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ANALYSIS OF SOCIETY

ANALYSIS OF SOCIETY

By Leo Silberman

Beit Memorial Research Fellow



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To
the memory of
John L. Gray

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PREFACE

THE analysis of social phenomena presents something of a problem. The social investigator has little difficulty in defining his subject matter in any specific and localised enquiry he may be undertaking. He is put to it, however, when he has to explain how the various separate social studies organised at various times and by different sociologists knit together into a coherent body of thought. What is he to answer when he is asked whether social enquiries do, in fact, contain a precise core of knowledge? or whether social analysis will in time come to be as clear-cut (and clean-cutting) an instrument as economic analysis is today? or whether it will approximate in its logical structure to modern economics or more to philosophical analysis, to statistical analysis or even to psychoanalysis?

This book discusses sociology with these questions in mind. It discusses the aims and programmes put forward by sociological writers and the reception which has been given to them by persons concerned with the important decisions which each generation has to make afresh on matters of social policy. It traces the methods by which sociologists seek to understand social relationships. And lastly, in a final chapter, it indicates some of the limitations which sociologists must accept at our present stage of development.

The probable advantage of such a treatment may be that the various parts of the book balance one another: the first chapter, for instance, gives an exposition of the scope of sociology as a scientific study in theory, while the last makes some qualifications which have in practice restricted its appeal among scholars. A similar correspondence exists between the first part of chapter II and chapter IX; between the second part of chapter II and the content of chapter VIII; and so on.

The argument can become, as the book advances, more concrete, i.e., it defines more and more closely man himself and his practical problems. So as to mark off the steps and distinguish concepts—those of function from those of social structure, standards from human relations, more philosophical

from more experimental approaches—the term "level" is used. Each level builds upon the previous one and brings to the fore some aspects which in the foregoing was of merely incidental interest. At the same time, methods are used ever more self-consciously which causes the chapter on the methodology of social research to be the longest in the book.

Yet the conjunction "social science" is sparingly used as a synonym for social analysis. The reason for this lies in the number of meanings which attach to the word "science", not because there can be, at this stage of the development of the discipline, any doubt that social analysis will successfully incorporate the full range of scientific techniques. One or more of the following canons (they are not all of the same order of objectivity) would permit, one supposes, a study like sociology to assume the mantle of science:

(1) If the writer gives a detailed and, if possible, independently corroborated description of the subject and offers some summarising concepts by which the data can be marshalled. (This may be called the Aristotlean criterion.)

(2) If the writer measures and establishes causal relationships between variables. (This may be called the Galilean criterion.)

(3) If the writer finds regularities or "laws" which hold in a large number of cases. (This may be called the Newtonian criterion. The cautionary provision that truths are merely "probable" was appended in the 19th century.)

(4) If the writer verifies by tests and experiment certain specific hypotheses. (This, always a cardinal feature of natural science, has been diligently advocated by John Dewey for the social sciences.)

(5) If the writer accepts the Platonic injunction that his duty is to stimulate the curiosity of his public and cause people to ask, perhaps for the first time, significant questions about the nature of thought, society and the physical world, to demand more facts, and so re-examine what they had previously considered self-evident.

Implied in the last criterion is the suggestion that an item, be it ever so carefully checked, is science only when it "signifi-

cantly" adds to the established body of knowledge. Experience and tradition are the two judges of what can pass as significant.

Opinion will vary and later scholars will admit matter which was once considered trivial, and *vice versa*. No acquisition of science is ever to be taken as final. The march of science is circular, throwing doubt on what seemed well confirmed. Science is, moreover, in the process of constant interchange with non-scientific spheres of life.

It is fortunate for social analysis that this is so and that the realm of social thought is not exhausted by what is readily accessible to the research worker who wields exclusively scientific tools of investigation. The multiplicity of motives in human conduct, their subtle overtones of meaning, the beauty, the cruelty, the tedium, the tragi-comic features of the social scene are more often caught by the impressionistic methods of the humanist eschewing scientific procedures. Social disciplines enlarge the critical equipment of the humanistic studies, as they have long been practised; they do not replace them. The newer disciplines themselves are probably best handled by persons imbued with a love of the arts and letters and possessing a long training in philosophical and historical pursuits and a sense of cultivated leisure.

The position of social analysis is in this respect comparable to that of the learned professions. In medicine, architecture, engineering, even in actuarial science, the scientific training must be supplemented by personal factors. Though laboratory aids are vital in medical diagnosis, successful therapy often hinges on the personality of the doctor, on the working of various social agencies and on the whole human situation in which the patient finds himself. The medical student is accustomed to think on various levels and so are the professions engaged in administration, government and industry.

For sociology to play its full part in the management of social affairs, speculation and science should re-inforce one another. If they do, social analysis can contribute in a constructive manner to social progress. Science and planning can only flourish in a society which takes thinking seriously. The managerial circles, should they become estranged from the humanities and grasp at any substitute which "logistics" or

technical research may offer them, are perhaps more to be feared than the forthright opposition of the old-fashioned classical scholar who disclaims all observations which the sociologist with his scientific apparatus may have in store.

While this book dwells mainly on scientific devices, the personal quality of much of sociological theory is, I think, preserved in the many quotations contained in the text. They are therefore preferred; also they put the respective ideas more succinctly. Since conciseness is one of the aims of the book, the customary expedient of speaking of abstractions like "social process" or "culture", as if they had a life of their own apart from the human beings whose activity are thereby described, is reluctantly followed. It is hoped that the reader will not be misled by this recourse to a "shorthand."

I acknowledge, briefly and inadequately, my profound debt to a large number of persons, especially to Professor Morris Ginsberg, Dr. Alice Stewart, Dr. Ellen Hellmann, Miss Theresa Ashton, and to MM. W. E. Lloyd, Donald Macrae, and M. A. Stern. Mrs. H. Silberman and Mr. J. Fraser checked a number of dates and references.

The writing was inspired and supported by the Beit Trust for Preventive Medicine and its secretary, Sir Alan Drury, F.R.S., who conveyed to me the expectation of the Trustees, when making the experiment of electing a sociologist to a Fellowship, that it might be possible for them to receive a statement of the techniques of the sociologist and his place, as he sees it, in scientific teamwork generally. I was all the more grateful to utilise this opportunity, as I had returned, not so long before, from quite another part of the globe, where the same questions were posed to me in connection with the replanning of urban areas in Mauritius. A temporary immobility, caused by illness, forced the writer to relinquish field studies for a while and accept the welcome discipline of theoretical self-examination.

March, 1951
Balliol College, L.S.
Oxford.

PART I

THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER I

Approaches to Sociology

It is natural for men to discuss the social arrangements under which they live, but the organisation of sociological knowledge into a systematic theory concerning the freedoms and the constraints of social action is the achievement of the last two centuries.

Four main approaches to sociology can be distinguished. The first may be called, with reference to the aim of its expositors, "perspective", as according to its conceptions history unfolds a design which becomes ever more coherent, and is finally made explicit in social science. The factors which determine the course of social events can be explored, set out and applied, though not without the examination of a vast array of material. The enquiry is in its method "encyclopædic". In the second approach which sociologists develop, partly in reaction to the encyclopædists, the field is restricted to an analysis of the hidden structure of social life, as expressed in the forms of social organisation, and is known as "formal sociology". The recurrent constellations of the human situation and the fatal dilemmas of social thought and action are crystallised in a number of carefully differentiated concepts.

In contrast to both these types of sociology, the Social Studies Movement rejects the hint of academic seclusion and want of contact with men going about their daily affairs by conducting empirical investigations. The field investigator directs attention to some section of society which is neglected, exploited or abused, in the hope of effecting reforms, or he adds personally verified items of information on new social agencies and institutional developments which in time influence the lives of every member of society. His objectives are more limited, but his care and labours more painstaking, than those of his predecessors. This interest in practical problems is taken further by modern Social Analysis which combines the chief discoveries of each school in an effort to contribute to the solution of the many new problems which face present-day society as a whole. Social thinking is given a new flexibility and freedom which wakes men to untried, unsuspected possibilities of social theory

and policy. Modern Social Analysis is in equal measure interested in an integrated theory of human behaviour and in its experimental testing.

I

Perspective or encyclopædic sociology has its roots in the world of the 18th century; it flourishes in the synoptic work of Comte, Spencer and Hobhouse; and it continues in our day, perhaps, in the *Study of History* of Arnold Toynbee. The first generation of sociologists were the natural heirs to French rationalism and the idealist philosophers, notably Hegel. If any single work can be quoted as programmatic, it is the *Encyclopédie*, a co-operative endeavour which was to co-ordinate all knowledge relevant to the guidance of society. The *Encyclopédistes* were firmly convinced that the accumulated data would express the inherent plan of the universe, and give direction to social progress with which the spirit of tolerance, justice and philanthropy was frankly synonymous. The government of the day sensed sedition, but the ideas of this circle did not have to wait long for public acclaim. The French Revolution and after it, the great idealist system builders of the 19th century, were inspired by them. If as time proceeded, the social order showed itself again and again insecurely founded or irreconcilable with the stated principles of reason and freedom, it was to a re-formulation of the social ideals, which had not yet a sufficient command of compelling language, that the fault was traced. The purpose of social theory, still, was to redress men's ideas about man and society and find somewhere firm ground on which a durable social structure could be erected once and for all.

It was suspected that the speculative elements of idealist social philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment were most open to distortion. Two opposing currents, one "positivist", the other "materialist" in outlook, aimed to overcome the weaknesses of traditional social philosophy. The study of society to justify itself in the eyes of the generation fufilling, as much as reacting against, Hegel had to be anti-metaphysical, factual and inductive, in short, it had to make that vital step to which all intellectual development seemingly pointed: liberate the mind from philosophical trammels in its investigation of social

phenomena. "Theological and metaphysical philosophy", wrote Comte in his emphatic manner, "do not hold sway today except in the system of social study. They must be excluded from this final refuge."[1] Comte at this moment felt himself on the brink of a new stage of intellectual endeavour, comparable perhaps in importance to the emancipation made in the 16th century.

Comte set forth the "Law of Three Stages" to indicate the great transformations of the spirit: At first men saw everything in terms of divine agencies with a god in every river and in every tree. Later men tended to explain events as emanations of absolute values and incorruptible essences. The 19th century and the future would abandon the search for absolute ideas and replace it by a "basic interpretation that social movements are necessarily subject to invariant physical laws, rather than being governed by some kind of will."[2] These laws establish the limits of constructive action and relieve man of his past vagaries. The science which finds these laws is the youngest of the sciences and forms the apex to the pyramid of knowledge resting upon mathematics but followed, layer upon layer, by physics, chemistry and biology. The intellectual unification of society is complete with the last step which conceives of "each state of society as the necessary result of the preceding one and the indispensable motor to the succeeding one."[3] The perspective of a humanity conscious of the driving forces of history and of the various factors which influence social behaviour opened up before the social scientist a new humanity determined to mould its destiny in conformity with objective compulsions, rather than to waste itself pathetically in rebelling against them.

The long cherished hope that it might be possible, as James Mill once wrote to a friend, "to make the human mind as plain as the road from Charing Cross to St. Paul's," seemed at that moment a realistic possibility. Given time, sufficient

[1]A. Comte: *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, Paris, 1864, Vol. IV, p. 267. "Philosophy" was used "in the sense in which it was employed by the ancients, and especially Aristotle, as comprising the general system of human conceptions; by adding the word 'positive' I wish to denote that I am considering that particular manner of philosophising which holds that the purpose of theory in any class of ideas is to coordinate facts."

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 267.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 263.

data, freedom to research and a concentrated attack on the problems by a compendious mind, the road lay wide open to a society which would banish prejudice, error and conflict. A new name for this science was called for and Comte coined the word "sociology", which was introduced into England by John Stuart Mill in 1843. Mill emphasised from the first the naturalistic quality of the new discipline to which in time he hoped himself to add:

"This science stands in the same relation to the social, as anatomy and physiology to the physical body. It shows by what principles of his nature man is induced to enter into a state of society; how this feature of his position acts upon his interests and feelings, and through them upon his conduct; how the association tends progressively to become closer, and the cooperation extends to more and more purposes; what those purposes are and what the varieties of means most generally adopted for furthering them are; what are the various relations which establish themselves among man as the ordinary consequence of the social union; what are those which are different in different states of society; and what are the effects of each upon the conduct and character of man."[1]

Such was the announcement made but what Comte eventually developed was in all but its proclamations the work of a metaphysician. Mill could not disguise his disappointment for all his intimate friendship for Comte. The "third stage" of thought was taking longer to achieve than expected and not Comte but Herbert Spencer was chiefly responsible for the development of British sociology. Spencer set out "to grasp the vast heterogeneous aggregate" [2] which was man's estate and operate on a wide front of enquiry. To the intellectual history to which Comte had devoted most of his researches, he added the study of political and military organisation. Primitive societies were useful matter and books of travellers were raided until an enormous store of knowledge was amassed, which was marshalled by a system reducing all, as if by magic, to a few fundamental principles—which in addition showed themselves to be in broad agreement with the ideals of British liberal statesmanship.

Spencer furnished the key to unlock the treasure house of

[1] J. S. Mill: *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy*, London, 1844, pp. 135–6.
[2] H. Spencer: *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1882, Vol. I, p. 462.

perspective sociology. Six years before Darwin published his thesis, Spencer demonstrated the working of the principle of evolution in history and therefore powerfully contributed to the acceptance and dissemination of Darwinism. The idea of evolution from simple to complex, but better adapted, forms, provided a framework which gave animation to the data, interesting and exciting in themselves, but hitherto lacking a connecting thread. That sociology was reinforced by geology, zoology and human embryology, which reached similar evolutionary conclusions, brought an added sense of security and prestige to the Spencerian scheme. It also showed that *progress* had been made and was continuously advancing without disturbing a few telling generalisations.

Like Comte, Spencer was fascinated by the inevitable force of the objective laws of development. He used the concept of the "social organism" to demonstrate the insignificance of individual action, although he thereby facilitated the growth of Neo-Hegelianism with its debatable metaphysical approach to the State. It was left to Hobhouse to dispense with this unnecessary crutch and to return to the pristine intentions of perspective sociology, with its desire "to formulate a just conception of human progress; to trace progress to its ramified complexity in the course of history; to test its reality by careful classifications and by searching comparisons to ascertain its conditions, and if possible, to forecast the future."[1] A true rationalist, Hobhouse reiterated the importance of constructive thought. The ultimate meaning of sociology lay in the "extension of rational control over the conditions of life"[2], the consummation of which may be taken thus "as the measure of social progress." With Hobhouse, sociology becomes self-critical and leaves behind the rather naïve assumptions of the positivists and utilitarians. Hobhouse's work foreshadowed the kind of problems which would interest the future generations

[1]Quoted by H. E. Barnes and H. Becker: *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, Boston, 1938, pp. 807–8.

[2]*Op. cit.*, p. 156. His view of the Neo-Hegelian adoration of the status quo is well expressed in the statement: "When we think of the actual inconsistencies of traditional social morality, the blindness and crudity of law, the elements of class-selfishness and oppression that have coloured it . . . we are inclined to say that no mere philosopher but only the social satirist, could treat this conception as it deserves."(*The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, London, 1918, p. 80.)

of sociologists—the relation of primitive society to secularised modern society; the relation of theory to policy; the causes of social change; and the consequences of scientific enquiry to humanism. Hobhouse added to Spencer's investigations an interest in material culture. Such a broad humanist spirit was not without its reward. While in choice of examples and methodology he may be outmoded, in language and clarity of view Hobhouse alone among the encyclopædists remains alive and fresh. He was fortunate too in finding in Morris Ginsberg a successor who knew how to develop his thought in the examination of current problems.

Hobhouse was likewise indebted to many contemporary workers in his field, to whom *sociology came to be that branch of knowledge which coordinated positive data on social life and, by means of the comparative method and the theory of evolution, gave unity to them.* In their division of history into a few grand stages and the sort of long-term trends they stressed, there was, of course, great diversity between Spencer and Hobhouse and Buckle in Britain, Marx and Engels,[1] Durkheim in France, and Ward in America, yet there was a congruence of outlook, and in the laws of over-all development which they had analysed a similarity which is not unimpressive. Briefly summarised and tabulated some of the laws are:

Comte:	The whole progress of history is a passage from the theological through the metaphysical to the "positive" stage of mind.
Spencer:	Progress proceeds from an indefinite, incoherent, homogeneity to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity. There is a growing differentiation and integration of social groups.
Marx:	Mankind proceeds from primitive communism through a long and painful history of class divisions and struggles to scientific communism. During the various stages of the class struggle, technical knowledge is accumulated which supplies the objective basis for a freely associated and cooperative society in which man realises his full humanity.

[1]For a discussion of Marxist sociology, see Chapters V and VIII.

Durkheim: There is a gradual change from a state of society which is based upon "mechanical" solidarity to one based upon "organic" solidarity. "Repressive" law is replaced by "restitutive" law.

Buckle: Society develops progressively by diminishing the influence of physical laws and accepting the force of mental laws.

Ward: Society becomes increasingly teleological, circuitous, artificial, self-directed and self-controlled. It greatly adds to its powers of social adaptation.

Hobhouse: A trend can be observed which runs through history taking man from a stage of society based upon kinship, through one based on authority, towards a final stage built on citizenship.

II

The success which attended encyclopædic sociology was short-lived. The validity of the data upon which so many of the conclusions were based was questioned. Did the method of selection and classification bear critical inspection? No, the study seemed to lack coherence. In the case of Spencer, for instance, discursiveness had led him to incorporate data which no one could accept as sociology. His *First Principles* contained some hundred pages on the "unknowable".[1] Mill, who would have been the natural expositor of the new discipline, withdrew and never began his long-planned book on "Ethology," which was to give the objective laws of human nature. He does not figure in the above list.

It looked as if sociology was a receptacle, an "omnium

[1]This is what a gifted contemporary recorded in her journal: "I read with a sort of fervid enthusiasm Herbert Spencer's *First Principles*, and accepted his perfect formula of the course of life in all being. But his deductions from general theory, used as first principles of social science, are to my mind suggestive hypotheses, not proven laws. He irritates me by trying to palm off illustrations as data; by transcribing biological laws into the terms of social facts, and then reasoning from them as social laws. A deeper knowledge of his work, based on a wider experience of life, may make me in the end his true disciple. At present I am *not*. I am biased by his individualism, not converted to it. I should like to understand clearly what his theory is, and, apart from mere deduction from *First Principles* and general analogies, which seem to me only to require skilful handling to cut into facts anyway, how he has worked it out." B. Webb: *My Apprenticeship*, London, 1938, Vol. II, p. 319.

gatherum" of information with all the vices of descriptive economics and few of its virtues to offset the disadvantages.[1]

"The source of error is in the conception that the subject-matter of sociology is the whole of occurrences which take place in society. But it is plainly nonsensical to throw into the melting pot labelled 'sociology' all those researches which have been satisfactorily conducted by economics, history, philosophy, political science, statistics, demography, jurisprudence, and ethics. That gives us a new name but no new knowledge."[2]

Georg Simmel's *Soziologie* (1908) was the first general work to give expression to a restricted view of sociology. Drawing a clear distinction between what is form and what is content it assigned to sociology, as the book's sub-heading indicated, "the study of the forms of sociation". Simmel's concern was with concepts and types, with the component units which, like building stones behind the plaster, make up the structure of society. *Formal* or *structural* sociology is interested in the "meaning" of competition, power, hierarchy, the division of labour, and such typical relationships as leadership and obedience. The basic antinomies of life—control and revolt, self-preservation and death-wishes, intimacy and strangeness, social distance and affinity were developed by Simmel, Dilthey, Vierkandt, and in a more concrete manner by Max Weber. The approach is well represented in the *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie* (1931), but is also established in America, where Wiese has found a spirited adaptation and, more recently, in the analytical work of Talcott Parsons.[3]

The Germans took their cue from one remarkable feature of encyclopædic sociology: the encyclopædists had each failed to surmount his own inherent political sympathies. Spencer condemned from first principles, the operation of factory legislation, municipal sanitary inspectors, the Post Office as run by the state and public poor relief. Marx, at the other extreme and equally claiming to give a scientific interpretation of history, came to opposite conclusions and reflected in every line he

[1]The works were of intimidating length. Comte's *Cours* ran into six volumes; his *Système* into four. Spencer produced ten volumes of *Synthetic Philosophy*. Carey's *Principles of Social Science* was in three volumes. Lilienfeld's *Gedanken über die Sozialwissenschaft der Zukunft* was in five.

[2]G. Simmel: "The Position of Social Groups" in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, 1897–8, p. 662.

[3]T. Parsons: *The Structure of Social Action*, New York, 1937.

wrote, a party view point. The German academics could not readily persuade themselves that either *laisser faire* or scientific socialism was a necessary conclusion of the study of society; struggling German industry could not accept the policies of free trade and felt the growing Marxist labour movement to constitute a challenge to Germany's ambitions. So if the encyclopædic sociologists by turning Hegel and Enlightenment upside down had arrived at challenging new perspectives, then the formalists would turn encyclopædic, especially Marxist, sociology inside out. Marx had shown in his *Theorien über den Mehrwert* that the categories of classical economics could be related to the existential matrix of the economists that had deduced them. If the social situation in which a thinker finds himself is studied, we can, where necessary, criticise his approach and the limitations of his attitude. Hence by going behind the theories it is possible to describe objectively the "spirit" informing the various systems of thought and explain them with reference to the historical experiences of the thinker and his public. In *Das Kapital*, Marx also applied a handy methodological device which could be creatively exploited. All the contradictions of capitalist society are contained, he thought, in embryonic form, in the very nature of the commodity. In his first chapter, the commodity form of every product that comes onto the market, is analysed and this analysis is taken further in later chapters. However, it is not until we reach the third volume of this work that the fullness of social reality is taken into account. In the first two volumes Marx shears capitalist society of all its "inessentials", i.e., he treats it as if it consisted only of capitalists and workers and as if foreign trade was of no consequence. Only at a late stage are the secondary features of society introduced.[1] Marx's destructive critique and methodology could be put to admirable use in the criticism of encyclopædic sociology, while Historical Materialism could be "deepened" by appropriating such concepts as solidarity, rationality, organic heterogeneity and relating them to economics.

[1]To the formal sociologists Marx appeared as an encyclopædist who would have made a good analyst would he but have divested himself of the old approach, but Engels contributed nothing to the formalist's "tool box." He forms a bridge to empirical research and his accommodating interpretation of historical materialism in later years is almost "British" in its readiness to take the commonsensical view.

The formal analysis is well exemplified in Simmel's work on the *Philosophie des Geldes*. He explores the hiatus between the "feel-thinking" of primitive economies and the rationalistic calculations made possible by the acceptance of an objective standard of value—money. As one commodity becomes isolated as the general measure of the worth of goods of very different nature and use, man's thinking shifts from use value to exchange value, from inherent worth to social acceptability. As token money shows, the standard value need not have any value itself as long as it is generally convertible. The community is henceforth concerned with formal issues instead of with substance. Ancient spiritual experiences are eroded, but exchange is facilitated and with it new avenues of experience are discovered. A money economy leads to an unexpected intellectualisation of men and a great emancipation from magical spells. Simultaneously it carries with it a sense of loss and the danger of burying man under the sheer quantity of the new creations which it produces. Such ideas give the historical materialism of Marx "a substructure which retains the economic interpretation of intellectual life, but divines in the economic forms deeper values and tendencies of a psychological, or indeed of a metaphysical, nature. The business of analysis is to mediate between the two poles: intellectual construction must be referred to the economic structure, which in turn must be comprehended as the rationale of those spiritual depths which once more inhere in economic phenomena. And so on indefinitely."[1]

The formal sociologist perceives the *leit-motivs*, whereas the participants in the social processes, immersed in and blinded by, their own uniqueness and subjective feelings, cannot gain rational insight into what they are doing, or at least only by slow and tragic experience. The purpose of sociology is to make the participants more self-conscious and to show them the basic human needs that are fulfilled by (say) religion, literature, the

[1]G. Simmel: *Die Philosophie des Geldes*, Munich and Leipzig, 1920. Preface, p. VIII.

This approach is influenced by the post-classical revolution in economic theory, which with Böhm-Bawerk and Menger turned to the elaboration of economic decisions; to the "insightful approach" in history and philosophy; and to the Kantian revival in epistomology and jurisprudence. If encyclopædic sociology developed in close association with the new theories of natural science, formal sociology sought its models in the social disciplines.

nation: Religions are manifold, but all are lit up by piety; literature is vast, but it appeals directly to the imagination; political entities are diverse and conflicting, but all call upon loyalty. Introspection beside historical analysis is advocated by the German school, which gave sociology a psychological twist, as decidedly as an encyclopædic sociologist like Durkheim had given psychology a sociological dimension.[1]

To the formal sociologist, life proceeds uneasily between opposite centres of attraction. At one period of history one pole forms the more powerful attraction, at a later the other pole. The sociologist makes them both explicit and encourages people to restore the balance. From the solidarity of the folk society to the efficiency-ridden, individualistic urban society of modern days man makes progress—but also falls behind. The magical and "charismatic" personalities of the past give way to the technical expert and the bureaucrat, so that, for instance, the industrial monopolist in America and the Soviet Commissar are more closely related to one another than either are to the isolated and still pre-industrial rural communities in the Deep South or in the fastnesses of Asiatic Russia. These developments are filled with destructive power, they side-track the vital stream in us which is greater than science and dangerously increase our dependence on scientific procedures. Sociology more than other disciplines must allow for "insight" as a means of understanding. The formalist school has the ambition of capturing the colourful reality by comprehending it, rather than by dissecting it in the manner of the physical sciences. In the mirror of social reality the sociologist should understand above all himself: sociologists should try to turn the flashes of wisdom of the moral philosophers into scientific knowledge and the inspiration of the poets into points of departure, but they should also recognise the limitations of this procedure. "Life is the basic fact and it always must be the frame of reference. . . . Life is that which is known from inside, that beyond which it is impossible to penetrate. Reason cannot play the judge to life."[2] At the same time, formal sociology is itself the highest expression

[1]Formal sociology as well as social psychology can be dated from the first appearance of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, founded by Lazarus and Steinthal in 1860.

[2]W. Dilthey: *Gesammelte Schriften*, Leipzig, 1927, Vol. VIII, p. 261.

of rationalistic attitudes. It would have been unthinkable in a magical or sacred society. Its concern with the core of things lends it indeed an acrid quality. In certain climates of thought, the sociologist becomes a debunker impatient of the camouflage of ideology, which ineptly disguises the power ambitions of the supporting groups. Thus, with visible relish, Vilfredo Pareto analyses the scandals of the Third Republic and seeks out the irrational motives which determine political and economic behaviour, however carefully these "residues" are wrapped up in a sheep's clothing of humanism and liberalism.[1]

Formal sociology thus is the exploration of the main springs of human nature, the necessary forms to which action is bound, the meaning and limits of our thinking about social reality. It has found its fullest application in the writings of Max Weber, who wrote with great scholarship on matters as diverse as Buddhism and the Greek *oikos*; the obligations of the man of letters; and the methodology of the social sciences; besides a vast number of other subjects. His historical work was not primarily descriptive, still less was it intended to lead to any facile "laws" of social change; what he sought was to define the "typical" forms of social life as lived in different epochs. His method is similar to that of Marx, with whose ghost Weber maintained a life-long discussion. His suggestion is that in engineering we make use of the Carnot Cycle as an idealised picture of the operation of the steam engine, and that in the social sciences we should aim to erect similar "models of thought" or "ideal types" which separate the essential from the disturbing local and temporary accretions. Economics knows of imaginary states and sociology likewise requires constructs. A favourite one is "feudalism", i.e., a certain master-vassal relationship which can be observed in many parts of the world, though its concrete manifestations may differ as much as Western feudalism does from Japanese feudalism. Withal Weber never wished to exaggerate the potency of scientific thought. There were realms of "essence" to which the thinker could not penetrate. The technical and the "magical" plane of social life remained, to be bridged by action and genius, and a certain romantic note underlies the work of Weber and of many of his fellow workers.

[1] V. Pareto: *Trattato di Sociologia Generale*, Florence, 1916.

III

Some of Weber's investigations were followed up in Britain, e.g., the protestant reformation in its relation to the rise of capitalism, was one of the subjects which occupied economic historians. In general, however, formal sociology found little response in Britain. Perhaps Graham Wallas was more in tune with this approach than any other sociologist in England, where "pure economics" likewise has commanded only partial acceptance.[1] Neither the cynicism nor the tragic despair inherent in the German outlook were to the British taste. If America was more open to German influences, the Americans impressed upon them their own stamp. Instead of the "existentialist" mode of German thought, the Americans preferred pragmatic applications. The Marxian point of departure was incorporated in the "Institutional School" of economists; the romantic elements were developed in Sumner's concepts of folkways and mores; the "ideal types" gave birth to the dichotomy of Urban Sociology and of Rural Sociology;[2] Von Wiese's simple continuum along which all social relationships can be ranked as either tending towards the associative or the dissociative extreme ("tertium in sociologica non datur"[3]) was transformed into a research tool by Bogardus, whose "social distance scale" measures the hostility between two persons of different race or class.[4] The changes in the style of life and thought from magical to secular were investigated with the aid of letters, verbatim statements and life-histories of the immigrant Polish peasants in one of the first great pieces of socio-psychological research in America.[5] Indeed it was the contribution of the Americans to transpose the philosophical mood, which despite disclaimers still adhered to all sociological work, into practical empirical enquiry.

Empiricism also became the key-note of the British approach. Sociology was fused with existing research disciplines. For a

[1] G. Wallas: *Human Nature in Politics*, London, 1908.

[2] The first important work on urban sociology was undertaken by R. E. Park who had studied in Germany under Simmel and Weber. Simmel's work *Die Grosstadt und das Geistesleben* influenced Park.

[3] L. von Wiese and H. Becker: *Systematic Sociology*, New York, 1932, p. 38.

[4] E. S. Bogardus: *The New Social Research*, Los Angelos, 1926.

[5] W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki: *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Boston, 1918.

long time the best sociological work to be done in England was in the field of social history and social biology. Human geography and social psychology were two further borderline subjects of promise. Demography was of interest because of the sudden rise of the population and later its equally precipitate fall. Britain could look back to the work of the Political Arithmeticians of the 17th century and an almost uninterrupted tradition of demographic studies. Institutional analyses of primitive peoples; of the recruitment of the new industrial proletariat; of the organisations of the working class; the growth of the social services and the political structure of the country; as well as the rôle of professional associations and of the professional man in administration produced research work of lasting value. All these studies had in common a dislike for system-building and reverence for factual data. To the empiricist too little was known of the facts to warrant a fraction of the generalisations of encyclopædic and formal sociology: "I have to forge every sentence," William James wrote to his brother Henry while almost breaking under the strain of writing his *Principles of Psychology*, "in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts."[1]

The new generation criticised in the sociologist the lack of historical training, and in the historians of the mid-Victorian age, the lack of attention to primary research. "The half truth that lingers in every generalisation of Dicey or Anson is brought home (to the research worker) daily and no doubt he is harder put to it than the academic historian to maintain a sense of proportion."

"Little is left at the end of first-hand research of an ordinary academic education in history. The consequence may even be to have forfeited the title of historian, so thick is the wood and so many are the trees; but if so there is at least compensation in the fact that the experience has quickened interest in the past. It is hard, perhaps impossible, for a custodian of records to preserve the rather abstract cast of thought which is so characteristic of university teaching. Borne down at first by sheer bulk, the archivist takes refuge in hard facts, in particular lines of cut and dried inquiry, in finding definite answers to practical questions. . . ."[2]

[1]Quoted by A. N. Whitehead: *Science in the Modern World*, London, 1938, p. 13.
[2]V. H. Galbraith: *Studies in the Public Records*, London, 1948, pp. 5–6.

The research worker re-emerges with "answers to practical questions!" The realistic approach of the historian, economist and philosopher was encouraged by the participation of the man of letters in public affairs. A long tradition of Royal Commissions prepared the public for the acceptance of recommendations derived from field investigations. A still older tradition promoted local studies as a means to "evaluate the social heritage." Inspired by that message, the sociologist Victor Branford wrote of "Sociology" in the 11th Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* that

> "it is the continuance of the concrete, open-air method of Nature Study, taken over into the human field, thus finding its objects in everyday observation and putting the student face to face with these and only falling back on books and classroom work as a secondary aid. The field naturalist's modes of observation and study, his recurrent travel on foot and similar open-air studies of historic formations . . . his habitual watching (and interpretation) everywhere and at all times of the interplay between past, present and future (help) to evaluate the social heritage."[1]

If the formalists had turned sociological theory inside out, the Social Studies Movement deflected attention from *inside* the universities to what was *outside*. Social surveys would make articulate the knowledge already possessed but never collected and published, information available to but unused by different social agencies. When Charles Booth set to work on his "Grand Inquest on the Problem of Poverty in the Midst of Wealth" he made use of the knowledge of the school attendance officers of the families in each of the streets surveyed. "The root idea with which I began the work was that every fact I needed was known to some one and that the information had simply to be collected and put together."[2] At the same time Booth was not content to use scraps of information and vague opinions. His proud ambition was "to make use of no fact to which I cannot

[1]The tradition goes back to William the Conqueror. The Domesday Book which he put into commission, was a survey of the whole of England and remained in constant use in the Middle Ages. "Its influence was directly felt in law and government for at least four centuries, and a volume might be written on the history of Domesday in the Middle Ages. It is still sometimes cited in the House of Lords." (Galbraith: *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90.)

[2]Quoted by B. Webb: *op. cit.*, p. 275.

give a quantitative value."[1] It was his aim to measure and not to rely on vague opinions.

It is difficult to-day to say how profoundly our view of social reality has been affected by these social enquiries. The work of the Fabians, of the London School of Economics, of the local surveys undertaken by the provincial universities and, in America, by the State universities and the W.P.A., the National Resources Board and the various scientific trust institutions, have made social studies an inseparable part of the democratic State. They constituted an essential stepping stone from the *laisser faire* world of the 19th century into the world of to-day with relatively little loss in the quality of the humanistic ideals of society. How clearly is the modern mixed economy envisaged by an investigator like Charles Booth, shipowner and F.R.S., positivist and privy councillor:

"My idea is to make the *dual* system, Socialism in the arms of Individualism, under which we already live, more efficient by extending somewhat the sphere of the former and making the division of function more distinct. Our Individualism fails because our Socialism is incomplete. In taking charge of the lives of the incapable, State Socialism finds its proper work, and by doing it, completely relieves us of a serious danger. The Individualist system breaks down as things are."[2]

The deductive nature of the current economic theories, both liberal and socialist, does not satisfy the social student to whom so much that is axiomatic in economic discussion is based on unverified assumption with no real effort made to check the bias of the theoretician. The social investigator has a duty towards the facts. He effaces himself in the study and evaluation of facts. His manner of approach was likened to that of the botanist patiently collecting his specimens, his mind emptied of all theoretical predispositions. As the Webbs explained:

"The right way in which to approach the subject-matter of sociology is not to focus the enquiry upon discovering the answer to some particular question in which you may be interested. On the contrary you should choose a particular section of social environment or more precisely a particular social institution, and sit down

[1] C. Booth: *Life and Labour of the People in London*, London, 1902–3, Vol. I, p. 6.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

patiently in front of it, exactly as if it were a form of energy or a kind of matter, the type-specimen of a plant or some species of animal, and go on working steadfastly to acquire all that is possible about it with the sole purpose of discovering every fact concerning its constitution and its activities together with every ascertainable actual reaction between it and its environment. It is the experience of investigators that, except by sheer accident, it is in this way only that anything novel is discovered: and certainly it is in this way only that we can ascertain the causal sequences or as we say the 'laws' that underlie the particular manifestations of external nature in such way as to enable us to predict what will happen to it."[1]

The Social Studies Movement discovered the living People. Customs and culture traits were recorded in all their profusion, and yet among all the diversity measurable regularities would be discerned. The great variability of human stations fascinated; but so did the statistical tools which showed their grouping in characteristic distributions, their laws of average, of regression, of correlation. "The statistical variations", said Galton, "are extremely regular, so much so that their general conformity with the result of calculations based on the abstract law of frequency of error, is an accepted fact by anthropologists."[2] This observation, to-day accepted by students of social phenomena, had first to be proven by men like Galton, Pearson, Bowley and many others. *Social Studies found in the statistical method the natural instrument for handling large numbers of social variables and describing social events and populations in a definite and easily assimilable form.*

Booth was concerned with poverty; the Webbs with institutions; Galton with heredity and environment; other social students investigated the prison system; leisure time occupations or public opinion. One list enumerates ten fields and 48 subtopics not usually covered by any other discipline. Another definition of the scope of empirical sociology gives this assortment:

"Human Nature and Personality.
The Family.
Peoples and Cultural Groups.
Conflict and Accommodation of Groups.

[1] S. and B. Webb: *Methods of Social Study*, London, 1932, p. 41.
[2] F. Galton: "Presidential Address," *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1885, Section H, p. 1209.

Population and Territorial Groups.
Collective Behaviour.
Social Organisation and Social Institutions.
Social Problems, Social Pathology and Social Adjustment.
Theory and Methods."[1]

The eclecticism of this list is not accidental and is not considered a mark of inadequacy by those who value this approach. The social student naturally turns to the problems which he can answer, and to the sectors of society where he can do "most good" and assist tangible reform. He investigates the magnitude of a problem, estimates the cost of reform, singles out special characteristics for the administrator to base a policy. He verifies opinion; he neither transcends phenomena to reach to some essence, nor does he erect a monumental world picture in the manner of encyclopædic sociologists; what he transcends is uninformed judgments and what he realises is a small extension of our factual knowledge about the way people live. His satisfaction is that "our expectation of living has increased as we have learned to worry less about the good life and more about the good drain."[2] Untroubled by philosophical preoccupations or the problems which have engaged the first approaches to sociology, the Movement avoids "basic" questions or "ultimate" causes and all that reminds of "the atmosphere of G.H.Q." which "only after many councils . . . gets going."[3] The social student was not only resigned but content to be a regimental officer.

IV

The neglect of theory, the eclecticism and pragmatism of the Movement, soon gave the social investigator the appearance of being a narrow specialist. The social student had rejected the grand toy balloons of the first two schools of sociology, but his own attitude was also subject to some derision.

[1] *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 38, pp. 815–6.

[2] Cf. L. Hogben: *The Nature of Living Matter*, London, 1930.

[3] A. M. Carr-Saunders: "The Place of Sociology," *Conference on the Social Sciences*, London, 1936, p. 215.

"He deals with them (the toy balloons) by sitting tight, hedgehog-like raising his spines of sharp fact, in the certain expectation that sooner or later those gay toys will come to earth and be deflated by a single prick with much dissipation of gas. But the hedgehog is a timid and uninspiring animal; he haunts the same shrubberies year after year. The student, introduced to this world of hedgehog teachers, finds it somewhat dim, and may well wish that his teachers would come more freely out into the open where things are on foot and would lift up their eyes and see land of greater promise beyond."[1]

The bite of these remarks comes from a generation which already stood on the shoulders of the Social Studies Movement and which needed no convincing that playing fields and better housing were desirable. The period between the "Naughty Nineties" and the "Roaring Twenties" as they were oddly called, appears in retrospect strangely pedestrian. A bolder course was wanted. It became practical as soon as social planning was accepted, after the Great Depression but particularly during the World War, as a matter of survival.

As social students had brought in their harvests of information and supplied the chief ideas for various social and administrative schemes for which the democratic statesmen were looking, Government departments had begun to take note. The Social Studies Movement made sociology a technical subject and assured it of a place in society. It was the fault of this too acquiescent Movement that the place accorded to the investigators was a modest one; they were not drawn into the councils of the chief policy makers. The intellectual climate before the Great Depression was not challenged, so that the social studies were conducted in "problem areas" located rather on the margin of society, areas where Society saw The Social Problem, not where the vital issues which sociologists could already tackle, actually lay. Hence most of the work concerned the "3D's"—the deficient, the delinquent and the destitute. The regimental officer had ventured forth into the front line, knocked in wind and weather at the doors of his fellow-citizen or sat through long evenings in damp Women's Institutes, but as a front-line man he was concerned mainly with tactics. The impression was created that he recommended on the whole "more research, more social work, and more

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

generous assistance schemes" than were in operation at the time of the enquiry. He added by-laws rather than a vision of the City of Man. If he investigated the factory it was always the workers, and never the management, that constituted his problem. The human needs of the workers were honourably championed, but with few exceptions, his suggested reforms culminated in the appointment of a Labour Manager, whose duties were more in the canteen and on the recreational side outside of working hours, than in and among the working groups. The Social Studies Movement, *wise in its initial caution*, had shown a tendency to treat symptoms rather than the disease.

Or was it that sociology, a late-comer in the world of science, and all its workers were yet ahead of a society[1] which had not yet begun to "think of everything just as everything is thought of in the laboratory, that is as a question of experimentation,"[2] and apply the results of experimentation to social policy? Only with the World War and its many urgencies were scientists of many disciplines employed in the solution of questions of major social policy. When it at last came, the experience was crucial.

"It has been found that in almost every aspect of the war effort the mind and method of the scientist are able to suggest solutions of operational problems often quite apart from the particular fields in which the scientists concerned were normally engaged. This type of scientific work in its relation to the organisation of the fighting services has been given the special name 'operational research.' Essentially it means bringing to bear on problems of military strategy and technique the trained intelligence of men who, working with a diversity of scientific fields, have acquired certain ways, largely though not exclusively statistical, of approach to problems and certain techniques for the measurement of the essential factors. . . ."[3]

[1] "Turning next to the formulation of policy, we have come to the conclusion, after surveying what came before us, that in the sphere of civil government the duty of investigation and thought as preliminary to action, might with great advantage be more definitely recognised. It appears to us that adequate provision has not been made in the past for the organised acquisition of facts and information, and for the systematic application of thought, as preliminary to the settlement of policy and subsequent administration." (*Report of the Committee on Machinery of Government* (Haldane Report), London, 1918, Cmd. 9230, p. 6.)

[2] *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1934, Vol. V, p. 272.

[3] *Problems of Scientific and Industrial Research*, published by Nuffield College, Oxford, 1944, p. 46.

The men who formed research teams found themselves to their own surprise on new, but common ground. In a number of subjects the "operational" viewpoint had become the accepted one, forced upon the theorist by the new problems and material that were coming to hand. In addition, philosophical trends were defining knowledge as "literally something which we do. Analysis is ultimately physical and active; meanings in their logical quality are stand-points, attitudes, and methods of behaviour towards facts and active experimentation is essential to verification."[1] The controlled experiment is the centre of interest. A problem was posed by the key issues of society and the procedure for its analysis was derived from the knowledge, the concepts, the statistical tools, the frames of reference found profitable in one of the sciences.

After a long period of isolation, the various disciplines were converging, were attending to the same problems, now sufficiently advanced to go beyond their theoretical structures and rethink their concepts in the language spoken by other scientists. Modern physics had given an interpretation of matter in terms which make it partake of the characteristics of energy. In atomic research the "human equation", the disturbances which the experimenter introduces by experimenting, was no longer overlooked. The total situation had to be taken into account. In medicine it was realised that the mental and economic anxieties of the patient influence his speed of recovery. There was also the problem why one individual showed resistance to infection and another not. In diagnosis isolated symptoms dwindled in importance. The Juvenile Courts and social case-work began to fit the individual's deviant behaviour into his social background. There was a return to an interest in the wider framework, dynamically interpreted. Psychoanalysis with its stress on unconscious motivation and the "need" felt by a certain personality structure for debilitating complexes, reduced the faith in admonitory exhortation, corrective punishment, or facile reforms. Keynsian ideas in economics undermined the belief in an economic system self-adjusting at the highest levels of efficiency, but showed at the same time how budgetary policy and financial intervention

[1] J. Dewey: *Essays in Experimental Logic*, Chicago, 1916, p. 330.

could control investment and outlay. Neither the automatism of the orthodox, nor the totalitarianism of the unorthodox economist, was an adequate standpoint to adopt in present circumstances and with the equipment of our present understanding. However different their prescriptions *laisser faire* and Marxism had in common a tendency to vacillate between a fatalistic determinism and an idealistic voluntarism. In either case, according to Keynes, reason and the lasting objectives of social enquiry have little place.

Keynes opposed the closed systems of the two inflexible, or as he called them, "classical" schools. Their assumptions were unrelated to the new problems and clumsy into the bargain. They were to be considered as one type of rather simple solutions, a kind of Euclidian geometry which had to be duplicated and differentiated by non-Euclidian assumptions. The new outlook reduced classical economics to a special case, one of a number of possible conceptions, with which it may be alternatively useful to operate. Now it was unnecessary to advocate new social schemes by describing the wretchedness of life for the underprivileged, ill-housed groups of the population; the task was to show the stimulus to be derived from a housing programme for the industrial life of the entire community, dogged by deflation and unemployment; while in an inflationary period, the task was to find the most desirable progressive steps to regain stability. Keynes was personally concerned with the artistic problems of his century. In the investigation of social institutions he was interested in their capacity to make, as well as to mar, the lives of men. He was interested in the ability of the policy maker to release new constructive forces and transform empty aggregates into vital communities. He thus becomes the prototype of the modern social analyst.

We might define the new stage of sociological work as "Operational Sociology", a new approach to sociology which "subsumes" much that is creative and viable in each of the previously discussed types of sociology. However, because of the various connotations which "operationalism" has acquired, both philosophical and political, "Social Analysis" may be the better term.

The name suggests that the new approach is above all "analytical", i.e., concerned with methods, with the formulation of new concepts, and the limitations of individual social theories when applied to given problems. It wishes so to cast realistic problems that they can be studied through controlled experiments, where two groups are matched in every respect but for the one set of characteristics, which are being studied. The formal sociologist spoke of "ideal types", the social analyst nowadays uses controlled experiments and "models" of thought, by which are meant "theoretical constructs with a precise exhaustive and not too complicated definition; they must be similar to reality in those respects which are essential in the investigation."[1] For were the analyst to dispense with the criterion of precision, he would have forfeited his claim to be experimental; if statistical tools are used the "region of risk" in their employment has to be precisely stated. Were the analyst to refuse to reveal, as fully as he can, his own valuational bias, his definitions and his methods, he would fall below the canons of modern research. Were the analyst to be too complicated, he would find his work incommunicable and incapable of independent verification by other workers. Were the experiment too far removed from reality, treatment would lose its relevance and the analyst would shirk the most interesting of all problems, the elucidation of what in a realistic situation he considers "essential" to a problem and what is merely peripheral. The purpose and core of theory can be stated as follows: *Social Analysis should yield new techniques, which are fairly easy to manipulate, show consistency of method and of point of view, make the principles of classification and the criteria of selection explicit, and contribute to the validation of a theory of human behaviour, which is useful to the policy-maker.*

Social analysts accept the need for a general theory of human development as the objective as much as encyclopædic sociology, but believe that the aim is best attained by social experimentation rather than by the comparison of diverse data found by observers with different criteria and problems in mind. Social Analysis retains the empirical bias of social students and the programme that knowledge should contribute to the clarification

[1] J. von Neumann and C. Morgenstern: *The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour*, Princeton, 1947, p. 32.

of social policy, but it believes that field work is best conducted with the view to testing some challenging hypothesis, which is related to a wider frame of reference. If the empiricists showed us that sociology is impossible without first-hand contact with ordinary people, then they have also shown that these first-hand contacts are by themselves insufficient. Without hypotheses they are odd bits of interesting information, not analysis.

The procedure followed by modern Social Analysis is to integrate the various approaches. The paradox of sociology, the subject which set out to unify all social enquiry, breaking up into a number of different approaches, is proved to be but a temporary (yet necessary, intermediary) phenomenon. We shall find in the next chapter that the various specialist social disciplines with their separate outlooks, fields and methods are also showing signs of re-integration. The word "approach" has been used advisedly.[1] Many of the ancient quarrels between the various schools are out-of-date. We can alloy the encyclopædic and the empirical approaches by utilising the analytical procedure of the formal sociologists.

At the same time, sociology dare not become a closed subject. The integration is always tentative. Fields, methods and objectives are continuously being redefined. The analysis must move in unison with related enquiries in other disciplines. It is sensitive to the social situation in which the social analyst works. Social theory cannot be decreed, it is part of social action and objective social forces. It "guides" social action by building systematically on past knowledge, showing the interplay of factors and what is in any given situation controllable. The sweep of social analysis is necessarily limited, yet such diverse problems as the re-education of interned persons, interracial tensions, incentives and the human factors of productivity, the social implications of a great economic development scheme in the colonies, and the effects of full employment on the quality and mobility of labour, have been studied. The

[1]H. G. Wells singled it out for commendation at an early stage in the development of the subject: "Mr. V. V. Branford recently attempted a useful work in a classification of the methods of what he calls 'approach', a word that seems to me eminently judicious and expressive." ("The So-called Science of Sociology" in *Sociological Papers*, London, 1907, Vol. VII, p. 359.)

social analyst is most at home where he is confronted with a compact and well-defined group, characteristic of some larger population which he can face with clear-cut alternatives as he reveals the relationship of internal and external, material and psychological, central and peripheral influences. The social analyst aids judgment by careful investigation and makes decision more meaningful. However, his ultimate objective is to go further and discover in the texture of society and the nature of man unsuspected constructive potentialities.

CHAPTER II

The Meaning of Analysis

The history of social theory has proved to us that the unity of the social sciences can never be achieved by a simple pooling of all available knowledge. Comte's encyclopædic plan must be surrendered.[1] Subjects multiply. By making "society" a subject of objective enquiry, each discipline is encouraged to set up its own sociological subdivision. This lesson was already appreciated when the Sociological Society was founded in 1904. Instead of trying its hand at the unification of all the social studies, the Society, in the words of its president, the Rt. Hon. James Bryce, wished to "father the many incipient branches of social studies."[2] Instead of systematising all knowledge, the Society was content to provide a forum for "specialists in the different groups to meet and compare notes more often." The special social disciplines should resist "the tendency to become isolated from one another and from general sociology, which can surely only flourish by their systematisation"[3] and Professor Morris Ginsberg has himself contributed no small part to the integration of the social sciences, realising at an early stage, that interest had shifted towards history, economics, social anthropology, psychology, politics and jurisprudence. Under cover of these subjects much sociological work was done. At the same time, they constituted the limits beyond which an

[1]There is an episode in the history of sociology where an attempt was made to organise a university by taking Comte's ideas seriously. Lester Ward, the "Father of American Sociology", taught that "sociology standing at the head of the entire series is enriched by all the truths of nature and embraces all truth. It is the *scientia scientiarum*." His successor at Brown University, Rhode Island, moved that the department of sociology act as a sort of *court de cassassion*, reviewing all work in other departments. As Rhode Island is the State which since its creation has the most stubborn record of individual liberty, it may be imagined how this proposal was received at the University and outside. Not until the "last surviving member from this period has retired" will the bitterness subside. (See R. E. L. Faris: "American Sociology" in *Twentieth Century Sociology*. Edited by G. Gurvitch and W. E. Moore, New York, p. 542.)

[2]J. Rumney: "British Sociology" in *Twentieth Century Sociology*, p. 572.

[3]M. Ginsberg: "On the Place of Sociology" in *Conference on the Social Sciences*, London, 1935, p. 12.

integrated theory of society could for the time being not venture.[1] In each discipline there were some who did not wish to contaminate pure theory with problems of policy and realistic research. Yet, if pushed far enough, abstraction fits models together which can be contrasted by other models and creatively exploited by social analysis. Each specialist study has developed its own techniques and terminology, its own "axis", but at a certain stage they are sufficiently elucidated to allow the analyst to go to their foundations and show to the social worker in training, to the town planner and medical scientist, production engineer, architect and teacher, the vital connection of widely separate intellectual and professional pursuits. Team work becomes possible on a firm theoretical basis.

I

In the following discussion only those features will be mentioned in each social discipline which are of general interest to the social analyst. It is in no sense meant to be a survey of the scope of the six major social sciences or even of their main techniques.

It was in the study of his past and the recording of the present that man first became aware of society as a problem. *History*, the most venerable of social disciplines, is also the first subject to experience within its own domain the problematic nature of social thought. It divided into "philosophical" history, in which an historian wishes to "prove" some trend or development, and the "antiquarian's history" of the chronicle without a thesis. History according to the first school approaches moral philosophy in its desire to bring the characters and periods of the past into a scheme. It holds a very special position in relation to "life".

[1] A. Marshall said in his Inaugural Lecture in 1885: "It is vain to speak of the higher authority of a unified social science. No doubt if that existed economics would gladly find shelter under its wings. But it does not exist; it shows no signs of coming into existence. There is no use in waiting idly for it; we must do what we can with our present resources." Somewhat similar views were developed in the same year by Sidgwick in his presidential address to the Section on Economic Science and Statistics of the British Association and these voices grew in number and volume as the years went by.

"To the extent that the past is honorific we may be proud of it and employ the sentiments it inspires to stiffen men's wavering current loyalties! to the extent that it reveals man confronted by typical human dilemmas and finding serviceable paths through them, we may cautiously canvass past precedents as possible dress rehearsals for coping with the fumbling present! and in so far as it represents irreparably spilled milk, we may learn from it how to avoid past errors. Each human being has telescoped his past experience in culture, pressed by vital impulses against present circumstances! and history enables him to extend this experience beyond his personal life-span."[1]

This to many historians is a "typically" sociological view, fraught with implications of which the writer is often hardly aware. Historians are inclined to reject it. They are embarrassed rather by so much popular interest. A subtle distortion corrupts the material, as soon as the events are made to trail a moral. Many of the best are emphatic on this point. "One has insisted that the function of history is to sit in judgment over the past and to instruct contemporaries for the benefit of future generations. The following pages do not presume to such high office; all they intend to show is what really and actually happened."[2] Professor Galbraith has been quoted as saying that[3] little remains of the architectonic visions once they are checked against the documents, the letters, tablets, treaties, *objets d'art*, tombs, medals, utensils, judicial decisions of a period and locality. "Years of analysis are required for one day of synthesis." There can be no escape from the historian's duty to analyse whatever happens to the unity of the picture, and to record accurately at the cost of abandoning the elegant stroll "down the high priori road". The question only is whether the material can be left in this uncrystallised state. The school of sociologically orientated historians denies that it can.

Most sociologists claim that a "*histoire historisante*" leaves us unsatisfied: for the sake of history, research must be guided by some hypothesis. Blind erudition is never the equivalent of sound scholarship. Selective principles operate in the arrangement and presentation of the facts. Historians do well to make apparent their underlying assumptions and with them the

[1] R. S. Lynd: *Knowledge for what?* Princeton, 1939, pp. 129–130.
[2] L. von Ranke: *Sämtliche Werke*, 1877, Vol. 33, p. VII.
[3] See p. 16.

conditioning forces of their own times. Historical studies quicken, are given a new slant, as soon as the analyst has in mind questions such as: "what was the influence of religion on the 16th century and what is the general influence of religion on historical change; why was (or was not) religion a more potent force in the 16th century"; or "why did feudalism generate capitalism in the West, but fail to do so in East Asia until the arrival of Europeans"; or "do political revolutions spring principally from economic causes"? There are many sociologists who hold that *at the present time* such questions must be ruled out of order as premature and likely to disconcert serious investigation. Others accept the challenge either as a desirable objective or as a condition of more fruitful researches; some aim at a "logicalised" model of historical change, which, for the period they are investigating, would provide the scaffolding to their researches in the spirit of Coulanges: "All history properly understood is sociology, no history is worth pursuing that is not sociology."[1] The two points of view continue with the balance still weighted towards Ranke's antiquarian approach.

In the case of *Economics*, the balance is tipped differently. Economists hostile to sociology are interested in other things than "what really and actually happens". No discipline has taken "logicalisation" further or been more successful in the use of models than economics. "One employs constructions throughout the whole field of theoretical economics including monetary and business cycle theory, international trade, etc. It goes without saying that the existence of such systems in no way hinges upon the employment of symbolic or mathematical methods. In fact, any sector of economic theory which cannot be cast into the mould of such a system must be regarded with suspicion as suffering from haziness."[2]

[1] N. D. Fustel de Coulanges: *L'Alleu et le domaine rural pendant l'époque Merovingienne*, Paris, 1875,

He says: "History had the same meaning as sociology and said the same things at least to those who understood. History is the science of social facts, i.e., of sociology," pp. IV–V.

[2] P. A. Samuelson: *Foundations of Economic Analysis*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1948, p. 9.

Words like "logicalisation" are used by the authorities quoted. They, as later "professionalisation" and "compartmentalisation", will be retained in the text.

The "systems" show how the various groups in production and exchange who enter into economic life, dovetail their actions at determinate, optimum levels of satisfaction. In the "classical" system the agents, if undisturbed by outside interference, will co-ordinate means and ends by acts of choice which, in the mass, are the necessary outcome of the customary avariciousness of human nature and the stinginess of external nature. Men have to find a livelihood; they follow habits and fashions; competition and the depreciation of capital, population increases and the natural exhaustion of the land impose laws of conduct, and determine public affairs. Prices, incomes and market equilibrium are completely conditioned under "perfect competition", or the reverse, "perfect monopoly". In the perfectly competitive market, where there is "no conspiracy against the consumer" as Adam Smith called it, each increase in demand is offset by an increase in supply and each buyer can take advantage of a growing supply and press prices down to near the cost of production. Suppliers must of course cover, in the long-run, their price of production which cannot be cheapened, however efficient they are, beyond the level required to keep their workers in health and fitness and the cost of certain other scarce factors. There are other trends possible. The more the suppliers wish to produce, the more will the workers be able to turn competition to good account and improve their terms, until increases in the population and the number of workers offering themselves, catch up with the demand for labour, and wages follow once more the general downward trend of all prices to where they reach the subsistence level, the worker's minimum cost of maintaining himself and his family. This balancing of supply and demand, of price increases and decreases, also determines the incomes and output of other agents of production, distribution and exchange as long as they are operating under conditions of perfect competition.

In this scheme, the "facts" are given: the subjective desires, the objective resources, the social distribution of economic wealth, are data to criticise which would fall outside the realm of "pure economics". The technical combinations and the decisions which rationally must animate the parties participating in the productive and exchange process, are the subject

of economic enquiry. A natural starting point, found almost at the beginning of economic thought, is the voluntary exchange of commodities at self-regulating price levels, and different conditions have been adduced for the working of this automatic "model". Certain artificial restrictions in the behaviour of the agents taking part in these transactions, such as that they can only act as "economic men", must be assumed so that it is never more than a "short-hand description" of reality. Pure economists may indeed object that they are concerned with reality:

"Theories in the social sciences do not consist of 'laws' in the same sense of the empirical rules about the behaviour of objects definable in physical terms. They provide a technique of reasoning which assists us in connecting individual facts but which, like logic and mathematics, is not about the facts and can never be verified or falsified by reference to facts. The theory itself . . . can only be tested for consistency."[1]

Despite its abstract cast, not one of the social disciplines has had a more potent influence on policy, be this on general policy, or on tariffs, taxation, anti-trust legislation or reflationary pump priming, than economics. At the behest of economists hundreds of millions are spent. As there seems to be a contradiction here, the precise nature of the relation of theory to reality is the subject which the "welfare economists" have taken as their own field of study. The more the theoretical structure is clarified and the underlying restrictions stated, the greater is the pressure that historians do not only write for historians, or economists for economists, but also for the world of letters and politics. From the real world, "welfare economists" maintain, they can receive many new points of departure and analytical tools. Market constellations occur which fall neither under the general heading of "pure competition", "pure monopoly", or the economist's intermediate positions of "oligopoly." Risk and expectation, if included as dimensions in the entrepreneur's activities, add unsuspected principles. "Fundamental topics like the significance of the producer's incentive for capitalist dynamics, or the influences of technique on the mobility of market elements will hardly

[1]F. Hayek: "The Facts of the Social Sciences" in *Ethics*, Oct. 1943, pp. 11 and 13.

gain their full importance for the economist, if he traces their effect only from case to case within some specialist deductions."[1] The classical starting point of self-adjusting price levels may be less interesting theoretically than the conditions necessary for the maintenance of full employment. Löwe insists that "economics cannot dispense with a conception of the social process in general" or the co-operation of other social scientists in particular. The very blemishes of which welfare economics is accused suggest that economists must go outside the confines of their own subject. Economics depends for its own clarification on the construction of "pure systems", but the "systems" must be generalised and their assumptions checked, in realistic social conditions, not derived from deductive and imaginary models. "Logicalisation" is never enough, unless the models are examined concurrently by several social disciplines.

If we examine the models in this light then even a relatively superficial acquaintance with social evolution would show that men have, at times, behaved very differently from the models' basic assumption of "economic man", who seeks to maximise his profit in every transaction. *Anthropology* provides factual evidence of the naiveté of those economists who persuade themselves that they have isolated a supra-temporal human trait. Thus a number of societies impose upon their members the injunction of competitive munificence. Trobriand Islanders in any exchange of goods vie with each other who shall be the greatest loser. Anthropology demonstrates that sets of behaviour are more diverse than logic or imagination supposes. Its procedures and its application are of interest to the modern world.

The literal meaning of the term "anthropology" is "study of man", and is therefore not limited in time or space, or in the aspects which are to be studied. Enough has already been said, however, to permit the conclusion that social anthropologists have, wisely enough, circumscribed their field. Primarily they are concerned with societies without written history, such as still survive. They study how primitive men provide for their needs; keep law and order; safeguard their privacy; how their society is structured, and labour, enjoyments and rights are divided; what principles govern educational practice, religious

[1] A. Löwe: *Economics and Sociology*, London, 1935, p. 150.

belief and etiquette; what the state of scientific knowledge is; the psychology of grammar and language; the contact with other civilisations; and their adjustment to modern conditions. Anthropologists are engaged in first-hand descriptions of these cultures. They maintain therefore a vital contact with field research and the methods most efficacious in assuring the accuracy of the observations. In their interpretive work they try to think "Black", i.e., to analyse the culture under review on its own premises and to show how the various "traits" reinforce one another. The formidable superstructure of rites, magic and taboos under which life is carried on is shown with its promoting, as well as in its inhibitory, functions. Even the negative aspects of the culture add survival value to the group honouring it: they pledge men anew to collective solidarity, harness affection and energy, and assist memory.

These small and simple societies demonstrate how man realises his nature in society, they are thus *realistic*, though restricted, "models" of how more complicated and technically advanced civilisations operate. Anthropology shows up a pattern in each culture, while enriching our knowledge of man and his many superstructures of custom and belief. The "culture perspective" of anthropology has been applied to modern society. However, it is not here that anthropology meets the crisis which comes to each social discipline and makes it interesting to the analyst. Anthropology divides once the descriptive work of the field investigator is done. In fact, a new school of anthropologists declares that the serious business only then begins. The interrelation of institutions and environmental conditions; their evolution in time; the interdependence of institutions and behaviour including abnormal psychological manifestations and psychopathology; the malleability of the culture to suit modern needs without inflicting permanent injury to it, are the problems of the "action" school of anthropologists. As conclusions are to be of importance to men in advanced civilisations, as members of these advanced civilisations, the action anthropologist tests hypotheses such as those put forward by psycho-analysis and verifies them in cultures with family situations and educational provisions very different from capitalist or socialist society.

Among anthropological students, Freud is beginning to hold the place in the 20th century, that Darwin occupied in the 19th century. The "psycho-dynamic" approach is becoming as suggestive as Natural Selection was in the past, yet with a significant difference: Freud is taken as a starting point, though material is not cast in psychological analogies, and psychoanalysis is not uncritically accepted. Freud's procedure is of greater interest than his positive statements, his manner of marking out new fields of research more important than his findings themselves. Upon closer examination *Psychology* seems well fitted to add a series of hypotheses which can act as frames of reference to the various social disciplines. The latter have, in consequence, come to give their work a "psychological" bias. Psychology is by nature most closely allied to the "operational approach", which draws the subjects together around common problem areas. Whereas there is a real affinity between historians and the encyclopædic sociologists through their mutual concern for development and periods; between economists and the analysis of the formal sociologists; between the field work of the anthropologists and of the social students; psychology is in its modern manifestation most intimately related to Social Analysis.

Starting out as a subject opposed by definition of its subject-matter to the natural sciences, for "mind" was deemed inaccessible to any of the procedures current for dealing with inanimate matter that has "dimension", psychology has become *the* social discipline which has developed laboratory methods. It also clearly distinguishes "levels of analysis"—the physiological-neurological, showing a minimum of intrusion of intelligent and circuitous reactions; the level of individual experiences, on which images, insight, organisation, delayed responses and the antagonistic workings of the personal pattern are admitted as part of a chain reaction; and lastly, the higher and perhaps more questionable level on which organisms seem to envelop their environment, i.e., "seek out" diseases, social contacts, errors and accidents required for the perpetuation of their special idiosyncrasies. There is also the tendency to let ancient philosophical problems and debates either seem out-of-date or premature. The use of animal experiments and of

mathematical conceptual schemes;[1] the close collaboration with other sciences and professions, especially medicine; the manipulation of small groups with the necessary controls; the use of refined apparatus; of statistical tools; and the summarising of a large number of variables in a "factorial analysis"; all approximate psychology to the principles of contemporary Social Analysis. So too does the branching out of psychology into industrial psychology; educational psychology; army psychology; medical psychology and psychotherapy; and the professionalisation of each of these subjects strikes a familiar note. Fields of investigation are being continuously added to psychology, which like sociology, was once very closely hedged in. In industrial relations, for instance, problems of economics, power and law were so paramount that until recently psychological problems received only cursory attention. Thus psychology is applied to fields hitherto dealt with exclusively by other social disciplines.

Psychology has a special sociological subdivision in social psychology. Among the temperamental traits and affectional ties as they are distributed and enhanced or discouraged in a group; in the re-orientation of stimulus; in the influence on thought and emotion which competition, cooperation, leadership, discussion, constructive activity will exercise, the social psychologist finds a vast congery of problems, sometimes more easily formulated than, with our inadequate apparatus, scientifically investigated. The wider setting of group phenomena in the family, in the psychological clinic, in prison during a war, the inter-relationship of psychological and socio-economic and political issues, cause psychology to borrow the findings of other disciplines.

The intertwining of analyses has its dangers. Indeed, the question to what extent psychology is a "branch" of sociology, or vice versa, has been raised. The autonomy of each of the separate disciplines has, at one time or another, been questioned, thus indicating how near to the surface of each study are the unifying and integrating factors, and also how easily are theoretical acquisitions swamped. The question has been well

[1]Psychologists speak of "dimensions of the mind", "sectors of the mind", the "life space" occupied by a "personality structure".

aired in *Political Science*, where indeed the outside observer is occasionally astonished to learn that not every political scientist unconditionally accepts that the theory of the state, of political parties, of public administration and of individual liberties, is part of the larger study of society. This view is, of course, held by one school:

"Political theory is concerned with the study of these forces which shape and influence the action of the state in social life. Its business, therefore is to formulate such conclusions as will enable it (*a*) to explain the action of the state in the past; and (*b*) its probable action in the future. If this field of study be accepted as adequate it seems to me to follow that political theory cannot separate itself from sociology of which, indeed it is then clearly a branch or aspect."[1]

In the discussion, at which this view was expressed, others regretted, with Professor Stocks, any association with sociology. They felt, in fact, that there was "considerable ground for the suspicion that a positive social science is not a possible human achievement."[2] Yet a third speaker, Professor Brogan, conscious of the erosion which has taken place in his subject due to the Marxist and other social critiques, found that the sociological approach to the state was becoming "to an increasing degree a substitute for thought about it."[3]

This hostility to the sociological school has its historical and "doctrinal" reasons. Political theory as an autonomous intellectual study has been a laborious achievement. The subject had to be rescued from its abuse by the Sophists who made of it the training ground of those who wanted to advance themselves. Protagoras and Gorgias in their notion of *arete* identified the good with the clever, and were prominently concerned with oratorical proficiency and cunning, in short with "how one can act and speak with the greatest influence in affairs of state." Only slowly could philosophical interest secure itself against practical considerations. It still stands in danger of being submerged with every turn in political affairs. Socrates in opposition to the Sophists furnished an ethical approach, and since that time Politics has flourished at its best in close proximity to

[1] H. J. Laski: "Political Theory and the Social Sciences" in *Conference on the Social Sciences*, London, 1937, p. 115.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 97.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

Ethics. It has also developed a positive branch, following Aristotle's comparative analyses of constitutions, which aims to describe and study political institutions not in a normative spirit, but as working entities. Political theory as a whole tends to warn the analyst from any precipitate coalescing of disciplines.[1]

If political science suggests that close association with practical affairs can detract from theoretical interest the study of *Law* can be quoted as a further example; for jurisprudence has always taken a back-seat compared with the lawyer's professional pre-occupations. Problems arising from the limitation of the legal material when confronted with the wealth of cases emanating from the course of the social process, and the relation of both the material and the practical issues to the higher ideals of justice, are dealt with on a professional, rather than on a theoretical plane. And yet Law is also an example of the vitality which a subject can derive from a professional group of established standing and with well-elaborated techniques of procedure. The judge's *obiter dicta* frequently go beyond the immediate case in hand, viewing it as a type of larger class of cases, indeed by implication all judgments deal with the nature of justice and other values.

Jurisprudence systematises the *obiter dicta*. It thus reproduces the same "approaches" as sociology. Its "philosophical school" seeks a method, if possible universal in application, which will guide the law-maker in his attempt to realise Justice in the welter of legal disputes. The function of the jurist is to express the ideals of his age and in the light of these to criticise the shortcomings of the legal system. The "historical school" interprets law as the product of experience accumulated in the administration of justice. Law is improved by trial and error, and reinforced by the legal ideals, or rather the prestige which some legal ideas and practices have gained. The "analytical school" does not speak of Law, but of laws. Laws are not "found", but made. They have to keep the peace and must be judged by that principle of efficiency. Much imprecision and many injustices occur as soon as judges presume to go beyond

[1]It is no accident that political theoreticians have emphasised the separation of powers, the judicial from the legislative, and the administrative from both. Laski was a believer in the plural state with multiple centres of authority.

the "pure facts of law" and set themselves up as guardians of moral values. Laws are the products of political conflicts. Lastly, the "sociological school" approaches laws as special parts of the cultural apparatus with its customs, vested interests and traditional modes of thinking. The actual behaviour of the judiciary is studied and Law is related to the social process. The psychology of crime, punishment, guilt, and the "need" for them, is a branch of the sociological school. Jurisprudence then follows one of the roads along which mankind travels in its ramified social development and in its efforts to gain clarity as it progresses. The jurist meets with the sociologist, psychologist, anthropologist, economist and historian on a common quest. Law itself becomes a "model" discipline, for it contains in stylised form the kind of intellectual problems that social students in all disciplines find recurring.

"If one turns to a current number of the *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft* one will probably find that the first article deals with some such topic as the Soviet Civil Code and the last with say, a biological theory of Totemism. . . . By almost imperceptible stages comparative jurisprudence passed into juristic ethnography and then widened out into cultural anthropology. There was little difference of subject matter, hardly any of treatment, only the outlook was broader and the point of view freed from the pre-occupations of the jurist. But if the special training of the lawyer is no longer a first requisite in the comprehensive study of legal phenomena, that is not to say that the jurist is not concerned with the solution of his own particular problems. In fact it is precisely from this angle that both jurists and sociologists are coming to discover fresh possibilities for their investigations."[1]

So, each of the six classical social disciplines points beyond itself. Each concerns a sector of the social process. The investigator lifts this sector out of the context and makes it a subject of scientific study. Such isolation trains us in careful, logical and controlled analysis. Each social discipline has its own method of attack, but the more the theoretical constructions are clarified and become transparent, the more points of contact between different theoretical subjects emerge and the closer do we approach the stage at which the analyses of the theoreticians become relevant to one another, and the more can the disciplines be revitalised by contact with the real world. The

[1]Article on "Jurisprudence" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14th Edition.

theoretician must erect a structure which safeguards the integrity of the subject under review but he must push his analysis to the point where it can be fructified by social policy and by the professions. He must show how the "practical man" in the professions and the social worker can contribute and make their own activities more meaningful by raising theoretical questions. Men work best if their activities are given the lustre of a wider reference.[1] The unity of realistic thought and action, of practical affairs and of education in the social sciences must be clearly there for all to see. The sociologist underwrites this unity by making it fully explicit and drawing the specialists together.

II

To give the social disciplines a practical focus and thereby new view points and new stimuli, is to demand, as a corollary, that practical men are trained to use theory and assist theoreticians. The future of the social disciplines lies in this two-way exchange process. This was already appreciated by Alfred Marshall when he deplored the lack of interest of theoretical and practical workers in one another's business.[2] Bryce therefore gave as one more reason why the Sociological Society had been founded, an awakening interest among social practitioners in matters of theory. "In contrast to our great practical advancement in the sphere of philanthropy," he thought that theory was at a low ebb. He held that it would be of "enormous benefit to practical philanthropists to have the aid of men of theory."[3] The transition from "practical philanthropy" to modern social case work and social welfare is symptomatic of the change which is taking place over the entire field of social training.

The training of social workers began in 1869, when the Charity Organisation Society organised tuition for almoners.

[1] "No men can act with effect who do not act in concert; no men can act in concert who do not act with confidence; no men can act with confidence who are not bound together with common opinions, common affections and common interests." E. Burke: *Works*, Vol. I, London, 1848, p. 151.

[2] A. Marshall: "Economic Teaching at the Universities in Relation to Public Well-Being," *Charity Organisation Review*, 1903, Vol. XIII (New Series), p. 33 ff.

[3] Rumney: *Op. cit.*, p. 572.

In 1893, the Women's University Settlement in Southwark initiated courses of lectures for social workers covering a wide range of subjects. In 1903 Mr. (later Sir) Charles Lock established the School of Sociology, which then became the Social Science Department of the London School of Economics. The progress was slow, but it achieved its objective of making social work a university subject.

Acceptance did not come easily as there were those who sided with Professor (later Sir) Sydney Chapman and opposed the establishment of social science departments in the universities. Chapman told the Conference on Social Education in 1902 that,

"there was a wholesome prejudice against mixing up theoretical and practical teaching. It was imperative that the teaching of the Universities should be free from any suspicion of bias in controversial matters. Their function was to train students in the observation of facts and the construction of theory from such observation."[1]

To this day many of the universities give but grudging recognition to social training. Likewise many social practitioners hold aloof, especially if they have not themselves attended a university. All too conscious of the need for efficiency, staying power, personality, flexibility, they are critical of the universities which do not, to any conspicuous extent, develop these virtues in their students. As far as positive training is required, the purists on both sides prefer this to be imparted in the trade schools.[2] Nevertheless by 1945, there were 19 university departments awarding a diploma in social work, or other qualification, and 16 a certificate in public administration,[3] numerically a satisfactory position. However, until quite recently, the training has lacked agreed objectives.

[1]Quoted in *Training for Social Work*, published by Nuffield College, Oxford, 1946, p. 22.

[2]"The Trade Schools are interested in immediate efficiency, the Universities are not. The University assumes that the individual should be given breadth of view with a grasp of fundamental theories and principles so that he will be able to apply his principles and his theories to the solution of problems which arise from day to day and so he will be permitted to grow through his experiences in the actual work of the world during a series of years." (J. H. Hagerty: *The Training of Social Workers*, London, 1931, p. 93.)

[3]*Careers for Men and Women*, Ministry of Labour and National Service Publications, No. 39, London, 1945.

The reason for this is to be found in the characteristic feature of the evolution of social work training, that it was begun not by the State, nor by academic persons, but, as so much in the British social services, by far-seeing individuals active in practical affairs. The imprint of this development is still upon the training: sometimes the vocational qualification is a diploma; sometimes a certificate; sometimes a testamur. Degrees may be called a B.A. (Honours) in Sociology as at Bedford College; or a B.A. (Administration) as at Manchester; or a B.Sc. in Household and Social Science as at King's College; and a B.Com. (Social Study) at Birmingham. No two syllabuses are alike. A survey undertaken in 1936 established "that there was a vast difference in the teaching matter from university to university, leaving no doubt that the present position is chaotic, and that the need for mutual understanding between teachers of the social sciences is most urgent. We have not really made up our minds what it is that we are trying to do."[1] Training as a general rule includes social economics; social administration; social psychology; sometimes criminology or political science. All departments provide facilities for practical work. But the underlying unity of the social disciplines is rarely visible to the ordinary student.

With a new generation of students integration should become possible. The step already taken resembles that of the social disciplines. There is, first of all, a proliferation of specialised courses for Boarding-Out Officers; Psychiatric Social Workers; Personnel Managers; Probation Officers and many others. In each case the accent lies on professionalisation which raises the occupational group to a higher status. Professionalisation becomes an element of growing social significance, for through it the entire body of workers becomes concerned with the problem of training, making them, as professional people,

[1]T. H. Marshall: "Report on the Teaching of the Social Sciences." Conference on the Social Science. *Op. cit.*, p. 55. "The B.A. (Honours) in Sociology is unique . . . here alone is the title Sociology used to designate a degree." However, the word "Sociology" is not used in the title of any paper (p. 30). During the war, the British Association asked a committee under P. Sargent Florence "to consider how the results of scientific research on human institutions and human needs and their interrelations can best be coordinated and brought to bear on the formation of public policy." The Committee came to identical conclusions as Marshall seven years before. See *The Advancement of Science*, 1943, No. 8, p. 347.

interested in strengthening the sphere of communicable knowledge.

Social work as soon as it is recognised as a profession, begins to offer a career for those who have to find a livelihood. From the start, the Institute of Personnel Management and the Institute of Almoners have been unequivocal about the need for theoretical training. The Association of Psychiatric Social Workers has taken the same stand. The National Association of Local Government Officers has fought for professional status and qualifications as a means of advancement in the service. Indeed so friendly have been its contacts with the universities, that for several years the Association paid the rent for the office of the Joint University Council for Social Studies and Public Administration. Other organisations have recently come into line: the Y.W.C.A. which for fifty years has had its own training scheme, now makes a university qualification the normal basis for appointment as club leader and warden. Social work ceases to be the preserve of charitable souls, and becomes scientific, humanist and practical.

The disappearance of the middle-class amateur from social welfare is of more than internal importance. Gradually the meaning of social work is changing. The element of class consciousness, which made so much laudable devotion seem vulgar, vanishes. All hints of the tradition of social workers as "overseers of the poor" are being buried. It is worthwhile to remember, that it is not so long ago that the dispensers of social assistance expected praise for keeping their many "cases" in a state of tutelage. Decisions were taken by boards without consultation with the poor, who were considered incapable of decision. The secret of good social work lay in the ability to make the clients fall in with what was considered best for them. An American writer is outspoken on the not so distant past.

"There is no literature to express what humble John Smith thought about it, but the literature of social work is eloquent in its concern with methods of overcoming resistance of the client—resistance to giving the information thought necessary, resistance to accepting advice, resistance to being known as a charity case."[1]

[1]B. C. Reynolds: *Rethinking Social Case-Work*, New York, 1936, p. 6.

With the "clients" less poor and the social worker less well-to-do than in the old charity days, with both as part-contributors to the social services and both better educated, training and theory can come into their own. The social disciplines can combine because the students in training will now require a defined corpus of knowledge, a procedure, a professional "ethic" and a theoretical interest: the final consequence of professionalisation is the acceptance of people in different fields as equals and as persons able to stimulate one another and to inform on policy. Where matters of departmental practicability and routine were once considered to the exclusion of theory, the profession, suitably trained to view the larger questions, can assist other professions. As the learned professions are also reaching beyond their specialist training and viewing themselves as concerned, in the fullest meaning of the term, with social welfare, a new spirit of cooperation among all social practitioners is abroad.

III

In short, on all sides the scope of the work widens. In social work, "good" behaviour is no more exempt from study than "bad". The individual who meets with misfortune, whether he has been responsible for it or not, is not seen as a category apart. Many obvious maladjustments are different more in degree than in kind from the behaviour of "normal" people. Social work is increasingly concerned with prevention. The work in clubs, the organisation of group activities among the "ordinary" people, the facilitation of cultural growth, are becoming objects of social work. A sound society has a minimum of social misfits; hence social workers must intervene where social organisation is defective and likely to break individuals. It is as much a part of civic planning, as good physical planning (in the prevention of slums, for instance) is a contribution to social work. As has been suggested a similar redefinition of tasks is taking place in other professional groups.

Town planners are to conceive of their task as one of social planning, educating the community in the proper development

of land, buildings and roads, and in the conception of itself as a community. Plans are instruments with which to anchor more firmly the divergent social groups in the common ground they share as neighbours and as men and women involved in the same local problems. The social principles animating the plans are now brought out explicitly and assumptions about the rate of growth, the economic future and the social stratification of the towns are discussed in a growing number of reports. The relations of the urban areas with the surrounding countryside are examined. The plans are less in the nature of detailed site planning, which are best left to local officers, but rather "master plans" commanding attention for the strategic problems. More and more they are the product of teams on which the sociologist is represented.[1]

We are hearing a good deal of health teams, production research panels, and projects undertaken by educational units. Medicine having conquered the main European epidemic diseases and predicting the end—battle with man's bacteriological enemies, turns to the inter-connections of pathological, psychological and social factors. Social medicine gains in significance as we concentrate on the problems of prevention. In underdeveloped countries where disease is often an expression of poverty, medical intervention must be accompanied by the introduction of new agricultural techniques; the cultivation of new crops; new food habits; new notions of hygiene; or new fertility patterns in the family. It is sometimes the question not which patient to treat, but which disease to prevent according to decisions on wider problems of social policy. In advanced countries, the medical service, the place of the hospital, the organisation of the profession, the problems of urbanisation or import restrictions engage the medical conferences and agendas.

[1]An example of this conception of town planning will be found in *Nairobi—Master Plan for a Colonial Capital* by L. W. Thornton White (architect), L. Silberman (sociologist) and P. R. Anderson (civil engineer), London, 1948. In 1945 the Nairobi Town Council commissioned a team of three to plan the town of 110,000 which had outstripped the period of haphazard growth. In the proposed physical design the planners aimed at reducing the cost of roads, accidents, the transport to and from work; in the social aspects of the plan, the citizen was to have easy access to cultural opportunities, diversify his occupational opportunities, and reduce his cost of living. The plan was directed at a society concerned with a high level of employment, a cheapening of its cost of production and enhancing the civic loyalties of its many racial groups.

Every facet of social life has its medical problem as soon as doctors do more than cure people of obvious complaints. Medicine has become interested in health; the nature of ageing; the problem of health education; marital happiness; productivity and inheritance, are but to mention a few subjects which are being continuously discussed.

Even that most secluded body of technicians, the engineers, have tried their hand on schemes of national reorganisation on engineering lines. When Veblen wrote his *The Engineer and the Pricing System* he gave life to an ethos which suggested to the engineers and other "productive professions", that they were the section of the population most interested in the organisation of plenty. Hence the engineers demanded that they be not merely "on tap", but on top. So impressed have some analysts been with the authority assumed by, or given of late to, certain outstanding technicians, that they predict a "Managerial Revolution" aiming at the establishment of a technocracy in which the principal social division will lie between the scientific managers on the one hand and the great mass of the inexpert people on the other. This is a possibility, but the trend of the times is also fostering democratic movements, by making what was once an "inexpressible mystery" of gifted and privileged leaders a matter of experiment and communication through education. As the handling of machines is something which the engineering student can learn, so industrial production problems as they affect human relations can be subjected to analysis and transmitted to large numbers of industrial personnel—a trend to which the technocrats have themselves contributed by making all kinds of operations amenable to scientific study.

In a simple experiment with a labourer shovelling coal, F. W. Taylor, after three and a half years of research, found that by changing his method and the size and design of the shovel, he could reduce the cost of handling the coal from 7 or 8 cents to 3 or 4 cents per ton. What is more important is that Taylor was able to generalise his ideas into an experimental philosophy which involved the training of management; the transfer of skill; the design of machines; the work place; the line of command in the factory; motion study; and in its wider

ramifications wage incentives and factory layout. "Scientific Management" as Taylor conceived it, has long been overtaken by a more humanistic approach, but the field study of men-tools-work in combination and in close relationship with the industrial setting is now an effective part of industrial planning. Shop stewards and workmen are asking for training in these techniques to which they are increasingly able to make a creative contribution. There is a nation-wide transfer of managerial skills afoot.

Planning is now more planning with people than for people. The architect takes cognisance of the economics of the building industry; the materials of the area; the structure of the family; and the psychology of local human relationships. Having overcome his own attempt at formulating "function" in terms of physical needs only, the architect draws on larger numbers of professional advisers in the solution of new assignments. In the planning of social centres; exhibitions; polyclinics; laboratories; factories and "village greens", buildings and their designers fit into a larger pattern. Around this pattern the people come to hold a new place. The people are made articulate through their organisations; discussion groups; brains trusts and in opinion surveys. New educational facilities; cheap editions of new books; the radio; the documentary film; factory visits and summer schools are producing a new social situation in which the professional man can take his "clients" into partnership.

A typical illustration of the change in relationships is education itself, with its stress on "educating for living." In the Middle Ages education was acquired in a monastery, where teachers lived a segregated group life. In the Renaissance and even in the later epochs, education still involved close confinement. Rousseau wanted education to be a corrective to, rather than a part of, society. He was less revolutionary than he thought. The separation of school from society, and, within the syllabus, of the one subject from the other, has perpetuated occupational isolation and the "compartmentalisation" of intellectual and practical life. Iron-cast divisions have fitted men with blinkers rather than with education. To-day, there are far more cases of several subjects being grouped around one field problem, based on the dynamic interpretation of

learning. The new approach also affects moral and religious instruction:

"Formerly the moral self was to remain compartmentalised and one thought to have paid due tribute to it, if one inserted into the curriculum religious or moral education. To-day we know that this religious or moral education is bound to remain ineffective, unless it is related to the other parts of the curriculum. Everything we teach and even more *how* we teach it, has an impact on character formation."[1]

Social disciplines, now coming to be re-interpreted in terms of one another, are capable of systematic treatment in an integrated syllabus. History can be taken beyond a purely expository stage by economics; economics is made conscious of its institutional frame work by the anthropologist; anthropology is reminded of the complexity of factors by the new hypotheses in psychology; psychologists are drawn into political theory; politics and jurisprudence finally reproduce many of the approaches found in sociology; while social policy provides the meeting ground for all the social sciences.

Decisions on policy may be required on relatively minor issues of social work or on the lofty problems of foreign affairs and the appraisal of social trends. Policy may have to inform the intermediary levels on which professional people work. *Policy is concerned with the clear statement of the scope, the methods, the objectives of social action when it attempts to be rational and efficient. It is clarified as it begins to understand the similarities and relationships of phenomena and goes beyond an immediate situation to examine its broader theoretical implications.* Beginning with the kind of problems which occupy us in the relief of poverty, it turns to those of social welfare generally and lastly to the whole executive machine, to "the governing classes". Analysis casts the decisions in clear language and provides criteria which permit us to check its gradual translation into practice.

[1]K. Mannheim: *Diagnosis of our Time*, London, 1943, p. 55.

CHAPTER III

The Education of the Governing Classes

Why has there been so little sociology in Britain? Until the World War came to an end Britain possessed one chair of sociology, while America had 441 institutions with departments of sociology.[1] Britain also lagged behind the Commonwealth.[2] The divergence must perplex us if we recall that sociology—certainly in its first approaches—was devoted to fundamental research; its philosophical import should have found it a natural home in the universities. Directed at men of affairs, as it was from the first, it is astonishing that the universities, concerned with the training of candidates for the highest posts in the land, should have passed it by.

I

Actually the course seemed set for fair when sociology began upon its career in Britain. Some German scholars, like Sombart, have argued that sociology did not originate with Comte but among the British, notably the Scottish, moral thinkers; John Brown, Lord Kames, Millar, Dunbar and Ferguson (their number is astonishing), chose sociological problems. Hume set himself out to become the Newton of the Human Mind. The subtitle of the *Treatise on Human Nature* defines the work as "an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects." In the preface he vows that "there is no question of importance whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man, and there is none which can be decided with any certainty before we become acquainted with that science."[3] Mandeville essayed an "ideal-type" description of a planned society. The prison reformer Howard conducted an institutional survey with great thoroughness. Demography was much

[1] See *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1945.

[2] South Africa, for instance, with a European population of 2½ millions has six chairs of sociology.

[3] D. Hume: *Treatise on Human Nature*, London, 1874, Vol. I, p. 307.

discussed. Economists were concerned with the institutional framework. The author of the *Wealth of Nations* was not content with market analyses; he considered his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* a necessary complement. Among his many plans was a work which was to provide a "connected history of the liberal sciences and elegant arts." He lectured on natural theology, ethics, national and international law, arms and "police". In fact, economists long retained these broad interests. S. W. Jevons, the first important exponent of "pure economics" in England, was styled Professor of Logic, Mental and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy. There was classical support for social enquiries,[1] and the liberal creed distinguished carefully between Society on the one hand and Government on the other.[2]

However, when the social disciplines began to be noted little room was accorded to them in the university syllabuses, and none to sociology. Perhaps it was the empirical temper of British philosophy which inhibited a study of society *sui generis*. It may have been felt that in the circumstances sociology could only add some pieces of positive knowledge and the universities were interested in "training the mind, not in giving much positive or any professional knowledge." Liberals can be illiberal in their ideas of what trains the mind; Blackstone, one remembers, had the greatest difficulty in establishing Law as a university subject. When the Moral Sciences Tripos was at last adopted at Cambridge, in 1848, it was heavily loaded with philosophy, so that it was more advantageous for the average undergraduate to specialise straight away in philosophy. The same fate befell the Final Honours Course at Oxford which, after 1903, permitted a combination of philosophy and economics. Unfortunately the first British sociologist to be published was Spencer who, though not offending on account

[1]Aristotle's famous remarks occur in *Ethics*: "Man is a social being and formed by nature to associate." (Book IX, Ch. 9.) In the *Treatise on Government* he says: "Man is naturally a political animal and whosoever is naturally and not accidentally unfit for society must either be inferior or superior to man."

[2]Tom Paine made this distinction: "Society is produced by our wants and Government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. Society in every state is a blessing, but Government even in the best state is but a necessary evil."

of unorthodox views, failed to win contemporary scholarly recognition, as he did not even hold a degree nor did he link up with any recognizable tradition. Synthetic efforts have always been mistrusted and in his case mistrust seemed well founded. Mill, the Webbs, Booth, Hobson, Rowntree and other important figures in the field of empirical studies also remained outside the universities.

No move came from the undergraduates. Many of the most forward-looking had to consider the opinion of selection boards or the opportunity of winning prizes, scholarships and fellowships, hardly any of which were available in the social sciences. Modern History was introduced into the older universities only after 1850. The sum total of endowments in London for social studies at the end of the century was £100 per annum. Neither were the professions interested. They clung to their own apprenticeship system. The 19th century architect learnt his art in an architect's office. Medicine was a matter for specialist schools, working in close cooperation with hospitals. Legal qualifications were conferred at the Courts, whither they had shifted as far back as the 13th century. The civil service preferred persons with a well-aired mind and cultured manner to experts, feared as likely doctrinaires and avoided as probable bores. Yet the support of the civil service, chiefly drawn from the universities of Oxford and Cambridge which set the tone, would have been most valuable and also would have provided the necessary financial assistance.

Political economy had been taught by most eminent teachers at Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester, since the 18th century; it appeared that the further development of the social disciplines would have to await the emergence of the provincial universities and London to full intellectual independence. The centre of all the newer subjects was to be the London School of Economics and Political Science, founded in 1895 on a radical basis. Not only did it provide a great deal of economics and politics, but a social science course was begun in 1899. Sociology was listed in 1904. In the following year a second lectureship was created and a chair followed in 1907. The provincial universities had by now arranged for chairs in economics, history, and, in many cases, psychology; but

anthropology lagged further behind. In spite of the lead provided by the London School of Economics, sociology was not welcomed. Social Work training was given, but empirical studies were few in number. In 1936, the Social Studies Departments of all British universities put together spent no more than £7,551 on research and equipment, at a time when the natural sciences disposed of £628,907. At the end of the Second World War the position was still as described in the following passage:

"The existing provision for these (social research) purposes in British universities is lamentably inadequate. It is only within the past few years that it has been thought worth while to set up institutes of research and research divisions for economics and economic statistics; and the financial basis of such of these bodies as now exist at Manchester, Oxford, Cambridge and London is still severely limited in amount and highly precarious in continuity. On the social and political side provision is even more exiguous. There is a Social Research Division at the London School of Economics which has no continuing financial support, and small research units at Glasgow and Liverpool. Elsewhere there is nothing."[1]

Something had happened in British thought during the "hungry 'forties", for outside the universities the position was little better. There was the Edinburgh School of Sociology, founded by Patrick Geddes in 1892, which held summer schools. The Sociological Society published papers and organised conferences usually with many illustrious names present, among them the new writers with a Fabian bent. After the third volume the papers became the *Sociological Review*. The Branfords endowed Le Play House Trust which remained the main financial support for the Institute of Sociology, as it took over from the short-lived Sociological Society.[2] Le Play House was bombed during the war and no new London quarters have been found. There were other groups, such as the positivists

[1] *Report of the Committee on the Provision for Social and Economic Research.* Cmd. 6868, 1946, par. 20. The great foundations of Rockefeller, Carnegie, Pilgrim, Cassel, Nuffield, Beit, Leverhulme, Commonwealth and Halley Stewart must naturally not be forgotten in an assessment of the situation as a whole. Much of the money came from America.

[2] V. V. Branford wrote in 1914: "If asked to name the most significant event in the third generation of the 19th century, the sociologist would look around for something calculated to appeal to the mind of the childlike questioner" and he would answer "that Barnett took his bride to a vicarage in East London in 1873 and there founded Toynbee Hall." As far as sociology in Britain was concerned, Branford's childlike answer may not have been far wrong.

still under the influence of Comte, who in 1893, published the *Positivist Review*, which continued until 1923, when it was renamed *Humanity* and then, perhaps prophetically, ceased publication.[1]

Public personages who for a time were affected by sociology did little to help. Lord Morley, Lord Houghton, Lord Arthur Russell, George Eliot, John Ingram and others who would have commanded a wide hearing, failed to rally to the defence of the new study. While America was going ahead even those in touch with intellectual developments there, such as Sir Frederic Pollock, did not bestir themselves. It is interesting to note how in their famous cross-Atlantic correspondence, Mr. Justice Homes frequently refers to Spencer, Giddings and Ross, but is never honoured with a reply or even a query about them by Pollock.[2] One gains the impression that the American was seeking in sociology an approach to a stable society, while the Englishman was resting secure in his culture.

For system building and the demand for encyclopædic visions come in times of crisis and fundamental reorganisation. A society rejoicing in its even gait, conscious of practical affairs, a closely knit island society containing a traditional community of apparently assured position cannot be expected to be too anxious to enquire critically into the principles of its own foundation. James Mill still wanted government based on a theory of human nature as explored by the science of psychology. Macaulay rejected this as early as 1829. In the *Edinburgh Review* he condemned such an undertaking in round terms: "Our objection . . . is fundamental: we believe that it is utterly impossible to deduce the science of government from the principles of human nature." In vain did John Stuart Mill expostulate that this view "reduces politics to mere empiricism."[3] This is just what it was to be: "A smile for a friend and a sneer for the world is the way to govern mankind, and such was the motto of Vivian Grey," Disraeli wrote in his

[1]The last of the positivist "Temples of Humanity" was closed four years ago in Liverpool. The building is now in the hands of the Christian Scientists. Its concluding years were darkened by scandal. Its organist had been killed in the Temple by one of the Humanitarians.

[2]O. W. Holmes and F. Pollock: *Correspondence*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1941.

[3]J. S. Mill: *A System of Logic*, London, 1843, Book 6, Ch. IX.

novel. Disraeli found the justification in the values of a Silver Age:

"The high style of conversation where eloquence and philosophy emulate each other, where principles are profoundly expounded and felicitously illustrated, all this has ceased. It ceased in this country with Johnson and Burke, and it requires a Johnson and Burke for its maintenance. There is no mediocrity in such discourse, no intermediate character between the sage and the bore. The second style, where men, not things, are the staple, but where wit and refinement and sensibility invest even personal details with intellectual interest, does flourish at present, as it always must in a highly civilised society."[1]

Whig and Tory, grand men with panache such as Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, or placid types like Balfour or Baldwin, all aimed to combine intellectual distinction with a disdain for political theory.[2] The theoretician probes and burrows, but to them he is not truly "educated". He is, to repeat a previous simile, a hedgehog frequenting year after year the same shrubberies. Like the technicians', his sensibilities are under-developed outside his own domain. As in other idolators who worship expertise, his appreciation of all that is unique and personal is blunted. The leaders of British society preferred to operate on a personal level, and to such disposition

[1]B. Disraeli: *Vivian Grey*, London, 1871.

[2]The boast was not to have a Theory: "Let us not be too keen on definition. I should like to remind you, if I can remind an audience so educated as this, that it was that attempt to define that split the Christian Church into fragments soon after it came into existence and it has never recovered from that, and therefore I deduce—and I hope that it is a logical thing—that if we try to define the Constitution too much we may split the Empire into fragments, and it will never come together again. Politically, if ever a saying was true, it is this: 'The letter killeth but the spirit giveth life.' " Quoted by S. Stebbing: *Thinking to some Purpose*, London, 1939, p. 13. The love of a blurred form can also be studied in the popular arts. Speaking of photography in the 'twenties: "For the first time in the history of photography, it was not only the shape, the delineation and expression of the human face but the sculptural details of the head and the texture of the skin, hair, nails and dress which became attractive subjects to the photographer. For the first time he had the perfect apparatus, material, light and other implements at his disposal and he was prepared to make use of them. Experience in object photography and films—produced in Russia and America—which were shown in all cinemas gave him inspiration for a kind of portraiture which was very remote from everything which had been done before. The number of these photographers has been considerable in Russia and Germany . . . (but England) conserved a strong taste for the soft-focussed, gentle and placid portrait photograph of the Reynolds and Gainsborough style." L. Moholy: *A Hundred Years of Photography*, London, 1939, pp. 165–166. This parallel is admittedly taken from far afield, but the same attitude can be found in a wide variety of examples which come to mind

the older universities had throughout this period (1830–1930) to address themselves. It is the subtler "facts", not contained in the formal structural analyses, that undergraduates must be taught. Social grace and an ability to act as a member of the team, an interest outside of one's own profession, alone can convey subtlety. From school, through the university and into office, the ideal man was to have a proper appreciation of leisure and a gentleman's taste for politics, even for intrigue. "Vivian", we are told by Disraeli, "had stumbled upon a branch of study certainly the most delightful in the world . . . the study of Politics."[1] Beside pleasure, the Higher Sociology as one might jocularly call it, is the secret purpose of the Common Room, the many undergraduate societies, the sports fields and the boat club, and the sherry parties. They puzzled the purposeful visitor from America in whose opinion, sometimes reflecting technocratic views, the older universities came near to encouraging idleness. "Men are trained there to argue with charm and a lofty sense of detachment rather than to investigate with precision. The subject-matter may be trivial, but if the literary finish is glossy all is well. The whole process is a dignified and seductive flight from reality. . . . The students are taught to move easily and urbanely in formal social circles rather than actually to understand the process of human society."[2]

In some obscure manner it was felt that Social Science was inimical to the objects which the older universities had in mind in developing their educational ideals. American comments such as these seemed to verify the incompatibility of the humanistic approach and sociology. It showed that the critics were insensitive to the fact that behind the otiosity of the older universities lay a long struggle and a triumph: utilitarianism was being beaten to the retreat and this at a time when many people in the outside world were flaunting the hard-headed view which saw in utility the final arbiter of all that had educational value. The universities and their young charges could permit themselves a "dignified and seductive flight from reality" because they had become sure of themselves. Free trade, prosperity, the coexistence of an export surplus with

[1]Disraeli: *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[2]H. E. Barnes and H. Becker: *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, Boston, 1938, pp. 794–5.

what was virtually a world investment bank in London, expanding democratic institutions, Empire and scientific progress were contained in one social ensemble; the like is not to be found again. The situation was remarkable for the opportunities it afforded to the man of talent to fulfil himself in social endeavour.

Formal sociology is a symptom of the speculative man thrown back upon himself, seeking depths in the dialectics of thought in conditions in which he is unable to expand by the thrust and counter-thrust of action.[1] In England, the intellectual could advance without hurt to his intellectual integrity. He did not have to battle at closed doors for the 19th century university could give him the password. Thus the sight of a Spengler—to take but one German example—fawning in front of naked power was agreeably rare in Britain. Even Cecil Rhodes, Spengler's ideal-type and symbol of the Age of Caesarism which he hailed, came as a mature man to Oxford, to read with university dons, rather than that they came to him for patronage and approbation. When they did go—as members of Milner's famous "Kindergarten"—to South Africa, it was to occupy the key positions in the civil service of the subcontinent.

Societies with an aristocratic face, as Weber has shown at greater length, are slow to evolve a bureaucracy.[2] When formed, it is accommodated to aristocratic patterns of behaviour and training. The universities had to fit the civil service, which represents the rational and technical element in public affairs as compared with the "flair" and momentary grasp of the born political and industrial leader, into the existing pattern and transform the pattern from within. British society had naturally to keep pace with technical and international developments and the maturing of new social institutions, but having enough to do as a world power, it felt no desire to storm ahead. So the older universities accepted the 19th century for what it was, a period of transition from the 18th century with its indifference to technical problems, to the 20th century in which, with a

[1]Such psychological interpretations are suggested by formal analysis itself. The German school introduced the "psychological dimension". Freud confesses in his *Autobiography* that it was poverty and his race which frustrated his desire to study literature and forced him to practice medicine and the resultant of his practical pursuit and frustrated interest was—psycho-analysis.

[2]M. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen, 1922, p. 650 ff.

new home and imperial position, technical issues would command the centre of attention. During the 19th century the universities were able to do no more nor less than to ingrain a true respect for dispassionate enquiry into society. The universities emancipated themselves from the shackles of vocationalism which they had had to wear in previous centuries, when they turned out clerics and other professional people. Their education embodied the aristocratic outlook; it was "liberal", which in the definition of the Concise Oxford Dictionary is knowledge "fit for a gentleman".

II

Prior to the 19th century, society was wedded to the principle of patronage and nepotism. The universities had little influence, by means of the training given to their graduates, on appointments. When they tried in a famous document to propose formal training as a *sine qua non* of entry into the higher civil service, i.e., a special entrance examination and promotion by merit, even such an enlightened man as the great Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, who had faced settlers and slave-owners with equanimity and fortitude in pursuit of liberal and emancipationist policies, was appalled by its affront to established institutions. Privately communicated to Sir James Stephen, he rejected its main thesis:

"The basis of the whole scheme, that of government on the principles of the strictest purity even so as to exclude all patronage whatever, is it as sound a principle as at first sight it appears to be? . . . It is at least a perfect novelty. It is a rule never hitherto enforced in any commonwealth except that of Utopia. It does not prevail in the legal or medical or sacerdotal or naval or military or mercantile professions. It is unknown to the great commercial and municipal corporations among us. In every age and land and calling, a large share of success has hitherto always been awarded to the possessors of interest, of connection, of favour, of what we call good luck. Can it be that all the world is and always has been wrong about a matter so level, as it might seem, to the capacity of the least wise, as well as of the wiser?"

These remarks do not betray any awareness of the fact that the *Report and Papers relating to the Re-organisation of the Civil Service* had been the outcome of an agitation which was started

by Burke. In Burke's time, it has already been said, statesmen paid scant regard to considerations of efficiency in the allotment of office, so that Burke found the civil service of his day "an apparatus not fitted to the object, nor the workman to the work."[1] Burke had remained a lone voice until the Philosophical Utilitarians with their belief in competition in every sphere, popularised new ideas. The Report, carefully worded, 450 pages in length, reached Parliament in 1854.

Its reception had been well foreshadowed by Stephen. The ideas were considered subversive to every well-worn principle. The experiment was doomed to failure: it was said society hostesses would cold-shoulder heads of departments who passed over their friends. "The Offices," warned one Secretary of State, "would be filled with the picked clever young men of the lower ranks of society. . . . There would thus be a lower class of men gradually introduced."[2] Examinations would not test real merit. Would they test anything? They were clumsy devices. The plan was Chinese; it was Prussian; it was academic. There would be public clamour against the Commissioners making the selection. The storm almost swept the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, Sir Charles Trevelyan, who was fathering the scheme, from office. The Queen was hostile.

But the break was made. The examination system and university training were introduced, albeit by Order in Council, not by Act of Parliament as the opposition might have been too formidable. It was not for twenty years that party attacks upon the work of the Civil Service Commissioners ceased. It is noteworthy how much the older universities had been engaged in promoting the new approach. The authors of the Report were indebted to Macaulay, Trevelyan's brother-in-law and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; Sir George Shaw Lefevre, Senior Wrangler at Trinity; and Jowett, tutor and later Master of Balliol College, Oxford. In setting their entrance examination papers, the Commissioners were careful to appreciate the criticisms voiced. Candidates were to avoid anything in the nature of "cramming" in their preparations. "We do not wish candidates to adapt their education to the

[1]E. Burke: *Works*, World's Classics, Vol. II, p. 304.
[2]Quoted by H. Finer: *The British Civil Service*, London, 1937, p. 46.

examination; on the contrary the examination should be adapted to the chief forms of general education." No credit was to be allowed for any snippets of knowledge. The candidate should show himself able by his manner of handling the subject. The University education preparing him for the higher rungs of society, not only of the civil service, should cover a limited range but this in such a way that the student's critical powers were sharpened. The adequate expression of these ideals was found in the tutorial system. At its best the private meeting of tutor and undergraduate, would bring the young in close touch with a lofty mind, at its worst he would still learn to elucidate phraseology, learn to despise wordy nothings, parry attack, and mistrust shortcuts in argument. The subjects studied—ancient languages and history, philosophy and mathematics in the main—seemed perfectly suited to the purpose.

Can the same advantages be said to exist unmodified in the 20th century? Friendly American observers have become increasingly conscious of the disadvantages of the Oxford and Cambridge system of education as a preparation for government and administration. The products of the older universities have been taunted for "failure to consider public administration a science and treating it as an art or mystery revealed only to those who have followed the initiatory rite through which they have passed or alternatively as a faculty inborn, which is denied to all who are not blessed with it at birth. There are notable exceptions, but this indictment may safely be brought against the great mass of the members of the class." This writer claims that the "principal reason" for all the ills of the British civil service "is lack of proper social training although facilities for it are readily available."[1]

[1]E. Walker: *Training Public Employees in Great Britain*, New York, 1935, p. 13. A Committee of Enquiry in 1930 openly admitted: "Though (the high colonial officials) would not claim that the qualities they regard as essential in an administrative officer, namely, vision, high ideals of service, fearless devotion to duty born of a sense of responsibility, tolerance and above all the team spirit, are a monopoly of the products of the public schools and Oxford and Cambridge, they undoubtedly believe that the administrative recruits drawn from these sources are more certain to possess them than those drawn from schools and universities about which they know little." *Report of the Committee on the System of Appointment in the Colonial Office and Colonial Service*, London, 1930, Cmd. 3554, p. 23.

Upholders of the British traditional hostility to social science would claim that the assertion in the quotation is open to doubt. What came from America to Britain in the way of sociological theory was, until recently, not convincing. An American—now Reader at the London School of Economics—has recently summed up the position:

"In almost all courses for students beginning their studies in sociology, the major reading is a compendious volume, usually about 700 pages in length, in which all the subjects treated by sociology are touched on and in which the chief intellectual content is an elaborate terminology. Very few of these books go so far as to formulate in explicit fashion causal hypotheses and most of them do not advance beyond the point of vague amorphous generalities, while the terminological system, i.e., the 'concepts' all too frequently represent a translation into professional jargon of insights which are commonplace. The research on which they draw for illustrative purposes is the very concrete descriptive case study type of material, which is moreover used to a great extent for the purpose of exemplifying definitions."[1]

This hard view of sociological education has been shared by Harvard, where sociology was only recognised in the 1930's. At Princeton, it has now been established. Sociology was taught mainly in the newer universities and colleges of the Middle West. It was at home in Chicago, when the university was founded in the early 'nineties. Most of the text-books and research work stemmed from the new state universities and bore the stigmata of weak humanistic ideals, characteristic of these institutions. If, as a theory, American sociological work was unimpressive, it served a function. It did emphasise the human factor in professional activities. It provided an original departure which might have had a formative impact on British developments.

Industry in America made a determined effort to apply scientific principles to industrial administration. With common *industrial* problems the two Anglo-Saxon countries might have inaugurated a fruitful period of collaboration. Industrial administration developing its new techniques could then react back on political and social science, giving to it more than it had received. The situation was a particularly fortunate one because the new techniques of administration had sprung from

[1]E. Shils: *The Present State of American Sociology*, Glencoe, 1948, p. 57.

a body of engineers who met British engineers at frequent intervals and who were extremely eager to propagate their novel approaches. Moreover, Frederick W. Taylor, the founder of Scientific Management, was highly respected for the discovery of high-speed tool steels. British engineers, among all professional classes, were presumably more interested in a technical approach to human productivity than anyone else. In 1904, at a joint meeting of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and its British counterpart, the efficiency engineer Emerson put forward ideas on incentives. The British visitors complained that he had been "unnecessarily provocative". On a return trip, at Birmingham in 1910, Taylor was himself present:

"A group of papers on machine tools gave some excuse for talking about management. He intervened in the discussion with a brilliant short description of the Gilbreth motion studies on brick laying. The leader of the discussion followed the narrow path of strict conference procedure and said that while he agreed with Mr. Taylor's remarks about motion study, he regretted that he had not given them the benefit of his unrivalled experience in machine tools."[1]

This was no isolated reaction. Taylor's *Shop Management* was not noted in any of the four leading technical journals, while his *Art of Cutting Metals* had been reprinted complete in *The Engineer* and in *Mechanical Engineering* and in extracts elsewhere. Such neglect of Taylor's sociological contributions was more than a slip, since *The Engineer* had praised the technical paper "as the most remarkable paper produced to a learned society." To such an extent had the "cultural" view of administration and management permeated British society, that the adjective "scientific" before management seemed to almost everyone incongruous. Adam Smith had taught that "not from the benevolence of the butcher do we expect our dinner but from his regard to his own interest,"[2] but as a social theory and in the organisation of large bodies of men and in practical policy such hard ideas were anathema. Characteristically the first positive attitude to Scientific Management came in the pages of the *Sociological Review*, which opened a discussion on it with

[1]L. Urwick: "The Development of Scientific Management in Great Britain", *British Management Review*, 1938, Vol. III, No. 4 (Reprint), p. 28.
[2]A. Smith: *The Wealth of Nations*, London, pp. 6–7.

G. D. H. Cole and J. A. Hobson taking part. A few years later Sidney Webb wrote his *Works Manager*.

The humanistic opposition to Taylorism was fundamental: making man its subject of investigation Scientific Management assisted in the mechanisation of human qualities and thereby was the reverse of a theory of social organisation. The humanist was dismayed by the crudity of the technocratic creed, which in its simplicity was apt to launch the manager on a career of exploitation, and in public affairs, encouraged a machiavellian cynicism, which if pursued to its conclusion would inevitably sweep away the American progressive and the very foundations of rational thought. The enormous wealth of America and the vitality of her democratic institutions have so far prevented such a course, but a poorer country which would take to such an outlook, might soon lose all restraint. This outcome could be sensed in the work of Veblen, the one sociologist of genius who, coming to grips with the technical question and the problem of efficiency, still inadequately dealt with in traditional education, had led to one of the most stimulating developments in sociology.

Thorstein Veblen, professor of economics at Chicago, espied a new vantage point for social thought. Others had seen the *discrepancy* of the refined culture of the ancient colleges and the drabness of Bleak Street and of Coke Town; Veblen did not bother himself with so obvious a target. He attacked the culture of the Leisure Class itself. The suave, slightly other-worldly style of education was to blame for a complete misreading of the functions of the intellectual: sociologists had the task of unmasking the Leisure Class. He redefined the duty of the policy-maker in biological and engineering terms. Social science was to be part of evolution which adapted the species closer to the demands of environment. Social institutions showed a propensity to fall behind technical requirements, much to the detriment of human welfare and of plentiful production. Continuous readjustments were necessary.

"For the environment, the situation, the exigencies of life, which enforce adaptation and exercise the selection, change from day to day; and each successive situation of the community in its turn tends to obsolescence as soon as it has been taken; this step itself

constitutes a change of situation which requires a new adaptation; it becomes the point of departure for a new step in the adjustment and so on interminably."[1]

Instead of being trained in the workmanlike approach of the technician and the "tool-minded" productive classes, the governing cliques were crammed with ancient learning, philosophy, abstract economics and ritual. Beneath the mocking gaze of Veblen an elaborate structure of intellectual waste and privilege revealed itself. In the very texture of gentility, Veblen discovered the features of a predatory, archaic and parasitical cast of mind. The concept "barbarian culture" castigates the esteemed training and outlook of the ancient civilisations. This term, the mark of Cain of the Leisure Class, occurs in the first sentence of Veblen's most celebrated work. The academic teachers have a vested interest in holding back society, for without scarcity men would have sufficient energy to sweep away their anachronistic antics. The whole Leisure Class, reared in the aristocratic ideals of the past, conspired with them because the Class was detached from any really useful occupation. "An archaic habit of mind persists because no effectual economic pressure constrains this class to an adaptation of its habits of thought to the changing situation."[2] It was the analyst's turn to stand aghast at the consequences—of classical humanism.

Here was a thesis for a sociology, containing more than the usual measure of impish laughter, which might have commended itself to sections of the scientific world in Britain even if its progenitor, Scientific Management, met with refusal. The position was weakened by an element of spleen, familiar among debunkers, but fatal to its propagation in a stable society. In a famous excursus, Veblen compared the clergyman to a commercial salesman. Hostility to the intellectual tastes was implied in his attacks on "higher learning". Lack of judgment showed itself in his naïve faith in the wisdom of the production engineer. He rebuked not only civilisation but Heaven for its addiction to unproductive and Leisure Class ideals.

"It is felt that the divinity must be of a peculiarly serene and leisurely habit of life. And whenever his local habitation is pictured

[1] T. Veblen: *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, New York, 1934, p. 319.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 319.

in poetic imagery for the edification or in appeal to the devout fancy, the devout word-painter, as a matter of course brings out before his auditors' imagination a throne with a profusion of the insignia of opulence and power, and surrounded by a great number of servitors."[1]

The shock effect by which the original mind makes its mark does not always distinguish itself by tactfulness. A new theory often falls into the very trap of salesmanship which it denounces. The managerial approach "sells" itself by an appeal to economic considerations with which it hoped there can be no argument. A recent Working Party Report, to take one example, illustrates the jarring quality of such appeal. It is agreed that to call for an "adaptation" to the new situation in which a country finds itself, is one of the duties which social investigators have, but they are ill-advised if they discharge themselves of their obligation without adapting themselves to the most cherished and hard-won traditions of the community. Very justly perhaps, the Report referred to recommends "centrally co-ordinated action guided by planned research", yet the authors motivate their demand by relying on the economic calculus. The "chronic sick must be prevented from becoming a millstone round the neck of the health service". The nurses must get their patients back into production. "Nursing the chronic sick is now wholly 'humanitarian', for patients do not recover and go back to work, so a reduction in the patient's stay yields no economic return. But in a good many cases it would doubtless be made to do so, and there would then be an economic inducement to endow the medical and nursing treatment of the chronic sick more generously."[2] Such formulations do not endear themselves either to the public which is asked to finance the managerial groups controlling the "centrally co-ordinated action", nor to the nursing profession which has, apparently, to justify itself not by its humanitarian work but by the "economic return" which it can ensure.

In the eyes of its exponents, the liberal arts and fundamental sciences freed the intellect from the pressure of immediate

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

[2] Working Party Report: *The Recruitment and Training of Nurses*, London, 1947, p. 109.

purposes and preserved free play to the intelligence. At the same time, practical affairs, conducted in a gentlemanly fashion, redressed any leanings towards an esoteric mentality. British philosophers frankly intervened, often on the unpopular side, in political discussion. Thus it could be held that the combined American criticism ignored the essential contribution which the university could make to society. The training provided a framework which was held to convey, what neither descriptive sociology from the Middle West, nor Scientific Management and Social Engineering, nor ultimately (despite its name) the German school could convey—a sense of form and a breadth of mind attuned to the many facets of social life.

The strong point of the liberal approach is its perspicacity; its weakness is its lack of direction. The strong point of the technical approach is the honesty of the factual information, its attachment to the "law of the situation", and its exposure of muddled policy and outworn shibboleths; its weakness is the crude interpretation of "the situation". It is more difficult to express in meaningful language the ethics of nursing, than to calculate the possible savings which can be made in the health service of the chronic sick. *Yet there is no reason why the technician cannot be taught a cultural understanding, while the liberal receives an analytical and experimental training.* Professional knowledge, as has been shown in Chapter II, is stressing just these aspects, while the social sciences are raising problems of real significance to the man of affairs. Men of letters of wide sympathies have chided the official leaders of society for falling behind the times. Arnold Bennett exposed the cultural deficiencies of the governing class; Wells ridiculed their hollow liberal pretensions; Shaw pointed to their inclination to mouth empty phrases. In their own ranks civil servants have fought the fatal Leisure Class propensity for "muddling through". For the vacillations so characteristic of the liberal statesman is the consequence of inadequate understanding of society. Examples are many and have been especially noted by students of Foreign Affairs. Harold Nicolson, for instance, has much to say about the tension before 1914 between his father, Sir Arthur Nicolson, as Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Secretary, the liberal statesman

Edward Grey. History seems to have utterly vindicated the view point of the technician, and condemned Grey for haziness and indecision, which was completely misinterpreted in Germany. What is interesting in Harold Nicolson's description of the contest is that he does not overlook the good qualities of the Foreign Secretary who groped beyond the issues dividing the Entente and Germany. Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Foreign Office technician,[1] wanted to be able visibly to strengthen the Triple Entente. In the position in which Grey had put the Entente it appeared to have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of an alliance. Nicolson also feared the desertion of Russia to the side of Germany (a defection which took place, 25 years later, in circumstances not so dissimilar). He felt that the attitude of Britain was unfair; unfair to Germany; unfair to Britain's partners; unfair to British public opinion; and he told his Foreign Secretary as much.

"It is always irritating for a gentleman in a false position to be assured by other gentlemen that his position is false. . . . Grey stumbled and fumbled at places where Nicolson and Crewe saw clearly and incisively: their aim was to clear a way through the immediate thicket! his aim was to reach to something wider. But if he stumbled, it was because his eyes—those sad eagle eyes—were fixed upon an ultimate distant ideal."[2]

III

Since this drama was enacted much has changed; and we owe the change largely to the drama. Britain is poorer. The private incomes and the independence lent to the aristocratic society by a world of property are disappearing. The higher reaches of the social scale are far from being above earthly worries, even when salaries are high on paper. Ministers are of a new type, drawn from the London School of Economics and the adult education movement, and, because of the new tempo,

[1]The "expert" can be equally deluded. A Foreign Office Minute says in 1919: "Lenin (who represents the moderate element) is losing influence in Russia." (*Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 1919–1939. Edited by E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, London, 1949.)

[2]H. Nicolson: *Lord Carnock*, London, 1930, pp. 333–334.

too busy to be versed in classical knowledge. It is no good quoting the articles of the *Connoisseur* or finding common interests in Cicero; at best the new minister might have something to say about the economic background of the Cateline rebellion, not about Cicero's use of subjunctives. The time when people were content with a government which merely "held the ring" and a civil service which was to keep out of developments as far as possible, is past, and more than ever before bureaucrats must rub shoulders with business men and journalists, and cooperate with the armed services and their specialised minds trained in the Staff Colleges. It is now for the civil service to transform the limited view points of sectional interests, and reveal the hidden strength of formal training. For this task the civil servants must be given additional facilities to acquire sociological knowledge and a mind capable of scientific analysis. Education must come into line with the new social demands and the broader range of recruitment of the governing classes.

In the 'thirties it was still possible to draw a picture of the upper ranks of the civil service in upper class terms: "They have charm and tact and literary facility. They are usually incorruptible and have a high sense of public duty. They are 'constitutional'." Finer criticises "their weakness to resent 'outsiders'." They "are not markedly ruthless in the exposure of incompetence in their own ranks." Moreover, "it is questionable whether they can ever easily escape from the sense of superiority unconsciously assimilated in their country or suburban homes and public schools and colleges. They are too alien to their subordinates." The solvent which this Oxford political scientist wished to administer as the deficiencies were beginning to become glaring, was to recruit a number of persons who had "the memory of misery, hunger, squalor, bureaucratic oppression and economic insecurity."[1] It is not so long ago that this was written, yet the tenor of the governing classes has considerably changed, while, thanks to the activities of social students and progressive movements, the grosser forms of misery are no more than memories also in the lower income groups. In view of this levelling out it now becomes

[1]H. Finer: *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

possible to integrate into education firmly the study of poverty and the effects of bureaucratic action.

"Pressure ought to be exerted," wrote Mr. Finer, to "this purpose and arrangements made for advanced university studies in the higher ranks of the service."[1] But the recommendations of post-war committees have gone much further. Censuring the past, when training was "too much a matter of hit or miss", one committee demanded a sabbatical year or secondment of officers to local authorities or public bodies outside the United Kingdom, even to business concerns, if they can be induced to accept them. "Academic institutions would be able and willing to provide courses adapted to the needs of civil servants in such subjects as the *social sciences, economics and statistics.*"[2] Mr. Finer held that "if the older men in the Department were required to share such lecture courses with outside experts from the university a tendency to be cynical might wither and disappear. . . . Departments should proliferate with discussion clubs and members of eminent scientific bodies as the Institute of Public Administration." The Committee recommended a Director of Training and Education to each Department, who would organise lectures, reading and discussion classes; an office bulletin, a house journal, a good library and films should be the property of each Department. Special courses on the rôle of the civil service should include its financial and parliamentary background, the use of experts and non-experts outside the service, and the function of public relations work. The official Committee was eager to introduce "positive knowledge" and "tool subjects" of a very diverse, but none the less important, kind. The techniques of writing out orders, forms, codes of instruction, the manner of preparing and presenting information, and the reading and compiling in a readable manner, of statistical data, were to be some of the skills to be imparted.

On their part, the universities have for some time been asking for the formal qualification at least of officers in the social services. In 1918 the Joint University Council urged,

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 244–245.

[2] *Report of the Committee on the Training of Civil Servants*, Cmd. 6525, London, 1944, par. 114.

unsuccessfully, upon "the Minister of Reconstruction and the President of the Local Government Board to make training for the Public Social Services the subject of an enquiry."[1] The J.U.C. put the case for social science training to the Royal Commission on the Civil Service in 1931 and again to the India Office in 1939. It criticised the regulations which debarred many graduates who might be excellent recruits, e.g., when the upper age limit of the Administrative Class excluded graduates who may have worked in the social services. The age limit of the Executive Class debarred any graduate. "Ever since the Assistance Board", the Council records, "came into operation the importance of training their officials had been recognised but owing to the magnitude of the task little was accomplished."[2]

It should be noted that some successes were achieved in the period under review. In the Great War, university courses were organised for the Ministry of Munitions' welfare workers. A similar scheme came into operation for certain other categories of social workers. Most training schemes were, however, initiated during the World War. Thus the Ministry of Education assisted university training of youth leaders. In the appointment of evacuation officers the Ministry of Health desired Local Authorities to have regard to training: "A candidate should normally be expected to produce evidence of training by having taken a diploma or certificate in Social Science, granted by a recognised body, or a course which includes some field work in social welfare."[3] Trained almoners are recruited by the Tuberculosis Care Committees and the Veneral Diseases Centres. Special part-time facilities now exist for officials at the Employment Exchanges.

Industrial administration has emerged as a professional study, treated as a subject of applied sociology. The Government has set up a British Institute of Management. The London School of Economics has established no less than four chairs of sociology and a readership. Oxford has created a

[1] *Joint University Council for Social Studies and Public Administration.* A Review of Work during the Years 1918–1944. London, 1944, p. 3.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[3] *Ministry of Health Circular* of 10th March, 1942.

readership in sociology. The taboo, which so long inhibited the use of the word, is being broken[1] and popular interest has since the War gained commercial value as can be seen by the large "Libraries of Sociology" which publishers have launched. New journals are being added. The Government has handsomely endowed social research. The liberal arts teachers are themselves giving a social interpretation to their subjects.[2] *The trend in sociological theory, new trends in the separate social disciplines and professions, changes in the social situation, an expansion of the content and nature of government are all tending in the direction in which Social Analysis can play a constructive rôle at a time when the makers of policy must be suitably equipped.* To take a practical example, the changes which have come over the British scene can be studied in the training of officers who are to run the Colonial Empire, once "a gigantic system of out-door relief for the younger sons of the upper classes".

The existence of the Colonial Empire has enabled Britain to use the "pilot method" of testing out reforms on a small scale and in compact, remote areas.[3] The evolutionary course of British democracy has often been related to the wealth as well as the knocks it collected in the colonies. Hence we are not surprised to find that the new approach to administration is being tried out first in the Colonial Service. The administrative officer in the colonies with under-developed democratic institutions bears the full brunt of the criticism which is everywhere levied against civil servants as a group. He is accused of being spiritually and physically isolated, a law unto himself, ingrown, opposed alike to the white settlers, economic development by public enterprise and the native intelligentsia. In

[1] V. A. Demant, late chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral and recently appointed professor of divinity at Oxford University, opens a booklet with the words: "I want here to interpret the crisis of our time as the breakdown of a civilisation. As a sociologist and a historian of human cultures I am sure . . ." (*What is happening to us?* London, 1948, p. 1.)

[2] F. R. Leavis: *Education and the University*, London, 1943.

[3] The first successful blow struck for civil service reform was achieved by Macaulay in the Indian Civil Service. He also drew much support from the Government administrators of Ireland. They had used methods of appointment by merit and recommended it. "It is interesting to reflect that in this instance, as in the case of the reforms of the English police system and the Royal Irish Constabulary, Ireland was a sort of administrative laboratory for its oppressors." (H. Finer: *Op. cit.*, p. 47.)

climatic environments which are enervating, harassed by superiors without a clear policy, conscious of detractors who sit in New York as well as in Moscow, his task is Herculean; the calls for reform in his education are therefore natural and manifold. They come from the ranks of the Colonial Civil Service themselves. Moreover, not all present-day colonial servants are nurtured in the British tradition; some colonial servants are colonials. It may be doubtful practice to raise the Malay official on Tacitus. There is no aristocratic past in Africa. We are pledged to initiate courses of training which will fit the native inhabitants in a limited number of years for self-government.

The relevant committee sitting under the Duke of Devonshire proposed in 1946 a course of social training for the Colonial Service. How radical was such a change of policy will be realised, as soon as it is remembered that until the end of the Great War there was no organised system of recruitment, let alone of training. Then a three-months course was introduced for Administrative Officers proceeding to Africa. A rather haphazard course of one year followed in 1924. There was nothing like the training that French, Dutch or Belgian colonial officials were at that time receiving; still the Colonial Service had gone further than the Indian or the Home Civil Service. Results were, however, not encouraging. The official turned out was not only non-experimental in his approach, and usually could not see a vital research problem when he met it, but he was unable to utilise theoretically or put to paper, his practical experience. He could not analyse what he knew:

"In the non-scientific services, at any rate, rich stores of valuable knowledge and experience are at present allowed to run away in the sands. Where the officer possessing it has a gift for writing the fruits of his experience are preserved in books like the *Dual Mandate*. But where he has not, how much dies with him! If the best of such experiences could be sifted out and permanently preserved in available form, it would greatly help to the building up of a body of knowledge and doctrine in a field, which is so far only partially explored, and over which the broad lines of policy are still—and partly for this very reason—but imperfectly defined. Without such knowledge and doctrine in an available form the British case, which it is becoming so important to make, lacks that conclusive evidence

which it needs in these days when an ignorant England and a post-isolationist America are beginning to ask searching questions and if they do not get satisfactory answers promptly, to formulate misguided opinions of their own."[1]

The Committee did not advocate a return to the old liberal education of before 1924, nor did it endorse a specialised Colonial Staff College on the French or Belgian model. A course of *post-graduate* training, following general humanist studies, is given with classes on agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry; law; economic and social history; geographical and anthropological studies; a course lasting fifteen months altogether. Languages are taken, and regional social studies, are focused on West Africa; East Africa; Malaya and the Pacific Islands. In the vacation the student gains practical experience of local government administration and of the running of the social services. "The university members of the committee having been taken to task by witnesses for demanding too little of the pre-war Colonial Administrative Service students, are determined to give no such cause for criticism again. They agree that long leisured vacations are quite inappropriate at this stage of a young man's career, though they point out that, for the hard worker, periods of rest and mental digestion have a value."[2] No clearer indication could have been given that the curtain has fallen on a former age.

Subsequent to fifteen months of this training the cadet serves a period of apprenticeship in the colonies, after which he will return home once more, this time for a second course in which British colonial aims; comparative colonial administration; social administration; economics and statistics feature, as well as optional courses in the separate social sciences, or further studies in agriculture or languages. At a later stage selected officers may be allowed a sabbatical year for their own specialised studies.

The ultimate objective is to create a Unified Service, welding into one what is to-day a series of services, Administrative, Educational, Agricultural, Medical, etc. The majority of

[1] *Post-War Training for the Colonial Service*, London, 1946, Colonial No. 198. Sir R. Furse's Memorandum, Para. 11 (3).

[2] *Ibid.*, para. 14.

courses will be shared by probationers from all branches of the Colonial Service with liaison from the Colonial Office and various native students from the colonies.

New subjects add information, a new course may sharpen the analytical powers, but they do not give the student an education, until they have conveyed a new spirit. The need for cultural values was appreciated in the humanist scheme of education, but somehow, outside the familiar surroundings where tradition was strong, liberal education has lacked penetrative power. It was never integrated with the technical activities towards which an administration has in the backward countries to devote so much attention. Despite Oxford and Cambridge, the governing classes proved incapable of awakening or even evaluating the cultural values of the peoples they came to rule in the colonies; they showed themselves to be the "technicians" they despised, rather than humanists, outside their own circles. Sir Ralph Furse in a much quoted passage, has asked whether it has not been a weakness of British Colonial Administration that "we have too closely followed the Roman model. Have we too much concerned ourselves with material things; communications, trade, physical well-being, material propensity?"

"And, where we have gone outside the material sphere, have we, perhaps concentrated too exclusively on the Pax Britannica and the rule of law, on the development of political institutions and the expansion of political rights? We are sometimes surprised, and a little pained, that the immense benefits we have conferred on the so-called backward races have not been received with more wholehearted enthusiasm and have not more completely satisfied their aspirations. Is part of the explanation to be found here? Is there not room for a little more of the Greek spirit? In Africa, in the Pacific, as well as in Asia, we are dealing with people to whom spiritual and æsthetic values are often more important than they have come to be for the average modern European. In this aspect of Colonial Administration I suspect that we have something to learn from the French. Might it not be worth while to try to teach our future administrators more about the artistic and spiritual background of the people amongst whom they are to live? The modern type of recruit is often more receptive of such ideas than many of his seniors."[1]

[1] *Op. cit.*, para. 21.

In the exacting conditions of the 20th century the cultural values of the official classes have often proved spurious. They lacked organic relation with the content of social action. In these days a new meaning must be given to the culture concept in education, one equally distant from æstheticism and from utilitarianism. Freshness, the experimental outlook, a sympathy with widely divergent traditions, a humanism which finds its material in humanity, and humanity in the material culture as much as in art and literature, are more easily instilled in a period of social change and among men deprived of some of the more obvious props of power. The new conditions of Britain are well fitted to advance humanism.

A number of the shafts of the Veblen critique have been well aimed. They fatally struck the trait of snobbery which hangs about so much of classical humanism and upon which Disraeli's father remarked, when he first picked up the portrait of "The Young Duke": "What does Ben know about dukes?" In a mordant letter to the *Encyclopédiste* d'Alembert, Voltaire wrote: "We have never intended to enlighten shoemakers and servants—this is up to the apostles!"[1] The restriction of Enlightenment to a closed circle was unmasked by Veblen. In the "deliciously different" and the "quaintness" of so much that was considered fashionable, long before these terms had become the daily coin of the real estate agent and the advertiser, he discerned the poverty of culture. In Victorian buildings the tawdry interior is hidden by elaborate façades and personal touches of the designers which have no reference to the real purpose that the buildings are meant to serve:

"Certain funds, for instance, may have been set apart as a foundation for a foundling asylum, or a retreat for invalids. The diversion of expenditure to honorific waste in such cases is not uncommon enough to cause surprises or even to raise a smile. An appreciable share of the funds is spent in the construction of an edifice faced with some æsthetically objectionable but expensive stone, covered with grotesque and incongruous details, and designed in its battlemented walls and turrets and its massive portals and strategic approaches, to suggest certain barbaric methods of warfare."[2]

[1]Voltaire: *Oeuvres Complètes*, Paris, 1880, Vol. 46, p. 112.

[2]T. Veblen: *Theory of the Leisure Class*, London, 1924, p. 349.

A long line of British social thinkers preoccupied with æsthetic and artistic problems was required to upbraid the flowery ornaments about the intellectual and cultural life of the community as vulgar and dishonest. Social theory sought and at last found a culture concept which is an "ideal type" of social analysis, containing all the levels of social reality. This anthropological concept is to be discussed in the next chapter. It implies in a primitive frame the various principles which organise social thinking to take note of investigations and contributions in all the relevant branches of social science. Analysis functioning in a favourable social situation is now able to give guidance to policy. For it is not sufficient for theory to try to encompass reality; society must desire to make use of theory. After a long period of reserve, British society, as much as America and the Commonwealth countries, perhaps even more constructively, is willing to utilise social theory and make it a part of its education of the governing class.

PART II

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

CHAPTER IV

The Cultural Process

Social Analysis has been defined, or rather the aims proposed by sociologists and its place in society have been defined. Little has been said of how the contemporary social analyst looks at society. We shall distinguish, as a means of creating some order in the discussion, various levels of analysis. We begin with the methods best exemplified by the field anthropologist who records the features of simply compounded societies as accurately as he can. It is his purpose to see the business of society as a rounded unity. Men cooperate as members in a social process, the final outcome of which is a culture. It is for the social analyst to interpret their labours sympathetically. He may be fascinated by the romantic elements and the creative ventures which, almost overnight, raise another storey upon the structure, but he must pay equal attention to the patient tiny contributions of humbler folk. The slowness of construction must be explained as part of the security system which people require to protect their interests. The workmen themselves, occupied with their own affairs, with their working conditions and social relationships, may be unaware of the building to which they are adding by their efforts, while the technicians who are directing them are in turn blind to the rich social life of the workmen; the analyst must value all aspects equally; his duty is to show up the mechanism which knits the various culture traits into a coherent pattern.

I

Social students use the term "culture" to denote all that "includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society."[1] Any group comes in time to possess a culture, which serves as the groundwork of its human relationships. Be this a village or a nation, a factory or a family, every time

[1]E. B. Tylor: *Primitive Culture*, London, 1891, p. 1.

"a complex whole is erected from diverse and mutable parts; this process colours the significance of everything that occurs. . . . *The task of analysis consists in demonstrating the unity of all expressions of life,* to show how the circle is closed by the purposes which are assigned to each, a circle which encompasses men at any given moment. Even the contrary tendencies are stamped and modified in their free development, conditioned as they all are by the ensemble in which they occur."[1]

A culture enmeshes its subjects, soaks them in its substance, fills them until they are thoroughly saturated by it. An old culture furnishes an almost dream-sure unspoken understanding of things. It possesses, rather than that it is possessed. It acts, as T. S. Eliot says in another connection, like "a poem or a section of a poem, which tends to appear first in the shape of a rhythm before developing into words, and that rhythm is capable of giving birth to the idea and the image." It must not, however, be assumed that culture is to the sociologist anything mystical, an expression of the "Life Force", as some might say. On the contrary, to him it is severely practical, since culture must first of all satisfy biological needs dictated by the metabolism; reproduction; the exercise of the muscular and nervous system; protection from moisture, wind and other damaging forces of nature, human beings and disease. What welds these heterogeneous satisfactions into one single whole is the fact that needs can be met, on any adequate level, only by means of *tools,* fabricated and operated through *social cooperation.* In every transaction social solidarity must as far as possible be safeguarded. The tool must be conceived; must be produced; must be preserved; must be handed down to the young, who are instructed in its use; and its ownership must be regulated. All this requires a certain stability and agreement between men. Tool and pattern mutually condition one another.

A tool pattern organises a mere collection of persons into a working unity. Design lends a purpose, an accepted body of understandings, which, manifest in art and artifact, is elaborated, persists in tradition, and is enshrined in a memorable form. The total culture pattern of a people constitutes the people's "social capital" on which they draw continuously and

[1]W. Dilthey: *Gesammelte Schriften,* Leipzig, 1927, Vol. VII, pp. 185–186. (My italics.—L.S.)

which they invest with much love and pride. It is an essential corollary of their physical capital, their tools and technical skills. Man no sooner appears on the historical scene than he fashions tools,[1] he no sooner uses tools than he builds a culture.

The earliest human culture of which we have evidence belongs to Man living some 25,000 years ago. His remains are chiefly of two types: (1) almond shaped flakes of flint, broken from a central nodule, and (2) nodules shaped into a *coup de poing*. The flakes are remarkable for having been fashioned with the help of other tools, sharpened at the edges and generally shaped at great expense of labour. Moreover, certain bone instruments have survived. There are spear heads, throwing stones and knives. Fire was known. We can judge from an inspection of the anatomy of this type of Man that he had a language. From the way the burials are laid out we assume that he had a religion, also that he lived in family groups. By the time we reach Cro-Magnon Man, only ten thousand years later, we have an elaborate culture which is similar to the living cultures of many known primitive peoples, extant in our days. However simple a society may be and however undifferentiated the working groups, in each case an extensive ritual surrounds the daily operations, swathes them so to speak in a social and cultural fluidum.

The most primitive of cultures, where the use of tools is still relatively undeveloped, have highly conventionalised social techniques. Even where people are so little advanced that they collect food in the manner of animals, they use complicated conventions in doing so. Thus the Objway Indians in the vicinity of Lake Superior eat "wild rice" as do the birds about them. But the Indians eat rice only after gathering it and curing,

[1]It should be noted that some animals use tools. The chimpanzee in the state of nature cracks a walnut with a stone; "with Ammophila Urnaria the tool is a small stone with which the female rams and packs the dirt that closes her burrow; with certain ants of India (Oecophylla Smaragdina) and of Brazil (Componotus Textor) the instrument consists of larvæ of the same species which, held between the mandibles of the workers, glue and fasten the leaves of which the nest is constructed, edge to edge, with their teeth. The implement of the crabs of the Fenus Melia in the Indo-Pacific seas is a delicate sea anemone which held between the pincers of the animal probably serves to paralyse its prey by its . . . exudations." (E. L. Bouviers: *The Psychic Life of Insects*, New York, 1922, pp. 355–356.) The number of tool-using animals are few. Tools are not perfected in use. No tool is the outcome of collective or historical thought. New discoveries cannot be handed down. No known animal uses a tool-made tool.

hulling, winnowing, storing and cooking it. They do not snatch the food as do the birds. Though the rice is not cultivated care is taken to look after the places where it is wont to grow. Plants are tied in bunches to discourage the birds. Some of the rice is exchanged or given away. All the processes involved, require special appliances and children are carefully taught how to perform the work.[1]

Social techniques can be studied where they are most conventionalised, in magic. Where the group feels powerless it seeks to manipulate nature by spiritual aids. Magic is an essential part of a culture when coping with the complicated problems of life. The weaker the scientific certainties, the more must men take refuge in magic and foster magical personality traits. Those who are acquainted with some good magic have, by virtue of this, courage and confidence. In war, man, however simple-minded, knows that well-made weapons, the force of numbers and the strength of individuals secure a victorious outcome. Yet with all this, the unforeseen and the accidental can help even the weaker side to victory. Conditions may favour one side at the expense of the other. Magic is used to master accident and ensnare good luck. At other times some unaccountable circumstances will wreck the best-laid plans, and the undertaking is occasionally doomed to failure by some unacknowledged external force. These dreaded elements must also be harnessed. In magic man tries to control hazards: a coastal expedition with a canoe does not require magical preparations, but a perilous voyage across the seas demands a propitiation of the gods.

Even so magic must be used with care, it cannot be a substitute for work: magic itself must be controlled within the pattern. Therefore magical acts are always set apart, regarded as different and isolated, carried out in a definite sequence and manner and at a specified spot. The character of the magician is fitted with special powers, unattainable to the common run of men. He follows a unique routine, shrouds himself in secrecy and consorts with esoteric figures. No normal response is sought in a ceremony. Yet the emotional effect of success or

[1]Everywhere food must be taken with a certain decorum. Most elaborate rites, for instance, surround the Japanese drinking of tea. "It isn't tea" is synonymous with the English "It isn't cricket".

failure is realistically anticipated. To either the beholder of a ritual performance is resigned; magic is a preparation for the inevitable great moments of life and life's dangers. Thus in the rituals that surround death, which all must face, the individual and his group are helped in this supreme conflict. Death's ultimacy is erased and hope restored. The bereaved in the ritual of wake and burial express the dogma of the continuity after death and the community of dead and living. Any survivor who has witnessed a number of these mortuary ceremonials for others becomes prepared for his own death. His belief in immortality is lived through ritually. A mourner's emotional upheaval may in the chaos of excessive grief threaten his environment—he is given once more cohesion and so disintegration is overcome. Ceremony, art, play contribute to the same end: the individual becomes part and partner of a stable pattern.

In rituals which provide an experience all of their own, an act, an animal, a place associated with these performances, gains symbolic value. It is felt that in some indescribable manner the individual's life is linked with a certain symbol, such as an animal. The anthropologist will remind the outside observer that the central importance of a totem "lies not so much in a mystical identification of the individual or group with an animal . . . as in the clustering of all kinds of values that appertain to a social unit around a concrete symbol. This symbol becomes surcharged with emotional significance . . . because of all the vital experiences, inherited and personal, that it stands for."[1]

Every opportunity is sought to reaffirm unity. Such a simple occurrence as the meeting of two people on a narrow path is used, through agreed solutions, to establish goodwill. What at first looks like an occasion for friction is utilised to stress the harmony of the unit. Many strange customs can be explained as a means whereby men testify that the social responsibilities are willingly shouldered. The *couvade* which is found among the Californian Indians, as well as in Africa, in Siberia and among the Basques, is according to many investigators a symbolic

[1]E. Sapir: "Anthropology and Sociology" in *The Social Sciences*, Edited by W. F. Ogburn and A. Goldenweiser, London, 1925, p. 111.

acceptance of the duties of paternity. In it the father lies down and simulates labour-pains at the time of his wife's last stages of pregnancy. Many customs are fantastic efforts to establish relationships between disparate elements of life, to impregnate the memory and to trace the single thread of social cooperation in all phenomena.

II

Just how many features of social life are controlled and turned into *culture traits* differs from one system to another. In an American investigation of 25 different preliterate cultures all "controlled eating, marrying, naming, mourning, speech, coitus, fits, politeness, harming others, harming oneself."[1] Ninety-two per cent. also controlled adultery, in-law incest, receiving, cleansing oneself, work, touching things. Sixteen per cent. controlled coughing, prostitution, standing, grasping, scratching, fear, ridiculing others, mutilating others, ornaments in others, sucking. In this sample no culture controlled the manner in which people salivate, belch, hiccough, breathe, flush, blush, shiver, yawn, blink, are curious, or the phenomena associated with sadism or masochism.

Not all members of a society, of course, accept all the injunctions. Certain traits cluster around certain localities or groups. Hence we can speak of a *culture trait area* and a *culture trait centre.* Investigating "curious Indian stone ornaments", Moorhead finds, in the East and South East of the United States, three different types; "all three are present in the central area, two in an outer ring and one farthest away from the centre."[2] Nelson locates a culture trait centre for Indian pottery in the Rio Grande valley. As one travels outwards from the centre "the pots scattered about on the ground . . . become simpler and less variegated."[3]

[1]C. S. Ford: "Society, Culture, and the Human Organisation" in *Journal of General Psychology*, Vol. 20, 1939, pp. 167–168.

[2]W. K. Moorhead: *Stone Ornaments used by Indians in the United States of America and Canada*, 1917.

[3]N. C. Nelson: "Phrenology of the Tano Ruins, New Mexico" in *American Anthropologist*, 1916, Vol. 18.

Associations of different culture traits are sometimes verified. Tylor correlated matrilocal habitats and mother-in-law taboos. In the 359 societies analysed, 36 possessed a law prohibiting a man to look at his mother-in-law, and this prohibition was significantly associated with cases in which the husband lived with his wife's family. The prohibition occurred twice as frequently as could be accounted for by mere chance.[1] Tylor, still under the spell of a mechanistic terminology, spoke of the "adhesion" of different culture traits. To-day we would speak of a *culture complex*. Where the complex is about one of the mainstays of life—food, procreation, the accumulation of wealth, the appeasement of the gods—and thus about a focal point of the culture, we use the concept *institution*.

Each group makes use of a number of institutions: the family in Western society is characterised by the institutions of marriage, laws of contracts regarding property, mutual obligations, inheritance, external recognition, a joint household and other similar institutions. In an advanced society there may be institutions such as standard speech, democratic electioneering, or free academic learning. Each institution has two aspects: an unconscious one, accepted as in the nature of things, and an official recognition of it frequently supported by codified laws or constitutions. The latter lends an institution rigour:

"When interests, ideas, sentiments, and beliefs, in the form of folkways, customs, conditions, rights, and mores appear in more coherent and rational forms as precipitated types of social procedure or more or less definitely organised structures for regulating the intercourse between the members of social groups they become institutions."[2]

The unconscious elements are needed for the vigour of the institution. The cultural analyst makes explicit the unconscious elements of the institutions. Sumner has called them the *folkways*. They are learnt at mother's knee and can make vice appear as virtue.[3] The institution of witch burning was once

[1] E. B. Tylor: *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, Vol. 18, 1888–1889, p. 245 ff.

[2] J. O. Hertsler: *Social Institutions*, New York, 1929, pp. 67–68.

[3] "For such is the effect of custom that it not only reconciles us to anything we have long enjoyed but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us prefer it to other objects which may be more valuable but less known to us." D. Hume: *Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 503.

considered by society right, while chemical experiments were wrong. Put in greater detail:

"Folkways are like products of natural forces, which men unconsciously set in operation, or they are like the instinctive ways of animals which are developed out of experience, which reach a final form of maximum adaptation to an interest, which are handed down by a tradition and admit of no exception or variation, yet change to meet new conditions still within the same limited methods and without rational reflection or purpose. From this it results that all the life of human beings, in all ages and stages of culture, is primarily controlled by a vast mass of folkways handed down from the earliest existence of the race, having the nature of the ways of other animals, only the topmost layers of which are subject to change and control, and have been somewhat modified by human philosophy, ethics and religion or by other acts of intelligent reflection."[1]

Not all folkways are of equal importance either to the individual or to society. The most important, those charged with the greatest affective valuation, are, by Sumner, called the *mores*. They are often objectified in the shape of gods, totem animals, saints, moral laws. His most conclusive definition of them is: "Popular habits and traditions when they include a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare and when they exert a cohesion on the individual to conform to them, although they are not co-ordinated to authority."[2] A violation of the mores adds severity to a court sentence. Since they represent the living character of a group, transgression incurs group displeasure. More than folkways, "the mores are authorities with which one cannot argue for they are guarded most tenaciously by those that reason least."[3]

Withal the mores are not inflexible and hide-bound. It is well recognised that institutions cannot completely meet individual need and that individuality can only be partially satisfied by the prevalent pattern. Strict patterns provide certain safety valves. Officially recognised "revolts" against the pattern are instituted. In Catholic countries the carnival gives a certain licence. There is an intermingling of classes: rich

[1]W. G. Sumner: *Folkways*, Boston, 1907, p. 4.

[2]W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller: *Science of Society*, New Haven, 1927, Vol. I, p. 34.

[3]R. S. MacIver: *Society*, New York, 1940, p. 17.

masquerade as poor and poor as rich, each seeking the freedom otherwise denied to them. At the regimental Christmas dinner, "Other Ranks" are served by officers and N.C.O.s. The pleasure which these institutionalised tastes of freedom render make the ordinary routine more tolerable, passion less often burst the frame.

In his life's work the individual seeks to achieve an *ethos*: the synthesis of his personal and collective ideals. Satisfaction is achieved by many when the personal ethos and the collective style of life are complementary, when the personal ideals seem the necessary and natural outflow of a cultural pattern, made more compelling, elegant and charming by the individual contribution. *The work of the cultural analyst is to assist the creative and satisfying intermeshing of personal and social ambitions.* He can do so by showing how the traditional pattern has resolved the individual and the collective viewpoints and how the bearers of the culture have at different stages been successful in rekindling both the individualist ethos and the communal ethos. The analyst of cultures will study with particular care the creative and successful movements which revivify the pattern of the culture within the framework of traditional beliefs, of which, to take a not unfamiliar anthropological example, we might point to the Non-Conformist and the Anglo-Catholic revivals in 19th century Britain, two successful movements which deepened the ethos of British society. The Methodist message that "Christ died for *me*" had a resonance at a time of rapid individualisation and change, when in addition morals and habits had deteriorated. So powerful was the appeal to the individual conscience that Palmerston would say, that "in the long run English politics will always follow the conscience of the Non-Conformists." Christianity was remade as a living force, through the personal and evangelical approach to religion. Some time later a reform movement from within the Church reminded the dignitaries of the onus of Apostolic Succession. "We could not wish our Bishops," said Newman in his *Tracts for the Times*, "a more blessed termination of their course than the spoiling of their goods and martyrdom." The Anglo-Catholic revival did not offer the individual salvation in the gift of a sudden act of conversion, but called for a continuous

process of self-examination, frequent confessions and sacramental communion. The Church was a mystery, the "mystical body of Christ" as the Prayer Book called it, or it was nothing. The institution alone could keep men in a state of religious grace.[1]

So well were the two viewpoints worked out that a table can be drawn up of the Christian doctrines as the two sides see them:

CHRISTIAN ETHOS

Individualist emphasis	*Communal emphasis*
"Salvation by faith.	"Salvation by works.
Grace.	Reason, morals, feelings.
Revealed Theology.	Natural Theology.
Christus pro nobis.	Christus in nobis.
Justification.	Sanctification.
Man as sinner.	Man as imago Dei.
De servo arbitrio.	De libero arbitrio.
Man in contradiction to God.	Man in continuity with God.
Creator and creature incommensurable.	Creature and Creator mutually necessary.
Christ as Saviour.	Christ as pattern.
History as Sin.	History as divinely ordered progress.
Political pessimism.	Politics as the Coming of the Kingdom.
God transcendent."	God immanent."[2]

In some cases, however, the tension which arises between personal goals and institutional forms, between "personalisation" and "institutionalisation", disrupts the institutions without that a new viable form arises for a long time. Pathological substitutes are sometimes found. In a new society, say in a mining camp town, the institutions of the social systems from which the newly immigrated inhabitants are drawn may fall out of use, and gangs and drunkenness develop in their

[1] "Men speak as if Christians came first and the Church after, as if the origin of the Church was in the wills of the individuals who composed it. But on the contrary throughout the teaching of the Apostles we see it is the Church that comes first, and the members of it afterwards. . . . In the New Testament . . . the Kingdom of Heaven is already in existence, and men are invited into it. . . . Everywhere men are called in: they do not come in and make the Church by coming. They are called into that which already exists; they are recognised as members when they are within, but their membership depends on their admission and not upon their constituting themselves into a body in the sight of the Lord." (Archbishop W. Temple: From the sermon "Catholicity and Individualism," preached at the consecration of Truro Cathedral.)

[2] *Catholicity*. A Report by E. S. Abbott *et al.*, London, 1947, p. 42.

stead. In times of civic upheavals a Maffia may take over and enforce by terror the citizen's social "integration". Quixotic personal efforts or ritualistic and mystical collective movements may try to breathe fire into extinct forms. The street with its institutions may give a sense of belonging where, in slums, the family organisation is weak. In the defeat of France all took to the road in the hope of finding somewhere safety and the defence of the pattern which had made France. French analysts have for a long time been studying the problem of "anomie", social changes which produce loneliness and unhappiness in the individual denuded by industrial society of his customary institutions. Durkheim found the rupture in the "life-plan" represented in suicide rates.[1] Others have attributed the fall in the French birth-rate during the 19th century to "social capillarity" or the "mobility of social status" and its financial burden in a competitive society. In recent periods "existentialist" thinkers have taken the problem of "anomie" into the æsthetic realm.

III

Cultural analysis has another significance for the policy maker. As we have no ready prescriptions how vigorous institutions and a community life can be erected, the analyst of culture is anxious to preserve from fatal injury any viable pattern. Clumsiness through lack of understanding of the culture of a people may do damage to the entire fabric. Adaptations should be "in the nature of the material" and not in disregard of the most valuable inter-personal agreements. A colonial magistrate, for example, may think he is doing right in giving some native litigants, disputing over a bride price, his European-style "good advice", but from the cultural point of view he may be utterly wrong. Margaret Mead reports a European official who was advising the parties in a matrimonial case as follows:

"You fellow throw away plenty too much money along mary.

[1] E. Durkheim: *Le Suicide*, Paris, 1897. The first full treatment of institutional problems is to be found in E. A. Ross: *Social Psychology*, New York, 1908, which already deals with personal disorganisation as a result of the malfunctioning of social institutions.

This fellow fashion he no good. More better you catch him mary straight all the same fashion belong white man."[1]

The anthropologist rebukes him for his *obiter dicta*. "Here a more detailed knowledge of native custom would show that there is no wife purchase . . . that upon this constant interchange of valuables the whole structure of the (natives') intra- and intervillage relations is built."[2] A reading of culture as "social capital", not to be easily dissipated unless new institutions are ready to hand, was accepted by those responsible for colonial policy. "Indirect Rule" as interpreted in the 'thirties by British Governments demands that, where possible, colonial officials administer through existing native institutions, such as the chief and the native code of law. This implies a maintenance of the tribal unit, its social obligations, learning the native language and the building up a tribal treasury to be used for local purposes at the discretion of the tribe. A famous administrator who knew his Africa, said long ago in defence of such a policy:

"Even an imperfect and tyrannical African administration if its extreme excesses were controlled by European supervision would be, in the early stages, productive of far less discomfort to its subjects than well-intended but ill-directed efforts of European magistrates often young and headstrong, and not invariably gifted with sympathy and introspective powers. If the welfare of the native races is to be considered, if dangerous revolts are to be obviated, the general policy of ruling on African principles through native rulers must be followed for the present."[3]

It is clear that the preservative policy with regard to working cultures is not a simple one to pursue.[4] It is easy for critics to say that "nothing is being done" and to point to barbarous practices which are being permitted to continue. It takes some strength of will, much patience, and since changes must come about, subtlety and understanding to rule "indirectly". Often the cultural policy is assailed by organisations and interested

[1]In ordinary English, "You people pay too much for your wives. This is a bad way of doing things. It would be better if you simply got married the way white men do."

[2]M. Mead: *Growing up in New Guinea*, London, 1931, p. 231.

[3]T. G. Goldie: *Introduction to "Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger"*, by S. Vandeleur, 1898, pp. XXI–XXII.

[4]For a critical assessment see Chapter VI.

parties, attracted by the unplumbed wealth of a colonial country, which modern capitalist methods could unlock. The difficulty involved in the policy of Indirect Rule is reflected in the title of the work of Lord Lugard: *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1929), which more than any other brought about the conversion of official policy, though in Goldie's and his own administration in Nigeria the main ideas of Indirect Rule were practised long before they were officially embraced.

Goldie and Lugard found in Nigeria with its Emirs and large tribal units a situation well suited to follow the policies of Indirect Rule. They did not ignore the fact that Nigeria is part of the wider world, that there is a "dual mandate". The administrator must make the wealth of Africa available to the world as well as to the native inhabitants. A long battle ensued over what weight to give to this "mandate"—most significant because the Nigerian Government stood its ground against, as was said in the House of Commons Debate (31st July 1913), the "soap boilers of the world".

A system of enforced cultivation had been introduced elsewhere with great profit to plantation managers. Over thirty years the Big Companies argued that to achieve progress for Africa, new incentives and new management and plantations were needed. To achieve progress, Nigeria had to export: progress would give hope: hope and new vitality would unleash the productive forces of the African: a busy society would attract further capital: the investment of further capital would secure a higher standard of living: in short, the backwardness of the African could be overcome, only if the first step was taken and an export crop of considerable size guaranteed. Left to himself the African would continue to collect the wild palm oil fruit instead of cultivating it. He would lose time penetrating deep into the indigenous forests; climb high trees; wait until the inferior, wild fruit would mature; stack it in various heaps where it would ferment and produce a high percentage of free fatty acid, which is the chief cause of low quality. The world market penalises those who are inefficient. What was needed, so argued the "soap boilers of the world", was to achieve higher productivity by the most scientific and modern

methods which could only be introduced by the Companies, not by the "mystical magic techniques" of the primitives. When the colonial government showed itself unimpressed, it was charged with sacrificing the substance of economic independence for the shadow of cultural conservation. Figures went to show that Nigeria with her native system had only doubled her exports from 1909 to 1936, whereas the neighbouring Belgian Congo, with plantations, had increased exports tenfold by 1923, and in the next eight years she trebled this again.

If the government contrived to resist the establishment of plantations it was because they knew that to produce the labour would require force. The natives' fashion of collection was solidly rooted in the nature of their culture: to concentrate on the world market would endanger the stability of the economy: home-produced food had to be attended to and the country would have been ill-advised to make itself dependent on a world price which might, at any moment, slump: there was little land idle and the Government was pledged to uphold land titles: it had also to safeguard the fertility of the soil. Finally, it was not at all certain that the profits made would accrue to the benefit of Nigeria and its inhabitants. The plantation economy would hardly enrich the native civilisation culturally or teach effective new skills, which could be put to use elsewhere. It was doubtful if in a depression the high managerial expenses of the plantation would not prove most rigid factors, necessitating government subsidies, while the native collector had no overheads.

The chief contribution of cultural analysis, however, is not in the sphere of practical policy, for the analysis of culture is general and will leave the exact nature of the future goal towards which society is driving largely undefined.[1] The most

[1] "The principle underlying this policy (of Indirect Rule), the validity of which is still challenged by other colonial powers, notably France and Italy, is that native institutions are in themselves of value as agencies of government, and that a replica of European institutions in Africa is not the aim of policy most to be desired even in the distant future. . . . The political traditions of Great Britain involve the assumption that self-government implies representative parliamentary institutions, and this is held also by the majority of educated Africans. It is implicit in the philosophy of Indirect Rule, however, that the nature of the political forms which may ultimately be involved should not be prematurely defined." (Lord Hailey: *An African Survey*, London, 1945, pp. 132–133.)

relevant sphere in which the cultural analyst works concerns the general outlook of a society; this, the universities have called "the training and broadening of the mind". In this respect we have greatly outdistanced all patterns in which only one norm is accepted as logical and good. Many primitive people speak of themselves alone as "men", and the unconscious assumption of most simple people is that "foreigners" are not truly human. But Lawrence of Arabia could now say: "Arab processes were clear, Arab minds moved logically as our own, except the premise. There was no excuse or reason except our laziness or ignorance whereby we could call them inscrutable or oriental or leave them misunderstood." This view was alien to the social philosophy of our own forefathers.[1] So reasonable a people as the Greeks denied any culture to the Barbarians. Odysseus relates of one of these barbarous tribes he visited; not unlike the Objway Indians mentioned earlier in this chapter:

"So we left that country and sailed on sick at heart. And we came to the land of the Cyclops, a fierce, uncivilised people, who never lift a hand to plant or plough but put their trust in Providence. All the crops they require spring up unsown and untilled, wheat and barley and the vines whose generous clusters give them wine when ripened for them by the timely rains. The Cyclops have no assemblies for the making of laws, nor any settled customs, but live in hollow caverns in the mountain heights, where each man is law giver to his children and his wives, and nobody cares a jot for his neighbours."[2]

In the face of such patent deficiencies the "civilised" are overcome by a missionary zeal of beneficiary law giving, forcing thereby the barbarians into their own mould at the pain of persecution or extinction, more particularly when the barbarians inhabit rich lands which they do not exploit to best advantage. In this case, Odysseus is quick to notice:

[1]As colonisers we first saw the natives "as trees walking, or as wild animals infesting the country in which we happened to come across them. In fact, we see them as part of the local flora and fauna, and not as men of like passions with ourselves. . . . They are merely natives of the land which they occupy, and no term of occupancy can be long enough to confer any prescriptive right. Their tenure is as provisional and precarious as that of the forest trees which the Western pioneer fells or that of the big game which he shoots down." (A. J. Toynbee: *The Study of History*, London, 1936, Vol. I, p. 152.)

[2]Homer: *The Odyssey*. Translated by E. V. Rieu, London, 1946, p. 143.

"I must explain that the Cyclops have nothing like our ships with their crimson prows; nor have they any shipwrights to build merchantmen that could serve their needs by plying foreign ports in the course of that overseas traffic which ships have established between the nations. Such craftsmen would have turned the island into a fine colony. . . . For it is by no means a poor country, but capable of yielding any crop in due season."[1]

Odysseus is more like the Cyclops than he knows, one-eyed, he sees only his own culture pattern and no other. The Greeks, too, were partially blind to the pattern of those groups in Greece who were not free citizens. The same holds good for class attitudes in more recent times. Indeed, the anthropological analysis is a "model" enquiry into a new type of humanism. Primitive societies are studied somewhat as the teacher of modern scientific method would use case histories of the 17th and 18th centuries to make his points.[2] The study of patterns and their function in the lives of ordinary people has contributed to an understanding of one's own people. It is appreciated that the less physical capital a group possesses the more will it cling to its "social capital", and all the social securities the locality offers will impede mobility of labour. As in Nigeria, economic inducements are often insufficient to detach working men from their social environment. The analyst was able to assign the reasons for the immobility of the unemployed living in the Distressed Areas:

"The young men were apparently unwilling to accept the fact that the community in which they were born and nurtured, wherein they had built up their social life, was unable to provide them with work. They kept on looking for their luck to turn perhaps to-morrow or next week, or next month. . . . Many people appear to be unable to give the consideration of localities its due weight. . . . Middle-class people trained for the professions, expect to have to follow the job, wherever it may take them. The same holds good only to a very limited extent among the working-class people."[3]

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[2] "The only advantage of turning to the 17th and 18th centuries for material rather than to the 20th century is the relative simplicity of the factual knowledge", says J. B. Courant when explaining the methods of science. (*On Understanding Science*, New York, 1947, p. 99.)

[3] *Disinherited Youth.* A Report on the 18 + Age Group Enquiry. Prepared for the Trustees of the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, 1943, p. 91. The report relates to the years 1936–1939. Not only horizontal mobility is impeded. Workers accustom themselves to a certain standard of living. "Increases in pay

It is now recognised that social happiness may be better served by bringing industry to the Distressed Areas rather than making the people abandon an area, although on a rigid cost comparison of industrial production per unit of output this may be uneconomic. This support of the cultural patterns is no frivolous expenditure, which the public is asked to finance where it would never occur to the individual to do so. On the contrary, men make great sacrifices to realise their ethos. Grave material discomfort is suffered in order to minister to the realm of social relationships. Well known is the inclination of the poor to set aside in their overcrowded homes a separate "parlour". In the past middle-class people were apt to consider this an example of gross mismanagement of available space. In fact, it is one of the people's contributions to the maintenance of the cultural pattern on which social life and the institutions depend.

More precisely, the parlour permits of a fine ordering of external relationships. The worker's family is, among others, visited by the doctor, the health visitor, the rent collector, the representative of the electricity and water undertakings, the salesman and the milkman. According to the family's opinion of the social status of the persons they may be admitted to the

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do not necessarily evoke increased output. Absenteeism increased with better pay among the drillers in the ship-building trade and decreased when pay was low. The reduction of wages of the coal face workers (1924–8) also led to decrease in absenteeism and vice versa." (P. Sargent Florence: "Incentives and Government Policy" in *The Political Quarterly*, 1947, Vol. 18, p. 285.) A Birmingham report describes the upheaval caused in the common daily round of working men by a removal to a new estate. "Anywhere in the crowded centre of a city a woman can pop out of her own home and find, a few doors off in a dwelling similar to her own that has been made into a little shop, the common commodities that are her daily need. Where will she find like facilities in a great municipal housing estate? And the little shopkeeper behind the counter set up in his little parlour—where will he find a chance to drive his small trade in the grand new place? . . . In dealing with human affairs one finds what people *ought* to like is not always the same thing as what they do like. For example, to many folk from the congested areas the new spaciousness is not at first welcome, for it involves a radical change in way of life. The neighbours are not so handy, or so obviously neighbours at all, since they are up trim paths and behind trim curtains. A friendly and exhilarating quarrel in the court has become a thing of the past. The shop and public house and the cinema are no longer just around the corner. In winter the estates are colder than the concentrated living quarters in the older districts and not uncommonly the tenants on the windswept roads and shopping centres compare their new homes to Siberia." (*When We Build Again*, Bourneville Village Trust, London, 1941, pp. 95 and 96.)

house, either in the "hall", the living room, or the parlour. "The parlour", says one penetrating report based on a field investigation into the anthropology of the family, "has the quality of a neutral zone or an area of defence in depth, where the official and the stranger may be met, where he may be given a favourable picture of the family, its status, equipment and organisation, and where the secrets of the household are not revealed." The stranger will not discover the condition of the living-room, the extent to which the housework has advanced, what meals are being prepared or what other domestic tasks are in train. The stranger is excluded from contact with the rest of the family, can be entertained when they are eating or while the infants are being fed or washed. "The room likewise offers privacy for the discussion of intimate personal details with doctor or nurse, or matters of business with officials."[1] The privacy of the parlour makes it a haven of rest in times of domestic dispute. The bedroom with its marriage associations is not suitable. The furnishings of the parlour symbolic of the joyous highlights of life, wedding and honeymoon, christening and confirmation, prizes won and ornamental gifts received, are designed to restore equilibrium. The very objects portrayed on the mantelpiece, the profusion of dogs, children, shepherd scenes and religious images epitomise the wider stable world and the fulness of the cultural possessions. The æsthetic quality of these ornaments is low and for that reason the so-called functional[2] architect has been inclined to

[1]D. Chapman: "Families, their Needs and Preferences in the Home," in *Furniture Design*, Report of a Conference organised by the Council of Industrial Design, London, 1949, p. 28. Relatives are also entertained in the parlour. "The mother-in-law will appraise her daughter-in-law and approve or disapprove according to her skill in the furnishing and equipping of her home, the centre of which on this occasion will be the parlour." C. Arensberg's *The Irish Countryman* discusses the magical importance which the parlour holds in some Irish villages. At Lough it is unfailingly the West Room. It does not only contain the best furniture but also looks out to "the land of the west" where the fairies and the souls of people live. The fairies or "little people", who are sometimes visible under the right conditions, surround the lives of the villagers. The parlour is their abode.

[2]B. Malinowski who more than any other British anthropologist has contributed to the culture analysis himself spoke of his as the "functional approach", using a term current in architecture and mathematics. His use of the word is much wider than the usual interpretation given to "function" by the architect. Since the term has become established it will be retained in these pages, despite its ambiguity.

laugh at them. Concerned as he was with bricks and concrete, before he could be interested in sociology, the architect was often out of sympathy with the traditional culture of the people for whom he was building. He interpreted it often as no more than a cheapening and a degeneration of a truly æsthetic civilisation which went before. To the larger view, the analysis must educate the technician's mind.[1] Simultaneously the quality of popular culture can be raised by a better informed, more self-conscious, populace.

[1]Not only the architect but also administrative bodies are sometimes equally narrow in their approach: "In the case of Becontree, the London County Council has been content to plan, build and manage as a landlord. There would be no use, therefore, in expecting from that Council any general account of the social effects of its vast experiment. The several local authorities in South Essex were in no way partners in the enterprise and had been too much embarrassed by its consequences to be asked for a dispassionate study of it. The Government departments most concerned might be presumed, in present circumstances, to have neither the time nor the money for special reports upon a case which, for them, raised questions rather of administration than of principle." (Lord Baldwin: *Introduction* to "*Becontree and Dagenham*". by T. Young, London, 1934, p. 9.)

CHAPTER V

Social Structures

The cultural analysis with its traditional orientation is most at home among simple societies, such as tribes and isolated folk communities. The distance and the detachment needed to see a culture as a whole and as one pattern require a quietistic philosophy which is deceptive to the analyst when he is faced by rapidly moving and fragmented structures of more advanced civilisations. There, beside group co-operation, group struggles are in the forefront. Conflicting institutions set off subdivisions of the society and dominant culture patterns are resented by minorities or oppressed majorities. Such groups ask "for whose benefit" a certain culture complex is designed. The functional analysis sees everything in the flat, whereas even a small town shows that living moves along

> "a bewildering variety of gaits. Differential rates of adjustment in the performance of the same function have been observed between elders and their juniors and between people living next door to each other, while the females have exhibited greater conservatism than the males at many points. . . . In many activities . . . the working class to-day employs the habits of the business class of roughly a generation ago; if it were possible to differentiate clearly the gradations by which each of these two major groups shades into the other, it might appear that many changes are slowly filtered down through various intermediate groups. Shifts sometimes diffuse, however, in the reverse direction from working class to business class, as has been noted, for example, in the use of commercially baked bread and canned foods."[1]

The structural analyst allows for the fact that cultures are stratified and possess more than one focus. He adds a new dimension when he sees how a pattern is made up of part-systems hierarchically organised. There are distinctions between groups according to rights, duties, standards of living, cultural opportunities and functions within the wider whole. These smaller cooperative units are often more real to the individual than the entirety of society. They are based on physical differences or on geographical distinctions (a valley, an island off the

[1] R. S. and H. M. Lynd: *Middletown*, London, 1929, pp. 496–497.

coast, on oasis in a desert) or on divisions of labour, each group containing a special modification of the over-all culture, special culture traits, techniques and tools. Often there is a cleavage between those who operate physical tools and those who are concerned with magical, intellectual and administrative tasks. From a height, the scene at first appeared flat but coming up close against it, the observer finds the horizontal and vertical dimensions sharply contrasting.

The questions which this new perspective suggest revolve around problems of power. The seat of power in a society; the rivalries between groups; the shifts and trends which are discernible—the structural analyst will enquire into the personnel that fills the key posts and trace from which stratum they are drawn. Rather than avail himself of the accommodating language of culture analysis, he will search out "the changes, the conflicts, the absence of static equilibria, the lability in all relations even when they are temporarily, perhaps for decades, held at a standstill."[1] Myrdal, who analyses the colour struggles of America and the inflammatory situation in areas where white and coloured workers compete, considers that "the valuation spheres of such a society as the American more nearly resemble powder-magazines than they do Sumner's concept of mores." While the "model" of the structural analysis is the plural society of our own times, such as America, structural problems arise as well in primitive society (erroneously considered "groupless" by Durkheim), where the pattern exploits human and biological differences and allots them differential rights and obligations.

I

Innate differences in human beings such as those of *age and sex* are accentuated in the cultural process and made to integrate the local pattern. Different age groups have different obligations. Children cannot be held accountable, as adults are, if they transgress the law. In primitive society the aged occupy a respected place; where so much depends on personal experience, the old by their long life automatically have prestige. Their

[1]G. Myrdal: *An American Dilemma*, New York, 1944, Vol. II, p. 1032.

survival proves their intellectual superiority. At the same time, there is a contest between old and young. The pre-Christian, Germanic *Hildebrandtslied* deals with the struggle between Father and Son. Freud has raised the story of Œdipus to the central theme of human history. In Roman law a father could kill his child, or, at a later stage, sell him into slavery; only during the Empire was his authority restrained. The passage from one age group to another is in many societies solemnised with special rites (*rites de passage*) which survive into our own day in the first communion and confirmation or the secular 21st birthday party. In many professions there are rules about the age of entry and retirement. Special enquiries about the needs of young or old people are called for and set afoot, to allow for the structural problems thrown up by the intersection of human needs and cultural levels.

Equally fundamental are the physical and psychological differences of sex and the division of functions as far as they result therefrom. In primitive society the spheres of operation of male and female are neatly defined and often include dichotomies of food, taboos, objects which may be held as property, even of the money used in exchange. The Ninth Commandment associates women with servants, mules and other chattel.[1] In Western Europe women were first more, then less, and then more, independent of male tutelage in their right to inherit, to go to law, to divorce and in their personal liberty. Sex equality in politics, the labour market, the law and in other spheres appears to be the secular trend of recent history, but there have also been reversals. What has been considered as "characteristically female" behaviour has varied with the culture context. The charge of woman's ferocity, sexual aggressiveness and disrespect for tradition is a recurring theme of Greek literature. It is hard to recapture the emotionalism of the suffragette agitation of only a generation ago, or to understand the docility with which Muslim women accept

[1]Myrdal sees a close analogy between the patriarchal attitude to women and the Southern approach to the Negro: "In personal relations with both women and Negroes, white men generally prefer a less professional and more human relation, actually more paternalistic and protective position." It is said that women and Negroes are intellectually inferior, lack genius, will work for low wages at uninteresting tasks, refuse to organise and suggest that they are content with their lot. (*Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1078.)

a fate which in some countries means life-long purdah. Until the 19th century the Hindoo widow was expected to burn herself on her husband's funeral pyre, a conception of the family bond and of the subordinate autonomy of the individual, very different from what is conventional in the West.

It is possible to classify societies according to the prevalent family structure. The family obviously holds a central place in the life of the individual and exhibits very clearly the kind of questions presented to the cultural analyst as well as those probed by the structural analyst. The first will be concentrating on the importance of the family in handing on the folkways and knowledge of the culture as well as its property and accepted obligations. The latter will discuss whether inheritance is through the mother's family or through the paternal relatives—patrilineal descent or matrilineal descent or both; whether the marriage is established in the wife's village or the husband's village—matrilocal or patrilocal; whether laws prohibit marriage from within one's own community or demand it—exogamy or endogamy. Regulations exist on the number of spouses that may contract a marriage.

Monogamy: 1 man × 1 woman.
Polygyny: 1 man × several women.
Polyandry: Several men × 1 woman.
Group Marriage: Several men × several women.[1]

Polygynous and polyandrous unions are both covered by the term "polygamy". Societies sanctioning polygamy do not, necessarily, insist on it; many of the poorer people and some of the upper classes contract monogamous unions. Some societies group together various families into a *phratry* in which families observe special obligations to one another. Where there are but two groups, we speak of *moieties*—the Green and the Red Parrots, the Animals and the Plants and similar names distinguish them—and exogamy (and rarely endogamy) is the convention governing the two sections.

In Western society no sharp distinction is made between the married couple and the biological unit of blood relatives, so that the terms marriage and family are often used synonymously. But to many civilisations the *conjugal* group, i.e., those

[1]A number of analysts deny the existence of a true "group marriage."

related by marriage, is of secondary importance to the *consanguine* relationship of the family into which the individual is born. New distinctions are suggested by these comparative studies. In societies organised on the conjugal basis, the authentic functional family consists of a nucleus of spouses with their offsprings and parents, surrounded by a fringe of consanguine relatives. In those organised on the consanguine basis, the authentic family is a nucleus of blood relatives surrounded by a fringe of spouses. In the first case the blood relatives are of only incidental importance to the functioning of the family unit, under the second, the spouses are of only incidental importance.

Marriage in some societies leads to a break-away of the young couple from the parental hearth, in others where the *Joint Family* is the basic cooperative unit, the spouses are absorbed and the effective decisions are made by the entire family or the senior head of the combined clan. Sometimes family communism is effective and all property is vested in a joint family chest. The traditional Zadruga which existed long in what is to-day Yugoslavia, is described by Engels in a celebrated passage on the family:

"It comprises several generations of the father's descendants together with their wives, all living and clothing themselves from the same stock, and possessing collectively the surplus of their earnings. The community is managed by the master of the house who acts as its representative, may sell inferior objects, has charge of the treasury and is responsible for it as well as for a proper business administration. He is chosen by vote and is not necessarily the oldest man. The women and their work are directed by the mistress of the house who is generally the wife of the master. She also has an important, and often final, voice in choosing a husband for the girls. But the highest authority is vested in the family council, the assembly of all grown companions, male and female. It takes all important resolutions, sits in judgment on the members of the household, decides the question of important purchases and sales, especially of land, etc."[1]

In a large number of societies family relationship is the foundation of political organisation. In traditional China, a *clan* may have some 200,000 members, scattered possibly over the whole of China and beyond. All clansmen pay homage to

[1]F. Engels: *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Chicago, 1902, pp. 71–72. See also M. D. Novakovitch: *La Zadruga*, Paris, 1905. The Zadruga may be a result of the Ottoman taxation system.

one ancestral home territory with its temple and lands, which the clan collectively owns. Rich members make bequests for the support of the ancestral temple and for the assistance of the poor members. They will endow clubs in distant towns for their kinsmen. Clan members will be listed and the records revised at regular intervals. The Jews of the Old Testament were clearly organised as clans. To the Levites were specifically assigned the priestly functions. Distinctive dress (e.g. the Scottish tartans), ceremonial observances, and sometimes secret signs enhance the feeling of community. Joint responsibility for misdemeanours of clan members was recognised in the Middle Ages in a still magically bound society. A man expelled from his clan feels himself also condemned to lead a vagabond life in the next world. Frequently a clan professes a direct relationship or patronage to some saint, deity, plant or animal. The prestige and power which a clan may acquire are greatly treasured and may be more assiduously promoted than any individual ambition. Group competition rather than personal advancement is often the rule. Ethical injunctions may be held to operate only between clansmen; outside the clan reigns the jungle.

Cousins many generations removed may view themselves as close relatives, while individuals not related are outsiders and moral obligations to them will be purely voluntary. The in-group uses the feuds with other clans as an integrating force. Where government is weak and population sparse blood feuds may break out. Societies revert to the clan level. Famous was the case of the McCoys and the Hatfields, on opposite sides of a small river fork which separated Kentucky from Western Virginia. During the American Civil War, the two families had to protect themselves from marauders by forming armed bands, much in the manner of the American Indians. Although they were both on the same side of the war they often brushed one another, and at an election quarrel, fifteen years later, a feud developed which spread and continued until it was utterly impossible to obtain punishment of a Hatfield on the Kentucky side, and of a McCoy on the Virginian side of the river frontier. Both clans were reinforced by desperados who gloried in the unbound freedom which the resumption of clan struggles gave them. One reason for the perpetuation of the feud pattern was

the vivid excitement which accompanied the release of primitive human impulses and the revival of the pattern of an earlier epoch. Hence governments are ever vigilant that family disputes do not fester. From Antigone to Romeo and Juliet and into the modern novel the more "natural" or cultural loyalties conflict with the structural principles of political society; they remain the stuff of literature.

When the clan loyalties fade and political and economic interests dominate the social scene, society takes a new step. Thus, in the discussion of age groupings, the division of functional spheres between the sexes and the organisation of the family, the language and concepts of the cultural analyst might have been adequate. In fact, it is more convenient to use hierarchical concepts than culture patterns as a number of questions on the distribution of privileges and the exact nature of the conflicts are thereby posed, which otherwise remain unnoticed. Structural analysis is much more conscious of the antithetical forms into which institutions are built. After the clan stage, the structural analysis gains in importance however much in the background of history and still in the foreground of the ordinary man cultural complexes continue to play their part.

The reverse of a gradual elaboration of cultural organisation is seen in structures composed of refugees, outcasts, monks, lepers, in prison colonies and so on. Gilbert Murray gives the following description of the birth of the Greek *polis*:

"For the fugitive settlers on the shores that were afterwards Ionia and for parts of Doris and Æoli there were no tribal gods or tribal obligations left because there were no tribes. There were no old laws. . . . A man was now not living with a wife of his own race, but with a dangerous strange woman of alien language and ancient gods, a woman whose husband or father he had perhaps murdered . . . He had left the graves of his fathers, the kindly ghosts of his own blood, who took from his hand and loved him. He was surrounded by the graves of alien dead, strange ghosts whose names he knew not, and who were beyond his power to control, whom he tried his best to placate with fear and aversion. One only concrete thing existed for him to make henceforth the centre of his allegiance, to supplement the place of his old family hearth, his gods, his tribal customs and sanctuaries. It was a circuit wall of stone, a Polis, the wall which he and his fellows built up to be the one barrier between themselves and a world of enemies."[1]

[1]G. Murray: *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, London, 1924, pp. 77–78.

In the town wall, a barrier and a protection, the *segregation* which social organisations usually imply is well typified. In many societies the separation between groups is carried further. A certain animus towards the "foreigner" from beyond the walls, exists everywhere. However, in a *caste* society, especially if it is organised on a religious or "sacred" scheme, people are grouped according to their birth in rigid compartments. In India,[1] before the onset of industrialisation, a man was in popular conception born with a certain degree of virtue. If far advanced in virtue, he was a Brahmin; if less advanced, he belonged to the Kahatriya, and so on, right down the caste scale, to the "Untouchables". When one man assaulted another, the heinousness of his crime depended upon the caste of the sufferer: the higher the caste, the greater the sin. Hindoo law directed that fines and punishments should be imposed according to caste: the higher the caste of the criminal the lighter the punishment. This is logical since high caste is a result of a virtuous life in previous incarnations. All religious authority was entrusted to the Brahmins. They alone by their spiritual nature were fit to give religious instruction, decide points of law, make sacrifices and perform ceremonies. "Untouchables" had to keep a distance from caste people, lest they polute by touch or shadow, the distance being roughly proportionate to caste status. "Untouchables" were not allowed to live in the same village with high-caste Hindoos, nor to enter Hindoo temples. No man was allowed to marry outside his own caste; usually there were also a number of further rules, restricting a man's choice of wife to a certain sub-division of the caste. Only certain kinds of food were legitimate. Rules on the castes of cooks were prescribed: no man might eat with a man of lower caste. There was one range of occupations which was regarded as fully legitimate for each caste.

Much of this description belongs to the past. Modern transport, the post office, the university and a hundred institutions

[1] "There is a ritual for every hour of the day in India—the ritual of the peasant and the workmen and the ritual peculiar to the Brahmin household like ours. The members of my family, the towns people, the labourer in the field, the many beggars—each followed an intricate and age-old pattern of life, from sudden sunrise through fervid noon to the heavy fall of night." (D. G. Mukerji: *Caste and Outcaste*, New York, 1923, p. 6.)

force people of many castes to mingle. Economic incentives draw people into diverse occupations, often far apart from the traditional walk of life of the caste. Reformers like Gandhi enveighed against the rigidity of caste separation. A new technical epoch upsets and rearranges the previous structure which no more serves the ordering of economic life.

Wherever there is to-day a fair degree of intergroup mobility, an absence of legal or religious prohibitions against entering another group, on a different rung of the social ladder, yet where certain monopolies remain firmly vested in certain strata, we speak of a *class* society. Class is closely linked with property and income and the class society of Western Europe was the product of a prolonged struggle directed by the thriving burghers of the towns against the privileged feudal aristocracy and the Church. Enactments had to be forced through, which made work and trade respectable, such as the famous Prussian decree of 1807, which gave all men the right, without detriment to their station as gentlemen, to engage in the pursuit of trade and industry. The ethos of the newly founded society was one of the "careers open to all the talents". The inheritance of property and the educational "flying start" which the rich could give their children, however, limited vertical mobility in practice.

Around the economic distinction, and the occupational structure which underlies it, social stereotypes have become imperceptibly attached. A certain age structure; family composition; culture pattern distinguish the classes. Residential location stratifies them further. Conventions concerning the rearing of children; religious observances; the type of domestic architecture and the proper way of keeping a garden are some of the many things on which the classes divide. Expenditure schedules and economic prospects are naturally co-ordinated with income. These distinctions may exert a cumulative pressure upon the classes which generates its own orthodoxies. A recent American investigation shows how different sex mores cluster around the different classes.[1] Strenuous efforts are made by individuals to enter a higher social class or to acquire the

[1]A. C. Kinsey *et al*: *Sexual Behaviour in the Human Male*, Philadelphia, 1948. (This book has the novel distinction of being an enquiry of a sociological nature to achieve the circulation of a best-seller.)

cultural appearances of a higher class. Hopes of vertical mobility encourages ambitious working class parents to favour white-collar occupations for their children, notwithstanding that they forego some earning power in doing so. Pathetic cases are known of people preferring to live in dire want rather than be known as charges to public assistance. Socio-psychological factors of personal worth, recognition, superiority, status and personal dignity are involved in class membership and much of the human scene is occupied with the marking out of the proper place which the various individuals in the closer or wider environments should occupy. Associations are founded and political campaigns pursued with the intention of giving reality to class ambitions.

Cliques are formed. There is a sensitivity about the sub-divisions which sometimes overshadow in importance the larger scheme of stratification. Income is not the only criterion by which an individual is ranked in the eyes of his fellow men even in a pecuniary society. The manner in which he spends his wealth; the time he or his family has been holding a certain position in the hierarchy; and his relationships with other powerful circles are relevant for assessment. Deemed meritorious they may balance certain deficiencies in actual economic substance. Lloyd Warner has taken a small American community and analysed minutely the cliques and strata of this town. In this work he found the following classification of the social classes satisfactory:[1]

Upper Upper.
Lower Upper.
Upper Middle.
Lower Middle.
Upper Lower.
Lower Lower.

Yet America is an example of a society where an extreme degree of economic inequality has not produced a marked consciousness of discriminatory class affiliation. Many Americans

[1]W. Lloyd Warner and P. S. Lunt: *The Social Life of a Modern Community*, New Haven, 1941. A number of difficulties are unexplained in this book, e.g. how the individuals were placed in the different divisions.

feel that they are living in a society in which class has a purely fiscal meaning. When the American periodical *Fortune* conducted an opinion poll in 1940, in which a representative sample of persons in each broad class of society was asked to which class they belonged, seventy-nine per cent. of the people thought they were members of the "middle class". Even seven out of every ten unemployed and lowly farm labourers included themselves among the "middle classes".[1]

"Most Americans in all classes believe that they are 'middle class'. Perhaps this national theory is responsible also for the fact that American sociology (which generally must be given the highest ranking in the world) is weak and undeveloped in regard to the problems of social stratifications. When recently a group of social anthropologists and sociologists stressed caste and class their colleagues everywhere in America exhibited an interest in the adventure rather out of proportion to the specific scientific novelties involved."[2]

II

If there is a relative absence of external stigmata of class in America, this is because she has no feudal past which has left an "overhang" of distinctions between those addressed as "Mr." and those who are "Esq." The American college boy has no shame about washing dishes in his vacations, and his family considers a menial job part of the young man's social education. Local accents are no dividing lines. The analyst will point to the revolutionary birth of American society and its democratic structure of government and higher education; the competitive ethos; and the size and wealth of the country. Technical developments open new opportunities as the age of overseas expansion draws to an end. Culture features in the structural analysis as "tradition", and as one of the dimensions of social structure. *Size, wealth and tradition of a country exert a certain pressure on events.* They may clog the process of social development or provide it with opportunities for "lateral" growth as in America.

[1]In Canada the percentage was 65 among all persons interviewed and in Britain in 1948, the number was one out of every two. Most of these only claimed to be "lower middle class".

[2]G. Myrdal: *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 670. The reference is to the work of Lloyd Warner and of John Dollard.

Only recently has her "Western Frontier" been closed.[1] Previously we had the phenomenon of a people with an advanced culture, finding itself living next to an unlimited area of unowned or slightly valued land, from which the common man could capture for himself what he needed and upon which he could build, free of most of the restrictions of congested society, what personal life he was capable of. Penetration inland was encouraged by the river system and the sparse population of Indians. Indian places of habitation were depopulated by preceding disease and taken over under conditions where little military control was required. The cutting edge of the Frontier was the single family farmer whose cabin on the margin of settlement formed a nucleus whence started the occupation of the wilderness. In cycles of 20–25 years, as each new generation grew to manhood, the Frontier was pushed further West, and so on for two centuries. There were few restraints on the type of government which the new societies might set up; there was no dead hand of property; men showed no patience either with the conservatism of the societies that had been left behind. The parties of Jefferson, Jackson, Harrison, Lincoln and Bryan indicate, in turn, the waves of political emotion for which the West provided the breeding ground. The openness of the Frontier has given an openness to the American social structure.

Structural analysts are concerned with the evaluation of the *environment* in which a society is set, to which at a certain stage in technological development the *hinterland* of a culture also belongs. Feared and as far as possible ignored beforehand, the hinterland becomes an active factor as an area of migration, conquest and escape. Horizontal mobility lends freedom, alternative walks of life, trading or imperialistic opportunities. Europe has possessed a "frontier" since the Ages of Discovery which was stimulated by and stimulated the technical improvements and scientific discoveries at home. Together they provided an openness to society in the past and have demonstrated the importance of technique, space, and the relationship between the two. With *space* at its disposal, the wayward and jobless of Europe could be off-loaded and thus the traditional

[1]E. J. Turner: *The Significance of the Frontier in American History*, New York, 1893.

patterns gain a firmer hold. In this way the old cultures of Europe were made more secure and could, in later times, tolerate a great deal of eccentricity and independent thinking aided by the stream of material wealth which flowed home from the new areas. At the same time the new countries gave a liberal stimulus. The American revolution gave heart to the democratic movements of Europe. The free, spontaneous, open-handed solidarity of pioneering countries contrasted vividly with the cautious and deep searching, more inward looking Old World.

Communication has set up a fruitful *tension* between areas characterised by magical thinking and those in which rationalism found its uneasy home. The ancient magical practices of the East now reproduce this tension on a grander scale, as they resist or assimilate the utilitarian capitalism of the West. The new outlooks have been introduced into the extra-European areas by foreign communities who complicated the stratification of the countries of immigration. Foreign traders and labourers flowed into the ancient structures. In the colonies, below the European officials and military, Indian, Chinese, Syrian and other groups established themselves. Alongside the native peasantry indentured labourer opted to settle.[1] Where more than one ethnic or religious population was already resident in the colonial territory, the one incorporates the competitive outlook more speedily than the other with consequent jealousies and internal social strife.

Much of the difference between the South and the North of the United States of America can be explained in these terms. The South still thinks in terms of family, traditional relationships and the clan complexes of patriarchal times, while the North is more concerned with economic efficiency, mobility

[1]The mixed character of the population of some territories is well exemplified by British Guiana:

East Indians	164,522
Blacks [*sic*]	137,422
Aboriginals	9,516
Europeans	
Portuguese	8,247
Others	2,370
Chinese	3,648
Mixed, etc.	47,853
	373,598

(*Colonial Office List*, London, 1946).

and competition. The distinctions affect the attitudes of South and North to each other, but especially towards the Negro and other structural questions.

From what we know of the "viscosity" of cultural entities the adjustment of the various patterns to one another can be, at best, a slow process. In fact, the unfolding of a new economy and new political institutions often accentuate the divisions. Such countries where *culture contact* acerbates relationships are known as plural societies. In a plural society a buyer will prefer to trade with a member of his own cultural affinity even though he may buy more cheaply elsewhere. Economic incentives are relatively weak and class issues are of secondary importance in politics compared with race and culture.

The structural analyst watches and carefully records "typical" social forms and how they are related to problems of technical efficiency, to social peace and progress or the shaping of social theory.[1] He will also investigate the influence of tradition, the nature of the culture contact, the spatial containment and relative "openness" of the society or its sub-divisions, and try to test his analysis on topical issues. *The structural analyst takes note of the degree to which a society has come to accept a certain scheme of stratification; the kind of stratification most characteristic of the society; the adjustment of the various divisions to one another and the extent to which they are derived from different functions and natural distinctions.*

The constructive task of the structural analyst is to find means to prevent a plural society (and all societies have plural elements) from reaching an impasse. He will seek to make explicit the assumptions of the various viewpoints. Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* (1936) tries to chart the structural principles inherent in the social philosophy of different social groups. The structural analyst will record as

[1]Numerous "utopian" novels by Mandeville, Butler, Huxley, Orwell, to mention a few, have described social structures in which one or the other principle of stratification has been made all-powerful. A number of modern social theorists have pointed to indications which suggest that new structural alignments between the different racial groups; various continents; the managers and the rest of mankind; the "land-mass" people against the maritime civilisations, will take the field and re-model society. They cannot be discussed in the framework of this book. One such sociology will be discussed which assimilates all other stratifying principles to the particular one, the class issue; it shows the general principles on which they operate.

simply as is possible the relationships, divisions, accommodations, and areas of conflicts which disturb the society.[1] A recent symposium on *Race Relations in South Africa* (edited by E. Hellmann) makes such an analysis. The distortions to which a caste situation gives rise in a democratic society have been analysed, e.g. by G. Myrdal and his associates in *The American Dilemma*, and the dynamic elements traced which may, under given conditions, transform the society into a homogeneous structure.

In this connection, the sociologist distinguishes different types of plural accommodations. Where virtually different nations are made of the contending groups, he may speak of *partition*. The Treaty of Versailles split up Austria-Hungary. India and Palestine have been partitioned. German minorities in Eastern Europe have been expelled. Where no political partition takes place there may yet be *separation*. A section of the population may be isolated in special "reserves", where land may not be alienated. The various units live side by side on their territory within the same political entity like two different animal species. Their interaction, such as remains, may be punctuated by persecution or may be relatively peaceful. If the superiority in numbers and weapons of one side is self-evident, the society is not aggressive. A less extreme form of separation is social *segregation* by which two or more groups may meet at the place of work but not in their places of residence. Special quarters are reserved in the towns. There is a determined policy to resist any assimilation of the various groups. The various barriers which are placed in the way of social intercourse and the evolution of a single-status citizen vary from case to case and within the country they differ between the regions.

[1]The writer has, for instance, sketched out some of the changes necessitated in the traditional colonial pattern, as a consequence of economic development and the maturing of new social groups of educated Africans, in his pamphlet *Crisis in Africa* (London, 1947). The functional scheme of Indirect Rule based on the tribal framework tends to antagonize the more forward looking Africans, the teacher, the preacher, the ex-corporal, the trader, all those who want a higher level of productivity. From the start the ancient institutions were twisted to new conditions and the strain upon them may now be too great. It is one thing for the chief to have to introduce new agricultural techniques, for native law to deal with urban litigants, and the native language to conceptionalise a new ethos. This is difficult enough, but when the native intelligentsia, the co-operative societies and trade unions throw up a new leadership with new ideas and Western education the frail institutions come to be viewed as shackles and Indirect Rule is denounced as a retrograde policy.

In South Africa new economic developments called in new ethnic groups, as already described. The "native policy" is sometimes an object of contention between the urban and industrial section of the white population and the rural, mainly Afrikaans-speaking farming population. But on the whole, the immigrant groups are agreed in their treatment of the native population. The segregationist policy followed is designed to attach the native to his "reserves" and in his own traditional culture, yet see to it that he offers his labour periodically to the farmer, the mines and in industry. The African should leave his family in the "reserves"; he should not become permanently urbanised or, while living in juxtaposition with the other races, have as little social contact with them as possible. No person of colour is in a position of authority over a white man. Non-whites do not bear arms. South African trade union organisations are in the main keenly segregationist and restrict entry of natives into the skilled trades. The colour policy also draws the Indian and the Cape Coloured people of mixed descent into its vortex. The light skinned Coloured person in some cases looks down on those of darker hue. Plural societies are haunted by many anxieties foreign to other social structures. They find no peace; economic trends appear to upset the structural organisation achieved. The more social cooperation is forthcoming from the various ethnic groups, the more will the spectre of *assimilation* and the demand for equality be feared by many. The equilibrium which economic conditions are moving to establish is different from the equilibrium which dominant and intermediary sections in the society want.

Some countries have made a determined bid to assimilate divergent cultural elements either by education or by more violent methods, such as the prohibition of a language or of religious practices. In some few cases, biological unification has been tried. After 1514, Spain hoped to create a stable settlers class in her colonies by promoting Spanish-Indian marriages. In racialist countries such biological *amalgamation* would be prohibited by law. Policies of assimilation simplify the social structure and when successful, eliminate danger points to social peace. Homogeneity is, however, achieved at the price of cultural impoverishment, as previously defined.

The structural sociologists should in time be able to advise on policies: Which steps are likely to lead to an abatement of communalism? What are the social consequences of a policy of bi-lingualism? What repercussions would a policy of equal pay for equal work have? Can social security schemes designed for one group be generalised to all groups of a stratified society and what will the effect of that be on stratification? Should social organisations incorporate heterogeneous social elements and will these organisations work? What degree of cultural autonomy can be granted in a situation in which assimilation is desirable? What natural divisions in society are best fitted to promote a high standard of living? There have been long discussions between those who favour industrial unions rather than craft unions as a principle of structural organisation of labour. The problems of devolution of power to local units is given a new aspect in a period in which nationalisation questions are on the agenda. Social services have derogated some of the functions of the family. Is it useful to ask how the family unit can be strengthened? Technical considerations favour an organisation of a national air force on functional lines, but this detaches the "commands" from the regional loyalties upon which army regiments have been built with popular success. In most administrative problems the efficiency of central organisation and of coordination must be balanced against the cultural values expressed in local and regional attachments.

In the sphere of policy the structural analyst makes recommendations on departmental arrangements; the separation of powers or their combination; the increase of cohesion or "openness" of a group and the best use of spatial and physical conditions. The analyst may wish to learn from the success of closely knit island societies and deliberately plan for a certain degree of "nucleation" with hard outlines. The tension that lies between differentiated structures has been so well illustrated by the "frontier" thesis of American analysts and may be creatively exploited. Besides recognising that structural conflicts are in part the expression of alternative solutions starting from different natural conditions which have not yet found a proper attunement, the mind must remain open to explore the possibilities of a "polytonal" composition as a means of reach-

ing to the full depths of the potentialities of the human scene. Policy making on this level becomes a task of orchestration with widely different instruments and individual "tonal" contributions.

III

In such diverse fields as æsthetics, political science and town planning, problems of social organisation are offering fields of investigation. How much we actually *know*—and not merely believe we know—about these matters is doubtful. Societies have acted on their intuition and "general experience" rather than on the basis of sociological analysis, except when the problems have been small and compact. An exception are Marxist countries which claim to have ordered their group relationships and even their administration according to Marx's sociology and its further development by Lenin. Marxism is considered a scientific analysis because it is able to its own satisfaction to define the structural principles of each society, and extrapolate the likely future of the society from past social changes.

Marxism is remarkable among all the attempts at structural analysis for its success as the ideology of a powerful movement. Each epoch and social class has thrown up its own "ideologues" who have interpreted history in their own image, but Marxism to some extent preceded the modern revolutionary movements and is at its most forceful in countries very different from the industrial societies which Marx expected to be the first to acknowledge his analysis. In these technically backward countries and plural societies, where Marxism has gained a foothold, the analysis becomes a forcing house in which these societies try to divest themselves of "irrational" plural divisions. Where the "cultural" elements tend to impede technical progress and where vertical divisions according to region, nationality, religion and race overshadow the modern horizontal class issues, Marxism represents that structural approach which is most useful in cutting through the tangle of these divisions, because it reduces all political problems to class problems.

Sociology to Karl Marx is designed to hasten the emancipation of mankind from institutions and divisions which obstruct

man's proper business, i.e., the conquest of nature and a rapid raising of technical knowledge to a state when man would have overcome scarcity, social conflicts and the need for oppressive authority. Marx was interested in many structural schemes such as were produced by Europe's invasion of the colonial world; the ancient struggle between town and country; or the primacy or independence of Church and State.[1] However, in his theory these become secondary considerations relatively unimportant in the universal struggle waged around the distribution of the social dividend. The modern class struggle is the sharpest expression of the underlying *motif* of human history, according to the *Communist Manifesto* which begins with the lines:

"The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebean, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes."

To simplify in this manner the historical process was to Marx's mind all the more justifiable since the various "vertical" divisions into nationalities, religious groups, occupational demarcations were bound to be absorbed by the relentless progress of the capitalist economy and the sharpening of the class conflict. Disturbing factors and local modes in which the economic conflicts found expression were not to be ignored, possibly exploited by revolutionary parties, but they eventually were to be shed as an unnecessary disguise of the real questions. Marx and the class-conscious proletariat by pointing out the economic core contained in any structural issue, were hastening the passing of "irrational" loyalties. For to stress the "priority of finding a living" would, Marx felt, educate man and make him more rational. It united the human race which

[1]Marx would tease those socialists who demanded the immediate "abolition" of nations. He pointed out to them that they were demanding this abolition each in his own national tongue. He also severely criticised Lassalle for "betraying the struggle to the Junkers and Prussians" because Lassalle "soft-pedalled" the exploitation of the peasantry. Engels wrote to Marx, 6th February, 1865: "In a predominantly agricultural country it is base to confine oneself to attacks on the bourgeois exclusively in the name of the industrial proletariat."

shares, however much culturally and otherwise divided, the need for food, shelter and other necessities. As soon as the productive classes had discovered the truth of the Marxist analyses, they would in fact unite and drop their chains. "When this occurs, the world wakes to the fact, that it has long possessed a dream, which must only be realised in full consciousness to make it come true."[1]

A planned society does away with inequalities and confusions. Freely associated, organised for plenty, and using any surplus production for the benefit of society, men would at last be able to realise their individuality. Both structural and cultural, economic and social, considerations would be reduced to a subordinate position in men's thinking. The preoccupation with power and wealth would give pride of place to man's concern with truth. The rational society would recognise in its cultural creations its own handiwork. The cumbrous superstructure would be simplified. Things cease to be fetishes; the only "magic" would be that of human creativeness. Structural division would disappear as would ultimately the division of labour: a highly efficient society dispenses with narrow specialisation. Writing with the radical twist that he gave to his pronouncements in his early work, Marx said: "The question is not the Liberation, but the Abolition of Labour."[2] The structural analysis when it raises the question of efficiency and human fulfilment leads to the analysis of human needs, of the standards of technical achievement most concordant with human needs and the manner in which men have at intervals and partly through their predatory and antagonistic activities, realised their advancement as *individuals*. The structural analyst hands over at this point to those concerned with the investigation of human needs, with group analysis and with the development of society.

Structural analysis points beyond its own limits. On the last page of the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx puts before the communist the obligation to transcend the narrow loyalties of his occupation and locality and build a class movement. However, Marx was in the final resort interested not in class, but in the

[1]K. Marx: *Nachlass*, Berlin, 1919, Vol. I, p. 392.
[2]"Sanct Max." *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*, Moscow, 1927, Vol. V, p. 185.

cooperative system in which class had no meaning. Class is a stultifying force. It is a mark of man's immaturity to be grouped into classes. He speaks in derogatory terms about class divisions as so many frustrations. His exasperation expresses itself even in descriptive passages like the following:

"The class achieves an independent existence over and against the individuals in such a manner that the latter find their conditions of existence predestined and hence have their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their class and become subsumed under it."[1]

All that is demanded of the functional analyst is sympathy and insight into the cultural pattern he is examining, but the structural analyst usually requires something more. He should reach beyond theory. He should be a man of the world with a realistic appreciation of power and strategy. This requirement was sharply stressed by Lenin's party which claimed, and gained, pre-eminence in the councils of the Marxist movement not because its leaders controlled the Red Army and a large country, but because they had acquired practical knowledge "through suffering, by a half-century of unprecedented torments and sacrifices, of unprecedented revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study, testing in practice, disappointments, checking, and comparisons with European experience."[2] The integrity of the structural analyst, in Lenin's opinion, was beset by the corroding influences of his bourgeois environment. Only a disciplined party could gain the necessary intellectual toughness which would resist the "small commodity producers" who

"encircle the proletariat on every side with a petty bourgeoisie atmosphere which permeates and corrupts the proletariat and causes constant relapses among the proletariat into petty bourgeois spinelessness, disintegration, . . . and alternative moods of exaltation and dejection . . . The strictest centralisation and discipline are required in the political party of the proletariat in order to counteract this."[3]

Neither Marx, Lenin nor most of the other sociologists working on this level went beyond the structural problems:

[1]K. Marx: *The German Ideology*, New York, 1933, p. 49.
[2]N. Lenin: *Left-wing Communism an Infantile Disorder*, London, 1942, p. 9.
[3]*Ibid.*, p. 27.

they did not minutely enquire into the manner in which technical efficiency or personal liberty is increased in societies. It was Marx's belief that the wage demands of workers automatically increase efficiency because they force capitalists to instal machines in their stead and also because workers with a higher standard of living are more intelligent. He left it at that. By giving the workers the theoretical tools for them to organise a mass movement which could enforce wage increases, Marx felt he was contributing to technical efficiency. He also hoped to be preparing a new man, one to outstrip limited sectional interests by repeating that every advance in structural understanding involves for the proletariat a step beyond the limitations of the class position, and the clarification of the historic mission of man. However, since the days of Marx and Lenin special investigations, organised on a different level of thought, have been conducted into the problem of productivity. The level of analysis which makes the problem of "human needs and standard of social performance" the centre of its thought, will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

The Measurement of Human Needs

The analysis has so far concentrated on the nature and the working of a system of society. Another analysis probes the efficiency with which these systems meet human needs considered essential to social well-being. This approach is more teleological, technical and economic. It asks "to what extent" rather than "why". Throughout the previous chapters the problem of need was mentioned, but it was always submerged by other considerations. It has a separate place in social analysis. In discussions between a social worker and the mother of a poverty-stricken family, the social worker will often be heard to say, "Your Johnny must be taken away and properly looked after; he's starved and lousy." (That's what he needs.) The mother replies: "But he's *my* Johnny." (That's to whom he belongs.) The functional-structural analysis is represented in the mother's reply, while the "analysis of needs", to which we now turn, is contained in the social worker's recommendation.[1] This level of analysis furnishes objective purposes, targets and standards for society to live by.

A modern economist might approach society with the programme of full employment, and ask himself whether the system is so constituted that it will absorb the country's total manpower unaided. Full employment is his "datum" and he may come to the conclusion that certain controls must be retained so that the economic system is kept to the standard he has set. The social investigator may accept certain basic minima of life as essential to human dignity and devise means to raise everyone to this level. When in the depths of the slums he finds a substandard class of workers, trying to eke out an existence in conditions so oppressive that they cast a shadow over the whole society, he proposes reforms. If he finds that the

[1]The discussion of society in terms of purpose comes natural to professional persons. A recent text-book written for medical students opens with the sentence: "We may define Society as the association of human beings for common defence against the hazards of life and for the exploitation in the interests of human well-being of the natural resources of the world." (J. D. Kershaw: *An Approach to Social Medicine*, London, 1946, p. 1.)

building industry requires subsidies by the state in order to provide houses for the lower income groups, who cannot afford economic rents, he will calculate the cost. The public health worker will enquire into the level of hygiene necessary to eliminate preventable disease. Together they are concerned with human needs and standards, their objective measurement and their administrative organisation. In a wider context, the analysis of needs establishes a case either to the effect that the society is already sufficiently productive to "afford" the standards demanded, or that improvements will further raise the general level of society, so that they constitute a social investment programme, which does not only provide a fuller life for a section of the population, hitherto neglected and down-trodden, but a fuller life for all.

I

The structural analyst characterises a social organisation by defining precisely its component classes. The analyst of needs attaches to these classes numerical values. His is a quantitative analysis, which begins with the problem of proportioning of numbers and means. Thus the 19th century was haunted by the fear of over-population. The Malthusian theory, persuasively but to us inadequately documented by statistics, predicted an inevitable decline of living standards as increasing populations struggled for a share in the produce of an exhausted agriculture. Though new land was put under the plough, new generations multiplied. The limited vacant lands would eventually come to an end, bringing famine and decline of numbers in its wake until the balance was redressed. The legislature, faced with this ominous prospect called for "an account of the population of Great Britain and of the increase and decrease thereof" in a Bill, which passed all stages of the House of Commons without opposition. The first census was conducted in 1801, and was carried out by the "Overseers of the Poor" and the parish clergy. After special superintendent registrars had been appointed under the subsequent Registration Act concerning the further official notification of births, deaths and marriages, the administration of the decennial

census, was still paid for out of the poor rates, so that there was from the first a close connection between the analysis of needs and social administration and statistics, though no more was intended with the census than a record of what was actually happening. Reforms and intervention were expressedly ruled out of the discussion by current social theory. The very pressure of information, however, changed the public mind.

The census and the figures on mortality, morbidity and fertility became to the analyst of human needs what a trigonometrical survey was to the civil engineer. Generalisations about society can now be checked against the fundamental figures. Local incidences can be compared. The spectacular individual case can be seen in its just proportion. The composition of a sample can be tested for its representativeness of the entire population. Rates can be "standardised." A disquietening increase in delinquency may be no more than expected at constant rates of crime in a growing population. A pessimistic interpretation of social trends may prove to be contradicted by vital statistics, objective measuring rods of social progress. In 1849, the mean expectation of life was 41 years, a century later it was 61 years for males and 65 years for females. Infantile mortality has dropped from 118.2 per 1,000 live births in the period 1911–14 to 34 in 1948. Divisions of births, marriages and deaths by causes, locality, occupational groups and other categories provide clues for the research worker and the administrator of the interrelationship of many seemingly unconnected occurrences. The local rate of population growth is of interest to the town planner and the industrialist. Crime and divorce and other indices of "social pathology" show the viability of social institutions. They also raise questions of the meaning of the statistics in terms of human suffering and the concrete situation which the figures reflect.

The limitation of census-work and registrations lies in the all-inclusive and nation-wide character of these statistics. Field investigations with specific problems in mind soon become necessary. Once set in motion, the analysis of needs makes rapid progress. We find that the first intensive enquiry into living habits with a proper field technique was undertaken by Édouard Ducpétiaux who collected the family budgets of 153

Belgian families. Building on this work, Frédéric Le Play visited selected families in France, Belgium, Austria and many other European countries as well as the French colonies and China. Le Play lived in the homes of the families he studied. The family budget was to him an index of family life, a cardiograph of its social health. The income and expenditure accounts of the family stood as much in the centre of its life as the annual budget of Parliament governed political life. All important aspects of the family found their place sooner or later in the expenditure patterns. The quality of the home could be diagnosed by examining range and quantitative distribution of the various items and classes of expenditure. Thrift, vicarious enjoyment, the attention given to non-material values, all these were mirrored in the budget. The social assets and the cultural status were contained in it, as well as the consequences of its material affluence.

Like the early population enquiries Le Play was not concerned with reform. Higher wage-levels did not spell to him, in any automatic way, social improvement and progress. It is "a generally low level of consumption (that) rather tends to discipline a people in the social practices essential to well-being."[1] Rapid change is apt to unsettle folks, whereas an ordered system of accounts is kept when frugal housekeeping is necessary. A rising standard of living may lead people astray and prodigality will be the consequence: gains in comfort are often made at the expense of spiritual well-being, and are thus lopsided. Since it is an easier matter to raise material standards than to create spiritual achievements, the wise statesman will display a halting and cautious disposition when he hears the siren calls of the reformer. Le Play's conservative, almost Confucian, cast of mind was consistent in that he did not spare the rich:

"The depraved upper classes abandon themselves to all kinds of irregularities, inspired by their sensual passions and selfish interests. Seized now and then by a kind of vertigo, they yield, in contradiction to their most evident interests, to the propagation of error and destruction. We find them, in their speeches and writing, as well as by their actions, sapping the foundations of religion, the family

[1]Quoted by C. C. Zimmerman: *Consumption and Standards of Living*, London, 1936, p. 44.

sentiments, the traditions of the hierarchy and, in general, the ideas and sentiments which hitherto had made the strength of society."[1]

Yet far from slowing down change by his teachings, Le Play's work hastened it. He would have been puzzled to learn that family budget enquiries soon became an instrument of wage agitation and adjustments. Instead of giving more weight to the family institution, as was his intention, his work has culminated in the extensive provision of social securities by the public authorities which before were the age-old obligation of the family unit. Le Play saw in the family an index of the solidity of a civilisation. He treated society as a family writ large, and did not enquire into the structural relationships which tied individual families to the community in which they functioned. His pupil de Tourville widened the scope of the surveys at a time when numerous tendencies in art and literature were converging upon the same examinations. Zola, for instance, carefully studied, in the field so to speak, the interconnections of family, home environment, heredity and morals. Journalists began to give "close-ups" of urban life. Mayhew's excellent *London Labour and the London Poor* appeared in 1861 in four volumes. The decisive step was, however, made by Charles Booth, the Liverpool shipowner, in his social survey of the East End of London.

Booth was disturbed by the socialist agitation of the day with its terrible stories of suffering among the poor. His street-by-street survey was to enumerate the families of the working classes of London, classify them according to their structure, occupation and their state of poverty. He wanted to obtain a statistical figure which expressed the amount of poverty prevalent in London. He used census material, but also knew how inadequate it was. So elementary a division as occupation was very inadequately classified. Under "builders" he found employers, manual workers, superannuated, and those who had entered the trade only as a temporary make-shift.[2] Personal

[1] F. Le Play: *L'Organisation du Travail*, Paris, 1893, p. 26.

[2] Booth made a painstaking analysis of occupational statistics in the series of census reports from 1841 to 1881. Owing to the changes in classification of persons and industries adopted by successive Registrars General the scientific result of this analysis was disappointing.

observation was indispensable and wholesale interviewing of social leaders was undertaken with a view to obtaining a profile sketch of each family in the area. A family with an income of between eighteen shillings and twenty-one shillings per week was considered "poor", while those who fell below that standard were "very poor".

The number who lived below the "poverty line" amounted to 30 per cent. of all the people living in the area covered.

This figure came as a shock to complacent Victorian England. The great dock strike of 1889 had given dramatic publicity to the straits of some of the workers, and Booth's statistics by their very sobriety deepened the impression. He showed that charity as a practical instrument of relief had proved ineffective. On the other hand, it was clear that the socialists were overstating their case, when they claimed that the entire working class was living in want. Half of it enjoyed relative comfort and security. Local prejudice was articulate about the "blackleg" activities of rural labour, recently migrated into the dock area, but Booth showed that the accusations were unfounded. Aliens too were coming to London at a much slower rate than bias was willing to admit. Booth revealed another fact which struck at the heart of 19th century social philosophy. Malthus was wrong after all on the showing of the figures. Booth found that the poorest had the largest families, and that those who were among the more well-to-do had smaller numbers of children. Malthus's law of a proportional increase of births and survivals with each increase in wealth was proved to be untrue. Booth broke "the spell of helplessness that tries everyone." Hitherto it had always been felt that

> " the wage earners . . . are *helpless* to regulate or obtain the reward of their work; the manufacturer or dealer can only work within the limits of competition; the rich are *helpless* to relieve want without stimulating its sources; the legislature is *helpless* because the limits of successful interference by change of law are closely circumscribed."[1]

"It was certainly due to his statistical investigations and incessant propaganda", wrote Beatrice Webb many years later, "more than to any other factor that the Old Age Pensions Act

[1]C. Booth: "The Inhabitants of Tower Hamlet (School Board Division)" in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, London, 1887, Vol. 50, p. 376.

was passed in 1908, to be greatly enlarged and extended in 1911, 1919, and 1924."[1] Moreover, the education which work with Booth offered to his collaborators, Beatrice Webb among them, made skilled personnel available for the framing and administration of new legislation, e.g., the statistician who was most closely associated with Booth, found himself, in 1906–10, initiating and organising the first network of State Labour Exchanges and later the first Unemployment Insurance Scheme. The Social Survey had focused attention on the need to make the openings known to the workers which existed in industry. The labour exchanges were an immediate answer. However, Booth saw further and was determined to diagnose the root evil, as he thought, the source of poverty. "The disease", Booth had written, "from which society suffers is the unrestricted competition in industry of the needy and the helpless." It was in "Class B" that he finally found the mainspring of social ills, and "the entire removal of this very poor class out of the daily struggle of existence is, I believe, the only solution to the problem."[2]

Class B against whom Booth directs so much of his fire is the class of "shiftless, hand to mouth, pleasure loving, and always poor" persons, in whom he catches the glimpse of another culture living incongruously in the midst of the thrifty and disciplined working men as alien to these as they are to Booth. They are shunned by all as a seat of infection:

"To work when they like, and play when they like, is their ideal. Many circumstances constrain men to this life, or prevent them from leaving it when once adopted. . . . They cannot stand the regularity and dullness of civilised existence, and find the excitement they need in the life of the streets or at home as spectators of, or participators in, some highly coloured domestic scene. There is drunkenness amongst them . . . but drink is not their special luxury as with the lowest class, nor is it their passion as with a portion of those with higher wages and irregular but severe work."[3]

Class B is a typical phenomenon of a metropolis which is also an important port town. It did not take long to find a research worker who investigated the extent, cause and conditions of poverty in a provincial inland town. B. Seebohm Rowntree, the

[1] B. Webb: *My Apprenticeship*, London, 1938, Vol. II, p. 303.
[2] C. Booth: *London Life and Labour*, London, 1889, Vol. I, p. 162.
[3] C. Booth: "The Inhabitants of Tower Hamlets," *op. cit.*, p. 329.

well-known chocolate manufacturer, began his study of York in 1899. He observed that poverty was as prevalent in York as it was in London despite the absence of Class B in large numbers. Rowntree's survey broke new ground in other respects, by improving on Booth's "poverty line", which in Booth's hands was a rather rough tool of investigation. In the York enquiry "the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency" were calculated on the basis of detailed study. Rowntree allowed 3,500 calories per day for a grown man and 2,700 for a woman with appropriate reductions for the children. Estimates of the barest expenditure on clothing and household sundries were obtained in consultation with a large number of working class families. Fuel and light were assumed; they were small items in comparison with expenditure on food and rent. All items were priced at the "lowest practicable cost" in the open market, although it was recognised that "to select a diet that is at once as nutritious and as economical as that which is here adopted as the standard" was beyond the ken of the ordinary poor person.[1] There was one exception to the requirement for "lowest practical market cost": rent was allowed for on the basis of actual rents paid, as working class people had no real choice of housing, of which then as now there was an acute shortage.

Rowntree distinguished between "primary poverty" caused by an insufficiency of income, and "secondary poverty" which existed among families with an income above the poverty line, but who for other reasons were in want. Rowntree established the "poverty cycle" of the average working class family. At three junctures in his life is the working man threatened with want: as a child in a large family: as a married man when children arrive and until they begin to contribute to the family exchequer: and in retirement when the children have their own families to support.[2] There are other periods in his life in

[1] B. S. Rowntree: *Poverty; A Study in Town Life*, London, 1922, p. 137.

[2] "I think that 52.5 per cent. probably comprises practically the whole of the working class population who pass any part of their lives in poverty." B. S. Rowntree: *Poverty and Progress*, London, 1942, p. 157. "The best earning age of a worker is the period between forty and fifty or more exactly, when his children live with him, while already working. . . . Later, he begins to take it easy, and his strength gradually decreases, while his children leave him one by one, and the shadow of poverty again creeps over his home." F. Zweig: *Labour, Life and Poverty*. (Prepared for the Rowntree Trust), London, 1948, p. 15.

which he lives in relative ease. The corollaries of poverty were discussed and a picture drawn of housing, leisure time activities, health and education at different income levels.

The surveys were repeated in the same locality after a lapse of time. The great advantage of quantitative research was its hard and definite character, its explicit nature, and carefully explained methodology. A. L. Bowley undertook an investigation into poverty in five provincial towns before 1914 and repeated his surveys in the same places in 1923–24 after various social legislation had come into force. He published his new survey under the title: *Has Poverty Diminished?*—a question to which he could give an affirmative answer. Poverty, as measured by the poverty line, had decreased to one-half of its pre-1914 proportions, and this in a period of large-scale unemployment. The reasons for the improved position were to be found in the wage increases won especially by the unskilled workers; the operation of the Trade Boards Act; better industrial organisation; minimum wages in certain industries; also better general education had made itself felt. There were cost-of-living allowances, equal for all wage earners but helping most materially the lowly paid workers, for whom they meant a substantial increment. Another reason was the decline in the size of the working class family. Family demands had come down to meet the level of income by family limitation. The average number of children reared by a mother born in the years 1841–45 had been 5.71, while there was an average of 3.37 live births among women marrying in the period 1900–09. Those marrying in 1920–24 recorded, according to the recent Report of the Royal Commission on Population, only 2.40 live births. Repeat surveys were undertaken by Rowntree himself in York and by the London School of Economics in London. Social Surveys were made of many towns, almost all of them devoted to the study of poverty and the characteristic nature of certain problem groups. In the 'thirties poverty decreased further. The Bristol Survey in 1937 found 11.9 per cent. of families living in want; the Birmingham Survey in 1939 found 14 per cent. of the families investigated living in want.

II

The analysis of needs draws attention to those classes of the population who by their own efforts are seemingly unable to improve their lot. Trade Unionism had organised first the skilled and at a later stage the broad masses of the working class. There remained, however, groups of "sweated" workers, spending long hours in atrocious conditions, who were untouched by the unions. Moreover, the sick, the aged, and other clearly definable groups had to be more adequately cared for than was possible under the old Poor Laws. The "poverty line" gave an expeditious means of calculating minimum needs; and the quantitative surveys generally permitted a break-down of the over-all problem and an assessment of the costs of differentiated assistance schemes.

In 1890, a Select Committee of the House of Lords confirmed many of the old allegations that had been made about "sweated labour". In 1906, the Board of Trade made an independent enquiry. Another Select Committee was asked to report, but in 1909, a new departure in *industrial legislation* was heralded by the passing of the Trade Boards Act with powers to fix wages in trades, in which low wages were customary, after taking evidence from all interested parties. Soon the limitations which restricted the scope of the Act were dropped. In 1912, a national strike in the mining industry was called and the Coal Mines (Minimum Wages) Act contributed largely to the termination of the dispute. It guaranteed to the underground miner on piece work a minimum income, and similar legislation was introduced for other industries as the years went by. During the Great War, cost-of-living allowances were introduced, based on family budget studies made in the manner of Le Play.

At the same time expenditure on the social services increased. At the end of the 19th century the Poor Law, free elementary education and a limited amount of hospital accommodation in cases of lunacy and those suffering from infectious diseases, were the only forms of public provision for the assistance of the individual citizen. Charity societies, of which there were many, acted as buffers for some deserving cases, but the State would not itself provide for the needy, except in the

last emergency and under deterrent conditions. The social surveys and the Royal Commissions, investigating how the individual looked after himself and his family through all the ups and downs of life, showed that much distress was present. The public schemes which were inaugurated in this century to compensate for loss of earnings through unemployment, sickness and death of the main wage earner signalised a radical change in sentiment and opinion. Poverty no longer incurred the suspicion of personal culpability. By pronouncing unemployment a risk against which workers should insure, the belief that worklessness constituted some form of industrial malingering was condemned to ridicule by the legislature.[1] The experiences made with these early forms of social insurance provided the foundation for more elaborate schemes at a later stage.

Insurance schemes depend on the inertia of large numbers and are well suited to meet the individual contingencies of the ordinary man living in a stable, large society where records are available.[2] The earliest life insurance, of which reports survive, dates from the year 1583. In those days insurance was restricted to certain small classes of persons and covered only short periods. Organised communal fire insurance, which appeared in England early in the 18th century, is more in the line of a development which, in our day, has led to a vast network of schemes. A stable culture which has clearly articulated social subdivisions, makes it possible to insure the continuity of income. Insurances replace earnings "when they are interrupted by unemployment, sickness or accident; to provide for retirement through age; to provide against loss of support by the death of another; and to meet exceptional expenditure such as those connected with birth, death and marriage."[3] To-day,

[1]In point of fact unemployment is not a "risk" for which actuarial provision can be made, as the many changes in Unemployment Insurance have shown.

[2]Because the records had not been collected the benefit schemes of the Trade Unions were at first assailed as actuarially unsound. When a strike ensued support for the participants constituted a first charge on the unions' funds. Nevertheless the unions continued their schemes, thereby making membership more attractive, restricting the tendency to form break-aways, and impressing obstinate employers with their resources. In fact, so much did they value this method of enforcing the "solidarity of labour" that, in their evidence before the Aged Poor Commission of 1895 they vigorously opposed the suggestion of a State contributory old age pension.

[3]*Social Insurance and Allied Services*. Report by Sir W. Beveridge, London, 1942, Cmd. 6404, par. 300.

State insurance covers all the basic contingencies of life; national assistance caters for special cases of want; and voluntary schemes make additional provisions. These provisions are the culmination of the analysis of needs. "Social Security" makes explicit in terms of legislation and administration, at what is only hinted in a general and qualitative way by the cultural and structural analyses of a society, viz., that men in organised societies have the capacity of achieving certain standards of welfare for themselves and their children.

III

The importance of the Beveridge Plan and of most recent legislation in Britain consists in the comprehensiveness of the survey; the unification of administrative responsibility; and the clarity with which the various classes of need are distinguished.[1] Social security is seen against a wider background of social and economic policy. In the past

> "each problem has been dealt with separately with little or no reference to allied problems. The first task of the Committee has been to attempt for the first time a comprehensive survey of the whole field of social insurance and allied services, to show just what provision is now made and how it is made for many different forms of need."[2]

The analysis of needs necessarily leads to a positive policy of conservation of the society's real resources. Forests, the fertility of the soil, natural beauty spots represent assets which society cannot afford to waste. It would be folly to insist on personal needs and forget the needs of the nation. Moreover, the scale of social services depends on the state of the national wealth and its further growth. The services have to be related to national income, full employment, general health, and a population with a plentiful supply in the productive and younger age groups.

[1] In its survey the Committee found many inconsistencies: "An adult insured man with a wife and two children receives 38s. per week should he become unemployed; if after some weeks of unemployment, he becomes sick and not available for work, his insurance income falls to 18s. On the other hand, a youth of 17 obtains 9s. when he is unemployed, but should he become sick his insurance income rises to 12s. per week." (Par. 4.)

[2] *Ibid.*, par. 3.

They are dependent on, and contributory to, the maintenance of a high level of productivity and the avoidance of waste factors such as unemployment and a high bill of ill-health.

Budgetary policy, the national health service, family allowances, the Royal Commission on Population and its recommendations, are associated aspects of the same approach to public affairs. The related concepts of *labour productivity* and of *man power* which a society requires to maintain itself and to expand technically, socially and culturally, supply the analysis with its natural theoretical focus. It is well expressed in the interpretation of health as something more than the absence of disease. The healthy nation has a surplus of energy and vitality and is so organised, that it does not find its outlet in aggressive and anti-social avenues, but in the raising of the productive powers of each individual. A society is healthy if it provides new levels of accomplishment for each group contained in it. At its best it reinforces the power of the culture of a whole, and revitalises men's minds by turning them from the struggle over the disposal of scarce goods to the abolition of scarcity and the production of plenty, as part of which the quantitative analysis will calculate the burden of ill-health to society. A pre-war figure puts the cost to Britain at £300 million per annum; the £6 per head of population do not express the human costs of suffering. The number of working weeks lost by insured persons claiming sickness benefit amounted in 1935 to 30,000,000 working weeks. This figure takes no account of illnesses lasting less than four days on which no claims would be registered, or of sickness of earners of more than £5 per week, then not insured.[1] Further expenses are also incurred in the case of rehabilitation; and an interruption of work usually means a loss in speed on resumption of work. Sometimes the person who has been invalided must be entirely retrained. The link between poverty and ill-health is a very close one. Poverty is caused by prolonged ill-health, and in turn poverty causes ill-health and makes prevention more difficult. From military figures we know that physical deterioration of the population takes alarming proportions. In 1920, the Ministry of National

[1] *Britain's Health.* Report prepared by Political and Economic Planning, London, 1939, Chapter I.

Service published its reports which found that 41 per cent. of the men examined in 1918 were in a C3 condition, although they were, when called up, in the prime of their life. In 1935, no fewer than 62 per cent. of prospective recruits were below the comparatively modest standard of physique required by the Army.

The above approaches to man power problems and to the issue of health has been greatly facilitated by the discoveries in the sphere of nutrition and by advances in environmental medicine. They have supplied the same kind of simply calculated standards which the poverty line and family budget enquiries made possible in the sphere of social administration. To-day talk of malnutrition and the components of a balanced diet in calories, proteins, vitamins and minerals are so much the matter of daily conversation that it is forgotten how recent are the discoveries which provided the essential data for nutritional science. Rowntree was greatly in advance of his contemporaries in calculating a minimum food budget in nutritional terms: the Government *War Book*, compiled before 1914 to examine the various problems which would have to be attended to on the outbreak of hostilities, made no reference to the problem of nutrition. As late as 1916, the President of the Board of Trade had said that he "wanted to avoid any rationing of our people in food."

The relationship of food intake to work output was established first. The need of certain protective elements in food, the vitamins and minerals, to avoid deficiency diseases, was a discovery of the second decade of this century. Balanced diets which could command the full backing of nutritionists were soon put forward in the 'thirties by the British Medical Association, the Health Organisation of the League of Nations, and in America, by such authoritative workers as the Stiebeling Group. The menus made allowance for the economies, of which the housewife in the lower income brackets must never lose sight. Just how far the poorer classes could afford a balanced diet was the subject of a major social enquiry conducted by Sir John Boyd Orr. Analysing 1,152 family budgets, nearly half of which were collected for his enquiry, and making a number of statistical extrapolations, Orr found that less than one-half

of the British people were not in a financial position to buy sufficient foodstuffs to meet an optimum diet. His calculations, disquietening to the public mind which had been well prepared on this subject, were checked against the information available on wages, on the size of families, on the total consumption of food, and on health data and average physique available in many quarters. A body of experts were asked to verify Orr's conclusions and report to the Minister of Health. The Statistical Sub-Committee of this Advisory Committee on Nutrition accepted them as "likely to be in accordance with the facts."[1]

Experiments on the effects of additional food supply were made. School children receiving one pint of milk in their daily diet over a period of one to three years gained 2.63 inches in height and 3.13 pounds in weight over a similar group who were not given any additional allowance of milk.[2] Another test on 1,500 elementary schoolchildren in seven Scottish towns showed that those children who were given supplementary milk gained 0.52 pound a month in weight and 0.21 inches in height as compared with a control group, not in receipt of the supplement, who gained only 0.42 pound and 0.17 inches during the same period of months.[3] Public schoolboys recruited from the homes of the middle and upper classes are taller and heavier than the Council School children from poorer homes. Anthropomorphic measurements have shown that at every age the average height of professional men is two inches above the average of a comparable artisan group.[4] The number of working days in a sample factory lost by sickness was reduced by the supply of an extra half-pint of milk per day to the employees. There was a reduction of 31 per cent. in the absentee rates of 1,500 persons, owing to cold and respiratory diseases while receiving cod liver oil, in comparison with records for the

[1]Quoted in the Foreword to the second edition of *Food, Health and Income*, by J. B. Orr, London, 1937, p. 5. The balanced diet adopted by Orr was "a diet which will keep people in health. . . . The standard of health adopted is a state of well-being such that no improvement could be effected by a change in the diet." (p. 7.)

[2]H. C. C. Mann: *Report No.* 106 of the Medical Research Council, London, 1926.

[3]J. B. Orr: *British Medical Journal*, 1928, No. 1, p. 140.

[4]Quoted together with subsequent experiments by H. M. Vernon: *Health in Relation to Occupation*, London, 1939, pp. 145–146 and p. 291.

year prior to the experiment. At Port Sunlight, 100 employees were provided with free vitamins. From October, 1933, to March, 1934, they lost 1,555 hours through sickness, while another group, similar in composition but not supplied with the vitamin-containing food, lost 2,397 hours. Accidents were found to be correlated with the standard of health.

If health depends to some extent on the intake of food, certain lower limits must be adhered to if a consistently high work effort is to be maintained, but health also depends on the expenditure of energy and so a certain upper limit has to be accepted if overall output is not to suffer. The British Association for the Advancement of Science published its first report on the subject of fatigue in 1915. In 1916, the Committee on the Health of Munition Workers wrote the first of a remarkable series of papers which led to a limitation of hours of factory workers. In the flush of mistaken patriotic enthusiasm working hours had been prolonged in munition factories and it was found that the output per hour was not only relatively less than during the shorter working day, but after a period, began to fall absolutely, while absenteeism increased. It was found that sickness rates increase with the length of the continuous work period. In a fuse factory where a 12-hour shift was worked in the early days of 1914, a 10-hour shift was introduced and the accident rate of the women workers fell to a third of the previous rate.[1] Similar experiences were had during the recent war.[2]

The manipulation of the environment to satisfy the demands of human comfort is the next matter to which analysts addressed themselves. Cuts suffered by munition workers were found to be at a maximum at air temperatures of 47° to 55° F.; they fell swiftly as temperatures rose to 67°. After that point accidents

[1]H. M. Vernon: *Memorandum No. 21*. Health of Munition Workers Committee, 1918.

[2]The *Emergency Report No. 2* (February 6th, 1942) quotes a case of a factory instituting a 67½ hour week after the retreat from Dunkirk. Its sickness rate was 21 per 1,000 workers in June, 1940. The rate rose to 37 in July and to 47 in August, although by then the number of hours worked had been reduced to 60½. Two-thirds of the absentees were suffering from "nervous breakdowns". When the hours were further reduced to 57 per week figures fell to an average of 39 per 1,000 workers. This investigation is mentioned because it must not be assumed that there is any simple "linear correlation" between sickness and length of working day. The correlation is a complex one.

were more numerous.[1] Accidents are consequently also more frequent in the winter months, when in addition to the inclement weather and temperature conditions, much work is performed by artificial light. Errors in type-setting have been counted and compared with the strength of illumination, and it is observed that errata are more frequent under artificial light, except when it is at its brightest (24.5 foot-candles).[2] The Factory Act of 1937 embodies most of these research findings and the accumulated experience of previous factory legislation. Environment has to be appropriate to good work output and health, and this is no less true in the home, the street, the school and the hospital.

We know that slums are typified by high mortality rates and that infections may spread there to assume epidemic proportions. Overcrowding of persons in rooms and overcrowding of buildings in the neighbourhood are associated with so many evils that legislative initiative was taken relatively early. The Glasgow Police Act of 1862 provided that a one-apartment house had to be of a minimum capacity of 700 cubic feet. The subsequent pieces of legislation are noted for their greater stringency; the standard has been moving upwards almost with each new enactment. Once the wedge had been driven, more needs were observed and greater provision made for them. The standard leapt to 900 cubic feet in 1866. The Building Regulations of 1892 imposed 1,000 cubic feet. By 1935, the Housing Act made 1,440 cubic feet obligatory, more than double the initial standard. It laid down that no room may be of less than 400 cubic feet, and that two adults require, as a minimum, an air space of 880 cubic feet. A dwelling is also deemed overcrowded if two persons "ten years old or more, of opposite sexes, and not being persons living together as husband and wife, must sleep in the same room". This decency standard has, in turn, been criticised as too lax and many have felt that children of opposite sex should be separated before the age of ten.[3]

[1] E. E. Osborne and H. M. Vernon: *Report No.* 19. Industrial Fatigue Research Board.

[2] H. M. Vernon: *Accidents and their Prevention*, pp. 275–296.

[3] "It will be possible for a father, mother and three children under ten to occupy two rooms; and a father, mother and seven children under ten to occupy three rooms without being legally overcrowded, provided the rooms are not under 110 square feet." (Lord Balfour: "Overcrowding—a Bad Bill", in *Contemporary Review*, March 1935, p. 293.)

These Acts have more uses than the protection of health and morals. They prevent the creation of new slums. They permit the authorities to rationalise operations with regard to the mass production of parts, and so to reduce costs in planning, design and construction. The builder can now estimate with greater accuracy; the sponsoring authorities can supervise execution of the contracts; the worker can increase his efficiency through familiarity with repetitive operations; materials can be supplied in greater bulk; efforts of different authorities can be compared and the necessary mobility of labour and material ensured; furnishing industries can concentrate on a few good designs. Not only comfort and costs are taken care of, but also the social and æsthetic qualities of the home can be improved. Of late attention has shifted more and more to the investigation of the internal plan of the house. Analyses of the necessary furniture for healthful living were inaugurated with the Tudor Walter Report of 1918.[1] The Dudley Report of 1945 recommends on such matters as:

Food Storage: Space especially in rural houses should be on an ample scale and additional accommodation should be made available either in the house or in outbuildings. . . .

Fuel Storage: . . . The coal store should be capable of accommodating not less than 10 cwts. of coal, etc. In cottages and flatted houses main storage space for fuel should never be provided in the kitchen and wherever practicable the fuel store should be so designed and located that coal can be delivered from the outside and collected from inside the house, or alternatively should be located in an outbuilding.[2]

Representations were made by the public to the Dudley Committee that these improvements are worth paying for. The general public had accepted that in the future every family house should contain a general utility room in which washing can be done in such a manner, that "the steam does not circulate where the meals are prepared and the food stored".

[1] *Building Construction in Connection with the Provision of Dwellings for the Working Classes in England, Wales and Scotland, and on Methods of securing Economy and Dispatch in the Provision of such Dwellings*, London, 1918.

[2] *Planning our New Homes*. Report by the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee on the Design, Planning and Furnishing of New Houses, Edinburgh, 1945, paras. 140 ff.

This room can serve as a workroom for all "general purposes", where small repairs are executed by the family and the children exercise manual skills, which will be beneficial to them whatever their future walk of life. The analysis if pushed far enough, involves major questions of social living; it shapes, as much as it is shaped by, the culture traits of a society and the living habits of the different classes. The analysis of needs finds its fulfilment in a setting in which a civilisation can deploy its inherent powers. It communicates the sociological requirements of the inhabitant to the architect at the drawing board, so that environment is taken in hand, and the house and the factory made to serve man, rather than the reverse. From the primitive legislation on nuisances and the control of buildings and insanitary and inefficient structures to the marriage of design and social science is visible the single thread of quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Investigating the relationship of the environment to human needs also implies the planning of the different parts of the environment: of house to factory; of the road to both; of house, industry, and social services to open areas. There must be "shopping facilities; schools; churches; and the other communal buildings frequented in everyday life, so as to meet the practical needs and at the same time lead to a sense of neighbourliness among the families who go to live there."[1] A higher quality of life through proper facilities and the use of communal provisions; a greater measure of orderliness by bold articulation and grouping; a stress on community and social relationships; cultural acquisitions and health; a pleasing element of diversity and a subtle mixing of structural units, are among the ambitions voiced by well-known planners. The analyst fills in a map; he enters an area; he collects opinions; unifies and differentiates; and together with others conceives a plan which will work and enhance living. The Greater London Plan makes proposals for the regionalisation of the population over a wide area. The London County Council Plan sets itself the goal of using the existing open space and parks and the river to connect them all up so that it should be possible in the future to drive from one end of the metropolis to its very centre without leaving

[1] *Housing Manual*. H.M.S.O., London, 1944, p. 11.

greenlands.[1] The close-up views of the borough plans return to an analysis of streets and house types. In a classical description Charles Booth had already uncovered the layers of development which had confused the original layout of estates. "In many cases", Booth found in his day, "they (the old structures) are still standing, and between them on the large gardens of a past state of things, has been built the small cottage property of to-day. Houses of three rooms, houses of two rooms, houses of one room, houses set back against a wall, or back to back, fronting them may be a narrow footway, with posts at each end and a gutter down the middle. Small courts contrived to utilise some space in the rear, and approaches by an archway under the building. . . ."[2] Under the pressure of individual need, driven by economic forces never understood, the family, the builder, the road-building authority sprawled over the face of the land to the detriment of economic efficiency and careful housekeeping of the nation's limited resources. The plans of the social investigator are once more to harmonise human values, economics and social and environmental structure. Patrick Geddes, one of the pioneers of "civic surveys", spoke of the "conservative surgery" of the town planner and of the analyst of needs. Having analysed the "wisdom" of the culture, and of the body, a re-adjustment takes place. Instead of the "exhilarating quarrel" between neighbours in a slum, of which the Birmingham investigators quoted in Chapter IV speak,[3] or the "suffering, unprecedented torments and sacrifices, unprecedented revolutionary heroism and disappointments" of the Bolsheviki,[4] human beings are to be given, as a consequence of social analysis, a framework in which they can realise their inherent propensities to fashion for themselves a constructive

[1] "It is not possible to lay down exact figures of acreage per 1,000 population for these various forms of open space but as a general guide the following distribution is suggested: General playing fields, school playing fields, recreation and sport centres—two acres per 1,000 population. Large amenity parks, parkways, riverside pleasaunces, open space in industrial areas, and allotments—one and two-thirds acres per 1,000 population. Small amenity gardens and squares and children's local play centres, to be provided as redevelopment takes place—one-third acre per 1,000 population." (J. H. Forshaw and Sir P. Abercrombie: *County of London Plan*, London, 1943, p. 38.)

[2] C. Booth: *London Life and Labour*, Vol. I, p. 30.

[3] P. 95.

[4] See Chapter V, p. 118.

and pleasurable, and in the full sense of the words, healthful and helpful life. Thus a new field was discovered by the long line of investigators dating from the early Registrars General, which was never suspected by even the most gifted classical social students for whom John Stuart Mill still argued that they have "nothing to do with the consumption of wealth" because "we know of no laws of the consumption of wealth as the subject of a distinct science." No modern analyst could make such a statement.

CHAPTER VII

Human Relations

Any analysis of needs which neglected psychological factors and exhausted itself in establishing formulas of the optimum relationship of numbers to area; or of food intake to work output; or of health to environmental conditions would be incomplete. We know that a large number of absentees in a factory are neither organically ill nor congenitally "lazy", but suffer from nervous disabilities. We know that the best lighting arrangements and safety-first organisations still leave a number of individuals unprotected; they seem neurotically "accident prone". Furthermore, some children boarded out into enlightened homes, do not benefit by their new surroundings. The social worker who takes Johnny, because he is lousy and ill-fed, away from his mother may, in certain circumstances, deprive him of his last bit of security. Hence many claim that physical improvements are of subordinate importance, because the character of people is at fault:

> "Bad parents irrespective of their incomes, tend to select bad houses, as the money is often spent on other things. The saying that 'what is wrong with the poor is poverty' is not substantiated by these investigations, which show that the problem of a slum population is far more complex than such a statement would indicate. . . . The evidence gives too much rather than too little weight to the environmental factors which, theoretically at least it might be possible to remedy by economic adjustments."[1]

This may be an extreme view but "the most up-to-date plumbing equipment," as American sociologists repeat, "the most careful selection of materials, the greatest protection against fire and the best sanitary arrangements do not make housing a device for the carrying on of a normal families and social well being. Indeed the elements which make up family membership are so diversified that their consideration is as important as the structural aspects of safety and convenience."[2]

[1] D. N. Paton and L. Findlay: "Poverty, Nutrition and Growth in Scotland." *Medical Research Council Special Report Series No. 101*, London, 1926, p. 305.
[2] C. Aranovici: *Housing the Masses*, New York, 1932, pp. 261–262.

The analysis of human relationships throws light on these elements. It applies the central concepts found useful in the study of society at large to a smaller circle. Pattern, hierarchy, manpower and health can be again made the coordinating concepts, to which is added social control, personal growth and therapy. However, the analysis starts from a different vantage point. It is not the requirements of society or a technical problem of output and efficiency but the requirements of the personality which form the frame of reference. On this level, the individual is interpreted not as a passive object, but as a system with a dynamic of its own, responding in a complex manner to environment and projecting upon that environment some of its own difficulties and struggles.

The psycho-dynamic analysis with which we are concerned, registers the various fears and suspicions of the individual as he experiences them as a member of a group. Cooperation on which he depends may be withdrawn. He tries to win love, affection, and understanding and may fail to secure them. In a competitive struggle, he may lag behind and worry. As age creeps on he may fear to be surpassed by stronger elements and ultimately be pushed aside. In a moment of triumph he may sense another's envy. Where there is rapid change he may be bewildered, his adjustments, often acquired at great sacrifice and leaving much of his individuality unfulfilled, may prove too insecure to allow for further modifications. The very improvements in living standards, vitality and productivity over which the reformer waxes so enthusiastically may increase competitiveness unless new controls are developed. This branch of sociology will investigate these controls and the "efficiency" of groups in satisfying the individual's needs for reassurance, and conversely, the kind of fears the groups engender by the imposition of their controls and the sometimes harsh methods of achieving group unity and solidarity.

I

It was stated in the discussion on social structures that an effective means of knitting a number of individuals together is

to emphasise, e.g., what distinguishes them from others. The Communist will try to achieve the unity of the working class by unfolding the class struggle. The nationalist will discover a threat to the fatherland. However, the very element of crisis which is introduced into society endangers the sanity of its members and the continuation of many of its administrative agencies.[1] Therefore each movement has to make for cohesion without absorbing the private spheres too drastically. Groups differ in the manner they control their members. Unity may be "rationally motivated", a combination of like-minded individuals striving to realise some common goal and adjusting their means to the achievement of that goal, as in a deliberately formed political association, or they may be bound together by "subjective feeling, affection or tradition, a sort of bearing together,"[2] with no definite constitutional or administrative set-up to keep the group from disintegrating. Looked at in a different light, controls can be direct and positive (wealth, power, privileges are accorded to those who are able to meet the demands of the group); or indirect and positive (flattery, praise, honorific status, prestige); or direct and negative (punishments, ostracism, withdrawal of livelihood); and finally indirect and negative (gossip, threats, ridicule, name-calling). Controls can be overt (propaganda) or more individual and personal (persuasion through discussion). The analysis of these social controls was begun by the American sociologist E. A. Ross.[3] Their importance was soon recognised:

"From this point of view (of corporate action), social control is the central fact and the central problem of society. Just as psychology may be regarded as an account of the manner in which the individual organism, as a whole, exercises control over its parts . . .

[1]It is not suggested that conflict necessarily introduces an element of aggressiveness in each member of the affected groups. Its effect is rather that of increasing narrowness: "The members of every group are pervaded by a feeling that comes to consciousness in two ways. . . . Their group is more important than any other, and around it the whole world of values and facts congregates; their group is the final end of creation. All other groups the world can show and especially those somewhat similar, as well as all persons not members of any group, are in comparison with their own, utterly inferior." (A. Zweig: *Caliban oder Politik und Leidenschaft*. Berlin, 1927, p. 54.) This is particularly true of militant groups, and points to a sense of inferiority which is heightened and relieved at the same time by the group.

[2]M. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen, 1922, p. 14.

[3]E. A. Ross: *Social Control*, New York, 1901.

so sociology, speaking strictly, is a point of view and a method for investigating the process by which individuals are induced to cooperate in some sort of permanent corporate existence which we call society."[1]

Sociologists found that a group needs five conditions for its successful operation:

(1) Relatively long duration and relative continuity.
(2) Organisation based on division of function among its members.
(3) Neuropsychic patterns, symbolic of the group, present in its members.
(4) The growth of traditions and customs as the group grows older.
(5) Interaction with other plurality patterns."[2]

Groups must be recognised as such by others and by themselves. People, accidentally thrown together, merely form a crowd. Passengers on a ship are a crowd until activities are organised and the awareness of certain affinities and common interests develop a consciousness of community. Frequent interaction and conflict give rise to more permanent organisation, group leaders, associations and loyalties which may outlast the length of the journey. Beyond these concrete unities there are more abstract collectivities which permit people to speak of themselves as "owing" allegiance to Western Civilisation, to Science, or to Mankind. The more intimate groups are sometimes called "primary" or face-to-face relationships. Cooley suggests that on the effectiveness of these groups (the family, the neighbours, the circle of friends) "depends ultimately the growth of moral health".[3] They are the "transfer point of civilisation", the link between the wider society and the individual. In them men learn that they depend on group solidarity. At the same time, individuals acquire the wish to demonstrate their resistance to group demands. They hope to advance their distinct individual goals, impelled by internal urges, some of them unconscious. The analysis is raised

[1]R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chicago, 1926, p. 42.

[2]L. von Wiese and H. Becker: *Systematic Sociology*, New York, 1932, p. 490.

[3]C. H. Cooley: *Social Organization*, New York, 1909, pp. 23–31 *passim*.

to a new level of understanding as soon as it is seen that the individual is viewed as an active partner in "control".

Adjustments must be sounded for the "ambivalent" sentiments which surrounds them. A love-hate attitude is not only manifested by the individual towards certain necessary but irksome commands, but is to be traced in the most holy and sacred objects of affection. The Latin meaning of "sacer" stands for something that is hallowed and for things that are execrated. Personal relationships contain an antagonistic element: "Almost every intimate emotional relationship between two people which lasts for some time . . . leaves a sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility, which has first to be eliminated by repression."[1] Freud's psychology explores the clash of social demand and the vital energies of the individual as excited and fed by his body tensions or "libido". The libido can be moulded and repressed but never extinguished, it dies only with death. In fact, repression is never complete, that which is repressed suddenly makes its re-appearance in unexplained anger, in slips, in dreams, strange compulsions and anxieties, suggesting that the prohibited wishes have lain "dormant" in a secluded part of the personality. The personality is made up of certain patterns related in many contradictory ways to its group environment. External controls may become *excessive*, unless they are carefully mediated and translated into personally acceptable terms. The "ego" must safeguard its functioning by devising certain defence measures. Freud's daughter describes how psycho-analysis elaborated this central concept of defence:

"The term 'defence' . . . is the earliest representative of the dynamic standpoint in psycho-analytic theory. It occurs for the first time in 1894 in Freud's study 'The Defence Neuro-Psychosis' and is employed in this and several of his subsequent works . . . to describe the ego's struggle against painful or unendurable ideas or effects. Later this term was abandoned, and as time went on, was replaced by that of 'repression'. The relation of the two notions however, remained undetermined. In an appendix to 'Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety' (1926), Freud reverted to the old concept of defence, stating that he thought it would undoubtedly be an advantage to use it again, provided . . ."[2]

[1] S. Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, London, 1922, p. 54.
[2] A. Freud: *The Ego and the Mechanism of Defence*, London, 1937, p. 45.

The provision which Freud makes is that "defence" is not simply thought of as a repulsion of hostile forces, but that it is viewed as a dynamic process. It is not enough for the ego to develop a certain amount of toughness or to ignore untoward criticism. There is a "defence in depth" which may involve character distortions, injuries wrought on the self more damaging than the relatively harmless demands of the environment could ever have been. Paralyses, amnesias, anæsthesias, convulsions, phobias, are some of the terrifying contents of this Pandora's box of the mind. A study of the "defensive" actions under the magnifying glass of psychopathology leaves the analyst with a sorry opinion of the nature of man. Selfishness, it would appear, is "older than love, for it derives from the rejection of the outer world and its sensations by the narcissistic ego."[1] There is inborn in man "a drive towards the bad, aggression, destruction and hence cruelty."[2] Freud observes that the meekness and humility which certain melancholics show is a subtle stratagem of blaming others. Behind the self-effacing demeanour lurks hostility and anger, which can be seen when these patients blame themselves for the obvious characteristics resented among their environment, particularly the next of kin. The afflictions are calculated to evoke pity and attention which the patients do not feel capable of eliciting in any more direct manner.

The culture traits now appear in a new light, they are often makeshifts. They are temporary, more or less successful, solutions or rather truces in the "battle between Eros and Death, between the vital and destructive principles."[3] It was a slave-ship captain who wrote the hymn: "Sweet is the name of Jesus," and Marat while piling up execution orders vehemently denied that he was a cruel man: "They call me cruel and I cannot see a fly harmed."[4] Art, inventions, literature, jokes and fantasies are means by which the individual fights his environment, in a manner which the group cannot actively disapprove. He canalises his urges. "All disciplines, religion, morals, laws are

[1] S. Freud: *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vienna, 1924, Vol. V, p. 464.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 433.
[3] S. Freud: *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, Vienna, 1924, p. 87.
[4] Quoted by H. Cunow: *Die Parteien der grossen französischen Revolution und ihre Presse*, Berlin, 1912, p. 334.

desperate efforts to stem the destructive propensities of man."[1] To the individual they form essential supports, dams which contain his libido. In the analysis of the individual's quirks, attitudes, prejudices, the psycho-dynamic analyst enquires not whether he can explain them rationally, but why they are necessary to certain groups.

The individual usually cooperates with his society by "introverting" the demands made on him. He controls his less acceptable urges by despising them. External conventions are enshrined in the mind of the individual and made into watchdogs of the emotions. The conscience and the censorious qualities in man are called by Freud "the superego". When anxieties are increased and these internal mechanisms prove insufficient, hostilities towards society at large are often "projected" on some outside object. Hostility to some small group serves various needs both on the group and on the personal level.[2]

The lower-class American "negrophobe" sees, e.g., in the negro a person who first of all constitutes an economic threat: he is willing to work for low wages and accept inferior conditions. However, the negro also constitutes a social threat: he is socially impotent, ignorant, uncouth, just as, objectively, are the poor whites; the two groups may be compared by the well-to-do. By persecuting the negro, the white worker of little or no skill reduces the competition of the black unskilled worker, and flatters himself that he has established a solidarity with "White Civilisation". He manages to remind the well-to-do of his kinship. The upper-class negrophobe sees the negro as happy-go-lucky, shiftless, childlike, a person sexually potent and potentially aggressive. He feels fear and envy. The negro also may corrupt the morale of the workers. As a carefree group, the negroes are unwelcome reminders of the painful sacrifices which the more "successful" members have had to make to

[1] S. Freud: *Das Unbehagen*, p. 89.

[2] "In every known society there appears to exist a varying amount of 'free-floating aggression'. This is thought to be mainly the product of the painful restraints put upon all immature human organisms during the socialisation process and of the deprivations and frustration which are incident to adult social life in all societies." (C. K. M. Kluckholm: "Group Tensions" in *Approaches to National Unity*, Edited by L. Bryson, New York, 1945, p. 224.)

achieve power and status.[1] Oppressed and sullen they appear as the witnesses of the wrath to come.

The image of the negro is a contradictory one, and sometimes one, sometimes the other, aspect is pushed into the foreground of discussion. A similar duality characterises the image of the Jew in the demonology of the anti-semite. The historical symbolism of the Jews as the Chosen People and as the Christ-killers as well as their intermediary economic rôles and cultural diversity, make them an ideal subject for angry denunciations: they are disliked as over-successful and as low-class; as capitalist and as communist; as clannish and as intruders into other people's society; as omniscient and incredibly helpless; as plotting on an international scale yet locally utterly defenceless and therefore readily destroyed. The lower-class jew-baiter ventilates his fury at his own marginal life on a group which is marginal. Suffering perhaps from some deficiency which prevents him from acting from the centre of his own self or communicating with people so as to derive satisfactory stimulation, he maligns those who to him are even further from the centre of social life in trade, nationality, and social acceptability. He is encouraged in these attitudes because the "scapegoat" is also a "safe-goat"; he has chosen a group that has few defences. To the upper-class jew-baiter, the Jews are used to demonstrate what may happen to anyone in the populace at large who does not conform to his regimen.

Argument is of little avail with the person who "needs" a certain irrational crutch. Until he reorganises his psychological structure he cannot do without it. The analyst of human relations will not accept any facile rationalistic optimism. "Whoever sets himself to base his political thinking on a re-examination of human nature must begin by trying to overcome his own tendency to exaggerate the intellectuality of mankind."[2] Cartoons and Charlie Chaplin may do more than information centres in combating the destructive proclivities of individuals who are disturbed by aggressive impulses. To show a persecuted

[1]Needless to say the picture is far from the truth. More penetrating observers of the American Negro have called him "the quintessential American". The negroes act there as a kind of Class B, against whom Booth brought so many charges.

[2]G. Wallas: *Human Nature in Politics*, London, 1908, p. 21.

race as weak and defenceless and therefore not dangerous may stimulate the sadistic personality to wish greater inflictions and suffering on the victims. Moreover, social research points to the definite conclusion that exhortation usually reaches only those who are already convinced. Educational radio programmes, American sociologists have shown, designed to promote mutual accord between immigrant groups and Italians, were listened to chiefly by Italians; a programme about Poles was listened to chiefly by Poles and so on.[1] The prejudiced person, who needs his prejudice as part of his personality, *evades* education, as was clearly proved, in an experiment on evasion when persons known for their bitter racialism were confronted with "unmistakable" tolerance propaganda in the form of cartoons which lampooned a character called Mr. Biggott. The experimental subjects understood the point at first but soon managed to extricate themselves from any identification. "I imagine Mr. Biggott is a sour old bachelor," one informant would say, "I'm an old bachelor myself." Identification was shifted onto safe ground. "Biggott looks to me rather an inferior chap. I have no interest in knowing anyone like that," said another, "I've known some like him, one was an undertaker. You know when my father died . . ." In a little time the issue of prejudice was completely side-tracked. Inferior social status was attributed to Mr. Biggott or he was transformed into a foreigner or a Jew.[2] A story of persecution may be brushed aside as atypical, or people may concentrate on the "adventure" aspect of the story; or an unrelated issue thrown into the argument. "How would you like your sister to marry a black man" is an argument which any liberal has heard when advocating better race relationships in a racially prejudiced milieu. The prejudiced person "derails" the issue and invites the liberal to meet him on his own irrational ground.

This shift is more interesting than many analysts, in their first discoveries, thought. The prejudiced person is "derailed" himself. Unable to master his own psychic "economy" he fears

[1] P. F. Lazarsfeld (Editor): *Radio and the Printed Page*, New York, 1944.
[2] E. Cooper and M. Jahoda: "The Evasion of Propaganda" in *Journal of Psychology*, 1947, Vol. 23, pp. 15–25.

anything which seems to deviate from the normal and might thus remind him of his own difference. He sees himself reflected in the deviant. This he will not tolerate.

"The fear of the 'different' is hence not in proportion to the extent of objective measurable differences; rather it grows in proportion to the implied ego threat, in other words, to the degree to which the difference symbolises the fruitless suppression of the self. All prejudiced people insist on conformity to the extent of trying to destroy the non-conformist. The prejudiced person cannot bear an implied comparison."[1]

In an effort to reintegrate the discordant parts of his personality he is "partial" in the meaning of partisan and bigoted. It is his "alter ego", which he attacks with so much venom.

"Men espy their taboo in what is strange, find it in harmless congregations, sects, palaces, monastic orders, and behind every locked door. The stranger is equated with the idea of the forbidden, the dangerous, the defiled, and hatred towards it is the more deadly the more aloof it is. Petty bourgeois resentment against the nobility and anti-semitism hide psychic need. In the hatred of the prostitute, epicurianism, materialism, there is contained a deeply erotic desire for the death of its representatives who should, where possible, be exterminated amid torture and suffering, lest their existence might expose the wretchedness of the lives of those who persecute them. In the allegation of the orgies of the aristocracy, the blood sacrifices of the prescribed denominations, in all these fables, virtue reveals its own secret wish."[2]

By assailing the outgroup, the maladjusted personalities hope to establish some affectional bond within their own ranks. A joint experience, a negative ethos and a dramatic act momentarily release them from their half-understood self-hatred. Destructiveness is often an expression of despair which tries to conceal itself behind ferocious activity. The noisy, partisan clamour of the neurotic does not take the real activist in. The true revolutionary knows the difference between a positive and a negative ethos. "*La Terreur*," Engels wrote to Marx apropos the Parisian excesses in the French Revolution, "wasn't it

[1]N. A. Ackerman and M. Jahoda: "Toward a Dynamic Interpretation of Anti-Semitic Attitudes" in *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1948, p. 6 (Reprint). The authors remark: "We found no essential difference between the psychodynamic bases of Jewish and non-Jewish anti-semitism".

[2]M. Horkheimer: "Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung" in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, Paris, 1936, No. 2, p. 221.

mainly useless cruelty perpetrated by people who were afraid and wanted to regain peace of mind? I am convinced from the evidence that the blame for the terror of anno 1793 must be laid at the door of the scared petty bourgeoisie inflating itself into patriots and of the guttersnipes who make their business in *terreur.*"[1]

The word "partial" should be read in both meanings of the word. The "partial" quality of neurotic characters had been observed by analysts in the early days of clinical studies. The psychasthenic frequently says: "It is not I that is here, the real I is dead. I am dreaming." Many psychiatric cases actually recognise the nature of their obsessions. They seem to play with their symptoms:

"They have impulses but do not carry them out; they have phobias concerning acts but never real inability to perform acts or real paralysis; they have interminable doubts but no true amnesias. It is the striking trait of their character that they never have any symptom in its completeness and this incomplete character of the disturbances of their personality falls within a general law."[2]

II

Many frustrations arise because of the incongruity of the various demands that are made upon the individual or because he may be out of sympathy with the groups in which he moves, or because they are thwarting his own life scheme. If he belongs to a "negatively valent" group, condemned to a low place in the hierarchy and unable to better itself, he may doubt his own worth. Individual failures on the other hand, may be blamed on the family, the local work place, or on unsuspecting secondary groups. In a complex civilisation people may be incapable

[1]F. Engels in a letter to K. Marx: *Briefwechsel,* Berlin, 1931, Vol. IV, p. 377. Contemporary support for this view is found in the writings of the police officer Dutard who in his diary wrote: "These executions have great effect in politics, the chief of which are their usefulness in silencing discontent with the suffering of the people. The people can have their revenge in this form: The woman who has lost her husband, the father who has lost his son, the merchant who has no merchandise, the worker who must buy everything so dearly that his wages are reduced to nothing, are willing to tolerate these miseries as long as they can see others even more wretched than themselves, as long as they are persuaded that they are the enemy." (Quoted by A. Mathiez: *La Révolution Française,* Paris, 1928, Vol. III, p. 81.)

[2]P. Janet: "A Symposium on the Subconscious" in *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* 1907–8, Vol. II, p. 60.

of learning from their group how to deport themselves in society. The help which analysis can give here is to ease the adjustments through improved "social techniques" and the exposure of the mechanism of personal growth by a deeper insight into the nature of learning.

"Learning," in the sense of adequate responses to external pressures and the "solution" of problem situations and challenges, already occurs in the uterus as soon as the embryo becomes differentiated. A number of "reflexes" have been formed at birth and over the succeeding weeks more and more are learnt. Social contact is of the greatest importance in learning. Experiments on chickens show that there is an automatic "pecking response" at hatching but the accuracy and judgment of distance and position of the object on the ground is improved with practice. Maturation, even without practice, will increase the proficiency of the chickens, although those who are not prevented from pecking improve their accuracy faster. If kept in a dark room and isolated for more than five days from hatching, they are retarded permanently. The total response of isolated chickens not otherwise hindered in their desire to peck, is poorer than those growing up in the presence of other chicks.[1] Children abandoned and neglected show an unpredictable emotional behaviour reminiscent of an infant. An abandoned girl of twelve years old could hardly be taught anything.[2]

The physiologist Pavlov has studied the way learning takes place in dogs. A dog automatically salivates when food is brought within his field of vision. If a bell is rung each time that food is given, the dog learns to associate the bell with feeding, which can be seen by his ability to salivate every time the bell is sounded, whether or not food is shown to him. The dog has developed a "conditioned reflex". When in one of Pavlov's experiments, a sound of 800 vibrations per second was the conditioning agent, a different sound of 812 vibrations was found to cause no increase in salivation.[3] Reflexes could also be

[1] N. L. Munn: *Psychological Development*, New York, 1939, pp. 65–71.

[2] K. Davis: "An Extreme Case of Social Isolation of a Child" in *American Journal of Sociology*, 1940, Vol. 45, pp. 556–565. The girl was found at the age of twelve chained in an attic. She only saw her mother, when she got her food. See also A. Gesell: *Wolf Child and Human Child*, New York, 1939.

[3] I. Pavlov: *Conditioned Reflexes*, London, 1927, p. 136.

"inhibited", by disturbing the dog when a cat was introduced, or "disinhibited", if the cat was removed. Hysterical symptoms were induced in the dogs by confusing the meaning of conditioning agents, or, if a certain figure was made the agent, by changing its shape. In time, the conditioned reflex wears off unless "teaching" is renewed, or the reflex has been thoroughly integrated in the entire psychological make-up of the organism. Integration is helped by rhythm. Stimulants should not be varied in essentials if conduct is to be made permanent. Easy signs of recognition facilitate orientation. The manner of excitation should be adapted to the mental and physiological needs of the experimental subject and his fatigue, depression, excitement and native endowment must be taken into account.

The process and the speed of development at various ages of a child and of an ape have been studied. The Kellogs raised a $7\frac{1}{2}$ months old chimpanzee in their own home together with a 10 months old son. The ape was superior to the human child in the early manifestations of motor habits like crawling, but was inferior in his understanding of social situations. For a short while the two were fairly close in development, first one exceeding, then falling behind, then catching up. But at the end of the first year, the lead of the child was assured in language facility, mental abilities and in social behaviour.[1]

The interrelation of social responses and of internal and external growth does not proceed in a simple upward progression. There is a spiral along which certain responses are learnt, while others are forgotten, to be relearnt at a later stage. As the child learns how to walk he may lose the habit of some of his words, and has to acquire them (very rapidly) again. When the child is forty weeks old he exhibits great skill with his fingers, picking up new minute objects and often feeding himself on crumbs and other small particles with neatness. By the time he is one year this meticulous skill has disappeared. His eating is "messy" and he flings his toys about. This is the period when different muscular controls are being formed and minute actions give way to a "pompous" control of his environment, in which he shows off.[2] Individual development is a

[1] W. N. and L. A. Kellog: *The Ape and the Child*, New York, 1945.

[2] A. Gesell and F. L. Ilg: *Infant and Child in the Culture of Today*, New York, 1943.

zig zag, here a turning to new things, there a turning away from them; always the child is attempting new integrations and connecting up some new associations.

Shocks are part of the conditioning process in human beings. They have been studied by American behaviourists. Famous is Watson's experiment on "Albert", eleven months old. Fear was instilled into the child at the approach of a rat by a sharp and loud sound. Later the child cried when the rat was sighted, also when no sound was produced. The conditioning did not, however, "carry over" to the table; the blocks he was playing with while the experiment went on; or the room in which it was performed. He simply started and cried when the rat was introduced. Once conditioned to this fear he showed fear reactions to other "rat-like" things, such as a small dog, a seal skin coat, and in a mild way, to cotton wool.[1]

Sociability facilitates the child's capacity to learn. Petting, kissing, cooing, carrying, singing, rocking and other forms of indulgence by the parents speedily establish contact with the child and assist it in understanding the outside world. From the great "blooming, buzzing confusion" which, as William James says, is the world to the infant, the child learns to discriminate the mother's voice, and his personal growth towards independence proceeds by becoming dependent, by achieving rewards through learning the will of the mother: and through these rewards he develops some pleasant show of independence. At one stage he will see himself through his parents' eyes and say "Johnny wants that". At another he will practice "rôle taking", playing mother, nurse, fireman, milkman. In the interstices of these copies of the external world, i.e. as the "me", as Mead says, becomes more and more coherent, the "self", the dynamic actor or "I", who does the copying, is apprehended. But it is never fully understood. Asserting itself, this I always remains somewhat mysterious. "I wanted to give him a piece of my mind, but at the last moment I thought better of it and said nothing," is a typical phrase we make to gloss over the dialectic of give and take and the strangeness of the occasional "answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take

[1]J. B. and R. Watson: "Studies in Infant Psychology" in *Scientific Monthly*, 1921, Vol. 13, pp. 493–515.

towards him, when he assumes an attitude towards them".[1] The to-and-fro of social intercourse both socialises and individualises.

The dominance of the external "me" over the real "I" never quite disappears. Human beings will accept the character imputed to them. They employ it as the mask through which they peer and behind which they hide. This is well recognised, but their environment prefers to know them by this "persona". Individuals are attributed rôles as leaders, officials, jesters, eccentrics, marginal men, with a certain emotional attitude and behaviour. Some individual features are negatively valued by the group. The American workers call those who turn out too much work "ratebusters"; those who turn out too little are "chisellers"; those who curry favour by reporting works attitudes are "squealers". These characters have their equivalents in public school jargons where they appear as "swots, squealers and sneaks". Their replicas appear in many groups.

To the Freudian the etiology of the negative traits is to be found in some universal antipathy located in early childhood when the mind is most plastic. We must imagine the suckling as living in a golden age where every wish is gratified. He has fantasies of omnipotence which may include incestuous desires. At a certain point there comes a rude awakening. He must be disciplined and adjust his behaviour to external demands, if he wishes to avoid punishments. We may picture him as experiencing a chill in his human relations from which he never quite recovers. The infant does not willingly accept the limitation of his freedom, and he may plot some dark revenge. Finding himself impotent to execute it, he may exaggerate the punishment which would be meted out to him, if he were to make his scheme real. From his Œdipus Wish he proceeds to develop a Fear of Castration.

An influential group of psycho-analysts attributes the chief shock experience of the individual to his "birth trauma"—the sudden expulsion of the baby from his secure and warm place in the womb and the strange situation in which the child finds himself, when born. He has to breathe, to scream and to eat.

[1] G. H. Mead: *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, Chicago, 1934, p. 177.

Other analysts put the crisis in the experiences of the first six months. Others again, more conscious of the need to explain the divergencies of culture, in the method in which the later weaning process is performed; how he is swaddled; and to what extent his needs are instantaneously or periodically gratified. It is said that if cleanliness training is cruelly performed, the child will grow up with the conviction that the world is a hostile place.

As an example of this kind of analysis applied to sociological material, we may quote an essay on the culture of the Rhodesian African. There is in this culture no regularity in breast feeding; the child is carried on his mother's back or side and has access to the breast whenever he wants it; and the child is with the mother for a protracted period. During the first two years of his life he has the pleasurable sensation of the swaying movement of his mother as she walks or hoes, and the permanent soft warm security of her body. He is supreme in his enjoyment of his mother.

"As long as an African child is breast-fed, his parents are sexually taboo to one another. The weaning of the child and the end of the sexual taboo ordinarily occur together, and the infant is perfectly correct in seeing a close association between deprivation of his mother's breast by day and the fact that he is deposed and replaced by his father as her bedfellow at night."[1]

In the twilight of the hut, he suddenly witnesses the parents together. He grows up with a strong Œdipus Complex, and as a surrogate, with a dislike of all persons in authority, especially if they are strangers. He conflicts with them if they demand, what is particularly difficult for him to achieve, regularity and punctuality. For the manner of his breast feeding has left him without any sense of time. He has no sense of planning. He cannot master his weakness, and he cannot repress, on account of the shock experience at the termination of the weaning period, his aggressiveness. He shows neither sympathy with those who suffer, nor with himself. Paradise is lost, he is alone in the world. Vainly does he try to regress to a more infantile character in order to escape responsibility and punishment. He is a bad pupil:

[1]J. F. Ritchie: *The African as Suckling and as Adult*, Livingstone, 1943, p. 12.

"He expects his teacher to think for him and somehow to insert the finished thought into his mind; just as his mother did all but digest his food for him, even far into childhood. But the most serious difficulty is the barrier of morbid dread. Most of our system is mystery to the African, especially the subject of arithmetic, and 'the mysterious' is always unconsciously identified with (*a*) his ambivalence of emotions, and (*b*) parental intercourse after he was weaned."[1]

Much of this analysis is, of course, highly questionable. It approaches a native civilisation, which has stood the test of time, with European values. Some of the facts have been queried and the author fails to evoke any sympathy for his material. One point is, however, of interest. An entire culture is put on trial: the solutions that the Africans have reached are found, according to one set of values, to be inadequate. Moreover, the thesis is interesting because it could be put to the test, and Africans who have been brought up in orphanages, mission stations or Westernised African homes could be compared with others, who follow the weaning habits of old. If the difference in behaviour were small then the thesis would have to be re-examined, since in any case, the educational privileges of the Westernised African child give him an advantage.

Such researches might be more easily conducted among peoples who are said to derive their neurotic character components from some cruel ceremonies performed on them at the onset of puberty. The Hopi Indians allow the boy to "learn easy" up to the age of twelve. At that time he is initiated with great suddenness into a secret society. Much social responsibility is put upon his shoulders. Ceremonies include the frightening of the boy with masked gods, whipping and other traumatic experiences. His adult character is self-effacing, but his repressed aggressiveness and anxieties reveal themselves in witchcraft and gossip.[2] Detribalised Hopi Indians could be compared with boys who have gone through these ceremonies. All these comparisons are of particular interest because a growing school of psycho-analysts accepts Freud's analytical tools and procedure without his specific theories. They feel that classical

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[2] D. Eggan: "The General Problem of Hopi Adjustment" in *American Anthropologist*, 1943, Vol. 45, pp. 357–373.

psycho-analysis does not sufficiently explain why one individual shows, in later life, a normal disposition, another develops a certain neurosis, another a different neurosis, while the fourth individual breaks down as a psychotic. Later anxiety situations must supervene to disorganise personality, according to the teachings of Fromm, Horney, Reich, Sullivan and others. Physical conditions on the one hand and economic and marital disappointments on the other induce a disturbance. Neurosis is derived from a general state of social frustration.

III

All psycho-dynamic analysis holds fast to the fact that the character of man is formed by a dynamic adaptation to reality which includes the social environment as much as the inner structure of the mind with its subconscious pressures: the person is engaged in a "historic" and an emotional adventure throughout his life. He cooperates with and he sets himself off against his environment. He seeks the goals with which society is engaged, but he also has his private aims which need not agree with the social motivations. The tension which is produced is the subject of much inner and outer conflict, ambivalent attachments, doubts, and anxiety. The task is to convert the tension into a creative one, to transmute the aggressiveness and the underlying anxiety into enhanced productivity and effectiveness, and to make the dichotomies which persist a means of creativity. For the "libidinous raw material" can be quarried; doing so is to make the fullest use of environment and its analysis, i.e. to become conscious not only of the dynamics of individual growth and its relation to human groups, but also of collective development.

The analysis is enriched by the recent discoveries in genetics, endocrinology, and neurology. The genetical make-up of a person naturally predisposes, in certain aspects, his life-course. Disfigurement or inherited disabilities, the failing of one of the senses and a certain susceptibility towards mental or physical illness, or "deviant" behaviour (deviant from those not so constituted) affect his psychological responses as well as the attitude of his environment. According to his culture pattern

the social environment may evaluate his "deviant" character positively or negatively. In many societies people suffering from epileptic seizures are honoured and in Siberia they may become shamaans to the primitives. Emotional behaviour is partly conditioned by endocrine secretions. Small disturbances in the pituitary, either a small deficiency or an excess of hormones, have pathological effects, while astonishing changes for good take place if dull children suffering from a malfunctioning pituitary are fed with hormone extracts.

Brain surgery has demonstrated some of the mechanisms of nervous internal controls. The hypothalamus, a lower section of the brain, acts, for instance, in such a manner that, if the cortical checks are anæsthetised or removed, the organism shows wild and uncontrollable sequences of rage, fear, pain, or joy. Deaths from witchcraft can be explained physiologically, by excessive discharges of the adrenal, causing increased blood pressure and a restriction of the blood circulation through the blood vessels. In the case of persons convinced that they are bewitched, the refusal of food and water contributes to the stimulation of the adrenals, so that more adrenalin is discharged.

Readjustments may be made by physical manipulations, such as "shock treatment" by electricity. "It is hardly too much to say", one enthusiast claims, "that a conversion from selfishness to altruism can be effected by electric shock acting, when added up, to six seconds! Many can testify to this and I have seen it in action. Can electricity take the place of a spiritual guide or the traditional much prayer and fasting?"[1]

In cases of disturbances in behaviour, drugs are used by some practitioners, others recommend a surgical intervention. Prolonged rest and a change of environment are ancient methods of re-establishing contact between segments of the personality which have become disjointed. Freud was unimpressed by any procedure that did not strengthen the reasoning "ego" and leave it at the end of the cure with a deeper self-knowledge. He was above all interested in "analysis" and the relationship spun between patient and analyst in the combined quest for the seat of disturbance. He used at the beginning of his career hypnosis, but later abandoned it, but this is still used

[1]V. H. Mottram: *The Physical Basis of Personality*, London, 1944, p. 49.

effectively by many therapists. We have accounts of patients whose personality has been re-integrated in hypnosis. Morton Prince has described the case of Miss Beauchamp with a wealth of detail. Here the personality was split into three distinct characters. In therapy, "Sally B" was suppressed by hypnotism, while her other two characters were synthesised in analysis. In hypnosis the dependency of the patient is increased, in analysis he is made to relinquish his habit of leaning on others. The two can be alternated. In the classical methods of psycho-analysis, great privacy is maintained throughout the period of treatment, the analyst must be a trained person and have himself passed through a course of analysis, so that he is aware of his own subconscious motivations. In newer approaches, e.g., in group therapy, use is made of groups composed either of "normal" or of deviant persons who are not psycho-analytically trained.

It was already known to the social psychologists of the 19th century that numbers have a "disinhibiting" effect on certain individuals. At that time only the negative side of crowd action was noticed. The civilising restraints are said to be lifted, so that crowds behave in an irrational and emotional manner. They are easily swayed, and "regress" to a pre-adult plane. Numbers intoxicate and the contagion is not easily resisted. "In a crowd men always tend to the same level and, on general questions, a vote recorded by forty academicians is no better than that of forty water-carriers."[1] Nowadays, the release which men experience in the company of sympathetic persons can also be a means of increasing rationality, and "group therapists" have employed it in a variety of avenues, linking up with traditional beliefs that recognise the value of taking the "sense" of a meeting.[2]

In the therapeutic group discussions, the individual tries out another point of view. He may be heartened by the experiences of various group members and lose his sense of uniqueness and

[1] G. Le Bon: *The Crowd*, London, 1903, pp. 211–212.

[2] "The primary cell of the democratic community is the discussion group." (A. D. Lindsay: *The Modern Democratic State*, London, 1943, Vol. I, p. 135.) A healthy democracy, says Lord Lindsay, should proliferate with discussion meetings: union branches, cooperative guild meetings, Workers' Educational Association classes, and groups of all kinds. To-day we would add the Brains Trust meetings and the many "Forums" which are organised by the B.B.C. and other agencies.

guilt. He may take courage to face up to his difficulties. He may learn by "teaching", i.e., by analysing another's problems. The kinship which pervades a group of "fellow-sufferers" may, if not too prolonged, assist communication, whereas a more private interview would slow down the progress of self-understanding. The group also constitutes a training ground for interpersonal collaboration in the wider world. The individual cannot dwell too extensively on his own complaints and obtains a sense of proportion. The frankness, on which a group can insist, may reduce the terror that fills the patient suffering from certain "montrous" urges or memories. The knowledge of human nature is expanded all round. Group discussion is an exploration and "a good discussion can draw out wisdom which is unobtainable in any other way".[1] It is a method widely used.

In permitting frank discussion in the factory, between men and supervisors, the American business sociologist Elton Mayo found "that many seemed to have 'something on their minds' in ordinary phrase, about which they wished to talk freely to a competent listener. And these topics were by no means confined to the Company. This was, I think, the first observation that emerged from the MSS of interviews reported daily."[2] Everyday experience suggests that there are situations in which the formulation of certain inchoate feelings into words, is a considerable help. Managers no less than workers are eager to "confess": "Once the emotion has been put into words," writes another business consultant, "the person's face often 'lightens'; in a sense by speaking of the matter he has 'put it behind him'. Often he is conscious of this. 'Ah, I feel better now for having been able to say that,' he may say."[3] Group discussion techniques have been used for the promotion of foremen and, in the British Army, in the selection of candidates for commissioned ranks. A number of firms are experimenting, in a controlled manner, with joint managements of workers and technicians. A special "panel" has been set up by the British

[1]Lindsay: *Ibid.*, p. 135.

[2]E. Mayo: *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilisation*, London, 1949, p. 68.

[3]W. Raphael: "A technique for surveying employers' opinions and attitudes" in *Occupational Psychology*, London, 1948, Vol. II, p. 4. Quite similar observations have been made elsewhere. See Shih Kuo Heng: *China enters the Machine Age*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1944.

Government to study the human factors in productivity. The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations and other scientific bodies are investigating group relationships at the work place, in community centres and in schools.

In a book on colonial policy, L. Barnes discusses the psychodynamic concepts in the language of topology, a branch of mathematics which examines the relationships of sets in proximity. The group is seen as a social field and novel recommendations on colonial administration are derived from the analysis:

"The social field serves for social science much the same purpose as the gravitational field serves for physics. The social order or situation is treated as a psychological field of force and the individual is seen as a singularity, a place of singular character within that field. Call him a point region, if you like. In the social field behaviour follows lines of field force whose direction and magnitude vary with variations in the structure of the field. Such behaviour, like any movement in modern kinetics, is thus defined by a vector—a directed magnitude—which represents the potential at a given point-instant and which is determined by the field structure. An electric charge derives its potential from an electric system or field in which there are necessarily other potentials. So too with human behaviour; force and direction are functionally related to the social setting. The value of a vector depends both on its position in the field, and on the field's general character."[1]

Human beings act well if they belong to groups with unexhausted social energy. They act purposefully if their potential energy is transformed into kinetic energy by achieving direction. The individual's abilities are only of subordinate importance, to Barnes they "are as a ripple rises on the surface of the pond". Hence the gifted individual, educated and a member of the "best" circles, is historically of less interest and ultimately capable of less achievement, than are the unknown forces of the lowly, untried, unawoken but newly structured "social fields" as represented by the colonial masses, i.e., in the case

[1]L. Barnes: *Soviet Light on Colonies*, London, 1944, pp. 115–116. The book is written in the form of a series of conversations between English colonial officials and a Soviet visitor. It may be rather surprising to Soviet ears that the quoted passage is spoken by the Russian. Here his English friends protest against these analogies. "Honestly, old boy, if you are going on in this strain I may as well as the golfers say—pick up," they say. A more ponderous but more "rigorised" exposition of these concepts will be found in K. Lewin: *Principles of Topological Psychology*, New York, 1936.

under discussion, the African peasant and pastoralists. "If you want new social possibilities in a crisis of civilisation, it is among the untried class in society that you must look for them—among the class whose free growth and full development have hitherto been checked by society's customary structure . . . the source of new social forms and specialisations, and of untapped reserves of social energy, which may reinvigorate and impart a higher, closer, intenser fellowship to all man's associated life."[1]

This point of view is illustrated with examples from the war effort of the Soviet Union which stemmed the Germans before Stalingrad and is contrasted with the failure in the Far East of the Western powers. The Russians, technically backward but socially advanced, could "go all out" when they wanted.[2] It is not explained whether in the process of training, which Russians and leading colonials must undergo to meet the needs of the modern world, they do not lose contact with the "untried masses" and become members of another field which is socially exhausted; or, if they maintain that contact, whether they do so at the price of simplifying and distorting their individual sensibilities to an extent which must affect their judgment; for the "vista" or the "life space" is severely limited for the "untried", barely educated, groups. Secondly, it is not fully explained what part the geographical setting plays in the structuring of the social field. The lack of natural qualities in the population; the frailty of their inherited institutions; the paucity of their numbers (relative to the area); and the greater paucity of the natural resources of the area must bring these groups out of alignment with more advanced peoples, however potentially fertile they are. Battling with so many adverse factors, the dynamic elements in these new social movements may seek

[1]L. Barnes: *op. cit.* p. 121.

[2]The analysis here represented is not committed to one political outlook. The American idealist philosopher, A. N. Whitehead, thought that every entity "takes account of the essential character of other things; it prehends aspects of other entities". An event is an occasion of prehension or one modality of the process. "Each individual activity is nothing but the mode in which the general activity is individualised by the imposed conditions." (*Science in the Modern World*, Cambridge, 1926, p. 247.) "The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the 'many' which it finds and also the 'one' among the disjunctive 'many' which it leaves." (*Process and Reality*, Cambridge, 1929, pp. 28–9.)

refuge in an aggressive behaviour which will eventually exhaust all concerned.

The physical and other aspects of environment is the subject of another level of analysis; it will be discussed in the next chapter. Here this much may be said on the factor of environment: we know that morale is more easily maintained in an army which feels itself on the winning side; which fights with superior weapons; which is well fed; and where administration is competent. The point which the analysis of human relations makes is that there are examples of armies winning victories in the teeth of adversity and without technical superiority. The exploration of these conditions in children's groups has been the subject of experiments. To find the necessary arrangements which encourage individuals in association to unfold their potentialities; children at play were experimentally observed under different group atmospheres. Leaders behaved first in an authoritarian manner, i.e., dictated tasks, gave personal praise, and showed wilfulness in the manner and selection of the commands. The behaviour of the children could be compared with the responses to a "laisser faire" leadership in which interference with the children was reduced to a minimum, no praise or blame was allotted and the children were left to their own devices. A third type of leadership, called in this experiment "democratic", organised group discussion, gave praise factually, and allowed for a division of labour in the group. Briefly summarised, the "authoritarian" group responded at first efficiently, but when left alone was at a loss to know how to act. The "laisser faire" group seemed purposeless and bewildered. The "democratically" run group gave the best long-term results.[1] "Sociometry" is the name given by Moreno and his fellow workers to the study of informal groupings and friendship and rejection patterns in the class room, in youth camps and indeed in any situation where human beings are brought together for a common purpose and remain together for some time.

[1]R. Lippitt: "An Experimental Study of Democratic and Authoritarian Group Atmospheres" in *Studies in Topological and Vector Psychology*, Iowa, 1940, Vol. I, No. 3.

Well organised groups provide support for their weaker members. Characteristic attitudes of fair play lend a sense of security. We may speak, in analogy to the "social capital" of a culture, discussed in Chapter IV, of a "psychological capital" upon which the individual can draw. Cooperative units assist the individual over his difficult periods and reduce the number of maladjusted cases. We should, however, always remember that the method by which these better group relationships may be formed are not always psychological. They may be cultural, structural or technical. Economic readjustments may give a new dignity to each individual member.[1] In other cases—one may think of a demoralised army—a tightening up of organisation may be the correct "therapy". Since the individual depends so closely on his group, it may be unwise to reform the straying individual as such a procedure might merely heighten the person's insecurity and arouse feelings of guilt in the individual, a point of view found fairly widely dispersed among social workers. "The 1934 records", says an analyst of social case-work, "dealt in a far more detailed way with different aspects of personality and with the specific nature of family relationships than did the same type of record in 1924. The earlier comments were more concerned with kinds of behaviour, such as 'cleanliness', 'honesty', and 'sobriety' and with material conditions." The change which has taken place and which has since been taken further, is ascribed to the growing recognition among those who are sociologically trained that individual traits are dependent "upon the attitudes and intimate social relationships of the individual rather than upon his superficial habits and physical surroundings".[2]

The analysis is nowadays cast in terms of social control; of

[1] "One must recognise the enormous benefits which the teachers and the community have gained from the recent growth of professional organisation. The private school "usher" clinging to the rags of his gentility with the wages and independence of a footman, has a chance of becoming a man when he joins the Association of Assistant Masters; the sweated school mistresses have successfully claimed the wages of a skilled occupation; some 'public school' masters have been drawn out of their atmosphere of elderly boyhood; the whole profession has gained in intellectual independence, as against the clerical 'managers', capitalist governors, and the politicians on the local education authority." (G. Wallas: *Our Social Heritage*, London, 1921, p. 141.)

[2] S. C. Brown: "The Methods of Social Case Workers" in *Science of Society*, Edited by F. C. Bartlett, London, 1944, p. 383.

the dialectic between individual wishes and collective demands; and sometimes in "topological" analogies. It stresses group factors as well as structure, which is now found to be a concept applicable to the nature of the individual mind as much as to society. Development; the concept of "stages" in learning; evolutionary growth; and shocks and crises are included. The culture traits are mechanisms of society useful in educating new members, in disciplining them and directing their energies to the constructive tasks which must be performed. The analysis, however, goes one step further and in a manner hitherto believed incredible boldly confronts the individual with revelations of his hidden desires, with his distasteful urges and the weakness of his defences against the sudden upsurge of dark forces. In the full analysis of these, the rational powers of the individual are strengthened and a new vision of the "normal" person arises, who can make the responses expected from him as a member of society, but who can also look through the manifest forms and beyond the limited content of them. The test of normality now becomes a balanced mediation of individual and collective demands. This balance is struck consciously and in full realisation that with social changes a new balance must be achieved. The test of the "abnormal" or maladjusted individual, is that he is not capable of new adaptations. His mind is irreversible. He refuses education and development. In the fullest meaning of the word, he is prejudiced.

CHAPTER VIII

The Development of Society

Freud and with him most of the analysts of human relations have valuable things to say about the dynamic nature of the individual's adjustment, yet too little attention is paid to the effects of changes in environment on the individual; of new economic factors appearing with the discovery of new raw materials; of new moral ideas; of changes in education or in the laws relating to inheritance and family life. Such influences have been the pre-occupation of social theorists, more particularly during the 19th century.

Efforts have, of course, been made to broaden the concepts of psychology and to give a more sociological definition to the psycho-dynamic analysis: to speak in terms of the "collective unconscious" and to investigate the organising rôle of myths in the life of a society that believes in them. The psychological work of C. G. Jung is an attempt at a mixed individual-collective psychology, though on a somewhat mystical basis and again without, it would now seem, proper regard to climate, technology, legal codes, political constitutions and economic factors. On a new level, the analysis of social change, must evidently introduce the dynamic element of time and relate, into a coherent scheme, the various external factors on which social growth may be said to depend. It must enlarge our understanding of the "human environment" and must move the facts of social change into the centre of our modern outlook.

Social change is only of subordinate importance in animal societies, but is a fundamental characteristic of human societies. Biologists have found, in investigating the nests of ants more than a million years old, that they hardly differed from those built by present generations of insects.[1] Animal societies are essentially stationary, whereas human societies are ever changing and developing. Human societies are of great variety. Still, a limited number of types can be distinguished.

[1] W. M. Wheeler: "Social Life of Insects" in *Scientific Monthly*, 1922, Vol. 14, pp. 497–525.

These can be placed on a time continuum. There is a historical hierarchy as well as a social hierarchy, and "developmental analysis" is concerned with the main stages through which society has passed. In order to arrive at a secure theory of social growth, social analysis must indicate the kind, number and organisation of the factors which contribute to it and the general manner in which change proceeds.

The developmental analysis of social forms occupies itself more than the previous levels of analysis, with social theories. It elaborates and clarifies the nature of society as an entity; social causation; the criteria best suited to establish social evolution; and the trends of which any decision involving matters of social policy must take cognisance. The large number of different causal "schools" can actually be grouped under a few major headings. The analysis of schools, although most of them seem doctrinaire now, is useful. The mind gains clarity by passing through extreme positions which can be contrasted with other attitudes no less uncompromising. On the question of *the kind of agents* which have been designated as the causes of social changes there are three main approaches:—

(1) Those who seek the causative agent, the demiurge of history, in man and his social institutions.

(2) Those who seek the causative agent in environment and chiefly in the physical or geographical environment.

(3) Those who seek the causative agent in biological or demographic phenomena, i.e., who make a combination of the first two points of view, and locate it in man's inherited nature and in the spread of certain inherited characteristics.

The view that no causal factors have been discovered at all which bear inspection and that history is a succession of accidents lies outside of this analysis.[1]

I

The most direct manner of interpreting social change is by focusing on the supreme actors on the stage of world history and to treat them as the authors as well as the players of their

[1]See J. B. Bury: "Cleopatra's Nose" in *Rationalist Press Association Annual*, London, 1916, pp. 16–23.

parts. Reverent towards them on the whole, sarcastic in detail about their follies, the Great Man Theory tells the story of mankind in terms of its leaders, who are born under a star, with characters and circumstances so compounded as to engender historical change. History is a process of human self-realisation, a series of giant steps from one great character to another. The quality of greatness can be felt rather than analysed.

"Real greatness is a mystery. . . . The great man is of that kind: a man without whom the world would seem to us incomplete because certain great achievements only become possible through him in his time and place and are otherwise unimaginable. He is an essential strand in the great web of causes and effects. 'No man is irreplacable', says the proverb. But the few that are, are great".[1]

Within this particular interpretation will be found various writers who do not accept the same criteria of greatness. Some find the real actors of history in the men of affairs; others lay greatest stress on the propounders of ideas—the prophets, saints, poets and thinkers. Carlyle looks for his heroes among kings and generals; Lecky, among the great religious and moral figures of history. Max Weber, and more recently Keynes and Mannheim, speak of the formative influence of the "man of knowledge" who in giving intellectual leadership sets in train a host of consequences. The conditions, under which the creative élite formulate their ideas and propagate them, is of great importance, as is their recruitment, training, encouragement, "bureaucratisation", and the tradition on which they can build. In Toynbee's view, when the minority of intellectual leaders begins to weaken in its pursuit of cultural growth, schisms open in the body politic which are inverted and expanded into schisms of the soul. In periods of divided loyalties saviours may or may not be thrown up upon the main stage of conflict. They may be philosopher kings like Marcus Aurelius, great generals like Alexander or religious saviours. The great men follow a certain pattern of behaviour. They go through the stages of communion and withdrawal, Moses, Caesar, Christ, Paul, Gautama, Mohammed, and others are quoted as examples.[2] They adopt a mystique which Toynbee calls

[1] J. Burckhardt: *Reflections on History*, London, 1944, pp. 173–4.
[2] A. J. Toynbee: *The Study of History*, London, 1936, Vol. I.

"etherialisation". They act through example; their ideas and the disciplines are copied by those who try to be like them.

Some emphasise the active willing of a new intellectual movement and speak of "idea-forces", as did the sociologist Fouillée. Others prefer a more mysterious interpretation of leadership "which has no laws, only knows of destiny; for the organism is not a mechanism and no mediation is possible between the two concepts".[1] In a civilisation Spengler perceives unerring "souls seeking light, progression, complete realisation of their destiny and the experience of one great ambition". Though the passive view of social theory detracts from the realistic investigation of how changes are taking place and is mainly retrospective, it has its strong points. It may not show how a society makes a new step but it teaches us conclusively, if perhaps unintentionally, that a single man, invention or work is not sufficient to explain a change. The discovery of America did not revolutionise the Middle Ages. On the other hand, the rediscovery of America, when it happened, was not "accidental". With reference to Columbus the discovery was, of course, unexpected, but with the arts of shipbuilding, seamanship and navigation developed as they were in the closing decades of the 15th century, America was bound to be colonised about the time of the 16th century. The simultaneous development of the calculus by Newton and Leibniz; the simultaneous isolation of oxygen by Scheele and Priestley; the simultaneous propounding of the theory of evolution by Darwin and Wallace, are examples of the force which certain social and material conditions exert on productive minds. Darwin thought out his theory in England and Wallace at the Antipodes: the objective logic of the material they were sifting as well as the new developments in social thought, geology, embryology, and demography forced them to the new theory. When conditions are ripening for an invention a number of workers strike upon the correct solution within the same span of months. The Patent Office is engaged in a perpetual struggle with the problem of simultaneity.[2]

[1] O. Spengler: *Untergang des Abendlandes*, Munich, 1920, Vol. I, pp. 165–166.
[2] See S. C. Gilfillan: *The Sociology of Invention*, Chicago, 1935.

Past thinkers have been content with a very general idea of the development of a civilisation. Functional analysis is more concrete and examines the pattern. Structural analysts are specific about the groups which subvert ideologies, or techniques. Analysts of needs relate these to productivity and standards of living. Psycho-dynamic theory introduces the discussion of character and character-forming disciplines in the life of the individuals composing certain groups. Causal analysts go further and try to find by comparative studies, the generic factor making for creativeness in civilisation. Unwin, analysing some sixty odd civilisations, reaches the conclusion that where man's sexual urges are constrained inventiveness is great. Energies are available for constructive work.[1] Freud's theory of sublimation is very similar. It is noted that "the motive back of discipline and many primary inventions . . . was not technical efficiency but holiness or power over other men. In the course of their development machines have extended these aims and provided a vehicle for their fulfilment".[2] The spirit of sectarian and ascetic religious groups sometimes promotes an attitude to life which fosters a new approach to economic activities. Max Weber has ascribed to Puritanism and the dogma of Predestination great formative importance in the evolution of the capitalist ethos. Sober living, strict housekeeping, a search for the signs of grace in daily events were conducive to the new spirit of enterprise.[3] Sombart found monastic institutions administering their property in a capitalistic manner before the onset of the Renaissance.

Gibbon and others concentrated on the political and religious *institutions* of a society and their intertwining with social change. As already mentioned, the Marxian point of view traced social change to the given "mode of production" and change to crises brought about by the unfolding of its contradictions. Economics, technical discoveries and enterprise are *facets* of "man's active response to nature", the productive expression

[1]J. D. Unwin: *Sex and Culture*, London, 1934. M. Kyrle reaches the opposite conclusion about sexual constraints. (See his *Psyche*, 1931.)

[2]L. Mumford: *Technics and Civilisation*, New York, 1934.

[3]M. Weber: *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London, 1930. See also R. H. Tawny: *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, London, 1926, and E. Troeltsch: *Bedeutung des Protestantismus in der modernen Welt*, Munich, 1924.

of his total process of living and, as such, also of his social relationships and the theoretical conceptions based upon them. "A history of religion which were to neglect the material foundation on which the religion throve, would be uncritical history. In fact, it is easier to deduce the mundane core of religious nebulæ, than in the opposite direction to deduce (from the basic structure) the kind of celestial forms in which real life will wrap itself."[1] Marx felt the "materialist interpretation of history" to "be the only scientific method". Social forms express material interests; the material base, both in the needs which it satisfies and those which it leaves unfulfilled, conditions the main social institutions, including the most sublime manifestations of the spirit. The individual and his personal bias are determined by economics; his ability to mould the institutions is limited. He is one, but only one, of the active forces of history—along side are the growth of the economy; the conflicts which arise between basic structure and superstructure; and the unequal growth of various parts of the economy. Even where Marx attacks the capitalist he does so with his theory of social causation well in mind:

"A word to prevent possible misunderstandings. I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense *couleur de rose.* But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personalification of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, cannot then make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains however much he may subjectively raise himself above them."[2]

There are a number of "economistic interpretations" of social change which are even more thorough-going than that of Marx and further reduce the rôle of the individual.[3] Certain discoveries, according to Loria, come accidentally to the individual but are inescapable in a specific economy. Once in motion, inventions release other inventions. "It is the peculiar character of all technology, from chipped flints to the Boulder

[1]K. Marx: *DasKapital,* Berlin, 1926, Vol. I, p. 317.
[2]*Ibid.* Preface to the 1867 edition, p. XXXVIII.
[3]For instance, A. Loria: *The Economic Foundation of Society,* London, 1899.

Dam and Beethoven's quartets, that it is progressive. It is inherently developmental."[1] Inventions irradiate over the whole body of society. The invention of the combustion engine and its use in the form of the motor car have changed the course of war and peace, expanded towns, rearranged family budgets, influenced the trade cycle, called forth wealth in the Arabian Desert where oil was found, and brought money and misery to rubber planters, W. F. Ogburn has described in detail how certain inventions spread and revolutionise the folk-ways, the mode of production and even the "ethos" of a society.[2] To him technical inventions are the pivot of social change, while Simiand attributes to the discovery of new gold resources the vital changes which have advanced the history of capitalism.[3] Sombart has taken the view that the introduction of Arabic numerals and double-entry bookkeeping ushered in the Commercial Revolution which was the necessary preliminary stage to the Industrial Revolution.[4] The new social forms of the West after the fall of the Roman Empire were ascribed by Lefebvre des Noëttes to the discovery of a correct method of harnessing draught animals. On antique sculptures horses drawing chariots are seen to be throwing up their head, their tracheæ squeezed; they seem to be continually shying. They were so harnessed that they could not use their power for traction, so that slaves had to be used instead. When animal labour could be employed for transport, slaves became supernumerary, and although much large-scale building was carried out during the Middle Ages, slavery as an institution died out.[5] Another crucial invention of the early Middle Ages was the stirrup which made the knight possible.[6] Until the latter days of the Roman Empire the cavalry had to campaign without stirrups and thus was no match for the metal clad infantry, as typified by the Roman legionary and the Greek hoplite. To deploy

[1]C. E. Ayres: *The Theory of Economic Progress*, Carolina, 1944, p. 111.

[2]W. F. Ogburn: *Social Change*, New York, 1922.

[3]R. Simiand: *Le Salaire, l'Évolution Sociale et la Monnaie*, Paris, 1932.

[4]W. Sombart: *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, Munich, 1916–7.

[5]Lefebvre des Noëttes: *L'Attelage, Le Cheval de Selle à travers les Ages*, Paris, 1931. It is not suggested that this interpretation is correct.

[6]W. Tarn: *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments*, Cambridge, 1930.

cavalry successfully in "shock tactics" against such infantry the thigh had to be sheathed in armour, an impossible feat for a rider who depended for his grip solely on his muscles. The introduction of the stirrup made the medieval knight capable of using his lance not merely by wielding it, but in a thrust which gathered the full momentum of man, horse and armour behind it.

It is not necessary to confine explanations to some financial, technical or military invention. It is possible to construct a materialist "single-factor" theory also by picking out one legal institution. F. Oppenheimer constructed a sociology which specifically named the monopoly ownership of land—the food base of the community and the source of livelihood to the most numerous section of mankind—as *the* institutional factor which underlay the struggles of history.[1] Oppenheimer's sociology points, however, with all its emphasis on the problems of property, beyond the human realm to the next division of social theorists who seek the explanation of social change in the natural environment outside of the activities and laws of groups. To the geographical school of sociology each environment contains a specific challenge. The necessity of organising irrigation and canalisation produced the despotic empires of antiquity. Asiatic feudalism never matured into merchant capitalism because inter-regional trade was hampered by distances, difficulties of transport and the lack of local specialisation. Due to the formidable geography of Asia, the mercantile class could never rise to any position of substantial power. Populations which live in the unfeatured expanses of the East face very different conditions from the populations which inhabit the finely differentiated and physically favoured parts of Western Europe. Where there is room for expansion a feeling of optimism pervades the society. Early nationhood which gives coherence to society, enterprise, optimism, national unity, are products of the space which a social entity finds available.[2]

The element often chosen by those environmentalists inclining to a single-factor theory is climate. Montesquieu thought

[1] F. Oppenheimer: *System der Soziologie*, Berlin, 1923–33.
[2] F. Ratzel: *Politische Geographie*, Munich, 1903.

the British Parliamentary regime well suited to the changeability of the climate. The backwardness of the tropical peoples and of those living in the arctic regions is explained by reference to the rigours of the climate which impedes mental ability, health and productivity.[1] Not only does the climate exert, according to this school, an influence on the quantity of food and the kind of vitamins and of animal products which can be consumed, but the entire metabolism of the body and, more subtly, the mental state of the individual, are conditioned by the weather. Advancing desiccation can undermine a civilisation. Excessive humidity can devitalise it. Heights make people irritable. Mougeolle has a "law of altitudes" according to which cities become larger and more civilised as we descend from high to lower altitudes.[2] Economic phenomena such as the trade cycle have been related to fluctuations in the weather. Jevons argued that the periodicity of the sun spots had a bearing on the price of bread and hence on wages and the cost of production.[3] Moore worked out a correlation of 0.718 between the cycles in American pig-iron production and crop yields, with a lag of the former of one or two years, and an even higher coefficient of correlation for the general price level and the yields of crops:

"The rhythmically varying yields per acre of the crops are the cause of Economic Cycles. When the yield increases, the volume of trade, the activity of industry and the amount of employment, increase; the demand for producers' goods increases, and the prices for producers' goods rise; the demand curves for agricultural commodities rise; with the ultimate result of a rise in general prices. The contrary changes would follow upon a fall in the yield per acre of the crops."[4]

If agriculture is so important, the exhaustion of the soil can be held responsible for the decline of civilisations. Soil erosion is said to have overtaken Italy at the beginning of the Christian era and to have been one of the major reasons for the decline of the Western Roman Empire.[5] The threat of famine hung

[1] C. A. Mills: *Climate makes the Man*, London, 1946.
[2] P. Mougeolle: *Les Problèmes de l'Histoire*.
[3] W. S. Jevons: *Investigations in Currency and Finance*, London, 1909.
[4] H. L. Moore: *Economic Cycles. Their Law and Cause*, New York, 1914, p. 146.
[5] V. G. Simkhovitch: "Hay and History" in *Political Science Quarterly*, 1913, Vol. 28, pp. 385–403. This view is held by few scholars nowadays.

over the fortunes of peoples for the greater part of history and has coloured the outlook of men. Only briefly and locally has man enjoyed abundance.[1] Man has built an elaborate ritual around the problems of eating and drinking because he could never be quite sure of food; they were matters as valuable to him as life. W. H. Rivers records one community:

"The lives of the people are largely devoted to their buffaloes. . . . The ordinary operations of the dairy have become a religious ritual and ceremonies of a religious character accompany (their pursuit.)"[2]

The problem of plenty depends in an agricultural country to a large extent on the number of mouths that have to be fed. So long as additional numbers can be met by additional output because land and water are plentiful, so long is an increasing population very welcome. However, the "instinct to multiply", as some demographers have called it, may go beyond that point and outrun the means of livelihood. The demographic explanation of social change fuses the environmental and "societal" schools on the basis of the quantity and quality of population. Malthus held that populations show the tendency to increase in geometric ratio, whereas new land could be put under the plough only in arithmetical ratio; hence there was a constant threat of overpopulation and starvation. On the other hand, sparcity has been considered a hindrance to the efflorescence of nations; a certain minimum amount of diversity and of mutual stimulation is required for cultural growth:

"Numerical increase of the members of a society is the primary cause of its whole revolution. The increase of a unified population leads to an increase of social differentiation and to a division of labour, and of social attitudes, and facilitating the provision of various tools and making possible a better and more powerful co-ordination of the individual actions and a more accurate presentation of natural laws."[3]

Numbers may enforce technical proficiency and open up new frontiers. Without this driving force, production ceases to be stimulated by additional demand and other devices must be found to encourage investment. When the slave trade was

[1]E. P. Prentice: *Hunger and History*, New York, 1939.
[2]W. H. R. Rivers: *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 38.
[3]A. Coste: *L'Expérience des Peuples et les Prévisions qu'elle autorise*, Paris, 1900, p. 588.

prohibited much land that was under cultivation returned to bush—the planters could not afford paid labour. The international market depends on the specialisation of countries, and is encouraged by large numbers and the need to concentrate on the most profitable outlets. Abundant population provides the surplus for armies and emigration. A declining population is also an ageing population, soon incapable of reproducing itself or of retaining the level of civilisation achieved by other, more fertile, generations. There is an optimum rate of population increase for each social and technical condition of society.

A society must see to it that it not only maintains its numbers, but also the quality of its population. Beside the quantitative view of population, there is the further consideration that not all children are of equal intelligence. It has been stated, that there is a correlation between low intelligence and the classes of the population who have large families. "For families of four the average (intelligence) score was 35.3, for those of eight the average score was 28.8, and the drop continued. There were families of every size up to 19, the representatives of families of 18 and 19 scoring seven and zero respectively." These figures were derived by Godfrey Thomson in an enquiry in Scotland covering some 70,000 school children.[1] In another social survey, Caradog Jones found that "the mean number of children recorded as born alive in 1,115 families containing at least one M.D. child was 4.69 as compared with 3.39 in normal working-class families with at least one child alive."[2] Professional people have nowadays in the Western countries considerably fewer children than manual workers. According to the British Family Census of 1946, the former are below replacement level.

"Eugenists" call for action to preserve or improve the "biological resources" of society. Assuming that social élites are more intelligent and more creative than men of lower class, a civilisation is forced to decay when the ruling groups do not have sufficient children to man the leading positions of a society. They have to be reinforced by men of lesser quality. According to Gini and to R. A. Fisher, the biological sterility

[1]Quoted in the *Report of the Royal Commission on Population*, London, 1949, Cmd. 7695, p. 154.

[2]D. Caradog Jones: *Social Surveys*, London, 1949, p. 130.

of the aristocratic families of Rome condemned the Roman Empire first to intellectual sterility and then to extinction.[1] Gradually the refined civilisation of the "well born" was replaced by coarser forms until nothing was left of the ancient glory. The "eugenists" see the cause for the decline of civilisations in the "breeding out" of "creative genes."

The arguments which environmentalists advance in opposition to the "eugenists" need not to repeated here. The significant feature of this part of the developmental analysis is that it proves that the many schools which have established themselves in a short while form a certain unity. Each of them tries to uncover a sub-structure of history, from which other phenomena can be derived. The purpose of this procedure is to reduce the multiplicity of factors, give orderly and consequential treatment to the various features, and show the unity of all social life.

However, the very multiplicity of standpoints suggests that no one set of laws can do justice to all historical change. It also appears that the kind of social theory acclaimed by a group depends on the prevailing culture; on group interests and social structure; on the social atmosphere with the various psychological justifications which groups require; and on the factual and analytical material which is available to the theorist. "A truly believing Hindoo," Weber once said, "if reminded of the miserable situation of the Untouchables, could have only one idea; the Untouchables were atoning for many sins committed in previous existences."[2] What has come to be called the "Sociology of Knowledge" (*Wissenssoziologie*) describes the social conditioning of theoretical analysis. A sociologist grown up in a plural society is naturally inclined to emphasise the struggle between ethnic groups.[3] A society eagerly debating needs and standards will be pre-occupied with administrative problems and the controversy between environmentalists and eugenists. Social atmosphere colours viewpoints: Condorcet writing in the early days of the French Revolution saw the future in optimistic perspectives; Spengler writing in the

[1] R. A. Fisher: *The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection*, Oxford, 1930.

[2] M. Weber: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Tubingen, 1921, Vol. II, p. 120.

[3] A characteristic example is L. Gumplowicz: *Der Rassenkampf*, Innsbruck, 1883.

Götterdämmerung of the German defeat painted the coming century in sombre hues of ossification and decay. Certain discoveries greatly fascinate contemporary writers. Newton's *Principia* deeply affected the social thought of the 18th century. The population increases in the Industrial Revolution influenced Malthus who again had a bearing on economics and on Darwin. The work of Darwin and the progress in medicine directed attention to biological factors. The collapse of the Phlogiston Theory and the synthetic preparation of an organic substance in the laboratory by Wöhler "drove the spirits from their last resting place in the theory of chemistry."[1] Materialist explanations became current and we see social theorists pushing the causal agent back from the spiritual to the technological and further to the biological nature of man. Others see man against a universal background, dependent on geological formations and climate, which are themselves functions of stellar periodicities.

II

Theories can be categorised according to their desire to explain social change from within or from without the social system. There are *endogenous, exogenous and mixed models.* Thus the Great Man Theory and the demographic approach are two examples which belong to the endogenous type. The strength of the first is to explain phenomena by the phenonema themselves and thus to shorten the chain of reasoning; the exogenous theorists deride the endogenous models as so many Baron Münchausen's horns that blow themselves. The former approach is characterised by the greater place that is reserved for acts of will and for social institutions used to agreed purposes, while the latter model is rather rigid in its determinism (and thus also less vague). Rigid determinism linking society to some

[1]L. Hogben: *Science for the Citizen*, London, 1938, p. 500. Hogben quotes the chemist Henry, who only one year before Wöhler's work said: "It is not probable that we shall ever attain the power of imitating nature in these operations. For in the functions of a living plant a directing principle appears to be concerned peculiar to animated bodies and superior to and differing from the cause which has been termed chemical affinity." In the light of organic chemistry and Mendelian genetics the vitalist position to which Henry adheres has been greatly modified.

natural sequence suggests the operation of natural laws in all things and brings society under the wing of a wider universe. The latter type of theory will find the language of natural science serviceable and approximate its concepts to those of mechanics, physiology or genetics. As in natural science the simplest explanation will be given preference.

The above analysis has shown us that the *number of causal agents*, making up the "sub-structure", varies and that theories differ according to whether they are able to explain satisfactorily social change with the help of a single cause or require many cooperating causal factors.[1] There is a third type of theory which gives a single ultimate cause, but defines this so widely that it represents in effect a wide number of determining agents. The one-factor type of explanation has the virtue of simplicity. It lends itself to verification in the laboratory. Mills, to prove his climatic theory, injected rats with bacteria. Animals reared in cold rooms overcame their illness. The white blood cells sprang "into vigorous attack almost at once, gathering and digesting enormous numbers of invaders; but in the heat the cells remain largely inactive."[2] Rats in a cool room required 12 trials to find their way through a maze and to get at their food. Those reared in moderate warmth required 28 trials; whereas those raised in "tropical heat" required 48 trials or were unable to find a solution. Single-factor theories about the trade cycle can be studied when new gold mines have been opened, as monetary theorists have done. Biological theories can utilise effectively what we know about the laws of heredity. The transmission of a number of physical and mental disabilities is assured as a fact, and the susceptibility of certain families to labour under handicaps has been established very clearly. The single-factor analyses can produce some powerful examples in their support. Yet these isolated cases hardly convince everybody.

Pluralist theorists find it difficult to reduce all events to one simple explanation: how is it, if climate is the governing factor,

[1]For example: "The beginnings of effective plant study have been traced to a fortunate combination of Humanistic Learning, Renaissance Art, and the perfection of the Craft of Printing." C. Singer: *A Short History of Biology*, Oxford, 1931.

[2]Mills: *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

that countries like Egypt, Persia, Spain, North America have given rise to so many different civilisations? Can climate explain the convergence of behaviour of British civil servants located as far apart as Hudson Bay and Fiji, or the divergence of the cultures of Pueblo Indians and Navaho living in adjacent territories? Those who attribute to new supplies of precious metal the changes which take place in more advanced economies fail to explain why they led to a recrudescence of serf conditions in the Baltic States, Hungary and Poland, while in Western Europe they helped to dissolve feudalism. "There is in fact", says Dobb, "as much evidence to be adduced that the growth of a money economy *per se* leads to an intensification of serfdom as there is evidence that it was the cause of the feudal decline."[1] The single-factor determinists show a tendency of generalising from a limited field of observation. It is possible to ascribe the drop in the size of upper class families towards the end of the 19th century to the spread of knowledge of birth control, but this does not explain the fall in the birthrate in Southern Ireland. Imperialist share-outs in the same period can be ascribed, with equal plausibility, to the search for investment outlets by surplus capital, as Hobson and Lenin suggested, or to the search for defensible frontiers as Lord Curzon thought. Neither explanation can unequivocally determine whether a similar need for investment or for security will produce an expansionist policy or an intensification of social changes at home. Collective measures may commend themselves to nations to solve their problems: the total situation must be taken into account. The neat laws which 19th century social theorists tried to distil, such as the Quantity Theory of Money or Engel's Law of Consumption, always show the same weaknesses. On food consumption Engel's Law states: "The poorer an individual, a family or a people, the greater must be the percentage of the income necessary for the maintenance of physical sustenance and of this the greatest portion must be reserved for food."[2] An elaboration of this was later found by

[1] M. Dobb: *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, London, 1947, p. 40.

[2] E. Engel: "Die Lebenskosten belgischer Arbeiterfamilien früher und jetzt" in *Bulletin de l'Institut Internationale de Statistique*, Rome, 1895, Vol. 40. (Ernst Engel should not be confused with Frederic Engels.)

Engel (in collaboration with Le Play) which relates the proportion spent on animal products to rising incomes. Engel's Law is an application of the well-known principle of economics of decreasing marginal utility of an article with its increasing supply. It is an interesting contribution, for it points to certain constants in human behaviour; but even such a simple item in a family budget as food is a factor of many variables. The law can only hold in a middle range of incomes. No man, however rich, can approximate zero per cent in his expenditure on food, and no family (except in times of famine) will spend all its income on food. Further coefficients are provided by the locality of the family and the culture traits of the society in which the family disburses its income. In a rural community with few competing distractions, the pleasures of the table may take predominance. Other expenses may be low. In some societies lavish expenditure on food is the chief vehicle for the conspicuous display of wealth and standing. Personal factors intervene. The drunkard spends more on "food" than classes considerably poorer than himself. Some backward countries with a high infantile mortality rate show larger families in the middle income groups than among the poorest, where the survival rate is low because of malnutrition and ill-health. Larger families mean, of course, greater expenditure on food. In another society, certain class groups, obeying religious instructions have to purchase great quantities of food to be distributed among the poor, as a means of salvation for the rich. Conversely, religious injunctions may raise abstinence and fasting to a moral and spiritual obligation. Engel's law holds "in the small", i.e. within a social situation about which a number of coefficients have already been determined.

"In the small" Engel's law may give us some guidance and suggest the desirability of steering price policies so that lower income groups can allow for various needs. Rent subsidies, food subsidies, social security schemes and other schemes may be used to "upset" the law, once the relationship between poverty and high proportional layout for food has been seen. Likewise, in the economic example, the increase of available capital must be met by increased investment outlets, lest idleness of resources or imperialist tendencies should follow.

Strategically, countries must be given security. Not substructures, but *relationships about which we must do something*, policies not determinism, result from analysis. The 19th century quest strikes us as old-fashioned and misdirected, a grim desire for possession of what is transient.

Mixed models, trying to retain the advantages of single-factor explanations without their disadvantages, will be discussed next.

Marx's theory can be taken as an example. In the passage quoted, economics is equated with the whole productive process of man in his interchange with environment. In a number of programmatic declarations Marx was careful not to claim too much for any narrower definition of economics. "Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., developments are based on economic development. But all these react upon one another and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic problem is the cause and the sole active force while all else remains passive. There is rather interaction on the basis of the economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself."[1] When in later years, any independent Marxist had qualms about the materialist interpretation of history as not sufficiently wide to explain all phenomena even in times of revolutionary crisis, he was taken to task by other Marxists. Bloch thought economics too rigid a category to encompass the apocalyptic manifestations of the Peasant Wars. To him they seemed to be harking back to some "ancient heresy, the ecstasy of the upright posture, the most impetuous, rebellious, serious of all strivings, the determination to enter the gates of Paradise."[2] The rejoinder to this was as follows:

"By limiting the economic realm, and opposing it as an objective 'reified' category to the soul and 'inner' experiences he (Bloch) forgets that what we call economic is but the real whole world in

[1]F. Engels in a letter to H. Starkenburg, dated 25th January, 1894. Reprinted in *Historischer Materialismus*, ed. by H. Duncker, Berlin, 1930, Vol. II, p. 151. Engels also saw that thinking tries "to be consistent with itself . . . In order to achieve this the faithful reflection of economic conditions is more and more infringed upon. The more so, the more rarely it happens that a code of law is the blunt, unmitigated, unadulterated, expression of the domination of a class. This in itself, if nothing else, would offend the 'concept of justice' ". (Letter to C. Schmidt, dated 27th October, 1890. *Marx' Selected Works*, London, 1942, Vol. I, p. 385.)

[2]E. Bloch: *Thomas Münzer*, Munich, 1921, p. 74.

its more normal aspects of systematised objectivity. A truly social revolution can never be anything less than a transformation of the concrete content of existence."[1]

As soon as the definition of economics is thus "enriched", the possibility of deriving contradictory conclusions from the same reading of events is great and the history of Marxism shows a continuous oscillation from alternate widenings to a narrowing of the meaning of the terms which are used.[2] The modern solution to the problem of analysis of change takes account of the difficulty by accepting the greater vagueness of a multi-factor explanation, but distinguishes clearly what *in any particular situation* are the most active, what the secondary, and what the derivative factors, and relates them to the objectives which the analysis is destined to serve; the elucidation of a period; the guidance of policy; the investigation of relationships which permit of extrapolations into the immediate future.

Little remains therefore of the simple "laws" which the first sociologists thought to have secured as the ultimate conclusion of their researches. Let it be said that their work was not below the current level of discussion in other disciplines. Darwin was satisfied with sustaining his thesis of the evolution of the species on a few mechanisms of extreme simplicity—two forms of selection, natural and sexual, and the theory of acquired characteristics and their propagation among the offspring. To-day the theory of evolution has left behind Darwin's "extremely abstract and generalised" treatment[3] and made of "evolution . . . an alarmingly large and varied subject."[4] The "multiformity of evolution" takes into account the nature

[1]G. Lukácz: *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, Berlin, 1923, p. 211.

[2]A classical example of the disagreement between two leading Marxists is the controversy between Lenin and Plekhanov—who at that time respected one another—over the attitude of the Social Democratic Party during the revolution of 1905. Both were agreed that conditions did not favour the seizure of power. Plekhanov assumed that social theory was to be a guide and if it appeared clear that armed action would fail, the Party should warn the proletariat. Lenin took the opposite view. Far from considering himself demagogic or utopian, he welcomed the rising as a dress rehearsal for later struggles. The abortive rising was a good education for the masses. Therefore Plekhanov's slogan: "We should not have taken to arms" was false. "On the contrary we should have taken to arms more resolutely, energetically, and aggressively." (*Selected Works*, London, 1936, Vol. III, p. 348.)

[3]J. Huxley: *Evolution. The Modern Synthesis*, London, 1944, p. 125.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 30.

of the genetic system of each species; its habitat and changes occurring in it; the ecological relationships of the species; the size and structure of the group; the method of development of the individual, for "these and many facts besides have their evolutionary effects."[1] The same complication of the theoretical framework has taken place in the analysis of social evolution; we require concreteness, we want to know the sweep of any regularity found, and we wish to derive from theory an increasing range of action and of self-understanding. The notions of a universal "sub-structure", as well as of universal laws, must be considered as detracting rather than adding to knowledge at this stage. In any particular situation, climate, biology, a Great Man, a new discovery, may "electrify" groups and the resulting tension may "cause" them to effect a rearrangement in the social structure. Attention shifts from the "primal mover" to the actual circumstances and the form which social change takes.[2] Instead of looking for universal causative agents we look for concepts which in the given concrete situation assist analysis and raise challenging questions of policy. What is of interest is how various factors which in one period acted as motor forces, can in another become limiting factors. Effect may become cause and react back on the initial cause; in their development they may "interpenetrate".

III

Hegel has shown how difficult it is to find concepts of sufficient flexibility to allow for this kind of analysis. It is to the concepts of developmental analysis that we turn next:

"Definition renounces of itself the concept-terms, properly so-called, which would be essentially principles of the subject-matter, and contents itself with marks, that is with determinations, in which essentiality for the object itself is a matter of indifference and which

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[2] F. Engels admitted that future generations might be more interested in the forms which social change take than in designating any factor as the all-powerful one: "We laid the main emphasis on the economic derivation of political, legal and other ideological conceptions and the various actions which were based on them. This we had to do. But we neglected the formal aspect by concentrating on the substance." (Letter to F. Mehring, dated 17th July, 1893. Historischer Materialismus, *op. cit.*, p. 154.)

are designed merely to be *distinguishing* tokens for an external reflection. A single external determinateness of this kind is so entirely inadequate to the concrete totality and the nature of its concept that its exclusive selection is beyond justification; nor could anyone suppose that a concrete whole had its true expression and character in it."[1]

Later developments in the realm of social theory have been encouraging; Hegel took a too gloomy view. Concepts have been found which apply to concrete investigations, field work and experiment, and enlarge our powers of observation. In the course of constructing new concepts many mistakes were naturally made, and we shall briefly discuss the early sociologists in going beyond Hegel and attempting to translate his "dialectics" into more concrete and tangible language. Faced with the cloudiness of a passage such as the above it was natural for social theorists to look for a medium of expression which was simpler and more direct. Terms like "social organism", "inevitable stages", "struggle for existence", became the stepping stones towards the analysis of culture, of social structures, human needs and human relationships.

The 19th century wrestling with the difficulty of describing society as an entity which showed a unity and yet was made up of autonomous parts sought refuge in the concept of the "social organism". It was recognised that "there exist unquestionable differences between societies and the organism, but they are not so important as to separate them radically from each other."[2] Society like natural organisms possessed the capacity for growth, differentiation, cohesion, perfectibility, regeneration, sickness and death. Once launched the concept was employed for the most extravagant comparisons. Parliament was the social brain; the workers were the limbs; the flow of commodities in the nation was likened to a blood stream. Anti-social acts were said to be the diseases in the body politic. One writer compared the State to the male organism, and the Church to the female. Lilienfeld thought he was advancing knowledge when he "explained" migration as social ejaculation and individuals as so many free cells in the body.

[1] F. W. Hegel: *Subjective Logic*. Translated as "Hegel's Logic of World and Idea" by H. S. Macran, Oxford, 1929, p. 153.
[2] R. Worms: *Philosophie des Sciences Sociales*, Paris, p. 55.

Sociologists had taken a wrong turning. Yet the notion of the "social organism" was an advance as a more concrete rendering of what Hegel had expressed by the "folk spirit". Nor was there anything fundamentally wrong with the use of an analogy. The natural sciences had many concepts culled from the social disciplines. The word "cause" is borrowed from legal practice; "statics" and "statistics" point to the theory of the State; even so characteristic an idea as the "stable equilibrium" used in physics to such effect, was first employed in connection with the human body and its resistance to disease; it was known to the ancients as the *vix medicatrix naturæ*. The school of Durkheim substituted "social mind" for social organism. In England it had a vogue as the "group mind". It worked on the thesis that "the thinking and acting of each man, in so far as he thinks and acts as a member of society, is very different from his thinking and acting as an isolated individual."[1] C. G. Jung added the "collective unconscious"; and Freud operated with the "racial memory" which preserved the guilt feeling of the "primal horde": "A process like the removal of the primal father by the band of brothers," an act which Freud thought to have proved, "must have left ineradicable traces in the history of mankind."[2] All these thinkers were dominated by the current belief in supra-temporal instincts. The instinct concept had to be ridiculed before further progress could be made.

To hold that the "gregarious instinct" is responsible for altruism, intolerance, fear of solitude, sensitiveness to the herd, standardisation of the mores, the passion of mob violence, panics, susceptibility to leadership, imitation, striving for popularity and suggestion, as Trotter did in different sections of his *Instincts of the Herd in War and Peace*, is excellent evidence that there is no such instinct.

"An instinct with such divergent manifestations is not an instinct at all. We must conclude that those who do not go to the cities are devoid of the instinct (of social gregariousness) and that in the past when there were no big cities the population seems not to have had an instinct. This inference leads further to the conclusion that the instinct appeared recently and that it has been acquired, which

[1] W. McDougall: *The Group Mind*, London, 1920, pp. 9–10.
[2] S. Freud: *Totem and Taboo*, London, 1938, p. 237.

means that it is not an instinct at all, because an acquired instinct is a self-contradictory conception."[1]

Instinct, libido, *élan vital* are not entities with which we can operate in developmental analysis. This is most clearly demonstrated in the caution with which these kinds of driving forces have been formulated in recent years. Social psychologists still speak of "wishes" and "motives", but the failure of the most elaborate of all sociologies which is based on a limited number of drives or "residues", that of Pareto, shows how far we must travel away from them.

Pareto saw in the residues the ultimate driving forces of society on which logic and higher motives vainly wish to impose certain inhibitions. However, the residues prove always stronger and set limits to the work of logicians and humanitarians. A mere enumeration of the six basic residues of Pareto shows what a mixed assortment they are:

I. Residue of Combination.
II. Residue of Persistence of Aggregates.
III. Residue of Manifestation of Sentiments through Overt Acts.
IV. Residue in regard to Sociability.
V. Residue of the Integrity of the Individual and of his Dependants.
VI. Sexual Residues.

Capitalism is considered a good system because it provides a wholesome mixture of these residues among leading élites. The Speculators with their variable and insecure income develop shrewdness, and are thus fitted with a large amount of Residue I, are opposed by the Rentiers, who with fixed income and retiring dispositions impart to society a good deal of Residue II. When the Speculators have amassed wealth, they themselves become "safe" Rentiers and are replaced by other élites who are more dynamic. Capitalism is an open system which allows for the circulation of élites. Pareto formalises the

[1]P. Sorokin: *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, New York, 1928, p. 614. See also M. Ginsberg: *The Psychology of Society*, London, 1933, for a final criticism of "instinct" theories. In economics the "utility" concept has been similarly emptied of hedonistic, ethical or welfare connotations. Like the "wishes" in psychology, utility has become a mere convention among economists.

situation in which social behaviour (B) expresses an underlying psychic state (A) which is justified by a theory (C) and which is usually not strictly logical in its connection with (B).[1]

Pareto's work bears little reference to modern research. If certain instincts are referred to they are now treated "heuristically", because attention is to be concentrated on them momentarily. The newer approach, which makes use of a number of levels of analysis, can dispense with entities such as social organisms or instincts, or employ them as temporary short-hand terms for parts moving in the same direction and bound together into a working pattern, *making use of environment in a determinate manner* over a fairly extensive period.

A similar "loosening up" of concepts has marked the tracing of stages of development. The first step in this direction was made when, in the 17th century, three periods of history were distinguished: Antiquity; the Middle Ages; and Modern Times. The medieval schoolmen only knew of two epochs: from the time of Genesis to Christ's birth and thenceforth to the Second Coming. The three-fold division, which is not dependent on Christianity for its criteria of classification, was first applied to literary criticism. The social evolutionists enlarged the framework. Spencer used political institutions to distinguish Simple Society from Compound Society. Simple Societies, nomadic, semi-settled and settled, were of four varieties:

(*a*) Headless (leaderless).
(*b*) With Occasional Headship.
(*c*) With Vague and Unstable Headship.
(*d*) With Stable Headship.

When the stage of Compound Society with a supreme chief and a number of sub-chiefs had been reached, the entity rapidly increased in complexity until we come to the Doubly Compound Society, which possesses political organisations; ecclesiastical hierarchies; a caste or class system; military formations and other "Grand Associations" (as they were later called). In the third stage, we find positive law, theology, towns, roads and progress in knowledge and the arts.

Durkheim, while using different criteria of classification, had

[1]For a detailed critical work on Pareto, see F. Borkenau: *Pareto*, London, 1936.

recourse to a similar division: the horde, the polysegmentary society simply compounded and later, doubly compounded. In archaeology it has been customary to speak of the Stone Age, the Bronze Age and the Iron Age. Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg, using technological criteria, saw the first stage characterised by kinship and territorial contiguity with:

Lower Hunting Societies.
Higher Hunting Societies.
Agricultural Societies I.
Agricultural Societies II.
Agricultural Societies III.
Pastoral Societies I.
Pastoral Societies II.

The second stage is clearly present in Antiquity but has persisted into more recent times. It includes:

Absolute Monarchy.
Feudal Monarchy.
Empire.

The third stage of citizenship contains societies of two kinds, one highly localised, the other covering a wide area:

The City State.
The Country State.

Ross and a large number of other sociologists discerned more than three stages. There were clericalist societies; militarist; bureaucratic; liberalist; capitalist; and individualist societies. Marx proposed a sixfold division: primitive communism; classical slave-owning societies; oriental; feudal; capitalist; and socialist societies. Examples could be multiplied. The danger into which all these divisions ran was that of arbitrary grouping and false stereotyping. As in natural evolution, classification, "if pursued too exclusively for its own sake . . . leads, as Radl has pithily put it in his *History of Biological Theories*, to spending one's time comparing one thing with another without ever troubling about what either of them really is."[1] Eventually, social morphology as generally morphology suffered from the neglect of physiology and experimentation.

[1]Huxley: *Op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

The cardinal flaw of the 19th century was that it assumed that all societies have passed through the same stages: Before Empire there was "in every case" the "gens"; before patriarchy there was matriarchy; before marriage there was "sexual communism"; before private property there was collective ownership; before religion there was animism; before agriculture there was pastoral life; before contract there was status. Family trees were planted for every institution, custom and tool. The 19th century was tireless in its hunt for origins[1] and mistaken in its belief in the inevitability of each stage as a prerequisite for the next. Soon it was shown that there was no warrant for assuming that the Indians of South America had ever formed a "gens". All societies appear to have marriage ceremonies. Morgan's construction of "sexual communism"[2] in earlier Iroquois society on the strength of inspecting the classificatory system of naming relatives was criticised. Kroeber pointed out that kinship names depended on psychological factors and especially on the linguistic system; and he gave instances of European languages which make either finer distinctions than is customary in English or lump together relatives that are differently named in the English language.[3] Matriarchy is rarely found. Private property is known in every society. Religion and animism can be shown to be equally primitive. Lenin interrupted his heavy administrative duties during the Russian Revolution, at a time when interventionist armies were still on Russian soil, to disown Kautsky for having quoted Marx's law of stages against the Russian Revolution.[4] Lenin denied that socialism in Russia must wait until capitalism had thoroughly established itself. Marx had to be more

[1]Darwin's title for the "Origin of Species" was ill-chosen. It was not seen that Darwin had hardly dealt with "origins".

[2]L. H. Morgan: *Ancient Society, or, Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilisation*, London, 1877.

[3]A. L. Kroeber: "Classificatory Types of Relations" in *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute*, 1909, Vol. 39, pp. 77–84.

[4]N. Lenin: *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*. (In the West Indies the imputation of primitive origins of the culture pattern is resented. See T. S. Simey: *Welfare and Planning in the West Indies*, London, 1947, for a cogent summary of the point of view which explains the culture of the West Indies in terms of the African origin of many of the inhabitants, and of the contrasting view which is content to trace it to more recent periods, mainly the circumstances of slavery, liberation and their aftermath of economic difficulties.)

generously interpreted: capitalism in the West was sufficient to the evolution of socialism anywhere without each country itself having to pass through the stage of capitalism.

The reaction to the concept of inevitable stages was more extreme than towards the other fundamental "constructs" of the 19th century thinkers. Social anthropologists abjured the concept of structure and spoke only in terms of "function". Bateson, armed with the facts of Mendel and of determining biological changes in embryological experiments, made sport of Darwinian views. In psychology, behaviourism denied the very idea of "mind" as an entity, outside of the associations learned during the process of conditioning. In history, research workers looked askance at any division and separation of history into periods. Assumptions about the general movement and direction of civilisations have become equally hazardous.

Social Darwinists like Spencer, Ward, Small, Ratzenhofer and Gumplowicz believed in progress and stressed the gradual adaptation that the species makes to meet more adequately its human needs.[1] In the course of many painful experiences it learns to utilise its environmental by more perfect "forms of sociation". However, a number of analysts denied that history showed any such direction. There was no ground for optimism; civilisations passed through cycles: they have a beginning; a period of early maturation; full bloom; decay and death. Civilisations are like flowers in Spengler's cosmology. Sorokin prefers to speak of rhythmical undulations about a norm. There is the "ideal calm" during the summer of civilisation when society is still in its "sacred stage". Men go about their affairs assured that they know what is right and that the morrow will present no insoluble problems. As soon as the "winter period" begins, with technical inventions multiplying, nothing is stable; men give themselves up to sensate pleasures; show ruthless egotism and eventually extinguish civilisation, either in war or through mercantile competition. The large soulless cities are reft asunder by class struggles.[2] The first

[1]It should be noted that the evolutionary approach was formulated in opposition to the traditional religious views that society never changes and that primitive societies with customs different from those of Europe and Christian ethics, are degenerations of the norm.

[2]P. Sorokin: *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, New York, 1926.

school cannot foresee the ultimate goal of society but sees the next step; the second school is uncertain of the next step but predicts the ultimate course of every civilisation.

Marx assumed a third approach which combined the evolutionary and the cyclical viewpoints in a spiral-like evolution. Equally opposed to the facile optimism of men like Spencer, and the defeatism of the cyclical schools, he thought that many previous culture traits reappear but on a higher level. Progress is not consistent, but nor is life and history stationary or penned within a "seasonal" cycle. Lenin defines the Marxist viewpoint as follows:

"A development that repeats, as it were, the stages already passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher plane ('negation of the negation'); a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line; a development in leaps and bounds, catastrophies, revolutions; 'intervals of gradualness'; transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses for development, imparted by the contradiction, the conflict of different forces and tendencies reacting on a given body or inside a given phenomenon or within a given society; interdependence, and the closest, indissoluble connection between *all* sides of every phenomenon (history disclosing ever new sides), a connection that provides the one world-process of motion proceeding according to law—such are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of evolution, more full of meaning than the current one."[1]

All three approaches are in themselves inadequate. Instead of a single, uni-dimensional evolution, social growth is now studied from a number of angles. Spatial relationships have been investigated by "social ecologists" like Park, Burgess, McKenzie, Mukerjee and Wirth,[2] and use is made of such

[1]N. Lenin: *Karl Marx, his Life and his Teachings*, London, 1931, p. 15. Marxism is not incompatible with a belief of stationary epochs. Engels thought that religious risings, so typical of Islamic societies, "leave everything where they found it. The collisions are periodical." ("Historischer Materialismus", *op. cit.*, p. 156.) See also K. A. Wittfogel: "Die Theorie der orientalischen Gesellschaft" in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, Paris, 1938, Vol. 7, No. 1–2, pp. 123–133.

[2]See E. C. Llewellyn and A. Hawthorn: "Human Ecology" in *Twentieth Century Sociology*. Ed. by G. Gurvitch and W. E. Moore, New York, 1945, pp. 466–499, for a bibliography and critical evaluation of the social ecologists. The authors say: "However concrete they may seem on the surface, one of the dangers of ecological theories is that, sounding concrete and like common sense, they appear both more inclusive and more definite than they prove in applications" (p. 493).

terms as succession, dominance, gradients and mobility. The selective effects of environment are studied. Certain environments favour certain types of behaviour and are refractory towards others. There is a "heterogeneity of diffusion" with unequal rates of change between the various social sectors, making in more complicated social structures for "cultural non-contemporaneousness".[1] There are survivals and anticipations. The "stages" isolated by the 19th century evolutionists are, like the ideal states of "perfect competition" or "perfect monopoly", models rather than realities. Modern economics provides us with a number of non-linear dynamic concepts which apply also to social data. "Relaxation oscillations",[2] damping, anti-damping and explosive amplitudes; rebounds; cobwebs and "stability in the sense of Poisson"[3] are some of the concepts used in modern economic analysis. Myrdal has used mechanisms, first elaborated by him in his monetary equilibrium analysis, in his book on the American Negroes. He stresses the "principle of cumulation" whereby a group once oppressed integrates some of the accusations of inferiority hurled at it. A vicious spiral is set up in which subnormal performance is used as an argument for inequality, and inequality leads to further inferiority of performance.[4]

Sufficient has been said to convince us that neither the "reified" terms of closed social philosophies, nor the shifting and vague language of more general approaches, are adequate.

[1]E. Bloch: *Erbschaft der Zeit*, Zürich, 1935.

[2]Relaxation oscillations are also known as "self exciting oscillations" or Van der Pol equations, after the name of the man who devoted a good deal of attention to them. See: Van der Pol: "Relaxation Oscillations" in *Philosophical Magazine*, 1926, Vol. II, pp. 987–992.

[3]See a brief discussion of these concepts in P. A. Samuelson: *Foundations of Economic Analysis*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1948, p. 336 ff.

Hawtrey speaks of rebounds, e.g. a minimum reserve ratio acts as a "billiard cushion against which the system bounces back, so to speak."

There is a vast literature on the cobweb theorem of alternatively stable and unstable equilibrium positions. (See W. Leontief: "Verzögerte Angebotsanpassung und partielles Gleichgewicht" in *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie*, 1934, Vol. V.)

Stability in the sense of Poisson "means that, although the system may not exactly repeat itself starting from an arbitrary initial state, yet in general it will return to the vicinity of its initial state and nearly repeat its motion during a long interval of time." (G. D. Birkhoff and D. C. Lewis: "Stability in Causal Systems" in *Philosophy of Science*, 1935, Vol. II, p. 310.)

[4]G. Myrdal: *An American Dilemma*, New York, 1944, Vol. II.

Terms and approaches must arise from concrete investigations which tie all analytical levels into a unified theory of social evolution. Developmental analysis introduces a new dimension, the dynamics of environment, and raises the whole discussion onto a new plane. The resulting theories must, however, themselves be tested ever anew by social research procedures in ever-expanding fields of enquiry.

CHAPTER IX

Methods of Social Research

The analysis of social development is not the only level of discussion on which theories are preferred which can be put to the test. To a certain extent all levels of analysis tend towards experimental research and the whole subject is integrated by similar research methods and problems.[1] Where policy is derived from analysis, this policy must be tried out, with the necessary scientific devices, in pilot schemes. Moreover, all analysis is an effort at controlling the bias of the social investigator, but it is in discussions on social research procedure that bias is examined in greatest detail.

Social theories improve with the flexibility of the research tools, the concepts and controls, which are built up in the course of social research.[2] On every level a fuller appreciation of the problems is assured if the theoretical work at the desk is preceded by field work. The "open humanism", which is part of the analyst's creed, distinguishes itself by its mistrust above all of "self evident" views and conventional opinions which have not been corroborated by inductive findings. Judgment and the enlargement of positive knowledge reinforce one

[1]Karl Pearson's famous phrase applies with particular force to the different levels of social analysis: "The unity of all science consists alone in its method not in its material." (*The Grammar of Science*, London, 1900, p. 16.) He defines the method of science as consisting "of (*a*) careful and accurate classification of facts and observation of their correlation and sequence; (*b*) the discovery of scientific laws by the aid of the creative imagination; (*c*) self-criticism and the final touchstone of equal validity for all normally constituted minds") p. 37).

[2]It seems that certain linguistic tools are much less well adapted than others. Abstraction is greatly assisted by useful symbolic devices. Chinese is sometimes quoted as an example of a language which lends itself only with difficulty to the kind of analytical processes of thought with which we are concerned in the social sciences: "There is no word which simply signifies 'old man'. Rather a considerable number of words paint different aspects of old age: *k'i*, those who need a richer diet: *k'ao*, those who have difficulty in breathing, and so on. These concrete evocations entail a multitude of other similarly concrete images of every detail of the mode of life of the aged . . . but there are but a few images evoked by *k'i* which, in general, correspond to the quasi-singular notion of old persons, some 60 to 70 years of age." (R. K. Merton: "The Sociology of Knowledge" in *Twentieth Century Sociology*, New York, 1945, p. 387. See also: D. Lee: "Conceptual Complications of an Indian Language" in *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. V, No. 1, 1938.)

another. It has already been pointed out how much our modern view of the world owes to the broadening of our positive knowledge of how different societies and classes work. Our whole method of formulating problems has also been changed by the advances in the manner of stating questions, of answering them and of applying results.

The natural sciences and the humanities are building up canons of research which can be adapted by the social investigator. But before the sociologist makes an analysis in terms of culture traits and patterns he should learn from the historian's use of documents. The structural analysis can gain from the economist's judicious employment of statistical data, as well as from the social psychologist's study of group situations and responses. The manner of entry into the field is of importance to the anthropologist. In the study of needs, the market research organisations and administrative executives have gathered many useful experiences in the framing of questions. Most important in statistical enquiry are the accurate representation of the population and the correct weighting which is to be given to each sub-division. Psychological work and the biological sciences have contributed much to our understanding of the need for "design" in experiments. There are many further examples of a fruitful interaction between social analysis and other disciplines. Some typical research problems shall be taken as a sample of the wider orbit.

I

Social research involves the evaluation of information, either in written form or in the testimony of an informant. An informant in an anthropological enquiry—an old man well versed in the genealogy of the tribe—or in social work—a client in need of assistance—tells his story. When examining this information we distinguish two steps: the verification of the authenticity of the information and the piecing together of the information using other knowledge for a complete picture which will reflect the living entity. The first is a problem of social research, the second of analysis. For the sake of brevity, we shall call each extant piece of information, whether it is

written down or not, a *document.* Historians group documents into primary sources, and those that are not primary. Data gathered at first hand and recorded by the person responsible for the collection of the data, are primary sources. Secondary sources are never as reliable, for the process of transcription and reprinting affords many opportunities for error. Punctilious workers demand from the historian that he reads his documents in the original; verbatim printed editions are not good enough, as the print obscures the handwriting and other marks of authorship which require checking: "New opportunities for study bring with them the possibility, and even the obligation, of writing our history anew, *and at first hand.* The only moral I would venture to draw from seven years spent as an archivist lies in those last four words."[1]

Obviously when examining information we are continuously concerned with authorship, i.e. with such questions as: "Is the authorship of the document identified? Has the author an interest in deceiving us, is he under any pressure (and be it only disdain of his readers) to tell an untruth or hide the full truth? Can his vanity be affected by the information he imparts? Is the author well situated in time, social position and place, to observe what he reports? Is he a trained observer? Is he, in the case of some extraordinary information, an intentional or accidental witness?" One could add to these questions, they will, however, suffice to indicate the kind of problem which the verification of authorship presents, before we come to make out the meaning of a text, which is the second step which the investigator makes.

The interpretation of the information puts the investigator before a new set of difficulties: "What has the informant wanted to say with a particular piece of information? What is his real, as distinct from his literal, meaning? Why has he chosen this way of expressing himself and are any further inferences to be drawn from his exact choice of words?" The analyst will begin at this point with a process of self-examination. He will ask himself: "How do I come to hold my present point of view? What sound evidence is there to support it? Why do respected authoritative opponents think otherwise? What are the general

[1]V. H. Galbraith: *Studies in Public Records*, London, 1948, pp. 5–6.

principles underlying our differences and how can I make them explicit to the reader? Can we put the respective opinions to the test?" Most dangerous are "æsthetic" likes and dislikes: e.g. a traditional objection to the values of urban life, a touchiness about language or some other resistance to a certain "style of life". Thus the well-known anthropologist Sapir dislikes French civilisation as "emotionally shallow". "It exaggerates manner at the cost of content." He quotes as evidence the formalism of French classical drama, the prevalence of epigrams and the lack of an ecstatic note in French religious thought.[1] This appears, on the evidence presented, as an emotional antipathy, but Sapir replies that his critic has an æsthetic bias *in favour* of the French. He has stated his view with the necessary frankness. "Indeed, other writers are more dangerous because less outspoken." Other analysts may hide behind authorities whom they exploit to prove their case.

To quote therefore, a less careful social analyst. Havelock Ellis shows in one sentence the kind of looseness into which the writer can easily slip:

"Savage women are evidently very attentive to music; Backhouse, as quoted by Ling Roth (*The Tasmanians*, p. 20) mentions how a woman belonging to the very primitive and now extinct Tasmanian race, when shown a musical box, listened 'with intensity; her ears moved like those of a dog or horse, to catch the sound.' "[2]

Ellis observes at second or third hand and leaves us uncertain about the reliability of the observer. One reaction is taken as general for all primitive people. The reaction itself might have been less in response to the music and more to the strange box, which gives forth sound. It is awkward to have chosen an extinct race to demonstrate a general thesis. Here a problem of research craftsmanship is involved.

Scepticism is often expressed over documents which contain statistics. Statistics are useful because they are definite and permit of verifiable comparisons. Statistics are misleading when they do not reflect accurately the true situation; when they have been collected by persons with an axe to grind; are

[1] E. Sapir: "Culture, Genuine and Spurious" in *American Journal of Sociology*, 1924, Vol. 29, pp. 401–429.

[2] H. H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex. Sexual Selection in Man*, New York, 1936, Vol. II, pp. 130–131.

spurious or based on dubious information. Because extravagant claims are sometimes derived from statistics and because there is the widespread feeling that figures can never tell the full story, there is a belief, fed on a common aversion towards mathematical reasoning, that "anything can be proved by statistics". In fact, statistical work is often amenable to a more precise statement of the *sources of bias* and the methods by which they can be controlled or kept within calculable limits than any seemingly qualified verbal statement.

In evaluating statistics it is important to know who collected the primary data; whether the enumerators were trained; whether the informants willingly cooperated; who compiled the tabulations; where machines were used for the calculations and what checks were employed for verifying the results. We should be able to say with conviction why a "family"; an "engineer"; a "room"; a "coloured person" was given the definition employed and no other, and to what extent convenience had to overrule logic. Decisions on border line cases should be instanced. When evidence is put forward in quantitative form care must be exercised in the conclusions which the evidence permits. In crime statistics we must recognize that not actual crime, but detected crime, is recorded, and that this is, among other things, a function of the vigilance and size of the police force; of the cooperation of the public with the police; and of the inclusiveness of the law. The length of the reporting period; the classification of the offences; the reliability with which instances are recorded are matters on which we require assurance. Again, public assistance figures measure often rather the amount of money and the number of social workers at our disposal than the real extent of the need. The more generous the agencies, the greater, within wide limits, will be the call upon them and what was once shouldered by the family unit becomes the concern of the relief organisation. It should be remembered also that health figures reflect fashions in diagnosis. Finally comparisons should be made on standardised populations. Well known are the cases of health resorts with death rates higher than in the country at large because of the disproportionate number of aged and sick persons in the population visiting these places.

Each piece of information should meet the criteria of *consistency, efficiency and significance.* The first criterion implies that the field remains the same during the course of the enquiry and that comparisons are valid in the sense just described. Efficiency demands that all relevant information is collected which it is in the power of informants to give. Questions must be so phrased and of such a kind that reliable answers can be secured. For the sake of brevity, we shall assume that the information we seek can be elicited by asking questions. The criterion of significance will be examined at the end of the chapter.

Questions can be of a general kind to put the informant at his ease and make him tell his story, if the purpose is to record statements in the words of the informant. The anthropologist Radin has published the autobiography of an Indian taken down in his own words.[1] The social worker and the psychologist continuously extract life histories.[2] Case-studies and résumés of diaries can be used.[3] The entire document then needs relating to the social context in which the informant lives—his experiences as a unit within a social structure and the kind of group interests and ambitions to which he contributes.[4]

More specific questions which the analyst asks from his informant can be grouped according to their formal aspect into:

(*a*) The free response type: "What is your attitude to capital punishment?"

(*b*) The priority-rating type: "If you had to distribute £10,000 in some socially useful way, would you: (*a*) promote research of a sociological kind; or (*b*) promote other types of research; or (*c*) endow a crèche . . .

(*c*) The check-list type of single or multiple choice: "Were your opinions on crime and punishment mainly influenced by what (*a*) you heard at home; (*b*) were taught at school;

[1] P. Radin: *Crashing Thunder*, New York, 1927.

[2] C. R. Shaw: *The Jackroller* is an outstanding autobiographical document of a juvenile delinquent.

[3] L. W. Cole: *Psychology of Adolescence*, New York, 1944, uses case-studies and extracts from diaries to reveal the psychological changes occurring during adolescence.

[4] J. Dollard: *Criteria of the Life History*, New Haven, 1935.

(*c*) religious instruction during youth by ordained members of your church; . . .

(*d*) The yes-no type of answer: "Should the salaries of prison warders be increased?"

Each type of question has its place. The fourth question is easy to ask, but many people, not the least intelligent, object to having to give an unqualified answer. Others feel that the alternatives presented in the choice are not real unless a good deal of additional information is given. Priority ratings are considered rather puerile by many people. In reply it is said, that in real life we are continuously put before questions in which we must make a somewhat unreal decision: in an election we may not be happy about any candidate, yet feel that we have to record our vote; or a motion may not meet our requirements, yet no decision might be a bigger inconvenience.

Questions must naturally be phrased in psychologically favourable terms, so that the informant can give a reply without looking silly. Words used must be comprehensible to him. It is false to ask people, taken at random, whether they favour laws against "monopolies", as many are not sure what a monopoly is. One British census asked people to state whether they were employers or employees, as Registrars General had been dissatisfied with such loose replies as "builder" or "contractor". But the question touched personal pride and many more "employers" were returned than were known to be in business. In an American survey on reading habits, practically everyone claimed to have read *Gone with the Wind*, apparently ashamed to have omitted a best-seller of the reputed importance of this book from his reading list. The true proportion of readers was ascertained by asking: "Do you *intend* to read *Gone with the Wind*?". During a wartime survey of the requirements of the public for razor blades, 132 persons in a sample of 800 answered "yes" to the question: "Did you insert a new blade this morning?"; while only 39 claimed to have inserted a new blade yesterday. It is well known that questions: "Do you approve of the present Government's attitude to licensing hours?" may evoke a negative answer from persons who are in agreement with the present laws, but are, on

principle, against anything supported by the Government. Many a liberal person may resent a question of the type: "Should we be tolerant to coloured students?" because the wording faintly implies a measure of inferiority and a need for special consideration of the coloured student.

We know from practical experience that there are words, which have been called "witch words", which call forth a "conditioned" response in certain groups and which should be avoided. In a survey on betting, very different replies will be given if the operative word used is "do you wager a bet?", than if it is "do you gamble?". Questions should be clear, so that the frame of reference is always the same in the informants' minds. To the question: "Is the Church powerful?" it is possible to give both a positive and a negative reply according to the comparison made: positive if compared with smaller denominations without stable organisation, negative if compared with the power of the State. An additional weakness is that it is not clear how replies should be evaluated. A positive reply may suggest resentment as well as approval. Indeed, it may well be that church-goers will consider the Church more powerful than non-religious persons, as they are better informed about the ramified activities of the Church. On the other hand, militant atheists may have exaggerated views about the power of the Church, and here a positive reply may signify strong disapproval. An affirmative answer to the question: "Have the Jews much power?" may have nothing to do with anti-semitism, as many persons respect power as the rightful deserts of enterprise.

Under the category of "psychologically favourable" arrangements we should be mindful that the sequence of the questions must never predispose an informant to give a certain answer. In a survey of workers in a nationalised industry it would be wrong to put the question "Should the number of posts and the salaries of the chief executives be reduced?" before "What improvements have you to suggest?" By asking the general question first a larger percentage of "don't knows" will result, but quite conceivably also a greater diversity of constructive proposals. If the specific question is given priority, the informants are likely to return again to the question of managerial

costs. The first few questions must be simple and, if possible, topical. It is good practice to interview on the "time line", i.e. if we wish to know how a man spends his leisure time it may be useful to ask him first when he leaves his work place; what he does when he reaches home; and so gradually cover the number of leisure hours.

Considering the large number of organisations which are now conducting opinion surveys in America, and also in Britain—market research oganisations; the official Social Survey Department under the Lord President; the B.B.C. Listener Research Service; the various institutes of public opinion—it is worthwhile to recall that the first properly conducted attitude research dates no further back than 1925, when Allport and Hartmann questioned 367 students on their attitudes towards Prohibition. It has become evident that there are severe limits imposed on opinion surveys; questions are more reliable if concerned with behaviouristic rather than normative matters. Instead of asking "Are you well educated?", the question had better read: "How long were you at school; which educational institutions have you attended since school?" Care must naturally be taken with the interpretation of the answers. Five years at a university may indicate post-graduate work as well as repeated failures in examinations. Not all derive the same benefit from scholastic and academic training. It is easier to use the questionnaire technique for gaining information on the quantitative aspects of social structure than on opinions about it. This can be seen from the advice frequently found in statistical text-books on the kind of questions that should be put. Bowley has recommended that questions should:

(*a*) Be comparatively few in number.
(*b*) Require a "yes" or "no" or a number as an answer.
(*c*) Be not unnecessarily inquisitorial.
(*d*) Be such as will elicit the desired information directly and unmistakably.
(*e*) Be as far as possible corroboratory.[1]

Questionnaires should always be tested in the field, before they are put to general use. Questions may have to be reworded

[1]A. L. Bowley: *Elements of Statistics*, London, 1926, pp. 21–22, *passim*.

and reshuffled as many as 15 times. The time interval between the "pilot survey" and the actual survey must not introduce new disturbing elements. If a strike intervenes, an interviewer at a factory will be judged by the employees in quite a different light than he was in the pilot survey before the dispute; hence the questionnaire may have to be recast to suit the new situation. The publication of survey results may themselves influence the public. One likely explanation why the opinion polls failed to predict the outcome of the presidential elections of 1948 in America was the wide publicity given to the public opinion polls, which forecast an overwhelming Republican victory. The American electorate fearing the influence of an overwhelmingly Republican Administration and Congress may have shifted, at the last minute, to the Democratic candidate. This is, at least, one of the reasons put forward by Gallup.

The type of dress and the right length of interview which should be observed by the field workers must also be considered. It is often difficult to know how much elasticity to give to the field workers. Field workers are usually paid according to the time they devote to the interviews. Many research workers who try to be friendly, find informants attempting to break down the professional nature of the interview or to separate the individual from the organisation he represents. The human relations between the person interviewed and the interviewer are the more delicate the more topical are the questions. Since we are dealing with human populations there is the problem of cooperation which the research workers have to consider. Populations will vary in their attitudes to research according to the standing which social research has attained in the society. In America it is easier to achieve a favourable *rapport* than in Britain; and a housing estate will be more "open" to investigation than a Welsh village mistrustful of "foreigners". On the other hand, it can be assumed that a Welsh investigator would find a better welcome (as compared with an English field worker) in Wales, while it is hard to determine what kind of person to send to an amorphous housing estate. The amount of patience, pleasantness, tact, which it is necessary to show will vary with the type of investigation. Intimate questions can be asked by people

associated with the medical profession or other strata in whose discretion the population has confidence. Once confidence is established people may be very happy to cooperate, and glad to know that there are educated people interested in their problems. Often the informants will want to know what the investigation is likely to achieve.

Analysts have given some attention to the human relations problems. Elton Mayo counsels his interviewers to listen rather than to talk, to show no sign of hurry or impatience, and to be sympathetic with the problem which the informant wishes to explain.[1] Freud recommends that the analyst remain "emotionally cold" and "opaque".[2] "I cannot reiterate my advice to practitioners often enough, to take their cue from the surgeon who will cast aside all feeling, even the feeling of pity, and to direct all his mental powers to the sole object of performing a technically perfect operation."[3] Freud is speaking here as a medical man. The kind of human situation which he extols has been challenged by other psycho-analysts. Since the analysis is a search for hidden motives in which all the patient's courage and honesty are required, Ferenczi condemned anything which did not put analyst and informant on a basis of equality.[4]

In sociology both the "participant-observer" technique and the "unknown stranger" technique have been employed successfully. In the first the investigator assumes a rôle in the community which he is studying, and merges as completely as possible with the people.

"What is the value of being a participant-observer? First, it increases the observation opportunities insuring in some respects greater objectivity and accuracy. Second, its use will provide a desirable balance between the more purely behaviouristic type of investigation and the type which seeks some measure of insight into the 'meaning' current in the community."[5]

[1] E. Mayo: *The Social Problem of an Industrial Civilisation*, London, 1949, p. 65.
[2] S. Freud: "Bemerkungen über die Übertragungsliebe" in *Gesammelte Schriften*, London, 1943, Vol. X, pp. 306–321.
[3] S. Freud: "Ratschlage an den Arzt bei der psycho-analytischen Behandlung," *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 380–381.
[4] S. Ferenczi: *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis*, London, 1926, pp. 198-229.
[5] F. Kluckholm quoted by G. A. Lundberg: *Social Research*, New York, 1942, pp. 376–377.

There are instances of anthropologists who settled among the people they investigated and were adopted members of their secret societies. In the "Middletown" survey, the Lynds and their co-investigators entered a variety of clubs and occupations for the full period of their field work. In the survey of the life of the unemployed of the Austrian town Marienthal, the observers screened their identity behind the social welfare work which they carried on concurrently.

Others are more dubious of this technique, as difficulties such as the following may arise:

"In stratified or rigidly subdivided societies, a social place can be assumed in one stratum or section only, and estrangement from the people belonging to other strata or sections, and even their enmity, may result. Thus in the Nigerian society in which I worked, close friendship with the alien, Mohammedan ruler caste aroused the suspicion of the pagan aboriginal peasant population, and vice versa. The only solution is to emphasise the detached, impartial, scientific aim of an investigator from outside and so to capitalise what has been termed his 'stranger-value'."[1]

Valuable information comes to the outside observer just because he is "above the parties". The critical point is that the stranger be not viewed vaguely as an outsider, but is accepted by the different groups as an interested and independent guest.

One reason for remaining "opaque" is that informants are often eager to say what they think the investigator wants to hear. The subtlety of informants can be seen in the literature of the varying psychological schools, for patients seem to conform with astonishing alacrity to the theoretical framework of divergent schools, according to the analyst's preference. The suggestibility of informants has been tested. It has been shown that eight per cent. of American informants admitted to having seen an advertisement which never appeared, against only four per cent. in Great Britain.[2] The language which children use when among themselves, as compared with the language used when they know that they are overheard by an adult, has been found to vary considerably by the use of a

[1]S. F. Nadel: "The interview technique in social anthropology" in *The Study of Society*. Edited by F. C. Bartlett, London, 1939, p. 327.

[2]See G. I. Palmer: "Factors in the Variability of Responses in Enumerated Studies" in *Journal of the American Statistical Societies and Associations*, 1943, Vol. 38, p. 143.

one-way screen in experimental children's groups. This screen was opaque to the children, but transparent to the observers.

Problems of "entry", and of the proper "build-up" involve a number of important decisions.[1] One way of dealing, for instance, with the problem of the sex, class and race of the interviewers, is to "randomise" investigators; another is to compare results in comparable populations for field workers of different sex (male or female), class (middle class or working class) and race (white or non-white). Male-Middle Class-White can be compared with Male-Middle Class-Non-White; Male-Working Class-White compared with the results achieved by the first two and so on, until the best combination has been found. The "standard errors of interaction" of the various characters in combination can be studied by methods appropriate to the "factorial analysis of replicated experiments;"[2] there are standard statistical techniques which can be drawn upon by the director of the research.

II

New problems present themselves when we ask ourselves in which way the research findings are representative of a larger realm of enquiry. Even when our questions are put to the entire population, as in the census, we still have to *sample* a date in time at which to conduct our census. We also sample a few questions from a large number of possible ones. Our judgments are based on sampled experiences and we must be careful to avoid the bias of false weighting. We must know to what kind of population our sample (etymologically related to *exemplum*, "taken out of") refers.

A biased sample is one which is so drawn that, in the long run, its results differ in a systematic manner from the characteristics of the population studied. A sample which yields results not deviating from the true statistical values of the population more than may be expected from the effect of pure chance

[1]For a detailed discussion of "entry and build-up problems" in one research situation, see L. Silberman and B. Spice: *Colour and Class in Six Liverpool Schools*, Liverpool, 1950.

[2]See R. A. Fisher: *The Design of Experiments*, Edinburgh, 1947.

attendant in the process of selection is called a fair or *valid* sample. It is the aim of social research to produce valid sampling procedures, i.e. samples which are

(*a*) *representative:* characteristic of the total population and its component parts.

(*b*) *efficient:* excluding, as far as possible, all interfering factors which may distort the sample or increase the margin of error for which allowance must be made.

(*c*) *adequate:* sufficiently large to give all or most of the variations among the population members a chance of being included in the sample.

The term "population" which is used here has a technical meaning. Sometimes statisticians also speak of the "total population" or the "universe" or the "parent population" when referring to the total bulk, set, mass or aggregate from which the sample has been chosen. "Population" need not be limited to human populations, but may imply a "population of prices" or a "population of the six faces of a dice" or the "population of cephalic indexes". Fisher speaks of a "population of possibilities" when discussing the possible results of an experiment many times repeated.[1]

There are many types of populations. Populations may be "finite", such as the number of members of a club, or very large so as to approach infinity with reference to the enquiry. A sample of 1,000 of the population of Great Britain still leaves that population "infinitely" much larger when compared with the sample. Fisher's "population of possibilities" is a "hypothetical" population. Populations can be "known" in their composition, such as we know the contents of a complete pack of cards, or be unknown so that their composition has to be inferred from the sampling procedure. Populations may be made up of "distinct" attributes, such as human beings who are *either* males *or* females, or they show a "continuous" variable such as height. Populations may be clearly "defined", such as the

[1]R. A. Fisher: *Statistical Methods for Research Workers*, Edinburgh, 1946. The term "population" reminds us of the debt which statistics owes to social investigators, especially to the demographic work of Quetelet.

number of persons in Great Britain with life insurance policies, or vague and shifting such as the population of unemployed in Africa. Populations may be "homogeneous", i.e., possess little racial variation such as a highly inbred community, or exhibit a wide variation of essential characteristics such as all the subjects of King George VI. A population can be "stable and recurrent" in time, or unique and fluctuating. To each of these populations a specific sampling procedure is most applicable if good approximations to the parent population are to be achieved.

According to the type of population in which we are interested we may use one of the following sampling devices:

(*a*) *Random sampling:* by selecting the individuals free from all elements of choice on the part of the compiler.

(*b*) *Purposive sampling:* by selecting the individuals according to some known principle of typicality.

(*c*) *Mixed sampling:* by using an intermediate procedure, and breaking up a population into more homogeneous sub-divisions and then taking

(i) *a random stratified sample* by selecting individuals in each sub-division free from all elements of choice on the part of the compiler.

(ii) *a purposive stratified sample:* by selecting the individuals in each sub-division according to some known principle of typicality.

(*d*) *Multi-stage sampling:* by sub-sampling a sample for certain characteristics according to one or more of the above methods.

(*a*) *Random Sampling.*

When little is known of the constitution of the population, we adopt "random sampling" methods. Random sampling has been defined as "the process of selecting a limited number of individuals in such a manner that every individual in the population or universe has an equal and independent chance of being included in the sample".[1] In shorter words, each

[1] A. K. Kurtz and H. A. Edgerton: *Statistical Dictionary of Terms and Symbols*, New York, 1939, p. 140.

member must have an equal probability of being chosen. The term "random" must not be read as meaning haphazard, unplanned, "having no definite aim or deliberate purpose". In fact, to make a sample properly random involves in many cases a "randomising apparatus". Thus to make an estimate of the number of nouns in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, it would be wrong to let the Dictionary open "at random" and count the nouns on the page, as some pages are likely to turn up more readily than others.

The simplest method of randomisation is to mix all the members of the population. A cook will stir and taste a teaspoonful of soup and be able to rely on the sample results. Lottery sampling depends on the principle of mixing. In social research, we often list the members of the population alphabetically or by residence and attach to the names a number, and mix the numbers in a rotating drum; then draw a sample from the drum. When we have to investigate a finite population of relative homogeneity such a method is likely to yield satisfactory results. The care which must, however, be taken is illustrated by an experiment made by some statisticians:

"In certain experiments, counters of the same shape but of different colours were put into a bag and chosen one at a time; the counter chosen being put back and the bag thoroughly shaken before the next trial. On the face of it, this appears to be a purely random method of drawing counters. Nevertheless, there emerged a persistent bias against counters of one particular colour. After careful investigations, the only explanation seemed to be that these particular counters were slightly more greasy than the others, owing to peculiarities of the pigment and hence slipped through the sampler's fingers."[1]

A drum may be dispensed with where we take a *systematic* random sample. Every nth individual on a list (say every 47th, every 123rd or every 1,033rd) is chosen and included in the sample. Hilton in a sample of the unemployed population of England and Wales selected every 100th insurance book. The obvious danger here is that the interval chosen may correspond to some sub-division in the parent population. If for instance, every tenth house in a street is chosen and the

[1]G. U. Yule and M. G. Kendall: *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, London, 1937, p. 338.

streets are cut up in blocks of ten houses, then we should get a large number of corner houses. Since it is a customary preference of shopkeepers to select corner buildings the sample would be unduly weighted for shops.[1] As Yates says: "In general, systematic sampling from lists will be found to be quite satisfactory provided care is taken to see that there are no periodic features in the list which are associated with the sampling intervals."[2]

A more rigorous procedure is implied in the use of Random Numbers as developed by the statisticians.[3] In the choice of a number of random pages in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary we are guided by the Tables of Random Numbers. Tippett's list contains the following five:

2952
4167
2370
0560
2754

Since the volume has only 2,475 pages, three of the above figures must be discarded. (As the first and last pages are not complete it would be more correct to consider them as one page and say that there are only 2,474 pages.) With the help of Random Numbers we can make random samples of all kinds of populations: we could select 80 pupils from a population of 4,879, and split this sample into random sub-samples, as we would select at random six houses from 14 streets of different lengths.

We must not be disturbed by the fact that the five figures in the list appear non-random by containing three figures in the 2–3,000 group. Such accidents are part of the chance method. The "randomicity" of the figures has been tested.[4] In

[1] A list may be random for one characteristic while non-random for another. A marriage register may be random for the cephalic indexes of the local population but non-random for age.

[2] F. Yates: *Sampling Methods for Censuses and Surveys*, London, 1949, p. 30.

[3] L. H. C. Tippett: *Tracts for Computers*, No. 15, Cambridge, 1927. More extensive figures have been prepared by M. G. Kendall and B. Babington Smith: *Tracts for Computers*, No. 24.

[4] Yule has found small divergencies from random expectations. He calls the figures "patchy".

all sampling work we must expect extreme cases to be over-weighted on occasion. If we were to sample every 50th hut in a village of African natives it is quite possible that the chief's house would be among them and the more numerous commoners neglected. When a sample "looks" random, we can never presume that it *is* random, unless it has been selected by random methods. Dangers lie in store as soon as the randomising apparatus is tampered with. In the above-mentioned study of unemployed persons it was decided, in order to speed up the enquiry, to deviate from the 100th person when an unemployed with an insurance book either 99th or 101st on the list presented himself first at the Labour Exchange. The authorities could not see how this would make any difference. The sample was, however, biased by this procedure. It was later discovered that an unduly large number of persons were included in the sample who had to present themselves more than once a week at the Exchanges.

Yet in practice it is not always easy to adhere to a random sample. In a survey which requires visits to the informant, the surveyor may find despite repeated visits that the informant is away from home. If he were to neglect these cases he would underweight the samples for those who are frequently taken out of their homes because of work or leisure-time activities or because they are "persistent queuers".[1] To deal with informants who are "not at home" special devices have been developed. If certain cases are never "at home" when surveyors call, a sub-sample may be made of this group and these visited in the evenings or at other times ascertained from neighbours. Information is then weighted proportionally for the entire group.[2]

We are not always concerned with sampling of populations in their homes. In the planning of air-raid shelters it was

[1]A Ministry of Health investigation into the 1918 influenza epidemic at first neglected the families who were not at home. On examination of the results it was found that the sample was not representative, since the families with small children were over-represented. (*Report of Public Health and Medical Subjects*, No. 4, 1918.)

[2]There are various methods (known as the "ratio method" and the "regression method") for dealing with *supplementary information* which comes to hand after the completion of the sample. (See F. Yates: *op. cit.*) Practice differs between investigators as to how to treat *defective or palpably wrong information.*

necessary to know how many persons were at any given moment in the streets and shops. Sampling was to be of a random kind and the method adopted was for two observers to move down certain sample streets in a transverse direction and to count the numbers of persons passing each two neighbouring observers.[1]

One way of reducing the expense of time and of transporting the surveyors, is to adopt the method of block sampling. Instead of selecting every 47th house, every 47th block of houses can be made the unit and the entire block investigated. This is, of course, chiefly practicable where large cities are being investigated built on a sufficiently uniform plan, or where we are dealing with rural surveys in which villages do not follow a street pattern: the entire area can be divided with the help of ordnance maps and every 47th section sampled. The advantage of *zonal sampling* over *point sampling* lies not only in the saving of expenditure, but also in the possibility of further sub-sampling. Moreover, it is easier to gain the cooperation of the community if everyone is sampled. Lists need not be resorted to, which is an advantage, as they are often out-of-date. The disadvantage lies in a greater uncertainty attaching to the results and the computers' ignorance of the size of the sample until the sample has been completed.[2]

We may deviate from the random method deliberately. There is a technique mid-way between the random and the purposive sample (next to be considered) which is called the *balanced sample.* For this we manipulate the sample by exchanging members, and so bring sample results nearer to the known values of the parent population. We shall replace the first, then the second, then the third member of the sample and so on, until the sample is sufficiently like the parent popula-

[1]See F. Yates: *op. cit.*, pp. 43–44. The method can also be used in assessing the size of a population of insects in a state of movement, provided all individuals can be readily seen and the passage of the observer does not itself influence the movement of the animals. As this is often difficult to achieve, the social research worker may feel encouraged that in one respect at least, his work is simpler than that of the biological research worker.

[2]Much work has been done in America on zonal sampling by M. H. Hanson and W. N. Hurwitz, and by P. C. Mahalanobis in India (*cf.* M. H. Hanson and W. N. Hurwitz: "Relative Efficiency of various Sampling Units in Population Enquiries" in *Journal of American Statistical Societies Association*, 1942, Vol. 37, pp. 89—94).

tion to satisfy our purposes. This method is laborious and throws aside the probability assumption on which the statistical calculation of the "random errors" rests.[1]

(*b*) *Purposive Sampling.*

When we know much about the population, when it is finite, defined, heterogeneous, but following some well-known pattern, we use "purposive sampling". We dispense with random methods and choose all our members according to their agreement to known characteristics in the population. We might draw a sample from a marriage register and see that our sample contains in equal numbers bridegrooms and brides. Likewise we might control our sample for occupation, if the occupational distribution of the particular age groups from which the marrying population is drawn is known. An element of purposive sampling is contained in any sample, also the most random, for the type of population, the time of enquiry, the definitions and minor rulings are chosen according to our information about the population or what we feel justified in surmising about it.

Purposive sampling adds some new trait to what is known about a population. A purposive sample has always the appearance of representativeness; there are no freak distributions possible. At the same time, the formulas which calculate the "error" contained in sampling by random selection, based on the Law of Large Numbers, do not apply. If we have to choose between a random and a purposive sampling scheme, our choice would probably be guided by balancing the uncertainties of the operation of chance, which are large but calculable, against the possibility of biased selection, which are smaller in correct purposive sampling but not calculable. Purposive sampling finds a frequent application in experiments with "matched groups".

[1] "There does not appear to be any procedure which will give exact equivalence to a restricted random sample, whatever the form of parent distribution, even if such a sample could be obtained, estimates derived from it would in fact be subject to some elements of bias, though such bias is not likely to be of importance in practice." (F. Yates: "A review of recent statistical developments in sampling and sampling surveys" in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, London, 1946, Part I, p. 16. See also the communications on the balanced sample by Anscombe and Quenouille, pp. 38–39.)

(*c*) *Stratified Sampling.*

The two methods—random and purposive sampling—define the two extremes and were first systematically discussed by Bowley in a Memorandum in 1926. Bowley did not discuss any mixed procedures, which were presented in a rigorous manner by Neymann in 1934.[1] We owe to Bowley the resurrection of sampling technique which after the exaggerated claims made by early investigators had fallen into disuse.[2]

The mixed procedure of random and purposive sampling is known as stratified sampling. If the broad composition of the population falls into some distinct categories we can increase homogeneity by stratification, that is we employ a random or purposive scheme within each of the sub-divisions, but ensure by purposive selection that the sub-divisions are represented proportionally in the sample. An American research worker is of the opinion that stratified sampling is the proper procedure for human populations clustering around some known but diverging norms:

"The process of economic, social and racial segregation and other ecological processes which characterise American cities produce heterogeneity, i.e. a grouping of people and various social phenomena into clusters of similar and supplementary units This clustering by race, religion, nationality, economic status, occupation, and by many attitudes and preferences, is such that no cluster is quite like the entire community and consequently no one cluster can represent it accurately. Information must be secured from each cluster to provide a faithful picture of the whole. . . . It is like drawing balls from a large bin into which the contents of a number of different urns have been emptied without being stirred."[3]

The kind of stratification that is appropriate must be guided by the structural analysis of the population in question. Roper's

[1]A. L. Bowley: "Report on the Representative Method in Statistics" in *Bulletin de l'Institut Internationale de Statistique*, Rome, 1926. J. Neymann: "On Two Different Representative Methods" in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1934, pp. 558–625.

[2]A 19th century text-book could seriously demand that "information gathered must be exhaustive" (C. G. Pidgin: *Practical Statistics*, Boston, 1888.). Bowley still had to remark in an address to the Economic Science and Statistics Section of the British Association in 1906 that sampling is "persistently neglected and even when it is used the test of precision is ignored. We are thus throwing away a very powerful weapon of research".

[3]F. F. Stephan: "Practical Problems of Sampling Procedure" in *American Sociological Review*, 1936, Vol. I, p. 572.

opinion poll uses: region; size of township; sex; age; occupation; income (i.e. real income computed according to the cost of living index of the place of residence); whereas Gallup has used geographical divisions; urban and rural residence; age; sex; political affiliation; and socio-economic status (determined by the rents paid by the family). One might have thought that in America occupation, race and nativity were divisions of importance and it has been suggested that one more reason for the failure of the opinion polls to predict the 1948 Presidential Election results was their neglect of the organised workers as a sub-division. Organised labour polls heavier than do most other politically less conscious classes, and must be weighted disproportionally to the actual number of trade unionists in the population. The pollsters' samples were representative for all classes of labour, but deficient for factory and other highly organised groups of the working class.

Strata are of many kinds. In standard of living enquiries, effective income, cultural equipment and material possessions have been taken as traits defining classes. In working class surveys the degree of skill required for a job offers a convenient breakdown into skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled occupations. Special categories must be reserved for the particular clustering of culture traits among miners and agricultural workers. One of the purposes of stratified samples is to test the structural analyses and find to what extent the population does in effect split according to some structural scheme.

Stratified sampling represents more truly the real character of human populations. However, the most potent reason for applying stratified schemes is because they are more *efficient*, and therefore meet the second canon of proper sampling. Stratification reduces the heterogeneity of the sample and the likelihood of chance deviations. Hence the allowance which has to be made for statistical errors of selection can be reduced. The sample is more efficient because the formulas in use for the calculation of standard errors are less stringent.

How far we must safeguard the randomicity of the sample within each stratum depends on the accuracy which we wish to obtain in our experiment. For some purposes it is sufficient to leave the selection of the members in each stratum to the

field worker (the so-called "quota method"). Some organisations, such as the B.B.C., make use of panels with stabilised samples of individuals falling into determined classes of the listening population.[1]

(*d*) *Multi-stage Sampling.*

The procedures so far discussed belong to the category of Simple Samples. A different method is to treat a sample once compiled as a parent population and to sub-sample. The sample can be broken up for its constituent strata and each stratum separated into further more homogeneous cells. This is known as "deep stratification", and achieves a gain in accuracy, especially if variable "sampling fractions" are used which are proportional to the standard deviations of the individuals making up the strata.[2] A random, nation-wide sample may be stratified for regions, a region again for localities, each locality for types of density, and each density zone for another characteristic. Each original stratum in this example being divided into four "deep strata" or cells we have $4 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4 = 256$ cells.

The Allied Mission for Observing the Greek Elections in 1946 had to check the accuracy of the Greek electoral lists and to note omissions, duplications and redundancies in the lists. The parent population was contained in the census reports for 1940. The first stage was to stratify communities according to residences. A variable sampling fraction was used for the different towns and villages according to their size. For instance, a ward might consist of 65 blocks containing 14,170 households. Three blocks with 966 households might be selected, and of these households one in 100 would be checked for inclusion on the electoral lists. The ten households were selected by systematic random sampling. The survey proved to be very accurate with a "standard error" of $\pm$ 2.1 per cent. The field work was completed in three weeks, using 65 teams, each team consisting of an observer, an interpreter and a driver. The sampling and computations were completed in seven weeks.

[1]R. J. E. Silvey: "Methods of Listener Research employed by the B.B.C." in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1944, Vol. 57, Part III/IV, pp. 190–230. See also P. Lazarfeld and M. Fiske: "The Panel as a new Tool for measuring Opinion" in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 596–612.

[2]For a detailed treatment of sampling fractions, see F. Yates: "Sampling Methods", *op. cit.*, Chapter VII.

In a thoroughly controlled experiment, we should try alternative sampling schemes and deduce from practical considerations, inspection of pilot samples and mathematical models the best procedure. Often the answer to the alternative desiderata of speed and of low cost on the one hand, and of proper safeguards and controls on the other, is met by *combined* methods of sampling. In the American Study of Consumers' Purchases, stratified sampling was used at the first stage:

"The communities were so chosen as to make comparisons possible between different parts of the country with differing climatic, geographical and cultural characteristics, between different degrees of urbanization and different types of farming. Other things being equal, the most typical and homogeneous areas and the most economically important were selected. The areas chosen were two metropolitan communities, six large cities, 14 middle-sized cities, 29 small cities, 140 villages and 64 counties."[1]

The strata having been chosen, a random selection with varying sampling fractions was made to sample the population in each of these strata:

"Since it was impossible to canvass all the families a random sample was taken ranging from four per cent. in New York to 100 per cent. in the smaller villages."

At the next stage a purposive sample was compiled:

". . . a selected sample, including all families approached in the random sample, which were willing to cooperate."

A control sample checked the purposive sample:

"A 'controlled' sample was arranged so that in each community detailed data for about the same number of families in each colour-income-occupation-family type cell would be obtained."

If a sample is stabilised and used for various enquiries it is called a *master sample.* The Statistical Laboratory of the Iowa State College, in cooperation with the U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics and the Bureau of Census, has constructed an American master sample for agricultural purposes. The master sample represents in principle the same kind of panel which has been discussed above for Simple Sampling. In this case, the "primary strata" consist of divisions according to residence,

[1]International Labour Office: *Methods of Making Family Living Indices,* Geneva, 1940, Series No. 23, pp. 22–23.

towns and cities, named places with more than 100 inhabitants and an open country stratum.

IV

Reference has frequently been made to the standard error of a statistical value. There are two kinds of "errors" which apply to social research work of this type. The first kind may be called systematic, the second stochastic. "Systematic" errors have already been dealt with. They are distortions of data due to the bias of the informants or of the observers, or omissions and faulty definitions. Departures from proper randomicity of the sample where "randomness' is claimed are a source of systematic errors. However, even when all traces of systematic error have been eliminated, there still remains the uncertainty which arises when not the entire population, but only a sample, is investigated. This error forbids us to say that the inferred statistical value is X. We must say it is X $\pm$ the sampling error.

In the statistical description of populations we use a number of statistical concepts such as the various means (measures of central tendency) and measures of dispersal; in correlating two functions we arrive at coefficients of correlations; in experiments we compare "expected" theoretical results with actual results; in all this work the theory of probability can furnish us with estimates as to what extent random samples of a certain size will vary from the "true" statistics. Much used is a series of formulas calculating the "standard errors" of these statistics which define sampling variations. Older text-books often make use of "probable errors", which are measures roughly two-thirds of the size of the standard errors.

It will seem paradoxical that the statistician assigns laws to chance, which is the negation of all laws. He bases his estimates on the common observation that large deviations from the truth are more unlikely than small deviations and that if the selection of the sample is random two out every three choices must, in the long run, fall within a certain range on either side of the true value. To be more specific: we know that a complete pack of cards has four aces. If we call the number of aces in the pack s, and the number of draws or cuts n and if we place

every card, drawn and noted, back into the pack, the fraction s/n will approach 1/13, and will do so the more closely the oftener we make our "cut". The theory of probability can predict the number of aces we are likely to draw according to the size of the sample, and empirical experiments of 10,000 cuts have verified the theory. This experiment showed that 745 aces were drawn, i.e.

$$\frac{s}{n} = \frac{745}{10{,}000} = 0.0745$$

compared with the theoretical expectation of

$$\frac{1}{13} = 0.0769.$$

Let us assume we wanted to know what reliance to place on the finding that half of a sample of 100 members in a given population were non-conformists. According to statistical theory we can say that two of every three random samples would show a proportion varying between 45 and 55 per cent. non-conformists.[1] If this is not a very valuable result then this is because "two of every three" samples is rather vague[2] and the range is very large. Our certainty can be increased by multiplying the standard error by a factor to cover 99 of every 100 samples and even higher degrees of probability. In practice, we are often content with a range which is wide enough to include 95 of 100 samples. The latter probability is included within what Fisher calls "likely limits"; the greater probability is contained within "cautious limits".[3]

It is implicit in the foregoing that certain assumptions about

[1]This is based on the standard error formula for proportions (p)

$$\text{S.E.} = \sqrt{\frac{p\,(1-p)}{n}}$$

$$\sqrt{\frac{(0.5)\,(1-0.5)}{100}} = \pm 0.05 = \pm 5\%.$$

[2]According to the probability theory we should more strictly say 68 of 100 samples.

[3]It is only of recent date that we have become conscious of the "region of risk" and the "degree of confidence" involved in sampling. Fisher's own work has increased in rigour. He himself criticised his agricultural experiments of 1926 for their lack of proper controls, and J. Neymann and S. C. Pearson have added to his "analysis of variance". Fisher is indebted to "Student", who published a significant paper in 1906, which broke with the classical model of statistical theory based on games of chance. Mises defines probability as the limit of a series of measurements which obey no gaming rules. (L. von Mises: *Probability, Statistics and Truth*, London, 1939.)

the nature of the population and the sample must be fulfilled before the standard error formulas become statistically meaningful. The sample must be composed of units which are independent. In the sample of non-conformists, the formula would have been vitiated if the members had been related to one another. Children, in the normal course of events, take the religion of their parents. In small samples of less than thirty units more stringent conditions are laid down[1] because it is not certain whether the samples conform to the assumption of "normality", i.e. a distribution described by the Normal Curve of Error.[2]

The accuracy of a sample increases with the size of the sample (providing that the selection is non-biased in the first place). Unfortunately sampling errors do not decrease proportionally with the number of individuals included in the sample, but only in proportion to the square root of the size. If 400 cases yield an error of 4 per cent., then doubling the size of the sample is not sufficient to halve the error; the number needed would be 1,600 cases to achieve an error of only 2 per cent. In practice, the experiment must balance the need for reliability with the need for economy.

The above formula for the standard error of a proportion suggests that a smaller error results if the attribute measured is either strong in the minority or in the majority, i.e. if the two sections (in this case the non-conformist members and the rest of the population) are markedly unequal in number.[3] Stratifica-

[1]See R. A. Fisher: *Statistical Methods for Research Workers*, Edinburgh, 1946.

[2]We owe the function to Laplace and Gauss. De Moivre had defined the Normal Curve in 1733, but the work had been forgotten. Non-normal populations were investigated in the late 19th century by Galton and Pearson. The height of individuals follows a normal distribution, income a logarithmic curve. The binomial, logarithmic, and "Student" distributions are some of the better known non-normal distributions. (See E. S. Pearson: "Some Aspects of the Problems of Randomification" in *Biometrica*, Vol. 29, No. 1–2, pp. 53–64.) Distributions can often be "normalised" by stratifications or by transforming the data on logarithmic paper.

[3]If only 10 per cent. of the sample are non-conformists the standard error is reduced to three per cent.:

$$\sqrt{\frac{(0.1)\ (1 - 0.1)}{100}} = \pm\ 0.03 = \pm\ 3\%.$$

By rearranging the formula the required size of the sample can be calculated at determined levels of stochastic errors:

$$n = \frac{p\,(1 - p)}{(\text{determined standard error of } p)^2}$$

If we wished to reduce the standard error in the above distribution to one per cent. we need a sample of 900.

tion by reducing the diversity of the sample further reduces the size of the standard error.[1]

In social research samples of 3 per cent. to 5 per cent. of the total population have often been found adequate, but some investigators have demanded 15 per cent. of the population, while others dealing with large, stable and homogeneous populations have been confined to one-tenth of one per cent. The ordinary public distrusts small samples, though experiments have shown their reliability as calculated by standard statistical formulas. A convenient means of determining the size of the sample is to test the statistical values for "stability" which is reached when additions of new cases do not appreciably affect the statistical values.

The point at which a sample stabilises depends on the nature of the population. A sample of hair tonic consumers will stabilise later, because they are more diverse in nature, than a sample of hairdressers selling tonics; and a sample of bread consumers will stabilise later still, although bakers will probably show the same degree of sampling stability as hairdressers. Rules can therefore be suggested for the size of a sample, which will make the sample meet the criterion of *adequacy*.

(*a*) The lower limit should be the smallest number which will include all the essential elements.[2]

(*b*) The upper limit should be the largest number which can be economically handled.

(*c*) A sample should be large enough for the sample to stabilise.

In many research situations it is our task to compare the statistical values of two situations equal in all but the one characteristic, the effectiveness of which is to be tested. If we investigate two maternity wards, one considered "adequate" and the other considered "inadequate", in the hope of proving the hypothesis that higher standards will reduce the still-birth rate, and we find that the still-birth rate is 30 of all recorded

[1]In one of his samples, Bowley found 20 per cent. of the houses to fall in the "unhygienic" category. In a random sample the standard error would have been ± 1.41 per cent., but as Bowley had stratified his sample the error was reduced to ± 1.36 per cent. ("Elements of Statistics", *op. cit.*, p. 333.)

[2]In the case of stratified samples, no stratum should have less than three members, while larger strata should receive a proportional representation. When multi-stage sampling is used more units will be required.

births in the ward marked "adequate", but 61 in the clinic marked "inadequate", there is a presumption that "adequacy" affects the rate. Probability theory has, however, made us wary of a hasty conclusion, for there may be chance factors operating in the limited number of cases studied. In fact, the difference is not sufficiently great to warrant a conclusion of statistical significance, i.e. we have no assurance on the basis of the "chi squared test of significance", frequently used to test the discrepancy between the statistical figures and chance expectation, that the difference may not be due to the operation of chance factors. The difference must be sufficiently large to turn up less frequently than once in twenty experiments —the usual "level of significance". Statistics which have been tested for "significance" meet the third criterion of this chapter: they are both adequate and sufficient.

It is possible to illustrate the two types of errors, systematic and stochastic, in an experiment testing a simple hypothesis. The entire discussion is summarised if we imagine an experiment in which we compare the results obtained by two different teaching methods applied, for example, to Displaced Persons in rehabilitation camps. Various designs are possible with varying control over the two types of errors.

Design I: Two groups of D.P.s are chosen at random and assigned to two different camps where they are taught by two different teachers.

This design provides a valid estimate of the size of stochastic errors arising from the variation in the individuals. A test of statistical significance of the differences in their performance after conclusion of their training is not likely to give positive results as groups, chosen at random, show considerable variability. Stochastic errors will be large. Systematic errors cannot be measured, no control has been instituted for them.

Design II: The same as Design I, except that both groups are assigned to one camp during their training.

This design makes an attempt to control the systematic errors by holding environmental conditions constant. However, there is still a variation between teachers' abilities.

Design III: The same as Design II, except that both groups are taught, successively or consecutively, by the same teacher.

This is a further attempt to control systematic errors, but no allowance is made for the fact that some teachers are more adapted to one method than to another and may try harder to make the preferred method a success.

Design IV: The same as Design III, but instead of a random selection of group members, these are matched for ability.

Another attack is made on stochastic errors, which now are considerably reduced in size.

Design V: The experiment is conducted in one camp but upon two sets of five groups; the ten groups are matched for ability. Each group has a different teacher, but the teachers are also matched for ability. Results are pooled.

This is the most precise of all designs. By conducting what amounts to ten experiments divided into two sets, teachers' abilities and preferences are randomised and controlled. Environmental conditions are standardised; and stochastic errors are minimised. The disadvantage of this design is that it must be larger and is expensive to set up. The statistical technique adapted to deal with the sources of error arising "within groups" and "between groups" has been called the Analysis of Variance. An extension of the method the Analysis of Covariance would dispense with some of the controls at the expense of more cumbersome statistical techniques.

The research worker seeks to approximate a situation in which definite answers can be given to definite questions. This does not mean that the answers found are either final or conclusive but only that they state with some clarity how they are biased by the conditions in which the research was conducted, and how we can formulate our questions in the next experiment more sharply. We shall be able to know better and better what kind of information to elicit and what reliance to place on the data obtained. The course of research methodology is one of converting an inchoate and disorganised material (from the research point of view) into authenticated documents, logical definitions, tested questionnaires, decisions on the method of entry into the field, efficient sampling procedures of specific populations, tests of statistical results and other controls of the errors. Analysis as we have understood it on other levels of discussion is given a new precision, but is

also narrowed down to a more limited meaning. The analysis of social research methods reveals the basic dilemma of sociological work: the more precise we are, the less can we assert about the universe, though what we assert can be verified by independent workers. Social research is not only a part of every other level of analysis but also reopens the basic antinomies of social thought which concerned us in the first three chapters of this book.

"Every fabulist has told how the human mind has always struggled like a frightened bird to escape the chaos which caged it; how—appearing suddenly and inexplicably out of some unknown and unimaginable void; passing half its known life in the mental chaos of sleep; victim even when awake to its own ill-adjustment to disease, to age, to external suggestion, to nature's compulsion; doubting its sensations, and, in the last resort, trusting only to instruments and averages—after sixty or seventy years of growing astonishment, the mind wakes to find itself looking blankly into the void of death."[1]

This is not an original thought, but the occasion on which it was uttered was significant. The intelligent American was moved to make these earnest observations when reading Pearson's *Grammar of Science*, which created such a stir with its forceful contrast of the universe science, and the chaos of ignorance which reigned outside of corroborated knowledge. The fraction of the universe in which mankind had created order was "like the circle of light generated around it by the deep-sea fish". In more recent times the contrast is less sharply drawn, for we are less certain of either order or chaos, our knowledge or ignorance. The connecting link between opinion and science is established by mature judgment, supported by tests and experiments. Social analysis is particularly concerned with mediating between research and assumption and the concluding chapter will deal with this relation.

[1]H. Adams: *The Education of Henry Adams*, New York, 1931, p. 460.

PART III

THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER X

The Limits of Social Analysis

The productive and inventive powers of modern industry and science while promising riches beyond the dream of any former generation also present the fear of mass destruction. Over-population and overproduction threaten the world while unrest, shortages, displacements of large numbers of persons alternatively introduce grave temporary disorders. At a certain stage of social development, man must make a determined intellectual effort to match his technical progress with new social skills and knowledge, if he is not to run the risk of a dangerous dissipation of his social energies. Every minute, the experts say, forty more mouths have to be fed, and every minute of the hour, soils are lost by erosion. In the United States some 330 million acres of good arable land have already suffered from erosion by bad management and so have half of the wheatlands of Australia. If only possessed of the right social organisation such wasteful use could be avoided. A land-worker, who now feeds four to five persons could, even at our present stage of inadequate knowledge, support 15 to 20 people. It is often not the problem of finding the right answers, but of finding methods of applying technical knowledge to human situations and of convincing men to use what we know. In this sense the early sociologists had seized upon an important truth when they claimed that the pyramid of science is incomplete without a study of society.

As at the time of the *Encyclopédistes*, the guidance of society is one of the most pressing tasks before science. Before our social analysts is the political problem of raising men to the level of accomplishment which is technically feasible but against which social institutions, weaknesses in administration, inadequate social leadership and other factors militate. Sociology has the function to make clear the steps that are needed to overcome these lags.

As we then consolidate our advances, legal minima, objective standards, a more fully developed machinery of social inspection

become part of modern society. The analyst is concerned with generalising these standards further and bringing up the rear of society which still falls behind the desirable and achieveable levels. Those in institutions which are withdrawn from the public eye, in prisons, asylums, the distressed areas, primitive peoples suffering from malnutrition, are investigated and helped. Eventually, agencies of the United Nations, such as the International Labour Organisation, frame supra-national conventions which find adoption first by the represented Governments, trade union and employers' organisations, then their adaptation to the law of the more progressive member nations. Steps are taken to integrate the social provisions of different member states so that, for instance, the Rhine boatsmen of whatever nationality can draw health insurance benefits whether they fall sick within their own country or in another riparian country. Backward nations, such as Haiti, are being assisted by teams of UNESCO research workers drawn from many countries. This work is the logical outcome of the patient investigations of men like Simon, Farr, Webb, Booth, Olivier, who conceived of social research as the natural companion of an industrial, rational and secular world.

Men like Charles Booth objectively verified the facts about poverty in London; Godfrey Thomson by repeated intelligence tests showed the effects, if any, of dysgenic breeding; the Webbs documented the long growth of local government institutions. Reason is increasingly exercised as man comes to feel less impotent about the study of social forces. Tools are being forged by analysis to deal with the problem of unemployment. The financial implications of a family allowance scheme are measured. The effects of a policy for the location of industries can, for a period of years, be accurately forecast. Social analysis makes social direction possible. Among peoples jealous of their personal liberties, it becomes necessary to justify each change by careful explanations. Only if it can be demonstrated that certain changes are rational and necessary will new policies be implemented: the higher the standard of education the more subtle a task does governing become. Corroborated information, once it has been shown to be possible, becomes a part of the legislative and administrative sphere of society as, for a

long time, it has been part of judicial decisions. In the mixed economies of the West with a high standard of living, sociology offers an important instrument of government.[1]

A single thread runs through the history of social thought from the days of the 18th century when men for the first time employed the language of science to human problems. Political issues (even in the countries in the throes of vast social changes and excited popular movements) increasingly demand an unemotional presentation of the various alternatives. Analysis and experiments are needed for people to know the area of free social choice. The modern world does not diminish political passions, but it imposes on the contending parties the discipline of sociology. More and more are people constrained to translate general principles into verifiable propositions. Gradually a new spirit comes over the world, comparable in its effect with the secularisation of thought which is a mark of the Renaissance and which is so clearly demonstrated in Machiavelli's *Prince*. We are still only at the beginning of the transformation of thought and so the testimony of the shock which the first objective treatment of human affairs in terms of science in the class room caused is of topical interest:

"The opening of these classes (on political economy) made a great sensation. The economical writings of Hume and Smith, though familiar with the liberal youth, had so little impregnated the public mind, that no ordinary audience could be collected to whom the elements and the phraseology for the science were not matters of surprise. The term 'Political Economy' made most people start. They thought it included questions touching the contribution of governments, and not a few hoped to catch Stewart in dangerous propositions. It was not unusual to see a smile on the faces of some when they heard subjects discussed upon seemingly beneath the dignity of the Academical Chair. The word '*corn*' sounded strangely to the Moral class, and '*drawbacks*' seemed a profanation of Stewart's voice."[2]

[1] *The Economic Survey for* 1947 suggested that modern economic organisation requires "(1) an organisation with enough knowledge and reliable information to assess our national resources and formulate the national needs; (2) a set of economic 'budgets' which relate these needs to our resources; (3) a number of methods, the combined effect of which will enable the Government to influence the use of these resources in the desired direction". (London, 1947, Cmd. 7046, para. 12.)

[2] Lord Cockburn, quoted by G. Bryson: *Man and Society; The Scottish Enquiry of the 18th Century*, Princeton, 1945, p. 217. Stewart was for years under police suspicion because of his espousal of political economy.

The factual underpinning of discussions on political and managerial activities, and the viewing of human affairs as objective data, show during the last 150 years a growing momentum. It has enhanced interest in science. It has now begun to liberalise conventions and prepare people to accept social systems based on different premises to their own. Freedom has been given a new meaning by being allied to physical and psychological needs and to the provision of work and leisure-time facilities, and training, the avoidance of blind-alley occupations, and the improvement of selection techniques.

Having shown the weaknesses inherent in social organisations, sociologists go beyond the objective standards formulated by themselves or by previous generations. The "one-best-way" of the reformer is but one of a number of "best" ways: "There is more than a Euclidian geometry possible." A differentiated application of standards and policies, of concepts and tools, is the motto as social analysis advances. The garden city planner and his "ideal" standard of "twelve houses to the acre" is now seen as one solution in a specific set of circumstances. Justice Higgins calculating a minimum needs budget for the Australian worker took constants for granted which do not exist. Concepts like "social organism" or the "group mind", and even "self-explanatory entities" like inheritance or intelligence are no more in use in the form they were first propounded.[1] Even "progress" is critically examined. The sociological movement is not only one of Reform. To a large extent the social analysts are rediscovering truths which have been forgotten in the course of development. By drawing on many social systems they see that each only satisfies a limited range of human needs. We now know that a plantation economy may materially enrich a nation, but socially impoverish it. It should have been obvious that it will play havoc with native institutions, but that

[1] A "self-evident" reform like the rehousing of slum dwellers has been shown to be in need of careful handling. M'Gonigle and Kirby produced statistics for 152 families in Stockton-on-Tees. They were rehoused and their previous overcrowded and insanitary quarters demolished. The standardised death rate had been 22.9 per 1,000 in the five years prior to removal. In the new housing estate it rose to 33.5 or an increase of 46 per cent. The reason for this must be sought in the increases in rent from 4s. to 9s. entailed in the removal. Since the families were unemployed the increased rent left 2s. 11d. for food per man-equivalent for the week, as contrasted with the previous budget of 4s. (G. C. M. M'Gonigle and J. Kirby: *Poverty and Public Health*, London, 1936, pp. 108–129.)

was not always appreciated. The presence of fatigue is now generally accepted in industry, but it had to be accidentally "rediscovered" by industrial sociologists interested in labour turnover and absenteeism, that a worker needs a rest pause in a long work spell. The very success of one advance obscures other factors. Bacteriology has distracted attention from social and psychological factors in medicine. Sociology is concerned with the re-establishment of balance in society. Conventional, profitable, courses are questioned and new techniques analysed for their implications in wider realms. The ideal reformer must possess a social philosophy which takes the whole social scene into account and the ideal society is one which allows the fullest play to the variety of human experiences.

"The ideal society . . . is conceived as a whole which lives and flourishes by the harmonious growth of its parts, each of which in developing on its own lines and in accordance with its own nature tends on the whole to further the development of others."[1]

In the urgencies of the modern world the constants and variables, the elasticities and rigidities, the required mixtures of assimilation and segregation will be reassessed ever anew. It is the very discussion of culture, carried on through successive generations, that produces the mental climate in which rational leadership can play its part. Sociology is research into the forms—and the wisdom contained in these forms—of social arrangements by men who preserve a scholarly distance to the problems of the moment:

"Our methods are not revolutionary; in a way they are essentially conservative, since they consider social phenomena as things, the nature of which however flexible and malleable they might be cannot be changed at will."[2]

Thus sociology is conscious of the social limits now hedging improvements in, and the aim of analysts is to widen the limits set to their own studies. Every advance shows the birth marks of the wants, experiences, technical equipment of the society which generated it and needs criticising for the shortcomings that inhere in that social structure. In the first section

[1]L. T. Hobhouse: *Social Development*, London, 1924, p. 87.
[2]E. Durkheim: *Les Formes élémentaires de la Vie réligieuse*, Paris, pp. 601–602. Hobhouse defines sociology as a study "detached, continuous, exhaustive in its desire to understand social life." (*Development and Purpose*, London, 1913, p. 122.)

of this book we touched upon the "antinomics of thought". By making clear what difficulties the proper understanding of reality must overcome—the inadequacy of concepts; the lack of tested knowledge, the dangers of obscuring fundamental issues by spurious data or of clouding the uncontrolled factors in an experiment by seeming precision in other directions; the bias of the times and of the observer—and by distinguishing the various levels of discourse on which analysis must be conducted, the contradictions lose some of their sharpness. In some cases, of course, the best we can do is to become fully aware that all thought is governed by the social context in which it is formed, and allow for the inevitable valuational accents.

"The sociological nature of all knowledge, of all forms of thought, intuition and cognition is now beyond doubt. Although the content and even less the objective validity of all knowledge is not determined by the controlling perspectives of all interests, nevertheless, this is the case with the selection of the objects of knowledge. Moreover, the 'forms' of the mental processes by means of which knowledge is acquired, are always and necessarily co-determined sociologically, i.e. by the social structure."[1]

A practical consequence of the process of social conditioning of thought is that the mind is always ready for a number of "defence mechanisms", i.e. makes use of processes of rationalisations which blind it to all conclusions which contradict well ingrained and preferred attitudes. Sociologists have themselves been to blame for espousing the most blatant prejudices.[2] Unfortunately there are in sociology no "crucial experiments" which can do for the realm of social theory what Lavoisier was able to do in chemistry with the Phlogiston theory. When we pass electricity through soft iron it is turned into a magnet. No such "one-to-one" correspondence exists among human beings. Because people have reacted in one way to a certain

[1]M. Scheler: *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, Leipzig, 1926, p. 55.

[2]Two examples will suffice: "I insist that negro slavery is not unjust; it is just, wise and beneficient . . . I insist that negro slavery is ordained by nature so that yielding to the clear decree of nature and the dictates of sound philosophy we must pronounce that institution just, benign, lawful, and proper." (C. Fitzhugh: *Sociology for the South*, Richmond, 1854, pp. 118–9.) And about a half century later: "You may hope for a time when the sword shall be turned into the ploughshare, when the white man and the dark shall share the soil between them, and each till it as he lists. But believe me when that day comes mankind will no longer progress. . . ." (K. Pearson: *National Life from the Standpoint of Science*, London, 1905, p. 24.)

social policy at one time there is no assurance that they will act so again at a later stage, as many social scientists have found.[1] To have discovered that a fat person can yet be suffering from malnutrition was a great discovery, but not every person who does not receive the full complement prescribed by the Stiebeling Scale will suffer from malnutrition. The body knows a number of ways of making up deficiencies, e.g. vitamin D can be produced by adequate sunshine. The mind knows of even more ways of escaping certain sequences. The ultimate purpose of social analysis is to strengthen the reasoning powers of the individual. Passing between the Scylla of the Unconscious and the Charybdis of the Superego (representing society's unanalysed social demands), free and rational thinking is ever in danger of being crushed. Social theory must enlarge the area in which intelligence can safely function, the area where rationality must replace rationalisation. The mind conscious of the tricks which it can play and of the kind of blinkers it can assume must acquire sufficient dignity to refuse them. The free mind must understand the rules which in one direction limit, in another direction make its freedom possible.

One of the limitations imposed upon social science is the great amount of popular interest that can be excited by social enquiry. Ambitious research projects are impossible in a society either too fixed in its ways or too insecure to afford time, money and the required tolerance to conduct a scientifically controlled piece of research but the reverse applies also. Sociology fulfils itself to best advantage in a restricted field; only slowly can field work be directed to the more general issues which confront society.

[1] "In the autumn 1923, the German inflation was stopped with the help of the so-called Rentenmark. Almost every monetary expert and financial authority had been strongly opposed to the introduction of that new type of currency. From the viewpoint of purely economic reasoning the additional emission of more than 2,000 millions Rentenmark, equivalent to more than 100 millions gold pounds, could hardly be supposed to restore stability of the monetary system but rather expand inflation. Absurd ideas on the backing of the new currency by a general mortgage on the industrial and agricultural property of the country could not but destroy the last vestige of public confidence in monetary management. But as there was no other practicable plan, the project was rushed through by the bureaucracy of the treasury and developed into one of the most sensational successes of economic policy in modern history." (A. Löwe: *Economics and Sociology*, London, 1935, pp. 19–20.)

For a long time social studies were interested almost exclusively in the most backward members of society, the very poor, the physically handicapped, the delinquent; the slums and semi-slums. For a long time, they were applied to economic difficulties only. As these sectors were improved or else showed themselves refractory to direct reforms, aimed not at society generally but only at certain spectacular ills, bigger issues were examined. Instead of the evils of slum life, proposals now are made on the location of industries; instead of mitigating the consequences of bad factory buildings, training schemes are studied which might make for more intelligent management; instead of social work among the needy, all classes are seen as requiring some communal encouragement. Social analysis at last goes beyond the confines of social research and standards, to the elaboration of new intellectual concepts, to an interpretation of personality, of human relations, of the basis of human creativeness.

Enlarging our horizon, putting before us, alongside with the classical, new models for a vital humanistic society, sociology, now accepted as a technical auxiliary of modern administration, is beginning to direct attention to the means by which speculative thinking, philosophy and the arts can be included as essential cornerstones of a liberal "scientific" discipline. Among the learned pursuits which lend themselves to administrative application and the elaboration of schemes, social analysis is marked by the large element of judgment and doubt that must remain in even the most "proven" statements. Social scientists must be philosophical, or be nothing. For as the Greeks informed a foreigner: "Harbours, shipyards, fortifications and taxes are good, but it is the happiness of the community founded on the contemplation of values, which if forgotten turns these factors of security and prosperity into instruments of destruction."

In a notable article Keynes has set out all the difficulties that attend statistical and "scientific" research into the trade cycle. Doubts about the validity of the information; the measurability of the factors; the linearity of the correlations; the data about specific lags; the stability of the series make extrapolations from time series "like one of those puzzles for

children where you write down your age, multiply, add this and subtract something else and eventually end up with the number of the Beast in Revelation."[1] A single chemical test of acid in solution outweighs in persuasive power ten thousand questionnaires. No one can prove conclusively that all religions are totemic in origin or that the French Revolution was inevitable. Keynes may be right to tell the peace-makers at Versailles that "the most serious of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial but financial and economic. . . . The perils of the future lay not in frontiers or sovereignties but in food, coal and transport."[2] Yet one knows of political treaties which have sworn nations to relentless opposition although all the basic economic problems had been solved. In the case of the Treaty of Versailles, Keynes may well have been right; his own book and later events seem to substantiate much of his thesis. But he would not have added to his claims if he had sought a more rigorous scientific, or even mathematical, medium of presentation. He was well aware that "in so far as mathematics is about reality it is not certain, and in so far as it is certain it is not about reality."[3] Sociology as it approaches real problems becomes increasingly "uncertain", i.e. dependent on judgment and general argument. Efforts to "rigorise" analysis by using a formalised language only end up by being unreadable. Mathematical symbols and technical jargon have not shown any success.[4] There was for a long time a desire evident among sociologists[5] to adopt the scientific

[1] J. M. Keynes: "The Statistical Testing of Business Cycle Theory" in *Economic Journal*, 1939, Vol. 49, pp. 558–568.

[2] J. M. Keynes: *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, London, 1919, p. 134.

[3] A. Einstein: *Geometrie und Erfahrung*, Berlin, 1921, p. 3.

[4] How little are the real processes clarified by Pareto aiming at a "scientific" idiom: "Before the invasion of the Greek Gods, the ancient Roman religion did not have any theology, C; it was confined to a cult B. But the Cult B acting on A strongly influenced the actions of D of the Roman people. More than that, when the direct relationship BD is given, it appears to us moderns as manifestly absurd. But the relationship BAD may on the contrary have been in certain cases highly reasonable and useful to the Roman people. In general, the theology C has a direct influence on D even more important than on A." (V. Pareto. *Traité de Sociologie générale*, Lausanne, 1917) ("A" stands for "state of mind", "B" for ritual, observable acts, "C" for religious expressions, and "D" for intrinsic actions.)

[5] "There is but one system of laws for the government of all matter whether existing in the form of a piece of coal, a tree, a horse, a man. . . . The laws of physical science are equally those of social science." (H. C. Carey: *Principles of Social Science*, London, 1856, Vol. I, pp. 39–40.)

approach of the natural sciences without either seeing the limitations of this approach or the more subtle problems which humanistic studies throw up. A historian of ideas has remarked on the utilitarian tendencies among the sociologists of yesterday:

"The anti-philosophical bent of sociology is of great significance. We have seen that with Comte, society became the subject-matter of an independent field of investigation. The social relations and the laws governing them are no longer derived, as they had been in Hegel's system, from the essence of the individual; still less were they analysed according to such standards as reason, freedom and right. The latter now appeared unscientific; sociological method was oriented to describing observable facts and to establishing empirical generalizations about them. In contrast to the dialectical conception which viewed the world as 'a negative totality' and was therefore intrinsically *critical*, the sociological method was intrinsically *neutral*, viewing society in the same way physics viewed nature."[1]

Sociology performs its real function in a modern society by overcoming, without recourse to mysticism or lapsing into vagueness, our fascination with natural science. As soon as it strips off the familiar questions and methods that belong to previous generations of naturalists, the study recaptures some of the "intuitive" knowledge lost in the progress of rational thinking. "What the mind strives for is the realisation of its own notion; but in doing so it hides the goal from its own vision and is proud and well-satisfied in its alienation from its own essence"[2]—this Hegelian lament is the starting point of modern sociology. It must end its alienation from those parts of social understanding which are variously described as "good sense", "flair", and *savoir faire*. The philosopher Carritt has well said: "Personally I know a dozen plain men and women to whom I would rather go for advice on a difficult point of personal ethics than to Kant and Hegel."[3] This is equally true of economics or social policy. While translating emotional conflicts into analytical terms, the language of facts as was said above, sociology also penetrates the realm of the creative experience that is contained in them.

[1]H. Marcuse: *Reason and Revolution*, New York, 1941, p. 376.
[2]F. W. Hegel: *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Trans. by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simons, London, 1892, Vol. III, p. 55.
[3]E. G. Carritt: "Ethics in Philosophical Education" in *Journal of Philosophy*, 1925, Vol. 22, p. 577.

"Factual" analysts know that they have often been more erratic in their predictions than artists. Heine and D. H. Lawrence saw more truly the way that Germany was likely to travel than that unfortunate sociologist who wrote an article in 1932 showing, with much display of statistics that Nazism was a spent force and fascism functionless in an advanced country like Germany. The article appeared in March, 1933, just in time for the Third Reich. General ideas in systematic exposition may reduce the sensibility of the observer. Abstractions can blunt perception and flatten expression, and the social analyst easily finds himself betrayed by the crudity of the *language*. A much discussed British writer brought, for example, the following observations to bear on Shakespeare:

"Hence we find Shakespeare, although expressing the bourgeois illusion, is an official of the Court or of the bourgeois nobility. Players are the 'Queen's Servants'. He is not a producer for the bourgeois market or the 'public'. He has a feudal *status*. Hence the art is not in its form individualistic, it is still collective. It breathes the collective life of the court."[1]

Or when dealing with Milton:

"Milton is . . . revolutionary in style, revolutionary in content. The bourgeois now enters a stage of the illusion where he sees himself as deficient and lonely, challenging the powers that be. With this therefore goes an artificial and consciously *noble* style, an isolated style, the first of its kind in English poetry."[2]

Such light as these attempts at a sociology of art shed is again obscured by the dogmatic and intractable language, the barrenness of the observation and the dubious relevance of these "explanations". Similarly, writers on the pictorial arts often mistake sociological docketing for meaningful statements about the subject. A social analyst of Florentine painting who has been content to name Masaccio as "the representative of the Florentine upper-bourgeois, intellectual rationalist, upper stratum" and to rank Gentile among the "aristocratising upper bourgeoisie"[3] only conveys the impression that insignificant painters may be described in this classificatory manner, but that any real artist bursts all simple systematics. The reader is

[1] C. Caudwell: *Illusion and Reality*, London, 1946, p. 76.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[3] F. Antal: *Florentine Painting and its Social Background*, London, 1947, p. 315.

not helped by them in his understanding of art and never learns why he places a high value on certain painters, whether they be aristocratic, bourgeois or lower middle class, while he passes others by with a perfunctory nod of recognition. The ubiquity of sociological conditioning does not imply that social analysis is everywhere equally illuminative. Frequently it detracts from an appreciation of the field *sui generis*. Freud in some passages reduces art to a mere channel of sublimation. Towards ideas he takes a haughty attitude, showing himself interested in motives rather than in the substance of the ideas themselves: "Faced with an opponent who believed that the interior of the world is made of jam," he mockingly suggests, he would be interested not in the theory but in the "kind of man who can get such an idea into his head."[1] Social analysis must be critical towards its own methods and prevent them from achieving mastery over sociologists. It has often been said that man, as soon as he is viewed as a product of social relations, loses his individual features. He belongs to them, not they to him, he is subordinated to the facts of culture, class, psychological type, and he is more and more adapted to these categories. This is particularly noxious at a moment when the pressure of powerful groups is great and the individual is prepared to meet them halfway "by transforming himself from a human being into a member of organisations, by sacrificing his potentialities for the sake of readiness and ability, to conform to and gain influences in such organisations".[2] Social analysis may inadvertently reinforce these tendencies if it does not point to the necessary limitations involved in its own approach.

The acrid quality of so much analysis[3] dates from a past age

[1]S. Freud: *New Introductory Lectures*, London, 1933, p. 47.

[2]M. Horkheimer: *The Eclipse of Reason*, New York, 1947, pp. 141–2.

[3]Marx wrote to Engels about the inaugral meetings of the First International and how he cleverly dealt with its programmatic declarations: "I saw that it was impossible to do anything with this stuff. To justify the odd kind of editorship which I wanted to apply I wrote the 'Address to the Working Classes', not our original intention, a sort of review of the experiences of the working classes since 1845. Pretending that all factual matter was contained in this Address and that we could not repeat ourselves three times over, I revised the entire preamble, deleted the *déclaration des principes*, and replaced the forty rules by ten. . . . My proposals were all accepted by the sub-committee. However I was made to include two 'Duty' and 'Rights' clichés, ditto a reference to 'Truth, Morality, and Justice', but I placed them so that they can do no harm." (Letter of the 4th November, 1864, *Marx-Engels Briefwechsel*, Moscow, 1937, p. 237.)

still fighting against a vapoury idealism. The intellectual effort which men must now make to match technical progress with social skills involves also the critical appreciation of the various assumptions and limitations which their approaches entail. Beyond the realm which can be explored by scientific procedures there need neither lie "chaos" as Pearson thought, nor "non-sense" as modern positivism often asserts. Social engineering,[1] the iconoclastic propensities of some forms of logical positivism,[2] functionalism, and the type of sociology represented by the above quotations on the arts can be taken as a transitional phase of social thought, a belated *Sturm und Drang* period of the study. To-day, on the contrary, the real problem is to find the connection between "chaotic" ordinary life and the statistical needs of entire communities, between the human relations reflected in the appalling "non-sense" objets d'art of the mantelpiece, and a real appreciation of the arts and values. Social analysis mediates between the "ordinary" and the "sublime", and aims to make explicit the social relations and the resources in man which can bring the two, so long separated,[3] together in a fruitful unity. We are only at the beginning of this task, but it is the ultimate goal of social enquiry. A condition of further progress is the organisation of sociological techniques and knowledge, which traces the

[1] "The institutions are man-made and designed with a certain aim in mind. . . . The (social) engineer or the technologist approaches institutions rationally as means that serve certain ends . . . as a technologist he judges them wholly according to their appropriateness, efficiency, simplicity, etc." (K. Popper: *The Open Society*, London, 1947, Vol. I, p. 144.)

[2] "To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy. . . ." Yet this writer concludes: "He who understands me finally recognises them (the propositions) as senseless when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it.)" (L. Wittgenstein: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, London, 1922, p. 189.)

[3] The creative individual suffers greatly by his isolation. Herbert Read, underlining Klee's plea for the right of the artist to create his own order or reality, agrees with Klee that the transcendental world can only be created in obeisance to certain rules implicit in the natural order: "The final source of power in the artist is given by society, and that is precisely what is lacking in the modern artist—'Uns trägt kein Volk'. We have no sense of community of a people for whom and with whom we work. That is the tragedy of the modern artist, and only those who are blind to their own social disunity and spiritual separateness blame the modern artist for his obscurity." (P. Klee: *On Modern Art*, London, 1948, Preface by H. Read p. 6.) The social analyst relieves this obscurity by reducing the estrangement of social spheres to one another.

continuity of social thought from the random observations of humanists through 19th century sociology and the social sciences to modern social analysis. The subject has by now achieved a satisfactory roundness. At the same time, integration must never be at the expense of individual approaches. Analysis must never dissolve the subject under discussion in order to piece it together according to its own principles. The social investigator must be sensitive to the ambivalence of his facts, he must both distinguish levels and know what goes on in the interstices of his categories. He must shape his analysis in the image of the free individual at whom Aristotle in a famous passage in the *Politics* hints as one possessing both the courage of the European and the intelligence of the Asiatic, that individual who has the capacity for freedom and reflection while knowing how to allow for his animal instinct of self-preservation.[1] Social analysis extends the securities of man, furnishes the administrator with schemes and experiments, makes explicit the manner in which thinking proceeds and the framework within which thought can become effective, explores both the "day-side" and the "night-side" of man. It thus is part of that larger movement among men which the scientist James Clerk Maxwell hailed as "the abandonment of wilfulness without the extinction of will, but rather a means of a great development of will, whereby instead of being really in subjection to unknown laws, the individual becomes consciously acting by laws and really free from the interference of unrecognised laws". The analysis of society is an attempt at a realisation of this freedom.

[1]Book VII, para. 7.

APPENDIX

Dates of some of the Authors mentioned in the text and some of their Works.

Mandeville, Bernard (1670–1733).

British Philosopher and Satirist.

1689 Disputatio Philosophica de Brutorum Operationibus.
1704 Typhon, or, The Wars between the Gods and Giants.
1714 Fable of the Bees, or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits.
1724 A Modest Defence of Publick Stews, or, An Essay upon Whoring.
1732 The Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity.

Hume David (1711–1776).

British Philosopher and Historian.

1739–40 Treatise of Human Nature.
1741–2 Essays Moral and Political.
1748 An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.
1751 Political Discourses.
1754–62 A History of England.
1757 Four Dissertations: The Natural History of Religion; Of the Passions; Of Tragedy; Of the Standard of Taste.
1777 (Posthumously) My Own Life.
1779 (Posthumously) Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1712–1778).

Novelist and Philosopher, born in Geneva.

1743 Dissertations sur la Musique.
1749 Discours sur les Arts.
1752 Origine de l'Inégalité.
1760 Julie, ou, La Nouvelle Heloïse.
1762 Contrat Social.
Émile, ou, de l'Éducation.
1763 Lettres de la Montagne.
1766–70 Les Confessions.

Steuart, Sir James (1712–1780).

British Economist.

1767 An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, being an Essay on the Science of Domestic Policy of Free Nations.

D'Alembert, Jean le Rond (1717–1788).

French Mathematician and Philosopher. Organiser of the Encyclopédie (appearing 1755 and after with contributions from Diderot, Voltaire, Holbach, Helvetius, Rousseau *et al.*).

1739 Mémoire sur la Calcul Intégral.
1759 Éléments de Philosophie.
1779 Éléments de la Musique Théorique et Pratique.

Smith, Adam (1723–1790).

British Economist and Philosopher.

1759 The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
1763 Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms (reported by a Student).
1776 An Enquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations.
1795 Essays on Philosophical Subjects.

Burke, Edmund (1729–1797).

British Parliamentarian and Political Theorist.

1756 A Vindication of Natural Society in a Letter to Lord ——.
1770 Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents.
1774 Speech on American Taxation.
1775 Speech on moving his Resolution for Conciliation with the Colonies.
1780 Speech for the Better Security of the Independence of Parliament and the Economical Reformation of the Civil and other Establishments.
1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Procedure in certain Societies in London relative to that Event.

Paine, Thomas (1737–1809).

British Pamphleteer.

1791–2 Rights of Man: being an Answer to Mr Burke's Attack on the French Revolution.
1794 The Age of Reason: being an Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology.

Malthus, Thomas Robert (1766–1834).

British Economist and Clergyman.

1798 An Essay on the Principles of Population as it affects the Future Improvement of Society.
1803 Second greatly enlarged edition of the above work.
1815 An Inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent.
1820 Principles of Political Economy.

Mill, James (1773–1836).

British Philosopher and Journalist.

1817 The History of British India.
1821 Elements of Political Economy.
1829 Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind.

Carey, Henry Charles (1793–1879).

American Economist.

1837–40 Principles of Political Economy.
1858–59 The Principles of Social Science.

Comte, Auguste (1798–1857).

French Sociologist and Mathematician.

1826 Considérations du Pouvoir Spirituel.
1830–42 Cours de Philosophie Positive.
1844 Discours sur l'Esprit Positif.

1851–54 Système de Politique Positive, ou, Traité de Sociologie instituant la Réligion de l'Humanité.
1858 Appel aux Conservateurs.
1858 Essai de Philosophie Mathématique.

Macaulay, Thomas Babington, Lord Macaulay (1800–1859).
British Historian and Parliamentarian.

1825 Essay on Milton.
1842 Lays of Ancient Rome.
1848–55 The History of England.

Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beaconsfield (1804–1881).
British Prime Minister and Novelist.

1828 Vivian Grey.
1830 The Young Duke.
1832 Contrarini Fleming.
1835–6 The Runnymede Letters.
1844 Coningsby, or, The New Generation.
1845 Sybil, or, The Two Nations.
1870 Lothair.

Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873).
British Philosopher and Political Economist.

1831 Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy.
1843 A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive.
1848 Principles of Political Economy.
1859 On Liberty.
Thoughts on Political Reform.
1861 Consideration on Representative Government.
1863 Utilitarianism.
1865 Auguste Comte and Positivism.
1869 On the Subject of Women.
1873 Autobiography.

Le Play, Pierre Guillaume Frédéric (1806–1882).
French Social Investigator and Engineer.

1855 Les Ouvriers Européens.
1871 L'Organisation de la Famille.
1874 Réforme sociale en France.
1877–9 Second greatly enlarged edition of Les Ouvriers Européens.
1876 La Constitution de l'Angleterre.
Réformes en Europe et le Salut en France.
1881 Le Constitution Essentielle de l'Humanité.

Darwin, Charles Robert (1809–1882).
British Natural Scientist.

1832–6 Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of H.M.S. *Adventure* and *Beagle*.
1859 On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or, the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.
1868 The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication.
1871 The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex.

Marx, Karl Heinrich (1818–1883).

German Economist and Founder of the International Workingmen's Association (1864).

1845–6 Die deutsche Ideologie (with F. Engels).
1847 La Misère de la Philosophie. Réponse à la Philosophie de M. Proudhon.
1847 Lohnarbeit und Kapital.
1848 Das Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (with F. Engels).
1852 Der 18. Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte.
1859 Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie.
1867 Das Kapital. Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie.
1871 Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich.
1885–9 (Posthumously) Das Kapital. Vols. II and III.
1905 (Posthumously) Theorien über den Mehrwert.

Morgan, Lewis Henry (1818–1881).

American Anthropologist.

1851 The League of the Ho-dé-no-sau-née or the Iroquois.
1871 Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family.
1877 Ancient Society, or, Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilisation.
1881 Houses and Houselife of the American Aborigines.

Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895).

German Social Theorist and Manufacturer.

1845 Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England.
1870 Der deutsche Bauernkrieg.
1870–1 Notes of War.
1878 Herrn Eugen Duhrings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft.
1884 Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staates.
1893 Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft. (See Marx, Karl Heinrich.)

Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903).

British Sociologist and Engineer.

1850 Social Statics.
1852 The Development Hypothesis.
1857 Progress, its Laws and Cause.
1859 Essays, Scientific, Political and Speculative.
1862–93 A System of Synthetic Philosophy.
1884 The Man versus the State.
1887 The Factors of Organic Evolution.
1893 The Inadequacy of Natural Selection.

Buckle, Henry Thomas (1821–1862).

British Historian.

1857–61 History of Civilisation in England.

Engel, Ernst (1821–1896).

German Statistician.

1872 Der Preis der Arbeit.
1881 Das Rechnungsbuch der Hausfrau.
1895 Die Lebenskosten belgischer Arbeiterfamilien früher und jetzt.

Galton, Sir Francis (1822–1911).

British Statistician and Social Investigator.

1869 Hereditary Genius, an Enquiry into its Laws and Consequences.
1874 English Men of Science, their Nature and Nurture.
1883 Inquiries into the Human Faculty and its Development.
1889 Natural Inheritance.
1905 Eugenics, its Definition, Scope and Aims.
1907 Probability, the Foundation of Eugenics.
1908 Memories of my Life.

Lilienfeld, Paul von (1829–1903).

Russian and German Sociologist.

1860 Fundamental Principles of Political Economy (in Russian).
1873–81 Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft.
1896 La Pathologie Sociale.
1898 Zur Verteidigung der organischen Methode in der Sociologie.

Tylor, Sir Edward Burnett (1832–1917).

British Anthropologist.

1865 Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of Civilisation.
1871 Primitive Culture, Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art and Custom.
1881 Anthropology. An Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilisation.

Dilthey, Wilhelm (1833–1911).

German Philosopher and Historian.

1867–70 Das Leben Schleiermachers.
1883 Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte.
1891–3 Auffassung und Analyse des Menschen im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert. Das natürliche System der Geisteswissenschaften im 17. Jahrhundert.
1894 Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie.
1895 Über vergleischende Psychologie.
1905 Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung.
1910 Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften.
1911 Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen.

Booth, Charles (1840–1916).

British Social Investigator and Shipowner.

1886 Occupations of the People.
1887 The Tower Hamlets.
1889 London Life and Labour.
1891–1903 Life and Labour of the People in London (Enlarged edition of the above).
1899 Old Age Pensions, and the Aged Poor.
1910 Poor Law Reform.

Marshall, Alfred (1842–1924).
British Economist.

1879 The Economics of Industry (with M. Marshall).
1890 Principles of Economics.
1891 Elements of Economics.
1919 Industry and Trade.
1923 Money, Credit and Commerce.

Sumner, William Graham (1840–1920).
American Sociologist.

1874 A History of American Currency.
1883 What Social Classes owe to each other.
1891 The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution.
1907 Folkways.
1914 Want and Hunger and Other Essays.
1927–8 The Science of Society (Completed by A. G. Keller).

Lebon, Gustave (1841–1931).
French Social Psychologist.

1895 La Psychologie des Foules.
1913 Aphorismes du Temps Présent.

Ward, Lester Frank (1941–1913.)
American Sociologist.

1883 Dynamic Sociology as Applied Social Science.
1887 False Notions of Government.
1893 The Psychic Factors of Civilisation.
1903 Pure Sociology.
1906 Applied Sociology.
1913–8 Glimpses of the Cosmos.

Pavlov, Ivan Petrovitch (1849–1936).
Russian Physiologist.

1902 The Work of the Digestive Glands.
1923–40 Lectures on Conditional Reflexes: Twenty-Five Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity of Animals.

Pareto, Vilfredo, Marchese di Parigi (1848–1923).
Italian Economist and Sociologist.

1896–7 Cours d'Économie Politique.
1902–3 Les Systèmes Socialistes.
1906 Manuele d'Economia Politica.
1916 Trattato di Sociologia Generale.
1920 Fatti e Teorie.

Frazer, Sir James George (1854–1941).
British Anthropologist.

1887 Totemism.
1890–1915 The Golden Bough: a Study in Magic and Religion (A Supplement appeared in 1936).
1907 Questions on the Customs, Beliefs and Languages of Savages.
1908 The Scope of Social Anthropology.

1909 Psyche's Task; a Discourse concerning the Influence of Superstitution on the Growth of Institutions.
1913–24 The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead.
1924 Folklore in the Old Testament: Studies in Comparative Religion.
1933–6 The Fear of the Dead in Primitive Religion.
1938–9 The Native Races of Africa and Madagascar; America; Asia and Europe; Australasia, including Australia, New Zealand, Oceania, New Guinea and Indonesia.

Geddes, Sir Patrick (1854–1932).

British Biologist and Town Planner.

1889 The Evolution of Sex (with J. A. Thomson).
1904 City Development.
1913 Cities in Evolution.
1931 Life, Outlines of General Biology (with J. A. Thomson).

Taylor, Frederic Winslow (1856–1915).

American Engineer and Business Consultant.

1893 Notes on Belting.
1896 The Adjustment of Wages to Efficiency.
1906 On the Art of Cutting Metals.
1911 Shop Management.
1913 The Principles of Scientific Management.

Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939).

Austrian Psycho-Analyst.

1895 Studien über Hysterie (with J. Breuer).
1900 Traumdeutung.
1901 Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens.
1905 Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewusstsein.
Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie.
1910 Kindheitserinnerungen des Leonardo da Vinci.
1913 Totem und Tabu.
1917 Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psycho-Analyse.
1920 Jenseits des Lustprinzips.
1921 Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse.
1927 Die Zukunft einer Illusion.
1939 Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion.

Pearson, Karl (1857–1936).

British Mathematician and Social Investigator.

1885 Socialism in Theory and Practice.
1887 The Ethics of Free Thought.
1897 The Chances of Death and other Studies in Evolution.
1899 A Grammar of Science.
1901 National Life from the Standpoint of Science.
1914–24 Tables for Statisticians

Veblen, Thorstein Bunde (1857–1929).

American Economist.

1899 The Theory of the Leisure Class.
1904 The Theory of Business Enterprise.
1914 The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts.
1915 Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution.
1919 The Higher Learning in America.
The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation.
1921 The Engineers and the Price System.
1923 Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: the Case of America.

Durkheim, Émile (1858–1917).

French Anthropologist and Sociologist.

1893 De la Division du Travail social.
1894 Les Règles de la Méthode sociologique.
1897 Le Suicide.
1912 Les Formes élémentaires de la Vie réligieuse.
1924 Sociologie et Philosophie.

Hobson, John Atkinson (1858–1940).

British Economist.

1891 Problems of Poverty.
1894 The Evolution of Modern Capitalism.
1896 The Problem of the Unemployed.
1900 The War in South Africa, its Causes and Effects.
1902 Imperialism, a Study.
1904 International Trade, an Application of Economic Theory.
1911 The Science of Wealth.
1914 Work and Wealth, a Human Valuation.
1919 Taxation in the New State.
1922 Incentives in the New Industrial Order.
1926 Free Thought in the Social Sciences.
1930 Rationalisation and Unemployment.
1936 Thorstein Veblen.
1937 Property and Improperty.
1938 Confessions of an Economic Heretic.

Simmel, Georg (1858–1918).

German Philosopher and Art Historian.

1892 Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie.
1900 Philosophie des Geldes.
1908 Soziologie.
1916 Rembrandt.
1917 Grundfragen der Soziologie.
1918 Lebensanschauung: vier metaphysische Kapitel.
1922 Zur Philosphie der Kunst.

Wallas, Graham (1858–1932).

British Political Theorist.

1898 The Life of Francis Place.
1908 Human Nature in Politics.
1914 The Great Society.

1921 Our Social Heritage.
1926 The Art of Thought.
1934 Social Judgment (Unfinished).

Webb, Beatrice (1858–1943).
British Social Investigator.

1891 The Co-operative Movement in Great Britain.
1919 Men's and Women's Wages: Should they be equal?
1926 My Apprenticeship.
1948 Our Partnership.
(See Webb, Sidney James.)

Dewey, John (1859–....).
American Philosopher.

1887 Psychology.
1899 The School and Society.
1909 How we think.
1910 The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy.
1922 Human Nature and Conduct.
1934 Art as an Experience.
1935 Logic, the Theory of Inquiry.
1939 Freedom and Culture.

Ellis, Havelock (1859–1939).
British Social Psychologist.

1894 Man and Woman: A Study of Human Secondary Sexual Characteristics.
1897–1928 Studies in the Psychology of Sex.
1911 The World of Dreams.
1912 The Task of Social Hygiene.
1921 The Play Function of Sex.
1940 My Life.

Webb, Sidney James, Lord Passfield (1859–1947).
British Social Investigator.

1890 Socialism in England.
1891 The Eight Hour Day.
1894 The History of Trade Unionism (with B. Webb).
1904 London Education.
1906–22 English Local Government (with B. Webb).
1910 The State and the Doctor (with B. Webb).
1917 The Works Manager To-day.
1923 The Decay of Capitalist Civilisation (with B. Webb).
1927–9 English Poor Law (with B. Webb).
1932 Methods of Social Study (with B. Webb).
1935 Soviet Communism: a New Civilisation? (with B. Webb).

Sombart, Werner (1863–1939).
German Historian.

1897 Sozialismus und sociale Bewegung.
1902–28 Der moderne Kapitalismus.
1915 Händler und Helden.
1930 Die drei Nationalökonomien.

Cooley, Charles Houton (1864–1929).

American Sociologist.

1902 Human Nature and the Social Order.
1909 Social Organisation, a Study of the Larger Mind.
1927 Life and the Student.
1930 Sociological Theory and Social Research.

Weber, Max (1864–1920).

German Economic Historian and Sociologist.

1891 Die römische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für dàs Staats- und Privatrecht.
1903–6 Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der National-ökonomie.
1919 Wissenschaft als Beruf.
1921 Die rationalen und sozialen Grundlagen der Musik.
1922 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Part III of Grundriss der Sozial-ökonomik).
1924 Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Edited by S. Hellmann and M. Palgy).

Bowley, Sir Arthur Lyon (1869–. . . .).

British Statistician.

1893 England's Foreign Trade in the 19th Century.
1900 Wages in the United Kingdom in the 19th Century.
1901 Elements of Statistics.
1910 An Elementary Manual of Statistics.
1915 The Nature and Purpose of the Measurement of Social Phenomena
1915 Livelihood and Poverty (with A. R. Burnett-Hurst).
1919 The Division of the Product of Industry.
1920 The Change in the Distribution of Income.
1921 Official Statistics.
1925 Has Poverty Diminished (with M. H. Hogg).
1935 Family Expenditure (with R. G. D. Allen).
1937 Wages and Income in the United Kingdom since 1860.
1942 Studies in National Income 1924–38 (with others).

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyitch Ulyanov (1870–1924).

Russian Revolutionary and Political Scientist.

1895 Economic Content of the Popular Party and Mr. Struve's Criticism of it.
1899 The Development of Capitalism in Russia.
1902 What is to be done? The most Urgent Question of the Movement.
1905 Two Tactics of the Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution.
1909 Materialism and Empiriocriticism.
1915 The Collapse of the Second International.
1917 Imperialism, the Final Stage of Capitalism.
State and Revolution.
1918 The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.
1920 Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder.

Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawney (1864–1929).

British Philosopher and Sociologist.

1893 The Labour Movement.
1896 The Theory of Knowledge.
1901 Mind in Evolution.

1904 Democracy and Reaction.
1905 Morals in Evolution.
1911 Social Evolution and Political Theory.
1913 Development and Purpose.
1915 The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples (with G. C. Wheeler and M. Ginsberg).
1918 The Metaphysical Theory of the State.

Rowntree, Benjamin Seebohm (1871–....).

British Manufacturer and Social Investigator.

1903 Poverty, a Study of Town Life.
1910 Unemployment: a Social Study (with B. Lasker).
1913 How the Labourer lives (with M. Kendall).
1914 The Way to Industrial Peace.
1918 The Human Needs of Labour.
1921 The Human Factor in Business.
1941 Poverty and Progress.

Scheler, Max (1874–1928).

German Philosopher.

1913 Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle.
1923–4 Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre.
1926 Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft.
1929 (Posthumously) Philosophische Weltanschauung.

Jung, Carl-Gustav (1875–....).

Swiss Psychologist.

1905 Diagnostische Associationsstudien.
1912 Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido.
1921 Psychologische Typen.
1928 Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewusstsein.
1929 Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte (with R. Wilhelm).
1934 Modern Man in Search of a Soul (translated).
1946 The Integration of the Personality (translated).

Wiese, Leopold von (1876–....).

Austrian and German Sociologist.

1905 Grundlegung der Gesellschaftslehre.
1916 Staatssozialismus.
1917 Liberalismus.
1924–9 Allgemeine Soziologie, Versuch einer Beziehungslehre.

Watson, John Broadus (1878–....).

American Phschologist.

1903 Animal Education.
1913 As the Behaviourist views it.
1914 Behaviourism.
1928 The Ways of Behaviourism.

Beveridge, William Henry, Lord Beveridge (1879–....).
British Social Scientist and Administrator.

1909 Unemployment: a Problem of Industry.
1920 The Public Service in War and Peace.
1929 British Food Control.
1936 Planning under Socialism.
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