. The effort failed in England, because, after Elizabeth, it no longer answered to any genuine need, the nation being already well-formed, strong and secure against disruption from without. Elsewhere it succeeded both in Protestant and Catholic countries, or in the

rare cases, as in Poland, where this movement could not take place or failed, the result was disastrous. Certainly, it was everywhere an outrage on the human soul, but it was not merely due to any natural wickedness of the rulers; it was an inevitable stage in the formation of the nation-unit by political and mechanical means. If it left England the sole country in Europe where liberty could progress by natural gradations, that was due, no doubt, largely to the strong qualities of the people but still more to its fortunate history and insular circumstances.

The monarchical State in this evolution crushed or subordinated the religious liberties of men and made a subservient or conciliated ecclesiastical order the priest of its divine right, Religion the handmaid of a secular throne. It destroyed the liberties of the aristocracy and left it only its privileges so that it might support and buttress the power of the king. After using the bourgeoisie against the nobles, it destroyed its real civic liberties and left it only some outward form; as for the people they had no liberties to be destroyed. Thus the monarchical State concentrated in its own activities the whole national life. The Church served it with its moral influence, the nobles with their military traditions and ability, the bourgeoisie with the talent or chicane of its lawyers and the literary genius or administrative power of its scholars, thinkers and men of inborn business capacity; the people gave taxes and served with their blood the personal and national ambitions of the monarchy. But all this powerful structure and closely-knit

order of things was doomed by its very triumph and predestined to come down either with a crash or by a more or less unwilling gradual abdication before new necessities and agencies. It was tolerated and supported so long as the nation felt consciously or subconsciously its need and justification; once that was fulfilled and ceased, there came inevitably the old questioning which, now grown fully self-conscious, could no longer be suppressed or permanently resisted. By changing the old order into a mere simulacrum the monarchy had destroyed its own base. The sacerdotal authority of the Church having once been questioned on spiritual grounds could not be long maintained by temporal means, by the sword and the law; the aristocracy keeping its privileges but losing its real functions became odious and questionable to those below; the bourgeoisie conscious of its talent, irritated by its political and social inferiority, awakened by the voice of its thinkers, led the movement of revolt and appealed to the help of the populace; the masses, dumb, oppressed, suffering, rose with this new support which had been denied to them before and overturned the whole social hierarchy. Hence the collapse of the old world and the birth of a new age.

We have already seen the inner justification of this great revolutionary movement. The nation-unit is not formed and does not exist merely for the sake of existing; its purpose is to provide a larger mould of human aggregation in which the race, and not only classes and individuals, may

move towards its full human 'development.' So long as the labour of formation continues, this larger development may be held back and authority and order be accepted as the first consideration, but not when the aggregate is sure of its existence and feels the need of an inner expansion. Then the old bonds have to be burst; the means of formation have to be discarded as obstacles to growth. Liberty then becomes the watchword of the race. The ecclesiastical order which suppressed liberty of thought and new ethical and social development, has to be dispossessed of its despotic authority, so that man may be mentally and spiritually free; the monopolies and privileges of the king and aristocracy have to be destroyed, so that all may take their share of the national power, prosperity and activity; bourgeois capitalism has to be induced or forced to consent to an economical order in which suffering, poverty and exploitation shall be eliminated and the wealth of the community be more equally shared by all who help to create it. In all directions, men have to come into their own, realise the dignity and freedom of the manhood within them and give play to their utmost capacity.

For liberty is insufficient, justice also is necessary and becomes a pressing demand; the cry for equality arises. Certainly, absolute equality is non-existent in this world; but the word was aimed against the unjust and unnecessary inequalities of the old social order. Under a just social order, there must be an equal opportunity, an equal

training for all to develop their faculties and to use them, and, so far as may be, an equal share in the advantages of the aggregate life as the right of all who contribute to the existence, vigour and development of that life by the use of their capacities As we have noted, this need might have taken the form of an ideal of free co-operation guided and helped by a wise and liberal central authority expressing the common will, but has actually reverted to the old notion of an absolute and efficient State,—no longer monarchical, ecclesiastical, aristocratic but secular, democratic and socialistic,—with liberty sacrificed to the need of equality and aggregate efficiency. The psychological causes of this reversion we shall not now consider. Perhaps liberty and equality liberty and authority, liberty and organised efficiency can never be quite satisfactorily reconciled so long as man individual and aggregate lives by egoism, so long as he cannot undergo a great spiritual and psychological change and rise beyond mere communal association to that third ideal which some vague inner sense made the revolutionary thinkers of France add to their watchwords of liberty and equelity,—the greatest of all the three, though till now only an empty word on man's lips, the ideal of fraternity. That no mechanism social, political, religious has ever created or can ever create; it must take birth in tae soul and rise from hidden and divine depths within.

CHAPTER XIV

The study of the growth of the nation unit under the pressure indeed of a growing inner need and idea but by the agency of political, economical and social forces, forms and instruments shows us a progress from a loose formation in which various elements were being gathered together for unification, through a period of strong concentration and coercion in which the conscious national ego is developed, fortified, provided with a centre and instruments of its organic life, to a final period of assured separate existence and internal unity as against outside pressure in which liberty and the active and more and more equal share of all in the benefits of the national life become possible. And if the unity of the human race is to be brought about by the same means and agents and in a similar fashion to that of the nation, we should expect it to follow a similar course. That is at least the most visible probability and it seems to be consistent with the natural law of all creation which starts from the loose mass, the more or less amorphous vague of forces and materials and proceeds by contraction, constriction, solidification into a firm mould in which the rich evolution of various forms of life is at last securely possible.

If we consider the actual state of the world and its immediate possibilities we shall see that a first

period of loose formation and imperfect order is inevitable. Neither the intellectual preparation of the human race nor the development of its sentiments nor the economical and political forces and conditions by which it is moved and preoccupied, have reached to such a point of inner stress or external pressure as would warrant us in expecting a total change of the basis of our life or the establishment of a real unity, even a real external unity. It is true that the vague sense and need of something of the kind has been growing rapidly and the object lesson of the war has brought the master idea of the future out of the nascent condition in which it was no more than the generous chimera of a few pacifist or internationalist idealists. It is now recognised as containing in itself some force of eventual reality and the voice of those who would still cry it down as the pet notion of intellectual cranks and faddists has no longer the same volume and confidence, because it is no longer so solidly supported by the common sense of the average man, that common sense of the material mind which consists in a strong feeling for immediate actualities and an entire blindness to the possibilities of the future. But there has neither been that long intellectual preparation of a more and more dominant thought cast out by the intellectuals of the age and remoulding the ideas of common men, nor that gathering to a head of the revolt against present conditions which in their combination render it possible for vast masses of men seized by the passion for an ideal and by the

hope of a new happiness for mankind to break up the present basis of things and construct a new scheme of collective life. In another direction, the replacing of the individualistic basis of society by an increasing collectivism, there has been to a large extent such a preparation and a gathering force of revolt, and therefore the War has acted there as a precipitative force and brought us much nearer to the possibility of a realised State socialism. But there have been no such favourable preconditions in the sense of international unity. No great effective outburst of a massed and dynamic idealism in this direction can be reasonably predicted. The preparation may have begun, it may have been greatly facilitated and hastened by recent events, but it is still only in its first stages.

Under such conditions, the ideas and schemes of the world's intellectuals who would replan the whole status of international life altogether and form its roots in the light of general principles, are not likely to find any immediate realisation. In the absence of the general idealistic outburst of human hope which would make such changes possible, the future will be shaped not by the ideas of the thinker but by the practical mind of the politician which represents the average reason and temperament of the time and effects usually something much nearer the minimum than the maximum of what is possible. The average general mind of a great mass of men, while it is ready to listen to such ideas as it has been prepared to receive and is accustomed to seize on this or that notion with a

partisan avidity, is yet ruled in its action not so much by its thought as by its interests, passions and perjudices. The politician and the statesman—and the world is now full of politicians but very empty of statesmen—act in accordance with this average general mind of the mass; the one is governed by it, the other has always to take it into chief account and cannot lead it where he will, unless he is one of those great geniuses and powerful personalities who unite a large mind and dynamic force of conception with an enormous power or influence over men. Moreover, the political mind has limitations of its own beyond those of the general average mind of the mass; it is even more respectful of the *status quo*, more disinclined to great adventures in which the safe footing of the past has to be abandoned, more incapable of launching out into the uncertain and the new. To do that it must either be forced by general opinion or a powerful interest or else itself fall under the spell of a great new enthusiasm diffused in the mental atmosphere of the times.

If the politician mind were left entirely to itself, we should probably have as a first tangible result of the greatest international convulsion on record, very little more than a rearrangement of frontiers, a redistribution of power and possessions and a few desirable or undesirable developments of international, commercial and other relations. That is even now one disastrous possibility against which the future of the world is by no means secure. Still, since the mind of humanity has been greatly moved

and its sentiments powerfully awakened, since the sense is fairly wide-spread that the old status of things is no longer tolerable and the undesirability of an international balance reposing on a ring of national egoisms held in check only by mutual fear and hesitation, by ineffective arbitration treaties and Hague tribunals and the blundering discords of a European Concert must be now fairly clear even to the politician mind, we may expect that some serious attempt towards the beginning of a new order may be the result of the moral collapse of the old. The passions and hatreds and selfish national hopes raised by the war will certainly be a great obstacle in the way and may easily render futile or of a momentary stability any such beginning. But we may hope that, if nothing else, the mere exhaustion and internal reaction produced after the relaxing of the tensity of the struggle, may give time for new ideas, feelings, forces, events to emerge which will counteract this pernicious influence.

Still the most that we can expect must needs be very small. In the internal life of nations, the effects of the War cannot fail to be powerful and radical, for there everything is ready, the pressure felt has been enormous and the expansion after it has been removed must be correspondingly great in its results; but in international life we can only look forward to a certain minimum of radical change enough to be, however small, yet in itself an irrevocable departure, a small seed of sufficient vitality to ensure the inevitability of future growth

If indeed developments were to occur before the end which would both carry the general mind of Europe and force the mind of its rulers into greater depths and a more widereaching sense of the necessity for radical change than has yet been developed, more might be hoped for; but as the great conflict draws nearer to its close, no such probability emerges; we seem to have passed the dynamic period during which in such a crisis the effective ideas and tendencies of men are formed. The two real points on which the general mind has been powerfully affected are the revolt against the possible repetition of the present catastrophe and the strongly felt necessity for preventing the unparalleled dislocation of the economical life of the race which it has brought about. Therefore, it is in these two directions that some real development may be expected; for so much must be attempted if the general expectation and desire is to be satisfied and to trifle with these would be to declare the political mind of Europe bankrupt, convict its governments and ruling classes of moral and intellectual impotence and provoke a general revolt of the European peoples against their existing institutions and present leader ship.

We may expect then some attempt to provide for the regulation of war and international commerce, the limitation of armaments, a settled and effective means for the satisfactory disposal of dangerous disputes and, especially, though this presents the greatest difficulty, for meeting that conflict of commercial aims and interests which is

now the really effective, though by no means the only factor in the conditions that compel the recurrence of War. If this new arrangement contains in itself the seed of international control, if it be a first step towards the loose formation, perhaps contains the elements or initial lines of a loose rormation towards which the international life of humanity can turn for a mould of growth in its reaching out to a unified existence, then, however fudimentary or unsatisfactory it may be in itself, the future will be assured. Once having begun, it will be impossible for mankind to draw back and, whatever difficulties, disappointments, struggles, reactions may mark the course of its development, they will be bound to help in the end rather than hinder the final and inevitable result.

Still it would be vain to hope that the principle of international control will be really effective at first or that the loose formation, which is likely to be in the beginning half form, half nebula, will prevent farther conflicts, explosions, catastrophes. The difficulties are too great. The mind of the race has not as yet the necessary experience, the intellect of its ruling classes has not acquired the necessary wisdom and foresight, the temperament of the peoples has not developed the necessary instincts and sentiments. Whatever arrangement is made will proceed on the old basis of national egoisms, hungers, cupidities, self-assertions and will simply try to find a means for regulating them just enough to prevent disastrous collisions; and the first means will necessarily be

insufficient because too much respect will be paid to those very egoisms which it is sought to control. The causes of strife will remain; the temper that engenders it will live on, perhaps exhausted and subdued for a time in certain of its activities, but unexorcised; the means of strife may be controlled but will be allowed to remain. Armament may be restricted, but will not be abolished; national armies may be limited in numbers—an illusory limitation—but they will be maintained; science will still continue to minister ingeniously to the art of collective massacre. War can only be abolished if national armies are abolished and even then with difficulty, by the development of some other machinery which humanity does not yet know how to form or, even if formed, will not for some time be able or willing to utilise perfectly. And there is no chance of national armies being abolished; for each nation distrusts all the others too much, has too many ambitions and hungers, needs to remain armed, if for nothing else, to guard its markets and keep down its dominions, colonies, subject peoples. Commercial ambitions and rivalries, political pride, dreams, longings, jealousies are not going to disappear as if by the touch of a magic wand merely because Europe has in an insane clash of long-ripening ambitions, jealousies and hatreds decimated its manhood and flung in three years the resource of decades into the melting-pot of war. The awakening must go much deeper, lay hold upon much purer roots of action before the psychology of nations will be transmuted

into that something " wondrous, rich and strange" which will eliminate war and international strife from humanity.

National egoism remaining, the means of strife remaining, its causes, opportunities, excuses will never be wanting. The present War came because all the leading nations had long been so acting as to make it inevitable; it came because there was a Balkan imbroglio and a near Eastern hope and commercial and colonial rivalries in Northern Africa over which the dominant nations had been battling in peace long before one or more of them grasped at the rifle and the shell. Sarajevo and Belgium were mere determining circumstances; to get to the root causes we have to go back as far at least as Agadir and Algeciras. From Morocco to Tripoli, from Tripoli to Thrace and Macedonia, from Macedonia to Herzegovina the electric chain ran with that inevitable logic of causes and results, actions and their fruits which we call Karma, creating minor detonations on its way till it found the inflammable point and created that vast explosion which has filled Europe with blood and ruins. Possibly the Balkan question will be definitively settled, though it is difficult to see how it can be under the present circumstances; possibly the definitive expulsion of Germany from Africa may ease the situation by leaving that continent in the possession of three or four nations who are for the present close allies. But even if Germany were expunged from the map and its resentments and ambitions deleted as a European

factor, the root causes of strife would remain. There would still be an Asiatic question of the near and the far East which might take on new conditions and appearances and regroup its constituent elements, but must remain so fraught with danger till it is settled that it would be fairly safe to predict the next great human collision with Asia as its field or origin. Even with that difficulty settled, new causes of strife must necessarily develop where the spirit of national egoism and cupidity seeks for satisfaction; and so long as it lives, satisfaction it must seek and repletion can never permanently satisfy it. The tree must bear its own proper fruit, and Nature is always a diligent gardener.

The limitation of armies and armaments, we have said, is an illusory remedy. Even if there could be found an effective international means of controlling them, it would cease to operate as soon as the clash of war actually came. The present conflict has shown that, in the course of war itself, a country can be turned into a huge factory of arms and a nation convert its whole peaceful manhood into an army. England which started with a small and even insignificant armed force, was able in the course of a single year to raise millions of men and in two to train and equip them and throw them effectively into the balance. This object-lesson is sufficient to show that the limitation of armies and armaments can only lighten the national burden in peace, leaving it by that very fact more resources for the conflict, but

cannot prevent or even minimise the disastrous intensity and extension of war itself. Nor will the construction of a stronger international law with a more effective sanction behind it be a perfect remedy. It is often asserted that this is what is needed, that just as in the nation itself Law has been so developed as to replace and suppress the barbarous method of settling disputes between individuals, families or clans by the arbitration of Might, so a similar development ought to be possible in the life of nations. Perhaps, in the end; but to expect it to operate successfully at once is to ignore both the real basis of the effective authority of Law and the difference between the constituents of a developed nation and the constituents of that ill-developed international comity which it is proposed to initiate.

The authority of Law in a nation or community does not really depend on any so-called "majesty" or mystic power in man made rules and enactments. Its real sources of power are two, first, the strong interest of the majority or of a dominant minority or of the community as a whole in maintaining it and, secondly, the possession of a sole armed force, police and military, which makes that interest effective. The metaphorical sword of justice can only act because there is a real sword behind it to enforce its decrees and its penalties against the rebel and the dissident. And the essential character of this armed force is that it belongs to nobody, to no individual or constituent group of the

community except alone to the State, the King or the governing class or body in which sovereign authority is centred; nor can there be any security if it is balanced or its sole effectivity diminished by the existence of other armed forces belonging to groups and individuals and at all free from the central control so as to admit of their use against the governing authority. Even so, even with this authority backed by a sole and centralised armed force, Law has not been able to prevent strife of a kind between individuals and classes because it has not been able to remove the psychological, economic and other causes of strife. Crime with its penalties is always a kind of mutual violence, a kind of revolt, and even in the best-policed and most law-abiding communities crime is still rampant; even the organisation of crime is possible although it cannot endure or be powerful because it has the whole vehement sentiment and effective organisation of the community against it. But what is more to the purpose, Law has not been able to prevent, though it has minimised, the possibility of civil strife and violent or armed discord within the nation itself. Whenever a class or an opinion has thought itself oppressed or treated with intolerable injustice, has found the Law and armed force so entirely associated with an opposite interest that the suspension of the very principle of law and the insurgence of the violence of revolt against the violence of oppression were the only remedy, it has, if it thought it had a chance of success, appeared to the ancient arbitration

of Might. Even in our own days we have seen the most law-abiding of nations staggering on the verge of a disastrous civil war and responsible statesmen declaring their readiness to appeal to it if a measure disagreeable to them were enforced, even though it was passed by the supreme legislative authority with the sanction of the sovereign.

But in any loose international formation presently possible the armed force would still be divided among its constituent groups and belong to them, not to any sovereign authority. The position would be like that of the feudal ages in which very prince and baron had his separate jurisdiction and military resources and could defy the authority of the sovereign if he were powerful enough or could command the necessary number and strength of alies among his peers. And in this case, there would not be even the equivalent of a feudal sovereign—a king who, if nothing else, if not really a monarch, was at least the first among his peers, had the prestige of sovereignty and some means of developing it into a strong and permanent actuality.

Nor would the matter be much improved if there were a composite armed force of control set over the nations and their separate military strength; for this composite would break apart and its elements return to their sources on the outbreak of overt strife. In the developed nation the individual is the unit and he is lost among the mass of individuals, unable safely to calculate the force he could command in a conflict, afraid of all other

individuals not bound to him, because he sees in them natural supporters of the outraged authority; revolt is to him a most dangerous and incalculable business, even the initial conspiracy fraught at every moment with a thousand terrors and dangers lowering against a small modicum of chances. And the solidier is also a solitary individual, afraid of all the rest, with a terrible punishment hanging over him at the least sign of insubordination, never sure of a confident support among his fellows or, even if a little certain, not assured of any effective support from the civil population and therefore deprived of that moral force which would encourage him to defy the authority of Law and Government. And in his ordinary sentiment he belongs no longer to individual or family or class, but to the State and the country or at the very least to the machine of which he is a part. But here the constituents would be a small number of nations, some of them powerful empires, well able to look around them, measure their own force, make sure of their allies, calculate the force against them ; the chances of success or failure would be all they would have to consider. And the soldiers of the composite army would belong in heart to their country and not at all to the, nebulous entity which controlled them.

Therefore, without or until the evolution of an international State so constituted as to be something other than a mere loose coglomerate of nations or rather of the deputies of national governments, the reign of peace and unity dreamed of

by the idealist could never be possible by these political or administrative means or, if possible, could never be secure. Even if acual war were eliminated still, as in the nation crime between individuals exists or as other means, such as disastrous general strikes, are used in the war of classes, so here too other means of strife would be developed, much more disastrous perhaps than even war itself, to meet the psychological necessity of egoistic discord and passion and ambition and the sense of injustice, of oppressed rights, of thwarted possibilities. The law is always the same, that egoism being the root of action it must bear its own proper results, however minimised and kept down they may be by an external machinery.

It is apparent at least that no loose formation without a powerful central control could be satisfactory, effective or enduring, even if it were much less loose, much more compact than anything that seems at present likely to evolve in the near future. There must be in the nature of things a movement towards greater rigidity, constriction of national liberties, the erection of a unique central authority with a uniform control.

CHAPTER XV

What favoured form, force, system among the many that are possible now and likely to emerge hereafter, will be entrusted by the secret Will in things with the external unification of mankind, is an interesting, to those who can look behind the veil of passing events, a fascinating subject of speculation; but unfortunately it can at present be nothing more. The very multitude of the possibilities in a period of humanity so rife with the most varied and potent forces, so fruitful of new subjective developments and objective mutations forms an impenetrable mist in which only vague forms of giants can be half glimpsed. Certain ideas suggested by the present status of forces and by past experience are all that we can permit ourselves in so hazardous a field.

We have ruled out of consideration as a practical impossibility in the present international conditions and the present state of international mentality and morality the idea of an immediate settlement on the basis of an association of free nationalities, although this would be obviously the ideal basis. For it would take as its principle the harmony of the two great principles actually in

presence, nationalism and internationalism: Its adoption would mean that the problem of human unity would be approached on the rational and moral basis of a recognition, on one side, of the right of all large natural groupings of men to live and be themselves with respect for national liberty as an established principle of human conduct, on the other of the need for order, help, mutual participation, a common life and interests in the unified and associated human race. The ideal society or State is that in which respect for individual liberty and free growth of the personal being to his perfection is harmonised with respect for the needs, efficiency, solidarity, natural growth and organic perfection of the corporate being, the nation or society. So also in an ideal aggregate of all humanity, in the international society or State national liberty and free growth and self-realisation would be progressively harmonised with the solidarity and unified growth and perfection of the human race.

Therefore, if this basic principle were admitted, there might indeed be fluctuations due to the difficulty of a perfect working combination, as in the growth of the national aggregate there has been sometimes a stress on liberty and at others a stress on order and efficiency; but, the conditions of the problem being recognised from the beginning and not left to be worked out in a blind tug of war, there would be some chance of an earlier reasonable solution with much less friction and violence in the process.

But there is little chance of such an unprecedented good fortune for mankind. Ideal conditions cannot be hoped, for they demand a psychological clarity, a diffused reasonableness and scientific intelligence and, above all, a moral elevation and rectitude to which neither the mass of mankind nor its leaders and rulers have yet made any approach. In their absence, not reason and justice and mutual kindliness, but the trend of forces and their practical and legal adjustment must determine the working out of this as of other problems. And just as the problem of the State and the individual has been troubled and obscured not only by the conflict between individual egoism and the corporate egoism of the society, but by the continual clash between intermediate powers, class strife, quarrels of Church and State, king and nobles, king and commons, aristocracy and demos, capitalist bourgeoise and labour proletariate, so this problem of nation and international humanity is certain to be troubled by the claims of just such intermediate powers. To say nothing of commercial interests and combinations, cultural or racial sympathies, movements of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Anglo-Saxonism, with a possible Pan-Americanism and Pan-Mongolianism looming up in the future, to say nothing of yet other unborn monsters, there will always be the great intermediate factor of Imperialism demanding its own satisfaction in preference to or in place of both national unit and international comity. That satisfaction, persumably,

it must have for a time. At any rate to ignore its claims or to imagine that they can be put aside with a spurt of the writer's pen, is to build symmetrical castles on the golden sands of an impracticable idealism.

Forces take the first place in actual effectuation; moral principles, reason, justice only so far as forces can be compelled or persuaded to admit them or, as more often happens, use them as subservient aids or inspiring battle cries for their own interests. Ideas sometimes leap out as armed forces breaking their way through the hedge of unideal powers; sometimes they succeed in reversing the position and make interests their subordinate helpers, a fuel for their own blaze; sometimes they conquer by martyrdom: but ordinarily they have to work not only by a half-covert pressure, but by accommodation to powerful forces, even by bribing and cajoling them or by working through and behind them. So it must be until the average and the aggregate man become more of an intellectual, moral and spiritual being and less predominantly the vital and emotional half-reasoning animal. The unrealised international idea will have for some time at least to work by this secondary method and through such accommodations with the realised forces of nationalism and imperialism.

It may be questioned whether by the time that things are ready for the elaboration of a firm and settled system, the idea of a just internationalism based on respect for the principle of free nationalities may not by the efforts of the world's thinkers

and intellectuals have made so much progress as to exercise an irresistible pressure on States and Governments and bring about its own acceptation in large part, if not in entirety. The answer is that States and Governments yield usually to a moral pressure only so far as it does not compel them to sacrifice their vital interests. No established Empire is going to free its dependent parts and allow, unless compelled, a nation now subject to it to sit at the board of an international Council as its free equal. The times are past when France could intervene to aid the evolution of a free Italy or France and England to create a new Greek nation. The national liberties for which respect is demanded even at the point of the sword—or, we should say now, even with the voice of the cannon shell—are those which are already established and are considered to have therefore a right to go on existing or else those which consist in the restoration to already existing free States of men of their own nationality still under a foreign yoke. It is proposed to realise a greater Serbia, a greater Roumania, the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, of "unredeemed Italy", but not to constitute a free and independent Poland or Armenia. The autonomy of Poland under Russian sovereignty, and generally autonomy of a kind under an imperial sovereignty or where that does not yet exist, under imperial "protection" or "influence" are practical ideas, and they are signs perhaps of the obscure growth of that idea of federated empires which we have discussed as one of the possibilities of the future.

But national liberty as an absolute ideal has no longer the old general acceptation and creative force. Many even of the most advanced intellectuals, while warmly approving of the idea of subordinate autonomy for nations now subject, seem to look with impatience on their velleities of complete independence. So far has imperialism travelled and the imperial aggregate impressed itself even on the freest imaginations as an accomplished power in human progress.

We do not know how much farther it may not travel under the new impulse of humanity to organise its international existence on larger and more convenient lines. It is even possible that the German impatience of the continued existence of small nationalities opposing their settled barrier of prescribed rights to large political and commercial combinations may, while softening its rigour, yet justify itself, may be accepted by the general sense of humanity though in a less brutal, a less arrogant and aggressively egoistic form. That is to say, there may grow up a stronger tendency in the political reason of mankind to desire, perhaps eventually to insist upon the rearrangement of States in a system of large imperial combines and not on the basis of a *status quo* of mixed empires and free nationalities. But even if this development does not take place or does not effect itself in time, the actually existing free and non-imperial States will find themselves indeed included in whatever international Council or other system may be established, but this

inclusion is likely to be very much like the position of the small nobles in mediaeval times in relation to the great feudal princes, a position rather of vassals than of equals. The present War has shown that it is only the great Powers that really count in the international scale; all others merely exist by sufferance or by protection. So long as the world was arranged on the principle of separate nationalities, this might have been only a latent reality without actually important effects on the life of the smaller nations, but not when the necessity of combined action or a continual, active interaction becomes a recognised part of the world-system. The position of a minor State standing out against the will of large Powers or rather a party of Powers would be worse even than that of small neutrals in the present War or of a private company surrounded by great Trusts. It would be compelled to accept the lead of one group or another of the leviathans around it and its independent weight or action in the council of nations would be nil.

Undoubtedly, the right of small nations to exist and assert their interests against imperialistic aggression is still a force; it has been one at least of the issues in the present international collision. But the assertion of this right against the aggression of a single ambitious power is one thing; its assertion as against any arrangement for the common interest of the nations decided upon by a majority of the great Powers will very likely in the near future be regarded in quite another light.

The inconvenience of a number of small neutrals claiming to stand out and be as little affected as possible by an immense international conflict has been acutely felt not only by the actual combatants who have been obliged to use sometimes an indirect, sometimes a direct pressure to minimise the inconveniences, but by the neutrals themselves to whom their neutrality has been only a lesser evil than the burden and disaster of active participation in the struggle. In any international system, the self-assertion of these smaller liberties would probably be viewed as a petty egoism and intolerable obstacle to great common interests, or, it may be, to the decision of conflicts between great world-wide interests. It is probable indeed that in any constitution of international unity the great Powers would see to it that their voice was equal to their force and influence; but even if the constitution were outwardly democratic, yet in effect it would become an oligarchy of the great Powers. Constitutions can only disguise facts, they cannot abrogate them: for whatever ideas the form of the constitution may embody, its working is always that of the actually realised forces which can use it with effect. Most governments have now a democratic form, but nowhere yet is there a real democracy; it is the propertied and professional classes and the bourgeoisie who govern in the name of the people. So too in any international Council or control it would be a few great empires that would govern in the name of humanity.

At the most, if it were otherwise, it could be only for a short time, unless some new forces came into their own which would arrest or dissolve the tendency now dominant in the world towards large imperial aggregations. The position would then be for a time very much like that of feudal Europe while it was in abortive travail of a united Christendom,—a great criss-cross of heterogeneous, complicated, overlapping and mutually interpenetrating interests, a number of small Powers counting for something, but overshadowed and partly coerced by a few great Powers, the great Powers working out the inevitable complication of their allied, divided and contrary interests by whatever means the new world-system provided and using for the purpose whatever support of classes, ideas, tendencies, institutions they could find. There would be questions of Asiatic, African, American fiefs and market; struggles of classes starting as national questions, becoming international; Socialism, Anarchism and the remainder of the competitive age of humanity struggling together for predominance; clashes of Europeanism, Asiaticism, Americanism. And from this great tangle some result would have to be worked out. It might well be by methods very different from those with which history has made us familiar; war might be eliminated or reduced to a rare phenomenon of civil war in the international commonwealth or confederacy; new forms of coercion, such as the commercial which we now see to be growing in frequency, might ordinarily take its place; other devices

might be brought into being of which we have at present no conception. But the situation would be essentially the same for humanity in general as has confronted lesser unformed aggregates in the past and would have to progress to similar issues of success, modified realisation or failure.

The most natural simplification of the problem would be that of the division of the world into few imperial aggregates consisting partly of federal, partly of confederate empires. Although unrealisable with the present strength of national egoisms, the growth of ideas and the force of changing circumstances might bring about such a creation as a confederate Latin State, Italy, France and Spain combining to administrate either in common or in agreement their colonial African Empire. America seems to be turning dimly towards a better understanding between the increasingly cosmopolitan United States and the Latin republics of Central and South America which may in certain contingencies materialise itself into a confederate inter-American State. The idea of a confederate Teutonic empire is already born and if Germany and Austria are not entirely broken or even broken up as the result of the War, may realise itself in the near future; or, if they are broken, will all the more certainly realise itself though in a more distant future. Similar aggregates may realise themselves in the Asiatic world. Such a distribution of mankind in large natural aggregates would have the advantage of simplifying a number of difficult world-problems and with

the growth of peace, mutual understanding and larger ideas might lead to a comparatively painless final aggregation in a World-State.

Another possible solution is suggested by the precedent of the evolution of the nation-type out of its first loose feudal form. As there the continual clash of various forces and equipollent powers necessitated the emergence of one of them, at first only predominant among his equals, the feudal King, into the type of a centralised monarchy, so conceivably, if the empires and nations of the world failed to arrive at a peaceful solution among themselves, if the class troubles, the inter-commercial troubles, the conflict of various new ideas and tendencies resulted in a long confusion and turmoil and constant changing, there might emerge a king-nation with the mission of evolving a real and settled out of a semi-chaotic or half order. We have concluded that the military conquest of world by a single nation is not possible except under conditions which do not now exist and of which there is no visible prospect. But an imperial nation, such as England for example has a chance of being, spread over all the world, possessing the empire of the seas, knowing how to federate successfully its constituent parts and organise their entire potential strength, having the skill to make itself the representative and protector of the most progressive and liberal tendencies of the new times, allying itself with other forces and nations interested in their triumph and showing that it had the secret of a just and effective

international organisation, might conceivably become the arbiter of the nations and the effective centre of an international government. The possibility is as yet remote, but it is one of the definite possibilities of the future.

Conceivably, if the task of organising the world proved too difficult, if no lasting agreement could be arrived at or no firmly constituted legal authority erected, the task might be undertaken not by a single predominant empire, but by two or three great imperial powers sufficiently near in interest and united in idea to sink possible differences and jealousies and strong enough to dominate or crush all resistance and enforce some sort of effective international law and government. The process would then be a sufficiently painful one and might involve much brutality of moral and economical coercion, but if it commanded the prestige of success and evolved some tolerable form of legality and justice or even of prosperous order, it would in the end conciliate a general moral support and prove a starting-point for freer and better forms.

Yet another possibility that cannot be ignored is that the merely inter-governmental and political evolution which alone we have considered, may be broken in upon by the long-threatened war of classes. At present Labour internationalism has broken down, like every other form of internationalism, scientific, cultural, pacific, religious, under the fierce test of war and during the great crisis the struggle between labour and capital has

been suspended. It is hoped that after the war the spirit of unity, conciliation and compromise will continue to reign and the threatened conflict will be averted. Nothing in human nature or in history warrants any confident trust in such hopes of the moment. The inter-class conflict has long been threatening like the European collision. The advent of the latter was preceded by large hopes of world-peace and attempts at a European concert and treaties of arbitration which would render it finally impossible. The hope of a concert between labour and capital idyllically settling all their acute causes of conflict in amoebean stanzas of melodious compromise for the sake of the higher national interests is likely to be as treacherous and delusive. Even the socialisation of governments and the increasing nationalisation of industry will not remove the root cause of conflict. For there will still remain the crucial question of the form and conditions of the new State socialism, whether it shall be regulated in the interests of labour or of the capitalistic State and whether its direction shall be democratic by the workers themselves or oligarchic or bureaucratic by the present directing classes. This question may well lead to struggles which may easily grow into an international or at least an inter-European conflict rending each nation in two instead of uniting it as in the present crisis. And the results of such a struggle may have an incalculable effect, both in changing the ideas and life of men dynamically in new directions and in breaking down the barriers of existing nations and empires.

CHAPTER XVI

We have now answered the question with which we started ; we have sounded as thoroughly as our lights, the experience of history, the present data of the world and the laws of human development could enable us to sound, the possibility of a political and administrative unification of mankind by political and economical motives and through purely political and administrative means. We have concluded that it is not only possible, but that the thoughts and tendencies of mankind and the result of current events and existing forces and necessities are all beginning to point in this direction. It is one of the dominant drifts which the world-Nature is favouring in the flow of human development and it is the logical consequence of the past history of mankind and of its present circumstances. At the same time nothing justifies us in predicting its plainless or rapid development or even its sure and eventual success. We have seen some of the difficulties in the way ; we have seen also what are the lines on which it may practically proceed to the overcoming of those difficulties. We have concluded that the one line it is not likely to take is the ideal, that which justice and the highest expediency and the best thought of mankind demands, that which would ensure it the greatest

possibility of an enduring success. It is not likely to take until a probably much later period of our collective evolution the form of a federation of free nations or adopt as its motive a perfect harmony between the contending principles of nationalism and internationalism.

We have brought our inquiry to a point at which we have to consider the second part of the question we proposed. The political and administrative unification of mankind is not only possible but foreshadowed by our present evolution; the collective national egoism which resists it may be overborne by an increasing flood of the present unifying tendency to which the European War has given body and an articulate voice. But the question remains whether it will not necessarily then involve an overriding of the liberties of mankind, individual and collective, and an oppressive mechanism by which the free development of the soul-life of humanity will be for some time at least seriously hindered and repressed. We have seen that a period of loose formation is in such developments usually followed by a period of restriction and constriction in which a more rigid unification will be attempted so that firm moulds may be given to the new unity. And this has meant in past unifications and is likely to mean here also a suppression of that principle of liberty in human life which is the most precious gain of humanity's past spiritual, political and social struggles. The circle of progression is likely to work itself out again on this new line of advance.

Such a development would be not only probable, but inevitable if the unification of mankind proceeded in accordance with the Germanic gosped of the increasing domination of the world by the one fit empire, nation, race. It would be equally inevitable if the means employed by Destiny were the domination of humanity by two or three great imperial nations; or if the effectuating force were a closely organised united Europe which would, developing the scheme of a certain kind of political thinkers, take in hand the rest of the world holding the darker-coloured races of mankind in tutelage for an indefinite period.

The ostensible object and justification of such a tutelage would be to civilise, that is to say, to Europeanise the less developed races. Practically, we know that it would mean their exploitation, since in the course of human nature the benevolent but forceful guardian would feel himself justified in seeking to make the most profit he could out of his advantageous situation, always of course in the interest at once of his own development and that of the world in general. The regime would rest upon superior force for its maintenance and oppose itself to the velleities of freedom in the governed on the ground either that they were unfit or that the aspiration was immature, two arguments that may well remain valid for ever, since they can never be refuted to the satisfaction of those who advance them. At first this regime might be so worked as to preserve the principle of individual liberty for the governing

races while enforcing a beneficial subjection upon the ruled; but that could not endure. The experience of the past teaches us that the habit of preferring the principle of authority to the principle of liberty is engendered in an imperial people and reacts upon it at home leading it first insensibly and then by change of thought and the development of a fate in circumstances to the sacrifice of its own inner freedom. There could be only two outlets to such a situation, either the growth of the principle of liberty among the peoples still subject or, let us say, administered by others for their own benefit, or else its general decline in the world. Either the higher state must envelop from above or the lower from below; they cannot subsist perpetually together in the same human economy. But nine times out of ten, in the absence of circumstances ending the connection, it is the unhappier result that comes about.

All these means of unification would proceed practically by the use of force and compulsion and any deliberately planned, prolonged and extended use of restrictive means tends to discourage the respect for the principle of liberty in those who apply the compulsion as well as the fact of liberty in those to whom it is applied. It favours the growth of the opposite principle of dominating authority whose whole tendency is to introduce rigidity, uniformity, a mechanised and therefore eventually an unprogressive system of life. This is a psychological relation of cause and effect

whose working cannot be avoided except by taking care to found all use of authority on the widest possible basis of free consent. But by their very nature and origin the regimes of unification thus introduced would be debarred from the free employment of this corrective; for they would have to proceed by compulsion of a reluctant material and the imposing of their will for the elimination of all resisting forces and tendencies. They would be compelled to repress, diminish, perhaps even abolish all forms of liberty which their experience found to be used for fostering the spirit of revolt or of resistance; that is to say, all those larger liberties of free action and free self-expression which make up the best, the most vigorous, the most stimulating part of human freedom. They would be obliged to abolish, first by violence and then by legal suppression and repression, all the elements of what we now call national freedom; in the process individual liberty would be destroyed both in the parts of humanity coerced and by inevitable reaction and contagion in the imperial nation or nations. Relapse in this direction is always easy, because the assertion of his human dignity and freedom is a virtue man has only acquired by long evolution and painful endeavour; to respect the freedom of others he is still less naturally prone, though without it his own liberty can never be really secure; but to oppress and dominate where he can—often, be it noted, with excellent motives,—and otherwise to be half dupe and half serf of those who can

dominate, are his inborn animal propensities. Therefore in fact all unnecessary restriction of the few common liberties man has been able to organise for himself becomes a step backward, whatever immediate gain it may bring; and every organisation of oppression or repression beyond what the imperfect conditions of human nature and society render inevitable, becomes, no matter where or by whom it is practised, a blow to the progress of the whole race.

If, on the other hand, the formal unification of the race is effectuated by a combination of free nations and empires and if these empires strive to become psychological realities and therefore free organisms, or if by that time the race has advanced so far that the principle of free national or cultural grouping within a unified mankind can be adopted, then the danger of retrogression will be greatly diminished. Still, it will exist. For, as we have seen, the principle of order, of uniformity is the natural tendency of a period of unification; the principle of liberty offers a natural obstacle to the growth of uniformity and, although perfectly reconcilable with a true order and easily coexistent with an order already established into which it has fitted itself, is not so easily reconciled as a matter of practice with a new order which demands from it new sacrifices for which it is not yet psychologically prepared. This in itself need not matter; for all movement forward implies a certain amount of friction and difficulty of adjustment, and if in the process liberty suffered a few

shocks on one side and order a few shocks on the other, they would still shake down easily enough into a new adjustment after a certain amount of experience. Unfortunately, it is the nature of every self-asserting tendency or principle in the hour of its growth when it finds circumstances favourable, to over-assert and exaggerate itself, to carry its impulses to a one-sided fruition, to affirm its despotic rule and to depress and even to trample upon other tendencies and principles and especially on those which it instinctively feels to be the farthest removed from its own nature. And if it finds a resistance in these, then its impulse of self-assertion becomes angry, violent, tyrannical; instead of the friction of adjustment we have an inimical struggle with violent *peribeties*, vicissitudes, action and reaction, evolution and revolution till one side or the other prevails in the conflict.

This is what has happened in the past development of mankind; the struggle of order and uniformity against liberty has been the dominant fact of all great human formations and developments, religious, social, political. There is as yet no apparent ground for predicting a more reasonable principle of development in the near future. Man seems indeed to be becoming more generally a reasoning animal than in any known past period of his history, but he has not by that become, except in one or two directions, much more of a reasonable mind and a harmonious spirit; for he still uses his reason much more commonly to

justify strife and mutual contradiction than to arrive at a wise agreement. And always his mind and reason are very much at the mercy of his vital desires and passions. Therefore we must suppose that even under the best circumstances the old method of development will assert itself and the old struggle be renewed in the attempt at human unification. The principle of authority and order will attempt a mechanical organisation; the principle of liberty will resist claiming a more flexible, free and spacious system. The two ancient enemies will struggle for the control of the human unity as they did in the past for the control of the growing form of the nation. In the process, the circumstances being favourable to the narrower power, both national and individual liberty are likely to go to the wall,—happy if they are not set against it before a firing platoon of laws and restrictions to receive a military quiet us.

This might not happen if within the nations themselves the spirit of individual liberty still flourished in its old vigour; for that would then demand, both from an innate sympathy and for its own sake, respect for the liberties of all the constituent nations. But, as far as all present appearances go to show, we are entering into a period in which the ideal of individual liberty is destined to an entire eclipse under the shadow of the State idea, if not to a sort of temporary death or at least of long stupor, coma and hibernation. The constriction and mechanisation of the unifying process is likely to coincide with a

simultaneous process of constriction and mechanisation within each constituting unit. Where then in this double process will the spirit of liberty find its safeguard or its alimentation? The old practical formulations of freedom are likely to disappear in the double process and the only hope of healthy progress lies in a new formulation of liberty produced by a new powerful movement spiritual or intellectual of the human mind which will reconcile individual liberty with the collective ideal of a communal life and the liberty of the group-unit with the new-born necessity of a more united life for the human race.

Meanwhile we have to consider how far it is either likely or possible to carry the principle of unification in those more outward and mechaincal aspects which the external, that is to say, political and administrative method is prone to favour, and how far they will in their more extreme formulations favour or retard the true progress of the race to its perfection. We have to consider how far the principle of nationality itself is likely to be affected, whether there is any chance of its entire dissolution or, if it is preserved, what place the subordinated nation-unit will take in the new united life. This involves the question of control, the idea of the "Parliament of man" and other ideas of political organisation as applied to this new portentous broblem in the science of collective living. Thirdly, there is the question of uniformity and how far uniformity is either healthful to the race or necessary to unity. It is evident that we

enter here upon problems which we shall have to treat in a much more abstract fashion and with much less sense of actuality than those we have till now been handling. For all this is in the dark future and all the light we can have is from past experience and the general principles of life and nature and sociology; the present gives us only a dim light on the solution which plunges a little further on in Time into a shadowy darkness full of incalculable possibilities. We can foresee nothing; we can only speculate and lay down principles.

We see that there are always two extreme possibilities with a number of more or less probable compromises. The nation is at present the firm group-unit of the human aggregation to which all other units tend to subordinate themselves; even the imperial has hitherto been only a development of the national and empires have existed in recent times, not consciously for the sake of a wider aggregation as did the imperial Roman world, but to serve the instinct of domination and expansion, the land hunger, money-hunger, commodity-hunger, the vital, intellectual, cultural aggressiveness of powerful and prosperous nations. This, however, does not secure the nation-unit from eventual dissolution in a larger principle of aggregation. Group-units there must always be in any human unity, even the most entire, intolerant and uniform, for that is the very principle not only of human nature, but of life or even of aggregation itself; we strike here on a fundamental law of universal existence, on the fundamental

mathematics and physics of creation. But it does not follow that the nation need persist as the group-unit. It may disappear altogether; even now the rejection of the nation idea has begun, the opposite idea of the *sans-patrie*, the citizen of the world, has been born and was a growing force before the war; and though temporarily overborne, silenced and discouraged, it is by no means slain, but is likely to revive with an increased violence hereafter. On the other hand the nation-idea may persist in full vitality or may assert eventually, after whatever struggle and apparent decline, its life, its freedom, its vigorous particularism within the larger unity. Finally, it may persist, but with a reduced and subjected vitality, or even without real vitality or any living spirit of particularism or separatism, as a convenience, an administrative rather than a psychological fact like a French department or an English country. But still it may preserve just sufficient mechanical distinctness to form a starting-point for that subsequent dissolution of human unity which will come about inevitably if the unification is more mechanical than real, if, that is to say, it continues to be governed by the political and administrative motive, supported by the experince of economical and social or merely cultural convenience and unity and does not serve as a material basis for the spiritual oneness of mankind.

So also with the ideal of uniformity; for with many minds, especially those of a rigid, mechanical cast, those in which logic and intellectuality

are stronger than the imagination and the free vital instinct or those which are easily seduced by the beauty of an idea and prone to forget its limitations, uniformity is an ideal, even sometimes the highest ideal of which they can think. The uniformity of mankind is not an impossible eventuality, even though impracticable in the present circumstances and in certain directions hardly conceivable except in a far distant future. For certainly there is or has been an immense drive towards uniformity of life-habits, uniformity of knowledge, uniformity political, social, economical, educational, and all this, if followed out to its final conclusion, will lead naturally to a uniformity of culture. If that were realised, the one barrier left against a dead level of complete uniformity would be the difference of language; for language creates and determines thought as well is created and determined by it, and so long as there is difference of language there will always be a certain amount of free variation of thought, of knowledge and of culture. But it is easily conceivable that the general uniformity of culture and intimate association of life will give irresistible force to the need already felt of a universal language, and a universal language once created or once adopted may end by killing out the regional languages as Latin killed out the languages of Gaul, Spain and Italy or as English has killed out Cornish, Gaelic, Eise and is encroaching on the Welsh tongue. On the other hand, there is a revival nowadays, due to the growing

subjectivism of the human mind, of the principle of free variation and a refusal of uniformity. If this tendency triumphs, the unification of the race will have so to organise itself as to respect the free culture, thought, life of its constituent units. But there is also the third possibility of a dominant uniformity allowing such minor variations as do not threaten the foundations of its rule And here again the variations may be within their limits vital, forceful, to a certain extent particularist though not separatist, or they may be quite minor tones and shades, yet sufficient to form a starting-point for the dissolution of uniformity into a new cycle of various progress.

So again with the governing organisation of the human race. It may be a rigid regimentation under a central authority such as certain socialistic schemes envisage for the nation, a regime supressing all individual and regional liberty in the interests of a close and uniform organisation of human training, economical life, social habits, morals, knowledge, religion even, every department of human activity. Such a development may seem impossible, as it would be indeed impracticable in the near fnture, because of the immense masses it would have to embrace, the difficulties it would have to surmount, the many problems that would have to be solved before it could become possible. But this idea of impossibility leaves out of consideration two important factors, the growth of science with its increasingly easy manipulation of huge masses—witness the

present war—and of large-scale problems and the rapid march of Socialism. Supposing the triumph of the socialistic idea in all the continents, it might naturally lead to an international socialisation which would be rendered possible by the growth of science and scientific organisation and by the annihilation of space difficulties and numerical difficulties. On the other hand, it is possible that after a cycle of violent struggle between the ideal of regimentation and the ideal of liberty the socialistic period of mankind might prove comparatively of brief duration like that of monarchical absolutism in Europe and might be followed by another more inspired by the principles of philosophical Anarchism, that is to say, of unity based upon the completest individual freedom and freedom of natural, unforced grouping. A compromise might also be reached, a dominant regimentation with a subordinate freedom more or less vital, but even if less vital, yet forming a starting-point for the dissolution of the regime when humanity again feels that regimentation is not its ultimate destiny and that a fresh cycle of search and experiment has therefore become necessary.

It is impossible here to consider these large questions with any thoroughness. To throw out certain ideas which may guide us in our approach to the problem of unification is all that we can attempt. The problem is vast and obscure and even a ray of light upon it here and there may help to diminish its obscurity.

CHAPTER XVII

For man alone of terrestrial creatures to live rightly involves the necessity of knowing rightly, whether, as rationalism pretends, by the sole or dominant instrumentation of his reason or, more largely and complexly, by the sum of his faculties; and what he has to know is the true nature of being and its constant self-effectuation in the values of life, in less abstract language the law of Nature and especially of his own nature, the forces within him and around him and their right utilisation for his own greater perfection and happiness or for that and the greater perfection and happiness of his fellow-creatures. In the old phrase his business is to learn to live according to Nature. But Nature can no longer be imaged, as once it was, as an eternal right rule from which man has wandered, since it is rather a thing itself changing, progressing, evolving, ascending from height to more elevated height, widening from limit to broader limit of its own possibilities. Yet in all this changing there are certain eternal principles or truths of being which remain the same and upon them as bedrock, with them as a primary material and within them as a frame work our progress and perfection are compelled to take

place. Otherwise there would be an infinite chaos and not a world ordered even in the clash of its forces

The subhuman life of animal and plant is not subjected to this necessity of knowledge, nor of that which is the necessary accompaniment of knowledge, a conscious will impelled always to execute what knowledge perceives. By this exemption it is saved from an immense amount of error, deformation and disease, for it lives spontaneously according to Nature, its knowledge and will are hers and incapable, whether conscient or subconscient, of variation from her laws and dictates. Man seems on the contrary to possess a power of turning his mind and will upon Nature and a possibility of governing her movement, even of varying from the course she dictates to him. But here there is really a deformative trick of language. For man's mentality is also a part of Nature; his mentality is even the most important, if not the largest part of his nature. It is, we may say, Nature become partly conscious of her own laws and forces, conscious of her struggle of progression and inspired with the conscious will to impose a higher and higher law on her own processes of life and being. In subhuman life there is a vital and physical struggle, but no mental conflict. Man is subjected to this mental conflict and is therefore at war not only with others but with himself; and because he is capable of this war with himself, he is also capable of that which is denied to the animal, of an inner evolution, a

progression from higher to higher type, a constant self-transcending.

The evolution takes place by a conflict and progress of ideas applied to life. In their primary aspect human ideas of life are simply a mental translation of the forces and tendencies of life itself as they emerge in the form of needs, desires and interests of which the mind has an intelligence more or less clear and exact which takes into account and gives to one and another a greater or less value according to its own experience, preference and judgment. Some the man accepts and helps in their growth by his will and intelligence, others he rejects, discourages and even succeeds in eliminating. From this process there comes about a secondary aspect of man's ideas about life; he passes beyond the mere mental translation to a regulated valuation of the forces and tendencies that have emerged or are emerging in him and his environment. He studies them as fixed processes and rules of Nature and endeavours to understand their law and norm. He tries to determine the laws of his mind and life and body, the law and rule of the facts and forces about him that constitute his environment and determine the field and the mould of his action. Since we are imperfect and evolutionary beings, this study of the laws of life is bound to envisage two aspects; it perceives the rule of what is and the rule of what may or ought to be, the law of our actualities and the law of our potentialities. The latter takes for the human intellect

which tends always to an arbitrary and emphatic statement of things, the form of a fixed ideal standard or set of principles from which our actual life is a fall and deviation or towards which it is a progress and aspiration.

The evolutionary idea of Nature and life brings us to a profounder view. Both what is and what may be are expressions of the same constant facts of existence and forces or powers of our Nature from which we cannot and are not meant to escape, since all life is Nature fulfilling itself and not Nature destroying or denying itself; but we may and we are intended to raise, change, widen the forms, arrangements, values of these constant facts and forces of our nature and existence, and in the course of our progress this change and perfectioning may amount to what seems a radical transformation although nothing essential is changed. Our actualities are the form and value or power of expression to which our nature and life have attained, and their norm or law is the fixed arrangement and process proper to that stage of evolution; our potentialities point us to a new form, value, power of expression with their new and appropriate arrangement and process which is their proper law and norm. Standing thus between the actual and the possible, our intellect tends to mistake present law and form for the eternal law of our nature and existence and regard any change as a deviation and fall or else, on the contrary, to mistake some future and potential law and form for our ideal rule of life

and all actual deviation from that as an error or sin of our nature. In reality, only that is eternal which is constant through all changes and our deal can be no more than a progressive expression of it. Only the utmost limit of height, wideness and fulness of self-expression possible to man, if any such limit there be, could be regarded, did we know of it,—and as yet we do not know our utmost possibilities—as the eternal ideal.

Whatever the ideas or ideals which the human mind extracts from life or tries to apply to life, they can be nothing but the expression of that life itself attempting to find and fix its own law and realise its potentialities. Our mentality represents the conscious part of the movement of Nature in this progressive self-realisation and self-fulfilment of the values and potentialities of her human way of living. If that mentality were perfect, it would be one in its knowledge and will with the totality of the secret Knowledge and Will which she is trying to bring to the surface and there would be no mental conflict; we should be able to identify ourself with her movement, know her aim and follow intelligently her course, realising the truth on which the Gita lays stress that it is Nature alone that acts and the movements of our mind and life are only the action of her modes. The subhuman life does this instinctively and mechanically, living according to Nature within the limits of its tpye, and is thus free from internal conflict though not from conflict with other life; superhuman life would do it consciously, making

the secret Knowledge and Will in things its own and fulfilling itself through Nature by her free, spontaneous and harmonious movement unhasting, unresting, towards that full development which is her inherent and therefore her predestined aim. Actually, because our mentality is imperfect, we catch only a glimpse of her tendencies and objects and each glimpse we get we erect into an absolute principle or ideal theory of our life and conduct; we see only one side of her process and put that forward as the whole and perfect system which must govern our ordering of our life. Working through the imperfect individual and still more imperfect collective mind, she raises up the facts and powers of our existence as opposing principles and forces to which we attach ourselves intellectually and emotionally, and favouring or depressing now this and now another she leads them in the mind of man through struggle and conflict towards a mutual knowledge and the sense of their mutual necessity and towards a progressively right relation and synthesis of their potentialities which is represented in an increasing harmony and combination of realised powers in the increasing potentiality of human life.

If we look at the social evolution of the human race we shall see that it is entirely a development of the relations between three constant factors, individuals, commmunities of various sorts and mankind,—each seeking its own fulfilment and satisfaction, but each compelled to develop them not independently but in relation to the others.

The first natural aim of the individual must be his own inner growth and fullness and its expression in his outer life, but this he can only accomplish through his relations to other individuals, to the various sorts of community religious, social, cultural and political to which he belongs and to the idea and need of humanity at large. So also the community must seek its own fulfilment, but can only accomplish it through the individuals belonging to it through the circumstances of its environment and through its relations to other communities and individuals and to humanity at large. As for mankind, it has at present no consciously organised common life, but only an inchoate organisation determined much more by circumstances than by human intelligence and will; but the idea and the fact of our common human existence, nature, destiny has always exercised its influence on human thought and one of the chief preoccupations of ethics and religion has been the obligations of man to mankind. If or when the whole of humanity arrives at an organised common life and seeks a common fulfilment and satisfaction, it can only do it by means of the relation of this whole to its parts and by the aid of the expanding life of individual human beings and of the communities whose progress constitutes the larger terms of the life of the race.

Nature works always through these three terms and none of them can be abolished. She starts from the visible manifestation of the one and the many, from the totality and its constituent

units and creates intermediary unities between the two without which there can be no full development either of the totality or of the units. In the life-type itself she creates always the three terms of genus, species and individual. But while in the animal life she is satisfied to separate rigidly and group summarily, in the human she strives on the contrary to override the divisions she has made and lead the whole kind to the sense of unity and the realisation of unity. Man's communities are formed not so much by the instinctive herding together of a number of individuals of the same genus or species as by local association, community of interests and community of ideas; and these limits tend always to be overcome in the widening of human thoughts and sympathies brought about by the closer intermingling of races, nations, interests, ideas, cultures. Still, if overcome in their separatism, they are not abolished in their fact, because they repose on an essential principle of Nature,—diversity in unity. Therefore it would seem that the ideal or ultimate aim of Nature must be to develop the individual and all individuals to their full capacity, to develop the community and all communities to the full expression of that many-sided existence and potentiality which their differences were created to express, and to evolve the united life of mankind to its full common capacity and satisfaction not by suppressing that of the individual or the smaller commonalty, but by taking full advantage of the diversity which they develop, and so to increase the total

riches of mankind and throw them into a fund of common possession and enjoyment.

The united progress of mankind would thus be realised by a general principle of interchange and assimilation between individual and individual and again between individual and community, between community and community and again between the smaller commonalty and the totality of mankind, between the common life and consciousness of mankind and its freely developing communal and individual constituents. As a matter of fact, though this interchange is what Nature even now contrives to bring about to a certain extent, life is far from being governed by such a principle of free and harmonious mutuality. There is a struggle, an opposition of ideas, impulses and interests, an attempt of each to profit by various kinds of war on the others, by a kind of intellectual, vital, physical robbery and theft or even by the suppression, devouring, digestion of its fellows rather than by a free and rich interchange. This is the aspect of life which humanity in its highest thought and aspiration knows that it has to transcend, but has either not yet discovered the right means or else has not had the force to apply it. It now aims instead at getting rid of strife and the disorders of growth by enslaving the life of the individual to the community and logically it will be led to the attempt to get rid of the strife between communities by enslaving the community to the united and organised life of the human race. To remove freedom in order to get rid of disorder, strife and waste, to

remove diversity in order to get rid of separatism and jarring complexities is the impulse of order and regimentation by which the arbitrary rigidity of the intellectual reason seeks to substitute its straight line for the difficult curves of the process of Nature.

But freedom is as necessary to life as law and regime, diversity as necessary as unity. Existence is only one in its essence and totality, in its play it is necessarily multiform. Absolute uniformity would mean the cessation of life, while on the other hand the vigour of the pulse of life may be measured by the richness of the diversities which it creates. At the same time while diversity is essential for power and fruitfulness of life, unity is necessary for its order, arrangement and stability. Unity, but not necessarily uniformity. If man could realise a perfect spiritual unity, no sort of uniformity would be necessary; for the utmost play of diversity would be securely possible on that foundation. If again he could realise a secure, clear, firmly-held unity of a principle, a rich even an unlimited diversity in its application might be possible without any fear of disorder, confusion or strife. Because he cannot do either of these things, he is tempted always to substitute uniformity for real unity. While the life-power in man demands diversity, his reason favours uniformity; first because it gives him an illusion of unity in place of the real oneness at which it is so much more difficult to arrive; secondly, because it makes easy for him the otherwise difficult business of law, order and regimentation; thirdly,

because the impulse of the mind in man is to make every considerable diversity an excuse for strife and separation and therefore uniformity seems to him the one secure and easy way to unification. Moreover, by securing uniformity in any one direction or department of life he is able to economise his energies for development in other directions; as for instance, if he can standardise his economical existence and escape from its problems, he is likely to be able to attend more energetically to his intellectual and cultural growth, or if he standardises his whole social existence and rejects farther possible problems, he is likely to be able to attend more energetically to his spiritual development. Even here, however, the complex unity of existence asserts itself: in the end the intellectual and cultural growth suffers by immobility or poverty of the economic life and the spiritual existence, if it attains to remote heights, weakens at last in its richness and continued sources of vivacity when it depends on a too standardised and regimented society.

Thus, if owing to the defects of our mentality uniformity has to a certain extent to be admitted and sought after, yet the real aim of Nature is a true unity supporting a rich diversity. Her secret is clear enough from the fact that though she moulds on one general plan, she insists always on an infinite variety. The plan of the human form is one, yet no two human beings are precisely alike in their physical characteristics. Human nature is one in its constituents and its grand lines,

but no two human beings are precisely alike in their temperament, characteristics and psychological being. All life is one in its essential plan and principle, even the plant being a recognisable brother of the animal; but its unity admits and encourages an infinite variety of types. The natural variation of human communities from each other proceeds on the same plan as the variation of individuals; each develops its own character, variant principle, natural law. This variation and following of its own law is necessary to its life, but it is equally necessary to the healthy total life of mankind. For this principle of variation does not prevent free interchange and the enrichment of all from a common stock and of the common stock by all, which we have seen to be the ideal principle of existence; on the contrary without a secure variation such interchange and mutual assimilation would be out of the question. Therefore we see that in this harmony between our unity and diversity lies the secret of life, Nature insisting equally in all her works upon unity and upon variation. We shall find that a real spiritual and psychological unity can allow a free diversity and dispense with all but the minimum of uniformity which is sufficient to embody the community of nature and of essential principle. Until we can arrive at that perfection the method of uniformity has to be applied, but we must not over-apply it on peril of discouraging life in the very sources of its power, richness and sane natural self-unfolding.

The quarrel between law and liberty stands on the same ground and moves to the same solution. The diversity, the variation must be a free variation. Nature does not manufacture, does not impose a pattern or a rule from outside; she impels life to grow from within and assert its natural law and development modified only by its commerce with its environment. All liberty, individual, national, religious, social, ethical takes its ground upon this fundamental principle of our existence. By liberty, we mean the freedom to obey the law of our being, to grow to our natural self-fulfilment, to find out naturally and freely our harmony with our environment. The dangers and disadvantages of liberty, the disorder, strife, waste and confusion which its wrong use leads to are obvious enough. They arise from the absence or defect of the sense of unity between individual and individual, between community and community, which leads them to assert themselves at the expense of each other instead of growing by mutual help and interchange and to assert freedom for themselves in the very act of encroaching on the free development of their fellows. If a real, a spiritual and psychological unity were effectuated, liberty would have no perils and disadvantages; for free individuals enamoured of unity would be compelled by themselves, by their own need to accommodate perfectly their own growth with the growth of their fellows and would not feel themselves complete except in the free growth of others. Because of our present im-

perfection and the ignorance of our mind and will, law and regimentation have to be called in to restrain and to compel from outside. The facile advantages of a strong law and compulsion are obvious, but equally great are its disadvantages. Such perfection as it succeeds in creating tends to be mechanical and the very order it imposes to be artificial and liable to break down if the yoke is loosened or the restraining grasp withdrawn; and carried too far it discourages the principle of natural growth which is the true method of life and may even slay the capacity for real growth. We repress and over-standardise life at our peril; by over-regimentation we crush Nature's initiative and habit of intuitive self-adaptation. Dwarfed or robbed of elasticity, the devitalised individuality, even while it seems outwardly fair and symmetrical, perishes from within. Better anarchy than the long continuance of a law which is not our own or which our real nature cannot assimilate. And all repressive or preventive law is only unmakeshift, a substitute for the true law which must develop from within and be not a check on liberty, but its outward image and visible expression. Human society progresses really and vitally in proportion as law becomes the child of freedom; it will reach its perfection when, man having learned to know and become spiritually one with his fellow-man, the spontaneous law of his society exists only as the outward mould of his self-governed inner liberty.

CHAPTER XVIII

The principles that we have laid down, founded as they are upon the essential and constant tendencies of Nature in the development of human life, fix clearly the ideal principles which any intelligent attempt at the unification of the human race would observe if it could be realised after the manner of a Lycurgan constitution or by the law of an ideal Manu, the perfect sage and king. Attempted, as it will be, in very different fashion according to the desires, passions and interests of great masses of men and guided by no better light than the half-enlightened reason of the world's intellectuals and the empirical opportunism of the world's statesmen and politicians, it is likely to be done by a succession of confused experiments, recoils and returns, resistances and persistences, in the midst of a clamour of rival ideas and interests, through a war of principles, by a clash of vehement parties ending in more or less clumsy compromises. It may even, as we have said, be managed in the most unideal, though not the most inconvenient, method of all, by a certain amount of violence, the domination of a few vast and powerful empires or even the emergence of a single predominant world-empire, a king-state accepted or imposing itself as the arbiter of mankind. Not any intelligent principle, but necessity and convenience, not

urgent light, but urgent power is likely to be the effective force in any political, administrative and economic unification of the race.

Still, though the ideal may not be immediately practicable, it is that to which our action ought more and more to move; and if the best method cannot always be employed, it is well to know the best method, so that in the strife of principles and forces and interests something of it may enter into our dealings with each other and mitigate the errors, stumblings and sufferings which our ignorance and unreason compel us to pay as the price of our progress. In principle, then, the ideal unification of mankind would be a system in which, as a first rule of common and harmonious life, the human peoples would be allowed to form their own groupings according to their natural divisions of locality, race, culture, economic convenience and not according to the more violent accidents of history or the egoistic will of powerful nations, compelling the smaller or less timely organised to serve their interests as dependencies or obey their commands as subjects. The present arrangement of the world has been worked out by economic forces, by political diplomacies, treaties and purchases and by military violence without regard to any moral principle or any general rule of the good of mankind. It has served roughly certain ends of the world-force in its development and helped at much cost of bloodshed, suffering, cruelty, oppression and revolt to bring humanity more together. Like all things that, though in

themselves unideal, have been and have asserted themselves with force, it has had its justification, not moral but biological, in the necessity of the rough methods which Nature has to use with a half-animal mankind as with her animal creation. But the great step of unification once taken, the artificial arrangements which have resulted would no longer have any reason for existence, in the first place because the convenience and good of the world at large and not the satisfaction of the egoism, pride and greed of particular nations would be the object to be held in view, in the second because whatever legitimate claim any nation might have upon others, such as necessities of economic well-being and expansion, would be arranged for in a soundly-organised world-union or world-state no longer on the principle of strife and competition, but on a principle of co-operation or mutual adjustment or at least of competition regulated by law and equity. Therefore, no ground would remain for forced and artificial groupings except that of historical tradition or accomplished fact which would obviously have little weight in a great change of world-conditions impossible to achieve without breaking hundreds of traditions and unsettling the great majority of accomplished facts.

The first principle of human unity, groupings being necessary, should be a system of free and natural groupings which would leave no room for internal discords, incompatibilities and repression and revolt as between race and race or

people and people. For otherwise the world-state would be founded in part at least upon a system of legalised injustice and repression or at the best upon a principle of force and compulsion, however mitigated, which would leave dissatisfied elements eager to seize upon any hope of change and throw their moral force and whatever material power they might still keep, on the side of any velleities that might appear in the race towards disorder, secession, dissolution of the system and perhaps a return to the old order of things Moral centres of revolt would thus be preserved which, given the restlessness of the human mind, could not fail to have in periods favourable to them a great power of contagion and self-diffusion. In fact, any system which would appear to stereotype anomalies, eternise injustice and inequality or rest permanently on a principle of compulsion and forced subjection, could have no security and would be condemned by its very nature to transience.

This is the principal weakness of the present drift towards a settlement of the world whether on the actual *status quo* or on that which will follow the present convulsion of the world. Such a settlement would have the appearance of fixing conditions which in their nature must be transient, such as the rule of Germans over French Alsatians, Poles and Czeches and Servians and the supremacy of Europe over most of Asia and all Africa which would amount, if conditions remained the same, to the control of the enormous

mass of mankind by an oligarchy of white races. Such cannot be the principle of a long-enduring settlement of the world. Either the new system would have to support by law and force the present condition of things and resist any attempt at radical change, which would lead to an unnatural suppression of great natural and moral forces and in the end a tremendous disorder, perhaps a world-shattering explosion, or else some general legislative authority and means of change would have to be established by which the judgment and sentiment of mankind would be able to prevail over imperialistic egoisms and which would enable the European, Asiatic and African peoples now subject to make the claims of their growing self-consciousness felt in the councils of the world. But such an authority, interfering with the egoisms of great and powerful empires, would be difficult to establish, slow to act and not by any means at ease in its exercise of power or moral influence or likely to be peaceful or harmonious in its deliberations. It would either reduce itself to a representative of the sentiments and interests of a ruling oligarchy of great powers or end in such movements of secession and civil war between the States as settled the question of slavery in America. The only other issue would be if the liberal sentiments and principles aroused by the present war in Europe were to become settled and permanent forces of action and extend themselves to the dealings of European nations with their non-European dependencies, if, in short,

it became a settled political principle with European nations to change the character of their imperialism and convert their empires as soon as might be from artificial into true psychological unities.

But that would end inevitably in the recognition of the principle we have advanced, the arrangement of the world in a system of free and natural and not as hitherto of partly free and partly forced groupings. For a psychological unity could only be assured by a free assent of nations now subject to their inclusion in the imperial aggregate and the power of free assent would imply a power of free dissent and separation. If, owing to incompatibility of culture, temperament or economical or other interest, the psychological unity could not be established, either such separation would be inevitable or else the old principle of force would have to be resorted to, a difficult matter in respect to great masses of men who would by then have arrived at self-consciousness and recovered their united intellectual force and vitality. We have conceived of such imperial unities as a possible next step in human aggregation easier to develop than a united mankind in present conditions, but such unities could have only two rational purposes, one as a half-way house to the unity of all the nations of the world and an experiment in administrative and economic confederation on a large scale, the other as a means of habituating nations of different race, traditions, colour, civilisation to dwell together in

a common political family as the whole human race would have to dwell in any scheme of unity which respected the principle of variation and did not compel a dead level of uniformity. Therefore, the imperial unity has only a value in Nature's processes as a means towards this greater unity and, where not maintained afterwards by some natural attraction or by some miracle of entire fusion,—a thing improbable, if possible,—would cease to exist once the greater unity was accomplished. On this line of development also and indeed on any line of development the principle of a free and natural grouping of peoples must be the eventual conclusion, the final and perfect basis. It must be so, first, because on no other foundation could the unification of mankind be secure or sound, secondly, because once that unification was firmly accomplished and war and jealous national competition replaced by better methods of intercourse and mutual adjustment, there would be no object in maintaining any other more artificial system, and therefore both reason and convenience would compel the change. Its institution would become as much a matter of course as the administrative arrangement of a country according to its natural provinces or the regard which would necessarily be paid in any system of devolution or free federation to race or national sentiment or long-established local unities. Other considerations might modify the application of the principle, but there would be none that could be strong enough to abrogate it.

The natural unit in such a grouping is the nation, because that is the basis natural evolution has firmly created and seems indeed to have provided with a view to the greater unity. Unless, therefore, unification is put off to a much later date of our history and in the meanwhile the national principle of aggregation loses its force and vitality and is dissolved in some other, the free and natural nation-unit and perhaps nation-group would be the just and living support of a sound and harmonious world-system. Race still counts and would enter in as an element, but only as a subordinate element. In certain groupings, it would predominate and be decisive, in others it would be set at naught partly by the historic and national sentiment overriding differences of language and race, partly by the economic and other relations created by local contact and geographical unity. Cultural unity would count, but need not in all cases prevail; even the united force of race and culture might not be sufficiently strong to be decisive.

The examples of this complexity are everywhere. Switzerland belongs by language, race and culture and even by affinities of sentiment to different natural aggregations, two of sentiment and culture, the Latin and the Teutonic, three of race and language, the German, French and Italian, and we see at the present moment how these differences have worked to bewilder and divide Swiss sympathies in the clash of nations; but the decisive feeling overriding all others is the sentiment

of Helvetian nationality forbidding now and always any idea of a partition or dissolution of the natural, local, historic unity. Alsace belongs predominantly by race, language and early history to a Germanic union, but the German appeals in vain to these titles and labours in vain to change Alsace-Lorraine into Elsass-Lothringen; the living sentiment and affinities of the people, national, historical, cultural, bind it still to France. Canada and Australia have no geographical connection with the British isles or with each other, and the former would seem to belong by predestination to an American group-unity; but certainly, in the absence of a change of sentiment not now easily foreseen, both would prefer to belong to a British grouping rather than the one fuse itself into an increasingly cosmopolitan American nation and the other stand apart as an Australasian union. On the other hand, the Slavonic and Latin elements of Austro-Hungary, though belonging by history, geographical position and economical convenience to that empire, move strongly towards separation and, where local sentiments permit, to union with their racial, cultural and linguistic kin. If Austria had dealt with her Slay subjects as with the Magyars or had been able to build a national culture of her own out of her German, Slav, Magyar and Latin elements, it would have been otherwise and her unity would have been secure against all external forces of disruption. Race, language, local relations and economical convenience are powerful factors, but that which decides

must be the dominant psychological sentiment making for union; to it all others, however restless they may be, must succumb or, however much they may seek for free particularist expression and self-possession within a larger unity, must subordinate themselves to the more powerful attraction.

For this very reason the basic principle adopted must be a free grouping and not that of some abstract or practical rule or principle of historic tradition or actual status imposed upon the nations. It is eassy to build up a system in the mind and propose to erect it on foundations which would be at first sight rational and convenient. Especially, it would seem that the unity of mankind could most rationally and conveniently arrange itself upon the basis of a European grouping, an Asiatic grouping, an American grouping with two or three sub-groups in America, Latin and English-speaking, three in Asia, the Mongolian, Indian and West-Asian with Moslem North Africa as an annexe, four in Europe, the Latin, Slavonic, Teutonic and Anglo-Celtic, the latter with the colonies that still chose to adhere to it, while Central and Southern Africa might be left to develop under present conditions but with the more humane and progressive principles upon which the sentiment of a united humanity would insist. Certain of the actual and obvious difficulties might not be of great importance under a better system of things. We know, for instance, that nations closely connected by every apparent tie, are actually divided by stronger antipathies

than those more ideative and less actual which divide them from peoples who have with them no tie of affinity Mongolian Japan and Mongolian China are sharply divided from each other in sentiment; Arab and Turk and Persian, although one in Islamic religion and culture, would not, if their present sentiments towards each other persisted, make an entirely happy family. Scandinavian Norway and Sweden had everything to draw them together and perpetuate their union,—except a strong, if irrational sentiment which made the continuance of that union impossible. But these antipathies really persist only so long as there is some actual unfriendly pressure or sense of subjugation or domination or fear of the oppression of the individuality of one by the other; and once that is removed, they would be likely to disappear. It is notable, for instance, that, since the separation of Norway and Sweden, the three Scandinavian States have been increasingly disposed to act together and regard themselves as a natural grouping in Europe. The long antipathy of the Irish and English nations is rapidly giving way to the prospect of a just relation between these two national individualities, as the antipathy of Austrian and Magyar gave way when once a just relation had been established between the two kingdoms. It is easily conceivable therefore that with a system in which the causes of hostility would disappear, the natural affinities would prevail and a grouping of the kind imagined might become more easily practicable. It is arguable also that

the trend of mankind under a great stress of tendency towards unification would naturally move to the creation of such a symmetry; and it is again conceivable that a great change and revolution in the world would powerfully and rapidly abolish all the obstacles, as the obstacles of the old regime to a uniform democratic system were abolished in France by the French Revolution. But the point is that such rational arrangement would be quite impracticable unless and until the actual sentiments of the peoples corresponded with these systems of rational convenience. And the state of the world is at present far removed from any such ideal correspondence.

The idea of a new basis founded on the principle of national sentiment has recently taken within a limited field the shape of a practical proposition. It is confined to a European resettlement, and even there it is only to be imposed by the logic of war and force upon defeated empires. The others propose to recognise it for themselves only in a restricted form, Russia by the concession of autonomy to Poland, England by Home Rule in Ireland and a federation with her colonies, while other denials of the principle are still to persist and even perhaps one or two new denials of it to be established in obedience to imperial ambitions and exigencies. But still, however imperfect the application, this practical enforcement, of it, if effected, would mean the physical birth and infancy of a new ideal and would hold forth to the hopes of mankind the

prospect of its eventual application in a larger field until it came to be universalised. We cannot therefore any longer consider this ideal of a rearrangement of the world on the basis of free national groupings as an impossible dream, an altogether chimerical ideal.

Still the forces against it are considerable and there can be little hope of their being overcome except after long and difficult struggles. National and imperial egoism is the first and most powerful. To give up the instinct of domination and the desire still to be rulers and supreme where rule and supremacy have been the reward of past efforts, to sacrifice the advantages of a commercial exploitation of dependencies and colonies which can only be assured by the confirmation of dominance and supremacy, to face disinterestedly the emergence into free national activity of vigorous and sometimes enormous masses of men, once subjects and passive means of self-enrichment, but henceforth to be powerful equals and perhaps formidable rivals, is too great a demand upon egoistic human nature to be easily and spontaneously conceded where concession is not forced upon the mind by actual necessity or the hope of some great and palpable gain compensating the immediate and visible loss. There is, too, the claim of Europe, not yet renounced, to hold the rest of the world in the interests of civilisation, by which is meant European civilisation, and to insist upon its acceptance as a condition of the admission of Asiatic races to any kind of equality or freedom.

This claim which is destined soon to lose all its force in Asia, has still a strong justification in the actual state of the African continent. We shall have to consider some aspects of it when we come to the question of unity and uniformity. Meanwhile, we must note that it works strongly against a wider recognition of the new-born ideal and that until the problems it raises are resolved, the settlement of the world on any such ideal principle must wait upon the evolution of new forces and the coming to a head both in Asia and Europe of yet unaccomplished spiritual, intellectual and material revolutions.

CHAPTER XIX

Supposing the free grouping of the nations according to their natural affinities, sentiments, sense of economical and other convenience to be the final basis of a stable world-union, the next question that arises is what precisely would be the status of these nation-units in the larger and more complex unity of mankind. Would they possess in it only a nominal separteness or a real and living individuality and freedom of their organic life? Practically this comes to the question whether the ideal of human unity points to the forcible or at least forceful fusing and welding of mankind into a single vast nation and centralised world-state with many provinces or to its aggregation by a more complex, loose and flexible system into a world-union of free nationalities. If the former idea or tendency or need dominated, we must have a period of compression, constriction, negation of national and individual liberties as in the second of the three historical stages of national formation in Europe, ending, if entirely successful, in a centralised world-government which would impose its uniform rule and law, administration, economical and educational system, one culture, one social principle, one civilisation, perhaps even one language and one religion on all mankind. Centralised, it would delegate some of its powers to national authorities and councils but only as the centralised

French government—Parliament and bureaucracy—delegate some of their powers to the departmental prefects and councils and their subordinate officials and communes.

Such a state of things seems a sufficiently far-off dream and assuredly not, except to the rigid doctrinaire, a very beautiful dream. Certainly, it would take a long time to become entirely practicable and would have to be preceded by a period of loose formation corresponding to the feudal unity of France or Germany in mediæval Europe. But at the rate of ever accelerated speed with which the world is beginning to progress and with the gigantic revolutions of international thought, outlook and practice which the future promises, we have to envisage it as not only an ultimate, but conceivably a not very far-off possibility. If things continued to move persistently, victoriously in one direction and Science still farther to annihilate the obstacles of space and of geographical and mental division which yet exist and to aggrandise its means and powers of vast and close organisation, it might well become feasible within a century or two, at the most within three or four. It would be the logical conclusion of any process in which force and constraint or the predominance of a few great nations or the emergence of a king-state, an empire predominant on sea and land, became the principal instrument of unification. It might come about, supposing some looser unity to be already established, by the triumph throughout the world of the political doctrine and the

coming to political power of a party of socialistic doctrinaires alike in mentality to the unitarian Jacobins of the French Revolution who would have no tenderness for the sentiments of the past or for any form of group individualism and would seek to crush out of existence all their visible supports so as to establish perfectly their idea of an absolute human equality and unity.

Such a system, however established, by whatever forces, governed by the democratic State idea which inspires modern socialism or by the mere State idea socialistic perhaps, but undemocratic or anti-democratic, would stand upon the principle that perfect unity is only to be realised by uniformity. All thought in fact that seeks to establish unity by mechanical or external means is naturally attracted towards uniformity. Its thesis would seem to be supported by history and the lessons of the past; for in the formation of national unity, the trend to centralisation and uniformity has been the decisive factor, the state of uniformity the culminating point, and the precedent of the formation of diverse and often conflicting elements of a people into a single national State would naturally be the determining precedent for the formation of the populations of the earth, the human people, into a single world-nation and world-State. We see in modern times significant examples of the power of this trend towards uniformity. The recent Turkish movement began with the ideal of toleration for all the heterogeneous elements,—races, languages, religions, cultures,—of the

ramshackle Turkish empire, but inevitably the dominant Young Turk element were carried away by the instinct for establishing, even by coercion, a uniform Ottoman culture and Ottoman nationality. Belgium, composed almost equally of Teutonic Flemings and Gallic Walloons, grew into a nationality under the aegis of a Franco Belgian culture with French as the dominant language; the Fleming movement, which should logically have contented itself with equal rights for the two languages, aimed really at a reversal of the whole position and not merely the assertion, but the dominance of the Flemish language and an indigenous Flemish culture. Germany uniting itself suffered her existing states with their governments and administrations to continue, but the possibility of considerable diversities thus left open has been annulled by the centralisation of national life in Berlin; a nominal separateness exists, but overshadowed by a real and dominant uniformity which has all but converted Germany into the image of a larger Prussia in spite of the more democratic and humanistic tendencies and institutions of the Southern States. There are indeed types of a freer kind of federation, Switzerland, the United States, Australia, South Africa, but even here the spirit of uniformity really prevails or tends to prevail in spite of variation in detail and the latitude of free legislation in minor matters conceded to the component States. Everywhere unity seems to call for and strive to create a greater or less uniformity as its secure basis.

The first uniformity from which all the rest takes its start, is that of a centralised government whose natural function is to create and ensure a uniform administration. A central government is necessary to every aggregate which seeks to arrive at an organic unity of its political and economic life; and although nominally or to begin with this central government may be only an organ created by several States claiming to be sovereign within themselves, an instrument to which for convenience' sake they attribute a few of their powers for common objects, yet in fact it tends always to become itself the sovereign body desiring always to concentrate more and more power into its hands and leave only delegated powers to local legislatures and authorities. The practical inconveniences of a looser system strengthen this tendency and weaken gradually the force of the safeguards erected against an encroachment which seems to be entirely beneficial and supported by the logic of a general utility. Even in the United States with its strong attachment to its original constitution and slowness to constitutional innovations on other than local lines, the tendency is manifesting itself and would certainly have made by this time great changes if there had not been a supreme Court missioned to nullify any legislative interference with the original constitution and, secondly, the American policy of aloofness from foreign affairs and complications which removes the pressure of those necessities that in other nations have aided the central government to engross all real

power and convert itself into the source as well as the head or centre of national activities. The traditional policy of the United States, its pacifism, its anti-militarism, its aversion to entanglement in European complications or any close touch with the polities of Europe, its jealousy of interference by the European powers in American affairs in spite of their possession of colonies and interests in the Western hemisphere, are largely due to the instinct that this separateness is the sole security for the maintenance of its institutions and the peculiar type of its national life. Once militarised, once cast into the vortex of old-world politics, as it now threatens to be, nothing could long protect the States from the necessity of large changes in the direction of centralisation and the weakening of the federal principle. Switzerland owes the security of its federal constitution to a similarly self-centred neutrality.

For the growth of national centralisation is due to two primary needs of which the first and most pressing is the necessity of compactness, single-mindedness, a single and concentrated action against other nations, whether for defence against external aggression or for aggression upon others in the pursuit of national interests and ambitions. The centralising effect of war and militarism, its call for a concentration of powers, has been a commonplace of history from the earliest times. It has been the chief factor in the evolution of centralised and absolute monarchies, in the maintenance of close and powerful

aristocracies, in the welding together of disparate elements and the discouragement of centrifugal tendencies. The nations which, faced with this necessity, have failed to evolve or to preserve this concentration of powers, have always tended to fare ill in the battle of life, even if they have not shared the fate of Poland in Europe or of India in Asia. The strength to-day of centralised Japan, the weakness of decentralised China is a proof that even in modern conditions the ancient rule holds good. We see to-day the free States of Western Europe compelled to suspend all their hard-earned liberties and go back to the ancient Roman device of an irresponsible Senate and even to a covert dictatorship in order to meet the concentrated strength of a nation powerfully centralised and organised for military defence and attack. Were the sense of this necessity to survive the actual duration of the war, there can be no doubt that democracy and liberty would receive the most dangerous and possibly fatal blow they have yet suffered since their re-establishment in modern times.

The power of Prussia itself to take the life of Germany into its grasp has been due almost wholly to the sense of an insecure position between two great and hostile nations and to the feeling of encirclement and insecurity for its expansion which has been imposed on the new empire by its peculiar placement in Europe. We see also another example of the same tendency in the strength which the idea of confederation has acquired as a

result of the war in England and her colonies. So long as the colonies could stand aloof and unaffected by England's wars and foreign policy, this idea had little chance of effectuation; but the experience of the war and the embarrassments and inability to compel a concentration of all the potential strength of the empire caused by an almost total decentralisation seem to have made inevitable a tightening up of the loose and easy make of the British empire which may go very far once the principle has been recognised and put initially into practice. Loose federation serves well where peace is the rule; wherever peace is insecure or the struggle of life difficult and menacing, looseness becomes a disadvantage and may turn even into a fatal defect, the opportunity of fate for destruction.

The pressure of peril from without and the need of expansion create only the tendency towards a strong political and military centralisation; the growth of uniformity arises from the need of a close internal organisation of which the centre thus created becomes the instrument. This organisation is partly called for the same needs as create the instrument, but much more by the advantages of uniformity for a well-ordered social and economic life based upon a convenience of which life is careless, but which the intelligence of men constantly demands,—a clear, simple and, as far as the complexity of life will allow, a facile principle of order. The human intelligence seeking to order life according to its own fashion

and not according to the more instinctively supple and flexible principle of order inherent in Nature itself, aims necessarily at imitating Nature by fixing certain uniform principles of arrangement, but seeks also to give to them, as much as may be, a uniform application. It drives at the suppression of all important variations. It is only when it has enlarged itself and feels more competent to understand and deal with natural complexities that it finds itself at all at ease in managing what the principle of life seems always to demand, the free variation and subtly diverse application of uniform principles. First of all in the ordering of a national society, it aims naturally at uniformity in that aspect of it which most nearly concerns the particular need of the centre of order which has been called into existence, the political and military. It aims first at a sufficient and then at an absolute unity and uniformity of administration.

The monarchies which the need of concentration called into being, drove first at a preliminary concentration, a gathering of the main threads of administration into the hands of the central authority. We see this everywhere, but the stages of the process are most clearly indicated in the political history of France where the confusion of feudal separatism and feudal jurisdictions created the most formidable difficulties, and where by a constant centralising insistence and a final violent reaction from their surviving results they were most successfully resolved and removed. The centralising monarchy, brought to supreme power by the

repeated lessons of the English invasions, the Spanish pressure, the civil wars, developed inevitably that absolutism which the great historic figure of Louis XIV so strikingly personifies. His famous dictum "I am the State" expressed really the need felt by the country of developing one undisputed sovereign power which should concentrate in itself all military, legislative and administrative authority as against the loose and almost chaotic organisation of feudal France. The system of the Bourbons aimed first at administrative centralisation and unity, secondarily at a certain amount of administrative uniformity. It could not carry this second aim to an entirely successful conclusion because of its dependence on the aristocracy which it had replaced, but to which it was obliged to leave the confused debris of its feudal privileges. The Revolution making short work of this aristocracy swept away all these relics of the ancient system. In establishing a rigorous uniformity it did not reverse, but rather completed the work of the monarchy. An entire unity and unformity legislative, fiscal, economical, judicial, social was the goal towards which French absolutism, monarchical or democratic; was committed by its original impulse. The rule of the Jacobins and the regime of Napoleon only brought rapidly to fruition what was slowly evolving under the monarchy out of the confused organism of feudal France.

In other countries the movement was less direct and the survival of old institutions even

after the loss of their original reason for existence more obstinate; but everywhere in Europe, even in Germany and Russia, the trend has been the same and the eventual result is inevitable. The study of that evolution is of considerable importance for the future; for the difficulties to be surmounted were identical in essence, however different in form, to those which would stand in the way of the evolution of a world-state out of the loose and still confused organism of the modern civilised world.

CHAPTER XX

What may be called the objective organisation of a national unity, is not yet complete when it has arrived at the possession of a single central authority and the unity and uniformity of its political, military and strictly administrative functioning. There is another side of its organic life, which is equally important and the exercise of which becomes eventually the characteristic sign of the sovereign power, the legislative, and, as a necessary part of the administration of the laws, the judicial. Logically, one would suppose that the determination of its own laws of life should be the first business of a society from which all the others should derive and on which they should be dependent, and therefore it would naturally be the earliest to develop. But life develops in obedience to its own law and the pressure of forces and not according to the law and the logic of the self-conscious mind; its first course is determined by the subconscient and is only secondarily and derivatively self-conscious. The development of human society has been no exception to the rule; for man, though in the essence of his nature a mental being, has practically started with a largely mechanical mentality as the conscious living being, Nature's human animal, and only afterwards can be the self-conscious living being, the self-perfecting Manu. That is the course the individual

has had to follow and the group-man follows in the wake of the individual and always far behind the highest individual development Therefore, the development of the society as an organism consciously and entirely legislating for itself, which should be by the logic of reason the first necessary step, is actually in the logic of life the last and culminative step. It enables the society at last to perfect consciously by means of the State the whole organisation of its life, military, political, administrative, economic, social, cultural; and the completeness of the process depends on the completeness of the development by which the State and society become, as far as that may be, synonymous. That is the importance of democracy; that is the importance also of socialism. They are the sign that the society is getting ready to be an entirely self-conscious and therefore a freely and consciously self-regulating organism. But it must be remarked that modern democracy and modern socialism are only a first crude and bungling attempt at that consummation, an inefficient hint and not a freely intelligent realisation.

At first, in the early state of society, there is no such thing as what we understand by law, the Roman *lex*; there are only a mass of binding habits, *nomoi*, *mores*, *dharma*, determined by the inner nature of the group-man and according to the action upon it of the forces and the necessities of his environment. They become *instituta*, things that acquire a fixed formal status, institutions, and

so crystallise into laws. Moreover, they embrace the whole life of the society; there is no distinction between the political and administrative law, the social law and the religious law; these not only all meet in one system, but run inextricably into and are determined by each other. Such was the type of the ancient Jewish law and of the Hindu Shastra which preserved up to recent times this early principle of society in spite of the tendencies of specialisation and separation which have triumphed elsewhere as the result of the normal development of the analytical and practical reason of mankind. This complex customary law evolved indeed, but by a natural development of the body of social habits in obedience to changing ideas and more and more complex necessities. There was no single and fixed legislative authority to determine them by conscious shaping and selection or in anticipation of or by direct ideative action upon the general consensus of need and opinion. Kings and prophets and Rishis and Brahmin jurists might exercise such an action according to their power and influence, but none of these were the constituted legislative sovereign; the king in India was the administrator of the Dharma and not at all or only exceptionally and to a hardly noticeable extent the legislator.

It is worth noting, indeed, that this customary was law often attributed to an original legislator, a Manu, Moses, Lycurgus; but the historic truth of any such tradition has been discredited by modern inquiry and in a way

rightly, considering the actual ascertainable facts and the law of the human mind and its development. In fact, if we examine the profound legendary tradition of India, we see that its idea of the Manu is more a symbol than anything else. His name means man, the mental being. He is the divine legislator, the mental demi-god in humanity who fixes the lines upon which the race or people has to govern its evolution. In the Purana, he or his sons are said to reign in subtle earths or worlds, or, as we may say, they reign in the larger mentality which to us is subconscient and from there have power to determine the lines of development of the conscious life of man. His law is the *manava-dharma-shastra*, the science of the law of conduct of the mental or human being, and we may think of the law of any human society as being the conscious evolution of the type and lines which its Manu has fixed for it. If there comes an embodied Manu, a living Moses or Mahomed, he is only the prophet or spokesman of the Divinity who is veiled in the fire and the cloud, Jehovah on Sinai, Allah speaking through his angels. Mahomed, as we know, only developed the existing social, religious and administrative customs of the Arab people into a new system dictated to him often in a state of trance, in which he passed from his conscient into his superconscient self, by the Divinity to his secret intuitive mind. All that may be supra-rational or, if you will, irrational, but it represents a different stage of human development

from the government of society by its rational and practical mind in contact with life's changing needs and permanent necessities which demands a created and codified law determined by a fixed legislative authority.

This rational development consists, as we have seen, in the creation of a central authority,—at first a distinct central force but afterwards more and more conterminous with or representing directly the society itself,—which gradually takes over the specialised and separated parts of the social activity. At first, this authority is the king, elective or hereditary, who in his original character is a war leader and at home only the chief, the head of the elders or the strong men and the convener of the nation and the army, a nodus of its action, but not the principal determinant: in war only, where entire centralisation of power is the first condition of effective action, was he entirely supreme. As host-leader, *strategos*, he was also *imperator*, the giver of the absolute command. When he extended this combination of headship and rule from outside inward, he tended to become the executive power, not merely the chief instrument of social administration but the executive ruler.

It was naturally easier for him to become thus supreme in foreign than in internal politics. Even now European governments which have in internal affairs to defer to the popular will or to persuade and cajole the nation, are able in foreign politics to act either entirely or very largely according to

their own ideas; for they are allowed to determine their acts by a secret diplomacy in which the people can have no voice, and the representatives of the nation have only a general power of criticising or ratifying its results. Their action in foreign politics is nominal or at any rate restricted to a minimum, since they cannot prevent secret arrangements and treaties and even to such as are made early public, they can only withhold their ratification at the risk of destroying the sureness and continuity, the necessary uniformity of the external action of the nation and thus destroying the confidence of foreign governments without which negotiations cannot be conducted nor stable alliances and combinations formed. Nor can they really withold their sanction in a crisis, whether for war or peace, at the only moment when they are effectively consulted, the last hour or rather the last minute when either has become inevitable. Much more necessarily was this the case in the old monarchies when the King was the maker of war and peace and conducted the external affairs of the country according to his personal idea of the national interests largely affected by his own passions, predilections and personal and family interests. But whatever the other disadvantages, the conduct of war and peace and foreign politics as well as the conduct of the host in the field of battle had at least been centralised, unified in the sovereign authority. The demand for real parliamentary control of foreign policy and even for an open diplomacy—a difficult matter to our current

notions, yet once practised and perfectly capable of practice—indicates one more step in the transformation, far from complete in spite of the modern boast of democracy, from a monarchical and oligarchical to a democratic system, the taking over of all sovereign functions from the one sovereign administrator or the few dominant executive men by the society as a whole organised in the democratic State.

In the seizure of the internal functionings, the central authority has a more difficult task, because its absorption of them or of their chief control has to reckon with and is often modified by powerful forces and interests and the strength of established and often cherished national habits and existing rights and privileges. But it is bound in the end to arrive at some unified control of those which are in their nature executive and administrative. This administrative side of the national organisation has three principal parts, financial, executive proper and judicial. The financial is the control of the public purse and the expenditure of the wealth contributed by the society for national purposes, and it is evident that this must pass into the hands of whatever authority has taken up the business of organising and making efficient the united action of the community. But that authority in its natural impulse towards an undivided and uncontrolled gestation, a complete unification of powers must naturally desire not only to determine the expenditure according to its own free will, but to determine also the contributions of the society

to the public purse both in its amount and in its repartition over the individuals and classes who constitute the nation. Monarchy in its impulse towards a despotic centrality has always sought to engross and stuggled to retain this power; for the control over the purse of the nation is the most important sign and the most effective element of real sovereignty, more essential perhaps than the control over life and limb. In the most despotic regimes, this control is absolute and extends to the power of confiscation and despoliation otherwise than by judicial procedure. On the other hand, a ruler who has to bargain with his subjects over the amount of their contribution and the methods of taxation, is at once hedged in in his sovereignty and is not in fact the sole and entire sovereign. A vital power is in the hands of an inferior estate of the realm and can be turned against him fatally in any struggle for the shifting of the sovereignty from him to that estate. This is the reason why the supreme political instinct of the English people fixed in the struggle with the mon archy upon this question of taxation as the first vital point in a conflict for the power of the purse. Once that was settled in the Parliament by the defeat of the Stuarts, the transformation of the monarchical sovereignty into the sovereignty of the people or, more accurately, the shifting of the organic control from the throne to the aristocracy, thence to the bourgeoisie, and again to the whole people,—the latter two steps comprising the rapid evolution of the last eighty years,—was only

a question of time. In France, the successful practical absorption of this control was the strength of the monarchy; it was its inability to manage with justice and economy the public purse, its unwillingness to tax the enormous riches of the aristocracy and clergy as against the crushing taxation on the people and the consequent necessity of deferring again to the nation which provided the opportunity for the Revolution. In advanced modern countries, we have a controlling authority which claims at least to represent more or less perfectly the whole nation, and individuals and classes have to submit because there is no appeal from the will of the whole society. But even so it is questions, not of taxation, but of the proper organisation and administration of the economic life of the society which are preparing the revolutions of the future.

CHAPTER XXI

The gathering of the powers of administration into the hands of the sovereign is completed when there is unity and uniformity of judicial administration,—especially of the criminal side; for this is intimately connected with the maintenance of order and internal peace. And it is besides necessary for the ruler to have the criminal judicial authority in his hands so that he may use it to crush all rebellion against himself as treason and even, so far as may be possible, to stifle criticism and opposition and penalise that free thought and free speech which by their continual seeking for a more perfect social principle and their subtle or direct encouragement to progress are so dangerous to established powers and institutions, so subversive of the dominant thing in being by their drive towards a better thing in becoming. Unity of jurisdiction, the power to constitute tribunals, to appoint, salary and remove judges and the right to determine offences and their punishments comprise on the criminal side the whole judicial power of the sovereign. A similar unity of jurisdiction, power to constitute tribunals administering the civil law and the right to modify the laws relating to property, marriage and other social matters which concern the public order of society, comprise its civil side. But the unity and uniformity of the civil law is of less pressing and immediate

importance to the State when it is substituting itself for the natural organic society; it is not like the other an essential instrument. Therefore it is the criminal jurisdiction which is first absorbed in a greater or less entirety.

Originally, all these powers belonged to the organic society and were administered by various natural devices of a loose and entirely customary character, such as the Indian punchayet or village jury, the jurisdiction of guilds or other natural associations, the judicial power of the assembly or convocations of the citizens as in the various Roman comitia or large and unwieldy juries chosen by lot or otherwise as in Rome and Athens, and only to a minor extent by the judicial action of the king or elders in their administrative capacity. Human societies, therefore, in their earlier development retain for a long time an aspect of great complexity in their judicial administration and neither present nor feel the need of a uniformity of jurisdiction or of a centralised unity in the source of judicial authority. But as the State idea develops, this unity and uniformity must arrive. It accomplishes itself at first by the gathering up of these various jurisdictions with the King as at once the source of their sanctions and a high court of appeal possessing also original powers, which are exercised sometimes as in ancient India by judicial process, but sometimes in more autocratic polities by ukase—especially on the criminal side, in the awarding of punishments and more particularly punishments for offences against the

person of the king or the authority of the State. Against this tendency to unification and State authority there militates often a religious sense in the community which attaches as in most countries of the East a sacrosanct character to its laws and customs and tends to keep the King or State in bounds ; the ruler is accepted as the administrator of justice, but one strictly bound by the law of which he is not the fountain but the channel. Sometimes this religious sense develops a theocratical element in the society, a Church with its separate ecclesiastical authority and jurisdiction, a Shastra in the keeping of Brahmin jurists, a law entrusted to the Ulemas. Where the religious sense maintains its predominance, a solution is found by the association of Brahmin jurists with the king—or with the judge appointed by him—in every State tribunal and by the supreme authority of the Pundits or Ulemas in all moot judicial questions. Where, as in Europe, the political instinct is stronger than the religious, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction comes in time to be subordinated to the State's and finally disappears.

Thus eventually the State—or the monarchy, that great instrument of the transition from the organic to the rational society—becomes the head of the law as well as the embodiment of public order and efficiency. The danger of subordinating the judiciary entirely to en executive possessed at all of arbitrary and irresponsible powers is obvious; but it is only in England,—the one country always where liberty has

been valued as of equal importance with order and not considered a lesser necessity or no necessity at all,—that the popular sentiment has tried from an early period to limit the judicial power of the State. This was done partly by the tradition of the independence of the tribunals supported by the security of the judges, once appointed, in their position and emoluments and partly by the institution of the jury system. Much room was left for oppression and injustice, as in all human institutions, social or political, but the object was roughly attained. Other countries, it may be noted, have adopted the jury system but, more dominated by the instinct of order and system, have left the judiciary under the control of the executive. This however is not so serious a defect where the executive not only represents but is appointed and controlled by the society as where it is independent of public control.

Uniformity of the law develops on different lines from the unity and uniformity of judicial administration. In its beginnings, law is always customary and where it is freely customary, where that is to say, it merely expresses the social habits of the people, it must, except in small societies, naturally lead to or permit considerable variety of custom. In India, any sect or even any family was permitted to develop variations of the religious and civil custom which the general law of the society was bound, within vague limits, to accept, and this freedom is still part of the theory of

Hindu law, although now in practice it is very difficult to get any new departure recognised. This spontaneous freedom of variation is the surviving sign of a former natural or organic life of society,—as opposed to an intellectually ordered, rationalised or mechanised living,—which fixed its general lines and particular divergences by the general sense and instinct or intuition of the group-life rather than by the stricter structure of the reason.

The first marked sign of the rational evolution is that code and constitution begin to prevail over custom. But still there are codes and codes,—for first there are those which are unwritten or only partly written and do not throw themselves into the strict code form, but are a floating mass of laws, *decreta* precedents and admit still of a large amount of merely customary law; secondly, there are those which do take the strict code form, like the Hindu Shastra, but are really only an ossification of custom and help to stereotype the life of the society but not to rationalise it. Finally, there are those deliberately ordered codes which are an attempt at intelligent systematisation by the sovereign authority fixing the *cadres* of the law and admitting variations from time to time as intelligent accommodations to new needs which do not disturb but merely modify and develop the intelligent unity and reasonable fixity of the system. The coming to perfection of this last type is the triumph of the narrower but more self-conscious and self-helpful rational over the

larger but vaguer and more helpless life instinct in the society. When it has arrived at this triumph of a perfectly self-conscious and systematically rational determination and arrangement of its life on one side by a fixed and uniform constitution, on the other by a uniform and intelligently structural civil and criminal law, the society is ready for the second stage of its development, the self-conscious, uniform ordering of its whole life in the light of the reason which is the principle of modern socialism and has been the drift of all the utopias of the thinkers.

But before we can arrive at this stage, the great question must be settled, who is to be the State? Is the embodiment of the intellect, will and conscience of the society to be a king and his counsellors or a theocratic, autocratic or plutocratic governing class or a body which shall at least seem to stand sufficiently for the whole society, or is it to be a compromise between some or all of these possibilities? The whole course of constitutional history has turned upon this question and to all appearance wavered obscurely between various possibilities; but in reality, we can see that throughout there has been acting the pressure of a necessity which travels indeed through the monarchical, aristocratic and other stages, but must debouch in the end in a democratic form of government. The king in his attempt to be the State,—an attempt imposed on him by the impulse of his evolution,—must try indeed to become the fountain as well as the head of the law; he must seek to engross the

legislative as well as the administrative functions of the society, its side of efficient thought as well as its side of efficient action. But he is only preparing the way for the democratic State.

The king with his council military and civil, the priesthood and the assembly of freemen converting itself for the purposes of war into the host, were perhaps everywhere, but certainly in the Aryan races, the elements with which the self-conscious evolution of society began; they form or represent the three orders of the free nation in its early, elementary form. The king may get rid of the power of the priesthood, he may reduce his council to an instrument of his will or the nobility which they represent to a political and military support for his actions, but until he has got rid of the assembly or is no longer obliged to convoke it,—like the French monarchy with its States-general summoned only once or twice in the course of centuries and under the pressure of great difficulties,—he cannot be the chief, much less the sole legislative authority. Even if he leaves the practical work of legislation to a non-political, a judicial body like the French Parliaments, he is bound to find there a centre of resistance. Therefore the disappearance of the assembly or the power of the monarch to convoke it or not at his pleasure is always the real mark of his absolutism. But when he has got rid of or subordinated to himself all the other powers of the social life, there at that point of his highest success his failure begins; the monarchical system has fulfilled its positive part in the

social evolution and all that is left to it is either to hold the State together until it has transformed itself or else to provoke by oppression the movement towards the sovereignty of the people.

The reason is that in engrossing the legislative power the monarchy has exceeded the right law of its being, it has gone beyond its dharma, it has undertaken functions which it cannot healthily and effectively fulfil. Administration is simply the regulation of the outward life of the people, the ordered maintenance of the external activities of its developed or developing being, and the king may will be their regulator; he may will fulfil the function which the Indian polity assigned to him, the upholder of the "dharma". But legislation, social development, culture, religion, even the determination of the economical life of the people are outside his proper sphere; they constitute the expression of the life, the thought, the soul of the society, which if he is a strong personality in touch with the spirit of the age, he may help to influence but which he cannot determine. They constitute the national dharma,—we must use the Indian word which alone is capable of expressing the whole idea; for our dharma means the law of our nature and it means also its formulated expression. Only the society itself can determine the development of its own dharma or can formulate its expression; and if this is to be done not in the old way by a naturally organic and intuitive development, but by a self-conscious regulation through the organised national reason

and will, then a governing body must be created which will more or less adequately represent, if it cannot quite embody, the reason and will of the whole society. A governing class, aristocracy or intelligent theocracy may represent, not indeed this, but some vigorous or noble part of the national reason and will; but even that can only be a stage of development towards a democratic State. Certainly, democracy as it is now practised is not the last or penultimate stage; for it is often merely democratic in appearance and even at the best amounts to the rule of the majority and works by the vicious method of party government, defects the increasing perception of which enters largely into the present-day dissatisfaction with parliamentary systems. Even a perfect democracy is not likely to be the last stage of social evolution, but it is still the necessary broad standing-ground upon which the self-consciousness of the social being can come to its own. Democracy and socialism are, as we have already said, the sign that that self-consciousness is beginning to ripen into fullness.

Legislation may seem at first sight to be something external, simply a form for the administration, not part of the intimate grain of the social life like its economic forms, its religion, its education and culture. It so appears because in the past polity of the European nations it has not been like Oriental legislation or Shastra all-embracing, but has confined itself until recently to politics and constitutional law, the principles and

process of administration and so much only of social and economic legislation as was barely necessary for the security of property and the maintenance of public order All this, it might seem, might well fall within the province of the king and be discharged by him with as much efficiency as by a democratic government. But it is not so in reality, as history bears witness; the king is an inefficient legislator and unmixed aristocracies are not much better. For the laws and institutions of a society are the frame-work it builds for its life and its dharma. When it begins to determine these for itself by a self-conscious action of its reason and will within whatever limits, it has taken the first step in a movement which must inevitably end in an attempt to regulate its whole social and cultural life self-consciously; it must, as its self-consciousness increases, drive towards the endeavour to realise something like the utopia of the thinker. For the utopian thinker is the individual mind who fore-runs in his thought the trend which the social mind must eventually take.

But as no individual thinker can determine in thought by his arbitrary reason the evolution of the rational self-conscious society, so no executive individual or succession of executive individuals can determine it in fact by his or their arbitrary power. It is evident that he cannot determine the whole social life of the nation, it is much too large for him; no society would bear the heavy hand of an arbitrary individual on its whole social living.

He cannot determine the economic life, that too is much too large for him; he can only watch over it and help it in this or that direction where help is needed. He cannot determine the religious life, though that attempt has been made; it is too deep for him; for religion is the spiritual and ethical life of the individual, the relations of his soul with God and the intimate dealings of his will and character with other individuals, and no monarch or governing class, not even a theocracy or priesthood can really substitute itself for the soul of the individual or for the soul of a nation. Nor can he determine the national culture; he can only in great flowering times of that culture help by his protection in fixing for it the turn which by its own force of tendency it was already taking. To attempt more is an irrational attempt which cannot lead to the development of a rational society. He can only support the attempt by autocratic oppression, which leads in the end to the feebleness and stagnation of the society, and justify it by some mystical falsity about the divine right of kings or monarchy a peculiarly divine institution. Even exceptional rulers, a Charlemagne, an Augustus, a Napoleon, a Chandragupta, Asoka or Akbar, can do no more than fix certain new institutions which the time needed and help the emergence of its best or else its strongest tendencies in a critical era. When they attempt more, they fail. Akbar's effort to create a new dharma for the Indian nation by his enlightened reason, was a brilliant futility. Asoka's edicts remain graven

upon pillar and rock, but the development of Indian religion and culture took its own line in other and far more complex directions determined by the soul of a great people. Only the rare individual Manu, Avatar or prophet who comes on earth perhaps once in a millennium can speak truly of his divine right, for the secret of his force is not political but spiritual. For an ordinary political ruling man or a political institution to have made such a claim was one of the most amazing among the many follies of the human mind.

Yet the attempt in itself and apart from its false justifications and practical failure was inevitable, fruitful and a necessary step in social evolution. It was inevitable because this transitional instrument represented the first idea of the human reason and will, seizing on the group-life to fashion, mould and arrange it according to its own pleasure and power and intelligent choice, to govern Nature in the human mass as it has already learned partly to govern it in the human individual. And since the mass is unenlightened and incapable of such an intelligent effort, who can do this for it, if not the capable individual or a body of intelligent and capable individuals? That is the whole rationale of absolutism, aristocracy and theocracy. Its idea is false or only a half-truth or temporary truth, because the real business of the advanced class or individual is progressively to enlighten and train the whole body to do this for itself and not eternally to do things for it. But the idea had to take its course and the will in the idea—for

every idea has in itself a mastering will for self fulfilment,—had necessarily to attempt its own extreme. The difficulty was that the ruling man or class could take up the more mechanical part of the life of society, but all that represented its more intimate being eluded their grasp; they could not lay hands on its soul. Still unless they could do so they must remain, unfulfilled in their trend and insecure in their possession, since at any time they might be replaced by more adequate powers rising up from the larger mind of humanity to oust them and occupy their throne.

Two principal devices alone seemed adequate and have been employed in all such attempts at complete mastery. One was chiefly negative; it worked by an oppression on the life, and soul of the community, a more or less complete inhibition of its freedom of thought, speech, association, individual and associated action—often attended by the most abominable methods of inquisition and interference and pressure on the most sacred relations and liberties of man the individual and social being,—and an encouragement and patronage of only such thought and culture and activities as accepted, flattered and helped the governing absolutism. Another was positive; it consisted in getting a control over the religion of the society and calling in the priest as the spiritual helper of the king. For in natural societies and in those which, even if partly intellectualised, still cling to the natural principles of our being, religion, if it is not the whole life, yet watches over and powerfully

influences and moulds the whole life of the individual and society, as it did till recent times in India and to a great extent in all Asiatic countries State religions are the expression of this endeavour. But a State religion is an artificial monstrosity, although a national religion may well be a living reality; but even that, if it is not to formalise and kill in the end the religious spirit or prevent spiritual expansion, has to be tolerant, self-adaptive, flexible, a mirror of the deeper soul of the society. Both these devices, however seemingly successful for a time, are foredoomed to failure, failure by revolt of the oppressed social being or failure by its decay, weakness and death or life in death. Stagnation and weakness such as in the end overtook Greece, Rome, the Musulman nations, China, India, or else a saving spiritual, social political revolution are the only issues of absolutism. Still it was an inevitable stage of human development, an experiment that could not fail to be made. It was also fruitful in spite of and by reason of its failure; for the absolutist monarchical and aristocratic State was the father of the modern idea of the absolutist socialistic State which seems now to be in process of birth. It was, for all its vices, a necessary step because only so could the clear idea of an intelligently self-governing society firmly evolve.

For what king or aristocracy could not do, the democratic State may with a better chance of success and a greater security attempt and bring nearer to fruition,—the conscious and organised

unity, the regularised efficiency on uniform and intelligent principles, the rational order and self-governed perfectioning of a developed society. That is the idea and, however imperfectly, the attempt of modern life; and this attempt is the whole rationale of modern progress. Unity and uniformity are its principal trend: for how else are the incalculable complexities of the vast and profound thing we call life to be taken hold of, dominated, made calculable and manageable by a logical intelligence and unified will? Socialism is the expression of this idea. Uniformity of the social and economical principles and processes governing the collectivity by means of a fundamental equality of all and the management of the whole social and economic life in all its parts by the State; uniformity of culture by the process of a State education organised upon scientific lines; to regularise and maintain the whole a unified, uniform and perfectly organised government and administration representing the whole social being, this is the modern utopia which it is hoped to turn in spite of all extant obstacles and opposite tendencies into a living reality. Human science will, it seems, replace the large and obscure processes of nature and bring about perfection or some approach to perfection in the collective human life.

CHAPTER XXII

This then in principle is the history of the growth of the State. It is a history first of strict unification by the development of a central authority; secondly, of a growing uniformity in administration, legislation, social and economic life, culture and the chief means of culture, education and language, in all of which the central authority becomes more and more the determining and regulating power; thirdly, the transformation of that authority from the rule of the central executive man or the capable class into that of a body whose proposed function is to represent the thought and will of the whole community. The whole change represents in principle the evolution from a natural and organic to a rational and mechanically organised state of society. An intelligent centralised unification aiming at perfect rational efficiency replaces a loose and natural unity whose efficiency is that of life developing with a certain spontaneity its organs and powers under the pressure of inner impulse and the needs of the environment and conditions of life. A rational, ordered, strict uniformity replaces a loose oneness full of natural complexities and variations. The intelligent will of the whole society expressed in a carefully thought-out law and ordered regulation replaces its natural organic will expressed in a mass of customs and institutions which have grown up as

the results of its nature and temperament. In the last perfection of the state, a carefully devised, in the end a giant machinery productive and regulative replaces the vigour and fertility of life with the natural simplicity of its great lines and the obscure, confused, luxuriant complexity of its details. The State is the masterful, but arbitrary and intolerant science and reason of man taking the place of the intuitions and evolutionary experimentations of Nature, intelligent organisation taking the place of natural organism.

The unity of the human race by political and administrative means implies eventually the formation and organisation of a single World-State out of a newly created, though still loose, natural organic unity of mankind. For the natural organic unity already exists, a unity of life, of involuntary association, of a closely interdependent existence of the constituent parts in which the life and movements of one affect the life of the others in a way which would have been impossible a hundred years ago. Continent has no longer a separate life from continent; no nation can any longer isolate itself at will and live a separate existence. Science, commerce and rapid communications have produced a state of things in which the disparate masses of humanity, once living to themselves, have been drawn together by a process of subtle unification into a single mass which has already a common vital and is rapidly forming a common mental existence. A great precipitating and transforming shock was needed which should

make this subtle organic unity manifest and reveal the necessity and create the will for a closer and organised union, and this the present War has provided. The idea of a world-State or world union has been born not only in the speculative, forecasting mind of the thinker, but in the consciousness of humanity out of the very necessity of this new common existence. It must now either be brought about by a mutual understanding or by the force of circumstances and a series of new and disastrous shocks. For the old still-existing order of things was founded on circumstances and conditions which no longer exist; a new order is demanded by the new conditions and, so long as it not created, there will be a transitional era of continued trouble or recurrent disorders, inevitable crises through which Nature will effect in her own violent way the working out of the necessity which she has evolved,—with a maximum of loss and suffering through the clash of national and imperial egoisms or with a minimum if human reason and good-will prevail. To that reason two alternative possibilities and therefore two ideals present themselves, a world-State founded upon the principle of centralisation and uniformity, a mechanical and formal unity, or a world-union founded upon the principle of liberty and variation in a free and intelligent unity. These two ideas and possibilities we have successively to consider.

CHAPTER XXIII

The idea of a world-union of free nations and empires, loose at first, but growing closer with time and experience, seems at first sight the most practicable form of political unity; it is the only form indeed which would be immediately practicable, supposing the will to unity to become rapidly effective in the mind of the race. On the other hand, it is the State idea which is now dominant; the State has been the most successful and efficient means of unification and has been best able to meet the various needs which the progressive aggregate life of societies has created for itself and is still creating; it is the means to which the human mind at present has grown accustomed; it is besides the most ready means both for its logical and its practical reason to work with because it provides it with what it is always tempted to think its best instrument, a clear-cut and precise machinery and a stringent method of organisation. Therefore it is by no means impossible that, even though beginning with a loose union, the nations may be rapidly moved by the pressure of the many problems which would arise from the ever-closer inter-working of their needs and interests, to convert it into the more stringent form of a world-State. We can found no safe conclusion upon the immediate impracticability of its creation or on the many difficulties which would stand

in its way; for past experience shows that the argument of impracticability is of very little value. What the practical man of to-day denies as absurd and impracticable, is often enough precisely the thing that future generations set about realising and eventually in some form or other succeed in putting into effect. But a world, State would mean a strong central organ of power representing or at least standing for the united will of the nations; a unification of all the necessary powers in the hands of this central and common governing body, at least in their source-powers military, administrative, judicial, economical, legislative, social, educational; and as an almost inevitable result an increasing uniformity of human life throughout the world in all these departments, even perhaps to the choice or creation of one common and universal language. Such indeed is the dream of a unified world which Utopian thinkers are now apt to place before us. The difficuties in the way of arriving at this result are at present obvious enough, but they are perhaps not so great as they seem at first sight and none of them are insoluble. We cannot put away such an Utopia as an impracticable dream.

The first difficulty would be the character and composition of this governing body, a problem beset with doubts and perils. In ancient times, it was solved readily enough in smaller limits by the absolutist and monarchical solution with the rule of a conquering race as the starting-point, an is

the Persian and Roman empires; but that resource is no longer open to us in the new conditions of human society, whatever dreams may in the past have entered into the minds of powerful nations or their Czars and Kaisers. The monarchical idea itself is beginning to pass away after a brief and fallacious attempt at persistence and revival; it seems indeed to be already nearing its death-agony and, although contemporary appearances are often enough deceptive, they are less likely to be so in the present instance than in many others, because the force which makes for the disappearance of the still surviving monarchies is strong, radical and ever increasing. It is that the social aggregates have ripened into self-conscious maturity and that therefore they no longer stand in need of a hereditary kingship to do their governing work for them or even to stand for them—except perhaps in certain exceptional cases such as the British Empire—as the symbol of their unity. Either then the monarchy can only survive in name,—as in England where the king has less power even, if that be possible, than the French President and infinitely less than the heads of American republics,—or else it becomes a source of offence, a restraint to the growing democratic spirit of the peoples and to a greater or less degree a centre, a force or at least an opportunity for the forces of reaction. Its prestige and popularity tends therefore not to increase but to decline, and at some crisis when it comes too strongly into conflict with the sentiment of the nation, it falls

with small chance of lasting revival. We see it thus fallen or threatened and most suddenly in countries where its tradition was once the strongest. Even in these days, it has fallen in China, in Portugal, in Russia, is imperilled in Greece and Spain. In no Western country is it really strong except in Germany and Austria and in some of the Balkan States, and in all of them for reasons belonging to the past which may soon lose, are losing already their force. Suppose the Austrian empire to be disintegrated by the present upheaval and the Hohenzollern tradition in Germany to pass in the same stream of events or by the growth of social democracy, already the strongest force in the nation, into a predominant force, it is hardly doubtful that the continent of Europe will become in time as universally republican as the two Americas. For kingship is now only a survival of the world's past; it has no deep root in the practical needs or the ideals or the temperament of present-day humanity. When it disappears, it will be truer to say of it that it has ceased to survive than to say that it has ceased to live.

The republican tendency is indeed Western in its origin, stronger as we go more and more to the West, and has been historically powerful chiefly in Western Europe and dominant in the new societies of America. It might be thought that with the entrance of Asia into the active united life of the world, when the eastern continent has passed through its present throes of transition, the monarchical idea might recover strength and find a

new source of vitality; for in Asia kingship has been not only a material fact resting upon political needs and conditions, but a spiritual symbol and invested with a sacrosanct character. But in Asia no less than in Europe, monarchy has been a historical growth, the result of circumstances and therefore subject to disappearance when those circumstances no longer exist. The true mind of Asia has always remained, behind all surface appearances, not political but social and not monarchical but democratic or theocratic. Japan is perhaps the one prominent exception to this general rule. Already a great tendency of change is manifest. China, always a democratic country at bottom, though admitting in its democratic system an official aristocracy of intellect and a symbolic imperial head, is now definitely republican in sentiment, in spite of the recent reactionary *coup d'' etat* which is not likely to have at best a longer life than similar European reactions. The difficulty of the attempt to revive monarchy or to replace it by temporary dictatorships is due to an innate democratic sentiment now invigorated by the acceptance of a democratic form for the supreme government, the one valuable contribution of Western experience to the problem at which the old purely social democracies of the East were unable to arrive. In breaking with the last of its long succession of dynasties China had broken with an element of her past which was rather superficial than at the very centre of her social temperament and habits;

if it revives, it can only be as a constitutional monarchy of the European type. In India, the monarchical sentiment, which was never really able to prevail over the theocratic and social except during the comparatively brief rule of the Moghuls, has been hopelessly weakened, if not yet quite effaced, by the rule of a British bureaucracy and the political Europeanising of the active mind of the race. In Persia, the monarchy has become discredited and obdious by the part it has played in the destruction of new-born Persian liberty and as the instrument of a veiled foreign rule.

Only at the two extremes of the Asiatic world in Japan and in Turkey does the monarchy still preserve something of its old sacrosanct character and its appeal to the sentiment of the race. But in Japan, still imperfectly democratised, the sentiment which surrounds the Mikado is visibly weakness, his actual power is very limited, and the growth of democracy and socialism is bound to aid the weakening and limiting process and may well produce the same results as in Europe. The Moslem Caliphate, originally the head of a theocratic democracy, was converted into a political institution by the rapid growth of a Moslem empire of which now only a fragment exists precariously in the tottering fabric of Turkish rule over Constantinople and Asia Minor. Should that too break in pieces, the Caliphate becomes a purely religious headship and even in that character its unity is threatened by the rise of

new spiritual and national movements in Persia, Arabia and Egypt. But the one real and important fact in Asia of to-day is this that the whole active force of its future is centred not in priesthood or aristocracy, but, as in Russia and more even than in Russia, in a newly-created intelligentsia, small as yet in numbers, but rapidly increasing in energy and the settled will to arrive and bound to become exceedingly dynamic by reason of the inherited force of spirituality which it is beginning to apply to its new ideas of politics and society. Asia is not likely to lose its ancient spirituality, on the contrary even in its hour of greatest weakness it has been able to impose it increasingly even on the positive European mind but whatever turn that spirituality takes, it will be determined by the mentality of this new intelligentsia and will certainly flow into other channels than the old ideas and symbols and the old forms of monarchy and theocracy.

The only apparent chance eventually for the monarchical idea is that its form may be retained as a convenient symbol for the unity of the heterogeneous empires which would be the largest elements in any unification based upon the present political configuration of the world. Bnt even for these empires the symbol has not proved to be indispensable. France has done without it, Russia has recently dispensed with it; in Austria it is becoming odious to some of the constituent races as the badge of subjection and has recently become an object of reprobation to the outside

world. Only in England is it at once innocuous and useful and therefore upheld. Conceivably if the British empire, at this moment the leading, the most influential, the most powerful force in the world, were to become the nucleus or the pattern of the future unification, some chance of the monarchical element surviving in the figure—and even a figure is sometimes useful as a centre for future potentialities—might exist. But against this stands the fixed republican sentiment of America and the small chance of even a nominal kingship representing one element of a very heterogeneous whole being accepted by the rest. In the past, at least, this has only happened under the stress of conquest. Even if the world-State found it convenient as the result of experience to introduce or to reintroduce the monarchical element into its constitution, it could only be in some quite new form of a democratic kingship. But a democratic kingship, as opposed to a passive figure of monarchy, the modern world at least has not succeeded in evolving.

The two determining facts in modern conditions which alter the whole problem are that in this kind of unification nations take the place of individuals and, secondly, that these nations are mature self-conscious societies, predestined therefore to pass through pronounced forms of social democracy. It is reasonable to suppose that the world-State will tend to strive after the same principle of formation as that which obtains in the separate societies which are to constitute it.

The problem would be simpler if we could suppose the difficulties created by conflicting national temperaments, interests, cultures to be either eliminated or successfully subordinated and minimised by the depression of separative nationalistic feeling and the growth of a cosmopolitan internationalism That solution is not altogether impossible in spite of the serious check to internationalism and the strong growth of nationalistic feeling developed by the world-war; for, conceivably, internationalism may revive with a redoubled force after the stress of the feelings created by the war has passed. In that case, the tendency of unification may look to the ideal of a world-wide republic with the nations as provinces, though at first very sharply distinct provinces, and governed either by a council or parliament responsible to the united democracies of the world or else by a sort of modified and fluid oligarchy reposing its rule on the assent, expressed by election or otherwise, of a semi-passive democracy. That really is what the modern democracy at present is; the sole democratic elements are public opinion, periodical elections and the power of the people to refuse re-election to those who have displeased it; but the government is really in the hands of the bourgeoisie, the professional and business men, the landholders—where such a class still exists,—strengthened by a number of new arrivals from the working-class who very soon assimilate themselves to the political temperament and ideas of the governing classes. If a world-State were to be

established on the present basis of human society, it might well try to develop its central government on this principle and, whatever form it took, it is these classes which would govern in the name of the peoples.

But the present is a moment of transition and a bourgeois world-State is not a probable consummation. In each of the more progressive nations, the dominance of the middle-class is threatened on two sides, first, by the dissatisfaction of the intellectuals who find in its unimaginative business practicality and obstinate commercialism an obstacle to the realisation of their ideals, and secondly by the dissatisfaction of the great and growing power of Labour which sees democratic ideals and changes continually exploited in the interests of the middle class, though as yet it can find no alternative to the Parliamentarism by which that class ensures its rule. What changes the alliance between these two disatisfactions may bring about, it is impossible to foresee. In Russia, where it is strongest, we see it already taking the lead of the Revolution and compelling the bourgeoisie to undergo its control, though the compromise so effected is not likely to outlast the exigencies of the war. In two directions, it may lead to a new form of modified oligarchy with a democratic basis. The government of a modern society is now growing an exceedingly complicated business in each part of which a special knowledge, special competence, special faculties are required, and everry new step towards State

socialism must increase this tendency. The need of this sort of special training in the councillor and administrator combined with the democratic tendencies of the age might well lead to some modern form of the old Chinese principle of government, a democratic organisation of life below, above the rule of a sort of intellectual bureaucracy, an official aristocracy of special knowledge and capacity recruited from the general body without distinction of classes,—for equal opportunity would be insisted upon,—but still forming a class by itself in the constitution of the society. On the other hand, if the industrialism of the modern nations changes, as some think it will, and develops into some sort of guild socialism, a guild aristocracy of Labour might well become the governing body in the society. Any movement towards a world-State would then take the same direction and evolve a governing body of the same model.

But in these possibilities we leave out of consideration the great factor of nationalism and the conflicting interests and tendencies it creates. To overcome these conflicting interests, it has been supposed, the best way is to evolve a sort of world Parliament in which, it is to be presumed, the opinion of the majority would prevail. Parliamentarism, the invention of the English political genius, is a necessary stage in the evolution of democracy, for without it the generalised faculty of considering and managing with the least possible friction large problems of politics,

administration, economics, legislation concerning considerable aggregates of men cannot easily be developed. It has also been the one successful means yet discovered of preventing the State executive from suppressing the liberties of the individual and the nation. Nations emerging into the modern form of society are therefore naturally and rightly attracted to this instrument of government. But it has not yet been found possible to combine Paliamentarism and the modern trend towards a true democracy; it has been always an instrument eitheir of a modified aristocratic or of a middle-class rule. Besides, its method involves an immense waste of time and energy and a confused, swaying and uncertain action "muddling out" some tolerable result, which accords ill, with the more stringent ideas of efficient government and administration now growing in force and necessity and would be fatal to efficiency in anything so complicated as the management of the affairs of the world. These disadvantages may indeed be partially counteracted by two recent devices, the system of devolution, which may even be carried as far as a return by inverse movement to the method of American federalism, and the system of Paliamentary committees adopted by France during the war. But again, Parliamentarism means in practice the rule, often the tyranny of a majority, even of a very small majority, and the modern mind attaches increasing importance to the rights of minorities. They

would be still more important in a world-State where any attempt to override them might easily mean serious discontents and disorders or even convulsions fatal to the whole fabric. Finally, a Parliament of the nations must necessarily be a united parliament of free nations and could not well come into successful being in the present anomalous and chaotic distribution of power in the world, especially with the Asiatic problem unsolved.

A more feasible form would be a supreme council of the free and the imperial nations of the existing world-system, but this also has its difficulties. It could only be workable at first if it amounted in fact to an oligarchy of a few strong imperial nations whose voice and volume would prevail at every point over that of the more numerous but smaller non-imperialistic commonwealths and it could only endure by a progressive and if possible peaceful evolution from this sort of oligarchy of actual power to a more just and ideal system in which the imperialistic idea would dissolve and the great empires merge their separate existence into that of a unified mankind. How far national egoism would allow that evolution to take place without vehement struggles and dangerous convulsions, is, in spite of the superficial liberalism now widely professed, a question still fraught with grave and ominous doubts.

On the whole then, whichever way we turn, this question of the form of a world-State is beset

with doubts and difficulties, some arising from the surviving sentiments and interests of the past, some from the rapidly developing revolutionary forces of the future. It does not follow that they cannot or will not be solved, but the way and the line any such solution would take, are beyond calculation and can really be determined only by practical experience and experiment under the pressure of the forces and necessities of the modern world. For the rest, the form of government is not of supreme importance. The real problem is that of the unification of powers and the uniformity which any manageable system of a world-State would demand.

CHAPTER XXIV

In the process of centralisation of all the powers of an organised community in a sovereign governing body which has been the prominent feature of national formations, the largest overt part has been played by military necessity. This military necessity was both external and internal. The external, the defence of the nation against disruption or subjection from without, is strongest, but the defence against internal disruption and disorder is also an imperative necessity. To bind together the constituent parts of a nation forming or already formed, a common administrative authority is essential, and this was the part played by the monarchy; but the first need and claim of the central authority is to be able to prevent dissidence, strife and the weakening or breaking up of the organic formation. The monarchy or other central body may effect this end partly by moral force and psychological suggestion; it stands as the symbol of union and imposes respect for their visible and consecrated unity on the constituent parts, however strong may be their local, racial, clan or class instincts of separatism; it represents the united authority of the nation imposing its moral force as greater than the moral right of the separate parts, even if they be something like sub-nations, and commanding their obedience. But in the last resort, since these motives may at any

moment fail when revolting interests or sentiments are strong and passions run high, the governing body must have always the greatest military force at its command so as to overawe them and prevent the out-break of a disruptive civil war. Or if the civil war or rebellion comes about,—as is likely to happen especially if the monarchy or the governing body is identified closely with one of the parties in a quarrel, as in the American war of secession, or is itself the subject of attack,—then it must have so great a predominance of force behind it as to be morally sure of victory in the conflict. This can only be secured to the best possible perfection, - it cannot be done absolutely except by an effective disarmament,—if the whole military authority is centred in and the whole actual or potential military force of the society subjected to the central body.

In the trend to the formation of the world-State, however vague and formless it may yet be, we see that the same large part is being played by the element of military necessity. The peoples of the world already possess a loose and chaotic unity of life in which none can any longer lead an isolated, independent and self-dependent existence, but each feels in its culture, political tendencies, economical existence the influence and repercussion of events and movements in other parts of the world; each feels subtly or directly its separate life overshadowed by the life of the whole. Science, international commerce and the political and cultural penetration of Asia and

Africa by the dominant West have been the agents of this great change. Even in this loose unity the occurrence or the possibility of great wars has become a powerful element of disturbance to the whole fabric. Even before the European war, the necessity of avoiding or minimising any such disturbance was keenly felt and various well-intentioned, but feeble and blundering devices were being tentatively introduced which had that end in view. Had any of these makeshifts been tolerably effective, the world might long have remained content with its present conditions and the pressing need of a closer international organisation would not have enforced itself on the general mind of the race. But the European collision has rendered the indefinite continuance of the old chaotic regime impossible. The necessity of avoiding any repetition of the catastrophe is universally acknowledged. A means of keeping international peace, of creating an authority which shall have the power to dispose of dangerous international questions and preventing what from the new point of view of human unity we may call civil war between the peoples of mankind, has somehow or other to be found or created.

Various ideas have been put forward with more or less authority as to the necessary conditions of international peace. The crudest of these is that which supposes the destruction of German militarism to be the one thing needful and sufficient to secure the future peace of the world. The military power, the political and commercial

ambitions of Germany and her sense of being thwarted by her confined geographical position and her encirlement by an unfriendly alliance were, no doubt, the immediate moral cause of this particular war; but the real cause lay in the very nature of the international situation and the psychology of national life. The chief feature of that psychology is the predominance and worship of national egoism under the sacred name of patriotism. Every national ego, like every organic life, desires naturally a double self-fulfilment, intensive and extensive or expansive, a deepening and enriching of its culture, political strength, economical well-being within and, without, an extension or expansion of its culture, its political extent, dominion, power or influence and its commercial exploitation of the world. To a certain extent only this natural and instinctive desire, which is not an abnormal moral depravity, but the very instinct of egoistic life,—and what life at present is not egoistic?—can be satisfied by peaceful means. But where it feels itself hemmed in by obstacles that it thinks it can overcome, opposed by barriers, encircled, dissatisfied with a share of possession and domination it considers disproportionate to its needs and its strength, or where new possibilities of expansion open out to it in which only its strength can obtain for it its desirable portion, it is at once moved to the use of some kind of force and can only be restrained by the amount of resistance it is likely to meet. If it has only a weak opposition of unorganised or

ill-organised peoples to overcome, it will not hesitate; if it has the opposition of powerful rivals to fear, it will pause, seek for alliance, watch for its moment. Germany had not the monopoly of this expansive instinct of egoism; only its egoism was the best organised and least satisfied, the youngest, crudest, hungriest, most self-confident and presumptuous, most satisfied with the self-righteous brutality of its desires. The breaking of German militarism may ease the situation, but it will not cure it. So long as any kind of militarism remains, so long as fields of expansion remain, so long as national egoisms remain and there is no final check on their inherent instinct of expansion, war will be always a possibility and almost a necessity.

Another idea put forward with great authorities behind it is a league of free and democratic nations to keep the peace, by the use of force if needs be. If less crude, the solution is not for that any the more satisfactory. It is an old idea, the idea Metternich put in practice after the overthrow of Napoleon; only in place of a dynastic Holy Alliance of monarchs to maintain peace and monarchical order and keep down democracy, it is proposed to have a league of free —and imperial—peoples to maintain peace and enforce democracy. One thing alone is perfectly sure that the new league would go the way of the old; it would break up as soon as the interests and ambitions of the constituent powers became sufficiently disunited or a new situation arose such as

was created by the violent resurgence of oppressed democracy in 1848, such as would be created by the inevitable future struggle between the young Titan, Socialism, and the old Olympian gods of a bourgeois world; we see indeed the struggle already obscurely outlining itself in revolutionary Russia and it cannot be very long delayed throughout Europe, for the war which has momentarily suspended, may very well turn out to have really precipitated its advent and accentuated its force. By one cause or the other or by both in union dissolution would be certain. No league can be permanent in its nature; the ideas which supported it, change; the interests which made it possible and effective, become fatally modified or obsolete.

The supposition is that democracies will be less ready to go to war than monarchies; but this is only true within a certain measure. What are now called democracies, are bourgeois States in the form either of a constitutional monarchy or a middle-class republic. In each of them, the middle class has taken over with certain modifications the diplomatic habits, foreign policies and other international ideas of the monarchical or aristocratic governments which preceded them. This seems to have been a natural law of their mentality. For we see in Germany, not yet a democracy, that it is the aristocratic and the capitalist class combined who constitute the Pan-German party with its exaggerated and almost insane ambitions. In the new Russia, the bourgeoisie have rejected the

political ideas of the Czardom in internal affairs and helped to overturn autocracy, but they preserve its ideas in external affairs minus the German influence and stand for the expansion of Russia and the possession of Constantinople. Certainly, there is an important difference. In the first place, the monarchical or aristocratic State is political in its mentality and seeks first of all territorial aggrandisement and political predominance or hegemony among the nations, commercial aims are with it only a secondary preoccupation ; with the bourgeois State the order is reversed; it has its eye partly on political aggrandisement, but chiefly on the possession of markets, the command of new fields of wealth, the formation or conquest of colonies or dependencies which can be commercially and industrially exploited. In the second place, the monarchical or aristocratic statesman turns to war as almost his first expedient, as soon as he is dissatisfied with the response to his diplomacy ; the bourgeois statesman hesitates, calculates, gives a longer rope to diplomacy, tries to gain his ends by bargainings, arrangements, peaceful pressure, demonstrations of power and resorts to war only when these expedients have failed him and only if the end seems commensurate with the means and the great speculation of war promises a very strong chance of success.On the other hand, the bourgeois democratic state has developed a stupendous military organisation of which the most powerful monarchs and aristocracies could not dream ; and if this tends to delay the outbreak of large wars, it

tends too to make their final advent sure and their proportions great.

There is indeed the suggestion that a more truly democratic and therefore a more peaceful spirit and more thoroughly democratic institutions will reign after the war by the triumph of the liberal nations and that, in addition, one rule of the new international situation will be the right of nations to dispose of their own destinies and be governed only by their free consent. The latter condition is impossible of immediate fulfilment except in Europe, and even for Europe the principle is not really recognised in its totality. If it were capable of universal application, if the existing relations of peoples and the psychology of nations could be so altered as to establish it as a working principle, one of the most fertile causes of war and revolution would disappear, but all causes would not be removed. Nor does the greater democratisation of the European peoples afford a sure guarantee. Certainly, democracy of a certain kind, democracy reposing for its natural constitution on individual liberty would be likely to be indisposed to war except in moments of great and universal excitement. War demands a violent concentration of all the forces, a spirit of submission, a suspension of free-will, free action and of the right of criticism which is alien to the true instincts of democracy. But the democracies of the future are likely to be strongly concentrated governments in which the principle of liberty is subordinated to the efficient life of the community by some form of

State socialism. Such a democratic State might well have even a greater power for war, might be able to put forward a more violently concentrated military organisation in event of hostilities than even the present bourgeois democracies, and it is not certain that it would be less tempted to use them. At present, Socialism is pacific in its tendencies, largely because the necessity of preparation for war is favourable to the rule of the upper classes and war itself used in the interest of the governments and the capitalists, while the ideas and classes it represents are at present depressed and do not grow by the uses or share visibly in the profits of war. What will happen when they have hold of the government and its temptations and opportunities remains to be seen. The possession of power is the great test of all idealisms, and as yet there have been none religious or secular which have withstood it or escaped diminution and corruption.

To rely upon the common consent of conflicting national egoisms for the preservation of peace between the nations is to rely upon a logical contradiction and a practical improbability which, if we can judge by reason and experience, amounts to an impossibility. A League of Peace can only prevent armed strife for a time. A system of enforced arbitration even with the threat of a large armed combination against the offender may minimise the chance of war, may absolutely forbid it to the smaller or weaker nations; but a great nation which sees a chance of making itself

the centre of a strong combination of peoples interested in upsetting the settled order of things for their own benefit; might always choose to take the risks of the adventure in the hope of snatching advantages which in its estimation outweighed the risks. Moreover, in times of great upheaval and movement when large ideas, enormous interests and inflamed passions divide the peoples of the world, the whole system would be likely to break down; the very elements of its efficacy would cease to exist. Any such tentative and imperfect device would be bound before long to disclose its inefficacy, and either the attempt at a deliberate organisation of international life would have to be abandoned and the work left to be wrought out confusedly by the force of events, or else the creation of a real, effective and powerful authority must be attempted which would stand for the general sense and the general power of mankind in its collective life end spirit and be something more than a bundle of vigorously separate States loosely tied together by the frail bond of a violable moral agreement. Whether such an authority can really be created by agreement, whether it must not rather create itself partly by the growth of ideas, but still more by the shock of forces, is a question to which only the future can reply.

Such an authority would have to command the psychological assent of mankind and exercise a moral force upon the nations greater than that of their own national authority and commanding

more readily their obedience under all normal circumstances. It would have to be a symbol of human unity and make itself constantly serviceable to the world by assuring the effective maintenance and development of large common interests which would outweigh all separate national interests and satisfactions even in the estimation of the separate nations themselves. It must help more and more to fix the growing sense of a common humanity and a common life of mankind in which the sharp divisions which separate country from country, race from race, colour from colour, continent from continent would gradually lose their force and undergo a progressive effacement. Given these conditions, it would develop a moral authority which would enable it to pursue with less and less opposition and friction the unification of mankind. The nature of the psychological assent it secured from the beginning would depend largely on its constitution and character and would in its turn determine both the nature and power of the moral authority it exercised. If its constitution and character were such as to conciliate the sentiment and interest in its maintenance the active support of all or most of the different sections of mankind or at least those whose sentiment and support counted powerfully and to represent the leading political, social, cultural ideas and interests of the time, it would have the maximum of psychological assent and moral authority and its way would be comparatively smooth. If defective in these respects, it would have to make up the deficiency

by a greater concentration and show of military force at its back and by extraordinary and striking services to the general life, culture and development of the human race such as assured for the Roman imperial authority the long and general assent of the Mediterranean and Western peoples to the subjection and obliteration of their national existence.

But in either case, the possession and concentration of military power would be for long the first condition of its security, and this possession would have to be, as soon as possible, a sole possession. It is difficult at present to foresee the consent of the nations of the world to their own disarmament. For so long as strong national egoisms of any kind remained and along with them mutual distrust, the nations would not sacrifice their possession of an armed force on which they could rely for self-defence if their interests, or at least those that they considered essential to their existence and prosperity, came to be threatened. Any distrust of the assured impartiality of the international government would operate in the same direction. Yet such a disarmament would be essential to the assured cessation of war—in the absence of some great and radical psychological and moral change in humanity. So long as national armies exist, the possibility of war will exist. With their continued existence, however small in times of peace, an international authority even with a military force of its own behind it, would be in the position of the feudal king never

quite sure of his effective control over his vassals. The international authority would have to hold under its command the sole trained military force in the world for the policing of the nations and also,—otherwise the monopoly would be ineffective,—the sole disposal of the means of manufacturing arms and implements of war; national and private munition factories and arms factories would have to disappear.

Such a consummation would mark definitely the creation of a world-State in place of the present international conditions; for it could not really be done unless the international authority became not merely the arbiter of disputes, but the source of law and the final power behind their execution. For that execution against recalcitrant countries or classes, for the prevention of all kinds of strife not merely political, but commercial, industrial and others or of their decision by other than the way of law and arbitration, for the suppression of any attempt at violent change and revolution the world-State, even at its strongest, would still need the concentration of all force in its own hands. So long as man remains what he is force, in spite of all idealisms and generous pacific hopes, must remain the ultimate arbiter and governor of his life and its possessor the real ruler. It may veil its crude presence at ordinary times and take only mild and civilised forms,—mild in comparison, for are not the jail and the executioner still the two great pillars of the social order?—but it is there silently upholding the specious appearances

of our civilisation and ready to intervene, whenever called upon, in the workings of the fairer but still feebler gods of the social cosmos. Diffused, force fulfils the free workings of Nature and is the servant of life but also of discord and struggle; concentrated, it becomes the guarantee of organisation and the bond of order.

CHAPTER XXV

If the military necessity, the pressure of war between nations and the need for prevention of war by the assumption of force and authority in the hands of an international body, be it world-State or League of Peace, is that which is most directly driving humanity towards some sort of international unity, there is behind it another necessity which is much more powerful in its action on the modern mind, the economic, the commercial and industrial. Commercialism is a modern sociological phenomenon; it is, in fact, almost the whole phenomenon of modern society. The economic part of life is, necessarily, always important to an organised community; but, in former times, it was simply the first need, it was not that which occupied the thoughts of men, gave the whole tone to the social life, stood at the head and was clearly recognised as standing at the root of social principles. Ancient man was in the group primarily a political being, in the Aristotelian sense,—as soon as he ceased to be primarily religious,—and to this preoccupation he added, wherever he was sufficiently at ease, the preoccupation of thought, art and culture. The economic impulses of the group were worked out as a mechanical necessity, a strong desire in the vital being rather than a leading thought in the mind; nor was the society regarded or studied as an economical organism except in a very superficial

aspect. The economic man held an honourable, but still a comparatively low position in the society; he was only the third caste or class, the Vaishya: it was the intellectual and political classes,—the Brahmin, thinker, scholar, philosopher and priest, the Kshatriya, ruler and warrior,—who led, and it was their thoughts and preoccupations which gave the tone to society, determined its conscious drift and action, coloured most powerfully all its motives. Commercial interests entered into the relations of states and into the motives of war and peace, but as subordinate and secondary predisposing causes of amity or hostility, and rarely and only as it were accidentally came to be enumerated among the overt and conscious causes of peace, alliance and strife. The political consciousness, the political motive dominated, and increase of wealth was primarily regarded as a means of political power and greatness and opulence of the mobilisable resources of the State than as an end in itself or a first consideration.

Everything now is changed. The phenomenon of modern social development is the decline of the Brahmin and Kshatriya, of the Church, the military aristocracy and the aristocracy of letters and culture, and the rise to power or predominance of the commercial and industrial classes, Vaishya and Shudra, capital and labour; having together swallowed up or cast out their rivals they are now engaged in a fratricidal conflict for sole possession in which the completion of the downward force of social gravitation, the ultimate

triumph of Labour and the remodelling of all social conceptions and institutions with labour as the first, the most dignified term giving its value to all others seem to be already the visible writing of destiny. At present, however, it is the Vaishya who still predominates and his stamp on the world is commercialism, the predominance of the economical man, the universality of the commercial value or the utilitarian, materially efficient and productive value for everything in human life, even for knowledge, thought, science, art, poetry and religion, the economical conception of life overriding all others.

For the modern economical view of life, culture and its products have chiefly a decorative value; they are costly and desirable luxuries, not indispensable necessities. Religion is for it a by-product of the human mind with a very restricted utility. Education is indeed of a recognised importance, but its object and form are no longer so much cultural as scientific, utilitarian and economic, its value the preparation of the efficient individual unit to take his place in the body of the organised economical society. Science is of immense importance not because it discovers the secrets of Nature for the advancement of knowledge, but because it utilises them for the creation of machinery and in developing and organising the economical resources of the community. The thought-power of the society, almost its soul-power—if it has any longer so unsubstantial and unproductive a thing as a soul,—is not in its

religion or its literature,—though the former drags on a feeble existence and the latter teems and spawns,—but in the daily Press, primarily an instrument of commercialism and governed by the political and commercial spirit and not like literature, a direct instrument of culture Politics, government itself are becoming more and more a machinery for the development of an industrialised society, divided between the service of bourgeois capitalism and the office of a half-involuntary channel for the incoming of economic Socialism. Free thought and culture remain on the surface of this great increasing mass of commercialism influencing and modifying it, but themselves more and more influenced, penetrated, coloured, subjugated by the economic, commercial and industrial view of human life.

This great change has affected profoundly the character of international relations in the past and is likely to affect them still more openly and powerfully in the future. For there is no apparent probability of a change in a new direction in the immediate future. Certain prophetic voices announce indeed the speedy passing of the age of commercialism. But it is not easy to see how this is to come about; certainly it will not be by a reversion to the predominantly political spirit of the past or the temper and forms of the old type of aristocratic society; the sigh of the extreme conservative mind for the golden age of the past, which was not so golden as it appears to an imaginative eye in the distance, is a vain breath blown

to the winds by the rush of the car of the Time-Spirit in the extreme velocity of its progress. The end of commercialism can only come about either by some unexpected development of commercialism itself or through a re-awakening of spirituality in the race and its coming to its own by the subordination to it of the political and economic motives of life.

Certain signs are thought to point in this direction. The religious spirit is reviving and even the old discouraged religious creeds and forms are recovering a kind of vigour; in the secular thought of mankind there are signs of an idealism which increasingly admits a spiritual element among its motives. But all this is as yet slight and superficial; the body of thought and practice, the effective motive, the propelling impulsion remain untouched and unchanged. That impulsion is still towards the industrialising of the human race and the perfection of the life of society as an economic and productive organism; nor is it likely to die as yet by exhaustion, for it has not yet fulfilled itself and is growing, not declining in force. It is aided, moreover, by modern Socialism, which promises to be the master of the future; for Socialism proceeds on the Marxian principle that its own reign has to be preceded by an age of bourgeois capitalism of which it is to be the inheritor and seize upon its work and organisation in order to turn it to its own uses and modify it by its own principles and methods. It intends indeed to substitute Labour as the master intead of Capital;

but this only means that all activities will be valued by the labour contributed and work produced rather than by the wealth contributed and produced. It will be a change from one side of economism to the other, but not a change from economism to the domination of some other and higher motive of human life. The change itself is likely to be one of the chief factors with which international unification will have to deal and either its greatest aid or its greatest difficulty.

In the past, the effect of commercialism has been to bind together the human race into a real economic unity behind its apparent political separativeness. But this was a subconscient unity of inseparable inter-relations, of intimate mutual dependence and not either of the spirit or of the conscious organised life. Therefore, these inter-relations produced at once the necessity of peace and the unavoidability of war. Peace was necessary for their normal action, war frightfully perturbatory to their whole system of being. But because the organised units were politically separate and rival nations, their commercial inter-relations became relations of rivalry and strife or rather a confused tangle of exchange and interdependence with hostile separatism. Self-defence against each other by a wall of tariffs, a race for closed markets and fields of exploitation, a struggle for place in markets and fields which could not be monopolised and an attempt at mutual interpenetration in spite of tariff walls have been the chief features of this separatism and this hostility. The out-break of

war under such conditions was only a matter of time; it was bound to come as soon as one nation or else group of nations felt itself either unable to proceed farther by pacific means or threatened with the definite limitation of its expansion by the growing combination of its rivals The Franco-German was the last great war dictated by purely political motives Since then the political motive has been mainly a cover for the commercial. Not the political subjugation of Servia which could only be a fresh embarrassment to the Austrian empire, but the commercial possession of the outlet through Salonika was the motive of Austrian policy. Pan-Germanism covered the longings of German industry for possession of the great resources and the large outlet into the North Sea offered by the countries along the Rhine; and to seize African spaces of exploitation and perhaps French coal fields, not to rule over French territory was the drift of its real intention. In Africa, in China, in Persia, in Mesopotamia, commercial motives determined political and military action. War is no longer the legitimate child of ambition and earth-hunger, but the bastard offspring of wealth-hunger or commercialism with political ambition as its putative father.

On the other hand, the effect, the shock of war have been rendered intolerable by the industrial organisation of human life and the commercial interdependence of the nations. It would be too much to say that it has laid that organisation in ruins, but it has turned it topsy-turvy, deranged its

whole system and diverted it to unnatural ends. And it has produced a wide-spread suffering and privation in belligerent and a *gene* and perturbation of life in neutral countries to which the history of the world offers no parallel. The angry cry that this must not be suffered again and that the authors of this menace and disturbance to the modern industrial organisation of the world, self-styled civilisation, must be visited with condign punishment and remain for some time as international outcastes under a ban and boycott, shows how deeply the lesson has gone home, though it shows also that the real, the inner truth of it all has not yet been understood. Certainly, from this point of view also, the prevention of war must be one of the first preoccupations of a new ordering of international life; but how is it to be entirely prevented if the old state of commercial rivalry between politically separate nations is to be perpetuated? If peace is still to be a covert war, an organisation of strife and rivalry, how is the physical shock to be prevnted? Through the regulation of the inevitable strife and rivalry by a state of law as in the competitive commercial life of a nation before the advent of Socialism? But that was only possible, because the competing individuals or combines were part of a single social organism subject to a single governmental authority. Such a regulation between nations can therefore have no other conclusion, logically or practically, than the formation of a centralised world-State.

But let us suppose that the physical shock of war is prevented, not by law, but by the principle of enforced arbitration in extreme cases which might lead to war, not by the creation of an international authorty, but by the overhanging threat of international pressure. The state of covert war will still continue; it may even take new and disastrous forms. Deprived of other weapons, the nations are bound to have increasing resort to the weapon of commercial pressure, like capital and labour in their chronic state of "pacific" struggle within the limits of the national life. The instruments would be different, but would follow the same principle, that of the strike and the lock-out which are on one side a combined passive resistance by the weaker party to enforce its claims, on the other a passive pressure by the stronger party to enforce its wishes. Between nations, the corresponding weapon fo the strike would be a commercial boycott, already used more than once in an unorganised fashion both in Asia and Europe and bound to be extremely effective and telling if organised even by a politically or commercially weak nation,—for the weaker nation is necessary to the stronger, if as nothing else, yet as a market or as a commercial and industrial victim. The corresponding weapons to the lock-out would be the refusal of capital or machinery, the prohibition of all or of any needed imports into the offending or victim country, or even a naval blockade leading, if long maintained, to industrial ruin or to national starvation. The blockade is a

weapon used originally only in a state of war, but it has recently been employed, against Greece, as a substitute for war, and this use may easily be extended in the future. There is always too the weapon of prohibitive tariffs.

It is clear that these weapons need not be employed for commercial purposes or motives only, they may be grasped at to defend or to attack any national interest, to enforce any claim of justice or injustice between nation and nation. It has been shown into how tremendous a weapon commercial pressure can be turned when it is used as an aid to war itself; if Germany is utterly crushed in the end, the real means of victory will have been the blockade, the cutting off of money, resources and food and the ruin of commerce and industry; for if any military debacle arrives, it is clear that it will not be directly due to military weakness, but primarily to the diminution and failure of resources, to exhaustion, semi-starvation or worse and the moral depression of an intolerable position cut off from all hope of replenishment and recovery. This lesson also may have in the future considerable application in a time of "peace." Already it is proposed in some quarters to continue the commercial war after the political has ceased, so that Germany may not only be struck off the list of great imperial nations, but also permanently hampered, disabled or even ruined as a commercial and industrial rival. What unexpected applications may not the future make of such a

dangerous example! what rebound may it not have in quarters in which the possibility of such a recoil seems too remote to be entertained even as a far-off contingency!

It has recently been suggested that the future League of Peace might use this weapon of commercial pressure against any recalcitrant nation in place of military force. But so long as there is not a firm international authority, it would not be likely to be limited to such occasions or used only for just and legitimate ends. It might be used by a strong nation secure of general indifference to crush and violate the weak; it might be used by a combination of strong imperial powers to enforce their selfish and evil will upon the world. Force and coercion of any kind not concentrated in the hands of a just and impartial authority are always liable to abuse and misapplication. Therefore inevitably in the growing unity of mankind, the evolution of such an authority must become an early and pressing need. The world-State even in its early and imperfect organisation must begin not only to concentrate military force in its hands, but to commence consciously in the beginning what the national State only arrived at by a slow and natural development, the ordering of the commercial, industrial, economic life of the race and the control, at first, no doubt, only of the principal relations of international commerce, but inevitably in the end of its whole system and principles. Industry and trade being now five sixths of social

life and the economic principle the governing principle of society, a world-State which did not control human life in its chief principle and its largest activity, would exist only in name and not in reality.

CHAPTER XXVI

In almost all current ideas of the first step towards international organisation, it is taken for granted that the nations will continue to enjoy their full separate existence and liberties and will only leave to international action the prevention of war, the regulation of dangerous disputes, the power of settling great international questions which the nations cannot settle by ordinary means. It is impossible, however, that the development should stop there, for this first step would necessarily lead to others which could only travel in one direction. Whatever authority were established, would find itself called upon to act more and more frequently and to assume always increasing powers. To avoid preventible disturbance and friction, to avert hereafter the recurrence of troubles and disasters which in the beginning the first limitations of its powers had debarred the new authority from averting by a timely intervention before they came to a head, to bring about a co-ordination of activities for common ends would be the principal motives impelling humanity to advance from a looser to a closer union, from a voluntary self-subordination in great and exceptional matters to an obligatory subordination in all matters, an organised federation or single world-State with the nations for its provinces.

The desire of powerful nations to use it for their own purposes, the utility for weaker nations of appealing to it for the protection of their interests, the shock of actual or threatened internal disturbances and revolutions would all help to give the international authority greater power and provide occasions for extending its normal action. Science, thought and religion, the three great forces which in modern times tend increasingly to override national distinctions and point the race towards unity of life and spirit, would become more impatient of national barriers, hostilities and divisions and lend all their powerful influence to the change. The great approaching struggle between capital and labour, becoming world-wide and arriving at an international organisation, might well be a means of precipitating the inevitable step, might be even the actual crisis which would bring about the transformation.

We are supposing at present that a well-unified world-State would be the final outcome. At first, taking up the regulation of international disputes and of economic treaties and relations, the international authority would change from an arbiter and an occasional executive power to a legislative body and a standing executive power. Its legislation would be absolutely necessary in international matters, if fresh convulsions are to be avoided; for it is idle to suppose that any international arrangement, any ordering of the world arrived at after the close of the present war and upheaval, could be permanent and definitive.

Injustice, inequalities, abnormalities, causes of quarrel or dissatisfaction would remain in the relations of nation with nation, continent with continent which would lead to fresh hostilities and explosions. As these are prevented in the nation-State by the legislative authority modifying the system of things in conformity with new ideas, interests, forces, necessities, so it would have to be in the developing world-State. This legislative power,—which, as it developed, extended, regularised itself, became more complex and bound to interfere at many points and override or substitute itself for the separate national action, would imply the growth also of the executive power and an internationl executive organisation,—might at first confine itself to the most important questions and affairs which obviously demanded its control; but it would tend increasingly to stretch to all matters which could be viewed as having an international effect and importance, even those in which the nations are now jealous of their own rights and power. And eventually it would invade the whole system of the national life itself and subject it to international control in the interests of the better co-ordination of the united life, culture, science, organisation, education, efficiency of the human race. It would reduce the now free and separate nations first to the position of the States of the American union or the German empire and eventually perhaps to that of geographical provinces or departments of the single nation of mankind.

The present obstacle to any such extreme consummation is the still strong principle of nationalism, the sense of group separateness, the instinct of separateness, its pride, its pleasure in itself, its various sources of egoistic self-satisfaction, its insistence on the subordination of the human idea to the national idea. But we are supposing that the new-born idea of internationalism will grow apace and subject to itself the past idea and temper of nationalism, that it will become dominant and take possession of the human mind. As the larger nation-group has subordinated to itself and tended to absorb all smaller clan, tribal and regional groups, as the larger empire-group now tends to subordinate itself and may eventually absorb all smaller nation-groups, so, we are supposing, the complete human group of united mankind will subordinate to itself and eventually absorb all smaller groups of separated humanity. It is only by such a growth of the international idea, the idea of a single humanity, that nationalism can disappear, since the old natural device of an external unification by conquest seems no longer to be possible, the methods of war having become too disastrous and no single empire having the means and the strength to overcome, whether rapidly or in the gradual Roman way, the rest of the world. Undoubtedly, nationalism is a more powerful obstacle to farther unification than was the separativeness of the old pettier and less firmly self-conscious groupings which preceded the developed nation-State. It is still the most powerful

sentiment in the collective human mind, still gives an indestructible vitality to the nation and is apt to reappear even where it seemed to have been abolished. But we cannot argue safely from the present balance of tendencies in the beginning of a great era of transitions. Already there are at work not only ideas but forces, all the more powerful for being forces of the future rather then established powers of the present, which may succeed in subordinating nationalism to themselves far earlier than we can at present conceive.

If the principle of the world-State be carried to its logical conclusion and to its extreme consequences, the result will be a process analogous, though with necessary differences, to that by which in the building of the nation-State the central government, first as a monarchy, then as a democratic assembly and executive, gathered up into itself the whole administration of the national life. There will be a centralisation of all control, military and police, administrative, judicial, legislative, economical,social,cultural, in the one international authority and as a result of the centralisation a principle of uniformity and a sort of rationalised mechanism of human life and activities throughout the world with justice, universal well-being, economy of effort, scientific efficiency as its principal objects. Instead of the individual activities of nation-groups each working for itself with friction and waste and conflict, there will be an effort at co-ordination, such as we now see in a well-organised modern State, of which the complete idea is

a thorough-going State socialism, nowhere yet realised indeed, but rapidly coming into being. How and why this development must take place, we can see if we glance briefly at each department of the communal activity.

We have seen already that all military power, —which in a world-State would mean an international armed police,—must be concentrated in the hands of the common authority. A concentration of the final power of decision in economic matters would be also inevitable; but in the end, this supremacy could not stop short of a complete control. For, the economic life of the world is becoming more and more one and indivisible and the present state of international relations is an anomalous condition of opposite principles partly in conflict, partly accommodating with each other as best they can. On one side, there is the underlying unity which makes each nation commercially dependent on all the rest; on the other, there is the spirit of national jealousy, egoism and sense of separate existence which makes each nation attempt at once to assert its industrial independence and at the same time reach out for a hold of its outgoing commercial activities upon other markets than its own. The inter-action of these two principles is regulated at present partly by the permitted working of natural forces, partly by tacit practice and understanding, partly by systems of tariff protection, bounties, State aid of one kind or another on the one hand and commercial treaties and agreements on the other. Inevitably

as the world-State grew, this would be felt to be an anomaly, a wasteful, uneconomical process. The international authority would more and more intervene to modify the free arrangements of nation with nation; the commercial interests of humanity at large would be given the first place, the independent proclivities, commercial ambitions or jealousies of this or that nation would be compelled to subordinate themselves to the human good. The ideal of mutual exploitation would be replaced by the ideal of a fit and proper share in the common economical life of the race. Especially, as socialism advanced and began to regulate the whole economic existence of separate countries, the same principle would gain ground in the international field and in the end the world-State would be called upon to take up into its hands the right ordering of the industrial production and distribution of the world. Each country might be allowed to produce its own absolute necessities,—though in the end it would probably be felt that this was no more necessary than for Wales or Ireland to produce all its own necessities independently of the rest of the British isles or for one province of India to be an economical unit independent of the rest of the country; but for the most part each would produce and distribute only what it could to the best advantage, most naturally, most efficiently and most economically, for the common need and demand of mankind in which its own would be inseparably included. It would do this according to a system settled by the

common will of mankind through its State government and under a method made uniform in its principles, however variable in local detail, so as to secure the simplest, smoothest and most rational working of a necessarily complicated machinery.

The administration of the general order of society is a less pressing matter of concern than it was to the nation-States in their period of formation, because those were times when the element of order had almost to be created and violence, crime and revolt were both more easy and more a natural propensity of mankind. At the present day, not only are societies tolerably well organised in this respect and equipped with the absolutely necessary agreements between country and country, but by an elaborate system of national, regional and municipal government the State can regulate parts of the order of life with which the cruder governments of old were quite unable to deal effectively. In the world-State, it may be thought each country may be left to its own free action in matters of its internal order, and indeed of all its separate political, social and cultural life. But even here it is probable that the world-State would demand a greater centralisation and uniformity.

In the matter, for instance, of the continual struggle of society with the still ineradicable element of crime which it generates in its own bosom, the crudity of the present system is sure to be recognised and a serious attempt made to deal with it radically. The first necessity would then

be the close observation and supervision of the great mass of constantly recreated corrupt human material in which the bacillus of crime finds its natural breeding-ground. This is at present done very crudely and imperfectly, for the most part after the event of actual crime, by the police of each nation for itself with extradition treaties and informal mutual aid as a device against evasion by deplacement. The world-State would insist on an international as well as a local supervision, not only to deal with the phenomenon of what may be called international crime and disorder which is likely to increase largely under future conditions, but for the more important object of the prevention of crime.

For the second necessity it would feel, would be to deal with crime at its roots and in its inception. It may attempt this first by a more enlightened method of education and moral and temperamental training which would render the growth of criminal propensities more difficult; secondly by scientific or eugenic methods of observation, treatment, isolation, perhaps sterilisation of corrupt human material; thirdly, by a humane and enlightened gaol system and penological method having for its aim not the punishment but the reform of the incipient and the formed criminal. It would insist on a certain uniformity of principle so that there might not be countries persevering in backward and old-world or inferior or erratic systems and so defeating the general object. For this end centralisation of control would be necessary. So too

with the judicial method. The present system is still vaunted of as enlightened and civilised—it is so perhaps comparatively,—but a time will surely come when it will be considered grotesque, inefficient, irrational and in many of its principal features semi-barbaric, a half-conversion at most of the more confused and arbitrary methods of an earlier state of society. With the development of a more rational system, the preservation of the old juridical and judicial principles and methods in any part of the world would be felt to be intolerable and the world-State would be led to standardise the new principles and the new methods by a common legislation and probably a general centralised control.

In all these matters, it might be said, uniformity and centralisation would be beneficial and probably necessary and therefore no jealousy of national separateness and independence might be allowed under such conditions to interfere with the common good of humanity; but at least in the choice of their political system and in other spheres of their social life, the nations might well be left to follow their own ideals and propensities, to be healthily and naturally free. It may even be said that the nations would never tolerate any serious interference in these matters and that the attempt to use the World-State for such a purpose would be fatal to its existence. But, as a matter of fact, the principle of political non-interference is likely to be much less admitted in the future than it has been in the past or is at present. Always in times

of great and passionate struggle between conflicting political ideas,—between oligarchy and democracy in ancient Greece, between the old regime and the ideas of the French revolution in modern Europe,—the principle of political non-interference has gone to the wall. But now we see another phenomenon—the opposite principle of interference slowly erecting itself into a conscious rule of international life. America showed the way by its intervention in Cuba and in Mexico, not on grounds of national interest, but on behalf of liberty, constitutionalism and democracy, on international grounds therefore and practically in the force of this idea that the internal arrangements of a country concern under certain conditions of disorder or insufficiency not only itself, but its neighbours and humanity at large. A similar principle was proposed by the Allies in Greece, and now we see it applied to one of the most powerful nations of the world in the refusal of the Allies to treat with Germany or, practically, to re-admit it into the comity of nations unless it sets aside its existing political system and principles and adopts the forms of modern democracy.

This idea of the common interest of the race in the internal affairs of a nation is bound to increase as the life of humanity becomes more unified. The great political question of the future is likely to be that of Socialism. Supposing socialism to triumph in the leading nations of the world, it will inevitably seek to impose itself

everywhere not only by indirect pressure, but even by direct interference in what it would consider backward countries. An international authority, Parliamentary or other, in which it commanded the majority or the chief influence, would be too ready a means to be neglected. Moreover, a world-State would probably no more find it possible to tolerate the continuance of certain nations as capitalist societies, itself being socialistic in major part, than a socialist Great Britain would tolerate a capitalist Scotland or Wales. Supposing, on the other hand, all nations to become socialistic in form, it would be natural enough for the world-State to co-ordinate all these socialisms into one great system of united human life. But Socialism means the destruction of the distinction between political and social activities; it means the socialisation of the common life and its subjection in all its parts to organised government and administration. Nothing small or great escapes its purview. Birth and marriage, labour and amusement and rest, education, culture, training of physique and character, the socialistic sense leaves nothing outside its scope. Therefore, granting an international socialism, neither the politics nor the social life of the peoples is likely to escape the centralised control of the world-State.

Such a world-system is remote indeed from our present conceptions and established habits of life, but these conceptions and habits are already being subjected at their roots to powerful forces of

change. Uniformity too is becoming more and more the law of the world; it is becoming more and more difficult, in spite of sentiment and in spite of conscious efforts of conservation and revival, for local individualities to survive. But the triumph of uniformity would naturally make for centralisation, the radical incentive to separateness being removed, just as centralisation once accomplished would make for uniformity. Such decentralisation as might be called for in a uniform humanity would be needed for convenience of administration, not on the ground of separative variations. Once the national sentiment goes under before a dominant internationalism, large questions of culture and race would be the only grounds left for the preservation of a strong, though subordinate, principle of separation in the world-State. But difference of culture is quite as much threatened today as any other more outward principle of group variation. The differences between the European nations are simply minor variations of a common occidental culture, and with science, that great power for uniformity of thought and life and method, becoming more and more the greater part and threatening to become the whole of culture and life, the importance of these variations is likely to decrease. The only radical difference is between the occident and the orient; but with Asia undergoing the shock of Europeanism and Europe feeling the reflux of Asiaticism, the most probable outcome is a common world-culture. The valid objection to centralisation

will then be greatly diminished in force, it not entirely removed. Race-sense is perhaps a stronger obstacle because it is more irrational; but this too may be removed by the closer intellectual, cultural and physical intercourse which is inevitable in the not distant future.

The dream of the cosmopolitan socialist thinker may therefore be realised; given the powerful continuance of the present trend of world-forces, it is even inevitable. Even what seems now most a chimera, a common language, may become a reality. For a State naturally tends to establish one language as the instrument of all its public affairs, its thought, its literature, while the rest sink into patois, dialects, provincial tongues, like Welsh in Great Britain or Breton and Provencal in France; exceptions like Switzerland are few, hardly more than one or two in number, and preserved by unusually favourable conditions. It is difficult indeed to suppose that languages with powerful literatures spoken by millions of cultured men will allow themselves to be put into a quite secondary position, much less snuffed out by any old or new speech of man; but it cannot be certainly said that scientific reason taking possession of the mind of the race and thrusting aside separative sentiment as a barbaric anachronism may not accomplish even this psychological miracle. In any case, variety of language need be no insuperable obstacle to uniformity of culture, uniformity of education, life, organisation or a regulating

scientific machinery applied to all departments of life and settled for the common good by the united will and intelligence of the human race. For that would be what a world-State, such as we have imagined, would stand for, its meaning, its justification, its human object. Nothing else indeed would necessitate or could justify its creation.

CHAPTER XXVII

Such then is the extreme possible form of a world-State, the form dreamed of by the socialistic, scientific, humanitarian thinkers who represent the modern mind at its highest point of self-consciousness and are therefore able to detect the trend of its tendencies, though to the half-rationalised mind of the ordinary man whose view does not go beyond the day and its immediate morrow, their speculations seem to be chimerical and utopian. In reality, they are nothing of the kind; in their essence, not necessarily in their form, they are, as we have seen, not only the logical outcome, but the inevitable practical upshot of the incipient urge towards human unity, if it is pursued by a principle of mechanical unification,—that is to say, by the principle of the State. It is for this reason that we have found it necessary to show the practical principles and necessities which have underlain the growth of the unified and finally socialistic nation-State, in order to see how the same movement in international unification must lead to the same results by an analogous necessity of development. The State principle leads necessarily to uniformity, regulation, mechanisation; its inevitable end is socialism. There is nothing fortuitous, no room for chance in political and social development, and the emergence of socialism was no accident or thing that might not have been, but

the inevitable result contained in the very seed of the State idea, inevitable from the moment it began to be hammered out. The work of the Alfreds and Charlemagnes contained this as their sure result,—men working almost always without knowing for what they worked. But in modern times, the signs are so clear that we need not be deceived or imagine, when we begin to lay a mechanical base for world-unification, that the result contained in the very effort will not insist on developing itself, however far-off it may seem from immediate possibilities. A strict unification, a vast uniformity, a regulated socialisation of united mankind will be predestined fruit of our labour.

The result can only be avoided if an opposite force interposes and puts in its veto, as happened in Asia where the State idea could never go beyond a certain point, because the fundamental principle of the national life was opposed to its full development. The races of Asia, even the most organised, have always been peoples rather than nations in the modern sense, or nations only in the sense of having a common soul-life, a common culture, a common social organisation, a common political head, but not nation-States. The State machine existed only for a restricted and superficial action; the real life of the people was determined by other powers with which it could not meddle; indeed its principal function was to maintain sufficient political and administrative order—as far as possible an immutable order—for the real life of the people to function undisturbed in its own way.

according to its own innate tendencies. Some such unity for the human race is possible in the place of an organised world-State, if the nations of mankind succeed in preserving their developed instinct of democratic nationalism intact and strong enough to resist the domination of the State idea; the result would then be not a single nation of mankind and a world-State, but a single human people with a free association of its nation-units or, it may be some other new kind of group-units, assured by some sufficient machinery of international order in the peaceful and natural functioning of their social, economical and cultural relations.

Which then would be preferable? and to answer that question we have to ask ourselves, what would be the account of gain and loss for the life of the human race resulting from the creation of a unified world-State. In all probability, the results would be, with all allowance for the great difference between then and now, very much the same in essence as those which we observe in the ancient Roman Empire. On the credit side, we should have first one enormous gain, the assured peace of the world. It might not be absolutely assured against internal shocks and disturbances but, supposing certain outstanding questions to be settled with some approach to permanence, it could eliminate even such occasional violences of civil strife as disturbed the old Roman imperial economy and whatever perturbations there might be, need not disturb the settled fabric of civilisation so as to cast all again into the throes of a great

radical and violent change. Peace assured, there would be an unparallelled development of ease and well-being; a great number of outstanding problems would be solved by the united intelligence of mankind working no longer in fragments, but as one; the vital life of the race would settle down into an assured rational order comfortable, well-regulated, well-informed, with a satisfactory machinery for meeting all difficulties, exigencies and problems with the least possible friction, disturbance, mere uncertainty of adventure and peril. At first, there would be a great cultural and intellectual efflorescence; Science would organise itself for the betterment of human life and the increase of knowledge and mechanical efficiency; the various cultures of the world,—those that still exist as separate realities,—would not only exchange ideas more intimately, but throw their gains into the common fund; new motives and forms would arise for a time in art and poetry; men would meet each other much more closely and completely than before, develop a greater mutual understanding rid of many accidental motives of strife, hatred and repugnance which now exist, and arrive, if not at brotherhood,—which cannot come by mere political, social and cultural union,—yet at some imitation of it, a sufficiently kindly association and interchange. There would be an unprecedented splendour, ease and amenity in this development of human life, and no doubt some chief poet of the age, writing in the common or official tongue,—shall we say, Esperanto?—

would sing confidently of the approach of the golden age or even proclaim its actual arrival and eternal duration. But after a time, there would be a dying down of force, a static condition of the human mind and human life, then stagnation, decay, disintegration. The soul of man would begin to wither in the midst of his acquisitions.

This would come about, principally, for the same reasons as in the Roman example, because the chief conditions of a vigorous life would be lost, liberty, free variation and the shock upon each other of freely developing differentiated lives. It may be said that this will not happen, because the world-State will be a free democratic State, not a liberty-stifling empire or autocracy, and because liberty and progress are the very principle of modern life and no development would be tolerated which went contrary to that principle. But in all this, there is not really the security that seems to be offered; what is now, need not endure under quite different circumstances and the idea that it will is a mirage thrown from the actualities of the present on the possibly quite different actualities of the future. Democracy is by no means a sure preservative of liberty; on the contrary, we see to-day the democractic system of government march steadily towards such an organised annihilation of individual liberty as could not have been dreamed of in the old aristocractic and monarchical systems. From the more violent and brutal forms of despotic oppression which were associated with

those systems, democracy has indeed delivered those nations which have been fortunate enough to achieve liberal forms of government, and that is a great gain. It revives now only in periods of excitement, often in the form of mob tyranny. But there is a deprivation of liberty which is more respectable in appearance, more subtle and systematised, more mild in its method, because it has a greater force at its back, but for that very reason capable of becoming more effective and pervading. The tyranny of the majority has become a familiar phrase and its deadening effects have been depicted with a great force of resentment by certain of the modern intellectuals,* but what the future promises us is something more formidable still, the tyranny of the whole, of the self-hypnotised mass over its constituent groups and units.

This is a very remarkable development, the more so as originally individual freedom was the ideal with which democracy set out both in ancient and modern times. The Greeks associated democracy with two main ideas, first, an effective and personal share by each citizen in the actual government, legislation, administration of the community, secondly, a great freedom of individual temperament and action. But neither of these characteristics can flourish in the modern type of democracy, although the United States of America have tended to a certain extent in this direction. In large States, the personal share of each citizen

* Eg. Ibsen in his drama. "An Enemy of the people."

in the government cannot be realised; he can only have an equal share in the periodical choice of his legislators and administrators. Even if these have not practically to be chosen from a class which is not the whole or even the majority of the community, at present the middle class, still these legislators and administrators do not really represent their electors,—they represent another formless, bodiless entity which has taken the place of monarch and aristocracy, that impersonal group-being which assumes some sort of outward form and body and conscious action in the huge mechanism of the modern State. Against this power the individual is much more helpless than he was against old oppressions, and when he feels its pressure grinding him into its uniform moulds, he has no resource except either an impotent anarchism or else a retreat, still to some extent possible, into the freedom of his soul or the freedom of his intellectual being.

For this is one gain of modern democracy, which ancient liberty did not realise to the same extent and which has not yet been renounced, a full freedom of speech and thought. So long as this lasts, the fear of a static condition of humanity and subsequent stagnation might seem to be groundless, especially when it is accompanied by universal education which provides the largest possible human field for producing an effectuating force. Freedom of thought and speech—the two necessarily go together, since there can be no real freedom of thought where a padlock is put upon

freedom of speech,—is not indeed complete without freedom of association; for free speech means free propagandism and propagandism only becomes effective by association for the realisation of its objects: but that liberty also exists with more or less of qualifications or safeguards in all democratic States. But it is a question whether this liberty has been won for the race with an entire security,—apart from its occasional suspensions in free and its restriction in subject countries,—and whether the future has not certain surprises in this direction. It will be the last freedom directly attacked by the all-regulating State, which will first seek to regulate the whole life of the individual in the type approved by the community; when it sees how all-important is the thought in shaping the life, it will be led to take hold of that too by forming the thought of the individual through a State education, by training him to the acceptance of the approved communal, ethical, social, cultural, religious ideas, as was done in many ancient forms of education; only if it finds this weapon ineffective, is it likely to limit freedom of thought directly on the plea of danger to the State and to civilisation. Already we see the right of the State to interfere with individual thought announced here and there in a most ominous manner. One would have imagined religious liberty at least was assured to mankind; yet recently we have seen an exponent of "new thought" advancing positively the doctrine that the State is under no obligation to recognise the religious liberty of the

individual and that even if it grants freedom of religious thought,—as a matter of expediency, not of right,—it is not called upon to allow freedom of cult! And indeed this seems logical; for if the State has the right to regulate the whole life of the individual, it must surely have the right to regulate his religion, which is so important a part of his life, and his thought, which has so powerful an effect upon life.

Supposing an all-regulating socialistic world-State to be established, freedom of thought under such a regime would necessarily mean a criticism not only of the details, but of the very principles of the existing state of things. This criticism could only take one direction, the direction of anarchism, whether of the spiritual Tolstoian kind or else the intellectual anarchism which is now the creed of a small minority but still a growing force in many European countries. It would declare the free development of the individual as its gospel; it would denounce government as an evil and no longer at all a necessary evil: it would affirm the full and free religious, ethical, intellectual, temperamental growth of the individual from within as the true ideal of human life and all else as things not worth having at the price of the renunciation of this ideal, a renunciation which it would describe as the loss of his soul. It would preach as the ideal of society a free association or brotherhood of individuals without government or compulsion.

What would the world-State do with this kind of free thought? It might tolerate it so long as it

did not translate itself into individual and associated action, but the moment it spread or practically asserted itself, the whole principle of its own being would be attacked and its very base would be sapped and undermined. To stop the destruction at its root or else consent to its own subversion would be the only alternatives before it. But even before any such necessity arises, it is not impossible that the principle of regulation of all things by the State would have extended itself to the regulation of the mental as well as the physical life of man by the communal mind which was the ideal of former civilisations. A static order of society would be the necessary consequence, since without the freedom of the individual a society cannot remain progressive; it must settle into the rut or the groove of a regulated perfection—or of something to which it gives that name because of the rationality of system and symmetrical idea of order which it embodies. The communal mass is always conservative and static in its consciousness and only moves slowly in the tardy process of subconscient Nature, it is the free individual who is the conscious progressive: when he is able to impart that progressive consciousness to the mass, then only can we have a progressive society.

CHAPTER XXVIII

We have constantly to keep in view the fundamental principles and realities of life if we are not to be betrayed by the arbitrary rule of the reason, the rigorous and limiting idea into experiments which, however captivating to a unitarian and symmetrical thought, may well destroy the vigour and impoverish the roots of life. For a thing may be quite perfect and satisfying to the system of the logical reason and yet ignore the truth of life and the living needs of the race. Unity is an idea which is not at all arbitrary or unreal; for unity is the very basis of existence, and that which is secretly at the basis, the evolving spirit in Nature is moved to realise consciously at the top of its evolution. Unity of the race moves towards and must one day realise. But uniformity is not the law of life; life exists by diversity; it insists that every group, every being shall be, even while one with all the rest in its universality, yet by some principle or ordered detail of variation unique. So too the over-centralisation which is the condition of a working uniformity, is not the healthy method of life. Order is indeed the law of life, but not an artificial regulation; for sound order is that which comes from within as the result of the nature finding itself, finding its own law and the law of its relations with others; therefore the truest and soundest order is

that which is founded on the greatest liberty; for liberty is at once the condition of vigorous variation and the condition of self-finding. Nature secures variation by division into groups, and insists on liberty by the force of individuality in the members of the group. Therefore, the unity of the human race to be entirely sound and in consonance with the deepest laws of life must be founded on free groupings, and the groupings again must be the natural association of free individuals. This is an ideal which it is certainly impossible to realise under present conditions or perhaps in any near future of humanity; but it is an ideal which we ought to keep in view, for the more we can approximate to it, the more we can be sure of being on the right road. The artificiality of much in human life is the cause of its most deep-seated maladies.

The utility, the necessity of natural groupings may be seen if we consider the purpose and functioning of one great principle of division in Nature, that of language. The seeking for a common language for all mankind was very strong at the close of the last and the beginning of the present century and gave rise to several experiments, none of which got to any vital permanence. Now whatever may be the need of a common medium of communication for mankind and however it may be served by the general use either of an artificial and conventional language or of some natural tongue, as Latin, and later on to a slight extent French, was for some

time the common cultural tongue of intercourse between the European nations or Sanskrit for the Indian peoples, no unification of language which destroyed or overshadowed, dwarfed and discouraged the large and free use of the varying natural languages of humanity, could fail to be detrimental to the interests of human life and progress. The legend of the Tower of Babel speaks of the diversity of tongues as a curse laid on the race; but whatever its disadvantages, and they tend more and more to be minimised by the growth of civilisation and increasing intercourse, it has been rather a blessing than a curse, a gift to mankind rather than a disability. The purposeless exaggeration of anything is always an evil, and an excessive pullulation of varying tongues serving no purpose in the expression of a real diversity of spirit and culture is certainly a stumbling-block rather than a help; but this, though it existed in the past, is not now a possibility of the future; the tendency is rather the other way. In former times, too, diversity of language created a barrier to knowledge and sympathy, was often made the pretext even of an antipathy, tended to divide too rigdly, to keep up both a passive want of understanding and a fruitful crop of active misunderstandings. But this was a necessary evil of a particular stage of growth, an exaggeration of the necessity for the vigorous development of strongly individualised group-souls in humanity. These disadvantages have not yet been abolished, but with closer intercourse and the growing

desire of men and nations for the knowledge of each other's thought and spirit and personality, they have diminished, tend to diminish more and more, and there is no reason why in the end they should not become inoperative.

Diversity of language serves two important ends of the human spirit, one of unification, the other of variation. A language helps to bring those who speak it into a certain large unity of growing thought, formed temperament, ripening spirit. It is an intellectual, aesthetic, mental bond which tempers division where that exists, strengthens unity where that has been achieved. Especially it gives self-consciousness to national or racial unity and creates the bond of a common self-expression and record of achievement. On the other hand, it is a means, the most powerful of all perhaps, of national differentiation, not a barren principle of division merely, but a fruitful and helpful differentiation. For each language is the sign and power of the soul of the people which naturally speaks it; each develops therefore its own peculiar spirit, thought-temperament, way of dealing with life and knowledge and experience; it receives the thought, the life-experience, the spiritual impact of other nations, but it transforms them into something new of its own and by that power of transmutation enriches the life of humanity by its borrowing instead of merely repeating what had been gained elsewhere. Therefore it is of the utmost value to a nation, a human group-soul, to preserve its language and make of it a strong and

living cultural instrument; a nation, race or people which loses its language, cannot live its whole life or its real life. And here the advantage to the national life is at the same time an advantage for the general life of humanity.

What a distinct human group loses by not possessing a separate tongue of its own or by losing the one it had, can be seen by the examples of the British colonies, the United States of America and Ireland. The colonies are really separate peoples in the psychological sense, though not separate nations. English, for the most part or at the lowest in great part, in their origin and political and social sympathy, they are yet not replicas of England, but have already a temperament, a character, a bent of their own; but this can only be shown in the more outward and mechanical parts of life and there in no great, effective and fruitful fashion. The British colonies do not count in the culture of the world, because they have no culture, because by the fact of their speech they are and must be mere provinces of England, and whatever peculiarities they may develop in their mental life tend to create a type of provincialism and not a central intellectual, aesthetic, spiritual life of their own with its distinct importance for humanity. For the same reason the whole of America, in spite of its independent political and economical being, has tended to be culturally a province of Europe, the south and centre by its dependence on the Spanish, the north by its dependence on the

English language. The life of the United States alone tends and strives to become a great and separate cultural existence, but its success is not commensurate with its power. Culturally it is still to a great extent a province of England; neither its literature, in spite of two or three great names, nor its art, its thought, nor anything else on the higher levels of the mind, has been able to arrive at a vigorous and independent maturity. And this because its instrument of self-expression, the language which the national mind ought to shape and be in turn shaped by it, was shaped and must continue to be shaped by another country with a different mentality and must there find its centre and its law of development. In old times, America would have developed the English language according to its own needs until it became a new speech, as the Latinised nations dealt with Latin, and so arrived at a characteristic instrument of self-expression; but under modern conditions this is not possible.

Ireland had its own tongue when it had its own free nationality and culture; its loss was a loss to humanity as well as to the nation. For what might not this Celtic race with its profound spirituality and quick intelligence and delicate imagination, which did so much in the beginning for European culture and religion, have given to the world through all these centuries under natural conditions? But the forcible imposition of a foreigl tongue and the turning of a nation into a province left Ireland for so many centuries mute and culturally

stagnant, a dead force in the life of Europe; nor can we consider this loss compensated for by any indirect influence of the race upon English culture or the few direct contributions made by gifted Irishmen forced to pour their natural genius into a foreign mould of thought. Even now when Ireland is striving to recover her free soul and give it a voice, she is hampered by having to use a tongue which does not naturally express her spirit and peculiar bent. In time she may conquer the obstacle, make this tongue her own, force it to express her, but it will be long, if ever, before she can do it with the same richness, force and unfettered individuality as she would have done in her own Gaelic speech. Modern India is another striking example. Nothing has stood more in the way of rapid progress in India, of her finding and developing herself under modern conditions than the long overshadowing of the Indian tongues as cultural instruments by the English language. It is significant that the one sub-nation in India which from the first refused, as much as it could, to undergo this yoke, devoted itself to it the development of its language, made that for long its principal preoccupation, gave to it its most original minds and most living energies, getting through everything else perfunctorily, neglecting commerce, doing politics as an intellectual and oratorical pastime, —that it is Bengal which first recovered its soul, respiritualised itself, forced the whole world to hear of its great spiritual personalities, gave it the first modern Indian poet and Indian scientist of

world-wide fame and achievement, first made India begin to count again in the culture of the world, first, as a reward in the outer life, arrived at a vital political consciousness and a living political movement not imitative and derivative in its spirit and its central ideal. For so much does language count in the life of a nation; for so much does it count to the advantage of humanity at large that its group-souls should preserve and develop and use with a vigorous group individuality their natural instrument of expression.

A common language makes for unity; and therefore it might be said that the unity of the human race demands unity of language, and that the advantages of diversity must be foregone for this greater good, however serious the temporary sacrifice. But it makes for a real, fruitful, living unity, only when it is the natural expression of the race or has been made so by development from within. The history of universal tongues spoken by peoples to whom they were not natural, is not encouraging; they tend to become dead tongues, sterilising so long as they keep hold, fruitful only when they are broken up again into new derivative languages or have departed leaving the old speech, where that has persisted, to revive with this new stamp and influence upon it. Latin, after its first century of general domination in the West, became a dead thing, impotent for creation, generated no new culture in the nations speaking it, could not be given a real new life even by so great a force as Christianity. The times

during which it was the instrument of European thought, were precisely those in which that thought was heaviest, most traditional and least fruitful. A rapid and vigorous new life only grew up when the languages which appeared out of the detritus of dying Latin or the old languages which had not been lost, took its place as the complete instruments of national culture. For it is not enough that the natural language should be spoken by the people ; it must be the expression of its higher life and thought. A language surviving only as a patois or a provincial tongue like Welsh after the English conquest, Breton or Provencal in France, Czech in Austria or Ruthenian and Lithuanian in Russia languishes, becomes sterile and does not serve all the true purpose of survival.

Language is the sign of the cultural life of a people, its soul in thought and mind standing behind and enriching its soul in action. Therefore it is here that the phenomena and utilities of diversity may be most readily seized ; but these truths are important because they apply equally to the thing it expresses, symbolises and serves as an instrument. Diversity of language is worth keeping because diversity of cultures, of soul-groups is worth keeping, because without that life cannot have full play and there is a danger, almost an inevitability of decline and stagnation. Thus disappearance into a simple unity, of which the systematic thinker dreams as an ideal and which we have seen to be a

substantial possibility and even a likelihood, if a certain tendency becomes dominant, might lead to political peace. economical well-being, perfect administration, the solution of a hundred material problems, as did on a lesser scale the Roman unity; but to what eventual good if it leads also to the sterilisation of the mind and the stagnation of the soul of humanity? In laying this stress on culture, on the things of the mind and the spirit, there need be no intention of undervaluing the outward, material side of life, belittling that to which Nature always attaches so insistent an importance. On the contrary, the inner and the outer depend upon each other. We see for instance in the life of a nation that a great period of national culture and vigorous mental and soul life is always part of a general stirring and movement which has its counterpart in the outward political, economical, practical life of the nation. It brings the latter about, but also it itself needs that to flourish with an entirely full and healthy vigour. Therefore the peace, well-being and order of the human world is a thing eminently to be desired as a basis for a great world-culture in which all humanity must be united; but neither of these unities, the outward or inward, must be devoid of a thing even more important than peace, order and well-being,—freedom and vigour of life, which can only be assured by variation, by group freedom and individual freedom. Not then a uniform unity, not a logically simple, a scientifically rigid, a beautifully neat and mechanical, but a living unity full of healthy

freedom and diversity is the ideal which we should keep in view and strive to get realised.

But how is this difficult end to be secured? For just as an excessive uniformity and centralisation may bring about the disappearance of necessary variations and indispensable liberties, so a vigorous diversity and individuality may lead to an incurable persistence or constant return of the old separatism which will prevent unity from completing itself or will not allow it to get firm roots. For it will not be enough for the constituent groups or divisions to have a certain formal administrative and legislative separateness like the states of the American union, if as there it is only in mechanical variations that there is liberty and all real departures from the general norm proceeding from an inner variation are discouraged or forbidden. Nor will a unity plus independence of the German type be enough; for there the real fact is a unifying and disciplined Prussianism and independence is only in the form. Nor will even the English colonial system give us any useful suggestion, for although there is there a separate vigour of life, the brain, heart and central spirit are in the metropolitan country and the rest are at the best only outlying posts of the Anglo-Saxon idea. The Swiss cantonal life offers no fruitful similitude, not only on account of its exiguity, but because there the real fact is a single Swiss life and practical spirit with a mental dependence on three foreign cultures sharply dividing the race, so that a common culture does not exist. The problem is

rather, on a larger and more difficult scale and with greater complexities, that which offers itself now to the British Empire, how to unite Great Britain, Ireland, the Colonies, Egypt, India in a real community, throwing their gains into a common stock, using their energies for a common end, finding the account of their national individuality in a supranational life, yet preserving that individuality, Ireland keeping the Irish soul and life and cultural principle, India the Indian soul and life and cultural principle, the other units developing theirs, not united by a common Anglicisation, which was the past empire-building ideal, but finding a greater, as yet unrealised principle of free union. Nothing has yet been suggested in the way of solution except some sort of bunch or rather bouquet system, unifying its clusters not by the living stalk of a common origin or united past, for that does not exist, but by an artificial thread of administrative unity which may at any moment be snapped irretrievably by centrifugal forces.

It may be said that after all, unity being the first need, that should be acheived at any cost as national unity was achieved by crushing out the separate existence of the local units, and afterwards a new principle of grouping or variation may be found other than that of the nation unit. But the parallel here becomes illusory. For the nation was historically the growth into a larger unit among many units; the old richness of small units which gave such splendid cultural, but such

unsatisfactory political results in Greece, Italy, India was lost indeed, but the same principle of life by diversity was preserved with nations for the diverse units and the cultural life of a continent for the common background. Here nothing of the kind is possible. There will be a sole unity, the world-nation, with no outer source of diversity; therefore the inner source has to be modified indeed, subordinated in some way, but preserved. It may be that it will not, that the unitarian idea will eventually prevail, turning the nations into geographical departments or provinces; but in that case the outraged need of life will have its revenge, either by a stagnation, a collapse and a detrition fruitful of new separations, or by some principle of revolt from within, as for example by the principle of Anarchism enforcing itself and breaking down the world-order for a new creation. The question is whether there is not somewhere a principle of unity in diversity by which this method of action and reaction, creation and destruction, realisation and relapse cannot be, if not altogether avoided, yet mitigated in its action and led to a more serene and harmonious working.

CHAPTER XXIX

The only means readily suggesting itself by which the necessary group-freedom can be preserved and yet the unification of the human race achieved, is to strive not towards a closely organised world-State, but towards a free, elastic and progressive world-union. If this is to be done, we shall have to discourage that almost inevitable tendency which must lead any unification by political, economical and administrative means, in a word, by the force of machinery, to follow the analogy of the evolution of the nation-State; we shall have to encourage and revive that force of idealistic nationalism which, before the present War, seemed on the point of being crushed on the one side under the weight of the increasing world-empires of England, Russia, France and latterly Germany, on the other by the progress of the opposite ideal of internationalism with its large and devastating contempt for the narrow ideas of country and nation and its denunciation of the evils of nationalistic patriotism. And in addition, we shall have to find a cure for the as yet incurable separative sentiments natural to the very idea to which we shall have to give a renewed strength. How is all this to be done?

On our side in the attempt we have the natural principle of compensating reactions. Whatever may be the validity of the law of action

and reaction in physical Science, in human action, which must always depend largely on psychological forces, it is a constant truth. That to every action there is a tendency of reaction which may not operate immediately, but must operate eventually, which may not act with an equal and entirely compensating force, but must act with some force of compensation, may be taken as well established; it is both a philosophical necessity and a constant fact of experience. For we see that Nature works in this fashion; having for some time insisted on the dominant force of one tendency, she seeks to correct its exaggerations by reviving or newly awakening or bringing into the field in a new and modified form the opposite tendency. After a long insistence on centralisation, she tries to modify it by at least a subordinated decentralisation; having long insisted on more uniformity, she calls again into play the spirit of variation. The result need not be an equipollence of the two tendencies, it may be any kind of compromise; or instead of a compromise it may be in act a fusion and in result a new creation which shall be a compound of both principles. We may expect her to apply the same method to the tendencies of unification and group variation in dealing with the great mass unit of humanity. At present, the nation is the fulcrum which the latter tendency has been using for its workings as against the imperialistic tendency of unifying assimilation. The course of Nature's working in humanity may either destroy the nation unit, as she destroyed the

tribe and clan, and develop a quite new principle of grouping or else may preserve it and give it sufficient power of vitality and duration to balance usefully the trend towards too heavy a force of unification. It is this latter contingency that we have to consider.

The two forces in action before the war were Imperialism—of various colours, as the more rigid imperialism of Germany, the more liberal imperialism of England,—and nationalism. They were the two sides of one phenomenon, the aggressive or expansive and the defensive aspects of national egoism. But in the trend of imperialism, this egoism had some eventual chance of dissolving itself by excessive self-enlargement, as the aggressive tribe disappeared, for example, the Persian tribe first into the empire and then into the nationality of the Persian people, or as the city-state also disappeared, first into the Roman empire and then both tribe and city-state without hope of revival into the nations which arose by fusion out of the irruption of the German tribes into the declining Latin unity. So aggressive national Imperialism by overspreading the world might end in destroying altogether the nation unit in precisely the same way as the city-state and tribe were destroyed by the aggressive expansion of a few city-states and tribes. Defensive nationalism has been a force reacting against this tendency and restricting it to the best of its ability. But before the War, the separative force of nationalism seemed doomed to impotence and final suppression before the

tremendous power with which science, organisation and efficiency had armed the governing States of the large imperial aggregates.

All the facts were pointing in one direction. Corea had disappeared into the nascent Japanese empire on the mainland of Asia. Persian nationalism had succumbed and lay suppressed under a a system of spheres of influence which were really a veiled protectorate, and all experience shows that the beginning of a protectorate is also the beginning of the end of the protected nation; it is an euphemistic name for the first process of chewing previous to deglutition. Tibet and Siam were so weak and visibly declining that their continued immunity could not be hoped for. China itself had only escaped by the jealousies of the world-Powers and by its size which made it an awkward morsel to swallow, let alone to digest. The partition of all Asia between four or five or at the most six great empires seemed a forgone conclusion which nothing but an unexampled international convulsion could prevent. The European conquest of Northern Africa had practically been completed by the disappearance of Morocco, the confirmed English protectorate over Egypt and the Italian hold on Tripoli. Somaliland was in a preliminary process of slow deglutition; Abyssinia, saved once by Menelik but now torn by internal discord, was the object of a revived dream of Italian colonial empire. The Boer republics had gone under before the advancing tide of imperialistic aggression. All the rest of

Africa practically was the private property of three great Powers and two small ones. In Europe, no doubt, there were still a few small independent nations, Balkan and Teutonic, and also two quite unimportant neutralised countries. But the Balkans were a constant theatre of uncertainty and disturbance and the rival national egoisms could only have ended, in case of the ejection of Turkey from Europe, either by the formation of a young, hungry and ambitious Slav empire under the dominance of Servia of Bulgaria or by their disappearance into the shadow of Austria and Russia. The Teutonic states were coveted by expanding Germany and, had that Power been guided by the prudently daring diplomacy of a new Bismarck,—a not unlikely contingency, could William II have gone to the grave before letting loose the hounds of war,—their absorption might well have been compassed. There remained America where imperialism had not yet arisen, but it was already emerging in the form of Roose-veltian Republicanism, and the interference in Mexico, hesitating as it was, yet pointed to the inevitability of a protectorate and a final absorption of the disorderly Central American republics; the union of South America would then have become a defensive necessity. It was only the stupendous cataclysm of the world-war which interfered with the progressive march towards the division of the world into less than a dozen great empires.

The War has revived with a startling force the idea of free nationality, throwing it up in three

forms, each with a stamp of its own. First, in opposition to the imperialistic ambitions of Germany in Europe, the allied nations, although empires, have been obliged to appeal to and champion a qualified ideal of free nationality. Secondly, America, more politically idealistic than Europe, has entered the war with a cry for league of free nations. Finally, the pure idealism of the Russian revolution has cast into this new creative chaos an entirely new element by the distinct, positive, uncompromising recognition, free from all reserves of diplomacy and self-interest, of the right of every aggregate of men naturally marked off from other aggregates to decide its own political status and destiny. These three positions are in fact distinct from each other, but each has in effect some relation to the actually possible future of humanity. The first bases itself upon the present conditions and aims at a certain practical rearrangement; the second tries to hasten into immediate practicability a not entirely remote possibility of the future; the third aims at beginning into precipitation by the alchemy of revolution,—for what we inappropriately call revolution, is only a rapidly concentrated movement of evolution,—a yet remote end which, in the ordinary course of events, could only be realised, if at all, in the far distant future. All of them have to be considered; for a prospect which only takes into view existing realised forces or apparently realisable possibilities is foredoomed to error. Moreover, the Russian idea by its attempt at self-effectuation, however

immediately ineffective, has rendered itself an actual force which must be reckoned with. A great idea already striving to enforce itself in the field of practice is a force which cannot be left out of count, nor valued only according to its apparent chances of immediate effectuation.

The position taken by England, France and Italy, the European section of the Allies, contemplates a political rearrangement of the world, but not any radical change of its existing order. It is true that it enounces the principle of free nationalities; but in international politics which is still a play of natural forces and interests and in which ideals are only a comparatively recent development of the human mind, principles can only prevail where and so far as they are consonant with interests, or where and so far as, being hostile to interests, they are yet assisted by natural forces strong enough to overbear the interests which oppose them. The pure application of ideals to politics is as yet a revolutionary method of action which can only be hoped for in exceptional crises; the day when it becomes a rule of life, human nature and life itself will have become a new phenomenon, something almost superterrestrial and divine. That day is not yet. The allied Powers in Europe are themselves nations with an imperial past and an imperial future; they cannot, even if wished, get away by the force of a mere idea from that past and that future. Their first interest and therefore the first duty of their statesmen must be to preserve the

empire, and even, where it can in their view be legitimately done, to increase it; the principle of free nationality can only be applied by them in its purity where their own imperial interests are not affected, as against Turkey and the Central Powers, because there the principle is consonant with their own interests and can be supported as against German, Austrian or Turkish interests by the natural forces of a successful war justified morally in its result because it was invited by the Powers which will have to suffer. It cannot be applied in its purity where their own imperial interests are affected, because there it is opposed to existing interests and there is no sufficient countervailing force by which that opposition can be counteracted. Here therefore it must be acted upon in a qualified sense, as a force moderating that of pure imperialism. So applied it will amount in fact to the concession of internal self-government or Home Rule in such proportion, at such a time or by such stages as may be possible, practicable and expedient for the interests of the empire and of the subject nation so far as they can be accommodated with one another. It must be understood, in other words, as the common sense of the ordinary man would understand it; it cannot be and has nowhere been understood in the sense which would be attached to it by the pure idealist of the Russian type who is careless of all but the naked purity of his principle.

What then would be the practical consequences of this qualified principle of free nationality as it would be possible to apply it in the result of a complete victory of the Allied Powers, its representatives? In America, it would have no field of immediate application. In Africa, there are not only no free nations, but with the exception of Egypt and Abyssinia, no nations, properly speaking; for Africa is the one part of the world where the old tribal conditions have still survived and only tribal peoples exist, not nations in the political sense of the word. Here then a complete victory of the Allies would mean the partition of the continent between three colonial Empires, Italy, France and England, with the continuance of the Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese enclaves and the precarious continuance for a time of the Abyssinian kingdom. In Asia, it would mean the appearance of three or four new nationalities out of the ruins of the Turkish empire; but these by their immaturity would all be foredoomed to remain, for a time at least, under the influence or the protection of one or other of the great Powers. In Europe, it would imply the diminution of Germany by the loss of Alsace and Poland, the disintegration of the Austrian empire,* the reversion of the Adriatic coast to Servia and Italy, the liberation of the Czech and Polish nations, some

* This possibility has been modified by a recent pronouncement. But the modification is inconsistent with the free choice of their future by the Slav peoples.

rearrangement in the Balkan Peninsula and the adjacent countries, and perhaps, sooner or later, the conversion of Hungary into a Slavic state with a large Magyar minority. All this, it is clear, would mean a great change in the map of the world, but no radical transformation. The existing tendency of nationalism would gain some extension by the creation of some new independent nations; the existing tendency of imperial aggregation would gain a great extension by the expansion of the actual territory, of the world-wide influence and of the international responsibilities of the successful empires.

Still certain very important results will have been gained which must make in the end for a free world-union. The most important of these, the result of the Russian Revolution born out of the war and its battle-cry of free nationality, but still contingent on the success of the revolutionary principle, will be the disappearance of Russia as an aggressive empire and its transformation from an imperialistic aggregate into a congeries or a federation of independent republics. The second will be the destruction of the German type of imperialism and the salvation of a number of independent nationalities which lay under its menace. The third will be the multiplication of distinct nationalities with a claim to the recognition of their separate existence and legitimate voice in the affairs of the world, which will make for the strengthening of the idea of a free world-union as the ultimate solution of international

problems. The fourth is the definite recognition by the British nation of the qualified principle of free nationality in the inevitable reorganisation of the empire.

This development has taken two forms, the definite recognition of the principle of Home Rule in Ireland and India and the recognition of the claim of each constituent nation to a voice, which in the event of Home Rule must mean a free and equal voice, in the councils of the Empire. Taken together these two things mean the ultimate conversion from an empire constituted on the old principle of nationalistic imperialism which was represented by the supreme government of one predominant nation, England, into a free and equal commonwealth of nations managing their common affairs through a supple co-ordination by mutual good will and agreement. In other words, it will mean in the end the application within certain limits of precisely that principle which would underlie the constitution on the larger scale of a free world-union. Much work will have to be done, several extensions made, many counterforces overcome before this commonwealth can become a realised fact, but that it should have taken shape in the principle and the germ, is a notable event in world-history. Two questions remain. What will be the effect of this experiment on the other empires which adhere to the old principle of a dominant centralisation? Probably it will have this effect, if it succeeds, that, as they are faced by the growth of strong nationalistic movements, they

will be led to adopt the same or a similar solution, just as they adopted from England with modifications her successful system of Parliamentary government in the affairs of the nation. Secondly, what of the relations between these empires and the many independent non-imperial nations or republics which will exist under the new arrangement of the world? How are they to be preserved from fresh attempts to extend the imperial idea, or how is their existence to be correlated in the international comity with the huge and overshadowing power of the great empires? It is here that the American idea of the League of Free Nations intervenes and finds its justification.

Unfortunately, it is still difficult to know what exactly this idea will mean in practice. The utterances of its spokesman, President Wilson, have been marked hitherto by a magnificent nebulous idealism full of inspiring ideas and phrases, but empty of any clear and specific application. We must look for light to the past history and the traditional temperament of the American people. The United States have always been pacific and non-imperialistic, yet with an undertone of nationalistic susceptibility which threatened recently to take an imperialistic turn and has led the nation to make two or three wars ending in conquests whose results it had then to reconcile with its non-imperialistic pacifism. It annexed Mexican Texas by war and then turned it into a constituent State of the union, swamping it at the same time with American colonists. It conquered

Cuba from Spain and the Phillippines first from Spain and then from the insurgent Filippinos and, not being able to swamp them with colonists, gave Cuba independence under the American influence and has promised the Filipinos a complete independence which it will no doubt protect against any other foreign aggression. American idealism is governed by a shrewd sense of American interests, and highest among these interests is reckoned the preservation of the American political idea and its constitution, to which all imperialism, foreign or American, is regarded as a moral peril.

We may take it then that the League of nations as announced will have both an opportunist and an idealistic element. The opportunist element will make it take in its first form the legalisation of the map and political formation of the world as it will emerge from the convulsion of the war. Its idealistic side will be the use of the influence of America in the League to favour the increasing application of the democratic principle everywhere and the final emergence of a United States of the world with a democratic Congress of the nations as its governing agency. The legalisation will have the good effect of minimising the chances of war,—provided always the League proves practicable and succeeds, which is by no means a foregone conclusion. But it will have the bad effect of tending to stereotype a state of things which must be in part artificial, irregular, anomalous and only temporarily useful. Law is necessary for order and stability, but it becomes a

conservative and hampering force unless it provides itself with an effective machinery for changing the laws as soon as circumstances and new needs make that desirable. This can only happen when the Parliament, Congress or free Council of the nations becomes an accomplished thing. Meanwhile, how is the added force for the conservation of old principles to be counteracted and an evolution assured which will lead to the consummation desired by the democratic American ideal? America's influence in the League will not be sufficient for that purpose; for it will have at its side other influences interested in preserving the *status quo* and some interested in developing the imperialist solution. Another force, another influence is needed. Here the Russian ideal with the great though as yet quite chaotic attempt to apply it intervenes and finds its justification. For our present purpose, it is the most interesting and important of the three anti-imperialistic influences which Nature has thrown into her great crucible of war and revolution.

CHAPTER XXX

The issues of the Russian idea of free nationality are greatly complicated by the transitory phenomena of a revolution which seeks, like the French Revolution before it, to transform immediately and without easy intermediate stages the whole basis not only of government, but of society, and is, morever, being carried out under pressure of a disastrous war. This double situation has led inevitably to an unexampled anarchy and, incidentally, to the temporary forceful domination of an extreme party which represents the ideas of the Revolution in their most uncompromising and violent form. The Bolshevik despotism corresponds in this respect to the Jacobin despotism of the French Reign of Terror. The latter lasted long enough to secure its work, which was to effect violently and irrevocably the transition from the post-feudal system of society to the first basis of democratic development. The Labourite despotism in Russia, the rule of the Soviets, should it fix its hold and last long enough, may possibly effect the transition of society to a second and more advanced basis of the same development. But we are concerned only with the effect on the ideal of free nationality. On this point, all Russia, except the small reactionary party, seems to be agreed; but the resort to the principle of government by force brings in a contradictory element which

endangers its sound effectuation even in Russia itself and therefore weakens the force which it might have in the immediate future of the world-development. For it stands on a moral principle which belongs to the future; while government by force belongs to the past and present and is radically inconsistent with the founding of the new world-arrangement on the basis of free choice and free status.

The political arrangement of the world hitherto has rested on an almost entirely physical and vital, that is to say, geographical, commercial, political and military basis. Both the nation idea and the State idea have built themselves on this foundation. The first unity aimed at has been a geographical, commercial, political and military union, and in establishing this unity, the earlier vital principle of race on which the clan and tribe founded themselves, has been everywhere overridden. It is true that nationhood still founds itself largely on the idea of race, but this is in the nature of a fiction. It covers the historical fact of a fusion of many races and attributes a natural motive to a historical and geographical association. Nationhood founds itself partly on this association, partly on others which accentuate it, common interests, community of language, community of culture and all these in unison have evolved a psychological idea, a psychological unity, which finds expression in the idea of nationalism. But the nation idea and the State idea do not everywhere coincide, and in most cases the former has been overridden by the

latter, and always on the same physical and vital grounds, grounds of geographical, political and military convenience or necessity. In the conflict between the two, force, as in all vital and physical struggle, must always be the final arbiter. But the new principle proposed, that of the right of every natural grouping which feels its own separateness to choose its own status and partnerships, makes a clean sweep of these vital and physical grounds and substitutes a purely psychological principle of free will and free choice as against the claims of political and economic necessity. Or rather the vital and physical grounds of grouping are only to be held valid when they receive this psychological sanction and are to found themselves upon it.

How the two rival principles work out, can be seen by the example of Russia itself which is now prominently before our eyes. Russia has never been a nation-State in the pure sense of the word, like France, Spain, Italy, Great Britain or modern Germany; it has been a congeries of nations, Great Russia, Ruthenian Ukraine, White Russia, Lithuania, Poland, Siberia, all Slavic with a dash of Tartar and German blood, Courland which is mostly Slav but partly German, Finland which has no community of any kind with the rest of Russia, and latterly the Asiatic nations of Turkestan, all bound together by one bond only, the rule of the Tsar. The only psychological justification of such a union was the future possibility of fusion into a single nation with the Russian language as

its instrument of culture, thought and government, and it was this which the old Russian regime had in view. The only way to bring this about was by governmental force, as had been long attempted by England in Ireland and was being attempted by Germany in German Poland and Lorraine. The Austrian method of federation employed with Hungary or of a pressure tempered by leniency, by concessions and by measures of administrative half-autonomy might have been tried, but their success in Austria has been small. Federation has not as yet proved a successful principle except between States and nations or sub-nations already disposed to unite by ties of common culture, a common past or an already developed or developing sense of common nationhood; such conditions existed in the American States and in Germany, they exist in China and in India; but they have not existed in Austria or Russia. Or, if things and ideas had been ripe, instead of this attempt, there might have been an endeavour to found a free union of nations with the Tsar as the symbol of a supra-national idea and bond of unity; but for this the movement of the world was not yet ready. Against an obstinate psychological resistance the vital and physical motive of union could only resort to force military, administrative and political, which has succeeded often enough in the past. In Russia, it was probably on the way to a slow success as far as the Slavic portions of the Empire were concerned; in Finland, perhaps also in Poland, it would

probably have failed much more irretrievably than the long reign of force failed in Ireland, partly because even a Russian or a German autocracy cannot apply perfectly and simply the large, thorough-going and utterly brutal and predatory methods of a Cromwell or Elizabeth, partly because the resisting psychological factor of nationalism had become too self-conscious and capable of an organised passive resistance or at least a passive force of survival.

But if the psychological justification was deficient or only in process of creation, the vital and physical case for a strictly united Russia, not excluding Finland, was overwhelming. The work of the Peters and Catharines was founded on a strong political, military and economical necessity. From the political and military point of view, all these Slavic nations had everything to lose by disunion, because, disunited, they were each exposed and they exposed each other to the oppressive contact of any powerful neighbour, Sweden, Turkey, Poland, while Poland was a hostile and powerful State, or as now Germany and Austria. The union of the Ukraine Cossacks with Russia was indeed brought about by mutual agreement as a measure of defence against Poland. Poland itself, once weakened, stood a better chance by being united with Russia than by standing helpless and alone between three large and powerful neighbours, and her total inclusion would certainly have been a better solution for her than the fatal partition

between three hungry powers. On the other hand, by union a State was created, so geographically compact, yet so large in bulk, numerous in population, well-defended by natural conditions and rich in potential resources that, if it had been properly organised, it could not only have stood secure in itself, but dominated half Asia, as it already does, and half Europe, as it was once, even without proper organisation and development, almost on the way to do, when it interfered as armed arbiter, here deliverer, there champion of oppression, in the Balkans and in Austro-Hungary. Even the assimilation of Finland was justified from this point of view; for a free Finland would have left Russia geographically and economically incomplete and beset and limited in her narrow Baltic outlet, while a Finland dominated by a strong Sweden or a powerful Germany would have been a standing military menace to the Russian capital and the Russian empire. The inclusion of Finland, on the contrary, makes Russia secure, at ease and powerful at this vital point. Nor, might it be argued, did Finland itself really lose, since, independent, she would be too small and weak to maintain herself against neighbouring imperial aggressiveness and must rely on the support of Russia. All these advantages have been destroyed, temporarily at least, by the centrifugal forces let loose by the Revolution and its principle of the free choice of nationalities.

It is evident that these arguments, founded as they are on vital and physical necessity and regardless of moral and psychological justification,

might be carried very far. They would not only justify Austria's domination of Trieste and her Slavic territories, as they justified England's conquest and holding of Ireland against the continued resistance of the Irish people, but also, extended a little farther, Germany's schemes of Pan-Germanism and even her larger ideas of absorption and expansion. It could be extended to validate all that imperial expansion of the European nations which has now no moral justification and can only be justified morally in the future by the creation of supra-national psychological unities; for the vital and physical grounds always exist. Even the moral, at least the psychological and cultural justification of a unified Russian culture and life in process of creation, could be extended, and the European claim to spread and universalise European civilisation by annexation and governmental force presents on its larger scale a certain moral analogy. This, too, extended, might justify the pre-War German ideal of a sort of unification of the world under the ægis of German power and German culture. But however liable to abuse by extension, vital necessity may be allowed to hold in a world still dominated fundamentally by the law of force, however mitigated in its application, and by vital and physical necessity, so far at least as concerns natural geographical unities like Russia, the United Kingdom, even Austria within its natural frontiers.

The Russian principle belongs, in fact, to a possible future in which moral and psychological principles will have a real chance to dominate, and

vital and physical necessities will have to suit themselves to them, instead of, as now, the other way round; it belongs to an arrangement of things, the exact reverse of the present international system. As things are at present, it has to struggle against difficulties which may well be insuperable. The Russians have been much ridiculed and more vilified for their offer of a democratic peace founded on the free choice of nations to autocratic and militarist Germany bent on expansion by dishonest diplomacy and by the sword. From the point of view of practical statesmanship the ridicule is justified; for the offer ignored facts and forces and founded itself on the power of the naked and unarmed idea. The Russians, thorough-going idealists, acted, in fact, in the same spirit as did once the French in the first fervour of their revolutionary enthusiasm, offering their new principle of liberty and democratic peace to the world,—not, at first, to Germany alone,—in the hope that its moral beauty and truth and inspiration would compel acceptance, not by the Governments, but by the peoples who would force the hands of the governments or overturn them if they opposed. Like the French revolutionists, they have found that ours is still a world in which ideals can only be imposed if they have a preponderating vital and physical force in their hands or at their backs. The French Jacobins with their ideal of unitarian nationalism were able to concentrate their energies and make their principle triumph for a time by force of arms against a hostile world. The Russian

idealists find in their attempt to effectuate their principle that the principle itself is a source of weakness; they find themselves helpless against the hard-headed German cynicism, not because they are disorganised,—for revolutionary France was also disorganised and overcame the difficulty,—but because the dissolution of the old Russian fabric to which they have consented, has deprived them of the means of united and organised action. Nevertheless, their principle is a more advanced, because a moral principle, than the aggressive nationalism which was all the international result of the French Revolution; it has a greater meaning for the future.

For it belongs to a future of free world-union in which precisely this principle of free self-determination must be either the preliminary movement or the final result, to an arrangement of things in which the world will have done with war and force as the ultimate basis of national and international relations and be ready to adopt free agreement as a substitute. If the idea is able to work itself out within the bounds of Russia and arrive at some principle of common action, even at the cost of that aggressive force which national centralisation can alone give, it will mean a new moral power in the world. It will certainly not be accepted elsewhere, except in case of unexpected revolutions, without enormous reserves and qualifications; but it will be there working as a power to make the world ready for itself and, when it is ready, will play a large determining part in the final arrangement of human unity.

CHAPTER XXXI

By a free world-union we understand a complex unity based on diversity and that diversity based on free self-determination. A mechanical unit arian system would regard in its idea the geographical groupings of men as so many conveniences for provincial division, for the convenience of administration, much in the same spirit as the French Revolution reconstituted France with an entire disregard of old natural and historical divisions. It would regard mankind as one single nation and try to efface the old separative national spirit altogether; it would arrange its system probably by continents and sub-divide the continents by convenient geographical demarcations. In this opposite idea, the geographical, the physical principle of union would be quite subordinated to a psychological principle. For not a mechanical division, but a living diversity would be its object. If this object is to be secured, the peoples of humanity must be allowed to group themselves according to their free-will and their natural affinities; no constraint or force could be allowed to compel an unwilling nation or grouping to enter into or join itself or remain joined to another for the convenience, aggrandisement, political necessity of that other, or even for the general convenience, in disregard of its own wishes. Nations or countries widely divided from each

other geographically like England and Canada or England and Australia might cohere together; nations closely grouped locally might, on the contrary, choose to stand apart, like England and Ireland or like Finland and Russia. Unity would be the larger principle of life, but freedom would be its foundation-stone.

In a world built on the present political and commercial basis, this system of groupings might present often insuperable difficulties or serious disadvantages; but in the condition of things in which alone a free world-union would be possible, these difficulties and disadvantages would cease to operate. Military necessity of forced union for strength of defence or for power of aggression would be non-existent, because war would no longer be possible; force for the arbiter of international differences and a free world-union are two quite incompatible ideas and practically could not co-exist. The political necessity would also disappear; for it is largely made up of that very spirit of conflict and the consequent insecure conditions of international life apportioning predominance in the world to the physically and organically strongest nations out of which the military necessity arose. In a free world-union determining its affairs and settling its differences by agreement or, where agreement failed, by arbitration, the only political advantage of including large masses of men not otherwise allied to each other in a single State would be the greater influence arising from mass and population. But this influence

could not work if the inclusion were against the will of the nations brought together in the State; for then it would rather be a source of weakness and disunion in the international action of the State; unless indeed it were allowed in the international system to weigh by its bulk and population without regard to the will and opinion of the peoples constituting it,—if, for instance, the population of Finland and Poland were to swell the number of voices which a united Russia could count in the council of nations, but the will, sentiment and opinions of the Finns and Poles were to be given no means of expression in that mechanical and unreal unity. But this would be contrary to the modern sense of justice and reason and incompatible with the principle of freedom which could alone ensure a sound and peaceful basis for the world-arrangement. Thus the elimination of war and the settlement of differences by peaceful means would remove the military necessity for forced unions; while the right of every people to a free voice and status in the world would remove its political necessity and advantage. The elimination of war and the recognition of the rights of all peoples are intimately bound up with each other as has begun to be recognised, though as yet imperfectly, in the present European conflict.

The economical question remains, and it is the sole important problem of a vital and physical order which might possibly present in this kind of world-arrangement any serious difficulties, or in

which the advantages of a unitarian system might really outweigh those of this more complex unity. In either, however, the forcible economic exploitation of one nation by another, which is so large a part of the present economical order, would necessarily be abolished. There would remain the possibility of a sort of peaceful economical struggle, a separativeness, a building up of artificial barriers, —a phenomenon, the increase of which is a striking feature of the present commercial civilisation. But it is likely that once the element of struggle were removed from the political field, the stress of the same struggle in the economic field would greatly decrease. The advantages of self-sufficiency and predominance, to which political rivalry, struggle and the possibility of hostile relations now give an enormous importance, would lose much of their stringency, the advantages of a freer give and take would become more easily visible. It is obvious, for example, that an independent Finland would profit much more by encouraging the passage of Russian commerce through Finnish ports or an Italian Trieste by encouraging the passage of the commerce of the present Austrian provinces than by setting up a barrier between itself and them. An Ireland politically or administratively independent, able to develop its agricultural and technical education and intensification of productiveness, would find a greater advantage in sharing the movement of the commerce of Great Britain than in isolating itself, even as Great Britain would profit more by an

agreement with such an Ireland than by keeping her, as at present, as a poor and starving helot on her estate. Throughout the world, the idea and fact of union once definitely prevailing, unity of interests would be more clearly seen and the greater advantage of agreement and mutual participation in a naturally harmonised life over the feverish artificial prosperity created by a stressing of separative barriers. That stressing is inevitable in an order of struggle and international competition; it would be seen to be prejudicial in an order of peace and union which would make for mutual accommodation. The principle of a free world-union being that of the settlement of common affairs by common agreement, this could not be confined to the removal of political differences and the arrangement of political relations alone, but must naturally extend to economical differences and economical relations as well. To the removal of war and the recognition of the right of self-determination of the peoples the arrangement of the economical life of the world in its new order by mutual and common agreements would have to be added as the third condition of the free union.

There remains the psychological question of the advantage to the soul of humanity, to its culture, to its intellectual, moral, æsthetic, spiritual growth. At present, the first great need of the psychological life of humanity is the growth towards a greater unity; but also its need is that of a living unity, not in the externals of civilisation, in dress, manners, habits of life, details of political,

social and economical order, not a uniformity, which is the unity towards which the mechanical age of civilisation has been driving, but a free development everywhere with a constant friendly interchange, a close understanding, a feeling of our common humanity, its great common ideals and the truths towards which it is driving and a certain unity and correlation of effort in the united human advance. At present, it may seem that this is better helped and advanced by many different nations and cultures living together in one political state-union than by their political separateness. Temporarily, this may be true to a certain extent, but let us see within what limits.

The old psychological argument for the forcible inclusion of a subject nation by a dominant people was the right or advantage of imposing a superior civilisation upon one that was inferior or upon a barbarous race. Thus the Welsh and Irish people used to be told that their subjugation was a great blessing to their countries, their languages petty patois which ought to disappear as soon as possible, and in embracing the English speech, English institutions, English ideas, lay their sole road to civilisation, culture and prosperity. The British domination in India was justified by the priceless gift of British civilisation and British ideals, to say nothing of the one and only true religion, Christianity, to a heathen, orientally benighted and semi-barbarous nation. All this is now an exploded myth. We can see clearly enough that

the long suppression of the Celtic spirit and Celtic culture, superior in spirituality if inferior in certain practical directions to the Latin and Teutonic, was a loss not only to the Celtic peoples, but to the world. India has vehemently rejected the pretensions to superiority of the British civilisation, culture, religion, while still admitting, not so much the British, as the modern ideals and methods in politics and in the trend to a greater social equality; and it is becoming clear now, even, to more well-informed European minds that the Anglicisation of India would have been a wrong not only to India itself but to humanity.

Still it may be said that, if the old principle of the association was wrong, yet the association itself leads eventually to a good result. If Ireland has lost for the most part its old national speech and Welsh has ceased to have a living literature, yet as a large compensation the Celtic spirit is now receiving and putting its stamp on the English tongue spoken by millions throughout the world, and the inclusion of the Celtic countries in the British Empire may lead to the development of an Anglo-Celtic life and culture better for the world than the separate development of the two elements. India by the partial possession of the English language has been able to link itself to the life of the modern world and to reshape its literature, life and culture on a larger basis and, now that it is reviving its own spirit and ideals in a new mould, is producing its effect on the thought of the West; a perpetual union of the two countries

and a constant mutual interaction of their culture by this close association would be more advantageous to them and to the world than their cultural isolation from each other in a separate existence.

There is a temporary truth in this idea, though it is not the whole truth of the position, and we have given it full weight in considering the claims of the imperialistic solution or line of advance on the way to unity. But even the elements of truth in it can only be admitted, provided a free and equal union replaces the present abnormal, irritating and falsifying relations. Moreover, these advantages are only valuable as a stage towards a greater unity in which this close association would no longer be of the same importance. For the final end is a common world-culture in which each national culture should be, not merged into or fused with some other culture differing from it in principle or temperament, but evolved to its full power and profiting to that end by all the others as well as giving its gains and influences to them, all serving by their separateness and their interaction the common aim and idea of human perfection. This would best be served, not by separateness and isolation, of which there would be no danger, but yet by a certain distinctness and independence of life not subordinated to the mechanising force of an artificial unity. Even within the independent nation itself, there might be with advantage a tendency towards greater local freedom of development and variation, a sort of return to the vivid local and regional life

of ancient Greece and India and mediæval Italy; for the disadvantages of strife, political weakness and precariousness of the national independence would no longer exist in a condition of things from which the old terms of physical conflict had been excluded, while all the cultural and psychological advantges might be recovered. A world secure of its peace and freedom might freely devote itself to the intensification of its real human powers of life by the full encouragement and flowering of the individual, local, regional, national mind and power in the firm frame of a united humanity.

What precise form the framework might take, it is impossible to forecast and useless to speculate; only certain now current ideas would have to be abandoned or modified. The idea of a world-Parliament is attractive at first sight because the parliamentary form is that to which our minds are accustomed; but an assembly of the present unitarian national type could not be the proper instrument of a free world-union of this large and complex kind; it could only be the instrument of a unitarian world-State. The idea of a world-federation, if by that be understood the Germanic or the American form, would be equally inappropriate to the greater diversity and freedom of national development which this type of world-union would hold as one of its cardinal principles. Rather some kind of confederation of the peoples for common human ends, for the removal of all causes of strife and difference, for inter-relation and the regulation of mutual aid and interchange,

yet leaving to each unit a full internal freedom and power of self-determination, would be the right principle of this unity.

But, this being a much looser unity, what would prevent the spirit of separativeness and the causes of clash and difference from surviving in so powerful a form as to endanger the endurance of the principle of unity,—even if that spirit and those causes at all allowed it to reach some kind of sufficient fulfilment? The unitarian ideal, on the contrary, seeks to efface these in their forms and even in their root cause and by so doing would seem to ensure enduring unity. But it may be pointed out in answer that, if it is by political ideas and machinery, under the pressure of the political and economical spirit that the unity is brought about, that is to say, by the idea and experience of the material advantages, conveniences, well-being secured by unification, then the unitarian system also could not be sure of durability. For in the constant mutability of the human mind and earthly circumstances, new ideas and changes would be inevitable and the suppressed desire to recover the lost element of variability, separateness, independent living would take advantage of them for what would then be considered as a wholesome and necessary reaction. The lifeless unity accomplished would dissolve from the need of life within, as the Roman unity dissolved by its lifelessness in helpless reponse to a pressure from without, and once again local, regional, national egoism would reconstitute for itself fresh forms and new centres.

On the other hand, in a free world-union, though originally starting from the national basis, the national idea would inevitably undergo a radical transformation, might very probably disappear even into a new and less strenuously compact form and idea of group-aggregation which would not be separative in spirit, yet would preserve the necessary element of independence and variation needed by both individual and grouping for their full satisfaction and their healthy existence. Moreover, by emphasising the psychological quite as much as the political and mechanical idea and basis, it would give a freer and less artificial form and opportunity for the secure development of the intellectual and psychological change which could alone give some chance of durability to the unification. That change is the growth first of the idea and religion of Humanity and the psychological modification of life and feeling and outlook which would accustom both individual and group to live in humanity rather than in their individual and group egoism while yet losing nothing of their individual or group power to express in its own way the divinity in Man.

CHAPTER XXXII

The idea of humanity as a single race of beings with a common life and a common general interest, ordinarily expressed in a large formula as the advance of human civilisation and the maintenance of the progress of mankind, is among the most characteristic and significant products of modern thought. An outcome of the European mind which proceeds characteristically from life-experience to the idea and, without going deeper, thence returns from the idea upon life in an attempt to change its outward forms and institutions, its order and system, it has taken the shape known currently as internationalism. Internationalism is the attempt of the human mind and life to grow out of the national idea and form and even in a way to destroy it in the interest of the larger synthesis of mankind. An idea proceeding on these lines needs always to attach itself to some actual force or developing power in the life of the times before it can exercise a practical effect, and usually it suffers by contact with the interest and prepossessions of its grosser ally some lesser or greater diminution of itself or even a distortion, and in that form, no longer pure and absolute, enters on the first stage of practice.

The idea of internationalism was born of the thought of the eighteenth century and took some kind of voice in the first idealistic stages of the

French Revolution. But at that time, it was rather a vague intellectual sentiment than a clear idea seeing its way to practice, and it found no strong force in life to help it to take visible body. What came out of the French Revolution and the struggle that grew around it, was a complete and self-conscious nationalism and not internationalism. During the nineteenth century, we see the large idea growing again in the minds of thinkers, sometimes in a modified form, sometimes in a pure idealism, till allying itself with the growing forces of socialism and anarchism it took a clear body and a recognisable vital force. In its absolute form, it became the internationalism of the intellectuals, intolerant of nationalism as a narrow spirit of the past, contemptuous of patriotism as an irrational prejudice, a maleficent corporate egoism characteristic of narrow intellects and creative of arrogance, prejudice, hatred, oppression, division and strife between nation and nation, a gross survival of the past which the growth of reason was destined to destroy. It is founded on a view of things which looks at man in his manhood only and casts away all those physical and social accidents of birth, rank, class, colour, creed, nationality, which have been erected into so many walls and screens behind which man has hidden himself from his fellow-man and turned them into sympathy-proof shelters and trenches from which he wages against him a war of defence and aggression, war of nations, war of continents, war of classes, war of colour with colour, creed with

creed, culture with culture. All this barbarism the idea of the intellectual internationalist seeks to abolish by putting man face to face with man on the basis of their common human sympathy, aims, highest interests of the future. It is entirely futurist in its view and turns away from the confused and darkened good of the past to the purer good of the future when man, at last beginning to become really intelligent and ethical, will shake away from him all these sources of prejudice and passion and evil, and humanity will become one in idea and feeling and life as it is, in spite of itself, one in its status on earth and its destiny.

The height and nobility of the idea is not to be questioned, and certainly a mankind which set its life upon this basis, would make a better, purer, more peaceful and enlightened race than anything we can hope to have at present. But as the human being is now made, the pure idea, though always a great power, is also afflicted by a great weakness. It has an eventual capacity, once born, of taking hold of the rest of the human being and forcing him in the end to acknowledge its truth and make some kind of attempt to embody it; that is its strength. But also because man at present lives more in the outward than in the inward, is governed principally by his vital existence, sensations, feelings and customary mentality rather than by his higher thought-mind, feels himself in these to be really alive, really to exist and be, while the world of ideas is to him something remote and abstract and, however powerful and

interesting in its way, not a living thing, the pure idea seems, until it is embodied in life, something not quite real; that abstractness and remoteness is its weakness.

For it imposes on the idea an undue haste to get itself recognised by life and embodied. If it could have confidence in its strength and be content to grow, to insist and to impress itself till it got into the spirit of man, it might conceivably become a real part of his soul-life, a permanent power in his psychology and succeed in really remoulding his whole life in its image. But it has inevitably a desire to get as soon as possible into the life, for until then it does not feel itself strong, cannot quite be sure that it has vindicated its truth. It hurries into action before it has real knowledge of itself and thereby prepares its own disappointment, even when it seems to triumph and fulfil itself; and in order to succeed it allies itself with powers and movements which are impelled by another aim than its own, but are glad enough to get its aid so that they may strengthen their own case and claim. Thus when it realises itself, it does it in a mixed, impure and ineffective form. Life accepts it as a partial habit, but not completely, not quite sincerely. That has been the history of every idea in succession and one reason at least why there is almost always something unreal, inconclusive and tormented about human progress.

There are many conditions and tendencies in human life at present which are favourable to the

progress of the internationalist idea, and especially the drawing closer of the knots of international life, the multiplication of points of contact and threads of communication and the increasing community in thought, in science and in knowledge. Science especially has been a great force in this direction; for science is a thing common to all men in its conclusions, open to all in its methods, available to all in its results; it is international in its very nature; there can be no such thing as a national science, but only the nation's contribution to the work and growth of science which are the indivisible inheritance of all humanity. Therefore it is easier for men of science or those strongly influenced by science to grow into the international spirit, and all the world is now beginning to feel the influence and to live in it. Science also has created that closer contact of every part of the world with every other part, out of which some sort of international mind is growing. Even cosmopolitan habits of life are now not uncommon and there are a fair number of persons who are as much or more citizens of the world as citizens of their own nation. The growth of knowledge is interesting the peoples in each other's art, culture, religion, ideas, and is breaking down at many points the prejudice, arrogance and exclusiveness of the old nationalistic sentiment. Religion, which ought to have led the way, but owing to its greater dependence on its external parts and its infrarational rather than its spiritual impulses has been as much, or even more, a sower of discord

as a teacher of unity,—religion is beginning to realise, a little dimly and ineffectively as yet, that spirituality is after all its own chief business and true aim, and that it is also the common element and the common bond of all religions. As these influences grow and come more and more consciously to co-operate with each other, it might be hoped that the necessary psychological modification will quietly, gradually, but still irresistibly and at last with an increasing force of rapidity produce itself which will prepare a real and fundamental change in the life of humanity.

But this is at present a slow process, and meanwhile the internationalist idea, eager for effectuation, has allied and almost identified itself with two increasingly powerful movements which have both assumed an international character, Socialism and Anarchism, the latter of the intellectual type familiar in Europe. Indeed it is this alliance that has most commonly gone by the name of internationalism. But this socialistic and anarchistic internationlism has recently been put to the test, the fiery test of the European war, and thus tried it has been found sadly wanting. In every country, the Socialist party has shed its internationalist promise with the greatest ease and lightness, German socialism, the protagonist of the idea, massively leading the way in this abjuration. It is true that a small minority in each country has either remained heroically faithful to its principles or soon returned to them, and as the general weariness of the great international massacre

grows, even the majority have been showing a sensible turn in the same direction; but this has been rather the fruit of circumstance than of principle. Russian socialism, it may be said, has, at least in its extremer form, shown a stronger root of internationalistic feeling. But what it has actually attempted to accomplish, is rather a development of Labour rule on the basis of a purified nationalism, non-aggressive and self-contained than the larger international idea, though this larger idea, it might fairly be said, must be the necessary consequence and corollary of a non-aggressive nationalism if generally accepted. In any case, the actual results of the Russian attempt show only up to the present a failure of the idea to give the vital strength and efficiency which would justify it to life, and have served much more as a telling argument against internationalism than a justification of its truth or at least of its applicability in the present stage of human progress.

For what is the cause of this almost total bankruptcy of the ideal under the strong test of life? Partly it may be because the triumph of socialism is not necessarily bound up with the progress of internationalism. Socialism is really an attempt to complete the growth of the national community by making the individual do, what he has never yet done, live for the nation more than for himself. It is an outgrowth of the national, not of the international idea. No doubt, when the society of the nation has been perfected, the society of nations can and even must be formed;

but this is a later possible or eventual result of Socialism, not its primary vital necessity; and in the crises of life it is the primary vital necessity which tells, while the other and remoter element betrays itself to be a mere idea not yet ready for accomplishment. It can only become powerful when it also becomes either a vital or a psychological necessity. The real truth, the real cause of the failure is that internationalism is as yet, except with some exceptional men, merely an idea, not yet a thing near to our vital feelings or otherwise a part of our psychology. The normal socialist, syndicalist or anarchist cannot escape from the general human feeling and in the test he too turns out, even though he were a professed *sans-patrie* in ordinary times, in his inner heart and being a nationalist. As a vital fact, moreover, these movements have been a revolt of Labour aided by a number of intellectuals against the established state of things, and they have only allied themselves with internationalism, because that too is in intellectual revolt and because its idea helps them in the battle. If Labour comes to power, will it keep or shed its internationalistic tendencies? The experience of countries in which it is at the head of affairs, does not give an encouraging answer, and it may at least be said that, unless at that time the psychological change in humanity has gone much farther than it has now, Labour in power is likely to shed more of the internationalist feeling than it will succeed in keeping and to act very much from the old human motives.

No doubt, the war itself has been an explosion of all that was dangerous and evil in successful nationalism, and the resulting conflagration will burn up many things that needed to die; it will be or ought to be largely purificatory. It has also already strengthened the international idea and forced it on governments and peoples. But we cannot rely too greatly on ideas and resolutions formed in a moment of abnormal crisis under the violent stress of exceptional circumstances. Some effect there will be, some recognition of juster principles in international dealings, some attempt at a better, more rational or at least a more convenient international order. But until the idea of humanity has grown not only upon the intelligence, but in the sentiments, feelings, natural sympathies and mental habits of man, the progress made is likely to be more in external adjustments than in the vital matters, more in a use of the ideal for mixed and egoistic purposes that at once or soon in a large and sincere realisation of the ideal. Until man in his heart is ready, a profound change of the world conditions cannot come; or it can only be brought about by force, physical force or else force of circumstances, and that leaves all the real work to be done. A frame may have then been made, but the soul will have still to grow into that mechanical body.

CHAPTER XXXIII

The great necessity, then, and the great difficulty is to make this idea of humanity, which is already at work upon our minds and even has begun slightly to influence from above our actions, something more than an idea, however strong, to make it a central motive and its satisfaction a necessity of our psychological being, just as the family idea or the national idea has become each a psychological motive with its own need of satisfaction. And how is this to be done? For the family idea had the advantage of growing out of a primary vital need in our being and therefore it had not the least difficulty in becoming a psychological motive and need; for our readiest and strongest motives and psychological needs are those which grow out of our vital necessities and instincts. The clan and tribe ideas had a similar origin, less primary and compelling, and therefore looser and more dissoluble, but still they arose from the vital necessity in human nature for aggregation and the ready basis given by the growth of the family into clan or tribe. These were natural aggregations.

The nation idea, on the contrary, did not arise from a primary vital need, but from a secondary or even tertiary necessity which resulted not from anything inherent in our vital nature, but from circumstances, from environmental evolution; it

arose not from a vital, but from a geographical and historical necessity. And we notice that as one result it had to be created most commonly by force, force of circumstances partly, no doubt, but also by physical force, by the power of the king and the conquering tribe converted into a military and dominant State or else by a reaction against force, a revolt against conquest and domination bringing cohesion to peoples who, though geographically one or even one historically and culturally, had lacked power of cohesion and been too conscious of an original heterogeneity or of local and regional and other divisions. But still the necessity was there, and the nation form after many failures and false successes got into being, and the psychological motive of patriotism, a sign of the growth of a conscious national ego, arose in the form as the expression of its soul and the guarantee of its durability. For we have to recognise this clearly, that without such a soul, such a psychological force and presence within the frame, there can be no guarantee of durability. Without it, what circumstances have created, circumstances easily will destroy. It was for this reason that the ancient world failed to create nations, except on a small scale little clan and regional nations of brief duration and usually of loose structure; it created only artificial empires which went to pieces and left chaos behind them.

What then of this international unity now in the first obscure throes of the pre-formatory state resembling a ferment of cells drawing together for

amalgamation? What is the necessity behind it? If we look at outward things only, the necessity is much less direct, much less compelling than any that preceded it. There is here no vital necessity; mankind can get on well enough without international unity, so far as mere living goes, not at all perfectly, rationally or ideally indeed,—but after all where is there yet any element in human life or society which is perfect, rational or ideal? As yet at least none; still we get on somehow with life, because the vital man who is the dominant element in our instincts and in our actions, cares for none of these things and is quite satisfied with any just tolerable or any precariously or partly agreeable form of living, because that is all to which he is accustomed and all therefore that he feels to be necessary. The men who are not satisfied, the thinkers, the idealists are always a minority and in the end an ineffectual minority, because though always in the end they do get their way partly, their victory yet turns into a defeat; for the vital man, being still the majority, degrades the success into a parody of their rational hope, their clear-sighted ideal or their strong counsel of perfection.

The geographical necessity does not exist, unless we consider that it has been created through the drawing closer together of the earth and its inhabitants by Science and her magical lessening of physical distances and attenuation of barriers. But whatever may happen in the future, this is as yet not sufficient; earth is still large enough

and her divisions still real enough for her to do without any formal unity. If there is any strong need, it may be described,—if such an epithet can be applied to a thing in the present and the future, —as a historical necessity, that is, a need which has arisen as the result of certain actual circumstances that have grown up in the evolution of international relations. And that need is economical, political, mechanical, likely under certain circumstances to create some tentative of preliminary framework, but not at first a psychological reality which will vivify the frame. Moreover, it is not yet sufficiently vital to be precisely a necessity; for it amounts mainly to a need for the removal of certain perils and inconveniences, such as the constant danger of war, and at most to the strong desirability of a better international coordination. And by itself this creates only a possibility, not even a moral certainty, of a first vague sketch and loose framework of unity which may or may not lead to something more close and real.

But there is another power than that of external circumstance which we have a right to take into consideration. For behind all the external circumstances and necessities of which we are more easily aware in Nature, there is always an internal necessity in the being, a will and a design in Nature itself which precedes the outward signals of its development and in spite of all obstacles and failures must in the long end inevitably get itself realised. Nowadays we can see this truth everywhere in Nature down to her lowest forms; a will

in the very seed of the being, not quite conscious or only partially conscious in the form itself, but there in nature, subconscious or even inconscient if you like, but still a will, a mute idea which knows beforehand the form it is going to create, is aware of a necessity other than the environmental, a necessity contained in the very being itself, and creates persistently and inevitably a form that best answers to the necessity, however we may labour to interfere with or thwart its operations.

This is true biologically, but it is also true, though in a more subtle and variable way, psychologically. Now the very nature of man is that of an individual who on one side is always emphasising and developing his individual being to the extent of his power, but who is also driven by the Idea or Truth within him to unify himself with others of his species, to join himself to them or agglutinate them to him, to create human groups, aggregates and collectivities. And if there is an aggregate or collectivity which it is possible for him to realise but is not yet realised, we may be sure that that too in the end he will create. This will in him is not always or often quite conscient or foreseeing, it is often largely subconscient, but even then it is eventually irresistible. And if it gets into his conscious mind, as the international idea has now done, we may count on a more rapid evolution. Such a will in Nature creates favourable external circumstances and happenings or finds them created for it, and even if they are insufficient, she will still often use them beyond their

apparent power of effectivity, not minding the possibility of failure, for she knows that in the end she will succeed and every experience of failure will help to better the eventual success.

Well then, it may be said, let us trust to this inevitable will in Nature and follow out her method of operation. Let us create anyhow this framework, any framework of the aggregate,—she knows already the complete form she intends and she will work it out eventually,—by the power of the idea and our will to realise it, by help of strong force of circumstances, by pressure of all kinds, by physical force even, if need be, since that too seems still to be a part of her necessary machinery, let us create it. Let us have the body; the soul will grow in the body; and we need not mind if the bodily formation is artificial with at first a small or no conscious psychological reality to vivify it. That will begin to form itself as soon as the body has been formed, as the nation was at first more or less artificially formed out of incoherent elements brought together actually by the necessity of a subconscient idea, though apparently only by physical force and the force of circumstances. As a national ego formed which, identifying itself with the geographical body of the nation, developed the psychological instinct of national unity and the need of its satisfaction, so a collective human ego will develop in the international body and will evolve the psychological instinct of human unity and the need of its satisfaction. That will be the guarantee of

duration. And that possibly is how the thing will happen, man being what he is; indeed, if we cannot do better, it will so happen, since happen somehow it must, whether in the worse way or the better.

We may recapitulate here the main possibilities and powers which are shaping us towards such an end in the present world conditions. The old means of unification, conquest by a single great power, which would reduce part of the world by force and bring the remaining nations into the condition of dependencies, protectorates and dependent allies, the whole forming the basic structure of a great final unification,—this was the character of the ancient Roman precedent,—does not now seem any longer possible. It would require a great predominance of force simultaneously by sea and land, an irresistibly superior science and organisation and with all this a constantly successful diplomacy and an invincible good fortune. If war and diplomacy are still to be the decisive factors in international politics in the future as in the past, it would be rash to predict that such a combination may not arise, and if other means fail, it must arise; for there is nothing that can be set down as impossible in the chances of the future, and the urge in Nature always creates its own means. But at present, the possibilities of the future do not seem to point in this direction. But there is, on the other hand, a very strong possibility of the whole earth, or at least the three continents of the eastern hemisphere,

being dominated by three or four great empires largely increased in extent of dominion, spheres of influence, protectorates, and thereby exercising a pre-eminence which they could either maintain by agreements, avoiding all causes of conflict, or in a rivalry which would be the cause of fresh wars and changes. This would normally have been the result of the present European conflict.

But there has struck across this possibility a revived strength of the idea of nationality expressed in the novel formula of the principle of self-determination to which the great world-empires have had to do a real or a verbal homage. The idea of international unity to which this intervention of the revived force of nationality is leading, is the so-called League of Nations. Practically, however, the League of Nations under present conditions or any likely to be immediately realised would still mean the control of the earth by a few great powers, checked only by the necessity of conciliating the sympathy and support of the smaller or less powerful nations; for on the force and influence of these few would rest practically both the decision of all important debateable question and the chance of enforcing the decisions of the majority against any recalcitrant great Power or combination of Powers. The growth of democratic institutions would perhaps help to minimise the chances of conflict and of the abuse of power,—though that is not absolutely certain; it would not alter this real character of the combination.

In all this, there is no immediate prospect of any such form of unification as would give room for or rather necessitate a real psychological sense of unity. Such a form might evolve; but we should have to trust for it to the chapter of accidents or at best to the already declared urge in Nature expressed in the internationalist idea. On that side, there is one possibility at which we have merely hinted as a sort of off-chance, but which now seems to be very suddenly and rapidly growing into something more, the emergence of a powerful party in all the advanced countries of the world pledged to internationalism, conscious of its necessity as a first condition for their other aims and more and more determined to give it precedence and to unite internationally to bring it about. That combination of the intellectuals with Labour which has created the Socialist parties in Germany, Russia and Austria, has formed anew recently the Labour party in England and has its counterparts in most other European countries, seems to be travelling in that direction. This world-wide movement has already created the Russian revolution and made internationalism and Labour rule its two main principles; and it may any day surprise the world by bringing about another such cataclysm in central Europe, either on the removal of the constraining pressure of war or as a consequence of its excessive pressure. It is conceivable that, after the great war is over, this party everywhere may draw together. By a chain of revolutions such as took place in

the nineteenth century and of less violent but still rapid evolutions brought about by the pressure of their example, or even by simply growing into the majority in each country, this party might control Europe. It might create counterparts of itself in all the American republics and in Asiatic countries. It might by using the machinery of the League of Nations or, where necessary, by physical force or economic or other pressure persuade or compel all the nations into some more stringent system of international unification. A world-State or else a close confederation of democratic peoples might be created with a common governing body for all generally important affairs and the decision of principles or at least for all properly international affairs and problems, a common law of the nations and international courts to administer it and some kind of system of international police control to maintain and enforce it. In this or in any other as yet unforeseen way, a sufficient formal unity might come into being.

The question then arises, how out of this purely formal unity a real psychological unity can be created and whether it can be made a living unity. For a mere formal, mechanical, administrative, political and economic union does not necessarily create a psychological unity. None of the great empires have yet succeeded in doing that, and even in the Roman where some sense of unity did come into being, it was nothing close and living which could withstand all shocks from within and without and withstand also what was

more dangerous, the peril of decay and devitalisation which the diminution of the natural elements of free variation and helpful struggle would bring with it. A complete world-union would have indeed this advantage that it would have no need to fear forces from without, for no such forces would any longer exist; but this very absence of outer pressure might well give greater room and power to internal elements of disintegration and still more to the opportunities of decay. It might indeed for a long time foster an internal intellectual and political activity and social progress which would keep it living; but this principle of progress would not be always secure against a natural tendency to exhaustion and stagnation which every diminution of variety and even the very satisfaction of social and economical well-being might well hasten. Disruption of unity would then be necessary to restore humanity to life. Again, while the Roman Empire appealed only to the idea of Roman unity, an artificial and accidental principle, this world-State would appeal to the idea of human unity, a real and vital principle. But if the idea of unity can appeal to the human mind, so too can the idea of separative life, for both address themselves to vital instincts of his nature. What guarantee will there be that the latter will not prevail when man has once tried unity and finds perhaps that its advantages do not satisfy his whole nature? Only the growth of some very powerful psychological factor which will make unity necessary to him, whatever other

changes and manipulations might be desirable to satisfy his other needs and instincts.

The formal unification of mankind would come in upon us in the shape of a system which would be born, grow, come to its culmination. But every system by the very nature of things tends after its culmination to decay and die. To prevent the organism decaying and dying there must be such a psychological reality within as well persist and survive all changes of its body. Nations have that in a sort of collective national ego which persists through all vital changes. But this ego is not by any means self-existent and immortal; it supports itself on certain things with which it is identified. First, there is the geographical body, the country; secondly, the common interests of all who inhabit the same country, defence, economical well-being and progress, political liberty, etc; thirdly, a common name, sentiment, culture. But we have to mark that this national ego owes its life to the coalescence of the separative instinct and the instinct of unity; for the nation feels itself one as distinguished from other nations; it owes its vitality to interchange with them and struggle with them in all the activities of its nature. Nor are all these sufficient. There must be a sort of religion of country, a constant recognition not only of the sacredness of the physical mother, the land, but also, in however obscure a way, of the nation as a collective soul which it is the first duty and need of every man to keep alive, to defend from suppression or mortal attaint or, if suppressed,

then to watch, wait and struggle for its release and rehabilitation, if sicklied over with the touch of any fatal spiritual ailment, then to labour always to heal and revivify and save alive.

The world-State will give its inhabitants the great advantages of peace, economical well-being, general security, combination for intellectual, cultural, social activity and progress. None of these are in themselves sufficient to create the thing needed. Peace and security we all desire at present, because we have them not in sufficiency; but we must remember that man has also within him the need of combat, adventure, struggle, almost requires these for his growth and healthy living; that instinct would be largely suppressed by a universal peace and a flat security, and it might rise up successfully against s uppression. Economical well-being by itself cannot permanently satisfy, and the price paid for it might be so heavy as to diminish its appeal and value. The human instinct for liberty, individual and national, might well be a constant menace to the world-State, unless it so skilfully arranged its system as to give them sufficient free-play. A common, intellectual, cultural activity and progress may do much, but need not by themselves be sufficient to bring into being the fully powerful psychological factor that would be required. And the collective ego created would have to rely on the instinct of unity alone; for it would be in conflict with the separative instinct which gives the national ego half its vitality.

It does not follow that the indispensable factor could not be created, but certain psychological elements would have to be present in great strength. First, a religion of humanity much more powerful, explicit, self-conscious, universal in its appeal than the nationalist's religion of country; secondly, the clear recognition by every man in all his thought and life of a single soul in humanity of which each man and each people is an incarnation and soul-form; thirdly, an ascension of man beyond the principle of ego which lives by separativeness,—and yet there must be no destruction of individuality, for without that man would stagnate; fourthly, therefore, a principle and arrangement of the common life which would give free play to individual variation, interchange in diversity and the need of adventure and conquest by which the soul of man lives and grows great, and sufficient means of expressing all the resultant complex life and growth in a flexible and progressive form of human society.

CHAPTER XXXIV

A religion of humanity may be either intellectual, that is to say, an intellectual and sentimental ideal, a living dogma with intellectual, psychological and practical effects, or else spiritual, partly the sign, partly the cause of a change of soul in humanity. The intellectual religion of humanity already to a certain extent exists, partly as a conscious creed in the minds of a few, partly as a potent shadow in the consciousness of the race, the shadow of a spirit that is yet unborn, but is preparing for its birth. This material world of ours, besides its fully embodied things of the present, is peopled by such powerful shadows, ghosts of things dead and ghosts of things yet unborn. The ghosts of things dead are very troublesome actualities and they now abound, ghosts of dead religions, dead arts, dead moralities, dead political theories, which still claim either to keep their rotting bodies or to animate partly the existing body of things, repeating their sacred formulas of the past with which they hypnotise the backward-looking minds and daunt even the progressive portion of humanity. But also there are these unborn spirits which are unable to take a definite body, but are already mind-born and exist as influences of which the human mind is aware and to which it now responds in a desultory and confused fashion. This was mind-born in the eighteenth

century, the *manasa putra* * of the rationalist thinkers who brought it forward as a substitute for the formal spiritualism of ecclesiastical Christianity. It tried to give itself a body in Positivism, which was an attempt to formulate the dogmas of this religion, but on too heavily and severely rationalistic a basis even for acceptance by an Age of Reason. Humanitarianism has been its most prominent emotional result; philanthropy, social service and other kindred activities have been its outward expression of good works; democracy, socialism, pacifism are to a great extent its by-products or at least owe much of their vigour to its inner presence.

The fundamental idea is that mankind is the god-head to be worshipped and served by man and that the respect, the service, the progress of the human being and human life are the chief duty and chief aim of the human spirit. No other idol, neither the nation, the State, the family nor anything else ought to take its place, they are only worthy of respect so far as they are images of the human spirit and enshrine its presence and aid its self-manifestation; where the cult of these idols seeks to usurp the place of the spirit and makes demands inconsistent with its service, they should be put aside. No injunctions of old creeds, religious, political, social or cultural, are valid when they go against its claims. Science even, though it be one of the chief modern idols, must

* Mind-born child, an idea and expression of Indian Puranic cosmology.

not be allowed to make claims contrary to its ethical temperament and aim, for science is only valuable in so far as it helps and serves by knowledge and progress the religion of humanity. War, capital punishment, the taking of human life, cruelty of all kinds whether committed by the individual, the State or society, not only physical cruelty, but moral cruelty, the degradation of any human being or any class of human beings under whatever specious plea or in whatever interest, the oppression and exploitation of man by man, of class by class, of nation by nation and all those habits of life and institutions of society of a similar kind which religion and ethics formerly tolerated or even favoured in practice, whatever they might do in their ideal rule or creed, are crimes against the religion of humanity, abominable to its ethical mind, forbidden by its primary tenets, to be fought against always, in no degree to be tolerated. Man must be sacred to man regardless of all distinctions of race, creed, colour, nationality, status, political or social advancement. The body of man is to be respected, made immune from violence and outrage, fortified by science against disease and preventible death; the life of man is to be held sacred, preserved, strengthened, ennobled, uplifted; the heart of man is to be held sacred also, given scope, protected from violation, from suppression, from mechanisation, freed from belittling influences; the mind of man must be freed from all bonds, allowed freedom and range and opportunity, given all its means of self-training

and self-development and organised in the play of its powers for the service of humanity. And all this too is not to be held as an abstract or pious sentiment, but given full and practical recognition in the persons of men and nations and mankind. This, speaking largely, is the idea and spirit of the intellectual religion of humanity.

One has only to compare human life and thought and feeling a century or two ago with human life, thought and feeling now to see how great an influence this religion of humanity has exercised and how fruitful a work it has done. It has accomplished rapidly many things which orthodox religion failed to do effectively, largely because it has acted as a constant intellectual and critical solvent, an unsparing assailant of the thing that is and an unflinching champion of the thing to be, faithful always to the future, while orthodox religion allied itself with the powers of the present, bound itself by its pact with them and could act only at best as a moderating but not as a reforming force. Moreover, this religion has faith in humanity and its earthly future, and can therefore aid its earthly progress while the orthodox religions looked with eyes of pious sorrow and gloom on the earthly life of man and were very ready to bid him bear peacefully and contentedly, even to welcome its crudities, cruelties, oppressions, tribulations as a means for learning to appreciate and earning the better life which will be given us hereafter. Faith, even an intellectual faith, must always be a worker of miracles, and this religion

of humanity, even without taking bodily shape or a compelling form or a visible means of self-effectuation, has yet been able to effect comparatively much of what it set out to do. It has largely humanised society, humanised law and publishment, humanised the outlook of man on man, abolished legalised torture and the cruder forms of slavery, raised those who were depressed and fallen, given large hopes to humanity, stimulated philanthropy and charity and the service of mankind, encouraged everywhere the desire of freedom, put a curb on oppression and greatly minimised its more brutal expressions. It had almost succeeded in humanising war and would perhaps have succeeded entirely but for the contrary tend of modern science, and it has at least made it possible for man to conceive of a world free from war as possible, even without waiting for the Christian millennium, and at any rate this much change has come about that, while peace was formerly a rare interlude of constant war, war is now an interlude, though a much too frequent interlude, of peace, though as yet only of an armed peace, and although that may not be a great step, still it is a step forward. It has given new conceptions of the dignity of the humam being and opened new ideas and new vistas of his education, self-development and potentiality. It has spread enlightenment, made man feel more his responsibility for the progress and happiness of the race and raised the average self-respect and capacity of mankind; it has given hope to the serf,

self-assertion to the down-trodden and made the labourer in his manhood the potential equal of the rich and the powerful. True, if we compare what is with what should be, the actual achievement with the ideal, all this will seem only a scanty work of preparation; but it is a remarkable record for a century and a half or little more and for an unembodied spirit which has had to work through what instruments it can find and has as yet no form, habitation or visible engine of its own concentrated workings. But perhaps it was in this that lay its power and advantage, since that saved it from crystallising into form and getting petrified or at least losing its more free and subtle working.

But still, in order to accomplish all its future, this idea and religion of humanity has to make itself more explicit, insistent and categorically imperative. For otherwise it can only work with clarity in the minds of the few and with the mass it will be only a modifying influence, but will not be the rule of human life. And so long as that is so, it cannot entirely prevail over its own principal enemy. That enemy, the enemy of all real religion, is human egoism, the egoism of the individual, the egoism of class and nation. These it may at present soften, modify, force to curb their more arrogant, open and brutal expressions, oblige to adopt better institutions, but not to give place to the love of mankind, not to recognise a real unity between man and man. For that essentially must be the aim of the religion of humanity, as it must be the earthly aim

of all religion, love, mutual recognition of human brotherhood, a living sense of human oneness and practice of human oneness in thought, feeling and life, the ideal which was expressed first some thousands of years ago in the ancient Vedic hymn and must always remain the highest injunction of the Spirit within us to human life upon earth. Till that is brought about, the religion of humanity remains unaccomplished. With that done, the one necessary psychological change will have been effected without which no formal and mechanical, no political and administrative unity can be real and secure. And if it is done, that outward unification may not even be indispensable or, if indispensable, it will come about naturally, not as now it seems likely to be, by catastrophic means, but by the demand of the human mind, and will be held secure by an essential need of our perfected and developed human nature.

But this is the question whether a purely intellectual and sentimental religion of humanity will be sufficient to bring about so great a change in our psychology. The weakness of the intellectual idea, even when it supports itself by an appeal to the sentiments and emotions, is that it does not get at the centre of man's being. The intellect and the feelings are only instruments of the being, and they may be the instruments of either its lower external form or of the inner and higher man, servants of the ego or channels of the soul. The aim of the religion of humanity was formulated in the eighteenth century by a sort of primal

intuition; that aim was and it is still to recreate human society in the image of three great kindred ideas, liberty, equality and fraternity. None of these has really been won in spite of all the progress that has been achieved. The liberty that is so much proclaimed as an essential of modern progress, is an outward and mechanical liberty; the equality that is now so much sought after and battled for, is equally an outward and mechanical equality; fraternity is not even claimed to be a practicable principle of the ordering of life and what is put forward as its substitute is the outward and mechanical principle of equal association or at the best a comradship of labour. This is because the idea of humanity has been obliged in an intellectual age to mask its true character of a religion and a thing of the soul and the spirit and to appeal to the vital and physical mind of man rather than his inner being. It has limited its effort to the attempt to revolutionise political and social institutions and to bring about such a modification of the ideas and sentiments of the common mind of mankind as would make these institutions practicable; it has worked at the machinery of human life and on the outer mind much more than upon the soul of the race. It has laboured to establish a political and social liberty, equality and mutual help in an equal association.

But though these aims are of great importance in their own field, they are not the central thing; they can only be secure when founded upon a

change of the inner human nature and inner way of living; they are themselves of importance only as means for giving a greater scope and a better field for man's development towards that change and, when it is once achieved, as outward expressions of the larger inward life. Freedom, equality, brotherhood are three godheads of the soul; they cannot be really achieved through the external machinery of society or by man so long as he lives only in the individual and the communal ego. When the ego claims liberty, it arrives at individualism; when it asserts equality, it arrives first at strife, then at an attempt to ignore the variations of Nature, and, as the sole way of doing that successfully, it constructs an artificial and machine-made society. A society that pursues liberty as its ideal, is unable to achieve equality; a society that aims at equality, will be obliged to sacrifice liberty. For the ego to speak of fraternity, is for it to speak of something contrary to its nature. All that it knows, is association for the pursuit of common egoistic ends, and the utmost that it can arrive at is a closer organisation for the equal distribution of labour, production, consumption and enjoyment.

Yet is brotherhood the real key to the triple gospel of the idea of humanity. The union of liberty and equality can only be achieved by the power of human brotherhood and it cannot be founded on anything else. But brotherhood exists only in the soul, and by the soul, it can exist by nothing else; for this brotherhood is not a

matter either of physical kinship or of vital association or of intellectual agreement. When the soul claims freedom, it is the freedom of its self-development, the self-development of the divine in man in all his being; when it claims equality, what it is claiming is that freedom equally for all and the recognition of the same soul, the same godhead in all human beings; and when it strives for brotherhood, it is founding that equal freedom of self-development on a common aim, a common life, a unity of mind and feeling founded upon the recognition of this inner spiritual unity. These three things are in fact the nature of the soul; for freedom, equality, unity are the eternal attributes of the Spirit. It is the practical recognition of this truth, it is the awakening of the soul in man and the attempt to get him to live from his soul and not from his ego which is the inner meaning of religion, and it is that to which the religion of humanity also must arrive before it can fulfil itself in the life of the race.

CHAPTER XXXV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In other words,—and this is the conclusion at which we arrive,—while it is possible to construct a precarious and quite mechanical unity by political and administrative means, the unity of the human race, even if achieved, can only be secured and can only be made real by the religion of humanity, which is at present the highest active ideal of mankind, spiritualising itself and becoming the general inner law of human life.

The outward unity may well achieve itself, —possibly though by no means certainly,—because that is the inevitable final trend of the workings of Nature in human society which make for larger and yet larger aggregations and cannot fail to arrive at a total aggregation of mankind in a closer international system.

This working of Nature depends for its means of fulfilment upon two forces which combine to make the larger aggregation inevitable. First, there is the increasing closeness of common interests or at least the interlacing and interrelation of interests in a larger and yet larger circle which makes old divisions an obstacle and a cause of weakness, obstruction and friction, and the clash and collision that comes out of this

friction a ruinous calamity to all, even to the victor who has to pay a too heavy price for his gains; and even these expected gains, as war becomes more complex and disastrous, are becoming more and more difficult to achieve and the success problematical. The increasing perception of this community or interrelation of interests and unwillingness to face the consequences of collision and ruinous struggle must lead men to welcome any means for mitigating the divisions which lead to such disasters. If the trend to the mitigation of divisions is once given a definite form, that commences an impetus which drives towards closer and closer union. If she cannot arrive by these means, if the incoherence is too great for the trend of unification to triumph, Nature will use other means, such as war and conquest or the temporary domination of a powerful state or empire or the menace of a domination compelling those threatened to adopt a closer system of union. It is these means and this force of outward necessity which she used to create nation-units and national empires, and, however modified in the circumstances and workings, it is at bottom the same force and the same means which she is using to drive mankind towards international unification.

But, secondly, there is the force of a common uniting sentiment. This may work in two ways; it may come before as an originating or contributory cause or it may come afterwards as a cementing result. In the first case, the sentiment

of a larger unity spring up among units which were previously divided and leads them to seek after a form of union, which may then be brought about principally by the force of the sentiment and its idea or by that secondarily as an aid to other and more outward events and causes. We may note that in earlier times this sentiment was insufficiently effective, as among the petty clan or regional nations, and unity had ordinarily to be effected by outward circumstances and generally by the grossest of them, by war and conquest, by the domination of the most powerful among many warring or contiguous peoples. But in latter times, the force of the sentiment of unity, supported as it has been by a clearer political idea, has become more effective and the larger national aggregates have grown up by a simple act of federation or union, though this has sometimes had to be preceded by a common struggle for liberty or a union in war against a common enemy; so have grown into one the United States, Italy, Germany, and more peacefully the Australian and South African federations. But in other cases, especially in the earlier national aggregations, the sentiment of unity has grown up largely or entirely as the result of the formal, outward or mechanical union. But whether to form or to preserve the growth of the sentiment, the psychological factor is indispensable; without it there can be no secure and lasting union. Its absence, the failure to create such a sentiment or to make it sufficiently living, natural,

forcible has been the cause of the precariousness of such aggregates as Austro-Hungary and of the ephemeral character of the empires of the past, even as it likely to bring about, unless circumstances change, the collapse or disintegration of the great present-day empires.

The trend towards an international world-unification which is now just beginning to declare itself, though the causes which made it inevitable have been for some time at work, is being brought about by the pressure of need and environment, by outward circumstances. At the same time, there is a sentiment which is being stimulated by these outward circumstances, a cosmopolitan, international sentiment, still rather nebulous and vaguely ideal, which may accelerate the growth of the formal union. In itself this sentiment would be an insufficient cement for the preservation of any mechanical union which might be created, for it could not easily be so close and forcible a sentiment as the national. It would have to subsist on the conveniences of union as its only substantial provender, and the experience of the past shows that this is in the end unable to resist the pressure of unfavourable circumstances and the reassertion of old or the effective growth of new centrifugal forces. But it is being aided by a more powerful force, a sort of intellectual religion of humanity, clear in the minds of the few, vaguely felt in its effects and its disguises by the many, which has largely helped to bring about much of the trend of the modern

mind and the drift of its developing institutions. This is a psychological force which tends to break beyond the formula of the nation and aspires to replace the religion of country and even, in its more extreme forms, to destroy altogether the national sentiment and to abolish its divisions so as to create the single nation of mankind.

We may say, then, that this trend must eventually realise itself, however great may be the difficulties; and they are really enormous, much greater than those which attended the national formation If the present unsatisfactory condition of international relations should lead to a series of cataclysms, either large and world-embracing like the present war or, though each more limited in scope, yet in their sum world-pervading and necessarily, by the growing interrelation of interests, affecting those who do not fall directly under their touch, then mankind will be forced in self-defence to a new, closer and more stringently unified order of things. Its choice will be between that and a lingering suicide If the human reason cannot find out the way, Nature herself is sure so to shape these upheavals as to bring about her end. Therefore --whether soon or in the long run, whether brought about by its own growing sentiment of unity, stimulated by common interest and convenience, or by the evolutionary pressure of circumstances,--we may take it that an eventual realisation of at least some formal unification of human life on earth is,—the incalculable being always allowed for,—practically inevitable.

We have tried to show from the analogy of the past evolution of the nation that this international unification must culminate or at least is likely to culminate in one or two forms, either a centralised world-State or a looser world-union which may be either a close federation or a simple confederacy of the peoples for the common ends of mankind. It is the last form which seems to us the most desirable, because it gives sufficient scope for the principle of variation which is necessary for the free play of life and the healthy progress of the race. The process by which the world-State may come, starts with the creation of a central body which will at first have very limited functions, but, once created, must absorb by degrees all the different functions of a centralised international control, as the State, first in the form of a monarchy and then of a parliament, has been absorbing by degrees the whole control of the life of the nation, so that we are now within measurable distance of a centralised socialistic State which will leave no part of the life of its individuals unregulated. A similar process in the world-State will end in the taking up and the regulation of the whole life of the peoples into its hands; it may even end by abolishing national individuality and turning the divisions that it has created into mere departmental groupings, provinces and districts of the one common State. Such an eventuality may seem now a mere unrealisable idea, but it is one which, under certain conditions that are by no means beyond the scope of ultimate possibility, may well

become feasible and even, after a certain point is reached, inevitable. A federal system and still more a confederacy would mean, on the other hand, the preservation of the national basis and a greater or less freedom of national life, but the subordination of national to the larger of the common international interests and of full separate freedom to the greater international necessities.

It may be questioned whether the past analogies are a safe guide in a problem so new and whether something else might not be evolved more intimately and independently arising from it and suitable to its complexities. But mankind even in dealing with its new problems works upon past experience and therefore upon past motives and analogies; even when it seizes on new ideas, it goes upon the past in the form it gives to them, and behind the changes of the most radical revolutions we see this unavoidable principle of continuity surviving in the heart of the new order. Moreover, these alternatives seem the only way in which the two forces in presence can work out their conflict, either by the disappearance of the one, the separative national instinct, or by an accommodation between them. On the other hand, it is quite possible that human thought and action may take so new a turn as to bring in a number of unforeseen possibilities and lead to a quite different ending. And one might upon these lines set one's imagination to work and produce perhaps a utopia of a better kind; such constructive efforts of the human imagination have their value,

and often a very great value. But any such speculations would evidently have been out of place in the study we have attempted.

Assuredly, neither of the two alternatives and none of the three forms we have considered are free from serious objections. A centralised world-State would signify the triumph of the idea of mechanical unity or rather uniformity. It would inevitably mean the undue depression of an indispensable element in the vigour of human life and progress, the free life of the individual, the free variation of the peoples. It must end, if it becomes permanent and fulfils all its tendencies, either in a death in life, a stagnation or by the insurgence of some new saving but revolutionary force or principle which would shatter the whole fabric into pieces. The mechanical tendency is one to which the logical reason of man becomes easily addicted and its operations are, too, obviously the easiest to manage and the most ready to hand; its full evolution may seem to the reason desirable, necessary, inevitable, but its end is predestined. A centralised socialistic State may be a necessity of the future, but a reaction from it is equally a necessity; the greater its pressure, the more certainly will it be met by spread of the spiritual, the intellectual, the vital and practical principle of Anarchism in revolt against that mechanical pressure. So too a centralised mechanical world-State must rouse in the end a similar force against it and might well end in a crumbling up and disintegration, even in the necessity for a repetition

of the cycle of humanity ending in a better attempt to solve the problem. The only thing that could keep it in being would be if humanity agreed to allow all the rest of its life to be regularised for it for the sake of peace and stability and took refuge for its individual freedom in the spiritual life, as happened once under the Roman empire, and even that would be only a temporary solution. Again, a federal system would tend inevitably to establish one general type for human life, institutions and activities and allow only a play of minor variations; but with that the need of variation in living Nature could not always rest satisfied. On the other hand, a looser confederacy might well be open to the objection that it would give too ready a handle for centrifugal forces, were such to arise in new strength, and that it could not be permanent, but must turn after all in one direction or the other and end either in a centralisation or a break-up of unity.

The saving element needed is a new psychological factor which will at once make a united life necessary to humanity and force it to respect the principle of freedom. The religion of humanity seems to be the one growing force which tends in that direction; for it makes for the sense of human oneness, it has the idea of the race, and yet at the same time it respects the human individual and the natural human grouping. But its present intellectual form seems hardly sufficient. The idea, powerful in itself and in its effects, is yet not powerful enough to mould the

whole life of the race in its image; it has to concede too much to the egoistic side of human nature, once all and still nine tenths of our being, with which its larger idea is in conflict; and on the other side, leaning principally on the reason, it helps too much the mechanical solution. For the rational idea ends always by being captured by its machinery and becoming the slave of the machine, until a new idea revolts against it and breaks up the machinery only to substitute in the end another mechanical system.

A spiritual religion of humanity is the hope of the future. By this we do not mean what is ordinarily called a universal religion, a system, a thing of creed and intellectual belief. Mankind has tried unity by that means; it has failed and deserved to fail, because there can be no universal religious system. The inner spirit is indeed one, but more than any other the spiritual life insists on freedom and variation in its self-expression and means of development. What is meant, is the growing realisation that there is a secret Spirit, a divine reality, in which we are all one and of which humanity is the highest vehicle on earth and that the human race and the human being are the means by which it will progressively reveal itself here, with a growing attempt to live out this knowledge and bring about a kingdom of this divine Spirit upon earth. It means that oneness with our fellow-men will become the leading principle of all our life, not merely a principle of co-operation, but a deeper brotherhood, a real and

an inner sense of unity and equality; the realisation by the individual that only in the life of his fellow-men is his own life complete, the realisation by the race that only on the free and full life of the individual can its own perfection and permanent happiness be founded; a way of salvation in accordance with this religion, that is to say, a means by which it can be developed by each man within himself, so that it may be developed in the life of the race. To go into all that this implies, would be too large a subject to be entered upon here; it is enough to point out that in this direction lies the eventual road. No doubt, if this is only an idea like the rest, it will go the way of all ideas; but if it is at all a truth of our being, then it must be the truth to which all is moving and in it must be found the means of a fundamental, an inner, a complete, a real human unity which would be the one secure base of a unification of human life. A spiritual oneness creating a psychological oneness which would not depend upon intellectual or other uniformity, and compelling a oneness of life which would also not depend on its mechanical means of unification, but would find itself enriched by a free inner variation and a freely varied outer self-expression, this would be the basis for a higher type of human existence.

Could such a realisation develop rapidly in mankind, we mightt then solve the problem of unification in a deeper and truer way from the inner truth to the outer forms. Until then, the

attempt to bring it about by mechanical means must proceed. But the higher hope of humanity lies in the growing number of men who will realise this truth and seek to develop it in themselves, so that when the mind of man is ready to escape from its mechanical bent,—perhaps when it finds that its mechanical solutions are all temporary and disappointing,—the truth of the Spirit may step in and lead humanity to the path of its highest possible happiness and perfection.

APPENDIX I

The "Arya", born by a coincidence which might well have been entirely disastrous to its existence in the very month when there broke out the greatest catastrophe that has overtaken the modern world, has yet, though carried on under serious difficulties, completed its first year. We have been obliged unfortunately to discontinue the French edition from February last as our director, M. Paul Richard, was then recalled to join his class of the Reserve Army in France. We have to thank the indulgence of our French subscribers who have consented to receive the English edition in its stead.

We have been obliged in our first year for reasons we shall indicate in the preface to our August number to devote the Review almost entirely to high philosophy and severe and difficult thinking. But the object we had in view is now fulfilled and we recognise that we have no right to continue to subject our readers to the severe strain of almost 64 pages of such strenuous intellectual labour. We shall therefore in the next year devote a greater part of our space to articles on less profound subjects written in a more popular style. Needless to say, our matter will always fall within the definition of a philosophical Review and centre around the fundamental thought which the "Arya" represents.

We shall continue the *Life Divine*, the *Synthesis of Yoga* and the *Secret of the Veda*; but we intend to replace the *Selected Hymns* by a translation of the Hymns of the Atris (the fifth Mandala of the Rig

Veda) so conceived as to make the sense of the Vedic chants at once and easily intelligible without the aid of a commentary to the general reader. The same circumstance which obliged us to discontinue the French edition, will also prevent us from continuing the *Wherefore of the Worlds*. Happily, we have been able to bring it to a point where the writer's central idea appears, the new creation of our world by redeeming Love,—a fitting point for the faith and reason of man to pause upon at the moment of the terrible ordeal which that world is now undergoing.

Without the divine Will which knows best what to use and what to throw aside, no human work can come to the completion hoped for by our limited vision. To that Will we entrust the continuance and the result of our labours and we conclude the first year of the "Arya" with the aspiration that the second may see the speedy and fortunate issue of the great world-convulsion which still pursues us and that by the Power which brings always the greatest possible good out of apparent evil there may emerge from this disastrous but long-foreseen collapse of the old order a new and better marked by the triumph of higher principles of love, wisdom and unity and a sensible advance of the race towards our ultimate goal,—the conscious oneness of the Soul in humanity and the divinity of man.—*July 1915*.

APPENDIX II

The "Arya" having completed its first year and survived the first perils of infancy, now offers itself a second time to the decisions of Time and the mind of the hour. We think it necessary to open our new year with a succint statement of the idea this Review is intended to serve and the aim which it holds before it. For our Review has been conceived neither as a mirror of the fleeting interests and surface thoughts of the period we live in, nor as the mouthpiece of a sect, school or already organised way of thinking. Its object is to feel out for the thought of the future, to help in shaping its foundations and to link it to the best and most vital thought of the past.

We believe in the constant progression of humanity and we hold that that progression is the working out of a Thought in Life which sometimes manifests itself on the surface and sometimes sinks below and works behind the mask of external forces and interests. When there is this lapse below the surface, humanity has its periods of apparent retrogression or tardy evolution, its long hours of darkness or twilight during which the secret Thought behind works out one of its phases by the pressure mainly of economic, political and personal interests ignorant of any deeper aim within. When the thought returns to the surface, humanity has its period of light and of rapid efflorescence, its dawns and splendid springtides; and according to the depth, vitality, truth and self-effective energy of the form of Thought that emerges is the importance of the stride forward that it makes during these Hours of the Gods in our terrestrial manifestation.

There is no greater error than to suppose, as the "practical" man is wont to do, that thought is only a fine flower and ornament of life and that political, economic and personal interests are the important and effective motors of human action. We recognise that this is a world of life and action and developing organism; but the life that seeks to guide itself only by vital and material forces is a slow, dark and blundering growth. It is an attempt to approximate man to the method of vegetable and animal existence. The earth is a world of Life and Matter but man is not a vegetable not an animal; he is a spiritual and a thinking being who is set here to shape and use the animal mould for higher purposes, by higher motives with a more divine instrumentation.

Therefore by his very nature, he serves the working of a Thought within him even when he is ignorant of it in his surface self. The practical man who ignores or despises the deeper life of the Idea, is yet serving that which he ignores or despises. Charlemagne hewing a chaotic Europe into shape with his sword was preparing the reign of the feudal and Catholic interpretation of human life with all that that great though obscure period of humanity has meant for the thought and spiritual development of mankind. But it is when the Thought emerges and guides life that man grows towards his full humanity, strides forward on his path and begins to control the development of Nature in his destiny or at least to collaborate as a conscious mind and spirit with That which controls and directs it.

The progress of humanity has therefore been a constant revolution with its rhythm of alternative darkness and light, but both the day and the night have helped to foster that which is evolving. The periods

have not been the same for all parts of the globe. In he historic ages of the present cycle of civilisation, the movement has been almost entirely centred in the twin continents of Asia and Europe. And there it has been often seen that when Asia was moving through the light, Europe was passing through one of her epochs of obscurity and on the other hand the nights of Asia's repose or stagnation have corresponded with the days of Europe's mental vigour and vital activity.

But the fundamental difference has been that Asia has served predominantly (not exclusively) as a field for man's spiritual experience and progression, Europe has been rather a workshop for his mental and vital activities. As the cycle progressed, the Eastern continent has more and more converted itself into a store-house of spiritual energy sometimes active and reaching forward to new development, sometimes conservative and quiescent. Three or four times in history a stream of this energy has poured out upon Europe, but each time Europe has rejected wholly or partially the spiritual substance of the afflatus and used it rather as an impulse to fresh intellectual and material activity and progress.

The first attempt was the filtering of Egyptian, Chaldean and Indian wisdom through the thought of the Greek philosophers from Pythagoras to Plato and the neo-Platonists; the result was the brilliantly intellectual and unspiritual civilisation of Greece and Rome. But it prepared the way for the second attempt when Buddhism and Vaishnavism filtered through the Semitic temperament entered Europe in the form of Christianity. Christianity came within an ace of spiritualising and even of asceticising the mind of

Europe; it was baffled by its own theological deformation in the minds of the Greek fathers of the Church and by the sudden flooding of Europe with a German barbarism whose temperament in its merits no less than in its defects was the very ante-type both of the Christian spirit and the Graeco-Roman intellect.

The Islamic invasion of Spain and the southern coast of the Mediterannean—curious as the sole noteworthy example of Asiatic culture using the European method of material and political irruption as opposed to the peaceful invasion by ideas—may be regarded as a third attempt. The result of its meeting with Graecised Christianity was the reawakening of the European mind in feudal and Catholic Europe and the obscure beginnings of modern thought and science.

The fourth and last attempt which is as yet only in its slow initial stage is the quiet entry of Eastern and chiefly of Indian thought into Europe first through the veil of German metaphysics, more latterly by its subtle influence in reawakening the Celtic, Scandanavian and Slavonic idealism, mysticism, religionism, and the direct and open penetration of Buddhism, Theosophy, Vedantism, Bahaism and other Oriental influences in both Europe and America.

On the other hand, there have been two reactions of Europe upon Asia; first, the invasion of Alexander with his aggressive Hellenism which for a time held Western Asia, created echoes and reactions in India and returned through Islamic culture upon mediaeval Europe; secondly, the modern onslaught of commercial, political, scientific Europe upon the moral, artistic and spiritual cultures of the East.

The new features of this mutual interpenetration are, first, that the two attacks have synchronised and, secondly, that they have encountered in each case the extreme exaggeration of their opposites. Intellectual and materialistic Europe found India, the Asia of Asia, the heart of the world's spiritual life, in the last throes of an enormous experiment, the thought of a whole nation concentrated for centuries upon the pure spiritual existence to the exclusion of all real progress in the practical and mental life of the race. The entering stream of Eastern thought found in Europe the beginning of an era which rejected religion, philosophy and psychology,—religion as an emotional delusion, philosophy, the pure essence of the mind, as a barren thought-weaving,—and resolved to devote the whole intellectual faculty of man to a study of the laws of material Nature and of man's bodily, social, economic and political existence and to build thereon a superior civilisation.

That stupendous effort is over; it has not yet frankly declared its bankruptcy, but it is bankrupt. It is sinking in a cataclysm as gigantic and as unnatural as the attempt which gave it birth. On the other hand, the exaggerated spirituality of the Indian effort has also registered a bankruptcy; we have seen how high individuals can rise by it, but we have seen also how low a race can fall which in its eagerness to seek after God ignores His intention in humanity. Both the European and the Indian attempt were admirable, the Indian by its absolute spiritual sincerity, the European by its severe intellectual honesty and ardour for the truth; both have accomplished miracles; but in the end God and Nature have been too strong for the Titanism of the human spirit and for the Titanism of the human intellect.

The salvation of the human race lies in a more sane and integral development of the possibilities of mankind in the individual and in the community. The safety of Europe has to be sought in the recognition of the spiritual aim of human existence, otherwise she will be crushed by the weight of her own unillumined knowledge and soulless organisation. The safety of Asia lies in the recognition of the material mould and mental conditions in which that aim has to be worked out, otherwise she will sink deeper into the slough of despond of a mental and physical incompetence to deal with the facts of life and the shocks of a rapidly changing movement. It is not any exchange of forms that is required, but an interchange of regenerating impulses and a happy fusion and harmonising.

The synchronism and mutual interpenetration of the two great currents of human effort at such a crisis in the history of the race is full of hope for the future of humanity, but full also of possible dangers. The hope is the emergence of a new and better human life founded on a greater knowledge, a pursuit of the new faculties and possibilities opening out before us and a just view of the problem which the individual, the society, the race have to solve. Mankind has been drawn together by the developments of material science and for good or evil its external future is henceforth one ; its different parts no longer develop separately and in independence of each other. There opens out at the same time the possibility that by the development and practice of the science and the life of the soul it may be made one in reality and by an internal unity.

The idea by which the enlightenment of Europe has been governed is the passion for the discovery of

the Truth and Law that constitutes existence and governs the process of the world, the attempt to develop the life and potentialities of man, his ideals, institutions, organisations by the knowledge of that Law and Truth and the confidence that along this line lies the road of human progress and perfection.

The idea is absolutely just and we accept it entirely ; but its application has been erroneous. For the Law and Truth that has to be discovered is not that of the material world—though this is required, nor even of the mental and physical—though this is indispensable, but the Law and Truth of the Spirit on which all the rest depends. For it is the power of the Self of things that expresses itself in their forms and processes.

The message of the East to the West is a true message, "Only by finding himself can man be saved," and "what shall it profit a man though he gain the whole world, if he lose his own soul." The West has heard the message and is seeking out the law and truth of the soul and the evidences of an inner reality greater than the material. The danger is that with her passion for mechanism and her exaggerated intellectuality she may fog herself in an external and false psychism, such as we see arising in England and America, the homes of the mechanical genius, or in intellectual, unspiritual and therefore erroneous theories of the Absolute, such as have run their course in critical and metaphysical Germany.

The idea by which the illumination of Asia has been governed is the firm knowledge that truth of the Spirit is the sole real truth, the belief that the psychological life of man is an instrument for attaining to the truth of the Spirit and that its laws must be known and

practised with that aim paramount, and the attempt to form the external life of man and the institutions of society into a suitable mould for the great endeavour.

This idea, too, is absolutely just and we accept it entirely. But in its application, and in India most, it has deviated into a divorce between the Spirit and its instruments and a disparagement and narrowing of the mental and external life of the race. For it is only on the widest and richest efflorescence of this instrumental life that the fullest and most absolute attainment of the spiritual can be securely based. This knowledge the ancients of the East possessed and practised; it has been dimmed in knowledge and lost in practice by their descendants.

The message the West brings to the East is a true message. Man also is God and it is through his developing manhood that he approaches the Godhead. Life also is the Divine, its progressive expansion is the self-expression of the Brahman, and to deny Life is to diminish the Godhead within us. This is the truth that returns to the East from the West translated into the language of the higher truth the East already possesses; and it is an ancient knowledge. The East also is awaking to the message. The danger is that Asia may accept it in the European form, forget for a time her own law and nature and either copy blindly the West or make a disastrous amalgam of that which she has in its most inferior forms and the crudenesses which are invading her.

The problem of thought therefore is to find out the right idea and the right way of harmony; to restate the ancient and eternal spiritual truth of the Self, so that it shall re-embrace, permeate and dominate the mental and physical life; to develop the most profound and

vital methods of psychological self-discipline and self-development so that the mental and psychical life of man may express the spiritual life through the utmost possible expansion of its own richness, power and complexity; and to seek for the means and motives by which his external life, his society and his institutions may remould themselves progressively in the truth of the spirit and develop towards the utmost possible harmony of individual freedom and social unity.

That is our ideal and our search in the "Arya." Throughout the world there are plenty of movements inspired by the same drift, but there is room for an effort of thought which shall frankly acknowledge the problem in its integral complexity and not be restrained in the flexibility of its search by attachment to any cult, creed or extant system of philosophy.

The effort involves a quest for the Truth that underlies existence and the fundamental Law of its self-expression in the universe—the work of metaphysical philosophy and religious thought; the sounding and harmonising of the psychological methods of discipline by which man purifies and perfects himself,—the work of psychology, not as it is understood in Europe, but the deeper practical psychology called in India Yoga; and the application of our ideas to the problems of man's social and collective life.

Philosophy and religious thought must be the beginning and the foundation of any such attempt; for they alone go behind appearances and processes to the truth of things. The attempt to get rid of their supremacy must always be vain. Man will always think and generalise and try to penetrate behind the apparent fact, for that is the imperative law of his awakened consciousness; man will always turn his generalisation

into a religion, even though it be only a religion of positivism or of material Law. Philosophy is the intellectual search for the fundamental truth of things, religion is the attempt to make the truth dynamic in the soul of man. They are essential to each other; a religion that is not the expression of philosophic truth degenerates into superstition and obscurantism, and a philosophy which does not dynamise itself with the religious spirit is a barren light, for it cannot get itself practised.

Our first preoccupation in the "Arya" has therefore been with the deepest thought that we could command on the philosophical foundation of the problem; and we have been so profoundly convinced that without this basis nothing we could say would have any real, solid and permanent value that we have perhaps given too great a space to difficult and abstruse thought whether in the shaping of our own ideas or in the study and restatement of the ancient Eastern knowledge. Our excuse is that we come forward as ourselves learners and students and must begin at the roots to proceed forward safely.

Our second preoccupation has been with the psychological disciplines of Yoga; but here also we have been obliged to concern ourselves with a deep study of the principles underlying the methods rather than with a popular statement of methods and disciplines. But without this previous study of principles, the statement of methods would have been unsound and not really helpful. There are no short cuts to an integral perfection.

Other and more popular sides of our work we have been obliged hitherto to neglect; but now that we have advanced a little in the more difficult part of

it, we hope to turn increasingly to these more obvious and general subjects of interest. And if our readers are still willing to follow us, their recompense will be a more clear, sound and solid thought on these subjects than we could otherwise have given them.

We shall develop our general thought in later numbers ; at present we content ourselves with restating our ideal. Unity for the human race by an inner oneness and not only by an external association of interests ; the resurgence of man out of the merely animal and economic life or the merely intellectual and aesthetic into the glories of the spiritual existence ; the pouring of the power of the spirit into the physical mould and mental instrument, so that man may develop his manhood into that true supermanhood which shall exceed our present state as much as this exceeds the animal state from which science tells us that we have issued. These three are one ; for man's unity and man's self-transcendence can come only by living in the Spirit.—*August, 1916*

APPENDIX III

We close this month the fourth year of the "Arya," and bring to a conclusion at the same time the "Psychology of Social Development," the "Ideal of Human Unity" and the first series of the "Essays on the Gita." A few more chapters will complete the "Life Divine." We are therefore well in view of the completion of the first part of the work which we had proposed to ourselves in starting this philosophical monthly, and we take the opportunity to say a few words upon the principle which has governed our writing and which the difficulty of a serial exposition on several lines at a time, scattering and breaking upon the total impression, may have prevented some of our readers from grasping in its entirety.

We had not in view at any time a review or magazine in the ordinary sense of the word, that is to say, a popular presentation or criticism of current information and current thought on philosophical questions. Nor was it, as in some philosophical and religious magazines in India, the restatement of an existing school or position of philosophical thought cut out in its lines and needing only to be popularised and supported. Our idea was the thinking out of a synthetic philosophy which might be a contribution to the thought of the new age that is coming upon us. We start from the idea that humanity is moving to a great change of its life which will even lead to a new life of the race,—in all countries where men think, there is now in various forms that idea and that hope,—and our aim has been to search for the spiritual, religious and other truth which can enlighten and guide the race in this movement and endeavour.

The spiritual experience and the general truths on which such an attempt could be based, were already present to us, otherwise we should have had no right to make the endeavour at all; but the complete intellectual statement of them and their results and issues had to be found. This meant a continuous thinking, a high and subtle and difficult thinking on several lines, and this strain, which we had to impose on ourselves, we were obliged to impose also on our readers. This too is the reason why we have adopted the serial form which in a subject like philosophy has its very obvious disadvantages, but was the only one possible.

Our original intention was to approach the synthesis from the starting-point of the two lines of culture which divide human thought and are now meeting at its apex, the knowledge of the West and the knowledge of the East; but owing to the exigencies of the war this could not be fulfilled. The "Arya" except for one unfinished series has been an approach to the highest reconciling truth from the point of view of the Indian mentality and Indian spiritual experience, and Western knowledge has been viewed from that standpoint. Here the main idea which has governed our writing, was imposed on us by the very conditions of the problem. All philosophy is concerned with the relations between two things, the fundamental truth of existence and the forms in which existence presents itself to our experience. The deepest experience shows that the fundamental truth is truth of the Spirit; the other is the truth of life, truth of form and shaping force and living-idea and action. Here the West and East have followed divergent lines. The West has laid most emphasis on truth of life and for a time come to stake its whole existence upon truth of life alone, to deny

the existence of spirit or to relegate it to the domain of the unknown and unknowable ; from that exaggeration it is now beginning to return. The East has laid most emphasis on truth of the Spirit and for a time came, at least in India, to stake its whole existence upon that truth alone, to neglect the possibilities of life or to limit it to a narrow development or a fixed status; the East too is beginning to return from this exaggeration. The West is reawaking to the truth of the Spirit and the spiritual possibilities of life, the East is reawaking to the truth of Life and tends towards a new application to it of its spiritual knowledge. Our view is that the antimony created between them is an unreal one. Spirit being the fundamental truth of existence, life can be only its manifestation; Spirit must be not only the origin of life but its basis, its pervading reality and its highest and total result. But the forms of life as they appear to us are at once its disguises and its instruments of self-manifestation. Man has to grow in knowledge till they cease to be disguises and grow in spiritual power and quality till they become in him its perfect instruments. To grow into the fullness of the divine is the true law of human life and to shape his earthly existence into its image is the meaning of his evolution. This is the fundamental tenet of the philosophy of the Arya.

This truth had to be worked out first of all from the metaphysical point of view; for in philosophy metaphysical truth is the nucleus of the rest, it is the statement of the last and most general truths on which all the others depend or in which they are gathered up. Therefore we gave the first place to the "Life Divine." Here we start from the Vedantic position, its ideas of the Self and mind and life, of Sachchidananda and the

world, of Knowledge and Ignorance, of rebirth and the Spirit. But Vedanta is popularly supposed to be a denial of life, and this is no doubt a dominant trend it has taken. Though starting from the original truth that all is the Brahman, the Self, it has insisted in the end that the world is simply not-Brahman, not-Self; it has ended in a paradox. We have attempted on the contrary to establish from its data a comprehensive Adwaita. We have shown that mind and life and matter are derivation from the Self through a spiritual mind or super-mind which is the real support of cosmic existence and by developing mind into that man can arrive at the real truth of the spirit in the world and the real truth and highest law of life. The Self is Sachchidananda and there is no incurable antinomy between that and the world; only we see the world through the eyes of the Ignorance and we have to see it through the eyes of the Knowledge. Our ignorance itself is only knowledge developing out of its involution in the apparent nescience of Matter and on its way to return to its conscious integrality. To accomplish that return and manifest the spiritual life in the human existence is the opportunity given by the successions of rebirth. We accept the truth of evolution, not so much in the physical form given to it by the west as in its philosophical truth, the involution of life and mind and spirit here in matter and their progressive manifestation. At the summit of this evolution is the spiritual life, the life divine.

It was necessary to show that these truths were not inconsistent with the old Vedantic truth, therefore we included explanations from this point of view of the Veda, two of the Upanishads and the Gita. But the Veda has been obscured by the ritualists and the scholiasts. Therefore we showed in a series of articles,

initially only as yet, the way of writing of the Vedic mystics, their system of symbols and the truths they figure. Among the Upanishads we took the Isha and the Kena; to be full we should have added the Taittiriya, but it is a long one and for it we had no space. The Gita we are treating as a powerful application of truth of spirit to the largest and most difficult part of the truth of life, to action, and a way by which action can lead us to birth into the Spirit and can be harmonised with the spiritual life. Truth of philosophy is of a merely theoretical value unless it can be lived, and we have therefore tried in the Synthesis of Yoga to arrive at a synthetical view of the principles and methods of the various lines of spiritual self-discipline and the way in which they can lead to an integral divine life in the human existence But this is an individual self-development, and therefore it was necessary to show too how our ideal can work out in the social life of mankind. In the "Psychology of Social Development," we have indicated how these truths affect the evolution of human society. In the "Ideal of Human Unity," we have taken the present trend of mankind towards a closer unification and tried to appreciate its tendencies and show what is wanting to them in order that real human unity may be achieved.

Our plan has compelled us to deal mainly with first principles and work them out in their fullness. In future, we do not propose to start any other long series of this kind, but to have more short articles with a broader, more direct and, as far as possible, more popular treatment. We shall also permit ourselves a freer range and diversity, so far as that is permissible in a philosophical review.—*July, 1918*

ERRATA

Page	12	line	4	for "an" read "and"
,,	17	,,	2	for "all-being" read "all being"
,,	19	,,	11	for "seek" read "seeks"
,,	28	,,	8	after "feels" insert "the"
,,	36	,,	2	for "Empire" read "Empires"
,,	45	,,	25	for "save" read "have"
,,	47	,,	2	for "Germatic" read "Germanic"
,,	47	,,	5	after "world" insert "would"
,,	48	,,	5	after "scale" omit "and"
,,	51	,,	77	for "from" read "form"
,,	68	,,	16	for "end" read "ends"
,,	75	,,	17	for "interest" read "interests"
,,	80	,,	17	for "development" read "developments"
,,	85	,,	5	for "condition" read "conditions"
,,	85	,,	5	for "condition" read "conditions"
,,	85	,,	2	for "recover" read "recovery"
,,	96	,,	3	after "such" insert "an"
,,	99	,,	26	after "seeking" insert "to"
,,	99	,,	28	for "large" read "larger"
,,	100	,,	2	after "Idea" insert "and"
,,	102	,,	25	for "Empire" read "Empires"
,,	108	,,	29	for "community" read "communities"
,,	113	,,	29	for "salvery" read "slavery"
,,	114	,,	29	after "into" insert "the"
,,	127	,,	29	for "lose" read "loose"
,,	135	,,	25	for "consideration" read "considerations"
,,	136	,,	32	for "seem" read "seemed"
,,	138	,,	4	for "Monarch" read "Monarchy"
,,	149	,,	7	for "rormation" read "formation"

Page	149	line	10	for " fudimentary " read " rudimentary "
,,	154	,,	32	for " appeared " read "appealed "
,,	155	,,	13	for " very " read " every "
,,	156	,,	30	for " coglomerate " read " conglomerate "
,,	160	,,	19	for "bourgeoise" read "bourgeoisie"
,,	166	,,	19	for " market " read " markets"
,,	167	,,	8	for " few " read " a few "
,,	171	,,	19	fot "plainless" read "painless"
,,	177	,,	16	for " peritedies " read "peripeties"
,,	178	,,	19	for " quietus" read " quietus "
,,	181	,,	79	for " country " read " county "
,,	182	,,	19	after " well " insert " as "
,,	,,	,,	30	for " Eise " read " Erse "
,,	189	,,	4	for " deal " read " ideal "
,,	218	,,	7	for " polities " read " politics "
,,	220	,,	29	for " men " read " man "
,,	253	,,	30	for " tends " read " tend "
,,	256	,,	10	for " obdious " read " odious "
,,	,,	,,	20	for " weakness " read "weakening'
,,	269	,,	3	for " alliance " read "alliances "
,,	507	,,	14	before " predestined " insert "the'
,,	333	,,	2	for " two " read " three "
,,	334	,,	7	before " league " insert " a "
,,	335	,,	29	before "wished " insert " they "
,,	364	,,	9	for " large " read " larger "
,,	398	,,	1	for " spring " read " springs "
,,	403	,,	26	before " spread " read " the "