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


ALL THIS IS AMERICA TOO – NORTH, EAST, SOUTH, WEST. THE OUTLOOK OF YOUTH FOR SECURITY AND REALITY AND THE NEW REALISM OF THE PEOPLE.

# AMERICAN SOCIAL PROBLEMS: *An Introduction to the Study of the People and Their Dilemmas*

BY

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# *PREFACE*

This volume is inscribed primarily to American youth in their search for security and reality and, secondarily, to their elders and to teachers and social workers, whose direction and co-operative efforts appear more and more to be conditioned by their own problems and dilemmas.

The work has two main purposes: first, to present a comprehensive, authentic, and vivid picture of the American scene with the chief emphasis always on the people and their dilemmas; and, second, to set up a realistic framework of inquiry through which the answers to many of their questions may be sought.

The arrangement of the volume into Books I and II conforms in general content and method to this twofold purpose. In Book I the portraiture is intended to sense something of the living drama of modern contemporary society as it is reflected on the screen of America's geographic and cultural backgrounds. A part of the reality of the picture is the epic quality of the powerful sweep of time, change, and technology. This requires more than the conventional, topical treatment and much of the book is, therefore, written in the form of a continuous, unfolding story, some of which perhaps might well be read aloud and then questioned as to its multiple meanings.

The method and emphasis of the second book is more conventional and seeks always to focus upon the question: What is the answer? It aims to select at least the minimum areas of inquiry necessary to an adequate understanding of American problems and then proceeds upon the premise that it is only through a systematic and comprehensive factual approach that realistic answers may be attained. Thus, given a problem or situation:

What are the facts?

What do the facts mean?

What is the relation of these facts to other facts and to the whole situation?

What are we going to do about the situation?

What will happen when we do what we are going to do?

In the light of this, then, what are alternatives and revised appraisals?

In the light of these, what are next steps?

And, finally, what are the best ways to proceed?

The general frame of reference of the volume is frankly, on the one hand, that of contemporary society in the setting of American democracy, and, on the other, of a definite motivation which may be characterized as the scientific-liberal, assuming sociology to be both a science and a tool, as opposed to the dogmatic-conservative, the emotional-radical, or agnostic-objective, which, on the assumptions of tradition, philosophy, ethics, or "pure" science, deny the effectiveness of social science and social planning.

The structural framework of the volume also differs radically from that of most works of this sort. Its emphasis is upon the people and their behavior rather than upon formal institutions and processes and it features physical and cultural backgrounds as fundamental to either the understanding or direction of society. It thus comes to grips with the newer reaches of inquiry and action in the area of natural resources and geographic factors as well as the folk factors which now seem to puzzle the world of students.

The volume, therefore, in addition to other uses, is designed to meet that very large and increasing demand for a work which will give new and definitive meanings to the old concepts of Americanism and democracy and will do it in such ways as to provide interesting and flexible methods of study which easily project themselves on into the general field of culture and civic interest or into the many fields of specialized study and effort.

The techniques of illustration provide that full-page statistical pictures may be analogous to the photographic presentations, which are also new. Both may be utilized as much or as little as desired. Each page comprehends a whole story or problem in itself and may be incorporated into whatever method of study desired.

The volume is the result of many years of hard work and study in the effort to interpret social problems in the framework of sound, realistic theory. Together with a subsequent volume on a "living sociology," it constitutes what seems to me an adequate system of societal study. Appreciation is expressed to the many students and

readers whose "give-and-take" have constituted a fine inspiration and a generous critique.

Special thanks are expressed to Professor James H. S. Bossard for his reading of the first drafts of the manuscript and for his helpful suggestions; to Miss Belle Mooring and Mrs. Treva Williams Bevacqua for their expertness with the manuscript; and, as always, to Dr. Katharine Jocher for her generous and critical reading of the manuscript.

H. W. O.

*Chapel Hill*
*April,* 1939

# *IN SEARCH OF AMERICA AT HER BEST*

## PREVIEW TO THE CHANGING WORLD OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

NEW WORLD OF OPPORTUNITY. In the new world of mid-twentieth century America, modern youth faces an extraordinary prospect and promise of American life. It is as if the challenge of America at her best is a challenge not only for richness of living but also for wisdom and foresight. American students and citizens, therefore, find themselves in a strategic position for both scientific study and practical consideration of social problems. Such study affords extraordinary opportunity to make superior contributions to the new world in which they live. In the first place, extraordinary opportunities are inherent in the need, timeliness and facilities that are abundantly available for study in the changing and enriched humanities as the backlog for realistic education and cultural equipment. There are also other essential contributions needed. Some of these are inherent in the practical planning and action programs which emerge from the effective study of social problems. Others may be found in the humanistic values which accrue in the study of social problems to intellectual education and the development of leadership. These opportunities, happily enough, apply alike to both the individual and the school. They afford for the individual both education and training, rich in the wisdom which is the heritage of culture and strong in the responsibility for realistic participation in modern life. They provide for the school an effective curriculum and training program for citizenship and cultural participation in the major aspects of life.

*Six Possible Levels to Study.* It must be clear that current opportunities for the study of social problems are abundant. In the first place the range of years and the special levels of American experience from World War I up to now afford an excellent laboratory for observation and recording the dilemmas and behavior of the people. It seems self-evident that the time between two world wars affords an extraordinary epoch to study contemporary America. And more specifically the postwar America which followed each

war constituted epochs of American life which reflected the ongoings of a changing society in many levels capable of study. For purposes of analysis and illustration it seems possible to delineate six periods of development. These were not always clearly differentiated, nor was the transition from one period to another always easily recognized. Nevertheless, a look at America on these changing levels of life becomes a first essential to understanding the nation and its dilemmas. First, there was the postwar period following World War I. This culminated in the late 1920's in the crest of America's tide of prosperity. There was quantitative achievement in most aspects of life and a certain quality of attainment in some. This general period ended as the 1930's came along. Next came the great depression period. This period seemed long to the American people, although it was scarcely more than half a decade. It brought with it, however, new social problems and social inventions of government to meet the emergent needs of the time and to stem the tide of economic calamity. Following this, then, was a third short period which may be characterized by a trend toward recovery and reconstruction. In reality, however, this period was never integrated into a definitive period due to the approach of the fourth period growing up from the rapidly rising tide of international demands and of European war. A part of the "recovery" and of the rise of prosperity was manifestly due to European war and America's part in supplying demands. The fifth period comprehended the years of World War II and especially the quick orientation to war economy. The sixth included the closing years of World War II, and the postwar period in which a new America was seeking to adapt itself to a new world of regions and nations.

*Three Levels of Testing Grounds.* In reality, however, our study of American problems may be accurately divided into three main parts. First there was the record of the nation as it behaved in prosperity and in the early 1930's in depression. Then followed a quick turnabout in the late 1930's and early 1940's as the nation reacted quickly, first to the threat, and then to the realities of a new world war more exacting than anything the world had seen. The third period would be the continuously unfolding picture of postwar America. In both periods it was in many ways a new America still changing rapidly. There was first the crest of prosperity and

the sweep of invention as technology in the 1920's was accompanied by a new emphasis upon isolationism and nationalism. Yet, even as the depression emerged, it was clear that World War II and internationalism had an important part in America's dilemmas. From that point on through the rising tide of war, it was clear that a part of America's problems was essentially bound up with international situations from which America could not isolate herself. Then came the powerful sweep of war with the immeasurable achievements of the nation with almost every civil test that could come to a people; and then the greater test of war and tragedy; and finally the test of peace and reconstruction to be synchronized with a new period of American growth and development.

*Emerging America.* In these periods of American life, the student will find not only a most definitive cross-section of the nation's experience, but well-nigh every experience found in modern civilization. For America in the shift to war had continued much of its depression strategy and much of its technological gains in the crisis of the nation's entrance into World War II and the consequent demand for production and regimentation much greater even in the days of the depression at its worst. And finally, the period after World War II afforded an extraordinary testing ground for both social study and social planning. This is the America that comes to the mid-twentieth century period of stocktaking which will afford not only an unprecedented opportunity for observation but also a rare obligation for a sort of super-census inventory of the state of the nation for which years of preparation and planning are required.

*Isolation and International Relations.* This vantage-point for the study of American social problems may also serve as a sort of bridgehead for reviewing America in the new world setting. In addition to the normal range of domestic problems, there is needed also an understanding of how the people envisaged the nation within a sort of world isolationism in which back to "normalcy" and nationalism appeared as the logical next steps for American security. Yet long before the depression was over and before the clouds of World War II had appeared, it was increasingly evident that what had happened and what was happening abroad was a major factor in American destiny. Yet the two conflicting philosophies continued as the newer reaches of world society encroached

upon both the great American tradition and upon the natural interests of the American people. These were buttressed by misunderstandings and impatience with many peoples and nations of the world. Added to the American heritage at home were new factors and complicating forces arising from the tragic sufferings of millions of Americans who were returning from the wars, with new experiences, new ideologies, and new dilemmas.

*Changed Meanings of Social Problems.* Because of all these factors the profile of American problems had changed greatly. Because of the wider range and nature of these social situations, it was logical that the meaning which the term "social problems" assumed has become broader. In the earlier days of America, following the Civil War and the rapid growth of the nation, the catalog and meaning of American problems were both relatively simple. There was increasing need for the study of such concrete problems as immigration and Americanization; of poverty and dependency as the cities grew; of crime and delinquency in the midst of frontier society; and of what was called the whole field of "charities and corrections," the remedy for much of which was "philanthropy" and privately supported social service. As the nation grew into the twentieth century, many of the problems centered around those of party politics, reform and agitation, and socio-economic problems of labor, trusts, and big business. In the world of contemporary society, however, our problems are more generic and organic in the sense that they are a part of the whole fabric of American life and democracy. They partake of the nature of fundamental adjustments and reconstruction or of fundamental differences in philosophy and practice. And they partake of the nature of world problems. The era of World War II and its total experiences contributed powerfully to this changing profile; but even before that, science and technology had so multiplied new situations that Thorstein Veblen had reversed the old proverb to read "Invention is the Mother of Necessity."

*A Maze of Independent Problems.* Growing out of total global developments, there were certain over-all problems that could scarcely be confined to the American scene. One of these was the regional balance of people and resources. This would become a long-time problem of readjustments between many different situations and communication and transportation facilities in the new

world. Another was the increasing role of race in the total picture. Still another was the problem of small nations and of minority peoples and their political and civil adjustment in addition to the specific problems of food and health needs. Rehabilitation was assuming worldwide proportions. All these would have important bearing upon the economic life and problems of America for many years. Closely related to itself there were essential problems of planning, of economic adjustment, of democracy and governments. The rehabilitation of the handicapped at home, as abroad, called for new reaches in both the number of people required to work on them and the strategy needed for their solution. And society was again facing the problem of how to master the powerful technology which had achieved war production and destruction in terms that appeared miraculous. There were also serious dilemmas facing the postwar America in terms of what sort of education it must provide for the people, many of whom had adjudged education to have failed.

*Specific American Situations.* More specifically there were several situations in the United States for which the "solutions" did not appear as clearly in prospect as they had in the earlier years of the republic. First, there was the problem of the American Negro, which was no longer merely a Southern problem. Second, the problem of organized labor, including the dilemmas of conflicting labor groups and of agriculture, grew more and more complicated. Third, closely related to it, the problem of the relation of business to government or the problem of what changes were imminent in American democracy assumed new proportions. Fourth, the problem of the man-woman ratio in modern society and in the many postwar readjustments was perhaps a major one. Fifth, the problem of the regional quality and balance of America involved not only a balanced economy, but a better cultural balance and quality. Closely related to these were other problems, such as centralization of power, urbanization and industrialization, the mechanization of agriculture. For the time being, perhaps, the problems of youth and old age had merged with the total problems of rehabilitation, of war or social security, or of employment and of total readjustment. On the one hand there was the problem of youth formerly in the armed forces and, on the other, of the new generation coming on for universal military training and new experimentation.

*Two Age-Old Problems.* There were general problems which appeared wherever war and peace were involved. In the modern world they were reinforced by new and powerful compulsion. First there was the practice of insuring a continuous peace through some sort of world organization that could enforce its regulations. Next there was the necessity to guarantee an abundance of economy with the assurance of a peacetime policy that would avoid inflation and depression. This would mean production and strategy in civilian manufacture comparable with war production and insuring a better-balanced distribution and consumption of goods. In particular the problem of reconversion of war industry into civilian production was a first, while the task of providing occupation for sixty million people was a continuous one.

*New Angles to Old Problems.* There were many specific problems which developed new angles. The problem of food, for instance, became also a problem of richer diet and better practices. There were, therefore, new drives to utilize science more liberally. Science and research in the service of both industry and agriculture became an important factor in the new developments. Education for use and conservation of natural resources to the end that there might be plenty for all, gave promise of an era in which all the people might look forward to adequate facilities for satisfactory health conditions and medical care. Yet in all of these there were great inequalities and imbalance between and among different groups and regions so that a major problem of domestic planning came to be the attainment of a better regional equality and balance of America.

*Scientific Societal Problems.* Now all of these situations and trends accentuated the significance of the emphasis upon the long time, societal, scientific type of problem in modern society as stressed in this volume in contrast to the earlier concept which tended to study only the local problems of crime, poverty, and others which were so often translated into social pathology. The chief emphasis upon studying the normal problems of social-economic development in contrast to special problems of pathology is perhaps, after all, that of understanding society—how it grows, how and why people behave as they do, and what is likely to happen in the future. Another reason is that although many social problems may become pathological, and are likely to do so if ameliorative measures

## NEW MEANINGS OF AMERICA: THE AREA, POPULATION, AND DENSITY OF POPULATION BY COUNTRIES OF AMERICA

| | Area (000) Square Miles | Population (000) | Density (per Square Mile) |
|---|---|---|---|
| AMERICA | 16,061 | 277,855 | 17.3 |
| *North America* | 8,031 | 143,480 | 17.9 |
| Alaska | 586 | 73 | .1 |
| Canada | 3,467 | 11,422 | 3.3 |
| Greenland | 838 | 18 | .02 |
| Newfoundland | 163 | 294 | 1.8 |
| United States | 2,977 | 131,669 | .... |
| Other | .2 | 4 | .... |
| *Middle America* | 1,080 | 40,596 | 38.3 |
| Canal Zone | 1.4 | 45 | . . |
| Mexico | 758 | 19,446 | 25.7 |
| Central America (6 Republics) | 208 | 7,875 | 37.9 |
| British Honduras | 44 | 4,228 | 96.1 |
| West Indies | 91 | 13,172 | 144.7 |
| *South America* | 6,973 | 93,886 | 13.5 |
| Argentina | 1,080 | 13,130 | 12.2 |
| Bolivia | 419 | 3,398 | 8.1 |
| Brazil | 3,286 | 45,002 | 13.7 |
| Chile | 286 | 4,677 | 16.4 |
| Colombia | 477 | 8,702 | 18.2 |
| Guianas | 147 | 544 | 3.7 |
| Ecuador | 176 | 2,807 | 15.9 |
| Paraguay | 154 | 1,988 | 12.9 |
| Peru | 482 | 8,000 | 16.6 |
| Uruguay | 72 | 2,147 | 29.8 |
| Venezuela | 394 | 3,491 | 8.9 |
| *Oceania* | 3,300 | 10,910 | 3.2 |
| Australia | 2,975 | 7,057 | 2.4 |
| Hawaii | 6 | 415 | 69.2 |
| New Guinea | 91 | 765 | 8.3 |
| New Zealand | 103 | 1,641 | 15.9 |
| Other Islands | 125 | 1,041 | . |

Source: Inter-American Statistical Institute, *Statistical Activities of American Nations, 1940; League of Nations Statistical Year Book, 1939–1940.*

## WORLD PROBLEMS AS INDICATED BY THE DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTRIES BY REGIONS AND PEOPLE

I. *Europe:* all Europe excluding European part of Russia, European part of Turkey.

II. Russia: all U.S.S.R. in Europe and Asia.

III. *North America:* Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador, Greenland, St. Pierre and Miquelon, Continental United States.

IV. *South America:* Mexico, all Middle and Central America, West Indies, all South America.

V. *Mediterranean:* Iraq, Iran, Turkey (Asia and Europe), Syria and Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Aden and Perim, Socotra, Kurya-Murya, Palestine and Transjordan, Bahrein Islands, Cyprus, Italian Aegean Islands, Sheikh Said, Egypt.

VI. *Oriental Asia:* Asia (excluding countries of the Mediterranean Region); Netherland Indies and all islands included in Oceania with the exception of Australia and New Zealand.

VII. *Africa:* All Africa except Egypt.

VIII. *Australand:* Australia (with Tasmania) and New Zealand.

## POPULATION, AREA, AND DENSITY OF POPULATION BY WORLD REGIONS, 1937

| Region | Population | | Area | | Density per Sq. Mile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Thousands | Percent | Sq. Miles | Percent | |
| WORLD TOTAL . . | 2,106,107 | 100.0 | 51,406,729 | 100.0 | 41.0 |
| Europe ..... | 395,187 | 18.8 | 2,086,362 | 4.0 | 189.4 |
| Russia. . . | 170,467 | 8.1 | 8,167,405 | 15.9 | 20.9 |
| North America . | 140,754 | 6.7 | 7,592,789 | 14.8 | 18.6 |
| South America | 128,933 | 6.1 | 8,224,764 | 16.0 | 15.7 |
| Mediterranean | 64,853 | 3.1 | 2,631,890 | 5.1 | 24.6 |
| Oriental Asia... | 1,060,014 | 50.3 | 8,440,413 | 16.4 | 125.6 |
| Africa ..... | 137,430 | 6.5 | 11,185,170 | 21.8 | 12.3 |
| Australand..... | 8,469 | .4 | 3,077,936 | 6.0 | 2.8 |

Source: International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics, 1938–39, International Institute of Agriculture, Rome, 1940.

are not included in programs of social planning, the bulk of American social problems are of a positive nature having to do with the normal processes of societal development and survival. And even in the pathological situations that continue in wartorn countries, the chief concern has urgently been in rehabilitation and building back to normal possibilities.

*See Part II, Chapter XXIX.* The distinctions between the "scientific" and the "ameliorative" types of problems are described fully in our discussions and illustrations in Part II, Chapter XXIX. Suffice it to point out here that the scientific, societal approach views the problem from all angles, extending back through the total history of the situation, and in all places and times wherever the problem may exist, while the ameliorative, social approach stresses the immediate situation, here and now, applying primarily to a specific area and application. It is important to note that such long-time complex societal problems as sex, race, religion, labor, cultural traits, also have their specialized local emergency aspects which in turn can be understood and adjusted better by understanding also the long-time scientific aspects.

*Nature and Society.* An illustration of an apparent trend in the scientific study of society and its problems may be found in the increasing emphasis being placed upon nature and the natural elements which are involved in most of our problems. This does not mean only that there is an increasingly wide recognition of the fundamental importance of natural resources and their use in relation to peoples and societies everywhere and the consequent tragedy which results from their neglect and waste. It means also the better understanding of natural laws and their relation to man and culture, to health and welfare. Nature as basic to the study of human society is of three sorts: material things, such as resources; the laws of nature and her processes of growth and evolution constituting the ecological foundations of culture; and nature as culminating in human nature and that part of the heritage and obligation of science which needs to be accentuated in recompense for the ruthless reaches of its technology.

*World Communications.* Other illustrations of the larger fundamental problems facing society may be found in the total societal problem implied in the new trends toward world communication and commerce. Specifically, a good illustration is the wider use of

the airplane for communication, travel and transport, in which many interrelated factors must be taken into consideration. Here the physical sciences have created, through invention and technology and through the use of invested capital, a new world to challenge ships and trains, trucks and highways. Yet the main implications are social and cultural. For youth in particular this is an alluring prospect of the future, yet their problem is one of finding a basis upon which an enduring balance between the physical and social can be worked out. The problem of war is an even more powerful illustration, since time and space and traditional strategy have been transformed; and physical science and technology can destroy the society that fostered them.

*Civilization and Culture.* In this framework of air and mechanics, as the flowering of civilization, are also the seeds for the destruction of humanity and its culture. This leads then naturally to the study of a supreme issue inherent in the quality of a civilization which may be based primarily upon technology and featuring the wide range and power of organizational activities implied in urbanism, industrialism, technology, intellectualism, centralization of power and the totalitarian state. The problem may well be one of finding a marginal survival level somewhere between the earlier processes of human culture and the later products of technological civilization. This implies also that there are still important problems of human values and moral issues involved.

*The Rediscovery of the Folk.* We come then immediately face to face with a new emphasis upon the people and especially the folk as the composite of the people's behavior and institutions. "Only the people count" becomes the new version of ***vox populi, vox dei.*** In our framework of study and planning, the people are always at the heart of both our dilemmas and our goals. Here again the more realistic humanities coincide with social study. Just as the inner personality of the individual rests at the heart of democracy, so the rediscovery and recognition of the folk personality in the modern world may become a chief objective of the new study and planning. This is true whether it be in the lands of suffering peoples whose rights have been trampled in the world conflagration or whether in the American scene where Negro and other minority groups reflect the new consciousness of their own rights and aspirations.

*Practical Classifications of Problems.* If the student seeks an orderly and logical arrangement for classifying modern social problems to be studied after the manner suggested in this volume, namely, first, the fundamental, long time, generic problems of society, and, second, the local specific problems, it is possible to follow a number of categories. In addition to the main divisional arrangements utilized in our table of contents, an important adaptation might well be somewhat as follows. First, there are the problems which center around *nature,* such as natural resources, problems of geography and situation, of ecology and adaptation of men and animals to land and plants and regions. Then there are the problems which center around the basic *cultural* factors of sex and race, of work and play, of art and recreation, of war and peace, of institutions and organizations. Then over against these are the special problems of *civilization,* such as urbanism, industrialism, science and technology, centralization and power, the state and totalitarianism. These are the levels of tension in much that is characterized as modern civilization now clamoring for interpretation.

*The People and Their Dilemmas.* Yet the traits of culture and the heritage of the people as they develop into civilization and the impact of technology and change upon society can be understood only as *the people* are understood. Thus we study the people in all their varied groupings and relationships and especially as human resources. But more than ever the *individual* and his problem is of increasing importance. How true this is has been shown in our study of the depression unit of American social problems and in the experiences of returning soldiers from World War II, as well as in the armies of that war. The people become again the cross-section of society whose problems are of, for, and by the folk. Yet it is the impact of civilization upon the people that gives us in the modern world a large part of our *social problems.* Thus problems of nature, of culture, of civilization, of people, of dilemmas all focus upon the new problems of *Social Planning* as the way to bridge the distance between science and facts and social problems and reality. The student of social problems, therefore, works a little more closely than ever with the sociologist, with the social worker, with those who work in the field of politics and public administration, of public health and welfare, and with educators,

religious leaders and community workers and with representatives of the common man everywhere.

*Five Types of Resource Problems.* Keeping in mind the newer trends in social planning and our premise that planning is itself a major social problem, our study of problems may well be analyzed, for purposes of closer and more vivid understanding, under the fivefold classification of resources which we have featured in this volume. The five major groupings of resources basic to the adequate human society are *natural resources, technological resources, capital wealth or money resources, human resources,* and *institutional resources.* This arrangement is especially suitable for making inventory of the community, the state, the region or the Nation and for channeling the results of such study into education and planning. For the simple catalog of resources brings vividly to the eye the nature and range of society's reserves; at the same time it indicates strong and weak points in resource use and conservation. Such a classification implies inquiry into the possibilities for new resources and their relation to the economy and culture of the people. Even more important is the framework of resource classification for the study and direction of what we have called the regional quality and balance of America. By this we mean not only a balanced economy as between agriculture and industry and between and among the upper brackets of production and distribution of goods, but also a balanced culture inherent in decentralization of power and wealth, balance between rural life and urban life, between and among the hundreds of occupational opportunities. This means, further, a better distribution of the people and their opportunities for education and work in the several levels of American culture. Here are American problems *de luxe,* symbolic of the Americanism of the future.

*Technological Resources.* Yet natural resources and their use in attaining the balanced culture and economy are merely basic to the desired ends since it is through science, invention, technology applied to them that the full fruition of social planning may be achieved. This is the field of technological resources. Here, too, is the answer to the question as to what to do with science and technology and how to do it. Here is the answer to many of the questions of training for youth and widening the range of occupational opportunity. Here is part answer to our problem of

balancing the people with resources and skills in the places where they live.

*Human Resources.* This division of technological resources is equally important in the development of human resources. Technology is not only science, skill, invention, machines in the physical world but also organization, management, training, education, leadership in the cultural world. Just as technological resources applied to natural resources result in capital wealth or money resources essential to total development, so technological resources applied to human resources give us institutional wealth for the development of the people and for the enrichment and welfare of society. And in the modern world of great change the institutions of the home and family, the school and education, the community, the state and government, industry and work are needed more than ever to act as buffer between the individual and technology and to conserve the gains which society has made in its long road up to now.

*The Total American Picture.* An emphasis upon these several systematic arrangements for the classification and study of social problems is one way of trying to picture them vividly but also of showing how they are intimately related to the total American picture. Such emphasis also points up more clearly our arrangement in the text by which we feature in Part One, natural and cultural heritage; in Part Two, the people; in Part Three, the institutions of the people; and in Part Four, the testing grounds for the people. We may, however, go still further in making clear these elemental factors by rating trends and definitions, current studies and writings, and the increasing need for popular interpretations and realistic study.

*Problems of New Definitions.* The sweep of war and change, of postwar and planning programs, have reflected not only new series of problems, but new terms to be defined and old terms to be more accurately defined and contrasted with other terms commonly used too loosely. One way, therefore, of looking at the range and sweep of contemporary problems is to examine a catalog of words and concepts which reflect the total scene. Thus socialism and communism, fascism and nazism, have different meanings from what many of their earlier connotations indicated. Liberalism, radicalism, conservatism, fundamentalism, and many other terms have

acquired additional meanings and sometimes have been indices of new situations. In the earlier America the economic liberal was one who believed the government should have little or nothing to say about or do with the economic processes and practices of competition and freedom of work. This was the accurate meaning of liberalism. Now economic liberalism is often confused with political liberalism which insists that government shall have a great deal to do with business and industry. There has been also an increasing tendency to define the liberal person in terms of his belief in and his advocacy of certain specific principles and procedures with reference to race, labor, religion, sex, and there is also a sort of free-lance intellectual liberalism which seeks the contradictory ends of pure intellectual freedom set in the framework of coercive governmental social sharing of goods and responsibilities. Manifestly, the need to understand the broader meanings of liberalism coincides with a clear understanding of problems and issues involved.

*New Values in Americanisms.* The experiences of the United States in its recovery from a great depression, its participation in a global war and its powerful prospect for future leadership and prosperity give new meanings also to the term "American." It is a long cry from the earlier years of the century when Americans transferred to European countries as a symbol of escape with the consequent degradation of what was American. It is a far cry even from those whose superficial culture and intellectual selfishness led them to ridicule American culture in return for which they bought the cheaper substitute of outmoded European manners to the present time when that which is American affords the greatest hope of the world. On the other hand, the older "one hundred percent American" which was utilized as a symbol of isolationism and provincialism has been relegated to an almost forgotten past. Efforts to revive the doctrine of isolationism and "America First" will be constantly arising but for the most part they will be reminders of an outmoded doctrine quite inconsistent with the newer ideals of contemporary America.

*The Americas.* There is another way in which the changing meanings of the term "American" is symbolic of the changing profile of contemporary problems. This is in the new connotation implied in "The Americas," in which to the south of us are the South American republics and to the north of us a Canadian prov-

ince allegedly capable of absorbing twenty million more people. The "good neighbor policy" adopted by the United States assumes not only friendly relations, but diplomatic implications of American unity. Thus the term America, which had come to be the synonym of the United States of North America, has many added meanings as when, for instance, a volume entitled *America, South* would mean anything but the southern United States.

*New Worlds to Study.* These changing usages clearly indicate the changing range and nature of American problems in the modern world. And so many other terms, new and old, become symbolic of problems as their multiple meanings keep pace with the changing nature of situations. There were new terms that grew out of World War II that clearly indicated new levels of problems and there were new characterizations of phenomena that grew out of the postwar planning and reconstruction, just as there were new occupations, new professional opportunities and new technological dilemmas challenging the best study and planning. The terms "global war" and "global democracy" reflect a powerful sweep of international dilemmas of organization, nationality, and race. Such terms as "lend-lease," "the four freedoms," and others like them suggested new problems and strategy during and after World War II. So in the domestic field the terms "Fair Practices," "WAVES," "WACS," "Quislings," and many others indicated levels of activities and problems that grew out of the war experiences. One way, therefore, of looking at the total framework of social problems is to set up a catalog of terms to be defined and to serve as a sort of "face sheet" or systematic arrangement of items to be explored. A catalog of four score such terms is presented on page 484.

*A Cross-List Puzzle of Books.* Another way of sensing both the total range and problems and to contrast some of the war and postwar developments with those of the prewar and depression periods is to note the range of books and studies seeking to keep pace with needs. Thus a cross-list puzzle of war and postwar titles of an emergency bookshelf may be compared with a similar face sheet of depression titles. The same procedure may be followed in noting the expansion and the increasing catalog of titles in such series of popular interpretations as "Headline Books" or "Public Affairs Pamphlets" which tend to cover the field of urgent problems at any given cross section of the American scene.

## A CROSS TITLE PUZZLE OF DEPRESSION PROBLEMS AND DILEMMAS

### Samplings of the Emergency Book Shelf on Contemporary Society

James Truslow Adams' *The Record of America, American Tragedy, The Epic of America*
E. L. Anderson's *We Americans*
Charles A. Beard's *The Idea of National Interest, America Faces the Future, The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy*
Mary E. Beard's *America Through Women's Eyes*
A. A. Berle Jr.'s *America's Recovery Program*
M. J. Bonn's *The American Adventure, The Crisis of Capitalism in America*
Struthers Burt's *Escape from America*
George S. Counts' *The American Road to Culture, The Prospects of American Democracy*
Samuel Crowther's *America Self-Contained*
Marion Cuthbert's *We Sing America*
Paul H. Douglas' *Social Security in the United States*
Abraham Epstein's *Insecurity. A Challenge to America*
G. Frank's *America's Hour of Decision, Thunder and Dawn*
Lucy Lockwood Hazard's *In Search of America*
Edwin C. Hill's *The American Scene*
Frank E. Hill's *What is American?*
E. M. Hugh-Jones and E. A. Radice's *An American Experiment*
Lucien Lehman's *The American Illusion*
John McConaughy's *Who Rules America?*
Alexander Meiklejohn's *What Does America Mean?*
William A. Orton's *America in Search of Culture*
Guy V. Price's *Optimistic America*
Fred J. Ringel's *America As Americans See It*
Eleanor Roosevelt's *It's Up to the Women*
Franklin D. Roosevelt's *On Our Way, Looking Forward*
B. Schrieke's *Alien Americans*
Charles Morrow Wilson's *Roots of America*

Sir Norman Angell's *From Chaos to Control*
Elizabeth Faulkner Baker's *Displacement of Men by Machines*
Harry E. Barnes' *Can Man Be Civilized?*
Charles A. Beard's *Toward Civilization, Whither Mankind*
N. A. Berdyaev's *End of Our Time*
O. F. Boucke's *Laissez-Faire and After*
Collin Brooks' *Our Present Discontents*
Nicholas Murray Butler's *Between Two Worlds*
G. D. H. Cole's *A Guide Through World Chaos*
Lewis Corey's *Crisis of the Middle Class*
John Drinkwater's *This Troubled World*
R. T. Ely and F. Bohn's *The Great Change*
Henry Pratt Fairchild's *This Way Out*
Samuel S. Fels' *This Changing World, As I See Its Trend and Purpose*
S. Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents*
José Ortega y Gasset's *The Revolt of the Masses*
Mauritz Hallgren's *Seeds of Revolt*

Leo Hausleiter's *Machine Unchained*
K. Jaspers' *Man in the Modern Age*
Harold Loeb's *Life in a Technocracy*
Gina Lombroso's *The Tragedies of Progress*
Frederick E. Lumley's *The Propaganda Menace*
E. D. Martin's *Conflict of the Individual and the Mass in the Modern World, Liberty*
William McDougall's *World Chaos*
L. Mumford's *Technics and Civilization*
H. A Overstreet's *We Move in New Directions*
Harold Rugg's *The Great Technology*
Sir Arthur Salter's *The Framework of an Ordered Society*
Howard Scott's *Introduction to Technocracy*
Hugo Simon's *Revolution Whither Bound*
George Soule's *The Future of Liberty*
J. W. N. Sullivan's *The Limitations of Science*
Norman Thomas' *Human Exploitation*
Freeman Tilden's *A World in Debt*

Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner C. Means' *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*
Sir William Beveridge's *Planning Under Socialism*
Basil P. Blackett's *Planned Money*
C. Delisle Burns' *Challenge to Democracy*
Stuart Chase's *Rich Land, Poor Land*
G. D. H. Cole's *Economic Planning*
Raoul E. Desvernine's *Democratic Despotism*
C. H. Douglas' *Social Credit*
Fred Henderson's *The Economic Consequences of Power Production*
John W. Herring's *Social Planning and Adult Education*
Harry L. Hopkins' *Spending to Save*
F. Cyril James' *The Road to Revival*
Benson Y. Landis' *Must the Nation Plan?*
Maurice Leven, Harold G. Moulton, and Clark Warburton's *America's Capacity to Consume*
Ernest K. Lindley's *The Roosevelt Revolution*
Leverett S. Lyon's *The National Recovery Administration*
Lillian J. Martin and Clare deGruchy's *Salvaging Old Age*
Henry S. McKee's *Degenerate Democracy*
Edward S. Mead and Bernhard Ostrolenk's *Voluntary Allotment*
E. J. Strachey's *Menace of Fascism*
Sydney Strong's *The Rise of American Democracy*
Mary Van Kleeck and Mary L. Fledderus' *On Economic Planning*
William Kay Wallace's *Our Obsolete Constitution*

Merle Curti's *Peace or War*
G. Ferrero's *Peace and War*
Bruce Winton Knight's *How to Run a War*
B. Nichols' *Cry Havoc!*
H. Norton's *Back of War*
A. Porritt's *The Causes of War*

*New Problems and Old.* A preview, therefore, to the study of contemporary social problems will provide for approaches from the contemporary, up-to-the-minute catalog of problems and situations that arise from day to day. These then may be checked with the special units of recent American periods which we have studied especially as American dilemmas of depression days and the prewar period. Yet the most important and dynamic of all our problems are those that overlap the several periods as a sort of constant in a world of variables, such as problems of institutions and human relationships of everyday life. Some are so new and so current and fugitive as to be problems of yet unknown nature and direction. In all these the student looks at America in terms of symbolic mile posts. "So came America to the depression days"; "so came America to Pearl Harbor"; "so came America to the European invasion"; "so came America to V-day." And so came peace when there was no peace; world organization when there was confusion; a new world which had a way of following old human nature.

*Always, What of America?* One way of appraising the composite nature of old and new problems was illustrated in the almost universal demand of Americans in the war service that America be preserved and made even more in the image of the liberty upon which she had been founded. Ten million young Americans, in temporary exile, could see in fine perspective what America had been and what they wanted it to be. And they sensed accurately and intensely the nature of certain elementary problems which they wanted solved. To work with freedom, to have security with family and community life; to have reality and honesty in their institutions and dealings with men; to participate in the new world of better education, of better science, and technology, and of better ways to live happily—all these were measures not only of new dreams, but of the reality of American life and problems.

# BOOK I

# THE AMERICAN PICTURE

## *Chapter I*

# *THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE*

This book attempts to answer many of the questions which are being asked alike by student and citizen concerning the dilemmas of modern society. It will seek to review the chief social problems of contemporary America and to give a more comprehensive picture and a clearer understanding of their meanings than have ordinarily been attempted. And it assumes, in general terms, that no one can be found in the broad reaches of the land who is not vitally interested in the problems of the new American epoch; no one who does not want to know what has happened; and no one who does not want to see further behind the scenes, if perchance he may learn something of what is going to happen.

Now this almost universal eagerness to know more about the modern scene is of many sorts even as it is reflected through many people. It may be the persistent interest of the scientist seeking to know the answers to his questions or the solution to his problem. It may be the high purpose of those who seek to come to practical grips with the living realities of the modern world. It may be primarily the keen interest of those who seek the answers to intellectual problems in terms of human values, or of those who strive merely to keep abreast of the times. Or, again, the study of problems may be motivated by a more specialized interest of the citizen, the statesman, or the social worker. Or the American scene may be viewed by historian or dramatist or man of letters seeking to chronicle the swift-changing scenes in America's most stupendous drama—the moving inventory of a powerful nation rebuilding its fortunes and reconstructing its own place in the changing world of nations. But whatever the name and nature of the groups and of their interests, questions must be asked and they must somehow be answered; dilemmas must be catalogued, and they must somehow be understood and attacked.

If we begin our treatise by saying that there is being enacted today the most momentous drama of survival-struggle that has yet

tested the enduring qualities of American civilization, this is one way of emphasizing vividly and forcefully the importance of understanding American problems and of sensing the need for mastery of the physical, technical, and societal forces that sweep down upon us in the changing times of today and tomorrow. It is also one way of saying that the American people, both in their own right and as leaders in modern civilization, are face to face with extraordinary opportunities. Rarely, if ever, has there been challenge to youth, to students, and to leaders for such high purpose and creative work as at the present time.

If we continue by pointing out the fact that it is possible to catalogue a long and distinguished list of authorities who agree that the present is a time of crisis and dilemma in which civilization itself is at stake and in which democratic institutions are endangered, this is one way of saying that we approach the study of our American problems through a background and setting of a world peculiarly conscious of tension and struggle. It is also one way of pointing to the relative unanimity of many judgments as to what is of chief concern to the people and their institutions today.

Or, again, if we review the vast literature of recent years and find there, in philosophy, in religion, in science, in education, in public affairs, in fiction, and in drama, overwhelming emphasis upon matters of social concern, this is one way of recognizing the fact that the people are becoming more articulate in the discussion of their situations. If in this literature we find an increasing tendency toward realistic facing of facts and the attempt to see our civilization in all its interrelationships between and among physical and cultural factors, natural resources and human resources, technology and change, this is one way of emphasizing both the reality of the situation and the hopeful outlook. And if we note further that this facing of reality is a part not only of the scientific outlook but is essential to the satisfying of the human mind and spirit, this is one way of saying that this major emphasis upon our problems is not misplaced either in the student world or in the world of workaday adjustments and processes.

If, however, we point out also the confusion which comes from hundreds of sure-fire "cures" and quick single-track solutions proposed for problems which confront a troubled world, this is one way of emphasizing the complexity of the situation, the contradic-

tions in suggested remedies, the inherent dangers in mass emotional action, and the need for realistic and scientific study of all problems in their physical and historical backgrounds as well as in their current setting.

If, then, we point out still further the fact that it is not possible to escape this new reality of facing these situations and that the new generation must face them either with or without facts, poise and equipment, it is easy to sense the need and the drama of a new dynamic study, research, and planning.

And if we go yet one step further and report that never before perhaps were student and common man alike asking so many searching and difficult questions, with apparent eagerness to help find the answers, this is one way again of indicating the promise of the future and of emphasizing the need and the timeliness for new and vivid ways of searching for the truth and of interpreting and presenting the findings to the public.

Now because of the extraordinary sweep and emergency of modern dilemmas, it is more important than ever to understand more than we have known before. To this end it is essential that our quest for understanding shall be based upon realistic scientific inquiries and that both the scope and the methods of our study shall be adequate. This means that we must not only picture our problems upon the backgrounds of world society, but also focus upon American social problems as the living laboratory of our study. We must also keep continuously in mind that dependable knowledge and enduring plans must be based upon facts and upon the effective interpretation and utilization of these facts. We, therefore, have our "scientific" problems to discover what the truth is and our "ameliorative" problems to do something about it, in realistic perspective to all parts of society. This means further that our problems all have their long-time background growing out of the historical development of the people and their society, and it means that America has emergency problems of the here and now which clamor for immediate social adjustment. It is in this sense that we shall find in American social problems not only the framework for important adjustments in the present era, but also the basis for understanding the problems of society everywhere. We shall, however, postpone for a separate chapter in Book II the presentation of the many technical meanings of scientific, ameliorative,

social, and societal problems, in order that we may come at once to the picture of the principal social problems which confront the American people in the late 1930's.

Now manifestly our American picture will reflect two sorts of problems, the one tending to feature broad, general organic problems and the other, the long catalogue of more concrete situations and specific problems of adjustment. Yet there need be no conflict between our efforts to make our study rigorously scientific and the desire of a contemporary "Walter Quest," whose survey of America gave him a feeling that in a land like this we've got something worth fighting for '. . . in a land as full of differences in race and creed and geography and thought as this there must be a future . . . in spite of all the misery and hunger and brutality we need to be ashamed of, the dream that started it all isn't dead. It's still the great reality of our land and our people.'[1]

This American basis for the study of modern problems is one which is constantly being emphasized in the new discussions in the field of education and public policy. But again and again, we learn that the American picture is of many sorts and all our problems are so inseparably interrelated that we must see the whole picture in order to work intelligently on any problem. Consider William Allen White's review of Louis Adamic's *My America: 1928-1938,* in which he praises the author for "rendering a balanced judgment." Thus, 'in his America, he takes account of the unrest of labor. He has set down the real and cruel grievances of the underprivileged. He has a keen sense of the inertia of the middle class and of middle-class idealism and unconscious middle-class class-consciousness. He knows the roadside American, the girl at the lunch counter, the filling station boy who wipes your windshield and hopes next year to own a filling station down the road. And he knows the labor agitator and the labor dynamiter, and the boss's spy. You also meet the boss, who is harried, tempted, rather mean, sometimes gentle, occasionally, even generally decent according to his lights and standards. Here in these pages one sees the mill town and the mining town; and the little country town with elm-shaded trees and wide lawns where a good two-fifths of our population live; the towns between five hundred and fifty thousand, the homes and fortresses of the middle class. And one sees also here in these pages, the great magnificent cities, the wide har-

bors with gull-like ships and the rich black plowing land of the farms, and the desert with swirling dust. . . .'[2]

There is another way of looking at American problems in the large, in which we may group them into four main categories. The first is the problem of developing, conserving, and adapting the people and their resources to the living geography of the American continent. This is a basic Americanism of work and planning. A second problem is that of conserving liberty and freedom within the framework of American civilization. This is also a basic Americanism. A third problem is the struggle of universal culture seeking to achieve enduring civilization in harmony with both technology and natural heritage. The fourth problem, then, is essentially one of progress in the attainment of these ends in relation to the world outlook of the present and in particular the titanic struggle between the democratic process and certain of the European trends toward totalitarianism.

Thus, it sometimes seems true that within recent years the tide and tempo of modern life may have changed so rapidly that our specific social problems tend to be submerged in certain fundamental societal and world issues, so colossal as to require more of our science and energy to study them than we have yet utilized. Consider, for instance, "two worlds in conflict" in which 'the gulf between the two conceptions of life is indeed deep and wide. Here, not absolute freedom certainly but great and precious freedom—freedom to think, to believe, to disbelieve, to speak, to will, to choose. There, not some freedom, but none—nothing but obeisance, body, mind and soul, before the iron will and upstretched arm of a restless, infallible master. . . . On the one side are nations which assume that human beings have individual minds, wills and aspirations, and that this is the fact which differentiates them from other animals; that they have capacities for self-improvement, even if very slowly; and that they should be allowed to use their minds, exercise their wills, and manage their own affairs as a means of learning how to do all these things better. . . . On the other side are nations which have never fully accepted the democratic conception of human progress, or which have discarded it because that sort of progress is aggravatingly slow and undramatic. The people in these states are living according to the rules of definitive systems revealed to infallible men or groups of men, im-

posed and enforced by decrees and bullets, and considered permanently immune to criticism, first because infallible men do not need criticism, secondly—and more simply—because they will not tolerate it. . . .'[8]

In the long run, of course, we must keep emphasizing the fact that we have only two great basic resources for society, and these are natural resources and human resources. In this book we shall discuss first the natural wealth as basic to our total picture. The people, however, are eternally both the creators and the creatures of all this wealth. They are alike the hope and the despair of society, so that we must come always to inquire as realistically as possible how the people may be adjusted to their environment and how again the environment may be utilized for the best possible development of the people.

In the search for the best possible solutions of our problems, we have been accustomed more or less arbitrarily to subdivide these two great resources into five categories of wealth. The first three are focused upon the larger category of material resources, the *first* of which is *natural wealth,* such as land and water, minerals and oil, climate and situation, and all those other units of natural resources which we have discussed in our earlier chapters. The *second* type of wealth or resources may be termed *technological wealth,* which comprehends science, skills, invention, management, organization, and all that complex of a technological and machine age through which our natural wealth is translated into the *third* type of wealth, which is what the economists call *capital* or *artificial wealth.*

The second two of the five subdivisions are more nearly synonymous with what we termed human resources. That is, the *fourth* of our types is *human wealth,* while the *fifth* may be called *institutional wealth,* which is utilized for the development of our human wealth and in many respects is a product of the utilization of the other four types, but which also is supreme in the development of our human resources.

If we wish to see how these types of resources or wealth are related to our problems in actual society we may illustrate with specific cases. Thus, a society or a nation or region which is rich in natural wealth but poor in the skills, knowledge, and technology

(upper) *Photo by Wide World Photos*
(lower) *Photo by Farm Security Administrati*

Which way is forward in the search for parity, equilibrium, an balance between these two great Americas, urban and rural, Ea



*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

There are great white mansions on hilltops among the trees, and there are unpainted houses perched on pillars along hillside gullies or lowland marshes.



for developing and utilizing these resources will likely be poor in capital wealth and, therefore, limited in capacity to support the institutions necessary for a high type of civilization. Two illustrations are often used. One is the culture of China or at least selected regions of this great geographic empire in contrast to the United States. The assumption is that if China's great natural wealth were fully utilized, the nation would be able to afford higher standards of living, of health, of work and wages. The other example is that of the southern regions of the United States, in which it is assumed that if the South would develop and conserve its resources through skills and technology it could afford capital for the development of its institutions and through them for the richer development of the people. At the present time, the South is a region of great potential abundance, but in actuality it is a land of deficiencies and scarcity. It excels in the two great resources of natural and human wealth, but lags in the other three, namely, skills, capital, and institutional wealth. It is clear, therefore, why we shall place so much importance upon the physical backgrounds and upon technology, both mechanical and social, since the proper application of adequate techniques and tools may enable a people to excel in all five types of wealth and, therefore, to embody the fundamentals of a rich civilization.

A realistic portraiture of American social problems will, therefore, reflect a background of these two great physical and cultural resources involving both complex factors and interrelationships between and among the several types of resources. Thus, problems of work and unemployment, of poverty and wealth, of race and regions are never simple problems but rather the visible ends of the stirrings of a virile people in contact and conflict with all their resources and arrangements. This is peculiarly true of the American scene set in a world of complex interrelationships. We shall therefore first give a sort of sweeping picture of the contemporary American scene picturing the way of a wealthy nation in the modern world, and then catalogue and discuss the many detailed problems inherent in this aggregate picture. Some of these specific problems we shall present in the several chapters, attempting to paint them with broad strokes of the brush and then in Book II of our more specific "The Search for the Answers" we shall make

available ample references and the more conventional teaching methods of question and answer. But first of all we must sense the drama of the contemporary scene.

Now, about this contemporary picture we must present facts that are fresh, new and vital. Yet we must not write or speak with finality about events until, in one way or another, we can look at them as complete or as past and so utilize the historian's tense. It thus comes to pass that our portraiture will often be presented in the past tense, often little more than the historical present tense and often mingled with the living reality of the scene but in general referring to the first third of the twentieth century in which the 1933-35 period may appear as the end of an epoch basic to our study of American social problems.

Now looking at the facts in this scientific-historical perspective it seems possible to conclude that about this civilization of the first third of the twentieth century there appeared to be almost universal agreement in most of the main products and trends. Yet prevailing characterization and pictures of these times, often profound and brilliant, strangely enough somehow come to appear trite and commonplace. Perhaps this was due largely to their multiplication and constant repetition. Perhaps there was such stark realism, such profound depths and range of change and revolution that the common language was inadequate. At best the characterizations sounded mechanical and hopelessly inadequate. It was an age of science. Yes, that was true. It was an age of technology. That was true, too. It was a machine age. That was a commonplace. The social sciences had not developed apace with the physical sciences. There was no one to contest this.

Again, the picture reflected a nation in which scientific discovery and mechanical invention had far outstripped the capacity of men to keep up with their speed. That meant that social invention and social technology were not commensurate with the other technology of the age. This meant, further, that society was inevitably out of gear, and that something had to be done about it. Pictures and pictures of all the great scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions and the innumerable problems of adjustment which they had left upon the doorsteps of society. For every major invention—radio, automobile, bio-chemical discovery—there were corresponding social and moral dilemmas and innumerable practical readjust-

ments to be made. These must surely be taken care of. Pictures of the acceleration of technology through invested capital's utilization and exploitation of inventions and discoveries reflected, therefore, a new and sweeping technology unprecedented in the annals of nations. That had become a commonplace statement, too. Civilization, so the characterizations continued, was top-heavy with science; science was lopsided with technology; technology was a runaway. Sometimes the characterizations took the form of evaluations. It was a case of mastery of machines over men. The future of the spirit was threatened by the slavery of the machine. Current civilization had succeeded more in the realm of material progress than in the realm of human affairs. The foundations of humanity were made to quake by the pulsating giants of power and energy and harnessing techniques. Yet the burden of these characterizations appeared always to be that of searching inquiry and of reasonable expectation of correcting this deficiency in human science: "Can we become as efficient in our social experimenting as we have already proven ourselves in scientific experimenting?"

These things were said in season and out, from press and pulpit, in school and forum, in books and in periodicals, over the radio and through the cinema. Engineer and artist, publicist and politician, preacher and teacher, farmer and industrialist, rich man and poor, scholar and laborer, all "deplored" the trend and urged a greater devotion to the things of the spirit, to human development. It was, they agreed, as if there had been the greatest of success in the development of all the nation's resources, but that such success had somehow led the nation into its greatest crisis and its greatest mass tragedy. Something else, therefore, was needed, and this something the nation had not yet found. It was eagerly in search for it, eloquently proclaiming its will to pay whatever price was necessary.

In the earliest days of the nation there was faith in the divine destiny of the nation. The American people had been set apart for a peculiar leadership. Nothing could stop the United States. In subsequent decades political liberty and equality of opportunity were the *religio-poetae* of the nation. Later it was economic abundance, the elimination of poverty, the American standard of living. Once again it had been a sort of religion of public education. Education would free the nation from all handicaps. But the people

## A CROSS TITLE PUZZLE OF WAR AND POSTWAR PROBLEMS AND DILEMMAS

Samplings of a Continuing Emergency Bookshelf on Contemporary Society Since 1939

Charles Abrams' *Revolution in Land*
Brooks Adams' *The Law of Civilization and Decay*
Eugene T. Adams and Others' *The American Idea*
James Truslow Adams' *The American*
Franz Alexander's *Our Age of Unreason. A Study of the Irrational Forces in Social Life*
American Council on Public Affairs' *Regionalism and World Organization*
H. Dewey Anderson and Percy E. Davidson's *Occupational Trends in the United States*
Robert Cooley Angell's *The Integration of American Society*
Ruth Nanda Anshon's *Freedom. Its Meaning* and *Science and Man*
Benjamin Appel's *The People Talk*
Jacques Barzun's *Darwin, Marx, Wagner*
Carleton Beals' *American Earth*
Charles A. and Mary E. Beard's *America in Midpassage* and *The American Spirit*
Ruth Benedict's *Race. Science and Politics*
L. L. Bernard's *War and Its Causes*
Henri Bonnet's *World Organization Emerging from the War*
Richard M. Brickner's *Is Germany Incurable?*
Bernard Brodie's *Sea Power in the Machine Age*
Earl Brown's *Why Race Riots?*
Stuart Gerry Brown's *We Hold These Truths*
Pearl S. Buck's *Of Men and Women*
Albert Carr's *Juggernaut: The Path of Dictatorship*
Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cockran's *War as a Social Institution*
Henry Hill Collins, Jr.'s *America's Own Refugees*
P. E. Corbett's *Post-War Worlds*
Darrell Haug Davis' *The Earth and Man. A Human Geography*
Anna de Koven's *Women in Cycles of Culture*
Paul de Kruif's *Health is Wealth*
Wallace R. Deuel's *People under Hitler*
Nicholas Doman's *The Coming Age of World Control*
Marshall Dunn and Lloyd N. Morrisett's *Wings for America*
James Fairgrieve's *Geography and World Power*
George B. Galloway and Associates' *Planning for America*
Lionel Gelber's *Peace by Power*
Ernest R. Groves' *The American Woman*
A. F. Gustafson and Others' *Conservation in the United States*
Sylvester John Hemleben's *Plans for World Peace Through Six Centuries*
Adolf Hitler's *My New Order*
Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson's *The Problems of Lasting Peace*
Preston E. James' *Latin America*
Frank J. Klingberg's *The Morning of America*
Clara Lambert's *I Sing America. A Pageant of the Regions*
Alexander Laing's *Way for America*
Harold J. Laski's *Faith, Reason and Civilization*
David E. Lillienthal's *TVA—Democracy on the March*
Alain Locke and Bernhard J. Stern's *When Peoples Meet*
Karl Loewenstein's *Hitler's Germany. The Nazi Background to War*
R. M. MacIver's *Leviathan and the People*
Karl Mannheim's *Diagnosis of Our Time* and *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*
André Maurois' *The Miracle of America*
Horst Mendershausen's *The Economics of War*
Lewis Mumford's *The Condition of Man*
Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*
Howard W. Odum's *Race and Rumors of Race*
Henry Bamford Parkes' *The World After War A Program for Post-War Planning*
George T Renner's *The Conservation of National Resources*
George Renner and Associates' *Global Geography*
Roy M Robbins' *Our Landed Heritage*
Nancy Wilson Ross' *Westward the Women*
Eliel Saarinen's *The City. Its Growth, Its Decay, Its Future*
Porter Sargent's *War and Education*
Carl T. Schmidt's *American Farmers in the World Crisis*
Walter Shepherd's *Science Marches On*
Henry E. Sigerist's *Medicine and Human Welfare*
P. A. Sorokin's *The Crisis of our Age* and *Man and Society in Calamity*
Henry William Spiegel's *The Economics of Total War*
Nicholas John Spykman's *America's Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power*
Jesse F. Steiner's *Behind the Japanese Mask*
Bernhard J Stern's *Society and Medical Progress*
Michael Straight's *Make This the Last War*
Robert Strausz-Hupe's *Geopolitics, the Struggle for Space and Power*
John Kenneth Turner's *Challenge to Karl Marx*
Herbert von Beckerath's *In Defense of the West*
Willard Waller's *War in the Twentieth Century*
Hans W. Weigert's *Generals and Geographers. The Twilight of Geopolitics*
Quincy Wright's *The Study of War*

had lost confidence in all of these as general social ideologies. There must be something more definite. There must surely be another great resource upon which the nation could draw for the successful integration of its gains. This thought was becoming more and more articulate in the popular and public press as well as in learned journals and periodicals, so that, paradoxically again there was evidence that the interlude might yet reflect such profound thought, such intense interest, and such dynamic study and action as had not yet been recorded in any of the other crises of civilization.

Yet, perhaps the first impression was one of a vast literature of disillusion, discontent, and satire. Here at least, however, were an approach to a realistic inquiry and the facing of unpleasant facts; also a roll call of many who saw primarily "the national movement of doubt" and a new low point in American history. They bore witness to "the most profound gloom and lack of courage" ever known in a nation "overcome by almost complete paralysis of will." Catalogue of trenchant phrases and titles, "omnibus of a barrage of vast and shallow literature" or of a new realism of dilemma, or liberal mixtures of both. The range of characterization was wide, from oft-echoed "breakdown of capitalism" to "a world gone mad." "A planless world" in the midst of "a babel of plans and schemes," "blind zeal in a whirlwind" of "habitual dumb practices" amidst the "dumb dilemmas of the dumb." There were "world crisis," the "crisis of the western spirit," "the most critical year in the history of modern civilization," "a challenge to the social order." It was also "a world crowded with stupidities, cruelties and follies," "a world rooted in confusion," "a complex and unprecedented situation" full of ugly and illogical dilemmas "shaking the pillars of society" and with "catastrophe binding society in its spell." There was "collapse of values," "institutional compatibility," "the crash of gold," "an industrial world out of gear," with America designated as "the Home of Frenzy" and "a conference-ridden country." Yet there were abundant characterizations more optimistic concerning "the enduring glories of the American ideal," "the American dream," the "living constitution," and the new society well planned and ordered through the New Deal and the "Roosevelt Revolution."

In the titles to the extraordinary number and nature of books

dealing with the American crisis and reconstruction there was to be found a considerable picture of the nation as it was, as it had grown through very recent years, and as it gave promise of being in the future. It was a new picture of a nation trying to inventory itself and its dilemmas and trying to find the way out. Here were samples of titles paraphrased to indicate the main questions of the day. Could man be civilized? What was American? Was democracy degenerate? Had men been replaced by machines? Which way was the road to recovery? What were the main recent social trends in America? What were the economic tendencies in the United States? What were the cause and cure of depressions? If we have recovered before, what was the road to recovery? What was to be the nature of the New Deal, of the new social order, of economic planning, of planned money? What was the nature of the Roosevelt Revolution, the N.R.A., the new party politics, the revolt of the masses, the American illusion? What was the nature of leisure in the modern world, life in a technocracy, the American experiment? Must we go to war? Must we plan? What are the hope of democracy, the dangers of Fascism, the doom of farmers? There were answers and answers in these and still other titles. The President of the United States and the President of Columbia University each presented to the public a volume entitled *Looking Forward.* There were others pointing toward world chaos, technocracy, civilization, the revolt of the masses, the conflict of individual and mass, and threescore more representative of the stirrings and ferment of the American people.

There was a continuous stream of books and articles dealing with the place of science in the modern world. There were *A Century of Progress, Science in the Changing World, The Degredation of Science, The Limitations of Science, A Guide through World Chaos, The Machine Unchained, America Self-Contained.* From these and multiple other viewpoints the American picture had reflected at every turn the extraordinary range and quality of scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions and the sweeping changes which their application had wrought upon the physical and social environment of mankind. If the first third of the twentieth century had been an era of science, its epochal quality had been reflected in the utilization of science through invested capital

and social organization to transform industry and living conditions. Physical science had gone forward by tremendous leaps and bounds; the measure of its use in accelerating the rate of modern life, in creating and applying mechanical technology to production, distribution and consumption, and in affecting the whole religious, intellectual, economic, and social life of the nation had been even more notable. All science had tended to become social in the complex ramifications of modern civilization.

We shall have much more to say about these things in our chapter on technology and change. Let us, therefore, turn logically to a more intimate picture of the more specific American scene as it evolves in the midst of contemporary events. For, again, it was nowhere difficult to portray the state of the nation in the early 1930's. The picture was everywhere eloquent not of a wealthy nation so much as of the plight of a wealthy nation bordering dangerously near disintegration and chaos. One-half of its more than thirty times the people of Jefferson's America was living on such meager subsistence as to make joking stock of the boosted American standard of living. Rich America was not providing for the basic necessities of its citizens. Yet in the picture somewhere were still billions of wealth, millions of units of subsistence and comfort and abundance. More than a fourth of the nation's total number of normally gainfully occupied workers were without work. Yet somewhere in the picture were nearly a million establishments equipped to employ millions while still other millions of unemployed awaited the call of great fields of occupations now woefully depleted. One-fourth of the nation's citizens were to all practical intents and purposes on "charity." Yet somewhere in the picture were billions of dollars of uncirculated money, billions of dollars of surplus wealth in the control of an extraordinarily small number of individuals and corporations in turn, in the current picture, impotent to use it or to let others use it. Nearly one-half of the farms of the nation, fruits of lifetime work, were ready for the auction hammer, yet somewhere in the nation were millions of people needing the buyable products of the farms and millions of capital available, under a different picture, for needed credit.

Every engineer and economist and technician assured the public that the nation's industries and machines and power and energy

were capable of producing three times the maximum output at the crest of the 1920's, ample for not only necessities but for comfort and convenience and leisure for a new American standard. Yet, not somewhere but everywhere, there was breakdown in distribution and consumption processes and standards. This was a motif that kept recurring again and again. Wasn't it possible, somehow, some way, some time to break this tragic deadlock between the giant forces of abundance and the insatiable demon of want? Millions of the nation's best citizens, broken from the unequal struggle, had laid down the burden of living in one way or another, many in "the only way out," in mournful numbers uncounted by any man. Millions of children, born and unborn, like the countless victims of war, awaited the crippling aftermath of this devastating peace-time crisis. Yet somewhere, everywhere, in the nation there had seemed to be new gains and new hopes for the vitality of the American people, promise of new highs in human wealth. And everywhere, anywhere, the nation seemed impotent, *was* impotent at least for the time being, to do aught save stand by and look helplessly on.

Yet this dramatic picture of American dilemmas must not be allowed to smokescreen those more specific technical problems, the solution of which will be necessary for any effective attack on our major maladjustments. For passing in swift review are taxation and governmental finance, banking and money, social insurance, the control and use of utilities, planned economic development of natural resources, the technique of public welfare administration, general governmental reorganization, cooperative enterprise, state and regional readjustment and planning. And still more intimately interwoven in the picture were the emergency problems of actual public relief, unemployment, farm relief, private debts and mortgages, public debts and balanced budgets—problems rushing the American people dizzily toward an era in which it could not protect its citizens in the decencies of adequate living and private property, could not give employment to its workers, could not insure the basic guarantees of any sort of Jeffersonian pursuit of happiness.

Other problems were pressing, such as the crisis in education, in which not only the whole structure and accomplishments of American education were endangered, but the problem of self-examination

and reconstruction on the part of schools and educators was critical. There were movements and movements, pictures and pictures of a changing educational system. So, too, the catalogue of special problems was a long one: crime and social pathology, urban and rural life, the family, children, mental hygiene, sex and morals, birth control, moving pictures and the problems of leisure time, health and sanitation, war and peace, problems of race and especially the Negro, epic and tragedy in one.

Then there were the problems of standards, of social values and social trends, the very existence and nature of which characterize the American picture. Was the trend to be toward continuing higher standards of living and culture, or backward to reduced salaries, lower wages, lower standards of consumption? Toward increased prices of commodities, increased cost of living, increased wages for the laboring man, but with decrease of salaries and income for the scholar and professional worker? Was the worker in the higher brackets to be added by the thousands to the unemployed in a "planned order" for reducing unemployment? Was the day of the independent, creative worker, with the sky and capacity the limit of his accomplishment, gone forever? Was there to be a levelling down of all status and occupations, the levelling to be a joint product of business captain and mass common man, both terribly in earnest, both ignorant of the implications and fundamentals involved? Was there to be a recrudescence of the worship of the dollar and of the material age, camouflaged through balanced budgets and the noble ideals of recovery? Was there to be a new nationalism under the guise of national planning and recovery, new imperialism and autocracy through federal concentration of power? Was there to be a new impulse toward new immigration to the nation, and what sort of people would inherit the nation in the future? Was there to be war again and failure of the nation in world conference?

There were many pictures which reflected long-time organic problems for which there was no immediate solution. Race relations, race differences, products of centuries of evolution, could not be prestoed into magic transformation over night, yet the nation must meet a thousand issues squarely. Nor could the nation breed out of its population in a generation all those who would squander the wealth of the nation in unscrupulous deeds. There were prob-

lems of human biology and the conservation and development of the fit and the greater problem of ascertaining who were the fit. There were problems of not only biological prepotency in the building of a greater race of people but of social prepotency in the building of a civilization which somehow could guarantee the survival qualities from one epoch to another. And there were the problems of conserving the folk values and folk strength and of working out institutional modes of behavior which would act as buffer between the folk and modern technology and bigness. What were the best ways out? Was there some adequate social technology which would become the science and planning so much needed?

Here, then, were the pictures of the new frontiers. They were, strangely, frontiers representing heights attained through great struggle and suffering with an unexpected mastery and a full measure of storm and flood and unseen forces. The new social frontier was the product of colossal achievements long sought. The nation had wrought too well what it set out to accomplish—with more will and purpose than design. The new frontier of democracy was no longer one where the primary obstacles to master were mountains and forests and rivers and storms, but frontiers of social complexity and action, of technical analysis and social planning. The nation's extraordinary natural resources in land, climate, minerals, energy, power, general geography still constituted its incomparable basic power in the first third of the twentieth century. Hand in hand with the empires of power and energy, domain of vast lands, woods and fields and nature's promise to the new era of work and leisure, went the still vaster riches in people and skill, machines and factories, and the incalculable promise of science and technology to the making of a democracy without gross inequalities, without poverty and the mass tragedy of accelerating maladjustment. Here was a frontier, so colossal, so stupendous in its possibilities, still retaining all the earlier resources and adding unbelievable new resources of people, of science, of skill, as to make joking stock of that vast host who complained that civilization had reached its limits. Yet the success of this reported great race between civilization and catastrophe would be continuously appearing in the picture as a race between the great forces and processes already described and the capacity of the new society to bridge

this chasm between the old Jeffersonian, unplanned democracy and the greater designed democracy of the New America.

Superachievement and mastery of physical frontiers—science, invention, and technology—having brought the nation to its present crest of achievement and crisis must be met by more superachievement and by social invention and technology for the mastery of the new social frontiers as the old technology mastered the physical frontiers. The great old Document of the Fathers, the political and economic Constitution of the United States, having brought the nation thus far, must be met now by a greater social constitution, built upon it but transcending it in reach and power and technical capacity to guarantee the enactment of its ideals. There was needed more than merely ideals and philosophies, superimposed; there was needed more than the architect's fine picture of the elevation of the new society. The blueprints of social progress, of the new and greater democracy, must be based upon specifications that fit, based upon facts, gearing together the essentials of the planned and well-ordered society of the future. No architect's mere elevation ever built a structure or fabricated a community. Rather it was the blueprint, a product of long study and hard work, every fact matching other facts, every beam fitting into its place, every room properly designed to match the whole. The specifications must work, the facts must be adequate, the interrelations must be complete, the design must be of master proportions, utilizing the best of ideals, art, and technology.

On the brighter side of the picture it seemed clear that there was fair recognition of the challenge of mastery and the heroic spirit of America clamoring for a way out. There was faith in the future, and there were purpose and will. There was the new adventure of planning, the challenge to produce this master blueprint of social progress, scientifically and technically fabricated from the new social architect's elevation of the planned society, building a civilization of security, permanence, work, abundance, leisure. If the nation had undoubtedly made such tremendous strides in the attainment of the ends which its people set out to achieve and if it had made such progress in the objectives which reflected the genius and purpose of the nation, wherein was the measure of failures? The conclusion seemed everywhere apparent that the essential problem and weakness of the national culture and organi-

## A SAMPLE CATALOGUE OF AMERICANISMS

All this clatter of class and class hate should end. . . . This is a classless country. If we hold to our unique American ideal of equal opportunity there can never be classes or masses in our country. . . . There is no employing class, no working class, no farming class.—Herbert Hoover, quoted in Wilbur and Hyde, *The Hoover Policies,* page 33.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, . . . not only the leader of the people of America boldly groping for a way out of economic depression but also the leader of the people of the world valiantly hoping for a way forward from democratic retreat and international despair. Through your leadership the voice and ideals of America are counting on the side of oppressed minorities and disinherited majorities. The America for which you gallantly speak, inclusive of factions and parties, stands for the freedom of open and wide discussion of all issues and a fair hearing to all sides; for the ways of peace and democracy rather than of war and dictatorship; for a new hope to youth and a more equal educational opportunity to all children in all the states; for the right to honest work whether in private industry or on public works; for humane nationwide minimum standards of hours, wages and conditions of fair competition in justice to workers and business men; for money as the medium of exchange rather than as master of labor and enterprise: For the saving of our soils, minerals, forests, and waterpower; for the security of banks, farms, industries and homes; for farmers as equal partners in our economic society; for the advancement of American democracy by more equality of bargaining power through the organization of workers, the cooperation of farmers and information of consumers; for social security against old age, unemployment, sickness, and the hazards of modern society; for intelligent production as a way of abundance and decent consumption as a way of life; and for a more abundant distribution of the good life for all people in the eternal adventure toward the kingdom of God. In appreciation of the democratic faith and the humane hopes your American leadership gives to the people of the world in this time of crisis and bewilderment, the University of North Carolina, by the vote of the faculty and the trustees, confers upon you the degree of doctor of laws.—*Citation* of Franklin D. Roosevelt by Frank P. Graham, December 5, 1938.

The men who established this country took it for granted that the conduct of public affairs would always remain in the hands of an upper class. They envisaged an aristocracy whose members would be qualified by brains and character . . . but they unquestionably envisaged an aristocracy.—Gerald W. Johnson, "The American Way: The Two Fundamentals." *Harper's Magazine,* Vol. 176, page 489. April 1938.

One of the most marked characteristics of the American is his genius for voluntary cooperation. . . . The United States is the home of millions of volunteer organizations whose members work perpetually and cheerfully and for nothing.—Struthers Burt, *Escape from America,* pages 98-99.

It was not a handful of robber barons who were successful, but millions of immigrants who came with nearly nothing and lived to see their children prosperous; and millions of farmers who managed in spite of the railways to live reasonably well; and millions of shopkeepers. For them it would be unthinkable to live in America and not believe in Progress. . . .—Gilbert Seldes in *Mainland,* page 102.

There seems also to have grown among the Americans a craving for sensation. Always in a world of change, of extraordinary happenings, they have come with the Machine Age to put an unusual emphasis on the spectacular, the exciting, and even the criminal events of life. . . .—Frank Ernest Hill, *What Is American?,* page 164.

America has an ideal. It is Liberty. That is, I am sure, our deepest commitment. No one who reads our national literature, who listens to our daily speech, who mingles in the common course of our living, can fail to hear that note rising above all others in which we express ourselves. The man who fails to find in us a deep, consuming passion for freedom does not know what we are.—Alexander Meiklejohn, *What Does America Mean?,* page 71.

. . . the nation's love for sheer bigness is after all responsible for the accomplishment of many things of great interest. . . . Unfortunately this desire for and expression of "bigness"— . . . to which one cannot be indifferent—is limited to about one fourth of the population. Only the inhabitants of the cities know the fever and react to its stimulus.—Lucien Lehman, *The American Illusion,* page 56.

(Americans) display an extraordinary enthusiasm for education. They have created an educational system which in point of quantity and physical equipment is without parallel. They have made a heavier investment in education than any other society, past or present. . . .—William Aylott Orton, *America in Search of Culture,* page 265.

Disorder is not an American habit. Self-help and self-control are the essence of the American tradition—not of necessity the form of that tradition, but its spirit.—Franklin D. Roosevelt, *On Our Way,* page 208.

Probably nothing in the American national consciousness has been of more importance than this sense of the frontier, nor has there been any other strain of tradition that has so shaped our character both for good and for ill . . . because of the frontier the American achieved his predominant characteristic, the imperturbable belief that everything is possible.—Struthers Burt, *Escape from America,* pages 143-144.

zation were in the conflict of new demands and outworn ways and means; in the lack of coordination, of integration, of consolidation of the social gains of recent phenomenal achievements, and in the realization of a better-ordered society. If these were the chief national defects, the picture of the 1930's showed a nation setting itself to the requisite tasks of reconstruction; the mighty chorus of defeatists proclaiming civilization as ready for the rocks, would not continue to be popular for long. For just as in the past, the nation had achieved successfully those objectives for which it sought, so now there was ample evidence to indicate that it could achieve new objectives on the new frontiers if and when it set out to do so with the same measure of definiteness, purpose, skill, and spirit which had been applied to previous objectives. If the American people had allowed their physical achievements to outrun them, it was theirs to achieve the catching up. They could either "give up" and lose or "keep on" and win. Here, then, was the basis for the new American picture. Surely the United States was too young, too capable, and too full of abounding energy to give up the task of building the necessary bridges between the old Jeffersonian democracy and the greater expanded democracy of the new era.

We must, therefore, turn now from this sweeping realism of the American scene and its contemporary societal picture to the consideration of more concrete problems. And we may envisage these problems in a threefold framework or setting. We have often pointed out the fact that organically our problems all focus around the two great basic factors of natural resources and of human resources. Yet the background of each and the social organizations and institutions through which both types of resources are conserved, developed, and used, or are wasted, destroyed, and misused, are of the greatest importance. We shall, therefore, present our pictures and review our problems within the framework, first, of natural and cultural heritage, second, of the people, and, third, of the institutions and arrangements through which the people work. In the midst of these and beyond them are the testing grounds of the people of tomorrow for the mastery of physical, technical, and cultural forces to the end that cultural evolution shall not be retarded and that society may function more and more adequately in the new era. Here also are the testing grounds for

science and technology; for education and practical statesmanship; for drama and living literature of men and land, of rivers and forests, of minerals and mines, and of the ever restless and resistless tides of people, old and young, male and female, white and black, brown and yellow, workers and drones—the stuff that society is made of, the substance of democracy. In all these realisms we shall be asking what the answers are in terms of the facts, of what the facts mean, of what we are going to do about the facts, and in terms of what will happen if and when we do something about the facts! The answers, therefore, will be in terms of approximations through multiple approaches, as comprehensive as society, as realistic as living people, as enduring as nature. And we begin our quest with the study of the physical backgrounds and resources of the earth upon which man lives.

# PART ONE

## NATURAL AND CULTURAL HERITAGE

### Chapter II

### GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUNDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES

OF ALL the stories of man's adventures on this earth none appears more dramatic and powerful than his struggle with land and climate, with mountains and rivers, with situation and resources, together with the resulting social arrangements which he has made for himself in his heroic attempts both to ameliorate his societal environment and to explain his long road up. It is a long story, sometimes tedious in the telling; sometimes, like a mighty river sweeping on, now deep and swift, now wide and turbulent in floodtide, now disappearing beneath the earth again in perpetual life-giving waters. It is a long way from the slow journeying of mankind toward all his earlier cultures to the swift-moving drama of western civilization; from the primitive fear of nature and the all-explaining magic to the modern mastery of nature through a new mechanistic order of technology. Yet the story is all there for the telling, as vivid as life, as comprehensive as the world of men and geography, as powerful and dramatic as the struggle to live and to conquer.

Inherent in this story of man and his physical environment is the societal problem of man's adjustment to his habitat and resources and the consequent conditioning of his cultures and his later civilization. All along the way there has been the perpetual "problem" of adjustment and adaptation. It is as ancient as man and it is as modern as technology. It is universal in its timeliness, and such a societal problem underlies both the scientific theories of society and the practical direction of institutions. We shall, therefore, examine

first something of the nature of this societal problem of man's physical backgrounds and then turn to the inventory of our American resources and the emerging social problems involved in land, water, minerals, forests, resources, power, as they relate to the American situation.

This societal problem of man in his relation to his environment has appeared so fundamental that many theorists have made it the central theme of their study. The range of emphasis has varied from the theme of man's love of the land to the assumption that only through the equitable adjustment of the world's population to its natural resources is it possible to attain a high civilization well balanced with human welfare. In between are the many theories relating to the environmental basis of society and of education. So, too, within recent years many factors, such as technology, transportation and communication, world tensions and nationalism, together with great population movements and conservation programs, have accentuated both the importance and timeliness of a re-examination of the social problems involved in nature.

Stuart Chase's *Rich Land, Poor Land,* the documentary moving pictures of "The Plow that Broke the Plains," "The River," and other American testimony to the reality of land are contemporary reminders of the eternal foundations of society inherent in land, long a subject of theoretical study by social scientists. Sumner and Keller, in their voluminous studies of society, make the "man-land" ratio a fundamental basis for their *Science of Society.* This was prophetic of many a problem of migration and mobility whether of whole peoples or of farm tenants and frontiersmen. The LePlay school in England, later developed by Patrick Geddes into the regional survey movement, featured the three elemental factors of place, work, folk as basic to the ongoings of society. The increasing emphasis now being placed upon human ecology owes its great importance to this problem of cultural achievement in harmony with natural heritage. The new regionalism, too, as a theory of cultural situations, is based upon and finds its basic theoretical importance in the fundamental considerations that all societies evolve from the region outward into larger groups and are conditioned by the circumstantial pressure of nature and the societal pressures exerted by the culture of the region.

Indeed one way to indicate the societal nature of this problem of

*Photos by Farm Security Administ*

Waste of land, waste of men. Poor land, poor men. Which wa
forward, land for foxes and briars or land for men?






Two great purposes emerging from the depression: To conserve, develop, and use more wisely *both* our natural and our human wealth for the benefit of the country as a whole.



the relation of man to his physical environment is to give, in simplified terms, the ecologist's viewpoint, which is that culture in its richest development is not likely to be attained except in harmony with man's natural heritage. The ecologist's viewpoint, originally worked out through the study of animal and plant life in relation to soil and climate, has been broadened to apply to human society. Modern developments, the waste and exploitation of natural resources, and the struggles for expansion of those nations which have limited land and resources all tend to re-emphasize the importance of this problem of land and men in realistic balance. And, in addition to being a societal problem of universal application and of long standing, it is susceptible of quite concrete illustration in the modern scene, such that the problems of the Dust Bowl or the eroded hills of Appalachian America would be a fair sample.

In substance, the ecologist's problem is one of adaptation and mastery. Ecology is the science which studies the relation of organisms—plants and animals—to their environment. That is, it is the study of plants and animals as they exist or survive or perish in their natural homes. Where climate and soil are favorable, plants cover the ground, provide food for animals, and thus provide the framework for the study of living populations of the earth. Thus, if applied to human society, the problem becomes one not only of adaptation but of planned utilization of natural resources and of mastery of geographic factors. Thus, ecology joins with geography in the study of distribution of animals, of men, and of resources.

The ecologist goes at the study of his problems of adjustment to environment by analyzing his subject into such subdivisions and concepts as to enable him to make it a science. He divides his areas into major divisions, or "biomes," in which the highest type of vegetation is accompanied by the highest type of animal life. Climaxes are described to denote the great influence of climate as well as of soil. Then, there are what the ecologists call "successions," which represent the environment plus the time quality. The ecologist, by working out his classifications, is able, let us say, to divide the United States into ten major regions.

(1.) The deciduous forest, including most of Eastern United States. Man is considered a deciduous forest animal since it is in these regions that he reaches highest development not only in North

America but in Europe and Asia. The fact that he is such is shown when he takes trees with him when he settles the prairies. 2. The grasslands, the area generally known as the Great Plains. Here the climax is grass. This biome, like the deciduous forest, is subdivided into smaller associations as "tall grass prairie," "mixed prairie," "short grass prairie," and "bunch grass prairie." This is the area which is now most disturbed by man by plowing and overgrazing with in some regions disastrous results. The study of ecology clearly shows that the short grass country should never have been plowed and should be only grazed sparingly. This is the basis for regional planning that needs to be done. 3. Northern Coniferous forest, including the Northern United States and Canada. This is "the north country" region of cold climate, evergreen spruces, pines, firs, etc., and heavy snowfall. 4. Montane or Mountain Coniferous forest of the high mountains of the West. 5. Coast Coniferous forest, a very humid region on the West Coast characterized by magnificent plant growth, such as the redwoods. 6. The tundra and alpine meadows, which include Arctic grasslands, northern Canada and Alaska, and tops of high mountains. 7. Pine-Juniper, low altitude forest area of Southwest. 8. Chaparral or region of winter rain in southern California. 9. Sage brush plains or cool desert in Nevada and adjacent states. 10. The desert, including southern Arizona and California. The desert plants of 9 and 10 have spread into much of the original grasslands because of overgrazing by cattle.[1]

From the above it is easy to see the importance of *human* ecology which interprets men and institutions in terms of their relation to the living environment. It is easy to catalogue many economic problems in relation to crops; conservation and waste problems in relation to the soil and Dust Bowl; problems of abundance and scarcity in plant and animal production; problems of disease and adaptation to climatic areas; and many others. And while the chief emphasis here is upon the societal or theoretical backgrounds, it is easy for the keen student to sense the very practical significance of ecology to our own American problems today. Such an understanding will help him to see solutions on the long-time basis.

Similar in some respects, but more general in its application, is the geographer's interpretation of history and culture within the

historic period of man's development as being profoundly affected by climate, topography, soil, rainfall, drainage, and the other physiographic factors. For the purposes of this chapter it is only necessary to indicate the range and nature of the problem. Thus the geographers point out that the great civilizations have developed around the conditioning influences of climate, or rich land, or river valleys, or situation or water fronts. Some geographers and historians ascribe climate as the chief determining factor, such that temperate and colder climates are reputed to provide the greater reaches of civilization. These authorities and their theories may be studied from the full-page presentation of their varied theories on an adjacent page in this chapter. The chief point here is to note that this has always been a major "problem" and continues to be one, greatly influenced by modern invention and technology.

The changing problem of adjustment and mastery may also be illustrated by examining the general requirements for a high type of civilization, namely, favorable climate, good soil, and accessibility. The climate and the land must include temperature and moisture, soil and situation, to which must be added abundance of sunshine and winds and growing seasons. To these potential resources of abundance must be added, of course, minerals and power, two other great blocks of resources essential to the flowering of a culture of the first order. It is easily observed that modern science, invention, technology will vary the importance of these. Thus, Miami and Los Angeles in the United States are examples of very prosperous and populous centers, once considered unsuited to civilization because of climatic factors which now constitute their chief assets. So in the desert areas the great reservoir dams being constructed make possible the utilization of desert lands through irrigation and add recreational features besides, so that the problem of adjustment to environment is to that extent solved through science and engineering. Thus, it may be said, in some respects, that climate and distance constitute a less important controlling factor than originally. By the same token, however, because of the new uses of science and technology, the role of natural resources assumes an increasingly larger place, and through competitive processes the geographic factors continue to be of major importance.

## BASING INQUIRIES INTO SOCIAL SITUATIONS UPON THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

People do not make continents; continents make a people. The age-long strength of Russia is due to her latitude, climate, resources and sweep. The strength of England is due to her position in the sea. The strength of our nation is due to the continent of North America. It has molded us, nourished us, fed its abundant vitality into our veins. We are its children, lost and homeless without its strong arms about us. Shall we destroy it?—Stuart Chase, *Rich Land, Poor Land*, p. 350.

Because the sustentation field both constrains and stimulates us, it thus furnishes us with our energies as well as drains us of them It drives us and it depletes us. Thus we have to consider all of these things in relation to the population, its size and number and distribution and its kind, and the food which it needs and must have, and the natural regions in which it must live. This circumstantial pressure involves the whole of organic society· structure, function, history, multiplicity, variety and distribution of organisms, their segregation and the whole process of evolution, and all kinds of circumstantial pressure which proceed from organic phenomena — Franklin H. Giddings, *Civilization and Society*, p. 64.

Man alone among life forms applies a mind to the frustration or adaptation of the natural forces of his environment and is less obviously distributed in a logical way. Yet for all his independence and ingenuity he can never wholly escape from his environment. . . . If man accepted his physical environment as plants and animals do, he would be living to the same degree on the plane of physical determinism. It is his peculiar power among living things to understand and thus frustrate or deflect or modify a number of the forces about him. . . . It is also commonly recognized that wherever man enters the scene he immediately alters the natural landscape, not in a haphazard way but according to the culture system which he brings with him, his house groupings, tools, and ways of satisfying needs. Mankind has specific forms of exploitation of resources. . . . The cultural landscape is fashioned out of a natural landscape by a cultural group. Culture is the agent, the natural area is the medium, the cultural landscape the result.—Isaiah Bowman, *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences*, pp. 3, 26, 149-150.

Men live in groups, and every social group is attached to some place or region. Every such region affords a certain type of topography, a certain type of soil, certain mineral and metal resources, and a certain type of climate. These things constitute the physical environment of the group. To this environment the social group must adjust itself. . . . Man is constantly surmounting disadvantages of physical environment. Poor soil is overcome by the use of fertilizers; lack of rainfall by the introduction of irrigation works; handicaps of relief by the building of roads, tunnels, and canals; and so on. The chief interest, therefore, in the study of human geography lies in the manner of man's adjustment to the physical environment, not in the elements of that environment. . . . The influence of environment upon the history of man and upon the shaping of human culture has been tremendous. Indeed the task incumbent upon each society at the start was to arrive at an adaptation that would enable it to survive. Each social group discovered certain helps to be gained from nature, and these had a hand in shaping the peculiar complexion of its culture.—John E. Pomfret, *The Geographic Pattern of Mankind*, pp. 4, 12.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of environmental theory for the study and interpretation of history The notion that geography influences the course of history did not originate with Huntington, nor Buckle, nor even with Montesquieu. Historians of all ages have been aware of the very close relation between the two fields Many of them have made large use of the contributions of the students of anthropogeography and not a few have made noteworthy contributions to that science . . it is more than ever agreed that the environment has a far-reaching effect upon every social group, in some cases overpowering social initiative and in others, the majority of instances, conditioning and limiting social activities which are directed toward the conquest of the environment and its adaptation for the use of the group.—Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society*, pp. 3-4, 6.

The British Empire of today occupies more than a quarter of the land area of the globe and counts nearly a quarter of mankind in its population. Thus it is by far the largest and most populous of the sixty distinct independent sovereign states of the world. Its lands extend by the shores of all the oceans, into every type of major geographical region, and on to every continent; while its peoples include members of every considerable racial and religious division of mankind, at all existing levels of culture and social development Hence it is preeminently a World State, perhaps the only state which is fully entitled to that description; for its politico-geographical relations and problems extend into every considerable region of the world, and bring it into contact in some degree with every other independent state on the earth. No other Power has so many, so varied, and so widely distributed geographical, economic, and political contacts with the rest of the world —C B Fawcett, *A Political Geography of the British Empire*, p. 1.

The characteristics of the immediate physical environment—climate, soil, minerals, topography, elevation, contour, waterways, coast line, harbors, etc —dictate the size and local distribution of a population, the key industries, the basic occupations, the lines of specialization, the mode of life, the routes of migration, the channels of transportation and the character of commerce. In a word, *Nature determines the general economic features of society* But there remains the question, What is her influence upon human relations, social organization, institutions, moral and esthetic standards, artistic, religious and intellectual development?—Edward A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 81.

A Sort of Minimum Reading List to Acquaint the Student and the Reader with These Newer Points of Emphasis upon the Relation of Physical Resources to Culture Would Comprehend Some Such List as Follows:

Isaiah Bowman, *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences;* P. W. Bryan, *Man's Adaptation of Nature: Studies of the Cultural Landscape;* H. J. Fleure, *The Geographical Background of Modern Problems*, J. E Pomfret, *The Geographical Pattern of Mankind;* Ellen Churchill Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions, The Geography of the Mediterranean Region, Influences of Geographic Environment;* J. R. Smith, *Men and Resources A Study of North America and Its Place in World Geography*, Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society;* W. P. Webb, *The Great Plains;* R. H. Whitbeck and O. J. Thomas, *The Geographic Factor Its Role in Life and Civilization;* C. L. White and G. T. Renner, *Geography: An Introduction to Human Ecology;* Milton Whitney, *Soils and Civilization*

This changing significance of geographic factors and of natural environment may be well illustrated in the case of rivers. Originally, rivers were basic to travel through navigation and through trails and gateways to new frontiers. The big rivers constituted the arterial trunklines for the location of settlements and for travel and commerce. Now most of these appear as minor factors in comparison with other major factors, namely, power, irrigation, flood control, and recreation facilities. The nature of the "problem" is different from the old problems, and problems vary in different geographic regions of the nation or of the world. Yet they are problems of the first rank, assuming sometimes the proportion of primary issues in government and economics.

The same changing nature of our problems may be seen with reference to land, forests, minerals, which, however, we shall treat in the next chapter as more specific American social problems. Enough has now been said to indicate the organic significance of our natural heritage and to point next to a sort of enumeration or catalogue of the nature, range, and size of these great problems of natural environment in the United States. Indeed, here as in many other instances which we shall point out, the problems and development of America have paralleled the patterns of societal evolution in general. Yet, in America, we have a peculiarly rich example of the role of physical resources, abundance and bigness in the civilization and dilemmas of the times.

There was a day more than a half century after Thomas Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase when Herbert Spencer looked at firsthand for the only time in his life upon the evolving American picture and reported that the American people had come into possession of an unparalleled fortune in mineral wealth and vast tracts of virgin land. They had inherited all the arts, appliances, and methods which had been developed by old societies. Inventiveness had been widely fostered, vast bodies of immigrants of various bloods had been incorporated, and an immense plexus of railways and telegraphs had consolidated the aggregates of states as had never before been done. Yet it is not recorded that Herbert Spencer ever envisioned a nation, with technology playing upon its natural resources, which, with only a fraction of the world's areas and a twentieth of its population, would produce half of the

work of the world, half of the world's energy from coal, most of its energy from oil, and wrap itself in copper wire enough to make twenty thousand crossings of the continent. Here was to be a new picture, beyond dreams, of this same nation producing a third of the world's iron, a half of its copper and zinc, a half of its steel mills, three-fourths of the world's corn. By the end of the first third of the twentieth century, there were to be more than twenty-five million automobiles, more than fifteen million radios, fifty thousand miles of natural gas lines, more than a hundred thousand miles of oil pipe lines, nearly a million miles of surfaced highways and nearly a quarter million miles of railroads.

Nor is it recorded that either Jefferson or Spencer saw the future picture of America as one in which in a single day's travel by air one could see practically every variety of topography, climate, soil, crops, minerals, and activities in the world. Nor did their picture of natural resources reflect the verdict of the 1930's that if coal, oil, electricity and water power should be withdrawn from the American power house a large percentage of the people of the continent would be dead in less than one month's time.

On the part of the people of the United States, there was an extraordinary ignorance concerning the nature, size, power, and problem-generating qualities of their natural resources and an incredible forgetfulness of the history and romance of their discovery and recent development. This applied not only to concrete knowledge concerning the specific catalogue of natural wealth, to a varied exhibit of fantastic notions, and to the absence of any reasonable conception of the situation, but to general knowledge and understanding of basic relationships between land, climate, regions, minerals, and the nature of the culture and the behavior of the people.

Here were extraordinary pictures of the basic natural wealth of the nation reflecting the stupendous spectacle of a changing use of wealth transforming the whole culture and civilization: land and forests limitless; rivers and lakes uncounted; water from thousands of rivers and lakes; coal and iron and hundreds of other minerals from the land undug; sticks and stone of fabulous mode for fabricating great building programs; energy and power surging and dormant from oil and gas and electricity; parks and playgrounds, summer and winter resorts, play-places of a nation; nature reserves

and sanctuaries for wild life; highways and byways, railroads and airways extraordinary; and all that other catalogue of physical resources basic to the superdevelopment and social utilization of vast public utilities.

There was land, for instance, the source and power of all the Jeffersonian dream of the greater domain and democracy. The nation's extraordinary resources in land, with the companion forces of climate and accessibility, still constituted its incomparable basic power, but like most other aspects of the American situation they challenged the nation to a new sort of utilization and planning economy as a result of the great changes of recent years. Land there was in abundance and more, but the epic of free land and frontier domain was transcended by the complicated problems of the new agricultural crisis, the land problem of cities, and the back sweep from frontier and city to newer rural life and to new ways of using the land. Forestry land there was but not the primeval limitless woods for prodigal cutting and lumbering; on the contrary new forestry policies and developments anticipated the utilization of millions of acres for other uses, such as erosion prevention, recreation, parks, game conservation, and paper manufacturing. The old frontier had gone, but a new and expanding domain of county, state, and nationally-owned lands challenged new utilization policies, extraordinary economic and social planning and great obligations for a new agrarian economy. All in all it would be difficult to find any phase of that early twentieth century situation in which the foundations of great natural resources were the same as the nineteenth century, which nevertheless reflected a greater difference of treatment and required greater science and skill than that of the utilization of land. The natural land resources themselves had changed little; the problem and setting had changed almost entirely.

The total American land picture comprehends not a few million, not one hundred or two hundred or three hundred million acres, but nineteen hundred million. Yet of all this extraordinary domain only 973,000,000 acres, or about a half, have been considered capable of farm use and only 359,000,000, or less than one-fifth, have actually been in harvested crop lands. And there are the spectacle and problem of more than 25,000,000 acres of farms from lands in the eastern United States lying idle.

## VALUES PER FARM OF FARM LAND AND BUILDINGS, BUILDINGS ALONE, AND IMPLEMENTS AND MACHINERY, FOR STATES AND REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940

| Area | Per Farm Values | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Land and Buildings (Dollars) | Buildings Alone (Dollars) | Implements and Machinery (Dollars) |
| UNITED STATES | 5,522 | 1,707 | 502 |
| *Northeast* | 5,331 | 2,906 | 645 |
| Maine | 3,183 | 1,744 | 503 |
| New Hampshire | 3,758 | 2,395 | 409 |
| Vermont | 4,712 | 2,815 | 662 |
| Massachusetts | 6,647 | 3,787 | 521 |
| Rhode Island | 8,737 | 4,811 | 723 |
| Connecticut | 9,675 | 5,206 | 609 |
| New York | 6,180 | 3,515 | 903 |
| New Jersey | 8,818 | 4,612 | 992 |
| Delaware | 6,104 | 3,120 | 639 |
| Pennsylvania | 5,113 | 2,963 | 764 |
| Maryland | 6,506 | 3,070 | 510 |
| West Virginia | 2,718 | 1,065 | 150 |
| *Southeast* | 2,519 | 795 | 175 |
| Virginia | 3,860 | 1,602 | 217 |
| North Carolina | 2,647 | 890 | 163 |
| South Carolina | 2,461 | 824 | 176 |
| Georgia | 2,222 | 743 | 165 |
| Florida | 5,195 | 1,096 | 311 |
| Kentucky | 3,070 | 1,014 | 164 |
| Tennessee | 2,683 | 864 | 199 |
| Alabama | 1,764 | 506 | 128 |
| Mississippi | 1,632 | 445 | 138 |
| Arkansas | 2,108 | 537 | 173 |
| Louisiana | 2,363 | 609 | 239 |
| *Southwest* | 5,788 | 938 | 437 |
| Oklahoma | 4,631 | 788 | 437 |
| Texas | 6,197 | 998 | 432 |
| New Mexico | 5,498 | 828 | 446 |
| Arizona | 8,321 | 1,250 | 539 |
| *Middle States* | 7,517 | 2,643 | 736 |
| Ohio | 6,176 | 2,673 | 514 |
| Indiana | 6,781 | 2,296 | 577 |
| Illinois | 11,887 | 2,999 | 875 |
| Michigan | 4,865 | 2,423 | 648 |
| Wisconsin | 6,365 | 3,173 | 931 |
| Minnesota | 7,312 | 2,765 | 980 |
| Iowa | 12,614 | 3,726 | 1,135 |
| Missouri | 4,324 | 1,345 | 340 |
| *Northwest* | 8,228 | 1,793 | 834 |
| North Dakota | 6,630 | 1,899 | 1,040 |
| South Dakota | 6,976 | 1,846 | 828 |
| Nebraska | 9,399 | 2,121 | 807 |
| Kansas | 9,092 | 1,649 | 737 |
| Montana | 8,373 | 1,593 | 1,033 |
| Idaho | 7,768 | 1,656 | 965 |
| Wyoming | 10,585 | 1,953 | 1,019 |
| Colorado | 7,550 | 1,650 | 759 |
| Utah | 6,074 | 1,419 | 470 |
| *Far West* | 11,746 | 2,357 | 846 |
| Nevada | 13,321 | 2,614 | 1,041 |
| Washington | 7,264 | 1,892 | 687 |
| Oregon | 7,727 | 1,864 | 721 |
| California | 16,337 | 2,867 | 998 |
| District of Columbia | 91,429 | 9,134 | 1,257 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940*, Agriculture, Vol. 3, Tables 9 and 16

*Photos by Farm Security Administr*

Remnants of the long-ago. Waste and cut-over in both north and southern woods.



*Photos by Farm Security Administr*

Remnants of the long-ago. Waste and cut-over in both north and southern woods.

## LAND IN FARMS, 1940

| State and Region | Number Farms | Total Acres | Average Acreage |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 6,096,799 | 1,060,852,374 | 174.0 |
| *Northeast* | 633,741 | 61,014,824 | 96.3 |
| Maine | 38,980 | 4,223,297 | 108.3 |
| New Hampshire | 16,554 | 1,809,314 | 109.3 |
| Vermont | 23,582 | 3,666,835 | 155.5 |
| Massachusetts | 31,897 | 1,937,963 | 60.8 |
| Rhode Island | 3,014 | 221,913 | 73.6 |
| Connecticut | 21,163 | 1,512,151 | 71.5 |
| New York | 153,238 | 17,170,337 | 112.1 |
| New Jersey | 25,835 | 1,874,402 | 72.6 |
| Pennsylvania | 169,027 | 14,594,134 | 86.3 |
| Delaware | 8,994 | 895,507 | 99.6 |
| Maryland | 42,110 | 4,197,827 | 99.7 |
| District of Columbia | 65 | 2,341 | 36.0 |
| West Virginia | 99,282 | 8,908,803 | 89.7 |
| *Southeast* | 2,259,030 | 183,677,294 | 81.3 |
| Virginia | 174,885 | 16,444,907 | 94.0 |
| North Carolina | 278,276 | 18,845,338 | 67.7 |
| South Carolina | 137,558 | 11,238,697 | 81.7 |
| Georgia | 216,033 | 23,683,631 | 109.6 |
| Florida | 62,248 | 8,337,708 | 133.9 |
| Kentucky | 252,894 | 20,294,016 | 80.2 |
| Tennessee | 247,617 | 18,492,898 | 74.7 |
| Alabama | 231,746 | 19,143,391 | 82.6 |
| Mississippi | 291,092 | 19,156,058 | 65.8 |
| Arkansas | 216,674 | 18,044,542 | 83.3 |
| Louisiana | 150,007 | 9,996,108 | 66.6 |
| *Southwest* | 650,262 | 236,998,208 | 364.5 |
| Oklahoma | 179,687 | 34,803,317 | 193.7 |
| Texas | 418,002 | 137,683,372 | 329.4 |
| New Mexico | 34,105 | 38,860,427 | 1,139.4 |
| Arizona | 18,468 | 25,651,092 | 1,388.9 |
| *Middle States* | 1,672,864 | 215,150,595 | 128.6 |
| Ohio | 233,783 | 21,907,523 | 93.7 |
| Indiana | 184,549 | 19,800,778 | 107.3 |
| Illinois | 213,439 | 31,032,572 | 145.4 |
| Michigan | 187,589 | 18,037,995 | 96.2 |
| Wisconsin | 186,735 | 22,876,494 | 122.5 |
| Minnesota | 197,351 | 32,606,962 | 165.2 |
| Iowa | 213,318 | 34,148,673 | 160.1 |
| Missouri | 256,100 | 34,739,598 | 135.6 |
| *Northwest* | 601,156 | 296,531,901 | 493 3 |
| North Dakota | 73,962 | 37,936,136 | 512.9 |
| South Dakota | 72,454 | 39,473,584 | 544.8 |
| Nebraska | 121,062 | 47,343,981 | 391.1 |
| Kansas | 156,327 | 48,173,635 | 308.2 |
| Montana | 41,823 | 46,451,594 | 1,110.7 |
| Idaho | 43,663 | 10,297,745 | 235.8 |
| Wyoming | 15,018 | 28,025,979 | 1,866.2 |
| Colorado | 51,436 | 31,527,240 | 612.9 |
| Utah | 25,411 | 7,302,007 | 287.4 |
| *Far West* | 279,746 | 67,479,552 | 241.2 |
| Nevada | 3,573 | 3,785,106 | 1,059.4 |
| Washington | 81,686 | 15,181,815 | 185.9 |
| Oregon | 61,829 | 17,988,307 | 290.9 |
| California | 132,658 | 30,524,324 | 230.1 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Agriculture: 1940*, Vol. III, Table 18, pp. 51–60.



*Photo by Bayard Wootten*

The people: Folk beauty of the hills and work of the hands. Promise or dilemma?

## LAND IN FARMS, 1940

| State and Region | Number Farms | Total Acres | Average Acreage |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 6,096,799 | 1,060,852,374 | 174.0 |
| *Northeast* | 633,741 | 61,014,824 | 96.3 |
| Maine | 38,980 | 4,223,297 | 108.3 |
| New Hampshire | 16,554 | 1,809,314 | 109.3 |
| Vermont | 23,582 | 3,666,835 | 155.5 |
| Massachusetts | 31,897 | 1,937,963 | 60.8 |
| Rhode Island | 3,014 | 221,913 | 73.6 |
| Connecticut | 21,163 | 1,512,151 | 71.5 |
| New York | 153,238 | 17,170,337 | 112.1 |
| New Jersey | 25,835 | 1,874,402 | 72.6 |
| Pennsylvania | 169,027 | 14,594,134 | 86.3 |
| Delaware | 8,994 | 895,507 | 99.6 |
| Maryland | 42,110 | 4,197,827 | 99.7 |
| District of Columbia | 65 | 2,341 | 36.0 |
| West Virginia | 99,282 | 8,908,803 | 89.7 |
| *Southeast* | 2,259,030 | 183,677,294 | 81.3 |
| Virginia | 174,885 | 16,444,907 | 94.0 |
| North Carolina | 278,276 | 18,845,338 | 67.7 |
| South Carolina | 137,558 | 11,238,697 | 81.7 |
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| Tennessee | 247,617 | 18,492,898 | 74.7 |
| Alabama | 231,746 | 19,143,391 | 82.6 |
| Mississippi | 291,092 | 19,156,058 | 65.8 |
| Arkansas | 216,674 | 18,044,542 | 83.3 |
| Louisiana | 150,007 | 9,996,108 | 66.6 |
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| Texas | 418,002 | 137,683,372 | 329.4 |
| New Mexico | 34,105 | 38,860,427 | 1,139.4 |
| Arizona | 18,468 | 25,651,092 | 1,388.9 |
| *Middle States* | 1,672,864 | 215,150,595 | 128.6 |
| Ohio | 233,783 | 21,907,523 | 93.7 |
| Indiana | 184,549 | 19,800,778 | 107.3 |
| Illinois | 213,439 | 31,032,572 | 145.4 |
| Michigan | 187,589 | 18,037,995 | 96.2 |
| Wisconsin | 186,735 | 22,876,494 | 122.5 |
| Minnesota | 197,351 | 32,606,962 | 165.2 |
| Iowa | 213,318 | 34,148,673 | 160.1 |
| Missouri | 256,100 | 34,739,598 | 135.6 |
| *Northwest* | 601,156 | 296,531,901 | 493 3 |
| North Dakota | 73,962 | 37,936,136 | 512.9 |
| South Dakota | 72,454 | 39,473,584 | 544.8 |
| Nebraska | 121,062 | 47,343,981 | 391.1 |
| Kansas | 156,327 | 48,173,635 | 308.2 |
| Montana | 41,823 | 46,451,594 | 1,110.7 |
| Idaho | 43,663 | 10,297,745 | 235.8 |
| Wyoming | 15,018 | 28,025,979 | 1,866.2 |
| Colorado | 51,436 | 31,527,240 | 612.9 |
| Utah | 25,411 | 7,302,007 | 287.4 |
| *Far West* | 279,746 | 67,479,552 | 241.2 |
| Nevada | 3,573 | 3,785,106 | 1,059.4 |
| Washington | 81,686 | 15,181,815 | 185.9 |
| Oregon | 61,829 | 17,988,307 | 290.9 |
| California | 132,658 | 30,524,324 | 230.1 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Agriculture: 1940*, Vol. III, Table 18, pp. 51–60.

The composite spectacle of 100,000,000 acres of tasseling corn, 60,000,000 acres of wheat, golden wave on wave, 40,000,000 acres of cotton, bloom and boll, gorgeous and stupendous as it was, constituted but a small part of the possible picture of the fruits of all available lands utilized. Indeed all of the harvested wheat land in the world would equal an area but little more than seven wheat states of America, and the world's total harvested land in cotton could be superimposed upon North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, while the area of Texas and Louisiana would be sufficient for all the present corn lands of the universe. The colossal size of the American domain may be further illustrated by presenting a map picture of the United States, which, if hay and permanent pasture lands be omitted, showed just enough land for superimposing the total area of harvested lands in the whole world. And it is commonly estimated that there were in the United States 500,000,000 acres of unused land in which climate, situation, and fertility of the soil were no less suitable for crops than some land now used for crops.

Although the ratio or farm folk to the total population of the United States had been steadily decreasing and the amount of lands used was far short of the maximum, there were still in this first third of the twentieth century more than 6,250,000 actual farms in the United States. These farms varied greatly in size according to region and purpose. There were more than 300,000 farms in Mississippi averaging 53 acres per farm; there were scarcely 16,000 farms in Wyoming, yet they averaged nearly 1500 acres each. Here, as in most aspects of American life, there were great regional differences. The Southeast showed an average acreage per farm of 71 acres; the Northeast 102, the Middle States 123, the Far West 243, the Southwest 268, and the Northwest 429 acres. Yet this cold statistical counting of acres could reflect little of the romance and struggle, the success and failure, the battles with storm and climate, and the later financial plight of those whose work and way of life were wrapped up in the farm.

In the American picture of the fruits of the soil was to be found a full measure of the romance and charm of the traditional horn of plenty. Wheat was king of the great Northwest, which produced a little over half of the nation's more than 850,000,000 bush-

els. Corn was king of the Middle States, which produced a little more than half of the nation's 2,384,000,000 bushels. Hay and hogs, however, were runners-up for leadership in the Middle States and Northwest which produced 60 percent of the nation's 86,000,000 tons of hay and 75 percent of its 56,000,000 swine. Old King Cotton, although periodically reported in ill health, still ruled in the Southeast and the Southwest, which produced, respectively, nearly 60 percent and nearly 40 percent of the nation's maximum of 15,000,000 bales. And tobacco had become a sort of new queen of the land in manufacture, in advertising, in internal revenue, and in manners. The Southeastern States produced 85 percent of the nearly 1,600,000,000 pounds of the American weed.

And the foster mother of the race, the dairy cow, flourished on three-fourths of all the nation's farms, aggregating more than 30,000,000 pastured on wooded lot and meadow, on hillsides and by the waters, or languishing on barren lands. The Middle States and the Southeast led the procession with more than 1,400,000 farms, which reported nearly half of the total cows milked. And what a picture and what variety—the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey with their golden and spotted fawns transferred to America, vying with other multiplied millions of big handsome blacks and whites, Holsteins from Holland or red and white Ayrshires from Scotland, for new world records of production. And of other domesticated living things on farm and around the home, the good old mule and faithful horse, albeit transcended by truck and motor and tractor, still numbered around 21,000,000. There were also 673,000,000 chickens that could lay 2,689,000,000 dozen eggs a year. Millions and millions of beef cattle fluctuated according to South American competition and the nation's eating of meat, changing habits from frontier to city, from youth to maturity.

From mammoth orchards and gardens of fruits and vegetables, the American picture reflected a new era of vitamines—of iodine and calcium, of phosphorus and lime, and a rapidly changing diet of the people. Of annual fruits, 250,000,000 bushels and more of apples, peaches and pears; more than 4,404,000 pounds of grapes and strawberries; 61,000,000 boxes of oranges and grapefruit, setting California and Florida in bumptious competition for the nation's favor. There were world quantity baskets of cherries and

figs, plums and prunes, lemons and limes. The new era of refrigeration and transportation aided and abetted the new patterns of diet and hygiene to require an annual supply of more than 4,300,000,000 pounds of cabbage, cantaloupes and onions; more than 400,000,000 bushels of potatoes, and a world-size market basket of beans and carrots, corn and cucumbers, lettuce and spinach, onions and tomatoes, asparagus and celery, turnips and squash, pumpkins, and watermelons smilin' on the vine. With flowers that beautify the nation, not in fields and woods and garden spots nor public parks nor flower shops, but in measures of business, 100,000 Americans were at work in 15,000 places, under glass and in the open, to contribute more than $60,000,000 to the sales picture of the nation.

Now all of these were part, parcel, and product of that other most important segment of the natural resources of the nation—its climate. But this was not all. Climate, the geographic historiographers said, was molder of culture and character. In America, for instance, it made slavery which made conflict which made war which set the nation in new patterns of political and economic behavior. It made, they said, for efficiency and inefficiency, for wealth and waste. Yet much of the new science and invention were making void both the extreme effects of climate and the dogma of the geographers. Nevertheless the great range in temperature and rainfall, in growing seasons, and adaptations constituted a basic source of wealth and was still fundamental so that, region by region, Americans were developing vast resources in varied and seasonable growing things and in the better utilization of climate for recreation, health, and commercial development. Yet the aggregate of storm and lightning, hot spell and dry, wet weather and flood, contributed much to the picture of the American struggle for survival and to the recurring vicissitudes of disaster, abundance, and scarcity.

Once again there was great difference in the regions in precipitation; for instance, there was a range from a few inches to more than a hundred inches. About a half of the total land acreage of the nation had a median of between fifteen and forty inches with ratios about as follows: nearly 10 percent of the land acreage showed less than ten inches, 30 percent between ten and twenty

inches, 16 percent each between twenty and thirty and between forty and fifty inches, while the areas of fifty to sixty inches were again about the same as those under ten inches. The highest rainfall prevailed in the south to southeast and extreme west to northwest, with special winter recreational areas, such as Florida, conveniently provided with low precipitation in winter and high in summer. In general, rainfall provided another one of those picturesque dividing lines between the east with more and the west with less precipitation, with the exception of the far west coast line. Bisecting the nation almost exactly in the middle is a uniform belt of three or four hundred miles width with a sort of median precipitation of twenty to thirty inches. Shading off to the east the precipitation increases while to the west it decreases into the great desert picture which again merges into the luxurious far west belt of greater moisture. Coincident with this east and west division of the nation in terms of rainfall was a similar division of east and west according to soils and crops. Almost coincident with this belt of uniformly medium precipitation was a bisecting belt of black lands, extraordinarily rich, from which shade east the brown and west the lighter shades of soil, gray white in desert, gray drab in forest lands. Thus the very climate and soils themselves add richness to the colorful natural American picture of the traditional East as East and West as West. So, too, the romance of the Southwest was fabricated into its distinctive pattern because of contrasting lack of moisture, lack of trees, and other climatic and soil differentials, while California was golden largely because of its climatic assets.

Of all these things about the land and its people, the great American urban populace knew little. Children and grandchildren of men and women who lived close to the soil helped the animal world to grow and multiply, and watched the rains and seasons bring benefit and disaster, in contemporary city generations scarcely knew one animal from another, nor mule from cow, nor sheep from goat. They little understood the ways and culture of American farm folk as they worked and struggled, paradoxical folk, prophets of gloom, cheerful in spirit. If Jefferson saw them as "those who labour in the earth—the chosen people of God . . . the focus of that sacred fire which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth," urban America complained of their demands,

lobbied against them, and took little thought for the morrow of a nation suffering from agricultural catastrophe.

Parts of the nation, however, were becoming interested in the American picture of the out-of-doors, a sort of back-to-nature movement, with the emphasis upon recreation, leisure time, physical reconstruction, picturesque and historical heritage. Parks and playgrounds—national, state, municipal—had multiplied a hundredfold, national forests and bird sanctuaries had become a public interest, and a thousand organizations attended to the promotion and educational features of the new good life. Here was scenic beauty unparalleled, a picture unsurpassed. The picture included twenty-one national parks in sixteen states with an area of over 8,000,000 acres and still others in prospect. There were national forests of 185,000,000 acres in nine regions in twenty-six states. Their names were entrancing even as their scenic beauty. Clearwater and Salway, Kaniksu and Nez Perce, Beartooth and Bearhead. Pictures and pictures: Custer and Cabinet, Madison and Missoula, Flathead and Durlodge. Historical names: Jefferson and Carson, Lewis and Clark, LaSalle and Cleveland. Indian and nature, river and hill names, animals and men. New pictures for old. And of national "monuments" and memorials more than threescore: Aztec ruins and Casa Grande, Chaco Canyon and Devil's Tower; Craters of the Moon and Dinosaur; forts and battle fields, birthplaces and shrines. This great American moving picture recorded millions of visitors to these places soon aggregating the total of the nation's people. Of state parks and forests there were almost 600, covering more than 4,250,000 acres. Of municipal parks and playgrounds, more than one-half of all cities of 5,000 population and over reported some sort of development of park recreational facilities.

And of physical resources for summer and winter resorts, thousands of coast line and interior establishments contributed to one of the most colorful of all American pictures. Such were the unparalleled resources that the picture must record such hectic episodes as the Florida boom of the 1920's as a dream in which was envisioned a physical play place big enough not only for the whole nation but for a large part of the world. And of other states, there were springs and caves, Great Smokies and the Grand Canyon, California and the Gulf Coast, New England's Maine and New

## REGIONAL DIFFERENTIALS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ACRES IN FARMS, 1940

| | All Land in Farms (Acres) 1940 | Cropland Harvested (Acres) 1939 | Crop Failure (Acres) 1939 | Cropland Idle or Fallow (Acres) 1939 | Plowable Pasture (Acres) 1939 | Woodland (Acres) 1939 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES. | 1,060,852,374 | 321,242,430 | 20,580,017 | 56,928,656 | 131,379,940 | 137,177,658 |
| *Northeast*..... | 61,014,824 | 20,418,698 | 405,946 | 2,900,105 | 9,106,490 | 15,891,224 |
| Maine..... .. | 4,223,297 | 1,146,613 | 14,898 | 108,164 | 319,687 | 1,783,327 |
| New Hampshire | 1,809,314 | 371,611 | 7,274 | 38,417 | 173,073 | 860,113 |
| Vermont.... .. | 3,666,835 | 1,022,581 | 8,118 | 46,477 | 400,890 | 1,173,791 |
| Massachusetts. | 1,937,963 | 456,267 | 21,655 | 79,868 | 230,025 | 716,862 |
| Rhode Island .. | 221,913 | 48,753 | 2,565 | 10,195 | 31,698 | 91,161 |
| Connecticut.... | 1,512,151 | 362,577 | 8,461 | 55,437 | 215,595 | 521,339 |
| New York. . .. | 17,170,337 | 6,581,296 | 132,780 | 742,791 | 2,779,979 | 3,022,323 |
| New Jersey .... | 1,874,402 | 778,809 | 28,930 | 150,375 | 198,538 | 424,221 |
| Pennsylvania... | 14,594,134 | 6,097,116 | 115,989 | 988,418 | 2,038,636 | 2,935,766 |
| Delaware . . | 895,507 | 378,448 | 10,233 | 96,789 | 84,113 | 225,361 |
| Maryland... .. | 4,197,827 | 1,608,856 | 30,137 | 344,884 | 600,743 | 1,142,236 |
| Dist. Columbia. | 2,341 | 1,017 | 74 | 121 | 214 | 386 |
| West Virginia . | 8,908,803 | 1,564,754 | 24,832 | 238,169 | 2,033,299 | 2,994,338 |
| *Southeast*... . | 183,677,294 | 60,926,188 | 1,609,181 | 9,332,907 | 26,293,268 | 65,552,452 |
| Virginia . | 16,444,907 | 3,840,189 | 63,303 | 867,199 | 3,191,670 | 6,761,703 |
| North Carolina. | 18,845,338 | 6,125,386 | 68,642 | 998,076 | 1,230,171 | 9,093,377 |
| South Carolina . | 11,238,697 | 4,321,962 | 34,832 | 568,689 | 604,350 | 4,862,909 |
| Georgia.. . . | 23,683,631 | 8,802,593 | 110,484 | 1,264,235 | 1,512,913 | 10,174,775 |
| Florida..... | 8,337,708 | 1,679,622 | 71,653 | 462,248 | 643,065 | 2,649,960 |
| Kentucky.. ... | 20,294,016 | 5,271,623 | 133,181 | 1,104,489 | 6,703,335 | 4,592,204 |
| Tennessee. .. | 18,492,898 | 6,158,662 | 203,446 | 1,249,748 | 3,547,298 | 5,219,105 |
| Alabama. ..... | 19,143,391 | 7,111,717 | 308,834 | 802,991 | 2,173,731 | 7,009,164 |
| Mississippi.... | 19,156,058 | 6,952,931 | 417,407 | 630,205 | 2,702,190 | 6,068,121 |
| Arkansas.... | 18,044,542 | 6,609,833 | 137,049 | 901,616 | 2,541,909 | 6,171,015 |
| Louisiana ... | 9,996,108 | 4,051,670 | 60,350 | 483,411 | 1,442,636 | 2,950,119 |
| *Southwest* .. . | 236,998,208 | 40,908,708 | 3,645,516 | 7,225,321 | 19,709,004 | 19,768,261 |
| Oklahoma .... | 34,803,317 | 12,766,219 | 1,253,543 | 1,811,454 | 3,830,147 | 3,064,889 |
| Texas .. | 137,683,372 | 26,044,008 | 2,087,470 | 4,887,405 | 13,242,974 | 14,073,922 |
| New Mexico | 38,860,427 | 1,572,507 | 260,820 | 364,987 | 2,374,384 | 1,481,992 |
| Arizona.. ..... | 25,651,092 | 525,974 | 43,683 | 161,475 | 261,499 | 1,147,458 |
| *Middle States.* | 215,150,595 | 106,715,099 | 1,489,539 | 8,151,311 | 37,551,438 | 24,681,886 |
| Ohio . . .. .. | 21,907,523 | 9,771,609 | 152,237 | 896,035 | 4,838,108 | 2,413,484 |
| Indiana..... . | 19,800,778 | 9,711,028 | 168,259 | 1,069,150 | 3,701,562 | 2,340,207 |
| Illinois ..... .. | 31,032,572 | 18,270,025 | 209,299 | 1,718,459 | 4,935,691 | 1,912,902 |
| Michigan..... | 18,037,995 | 7,862,858 | 114,888 | 1,045,320 | 2,875,696 | 2,710,129 |
| Wisconsin..... | 22,876,494 | 9,815,964 | 73,304 | 391,258 | 2,757,420 | 4,120,877 |
| Minnesota . . | 32,606,962 | 18,807,114 | 251,119 | 1,074,970 | 2,840,821 | 2,931,805 |
| Iowa .. .. . | 34,148,673 | 20,076,641 | 281,947 | 827,945 | 6,361,302 | 1,300,443 |
| Missouri..... | 34,739,598 | 12,399,860 | 238,486 | 1,128,174 | 9,240,838 | 6,952,039 |
| *Northwest* ... | 296,531,901 | 78,909,201 | 12,944,386 | 23,757,858 | 31,938,646 | 5,378,817 |
| North Dakota.. | 37,936,136 | 15,536,632 | 1,131,303 | 6,810,457 | 3,622,528 | 385,957 |
| South Dakota.. | 39,473,584 | 12,297,291 | 2,154,748 | 2,470,607 | 6,246,650 | 340,399 |
| Nebraska..... . | 47,343,981 | 17,304,802 | 1,883,723 | 2,490,646 | 3,735,689 | 550,100 |
| Kansas .... ... | 48,173,635 | 17,816,498 | 5,370,096 | 4,846,054 | 6,160,782 | 711,056 |
| Montana..... | 46,451,594 | 5,748,069 | 496,854 | 3,889,481 | 4,654,639 | 1,137,345 |
| Idaho ..... .. | 10,297,745 | 2,935,350 | 61,802 | 931,911 | 779,080 | 691,683 |
| Wyoming..... . | 28,025,979 | 1,534,800 | 210,082 | 309,321 | 1,459,211 | 386,539 |
| Colorado.. ... | 31,527,240 | 4,769,671 | 1,559,191 | 1,684,793 | 4,885,034 | 1,096,546 |
| Utah..... | 7,302,007 | 966,088 | 76,587 | 324,588 | 395,033 | 79,192 |
| *Far West*..... | 67,479,552 | 13,364,536 | 485,449 | 5,561,154 | 6,781,094 | 5,905,018 |
| Nevada..... | 3,785,106 | 435,855 | 15,833 | 36,252 | 373,698 | 25,475 |
| Washington..... | 15,181,815 | 3,569,803 | 61,013 | 2,598,523 | 950,815 | 1,460,546 |
| Oregon..... | 17,988,307 | 2,824,316 | 112,212 | 1,104,956 | 1,213,983 | 2,081,907 |
| California..... | 30,524,324 | 6,534,562 | 296,391 | 1,821,423 | 4,242,598 | 2,337,090 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Agriculture, 1940*, Vol. III, Table 14, pp. 82–121.

Hampshire, the dry beauty of the Southwest, the cold lakes of the Middle States, the snow-capped mountains of the farther west, and the myriad smaller places hither and yon reflecting a marvelous phase of the physical resources of the nation.

Another part of the nature picture reflected a growing interest in the conservation and development of wild life. In the earlier American picture the abundance and variety of the wild life of the New Continent was a constant marvel wherever it was not taken for granted by the pragmatic pioneers. There were pioneer pictures unsurpassed: buffalo and bear, turkey and deer, fox and beaver, marten and mink; clouds of wild pigeons, millions of ducks, millions of small game, rabbit and squirrel, bobwhite and dove. It was in reality one of the nation's great natural resources. Since the turn of the century there had been a great revival of interest, both from the esthetic and recreational viewpoint and that of economic value, in the conservation of birds, of fur-bearing animals, and of fish, particularly in stream and lake. By 1930 there were no less than 81 federal refuges and sanctuaries and 59 Audubon refuges throughout the country. And all the states save perhaps three had adopted an official bird, selected variously because of special-feature campaigns or for beauty, songs, economic value, or traditional associations. Here was another colorful picture of America—no less than seven states choosing the western meadow lark, four each the robin and bluebird; at least three states each the cardinal, the mocking bird, the bobwhite or quail.

There were other viewpoints. The states had increased appropriations for game farms and for the protection and conservation of wild life and thousands of individuals or private groups had established farms or sanctuaries until the industry had assumed large proportions. It was estimated, for instance, that in eleven Southern States more than 10,000,000 bobwhites alone were taken annually, and that the aggregate food value of millions of game birds would approximate $10,000,000. Of fur-bearing animals, the nation still boasted an abundance in the wild state, while domestic farms for commercial breeding provided an extraordinarily vivid picture of a new sort of "wild life." A national convention of Izaak Walton Leagues, with scores of commercial exhibits of fishing paraphernalia, would give the impression that America was chiefly concerned with the art and skill of fishing in its thousands

of streams and lakes. The annual commercial value of the production of fisheries from river and lake and bay and sea aggregated more than $100,000,000.

Just as forest and forest lore have played a significant and romantic role in the story of general human culture as well as in its specific aspects of literature, art, and religion so also in the United States, it was in nowise possible to understand the national culture and background without sensing the tremendous part which its more than 600,000,000 acres of forest lands had played in the development of the American people. Deep, dark piney woods with their tall, graceful, and compact millions of swaying and sighing lumber trees, fragrant with the incense of woodland moisture and golden brown needles, rich in wealth of rosin and turpentine and lumber and timbers. Great northern spruce and hemlock and hardwoods, powerful sentinels of a sturdy nation, native haunts of hunted game, terrain of the romance and commerce of a great fur industry, million dollar fortunes of the early Americans. Great deep swamp, forest dark and mysterious—now eloquent with the silence of morning, now echoing with the cry of wildcat and panther, owl and hawk—tall gnarled cypress silhouetted against the sky or river bank. Immense midland woods, bisected by great rivers, challenge to the clearing instinct of pioneers, ambush places for Indians on the warpath. Giant western redwoods incredibly big and old, chronicles of precivilization days of the continent, their manufactured products extending their survival qualities through generation and generation of fabricated pipe lines and timbers, roofings and containers. A vast panorama of wealth and beauty, American picture supreme.

Whatever of romance and beauty may have been in the earlier forest picture must have been reflected in hidden ways or in retrospect or in the tragic drama of a lost child crying in the piney woods, of a lost colony perishing in winter woods or of the survival struggles of countless pioneers upon whose spiritual natures the contest with forest, animals, Indians, climate, or the stark fear and superstition of a religious people had wrought deep imprint. Yet the character and economy of the American people could in nowise be separated from the multiple episodes of frontiersmen bent on transforming great woodlands into plough lands for farm crops. For it was not a part of the American tradition to conserve

great forests for hunting and pleasure, for nobleman and prince. Contrariwise, the frontiersmen seemed to have a veritable complex for the destroying of trees and forest. They passed by rich prairies in order to destroy trees and to make new grounds for harvested crop lands. They built up a pattern of the cleared, barren, open spaces roundabout the new built home. They slaughtered trees by the millions in profligate lumbering operations. They drained the life sap out of other millions of trees in the gathering of rosin for the enrichment of naval stores. They seemed impotent against destructive and terror-spreading forest fires.

These elements in the American culture were again for the most part unknown to the mass American citizen. Until recently with the revival of the conservation movement, of land planning, and of the Rooseveltian program of planning and reforestation, the forest lands of America were still for the most part empires for commercial lumber and cordwood. Yet there need be no conflict between the vast economic wealth inherent in the forest and reforestation programs and the larger aspect of forest development in the nation. The statistics of the situation were still eloquent if adequately interpreted. There was still magic in the 495,000,000 acres of commercial forests. There were challenging problems in the 100,000,000 acres of low-grade woodland and scrub. There were great possibilities in the 10,000,000 acres of forest land which had been withdrawn for uses other than timber production. Of the commercial forests, there was stark contrast between the old days and the 1930 era, only about one-fifth in virgin stands and with less than 40 percent constituting saw-timber area. Of the remainder, nearly a fourth was cordwood area, yet no longer constituting a great industry for railroads and mills and firesides. There were still left small remnants of the romance of logging communities and lumber towns, lost villages with scarcely a surviving trace to tell their story.

There was yet another significant picture to be found in the ever-growing federal national forest enterprise. Although no less than four-fifths of all timber-growing land, and 90 percent of the possible growing capacity were privately owned, the federal forest lands totaled more than 160,000,000 acres of which 140,000,000 acres were in the Continental United States. This land contained about 83,000,000 acres or 12 percent of all the western range lands.

They contained the major mountain ranges of the nation, 75 percent of the big game range of the West, and nearly one-sixth of the nation's commercial forest area, of which all was under timber management. The capacity of American forests was still equal to more than 1,600,000,000,000 board feet of saw timber, which continued to contribute much to the picture of the nation's artificial wealth. The problem of American forestry had now come to be considered one of the most critical of the nation, and would take its place more and more in the forefront of programs of reconstruction and conservation. It was already contributing one of the most vivid of emergency relief units through the Civilian Conservation Corps camps throughout the nation.

The phenomenal rise of the automobile and of new modes of rapid transportation and communication had obscured for most Americans the important aspects of the nation's physical wealth as found in its hundreds of rivers. Yet to counteract this was the new dominance of power in which streams were again keys to wealth and development. There were yet other inventories in the countless little lakes which dotted its landscape, the Great Lakes like inland seas, and the limitless reaches of its 5,000 miles of gulf and ocean water front. What the Lakes to Gulf development might be was still problematical; yet, with the new reaches of building upon the Tennessee, the Cumberland, the Ohio, and others farther west, the outlook was immense. There were four great rivers in the picture which would average more than two thousand miles in length; another four, more than a thousand miles; and fourscore and more were navigable, capable of adding richly to the scenic beauty and commercial assets of the nation. Pictures of showboat and river romance were lost in the past, yet the modern picture was more dynamic: power dams and factories, rivers of waters with towns on their shores, barges on their bosoms; big rivers laden with commerce, little rivers and creeks, mountain streams and lakes, water reservoirs for the cities. Yet it was unfortunate that the nation could forget what these rivers had been in the romance and practical techniques of earlier developments, whether as practical routes of discovery and commerce or travel ways for intrepid trappers whose trading posts penetrated far into the depths of the forest frontier.

And still the picture grew and grew. The episode of the rise of water power belonged perhaps more to the story of the technological than of the natural wealth of the nation. But its base was, like coal and oil, a part of the interrelated units of natural wealth. The problem had become one of superpower through the rise of interconnected electrical systems and other technical developments. Such was the development of water power in the United States during the early 1930's, that there was a capacity of more than 16,000,000 water wheels' horsepower, exclusive of the new Norris and Wheeler dams and other smaller units which would be constructed by the Tennessee Valley Authority. This capacity, however, had been estimated by the United States Geological Survey as being less than 40 percent of the total potential water power, exclusive again of possible new technical construction which could multiply it several times over. Yet it was characteristic of American power that even in this national picture, portraying a veritable empire dotted with storage dams and power plants, water power still furnished only 7 percent of the total energy consumption of the nation. And energy was to continue in the major role of nation maker.

Yet perhaps the magic of "natural" America had scarcely begun to appear until the great new energy resources of oil and gas were in the way of being developed. Something of this colorful picture, of the colossal power of minerals of the nation might be glimpsed by contemplating the new civilization constantly being transformed by energy from the crudest of crude resources—oil. A part of the picture was the marvel of production. There was a single state, and a part only of that, East Texas, projecting no less than 9,300 producing wells which in two hours of open flow could provide 50 percent more oil than the daily consumption of the whole nation. Or if one wished to sense the colossal nature of such a picture, one might imagine a review of more than 30,000,000 automobiles, trucks and tractors, buses and boats, airplanes and engines —picture de luxe of the great American mobility, product of the new engine, dethroner of steam. This was no mere fanciful scene, but the liberal transforming power of the nation.

Or, once again, if one wishes to see firsthand, let him visit a single cluster of Oklahoma fields which could reach a peak of daily

output of 527,400 barrels. And in the United States the total production in 1930 of gasoline was 436,217,000 barrels; of fuel oil 340,000,000; of lubricating oils 34,000,000. Such were the increasing production and uses, by-products and refinements that of the total oil reserves in the United States, no man had appraised their power and influence in America or in the family of nations. Yet, something further of the size and reach of this specific-energy picture might be envisaged by noting the rapid rise of mineral indexes in comparison to other American activities. Using the index number of 100 in 1899, *Recent Social Trends in the United States* fixed the index of horsepower equipment in 1929, including all automobiles, as 2,610. Agricultural increase was represented by 148; manufacture by 310; transportation in railroad miles by 338; and all mining physical volume by 386. So paramount was the picture of oil that already it had constituted grounds for federal and state regulation and price fixing.

And of coal which had been doing two-thirds of the work of the nation, there was again a magician's supply, as yet not measured even by the new technology. Of the world's coal reserves, estimated at the long, long count of 8,154,322,500,000 short tons, the portion of the United States was no less than 4,231,352,000,000 or a little more than half of the total, perhaps 250 times the French picture and more than 20 times that of Great Britain and Ireland. Such were the stupendous reserve resources that it was estimated that at the rate of consumption of the 1930's there was coal enough to last the nation hundreds, if not thousands, of years. And the coal reserves were scattered far and wide over the nation, so that the coal picture was one of the most representative of the nation's variety and power. In the same way there was great range in quality and in the opulence of its products: millions of tons of coke, 17,000,000,000 available tons of peat, a hundred by-products, $84,000,000 worth of gas, $30,000,000 worth each of ammonia and light oils, and $20,000,000 worth of tar. And of tar products alone, again hundreds of by-products and uses, problems for the chemist, pictures for the prophet.

America was a land of great buildings and monuments, memorials and bridges, pictures beyond compare, fabricated from seemingly endless supplies of building materials of steel and stone, mar-

bles and granites, concrete, and metals. Again, pictures and pictures. Steel, king of fabricated structures, and basic to modern civilization, appeared in the picture almost a hundred times as much as any other one metal. It was, too, index of advance and recession in the markets of the world. Of the world's requirement of about 100,000,000 tons of steel a year, the United States furnished a little more than half of the supply. The per capita annual requirement of new iron and steel was nearly one hundred times the amount upon which nearly half of the world operated. Yet in the America of the early 1930's the steel industry was sick unto death for the need of the oxygen of more consumption to provide for more production to satisfy its limitless capacity. Picture Pittsburgh and Bethlehem and Birmingham gauging the return of prosperity and hope by the red ember glow of furnace blasts!

The United States had grown steadily in its capacity to produce other metals for buildings or for industries—copper, zinc, lead, aluminum, mercury, and a hundred minor metals. Of copper, 540,000 tons or half of the world's supply. What part these metals played in the fabrication of American civilization could be seen in the new Waldorf Hotel, which used 80 tons of lead, 569,000 pounds of brass pipe, almost 100,000 pounds of copper. The inventory of other lesser metals again reflected extraordinary quality and abundance: radium and neon, aluminum and tin, mercury and arsenic, manganese and nickel, tungsten and cobalt, magnesium and cadmium, bismuth and zirconium, salt and sodium, codine and phosphorus, and the other hundreds of products of the uttermost earth reserves—supplies adequate for hundreds of years and likely to transform the life and labor, the health and happiness, of the people.

Traditional pictures of marble palaces had long since been transcended by real structures in America. Yet the picture of America's beautiful fabrications of marble, of both inside and outside construction, reflected but a fraction of all her total uses of multiple stone material—for buildings, monuments, paving, curb and crushed products for a thousand works. Of an aggregate of 65,949,000 tons, all told, marble was the least of all the household, with 333,000 tons, followed by slate with 410,000, sandstone with 2,623,000, granite with 4,221,000, basalt with 7,411,000, limestone with 49,760,-

000, and other stones with 1,191,000. And to the erstwhile building resources of the nation came the rapidly growing new member of the family, fabricated cement, with its 25,000,000 tons a year. It was freely prophesied that the present quantities and uses of cement were but a beginning of what future technology would require of this fabrication of natural resources which appeared almost unlimited in the nation.

There were yet other major aspects of the picture of the natural wealth of the nation which might be continuously featured with profit. Perhaps they were more matters of emphasis than of portraiture. Natural resources, after all, constituted the basic wealth of the nation. They existed for the future as well as the present. They had been fundamental in all of the past developments of the nation. These considerations should not be lost sight of. The further facts were that natural wealth was everywhere available in great abundance and variety sufficient for the attainment of a full measure of the American dream and for the zestful entertainment of its best talent for generations to come. On the other hand, there was the critical problem of technical ways of guaranteeing not only the utilization of natural resources, but such equilibrium of distribution and conservation as would make of the nation one of genuine balanced wealth and welfare. Opportunities seemed limitless. For it was to be remembered that although the land possibilities of the United States exceeded those of all Europe and approximated those of China and India, its population was still less than 125,000,000 in contrast to Europe's 350,000,000 and China and India with their 800,000,000. There were still land and resources in abundance to challenge new reaches of planning for human adequacy and security.

And the beauty and power of it! Scenic extravagance in a thousand parks, rolling hills and level plains; ten thousand smooth-flowing streams through meadows and valleys; a million pictures of farm folk at sunrise and sunset, in the fields and at the markets; a million pictures of ripening grain and mellowing fruits, pictures of the agelong contest of flowers that bloom, of foods for man and beast and weeds that grow and choke out the gardeners' and the farmers' handiwork; animals and animals, prize specimens and scrub, swift-running race horses, high-producing cattle; agelong pictures, meadows and hillsides, grazing lands and watering places.

Yet this greater picture has been blurred by the plight of farmer and miner and fisherman and lumberman, and by the dilemmas of poor men on poor land, of unemployed millions in a land of waste. These come to be the nation's chiefest problems of the new day.

*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

The people: Un-American farm tenancy contrary to the Jeffersonian basis of independent citizenship and an agrarian culture of strong institutions.



(upper) *Photo by Farm Security Administration*
(lower) *Photo by Bayard Wootten*

The people: Testing grounds of new American frontiers: to make democracy effective in the unequal places.

## *Chapter III*

# *NATURAL RESOURCES, THEIR CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION*

Of the American social problems of the new day which arise from the use and misuse, the conservation and waste of the natural wealth of the nation, some appear as logical and inevitable products of a national development which reflected greater purpose than design. Some appear as incidence of the new technological civilization which aided and abetted exploitation. And all such problems are clearly the fruits of the cumulative interplay, the natural and cultural heritage of the people. Of the new emphasis upon the social significance of these problems, much has grown out of the depression years and the New Deal. Some of it is extraordinarily timely, some perhaps exaggerated, but all of it is representative of the wide range of popular concern from the allegorical characterization of "poor land, poor men" to the prophecy that another century or two of our present procedure will render the nation a perpetual desert of abandoned civilization.

Of the questions asked and the problems presented there is a superabundance. What is the proper use of limitless earth, air, wood, water, food, minerals? What are the marginal limits of waste and wear in a complex, unplanned civilization? What are the sheer possibilities of development and utilization? What new inventions and scientific discoveries will usher in still other dramatic episodes of the new social technology, of new ways of mastering the social frontiers of a giant technological civilization and what social problems will they leave on our doorsteps?

Of the problems of land, for instance, which ones are most important? Which ones are essentially economic, which ones social, which ones political? Which problems will contribute to the essential balance of man and nature? How make land again the chiefest of our wealth reserves? In the midst of abundance of land should the back-to-the-land movement be encouraged in the face of overproduction of agricultural commodities? Should drain-

age and reclamation work cease? Should the great desert areas be irrigated or not? What should be the methods and means of preventing destructive erosion and of rebuilding the run-down lands? What should be done with the tax delinquent areas? What is to become of the millions of mortgaged acres and of the hundreds of thousands of tenants all but dispossessed of a where and how to live in any decent standard? What is to be the fate of millions of profitless acres of land abandoned by their owners? What is to be the redefinition of submarginal lands? What should be done about overproduction, curtailing the area of harvested crop lands, in the face of the new movement toward decentralized industry, part-time and self-sufficing farming?

These were some of the questions and problem-pictures which led the National Conference for Land Utilization in 1931 to approve of no less than eighteen recommendations, each of which represented a problem or a cluster of problems that characterized the land problem of the states. These recommendations were both general and technical, including such topics as the administration of public domain, watershed protection, protection of school lands, agricultural credit, the economic inventory of land resources and classification of soils, homestead interest, taxation, land development, regional competition, reclamation, use of marginal land, public retention or acquisition of land, soil conservation, land classification, decentralization of industry and its effect upon land utilization. The resolutions embodying recommendations were passed by representatives of no less than fifty universities, colleges and land grant colleges; at least eighteen railroads; thirteen government bureaus and commissions; and forty special and general agencies, such as agricultural credit corporations, federal land banks of different regions, chambers of commerce, agricultural associations, Investment Banking Association of America, National Farmers' Union, and state departments of agriculture.

Yet the problem of land planning for cities, towns, and villages was often overlooked. It constituted a separate picture in which many observers saw two conflicting pictures—one the crisis of megapolitan land use and another in which an extending village civilization might be the solution of depression problems. One group which did not neglect this was President Hoover's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership which featured land

planning as the basis for better homes and living. Village and suburb and the clustering of rural homes were to be conditioned upon cheap power and other resources for which America looked to science and technology for ample production; for new low rates and means of distribution; and for new minimum costs of equipment for their utilization. Whether those who saw in this village life the new mode of American life were correct or not, the problem of land utilization was assuming larger and larger proportions.

And what of the forestry problem consistently pictured as one of the largest before the American people? It was not only a problem of land utilization and rebuilding, but it was a problem of public policy and a test of private ownership, as the picture was presented in two significant volumes, on a *National Plan of American Forestry* presented in 1933 as a report of the Forest Service of the United States Department of Agriculture. Over against rapid deterioration and devastation were presented pictures of great possibilities through the solution of various problems—forest fires, flood and stream flow regulation, erosion, abandoned agricultural lands, forest industries, dependent related industries, the use of leisure time and recreation, the development of forest range for cattle, of forest wild life, of forest waters for fish. Through public ownership and planning and through state and national administration it was planned to balance the rural economic structure, increase taxables by improvement, and renew great resources of wood and pulp.

The main picture of the forest problems was presented in terms of four chief findings: The first was that practically all of the major problems of American forestry center in, or have grown out of, private ownership. The second was that unmanaged public lands constituted a chief problem of public ownership of forests. The third was that there has been "a serious lack of balance in constructive efforts to solve the forest problem as between private and public ownership and between the relatively poor and the relatively good land." The fourth conclusion was "that the forest problem ranks as one of our major national problems." Growing out of these findings were two chief recommendations looking toward the satisfactory solution of the problem. The first of these was for a large extension of public ownership of forest lands, and the second was for more intensive management of all publicly owned lands.

As in the case of the land and forestry, so with minerals a major problem was that of an equilibrium between the opulence of supply and production and such utilization as would meet adequately the present needs and those of the future without unnecessary waste. The nation not only had superb mineral resources, but had got into the habit of using metal and power far beyond the capacity of any other peoples of the earth. Under these circumstances, how long would fuel and metal continue to meet the extraordinary demand? And what new source of inexhaustible power might be discovered? And in the meantime, what of the problem of coal, an industry which appeared quite bankrupt and in which 3,300 mines had closed with the consequent laying off of 250,000 men? These human problems of millions of workers and their families came as near approximating the insolvable picture-puzzle as any in the American scene. And there were the complicated problems of the control of mineral resources and the control of production resembling in similar ways the problems of forestry, where waste and exhaustion were going on at a ruinous rate. The problems of costs and methods were problems more of technology than of resources. The conclusion of The President's Committee on Recent Social Trends was that for the country as a whole and for minerals as a whole the immediate outlook was for ample supplies which would be available at declining costs with the marginal problems of superabundance and control prominent in the foreground. For the long-time outlook the problems were those of supply, of growing difficulties of mining with the prospect of ultimate increase in cost, and consequently an increased obligation to make the prevention of unnecessary waste a matter of social responsibility and technology.

Here, again, as in many aspects of the natural wealth of the nation, the picture shaded off imperceptibly from opulence, quantity, and variety into a vast technology which comprised science, invention, discovery, management, and their application both to the physical processes of production and to their utilization in the changing of society. Of such dual character especially were the problems involved in electric and water power with their manifold ramifications. Ownership and control, productivity and distribution to the people at low cost, the transforming of rural and village areas were essential parts of the picture in the fabric of which

government, social planning, economic theory, philosophies, and procedures of democracy were important patterns. So interrelated were all the phases of the natural wealth of the nation that the picture could be complete in contemplation of not only this natural wealth but also of the technological wealth of the nation utilized to translate this natural wealth into capital or artificial wealth, which in turn must be the measure of the people's wealth and welfare. For here again was that oft-recurring motif of the incredible paradox of abundance of wealth in the midst of widespread want among the people and of manifest inadequacy of the social technology necessary to match the new reaches of science, invention, and technology.

In order to make more vivid the nature and emergency of these problems we may illustrate again with the problem of land. In this case, it is the problem of land waste through erosion, leaching, and draining the soil of its vitality and productivity. Thus, in the United States it is estimated that 300,000,000 acres of land have come to be well nigh waste places because of erosion and neglect.

Although perhaps no nation in the world possesses greater abundance of land resources and no nation offers a greater ratio of potentially fine arable land unused for crops, yet in no other nation does the picture of soil erosion appear so stupendous or rapid. There are many estimates of this waste. Stuart Chase's estimate is perhaps the most vivid, although it is supported by ample official statistics. From the 300,000,000 acres of eroded land and from other areas of washing he estimates that 40,000,000 tons a year of the three most valuable of all plant foods—phosphorus, potassium, and nitrogen—are washed out from fields and pastures. And from leaching and cropping drain other millions. If we multiply these millions, decade by decade during the century of America's prodigality, something of the astronomical immenseness of the loss can be imagined. To haul this annual waste of topsoil, it is estimated that it would take enough freight cars to girdle the planet nineteen times.

Yet it is not the bare waste of land that is most important. The nation might more easily afford the dumping of 400,000,000 tons of farm soil into the Gulf from the Mississippi and other millions into other river and ocean reservoirs than it could survive the gullied hillsides, the great chasm-scarred fields, the fruitless lands

for struggling men, the sand-covered bottom lands and the silt-filled river beds and flooded streams. For all of these strike deep at the heart of the work and wealth of people on the farms and of the permanent land endowment of the nation.

The extraordinary seriousness of this problem may be seen from the actual estimates of acres of wasted land and from the contemplation that such waste is the public enemy No. 1 of parts of the nation's areas—waste of land, waste of time, waste of work, waste of people. The emerging nature of the problem may be seen from an examination of the contrast between the earlier nation and the present America with a keen appreciation of how quickly the scene has changed. For in a period of barely three centuries the cumulations of 20,000 years have been spoiled to the extent that nearly all of the old primeval forests and all of the virgin grasslands have been transformed into crop lands or even deserts from which millions of tons of soil have been blowing east thousands of miles away. The National Resources Committee estimates, as is seen on the accompanying table showing the distribution of the nation's 1,900,000,000 acres of land, that two-thirds of the total is scarcely available for any sort of adequate crop production.

Of the social significance of this land waste much has already been said and much more will be said in subsequent pages. Suffice it to point out here how the nation is again becoming land conscious and how the land and the other natural wealths of the nation are being studied as never before. Yet, even as with the land, so with other resources, waste has been and still is too often the mode of national usage, and we must contemplate the national problems which arise from these as well as from the land. Let us look at a few and then return, through the contemplation of land and agricultural and rural life, to certain special remedies which may be taken as representative of all.

We have already called attention to the larger problems of forestry, but it is necessary to note here, as with the land, the contrasting picture in which it may be estimated that 75 percent of the extraordinary forest resources have been exhausted in these short 300 years. True, as Stuart Chase points out, the millions of acres of cut-over and burned-over lands are still called forests, but no one who ever saw the great piney woods of the South, or the great fir forests of the Northwest, or the primeval timbers of the

## PRELIMINARY INVENTORY OF LAND PRODUCTIVITY CLASSES OF THE UNITED STATES

Adapted from National Resources Board, Report, Part II.

| State and Region | Grade 1 Acres | Grade 2 Acres | Grade 3 Acres | Grade 4 Acres | Grade 5 Acres | Percent of Grades 4 and 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Southeast* .... | 5,423,479 | 36,955,099 | 100,234,769 | 104,992,387 | 78,757,366 | 56.3 |
| Virginia ..... | ..... | 3,653,134 | 9,279,761 | 7,312,200 | 5,399,769 | 49.6 |
| North Carolina.. | ..... | 1,166,506 | 11,360,152 | 9,381,729 | 9,285,453 | 59.8 |
| South Carolina.. | ..... | 296,359 | 7,069,969 | 7,127,990 | 5,022,890 | 62.3 |
| Georgia ..... | ..... | 1,851,537 | 15,614,067 | 9,750,361 | 10,368,603 | 53.5 |
| Florida ..... | 71,161 | 933,187 | 3,928,412 | 12,892,726 | 17,077,968 | 85.9 |
| Kentucky ..... | 863,916 | 5,020,424 | 8,956,319 | 7,905,826 | 2,877,195 | 42.1 |
| Tennessee ..... | 902,258 | 4,769,847 | 9,305,437 | 8,239,726 | 3,412,108 | 43.8 |
| Alabama ..... | ..... | 3,002,499 | 9,528,183 | 10,730,251 | 9,490,887 | 61.7 |
| Mississippi ..... | 844,230 | 5,336,459 | 8,614,697 | 10,928,882 | 4,090,950 | 25.7 |
| Arkansas ..... | 1,452,484 | 7,952,405 | 9,231,149 | 8,299,905 | 6,707,425 | 44.6 |
| Louisiana ..... | 1,289,430 | 2,972,742 | 7,346,623 | 12,422,991 | 5,024,118 | 60.1 |
| *Southwest* ... | 3,291,751 | 32,255,668 | 71,157,460 | 50,785,773 | 266,297,180 | 74.7 |
| Oklahoma ..... | 1,700,604 | 12,795,160 | 15,268,765 | 7,825,536 | 6,856,079 | 33.0 |
| Texas ..... .. | 1,591,147 | 19,460,508 | 54,974,391 | 35,950,166 | 56,098,156 | 54.8 |
| New Mexico.... | ... .... | ..... | 914,304 | 6,060,758 | 71,426,858 | 98 8 |
| Arizona ... .... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 949,313 | 71,916,087 | 100.0 |
| *Northeast* .... | 905,648 | 21,378,863 | 31,424,615 | 29,709,934 | 32,584,672 | 53.7 |
| Maine ..... | ..... | 1,615,033 | 3,788,506 | 5,791,456 | 7,977,805 | 71.8 |
| New Hampshire | 2,330 | 237,212 | 370,426 | 1,671,601 | 3,478,271 | 89.4 |
| Vermont .. .... | 33,217 | 900,588 | 1,268,238 | 2,185,398 | 1,451,919 | 77.4 |
| Massachusetts .. | 11,906 | 759,807 | 1,274,906 | 1,644,453 | 1,367,488 | 59.5 |
| Rhode Island... | ..... | 5,463 | 228,082 | 71,019 | 378,316 | 65.8 |
| Connecticut .... | 48,452 | 338,620 | 902,062 | 962,120 | 850,826 | 58.4 |
| New York..... | 94,037 | 6,863,934 | 9,248,628 | 9,172,273 | 4,925,960 | 46.5 |
| New Jersey..... | 6,272 | 943,268 | 963,896 | 1,379,108 | 1,471,016 | 59 8 |
| Delaware ..... | ..... | 222,080 | 350,784 | 417,216 | 273,280 | 54.7 |
| Pennsylvania ... | 177,151 | 6,268,104 | 9,496,900 | 5,908,804 | 6,909,469 | 44.6 |
| Maryland ... . | 143,732 | 1,874,527 | 1,445,544 | 1,859,409 | 972,532 | 45.0 |
| West Virginia.. | 388,551 | 1,350,227 | 2,986,643 | 7,647,077 | 2,827,790 | 68.9 |
| *Middle States* | 76,005,150 | 75,888,929 | 59,397,840 | 36,826,916 | 40,387,438 | 26.8 |
| Ohio ..... | 4,214,074 | 6,234,205 | 10,439,723 | 3,809,973 | 1,374,625 | 19.9 |
| Indiana ..... | 5,262,498 | 6,438,377 | 7,743,581 | 2,436,801 | 1,153,367 | 15.6 |
| Illinois ..... | 14,777,030 | 6,847,145 | 6,223,171 | 6,621,568 | 960,998 | 21.4 |
| Michigan ..... | 2,251,155 | 8,961,198 | 5,386,738 | 7,228,991 | 13,223,254 | 55.2 |
| Wisconsin ..... | 2,820,276 | 14,529,981 | 8,396,995 | 4,564,307 | 5,271,021 | 27.6 |
| Minnesota .... | 12,022,243 | 12,138,815 | 7,511,325 | 6,898,992 | 13,144,839 | 38.8 |
| Iowa ..... | 25,983,110 | 6,906,158 | 1,392,680 | 1,007,416 | 344,556 | 3.8 |
| Missouri ..... | 8,674,763 | 13,833,050 | 12,303,627 | 4,258,868 | 4,914,778 | 20.9 |
| *Northwest* ... | 14,938,514 | 41,376,309 | 68,160,714 | 105,537,864 | 293,448,979 | 76.2 |
| North Dakota... | ..... | 7,365,682 | 17,715,865 | 14,151,534 | 5,679,955 | 44.2 |
| South Dakota... | 3,052,320 | 8,775,365 | 8,960,392 | 15,552,419 | 12,821,104 | 57.7 |
| Nebraska ..... | 8,120,907 | 9,690,068 | 9,639,648 | 10,908,321 | 10,757,984 | 44.1 |
| Kansas ..... | 3,765,287 | 15,172,236 | 15,964,703 | 11,207,323 | 6,094,867 | 33.1 |
| Montana ..... | ..... | .... .... | 7,366,681 | 30,438,292 | 55,565,267 | 92.1 |
| Idaho ..... | ..... | 87,288 | 949,208 | 3,728,908 | 48,581,156 | 98.1 |
| Wyoming ... .. | ..... | ... .... | 522,936 | 4,577,769 | 57,314,015 | 99.2 |
| Colorado ..... | ..... | 285,670 | 7,041,281 | 13,743,839 | 45,270,330 | 89.0 |
| Utah ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 1,233,459 | 51,364,301 | 100.0 |
| *Far West*..... | 473,032 | 3,079,860 | 14,596,402 | 25,682,099 | 229,959,779 | 93.4 |
| Nevada ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 76,900 | 70,208,480 | 100.0 |
| Washington .... | 83,520 | 542,138 | 6,537,431 | 6,760,172 | 28,836,291 | 83.2 |
| Oregon ..... | 342,536 | 2,059,425 | 4,694,454 | 5,464,700 | 48,567,845 | 88.4 |
| California ..... | 46,976 | 478,297 | 3,364,517 | 13,380,327 | 82,347,163 | 96.1 |
| United States .. | 101,037,573 | 210,934,728 | 345,871,800 | 362,559,173 | 881,735,414 | 65.5 |
| Percentages .... | 5.3 | 11.1 | 18.1 | 19.1 | 46.4 | ... |

Some of the "cold statistics" of Stuart Chase's *Rich Land, Poor Land* and of Russell Lord's *To Save This Land* and *Behold Our Land* are found in the above table arranged by regions to indicate variations and different dilemmas. These figures should be studied in relation to such problems as the ratio between increasing population and a relatively decreasing arable land.

great Middle States can ever liken them to the earlier American wealth of forest reserves. The picture of devastated lands is one in which neither trees nor grass nor soil nor beauty may be salvaged. 'The soil itself is often burned in the ensuing fires. When new vegetation starts, if at all, it is a different and poorer tree crop. These cut-over, burned-over lands are still called "forest" on the maps, but we see that almost 100,000,000 acres is really dead land—totally unknown in the old America. This is a strange and desolate phenomenon—no farms, no productive forest, no animals, no life.'[1] So, too, the old wealth reserves of grasslands are gone. 'The primeval sod has been burned, overgrazed, plowed up and destroyed. Where dry farming for wheat has been practised on the Great Plains, the Dust Bowl spreads. Where corn has been planted on the slopes in the tall grass regions, water erosion spreads. The sharp hooves of too many cattle and the close cropping of the grass by too many sheep have torn the cover from the open grazing lands, loosened the ancient sod, and started the gullies and dunes of both water and wind erosion. One hundred and sixty-five million acres of grazing lands have been seriously depleted. As in the case of forests, when new vegetation secures a foothold, the species is inferior to the old climax crop.'[2]

As is the case with land and trees and grasses, so with rivers and water, the toll of time reflects tragic waste and rising problems. We have already referred to the wash of rain waters on the hills and into the valleys and river beds filling up streams, militating against water power, and multiplying floods. We still have to contemplate the scarcity of permanent water and of lowering water levels because of run-off of rains on plowed lands and exhaustion of water from irrigation-draining from the earth's depths. And there are yet so many other great problems that the National Resources Committee has treated the problems of water and drainage under no less than eleven main headings, including bank and coastal erosion control, domestic and industrial water supply, drainage, flood control, generation of electric power, irrigation, navigation, recreation, soil conservation and forest development, waste disposal and pollution abatement, wildlife conservation.

The statement of the essential national problems is well made by the Committee when it points out that water problems, like land and minerals and forests, have too long been individual and local

problems oblivious of the interests of other regions or of the public or of complicated interrelationships. Thus, 'in planning the storage of water for irrigation in the arid West, the possibilities of concomitant power development have not always been emphasized. In planning the drainage of lands for agricultural use in the humid East, the possibility of injury to other interests affected by the behavior of water commonly has been ignored. Far too often in all sections of the country the control of a stream subject to destructive floods, the improvement of a river channel for navigation, the procurement of water from a stream for municipal and domestic use, the disposal of sewage and industrial waste in a drainage channel, or other concern in the use or control of water, has been treated as an isolated problem, in disregard both of the inherent relationships between various types of water problems and of the possibilities of multiple-purpose development. Too often, also, specific water problems have been treated solely in terms of particular localities, urban or rural, with resultant injury to other localities on the same river system. Water development in general has been haphazard.

'During the last few years it has become increasingly apparent that such orderless, unintegrated treatment of water problems, however natural and excusable it may have been under pioneer conditions, should no longer be tolerated. Water, though at times a merciless enemy of man, is perhaps the most precious natural resource of the nation. The supply of water for essential purposes, available and potential, on the surface and underground, is strictly limited, though it varies from time to time at a given place as well as from place to place at a given time. The further development of large areas in all sections depends even now in considerable part on the extent to which the supply of available water can be increased by storing surface water, by pumping ground water, or by other means. Sooner or later, wasteful use of water must cease. Sooner or later, the maximum supply of water that can be made regularly available in each drainage area must be put to its best coordinated use.'[8]

Now these problems of water naturally lead us next into the consideration of the new and multiple problems of power which is to a large extent the new master of the new age. Here are problems of limitless resources coming from natural endowment. What

## CONSERVING AND UTILIZING NATURAL WEALTH THROUGH NATIONAL PARKS

**Illustrated Booklets Concerning No Less Than Twenty of the Twenty-six National Parks Listed Below May Be Had from the Director of National Park Service at Washington**

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, KY.—Birthplace of Abraham Lincoln. Established 1916; 0.17 square miles.

ACADIA, MAINE.—Combination of mountain and seacoast scenery. Established 1919; 24.91 square miles.

BRYCE CANYON, UTAH.—Canyons filled with exquisitely colored pinnacles. Established 1928; 56.23 square miles.

CARLSBAD CAVERNS, N. MEX.—Beautifully decorated limestone caverns. Established 1930; 15.75 square miles.

CRATER LAKE, OREG.—Beautiful lake in crater of extinct volcano. Established 1902; 250.52 square miles.

FORT McHENRY, MD.—Its defense in 1814 inspired writing of Star-spangled Banner. Established 1925; 0.07 square miles.

GENERAL GRANT, CALIF.—General Grant Tree and grove of Big Trees. Established 1890; 3.98 square miles.

GLACIER, MONT.—Unsurpassed alpine scenery; 200 lakes; 60 glaciers. Established 1910, 1,537.98 square miles.

GRAND CANYON, ARIZ.—World's greatest example of erosion. Established 1919; 1,008 square miles.

GRAND TETON, WYO.—Most spectacular portion of Teton Mountains. Established 1929; 150 square miles.

GREAT SMOKY MOUNTAINS, N. C.-TENN.—Massive mountain uplift; magnificent forests. Established for protection 1930; 643.26 square miles.

HAWAII: ISLANDS OF HAWAII AND MAUI.—Interesting volcanic areas. Established 1916; 248.54 square miles.

HOT SPRINGS, ARK.—Forty-seven hot springs reserved by the Federal Government in 1832 to prevent exploitation of waters. Made national park in 1921; 1.54 square miles.

LASSEN VOLCANIC, CALIF.—Only recently active volcano in United States proper. Established 1916; 163.32 square miles.

MAMMOTH CAVE, KY.—Interesting caverns, including spectacular onyx cave formation. Established for protection 1936; 54.09 square miles.

MESA VERDE, COLO.—Most notable cliff dwellings in United States. Established 1906; 80.21 square miles.

MOUNT McKINLEY, ALASKA.—Highest mountain North America. Established 1917; 3,030 46 square miles.

MOUNT RAINIER, WASH.—Largest accessible single-peak glacier system. Established 1899; 377.78 square miles.

PLATT, OKLA.—Sulphur and other springs. Established 1902; 1.32 square miles.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN, COLO.—Peaks from 11,000 to 14,255 feet in heart of Rockies. Established 1915; 405.33 square miles.

SEQUOIA, CALIF.—General Sherman, largest and possibly oldest tree in world; outstanding groves of Sequoia gigantea. Established 1890; 604 square miles.

SHENANDOAH, VA.—Outstanding scenic area in Blue Ridge. Established 1935, 282 14 square miles.

WIND CAVE, S. DAK.—Beautiful cavern of peculiar formations. No stalactites or stalagmites. Established 1903; 19.75 square miles.

YELLOWSTONE: WYO.-MONT.-IDAHO.—World's greatest geyser area, an outstanding game preserve. Established 1872; 3,437.88 square miles.

YOSEMITE, CALIF.—Valley of world-famous beauty; spectacular waterfalls, magnificent High Sierra country. Established 1890; 1,176.16 square miles.

ZION, UTAH.—Zion Canyon 1,500 to 2,500 feet deep. Spectacular coloring. Established 1919, 134.91 square miles.

In *What Are National Parks?* Supplement to *Planning and Civic Comment* for March 1938,

The role of parks in land planning and use is given as follows: "Park conservation is a national policy and a national challenge. . . . Parks are as much a form of land settlement as are farms, and park management is as much a land settlement industry as is the growing of corn, potatoes, or wheat. In the settlement of a country some lands are more suited to farming, others to grazing, others to forestry and mining. But some lands are more suitable for the inspiration, or recreation, of the people—breathing spaces, they might be called. . . . National parks may be defined as the superlative natural areas, set apart and conserved unimpaired for the inspiration and benefit of the people. National monuments are the objects of historic, prehistoric, or scientific interest, set apart and conserved unimpaired because of their national value. . . . For the national park and monument system, the Federal Government seeks to locate, appraise, and secure for public inspiration and benefit: All those areas that are nationally of more value for recreation than for any other use; Outstanding stretches of the ocean beaches; Nationally important prehistoric and historic sites, objects, and buildings; The finest representative examples of native plant and animal life; The most instructive geological exhibits—such as the Grand Canyon; and A system of nationally important scenic and historic parkways."

to do and how to do it—these are questions waiting to be answered. There are many problems of the development of power resources, the production of power itself, and its distribution to the people involving such changes and technology as give rise to far-reaching transformations in the nation.

Here are some of the question-problems which we must face. How much power is available and at what cost? How reduce the cost and widen its distribution? What is the relation of these services to the people and to government? Can this power be used: to remake rural life, to build a better rural community, to make a better agriculture? To decentralize industry and minimize the dangers of bigness and megapolitan civilization? To ruralize the urban culture and work out equilibrium between agriculture and industry? And many others.

There are other problems of natural heritage reflected through the cultural inheritance and social settings: conservation of wild life and the development of national, state, and local parks, all interrelated with the conservation of land, forests, fields, streams, fish, birds, game, recreation in a setting calculated to enrich the human wealth of the nation. We cite the catalogue of national parks and the picturesque descriptions of their promise and prospect as further example of some of the interrelations of nature and society in this great American continent. The national parks, situated in twenty states and ranging in size from less than a square mile to more than 3,000 square miles, are representative of the new reach of social and civic planning.

We may, however, now turn back to the problems of land and agriculture and note that, because of poor lands or lands not adequately utilized or managed, the nation has many millions of its people inadequately occupied, housed, clothed, educated; and all of this is reflected in national imbalance of wealth and purchasing power and in cultural imbalance of pathological conditions. Thus the lands of the South and its one half of all the farm tenants in America. Thus, the earlier lands of the Great Lakes area and the other rural "problem areas" of the nation. Concerning the Great Lakes cut-over areas, recent studies of living standards, made jointly by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and the Farm Security Administration, show eloquently the linking together of land and men and standards. 'The report is one of a series dealing with

rural social problems in various sections of the country. The study, made cooperatively by the two agencies, covers living standards of nearly 1,000 families in 10 counties in Wisconsin, Minnesota and Michigan, often designated as "one of the problem areas of the United States." "Few events in American history have paralleled the destructive exploitation of the lumber resources of the Great Lakes States," the report states. "The axe of the lumberman left thousands of acres of stump-dotted, unproductive land, upon which, because it no longer produced revenue, the lumber companies permitted taxes to become delinquent. The lands then passed into the hands of promoters. . . . After the lands were unloaded on would-be farmers, there began a struggle which still goes on. Often settlers found to their sorrow that lands they had bought were not suited to agriculture. They had bought heavily; their savings were invested and their holdings were mortgaged. Some abandoned the land and let it go back to previous owners or to the State; others hung on, always hopeful of making ends meet." For the 850 open-country families studied, the average total value of family living—the value of goods and services consumed per family—was $1,031 for the year. For the 122 village families studied, the value was $851.'[4]

Finally, we may close our discussion with the challenge of Secretary Henry A. Wallace's introduction to the 1938 *Yearbook of Agriculture:* 'The earth,' writes Secretary Wallace, 'is the mother of us all—plants, animals, and men. The phosphorus and calcium of the earth build our skeletons and nervous systems. Everything else our bodies need except air and sun comes from the earth.

'Nature treats the earth kindly. Man treats her harshly. He overplows the cropland, overgrazes the pastureland, and overcuts the timberland. He destroys millions of acres completely. He pours fertility year after year into the cities, which in turn pour what they do not use down the sewers into the rivers and the ocean. The flood problem insofar as it is man-made is chiefly the result of overplowing, overgrazing, and overcutting of timber.

'This terribly destructive process is excusable in a young civilization. It is not excusable in the United States in the year 1938.'

We come, therefore, to next steps both in the appraisal of facts and in the planning of remedies. Whatever else the depression years in America may have brought the people, they will retain a

residuum of information and high motivation with reference to the conservation and use of their natural resources. First, there has been a great era of adult education in which students even in the high schools talk of erosion and waste, of conservation and "human-use ends" of our wealth. The people have been told by experts and by popular writers what floods and soil waste and cut-over lands mean. All this has been dramatized, too, in thousands of photographs and in the documentary moving pictures, "The Plow that Broke the Plains" and "The River." The United States Department of Agriculture sends out its miscellaneous publication No. 321, *To Hold This Land,* by Russell Lord, who also writes for Houghton Mifflin Company *Behold Our Land,* which William Allen White calls "a new way and a wise way of looking at our country." The Progressive Education Association sends out *A Call to the Teachers of the Nation,* while the Public Affairs Committee, a list of whose pamphlets will be found in Chapter XXX, adds a title *Saving Our Soil.*

The greater portion of this educational program is pointed toward conservation and includes forests, minerals, and wild life, as well as soils. Yet another large area of emphasis and study will be found in the notable publications about parks and playgrounds, scenic wealth and beauty as assets of the great natural wealth of the nation. Thus the Catalogue of the American Guide Series of the Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration reports in 1938 more than one hundred and fifty volumes with a hundred others still to come.

More than education, however, has been achieved. In soil conservation, in crop control, and in various technical ways of new planning techniques, the federal, state, and county authorities have made great progress. Something of these efforts will, of course, be reflected in our chapter on Social Planning and Social Technology. So, also, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the state planning boards, and scores of workers throughout the nation have joined hands in this new era of conservation, which is more than mere "movement." It seems quite likely that the nation as a whole may date its new era from the depression years and after, when its phenomenal waste habits were at least checked and new wealth was to be added by the billions of dollars in the increase of values

of land and in the scientific utilization of forests and mines and water.

For more of the extent and details of all this movement, the reader may turn to Chapter XXX. In the meantime, our picture here, as in most aspects of our problems, carries us on into the new reaches of change and technology which we shall next examine.

## *Chapter IV*

# *SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND CHANGE*

NEXT to the heritage of natural resources and their utilization and waste through economic and cultural developments the most profound inheritance of the people in the modern world is that of science and technology and change. This is true the world over; powerfully true in America.

The most notable achievements of science and technology, including the resultant patterns of conduct and culture, during the first third of the twentieth century would have been adjudged by the earliest forefathers of the Republic works of madness, demonism, witchcraft, or immorality—fruits meet for death. And even within this first third of the twentieth century the concepts of many of the most potent inventions were characterized as vain imaginings, and only a little earlier the automobile was termed a crazy experiment, and yet still a little earlier a railroad across the Rocky Mountains was satirized as a mad project. A scarcely less vivid picture of contrast was that of 2,000,000 women in technical work in office and organization service which before the turn of the century had been assumed to be detrimental to the morals and manners of womankind. These and a thousand other illustrations indicated something of the degree and rapidity with which science, invention, management, technology had transformed the whole cultural picture of the nation; had made its natural wealth increasingly inseparable from the composite fabric of all its wealth—natural, technological, capital, human, institutional, regional. Such had been the role of technology in the progress and the plight of the nation and in determining the nature and direction of reconstruction and future development that it must be clear that neither its range nor speed had been predictable. Thus, even though the nation had given more attention to the designed and ordered development of its civilization, it seemed absurd to hold the earlier patriot and citizen responsible for such unforeseen developments

or to assume that the fabric of his government would be adequate for a civilization such as had so recently developed.

Indeed the two most important developments in connection with the natural wealth of the nation as reflected in the picture of the early 1930's were not foreshadowed in the 1789 federal Constitution. The one was this extraordinary advance of science and technology and their application, especially through invested private capital, to the utilization of natural resources for the almost complete transformation of man's life on earth. The other was the policy of the United States government toward the ownership and utilization of land, water, minerals, public utilities. Jefferson undoubtedly laid the foundation for the dream of John Quincy Adams of a nation which would so utilize its great resources and so correlate them with technical developments of roads and canals and public works as to endow education and science on a scale not hitherto recorded in the time of man. And, although it had generally been assumed that the political development of an unplanned economic nation had long since made impossible the realization of a dream to make science and education predominant, their support and endowment were such as would have appeared impossible to the sage of Monticello. By 1935 the federal government itself employed no less than 18,372 persons in professional and scientific service to which were added many hundreds more by 1938. Other evidences of this scientific interest were the American Association for the Advancement of Science; the National Research Council; $200,000,000 earmarked or appropriated by foundations for scientific research; more than 500 research organizations in universities and elsewhere; more than 250 research laboratories in major industrial plants. And there were many other evidences, eloquent in testimony of the advance of science and research.

Jefferson himself, to some extent a pioneer, was much interested in science, and in particular he was accustomed to encourage scientific methods in agriculture. Yet the agricultural science of the 1930's, with its thousands of institutes, laboratories, and workers, seemed far beyond any dream or plan of Jefferson. Here, for instance, was an inventory of the science of agriculture made by one of the 34 committees of the National Research Council for exhibits in A Century of Progress, the Chicago International Exposition of 1933, which showed no less than 250 sections, representing a hun-

dred years' progress in the science of agriculture. There were 83 sections featuring agronomy, crops, and entomology; 113 featuring horticulture, forestry, foods, and canning; 54 sections on animal husbandry, farm mechanics, and machinery. Or consider the science staff of the Department of Agriculture of the United States government which employed more than 5,000 specialists in nearly 200 categories, eloquent of the scope and nature of agricultural technology. There were soil technologists, sugar technologists, feed technologists, cotton technologists; there were biochemists, biophysicists, economic geologists, economic zoologists; statisticians, bacteriologists, petrographers, mycologists, and a host of others.

No less startling to the earlier concepts of science would be the other 33 inventories representing as many branches of science, categorized by more than 400 scientists appointed by the National Research Council to cooperate with A Century of Progress in planning the central feature of the Exposition. This chief feature was to center around exhibits which would "demonstrate, in a readily understandable manner, those fundamental discoveries in pure science which now form the basis of human progress." In addition to its special exhibit in physical anthropology, there were presented for consideration no less than 47 sections in the five basic sciences of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and geology. In the applied sciences there were several hundred sections in engineering, medicine, earth sciences, mineral sciences, and industries other than minerals, such as engineering industries, building and construction, industrial arts. The further picture of the popular presentation of science was manifest in the score of titles in the Century of Progress Science Series of Little Books. They pictured automotive engineering as "A New Necessity"; biophysics as "Life Giving Light"; mathematics as "Queen of the Sciences"; astronomy as "The Universe Unfolding"; geology as "The Story of a Million Years." They pictured "Chemistry Triumphant," "Frontiers of Medicine," "Man and Microbes," "Evolution and Insects." They told about feeding hungry plants, the treatment of steel and people, and our mineral civilization. These practical-application aspects of science indicated that, although the twentieth century was known as the age of science, science as such, even though laying the basis for the age of technology, occupied no such place in the picture as did those dynamic discoveries and inventions

which were readily applicable to the transformation of culture everywhere.

The 1930 pictures of science and technology as the most dynamic factors in contemporary society were so numerous that the whole scene sometimes appeared as one of a technological world, the portraiture of which seemed to have no limit. If the picture of the new world of technology be viewed from the harbor approach to New York City, it appeared as a magnificent wonderland of skyscrapers, of structures fabricated on a new metropolitan pattern of architecture, and of an incredible magic beehive of human activity. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the spectacle of the nation's dominant metropolis presented a picture which still seemed stranger than fiction. Yet the observer was likely to accept the product which he saw from the top of the Empire Building as a matter-of-fact achievement, forgetting for the moment the science and technology which had made such building possible. If, however, he investigated the details of construction or operation, he found a hundred pictures of technical handiwork that appeared little short of miracle work. Tons of steel and copper and brass and aluminum wrought into inside and outside construction. A dozen strokes of lightning might hit the building, but the observer would never know it. A hundred other pictures within the building—of ventilating and heating, of waterworks and sanitation; of elevators and communicating systems—wires and pipes, power and comfort, efficiency and precision, under the ground, inside the walls, hidden magic of technology transforming natural wealth into artificial wealth. Here were splendor, achievement, grace and beauty of line and light, new reaches in the metropolitan architecture, yet paradoxically sometimes adjudged so big and perfect as to defeat its purpose.

Still more impressive might be the underground technology in a great city, a cross-section of which appeared to the layman as a superpuzzle, impossible of solution, or as some great and terrible machine set for the enslavement of humanity. Miles of pipe, big and medium and small; millions of feet of wire and conduits; gas and water, electric power and light; great caverns and caves; water mains fabricated through marvels of engineering technology, colossal sewers leading to still other marvels of sanitary engineering. City subways and trading places, space where no space was, mul-

tiplied acres, neither land nor sea, neither natural light nor darkness, artificial fabrication of the new technology. Here were new modes of living, new problems of human relationships, new hazards and new thrills. Technology had made a new world.

And of the circulatory system of the city, marvels again. Four levels of movement—subway, surface, elevated, airways, complex of the new mobility; buses and cabs, trucks and hand cars, railroad terminals reminiscent of grand palaces of light and activity. From the outside world ships and ocean liners, new marvels of technology, incoming streams of commerce by boat and rail and highway, serving the millions of a city which could not survive without its technology working well. Distances eliminated, fresh winter fruits and vegetables from California and Florida, milk from the provinces, meat from the Middle States and further, luxuries from the uttermost parts of the world. Cable and telephone, radio and wireless, teletype and television; time and space were no more; time and space were forever. Complex of paradoxes, simplicity and speed, fabrications approaching dangerous margins of practicability and safety. Yet another picture of pictures: the plight of the great city in the new type of war—could technology match technology?

And within the buzzing busy buildings amazing technology again: commerce and trade, professions and business, management and science, multiplying efficiency, building machines, inventing new ways of doing more work, of making more money, of reaching new heights of comfort, convenience, success. Stock market scenes indescribable, wiping out millions in a day, recovering to show a single day's turnover of more than 30,000,000 shares. There was the picture extraordinary of the metropolitan newspaper, news from the provinces, news from the world, entertainment at home, entertainment from abroad, education and instruction, trade guide and index—technology de luxe, a half million words in a single issue, multiplied by daily issues for the years. Such technology that there is published daily not only "all the news that's fit to print" but almost a complete picture of the civilization of the times day by day. And of all newspapers in the nation an annual setting up of type for advertisements alone of lines equivalent to twenty times the whole national annual output of published books.

Thus, samplings from the picture of New York in the 1930's in

stark contrast to the same city at the time of Jefferson's official sojourn in it, with its simple homes and back yards, horses and cows, pigs and gardens. Yet it was a city even then too big for Jefferson who wrote, "In the great cities I go to see what travellers think alone worthy of being seen; but I make a job of it and generally gulp it down in a day." Turning from New York to the regions, pictures of technological magic seemed almost limitless. For one thing there were other cities—Chicago and Detroit, Denver and Los Angeles. And between the cities—speed, luxury—a Twentieth Century Limited or Capital Limited air-cooled de luxe passenger-carrying palace.

Or contrasting pictures of stage coach and automobile, of through trains and fast schedules; or a hundred thousand registered automobile buses traversing a million miles of roadways, tapping a million self-measuring gasoline pumps on the nation's motor highways, representing the new romance of retail gasoline sentinels of more billions of dollars' investment than were in existence for all industry in Jefferson's day. Thus technology was transforming the nation's landscape and its ways of living. Likewise, 26,000,000 automobiles were symbols of technology which built not only the new automotive industry to take the place of lost railway positions, but also roads and bridges and garages and tourists camps; and made necessary and possible police patrols and consolidated schools, smaller governmental units and new trade centers as well as creating demands for countless consumers' goods. There were enough automobiles for every person in the nation to ride any time he wanted to; there were 50,000 miles of air service, and there was record flight around the world in 8 days, 15 hours and 51 minutes. And then, again, this was shattered in 1938 by nearly half. There was the once incredible feat of Italian Air Minister Balbo flying to Chicago's Century of Progress with an air armada of 24 planes and 96 men, 6,100 miles in an actual flying time of 47 hours and 52 minutes. Thence, returning to Italy to receive the double kiss of the master, Mussolini. And all this within less than a decade becoming commonplace in the air armadas of competing nations.

If one followed the Roosevelt flying cabinet and the multiple committees, advisers, and delegates to the states and regions, his picture of science and technology grew to vast proportions and

brilliance. Yet the portraiture was one of great contrasts and unevenness. Here were science and technology working transformation in one aspect of life and ignoring others; or magic changes in one place contrasted with almost primitive conditions of nature and living in another. As in the city, the superskyscraper overlooked slums and back streets; so throughout the land the American picture abounded in striking contrasts. The network of national highways with their millions of automobiles speeding along ran through the midst of backwoods regions, poor lands and poor people. Packard and oxcart were still found in the same community.

Not all of the contrast was limited to mechanical instruments of living. Alongside the brilliant Century of Progress there were tragic limitations in the Chicago schools; alongside the increasing demand for better equipment there was decrease in vocational, recreational, and other special technical educational features. The same technology which built thousands of power stations, dotted the land with reservoir dams, and tied the nation together with a network of transmission lines, also made possible the massing of social control in the hands of a few. There were prominent, high-salaried officials of great companies campaigning for lower salaries of teachers, for less use of the great inventions for schools and human welfare; for more control by the few over the destinies of many. The same technology which had made possible riches and abundance beyond compare had also let the nation down in a two-year period with a $20,000,000,000 drop in workers' income; $7,000,000,000 for farmers, $10,000,000,000 vanished real estate; and half the people of the nation "ruined." What to do with such technology, that was the question. The final nature of this part of the American picture, however, was yet to be determined by the degree to which social technology would successfully play its role of controlling physical technology.

The common interpretation of a nation's progress was that it was due, not to its extraordinary natural resources, but to its successful development and use of these resources through the advances of science and technology. Thus, it would be pointed out, the differences between a civilization such as America's and that of China, in addition to differences of race and age, were largely due to different applications of scientific discoveries and mechanical

inventions. The picture of the United States at the end of the first third of the twentieth century, therefore, was a reflection of what science and invention had done to and with its great natural wealth during the previous century. In agriculture, for instance, it had multiplied the work capacity of a man manyfold and had made possible accomplishments which no number of men could do. A monster tractor driven by one man could pull enough deep furrow grain drills to seed more than 300 acres in one day. One man riding the newest corn cultivator could "plow" from 30 to 65 acres a day. The proposed cotton picker, when perfected, would do the work of from 16 to 48 Negro cotton pickers. The tractor-drawn combine machinery, harvesting the wheat in the fields by the hundreds of bushels—cutting, binding, threshing, filling the bags—was in brilliant contrast to the earlier pictures of a single man swinging the old "cradle," sweeping in with his fingers the gathered grain, piling it on the ground in small "hands" to be garnered later and tied by hand in bundles, these bundles to be shocked and later hauled by wagon to some central place where the day's threshing was to be done. Indeed few American episodes had been more dramatic than the evolution of the harvester from McCormick's first efforts to the last supermodel machine. Scarcely less revolutionary was the transportation of farm products by truck and fast-moving refrigerator trains, representative of technology's transformation of agriculture, markets, and consumption habits. Yet technology left as great a problem in overproduction since it was possible for an increasingly smaller ratio of farm folks to supply the nation's needs. Indeed the agricultural situation appeared to many onlookers hopelessly insolvable unless a great deal more intelligent attention was to be given to it than had hitherto been in evidence.

On the other hand, there were those who saw in the future a new agrarian culture made possible by still greater progress in technology, such that cheap light, power, heat, water, and transportation services would make possible a new type of rural comfort and culture. New inventions and skill would reduce the cost of equipment, such as electric ranges, mechanical refrigerators, household conveniences to such an extent that they would be available for the common man on a small self-sufficing farm, or in small groups clustered around plants of decentralized industry.

This, indeed, was a new picture and a fascinating one to look forward to, much more pleasant than that other devastating prospect of the farmer to be made peasant by a great sweep of mechanized agriculture, of overproduction, and poor markets.

Science, invention, technology were also mightily at work upon the other natural resources and their utilization. In forestry, in lumber industries, in mining and mineral processing; in the transformation of great quantities of crude resources into materials for the building of roads and bridges; in the development of large areas for recreation, hunting, fishing, the nation's measure of wealth was largely a measure of its technology. Perhaps still more vivid was technology's multiplication of products from all and sundry natural resources. There were a hundred products from the lowly sweet potato—sugar and meal and beverage and glue; other hundreds of products from peanuts and cotton, wood pulp and corn stalks, clay and rosin. A hundred and one by-products from packing houses and mill and factory together with the multiplication of novelties and varieties of standard products, which in turn multiplied selling techniques with which the consumer was being flooded. What the consumer could buy for five and ten cents and for the dollar reflected marvels of economic creative technique, the other side of the picture of which were possibilities of huge profits to the manufacturer and distributor and credit slavery for the buyer. The aggregate products of science and technology in the United States abounded in more examples of "Believe It or Not" than Ripley himself could muster in many years, ranging from the basic illustrations of technocracy through the brilliant achievements of science on to the hundreds of small novelties which entertained a nation, crowded it with rubbish, and left a junk pile of outdated commodities of yesterday.

The picture of technology at work, furthermore, was far more inclusive than merely an inventory of inventions, discoveries, machines. It went further to comprehend the whole scheme of scientific management in the uses of invested capital, which in turn multiplied the ways and means for the practical application of science. It included also new research into the best ways of speeding up industry and of supplying the world with comforts, luxuries, necessities, and of encouraging consumption. Management no less than discovery had become a part of the technological wealth of

the nation. Indeed the common definition of management was that it was an art or science or technique of organizing and directing human effort, applied to control the forces and to utilize the materials of nature for the benefit of mankind. Management at its best was intended to promote the optimum utilization of productive resources; in practice it often became, as many other technologies, a form of supertechnology for competitive practices, for the multiplying of profits, a spread out for the reduction of man power. The total picture itself was one of the largest and most picturesque of all the American developments—a thousand organizations and techniques applied to thousands of details of manufacture, of distribution, of consumption.

The startling nature of invention and discovery, and the extent of their extraordinary diffusion and application, however, did not alone constitute the main picture, which was that of a world of invention transforming at breath-taking speed the whole life and culture of the people. The quantitative achievement of science and technology, with their brilliant discoveries and inventions, represented one side of the picture. Upon the other side were to be viewed the qualities of science and invention and their multiplication together with the picture of what the future was likely to hold in store. William F. Ogburn had painted the picture more vividly in *Recent Social Trends* than it had appeared elsewhere. Science and technology were not only the most dynamic elements of the material culture; mechanical inventions and scientific discoveries were not only associated with fundamental social changes; but also social changes and social inventions were often effective in stimulating other discoveries and inventions. Moreover, most social changes were the result of many rather than of a single invention; and most of the larger inventions, such as the automobile or radio, contributed to many social changes. The catalogue of social inventions constituted a separate picture in itself basic to social planning and to the drawing up of such blueprints of progress as the national drama seemed to demand.

An inventory of the number and nature of recent inventions up to the early 1930's might well reveal an almost complete cross section of American life, featuring especially inventions in the fields of electricity, chemistry, physics and natural science; metals, power, transportation, building operations, production machines, and mis-

cellaneous inventions of material objects and mechanical devices. In addition, there were biological inventions and discoveries; and still others relating to those patterns of conduct and social attitudes which bordered closely on the realm of social inventions. These again were a part of the nation's wealth of social science and social technology which were to play such an important part in the continuing growth of America.

It was clear, from an examination of the brilliance of such technology as the new illuminating engineering with its designs and inventions: bulbs, mercury vapor lamps, ultraviolet rays; or trans-Atlantic telephone cable, radio telephony, picture telegraphy, television, that the future American picture was to be more and more a product of the technological and human wealth of the nation working with natural resources, some of which were still untapped. There were to be new pictures in abundance. Samplings would include the photoelectric cell, with vacuum tube amplifiers becoming a sort of supermechanical eye, seeing with invisible light, appraising color, seeing through fog, directing traffic, controlling trains, multiplying its uses a thousandfold, never knowing fatigue. There was another picture, partly actual, partly imaginary, of a new world of wires and radio for facsimile transmission, such that newspapers might be set up and printed simultaneously in many cities from a single headquarters, news pictures transmitted, criminals identified, documents signed. Television, motion pictures transmitted to homes by world wireless, moving pictures and radio classroom instruction in the schools were samples in prospect for influencing home life, travel, politics, education, recreation, investments. Other electric inventions greatly affected the fields of medicine, of heating and cooking, and the fabricating of a thousand new products which promised a still more magic picture of electrochemical and electrometallurgical processes.

In fine, here was a picture of a new world of electricity and power capable of seemingly limitless expansion. If a passenger train of aluminum cars could speed a hundred miles an hour with great ease, transportation would be transformed. There were to be light cars, new fuel, new equilibrium. Furthermore, culture was to be remade, regions replanned through the new technology of power. For this technology it was claimed that it could do for the community all that it wanted done—raise standards of living,

give the people new work and new play, end drudgery, banish noise and smoke and dirt, and contribute much to the enrichment of a universal culture. However, this picture, too, was to be conditioned largely by the degree to which social technology was able to control and direct these unprecedented technical processes. Ever and again a new rising action of the drama pointed to increasing wealth of social invention and social science which seemed to be the missing link in the nation's development.

Of chemical inventions the picture was scarcely less vivid. One of the current discussions of the 1933 Washington centered around the rights and advisability of creating a tremendous new market for corn by requiring gasoline fuels to be blended with alcohol distilled from corn. It might net the farmer millions of dollars and it might make a better fuel, and through by-products returned at cost to the farmer it might contribute to a new era of livestock feeding. It might also affect the costs of operation which in turn might affect the nature of industry which in turn would continue the chain of influences. The catalogue of chemical inventions was too long to incorporate into any single picture—drugs and medicine, paints and varnishes, nitrates and nitrogen fixation, flashes for camera, phonograph, cellophane, shatterproof glass, and a thousand and one others ranging from typewriter to by-products of farm and factory, mill and packing house, mine and camp.

There was one picture which morbid souls were wont to dwell upon and lovers of peace to paint, namely, the possibility of inventions in chemistry and physics when war and destruction should come again. It was commonly asserted at the end of the World War that the United States could produce enough poison gas to destroy all the inhabitants of the enemy nations. Pictures of the next war were presented with indescribable horrors of destruction through gas, bombings from the air, and other new engines of destruction yet to be invented. It was generally admitted that there could be no adequate defense from the efficient air squadron equipped with poison death and exploding destruction. Even the layman had begun to appeal to mankind not to destroy civilization by his master achievement in chemistry, physics, and aeronautics.

The earlier picture of the great mineral resources of America and other parts of the world, as being in existence but not available because of the lack of technology, was in great contrast to the cata-

logue of thousands of inventions for mining and utilizing this natural wealth. Scores of metals or minerals commonly unheard of by the average man had become the marginal factors in the development of industries. A hard cutting tool, for instance, upon which the layman was accustomed to stare and wonder as it would cut concrete or porcelain or saw away at steel and iron was possible because of the fabrication of tungsten carbide in cobalt. The inventions which made it possible to take molten metal and blow it on many substances and the giant machines of multiple inventions for the processing and fabrication of steel from furnace to razor blade were but a few of the samples of miracle-working inventions. Of aluminum, through various processes of electrolysis and others, it was freely predicted that it would transform the whole picture of transportation in the future. From great chemical processes it would be possible to construct light and safe railroad passenger cars capable of fabulous speed, transform the speed and fabrication of automobiles and airplanes, and work wonders in the building of homes and business structures.

Perhaps the nation was accustomed to forget perennially the revolution in the world which power had wrought. What invention had done in the harnessing of power and in the way of multiplying products from petroleum constituted itself an immeasurable achievement. Equipment was one great factor, but more than 400 products constituted another. It was not only by such inventions as the Diesel engine that transformations had been made, but through the scores of processes, such as petroleum cracking, extraction of gasoline from natural gas, the manufacturing and installation of great pipe lines. To these were added the whole series of pictures of engines for the use of gasoline and electricity, such that they had become a greater transforming agency than were such early inventions as steam, printing, and the like. The picture was continued into the speculation of the future, looking toward invention and discovery which would bring unlimited electric power from tide and waves and sun and moon; for extracting other energies, food, fertilizer, from air and elements; for cooling, as well as heating, homes and offices and factories.

Since it was not possible to present anything like an adequate portraiture of technology, samplings here and there, now of isolated inventions and now of incredibly geared interrelations, were

all that the observer could hope to see at one time. It was possible, however, to attempt glimpses of certain clusters of inventions and their influence upon society. Such a clustering was that relating to all communication agencies. Here, again, so impressive had been the changes that the observer was inclined to estimate that inventions and agencies of communication and transportation had affected conditions of social life in the United States more profoundly than any other of the many technologies. First the railroads—demoralized for some time by stupendous lag—were still an important part of the picture. Even with the rapid increase of highways and automobiles, there were in 1930 no less than 249,000 miles of railway tracks owned by American operators, which was a decrease from the maximum of 1916 of less than 5,000 miles. The passenger traffic ranged from the crest of 1920 at just about 1,270,000,000 passengers traveling 47,000,000,000 passenger miles to something less than three-quarters of a billion in the 1930's, and traveling only about half as many passenger miles each.

The automobile was replacing the street car, however, in one of the most spectacular changes caused by invention. The romance of big fortunes in traction was being added to the nation's history. There were 13,000,000,000 passengers on electric railway cars and 1,300,000,000 on affiliated buses in 1930. This picture, however, was continuing to shade off into a gradual decrease as 4,000 miles of abandoned tracks were deducted from the total. On the other hand, the growth of the automobile had been phenomenal, with no less than 25,800,000 registered cars in 1931. Of these, more than 20,000,000 were private passenger automobiles, cars for hire, taxicabs, and buses. There were 47,000 non-revenue buses, most of which were for the transportation of pupils; and 48,250 buses operated for revenue, of which 13,300 were operating on city routes, and 32,100 were in interstate and intercity service. There were more than one hundred thousand motorcycles speeding hither and yon.

Few transformations were more marked or fundamental than that of the highway system of the nation. By 1930, more than 3,000,000 miles, an increase of 40 percent since the turn of the century, with an increase of 330 percent in surfaced roads had wrought a revolution in American life. The picture of this new mobility included such rapid changes of automobile models as to make an

earlier Ford model a matter of exhibit by 1930. It also included rapid transformation of the early speed limits of 15 miles an hour to a common average of 50 miles on through highways. If the dominance and romance of earlier railway and interocean passenger traffic had receded, there was still a sizable picture of both, and they were being supplemented by new ways and means of travel. There was a total water-borne passenger traffic in the United States in 1930 of 389,000,000, which was an increase of 100,000,000 over 1920, but a decrease from 546,000,000 in 1929. With the decrease in railway and water-borne passenger traffic there was, of course, the new air transportation, which scarcely had its beginning before 1926. By 1931 there were 126 airway services, covering 45,700 miles, with 522,000 passengers. The aggregate would add something like 120,000,000 passenger miles flown in civil aeronautics, with a total of nearly 11,000 airplanes, and with nearly 20,000 licensed pilots. In this new aspect of civilization there was a continuous increase during the depression years, with more than 25 percent increase between 1930 and 1931.

The startling contrast of the pictures with the original eight months' trek from east to west transformed in 1930 into a dashing trip from New York to San Francisco between breakfast and dinner was scarcely more vivid than other techniques of communication. More than 250,000 miles of telegraph pole lines, 21 submarine cables crossing the North Atlantic with one from New York to Haiti, five to Cuba, and others from Galveston to Mexico, from Key West to Cuba, and from Miami to the Barbadoes. Such was the technology of this communication that it was possible to produce nearly one hundred words per minute with automatic transmitters replacing the staff of operators. Apparently the load of total land and ocean messages was something like a quarter billion. Still the picture continued to grow, with wireless telegraphy becoming an established mode of communication where it was not possible to maintain wire lines. All told, the number of messages transmitted by the private commercial system of the United States had reached nearly 4,000,000. Again, 20,000,000 telephones with perhaps a total of 30,000,000,000 originating calls, with the United States having more than half of the world's telephones. To the usual services of local, state, national, international calls were added the revolutionary techniques of the teletypewriter, the telegraphic

printer, with ample facilities for fingerprints, signatures, legal documents to be transmitted even over transoceanic radio, telegraph circuits.

Other vivid pictures were those of the thousands of radio stations dotted here and there throughout the nation. The incredible growth vividly portrayed by contrasting the garage radio station headquarters of broadcasting in Pittsburgh, in 1924, with the palatial superstructure of Radio City in New York, completed during the depression days, was symbolic of an achievement in quick time scarcely less colossal than in quantity and quality. For radio is first of all a phenomenon of science and technology. It is not only new and powerful in its own present status, but is developing, mutable, both creator and creature of physical technology, rich in kinship with all that growing family of telephone, telegraph, television, photography, multiple controls, potential master of new worlds to conquer. Radio, moreover, is also a great business and commercial phenomenon, exemplifying the great American tradition of what invested capital, utilizing the discoveries of science and the skills of technology, can do for the comfort, entertainment, and convenience of the people. Here, of course, are fundamental social-economic implications in this new superamericanism.

Radio becomes a social phenomenon, however, primarily when it assumes a major role in psychical communication, which is the chief medium of all social processes. It becomes a social phenomenon when its ramifications and services extend to that wide range of activities and realistic experiences typified by this extraordinary program here today and tomorrow: broadcasting as a community enterprise; as an educational force; as a technique in classroom, in forum and university, on farm and at fireside, in rural and urban areas; when it broadcasts music and religion, industry and politics, recreation and books, art and speech, advertising and propaganda. It becomes a social phenomenon in America when more than 50,000,000 folk in the uttermost corners of the nation "listen in" through more than 25,000,000 sets, and when the whole world of English-speaking folk, through perhaps 200,000,000 listeners, find thrill and drama in the troubles of an abdication of king and emperor or in the excitement and fear of war.

Once again, among so many dramatic pictures of American technology, it is impossible to present more than samplings. The pres-

ent inventory must be limited to two more, the one relating to those inventions which have modified profoundly the beliefs and customs of the people and the other a lighter picture of fads and fancies, frills and entertainment, such as have added to the gaiety of the nation. One of the most interesting of all American pictures of the first third of the twentieth century was that of the great stirrings and debates on evolution and religion. Biological discoveries and biological research, together with the expansion of education and its extension to the people had resulted in modification of the religious beliefs of the people. Other scientific discoveries and their extension to the common people undermined many of the original bases upon which Biblical beliefs were conditioned. The classical illustration in astronomy was the transformation caused by the radical significance of the Copernican theory in contrast to the Ptolemaic. Thus science and invention, multiplying their effects and queries, have been a large disturbing influence without at the same time developing social techniques for adequate instruction and education. Further discoveries in regard to breeding and the science of eugenics, with increasing knowledge of heredity, had brought about many revolutions in thought and procedure, such as the sterilization of the feeble-minded and the insane. Still other discoveries in physiology, especially those relating to sex and reproduction, joined with medical discoveries and mechanical inventions, had constituted technologies which had given rise to the birth control movement, to the use of contraceptives. These affected the distribution of population and the rate of increase, as well as social and religious customs and morality. Many other inventions had affected conduct in business, Sabbath observance, standards of sanitation, and comfort, and had tended to do away with many of the older folkways and superstitions. The whole picture of the leisure-time activities of the American people had been transformed.

Not exceptional perhaps was the picture of an American public luxuriating in multiple fads and fancies: Eskimo pies, miniature golf, or a million yoyoes dangling from fingers, marathons of pole sitting, dancing, bridge contests. If these were exceptional, there were scores of others that were not. The extraordinary picture of advertisements and the sale of articles for personal satisfaction, adornment, convenience, reflected something of the thousands of

patents, trade-marks, registered slogans, which made the *Index of Trade-Marks,* issued from the United States Patent Office, appear as a catalogue of entertainment. These were commensurate with good old American boosterism and slogan inventiveness.

Yet the magnitude of advertisements constituted their chief power over the public's buying and manners. It has been estimated that in 1927 there was an expenditure of $1,782,000,000 for current advertising. This was nearly $15 per capita. A single advertiser, in 1930, spent almost $4,000,000 in periodicals alone, while the advertising bill of the four leading tobacco companies approached the $50,000,000 mark. Yet by 1930 the advertisements of drugs and toilet articles in 30 leading periodicals had reached first place among all commodities. The billion dollar drug and toilet industry was spending about the same for advertisements as were the seventeen billion dollar food industry and the six and a half billion automotive industry. The flood of new forms of cosmetics, toilet preparations, perfumes, package fabricated candies, and novelties continued throughout the depression peroid with apparent acceleration. Other simple item pictures of the influence of inventions upon the consumer and upon custom included especially what has been called an amazing barrage of electrical equipment. Thus electric household clock sales rose in four years from less than a hundred thousand to nearly a quarter million. Here, however, was foreshadowed something of the havoc to come. For with the colossal drop in purchasing power came the sudden drop of purchases of luxuries which in turn threw three millions of employees of the new industries out of work.

Perhaps no American picture of the 1930's was more characteristic of the people and tempo than that of the ever-changing advertising styles and technique. In the pictures of newspaper and periodical advertisements could be found ample comedy, new folk art, rivalling the Sunday "funnies," as well as a great and powerful high-powered selling technique attempting to play upon the foibles and fancies of the average *homo Americanus,* and more particularly *uxor Americana, mater Americana,* and lately children and youth. The tourist who traveled the country over by automobile found the same young women of the cigarette token—"what more need be said," or "forever and forever" on huge bill boards as he saw on color plates in his favorite popular periodical.

So popular was this suggestive technique that the enticing young women appeared generously on the covers of church, college, and alumni periodicals and college papers of many other institutions where cigarette smoking was forbidden in the buildings. Many advertisements of toilet preparations or of soaps or foods bared to the world the reputed family ideals and quarrels and standards. A catalogue of such advertisements might well be entitled variously: how to sleep; how to keep fresh; how to please husband; how to be popular with the boy friend; what will the neighbors think? The radio advertisements were worse. On the other hand, there were many techniques calculated to constitute consumers' education, setting up for popular emulation standards for health and hygiene, etiquette, and conduct. The picture appeared, however, to be a part of the increasing supertechnology or artificial stimulation which was not grounded upon natural values. Indeed the nation was yet to evolve a satisfactory policy with reference to its advertising media and especially the radio.

But enough of the amazing picture of the American technologies. The realistic problem was to be found in their effect upon society. What was the balance sheet in the account—science and invention and the American attainment and promise of the future? Was there a median picture somewhere between the enthusiastic preachers of progress and the alarmist prophets of doom? First of all there was agreement everywhere upon the general picture: Science and invention, machines and technology had been the powerful instrumentalities in changing a universe. It was an age of science. It was an age of the machine. It was an age of technology. These modified the habits of individuals and the nature of institutions. Ogburn presented a picture of the effects of the radio, telegraph and telephone and of radio broadcasting, with a catalogue of more than 150 items classified under 11 general headings. There were uniformity and diffusion, recreation and entertainment, transportation, education, the dissemination of information, religion, industry and business, occupations, government and politics, and other inventions, together with multiple miscellaneous effects.

A similar picture of the effects of the automobile upon society was everywhere in evidence—upon roads and engineering and communicating agencies, upon farms and schools and churches and industry. Such a phenomenal development as the automotive in-

DISTRIBUTION OF AUTOMOBILES ON FARMS, BY STATES AND REGIONS, WITH PERCENTAGE OF FARMS REPORTING AUTOMOBILES, FOR STATES AND REGIONS, UNITED STATES, 1940

| Area | Number | Percent of Farms Reporting Automobiles | Percentage Distribution by States and Regions |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 4,144,136 | 58.09 | 100.00 |
| *Northeast* | 508,850 | 65.2 | 12.28 |
| Maine | 25,540 | 58.2 | .62 |
| New Hampshire | 12,901 | 65.2 | .31 |
| Vermont | 17,979 | 64.2 | .43 |
| Massachusetts | 23,734 | 61.9 | .57 |
| Rhode Island | 2,883 | 71.0 | .07 |
| Connecticut | 18,821 | 67.8 | .45 |
| New York | 139,718 | 74.3 | 3.37 |
| New Jersey | 24,223 | 71.6 | .58 |
| Pennsylvania | 157,988 | 73.8 | 3.81 |
| Delaware | 8,164 | 76.0 | .20 |
| Maryland | 38,848 | 70.5 | .94 |
| West Virginia | 38,051 | 34.9 | .92 |
| *Southeast* | 753,925 | 30.7 | 18.19 |
| Virginia | 86,785 | 43.0 | 2.09 |
| North Carolina | 127,476 | 42.4 | 3.08 |
| South Carolina | 63,653 | 42.8 | 1.54 |
| Georgia | 77,049 | 33.4 | 1.86 |
| Florida | 27,393 | 39.4 | .66 |
| Kentucky | 98,699 | 35.2 | 2.38 |
| Tennessee | 85,233 | 31.8 | 2.06 |
| Alabama | 48,473 | 19.9 | 1.17 |
| Mississippi | 55,702 | 18.3 | 1.34 |
| Arkansas | 48,571 | 21.6 | 1.17 |
| Louisiana | 34,891 | 21.5 | .84 |
| *Southwest* | 416,165 | 57.4 | 10.04 |
| Oklahoma | 112,369 | 57.3 | 2.71 |
| Texas | 277,664 | 59.5 | 6.70 |
| New Mexico | 15,731 | 40.3 | .38 |
| Arizona | 10,401 | 42.9 | .25 |
| *Middle States* | 1,606,004 | 80.8 | 38.75 |
| Ohio | 231,368 | 80.8 | 5.58 |
| Indiana | 172,981 | 80.8 | 4.17 |
| Illinois | 210,555 | 82.5 | 5.08 |
| Michigan | 181,209 | 81.5 | 4.37 |
| Wisconsin | 188,312 | 84.1 | 4.54 |
| Minnesota | 208,693 | 87.5 | 5.04 |
| Iowa | 236,601 | 90.2 | 5.71 |
| Missouri | 176,285 | 63.5 | 4.25 |
| *Northwest* | 576,174 | 81.8 | 13.90 |
| North Dakota | 71,907 | 83.0 | 1.74 |
| South Dakota | 72,675 | 86.3 | 1.75 |
| Nebraska | 126,269 | 88.8 | 3.05 |
| Kansas | 150,403 | 83.3 | 3.63 |
| Montana | 35,699 | 72.6 | .86 |
| Idaho | 38,184 | 75.1 | .92 |
| Wyoming | 13,852 | 72.5 | .33 |
| Colorado | 50,426 | 79.5 | 1.22 |
| Utah | 16,759 | 60.4 | .40 |
| *Far West* | 282,979 | 77.9 | 6.83 |
| Nevada | 3,158 | 66.7 | .08 |
| Washington | 70,490 | 74.5 | 1.70 |
| Oregon | 58,797 | 78.6 | 1.42 |
| California | 150,534 | 79.9 | 3.63 |
| District of Columbia | 39 | 46.2 | 0.00 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940*, Vol. III, Table 18, p. 12.

dustry had changed the face and form of government, changed its ratios of public expenditures, increased taxation, and gave evidence of helping to transform local units of government. It had contributed the basic element to the great American mobility, affected manners and morals, aided and abetted the crime increase in the nation, made possible more successful operation of gangs, racketeers, kidnappers, and bootleggers. In fine, it modified amazingly the behavior of individuals and institutions. It was also generally agreed that technology had speeded up material changes much more rapidly than social changes, and that one of the most difficult problems bequeathed by technology was the uneven rate of change in various parts of society. There were, moreover, limitations to science and invention. There were disasters of the *Titanic*, of submarines, of giant dirigibles; over-technological production widespread and uncontrolled.

On behalf of science and technology there was a chorus of commendable appraisals. Comfort, convenience, culture were being afforded to the common man and rich man alike. Many a factory employee enjoyed luxuries and conveniences impossible for the wealthy of earlier days, and later available only to the wealthy. They had raised standards of living, increased leisure time, furthered the dissemination of knowledge, promoted health and vitality, reduced suffering. Books, art, travel, cultural tools, were everywhere products of technology's wide reach and huge production. If there was progress in the universal process, here indeed was progress. As a matter of fact, for a long time the ledger had all been assumed in favor of science.

On the other hand, protesting against the machine age and against the purported dominance of material over man had come a veritable barrage of characterizations and criticisms. Physical science had been the chief force in producing the rapid social, economic, and political changes, which in turn had been the source of a world crisis. Science and invention, while making for progress in many fields, had developed a civilization which outstripped understanding and technique of control. This civilization, so the accusation went, was top-heavy because of physical science, and it was lopsided because of the lopsidedness of science itself. This rapid development of physical technology, outstripping progress in institutions and human relations, had resulted in a very great lack

of equilibrium, so that material and cultural factors were not geared together. This generated problems not only for mankind to keep pace with breath-taking inventions and discoveries, but to adjust social institutions to this breakneck speed. Man had conquered the machine in turn only to be conquered by the machine. Instead of the masterful direction of technology for the general well-being of mankind, much invention and discovery had been projected for the mere sake of mastery and conquest of some power or process. Invention for invention's sake, discovery for discovery's sake, multiplied thousands of accomplishments which were turned upon the world without asking the question which the dynamic Giddings was wont to ask: What else will happen or is likely to happen?

There were the powerful and dramatic scenes of technology sweeping on and on with the world beginning to sense its runaway powers, but with the world seemingly helpless. More machines and more technology must be evolved in order to keep pace with present machines and technology and with great competitive processes. There was the picture of millions of Americans in universal agreement concerning objectionable features of radio advertising and radio programs; with nothing to be done about it. There was almost universal agreement concerning the moving picture industry, and the programs it presented were far and away too artificial and unnatural and in general unsatisfactory; with nothing to be done about it. There was general agreement that technology of organization and wealth accumulation, concentrating actual wealth and the control of wealth in the hands of the few, was not only detrimental but sooner or later would be death to the American system; with little to be done about it. There was the picture of the world horrified by the tragedies of the Great War, standing as if paralyzed to watch an increasing world of science and invention manufacturing engines of destruction, and a machine technology and a technology of competition in the economic world rushing headlong toward another world conflict. And there were the dramatic pictures of a nation technically equipped to provide unheard-of bounties of food and raiment, of work and play, unable technically to carry these bounties to millions of its best citizens starving for them, or to provide an enduring technology of balanced distribution and equilibrium.

There were other pictures which seemed to dominate the whole

scene, pictures of an economic world torn asunder by something like an industrial tornado. The evils from which the world was suffering—depression, poverty, war, strife—had not grown out of electricity or steam technology, but out of the misuse and the maladjustment of these discoveries to impose supertechnology and artificial laws upon humanity. Machine industries swept on and on, slaves of colossal investments unable to direct the objectives of man and society, forced to seek artificial protection, monopolies, technologies which multiply hours and work and tensions. The catalogue of evils purported to come from this lack of adjustment was an extraordinarily long and cheerless list: economic, moral, social, political crises; war and conflict between nations and classes and races; unemployment, insecurity, financial insolvency, overtaxation, high cost of living; physical exhaustion, weakening of moral, intellectual, and spiritual stamina; weakening of the population, concentration in cities, depopulation of the countryside, confusion, superstandardization, artificial society, diminution of individual liberty and initiative, impotency of will.

Thus partial inventory of the nation's technological wealth, personified in technology itself. What to do with the giant? What was technology to do with America? From its beginnings as science and invention, tools for creating wealth and welfare, it had all but become an end in itself, dominant steering power of the nation. With time, technology had become a major actor in the national drama, complicating the plot, adding mystery and intensity to the gigantic conflict for the survival of American ideals and civilization. The depression and threatened disaster of the early 1930's had concentrated attention upon economic dilemmas, upon the need for new economic technology which might, first of all, prevent disaster and next point the way to reconstruction. Here, then, was one of the major tests for the new technology to come. Could it survive the test and lead the nation to further achievements? Or was the multiplying of artificial wealth the end?

And yet before America could answer these questions, even as in 1914 before Woodrow Wilson's domestic program for the people could be tested, war came. And it was science, invention, and technology that made the winning of the war possible. It was a stupendous task that only America could perform.

## *Chapter V*

# *FROM RURAL CULTURE TO URBAN CIVILIZATION*

PERHAPS nowhere are the extraordinary transformations of science, technology, and change more clearly marked than in the transition from rural culture to urban civilization, from agrarian life to industrial society. Indeed the world trend toward urbanization is changing the entire cultural landscape of the nation such that urbanization or megalopolitan culture has come to appear synonymous with the superlatives of technology. So fundamental does this transition appear that we are stating here rather emphatically two premises for study. The first is the hypothesis that one of our fundamental social problems is the task of the reintegration of agrarian culture in American life. The second is the challenge to "ruralize" the city instead of urbanizing the country as has everywhere been advocated in earlier years.

Now in examining the implications of such premises we immediately sense two major phases. First, in the American scene it seems quite likely that one of the key problems of all our adjustment is bridging the chasm between the earlier Jeffersonian democracy of the simple government of an agrarian culture and the new more complex democracy of a big urban and industrial society. The second is that to many students of contemporary society the trends toward the megalopolitan society of the supertechnical civilization lie at the heart of most current troubles of western civilization. We may look briefly at these two great problems, first by contrasting the present America with the earlier America and by noting the fundamental characteristics of the agrarian society and second by noting both the trends and character of modern urban and technological society. In later chapters, then, we shall discuss the more specific problems of rural and urban communities.

There was, for instance, the earlier Jeffersonian nation in which nearly all the people were rural, and there is the present America

in which an increasing majority are urban. There was the Jeffersonian nation in which the farmer was the bulwark of democracy and there was the agriculture of the 1930's providing less than 13 percent of the nation's income. There was Thomas Jefferson proclaiming "the mob of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body," and there was the 1930 America with more than 60 percent of its people living within metropolitan areas, with 93 such regions each boasting over 100,000 population, with a single metropolitan region having twice as many people in it as all of Jefferson's beloved domain. There was Thomas Jefferson admonishing "to let our workshops remain in Europe" and there was the America of the new crisis with more than 37,000,000 or 76.2 percent of all its working folk occupied in manufacturing, mechanical distribution, and social services.

Or to focus the two pictures in a slightly different way, there was the Jeffersonian small nation of rural states, of one or two regions of simple motivation, of homogeneity of people, of few occupations, with small individual fortunes centered chiefly in farm and forest, in land and homes, contrasted with the present very large nation of urban and industrial majorities, in greatly differing regions with complex motivation and heterogeneity of population, with hundreds of varied occupations, large individual fortunes, fabulous salaries, corporate holdings and wealth not only in farm lands and commodities, but in city real estate, factories, railroads, traction and steamship lines, coal and iron, stores and banks, utilities and amusements, food and tobacco, textile and furniture, rubber, and leather, and glass, and machinery, and automobiles, and metal, and petroleum, and power, and soap, and drugs, and multiplied consumers' goods.

The people of Thomas Jefferson's day have grown from a small nation of relatively homogeneous rural folk engaged in few callings into a vast empire of mixed peoples working at more than 600 occupations. Their activities had multiplied and converged into a crest of superachievement which at its floodtide would swallow up the whole stream of Jefferson's nation as a brooklet trickling into "Ole Man River." Jefferson's government, best which governs least, the nation will know no more forever. Jefferson's culture and civilization based primarily on the agrarian culture con-

tributes in the 1930's to the American stream as diminishing springs of bubbling waters along the hillsides empty into a rushing valley river whose main tributaries are the larger streams of industries and cities. And the tempo of technology and of world contacts has replaced the earlier slow-moving world of homemade work, of countryside manners, and the quiet, simple ways of living.

This statement of self-evident facts, however, is not the whole story. The change from one way of life to another has changed the nation's outlook and its future as well as its present character. It is as if there were two worlds. The nation began and grew up in one and has now chosen to continue in the other. So complete has the change been that it is generally admitted that the status and promise of those who live or will live in the rural areas will no longer appeal to the great mass of Americans, either those already on the farm or those who are trained in the higher brackets of education, science, skills. This means, then, that rural life and agrarian culture must recede still further in the perspective of American life.

This viewpoint was expressed vividly in the opening chapter of *Fifth Avenue to Farm* with three questions which at once state the problem and the dilemma. The first question was: 'Can a young man, born on an Ohio farm, who has made Phi Beta Kappa at Yale and taken his Ph.D. *magna cum laude* at Harvard, marrying a girl, born on Park Avenue, New York, who has graduated with honors at Vassar and taken an M.A. *magna cum laude* at Radcliffe, take his wife to the countryside and enter upon a life of farming, without giving up his ambitions for a life of high cultural and intellectual pretensions?'

The second question was: 'Can a young woman, born of wealthy business parents in Bronxville, New York, who has graduated with honors at Smith, marrying a man, born of wealthy business parents in Montclair, New Jersey, who has graduated with honors at Princeton, join with her husband in entering upon a life of farming without feeling that she is retreating from the demands of civilization, but with the same sense of dignity that she would have if he were entering upon the life of a banker?'

The third question was: 'Can a farmer's son from North Carolina, who has taken honors upon graduation from Duke, marrying a farmer's daughter from Georgia, who likewise has taken honors

at Duke, enter upon farming as a career and expect to make an estimable contribution to American civilization? Or can a youthful couple who for some good reason failed to go to college but who know their genuine worth look upon farming as a real career?'[1]

These questions might in all probable reality be summarized by asking a somewhat more simple question, the answer to which is probably as clear as the implications of the others. That is, will the young women graduates of our colleges be willing to marry young men who expect to live on the farm and will these young women cast their lot in the permanent abode of farm life? Now there are three chief problems involved here. The first has already been suggested, namely, if the "best" people will not live on the farms and in rural areas, then farming and rural life as we have known them are "gone" from the fabric of American culture. This is attested by the fact that colleges drawing 50 percent of their students from the farms usually send back no more than 10 percent. This leads to the need for a substitute of something else for our agrarian culture.

The second problem is one of ascertaining what this change—specifically what will the urban substitute—mean to society. Now the authors of *Fifth Avenue to Farm* consider this change so important that they give as a subtitle to their book, "A Biological Approach to the Survival of Our Civilization." By this they mean that the urban society will neither reproduce the race nor provide for that organic-cultural dignity, inherent in the family's contribution to civilization through children, which is fundamental to survival. Vividly stated again: 'Because cities are unproductive of children, a hundred and fifty years from now the offices and homes of our cities will not be occupied by the great-great-grandchildren of the persons who now occupy these homes and offices. The present occupants with few exceptions will have no great-great-grandchildren. Their places will be taken and their cultural practices will be pursued, if the practices are pursued at all, by the great-great-grandchildren of persons who at the present time are American farmers.'[2]

The third problem is how to so reconstruct our changing society as to retard these trends and to start yet other re-trends, as it were, toward the reintegration of rural life into our civilization.

Few students now appear to see the way clear for the consummation of such an end, although these particular authors close their book with this very clear prediction: "We prophesy, therefore, that the American people will rise, not decline, in their civilization for centuries to come, through the social dignity with which they will vest the American farmer in his best embodiment." [3]

Now there are so many aspects of this subject, that any adequate discussion of it would easily fill many volumes, and such volumes are multiplied. What we must do here, therefore, is simply to state the problem in its general major aspects and in its perspective to the promise and prospects of American urban civilization. These are the backgrounds of our heritage upon which we must study our problems of rural and urban situations. We must, therefore, examine the contemporary civilization with a view to understanding how this background and heritage of the people will prove to be of primary importance in the adjustment of our people and their institutions to the living geography and culture of the nation. One way of stating the problem is to say, as Harry and Bernice Moore have said, that 'American culture is in a state of imbalance in that urban-industrial culture elements outweigh the agrarian and seriously weaken or may eventually destroy fundamental and essential portions of any well-rounded and integrated foundation of our national life. This hypothesis [they point out] is based on the observations that America is approximately half rural in population, and that her political structure and material well-being have in the past sprung from, and must in the future spring largely from exploitation of natural resources through agriculture. Further, much of the population of our cities, accepting the Census Bureau distinction between "urban" and "rural," is imbued with rural ideas and patterns of life, being one generation or less away from an agricultural life in most cases.' [4]

Here we have, of course, two fundamental problems. One is the larger societal problem of the role of agriculture and rural life in the evolution of society and its function as a way of living, and the other is the more concrete American social problem of the decay of rural society and the plight of agriculture. The case for the organic role of agriculture and rural life can be stated and has often been stated. It is not only that agriculture has been basic to early cultures and to later civilization and that it has been interwoven

## MAJOR METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED STATES

| Region | Population |
|---|---|
| *Northeast* | |
| New York | 7,454,995 |
| Philadelphia | 1,931,334 |
| Baltimore | 859,100 |
| Boston | 770,816 |
| Pittsburgh | 671,659 |
| Washington | 663,091 |
| Buffalo | 575,901 |
| Newark | 429,760 |
| Rochester | 324,975 |
| Jersey City | 301,173 |
| Providence | 253,504 |
| Syracuse | 205,967 |
| Worcester | 193,694 |
| Hartford | 166,267 |
| New Haven | 160,605 |
| Springfield (Mass.) | 149,554 |
| Bridgeport | 147,121 |
| Yonkers | 142,598 |
| Scranton | 140,404 |
| Paterson | 139,656 |
| Albany | 130,577 |
| Trenton | 124,697 |
| Camden | 117,536 |
| Erie | 116,955 |
| Fall River | 115,428 |
| Wilmington | 112,504 |
| Cambridge | 110,879 |
| Reading | 110,568 |
| New Bedford | 110,341 |
| Elizabeth | 109,912 |
| Somerville | 102,177 |
| Lowell | 101,389 |
| Utica | 100,518 |
| *Southeast* | |
| New Orleans | 494,537 |
| Louisville | 319,077 |
| Atlanta | 302,288 |
| Memphis | 292,942 |
| Birmingham | 267,583 |
| Richmond | 193,042 |
| Jacksonville | 173,065 |
| Miami | 172,172 |
| Nashville | 167,402 |
| Norfolk | 144,332 |
| Chattanooga | 128,163 |
| Knoxville | 111,580 |
| Tampa | 108,391 |
| Charlotte | 100,899 |
| *Southwest* | |
| Houston | 384,514 |
| Dallas | 294,734 |
| San Antonio | 253,854 |
| Oklahoma City | 204,424 |
| Fort Worth | 177,662 |
| Tulsa | 142,157 |
| *Middle States* | |
| Chicago | 3,396,808 |
| Detroit | 1,623,452 |
| Cleveland | 878,336 |
| St. Louis | 816,048 |
| Milwaukee | 587,472 |
| Minneapolis | 492,370 |
| Cincinnati | 455,610 |
| Kansas City (Mo.) | 399,178 |
| Indianapolis | 386,972 |
| Columbus | 306,087 |
| St. Paul | 287,736 |
| Toledo | 282,349 |
| Akron | 244,791 |
| Dayton | 210,718 |
| Youngstown | 167,720 |
| Grand Rapids | 164,292 |
| Des Moines | 159,819 |
| Flint | 151,543 |
| Fort Wayne | 118,410 |
| Gary | 111,719 |
| Canton | 108,401 |
| Peoria | 105,087 |
| South Bend | 101,268 |
| Duluth | 101,065 |
| *Northwest* | |
| Denver | 322,412 |
| Omaha | 223,844 |
| Salt Lake City | 149,934 |
| Kansas City (Kan.) | 121,458 |
| Wichita | 114,966 |
| *Far West* | |
| Los Angeles | 1,504,277 |
| San Francisco | 634,536 |
| Seattle | 368,302 |
| Portland | 305,394 |
| Oakland | 302,163 |
| San Diego | 203,341 |
| Long Beach | 164,271 |
| Spokane | 122,001 |
| Tacoma | 109,408 |
| Sacramento | 105,958 |

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 26, pp. 29–30.

in the whole fabric of our culture and economy. It is not only that land is still the base of our American wealth. It is not only that the seed bed of the nation's population must continue to be in rural America and therefore the quality of future America is conditioned by the quality of our rural culture. It is not only that the spirit and genius of early America were grounded in a vital agrarian culture with the nature of our laws and institutions assuming a continuity of such fundamentals. It is all of this and more. It is a matter of essential equilibrium and balance between agrarian and industrial culture, between country life and city activities, between physical resources and technology, between machines and men. It is, therefore, essentially a problem of progress and survival.[5]

The solution of our problems, however, must be on the same basis of reality as has been the development of the nation. That is, there was a major rural America and a minor urban America. There is now a minor rural America and a major urban America. The adjustment must be made between these, and the understanding of the problems which have grown out of two differing cultures is a first essential. The premises of Mr. and Mrs. Moore state the problem clearly:

'Urbanism and industrialism, on the one hand, and agrarianism and agriculture, on the other, have developed a deep-seated antagonism seemingly inherent in their interdependent relationship. Philosophic and economic factors both enter into this situation. So long as the farmer feels himself the entrepreneur and the urban worker believes himself proletarian; so long as a higher price for agrarian wheat means a higher price for urban bread, the likelihood of concerted action seems remote.

'This is shown in, and probably results from, the fundamentally different nature of the characteristic organization and social processes of urbanism and agrarianism. Agrarianism builds its social organization on and around the primary group, an economic as well as a social unit. Urbanism promotes a dichotomy between social and economic activity and atomizes society by breaking down the *gestalt* of the individual's life pattern. Exposure to multifarious folkways, *mores,* and philosophies of life from which a choice is demanded inevitably leads to more or less disorganization

through realization that what had been conceived as moral is only customary.

'Persons exposed to this disorganization are often those who seem to have possessed great potentialities for leadership in their natural setting. It is argued that those who migrate to the cities are endowed with higher intelligence, initiative and education than those who remain in the rural environment.

'Since the Great Depression has demonstrated that cities have not yet attained anywhere near the agrarian ability to meet serious crises, the question arises as to the advisability of developing urbanism at the expense of ruralism. This failure of the city has placed upon rural districts the necessity of reabsorbing a large group of migrants, possessors of a hybrid culture fitting them for successful life in neither environment.

'This reabsorption is made extremely difficult by the fact that during its rise to dominance, urbanism has gathered within its own limits and has exploited for its own benefits many of the essential institutions and services of our social order thus denying agrarians access to them in times of economic stress.

'Urbanism is inherently a "hothouse of cultural change," whereas agrarianism is fitted to a slower tempo of cultural evolution, so that the ideals and values cherished in these two portions of society become widely divergent. This brings us face to face with the problem of ascertaining whether or not the rapid social change characteristic of the city is beyond our ability to successfully absorb and integrate. It would appear that urbanism and technology have resulted in a disequilibrium of our society through the too rapid imposition of unassimilated and undigested culture traits.

'Any solution, then, must plan a convergence or at least an accommodation of the attitudes and forces of social organization characteristic of these major elements of our social structure.'[6]

This leads us to inquire briefly a little further into those characteristics of the modern city which epitomize contemporary culture. We shall then have to move on to the statistical picture of urban-rural America, leaving more detailed queries about country life and city civilizations for our Book II. We have already pointed out some of the implications of change, technology, and urbanism in our Chapter IV. We are acquainted with the "count" against the cities, namely, that they do not reproduce the people, that they

are too big, that they are artificial, that in times of war they would provide superhazards, that they work against the rural interests of the nation, that they have reached the marginal limits of bigness through which they may survive. We recall also the Spengler dictum that cities represent always the deterioration of civilization; that in the spring of culture there is rural life, but as culture matures the city becomes the center of everything until at the beginning of the decline we have the megalopolitan civilization—the period of the world-city when man is no longer attached to the earth, but moves with the flux of the urban center and the folk changes into the mass. Here the city triumphs over the country, the intelligentsia over tradition, and money over policy.

Now, it is not necessary to accept the Spenglerian characterizations or the cycles of culture to note that historically all of the great civilizations have declined, along with the rise of the supercity. Nor is it necessary to accept such conclusions to recognize that this analogy is one which challenges the study of the modern scene and provides also an extraordinarily fine intellectual problem for all those interested in the rise and fall of cultures.

There is perhaps nowhere more vivid characterizations of the city nor more challenging inquiries into its problems than those by Lewis Mumford in his *The Culture of Cities*. Some of these appraisals, topically quoted, may well serve to complete our picture of this phase of American problems. Thus Mumford, although pointing to a reconstructed civilization which may realize on the glorified city, nevertheless realistically faces all the facts. Thus, he points out that the inordinate growth of cities alongside the superdevelopment of physical energies created more than temporary confusion. 'What followed,' he points out, 'was a crystallization of chaos: disorder hardened uncouthly in metropolitan slum and industrial factory districts; and the exodus into the dormitory suburbs and factory spores that surrounded the growing cities merely widened the area of social derangement. The mechanized physical shell took precedence in every growing town over the civic nucleus: men became dissociated as citizens in the very process of coming together in imposing economic organizations. Even industry, which was supposedly served by this planless building and random physical organization, lost seriously in efficiency: it failed to produce a new urban form that served directly its complicated

processes. As for the growing urban populations, they lacked the most elementary facilities for urban living, even sunlight and fresh air, to say nothing of the means to a more vivid social life. The new cities grew up without the benefit of coherent social knowledge or orderly social effort: they lacked the useful urban folkways of the Middle Ages or the confident esthetic command of the Baroque period: indeed, a seventeenth century Dutch peasant, in his little village, knew more about the art of living in communities than a nineteenth century municipal councilor in London or Berlin. Statesmen who did not hesitate to weld together a diversity of regional interests into national states, or who wove together an empire that girdled the planet, failed to produce even a rough draft of a decent neighborhood.'[7]

As the pace of urbanization increased, he concludes, the circle of devastation widened and we face the accumulation of all of it: 'ravaged landscapes, disorderly urban districts, pockets of disease, patches of blight, mile upon mile of standardized slums, worming into the outlying areas of big cities, and fusing with their ineffectual suburbs. In short: a general miscarriage and defeat of civilized effort.'[8]

And, finally, Mumford points to world crisis: 'a crisis which, if its consequences are as grave as now seems, may not fully be resolved for another century. If the destructive forces in civilization gain ascendancy, our new urban culture will be stricken in every part. Our cities, blasted and deserted, will be cemeteries for the dead: cold lairs given over to less destructive beasts than man. But we may avert that fate: perhaps only in facing such a desperate challenge can the necessary creative forces be effectually welded together.'[9]

We must leave the specific problem of the city for our later discussion of the community, and we must now turn to the size of the American picture and problem by looking at the statistical trend of American urban increase, and by the same token rural decrease. We have pointed out that the two most significant changes in the American people have been the increasing ratios of older people and of urban inhabitants. Yet we must look more in detail at the picture. The story is, of course, a story of census figures available for all who seek the facts. Perhaps the two types of summaries which will best complete the picture are those pre-

## A CHART OF THE NATURAL AND CULTURAL HERITAGE OF RURAL LIFE AND AGRICULTURE

Below is a list of "things I love in the country" as actually written by rural dwellers and published in *The Progressive Farmer* for 1923-1935. Contrast these with similar values and situations in urban life.

To see things grow . . . The happy expression on my boy's face as a martin goes into his gourd and hear him yell, "Time to go barefooted, Mother! Martin's in my gourd."

The smell of clean-scrubbed floors and freshly washed fireplaces . . . The songs and flashing colors of the birds . . . The sweetness of yellow jasmine by the roadside, of lilacs in my garden and arbutus in the woods.

To dig in flower beds and plant seeds . . . Pastures carpeted with sweet young grass . . . Elms that stand aquiver in frills of tender green, the rose mist of the red-buds, and the scent of wild plum blossoms in the air . . .

The rippling, dreamily-drifting river and the little marsh-surrounded islands and the high, green, white-capped waves that break on the uninhabited beaches of our sea-coast . . .

The winter winds as they sing in the chimney, chanting a melody no one knows, and the March winds that bring in the birds and blossoms in a flurry . . . The frogs as they sing in the marsh on the first warm nights in spring.

To inhale the perfume of a crab-apple tree in full bloom . . . To smell freshplowed fields and walk in a drizzling rain . . . The superb optimism of wheat fields nestling beneath blankets of snow.

To swap seeds and plans with my neighbors . . . To see smoke rising in little circles from the chimney top on a frosty morning . . . Bluebells forming lovely, fragile architecture in a gloomy swamp . . . The delicious drowsiness and peace that steal over one at night after planting Irish potatoes all day in a March wind . . .

The whispering and murmuring of pines . . . Terraced fields—they remind me of ocean waves . . . The hum of a crosscut saw working its way through a log . . . Lacy cypress trees and the moonlight making shadows on the rippling water . . .

Dark storms, leaden clouds, breath-taking gusts of sleet, frozen marshes, and streams with closed eyelids . . . To do my chores at the close of day . . .

The tap-tap of the ram as it pumps water up the hill to the tank in our yard . . . The clear ringing of the axe as the wood-cutters chop wood . . . The peep-peep of baby chicks in the spring . . .

The cows standing knee-deep in hay on a cold day, eating to their hearts' content . . . The delicate, far-reaching aroma of sage, and the smell of mist, wood-smoke, and pine needles . . .

The sound and sight of wild geese against the November sky . . . The nicker of a horse for his corn . . . The quiet solitudes, where one may steal away and be alone and yet not lonely . . .

The valleys of golden-hued stubble, dotted with shocks of ripened grain . . . The wild squall of a hawk before a summer shower . . . The friendliness of my country neighbors . . .

The rustle of the breeze through dry fodder . . . Big green patches of sugar cane surrounded by brown fields of corn . . . To see the men come in from the fields and water their tired horses at the well . . . The rumbling of farm wagons going to market . . . The smoky fog which settles over the river at sunset . . .

The odor of decaying cover crops . . . The smooth, flowing ribbon of earth as it slides over the plowshare . . . The towering white masses of clouds with the promise of refreshing showers . . .

The sound of a steady stream of milk in the pail . . . An orchard in bloom . . . To watch the hop toad around the doorsteps at eventide . . . The odor of ripe scuppernongs on a cool dewy morning in September . . .

The lulling roar and foam of the water pouring over the mill dam . . . The lazy drone of a bumblebee as he hunts the choicest cotton blossom . . . Sheep grazing on the hillside and a lamb down on his knees, wiggling his tail as he goes after his dinner . . .

Taking eggs to the store in exchange for things I do not have . . . The wind blowing across ripened broomsedge . . . The warm sun shining on brown pine needles . . .

The sound of cowbells as the cows come up the lane . . . The sweet odor of honeysuckle on a calm, still night . . . To watch a mother quail and her newly-

hatched brood . . . To watch the crows at sunrise . . .

The sloping hillsides near glades of cedar, where sheep have grazed, and left bits of wool on bush and shrub, from which the birds will line their tiny nests . . . To have the lines tightened on a team at the disk or plow . . .

To hear the purr of the old cats around the corncribs . . . The little brown wren that sits in the flowering willow outside and sings to me every day . . . The roar of a loaded wagon on a new gravel road . . .

The silent comradeship of another person plowing in the same field or across the road . . . The mournful note of the turtledove in distant fields . . . To gather the vegetables I have raised by the work of my own hands . . . To go a-fishing with Sonny in the little stream that runs through the pasture . . .

The gleam of a rattlesnake's back in the sun . . . The peace of twilight descending on the earth like a benediction . . . The apple orchard in October, when the trees are loaded with rosy fruit . . .

The firelight from the coals in the furnace and the lighted lanterns making fantastic shadows . . . The aroma of the boiling syrup, and added to it the sweet sharp scent of ripening muscadines . . .

I love corn-shucking time, when neighbors are invited to help and the dining table is loaded with delicious food and hot coffee and everyone revels in jokes and humor . . .

The trustfulness of young rabbits . . . To fondle the three-months-old colt, to feel its soft coat, and its odor that no other animal possesses . . . To lie on the ground and drink from a sand bottom spring . . .

After a sudden and brief shower, followed by the sun, to enjoy the watermelon odor that comes from sunbeams and raindrops together caressing vegetation . . . The tinkle of cowbells in the distance, the chirp of crickets, the croak of frogs, the nicker of farm horses . . .

The smell of freshly split oak and pine when getting winter firewood . . . The rumbling bellow of a sassy young bull . . . The thought of a day's work well done so that someone is able to eat or be clothed because of my having lived . . .

The low sweet sound of snow falling in the woods . . . The chirping of crickets in the bright fall sunshine . . . A boy and his dog driving home the cows down the cool shady lane . . . Purple and scarlet sumac and elm leaves touched with gold by Autumn's magic paint brush . . .

To take my pail and milk my little Jersey, and to stir up the rich cream into a golden ball of butter . . .

Sweet scents of country nights, and the voices of insects that are never heard until the curtain of darkness falls and the sun gives place to the moon and stars . . .

I love to "go home to dinner" with a neighbor and sit down to a meal at which there are a dozen or more guests . . .

I love the smell of ripe scuppernongs from the arbor near the kitchen door, the picnics and 'possum hunts of fall, the smell of oak and hickory wood on a camp fire . . .

I love a night flooded with the light of the harvest moon and hearing a hunter's horn and the sound of the dogs . . . I love the path between my neighbor's house and mine, worn white and smooth by much coming and going . . .

I love the cane mill in the corner of a nearby woodland, where neighbors make molasses in autumn, their days lengthening into the night in order to boil off three "runs" in one day . . .

Hog-killing time, and eating crackling bread with sweet milk . . . I love to pick off peanuts and have peanut-boilings . . . To go to the white cotton fields and pick cotton all day long . . . Cane-grinding time in the Fall and going out in the fresh of night to a cane-grinding.

A field of oats rippled by a languid summer breeze . . . The smell of clover on a spring day . . . A hummingbird buzzing around a bed of flowers . . . A lone buzzard against a stormy sky . . . Clouds flying like phantoms across the moon at night . . .

The sound of a woodpecker drumming on an old hollow tree . . . The call of treefrogs in the twilight of a summer evening . . . The pleasant smell of tobacco being housed . . . To arise early and prepare breakfast for husband and hearty boys, get milk pails and rush off to cowpens and have the baby calves run in as I call their pet names . . .

To get up in the cool, gray dawn and begin the adventures of a new day . . . The sharp bark of a fox late at night . . . The smell of homemade lightbread while cooking . . .

sented by the National Resources Committee of the New Deal and by the President's Research Committee on Social Trends of the Hoover administration. Concerning the general movement from country to city, the National Resources Committee writes: 'The transition of the United States from a predominantly rural to an urban country has taken place in less than half a century. Whereas in 1880 the United States was still overwhelmingly rural with only some 14,000,000 of her people, amounting to about 29% of the total, in incorporated places of 2,500 and over, by 1930 the urban population had increased to nearly 69,000,000 representing approximately 56% of the nation's total. The number of urban places rose from 1,099 in 1880 to 3,165 in 1930. If we restrict ourselves to the larger urban places of 8,000 and over, or the still larger cities of 30,000 and over, the rate of increase in both the number of cities and the urban population is still higher, as Tables I and II indicate.'[10]

'If the degree of urbanization of a country is a measure of its maturity then the United States may be said to have come of age. The leading problem facing the United States today is no longer what it was in the early days of the nation when a concerted national effort was put forth to overcome the dependence upon the Old World of an undeveloped, agricultural, frontier community by encouraging local industries, and incidentally thereby the growth of cities. The issue of the present day seems to be, rather, how in the face of the uncontrolled growth of urban and metropolitan agglomerations a reasonable balance may be retained between the urban and the rural elements in the national economy. As long as the United States was principally a rural and agricultural country, as long as our predominant mode of life was based upon a relatively self-sufficient local economy, as long as our rich natural resources were scarcely tapped, and as long as our population was more or less homogeneous and unchecked in its growth, it was not to be expected that special attention would be paid to the city in national affairs. But inasmuch as the trend of urbanization has proceeded on the scale that we now know, a lack of special knowledge of the city can lead only to an unbalanced perspective, inadequate understanding of our national affairs, and failure to seize our opportunities and to master our problems.'[11]

While the aggregate numbers for rural and urban populations are given in the accompanying full-page statistical pictures, from

which details may be studied, two of the summaries from *Recent Social Trends in the United States* will serve to conclude this phase of the story. Thus the Committee points out that 'not only has the increase of population been concentrated in a few states during recent years but it has also been concentrated largely in the urban centers of these states rather than in their rural areas. The urban population was larger by more than 14,600,000 in 1930 than in 1920, while the rural non-farm population was larger by only 3,600,000 and the rural-farm population was smaller by at least 1,200,000. A similar differential existed from 1910 to 1920 but additions to the rural population were relatively larger before 1910. The farm population was not enumerated separately before 1920 but it probably was larger in 1910 than now, since the entire rural population increased only a little over 2,000,000 from 1910 to 1930, whereas the rural non-farm group alone increased about 3,600,000 from 1920 to 1930. As a result of this large urban concentration, the rural population made up less than 44 percent of the total population in 1930 compared with 60 percent in 1900.'[12]

'The concentration of population in large cities was thus considerably greater in 1930 than it was earlier. . . . In the thirty years from 1900 to 1930 the proportion of persons living in cities over 500,000 rose by almost three-fifths, from 10.7 percent to 17.0 percent. The proportion in cities of 100,000 to 500,000 rose by about one-half, from 8.1 percent to 12.6 percent; while in cities of 10,000 to 100,000 the rise was about two-fifths, from 13.0 percent to 17.9 percent. The proportion in cities of less than 10,000 changed only from 8.3 percent to 8.6 percent, while that in rural areas decreased from 60.0 percent to 43.8 percent, as mentioned earlier.'[13]

The third major aspect of these problems, namely, what to do about them, comprehends a large number of interrelated factors and agencies. We have discussed some of the problems of agriculture in our chapter on the conservation of natural resources. Other aspects will be presented with reference to regional factors and problems. Still others must be seen through the medium of the rural community. Yet the ameliorative aspects, for the most part, must be comprehended within the range of social planning. So, too, with reference to the urban aspects, the ultimate test will be found in the broader realm of national and regional development and planning. And, finally, the more detailed inquiries, here

as in other chapters, are reserved for Book II, in which references and questions are presented. In the meantime, there are many questions to ask and answer with reference to the meaning of this transfer from rural to urban life and with reference to its meaning in the American picture of the people, their institutions, and their behavior.

Perhaps no better approach to these multiple questions and answers can be suggested than Lewis Mumford's powerful work on *The Culture of Cities* and, on the other hand, a sort of composite *magnum opus, Soils and Men,* the United States Department of Agriculture Yearbook for 1938, under the joint authorship of nearly a hundred specialists. As for *The Culture of Cities* it is predicated on the comprehensive picture of the future America to the end that 'today we begin to see that the improvement of cities is no matter for small one-sided reforms: the task of city design involves the vaster task of rebuilding our civilization. We must alter the parasitic and predatory modes of life that now play so large a part, and we must create region by region, continent by continent, an effective symbiosis, or cooperative living together. The problem is to coordinate, on the basis of more essential human values than the will-to-power and the will-to-profits, a host of social functions and processes that we have hitherto misused in the building of cities and polities, or of which we have never rationally taken advantage.'[14]

It is equally clear that the improvement of rural life, even as that of cities, is no matter for small one-sided reforms. Secretary Henry A. Wallace, in his Introduction to the 1938 Yearbook of Agriculture, entitled *Soils and Men,* emphasizes this point when he says: "This book must be reckoned with by all who would build a firm foundation for the future of the United States." In many of his addresses Secretary Wallace has repeatedly pointed out how important the reconstruction of agriculture is to the dwellers in the city. He has called attention to the fundamental conflict between an abundance economy and an economy of scarcity, pointing out the dilemma of having millions of people who are unable to get food and clothing and other millions who wish to produce these commodities. In order to seek the balanced economy in which the farmer's income shall be more nearly balanced with his neighbor in the city and in which the farmer's purchasing power

from the sale of his commodities may be able to buy manufactured products from the industrial centers, Secretary Wallace has pointed out how it is sometimes necessary to control farm products in order to have price parity. Now all of these difficulties are essentially the new socio-economic problems of the adjustment between agriculture and industry, between rural and urban life. 'We know,' Secretary Wallace concluded, 'what can be done and we are beginning to do it. As individuals we are beginning to do the necessary things. As a nation we are beginning to do them.'

Some of these "necessary things" we are presenting in the sweeping picture of our American social problems. A number of specific approaches to the problem are enumerated in Chapter XXVII on Social Planning and Social Technology. In the meantime, there appear in the picture a large number of possible factors which enter into the problem and a number of prospects for progress. First of all perhaps is the high motivation of the American people, already described, to conserve and develop their lands. Next there are the actual working programs of many of the divisions of the federal government, such as Farm Security, Rural Electrification, the various federal loans and payments to farmers, the continuously revised procedures of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and others.

Such movements as the American Country Life Association and special divisions on rural education of the National Education Association, in the United States Office of Education, in the various state educational associations, and in teacher-training institutions are efforts pointing in this direction.

Alongside these are such efforts as the Farm Chemurgic Council devoted to the application of science to agriculture and devising new processes and new products through which a greater amount of farm commodities may be utilized.

In favor of a richer country life are also the great strides made by the agencies of communication, including good roads, telephone, radio, and others, as well as the large increase of library service and community centers, including consolidated schools.

Over against these trends are the perpetual inroads of science, technology, and machinery with almost immeasurable possibilities for machine agriculture, which will displace millions of men for the much greater production of commodities on much smaller

## METROPOLITAN CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940

| Name of City | State | Population | Name of City | State | Population |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New York | N Y | 7,454,995 | Jacksonville | Fla | 173,065 |
| Chicago | Ill. | 3,396,808 | Miami | Fla | 172,172 |
| Philadelphia | Pa | 1,931,334 | Youngstown | Ohio | 167,720 |
| Detroit | Mich. | 1,623,452 | Nashville | Tenn. | 167,402 |
| Los Angeles | Calif. | 1,504,277 | Hartford | Conn | 166,267 |
| Cleveland | Ohio | 878,336 | Grand Rapids | Mich. | 164,292 |
| Baltimore | Md | 859,100 | Long Beach | Calif | 164,271 |
| St. Louis | Mo | 816,048 | New Haven | Conn | 160,605 |
| Boston | Mass. | 770,816 | Des Moines | Iowa | 159,819 |
| Pittsburgh | Pa | 671,659 | Flint | Mich. | 151,543 |
| Washington | D C. | 663,091 | Salt Lake City | Utah. | 149,934 |
| San Francisco | Calif | 634,536 | Springfield | Mass. | 149,554 |
| Milwaukee | Wis | 587,472 | Bridgeport | Conn. | 147,121 |
| Buffalo | N. Y. | 575,901 | Norfolk | Va. | 144,332 |
| New Orleans | La. | 494,537 | Yonkers | N Y. | 142,598 |
| Minneapolis | Minn. | 492,370 | Tulsa | Okla. | 142,157 |
| Cincinnati | Ohio | 455,610 | Scranton | Pa. | 140,404 |
| Newark | N. J. | 429,760 | Paterson | N. J. | 139,656 |
| Kansas City | Mo. | 399,178 | Albany | N. Y. | 130,577 |
| Indianapolis | Ind. | 386,972 | Chattanooga | Tenn. | 128,163 |
| Houston | Texas | 384,514 | Trenton | N J. | 124,697 |
| Seattle | Wash. | 368,302 | Spokane | Wash. | 122,001 |
| Rochester | N Y. | 324,975 | Kansas City | Kans. | 121,458 |
| Denver | Colo. | 322,412 | Fort Wayne | Ind | 118,410 |
| Louisville | Ky. | 319,077 | Camden | N. J. | 117,536 |
| Columbus | Ohio | 306,087 | Erie | Pa. | 116,955 |
| Portland | Oreg | 305,394 | Fall River | Mass. | 115,428 |
| Atlanta | Ga. | 302,288 | Wichita | Kans. | 114,966 |
| Oakland | Calif. | 302,163 | Wilmington | Del. | 112,504 |
| Jersey City | N J | 301,173 | Gary | Ind | 111,719 |
| Dallas | Texas | 294,734 | Knoxville | Tenn | 111,580 |
| Memphis | Tenn | 292,942 | Cambridge | Mass. | 110,879 |
| St. Paul | Minn. | 287,736 | Reading | Pa | 110,568 |
| Toledo | Ohio | 282,349 | New Bedford | Mass. | 110,341 |
| Birmingham | Ala. | 267,583 | Elizabeth | N J. | 109,912 |
| San Antonio | Texas | 253,854 | Tacoma | Wash. | 109,408 |
| Providence | R I | 253,504 | Canton | Ohio | 108,401 |
| Akron | Ohio | 244,791 | Tampa | Fla. | 108,391 |
| Omaha | Nebr. | 223,844 | Sacramento | Calif. | 105,958 |
| Dayton | Ohio | 210,718 | Peoria | Ill | 105,087 |
| Syracuse | N. Y. | 205,967 | Somerville | Mass. | 102,177 |
| Oklahoma City | Okla | 204,424 | Lowell | Mass | 101,389 |
| San Diego | Calif. | 203,341 | South Bend | Ind. | 101,268 |
| Worcester | Mass. | 193,694 | Duluth | Minn | 101,065 |
| Richmond | Va | 193,042 | Charlotte | N. C. | 100,899 |
| Fort Worth | Texas | 177,662 | Utica | N Y | 100,518 |

Source: U. S Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940*, Series P-3, No. 4, Table 1.

## POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE OF LAND AREA, PERCENTAGES OF URBAN POPULATION, AND DENSITY OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940

| Area | Population per Square Mile of Land Area | Percentage of Population That Was Urban | Density of Employment (Percent of Population 14 and Over in the Labor Force) |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 44.2 | 56.5 | 52.2 |
| *Northeast* | | | |
| Maine | 27.3 | 40.5 | 51.5 |
| New Hampshire | 54.5 | 57.6 | 53.7 |
| Vermont | 38.7 | 34.3 | 51.7 |
| Massachusetts | 545.9 | 89.4 | 53.5 |
| Rhode Island | 674.2 | 91.6 | 56.6 |
| Connecticut | 348.9 | 67.8 | 56.0 |
| New York | 281.2 | 82.8 | 54.6 |
| New Jersey | 553.1 | 81.6 | 55.4 |
| Pennsylvania | 219.8 | 66.5 | 51.8 |
| Delaware | 134.7 | 52.3 | 54.3 |
| Maryland | 184.2 | 59.3 | 54.0 |
| District of Columbia | 10,870.3 | 100.0 | 62.2 |
| West Virginia | 79.0 | 28.1 | 47.1 |
| *Southeast* | | | |
| Virginia | 67.1 | 35 3 | 52.5 |
| North Carolina | 72.7 | 27.3 | 53.5 |
| South Carolina | 62.1 | 24.5 | 56.1 |
| Georgia | 53.4 | 34.4 | 54.9 |
| Florida | 35.0 | 55 1 | 54 0 |
| Kentucky | 70.9 | 29.8 | 48.9 |
| Tennessee | 69.5 | 35 2 | 50.6 |
| Alabama | 55.5 | 30 2 | 51.4 |
| Mississippi | 46.1 | 19 8 | 53.2 |
| Arkansas | 37 0 | 22 2 | 48.9 |
| Louisiana | 52.3 | 41.5 | 51.7 |
| *Southwest* | | | |
| Oklahoma | 33.7 | 37.6 | 47.2 |
| Texas | 24.3 | 45.4 | 51.7 |
| New Mexico | 4.4 | 33 2 | 49 4 |
| Arizona | 4.4 | 34.8 | 50.8 |
| *Middle States* | | | |
| Ohio | 168.0 | 66.8 | 50.8 |
| Indiana | 94.7 | 25.1 | 50.0 |
| Illinois | 141.2 | 73.6 | 53.2 |
| Michigan | 92.2 | 65.7 | 52.7 |
| Wisconsin | 57.3 | 53.5 | 50.9 |
| Minnesota | 34 9 | 49.8 | 51.2 |
| Iowa | 45.3 | 42.7 | 48.9 |
| Missouri | 54.6 | 51.8 | 51.3 |
| *Northwest* | | | |
| North Dakota | 9.2 | 20.6 | 50.7 |
| South Dakota | 8.4 | 24.6 | 50.3 |
| Nebraska | 17.2 | 39.1 | 49.7 |
| Kansas | 21.9 | 41.9 | 48.0 |
| Montana | 3.8 | 37.8 | 52.6 |
| Idaho | 6.3 | 33.7 | 49.7 |
| Wyoming | 2.6 | 37.3 | 53.3 |
| Colorado | 10.8 | 52.6 | 49.3 |
| Utah | 6.7 | 55.5 | 46.6 |
| *Far West* | | | |
| Nevada | 1.0 | 39.3 | 55.1 |
| Washington | 25.9 | 53.1 | 51.3 |
| Oregon | 11.3 | 48.8 | 51.4 |
| California | 44.1 | 71.0 | 52.3 |

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 5, p. 3; Table 8, p. 7; Table 47, p. 54.

areas, and for invention of chemical processes and products which may be substituted for farm commodities and the ever-changing foreign market and economic nationalism reducing the demands of foreign countries for American farm products. This is especially true in the Southeast and the Southwest, where King Cotton has reigned so long and where the cotton economy, affecting perhaps two-thirds of all the people of the South, will have to be reconstructed. This, of course, affects the whole nation.

It seems quite likely that the social problems involved comprehend all these factors, and that the solution must be worked out through a combination in which science, skill, technology, organization, management, and various levels of social planning might be joined by a sort of folk movement, in which the value of rural life and agrarian culture might seek a nearer equilibrium in the flux of American change. Part of this balance and equilibrium may come through the necessity of decentralization and the limits to which big cities and industries may go. A part may come from decentralization due to the failure of the cities to employ and sustain their millions of people. Part may come from national planning and directed policies. But whatever the result may be, the social problems involved in the balance and equilibrium between urban and rural life, between agriculture and industry, exemplify admirably the necessity for the scientific and ameliorative approach, worked out through both long-time planning and emergency relief. More of the specific ways in which this is being done and reference for further study will be found in Chapter XXX.

When all is said and done, however, the chief generic problem in this area is that of attaining a balanced economy. The answer here is, of course, that such balance and equilibrium will be of multiple proportions, including balance between agriculture and industry, between rural life and urban culture. It will be found also in a better-balanced agriculture, which will again include many aspects; between cash crops and use crops, between land-destroying and land-conserving crops; between planted crops and livestock; between land ownership and farm tenancy; between the whole-land system; credit and colonial economy inherent in cotton economy. It means also balance and equilibrium between the income of farmers and of city folk and between production and consumption.

*Chapter VI*

# *BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUNDS*

UNIVERSAL heritage of the people, twin background with the powerful influences of land and climate, of cities and culture, potent long before the extraordinary sweep of modern science and technology; basic factors in the kaleidoscopic record of human behavior, the two great forces of biological heredity and psychological conditioning, are forever setting the stage for new problems in age-old relationships and for age-old problems in new relationships. For the heritage of a great nation is found not only in its natural resources and wealth, but also in its human wealth of great variety and in the culture which the people have made. Thus we must continuously check with the interrelated factors involved in the physical and cultural backgrounds of the people.

Their physical heritage is measured not only in terms of geography and soil and climate and situation, but also in terms of biological equipment and psychological inheritance. So, too, their cultural heritage is a product not only of history and social life and of ethnic and racial backgrounds, but also of the psychological conditioning and equipment of many individuals and groups of great variety. The greater the abundance of people and their diversity, the greater is the human wealth for both the development and utilization of physical resources. And always social problems and social arrangements are fabricated of the two elemental and inseparable factors of the individual and the group of individuals—a great multitude, all different, yet clamoring essentially for the same things; and of groups, a great multitude of like-minded folk wanting different things. In America, especially, this has been true, and the whole structure of the nation has been fabricated upon the basis of great respect not only for individuals of many differing sorts and heritages but also for such cooperative democracy as seeks the greatest good to the greatest number. Fundamental problems

of adjustment, therefore, must be understood in terms of a realistic knowledge of differences, while enduring plans and policies must likewise be projected on this basis.

We must seek, therefore, to understand those fundamental aspects of man's natural heritage, other than geographical, which give rise to social problems and which also condition the nature of the equipment and tools with which the problems may be attacked. One such major field is the biological background and heritage through which arise individual differences, sex and age classes, race differentials, and all that catalogue of cumulative heritage involved in the physiological processes through which nature utilizes food, climate, work, sex. For, whether "right" or "wrong," nature's economy is such that no two individuals are alike, no two groups behave alike, no individual is the same yesterday, today, or tomorrow.

If one is inclined to doubt this premise he might examine the scientific evidence of this in the modern fingerprint test which is universally accepted as a mode of exact identification of an individual, or he might study the scientific measurements of millions of individuals, or the evidence of individual differences in strength and appetites, in emotions and sex nature, and in the long catalogue of illustration of differences everywhere manifest in the division of labor throughout the world. Without raising any questions of rightness or wrongness, of equality or superiority or inferiority of men and women or of nationalities or of races, all the evidence indicates that biological heritage has contributed something to this differentiation of the people. So, too, it seems inevitable that these differentials are the basis of situations and of dilemmas and constitute the background for many of our social problems. The problem of the use and control of liquor is bound up with the facts of individual differences; the problems of crime and of poverty, of health and disease are all interwoven with the fabric of differentials in both inheritance and training.

It is clear, therefore, that just as societies, groups of people, races and nationalities are greatly influenced by their geographic backgrounds, so also their culture and behavior, and, therefore, their problems are conditioned by their biological heritage. More particularly, however, the people themselves who constitute each group

and all groups find the backgrounds of their character to a considerable extent in their biological heritage.

The societal problem involved is threefold. First is the fact that human beings as the elementary units in human society are essentially biological units, and, therefore, the character of culture and society is very much conditioned by the nature and type of these biological units that make up society. Second, is the organic fact, already indicated, of inherited differences in age, size, vigor, sex, and other characteristics. There is a third factor of increasing importance in the modern world which is inherent in certain physiological processes and biochemical aspects of diet, vitamines, glands, effect of light and foods upon the organism, and many other new and emerging possibilities. It is possible, of course, to inquire at any length desired into a fourth aspect, namely, that of the evolutionary processes and stages through which men have grown to their present stature. Some of these may be primarily "intellectual" problems, but the majority offer opportunity for the scientific study of many larger societal problems and for the ameliorative approach to many more local social problems.

Important also in the situations and problems which reflect great diversity and differentials among individuals and groups are the psychological foundations and the cultural conditioning through which individuals and societies develop. Thus, the behavioristic emphasis in psychology, while magnifying the totality of environmental influences, assumes a heritage for the child, for instance, which is already powerfully deterministic long before the child has been conscious of any such influences at all. These psychological backgrounds reflect both the psychophysical factors which are usually treated under general psychology and the cultural-social factors which engage the attention of the social psychologists. In either case they loom large in the total picture of individual and social differences. These psychological backgrounds are especially important in the modern world and constitute the basis for the study of much that is often termed pathological. They are important also in the study of modern leaders and of the mass action of great multitudes of people. And, again, they are of primary importance in the consideration of all programs of action or amelioration in that the ever-present human nature and individual dif-

ferences lie all too often athwart the path of successful organization and cooperative effort.

Now turning briefly to the further discussion and illustration of these problems of biological and psychological backgrounds we note that there are various types of situations conforming to our general emphasis upon the scientific and the ameliorative aspects of our problems and upon the societal and the social nature of most dilemmas. There is, for instance, the major problem of population itself which comprehends not only scientific inquiries into vitality, heredity, and a vast array of biological aspects, but also the more practical problems of population policy. There are further the larger problems of race and ethnic groups and, again, of eugenics and genetics as they may be practically applied to human stocks. Both these scientific and practical phases will, however, be treated in subsequent chapters dealing with specialized aspects of these subjects. It is, however, of the utmost importance to note the extraordinary significance of these problems of race and ethnic groups and of population study in any adequate consideration of social problems. So important do we consider them that "the people" will constitute the subject of the largest division in the book.

In much the same way the psychological backgrounds are elemental in the scientific study or the practical direction, let us say, of the child or of child welfare programs. So, too, they are fundamental in the study of crime and pathology, as well as of the dependent and other types of disadvantaged folk. Since, however, these factors will be considered in the several chapters in which they are appropriate, it is necessary here only to emphasize the societal and organic relation which they bear to many local and social problems in which the psychological factors are too often overlooked. Here, again, it is important to note that in the present work, "the new realism of the people," as the basic part of the present volume, can be understood only through the facts about this great natural heritage of biological and psychological backgrounds.

Now to look at the American picture, we immediately catalogue the people in terms of differences. Twenty-two million youth are different from approximately the same number of elders. Yes, there are then nearly the same number of children and there are

twice as many in the great multitude of those who work and play in the middle years of 25 to 45. Yes, there are about 65,000,000 who classify as female as opposed to nearly as many male, and the variations by localities, states, and regions are always catalogued as of importance. Some 11,000,000 or 12,000,000 Negroes are catalogued as being different from about the same number of foreign born, and the foreign born again are catalogued under nearly two-score major categories, which indicate basic assumptions of different biological and cultural heritage.

Again, 30,000,000 and more of the American people are catalogued according to the grades and classes in which they are enrolled in school and college and, therefore, as they are differentiated by educational equipment. Other special millions are catalogued in relation to their home and family conditions, their income and their religion, through which both as individuals and as groups they have inherited a profound behavior conditioning.

Still, again, our communities and our cities, our states and our regions are characterized in accordance as these likenesses and differences cluster about given modes and standards: How many are married and how many are not? What is the concentration of special racial and ethnic groups and where are the centers of each group? What of this area with 80 percent rural and this other area with less than 25 percent? What of an area with half of its farmers tenants, and how does this compare with another area where the great majority are landowners? Thus, we might continue with further illustrations, yet these are adequate to make the case, namely, here as elsewhere the reality and scientific nature of the case are found in the cataloguing of resemblances and differences.

All of these factors converge, in historical backgrounds and in contemporary situations, to point up both the organic significance of these differentials and their practical significance in the understanding of all problems of adjustment. This is so much the case that we are tempted to set forth a rather bold hypothesis that the most difficult general problem of the present era is to meet the demand of unlike people everywhere that everybody be provided with all those worldly goods, in kind and quality, which anybody or everybody else has.

The dynamic Giddings was wont to emphasize these factors as

of the greatest importance not only in the working out of our everyday problems, but especially in the basic considerations which underlie our choice of sovereign societal arrangements, such as democracy, socialism, communism, or fascism. Thus, he would say: 'Provided with this description and conception of adequacy, we perceive that human beings are not equal as individuals (as mentalized organisms) and that they never can be, however democratic our laws and institutions may become. Every population is seen to be made up of grades, or strata. Roughly, these correspond to distinctions made in popular speech. There are natural superiors (i.e., superiors made so by nature and habit and other conditioning and not by law), natural mediocres, and natural inferiors. Natural superiors have conditioned intelligence above C (on the marking scale of the now-familiar intelligence tests) and they have no hereditary defect. Natural mediocres have a conditioned intelligence of C and no hereditary defect. Natural inferiors have a conditioned intelligence below C, or they have other hereditary defect.

'If with these qualities we combine fecundity, as for sociological purposes we must, we get five grades, namely: A. Natural superiors who maintain a high birth rate, thereby transmitting their high qualities to posterity. B. Natural superiors whose birth rate is low; they serve their generation, and their thoughts and achievements may serve posterity, but their qualities die with them. C. Natural mediocres; their birth rate may be high or low; whatever posterity they have will be mediocre. D. Infecund natural inferiors; they are harmful while they live, but they do not transmit harmful qualities to posterity. E. Natural inferiors who maintain a high birth rate; the men and women of this grade are wholly harmful; collectively they are a vast anti-social power.

'All accumulations and controls of societal energy are generated in grades A and B. They carry the entire load of constructive societal work. All progress is their achievement. And it is probably true, as tests of more than one sort have indicated, that not more than four and one-half percent of our total population (described as grade A) is capable of discovery or creative activity, and that not more than fifteen percent (grade A plus grade B) is capable of leadership. . . . Adequacy, and therefore the ultimate effectiveness of societal energies, is measured by two sets of corre-

lations, namely: (1) the negative correlation of birth rate and the positive correlation of death rate with hereditary defect, (2) the positive correlation of birth rate and the negative correlation of death rate with conditioned intelligence.

'These correlations measure the net value of human society; the net value of the existing, or of any possible societal order. They are a *value* measure of progress.

'They should be ascertained, not only for entire populations, but also for component and constituent groups, because the shifting of these, when so measured, will indicate the trend of our civilization. They should be ascertained for colour races, for the native and the foreign born, for nationalities, for local communities, for kindreds and families, for the adherents of religions and sects, for the alumni of colleges and universities, and for occupations.'[1]

Keeping in mind, therefore, the fact that the body of our book will feature "the people," in terms of the workers, youth, the elders, women, races, children, and the other distinguishing characteristics, it is important for the student to learn something more about certain individual and cultural differentiations which underlie both our scientific and ameliorative treatment of many "problems" of the people. The individual is of peculiar importance in the whole scheme of social study because he represents both the subjective unit and also the objective service of society. The individual, after all, is an index to the quality and effectiveness of the good society and in him will be found the key to the understanding of society and its problems. The individual, socially behaving, is the smallest unit of society. The individual is the unit upon which the institutions are built. Individual and social differences represent the basis of much modern social study and social work. Thus the student of social problems must ask many questions concerning the individual himself. Of what sort is he? In what ways do individuals differ? What social differences are there to make or mar the individual and to influence him in his social relationships? How is he related to the institutions? How are the institutions related to him? What ways of testing his general and specific abilities? What ways are there of guiding him into social living? What ways of making the free individual also the socially-minded component of society?

How, then, shall we measure the individual, with his inherent

differences from other individuals, with his personality-product of adaptation to environment, with his character traits, with his ever-present social potential of the future, and with his present rating according to social standards and ideals? While many testing scales have been worked out and utilized for intelligence and other individual qualities it is clear, as Professor Floyd Allport points out, that "evaluation and measurement take us immediately into the social sphere," emphasizing again the social relationship of the individual. Perhaps no movement within recent years has made more progress or become more popular, in the larger sense of the word, than the adoption of scales for measuring individuals of all sorts with special reference to numerous qualities of character, ability, and adaptation. Although much that is unscientific and unsound has been produced, undoubtedly such new statistical material and objective methods will contribute much to the understanding of society.

For the specialized student of social problems this is a field of great opportunity. The scope of such information, however, is great enough to require extended study, so that our task here must be limited to general information about its nature and methods, with specific illustrations that will interpret situations and problems. Perhaps the best approach to the study of the individual will be through certain general measures of individual differences. Professor North in his *Social Differentiation* has pointed out how individuals differ first according to the type of work they perform. An increasingly complex society gives rise to more and more occupations and opportunities until, as at present, there are thousands of different types of work in professions, skilled labor and unskilled labor. Not only in industrial life is there such minute division of labor as that found in the Ford plant, where a worker, without knowing the function of his small task in the making of the whole, may mechanically turn a screw as each chassis passes by, but even in the newly developed social sciences there are the social technician, the social theorist, the research specialist, and the social worker. Division of labor and specialization have served to increase the range and complexity of various occupations. The United States Census for 1930 lists more than 600 occupations, but their number and variety would seem even more amazing could

we get a picture of the minutest division of labor within each of them.

Throughout the history of the world individuals and groups have been ranked as different because of their social status. Here the modern world reflects much of its tension on this basis of social differentiation. There have been men of noble lineage and noble prerogatives with the mass of folk of inferior rank standing over against them and aspiring for privileges similar to theirs. This is a world pattern. So, too, individuals have differed widely because of their wealth and economic status. This, too, has been a common picture of mankind. Men have differed because of political and religious status. They have differed because of family and hereditary standing and because of many artificial social standards. In the old days there were the slaves and the free. In certain parts of the world there are the differences of social caste. Individuals differ also because of language, religion, and general education and culture. They differ because of interests and cultivation and opportunity. In the complex maze of these individual differences the student of social problems must somehow find a key to the task of attaining equality of opportunity through that democracy which works out balance and equilibrium between and among the unequal folk in the unequal places.

Important in the understanding of the individual and his relation to society are the organic differences. In America we often affirm that there are no closed classes. Nevertheless, for the time being, there are ineradicable and fundamental differences between individuals because of age, sex, race, and biological inheritance and variation. The question of age is of great importance in studying the development of the individual and his conduct, as, for instance, in the study of juvenile delinquency and of the youth movement. The question of sex is of supreme importance always and particularly in the modern era with the enlargement of the rights and privileges of women and the challenging of certain standards. The question of differences because of race, always important, assumes new proportions in the present age of closer international relationships and communication. Finally, the whole question of the differences of individuals in temperament, intellect, and all other inherited variations lies at the bottom of much of the new social science and educational guidance.

Individual differences had been neglected so long that of recent years the enthusiasm for intelligence tests and for measuring other phases of special abilities and reactions has perhaps led to exaggerated ideas of their value. There has grown up a sort of cult of the intellect and a species of human censorship in which the modern intellectuals have exceeded Plato in their advocacy of the rule of the intellect. A minority of intellectuals, often limited in the power to reproduce the race, would sometimes delegate to themselves measures of social control, inimical to wholesome social development. The student of social problems need only remind himself that the intellect cannot be the sole guide of life because it is only a part of the great composite character of humanity. A common mistake, too, has been to misuse the terms intelligence and intellect and to measure them by current artificial standards of conduct or by social and cultural experience. Thus the extreme advocates of intelligence tests as the major guide to human abilities have ignored the great factors of social prepotency and general spiritual qualities. Nevertheless, the whole movement for testing the varied abilities of individuals is one of the most important in the field of social study. In proportion as these tests may discover the truth and point out desirable qualities, traits and methods for individual and social development, they will prove invaluable guides.

An illustration of both the importance and the complicated nature of differences may be taken from a report of a special committee of the National Education Association appointed to draw up a statement of the social-economic goals of America. What, they asked, are the ten social-economic goals which will approximate equality for all? The very catalogue of these goals is symbolic of our next great problem, namely, the role of individual and social differences in the program of any great modern society. The very first of the goals listed by this group was hereditary strength, and midway in between this is the goal of individual differences as one of five characteristics of the *active, flexible personality*. Other goals which test the very foundations of social order include *physical security, mental security, economic security, participation in an evolving culture, suitable occupations, equality of opportunity, freedom,* and *fair play*.

Even though the present-day student may appear, first of all, in-

terested in the relation of these differences to practical situations, he must also sense the fundamental theoretical significance. Perhaps the whole movement of mental and social testing may be utilized as illustration and may be said to center around three interests. The one is the purely scientific interest of psychology, biology, eugenics, and other disciplines. Another is the educational interest in which knowledge of individual and social differences is utilized to promote a more efficient teaching process. A third is the larger social interest in which there is some conflict between the ideals of democracy and equal opportunity and the cult of selection.

Is the youth, for instance, who, by formal tests of experience or contacts, makes a poor showing, to be refused the opportunity of a college education? Does the college student who fails in his examinations turn out sometimes to be the stone rejected by the builders, achieving distinction in a larger world? Efforts to resolve the scientific problems, which are here present, have centered upon three or four general types of tests. There are the detailed intelligence tests, the tests of special capacities, the tests of non-intellectual or personality traits, and tests of social adaptation, the last of which have not yet been well developed. There is a great mass of material here which has been gathered from hundreds of scholars and workers in the field and the advanced student will find much to help him in his research. The list of tests, of books, and of discussions would itself make a good-sized volume. Included, besides general tests of "intelligence" and "ability," would be those of originality, achievement, information, adaptation, and the whole list of tests in the special subjects—language, reading, vocabulary, grammar, mathematics, and the others. Another great area where the tests have been employed has been that of examining the Negro.

In subsequent chapters we shall point out the importance of critical self-examination by the institutions to see to what extent they are fulfilling their social obligations to the individual. We shall point out the importance of the institution as a buffer between the individual and the rapidly changing world. And we have found that one of the chief critical problems of the modern era lies in the lack of flexibility shown by many of the institutions. There is, too, the other side to the question. The institution not

only owes service and guidance to the individual but the institution must depend for its strength upon its member individuals. It is, therefore, very important for us to measure the individual in his relation to the institution, both in order to gauge the needs and obligations of the institution and the responsibility of the individual himself. We have pointed out how institutions have often failed because they ignored the rights of the individual and the functions of other institutions. What, then, is the function of the individual toward the institution? Whatever the changes in the form of church or school or family or industry, it must be clear that the vitality and power of such institutions, as well as their form, must be examined from the viewpoint of the individual's contribution. Without, therefore, assigning too much importance to the more or less formal and mechanical measurement of the individual's relation to the several institutions, we ought, nevertheless, to raise important questions respecting the individual and the institution. Six arbitrary tables of measurement, therefore, will be presented as types, using the method of position in a scale.

Just as the social environment, which includes the social institutions, has its important bearing upon the development of the individual, so his biological and social inheritance is highly important. Professor Giddings and others have pointed out how the intellect of the individual may be quickened by environment even though his intellectual ability is not changed. The health of an individual may be protected and promoted by environment. It is important to know, however, something of the fundamental inherent bases as well as the learned activities of the individual upon which society may work. Professor Allport lists six inherited activities which from the cradle to the grave constitute the basis upon which environmental influence may work. These are starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reactions, sensitive zone reactions, and sex reactions. Each of these technical terms, of course, involves many practical and simple processes of human activities and human training. It is important, therefore, for society to recognize not only its obligation but the practical means by which it can serve the individual. As Allport says, "The shaping of the fundamental activities by social factors renders the individual as truly socialized as he would be with inborn reactions of the same sort." Thus it is important to recognize, along with all the funda-

mental inherited activities, the social factors in their development. Such matters as imitation, gregariousness, language and gesture, facial and bodily expression, social stimulation in the crowd, social attitudes and social consciousness—all of these bring about important products in social behavior.

Thus the knowledge of the individual and his relationships will become a chief means of studying, and even of correcting, the abuses in the social institutions and of diagnosing various social and individual problems of maladjustment. The individual, therefore, cannot be separated from the group. Economic and industrial controls may relinquish their exploitation of the individual or prey upon individual suggestibility. In the family there may be important recognition of the moral independence of youth and woman and of other important aspects relating to the individual. Likewise government and religion may offer larger social service than mere police functions and force, on the one hand, and the pampering of weakness, on the other. And, of course, the school may change its whole process and direction through the socialization of its curriculum. In his discussion of social behavior of the individual in relation to society, Professor Allport continues:

'In all of these ways social behavior and social inheritance can be brought into the service of more adequate adjustment. The individual, through such reforms, will be assisted in carrying on the advancing cycle of problem and solution, of need and fulfillment. He will be enabled, moreover, to carry it on in cooperation with his fellows, and through the needs and satisfaction of the social life itself. But this is not all. Social continuity teaches us that the social behavior and adjustments of one generation are, if successful, handed on to posterity as useful rules of living. We thus live on in the habit systems of succeeding generations in proportion to the value of our contribution to the social order. The stimulations which our behavior gives to others are perpetuated in a vital tradition for the guidance of the ages to come. Life is enriched not only through the scope of one's own adjustments, but through the influence of those adjustments re-embodied in the lives of others. Progress which is the achievement of the individual becomes the heritage of the ages.' [2]

The various phases of the individual's relation to society and society's institutional relation to the individual which have just

been presented may be studied more effectively by an examination of the newer emphasis upon the social personality. We have quoted Professor Giddings as saying that the social personality represents the highest objective of society. Hence it is manifestly important for us to study more effectively and in more detail the qualities and backgrounds upon which such social personality may be built. Ernest R. Groves in *Personality and Social Adjustment* sees the individual as a product of basic impulses and social compulsion. These basic impulses or instincts are hunger, self-preservation and sex, which are stimulated, modified, and socialized through social control. Not only do the home and parents share in this socializing process but the school, the church, and the "gang," also play their parts. 'The education or socializing of the impulses is not an arbitrary interference with the purposes of the individual, on the part of the group, but a necessity. Human instincts do not furnish preparation for life. They merely give the substance for character-building. Preparation for life is for the human being a social process and involves a transformation of instinctive tendencies. Conduct is lifted from the level of impulses to the level of social behavior.'

Although all men begin life with certain innate characteristics which are common to the race, personality as the sum-total of traits derived from social and environmental conditions which are superimposed upon inborn capacities, varies from individual to individual. And not only is there a difference in the environmental conditions operating in the life of the individual, but there is a difference in native equipment as well. So important do these individual and social differences appear that our premise bears repeating again and again, namely, that the role of individual differences in the redistribution of wealth and opportunity in the modern world probably constitutes one of the two or three most difficult organic problems of modern society. These problems will be illustrated further again and again in the chapters which follow, and their ramification will extend throughout our studies of racial and ethnic backgrounds, of children, youth, old age, and of educational and community backgrounds. How these problems appear in the specialized studies and discussions of the present era may be observed in the large number of volumes being presented by biologists, physicians, and physical scientists calling attention to

the multiple and conflicting schools of thought with reference to the rediscovery of man, the realignment of races, increasing importance of personality, the rise and development of psychiatry and treatment of social pathology, and many other trends. From whatever angle we approach our biological and psychological backgrounds we face always the scientist's demand for that realism which comprehends both the facts of the laboratory and the facts of experience. These will be the twin sources for the working out of our problems and for which there is a great abundance of literature for the further answering of our questions.

## *Chapter VII*

# *REGIONAL FACTORS AND PROBLEMS*

In each of the major groupings of problems inherent in the natural heritage of physiography, biology, and psychology, in the technological heritage of science and invention, and in the cultural heritage of rural and urban life, there are great regional differentials among the people and their institutions. So much is this true that it does not seem possible to understand the development of society in general or the social problems of the American people without understanding their regional backgrounds and cultures.

America is so vast that we take for granted great expanses and differentials at which Europeans marvel. Many of the European states could be superimposed upon the great American continent and cause scarcely more than a small eclipse of view! The nation is so complex in its historical and cultural backgrounds and in its present situations that there can be no average man or composite community. Its people and its economies, its geography and its culture, are continuing evidence, not only of strength in diversity but of problems of unity and differentials. Throughout this volume, therefore, many of the facts relating to the American people will be presented, not only by totals and averages, but by regional distribution.

The American picture abounds in the evidences of regional diversity, basic to the understanding of the nation and to the direction of its future. Certainly within the sweep of its physical resources no two of the great regions are alike. Consider the soil, the climate, the forests, the minerals, the rivers and lakes, and the consequent crops and industries, work and manners that grow out of them. The Southeast is different from the Northeast. The Southwest is different from the Northwest. The rural Midwest is different from the rural Southeast. The industrial Northeast is different from the industrial Middle States. The Far West is different from any other region. Or to be more specific, consider the problem of rivers and water in the different regions, in one of

which the problem is floods and in another irrigation. Thus the problems of water planning in New England are quite different from those of the valley of the Colorado or the Rio Grande. In New England, flood control is uppermost, while in the Colorado Drainage Basin there are many more problems of storage, recreation, irrigation and navigation, and even the basic potentials of civilization are involved. Or again there is the California area in which the whole region must depend for further expansion upon the development, conservation, and utilization of all available water supply, while in the Southeast it is often a question of too much water. In all of these aspects we have pointed out how romance and realism alike necessitate the study of regional differences. The romance of the Oregon Trail or of the multiple transcontinental highways and railroads is no more romantic or realistic in frontier realism than the nearly completed 249-mile aqueduct to divert water from the Colorado River over the mountains to Los Angeles. So, too, what were formerly vast desert wastes now blossom with Edens of crops and flowers and beautiful homes, thus creating new regional worlds for the enrichment of the new frontiers. Still contrasting with these are the river valleys of the Great Pacific Northwest and of the multiple mountain and valley streams of the Southeast where power and industry are at stake.[1]

Or, again, the life and culture of the people of the different regions vary because of these other two great heritages of rural and urban life. Thus, the great regions of the Southeast, the Southwest, and the Northwest are essentially rural, while urban and industrial concentrations predominate in the great Northeast, the Middle States, and in the Far West of Los Angeles and San Francisco.

"Six Americas in Search of a Faith" was the phrase which Sir William Beveridge used when he went back to England after his observation of the multicultured United States to indicate differences in problems which characterize the nation. This study of the American people and their institutions in terms of six great cultural regions is both a fascinating task and a realistic approach to the understanding of our problems. It is one way of learning what "American" means in the sense that we may know what the historical and cultural factors are, what the stocks and types of people are, what problems of economic and social life owe their

genesis and development to geographical variations. Even the problems of justice, according to William Allen White, are problems of regional adjustment. These great regions, he points out, 'are not merely colored places on the map. They present different views of life; justice for one region is not justice for another. Yet a rough approximation of justice for each region must be worked out if all these regions are held together in the bonds of a continental commonwealth.'

For the purposes of understanding the nation and for the very practical purposes of analyzing it, we have divided the United States into six major regions, keeping in mind the greatest possible flexibility for future trends and allowing for the greatest possible number of uses and agreements. Thus, sixfold America comprehends the *Northeast* and the *Southeast,* the *Northwest* and the *Southwest,* the *Middle States* and the *Far West.* These are realistic extensions of the earlier historical "sections." They represent two "Souths," two "Norths," and two "Wests." Still more historically literal, they represent one "East," one "South," and four "Wests." These are *major* regions approximating a greater degree of homogeneity measured by a larger number of indices for a larger number of purposes and classifications than any other regional framework that has been utilized or than any other that, on the basis of our data and premises, would appear possible.

The *Northeastern Region* is practically synonymous with Frederick Jackson Turner's greater New England and includes twelve states: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The *Southeastern Region* includes eleven states, approximating the "Old South": Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Kentucky. The *Southwestern Region* represents a new cultural region long since differentiated from "the South" and nearer West than South, including the four states of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona. The *Middle States,* largely what was long known as the Middle West, include eight states: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri. The new *Northwest,* comprising much of what was called the Mountain States, includes nine states: North Dakota, South Dakota,

Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah. Finally, the *Far West* picture, holding to the concept of the Pacific West, includes the four states: Washington, Oregon, California, and Nevada.[2]

Here are great regional empires which might have developed into competing nations, as did the European states, had the earlier American sectionalism continued instead of the new emerging regionalism which sees the nation first, the region next, the development of each contributing to the richness of all. In order to indicate the powerful national unity which is fabricated of so great diversity, we have tried to describe each of the great regions in terms of what is "most American." The fact that each appears so realistically "American" in so many ways and that any tendency to characterize them as "less American" is described as "un-American" is powerful testimony to the present unity and integration of the nation.

Thus, when we classify the great Middle States as the "most American" and the great Southwest as the "least American" we run upon a storm of protests—protests from other regions that they are "more American" than the "Middle West"; protests from the Southwest that it is of all regions the "most American." All of these reactions are wholesome in that they help us to get acquainted with the nation and to understand its problems. Lewis Mumford has sometimes appraised the better understanding of these regions as one of the best possible exercises in patriotism.

In order to test out our emphasis upon regional factors and planning, let us look at these regions in terms of authentic historical Americanisms, which will, of course, include the nature and number of the people, the traditions and manners of our culture, the ideologies and laws of our institutions, the backgrounds and structure of our economics. Keeping in mind as many of these indices as possible, we have ranked the six regions in the following order as "the most American": the Middle States, the Northeast, the Southeast, the Far West, the Northwest, and the Southwest. Here are some of the reasons which we have ascribed in *American Regionalism*. The Middle States was the great Middle West. The very names which have characterized the region are eloquent of the frontier nation in the making, as distinctive from the earlier historical seaboard nation, the offshoot and expansion of European

cultures. For here are symbol and reality of "West" and "The Great Northwest"; "Middle West" and "Middle America"; "Midlands" and "The Middle Border"; "Midwest" and "Midwestern Empire" and all that "West," the supreme symbol so bitterly attacked by "The East" in the earlier frontier reconstruction of the nation. Here, too, was the great valley of the Upper Mississippi Basin comprehending most of the area between the Missouri and the Ohio and typified by the Mississippi River, "The most eloquent symbol of space and unity in America." Here, again, are symbol and reality not only of Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier America, but of the living land and people, of the man himself, bred and born in and of it. Here were epitomized the two great motivations of the nation—migration and westward movement, where first Europeans became in reality Americans rather than Europeans transplanted. Here were symbol and reality of rivers and forests, of land and prairies, of plain people and democratic patterns, symbols of the American dream. In the quality and number of its people, the nature and number of its occupations, its small industries and great agriculture, in the best examples of balanced industry and agriculture, are typified the heart of America and the backbone of its national framework. And here are American manners and morals, folkways and customs, religion and politics. Finally, here too are emerging industrial and metropolitan regions challenging the East, set in the midst of a vast wealth of natural resources, with all that train of social and economic problems which follow so naturally in the wake of a complex of technology, industrialization, and urbanism built upon an agrarian nation. Here, then, are at once symbol and reality, test and promise of American regionalism in all its manifestations and implications.[8]

So, too, when we come to characterize the great Northeast, concentration area for both population and industry, we start by pointing out that the early East was largely New England. But this regional claim for priority as the next "most American" region is not only based upon New England, the historical cradle of the nation, with its distinctive culture of the newest new world; with its plurality of the thirteen colonies; or metropolitan New York, often informally designated as America and dominating the financial and organizational nation; or Pennsylvania with its Cradle of Liberty and the City of Brotherly Love, center and symbol of

Benjamin Franklin, forerunner of our technology; and also its Pennsylvania Dutch and Friends; or its coal and iron resources, basic power of American dominance in the world; or Maryland and its Baltimore metropolitan area, borderland between North and South; or Washington and the District of Columbia, center and symbol of the earlier planned historical nation, as well as of a new nation in travail. It is all of these and more—wealth of capital and wealth of people, wealth of schools and wealth of philanthropy, wealth of industry and wealth of technology, cradle of the Yankee, cradle of the immigrant, cradle of the Jews, cradle of industry, gateway to Europe. And the region is American of the Americans in so far as it claims most of the wealth of the wealthiest nation and nearly all of the threescore vaunted families that "Rule America."

Once, again, when we come to characterize the great Southeastern Region we must recognize the historical character of "the Old South," often symbol of James Truslow Adams' "America's Tragedy." We have pointed out in *American Regionalism* that, in addition to the usual claims as being "the most American," the Southeast qualifies admirably as an example of Frederick Jackson Turner's sectionalism and of his historical frontier Americanism. That is, the Old South, itself an administrative confederacy, has commonly been considered as not only typifying, but as embodying the essential episodes of sectionalism. This, as will be seen subsequently, offers an excellent opportunity to illustrate essential differences between the section and the region. Likewise, in so far as the South was the gateway to the first "Wests" and "Southwests" and "Northwests" through Tennessee and Kentucky, then Alabama and Mississippi, it was essentially a continuing frontier, and its society is even now often characterized by the appellation of the arrested frontier.

As a matter of common characterization within the region itself, the Southeast is usually and unqualifiedly called the most American part of the nation. By this is meant, of course, that part of the nation which, holding on to its historical priority of the 13 original colonies and the traditions of the early settlers, still retains, since the turn of the twentieth century, more of the early "Americanisms" than any other region. These "Americanisms" are usually interpreted to mean the largest ratio of native whites of native

parents from original upper European stocks, small foreign population, the largest ratio of Protestants in religion, agrarian in culture, simple in living in rural isolated life, and retarded in certain aspects of culture so as to rank along where most of the nation ranked before the turn of the century. The fact that there is so much evidence which can be used to support this rationalization is eloquent testimony to the great American unity in diversity, both in the segments of historical sequence and of regional variation.

For without doubt the Old South provided much of the ideology, leadership, and statesmen who gave form and content to the political philosophy and practice of the nation, such as Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Calhoun; and of later popular democratic types, such as Andrew Jackson and Andrew Johnson. Jefferson was and is American in both the realistic and symbolic sense that he held every important political office in the gift of his own state, penned the Declaration of Independence, outlined the American land system and, to a great extent, organized the Democratic Party, set up new standards of liberalism and freedom from church domination, formulated the doctrine of agrarian democracy, set up the foundations for a great state university, negotiated the Louisiana Purchase, experimented widely in scientific agriculture and architecture. Surely, the Old South was American in that it provided a dozen presidents of the United States, more than 50 cabinet members. And of 41 political scientists, important in domestic affairs before the Civil War, deemed worthy of a place in the annals of American scholarship, only 14 were not of the South, while of those sketched as important for the development of political theory, the Southeast recorded more than all the other states.

The Southeast was essentially an "American" region in the range and abundance of its flora and fauna, of its land and forests, of its mountains and rivers, of its minerals and climate, and withal in its prevailing tempo and pattern of ruthless exploitation of resources, natural and human. Its people were symbolic, too, of all those who came down from the Northeast and from the upper European borders, adventurers, free and debtors, noble and common. Yet it is a long way from the pioneer days to the glory that was the Old South and a long way back again, through the scarred battlefields of sectionalism to a broken and charred region, humili-

ated with slaves turned rulers. Yet, all of this was of the essence of sectional America and of its paradoxes and contrasts, fact and symbol of the evolution of America.[5]

Now if we want to emphasize the meaning of Americanism by characterizing certain of the regions as less American, we turn to the Far West and the Southwest. Thus we say of both that they are at once the most American and the most "un-American" of the regions. The Far West, for instance, is "un-American" in so far as its exotic culture contrasts with the earlier historical nation and in so far as its oriental character contrasts it with the Eastern United States. It is "un-American" in so far as "there is none like it"; that is, it is a different world from "the East," or "the Middle West," or "the Great Plains," or "the South." It is "un-American" in its lower borders in so far as the Spanish influence represents the prenational pattern and in the northern part in so far as its earlier prenational culture or later "northwestern" culture prevails.

Yet, both the upper and lower Pacific west are often characterized as American phenomena, Oregon for its early development of a great agriculture and forestry and for the large-scale capacity of its land and forests and streams; the California west because of the composite character of its people from all the states in the Union and the multiple complex nature of its culture and credos. Thus, Idwal Jones writes of California as the microcosm of the United States. 'Let anything happen,' he says, 'in the rest of the country, in Arkansas or Maine, and there is instant repercussion inside its borders. It has absorbed the frontier; it has become the national hot-bed and testing-ground. Hardly anyone has described this aspect of California so well as Farnsworth Crowder in "Westways" did the other month: "Here American institutions sharpen into focus so startling as to give the effect, sometimes, of caricature. Here the socio-economic class conflict is vividly posed in burning silhouettes against the walls of the factory and the hinterland. Here American scholarship and research are at their best, American cults and quasi-religions at their shabby and shallow worst; here America's indignant soap-boxers and pamphleteers, her bigots self-surrendered to some oversimplified ideal, its scared reactionaries and its grim standpatters; its baronial aristocracy, its patient poor and its sober, good-natured, self-centered middle class; its promoters, racketeers, opportunists, and politicians; its fagged-out oldsters and

its brash, raw youths. . . . What America is, California is, with accents, in italics."'

Of particular emphasis at this point is the essential "American" nature of the Far West as pertains to its regional character and implications. It is a major part of the nation, boasting the highest standard of living in the nation or, for that matter, in the world, yet it is so far removed from the New York center of finance and of national organizations and the Washington center of government that it is necessary to operate through regional divisions, through telegraph and telephone communication, and through other techniques which must somehow transcend the distance and time elements involved in travel and personal contact.[6]

When we come to the great emerging *Southwest,* which surely is not East, not West, not South, not North, we face the dilemma of finding accurate delineation for so great and diverse a region. We have pointed out that beyond a doubt this great "empire" is "American" in size and open spaces with its symbol and reality of "the West," its cradle of cowboy lore, its allegiance to the Old South, its Spanish origins and its historical romance with Mexico, its heroic military traditions and episodes, its great Indian territory and traditions, and its quick-growing cities and "bigger and better" motivations, of oil derricks and cattle ranges, cotton fields and turkey ranches. American, too, it is in the precivilization sense that it comprehends the basic examples of early American culture and of the anthropologist's "culture area."

Because "American" culture is so new in this vast region, and because Latin and Indian culture was so well embedded there before the dominant group entered, there still remain more vestiges of the "foreign" civilization than in any other portion of the nation. This situation has been perpetuated to some extent by the presence of vast numbers of "Mexicans" in the present population—people of whom many have lived within the region for many generations, who speak the Spanish language and hold dear many of the Spanish culture traits so painstakingly taught them by patient Catholic padres, but who also retain many of the deeper feelings and more unobtrusive folkways of the Indians who have bequeathed them a high percentage of the blood which courses through their veins. Dominant though the "American" now is, his daily contact with a Latinized culture has had its inevitable

*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

The people: Americans all. Needing institutions to meet the varied needs of many groups and point them toward new frontiers.





*Photos by Bayard Wootten*

**he people: Pioneers and poise of the earlier days contrasting with the stress and tension of megalopolitan culture.**



effect in his speech, his manners, his ways of doing business, as well as in the names he gives the streets of his towns and his children.

Here two great culture systems have met and clashed and fused and are still in process of clashing and fusing. Here the elements in that typically American situation described as the "melting pot" are clearly drawn because of the relatively small numbers of culture systems involved and because of the distinct nature of those systems. Here, in a truly cultural sense, is found and may be observed the last frontier. In these elements the Southwest is American; in the further sense of bringing into contact the two culture systems which dominate the Western Hemisphere and affording a testing ground and experimental field, here is an opportunity for the "America" of the north, the giant of the western political world, to observe and select cultural elements and traits which will bring this nation into closer understanding and sympathy with that older "America" of the south, Latin America, which the circumstances of geography and politics have decreed must be our closest neighbor of the future, with all the implications of that fact. Here we have a blending of the two Americas, a circumstance which makes the region less "American" in the sense of the United States than any other, but from the point of view of the Hemisphere, the most truly American of all possible regions.

It is perhaps in this pluralism of the region together with the dominance and self-sufficiency of the great State of Texas, the exotic symbolic culture of Arizona and New Mexico, and the newness of the three states other than Texas, defying, for the present, classification or integration, that makes it less possible to picture the region as one approximating a large degree of homogeneity in the sense that some of the other major regions have. Yet this need and opportunity for integration in the great American process of frontier growth, especially in the newer developments of the nation, is of the essence of American regionalism and in particular of this Southwestern area. More of this will appear in the outlining of the region's cultural and physical profile, yet it is well to introduce here a vivid picture of this new Southwest as presented in 1938 by the United States Department of the Interior.

'This Southwest is a land of color, of amazing distance, of the

romance of vanished civilizations, and of living cultures closely related to prehistory and vastly differing from the habits and mode of life of the Anglo-Saxon and of the white man generally. Young in years, young in settlement by English-speaking peoples, the Southwest has the oldest definite records of human occupancy in the United States; and it was explored and to a certain extent settled by Spanish adventurers and missionaries long before English occupation of the eastern seaboard.

'The Southwest is a land of contradictions—of high mountains, tremendous canyons, and flat deserts; of little moisture and yet of torrential downpours that leave broad rivers which for a few days usurp old roadbeds; of abandoned prehistoric ruins hundreds of years old and of modern motor camps; of lands that lie parched for rain, yet "bloom like the rose" given a little water; of primitive Indian travel afoot and on horse, yet crossed by transcontinental highways, railways, and airway routes, the latter with huge beacons that intrigue the imagination; of enormous, rainbow-hued bridges built by nature, and of man's great engineering feats in bridge building and in conquering the mighty rivers that were Nature's tools in her bridge and canyon building.

'In all, it is a land of fascination, with its scenery, its traditions, and its relics of the past. Enchanted it has been called; mysterious, gorgeous, multicolored, primitive, romantic, artistic, vibrant—then adjectives fail, and the writer confesses that words cannot convey to the uninitiated the glory that is the Southwest.'[7]

Regional factors, however, have a larger theoretical bearing upon our understanding of all social problems, whether in the United States or in the smaller nations of Europe or in the conflicts of the new nationalism and racial loyalties of the modern world. For an understanding of regional factors will help us to understand how all societies grow from regional-cultural groups outward into states, nations, and empires and help to explain those essential loyalties through which patriotism arises. And it helps to understand the stubbornness of different groups and the loyalties with which they fight for the rights as well as the backgrounds upon which their cultures have been built.[8]

We have already discussed something of the problem of seeking the most satisfactory adjustment of man to the physical environment or what is sometimes called the regional balance of man.

Other theoretical aspects of the problem are also important. One of these is the theory that all cultures develop and grow from areas and regions of smaller groups to larger aggregates, states, and nations. This does not mean only that in America the nation expanded from an ever-widening domain and has evolved from earlier local and sectional patterns to current regional and national design. This does not mean only that our states have evolved from settlements, our regions from states, and our nation from frontiers. It means this and more. It means also that all cultures and civilizations have evolved logically from regional beginnings. No great civilization has ever blossomed full grown nor can it be superimposed from above. The local regional group represents the elemental unit in all societies whether that of the oriental city, the medieval city, or the world empire. Cultures and peoples, states and nations, federations and empires grow from regional sustentation areas out into expanded entities.

Now this is of the greatest significance in all our efforts to get understanding of social problems. People differ. Cultures differ. What one group holds to be "good," another holds to be "bad." Even in the United States, nearly all our problems have regional variations. Holding the people as the basic reality of all society and social study there is need to emphasize continually the theoretical significance of the folk and the region in the development of society, since there is an amazing ignorance of the various regions of the United States and their folk, even by well-informed persons. The primary significance of the folk lies in the fact that the ways of the folk are largely determinative in any society, since they tend to interpret actual situations in terms of the folk perspectives, of the mores. And, since folk cultures vary, the interpretations placed on facts will vary from region to region or culture to culture. The point is of particular interest to social planning agencies, since any plan which will succeed must fit into this pattern of folkways and mores. There is yet one other larger implication of the folk-regional society in relation to modern civilization. This we have emphasized in our discussion of change and urbanism. It is the contrasting character of the natural folk-regional society set over against the bigness and artificiality of the complex, technological, and industrial urban society of the maturing nation.

The student of social problems will understand more of this phase of the subject if he recalls his study of economic determinism as a primary influence upon society. Over against this, our problems of the region may be considered under the general framework of "societal determinism" as opposed to the older theories of economic determinism, geographic determinism, biological determinism, or any of the other theories of the single deterministic forces. It is easy to understand the significance of this theory when we examine the various other deterministic theories. For instance, Huntington's practice of making climate the chief determinant of the culture, character, and efficiency of a people is clearly seen to be only one of several contributing factors in the light of what modern science and engineering can contribute to the mastery of climatic handicaps and in the light of recent changes. So, too, the old geographer's saying that a man is what he is because of where he is is manifestly a very partial statement. Likewise, in the problems of race and individual differences there is no longer agreement upon the almost exclusive influence of biological heredity. And to select perhaps the most common illustration, the Marxian economic determinism is no longer held valid in the supreme sense, even by the adherents of socialism. In the modern world, the great trend toward technological dominance of culture may possibly find its best antidote in regionalism, through which it may be possible to maintain a quality civilization in a quantity world.

From the viewpoint of the scientific study of our problems regionalism may be said to constitute a methodological approach in the sense that it gives us a living areal laboratory and lets us look at the whole of a society at a given time and in a given area. Long ago the geographers divided the world into regional units with a view to being able to study the whole in units small enough and homogeneous enough to make their findings realistic. So, in our national problems, since getting the facts constitutes the first essential of scientific inquiry the regional division of the nation is essential. Thus, we come to speak of the science of the region as a considerable and growing body of knowledge about the region gathered through tested methods of research and study. On this assumption, then, regionalism through the cooperation and coordination of the efforts and techniques of the several sciences and social sciences may actually approximate a methodological approach.

Implied in this science of the region is the universal twofold motivation of all science, namely, to discover truth and to attain mastery, both of which are inherent in the new regionalism which, perhaps more than anything else, explains the nation, and may be now utilized in its further planning.[9]

This newer type of regional approach represents one of the best illustrations of the range and objectives of social research. We have pointed out elsewhere how the regional approach views a given society as a whole, and enables all of the social sciences to contribute to its study. In the second place, this concrete laboratory which we have described offers a common field through which practically all of the present trends in social research may be applied. At the same time it provides for adequate delimitation of areas and scope and extends the range for quantitative effort to discover *new* facts. Such a view of regionalism takes it out of the province of any one field of thought and demands the coordination of all lines of approach. And it is just this correlating and coordinating of various factors which gives the regional approach its greatest value. It demands that the planner or investigator see the region as a whole. It is the interrelationships of the various factors in regional analysis which give to the region its distinctive character, its way of life.[10]

From the viewpoint of world conflict as well as American trends, regionalism appears as a very realistic economy through which decentralization and equilibrium may be maintained in a world almost universally characterized as tending too much toward superurbanization, bigness, and technological centralization. We have already made the broad assumption that decentralization is one of the essential needs of the modern world. Now decentralization is inherent in regionalism. If this is true, one implication of regionalism may well be the opposite of the present tendency toward urbanism, centralization, and concentration of power and wealth. If, as we have pointed out, cultures grow from beginnings outward, the margins of bigness are the occasion for redistribution. An economy of decentralized industry is usually cited as the most common example of decentralization. Here regionalism offers what many students consider the best "way on" in so large and complex a nation as the United States. Again, regionalism provides an economy for the decentralization of political power and

administrative procedure in government and business. As such, it transcends the older "pure" states' rights and safeguards the people from federal overcentralization. In administrative procedure it provides for economy and efficiency in governmental and social services as well as representative opportunity for production and distribution of goods.[11]

The development of regionalism has taken several forms. Metropolitan regionalism was perhaps the key to earlier American regionalism. Literary regionalism has perhaps been the most popular and is still much in evidence in the novel and drama. Economic and industrial regionalism have also been much in evidence, while administrative regionalism in both governmental and nongovernmental aspects has developed rapidly during the last few years. Each of these affords techniques and tools for working out various adjustments of people to their environment, but they also often create problems anew.

Illustrations of American regional divisions are abundant. There are regions of earlier historical significance. There are regions of newer administrative functions. There are regions of convenience and of necessity. There are regions of government and regions of commerce. There are regions of literary achievement and regions of agricultural adjustment. There are regions of land and of water, of forests and of minerals, of flora and of crops. There are regions of educational institutions and football arrangements; regions of wholesale trade and of Rotary and Kiwanis. There are regions within regions, subregions and districts. Within and among all these and many other manifestations, regionalism becomes a realistic frame of reference for research and study and a practical framework for planning and for adjustment in such areas as population development and policy, standards of living and work, the increase of wealth and well-being, the changing status of race and minority groups, the equalization of opportunity, the development and mastery of new "social frontiers."

Much of the realism of this "American" emphasis upon regionalism flows naturally from the historical backgrounds of the nation which must constitute a chief thread throughout the volume. Rupert B. Vance sees arising from such background 'great hordes of America's regions, the number and variety of which are limited only by the frames of reference chosen. On the frontier emerged

zones of exploration, of military control, of missionary activity, of the "long hunter," fur trapper, Indian trader and squatter. Spanish frontier, French frontier, Indian frontier, Puritan and Tidewater, Fall Line and Appalachians, Old West and Old Northwest, Southwest and Middle Border, California and Oregon Country, these are the regions the pioneer process carved out of a virgin continent. Natural areas change into culture-made areas, drainage basins become hydroelectric power zones, biotic areas become types of farming areas, harbor indentations become the zones of port authorities and the list continues ad infinitum. Today one may take his choice of physiographic areas, trade areas, types of farming areas, census areas, railroad nets, superpower zones, army corps areas, Federal Reserve Districts, newspaper circulation areas, voting maps, or any of the multitudinous indices gathered by statistical agencies to delimit his regions.'[12]

There are essentially two major divisions of problems which involve regional factors. One is the problem of understanding America, of sensing the length, width, breadth, and depth of its great civilization and of understanding how strength and union may be found in diversity and differences. This is sometimes considered a problem of patriotism, sometimes a problem of education, sometimes a problem of statesmanship, but always an American problem de luxe. The other type of problem is found in the dilemma of integrating and coordinating these diversities to the end that the old sectional strife and isolation may be transcended by the new regional cooperation and national integration. Some of the ways in which this may be done will appear in the several chapters and in particular in Chapter XXVII, in which regional planning and problems are discussed.

There are, however, in addition to the regional quality and balance of America, certain aspects of regionalism that are fundamental to world order. The global problems which are the aftermath of global war require regional analysis and arrangements comparable to those specified in America. And it is this increasing role of regionalism in world society that also gives promise of world unity and peace. Here are new frontiers for study and planning

# *PART TWO*

# *THE PEOPLE*

## *Chapter VIII*

## *THE NEW REALISM OF THE PEOPLE*

"OF, FOR, and by the people" was not spoken by a great statesman for the American people merely as shibboleth or appeal to the mob. It was fundamental to the tenets of a societal democracy which sought special privilege to none and equal opportunity for all. Yet the theme was even more fundamental. It represented the theory that the reality of all realities in society everywhere will be found in the people. The dynamic Professor Franklin Henry Giddings, in the heyday of his lectures to large groups of graduate students at Columbia, was wont to make his final definition of sociology as the study of the behavior of human beings with, to, and for one another.

It is in this sense that the key to all our social problems will be found ultimately somewhere among the people in their multiple behavior situations. It is in this sense also that we have pointed out in previous chapters how the differentials of individuals and of regional and cultural groups, with varying geography and heritage, shape their conduct and affect their problems. It is in this sense also that we have pointed out the fact that the people represent the supreme wealth of a nation and that the development and utilization of all our other wealth is valid only in relation to the people themselves.

We are, therefore, always brought back to the realistic conclusion that the heart of society and the central key to all its problems and progress are found in the people themselves. They not only constitute the units of society; they, with their behavior and

societal arrangements, are society itself. If, therefore, we should have to choose a single theme around which to organize our study of society, it would be *the people.* In reality there has been an increasing emphasis upon the study of population within recent years, so that our plan of making our second unit focus upon the people and of giving it the largest portion of the book will conform to much of the best current methodology in the study of modern society.

In this approach to the study of society and its problems through the people, we shall recognize the importance of the usual and conventional aspects of population study, such as the composition of the population, migration and mobility of people, together with some of the questions of population policy. Yet we must realize, too, the fact that population study as a science is a very specialized task for experts. What we must learn in this discussion is its range and significance in our whole picture of American problems. We shall, therefore, of course, make special application to the American scene.

Somewhat different, however, will be our special emphasis upon what we call the new realism of the people as they appear in mass restlessness in the modern world. Somewhat different also is our arrangement whereby we study the problems of children and youth, of races and nationalities, of crime and delinquency and of labor as problems of special parts of the population rather than as general abstract problems or problems of institutions. Thus, we may look realistically at the living problems of those who work and of those who do not work; of those who lead and of the handicapped; of women and of children; of school folk and of professional folk. They are all people in whom reside the potentialities of the new world in conflict.

For, in this new day of powerful movements, great change, and epochal opportunity, the people are the center and symbol of our wealth and welfare, of whatever power and glory may be inherent in a great civilization. Such a verdict, however, can no longer merely be expressed in terms of abstract tributes, for a world of restless folk will see that they are more than concepts or statistical units, or charts or graphs of population studies. Timeless, spaceless, the ever-consistent springs of all civilizations, the people *live,* sometimes pointing the way ahead for the next great period of

progress, vibrant with the promise of a new day, or perhaps, unless conserved and developed, symbolic of the long road back.

The American ideal has always insisted that it is through the vigor and freshness of a strong and virile people, and through the orderly development of their capacities and institutions that we must attain stable and enduring civilization. Thus the popular ideal upon which the nation was founded rests also upon a scientific basis in which the people as individuals, as geographic units, and as regional component parts of the nation, constitute the elemental factors out of which the nation has been fabricated. This realism of the people has been recognized in many varied forms through varying periods of history, such that I have sometimes said that the common people, the mass folk power, appears as a sort of universal constant in a world of great variables. It is in this sense that the old *vox populi, vox dei,* the voice of the people, the voice of God, represented an organic truth paraphrased in a thousand ways by a thousand spokesmen. Thus Woodrow Wilson's picture, 'The great voice of America does not come from seats of learning. It comes in a murmur from the hills and woods and the farms and factories and the mills rolling on and gaining volume until it comes to us from the homes of common men. . . .'

This power and elemental force of the people are not only reflected in its romantic, heroic, beautiful episodes, in the sweep and power of epic movements towards freedom, justice, opportunity, but also in the tragic conflict of brothers, in the struggle for power and conquest, in ruthless exploitation of minority groups, in the terrifying carnage of revolution. There is something beautiful in the epic quality of the people; there is terror in the blindness and power of an unrestrained folk. Throughout the world today, apparently in whatever transition we may be making to new states of civilization, the mass man, the whole real people, approximate an accession to social power such as has not hitherto been recorded in the annals of man. Thus we come today to realize not only the historic significance of the people and their power, but in a day when the speed and sweep of technology have exceeded the capacity of even our most educated and widely experienced people, we face the problem of the great mass power of people, through communication, redistribution of wealth, clamoring for control, for

reality, for quick readjustment, in a world which they little understand.

There are other realistic aspects of the situation. In a day when the world at large, and America in particular, has come to realize that its destiny depends upon the conservation of its great physical resources, we have come suddenly face to face with the realization that all this conservation and redistribution of the world's resources has meaning only in relation to the people. On the one hand, we have found that the misuse and maldistribution of these resources have had their tragic results upon the people of the earth, upon the wealth of nations, upon national and international relationships; upon poverty of the people. If we use the analogy of soil erosion so freely predicated as the index of a nation's decay, we must also envisage the great erosion and waste of the people, an even surer index of how and when and why the people perish. But we must face also the other side of the problem in which it must be clear that there can be no permanent, enduring conservation and development of resources except as the people are equipped and trained, motivated and conditioned, for such individual and cooperative effort and arrangements as will make possible permanent planning for the coordinate development of physical and human wealth.

There is here also in this new world of technics and civilization a strange and powerful paradox; even as the machine gains power and control, even as science and technology dominate the world of man, even as lesser men through machines can do greater work, and lesser numbers produce greater wealth, so in the midst of this, and by its very token, man and the spirit of man become more important; the quest for spiritual expression and participation in the machine world becomes more insistent; and the people ever clamor for a larger and larger part and participation in a world which otherwise threatens to destroy them.

There is finally perhaps one other recapitulatory consideration indicative of this organic power of the people. It is illustrated in a recent statement made by President Roosevelt to the effect that those governments and government leaders who stray very far away from the life and reality of the people are not likely to survive. If we check up on the great historical civilizations, it seems quite possible that such a conclusion is justified. As best we can search

ut our facts from the opinions of the great historians, there have ppeared certain consistent factors or forces which seem to con- ribute to disintegration and decay. These have been expansion, igness, artificiality, and stratification on the one hand, and, on he other, a vast chasm of distance between the leaders and spe- ialists and the people together with the exploitation of these same eople.

There is here, however, new danger and challenge to the modern vorld. One such danger has been pointed out in our discussion f the chasm of distance between the people and technology. A imilar danger was pointed out by Ortega y Gasset in his *Revolt f the Masses,* in which he has characterized the trend of European nass behavior as being immoral in the sense that the people accept verything from science and technology, give nothing in return, nd clamor for more. Strangely enough, too, the power of the ictators is led by the multitudes. Thus, Professor Carl Joachim Friedrich quotes the dictator: 'It is always the peasant who re- sponds to my call.' Once again, '. . . From the very beginning, Hitler has cajoled and praised the peasants. Much of his early appeal was to this group, as well as to the lower middle class. Since coming into power, the Nazis have set up the peasant as the incarnation of national integrity; they have proclaimed him the true nobleman; they have instituted in his honor a national festival, Peasants' Day. Besides, they have sought to develop an elaborate set of policies to strengthen the economic position of agriculture, thereby "saving" the peasantry. In short, the peasant has been made the symbol of the real people.'[1]

So, too, he points out that in Soviet Russia 'the huge peasant masses, constituting over 90 percent of the population in 1917, ren- dered that problem of paramount importance. Essentially, Soviet policy in its first period was based on seeking cooperation with the peasantry. It has always been recognized as a singular evidence of Lenin's superior statesmanship that in order to win over the peasants he discarded all dogmatic considerations and adjusted policy to fact. At the beginning of the Bolshevik regime he ob- tained support from them by "nationalizing" big estates, which they had already divided among themselves. Three years later he courageously inaugurated the so-called New Economic Policy, which recognized individual enterprise and individual initiative in

## THE PROSPECTIVE POPULATION PICTURE FOR 1960

Adapted from Thompson and Whelpton's *Estimates of Future Population of States*

| State and Region | Population, 1930 | Population with Migration, 1960 | Population without Migration, 1960 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Southeast* | 25,550,000 | 29,066,000 | 35,168,000 |
| Virginia | 2,422,000 | 2,577,000 | 3,166,000 |
| North Carolina | 3,170,000 | 4,226,000 | 4,740,000 |
| South Carolina | 1,739,000 | 1,856,000 | 2,535,000 |
| Georgia | 2,908,000 | 2,898,000 | 4,048,000 |
| Florida | 1,468,000 | 1,997,000 | 1,640,000 |
| Kentucky | 2,614,000 | 2,943,000 | 3,631,000 |
| Tennessee | 2,617,000 | 2,892,000 | 3,497,000 |
| Alabama | 2,646,000 | 2,982,000 | 3,743,000 |
| Mississippi | 2,010,000 | 2,298,000 | 2,797,000 |
| Arkansas | 1,854,000 | 1,928,000 | 2,575,000 |
| Louisiana | 2,102,000 | 2,469,000 | 2,796,000 |
| *Southwest* | 9,079,600 | 11,330,700 | 12,201,800 |
| Oklahoma | 2,396,000 | 2,902,000 | 3,456,000 |
| Texas | 5,825,000 | 7,255,000 | 7,519,000 |
| New Mexico | 423,000 | 539,000 | 640,000 |
| Arizona | 435,600 | 634,700 | 586,800 |
| *Northeast* | 38,026,000 | 43,130,000 | 40,790,000 |
| Maine | 797,000 | 856,000 | 948,000 |
| New Hampshire | 465,000 | 487,000 | 496,000 |
| Vermont | 360,000 | 367,000 | 410,000 |
| Massachusetts | 4,250,000 | 4,613,000 | 4,391,000 |
| Rhode Island | 688,000 | 776,000 | 731,000 |
| Connecticut | 1,607,000 | 1,843,000 | 1,713,000 |
| New York | 12,588,000 | 14,548,000 | 12,617,000 |
| New Jersey | 4,041,000 | 4,930,000 | 4,204,000 |
| Delaware | 238,000 | 254,000 | 254,000 |
| Pennsylvania | 9,631,000 | 10,410,000 | 10,808,000 |
| Maryland | 1,632,000 | 1,825,000 | 1,768,000 |
| West Virginia | 1,729,000 | 2,221,000 | 2,450,000 |
| *Middle States* | 33,961,000 | 38,325,000 | 37,502,000 |
| Ohio | 6,647,000 | 7,548,000 | 7,096,000 |
| Indiana | 3,238,000 | 3,564,000 | 3,536,000 |
| Illinois | 7,631,000 | 8,544,000 | 7,838,000 |
| Michigan | 4,842,000 | 6,502,000 | 5,638,000 |
| Wisconsin | 2,939,000 | 3,312,000 | 3,538,000 |
| Minnesota | 2,564,000 | 2,690,000 | 3,019,000 |
| Iowa | 2,471,000 | 2,484,000 | 2,883,000 |
| Missouri | 3,629,000 | 3,681,000 | 3,954,000 |
| *Northwest* | 7,385,600 | 7,929,400 | 9,253,300 |
| North Dakota | 681,000 | 728,000 | 985,000 |
| South Dakota | 693,000 | 772,000 | 930,000 |
| Nebraska | 1,378,000 | 1,436,000 | 1,659,000 |
| Kansas | 1,881,000 | 1,979,000 | 2,228,000 |
| Montana | 538,000 | 503,000 | 650,000 |
| Idaho | 445,000 | 466,000 | 602,000 |
| Wyoming | 225,600 | 274,400 | 284,300 |
| Colorado | 1,036,000 | 1,117,000 | 1,184,000 |
| Utah | 508,000 | 654,000 | 731,000 |
| *Far West* | 8,285,100 | 10,824,600 | 8,147,500 |
| Nevada | 91,100 | 97,600 | 93,500 |
| Washington | 1,563,000 | 1,708,000 | 1,590,000 |
| Oregon | 954,000 | 1,075,000 | 949,000 |
| California | 5,677,000 | 7,944,000 | 5,515,000 |
| UNITED STATES* | 122,775,000 | 141,124,000 | 143,502,000 |

* Includes District of Columbia not in the above classification. The omission of hundreds and thousands, of course, also explains failure of totals to tally

See also especially the report of the committee on population problems to the National Resources Committee and published in May, 1938, under the title *The Problems of a Changing Population*, for additional data and for conclusions and implications. This is a vivid picture of one of America's chief social problems.

agriculture and thus allowed them to continue in their accustomed way. At the same time, he always maintained that the peasant economy must eventually be superseded by large-scale collective farming.'[2]

Here indeed is realism of the people, challenging fact and relationship, challenging as never before statesmen to turn to the science of the people as opposed to the demagoguery of the people. "Of, for, and by the people" as never before represents a new framework of reality in the modern world of change and revolution.

Perhaps nowhere in the world is the new realism of the people more vividly illustrated than in the United States, boasted melting pot of the world, and now a nation of great compositeness in the midst of diversity. Who and of what sort are these people whose voices are being raised more and more, oftener and oftener, in an ever-extending range of inquiries and complaints; whose patronage becomes increasingly important for ruler and leader; and whose restlessness appears itself as a major social problem in many parts of the world? Who are these people who seem closer to the living realities than all the rulers?

To ask the question more dramatically, who and of what sort are these Americans in the new picture? What are they doing and which way are they going? What are the names and natures of them that pass across the stage, a vast multitude, mass and class, from the ends of the earth, some planted deep in the soil of the New World, some fallen on barren ground, some crowded out by the luxurious growth of unplanned bigness and complexities of modern life? Over there in cities they speak forty tongues and know nothing of the regions of the national domain. Over here in the vast plains and countryside they toil and spin in the heat of the day, some in the backway places, some on the mountainsides and in the flatwoods, some in the richer soils of limitless land. And in between on highways and byways the millions of folks of village and smaller industry cling to the old dreams of opportunity for the common man and pray for the prophet of the new day. Other thousands move hither and yon, fruits of the new mobility and of the too rich harvests of unplanned achievements, homeless wanderers, farm squatters again, national nomad paupers, hitchhikers and freight train riders in multitude, mass on mass by wayside, in flophouses, anywhere, everywhere. Other hundreds of

thousands restless and dissatisfied, recruited from every class and type, maladjusted in the new crisis; millions of unemployed, common man and intellectual; and the new poor rich, head bankers and bakers and candlestick makers, unable to lead because themselves caught up in the whirling, uprooting financial tornado of unprecedented sweep and length and breadth and power.

And what a mass panoramic picture of the workers of the nation! For the more than 48,000,000 workers moving hither and yon on farm and factory, under the earth and over it, new occupations galore—more than 600 types—new industries, no less than 7,000 in all. Through these workers is told the story of a changing nation, from rural to urban and industrial, from primary to secondary work, from a man's world of work to woman's participation, from simple and plain ways to complex and technical intricacies—in the midst of which are countless discriminations and subdued irregularities, Negroes and immigrants, women and children, rich and poor. New years brought new things to do, new ways of doing them; bondsman and manipulator, salesman and promoter, beauty specialist and physical trainer, professional sympathizer and national critic. "Yes men" and "hangers on," organizers and planners, lawyers and doctors, architects and technicians, artists and poets, teachers and preachers and prophets still, a stirring, moving picture, vibrant with restless souls, alight with eagerness, smoldering with hidden fires. In the midst of these millions of work folk, inspectors and supervisors, enforcers of ten thousand mandates of the new order, and round about massed thousands of unemployed—white and black, Jew and Gentile, urban and rural, common man and rich, intellectual and illiterate—with haggard faces and staring eyes, strained nerves and flashing tempers, loyalties to loved ones and families straining loyalty to law and order.

And what of the other side of the picture—the other half of the people not counted among the work folk of the nation, or if counted, somewhere in the background or on the outskirts of the picture? A new generation of play folk, vacationing in summer, vacationing in winter, spenders of time, spenders of wealth, consumers of goods, stimulators of invention and makers of industry. At home and abroad, on land and on sea, in forest and field, at club and at games, in pictures and in playhouse, on tour and in park, a vast multitude, users of leisure time, prophets of the uni-



*Photo by Farm Security Administration*

The people: What is the margin between individuation and socialization, between culture and civilization, between the folk and machines?

*Photo by Bayard Wootten*

The people: America has always based its promise of a great civilization upon the assumptions of vigorous, well-bred, independent common men.

versal play of man and the shortened hours of work, or forerunners of the new levelling down of work and play, wealth and well-being? And other thousands making up the institutional population of homes and hospitals, schools and training centers, refuge for the physically handicapped, homes for the mentally sick—a vast multitude challenging the Jeffersonian democracy and the answer to the question: Who shall inherit the nation? And the host of school folk, children and youth, 30,000,000 strong, pictures and pictures. And of college and university men and women a vast host, restless, ambitious, thinking, questioning, promise of the new day, perfect gamble of the great Jeffersonian democracy. And the new woman, the new liberal, the new Negro, the new youth—crossroads and crises, shall they lead the nation, and which way will they lead?

And in the shadows of the great American pageant, stragglers and clusters of marginal folk, gangsters and racketeers, kidnappers and crooks, gunmen and thugs, bank robbers and hold-up confederates, incredible armies of the underworld. Organized criminals, leaders and financial backers, entrepreneurs of a new economic traffic, a new generation of specialists in speakeasies, of artists and technicians, of bootlegging commerce, new luminaries for the Star Spangled Banner, new reminders of Jefferson's dire prophecy of the civilization of cities. And still other dimmer shadows, silhouetted against the depression background, grafters and confidence men, promoters and manipulators, technicians in banking and real estate, tax dodgers and lobbyists, bribers and spoilers, stock gamblers and financial racketeers, buyers and sellers of justice, challenge again of the Jeffersonian democracy of America. Insulls and Kruegers, incredible actors, dramatic in sudden exits, curtain and curtain, new galaxy of untouchable great men caught in the web of depression finance.

Now all these people of whatever sort are the first wealth of the nation, sometimes its chief pride, sometimes a major hazard. For without them there would be no wealth; neither making nor using it. Yet here is human wealth, the people, dominated by technological and artificial wealth in the hands of some who make virtual slaves of human beings. The measure of human wealth is determined by the number and kind of folks, by the amount and nature of their increase, decrease, and mobility, by the multiple

ethnic composition and cultural cumulations and by the character and equipment of the people. What the people do and how they do it; what they want and how they go about getting it; how they lead and how they follow; and what they purpose in their hearts for the future—all of these are basic indices.

There are dramas multiplied a thousandfold, of the hazards and fortunes of a people translated from sparse numbers and patterns of early settlers and pilgrim fathers into a more than 125,000,000 composite folk of the Old World, driven hither and yon in eager and unplanned conquest of the New World. Another thousand dramas record the epic struggle of all those "giants in the earth" whose episodes and conquests are perpetually reminiscent of the exterior appearances and inner psychological realities in the American picture of merging European and racial heritage with the physical environment of the new nation. The real picture of the human wealth of America, nonchalantly termed the melting pot, has rarely been understood or adequately portrayed in that a full view of the deep-rooted social, economic, international, and interracial influences has rarely been attained.

The essential drama in the case is found in the picture of people as living, striving, battling folks and not merely as numbers and statistical units or curves of increase and decrease. Whatever else they are, the people of the United States are of the substance of drama and life. They are often sacrificed in the conquest of frontier and of physical resources, discriminated against by technology, and exploited by the masters of accumulating wealth. Yet they are the constant irreducible basic wealth. Foreigners are people. Negroes are people. Indians are people. Farm tenants are people. Male and female, those over fifty years, those under five, and all the census categories represent people.

The immigrants from the more than 25 countries from which the foreign-born population of the 1930 America came constitute a rare composite picture of people and the culture conflicts and adaptations which characterize the nation. There are three times as many Negroes in the nation as were all the people at the time of the Jeffersonian Declaration of Independence; three times as many foreign born of great heterogeneity; while New York City can boast—of the several largest cities in the world—of Italians more than all Rome, of Irish, and Jew and German and Negro.

A major exhibit proposed for a Century of Progress was to be a constant procession of peoples and cultures, American cavalcade de luxe, with a possible language range of more than 40 tongues. Such an exhibit would have been an Epic of America as portrayed in a hall of nationalities and depicting the distinctive contributions which each had made. It is a picture that has never been adequately or vividly portrayed. The picture, had it been complete, would have shown a mighty panorama of folk cultures merged or merging into the total American picture, still powerfully affected by its racial and ethnic groups. And what an amazing picture to most Americans who have taken it for granted as they have science, technology, invention. American people indeed: more than 1,000,000 each from Russia and Poland and Italy and Germany and Great Britain. And of others countless multitudes from Austria and Czechoslovakia, from Belgium and Denmark, and from Finland and France, Greece and Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia. For in spite of the changing immigration policies America continues to be a nation of many ethnic and racial groups. These groups continue to reflect great vitality and interest in their national backgrounds. There are some distinctive developments of note. One is the shift of immigration from European countries to that of the American continent, in 1929 the percentage from other continents being only 52 as opposed to 93 in 1911. The Mexicans increased from 3 percent to 18 and the Canadians from 3 percent to 32, while the numbers from the United States' dependencies increased also. All of these changes are vitally related to the American dilemma of employment, standards of living, purchasing power.

The Negro shows extraordinary vitality and cultural development. Although the Negro increase from 1920 to 1930 was not quite so large a percentage as the whole population, being 13.6 percent compared with 16 percent for the nation, his increase was more than twice as large between 1920 and 1930 as it was between 1910 and 1920, whereas the total population increase over the 1910-1920 decade was only 1 percent, from 15.0 to 16.1. Not only was there a substantial increase but there was a tendency to diffuse the population of the Negro throughout the nation, resulting in a number of important situations. Thus the largest Negro cities in

the nation are not in the South. New York has 224,670; Philadelphia has 219,599, while Cook County, Illinois, has 246,992. While the Negro thus increased much less rapidly in the South than did the white population and constituted a smaller percentage of the southern population than a half century ago, a number of northern communities show an increase in Negro population of several hundred percent; many new centers of Negro population have been established; there are no less than ten cities out of the South with a Negro population of over 50,000; there are 149 northern or western counties with a Negro population of over 2,500. There has developed increasingly an important middle class and in particular business and professional groups among the Negroes. Considerable progress has been made in improved race relations in the South, with new areas of race contact and conflict in the North.

The whole picture of the "American people" could scarcely be comprehended without at least a hurried review of the growth and main currents of the population. Yet modern America was prone to forget the romance and the costs, the will and the endurance, the purpose and the drive, the tragedies and the mistakes of its yesterdays. Here were pictures and pictures of a growing America. First the English stocks fringed here and there by Swede and Dutch and German and French Huguenot followed by a great floodtide from Ireland and Scotland, resulting in that strong thread in the American fabric known as the Scotch-Irish. Next was the dynamic movement of later Irish to the cities and of sturdy Germans to the then Middle West, contributing a new culture and a new energy to the building of great cities. These were again fringed round about with the Scandinavian groups. In contrast to this epic of the earlier peopling of the nation is the picture of the foreign born of 1930, in which the new immigrant nationalities contributed 54.5 percent of the nation's foreign-born people. This picture was a continuation of the earlier-later floods of immigrants from Italy and Eastern Europe bringing a different culture and a different character, such as was to influence profoundly the later years of the nation. Here were new elements which were to be woven into the new fabric of great cities and their complicated occupations and politics, religion, and conduct. They were to change the nature of the entire American picture and add new dramatic features to its development.

In addition to the Negro, with his separate epic of America, there were other color and racial groups, Chinese and Japanese, Filipino and Hawaiian, Hindu, Korean, Malay, Siamese, Mexican, and Indian. Indian and Negro were foci of dramatic action throughout the nation's development. Early New England settlers, praising God for victory over the Red Men, gave thanks that by virtue of Providence and good luck they were able to slay and burn hundreds of women and children in the Indian encampments. The red trail of American conquest of the American Indian constituted an unbelievable picture, eloquent of some of the backgrounds of the America of the 1930's. And the Negro had constituted one of the most dramatic pictures of any epoch in history. His achievements had perhaps never been excelled in so short a time; respect for his race had multiplied. Yet he was still the center of dramatic action of "avenging" mobs throughout the nation, but particularly in the southern regions, although lynchings had decreased rapidly since the turn of the century, the average of 187.5 for 1899 having decreased to 16.8 through 1929. In 1930 there was an increase to 20, with fluctuations in 1931-33 indicating some increase again.

The aggregate picture, however, of the nation's extraordinary wealth of people continued to be subject de luxe for charts and graphs, maps and figures. While these techniques were woefully inadequate to portray the picture, there was no other way to measure such magnitude and movement. For the nation had reported in 1930 a few more than 122,000,000 people with the popular estimates in the early 1930's continuing upward but with the population specialists predicting a slowing down in increase. The United States, they thought, would not reach the 150,000,000 mark for perhaps another quarter century, and it seemed quite likely that, if present conditions continued, it would never reach the 200,000,000 mark. This was a picture in great contrast to the earlier prediction of overpopulation beyond the nation's capacity. It was also generally in contrast to the earlier pictures of the consumer's capacity for American goods with a steadily rising population curve.

As in the case of other aspects of the American picture, the population picture has come to be a sort of matter-of-fact stereotyped census report. The formula has become so patent that it has appeared like sands of the shore in text and report, as the introduction to monograph and brochure, as the foundation for

conclusions about business and politics and education and social welfare. Yet the figures mean little to the average observer. He has forgotten the dramatic rise of the American population, a new phenomenon in a new world. He has forgotten those years when hundreds of thousands of immigrants poured into the country through Ellis Island and were counted in a great leveling process, oblivious of hopes and fears and tragedies. He has never reconsidered the profound changes which this immigration was destined to make in the nation's general culture, its politics, its cities, its ethics, its new social inventions in crime and gangland and especially in the driving of the nation headlong into the urban and industrial world against which Jefferson protested so consistently. Yet these are the real pictures which foretell the development and problems of the future. It is not a question of evaluating stocks or the relative merits of old immigrant stocks as against new, or old America as contrasted with the new, or even rural America contrasted with urban. It is a simple factual picture of millions of new people concentrating in new cities who knew nothing of the Jeffersonian ideals and cultures and whose efforts in the New World were immediately turned toward the future, toward a survival in a hard world of urban and industrial civilization.

While numbers, too, were important, the ratios of one group or class or age to the total are decisive elements in the dramatic culture conflicts which constitute increasingly important forces in the changing nation. In round numbers the American people were almost 90 percent white in 1930 with 108,000,000, and about the same number and ratio of all the people were native born. There were almost as many Negroes as foreign born, the number of Negroes being 11,891,143 as against 14,204,149 foreign-born population. A new turn in the 1920-1930 picture was a relative increase in Negro population and a decrease in foreign born. There was added new color to the picture by the new movement of Mexicans which had resulted in a count of more than four times as many Mexicans as Indians in the nation. Of the races other than Negro there were 1,423,533 Mexicans, 332,397 Indians, 138,834 Japanese, 74,954 Chinese, 45,000 Filipinos, 3,000 Hindus, nearly 2,000 Koreans with a sprinkling of others here and there.

The significant factor, however, was the relative declining rate of the whole population and especially of the foreign born. Thus

the percentage of increase, which was foreign, in 1930 was only 2 percent as opposed to earlier rates of more than 50 percent and even from 1900 to 1910 as much as 30 percent. There was a gradually declining decennial rate of increase with a relative increase in the colored proportion of the population and with prospects of a general stabilization on the basis of present distribution of white, native, and foreign born. As a consequence of the recent restrictive immigration legislation, the tendency is toward a slowly rising proportion of the people descended from populations of northern and western Europe. The picture was again one of conflict and paradox.

With the tremendous increase of new nationalities and the growing influence of such cities as New York and Chicago, there was still a general belief that America had decided to magnify the old American stocks rather than the new. It was known that President Hoover ascribed his election over Al Smith in part to the preference of voters for old America as against the new, and it was often stated that a part of President Roosevelt's popularity was due to his long family standing in the realm of traditional American families. Yet undoubtedly the picture was not so simple. America had been a melting pot. Its art and literature, its politics and industry had become so completely composite that it could never be segregated again into its original components. The problem again was to take a situation almost entirely different from the original America and apply the American genius to a new ordering of the new society. Here as elsewhere there was no turning back; nor was it a matter of surmising what might have been or what ought to have been, but rather of frankly facing what was fact. There could be no reliable verdicts as to a Nordic future any more than there could concerning a yes and no international policy. In the American people of the first third of the twentieth century were all the elements and prospects of world drama and world experimentation, but the observer was too close to see the picture in its power and processes.

Among the other important factors to consider was the changing status with reference to age. For the first time in the history of the nation there were fewer persons under five years of age at the end of a decade than at the beginning. In 1920, there were 11,573,230 children under five but nearly 129,000 less in 1930. The

census estimates of 1938 had indicated a continuing decreasing ratio. This decrease in the actual number of children tended toward a still more marked decrease in the ratio of children to the total in view of the fact that the older groups from 45 to 75 years of age increased nearly one-third. Thus a characteristic of the population is that of a greatly increasing ratio of old people with every prospect that the increase would continue. Thus, the problem of a very large population of older people in an industrial era disposed to lay off its workers before the older age limit was reached had begun to assume puzzling proportions. Here was another of the picture puzzles for the social scientists: The median age of the population had changed from the days of Jefferson from about 16 years to about 26 in 1930.

The chief change, however, was being wrought in the ratio of the old and the young for both of whom in 1933 there was every indication that the nation was making inadequate provision for education and guidance, on the one hand, and for work and security, on the other. By 1950 it was estimated that the proportion of people over 65 years and eligible for old age pensions would be half again as large as in 1930. Likewise, by 1950 the ratio of workers over 45 years of age, and thus subject to decreasing eligibility for employment, would probably have risen from 22.8 percent in 1930 to 30 percent or more. On the other hand, the declining ratio of children and youth accentuated the social significance of the old national ideal of measuring its wealth by the number, nurture, and education of its youth. Yet, faced with a need for increasing facilities, and with the absolute certainty that the America of tomorrow will need more and better equipment, the nation was showing a tendency to reduce its efforts all along the line—less general education, decrease in special and vocational training, decrease in provisions for recreation and leisure-time activities, less for health, less for preschool, less for parental education—in fine, less for all the things which had come to be recommended for the enrichment of the human wealth of the nation at its source. Again, the essential picture was not only one of appraising exactly how much of recent increases had been needed, but of reflecting the actual fact of the nation turning sharply back from the way it had been going. With reference to old and young, the picture showed the need for immediate long-time planning, or

else a sudden gross impoverishment of the human wealth at both ends of the life line and a mass deficiency in the ideals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Another phase of the modern picture which the public took as a matter of fact was the change in the number of women and the part which they played in the national picture. Here was almost complete transformation which affected the very heart of the whole culture. Perhaps no change had been more significant, unless it was the industrial revolution and public education. Yet the picture is a statistical one, too. The ratio of women to men has been steadily increasing since the earlier days until in 1930 it reached the point where there were 102.4 men to 100 women. With this increase in the ratio of women had gone a great increase in opportunities for education and for work, so that by 1930 there was an approximation of equality of opportunity for education. The inventory of occupations showed that there had not only been a phenomenal increase in work for young women but that one out of every seven or eight married women had been employed for pay. The depression, however, in many places showed signs of turning back toward the older discriminations.

The most radical change of all, however, in the population picture of the nation was the complete surrender of the rural nation to that of an urban America. The picture was a clear-cut one of gradual, then rapid urbanization of the nation until in 1930, of all the more than 122,000,000 people in the United States less than one-fourth were rural-farm population. And the total of all who lived on farms and in rural villages was less than 40 percent. Thus had a rural nation become one of cities and villages and of metropolitan regions with the rural variation found largely in the regional groupings of states and subregions.

New problems or old problems in a new setting were ever present in the new mobility and migratory trends, in the great regional variations in wealth and living standards, and in the trends toward a national population policy. A summary of these problems and questions will be found in Book II, in which more technical studies are suggested.

## *Chapter IX*

# *THE WORKERS*

The measure and problems of the human wealth of America will be determined not only by the number, age, sex, heritage of the people, but by what they do, how they are equipped, what their qualities, their vitality, and their work capacities and opportunities are. The American picture from the beginning was one which featured work as a way of life. All the people of the earlier days were supposed to work. Work was a sort of law of life and a code of the nation. In the story of America's industries and the episodes of its workers will be found not only the key to the historical nation, but also the heart of many of her present crises. Here indeed are multiplied American social problems superimposed upon the fundamentals of the nation's earlier development and of her future survival. For neither industry nor work, neither business nor worker will be the same tomorrow as yesterday or today.

Complicated problems extend all through the whole range of industrial relationship and of the right and the desire of human beings for work and security. From the basic capitalistic system upon which America was founded, through the great episodes of transfer from agrarian culture to industrial society on through the dilemmas set up by machines and technology in competition with men—the problems are ever recurring and ever changing.

But this is not all. The coming of machines, creating new classes of skilled workers and larger groups of technical workers, has created new "classes" whose participation in societal development is and will be different from that of the earlier workers.

Not only this but the technological creation of abundance and of skills and conveniences as well as the trend away from drudgery have set up a new economy of leisure in contrast to the older economy of work.

Not only this, but this same abundance economy has created a new standard of living, philosophically woven into the American

pattern and thence communicated to the people, all of whom seek a nearer equilibrium between the very small percentage of the families who have a very large percent of the income and a very large percent of the families who have a very small percent of the income.

Not only this, but the incidence of machines, of war, of depression, and of other factors has left on the doorsteps of industry and democracy millions of unemployed and with them handicapped industry and retarded prosperity.

Not only this, but efforts of labor to better conditions of the laboring man have broken into irreconcilable conflicts and antagonistic groups of organized labor, with the same hazards of leadership which abound in political life.

Not only this, but there has evolved a variety of concepts of labor and workers inconsistent with the realities of American civilization, as, for instance, the usage which differentiates the farmer and his helpers from the "laborer or worker" and the conflicting rules and regulations, on the one hand, in favor of "labor" and, on the other, adverse to "agriculture."

These are samplings of American problems which today focus within the framework of industry and society, of capital and labor, of employer and employee, and further of government and workers, of planning and employment. These points of tension, once again, recall the strategic importance of "work, place, folk" in the understanding of our society and directing its next stages of development, and they challenge a new and more realistic study of the problems of work and what it means and of leisure and what it promises.

There are few of the major aspects of American life in which there has been greater change since the Jeffersonian era than in the number and kind of workers of the nation and in the later emphasis upon leisure and freedom from the drudgery of work. Yet work is still the American mode, a greater percentage of the total population being gainfully employed than in 1870, from which date to 1930 the population increased 200 percent, while the employed increased 300 percent. The difference is in the astonishing array of jobs, of technical positions, and of professional work, which is an index of the new prosperity of the nation, even as the millions of unemployed are an index of the depression America. The quest of the people is still for the right to work and for se-

curity, but the problem is a far different one from that of the early nation.

Nearly 40 percent of all the living folk in the American drama are employed for monetary gain. This means in round numbers nearly 50,000,000 people, as measured by the Census of 1930 and exclusive of the later unemployed. A little over 20 percent of all the people were housewives with work "never done," but classified as not gainfully employed! Of others who do not work, nearly one in every ten of the population was classified as under five years of age; one in every 50 as five to fifteen years of age but not at school or gainfully occupied; almost one in every four was in school; and perhaps one in every 200 was an adult somewhere in the nation's institutions. Perhaps there were 3.5 percent left unclassified somewhere in the unknown miscellaneous class of unaccounted for—dependents and handicapped not accounted for elsewhere, folks of leisure, upper class, middle class, and lower, adventurers, wanderers, folks without a calling.

Of the gainfully occupied folks there had been a notable increase in the number of women at work, until by 1930 they were, like the army of the great war, 10,000,000 strong. The picture of the American woman at work and at play or as chief consumer was constantly appealing to the foreign visitor as one of the great contrasts in the United States. American women were extraordinary consumers, directing the buying public, setting the modes for consumers' goods, and appearing as the most "waited upon" class in the world. Yet they were the greatest of workers, too. In seven of the ten major occupational classifications of the census, women were liberally employed. Domestic and personal service led the group with 3,438,000. But the real index of the changing workers of the nation was found in the extraordinary array of women in three great branches of service. There were 1,970,000 women in clerical occupations, 1,860,000 in manufacturing and mechanical industries, and 1,226,000 in the professions. Trade and agriculture provided occupation for nearly a million each; another quarter million were working in each of the fields of transportation and communication. How great were these changes may be indicated by noting the increase from .1 percent in clerical service in 1870 to 18.8 percent in 1930; in trade and transportation from 1 percent to 11.7 percent; in professional services from 5.5 percent to 10.6.

## OCCUPATIONS OF GAINFULLY OCCUPIED PERSONS TOTAL POPULATION 14 YEARS AND OVER BY FUNDAMENTAL OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 1940

| State and Region | Total Number | Extractive Number | Extractive Per-cent | Manufacturing and Construction Number | Manufacturing and Construction Per-cent | Distributive and Social Number | Distributive and Social Per-cent | Industry Not Reported Number | Industry Not Reported Per-cent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U. S | 45,166,083 | 9,388,432 | 20 8 | 12,629,116 | 28 0 | 22,459,699 | 49 7 | 688,836 | 1 5 |
| *N E* | 14,455,403 | 1,144,563 | 7 9 | 5,187,714 | 35 9 | 7,836,272 | 54 2 | 286,854 | 2 0 |
| Maine | 279,036 | 40,284 | 14 4 | 103,692 | 37 2 | 129,584 | 46 4 | 5,476 | 2 0 |
| N H | 175,999 | 16,398 | 9 3 | 78,538 | 44 6 | 77,707 | 44 2 | 3,356 | 1 9 |
| Vt | 125,092 | 32,320 | 25 8 | 33,066 | 26 4 | 57,218 | 45 8 | 2,488 | 2 0 |
| Mass | 1,534,787 | 43,124 | 2 8 | 632,775 | 41 2 | 831,975 | 54 2 | 26,913 | 1 8 |
| R I | 264,723 | 5,814 | 2 2 | 134,334 | 50 8 | 121,283 | 45 8 | 3,292 | 1 2 |
| Conn | 680,490 | 27,902 | 4 1 | 328,992 | 48 3 | 311,687 | 45 8 | 11,909 | 1 8 |
| N Y | 4,974,518 | 222,069 | 4 5 | 1,599,788 | 32 1 | 3,038,838 | 61 1 | 113,823 | 2 3 |
| N J | 1,569,059 | 53,380 | 3 4 | 650,227 | 41 4 | 828,366 | 52 8 | 37,086 | 2 4 |
| Pa | 3,230,167 | 418,475 | 13 0 | 1,215,674 | 37 6 | 1,541,420 | 47 7 | 54,598 | 1 7 |
| Del | 102,627 | 14,352 | 14 0 | 36,612 | 35 7 | 49,090 | 47 8 | 2,573 | 2 5 |
| Md | 690,911 | 76,775 | 11 1 | 219,766 | 31 8 | 379,977 | 55 0 | 14,393 | 2 1 |
| D C | 308,900 | 703 | 2 | 41,968 | 13 6 | 262,497 | 85 0 | 3,732 | 1 2 |
| W Va | 519,094 | 192,967 | 37 2 | 112,282 | 21 6 | 206,630 | 39 8 | 7,215 | 1 4 |
| *S E* | 9,359,232 | 3,540,768 | 37 9 | 1,988,588 | 21 2 | 3,719,475 | 39 7 | 110,401 | 1 2 |
| Va | 933,058 | 253,729 | 27 2 | 236,218 | 25 3 | 431,103 | 46 2 | 12,008 | 1 3 |
| N C | 1,208,690 | 411,964 | 34 1 | 372,510 | 30 8 | 408,451 | 33 8 | 15,765 | 1 3 |
| S C | 661,073 | 263,133 | 39 8 | 173,286 | 26 2 | 218,897 | 33 1 | 5,757 | 9 |
| Ga | 1,107,412 | 393,161 | 35 5 | 246,923 | 22 3 | 455,246 | 41 1 | 12,082 | 1 1 |
| Fla | 683,333 | 131,905 | 19 3 | 123,899 | 18 1 | 417,181 | 61 1 | 10,348 | 1 5 |
| Ky | 847,563 | 370,149 | 43 7 | 136,411 | 16 1 | 330,096 | 39 0 | 10,907 | 1 2 |
| Tenn | 941,714 | 327,426 | 34 8 | 215,206 | 22 8 | 388,120 | 41 2 | 10,962 | 1 2 |
| Ala | 893,848 | 386,753 | 43 3 | 184,216 | 20 6 | 312,787 | 35 0 | 10,092 | 1 1 |
| Miss | 727,455 | 424,164 | 58 3 | 90,916 | 12 5 | 205,420 | 28 2 | 6,955 | 1 0 |
| Ark | 583,944 | 307,437 | 52 7 | 74,947 | 12 8 | 193,781 | 33 2 | 7,779 | 1 3 |
| La | 771,142 | 270,947 | 35 1 | 134,056 | 17 4 | 358,393 | 46 5 | 7,746 | 1 0 |
| *S W* | 3,087,536 | 1,052,961 | 34 1 | 438,702 | 14 2 | 1,555,563 | 50 4 | 40,310 | 1 3 |
| Okla | 658,739 | 253,334 | 38 4 | 77,616 | 11 8 | 316,838 | 48 1 | 10,951 | 1 7 |
| Texas | 2,138,355 | 700,166 | 32 7 | 322,325 | 15 1 | 1,090,963 | 51 0 | 24,901 | 1 2 |
| N M | 140,269 | 54,000 | 38 5 | 17,337 | 12 4 | 66,541 | 47 4 | 2,391 | 1 7 |
| Ariz. | 150,173 | 45,461 | 30 3 | 21,424 | 14 3 | 81,221 | 54 1 | 2,067 | 1 4 |
| *M S* | 12,348,186 | 2,278,237 | 18 4 | 3,891,604 | 31 5 | 6,007,315 | 48 7 | 171,030 | 1 4 |
| Ohio | 2,344,967 | 290,662 | 12 4 | 884,534 | 37 7 | 1,137,232 | 48 5 | 32,539 | 1 4 |
| Ind | 1,151,703 | 218,788 | 19 0 | 395,791 | 34 4 | 518,839 | 45 0 | 18,285 | 1 6 |
| Ill | 2,874,431 | 334,410 | 11 6 | 938,736 | 32 7 | 1,563,335 | 54 4 | 37,950 | 1 3 |
| Mich | 1,824,953 | 231,915 | 12 7 | 773,137 | 42 4 | 796,496 | 43 6 | 23,405 | 1 3 |
| Wis | 1,060,758 | 277,668 | 26 2 | 309,659 | 29 2 | 459,007 | 43 3 | 14,424 | 1 3 |
| Minn | 931,499 | 290,931 | 31 2 | 153,415 | 16 5 | 475,807 | 51 1 | 11,346 | 1 2 |
| Iowa | 862,781 | 315,365 | 36 6 | 134,935 | 15 6 | 397,187 | 46 0 | 15,294 | 1 8 |
| Mo | 1,297,094 | 318,498 | 24 6 | 301,397 | 23 2 | 659,412 | 50 8 | 17,787 | 1 4 |
| *N W* | 2,351,513 | 870,486 | 37 0 | 278,104 | 11 8 | 1,170,217 | 49 8 | 32,706 | 1 4 |
| N D | 200,396 | 108,011 | 53 9 | 9,085 | 4 5 | 80,690 | 40 3 | 2,610 | 1 3 |
| S D | 204,514 | 101,305 | 49 5 | 15,477 | 7 6 | 84,988 | 41 6 | 2,744 | 1 3 |
| Neb | 433,427 | 162,760 | 37 5 | 46,735 | 10 8 | 219,101 | 50 6 | 4,831 | 1 1 |
| Kan | 583,826 | 198,726 | 34 0 | 77,938 | 13 3 | 298,587 | 51 2 | 5,575 | 1 5 |
| Mont | 185,564 | 73,304 | 39 5 | 22,585 | 12 2 | 87,300 | 47 0 | 2,375 | 1 3 |
| Idaho | 158,606 | 65,597 | 41 4 | 19,746 | 12 4 | 70,791 | 44 6 | 2,472 | 1 6 |
| Wy | 86,559 | 31,873 | 36 8 | 8,745 | 10 1 | 44,976 | 52 0 | 965 | 1 1 |
| Colo | 349,735 | 89,943 | 25 7 | 53,436 | 15 3 | 200,525 | 57 3 | 5,831 | 1 7 |
| Utah | 148,886 | 38,967 | 26 2 | 24,357 | 16 4 | 83,259 | 55.9 | 2,303 | 1 5 |
| *F W* | 3,564,213 | 501,417 | 14.1 | 844,404 | 23.7 | 2,170,857 | 60 9 | 47,535 | 1.3 |
| Nev | 41,462 | 12,648 | 30 5 | 4,921 | 11 9 | 23,081 | 55 7 | 812 | 1 9 |
| Wash | 607,672 | 93,861 | 15 4 | 168,448 | 27 7 | 337,091 | 55 5 | 8,272 | 1 4 |
| Ore | 389,798 | 76,343 | 19 6 | 102,269 | 26 2 | 205,037 | 52 6 | 6,149 | 1 6 |
| Calif | 2,525,281 | 318,565 | 12 6 | 568,766 | 22 5 | 1,605,648 | 63 6 | 32,302 | 1.3 |

Source. *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 51, pp 59–62

On the other hand, domestic and personal service had decreased from 52.6 to 32.6 percent and agriculture from 20.5 to 7.4 percent.

Yet statistical enumeration could provide no adequate inventory of women's work in the nation and the long hard road to achieve it, the still hard road of keeping it. Nearly three-quarters of all women at work were in the distributive and social group. An indescribable drama of thousands of young women with soft-sounding voices, deft hands, and unlimited patience helping the world to carry on its communication through telephone, telegraph, and endless correspondence. Other thousands in attractive blue or green or brown costumed patterns in restaurant or factory or chain stores. And yet other thousands mastering office technique, ministering to hospital sick, or charting the course of administrators and professional men. Secretaries and assistants, technicians and helpers, office wife and boss—few pictures of America were more characteristic.

And in the farm country, a far piece and near, hundreds of thousands of bonneted women bore the heat of the day in forest and field, heritage of the older European and earlier American pattern, helping their menfolks in the age-old economic division of labor. And no man could paint fully the picture of the American woman as teacher—praised as servant and savant, accused of feminizing American education, paid a relatively less and less wage. Nevertheless, these concrete pictures and their aggregates were of the essence of the changing America and of the new society which was coming rapidly to demand new designs in a new venture. And here, too, in the planning and designing, the prospect was that women would be more and more dominant in the picture.

To continue in the more concrete pictures, there were no less than 527 types of occupations in which women were employed. It was an amazing inventory: on the one hand, even as men, lawyers, doctors, architects, chemists, business women. On the other, dressmakers and milliners, tailors and seamstresses, hotel keepers and managers, waitresses and cooks, hairdressers and barbers, manicurists and beauty shop specialists, janitors and housekeepers, elevator operators and a hundred callings of service. Or, again, creatures of modern organization and technology, clerks and storekeepers, salesgirls and buyers, stenographers and typists, bookkeepers and cashiers, decorators and artists, real estate and in-

surance, bankers and saleswomen. Of teachers and nurses, women were 78 percent and 98 percent respectively. The thousands of women pursuing graduate and professional courses in the universities constituted a picture such as could not be duplicated in any country. In politics, in community organizations, in national propaganda societies, women had assumed new roles of great significance.

Once again, to look at this inventory of the human wealth of the nation as measured by its nearly 50,000,000 workers, a little more concretely, here was the picture as classified into eight major divisions: Jefferson's nation of farmers had changed to one in which only a little more than a fifth were engaged in all agricultural and allied occupations. Yet, even then there were almost 10,500,000 so employed, or more than all of Jefferson's nation. The number of workers in his much berated manufacturing and mechanical industries had grown to a little more than 14,000,000 or more than a fourth of the total, while those in trade and transportation accounted for just about 10,000,000 or nearly as many as all the farmers. The minor ratios fell to mining with nearly 1,000,000, clerical service with a little over 4,000,000; professional service about 3,250,000; domestic and personal service about 4,000,000; with a miscellaneous and varied public service and not otherwise classified of nearly 1,000,000. Or to focus the groups, a little less than a fourth were occupied in all extractive processes, a little less than a third in manufacturing and mechanical services, while nearly one-half of all gainfully occupied persons ten years of age and over were engaged in distributive and social services. What was the meaning of this great change? Of what sort was the nation's progress and how was it assimilating this rapid transformation? That was a question which was yet to be determined by the degree to which the nation could successfully achieve what has often been called the balanced social order. In order to see the problem of employment as it has developed up to now, we ought to look at the figures over a period of years. The Census Bureau has brought the statistics of the sixty years since 1870, when records are first available, up to the 1930 census. We give this summary of trends as adapted from the release of October 23, 1938.

The most significant trend is the striking movement of workers from agricultural to nonagricultural pursuits. In 1870, over one-

half were in agriculture and even from 1870 to 1910, agriculture remained the chief field of employment of gainful labor. Since 1910, however, the number as well as the proportion of all workers engaged in agriculture has been declining.

In 1870, over 75 percent of the nation's labor force was engaged in the production of physical goods, that is, in agriculture, forestry and fishing, extraction of minerals, and manufacturing and mechanical industries. But since 1870 the trend has been plainly away from production of physical goods and toward distribution and service. The proportion of the labor force engaged in the production of physical goods dropped from somewhat over three-fourths in 1870 to somewhat over one-half in 1930.

During the 60 years covered by the statistics, it is pointed out workers have gone persistently from the farms to the factories, the shops and the offices. In ever larger and larger numbers rural dwellers have become urban dwellers. From 1870 to 1910 manufacturing and mechanical industries were next in importance to agriculture as a field of employment of gainful labor, and in 1920 and in 1930 these industries gave employment to more workers than did agriculture. From 1870 to 1930, the numbers engaged in transportation and communication increased over 600 percent and the numbers engaged in trade increased nearly 600 percent, as compared with an increase of 277.8 percent in the numbers engaged in all occupations.

During the 60 years covered by the statistics, the professional class increased until the group was almost 10 times as large in 1930 as in 1870. The clerical group increased more rapidly in relative importance than did any other of the groups—from 0.6 percent of all workers in 1870 to 8.2 percent in 1930. The proportion of all female workers in this group increased even more strikingly—from 0.1 percent in 1870 to 18.8 percent in 1930.

Such was the picture of the main groups of occupations as shown in the barest of statistical narratives. But it was no picture of America at work. It reflected little of miners in the earth digging coal for a bankrupt industry which was facing a world substituting something else for coal and leaving the worker stranded. It showed nothing of the hundred and one techniques of mining operations, the increasing mechanization of the industry, the toil and suffering of workers and families, the conflict

between operators and workers, the hopelessness of the situation save as it could be salvaged through some coordinated planning. The figures showed no comprehension of the hundreds of mines in nearly a hundred fields in 32 states and Alaska, with the multiplied drama of families and households and all that human wealth and waste which challenge the new democracy.

The statistical summary tells no human story of millions of industrial and manufacturing workers in a quarter million establishments with hundreds of varied jobs and wages, with now high peak, now low, of insecurity and unemployment, of strikes and lockouts, of mass democracy trying to forge a way on to better living and too often in solid conflict with forces of technology or *laissez faire* or exploitation. The picture failed to show mill folks and factory workers, industrial village and slum, sweat shops and stretchout, and all that long catalogue of complicated units which challenge the social technology of the new democracy. Yet surely these are the key to the problems involved.

The statistical picture does not show the hazards of farm life on 6,000,000 farms; hazards of weather, of storm, and drouth and winter and summer, of disease, of markets and prices. It shows nothing of the romance of soil and stream and forest and of the age-long passion for land and nature and battles against odds of technology, of a changing civilization of unbalanced economy; of women and children in the fields, sometimes in the spirit of the song of the lark, sometimes bowed down and tired with work and fatigue and hopes long deferred, and the statistics tell little of that long catalogue of complicated units in modern agriculture which challenge the technology to achieve a new parity for the new democracy.

And the multiple figures of unemployment, multiplied millions, tables and tables, median and mode, gathered with eagerness and earnestness, make a new statistical literature. Yet they have as yet not been adequately translated into terms of human waste. Up and up the curve went, the curve of numbers; down and down fell the curves of reserve resources and of community philanthropy. Up and up went the curve of public relief trying valiantly to right the wrong of a nation, abounding in all things necessary for the good life, unable to give its citizens work to do or food to eat or clothes to wear or wherewithal to live. A million squat-

ters on the land, new social type in the making—tenant, Negro, white, wanderers, a vast host of cases challenging the case workers for adequate diagnosis or treatment. This was a picture which the nation was compelled to see and see vividly before it could come to succeed in its permanent plans for the new democracy. It lay at the heart of the way of recovery and reconstruction for a demoralized people.

The picture of the American people at work shows many fundamental changes other than that of machine mastery substituted for man mastery in the great fields of industry and to some extent in agriculture. There has been a great increase in professional and social services, rising in a half century from 500,000 up and up toward the 2,000,000 mark; more than 1,000,000 teachers, of whom over 800,000 were women; musicians about 165,000; physicians and surgeons, about 160,000; artists to the number of nearly 60,000; chemists and metallurgists, nearly 50,000; 22,000 architects; 40,000 actors; uncatalogued numbers of social workers and trained nurses, playground directors and park superintendents upward and onward; and 30,000 librarians of the new order; and a finale of 300,000 lawyers, magistrates, and judges—an "American" array if ever one existed.

And of government employees, another mass picture of unprecedented proportions. Federal government with its thousands; state, municipal, and county with their tens of thousands, multiplying the gains of professional and technical services. By 1930, there were no less than 608,000 employees in the federal executive civil service alone, and by 1938 perhaps a 20 percent increase over this. New York State's roster of public employees registered as many as 30,000, while New York City nearly tripled it with 86,500, and by 1938 both had added their quota of cooperative work with the nation's relief workers. Illinois had 13,000, while Chicago more than tripled this with 41,983; California had slightly more than 10,000, while Los Angeles and Los Angeles County combined practically quadrupled this number with 39,119. This picture of personnel in the cities was again a cross section of the American problem of mastering the government of the great cities. Multiply the samplings of public employees for 48 states, for more than 3,000 counties, and for the thousands of cities and towns, and the

picture reflects another colossal action picture of millions of Americans on work rolls of many hues.

Here are pictures of American dilemma due to miscalculation, and one which was yet to be adjusted to continuing technology. The gain in professional occupations, the increase in technical and skilled workers, together with decrease of working hours and the lessening of drudgery for all labor have led to the dream of a new world in which a greater equilibrium of work and reward would be attained. If the ratio of agricultural workers has greatly decreased, it was esteemed an index of progress that many rural folks had gone into the field of professional and personal service, raising the standard of work and living, and in turn pointing the way through skill, technology, and planning for a similar standard everywhere. By the early 1930's there appeared signs of a slowing down of this process. There were too many teachers and lawyers and doctors and architects and white-collared workers for the demand. There was reaction against the oversupply of university-trained folks. Yet the oversupply was no greater than that of labor; it was, however, a new experience and was another challenge to the new democracy to plan for the creative, inventive, professional opportunities, even as for labor in general. The picture of hundreds of thousands of college men and women and of technically equipped folk without opportunity for work was one of the appalling episodes of the depression period, ominous for democracy unless the New Deal could plan better than the old. Yet the National Youth Administration and other agencies had recruited thousands and the new tempo and trend toward professional services were pointing to an increasingly larger and permanent ratio of professional folk and of a decreasing ratio of the world's work to be done by drudgery. Here, of course, are problems yet to be worked out satisfactorily.

The extraordinary changes in the types and classes of occupations and the changing nature of our nearly 50,000,000 people gainfully occupied in the United States are symbolic of the changes in types of industry, of goods wanted by the people and, therefore, of the role of new industries in the world of labor. They even presage something of the contrasting claims of such powerful divisions of American labor as the C.I.O. under the leadership of John L. Lewis and the A. F. of L. under William Green.

Some of our problems, therefore, may be reflected upon the background of the epic of the labor movement in the United States.

In the history of the nation, the rise of the American labor movement had been both a major force and a product of the American evolutionary picture. The newer ideals of justice and public welfare and the advance in education and social organization had prepared the way for a rapid rise in organized labor, which in turn had set itself to work for a more articulate part in the American economy. On the other hand, the rapid rise of machinery, the new technology of production, the new reach of business organization were powerful forces working upon American labor, even as they were affecting other institutional modes of life in America. What was to be the measure of technological unemployment and labor's relation to it? The picture in the early 1930's constituted an as yet unsolved puzzle with American organized labor up to 1933 apparently on the decline and somewhat demoralized. With, however, an added stimulus in the New Deal giving new impetus to its cause, the outlook was changed. The trade union membership had decreased steadily from 5,100,000 in 1920 to 3,300,000 in 1931. Yet the momentum set up by the New Deal and the competitive activities of the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. by 1938 had perhaps more than doubled the 1931 enrollment. The actual reported figures in 1938 were four million for the C.I.O., and the A. F. of L. had added to its membership, making a grand total of from 7,500,000 to 8,000,000 in vivid contrast to the decline of the late '20's. The picture of labor as the chiefest of American wealth makers is so inseparably bound up with industry and invested capital and the conflicts between the two are so marked that the problem continues to be almost symbolic of the whole national economy.

Greater production of goods and greater demand for workers contributed to the rapidly rising standard of living, but the hazards of machine production and the power of industry to hire and fire were such that a great depression would leave the laborer at the mercy of a system and of many industries over which neither employer nor employee seemed to have any control. The picture was a complex one in that it showed a multitude of conflicting forces—labor striving to adapt itself to changing conditions; large-scale technological production reducing the personal element; the

revivifying of the old open shop controversy; the failure and impotence of much of "big business"; the differences among labor groups themselves; the failure of the industrial democracy movement; the inability to organize more than two of the basic industries; the growing conservatism of labor and the later increasing radicalism of labor; the growing power of capital and the later challenge to its power; the rise of company unions with 40 percent of trade union membership and the later outlawing of these unions; the experimentation with investments in company stocks and bonds and the general failure of this procedure; the lack of government or corporate provision for unemployment insurance and the later multiple provisions—these and other items indicate a kaleidoscopic picture ripe for the readjustment of the new era to come. In all of these fields great changes have taken place, much progress made, yet they still constitute one of the greatest of the American social problems.

The depression picture of unemployed, estimated from time to time from 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 and more, and of those who were employed carefully husbanding their resources, was a far cry from the post-war period when laborers in every walk of life bought fancy apparel at fancy prices, and when "prosperity" reached new highs. That was a picture rich in humor and pathos and to millions in later years bitter with reminiscence of what might have been. Yet the destiny of many workers rested upon the superlative purchasing power and there were many who believed that new highs in buying and production would solve the problem.

Thus came the great American high-pressure salesman, augmenting such production and distribution as no nation had ever seen or dreamed of. Sales meetings, local, state, regional, national, magnified the great personality tests of success. The great man, the dominant personality, the hero of the American people was that one who could create in the people the desire to buy and buy liberally whether they needed to buy or not. And the people did buy; by mail and by express and by person; from agents and from syndicates; from clubs and from cooperatives. There was a single national mail order house mailing out an issue of more than 7,000,000 catalogues and having an advertising volume of more than $1,750,000,000, this same catalogue being later

reviewed in a literary periodical as one of the best books on American rural life. By the third decade of the century there were twenty advertisers who had spent as much as a million dollars in a year in the 30 leading periodicals of the nation. The picture of advertisement was itself another medium for the study of American customs and ideologies and especially for changing concepts and practices. From the traditional stimulus of keeping up with the Joneses, the later forces exhorted through more subtle appeal of sex and pride and community standing, counting heavily upon the new psychology of the inferiority complex and all that series of conditioning which set the pattern of youth, of family, of recreation. These facts showed also, like the moving picture, the great rationalization technique of convincing the prospective customer that much valued instruction on health and etiquette was being given free through the advertisements. And in all this, of course, there was the urge toward new fields for work and new purchasing power to help more workers produce to the end that they and others might buy more and so continue the cycle.

In this panorama of America as seen through its workers there are many special problems and multiple dramatic features to complete the picture. We must, of course, see something more of the conflict between the two great divisions of the major labor organizations. We must envisage something of the traditional problem of the child worker. There are new phenomena of the migratory worker and the story of men displaced by machines not only in factory but by millions on farms. And there are the everlasting problems of the role of work and of leisure-time activities to be adjusted in the new era. And there are the everlasting issues of class consciousness and of conflict between and among the various philosophies and organizations in the nation. All of these constitute both generic social problems and concrete situations which give rise to specific problems of time and place. Inherent in them may be the essential issues of government and economics, of liberty and freedom, of democracy and welfare.

## *Chapter X*

# *WHO OTHER THAN WORKERS?*

Of the people in the American picture, we have considered first those who work as constituting the most realistic and dynamic basis of both the historic and the current nation. Yet not all the people work. We pointed out how the census classifies scarcely more than 40 percent of the people as gainfully occupied. Yet, not all the people so classified work all the time. So, too, of those who do not work, some never work, some are unemployable, some work part time, some work in unclassified ways. Among the 60 percent of the people who are not at work, we enumerated many groups, some of which will be studied in separate chapters, as, for instance, children in preschool and school age; youth caught in the insecurity of a chasm between school and industry; some of the aged and infirm; some in other institutions; some who are delinquent and handicapped.

In this chapter we shall consider two great groups in striking contrast in tempo and wealth and setting up a chief point of tension and conflict in the philosophy of opportunity and security. We refer, on the one hand, to the vast host of Americans who play, who travel, who go to conventions, who enjoy athletic spectacles, and who symbolize the new era of more recreation and less work, as compared to other days. And we refer, on the other hand, to that other vast host of unemployed who, too, are people of the people, symbol and reality of the American drama.

And we shall ask certain fundamental questions about the adjustment of *all the people* to the new economy of shorter hours of work and more provisions for leisure. For the end of the first third of the twentieth century had reflected a new America indeed, one in which many people had more and more leisure; more and more wealth to use, on the one hand, and, on the other, many other people had less and less wealth as reflected in the millions of unemployed who by the same token had more and more leisure hours and more and more need for adjustment.

Here was another contrast. The nation in the 1920's had become a nation of travelers and a nation busy at play as well as at work. At the heyday of prosperity, farmers of the Middle States found their way to winter sojourns in Florida and California, while the summer months showed a vast network as of a nation honeycombed with hotels and tourists' homes, play places and camps, parks and resorts. A million and a half hotel rooms ranging in accommodations from the 19,000 hotels with less than 50 rooms to 25 hotels with over a thousand rooms each. That was the 1929 romantic era of hotels, an American picture of overproduction, before the spectacle of two-thirds of New York's 329 hotels becoming bankrupt. But it was a grand picture.

And the people traveled and traveled. Tourists to the numerous units of the Federal park system mounted to 16,233,688 during the travel year ended September 30, 1938. This represents an increase of more than a million over the preceding travel year. As the mood of the American tourist changes from year to year so do the attendance figures show a shifting from one national park to another, or from one type of area to another. These are reflected in the record of visitors to the federally administered areas. The great increase of travel was represented largely in the number of visitors going to the national military parks scattered chiefly over the eastern seaboard and east of the Mississippi. These parks showed an increase of more than one million. In 1938, 6,976,296 visitors went to the national parks proper, compared with 7,012,803 during the 1937 travel year, although for the entire system the number of tourists was over sixteen million for 1938. Shenandoah National Park, in Virginia's Blue Ridge, led the country in the number of visitors to the national parks with 954,967; this figure was below 1937, when 1,041,204 visitors entered the park's gateways. Great Smoky Mountains National Park, North Carolina-Tennessee, was second, with 694,634 compared with 727,243 in 1937. Rocky Mountain National Park, Colorado, led the western parks with 659,802 visitors, an increase over 1937 when 651,899 tourists were recorded. Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming, was down 33,057 from 1937 with 466,185 in 1938 compared with 499,242 in 1937. Yosemite, in California, dropped to 443,325 from 481,492 in 1937. Olympic National Park, Washington, the baby of the national park family, reporting for the first time as a national park, had 75,310

visitors. This park was established last June, and in the total are included figures of the former Mount Olympus National Monument, which the new park absorbs and which was visited by 23,520 persons last year. Mammoth Cave National Park, Kentucky, received 72,913 visitors, a slight decrease from 1937 when there were 75,434 tourists. While Mammoth Cave, Kentucky, fell off, Abraham Lincoln National Park, in the same state, where Lincoln was born, had 121,144 visitors compared with 111,840 in 1937. Acadia, in Maine, recorded 394,319 visitors, while 383,036 went there the year before. Grand Canyon, in Arizona, had an even greater increase, although the total was slightly smaller. To the Grand Canyon treked 336,557 compared with 297,876 in 1937. Mount Rainier, in Washington, also showed a considerable increase from the year before, with 381,876 against 349,289.

Other national parks which recorded an increase in travel included Platt National Park, Oklahoma, with 286,486 compared with 284,144 in 1937; Carlsbad Caverns, New Mexico, 205,765 against 201,333 in 1937; Sequoia National Park, California, 260,139 in 1938 and 243,661 in 1937; Grand Teton, Wyoming, 153,353 in 1938 against 135,000 in 1937; Zion National Park, Utah, 149,075 in 1938, and 137,404 in 1937; Bryce Canyon, Utah, 101,851 against 94,331. To Crater Lake, Oregon, went 190,699 visitors compared with 202,403; Glacier, in Montana, had 153,528 visitors against 194,522 a year ago; and General Grant National Park, California, received 148,116 compared with 157,810 in 1937. Hawaii National Park, Hawaii, reported 195,986 visitors for 1938, against 203,165 in 1937, while Mount McKinley, in Alaska, reported an increase with 1,487 tourists compared with 1,378 a year ago.

The 61 national monuments of the Federal Park System reporting set a travel record of 2,029,808 for 1938 compared with 1,770,486 in 1937, but the greatest increase was in the number of visitors to the national military parks and cemeteries, where tribute was paid to the soldier dead amid the scenes of the country's military strife. The military parks and cemeteries had 2,877,655 visitors, a jump of more than a million from the year before when 1,692,237 were recorded. To Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, where the decisive battle of the Civil War was fought 75 years ago last July, went 1,554,234 visitors in 1938 compared to 622,384 in 1937. Much of this increase

was on the occasion of the five-day celebration of the 75th anniversary of the battle held in early July.[1]

Other pictures need to be superimposed upon the screen. One of these was the colossal picture of America at play. There were no less than 7,000 public playgrounds, and there were in all in 1930 no less than 1,400 playgrounds open throughout the year, in which 2,666 play supervisors were at work. Many people were also at play in the municipal, state, and national parks already described as physical resources where no less than 3,000,000 persons were recorded as visitors in 1931, while 31,000,000 were reported as visitors to the national forests. As substitute for the old pioneer fishing and hunting days, there was a remarkable hunting and fishing picture to be found in the more than 5,000,000 fishing and 7,000,000 hunting licenses issued during the season 1929-1930. Commercially, the industry approached the billion dollar expenditure class.

Another kaleidoscopic picture of the American people at play was found in the ever-increasing popularity of water sports, beaches, municipal swimming places, and resorts throughout the nation. From colorful Palm Beach or Miami to California winter places extending throughout the nation it was a rare picture of a new society of play; within it could be seen not only the great numbers but the variety of activities, the picturesque bathing styles and costumes, the variety of aquatic sports and a thousand stunts of youth and "society." More than 200 cities of the nation could boast of public bathing beaches. The attendance at bathing beaches was for the time being beyond count, but it was estimated that the aggregate would run up toward the 100,000,000 mark. Chicago alone reported 7,000,000 in the summer of 1930. What the combined number at Atlantic City and the hundreds of other places and the small-town swimming pools would be no man could say. It was a new America again, violet rays and vigor—a swimming and diving and floating and sunning nation.

And what a picture of yachts, motorboats, sailboats, rowboats, canoes, and combinations fearfully and wonderfully made for the delight of youth and the testing of nerve and sinew of older folk. Nearly 250,000 registered motorboats under 16 tons; 3,300 documented yachts of 16 gross tons and over; and 450 yacht clubs to take care of them. A thousand yachts entered in national regattas. And of thrills, a great company. Above the air, the breaking of

air records across the continent and around the world with the accompanying employment or entertainment of 20,000 pilots and innumerable amateurs and youth aspiring to take to the air in new and devious ways. Here was "wrongway" Corrigan landing in Ireland, young matron Odlum beating all men across the continent, a Hughes shattering all round-the-world records, and a Will Rogers, playboy beloved, flying out of this life in a tragic crash. And on and on: racing of cars, racing of horses, racing of greyhounds; horses and hounds; hunting of big game, bring 'em back alive!

Play pictures again: an American public buying 33,000,000 golf balls at a cost of $8,000,000 or more to be used by from 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 players on nearly 6,000 courses. For the great "American game," 8,000,000 baseballs and 2,000,000 bats; more than 900,000 mitts and gloves for 250,000 hands of American playboys. A new race of tennis players perhaps comprehending 1,250,000 public park tennis players and uncounted others, for the use of which 10,000,000 tennis balls were manufactured in 1929. Tournaments to keep busy and develop a host of amateurs, professionals, college men and women on 25,000 tennis courts.

Kaleidoscope again of what sort Americans are and what they do: baseball fans, 20,000,000 strong, paying $50,000,000 for the great game. More than 10,000,000 people paid $21,000,000 to see college football, which had come to challenge baseball's priority in the nation even by the time of the depression. And the gates never reflected the depression as did other industries. There was the city and state which could not help its poor but could fill a stadium with 90,000 people. Football was reputed to be running away with the game of education, and something had to be done about it. But whatever its faults, it was a grand prophylactic, week-end pastime for millions of Americans, creating new folkways and conduct patterns in the hundreds of American stadia unpredictable. Here were giants of the new play world to appease a never-satisfied public. And there were erstwhile incredible pictures at Philadelphia and Chicago of heavyweight championship boxing contests with an attendance as high as 120,000, and a gate receipt of over $2,500,000. Among the changing vicissitudes of professional folk there was a new Americana featuring the high salaries and eminence of coaches. Yet they contributed perhaps as much to

the American character as any group. There were Fielding Yost and Pop Warner and Alonzo Stagg and Dan McGugin and ill-fated, canonized Knute Rockne of the earlier days. There are Fritz Crisler, Wallace Wade, Frank Thomas, Doc Sutherland, Jim Crowley, Walter Camp, and Major Neyland of the later days. And in between the Jones boys, Howard and Tad and Biff, and the "Bernies"—Moore and Bierman. Over against these the college professor had begun to complain of the high cost of culture attainment and the low reward for his work. But, alas, he was likely to be further disillusioned in the years soon to come when a united public seemed bent on reducing him still more and more to the lot of the average laborer in the vineyard.

Perhaps equally vivid among the play-work personalities of the nation were the new breed of movie actors. Men and women, they were created by the new technology and the new leisure-play trends of the time. The football coaches were but pikers in petty cash in the midst of them that received as much as $5,000 to $10,000 a week basking in the pictures and the public pleasure. To see these artists of the new day, there was a weekly attendance, at 23,000 moving picture theatres, of over 100,000,000 people, all manner of men, women, and children who spent $1,500,000,000 for the new necessity of the technicways. Incredible extravagance to the forefathers of the republic. A Will Hays, he of the big pay and smooth way, was bigger and better than senator or judge.

Still the picture grew and grew: amusement parks, state fairs, county fairs, chautauqua and lyceum courses, little theatres, school entertainments, benefit entertainments, Rotary, Kiwanis, womens' clubs entertainment—no man could do the picture justice. Americana of the Americanas, who could describe 1,000,000 people a day at the top peak of Coney Island, 20,000,000 people in the earlier days of chautauquas, 10,000,000 members of lodges and fraternal societies in 120,000 lodges. "Boys will be boys"—more than 300,000 men eating the weekly fellowship luncheons at Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions, Civitans, and the others; 2,000,000 members of the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls. And of summer camps still another new picture and new industry for the salvaging of summer youth whose parents had little to offer in work or play, control or companionship.

Or who could portray adequately the hosts of other American

## A NATIONAL ROSTER OF SPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES

(Adapted from the *New York Times*, December 25, 1938)

- Archery
- Auto Racing
- Badminton
  - National Champions
  - Metropolitan Champions
- Baseball
  - Professional
  - Colleges
  - Schools
- Basketball
- Billiards
  - Professional
  - Amateur
- Bobsledding
- Bowling
  - American Bowling Congress Champions
  - Women's International Bowling Congress Champions
- Boxing
  - Professional
  - Amateur
- Canoeing
  - National Champions
- Casting
  - National Association of Scientific Angling Clubs Champions
- Chess
- Court Tennis
- Cricket
- Cross-Country
- Curling
- Cycling
- Dogs
- Fencing
  - National Champions
  - Other Champions
  - Intercollegiate Champions
- Football
  - Colleges
  - Professional
- Golf
  - Men's Champions
  - Women's Champions
- Gymnastics
  - Men's National Champions
  - Women's National Champions
  - Eastern Intercollegiate League Champions
- Handball
  - Four-Wall
  - One-Wall
  - Hardball
- Harness Racing
- Hockey
- Horse Racing
- Horseshoe Pitching
- Horse Show
  - National
- Ice Skating
  - Figure
  - Speed
- Lacrosse
- Lawn Bowling
  - American Lawn Bowling Association
- Motor Boating
  - Inboards
  - Cruisers
  - Outboards
  - National Outboard Champions
  - Eastern Outboard Champions
- Polo
  - Outdoor Champions
  - National Indoor Champions
  - Eastern Indoor Champions
- Racquets
- Rowing
  - National Senior Champions
  - Other Champions
- Rugby
- Shooting
  - Skeet
  - Traps
    - Grand American Tournament
  - Rifle
  - Pistol
- Skiing
  - World Champions
  - National Champions
- Soccer
- Softball
- Squash Racquets
- Squash Tennis
- Swimming
  - Men's National Senior Outdoor Champions
  - Women's National Outdoor Champions
  - Men's National Senior Indoor Champions
  - Women's National Indoor Champions
  - National Collegiate A. A. Champions
  - Eastern Intercollegiate League Champions
  - Other Champions
- Table Tennis
- Tennis
  - National Outdoor Champions
  - Professional
  - Other Outdoor Champions
  - National Indoor Champions
- Track and Field
  - Men's National Senior Outdoor Champions
  - Women's National Outdoor Champions
  - Men's National Senior Indoor Champions
  - National Collegiate A. A. Champions
  - Intercollegiate A. A. A. A. Outdoor Champions
  - Intercollegiate A. A. A. A. Indoor Champions
  - Other Champions
- Weight-Lifting
  - National A. A. U. Champions
- Wrestling
  - National A. A. U Champions
  - National Collegiate A. A. Champions
  - Eastern Intercollegiate Champions
- Yachting
  - Yacht Racing Association of Long Island Sound

There were more than 750 subclassifications under these major types of sports, as, for instance, ten football conferences, and no less than 80 class champions in swimming.

joiners, 50,000,000 strong? Ten score fraternal societies: Masons and Odd Fellows and Red Men and K.P.'s and Elks and Moose, temperance societies, friendly societies, college fraternities and sororities, Sons and Daughters of I Will Arise. Societies for the control and welfare of the public, of morals, of neighbors, of nations, of children, and of animals, of whites and Negroes and immigrants. No man had counted the clubs of the American people; no man would: motor clubs, lecture clubs, city clubs, fishing clubs, hunting clubs, athletic clubs, country clubs, book clubs, women's clubs, clubs morning, noon, and night. And again Ku Klux and Brown Shirts, Silver Shirts, Black Shirts and Reds, gang groups and racketeers; call the long roll of them that join and join and join. And of parades no end, the good old American way, multiplied from Broadway to Los Angeles, marching for beer, marching for N.R.A., marching for Lindbergh and Hughes and Huey Long.

There were other pictures of great numbers and money-spending groups, such that the ever-recurring question kept coming up—should so many people have so much money to spend for leisure-time pleasure and so many other people not have money or opportunity? Of course, the question could not be put so simply, yet the contrast between the groups in the upper brackets and those whose income was pitiably low or who had no income was so great that the question continued to be a symbol of America's problem of security and of the distribution of wealth.

So we come to contemplate the plight of millions of men without work and other millions of people without adequate income—the families of the unemployed, the families of those whose pay is small and the families of the millions of low income groups. But particularly we must contemplate the millions of unemployed. America is still rich and has abundance enough for all. America has been known as the land of opportunity. Now our problem is to get the right factors to working to bring balance and equilibrium between the wealthy and the poor, between abundance and scarcity, between opportunity and men. For of the 48,000,000 and more who were catalogued as workers in 1930 perhaps a fifth are now unemployed. Estimates have varied from 15,000,000 at the peak to perhaps 10,000,000 in 1937-38. This host of unemployed workers

is in contrast to as low as 1,500,000 in the years of 1920 and again in 1926.

Yet we must recall again how mere statistics can tell no adequate story of men and their sufferings; of lost opportunity and lack of security; of the family left desolate, undernourished, inadequately clothed and housed and educated, and all that long catalogue of maladjustments, poverty, crime, sickness, death that involve not 10,000,000 but 50,000,000 dependents upon those who would but cannot work. More than a third of the people are caught up in the hazards of unemployment. And these, if they stood in whole multitudes asking for opportunity or bread in one place would shake the nation and encompass roundabout every supercity in the nation, or they would form a long unbroken line like some live wire six times across the nation—ten times all the folks of Jefferson's earlier America.

"Of, for, and by the people." These, too, are people or, in their own words eloquently transmitted by Louise V. Armstrong, "we, too, are people," symbol and reality of a plaintive, wailing, throbbing, laughing, weeping, fighting symphony of suffering and heroic effort. 'The actors are moving about to take their places in a thrilling, inspiring, sinister, pathetic, touching, amusing, comic and tragic pageant of human life. Men, women, children, babies, white men, black men, red men, old men, young men, girls, boys, officials, laborers, husbands and mothers. In they come and out they go to the never-ending sound of those tramping, scuffling feet.'[2]

Yet these tragic millions of Americans who once worked but now stand in line sometimes 100 for one position—sometimes even more than that; or these millions now fortunately temporarily employed on the building of great reserve wealth of the nation in buildings and roads and hospitals and schools—these and their families are not all the unemployed. For there must be no less than another five million young folks just out of college and high school who ask the question—why does not America offer us work and opportunity? Here is dilemma of youth even more stark because of the long look ahead in which the nation does not offer security.

And this problem comes back to some of the original tenets of American society—liberty, freedom, opportunity—justice to all and special privilege to none are the fundamental ideologies which the schools have taught to youth. But how liberty—unless free to

work and to marry and to have children and to do creative work? How freedom if there is no substance with which to live abundantly. It thus comes to pass that the examination of the earlier American liberalism is of the essence of our problem. Taken at its tide, American economic liberalism, which was the dictum of free competition unrestricted, has led the nation to a time when it cannot offer more than three-fourths of its people a fair opportunity for work.

The way out and on is, of course, not merely a problem of employment and work, but of the whole interrelated economy of government and community, of culture and economics, and we shall postpone our general conclusions concerning most of these for the last chapter in the book. Yet we must not forget that the problem here is one that must have more than philosophy, more than words, more than politics. There must be definite, technical workable ways for approaching these crises in unemployment. Among these are social security and its various instruments, old age insurance, unemployment insurance, Public Works and Works Progress Administrations with the corollary of relief and work relief. There are multiple plans for assisting the farmer and the low-income farm groups. And there must be still other plans for those who are being displaced by machine farming just as technological unemployment in industry has necessitated new ways of adjustment. The wages and hour law, fixing margins for wages and hours and strengthening the child labor provisions, is another attempt both to raise incomes and to create more jobs for the workers. These for the most part represent governmental efforts. Yet there must be other efforts of business and industry, of university and science, working together to create new opportunities and to devise new ways of abundance consistent with the reality and principles of economics and human behavior. We shall examine more in detail some of these aspects of our problems in Book II, where references are cited and programs suggested.

We have emphasized the problem of social security as one of the major dilemmas of contemporary America. We have repeatedly re-echoed the questions which youth are asking, namely, if not security and opportunity for work, what is America to offer them? We shall point out in greater detail the dilemma of the prospect of unemployment for 20,000,000 youth and for an equal

number of old people, both of whom are very much concerned about the future of work. We shall call attention to the dilemma of a nation in which a very small part of its people control capital and employing capacity of the nation such that the great masses of the people are at the mercy of this large minority. We shall call attention to the essential problems of widening the range of educational opportunity in all the regions of the nation to the end that growing youth may anticipate a reasonable prospect for successful work and opportunity, and we shall point out certain problems of the schools in training a new generation both in skills and adaptation to social change. In our questions and answers in Chapter XXX and in our discussions of social planning, we raise questions of the necessity of something equivalent to a permanent public works program under the auspices of the nation, and in our discussion of the need for a balanced economy as between agriculture and industry we point to the problem of both increasing and redistributing opportunities for work and wealth. So, too, the problem of employment and migratory labor are very much bound up with our problems of regional planning. Thus, the solution for the problem of the redistribution of wealth and opportunity will not be found in the re-allocation of actual wealth, but in the development of the capacity of each region to produce and consume liberally of its own commodities.

Many of the newer ideals of standards of living, of opportunity, and of welfare are based upon indices of urban civilization in the nation. Many of the programs appear to assume more and more that the maximum standards of wages and equipment in the cities must be extended to the rural areas or else the standards of the whole nation will be lowered. Most of these measures of standards and welfare are in terms of money and equipment, and many of them assume that all the people everywhere must have the same things as all other people elsewhere. The assumptions of the planners for parks, playgrounds, leisure-time activities, great superhighways, and the thousand and one other avenues for play and recreation are that America will be composed uniformly of people with both time and money to spend. There is, therefore, here a very large problem of adjusting time, recreational opportunity, standards, money, expenditures, and educational facilities between and among the great unequal groups of the nation, so that the

chasm of distance will not be so great between those who work and those who do not work, between those who work in some fields and those who work in others. This would appear to be a problem either of the equipment of the several regions and the people in them for the development of a culture in harmony with both their physical and cultural background, thus creating continuously adequate capacity for a richer culture, or else the assumption would be the reconstruction of the whole system of economy. How some of these problems are examined and worked out may be seen further from the continuing picture of the American scene.

## *Chapter XI*

# *YOUTH*

OF ALL the people, the two most dynamic groups concerned with the problems of work and of leisure are youth and the aged. And society is equally concerned about them. Each group, while troubled about the economic world, is troubled in a different way, and strangely enough each group is assuming significant changing ratios in the total population. The ratio of children to the total population has been, first, gradually and then more rapidly decreasing, and by the same token the ratio of youth becomes smaller and the proportion of older people larger and larger. We have already discussed this aspect of population, and we shall discuss it again in our chapter dealing with the children of the population. It is important, however, here to note that this decreasing children and youth rate is reflected in the school population, so that, in 1870, 31 percent of all the people was of school age, but, in 1930, only 26 percent. Yet the problem of employment for both groups assumes larger and larger ratios, since there has been a trend toward raising the age at which youth may go to work and lowering the age at which older people are likely to be "laid off" in industry. All of these trends, of course, tend to create new problems of adjustment. In this chapter we shall discuss the problems of youth and in the following chapter the situation with reference to the aged.

Here, as elsewhere, we have the larger societal problems of youth —the agelong problem of adaptation to elders, of acquiring education and tutelage, and of growing effectively into maturity. But there are also many social problems due to the particular situations at this particular time in the American scene. This is so much the case that the question, "How fare American youth?" has assumed the proportions of a national crisis. The federal government has attempted to come to the rescue with its National Youth Administration and other measures. The American Youth Commission of the American Council on Education has made valuable

studies. Hundreds of other organizations and agencies have set themselves to the task of helping modern youth to make the most effective adjustment possible to the modern changing world, while youth organizations themselves are active in the study and planning of their part in the new world.

Of the pressing American problems which face youth in relation to their own future, perhaps the very first one has to do with the quest for work, for economic security, and reality which perhaps is the outward symbol of mental security.

From considerable study and observation of the main currents of feeling and opinion in the several regions of the United States, the conclusion seems justified that the prevailing aspirations of the American people may almost be characterized as a twofold quest for security and reality. The quest for economic security represents a more specific, tangible urge for the substantial, standing out beyond and above all the common problems of the people. It is not only the increasingly imminent and desperate problem of insecurity for laborer and aged and infirm, the pall of unemployment, the fear of lost savings, lost hope and ambition which hang deep and dark over millions of laborers and of aged and aging throughout the nation. It is as if there has flamed up suddenly a well nigh universal passion for security among the young people —youth in college and university, youth in high school, youth from farm and factory, youth everywhere clamoring for security to develop a future, for homes and families, for living opportunities and pay, for the right to do creative work. They are asking with religious fervor, if not security, then what is the nation to offer? What cause to show why stirring crises must not be met with uprootings of the system? Along with this quest for economic security is the passion also for mental security, which is youth's way of seeking reality in the modern world. They want the facts. They want their questions answered frankly and fairly.

The significance of this quest for security and reality on the part of American youth may be emphasized vividly by pointing out the fact that there are nearly 22,500,000 youth in the American population—youth being listed as those between the ages of 15 and 24 years. The transition from the earlier years to adolescence is often so gradual and the basic problems so similar that in reality there are other millions of "children and youth" who are involved

in the problems of youth. These will be discussed in a later chapter dealing with the children of the people.

In terms of numbers and the distribution of youth in the nation the picture is somewhat as follows: First, of the nearly 22,500,000 youth, the largest number, nearly 6,750,000 are in the Northeast, the region of the nation having the densest population. Next, the great Middle States follow with nearly 6,000,000, and the Southeast with a little less than 5,250,000. Then come the Southwest with nearly 2,000,000, and the Northwest and the Far West with a little more than 1,250,000 each. Yet the ratio of youth to the total population varies greatly in these regions with the Southeast having the largest ratio and the Far West the smallest.

These ratios, of course, again are not merely statistical aggregates, but represent the varying living problems of youth in the several regions. In the Southeast, for instance, with its greater population of youth, with the demand from other regions being relatively less than formerly, and with the region itself limited in wealth and work, the problem assumes the proportions of a crisis. So, too, in many of the cities of the congested Northeast, youth is seeking opportunity elsewhere, even in the Southeast. Thus, it is estimated that 75 percent of youth 16 years of age in New York cannot find work to do. The details of regional, urban, and rural variations may be studied in detail from the accompanying full-page statistical picture. Yet, to point up vividly the wide range of differences, we may compare the ratio of youth to all other people 25 to 59 years of age in South Carolina with those in Los Angeles, California, as does the American Youth Commission. The South Carolina youth ratio is 63.3 and the Los Angeles ratio is 28.6. Once again, the rural farm youth are 53.3, while the urban is 37.7.

What else do we know or want to know about this youth of the nation? We know much, but we want to know more. Some of the conclusions which seem justified from many studies follow. First, with reference to work, there are not enough suitable jobs for youth. This is a twofold problem, namely, one of employment and one of keeping youth busy and trained. In the earlier days of the republic, there was always work ahead. Now youth does not receive its share of available jobs and even after all the child labor regulations are complied with there is still in the cities a great

## AGE DISTRIBUTION OF YOUTH 15–24, IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940

| Area | Total Population | Youth 15–24 | Percent Youth | Youth 15–19 | Youth 20–24 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 131,669,275 | 23,921,358 | 18.2 | 12,333,523 | 11,587,835 |
| *New England* | 40,629,591 | 7,255,188 | 17.8 | 3,675,167 | 3,580,021 |
| Maine | 847,226 | 145,152 | 17.1 | 78,779 | 66,373 |
| New Hampshire | 491,524 | 82,868 | 16.8 | 43,349 | 39,519 |
| Vermont | 359,231 | 61,539 | 17.1 | 32,599 | 28,940 |
| Massachusetts | 4,316,721 | 755,223 | 17.5 | 385,251 | 369,972 |
| Rhode Island | 713,346 | 131,625 | 18.4 | 68,181 | 63,444 |
| Connecticut | 1,709,242 | 315,042 | 18.4 | 154,880 | 160,162 |
| New York | 13,479,142 | 2,271,057 | 16.8 | 1,124,336 | 1,146,721 |
| New Jersey | 4,160,165 | 752,024 | 18.1 | 375,112 | 376,912 |
| Pennsylvania | 9,900,180 | 1,866,908 | 18.8 | 967,090 | 899,818 |
| Delaware | 266,505 | 47,565 | 17.8 | 23,297 | 24,268 |
| Maryland | 1,821,244 | 332,709 | 18.3 | 167,777 | 164,932 |
| District of Columbia | 663,091 | 114,163 | 17.2 | 48,680 | 65,483 |
| West Virginia | 1,901,974 | 379,313 | 19.9 | 205,836 | 173,477 |
| *Southeast* | 28,261,829 | 5,612,641 | 19.8 | 2,976,283 | 2,636,358 |
| Virginia | 2,677,773 | 535,373 | 20.0 | 282,053 | 253,320 |
| North Carolina | 3,571,623 | 760,584 | 21.3 | 404,850 | 355,734 |
| South Carolina | 1,899,804 | 417,981 | 22.0 | 224,090 | 193,891 |
| Georgia | 3,123,723 | 633,048 | 20.3 | 328,410 | 304,638 |
| Florida | 1,897,414 | 339,496 | 17.9 | 169,780 | 169,716 |
| Kentucky | 2,845,627 | 540,649 | 19.0 | 294,807 | 245,842 |
| Tennessee | 2,915,841 | 561,982 | 19.3 | 297,044 | 264,938 |
| Alabama | 2,832,961 | 562,067 | 19.8 | 300,291 | 261,776 |
| Mississippi | 2,183,796 | 427,681 | 19.6 | 229,647 | 198,034 |
| Arkansas | 1,949,387 | 376,986 | 19.3 | 204,913 | 172,073 |
| Louisiana | 2,363,880 | 456,794 | 19.3 | 240,398 | 216,396 |
| *Southwest* | 9,782,337 | 1,838,076 | 18.8 | 979,516 | 858,560 |
| Oklahoma | 2,336,434 | 440,422 | 18.8 | 241,064 | 199,358 |
| Texas | 6,414,824 | 1,204,518 | 18.8 | 636,081 | 568,437 |
| New Mexico | 531,818 | 100,931 | 19.0 | 54,301 | 46,630 |
| Arizona | 499,261 | 92,205 | 18.5 | 48,070 | 44,135 |
| *Middle States* | 35,741,574 | 6,253,848 | 17.5 | 3,198,500 | 3,055,348 |
| Ohio | 6,907,612 | 1,224,834 | 17.7 | 626,072 | 598,762 |
| Indiana | 3,427,796 | 600,844 | 17.5 | 311,912 | 288,932 |
| Illinois | 7,897,241 | 1,360,838 | 17.2 | 672,996 | 687,842 |
| Michigan | 5,256,106 | 935,371 | 17.8 | 478,220 | 457,151 |
| Wisconsin | 3,137,587 | 546,610 | 17.4 | 284,805 | 261,805 |
| Minnesota | 2,792,300 | 502,941 | 18.0 | 257,349 | 245,592 |
| Iowa | 2,538,268 | 443,131 | 17.4 | 231,986 | 211,145 |
| Missouri | 3,784,664 | 639,279 | 16.9 | 335,160 | 304,119 |
| *Northwest* | 7,410,435 | 1,345,689 | 18.1 | 712,024 | 633,665 |
| North Dakota | 641,935 | 123,501 | 19.2 | 66,049 | 57,452 |
| South Dakota | 642,961 | 119,584 | 18.6 | 64,716 | 54,868 |
| Nebraska | 1,315,834 | 232,440 | 17.7 | 125,101 | 107,339 |
| Kansas | 1,801,028 | 313,745 | 17.4 | 168,790 | 144,955 |
| Montana | 559,456 | 102,414 | 18.3 | 51,136 | 51,278 |
| Idaho | 524,873 | 99,848 | 19.0 | 51,866 | 47,982 |
| Wyoming | 250,742 | 47,298 | 18.9 | 24,002 | 23,296 |
| Colorado | 1,123,296 | 197,377 | 17.6 | 102,144 | 95,233 |
| Utah | 550,310 | 109,482 | 19.9 | 58,220 | 51,262 |
| *Far West* | 9,843,509 | 1,625,916 | 16.4 | 792,033 | 823,883 |
| Nevada | 130,247 | 17,933 | 16.3 | 8,349 | 9,584 |
| Washington | 1,736,191 | 295,592 | 17 0 | 146,725 | 148,867 |
| Oregon | 1,089,684 | 182,860 | 16 8 | 92,358 | 90,502 |
| California | 6,907,387 | 1,119,531 | 16.2 | 544,601 | 574,930 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Population*, Vol. II, Part 1, Table 26, pp. 56–78.

problem of work and, if not work, of leisure-time activities, and in the rural areas of an outlet for the large number of youth in an age where agriculture is a diminishing occupation. Furthermore, in a large and complex society youth cannot choose, and there is, due both to general impressions and to the depression, the spectacle of millions of youth glad to have "something" to do instead of looking forward to doing what they want to do. Here, of course, is a dilemma, since a great many more youth wish to go into the professional and social services than can possibly be accommodated. Now which ones shall have the chance and which ones not? Here is the ever-recurring question of how many and of what sort of youth should go to college and of what sort must the college education of the future be? There is also the problem of widening the range of occupational opportunity and of raising the standard of pay if possible to the end that youth may look forward to security and family. What to do with 40 to 50 percent of employable youth who cannot find work and what to do with them while they wait—these are questions that must have answers.

The raising of the school age as a means of bridging the gap between school and job raises other questions. If youth must stay in school until 20 and has not the training or experience or habit of work, how can he fit himself into the social order? And then again youth complains that he must spend so much of life getting ready to work, and just as he is well under way at 40 he is suddenly too old for employment in many fields, so what is he to do? This is a problem for both the school and for the sociologist and the economist. This involves the whole field of vocational education and the problem of making the high school and the junior college schools in reality for the people.

There are other problems. One is physical health more and more at hazard under the present circumstances. Another is delinquency with similar hazards and dangers. These two together add up to constitute the problem of mental health. These problems bring us face to face with the problems of play and recreation and of the facilities of the public school and the community for both recreation and training leaders. All of these problems are recapitulated and often accentuated in the special areas of rural youth, city youth, Negro youth, foreign-born youth, and the separate problems of boys and girls. And there are many other spe-

cialized aspects of the problem, including training in the upper brackets of research, teaching, politics, citizenship.

All of this leads us to ask more questions about the backgrounds of youth, the contrasts between the past and present, the nature of their complaints, and the prospects of the future. It is a far cry from our former attitude toward the youth, in which his discipline and regimen were planned arbitrarily from the viewpoint of his elders, to the present-day recognition of the changing processes that go on in the body, spirit, and mind of the youth, both male and female. The boy who grows from 12 to 15 becomes a new person. It is not only that his whole body changes, but his mind and spirit, his enthusiasms and feelings, his restlessness and desire for solitude race now ahead, now struggle within him, to keep him for the most part in storm and stress. The boy is timid and retiring, he is bold and crude. He is interested in the whole world and in many beings. He is a child and a man, and yet neither. For the most part he is not understood and he imagines that he is misunderstood more than he is. He is religious and affectionate but wishes to appear otherwise. He is gentle and savage and at the same time he may be poised as it were, ready to take his direction for mature life toward study and achievement or toward idleness and inertia. The boy of today knows more than the aged folk of a previous generation. He has more information, more social contacts, more stimulation. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the midst of all these physical, mental, and spiritual changes of his own, when he is thrust into a rapidly changing age, his own attempt at personal adjustment may cause some disturbance.

The young woman, come to quick maturity, will appear to have changed more rapidly, to be more romantic, more restless, more difficult to understand even than the boy come to manhood. She, too, having grown rapidly from girlhood to womanhood, has become a different person in body and mind and spirit, often without the knowledge and sympathy of her elders. With all the dynamic conflict of her being she has an agelong tradition of suppression and limitation with which her brother does not have to struggle. She has to combat the old conventions in a new day. Matters of dress, of speech, of work, of manners, of general conduct often appear to her as illogical and without foundation. Like

her brother, she has acquired a vast amount of knowledge of new things, and brings to bear upon new situations keen insight, satire, and often an irresistible, if illogical, argument. She resents the double standard in industry, in government, in the home, in morality, and protests against inequality of opportunity. Here again it is but natural that the modern young woman with all of her new knowledge and new life refuses to "stay put" in the forms of previous generations. It is not surprising, therefore, if in her attempts toward adjustment she should cause disturbance in the social order.

Manifestly the first of the problems of youth is therefore one of adjustment between growth and adolescence, between youth and society, and between youth and elders. On the part of the older generation, on the one hand, and the teacher and worker, on the other, it is necessary to understand more of the intellectual side of adolescence, to be sympathetic with the social phases, to recognize the importance and dangers of sexual maladjustment, to appreciate the religious and spiritual aspirations of youth, to understand and often to encourage whims and peculiar manifestations which may lie at the bottom of the esthetic life. It is especially important that they know more about the dangers of abnormal development and the basis upon which adolescent delinquency may rest. There are other delicate problems in the adjustment between the sexes and in the freedom which modern youth vaunts since the restraint and authority in the home have been largely removed. There are, furthermore, the problems of adjustment between youth and the several institutions—the family, the church, morality, citizenship. From the viewpoint of youth there are the constantly recurring needs for better guidance, better education, better companionship, and after all, a well-rounded social nurture such as will bring full growth and maturity without too heavy penalties of experience.

The common impression of modern youth that society has underestimated the strength, wisdom, foresight, and general power of youth has many facts to substantiate it. There are many classical illustrations of the unsuspected accomplishments of youth. There was, of course, the symbol of the Master Teacher who at twelve years of age was instructing the learned men of the temple. There have been the master musicians whose genius in the earlier years might easily have been smothered. There have been the masters

## BIRTHS, DEATHS, AND INFANT MORTALITY IN THE U. S., 1941

| Area | Excess of Births Over Deaths | Birth Rate | Death Rate | Infant Mortality per 1,000 Births |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 8.4 | 18.9 | 10.5 * | 45 |
| *Northeast* | 6.0 | 17.0 | 11.1 | 43 |
| Maine | 6.4 | 18 7 | 12.3 | 51 |
| New Hampshire | 5.7 | 17.8 | 12.1 | 36 |
| Vermont | 6.8 | 18.8 | 12.0 | 44 |
| Massachusetts | 4.3 | 16.0 | 11.7 | 36 |
| Rhode Island | 5.2 | 16.2 | 11.0 | 36 |
| Connecticut | 5.4 | 16.0 | 10.6 | 32 |
| New York | 4.8 | 15.7 | 10.9 | 33 |
| New Jersey | 4.9 | 15.8 | 10.9 | 36 |
| Pennsylvania | 6.7 | 17.6 | 10.9 | 41 |
| Delaware | 7.1 | 19.2 | 12.2 | 43 |
| Maryland | 6.8 | 18.8 | 12.1 | 52 |
| District of Columbia | 13.0 * | 24.7 * | 11.7 * | 51 |
| West Virginia | 13.7 | 23.0 | 9.4 | 60 |
| *Southeast* | 12.2 | 22.4 | 10.2 | 59 |
| Virginia | 10.5 | 21.9 | 11.4 | 67 |
| North Carolina | 14 7 | 23.7 | 8.9 | 60 |
| South Carolina | 14.0 | 24.8 | 10.8 | 75 |
| Georgia | 11.7 | 21.8 | 10.2 | 59 |
| Florida | 7.6 | 19.8 | 12.2 | 53 |
| Kentucky | 11.7 | 22.3 | 10.6 | 59 |
| Tennessee | 10.8 | 20.8 | 10.0 | 55 |
| Alabama | 12.5 | 22.7 | 10.1 | 60 |
| Mississippi | 14.6 | 24.9 | 10.3 | 55 |
| Arkansas | 12.4 | 20.7 | 8.3 | 45 |
| Louisiana | 12.9 | 21.3 | 10.2 | 57 |
| *Southwest* | 11.9 | 21.3 | 9.4 | 59 |
| Oklahoma | 10.9 | 19.5 | 8.5 | 47 |
| Texas | 11.8 | 21.2 | 9.4 | 57 |
| New Mexico | 17.0 | 27.8 | 10.8 | 91 |
| Arizona | 12.1 | 24.1 | 12.0 | 88 |
| *Middle States* | 7.3 | 17 4 | 10.7 | 38 |
| Ohio | 7.0 | 18.3 | 11.3 | 41 |
| Indiana | 7.7 | 19.3 | 11.6 | 40 |
| Illinois | 6 2 | 17.0 | 10.8 | 34 |
| Michigan | 10.4 | 20.5 | 10.0 | 38 |
| Wisconsin | 8.4 | 18.2 | 9.8 | 35 |
| Minnesota | 10.0 | 19.5 | 9.5 | 34 |
| Iowa | 8.3 | 18.4 | 10.1 | 36 |
| Missouri | 6.2 | 17.5 | 11.2 | 45 |
| *Northwest* | 9.5 | 19.0 | 7.0 | 31 |
| North Dakota | 12.8 | 21.0 | 8.3 | 38 |
| South Dakota | 9.7 | 18.0 | 8.3 | 41 |
| Nebraska | 7.6 | 16.9 | 9.3 | 34 |
| Kansas | 6.5 | 16.7 | 10.3 | 38 |
| Montana | 10.4 | 20.4 | 10.1 | 37 |
| Idaho | 13.8 | 22.3 | 8.5 | 35 |
| Wyoming | 11.9 | 20.7 | 8.8 | 44 |
| Colorado | 8.3 | 19.1 | 10.7 | 52 |
| Utah | 16.7 | 25.0 | 8.3 | 29 |
| *Far West* | 6.4 | 17.9 | 11.6 | 35 |
| Nevada | 7.1 | 19.8 | 12.6 | 42 |
| Washington | 6.6 | 17.6 | 11.0 | 36 |
| Oregon | 6.3 | 17.5 | 11.1 | 31 |
| California | 6.3 | 18.1 | 11.8 | 36 |

*Based on provisional estimated population.

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 92, p. 109; Table 98, p. 102.

## PERCENTAGE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POPULATION, 1940

| Area | Under 20 | 20–54 | 55 and Over |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 34.4 | 50.7 | 14.9 |
| *Northeast* | 31.6 | 52.8 | 15.6 |
| Maine | 35.4 | 46.0 | 18.6 |
| New Hampshire | 32.2 | 48.3 | 19.5 |
| Vermont | 34.8 | 46.4 | 18.8 |
| Massachusetts | 30.7 | 51.4 | 17.9 |
| Rhode Island | 31.7 | 51.8 | 16.5 |
| Connecticut | 30.3 | 53.4 | 16.3 |
| New York | 28.9 | 55 5 | 15.6 |
| New Jersey | 30.0 | 54.7 | 15.3 |
| Pennsylvania | 34.0 | 50.9 | 15.1 |
| Delaware | 31.4 | 52.4 | 16.2 |
| Maryland | 33 0 | 52.3 | 14.7 |
| District of Columbia | 25 2 | 60.7 | 14.1 |
| West Virginia | 42.1 | 46.1 | 11 8 |
| *Southeast* | 41.2 | 47.1 | 11.7 |
| Virginia | 39.2 | 48.2 | 12.6 |
| North Carolina | 43.9 | 46.2 | 9.9 |
| South Carolina | 45.5 | 44.9 | 9.6 |
| Georgia | 41.1 | 47.8 | 11.1 |
| Florida | 34.0 | 51.6 | 14.4 |
| Kentucky | 40.7 | 45.6 | 13.7 |
| Tennessee | 39.5 | 47.9 | 12.6 |
| Alabama | 42.9 | 46.3 | 10.8 |
| Mississippi | 43 1 | 45.7 | 11.2 |
| Arkansas | 41.5 | 46.2 | 12.3 |
| Louisiana | 39.9 | 48.9 | 11.2 |
| *Southwest* | 38.8 | 49.1 | 12.1 |
| Oklahoma | 39.6 | 47.2 | 13.2 |
| Texas | 37 9 | 50.1 | 12.0 |
| New Mexico | 44.7 | 45.5 | 9.8 |
| Arizona | 40.5 | 48.2 | 11.3 |
| *Middle States* | 32.5 | 51.2 | 16.3 |
| Ohio | 31.9 | 51.3 | 16.8 |
| Indiana | 33.1 | 49.5 | 17.4 |
| Illinois | 30.1 | 54.0 | 15.9 |
| Michigan | 34.1 | 51.8 | 14.1 |
| Wisconsin | 34.0 | 49.7 | 16.3 |
| Minnesota | 33.9 | 50.1 | 16.0 |
| Iowa | 33.7 | 48.3 | 18.0 |
| Missouri | 32.3 | 50.1 | 17.6 |
| *Northwest* | 36.1 | 48.2 | 15.7 |
| North Dakota | 40.0 | 46.2 | 13.8 |
| South Dakota | 37.8 | 47.2 | 15.0 |
| Nebraska | 34.7 | 48.6 | 16.7 |
| Kansas | 33.8 | 48.4 | 17.8 |
| Montana | 34.5 | 50.1 | 15.4 |
| Idaho | 38.5 | 47.7 | 13.8 |
| Wyoming | 36.2 | 51.5 | 12.3 |
| Colorado | 34.8 | 49.0 | 16.2 |
| Utah | 42.0 | 45.8 | 12.2 |
| *Far West* | 28.2 | 53.9 | 17.9 |
| Nevada | 30.1 | 54.6 | 15.3 |
| Washington | 29.6 | 52.1 | 18.3 |
| Oregon | 29.7 | 51.8 | 18.5 |
| California | 27.7 | 54.6 | 17.7 |

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 24, pp. 24–25.

of literature, like Shakespeare, whose talents were in his youth all but completely ignored. A common note in the biographies of men and women who have achieved success is lament over the limitations and suffering which have come to them through the failure of others to appreciate them and through their lack of opportunity. Thousands of youth in the schools of the older days have suffered and lost out because of misunderstandings. The timid youth dreaming dreams becomes the subject of satire for teacher and pupil alike until he is driven from the school. Formal religion and morality likewise have misunderstood the struggles of youth and have driven them in a direction opposite from that which both institutions and youth desired. This conflict between youth and institutions, on the one hand, and between youth and age, on the other, is, after all, not a new thing. In all ages the elders have conscientiously felt that the youth of the generation was lowering standards and endangering the common good. "The old days," they said, "were not like these." And so they were not. But in many ways the youth of each generation is both the friend and progenitor of a better society.

Youth as the transitional period from childhood to maturity assumed in primitive life a significance unsurpassed in the social life of the tribe. Instead of tabooing all reference to the approach of puberty, the primitive man openly recognized the approach and heralded it with song, dance, ritual, and ceremony. It was a social interest and social concern. At this time the young boys and in many cases the young girls were initiated into the tribal rites and ceremonies and youth became the preparation for the assumption of individual and tribal responsibilities. The boys could no longer as in childhood be associated with the women, but were turned over to the elders of the tribe, who put them through a course of rigorous and often extremely painful training as a test of each boy's bravery and endurance and as a means of impressing indelibly upon his mind his part and responsibility in the perpetuation of tribal welfare and tribal rites and customs. Likewise, the girl was often ushered into womanhood by elaborate and impressive ritual and ceremony symbolic of her entrance upon larger responsibilities. Thus youth, or the approach to manhood and womanhood, was emblematic of a rebirth, an awakening to new obligations and duties.

Not only in primitive times but in all periods youth has been a symbol of power. Athletics, general recreation, games, contests have been conceded to be the supreme realm of youth. The physical youth among the Greeks represented the superlative of form, endurance, and strength; and when on one occasion the aged Entellus, ex-champion, fretting at the defeat of a youthful champion, threw himself into the ring and fought with such vigor as to endanger the life of his antagonist, pious Aeneas stopped the bout and recorded the episode as of phenomenal occurrence. The absence of any such incident in later times may serve to emphasize the power and strength of the youthful athlete. If one wishes to illustrate the power of modern youth, one needs but examine the leading figures in his younger days in football, baseball, rowing, swimming, boxing, and other forms of athletics, and contrast their present and growing inefficiency as measured by increasing years. Or measure the desires and activities of youth with those of older groups, or take note of the proverbial appraisal of youth as being able to "stand anything." In war, youth is the supreme symbol of group power. Quickly and easily mobilized, quickly and effectively trained, the great army of youth represent the irresistible power of spirit and body. If much of the world's great tragedy has been in the sacrifice of such power, war is none the less eloquent testimony of its existence. The history of frontiers and pioneering has been also the story of youth. Thus the youth movement, with its disturbing factors and its challenging demands that its powers be conserved and developed, lies at the bottom of much of social development and social progress.

Youth is not only the symbol of strength and power, but it is essentially the symbol of growth, evolution, and progress. The chief function of the child and of youth for the time being is to grow. To retard growth is to retard the essential laws of life. Because children and youth can grow, because they can learn, because they can utilize vast power and strength in the development of themselves and of their surroundings, they represent the supreme force of social progress and evolution. Youth with its venturesomeness and fearlessness plunges ahead, sometimes suffering, sometimes losing, but making possible new gains. Youth takes the place of age, and the coming of each new generation with the passing of the old is typical of the great social and biological

processes of evolution. Age must decrease while youth increases. The liberalism of youth makes possible new discoveries and new inventions, while the fearlessness of youth overcomes difficulties to which older generations might surrender. How, therefore, shall we conserve, develop, and guide this greatest of social forces into right channels? How shall we avoid dangers and pitfalls of abnormal development, of misdirected energies, of wasted power? How shall the modern youth movement be turned into its natural power and effectiveness?

Thus, the spirit of the modern youth movement is, after all, an expression of youth in conflict. It is not merely conflict with elders and personal limitations, but a large part of the revolt of youth is closely related to many of the formal institutions. Indeed few, if any, of the institutions escape their critical approach. Revolt against the formalism and ritualism of religion has been expressed both positively in their conferences and resolutions and negatively by their neglect of the church. Revolt against certain industrial conditions and principles has been expressed in conferences, resolutions, and particularly in inquiries and efforts toward the formation of a social philosophy. Revolt against certain formal requirements of home and family has been expressed through conflict with parents, through greater freedom in custom and dress, and through more or less formal statements of principles. Revolt against authority and state has been expressed by means sufficient to justify the terms "radical" and "red." Similar revolts against wealth, morality and customs, literature and sex have brought the situation to the point where students, social workers, and educators find themselves challenged to put forth their utmost efforts toward a cooperative program for better social relationships.

The revolt of youth against formal curricula and methods in the school is growing. The resulting conflict has brought about in the high school a great many problems concerned with discipline and especially with sex instruction and sex relations. Other results, however, have been more consideration for the individual, a more democratic relationship between teacher and pupil, and better programs of vocational guidance and direction. Especially marked has been the restlessness of the college youth, men and women, in demanding curricula that would lead them out of the wall-enclosed college or university into the open areas of life.

Youth is protesting against the traditional methods and curriculum of earlier days, and freely prophesies that, if faculty and administration do not provide dynamic courses, youth itself will set in motion agitations for revision to that end. Among their demands are functionalized courses relating to such matters as marriage, the family, citizenship, science, religion, and the esthetic phases of life, along with practical vocational instruction.

The revolt of youth in industry has centered largely around the whole problem of industrial injustice. A part of this revolt has been expressed through the groups of student volunteers and church members as an appeal for the Christian way of life. Much of it has arisen from study of social problems and from the general atmosphere for reform. Much of it is expressed in allegiance to special theories of economic and social reform such as socialism, industrial democracy, and various other plans for adjusting the inequality of the distribution of wealth. Much of this protest is of course uninformed and jejune. Most of it, however, is sincere, and in this field, as in all others, it may well be the basis for the discovery of new facts and new relationships. Professor Groves, in *The Drifting Home,* quotes the composite youth as saying:

'We are going to have less exploitation. We don't think much of the world you have. It has too much exploitation. You call it Christian. We don't think it is. Strong and fortunate people are unfair to weak ones. We do not know how we are going to solve all these problems, but we are going to have very much less exploitation than you have, and as a result we are going to have less separation. We are going to have one big democratic class. We do not hesitate to make love and marry outside our class. We do not hold to your scheme at all. We do not believe the things you teach. Our programme is freedom, buoyancy, less exploitation, and much less separation.'

Perhaps modern youth causes more alarm among parents than among any other group. We have already referred to movements such as boys' and girls' clubs, father-son meetings, mother-daughter banquets, and the like, together with a great deal of modern literature, which are going far toward making parents and children understand each other. Nevertheless, the gulf still needs more bridging. Professor Groves, when he asks the question: "Youth,

against what are you revolting?" seems to get the following answer:

'We are revolting against the control of our parents; we like our parents, are glad they happened to be who they were; they are no worse than others, rather better; but we are not going to be under their control in the way they expect. We are decided as to that; we are not any longer the sort of child that used to be. We have settled this consciously and with great determination. Well, we don't accept home training. This does not mean that we dislike our homes or desire to trouble our parents. We had rather do what is expected of us, but in our everyday life we simply cannot conform to all of the restrictions put upon us. We don't need the protection that seemed necessary a generation ago. We can take care of ourselves, and we must meet our own problems in our own way. We cannot explain our situation because our parents and teachers are too rigid in their imagination to see our problems from our point of view. We cannot satisfy both our elders and ourselves, and naturally we prefer to please ourselves.'[1]

Modern youth continue their complaints. It is not only their parents but all older people against whom they protest. They are not in sympathy with traditions or customs. They do not have absolute confidence in the older people. They demand facts when facts cannot always be produced. They feel that school, church, home, government, and other institutions are too far away from life. They do not necessarily blame older people or institutions, but to refrain from blame does not satisfy their own aspirations. They do not like the rules of society, and they will therefore change them. They are critical of the wisdom of the past and are willing to suffer from experience if they may learn the truth. In order to obtain experience, thrill, adventure, and excitement, they are willing to pay whatever price is necessary.

There are many questions for youth to ask themselves. In the midst of their revolt will youth stop long enough to inquire carefully into the nature and the direction of future society? In their criticism of the elders, clearly justified, will youth also recognize the fact that they must solve the problems of their generation in the long run? Will youth recognize the value of ancient wisdom grafted onto modern learning? Will youth, at the same time



*Photo by Bayard Wootten*

The people: Chasm of distance between the place which grandparents held in the old frontier economy of the farm and home and new urban economy of apartment and kitchenette.

*Photos by Bayard Wootten*

Resources. Unused and undeveloped expanses of a great nation: Parks and playgrounds de luxe of the new frontiers for the people.



that it clamors for science and knowledge, accept the scientific spirit and methods of approach to all modern questions? Will it study the youth movements of the past and seek not a class movement but a social movement? Will it study especially the German youth movement of the 1920's? Is youth willing to work as well as dream, to cooperate as well as protest, to think as well as feel? Is youth ready to seek reality in the setting up of families and the rearing of children, or will they better choose the opposite course?

These and many other questions will be asked and must be answered. Some of them can be answered to some extent from books and articles and conferences. Many must be answered by trial and error and by experience. For most of them there will be no simple "yes and no" answer either from youth or from the elders.

In so far as they can be answered from readings there is a superabundance of literature. There is, for instance, within the covers of a single book an annotated bibliography on *American Youth,* in which the works of more than two thousand authors have been described. This book is one of the publications of the American Youth Commission of the American Council on Education and was prepared by Louise Menefee and M. M. Chambers. Here are the 18 major questions for which literature is supplied.

What are the problems of modern youth?

What are the attitudes of youth?

What about youth in the depression, especially with reference to unemployment and relief?

What about employment and vocational adjustment?

What about the education of youth?

What about the health of youth?

What about child welfare and child labor?

What about adolescence?

What of family life and housing?

What of leisure and recreation?

What are the problems of citizenship, character, and religion?

What are the dilemmas of delinquency and social maladjustment?

What is the rule of governmental youth-survey agencies?

What of non-governmental youth-serving organizations?

What of research and surveys?

What of rural youth? of Negro youth?

What of youth in other countries?

There are in all of these areas of questions and problems rich and varied materials. There are brief and vivid summaries and brochures of youth in *The World Today, Youth Tell Their Story, How Fare American Youth?, Education for Those Out of School, Vocational Guidance for Those Out of School, Finding Jobs.* And of course, we must not forget to examine those deeper more fundamental studies of youth and their capacities and backgrounds, suitable references to which will be found in Book II for the more detailed study of American social problems.

## *Chapter XII*

# *ELDERS*

AMONG the most dramatic of all American pictures is that of its older people and the role they promise to play in the next generation and beyond. Just as we must inquire into their concern about security and work alongside the questionings of youth, so, too, there has been a tendency to refer to the amazing activity of the nation's older people in terms of flaming age and flapper grandmothers. Here indeed is a new situation with new problems in old settings and old problems in new settings. In many ways it is a strange and surprising picture. In other ways it is a logical and inevitable development. In many ways it is a picture of contradiction and paradox. In other ways it is strangely consistent. But always it is a picture of dynamic proportions and of problems that rank among the "musts" for immediate attention.

Strangely enough, this picture of the aged is not just one of dependence, but contrariwise it is one of great independence and of the threatened dominance of the political scene and of parts of the fiscal policy of the nation. We have already pointed out that next to youth in America the older people are most concerned about security and work. And strangely enough their concern, like that of youth, has been brought about by developments and change in the society which they are criticising. That is, as a result of modern technology, there has been a tendency toward lowering the age limits of the older people in favor of the young. Yet because of science and society's ameliorative effects the people not only tend to live longer but to feel better. By the same token they have been conditioned to higher standards of living and to more capacity and desire for money to spend and recreational opportunities. Now, if alongside these developments there looms the spectacle of early old age without work or money or security, it is natural that older people should lay the problem of their future on the doorsteps of the society which created their dilemma.

But this is not all. It is not only that the aged and upper middle-age groups are becoming more articulate. They are also becoming more numerous, such that it is estimated there will be an increase of almost 50 percent of persons over 65 during the next 20 years and almost a 25 percent increase of persons 45 to 64 years of age. Needleess to say, this increase, alongside the decrease in children of school age and of later youth will work profound changes in our politics, our education, and in most phases of American life. Here is prospective spectacle of the elders who do not work and produce voting the money of the younger folk who do work and produce for their own support and use. But of these problems we shall see more later.

It is now important to look at the size of the picture and to note more in detail the trends of the future. Thus, the prediction of the population experts is that by 1980 the people in the groups from 45 to 65 and over will equal all those from 20 to 44 and will be nearly 50 percent greater than all those under 20 years of age. For the present, basing estimates on the 1930 census, it is important to repeat again the fact that there has been a steady decline in the proportion of persons under 20 years and a corresponding proportion of those over 45 years of age. More specifically, the group over 65 years of age has increased tenfold since 1850, while the increase of the whole population has been only fivefold. The principal facts are summarized in *Recent Social Trends* somewhat as follows:

'As the nation has become older, the median age of the population has risen from 16.7 years in 1820 to 26.4 years in 1930. This has come about because the number of persons in the older groups has increased faster than the total population and the number in the younger groups has increased more slowly. The 20-44 group has increased at about the same rate as the total, so the relative importance of this group is much the same now as formerly.

'This aging of the population is not a new process but one that has gone on for more than a century. What is new is the greater speed in recent years and the extent of the changes which have resulted, particularly in certain parts of the population. To illustrate, the first decrease in the number of persons in an important age group occurred during the decade 1920-1930. According to the census enumeration, there were 11,573,230 children under 5

years of age in 1920 but only 11,444,390 in 1930. The decline of 128,840 almost equals the number of children under 5 in Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle, or in the entire state of Connecticut. Furthermore, at no census prior to 1930 was the population in any five-year age group smaller than that in an older five-year group. But in 1930 there were slightly fewer children in the group under five years of age than in the five to nine year group, even after allowing for the under-enumeration that usually occurs in the former group.

'While the population under 5 decreased from 1920 to 1930, the increase in the number of elders was larger than for many decades. Persons 45-64 increased over one-fourth and those 65-74 over one-third. It might almost be said that the older the group, the more rapid the gain in population.'[1]

If we wish to present the picture of the older groups more specifically, we may look at the numerical drama of a little more than 21,000,000 people who are over 50 years of age. That is, in order to give the picture the traditional setting of older people as being all those over 50, we may omit the other five-year group from 45 to 50. This group of older people is almost identically the same size as that of youth, the group already described as being most dynamic in the search for security and reality.

Now if we wish to see this group in still smaller segments, we note that there are about 14,250,000 who are between the ages of 50 and 65 years, a little more than 2,750,000 who are from 65 to 70 and nearly 4,000,000 who are over 70 years. Of all these old people, nearly a third are in the Northeast and a little more than 6,250,000 are in the great Middle States. Yet the number of those over 70 years is larger, and the ratio considerably larger in the Middle States than in the Northeast. The Southeast has a little more than 3,500,000, the Southwest a little less than 3,250,000, the Northwest a few more than 1,250,000, and the Far West nearly 1,750,000. Five states have more than 1,000,000 people over 50 years of age, with New York leading with nearly 2,250,000, Pennsylvania with about 1,650,000, Illinois with about 1,150,000, Ohio with just about 1,250,000, and California with 1,160,000. All told, 10 states have a little more than half of the total, these states tending to be the highly populated urban areas and ones in which old age security and pensions will be playing an important part. Re-

gional variations will play important ratios as in the case of California where the ratio of children is small and that of the elders large, or in the Southeast where the people must support a very large ratio of younger folk and an increasingly larger ratio of older people and where the middle group of earning capacity is relatively smaller due to migration to other regions to work.

It is, of course, difficult to indicate the most important problems involved in this increasing ratio of older people. First of all, we must, of course, go back and look at the work situation and the trends in industrial and economic life. This means we must try to see what the balancing forces which are at work may accomplish. For instance, if it is decided that two ways of providing employment for all at high pay will be, on the one hand, to hold youth back in school for a longer period and, on the other, to let the older people out earlier, then that will frankly require a policy of Federal and state support of both extremes of the population, each segment of each extreme tending to become larger and larger. This would mean also a double load on the middle groups for the support of two kinds of education and recreation, namely, an increased output for children and youth in school and college and for adult education and leisure-time activities for the older groups. A corollary problem, therefore, would be the possibility that more and more older people with fewer and fewer children in their families would tend to be less and less interested in the elementary and high schools and more and more interested in old-age security and in provisions for their own maintenance. This might mean also, of course, a more conservative nation as the voice of the elders assumes a larger ratio to the whole.

This problem of the older people, therefore, assumes major proportions in the nation's public policy and fiscal organizations for two reasons. One is the bare fact of millions of older people in the present trend who will require old-age payments as guarantees of security and happiness; the other is the increasing power of their votes in the election of the people who represent them in legislative halls. There is a third major problem in so far as old age and aged people provide the framework for utopias and for idealistic ameliorative programs set up by the intellectuals, on the

one hand, and by the fanatics and publicity seekers, on the other. All three are problems of the first magnitude.

First, the problem of old-age security is already one of extraordinary magnitude. Even on the present scale as provided by the existing security legislation, the total amount of moneys will run into almost astronomical amounts. Yet the great masses of farmers and home workers and government employees and hosts of others are not now provided for, and it is not likely that they will forever be left outside the arm of governmental assistance. The present Social Security Act, passed by the federal government and now in process of being amended, presents the most comprehensive attack on the problem of old-age security yet undertaken in the United States. Through the Social Security Board there will be administered, in addition to those for the aged, provisions for unemployment compensation, for the needy, the blind, and to children, for maternal and child health services, and others. The provisions for old age were such that 1,500,000 old people were receiving assistance by 1938. And on the basis of the present plan, the reserves for the fund would by 1980, when provisions should be fully matured, amount to $47,000,000,000 invested in government obligations, and this fund, it was often claimed, must come from the earnings of the younger groups. Not eligible for old-age benefits under the act are agricultural workers, domestic workers in private homes, casual laborers, employees of the United States government, employees of any state or political subdivision of any state, employees of non-profit organizations and of carrier systems.

In the case of the aged two sets of provisions are provided as summarized by Louis M. Hacker: 'The first called for the payment of pensions to the aged by the states, with the federal government making matching grants-in-aid to those states which accepted the conditions laid down in the act. These included the following: programs were to be statewide in their effects; the minimum age limit for pensions was to be 70 years up to 1940 and 65 years thereafter; the period of residence to be required was not to be in excess of five years; and the federal government's maximum contribution to the states for each person aided was to be $15 a month, provided the states made matching grants. The second plan called for the building up of an old-age benefit fund

(which, in time, would replace the pensions), out of which aged persons would receive annuities based upon their wage experiences. The fund was to be created out of contributions made by both employers and employees; and these contributions, like the unemployment benefit contributions, were to be paid into the general fund of the federal Treasury. All working persons (except for the same excluded occupations listed above) receiving $3000 or under, or on the first $3000 of their wages or salaries, were to have annuities provided for them after 65 years of age. The employer contribution (in the form of an excise tax) and the employee contribution (a form of income tax, and deducted from pay rolls) were to be equal. Both were to begin at the rate of 1 percent each in 1937, 1938, and 1939, and increase gradually to 3 percent after 1948. Old-age benefits, from the fund thus built up, were to be paid on a monthly basis, beginning in 1942.'[2]

Concerning the success of the plan on its third anniversary the Chairman of the Social Security Board, Arthur J. Altmeyer, expressed the belief that "no legislation in our time has so taken hold of America." He pointed out, for newspaper release on August 14, 1938, that 'Whereas in August 1935, the month the act was passed, some 314,000 needy old people were cared for under State and local old-age assistance provisions, in August 1938 more than 1,700,000 are receiving regular cash allowances from combined Federal, State, and local funds under the act.

'Though this represents more than a 400-percent increase, it does not mean that the number of old people who are in need has increased since 1935. What has happened is, rather, that we have at last set up an organized Nationwide plan for meeting this immediate and urgent problem. A recent estimate indicates that only about one out of every three persons now 65 or over in this country is, on the whole, self-supporting—leaving some 5,000,000 who are dependent on their families, friends, or organized private or public assistance. Because we now have a system of old-age insurance, those who are not yet old will not have to face this 2-to-1 chance of future dependency. Meantime, old-age assistance—in which all the States but one are already cooperating—will continue to care for those who are now old and in need or who may become so.'[3]

Concerning the difficulties of the problem, the Chairman calls

attention to the fact that America must start "from scratch" and that America is different from other countries. Thus, he continues, 'Because the American concept of social insurance differs from that held in Europe, we cannot lean too heavily upon European precedents. For one thing, we gear benefits much more closely to the worker's individual earnings; for another, even allowing for the lower wage levels in most European countries, we have a much higher standard of what constitutes adequate benefits. Our determination to preserve these American principles, in developing an American system of social insurance, has compelled us to pioneer along new paths. The prospect of pioneering should not scare any good American. But neither should it lead him to assume that the entire job can be done on paper. The Social Security Act mapped out a practical plan, which is more than our pioneer forefathers always had to start on. In 3 years we have made astounding headway, but it is unrealistic to complain because the end of the road is not yet in sight.

'As to where this road will lead, that is in the hands of those who have charted the path so far—the American people and their representatives in Congress, who framed and passed the Social Security Act. Certain new lines of development are, however, beginning to emerge, particularly in the field of old-age insurance. These lie in the direction of extending coverage to agricultural labor, domestic service, and other occupations not yet included. Other possibilities to which the President has recently called attention are increasing the size of benefits for those retiring in the early years, and extending benefits to aged wives and widows of covered workers and to the young children of those who die before the age of 65. Finally, the question of health protection is beginning to appear on the horizon; we may one day set up safeguards against the hazard of illness, paralleling our present lines of defense against the hazards of want during unemployment and of a destitute old age. The Social Security Board is charged by the law with the duty of making studies and recommendations for legislation to improve and extend the scope of social legislation. Regarding this as one of its most important responsibilities, the Board is studying these questions, as well as others relative to immediate problems of administration.'[4]

Now the composite effort of the United States Government to

## AGE DISTRIBUTION OF OLD AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940

| Area | Total Population | Over 50 | Percent Over 50 | 50–64 | 65–69 | 70 and Over |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 131,669,275 | 26,848,365 | 20.4 | 17,829,051 | 3,806,657 | 5,212,657 |
| *Northeast* | 40,629,591 | 8,762,224 | 21.6 | 5,881,968 | 1,217,405 | 1,662,851 |
| Maine | 847,226 | 203,244 | 24 0 | 122,919 | 31,119 | 49,206 |
| New Hampshire | 491,524 | 124,162 | 25 3 | 75,442 | 18,656 | 30,064 |
| Vermont | 359,231 | 87,278 | 24 3 | 52,786 | 13,149 | 21,343 |
| Massachusetts | 4,316,721 | 1,036,104 | 24.0 | 667,130 | 152,480 | 216,494 |
| Rhode Island | 713,346 | 160,289 | 22 5 | 106,005 | 23,147 | 31,137 |
| Connecticut | 1,709,242 | 384,401 | 22.5 | 255,847 | 54,530 | 74,024 |
| New York | 13,479,142 | 2,945,957 | 21.8 | 2,023,601 | 395,772 | 526,584 |
| New Jersey | 4,160,165 | 895,037 | 21.5 | 616,216 | 119,172 | 159,649 |
| Pennsylvania | 9,900,180 | 2,062,275 | 20.8 | 1,384,807 | 285,720 | 391,748 |
| Delaware | 266,505 | 58,337 | 21.9 | 37,771 | 8,295 | 12,271 |
| Maryland | 1,821,244 | 366,447 | 20 1 | 242,931 | 52,494 | 71,022 |
| District of Columbia | 663,091 | 131,751 | 19.9 | 90,545 | 18,309 | 22,897 |
| West Virginia | 1,901,974 | 306,942 | 16.1 | 205,968 | 44,562 | 56,412 |
| *Southeast* | 28,261,829 | 4,533,003 | 16.0 | 3,011,322 | 698,354 | 823,327 |
| Virginia | 2,677,773 | 462,110 | 17 2 | 307,166 | 68,772 | 86,172 |
| North Carolina | 3,571,623 | 494,219 | 13.8 | 337,679 | 73,637 | 82,903 |
| South Carolina | 1,899,804 | 255,251 | 13 4 | 173,937 | 40,419 | 40,895 |
| Georgia | 3,123,723 | 479,696 | 15 3 | 320,982 | 75,095 | 83,619 |
| Florida | 1,897,414 | 368,809 | 19.4 | 237,592 | 58,429 | 72,788 |
| Kentucky | 2,845,627 | 521,232 | 18.3 | 331,948 | 80,951 | 108,333 |
| Tennessee | 2,915,841 | 502,965 | 17 2 | 331,187 | 79,145 | 92,633 |
| Alabama | 2,832,961 | 422,949 | 14 9 | 286,740 | 62,041 | 74,168 |
| Mississippi | 2,183,796 | 332,641 | 15 2 | 217,223 | 54,766 | 60,652 |
| Arkansas | 1,949,387 | 327,174 | 16 8 | 219,914 | 48,937 | 58,323 |
| Louisiana | 2,363,880 | 365,957 | 15 5 | 246,954 | 56,162 | 62,841 |
| *Southwest* | 9,782,337 | 1,636,408 | 16.7 | 1,096,786 | 240,688 | 298,934 |
| Oklahoma | 2,336,434 | 416,958 | 17 8 | 272,024 | 63,713 | 81,221 |
| Texas | 6,414,824 | 1,066,296 | 16.6 | 718,801 | 156,314 | 191,181 |
| New Mexico | 531,818 | 73,874 | 13 9 | 50,590 | 10,041 | 13,243 |
| Arizona | 499,261 | 79,280 | 15.9 | 55,371 | 10,620 | 13,289 |
| *Middle States* | 35,741,574 | 7,944,924 | 22.2 | 5,210,030 | 1,102,040 | 1,632,854 |
| Ohio | 6,907,612 | 1,570,335 | 22.7 | 1,030,606 | 221,229 | 318,500 |
| Indiana | 3,427,796 | 794,324 | 23 2 | 506,288 | 114,898 | 173,138 |
| Illinois | 7,897,241 | 1,747,395 | 22 1 | 1,179,432 | 235,125 | 332,838 |
| Michigan | 5,256,106 | 1,040,799 | 19 8 | 709,945 | 135,556 | 195,298 |
| Wisconsin | 3,137,587 | 692,902 | 22.1 | 450,720 | 95,081 | 147,101 |
| Minnesota | 2,792,300 | 608,627 | 21 8 | 396,009 | 82,635 | 129,983 |
| Iowa | 5,538,268 | 602,797 | 10 9 | 375,030 | 87,319 | 140,448 |
| Missouri | 3,784,664 | 887,745 | 23.4 | 562,000 | 130,197 | 195,548 |
| *Northwest* | 7,410,435 | 1,579,989 | 21.3 | 1,036,223 | 218,961 | 324,805 |
| North Dakota | 641,935 | 121,312 | 18.9 | 81,922 | 16,510 | 22,880 |
| South Dakota | 642,961 | 132,498 | 20 6 | 88,058 | 17,668 | 26,772 |
| Nebraska | 1,315,834 | 297,503 | 22 6 | 191,871 | 41,252 | 64,380 |
| Kansas | 1,801,028 | 425,557 | 23.6 | 268,421 | 62,414 | 94,722 |
| Montana | 559,456 | 122,391 | 21 9 | 86,134 | 15,356 | 20,901 |
| Idaho | 524,873 | 99,833 | 19.0 | 68,133 | 13,183 | 18,517 |
| Wyoming | 250,742 | 44,922 | 17.9 | 32,364 | 5,485 | 7,073 |
| Colorado | 1,123,296 | 244,376 | 21.7 | 157,938 | 34,927 | 51,511 |
| Utah | 550,310 | 91,597 | 16.6 | 61,382 | 12,166 | 18,049 |
| *Far West* | 9,843,509 | 2,391,817 | 24.3 | 1,592,722 | 329,209 | 469,886 |
| Nevada | 110,247 | 23,581 | 21.4 | 16,781 | 3,085 | 3,715 |
| Washington | 1,736,191 | 431,502 | 24.8 | 287,182 | 57,963 | 86,357 |
| Oregon | 1,089,684 | 272,120 | 25.0 | 179,392 | 37,085 | 55,643 |
| California | 6,907,387 | 1,664,614 | 24.1 | 1,109,367 | 231,076 | 324,171 |

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 24, pp. 24–25.

work out these problems of old age may be said to represent the cumulative experience of the nation, to include something of its study of European systems, to meet the growing demands of the older voters, and to avoid, if possible, many utopian and fantastic plans for old-age security. With reference to the experience of the United States it must be said that private philanthropy and individual efforts have not been adequate. Personal savings and the old-time care of the aged by their children can no longer be counted upon because of the insecurity of both in a modern world of unemployment and change.

Concerning other means provided by society, we need to ask and answer a number of questions. For instance, does anybody now believe public poorhouses are either adequate or proper for the indigent or ailing aged people of this country?

Does local public outdoor relief offer adequate and suitable care for the aged and infirm?

Can organized charity do the job for the old people any more than it can for the relief of the poor and the sick and the unemployed?

Is it likely that there can be enough endowments found to set up adequate benevolent homes for the aged?

Has the system of industrial pensions proved strong enough, either to succeed in large industries or to apply to the millions in small industries?

Are the trade unions providing or proposing now to provide pensions for their aged members?

Can the fraternal organizations meet the needs even of their own members?

Are the churches able to support pension funds for their aged?

Can the states and local governments provide pension funds for their civil service employees and, if so, how will this appeal to those not on the state rolls?

Can the teachers' retirement funds take care of a large number of older people?

How many can military pensions take care of?

These are questions that have been asked many times over, and they have been partially answered by experience. They can be further answered by a study of each of the main avenues of relief suggested in each question. In general, of course, the ap-

proximation to the best plan will be to utilize the best parts of all the acceptable programs to the end that public and private cooperation may assume workable proportions. In reality, it is necessary to utilize all methods, but with the trend decidedly toward larger and larger governmental participation in this field as in all aspects of relief and amelioration.

The very real dilemma of the American people in this area may be seen vividly and dramatically from an examination of recent political movements and the extraordinary hold they have taken upon the people. There is drama, and there is pathos here, but for all practical purposes, there is reality, too. There was, for instance, Upton Sinclair's EPIC to end poverty in California which swept the state off its feet. Mothers out in the towns, old people in the cities, citizens in the village—all were excited and earnestly asking why they should not join this movement to make things right in California. It was a recrudescence of the earlier New York utopian technocracy, which, too, was to remake society.

Then came the Townsend movement. Catching the imagination of the people, it became in the twinkling of an eye a national movement of great sweep and power. Two hundred dollars a month to be expended within the month and to make way for millions of jobs when the older people retired. This was indeed a plausible plan and one yet powerful in its motivation. Then there were Huey Long and Father Coughlin, and multiple variations, many very indefinite in plan, but appalling in imagery.

And, in 1938—California again with Sheridan Downey's "Thirty Dollars Every Thursday" sweeping him into the national Senate over the veteran William McAdoo and with $1500 a day pouring into the California headquarters. Instead of the "End Poverty in California" slogan, there is a more concrete one embodied in a persuasive natural colored booklet entitled "Ham and Eggs for Californians." If this seems fantastic to the realist who has not been in close touch, ask such practical men as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Is not Massachusetts one of the states with a very large old-age population and are not 800,000 votes of great importance? And doesn't Texas have nearly a million old folks or those coming into such heritage and, therefore, wasn't the music-minded "pass-the-biscuit" W. Lee O'Daniel from Ohio and points north a very wise man to promise $35 a month

to all over 60 years of age, money to be raised somehow by the Grace of God? So Arkansas and Tennessee and North Dakota and Washington State, Colorado, and Alabama and others. "Life Begins at Fifty," catching up the refrains, "Yes, but life will be hard before fifty" and various alternative satires—thirty-Thursday, fifty-Friday, sixty-Saturday, million-Monday.

Yet not all of this, nor any of it, must be allowed to obscure the realities of a great human and social problem, problem of the ages, of primitive and modern folk, suddenly grown into new proportions and complexities; problems really for youth to solve. For the glory of citizenship in its promise of life must not be allowed to sink into poverty and failure, and the old wisdom of honoring the elders unto the third and fourth generation is still powerful among the folkways that rule.

Here as elsewhere in the American picture there are many other questions to be asked and answered. How is it possible so to plan and legislate and educate that false movements will not endanger substantial programs?

How provide that in an age with the increasing numbers and wisdom of the aged they can be best utilized with the optimum effect and cost? This is a fundamental societal problem of long standing.

These and other questions may be studied more in detail from the exhibits in this chapter and in Book II, where opportunity is suggested for further reading and checking of the abundance of information about our American social problems.

## *Chapter XIII*

# *CHILDREN*

IN THE long road of human history there appears to be no area of man's life and culture in which universal progress seems so nearly recorded as in the field of child welfare. Yet, strangely enough, both in the past and the present, this great segment of the population has been the battleground of many bitter conflicts and of much that has been catalogued as social amelioration and reform. Strangely enough, too, the child has been the symbol of the race's most noble ideologies and the reality of almost universal exploitation. "The world is served only by the breath of the school children"—so runs the old adage of wisdom. Yet child labor and truant officers have constituted a strange accompaniment to so high an ideal. "Of such is the kingdom"—so runs another great saying; yet for generations and generations the suffering and death of little children might be said to be the most appealing of all claims for philanthropy—the appeal motivated by the ideal contrasted with the tragedies of children everywhere.

In this history of the child one may study epochs in society as well as examine the quality of various cultures. For instance, the child placed by the parent in the arms of the burning Moloch as a sacrifice to propitiate the gods seems today so unreal as to constitute mythological heritage. The ceremony of *tollere,* in which the Roman father lifted up the newborn child to decide whether he would accept it or place it out somewhere to perish, reads more like the fable of Romulus and Remus to the modern youth than historical fact. Yet these are representative of extremes, which have obtained in various ages and in various degrees and in milder forms, in the complete power of life and death held by the parent over children. It is only in comparatively recent years that the rights of the child have been recognized in practical ways. Even within the last generation, and in some places at the present time, there is still a tendency of parents to believe that the children are their property and may be utilized as assets in child labor.

So much has this been true that social responsibility of parents and of the community at large for the welfare of children may be looked upon as an index of the modern social movement. We have continued, therefore, to ask many questions and to seek the answers about the role of the child in civilization. What are the fundamentals involved in the modern program of child welfare? What are the "minimum essentials"? What are the methods and disciplines involved in bringing to pass the ideals of child welfare? What are the agencies and means whereby society may conserve this basic asset of its human resources?

Yet, strangely enough again, the problems of the child, in spite of all this progress, continue to multiply and the problems are not only of the same sort as originally, but there are new and different problems arising from the changed society about us. There are problems of standard child welfare services, and we must understand them. But there are also problems of population policy with reference to the number and kind of children that are born or that are adjudged desirable for the future society. And furthermore this problem of numbers has become one of great reality already, such that in many parts of the world there is the very genuine problem of replenishing the world with people. Not only, however, is this problem restricted to those portions of the world where the birth rate is not adequate for replacement, but, due to the trend everywhere, the questions of birth rate and birth control now constitute standard problems in all countries. So, too, the questions of the quality of the children to be born and which groups are likely to constitute the largest ratios are assuming an increasingly larger place in the whole field of social problems.

Now, if much of the most recent drama and dynamics in the American picture has been reflected in the two great groups studied in the previous chapters, namely, youth and the aged, we must not forget to see these great segments of the population in their setting as they appear over against those other two great segments of the poeple, the children from whom youth is emerging and the middle years into which youth will soon graduate. We have already studied that great middle portion and backbone of the population—those who work in the heat of the day and

## EFFECTIVE FERTILITY AND NET REPRODUCTION TREND OF NATIVE WHITES BY GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS AND BY STATES. DATA OF 1920 AND 1930

Adapted from Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population*

| State and Region | Children under 5 with native white mothers per 1,000 native white women aged 20–44 years | | | Index of net reproduction per generation (1.00 = trend toward stationary population) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Data of 1920(*) (a) | Data of 1930(†) (b) | Value for 1930 as *Percent* of Value for 1920 $\left(\frac{b^*}{a}\right)$ | Data of 1920(**) (Permanent Replacement Ratio 472) (c) | Data of 1930(‡) (Permanent Replacement Ratio 443) (d) | Value for 1930 as *Percent* of Value for 1920 $\left(\frac{d^*}{c}\right)$ |
| *Southeast* | | | | | | |
| Virginia | 688 | 594 | 86 | 1.46 | 1.34 | 92 |
| North Carolina | 827 | 694 | 84 | 1.75 | 1.57 | 90 |
| South Carolina | 777 | 648 | 83 | 1.65 | 1.46 | 89 |
| Georgia | 731 | 598 | 82 | 1.55 | 1.35 | 87 |
| Florida | 627 | 520 | 83 | 1.33 | 1.17 | 88 |
| Kentucky | 722 | 674 | 94 | 1.53 | 1.52 | 100 |
| Tennessee | 706 | 615 | 87 | 1.50 | 1.39 | 93 |
| Alabama | 786 | 682 | 87 | 1.67 | 1.54 | 92 |
| Mississippi | 740 | 659 | 89 | 1.57 | 1.49 | 95 |
| Arkansas | 798 | 672 | 84 | 1.69 | 1.52 | 90 |
| Louisiana | 659 | 583 | 89 | 1.40 | 1.32 | 94 |
| *Southwest* | | | | | | |
| Oklahoma | 722 | 599 | 83 | 1.53 | 1.35 | 88 |
| Texas | 630 | 514 | 82 | 1.33 | 1.16 | 87 |
| New Mexico | 757 | 688 | 91 | 1.60 | 1.55 | 97 |
| Arizona | 580 | 472 | 81 | 1.23 | 1.07 | 87 |
| *Northeast* | | | | | | |
| Maine | 515 | 539 | 105 | 1.09 | 1.22 | 112 |
| New Hampshire | 435 | 463 | 106 | .92 | 1.04 | 113 |
| Vermont | 525 | 539 | 103 | 1.11 | 1.22 | 109 |
| Massachusetts | 359 | 374 | 105 | .76 | .84 | 112 |
| Rhode Island | 363 | 393 | 108 | .77 | .89 | 115 |
| Connecticut | 371 | 374 | 101 | .79 | .84 | 107 |
| New York | 362 | 351 | 97 | .77 | .79 | 104 |
| New Jersey | 402 | 372 | 93 | .85 | .84 | 99 |
| Delaware | 491 | 421 | 86 | 1.04 | .95 | 91 |
| Pennsylvania | 512 | 478 | 93 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 100 |
| Maryland | 507 | 453 | 89 | 1.07 | 1.02 | 95 |
| West Virginia | 788 | 712 | 90 | 1.67 | 1.61 | 96 |
| Dist. of Columbia | 240 | 262 | 109 | .51 | .59 | 116 |
| *Middle States* | | | | | | |
| Ohio | 482 | 446 | 93 | 1.02 | 1.01 | 99 |
| Indiana | 519 | 483 | 93 | 1.10 | 1.09 | 99 |
| Illinois | 450 | 395 | 88 | .95 | .89 | 94 |
| Michigan | 524 | 505 | 96 | 1.11 | 1.14 | 103 |
| Wisconsin | 548 | 502 | 92 | 1.16 | 1.13 | 97 |
| Minnesota | 538 | 477 | 89 | 1.14 | 1.08 | 95 |
| Iowa | 546 | 491 | 90 | 1.16 | 1.11 | 96 |
| Missouri | 510 | 445 | 87 | 1.08 | 1.00 | 93 |
| *Northwest* | | | | | | |
| North Dakota | 722 | 634 | 88 | 1.53 | 1.43 | 94 |
| South Dakota | 670 | 573 | 86 | 1.42 | 1.29 | 91 |
| Nebraska | 578 | 506 | 88 | 1.22 | 1.14 | 93 |
| Kansas | 574 | 498 | 87 | 1.22 | 1.12 | 92 |
| Montana | 620 | 514 | 83 | 1.31 | 1.16 | 88 |
| Idaho | 729 | 619 | 85 | 1.54 | 1.40 | 90 |
| Wyoming | 593 | 534 | 90 | 1.26 | 1.21 | 96 |
| Colorado | 516 | 465 | 90 | 1.09 | 1.05 | 96 |
| Utah | 788 | 677 | 86 | 1.67 | 1.53 | 92 |
| *Far West* | | | | | | |
| Nevada | 477 | 423 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 90 |
| Washington | 462 | 388 | 84 | .98 | 88 | 89 |
| Oregon | 463 | 383 | 83 | .98 | .86 | 88 |
| California | 341 | 305 | 89 | 72 | 69 | 95 |
| United States | 538 | 479 | 89 | 1.14 | 1.08 | 95 |

* Ratios by Thompson, *Ratio of Children to Women*, 1920, pp. 200-201.

† Based on Census data.

** Permanent replacement quota based on *United States Abridged Life Tables*, 1919-1920. (See Prefatory Note, Appendix 2, above.)

‡ Permanent replacement quota based on life tables prepared by the Statistical Bureau of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. (See Prefatory Note, Appendix 2, above.)

See *The Problems of a Changing Population*, published in May, 1938, by the National Resources Committee, for a comprehensive treatise on the changing population and for the implications of the above full-page regional picture. It is evident that the Southeast and the Southwest will be providing the replacement population of the nation for some time to come. There are, therefore, a number of concurrent problems, such as the need for federal equalization funds for education and health, which must be studied very carefully.

*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

The people: These, too, are American youth alongside Fifth Avenue and children in the new schoolhouses—North, East, West, South.



*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

The people: New generations and old, meeting new problems in new ways. What is the answer?

carry the load of wealth making and of serving the rest of the people. These are those from 25 to 45 years of age.

In the previous chapter in which we studied some of the facts and problems which pertain to that large part of the population called youth, we asked and answered the question, "Who are the youth of the land?" classifying all those between the ages of 16 and 24 years as youth and leaving all those under 16 years to be classified as children. We pointed out the fact, however, that the borderline in the matter of both age and problems implied considerable overlapping and that many writers extend the years of childhood to 20. Especially those authorities who estimate the number of "children" to be educated tend to make their appraisals on the basis of all under 20 years of age.

It is important, however, to make our classifications a little more specific. The age of 16 as the top limit of the classification of children is itself indicative of a number of technical situations and problems. Sixteen years, for instance, represents the standard age at which child labor legislation recognizes children as workers, and it represents a norm for the completion of the secondary school program, from which point up to 24 years will be found a great gap between school and employment. This age, too, is a sort of mode which represents the transition from later childhood to adolescence. Primarily, however, children constitute a distinctive block of the population, index both of the number and kind of people and symbolic of the future.

In the United States, although the actual number and ratio of children to the whole population is large, there has been a gradual but certain reduction of the proportion of children to the total population. Thus from about 40 percent in 1850 the ratio has diminished to less than 30 percent in 1930, with the prediction that it will approach the 20 percent mark by 1980, when the population will apparently become stationary. More specifically, by age groups children under 5 years of age constituted a little more than 15 per cent of the population in 1920 and a little more than 9 percent in 1930; those from 5 to 9 years of age decreased from 14 percent to a little more than 10 percent, and those from 10 to 14 years decreased from 12.5 percent to a little under 10 percent. Not only, however, did the ratio of children decrease, but the actual number of children under 5 years decreased from 1920 to

1930 from 11,573,230 to 11,444,390. Previous to 1930, the children under 5 years were always the largest of the five-year groups, but in 1930 the group just above it, that is from 5 to 9 years, was a million larger. This was true, of course, in the face of a constantly reduced death rate of children. This decreasing ratio of children was more in evidence in the cities than in the rural areas, and it has been pointed out that the total number of children in the three great metropolitan centers of the Far West just about equals the total decline of children from 1920 to 1930. The trend, therefore, must be contemplated in the future alongside the trend toward urbanization.

There are great variations between and among the different regions of the nation. The 36,000,000 children under 14 years of age in the nation constitute a little less than 30 percent of the total population. Yet in the Southeast the children constitute about 35 percent, and in the Far West only 23 percent. The variation is even greater as between the Carolinas with about 38 percent children and California with less than 23 percent. The implications here are manifold in the obligation of the states and regions to educate their children, to protect them in health, and to give them work when they grow up. For the several regions the percentage of children of the whole population is as follows in the order of highest to lowest: the Southeast, 34.9; the Southwest, 32.9; the Northwest, 30.7; the Northeast and the Middle States, each 27.6; and the Far West 23.4. Here the three rural areas, Southeast, Southwest, and Northwest, are consistent as are the two great urban and industrial regions of the Northeast and Middle States.

Concerning the further implications of the differentials with reference to the number of children the Educational Policies Commission believes 'it is important to note that families of inferior economic status have the higher fertility rates.

'In the towns and cities the lower occupational groups, especially those in straitened circumstances and on relief, have on the average more children than neighboring groups with superior economic, social, and cultural advantages. At the same time there is hardly a single urban group in which the majority of the young people enjoy the advantages of high-school education, and in which many continue their education thru college, that is now replacing

## AGE DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940

| Area | Total Population | Children 14 and Under | Percent Children | Under 5 | 5–9 | 10–14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 131,669,275 | 32,972,081 | 25.0 | 10,541,524 | 10,684,622 | 11,745,935 |
| *Northeast* | 40,629,591 | 9,144,212 | 22 5 | 2,783,413 | 2,941,049 | 3,419,750 |
| Maine | 847,226 | 221,307 | 26.1 | 69,994 | 73,854 | 77,459 |
| New Hampshire | 491,524 | 114,897 | 23.4 | 35,805 | 37,496 | 41,596 |
| Vermont | 359,231 | 92,529 | 25.7 | 29,953 | 30,232 | 32,344 |
| Massachusetts | 4,316,721 | 940,426 | 21.8 | 281,697 | 304,742 | 353,987 |
| Rhode Island | 713,346 | 157,800 | 22.1 | 46,617 | 50,559 | 60,624 |
| Connecticut | 1,709,242 | 362,707 | 21 2 | 108,661 | 115,785 | 138,261 |
| New York | 13,479,142 | 2,777,296 | 20 6 | 835,784 | 895,102 | 1,046,410 |
| New Jersey | 4,160,165 | 874,762 | 21.0 | 256,264 | 280,722 | 337,776 |
| Pennsylvania | 9,900,180 | 2,395,586 | 24 2 | 726,065 | 762,813 | 906,708 |
| Delaware | 266,505 | 60,512 | 22.7 | 19,478 | 19,682 | 21,352 |
| Maryland | 1,821,244 | 433,847 | 23 8 | 136,665 | 140,830 | 156,352 |
| District of Columbia | 663,091 | 118,185 | 17.8 | 39,851 | 37,245 | 41,089 |
| West Virginia | 1,901,974 | 594,358 | 31 2 | 196,579 | 191,987 | 205,792 |
| *Southeast* | 28,261,829 | 8,656,747 | 30.6 | 2,819,387 | 2,359,140 | 2,978,220 |
| Virginia | 2,677,773 | 766,832 | 28 6 | 244,077 | 252,468 | 270,287 |
| North Carolina | 3,571,623 | 1,161,219 | 32.5 | 375,998 | 383,841 | 401,380 |
| South Carolina | 1,899,804 | 640,685 | 33 7 | 210,660 | 214,036 | 215,989 |
| Georgia | 3,123,723 | 957,187 | 30 6 | 313,122 | 319,056 | 325,009 |
| Florida | 1,897,414 | 475,529 | 25 1 | 151,478 | 152,968 | 171,083 |
| Kentucky | 2,845,627 | 864,049 | 30.4 | 285,192 | 284,999 | 293,858 |
| Tennessee | 2,915,841 | 856,003 | 29 3 | 278,112 | 283,807 | 294,084 |
| Alabama | 2,832,961 | 916,158 | 32 3 | 297,319 | 304,498 | 314,341 |
| Mississippi | 2,183,796 | 712,531 | 32 6 | 235,300 | 235,218 | 242,013 |
| Arkansas | 1,949,387 | 604,115 | 31 0 | 197,502 | 200,273 | 206,340 |
| Louisiana | 2,363,880 | 702,439 | 29.7 | 230,627 | 227,976 | 243,836 |
| *Southwest* | 9,782,337 | 2,816,976 | 28.8 | 912,140 | 931,874 | 972,962 |
| Oklahoma | 2,336,434 | 682,883 | 29 2 | 219,326 | 226,325 | 237,232 |
| Texas | 6,414,824 | 1,796,567 | 28 0 | 575,680 | 593,482 | 627,405 |
| New Mexico | 531,818 | 183,592 | 34 5 | 64,001 | 61,156 | 58,435 |
| Arizona | 499,261 | 153,934 | 30.8 | 53,133 | 50,911 | 49,890 |
| *Middle States* | 35,741,574 | 8,404,441 | 23 5 | 2,724,622 | 2,681,558 | 2,998,261 |
| Ohio | 6,907,612 | 1,578,860 | 22 8 | 507,316 | 495,366 | 576,178 |
| Indiana | 3,427,796 | 822,548 | 24.0 | 268,535 | 261,352 | 292,661 |
| Illinois | 7,897,241 | 1,708,001 | 21.6 | 546,962 | 542,759 | 618,280 |
| Michigan | 5,256,106 | 1,314,156 | 25.0 | 431,384 | 418,855 | 463,917 |
| Wisconsin | 3,137,587 | 782,232 | 24.9 | 253,780 | 253,205 | 275,247 |
| Minnesota | 2,792,300 | 689,151 | 24.7 | 230,057 | 220,176 | 238,918 |
| Iowa | 2,538,268 | 623,850 | 24 6 | 207,117 | 199,857 | 216,876 |
| Missouri | 3,784,664 | 885,643 | 23.4 | 279,471 | 289,988 | 316,184 |
| *Northwest* | 7,410,435 | 1,959,731 | 26.4 | 641,359 | 638,052 | 680,320 |
| North Dakota | 641,935 | 190,590 | 29.7 | 61,793 | 62,422 | 66,375 |
| South Dakota | 642,961 | 178,429 | 27.7 | 57,863 | 58,531 | 62,035 |
| Nebraska | 1,315,834 | 331,531 | 25.2 | 104,546 | 108,552 | 118,433 |
| Kansas | 1,801,028 | 439,465 | 24.4 | 138,310 | 143,415 | 157,740 |
| Montana | 559,456 | 141,895 | 25 4 | 48,581 | 45,213 | 48,101 |
| Idaho | 524,873 | 150,154 | 28 6 | 52,153 | 48,077 | 49,924 |
| Wyoming | 250,742 | 66,719 | 26 6 | 22,681 | 21,706 | 22,332 |
| Colorado | 1,123,296 | 287,983 | 25.6 | 96,660 | 93,705 | 97,618 |
| Utah | 550,310 | 172,965 | 31 4 | 58,772 | 56,431 | 57,762 |
| *Far West* | 9,843,509 | 1,989,974 | 20.2 | 660,603 | 632,949 | 696,422 |
| Nevada | 110,247 | 24,846 | 22.5 | 9,082 | 7,886 | 7,878 |
| Washington | 1,736,191 | 366,432 | 21.1 | 121,918 | 116,762 | 127,842 |
| Oregon | 1,089,684 | 231,305 | 21 2 | 76,109 | 73,209 | 81,987 |
| California | 6,907,387 | 1,366,678 | 19.8 | 453,494 | 435,092 | 478,715 |

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 24, pp. 24–25.

itself from one generation to another. The net reproductive loss in these urban groups ranges from 10 to 35 percent per generation.

'The groups in the United States which are at present reproducing at rates far above actual replacement needs are located in certain rural areas, and predominantly in communities that are at the lowest economic levels and most remote from those educational and cultural influences which are held typical of social progress. For the United States as a whole, fertility in the poorest areas is 77 percent in excess of that necessary to replace the population in those areas. This stands in contrast to a deficit of 17 percent in the areas with the highest level of living.

'To go a bit further in the contrast, some large rural groups are reproducing so rapidly and other large urban groups are so diminishing that the surviving children of a million women of childbearing age now living in the former groups will be twice as numerous as the surviving children of a million women in the latter groups. Such an extreme situation, if continued for three generations, would cause the descendants of the first group to be sixteen times as numerous as the descendants of the second group. Thus, each new generation of Americans is tending to be disproportionately recruited from areas with low standards of living and inferior educational resources.'[1]

Perhaps enough of this aspect of the problem of children has been presented to illustrate the nature of this set of problems. What are the further problems of health and nurture which, by the same tokens of economic status and regional wealth, also assume variable proportions? The White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, estimating deficiencies on the total basis of all under 20 years of age, figured that there were in the nation 6,000,000 children improperly nourished, 1,000,000 have damaged hearts and another similar number have defective speech, with 3,000,000 having impaired hearing. A half million are dependent, 200,000 delinquent, 300,000 are crippled, and another 1,000,000 are variously handicapped. Of the children 10 to 15 years of age only about 4 percent are employed now as compared to nearly 20 percent from 1890 to 1910, showing the results of child labor legislation and education. The facts of school enrollment have been interpreted by the Educational Policies Commission as correspoding to the general trends of population. Thus,

## THE CHILD IN SOCIETY: A SYMPOSIUM AND INVENTORY SYMBOLIC OF THE STUDY AND PLANNING OF AMERICAN PROBLEMS

A Twofold Contribution of the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection

### I. THIRTY-SEVEN VOLUMES, PUBLISHED BY D. APPLETON-CENTURY CO.

*White House Conference, 1930*
*Adolescent in the Family*
*Child Labor*
*Children's Reading*
*Education for Home and Family Life In Elementary and Secondary Schools*
*Education for Home and Family Life: In Colleges*
*Home and School Cooperation*
*The Home and the Child*
*Nursery Education*
*Parent Education · Types, Content and Method*
*Safety Education in Schools*
*The School Health Program*
*Social Hygiene in Schools*
*Special Education: The Handicapped and the Gifted*
*Summer Vacation Activities of the School Child*
*Vocational Guidance*
*Young Child in the Home*
*Body Mechanics: Education and Practice*
*Fetal Newborn and Maternal Morbidity and Mortality*
*Growth and Development of the Child: General Considerations*
*Growth and Development of the Child: Anatomy and Physiology*
*Growth and Development of the Child · Nutrition*
*Growth and Development of the Child: Appraisement of the Child*
*Health Protection for the Pre-school Child*
*Hospitals and Child Health*
*Nutrition Service in the Field and Child Health Centers: A Survey*
*Obstetric Education*
*Pediatrics: Education and Practice*
*Psychology and Psychiatry in Pediatrics · The Problem*
*Communicable Disease Control*
*Public Health Organization*
*Milk Production and Control*
*The Delinquent Child*
*The Handicapped Child*
*Organization for the Care of Handicapped Children. National, State, and Local*
*Dependent and Neglected Children*
*Administration of the School Health Program*

### II. THE CHILDREN'S CHARTER, 19 POINTS AS ABBREVIATED BELOW

For every child spiritual and moral training
For every child understanding and the guarding of his personality as his most precious right
For every child a home and that life and security which a home provides
For every child full preparation for his birth
For every child health protection from birth through adolescence
For every child from birth through adolescence, promotion of health
For every child a dwelling-place safe, sanitary, and wholesome
For every child a school which is safe from hazards, sanitary, properly equipped, lighted, and ventilated
For every child a community which recognizes and plans for his needs
For every child an education which, through the discovery and development of his individual abilities, prepares him for life
For every child such teaching and training as will prepare him for successful parenthood, home-making, and the rights of citizenship
For every child education for safety and protection against accidents to which modern conditions subject him
For every child who is handicapped, such measures as will early discover and diagnose his handicap, provide care and treatment, and so train him that he may become an asset to society rather than a liability
For every child who is in conflict with society the right to be dealt with intelligently
For every child the right to grow up in a family with an adequate standard of living and the security of a stable income as the surest safeguard against social handicaps
For every child protection against labor that stunts growth
For every rural child as satisfactory schooling and health services as for the city child
To supplement the home and the school every stimulation and encouragement should be given to the extension and development of the voluntary youth organization
A district, county, or community organization for health, education, and welfare

'from 1870 to 1922 both showed rapid gains. From 1922 to 1930 increases in enrolment were somewhat less pronounced, but there were still important increases at the upper-grade levels. Between 1930 and 1932, however, elementary-school enrolment decreased while the total population growth continued, altho with less rapidity. In this two-year period the total elementary-school enrolment declined by 143,173 children. By 1934 there were 370,383 fewer than in 1932, and by 1936 there were 372,476 fewer than in 1934. The decrease from 1930 to 1932 was 0.7 percent; from 1932 to 1934, 1.8 percent; from 1934 to 1936, 1.8 percent; and from 1930 to 1936, 4.2 percent.

'Up to 1934 the decreases occurred in the first five elementary grades while the sixth and each succeeding grade made annual gains. These decreases, however, will creep on up thru the grades as the years pass. It has been stated that in the year 1935 more pupils were graduated from the elementary schools than ever had been before or ever will be again. There was a smaller number of children to enter first grade from 1930 to 1935 than from 1920 to 1925. It is predicted that 5 percent fewer children between the ages of six and nine will be found in 1940 than there were in 1930. Thus, the accumulated effect of steady decreases in child population will be found in all grades soon. Indeed, by 1936 the *total* elementary and secondary enrolment showed a decrease of 67,000 below the 1935 peak.'[2]

The drama of the nation's children runs parallel with the nation's attempt to work out programs for the conservation and development of its children. The whole picture of the technical approach to the field of child welfare was admirably illustrated by President Hoover's White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. This had been the third of the decennial child welfare white house conferences, the first being called by Theodore Roosevelt in 1909-10, the second by Woodrow Wilson in 1919-20, and the third by President Hoover in 1929-30. The picture was characteristic of America in many ways. It revealed an unusual number and variety of specialists in the field with more than a thousand participating in the work: psychologists, pediatrists, physicians, social workers, sociologists, nurses, home economics specialists, psychiatrists, economists, anthropologists, school men and women, kindergarteners, and many others. Their problem and

their goal was one which looked to the building of a better nation through the guaranteeing of a better generation to come. The picture reflected an extraordinary range of subjects fully embodied in the formal *Children's Charter* and the more than twoscore volumes which grew out of the White House Conference.

Thus, the picture reflected a host of fields and ways and means, the technology of which was reflected not only in the scientific nature of the findings, but in the *Children's Charter* which demanded both ways and means. The findings, a library in themselves, constituted a new high in American child welfare. Here are samplings of the work: child labor, children's reading, education for home and family life, home and school cooperation, the home and the child, nursery education, parent education, safety education in schools, the school health program, social hygiene in schools, the handicapped and the gifted, vocational guidance, body mechanics, growth and development of the child, anatomy and physiology, nutrition, appraisement of the child, health protection for the preschool child, hospitals and child health, nutrition service in the field and child health centers, obstetric education, pediatrics, psychology and psychiatry in pediatrics, communicable disease control, the delinquent child, organization for the care of handicapped children, the handicapped child, fetal, newborn, and maternal morbidity and mortality.

The size of the child welfare picture indicated something of the organization and technical elements involved. The detailed picture could be had by examining a possible ten thousand pages from the *Children's Charter* all the way through to the comprehensive volume on milk production and control, a possible three million word total, picturing convincingly the technological nature of the work. The child's health and the vitality of future America were to be conserved and promoted. How? That was more "technology" and science and social science. By a hundred technical ways working out problems of milk, food, sanitation, disease, sickness, contagion, accident, strain. There must be practical ways and units in each, and these must be worked out on the basis of science and organization and general welfare. There were more than 3,000 health centers including pre-natal centers each of which was making available the discoveries and practices of science and social work. There were reported in 1928 more than 1,000 spe-

cialists in pediatrics. School hygiene had become a function of no less than 11 state departments of health; and of the department of education in at least 19 states. At least 44 states had developed mother's aid work. There were about 1,500 children's institutions and 350 child-placing agencies.

The development of case work, of increased provisions for the illegitimate child, the delinquent child, the rise of the juvenile court, were samples of the technical problems and procedures which must be faced in the adaptation of the child to the larger and complex society, products of invention, technology, and change. All states of the union except two were making some use of that new social invention known as the juvenile court. Probation and child guidance clinics had become well-nigh universal while in school and out new reaches had been attained in special classes and treatment of specially equipped children, whether defective or superior. Play and amusements, reading and vocational education were other fields in which technology was important. There were good school libraries. Perhaps 3,000,000 boys and girls had been affected by camps, while child study and parent education went hand in hand with a score of other educational activities, to show the size and nature of this amazing picture.

These various problems and viewpoints, of course, lead us back to the review of what mankind has done on behalf of the child and forward again to look into the future. In the past the child has been the symbol of conformity to the culture of his elders, on the one hand, and symbol of the miniature adult. In the United States, at least, the tendency has been to inquire more into what our culture can do for the child rather than how the child can be made to carry on the traditional culture of the past. This is a form of the problem of the democratic tenet of the right of each individual to develop. From this has come such measuring scales for "rights" as the *Children's Charter,* the points of which are enumerated on a separate page. That is, the child has the right to be well born, well nurtured, and well trained, and this right is held to be fundamental to the strengthening of the race.

The other point with reference to understanding the child as a "class" within the population has been well stated by Lawrence K. Frank, in his chapter on "Childhood and Youth" in *Recent Social Trends.* 'One of the most important discoveries of the past thirty

years,' he writes, 'is that the child is not a small-sized adult, but is a growing, developing, ever-changing individual, whose treatment must differ not merely in degree but in kind from that received by the adult. . . . The discovery of the child has been accompanied by a gradual acceptance of the principle of variability among children and a giving up of the belief that children are essentially alike and should be treated alike. The willingness to recognize individual differences in all aspects of the child is bringing far-reaching modifications in child nurture and a respect for the individual as a unique person. What this may mean to childhood and to adult life may be foreseen in the changes already initiated by the acceptance of this principle in medical care, mental hygiene, education and the special care of children.

'The realization of the influence of early childhood on later life marks another change in our beliefs about children which is exercising an ever-increasing influence. The more or less complacent attitude of parents toward the young child has been superseded by a concern for the child's early nurture, as shown by the demand for medical supervision of well babies, habit clinics, parent education and the increasing provision of facilities to detect and correct early deviations in health and conduct. This enhanced interest in early childhood has resulted in part from the discovery that many of the adults who are involved today in serious social difficulties were the neglected, dependent, poorly nurtured or otherwise maladjusted children of yesterday. This has been shown by case studies of the criminal, the insane and mentally disordered, the unhappy and unadjusted men and women, many of whom are revealed as the products of an unsatisfactory childhood or youth. As more knowledge has been gained about the power of nurture, the belief in the absolute determining power of heredity has been modified and the belief in the plasticity of human nature has been strengthened. Undoubtedly this faith in the possibility of moulding human nature and conduct is a powerful leaven in present-day child welfare work.

'We are witnessing the emergence of the child as a sensitive indicator of the quality of social life. His status is becoming a measure of the value of the whole complex of economic, political, and social activities as they affect his health, emotional development, education and maturation. This was the dominant theme of the

White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. In the perspective of the years this concept may well assume a position of outstanding significance, foretelling the major influence in twentieth century social development. As Ellen Key expressed it: ". . . 'holiness of generation.' This consciousness will make the central work of society the new race, its origin, management, and its education; about these all morals, all laws, all social arrangements will be grouped. This will form the point of view from which all other questions will be judged, all other regulations made."

'The efforts of the past thirty years to rescue childhood from the sins of omission and commission of homes and schools, employers, courts and the like have been carried on through public and private child welfare organizations. Through the years many separate programs of child welfare have been developed for different aspects of child care. They are now being recognized as different facets of a larger whole. How to integrate and coordinate the skills and techniques of these many specialists into a unified program may well become the dominant problem in this field.' [8]

We still have many questions to ask.

What will be the effect of so many ameliorative programs for children?

If children are taught only to play, how shall they suddenly become workers with skills, habits, and motivation to do the job?

If they are kept as children up to twenty years of age, how will they realize on the years of adult life, suddenly emerging as a new world?

Are the children of the intellectuals overeducated, oversensitized until the world loses its quality of zest, of wonder, and of ambition?

What is the best program for balance and equilibrium between and among the child and the various institutions and modern stimuli which beset him on every hand?

These and many other questions may be studied further through the living laboratory of experience, through reading, and through the examination of further evidence suggested in our quest for understanding, being the last unit in the present study.

## *Chapter XIV*

# *WOMEN*

IN FEW major areas of modern society have social inventions and social technology wrought greater social change than in that part which woman has attained in the world's work and the place which she has assumed in the total culture of the modern era. This is true in nearly all lands among nearly all people, such that the change has assumed the proportions of a cultural revolution. In so far as these changes affect the institutions and behavior of the people, they create new sets of adaptations basic to general social problems. In so far as they affect the family, the home, the community, industry, politics, they create new specific problems. More than this, however, it is important to study these problems separately on the basis of this new realism of the people, in which one-half of all the people tend to readjust themselves to both the other half which in turn finds difficult problems in the return adjustment of men and their ways to the new woman and her ways. However, this chapter is essentially a study of the people rather than of institutional problems, which will be studied in Part Four.

There is no more dramatic and realistic picture of America than that of its millions of women, their daughters and younger sisters and grandchildren and nieces, a little more than 60,000,000 strong. Of the created male and female total of nearly 123 million people in the nation in 1930, 60,595,760 are female. They are just short of being one-half of the population in the nation as a whole, the percentage being 49.4. There are, of course, state and regional variations, the Southeast, for instance, having a little more than half of its population women and the Northeast with approximately half. Seven of the 11 states of the Southeast are credited with over 50 percent of their population being female, while, in the Northeast, Vermont, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut are so reported. On the other hand, the "Wests" are all below the national average, the Far West having a little

under 48 percent of its population women, with Nevada having as low a percentage as 41.6 of its people women, not including, of course, temporary residents in Reno not reported as residents.

The regional picture shows the Northeast with nearly 19,000,000, the Middle States a little more than 16,500,000, the Southeast next with its extra pro rata of nearly 13,000,000, followed by the Southeast with about 4,500,000, the Far West with not quite 4,000,000, and the Northwest with 3,500,000. The detailed figures are shown on the full-page statistical picture on page 223.

The picture becomes more striking as we look at the ages of the female population, where again there is great variation in the several regions. Of the total number, about the same number are classified in the groups under 20 years and the group 20 to 45, each being about 23,500,000. The older group of women over 45 years numbered about 13,500,000. In terms of percentages the two first groups were 38.9 and 38.7 respectively, with the older group being 22.4 percent. The regional variations show most markedly in the youngest and the oldest groups respectively, with the middle group, those carrying the burden of the child-bearing age, being more uniform, with strangely enough, however, the Far West with the lowest number of children per 1,000 women of child-bearing age having also the highest percentage of women in that age bracket. This may be an interesting topic for investigation.

Here as in the case of the total population, the Southeast is highest in the percentage under 20 years with 45.4. The Southwest follows with 43.9 and the Far West again the lowest with 32.4 percent. The Southeast and the Southwest are again low in the ratio of females over 45 years of age, with 18 and 17.3 percent respectively, as is also the Northwest. On the other hand, the Far West has an unusually high percentage with 26.1 with California having a little over 27 percent, which is quite in contrast to the Southwest's 17 percent. Once again, the Far West leads with over 41 percent of its females in the great middle brackets from 20 to 45 years of age as compared with a little over 36 percent in the Northwest. The implications here are, of course, that the birth rate is much higher in the rural areas than in the urban and that an extraordinary ratio of women in their prime does not indicate any definite ratio of children born to that particular

group. On the other hand, there is a problem of the ratio of children to younger women under 20 years. For instance, South Carolina has the highest ratio of females under 20 and the lowest percentage over 45 years, the percentages being 49.7 and 15.6 respectively. Yet South Carolina has next to the largest ratio of its population classified as children.

Of the women in the United States 15 years of age and over, a little more than 26,000,000 are married; a little more than 5,250,000 are widowed or divorced; while 11,250,000 are listed as single or unknown. Of this last group, more than 50 percent are catalogued as gainfully occupied, while nearly 35 percent of the widowed and divorced and nearly 12 percent of the married are so catalogued.

We have already presented, in our discussion of the people who work, a kaleidoscopic picture of the increasing work of women outside the home. In round numbers, there are about 10,500,000 women at work, about a fourth of all those 15 years of age or over and about a sixth of all females. Of these women in occupations, classified by the Census, a little more than 3,000,000 are in agricultural, the domestic, and personal services, nearly 2,000,000 in clerical occupations, nearly as many more in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits, 1,500,000 in the professions, nearly 1,000,000 in each of trade and agriculture, and a little more than 250,000 in transportation and communication.

What the general numbers mean to industry and work, to the family and the home, and to woman herself constitute special problems upon which multiple interests are at work. It is a part of the great American picture, and it extends, of course, into international relations. Indicative of this interest and range was the request of 10 national organizations for an exhaustive study of the status of women in the economy of the United States. These organizations included: American Association of University Women, American Home Economics Association, Interprofessional Association, National Board of the Young Women's Christian Association, National Consumers' League, National Council of Catholic Women, National Council of Jewish Women, National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, National League of Women Voters, and National Women's Trade Union League.

Here are samples of the findings of such a report of nearly 150 pages, published in 1938. The 10,500,000 gainfully occupied in 1930 were nearly six times as many as 60 years before. . . . Thus two women were in gainful work to every seven men so employed. . . . More than three-fourths of all women are not in gainful occupations, and of these the great majority are homemakers, whose value to the family is signified by the fact that 95 percent of the families in this country have no paid help. The contribution these 24,500,000 homemaking women make to the economy of the nation still is paramount, despite the difficulties of measuring its value. . . . The extreme depression that began toward the close of 1929 bore with great severity upon women. . . . Practically one-fifth of the women normally employed were out of work. . . . Moreover, practically one-tenth of all jobless women in 1930 were heads of families. . . . Women also had to cope with employment discriminations that bore upon them with especial severity because they were women, such as those having to do with sex, age, and marital status. . . . Even where the two sexes are employed in the same industries the levels of women's wages are much below those of men. . . . Probably more than one-tenth of the employed women in the United States are the entire support of families of two or more persons, in many cases of those that are much larger. . . . A very large body of women in addition to those who are the sole family wage earners are supporting dependents, either wholly or in part. . . . Of the family heads in the United States one-tenth are women. . . . In practically one-sixth of the urban families in this country the only wage earners are women. . . . Well over one-third of all wage-earning women are homemakers as well, thus carrying a double responsibility to those depending upon them for money aid as well as for the social ministrations required in the home. . . . The universal experience with minimum-wage legislation, wherever it has been introduced into the various states in this country, is that it has very materially raised the wages of large numbers of women. . . . The development of gainful employment for women has been accompanied by extensive increases in the labor legislation applying to women. . . . It was found that regulatory hour laws as applied to women engaged in the manufacturing processes ordinarily *do not handicap the women* but serve to regulate employ-

## AGE DISTRIBUTION OF FEMALES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940

| Area | Total Population | Total Females | Percent Females | 0–19 | 20–44 | 45 and Over |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 131,669,275 | 65,607,683 | 49.8 | 22,399,491 | 25,881,921 | 17,326,271 |
| *Northeast* | 40,629,591 | 20,428,664 | 50.3 | 6,333,120 | 8,287,519 | 5,808,025 |
| Maine | 847,226 | 421,405 | 49.7 | 147,927 | 147,220 | 126,258 |
| New Hampshire | 491,524 | 246,615 | 50.2 | 77,955 | 89,465 | 79,195 |
| Vermont | 359,231 | 177,007 | 49.3 | 61,258 | 61,169 | 54,580 |
| Massachusetts | 4,316,721 | 2,214,242 | 51.3 | 654,584 | 857,007 | 702,651 |
| Rhode Island | 713,346 | 363,942 | 51.0 | 111,025 | 143,840 | 109,077 |
| Connecticut | 1,709,242 | 859,319 | 50.3 | 255,130 | 348,745 | 255,444 |
| New York | 13,479,142 | 788,816 | 50 4 | 1,925,650 | 2,896,280 | 1,966,886 |
| New Jersey | 4,160,165 | 2,091,006 | 50.3 | 617,306 | 872,872 | 600,828 |
| Pennsylvania | 9,900,180 | 4,948,973 | 50.0 | 1,663,907 | 1,940,623 | 1,344,443 |
| Delaware | 266,505 | 132,172 | 49.6 | 41,212 | 53,209 | 37,751 |
| Maryland | 1,821,244 | 906,206 | 49.7 | 297,171 | 364,332 | 244,703 |
| District of Columbia | 663,091 | 345,569 | 52 1 | 84,031 | 164,942 | 96,596 |
| West Virginia | 1,901,974 | 933,392 | 49.1 | 395,964 | 347,815 | 189,613 |
| *Southeast* | 28,261,829 | 14,205,393 | 50.3 | 5,781,744 | 5,458,298 | 2,965,351 |
| Virginia | 2,677,773 | 1,328,769 | 49.6 | 517,052 | 509,024 | 302,693 |
| North Carolina | 3,571,623 | 1,798,633 | 50 3 | 778,426 | 690,025 | 330,182 |
| South Carolina | 1,899,804 | 964,565 | 50.8 | 431,152 | 359,675 | 173,738 |
| Georgia | 3,123,723 | 1,588,965 | 50 9 | 641,547 | 623,024 | 324,394 |
| Florida | 1,897,414 | 954,291 | 50 3 | 322,333 | 395,479 | 236,479 |
| Kentucky | 2,845,627 | 1,409,815 | 49 5 | 571,515 | 507,063 | 331,237 |
| Tennessee | 2,915,841 | 1,470,012 | 50 4 | 572,067 | 571,961 | 325,984 |
| Alabama | 2,832,961 | 1,433,060 | 50.6 | 605,704 | 547,995 | 279,361 |
| Mississippi | 2,183,796 | 1,099,314 | 50 3 | 470,192 | 416,289 | 212,833 |
| Arkansas | 1,949,387 | 966,471 | 49 6 | 401,428 | 361,753 | 203,290 |
| Louisiana | 2,363,880 | 1,191,498 | 50 4 | 470,328 | 476,010 | 245,160 |
| *Southwest* | 9,782,337 | 4,849,326 | 49.6 | 1,881,559 | 1,920,975 | 1,046,792 |
| Oklahoma | 2,336,434 | 1,154,542 | 49 4 | 455,412 | 439,636 | 259,494 |
| Texas | 6,414,824 | 3,193,721 | 49 8 | 1,207,343 | 1,292,477 | 693,901 |
| New Mexico | 531,818 | 259,972 | 48.9 | 118,631 | 96,065 | 45,276 |
| Arizona | 499,261 | 241,091 | 48 3 | 100,173 | 92,797 | 48,121 |
| *Middle States* | 35,741,574 | 17,713,958 | 49.6 | 5,718,548 | 6,939,696 | 5,055,714 |
| Ohio | 6,907,612 | 3,446,540 | 49.9 | 1,089,651 | 1,348,381 | 1,808,508 |
| Indiana | 3,427,796 | 1,702,595 | 49.7 | 559,265 | 643,721 | 499,609 |
| Illinois | 7,897,241 | 3,940,092 | 49.9 | 1,174,475 | 1,628,920 | 1,136,697 |
| Michigan | 5,256,106 | 2,561,379 | 48 7 | 882,213 | 1,018,834 | 660,332 |
| Wisconsin | 3,137,587 | 1,537,411 | 49 0 | 523,890 | 580,732 | 432,789 |
| Minnesota | 2,792,300 | 1,364,755 | 48.9 | 464,753 | 525,658 | 374,344 |
| Iowa | 2,538,268 | 1,257,774 | 49 5 | 420,988 | 459,590 | 377,196 |
| Missouri | 3,784,664 | 1,903,412 | 50 3 | 603,313 | 733,860 | 566,239 |
| *Northwest* | 7,410,435 | 3,612,350 | 48 7 | 1,315,159 | 1,339,777 | 957,414 |
| North Dakota | 641,935 | 306,533 | 47 7 | 126,812 | 110,415 | 69,306 |
| South Dakota | 642,961 | 310,447 | 48.3 | 119,877 | 112,062 | 78,508 |
| Nebraska | 1,315,834 | 650,046 | 49 4 | 224,151 | 241,074 | 184,821 |
| Kansas | 1,801,028 | 894,688 | 49 7 | 299,124 | 330,543 | 265,021 |
| Montana | 559,456 | 260,447 | 46.5 | 94,678 | 98,813 | 66,956 |
| Idaho | 524,873 | 248,294 | 47 3 | 99,269 | 91,930 | 57,095 |
| Wyoming | 250,742 | 115,687 | 46 1 | 44,239 | 46,021 | 25,427 |
| Colorado | 1,123,296 | 554,518 | 49 4 | 193,358 | 209,737 | 151,423 |
| Utah | 550,310 | 271,690 | 49.4 | 113,651 | 99,182 | 58,857 |
| *Far West* | 9,843,509 | 4,797,992 | 48.7 | 1,369,361 | 1,935,656 | 1,492,975 |
| Nevada | 110,247 | 48,906 | 44.4 | 16,372 | 20,628 | 11,906 |
| Washington | 1,736,191 | 830,434 | 47 8 | 252,098 | 326,275 | 252,061 |
| Oregon | 1,089,684 | 526,995 | 48.4 | 159,456 | 205,592 | 161,947 |
| California | 6,907,387 | 3,391,657 | 49.1 | 941,435 | 1,383,161 | 1,067,061 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Population*, Vol. II, Part 1, Table 26, pp. 56–78.

ment and to establish the accepted standards of modern efficient industrial management. . . . Labor legislation divides broadly into two parts—(1) laws definitely prohibiting employment of women; (2) laws regulating their employment. . . . In almost every kind of employment the real forces that influence women's opportunity were found to be far removed from legislative regulation of their hours or conditions of work.[1]

Notable among the trends and achievements in the world of women have been their organizations with millions of members. For instance, the general Federation of Women's Clubs was at one time credited with more than 2,000,000 members working in many aspects of civic and cultural life from public welfare and social service to literature. The Congress of Parents and Teachers had enrolled more than 1,250,000 members in 22,000 units in 49 state branches. Miss Breckinridge estimates that there are 23 major organizations, including the Service Star Legion and the American Legion Auxiliary, National Society, Daughters of the American Revolution, Women's Overseas Service League, National Council of Catholic Women, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Congress of Parents and Teachers, American Association of University Women, Young Women's Christian Association, Girls Friendly Society, National Woman's Christian Temperance Union, National Council of Jewish Women, American Home Economics Association, Three National Organizations of Nurses, National Women's Trade Union League of America, American Federation of Teachers, Organizations for Women in Medicine, Osteopathic Medical Women's Association, National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Association of Junior Leagues, National Consumers' League, National League of Women Voters, National Woman's Party.

Other major phases of women's work are reflected in women as consumers and buyers, in the new citizenship and politics, and in the ever-enlarging field of public social services. Each of these might well constitute the theme for dramatic story or realistic picture of American life. In the matter of citizenship and politics the new era dates from the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and woman's subsequent participation in suffrage and the similar progress in the training of women in skills and techniques of public services. In this

*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

The people: New ways for old; machines turning to the enrichment of rural life. What else will it take to bring a better equilibrium between town and country?



*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

The people: What is the answer to this: North, East, South, West? The girl-mother is from the Northern Middle States; the children from the Southwest.

last group are the great developments in social work and public welfare through social security and many other agencies requiring the skills of many secretarial and administrative women workers.

Perhaps the best way to envisage woman's part in the setting up of styles, standards, and in the domination of the consumers' purchasing world would be to study the twenty major consumer commodities in relation to woman's part. Thus, check with *staple foods, canned and prepared foods, fresh fruits and vegetables, confectionery, beverages, tobacco and gum, men's clothing, women's and children's clothing, fur goods, silk, rayon, cotton, clothing, miscellaneous, furniture, electrical household equipment, heating and cooking equipment, health, cleanliness, beauty, funerals, music, radio, motion pictures, sports and games, personal accessories, travel, reading.*[2]

Other questions and answers will appear in Book II, in which these inquiries can be carried as far as may be desired. Yet the picture of women in American life is so much more than an itemized account that it should be interpreted in relation to our whole civilization. This Professor Ernest R. Groves has done well, and from his conclusions we obtain the best appraisal that has yet been given. Professor Groves points out how the history of woman's part in American life reflects both the bases of woman's past inequality and of her changing status. 'While woman's functions as worker, wife, and mother have been valued,' he points out, 'her distinctive reactions to life have often not been welcomed outside the home since, alien to the masculine scheme of things, they threatened invasion of man's prerogatives. The omission of women from American chronicles is an indictment of the civilization itself, evidence of an unbalanced appraisal of events and values, a lack of appreciation of the conserving attitudes characteristic of women from their socially-assigned activities and biologically-rooted interests.'

Professor Groves follows the evolution of the America of the frontiers up to now. 'As the American drama of life proceeds, woman gains a more prominent role, particularly when the stage is given a western setting. The influences that bring this about flow in two related currents. One represents an increasing encroachment upon the special privileges of men, led by aggressive,

moment in the American woman's social status is highly transitional. . . . It is not enough to catalogue the achievements of the American woman or to locate her present standing in the various lines of her advance. . . . The large number of women reported as gainfully employed in the twentieth census made clear how large a stake they had come to have in industry in all its ramifications. . . . One thing has been made certain and that is the uselessness of trying to interpret the role or the interest of women merely from the domestic angle. . . . The awakening of the modern woman to the significance of her sexual life in varying degrees of realization and her greater frankness in facing the problems this involves are radically changing the character of marriage adjustment. . . . The husband not only has to recognize the sex interest of the wife but also has to contribute to the matrimonial felicity with a skill and understanding rendered difficult by traditions of male self-assertion. . . . So great a shifting of emphasis under any circumstances would be disturbing but it is at present all the more so because at the same time divorce is growing easier and meeting with less recoil. . . . The tendency toward recognizing the sex integrity of the woman has not only drawn woman and man closer to equality in this sphere of experience but for the most part has led woman to assume man's attitude rather than man to assume woman's. . . . This readjustment also has led to disturbing consequences. . . . Another marked trend in our time, so clear that it has become one of the most common topics of public controversy, is toward deliberate parenthood. This has been made possible by improvement in the technique of contraception and the widespread distribution of knowledge of this and other methods of birth control. No happening in social experience could potentially have more volcanic influence. . . . Whatever the personal, the domestic, and the social hazards, birth control provides another means of establishing the integrity of the woman as a self-determining personality.'[6]

Many other phases of American social problems, as they relate to woman's part in life and culture, will be discussed in relation to the family, industry, the church and the community. Among the most interesting of the trends in the last few decades in America are those tending away from what was often called the woman's movement. That is, such movements as woman's suffrage, equal-

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FEMALES IN THE UNITED STATES BY AGE GROUPINGS, 1940

| Area | All Ages | 0–19 | 20–44 | 45 and Over |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 100.0 | 34.2 | 39.4 | 26.4 |
| *Northeast* | 100.0 | 31.0 | 40.6 | 28.4 |
| Maine | 100.0 | 35.1 | 34.9 | 30.0 |
| New Hampshire | 100.0 | 31.6 | 36.3 | 32.1 |
| Vermont | 100.0 | 34.6 | 34.6 | 30.8 |
| Massachusetts | 100.0 | 29.6 | 38.7 | 31.7 |
| Rhode Island | 100.0 | 30.5 | 39.5 | 30.0 |
| Connecticut | 100.0 | 29.7 | 40.6 | 29.7 |
| New York | 100.0 | 28.4 | 42.7 | 28.9 |
| New Jersey | 100.0 | 29.5 | 41.8 | 28.7 |
| Pennsylvania | 100.0 | 33.6 | 39.2 | 27.2 |
| Delaware | 100.0 | 31.2 | 40.2 | 28.6 |
| Maryland | 100.0 | 32.8 | 40.2 | 27.0 |
| District of Columbia | 100.0 | 24.3 | 47.7 | 28.0 |
| West Virginia | 100.0 | 42.4 | 37.3 | 20.3 |
| *Southeast* | 100.0 | 40.7 | 38.4 | 20.9 |
| Virginia | 100.0 | 38.9 | 38 3 | 22.8 |
| North Carolina | 100.0 | 43.3 | 38.4 | 18.3 |
| South Carolina | 100.0 | 44.7 | 37.3 | 18.0 |
| Georgia | 100.0 | 40.4 | 39.2 | 20.4 |
| Florida | 100.0 | 38.8 | 41.4 | 24.8 |
| Kentucky | 100.0 | 40.5 | 36.0 | 23.5 |
| Tennessee | 100.0 | 38.9 | 38.9 | 22.2 |
| Alabama | 100.0 | 42.3 | 38.2 | 19.5 |
| Mississippi | 100.0 | 42.8 | 37.8 | 19.4 |
| Arkansas | 100.0 | 41.5 | 37.4 | 21.1 |
| Louisiana | 100.0 | 39 5 | 39.9 | 20.6 |
| *Southwest* | 100.0 | 38.8 | 39.6 | 21.6 |
| Oklahoma | 100.0 | 39.4 | 38.1 | 22.5 |
| Texas | 100.0 | 37.8 | 40.5 | 21.7 |
| New Mexico | 100.0 | 45.6 | 37.0 | 17.4 |
| Arizona | 100. | 41.5 | 38.5 | 20.0 |
| *Middle States* | 100.0 | 32.3 | 39.2 | 28.5 |
| Ohio | 100.0 | 31.6 | 39.1 | 29.3 |
| Indiana | 100.0 | 32.8 | 37.8 | 29.4 |
| Illinois | 100.0 | 29.8 | 41.3 | 28.9 |
| Michigan | 100.0 | 34.4 | 39.8 | 25.8 |
| Wisconsin | 100.0 | 34.1 | 37.8 | 28.1 |
| Minnesota | 100.0 | 34.1 | 38.5 | 27.4 |
| Iowa | 100.0 | 33.5 | 36.5 | 30.0 |
| Missouri | 100.0 | 31.7 | 38.6 | 29.7 |
| *Northwest* | 100.0 | 36.4 | 37.1 | 26.5 |
| North Dakota | 100.0 | 41.4 | 36.0 | 22.6 |
| South Dakota | 100.0 | 38.6 | 36.1 | 25.3 |
| Nebraska | 100.0 | 34.5 | 37.1 | 28.4 |
| Kansas | 100.0 | 33.4 | 37.0 | 29.6 |
| Montana | 100.0 | 36.4 | 37.9 | 25.7 |
| Idaho | 100.0 | 40.0 | 37.0 | 23.0 |
| Wyoming | 100.0 | 38.2 | 39.8 | 22.0 |
| Colorado | 100.0 | 34.9 | 37.8 | 27.3 |
| Utah | 100.0 | 41.8 | 36.5 | 21.7 |
| *Far West* | 100.0 | 28.5 | 40.4 | 31.1 |
| Nevada | 100.0 | 33.5 | 42.2 | 24.3 |
| Washington | 100.0 | 30.3 | 39.3 | 30.4 |
| Oregon | 100.0 | 30.3 | 39.0 | 30.7 |
| California | 100.0 | 27.7 | 40.8 | 31.5 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, Population*, Vol. II, Part 1, Table 26, pp. 56–78.

ity of opportunity before the law, more nearly equal status with men are assumed rather than fought for, while the tendency in politics and education and in the professions is more towards co-operation. There are still inequalities to be adjusted. Of particular vividness is the extraordinary development of coeducation, which, beginning in a large way with the great Middle States universities, has extended now even into New England and the South. Here indeed in the colleges and universities are developing the new and more realistic co-relationship with the likelihood that problems of differentials will be decreasingly important in the future. Yet the role of women in Germany, Italy, and Russia will continue for a long time to raise new questions of many sorts. And in America the twin problems of unemployment for men and of low family incomes working against each other will continue to constitute major dilemmas. Altogether, however, the problem is a normal one of cultural development, in which again the chief actor in the drama has been that of science, invention, and change.

If the student wishes to glimpse vivid measures of this change, it is possible to survey the long road of cultural development as reflected in the proverbs of all races and peoples. Here woman, strangely enough and in contrast to the modern code of chivalry, was generally ridiculed or satirized. She was to remain in the home. The man was to be ruler. Woman talked too much. She was a gossip. From the recent study of proverbs of all races, it would appear that eight or nine out of every ten proverbs dealing with women were unkind to her. Contrast the modern technological world which now contradicts the eight or nine and reversing the order.

Yet there are still other questions to be asked, namely, whether woman pays too big a price for her equality and her emancipation; whether there is societal as well as organic function in the actual differences between men and women; whether the new role of person instead of woman will be satisfying to the individual or to society; whether the new freedom reverts to what many earlier tribes already had long before civilization; and many other questions which spontaneously tend to label the inquirer as reactionary. So, also, there are many other questions on the other side, namely, if mankind is to make progress intellectually and spiritually as he has materially, will it not be because of the free play of woman's

intellect and creative genius? Whether the new achievements in fellowship and sex relationship may not be the beginning of a new epoch of cultural evolution? Whether the newer balance and equilibrium between men and women may not be the means for a new social conditioning? Whether the long-sought-for roads to peace may not come through the inevitability of woman's participation in all activities? And so on and on through a hundred eager queries now being dramatized by a half million young women in the colleges and universities through their studies, their zeal and their too-oft tragedies of adjustment. In the area of social problems the student knows, however, that there is no "solution of a problem," but participation in an ever-widening societal evolution greatly accelerated by the technicways of the modern world. The answer is one of multiple approaches in which many problems are interrelated and many factors are interwoven into the cultural fabric. These the student will search out and seek to find the best answers—for modern society over ancient; for America over Germany; for all of society over against either man or woman.

## *Chapter XV*

# *RACES AND NATIONALITIES*

INTERWOVEN everywhere in the fabric of human history, races and nationalities sometimes appear to constitute the major part of the warp and woof of cultural drama. Even the geography of the world is often portrayed in terms of the great varieties of races and their work and life. Often characterized as the most difficult of all societal problems, extending throughout all periods of history and all geographic regions of the world the problem of races and peoples is even now being revivified throughout the world in situations of great intensity and in episodes of great frequency. Likewise, in the United States the problems of race and minority groups are continuously challenging the nation to better adjustment of its people to their opportunities, while the continuous development of the different ethnic groups is still remaking the nation's culture.

In the United States the merging of peoples has commonly been accepted as symbol of the melting pot of the world and for a long time it represented the reality of a haven of refuge for those who sought freedom and opportunity. So much has this been true that it has often been customary to refer to New York as the largest Italian city or the largest Irish city or the largest Jewish city as symbol of the large ratio of these ethnic groups in the metropolis. So, too, Minnesota and parts of the old Northwest have often been characterized as American extensions of the great population of the Scandinavian countries. In the great cities there are areas of the several foreign-born groups, such that it is usually necessary to study the culture of cities partially through the ethnic concentrations and the character of their economy and culture. Symbolic of all this is also the usual procedure in the study of poverty, of crime, and delinquency, and of various economic standards, to classify groups according to their racial and national groupings. So, too, the United States Census, catalogue de luxe of Americans, rates nationally as a major classification. But it is not

only in cities but in counties as a whole that this great "composite diversity" is found, such that Woofter estimates that at least two-thirds of all the counties in the nation reflect a standard of heterogeneity as measured by either race or foreign born.

*We Americans* is the story of a New England "Yankee" city which is symbolic of the ethnic story of the nation. Here is an "American" city in which much to his surprise the Connecticut farmer finds 40 percent of its people either immigrants or children of immigrants, being first French Canadians, second Irish, followed by Russians and Poles, English, Italians, Germans, and *29 other nationalities represented in a population of a little less than 25,000 people.* Call the long roll also of other American towns and cities from Maine to Florida, from the Carolinas to California and in the way places between—Jewish stores, Irish police, Greek or Syrian or Chinese restaurants, and threescore other types of occupational representation of the foreign born. And in religion and language, in school and community, 'the life of all these people is the story of the process of becoming at home in the ever-changing, increasingly complex, American world. They are all intent on realizing the hopes and dreams which America has symbolized to them or their forebears. Each group, according to its need, clings to its customs and traditions as to things assured in an unsure world; each has had to realize that this country has welcomed not only its own group but also those that have been its traditional enemies. Only slowly has each realized that the large economic and social forces affecting all America are drawing them all together in common concerns: all are concerned with earning a living, bringing up their children, keeping up their religious practices; all hope that their children may realize what they did not enjoy; all hope for a little fun; all worry over their old age.

'In the process of adjusting to their new American environment, different potentialities within the groups have been brought out—special interests in educational training, in the kinds of jobs they have taken. Thus, slowly, new divisions are arising within the groups; and those with similar interests have begun to reach across barriers of nationality or religion which once were all-important in American life. New divisions are being formed. The old, however, those of nationality or religion, may often color these new

## AMERICANS ALL · IMMIGRANTS ALL

The Columbia Broadcasting System has inaugurated during the winter of 1939, a series of twenty-six dramatic radio broadcasts, designed to show the contributions of various cultural groups to the social, economic and political development of the United States to be presented by the United States Department of the Interior, Office of Education and the Columbia Broadcasting System with the co-operation of the Service Bureau for Intercultural Education, and with the assistance of the Works Progress Administration.

## THE PURPOSE OF THE PROGRAMS

"Americans All—Immigrants All" is to promote better understanding for and among all cultural and racial groups through the dramatization of the contributions made by each group to American life. What sent different groups to these shores? How did they get here? What did they find? What did they contribute? What were their problems and what problems still remain? This series will be the dramatic presentation of their story. Abbreviated statements of some of the broadcasts will give the picture reality.

*Opening Frontiers.*—That great, unparalleled movement of peoples across the sea, then across the land to still another sea; peoples who built, slowly at first, then more swiftly.

*Our English Heritage.*—The English were the first to settle a number of successful colonies along the northern Atlantic seaboard. They laid the foundations for certain civil liberties upon which others built.

*Our Hispanic Heritage.*—States, rivers, mountains, cities and towns of our Southwest bear Spanish names. Spanish architecture, modified by contact with Indian building methods, is still conspicuous there

*Scotch-Irish and Welsh in the United States.*—Scotch-Irish and Scots settled our frontiers and played important parts in the development of our democracy and of our schools. The Welsh shared in the industrial development of our country.

*The Negro in the United States.*—The Negro has been called America's "tenth man," because his numbers compose one-tenth of our population.

*French Speaking Peoples in the United States.*—Huguenots, Belgians, French-speaking Swiss and French Canadians came. The French added much to the culture and foundations of law of our Mississippi Valley.

*Upsurge of Democracy.*—The trans-Allegheny communities developed democracy on the frontier. The interaction of newcomers and pioneers brought about the decline of aristocracy.

*Irish in the United States.*—The Irish, driven by the great famine in Ireland, drawn by the industrial needs of the United States, came in large numbers

*Germans in the United States.*—The Germans—Protestant, Catholic and Jew, came because of religious and political persecution. They, like the Scotch-Irish, helped on the frontier.

*Scandinavians.*—The Swedes and soon the Norwegians came early and gave us the log cabin. They came with the other Scandinavian groups in the 19th century and settled in our north central states, playing a great part in the conquest of the new wilderness.

*Jews in America.*—The Jews, like other religious groups, came during the colonial period as well as later because of religious persecution and economic stress, and in far-flung sections of the country became complete participants in its life.

*Slavs in America, I, II.*—The Slavs came—the earliest from groups of northern Slavs, then the southern Slavs. Great numbers entered our mines and helped to build up our industrial cities.

*Orientals in America.*—Orientals came: Chinese into California, and in smaller numbers into our industrial East, because their labor was needed on railroad and ranch and in factory, Japanese to the farms of California. The Koreans, the Indians, the Filipinos came.

*Italians in America.*—Italians came early, in small numbers, as explorers and artisans. Since the turn of the century they have built many of our railroads, bridges and highways and kept them in repair.

*Near Eastern People.*—The Near Eastern peoples came bringing their philosophy, poetry, manual skills, and their unique artistic sense.

*Other Groups.*—Through the century other groups came:—Hungarians, Rumanians, Portuguese, Mexicans, Lithuanians, Latvians, Finns,—all contributing essential ideas, the labor of their hands, noble traditions and esthetic values peculiarly their own.

*Contributions in Industry.*—Nothing was ever done in our country by one group alone. All groups contributed labor.

*Contributions in Science.*—Our scientists have come from all groups, and each invention has been mainly dependent upon inventions that have gone before.

*Arts and Crafts.*—*All* groups from earliest times have contributed *something* of artistry to American life.

developments, especially as each group has not fully realized the sense of freedom that it hoped to find in America.'[1]

Yet in this melting pot of foreign born and their children and grandchildren, we have not touched "the American race problem," which has come to be synonymous with the Negro, native and patriot. In many ways the American Negro is symbolic of American drama and dilemma, at the same time that he reflects a fine cross section of the age-long problem of race conflict and exploitation.

From Africa to America, in multiplied tens of thousands, the Negroes have come to comprehend an American population twice the size of all Jefferson's beloved American people.

From Africa to America, the Negro became slave and free, climaxing America's greatest tragedy in a war stranger than fiction, brother against brother, section against section.

From Africa to America, the Negro became the key problem that built and then destroyed a great and distinctive culture of the South.

From Africa to America the Negro grew and multiplied and made greater progress in less time than has ever been recorded in the history of a slave people turned free.

From Africa to America the Negro has adapted himself and survived, a black man in a white civilization.

From Africa to America, the Negro now reflects an extraordinary spectacle of cultural evolution going on before the unseeing eyes of the American people.

From Africa to America, the Negro has changed from a southern problem to a national problem, from no political prestige to the balance of power in many states.

From Africa to America, the Negro typifies the biracial civilization as has rarely ever been illustrated before, and has stamped a whole region of the nation as distinctive and handicapped.

It will readily be seen, therefore, that the Negro constitutes a separate problem: as symbol of race and reality; as symbol of race and cultural conflict; as symbol of population problems; as symbol of discrimination and exploitation; as symbol of retarded culture and progressive cultural evolution; as symbol again of "the American people" in its contrasts and paradoxes.

The American problem of races and nationalities is really of

two sorts. One is the problem of ethnic and minority groups of the white race and representing the foreign nations. The other is the problem of race in the more accurate sense of Negro, Mexican, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, in which race conflict, struggle and exploitation assume a more permanent basis. For here is a biracial civilization of varying degrees in various regions, in which nearly 14,000,000 people of the colored races try to adjust themselves to the rest of the people, who in turn reflect many types of dilemmas in their efforts to make adjustments. Of the colored peoples, the Negroes constitute nearly 12,000,000, the Mexicans nearly 1,500,000, the Indians considerably more than 300,000, the Japanese about 140,000, the Chinese 75,000, the Filipinos about 45,000.

Of the foreign whites of foreign extraction, a little more than 25,000,000 were of foreign or mixed parentage and a little more than 13,250,000 were foreign born, being nearly 500,000 fewer than all colored races in the United States. Of the foreign-born groups from Italy, Germany, Poland, and Russia, each had more than 1,000,000, Italy registering more than 1,750,000. Ireland had nearly 1,000,000 as did England. Of those having around 500,000, Sweden had a little over that, and Czechoslovakia a little under.

The regional distribution of these groups is of great significance. As to numbers, the Northeast had nearly half of all foreign born with the Middle States having 3,500,000, the Far West a little over 1,000,000, the Northwest 500,000, while the Southeast and the Southwest had very few. With reference to the distribution of the several groups by regions, the figures are illuminating. The Middle States has the largest number of Germans of any region, although it has less than a fourth as many Italians as the Northeast. So, too, the Middle States show the greatest concentration from Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, and Yugoslavia. The Northeast has the largest number from most of the countries, but particularly from Italy, Ireland, Poland and Russia. In so far as the Southeast reflects many foreign born, they are from England, Germany, Italy, Ireland, and Russia. The regional distribution of the Negro reflects a surprising picture of diffusion into the national picture. Details of these facts may be studied from the full page statistical pictures on pp. 236 and 241.

Woofter's picture of racial and ethnic groups in *Recent Social*

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NEGROES, INDIANS, JAPANESE, CHINESE, 1940

| Area | Negroes | Indians | Japanese | Chinese | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 12,865,518 | 333,969 | 126,947 | 77,504 | 13,403,938 |
| *Northeast* | 2,012,702 | 12,088 | 3,529 | 20,835 | 2,049,154 |
| Maine | 1,304 | 1,251 | 5 | 92 | 2,652 |
| New Hampshire | 414 | 50 | 4 | 63 | 531 |
| Vermont | 384 | 16 | 3 | 21 | 424 |
| Massachusetts | 55,391 | 769 | 158 | 2,513 | 58,831 |
| Rhode Island | 11,024 | 196 | 6 | 257 | 11,483 |
| Connecticut | 32,992 | 201 | 164 | 292 | 33,649 |
| New York | 571,221 | 8,651 | 2,538 | 13,731 | 596,141 |
| New Jersey | 226,973 | 211 | 298 | 1,200 | 228,682 |
| Pennsylvania | 470,172 | 441 | 224 | 1,477 | 472,314 |
| Delaware | 35,876 | 14 | 22 | 39 | 35,951 |
| Maryland | 301,931 | 73 | 36 | 437 | 302,477 |
| District of Columbia | 187,266 | 190 | 68 | 656 | 188,180 |
| West Virginia | 117,754 | 25 | 3 | 57 | 117,839 |
| *Southeast* | 8,168,552 | 29,609 | 405 | 2,594 | 8,201,160 |
| Virginia | 661,449 | 198 | 74 | 208 | 661,929 |
| North Carolina | 981,298 | 22,546 | 21 | 83 | 1,003,948 |
| South Carolina | 814,164 | 1,234 | 33 | 27 | 815,458 |
| Georgia | 1,084,927 | 106 | 31 | 326 | 1,085,390 |
| Florida | 514,198 | 690 | 154 | 214 | 515,256 |
| Kentucky | 214,031 | 44 | 9 | 100 | 214,184 |
| Tennessee | 508,736 | 114 | 12 | 60 | 508,922 |
| Alabama | 983,290 | 464 | 21 | 41 | 983,816 |
| Mississippi | 1,074,578 | 2,134 | 1 | 743 | 1,077,456 |
| Arkansas | 482,578 | 278 | 3 | 432 | 483,291 |
| Louisiana | 849,303 | 1,801 | 46 | 360 | 851,510 |
| *Southwest* | 1,112,905 | 153,814 | 1,333 | 2,698 | 1,270,750 |
| Oklahoma | 168,849 | 63,125 | 57 | 112 | 232,143 |
| Texas | 924,391 | 1,103 | 458 | 1,031 | 926,983 |
| New Mexico | 4,672 | 34,510 | 186 | 106 | 39,474 |
| Arizona | 14,993 | 55,076 | 632 | 1,449 | 72,150 |
| *Middle States* | 1,340,334 | 33,323 | 970 | 5,765 | 1,380,392 |
| Ohio | 339,461 | 338 | 163 | 921 | 340,883 |
| Indiana | 121,916 | 223 | 29 | 208 | 122,376 |
| Illinois | 387,446 | 624 | 462 | 2,456 | 390,988 |
| Michigan | 208,345 | 6,282 | 139 | 924 | 215,690 |
| Wisconsin | 12,158 | 12,265 | 23 | 290 | 24,736 |
| Minnesota | 9,928 | 12,528 | 51 | 551 | 23,058 |
| Iowa | 16,694 | 733 | 29 | 81 | 17,537 |
| Missouri | 244,386 | 330 | 74 | 334 | 245,124 |
| *Northwest* | 96,066 | 65,725 | 7,887 | 1,339 | 171,017 |
| North Dakota | 201 | 10,114 | 83 | 56 | 10,454 |
| South Dakota | 474 | 23,347 | 19 | 36 | 23,876 |
| Nebraska | 14,171 | 3,401 | 480 | 102 | 18,154 |
| Kansas | 65,138 | 1,165 | 19 | 133 | 66,455 |
| Montana | 1,120 | 16,841 | 508 | 258 | 18,727 |
| Idaho | 595 | 3,537 | 1,191 | 208 | 5,531 |
| Wyoming | 956 | 2,349 | 643 | 102 | 4,050 |
| Colorado | 12,176 | 1,360 | 2,734 | 216 | 16,486 |
| Utah | 1,235 | 3,611 | 2,210 | 228 | 7,284 |
| *Far West* | 134,959 | 39,410 | 112,823 | 44,273 | 331,465 |
| Nevada | 664 | 4,747 | 470 | 286 | 6,167 |
| Washington | 7,424 | 11,394 | 14,565 | 2,245 | 35,728 |
| Oregon | 2,565 | 4,594 | 4,071 | 2,086 | 13,316 |
| California | 124,306 | 18,675 | 93,717 | 39,556 | 276,254 |

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 16, pp. 16–17.

*Trends* featured five main situations: '1. There was a relatively stable Negro population whose rapid rate of increase was on the decline and whose location was for the most part in the south. 2. A growing immigrant population was divided between the older settlers on the farms of the middle west and the newer immigrants in the industrial cities of the east. The newer element in response to the pull of expanding industry was entering the country at a rate of between half a million and a million per year. 3. A small and slowly increasing Indian population was segregated in reservations. 4. There was an Oriental population largely confined to the Pacific states whose increase by immigration had been greatly reduced by exclusion acts and agreements. 5. A small Mexican population was confined to the border counties. The demand for the labor of these groups was slackening in most of the rural sections except in the Pacific and southwestern states and was increasing in the industrial sections of the east and middle west.' [2]

Of these situations, the one which provides the most critical series of problems is that of the Negro, which we may examine briefly, leaving the other problems for more technical and detailed study, as suggested in Book II.

In our studies of American regionalism we have tried to show how the problem of the Negro and of race relations is a national problem and that its solution must somehow be worked out in an equilibrium which takes into consideration that which is best for the Negro and for the whites, for the South and for the North, and, therefore, for the race and the nation. This is essentially, therefore, a societal problem of racial adjustment and a social problem of race relations. Adjustments, as we have pointed out, must be made on the basis of facts; yet facts are of two sorts, the one of race qualities and capacities and experience and the other of race prejudice and culture heritage. These constitute the factual basis of reality. And although the situation is very complicated and difficult it is possible to indicate a fine prospect for effective study and for successful adjustments. As the most distinctive minority group in America, with perhaps also the greatest handicaps, the Negro has shown extraordinary vitality and cultural development.

We have pointed out often the fact that predictions with ref-

erence to the Negro in the United States have been peculiarly unreliable in the past. There was, however, at the end of the first third of the century a different situation from that which had existed in any of the previous decennial periods. The four basic factors upon which prediction must be made and plans developed seemed to be: First, the ratio of Negro population to the total population was gradually decreasing and the experts estimated that this decline would be continuous until the maximum stabilization of population might occur in a half century hence. Second, the Negro population was being diffused throughout the nation so that the problem was national rather than southern. The Negroes complained that the North was "going southern." The third factor was the changing nature of the Negro population as it related to biological heritage. That is, there was growing up a "Brown America," a product of both selection and racial diffusion. The fourth element was found in the changing social character of the Negro as he expanded his activities and increased his cultural stature to higher levels. The future of the Negro was, therefore, essentially an American problem of development and assimilation. There would be need to take caution against riots and economic injustices, to provide for sensible political development, social representation, and for educational and cultural advance. The picture was such as to justify the conclusion that, if the Negro be given a fair opportunity with his remarkable powers of adaptation and his attractive personality, he would become one of the most important of the basic elements of American culture. For the time being, however, there was no quick solution of his problem or the problem of the white man's relation to the Negro.

Four general and international factors make the problem of the Negro in the South and the nation increasingly dynamic. One is the general conclusion of the psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists that evidence of inferior and superior races does not justify the world's previous appraisal and action in relation to races. This factor, communicated to all races, contributes to the dark races' as well as the white races' attitudes. A second factor has been the extension of learning and technology to all races and their consequent increasing use of common tools of economic and political development. A third factor is the increasing tendency toward racial and national consciousness. The fourth is the rapid

rise and increasing articulation of the American Negro in contradistinction, on the one hand, to his earlier status, and, on the other, in relation to his proportionate part in southern life.

Concerning the Negro in the United States, it is important to note certain fundamental facts. First, there are three other regions than the Southeast in which more than a million Negroes reside. Second, the Negro outside the South is almost wholly an urban inhabitant as compared to his rural heritage in the South. Third, the Negro has become in parts of the nation the balance of voting power in politics and has transferred from the Republican to the Democratic Party. These and many other specific aspects may be studied further from the sources suggested in Book II.

The problem of race in America as elsewhere appears to have its cycles of tension and of quiet. Now one phase of the race problem has always been that of conflict. So much has this been the case that certain sociologists have considered race conflict an elemental factor in human evolution. So much has this been true, again, that we may well consider race conflict and exploitation high up in the catalogue of the tragedies of human errors. If there be doubt as to the tragedies of the past there appears to be new multiplying evidence flowering nigh unto full bloom the world over. In this vast inventory of evidence are a multitude of exhibits: myth and patterns of racial superiority and inferiority, confiscation, annihilation, exploitation, appropriation of person and property; imperialism, economic, political, and religious discrimination; cultural exhaustion; prejudice, intolerance, distrust, emotional complexes, false conclusions of both science and sentiment, conflict motivation instead of specialization and cooperation ending in basic causes of war. So great have been these errors that it is everywhere clear now that present world struggles indicate a race between disaster and some sort of reconstructed motivation and techniques of race relations. A question is: How much longer before the breaking point will be reached in many places at once? And how long can civilization survive a world welter of social hatred and destruction?

Twin tragedy with race conflict and often product of race and economic forces has been war itself with its immeasurable train of social ills. If there be those who still think war and primary conflict are elemental forces necessary to adequate evolutionary sur-

vival, it is only necessary to recount our present universal recognition of the tragic dilemma of current civilization and the almost unanimous verdict that the World War has been a large contributing factor. Again, call to witness universal present-day dread of world cataclysm from a new and greater war of nations, prophetic of the destruction of civilization itself. How great an error, therefore, which threatens to destroy all that society has achieved! Not only the cumulative tragedies of blood and death and destruction of property and men; not only the catalogue of immeasurable social and economic waste; not only the decimation of the flower of the people and of their art and culture; not only disease and disorganization and disintegration and anti-social defeat of the ends of society; but also the threat of bringing to flower the genius, science, and invention of mankind in one grand slaughter through supertechnology wielded in the hands of the great age-long twin forces of rationalized hate and defense. To measure the length and width and depth of such error, we need only to set this catalogue of tragedies alongside any reasonable inventory of desired visible ends of social achievement. A question to be answered: How long could civilization carry the debit of slaughter and carnage over against its planned budget of human welfare?

Now it is not expected that sociology or the student of social problems can "solve" this problem of race conflict. Yet the knowledge of the historical factors and the cultural and biological heritage of society will equip the student to deal more objectively and intelligently with questions of race and will enable him to work out more effectively the specific and practical social problems of American race situations. Furthermore, an understanding of some of the older theories of race origin and development and of some of the newer conclusions of sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and others will help clear the way for sound theory and workable planning.

It seems quite likely that a major key to race conflict and exploitation, to misunderstandings and maladjustments, is found in the earlier assumptions of superior and inferior races, based upon the premises that races are inherently and innately different. A first task, therefore, is to examine the conclusion of social scientists within recent years and to note a changing trend with reference to these premises. On this point the verdict of a large number of



*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

The people: What is the answer to unemployment, to unequal opportunity? These are American children. What is their outlook?

*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

The people: Witness extraordinary patience, good humor, and courage of millions of Americans in disaster or depression relief.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE FOREIGN-BORN WHITE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF THEIR BIRTH, CENSUS OF 1940

| | Northeast | South-east | South-west | Middle States | North-west | Far West | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Northern Europe* | | | | | | | |
| England | 325,551 | 18,661 | 8,560 | 144,686 | 27,826 | 96,691 | 621,975 |
| Scotland | 157,201 | 6,289 | 2,534 | 70,087 | 9,481 | 33,729 | 279,321 |
| Wales | 17,799 | 706 | 435 | 9,841 | 2,340 | 4,239 | 35,360 |
| Northern Ireland | 77,423 | 1,309 | 542 | 15,739 | 2,266 | 9,137 | 106,416 |
| Irish Free State (Eire) | 438,782 | 5,804 | 3,360 | 80,344 | 9,834 | 33,907 | 572,031 |
| Norway | 53,665 | 2,379 | 1,656 | 113,173 | 43,111 | 48,104 | 262,088 |
| Sweden | 122,322 | 4,825 | 4,341 | 201,607 | 41,217 | 70,758 | 445,070 |
| Denmark | 28,326 | 2,312 | 1,799 | 54,139 | 22,678 | 28,921 | 138,175 |
| Netherlands | 30,050 | 1,791 | 828 | 57,226 | 7,180 | 13,989 | 111,064 |
| Belgium | 15,085 | 915 | 607 | 30,202 | 2,579 | 4,570 | 53,958 |
| Luxemburg | 956 | 118 | 80 | 4,276 | 759 | 697 | 6,886 |
| Switzerland | 29,514 | 2,679 | 1,717 | 24,967 | 6,195 | 23,221 | 88,293 |
| France | 51,833 | 5,022 | 2,114 | 20,092 | 3,355 | 20,514 | 102,930 |
| *Central and Western Europe* | | | | | | | |
| Germany | 547,219 | 25,165 | 23,932 | 477,240 | 66,403 | 97,813 | 1,237,722 |
| Poland | 600,719 | 7,818 | 4,977 | 351,057 | 9,550 | 9,358 | 993,479 |
| Czechoslovakia | 134,457 | 2,667 | 10,649 | 147,195 | 17,319 | 7,684 | 319,971 |
| Austria | 318,551 | 4,844 | 4,317 | 16,616 | 12,650 | 22,928 | 479,906 |
| Hungary | 161,905 | 3,737 | 1,100 | 110,769 | 3,125 | 9,592 | 290,228 |
| Yugoslavia | 41,747 | 1,307 | 1,423 | 90,539 | 9,396 | 16,681 | 161,093 |
| Russia (U S S R) | 710,546 | 17,206 | 8,602 | 180,691 | 57,394 | 66,442 | 1,040,884 |
| Latvia | 11,345 | 608 | 258 | 4,545 | 130 | 1,750 | 18,636 |
| Lithuania | 98,027 | 1,703 | 622 | 61,095 | 1,059 | 3,265 | 165,771 |
| Finland | 35,376 | 856 | 453 | 54,031 | 5,007 | 21,487 | 117,210 |
| Rumania | 63,404 | 1,744 | 674 | 40,061 | 3,304 | 6,753 | 115,940 |
| Bulgaria | 2,084 | 140 | 173 | 4,830 | 629 | 1,032 | 8,888 |
| Turkey in Europe | 2,650 | 154 | 78 | 1,128 | 233 | 169 | 4,412 |
| *Southern Europe* | | | | | | | |
| Greece | 79,545 | 8,506 | 2,954 | 49,337 | 6,387 | 16,523 | 163,252 |
| Italy | 1,210,396 | 24,806 | 8,207 | 243,980 | 20,086 | 116,105 | 1,623,580 |
| Spain | 24,401 | 4,066 | 1,321 | 3,827 | 1,491 | 12,601 | 47,707 |
| Portugal | 42,248 | 322 | 65 | 471 | 61 | 19,180 | 62,347 |
| Other Europe | 15,517 | 584 | 223 | 6,178 | 795 | 2,804 | 26,101 |
| *Asia* | | | | | | | |
| Palestine and Syria | 31,537 | 5,582 | 2,819 | 13,315 | 1,448 | 3,205 | 57,906 |
| Turkey in Asia | 33,887 | 1,333 | 349 | 10,320 | 128 | 6,462 | 52,479 |
| Other Asia | 19,950 | 1,033 | 440 | 8,131 | 544 | 9,426 | 39,524 |
| *America* | | | | | | | |
| Canada—French | 219,623 | 1,750 | 671 | 35,187 | 4,349 | 11,786 | 273,366 |
| Canada—Other | 346,420 | 16,091 | 7,188 | 225,884 | 31,576 | 143,594 | 770,753 |
| Newfoundland | 18,208 | 319 | 136 | 1,615 | 135 | 948 | 21,361 |
| Mexico | 6,076 | 2,099 | 194,468 | 22,261 | 16,718 | 135,811 | 377,433 |
| Cuba and Other West Indies | 19,167 | 7,569 | 586 | 1,498 | 147 | 1,567 | 30,534 |
| Central and South America | 21,402 | 2,304 | 754 | 3,780 | 623 | 7,535 | 36,408 |
| Australia | 3,101 | 408 | 290 | 1,676 | 467 | 5,056 | 10,998 |
| Azores | 14,822 | 27 | 9 | 35 | 27 | 10,831 | 25,751 |
| All others and not reported | 10,338 | 1,027 | 520 | 3,677 | 893 | 5,426 | 21,881 |
| TOTAL | 6,193,185 | 198,585 | 306,831 | 3,097,348 | 450,895 | 1,172,294 | 11,419,138 |

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 29, pp. 32–35.

leading sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists was sought recently with the result that it is possible to record a fair unanimity of opinion with reference to evidences of differences. The conclusion may be stated best negatively somewhat as follows. There does not appear to be adequate data from any sources of historical study, psychological tests, cultural comparison, or biological heritage to justify the conclusion that there are permanent organic differences between the races. This, of course, has a very important bearing upon the attitudes toward racial groups and the adjustment of conflicts.

For the purpose of setting up an effective technique both of study and of race relations, it is the assumption of this volume that there are no inherent racial differences, but that there is a great and cumulative mass of racial differentials due to explainable causes and often so numerous and powerful as to appear in reality to be fundamental differences. This distinction, therefore, between differences and differentials is of the utmost importance and assumes at once that races instead of being inherently different are *group products* of differentials due to the cumulative power of the physical and folk-regional cultural environment. The approach to the further study of this premise is simple enough. There are on every hand numerous differentials in the environment, living standards, treatment, cultural backgrounds, which, when continued long enough, become powerful *mores* wrought out through cumulative folkways, such that they assume the proportions of tradition, authority, facts. And then, of course, there are the measurable differentials of color and pigmentation, of stature, and cephalic types, and of cultural heritage which to all practical intents and purposes appear as differences. Yet it must be clear that the approach to the elimination of differences will be found in the elimination of separate units of differentials. In this concept of the differentials we may also find a suitable analogy to our social as opposed to societal problems. For the attack upon differentials as problems of immediate and practical concern will then transcend opinions as to organic differences which are of less importance to the student of social problems.

Symbolic of America's ethnic composition and racial problems is the new series of broadcasts and publications being planned by the United States Office of Education, beginning in 1939, and en-

titled "Americans All—Immigrants All." Many new situations are arising in this country and throughout the world to accentuate the dilemmas of racial conflicts. In Germany, the problem has been intensified as never before in the drive for the super-Nordic race through an unparalleled anti-Semitic purge. In the United States, we have the unusual spectacle of the Negro in the North and West turning Democratic against his earlier Republican adherence and becoming the balance of power in some areas. In the great Southwest, there is the problem of nearly a million Mexicans to be adjusted to the body politic and adding confusion to the problem of displacement of Negro workers. The American Indian continues the perennial problem for coeducation and adjustment. In California, there are major problems of the second and third generations of Japanese people, well educated, capable, cultured. Throughout the nation there are problems of amalgamation of bloods, of assimilation of unlike groups, and the hazards of race mixture. Yet all of these problems and many others constitute topics for the specialized study of scientists. It is, therefore, the assumption of this chapter that a knowledge of what the problems are and of how to go about studying them specifically will furnish enough equipment to understand their relationship to the totality of American policies and to participate intelligently in their solutions. Here, as in most of our other problems, there is an abundance of literature, and many organizations and agencies are at work, so that there need be no lack of opportunity for study and planning.

If the student, searching for scientific conclusions about race, wishes to challenge the findings of the psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and to some extent the biologists and educators, he may inquire into the validity of the following abstracts of findings that are quite in contrast to the older theories:

The scientific world holds to the belief that races are mutable.

The concept of race is lacking in clarity.

The real problem of race psychology is to determine whether there are mental differences belonging to one of the so-called races as distinguished from another. Are the races equal or unequal in mentality?

Mental traits are inherited according to the same laws as physical traits but the process is very complicated.

Races do not differ in sensory traits either qualitatively or quantitatively.

Practically all races have been tested psychologically, but it is difficult to articulate the results.

Results indicate race differences in intelligence, but findings are open to the criticism that nurture is not equalized.

Studies of foster children show that I. Q.'s have been changed by nurture.

There is but one esthetic impulse; beauty is universal.

Differences in color preferences are due to nurture.

No studies yet made justify the belief in a race personality.

Results of tests on mental fatigue suggest the influence of selection.

Test results do not indicate differences of an innate character in musical talent.

Studies of community of ideas reveal no differences in the association process where the environmental factor has been controlled.

In America and in the world at large race became increasingly a problem of crisis and tensions during and after World War II. Global democracy was being called as witness that America was responsible for its practices at home. American Negroes and American Japanese were new testing grounds, and because of the size of the problem, of the increasing trend in the United States to insist upon the elimination of legal reparation at the same time that segregation was being continued and race conflict was increasing, the problem was assuming the proportions of crisis and emergency. This was one of the situations for which the solution did not appear in the usual programs of planning although there were more organizations and agencies at work in this field. This may well be America's No. 1 problem.

## *Chapter XVI*

# *THE HANDICAPPED*

WHAT individuals or groups of people, we often ask our enthusiastic and youthful students of social problems, have suffered most during the last year or the last few years? Which ones have suffered the greatest inequalities and which ones the most unnecessary handicaps? Who in America? Who in the Orient? Who in Europe? What clustering of circumstances has seemed to heap upon the people that which is "unfair," "unjust," "not right"? Which of these handicaps and inequalities are tragic? Which are preventable?

The answer to these questions is often startling. The answers vary from year to year and from region to region and from nation to nation. Let us look at some of them.

Here are thousands of innocent sufferers in the wake of ruthless flood waters of the Ohio and Mississippi and of the Connecticut and the Rio Grande or of the Yangtze as they sweep resistlessly on with their death and destruction, misery and disease.

Here are other thousands, victims of drouth and dust storm and of cyclone and tornado—who suffer personally and whose property is destroyed.

Here are other thousands, victims of the new horrors and hazards, of war now no respecter of the homes behind the battle line.

Here are other thousands of people persecuted in Germany or in the uttermost parts of the world.

Here are still other thousands, victims of accidents on highway, in factory, in travel, and at work.

Here are millions of others with handicaps before they start, namely, racial groups in minority situations—the Negro, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Mexican in America; the Jew in Germany and elsewhere.

Here are hundreds of thousands of others who are handicapped through the deficiencies of economic opportunity.

Others are handicapped with unequal opportunity for education and for work.

Millions are handicapped because of physical inequalities.

Thousands are handicapped because of mental sickness and inherited limitations.

One half the human race, namely, womankind, starts the race with many handicaps of one sort or another.

A sixth of the race starts with handicaps of age.

A half million are lost in the handicaps of criminality.

Millions of youth are handicapped through maladjusted home relationships and lack of recreation.

Ten million in the United States are handicapped by reason of unemployment.

Their children suffer in the unequal race through no fault of their own.

These are the areas in which drama grows. Here are tragedy and tension and struggle. Here are the settings for what the literary folk come to designate as realism, as opposed to romanticism. Here are *Tobacco Road* and *Look Homeward Angel;* here are the stranger-than-fiction pictures of slum and tenement; of rural problem areas and mountain coves; of pathos and tragedy in high places—lakeshore to city, Fifth Avenue to Palm Beach.

What, however, does it all mean in the more scientific realms of reality? What are the measures of the disadvantaged and the handicapped? What are the causes? Which are due to physical inequalities? Which to mental? Which to economic maladjustments? Which are subject to remedies of what sort and what are the relations of each set of problems to others?

These and many other questions are asked to the end that we may understand the great range and variety of handicaps, the organic nature of many of our inequalities, the complexity and remoteness of many of the causes, and the essential need of scientific and comprehensive study. Thus, not all inequalities are due to economic causes. Not all handicaps reflect simple dilemmas of social organization or disorganization. Not all people begin life with any possible chance of the same or equal start and resources, physical, mental, or cultural. The remedy, therefore, is not so simple as merely changing our social order or of substituting a new economic system, but rather the greater task of

diagnosing problems and situations in realistic perspective to all the factors involved, many of which, such as biological heritage, the role of struggle and suffering, we do not yet understand. It must be clear, therefore, that our solutions must be worked out on a comprehensive basis, including special case studies of individuals and of broader planning for institutions. The larger problem is one which we have designated as making democracy effective in the unequal places.

It is not possible to gain any sort of understanding of the people and the reality of their problems without examining the handicaps which abound in all times and places in varying degrees among the people of different places. To a considerable extent it is again a problem of differentials. Disadvantages and handicaps are of many sorts. They are permanent and they are temporary. They are minor and they also assume devastating proportions. They are physical and they are mental. They are economic and they are cultural. There are handicaps of the individual and handicaps of the group. There are handicaps of the young and handicaps of the old. There are handicaps of women and handicaps of men. And all of these and more are interrelated and interdependent upon the individual and upon social organization, upon economic organization and upon cultural standards.

Our first group of disadvantages and handicaps due to storm and flood and drouth and accident, in terms of "problem," becomes the problem of disaster. Here the American Red Cross has worked out very definite techniques and procedures whereby the nation entrusts it with vast resources for the relief of suffering of this sort. The story of the Red Cross is an amazing one. Now down the Mississippi with succor for white and black, for men and animals, for people and property. Now off to a town in Georgia suddenly stricken by cyclone or a Florida coast scene, or more lately a New England community wrecked by tropical hurricane. Helping the farmer or the housewife or the sick—these are everyday tasks for Red Cross relief. So, too, the federal government of late has stood by to help reduce the handicaps of disaster or physical disadvantage, trying to make democracy effective in the unequal places.

There is another large group of handicaps which assumes the proportions of a special field, namely, the handicaps of health and

disease and the incidence of cultural and biological heritage. In terms of problems these are problems of public health. Here, again, both the Red Cross and private agencies are at work, in addition to great programs of federal, state, county, and city public health services.

We have already referred to the child welfare aspect of this service, but perhaps the simplest and most vivid illustrations of the almost universal problem of handicaps is that of children themselves whose basic problems have often been considered symbolic of all social problems. We pointed out how the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection estimated that of the 45,000,000 young folks in the United States under twenty years of age, no less than 10,000,000 were handicapped in one way or another in the sense of not having equal opportunity with the 35,000,000 estimated as "normal." These illustrate the inequalities of which we have just written, namely, no less than 6,000,000 undernourished; 1,000,000 defective in speech; another 1,000,000 with weak hearts. Three million have impaired hearing. There are more than 300,000 handicapped in each of the categories of tubercular weakness and crippled children. Nearly 500,000 are mentally retarded, and 200,000 are delinquent. In addition, there are 18,000 totally deaf and 64,000 blind and partially blind. Another 500,000 are dependent. While these handicaps are catalogued to apply to children only, their toll on the adult population is easily seen from an inventory of the handicaps of the older groups, which we shall study subsequently.

Yet the meaning of "the handicapped" has come to be more specific, such that the public thinks of the handicapped primarily in terms of physical handicap; then subsequently in terms of the pathological. Not only has the public come to assume some such meanings, but the earlier courses in social problems most commonly featured social pathology, so that "social problems" come to mean poverty and crime and broken families. These are problems and problems of great range and power and significance, such that they must always constitute an important segment of all our social problems. It may be well, therefore, to characterize, for the present at least, many of these handicaps in terms of the pathology of the people and subsequently to re-examine them in

the study of our institutions, our public welfare, and our social planning.

If we are to consider these problems as pathological, it is important to show how they recapitulate our whole framework of social problems in relation to our whole society. Professor Gillin has stated the problem well. 'Life from birth to death,' he points out, 'is a struggle for adjustment. We come into existence with a certain inherent endowment, physical and mental. We are born into a world with which it is necessary to come to terms. Through unknown ages man in his very inherited qualities has become adapted to it—but not perfectly. The struggle for existence has weeded out those individuals too widely variant from an ideal norm to meet the conditions of survival. Nevertheless, such selection has not yet produced a stock perfectly fitted to meet all the differences of climate, of food supply, of sunshine and storm, of bacterial parasites, and a thousand other variable conditions in different parts of the globe. Moreover, these physical conditions are complicated by the modifications of them which have been brought about by human efforts, and by the social arrangements which man has devised. In any given part of the world physical conditions change—for example, from season to season, from wind and rain to calm and sunshine, from heat to cold, from dryness to humidity. Conditions in one part of the earth differ vastly from those in other parts. Yet these differences and changes form by no means so large a class of change and difference as do the variations in the cultures of people. In view of the complexity of conditions to which the human being must make adjustment, is it any wonder that some people fail? The miracle is that so many succeed fairly well. No greater tribute to the capacity of human nature could be cited than the fact that man—without an understanding of the nature of the physical universe, and, but for his exceptional brain, less adequately endowed with means of self-defense and attack than the predatory animals about him—has successfully competed with the animal world, has overcome an often hostile physical environment, and has filled the earth with his kind.

'However, man's history is a trail of blood. The struggle for survival has left along the road the bones of those who have fallen in the fight. It has also imprinted indelibly upon the very

nature of man and upon his institutions certain qualities which make for success under some conditions of life, but make for failure under others. Strength and cunning, ruthless self-seeking and hypocrisy, hatred and envy that struggle has engendered. But also out of it have come friendship, parental love, pity, sympathy, and mutual aid. Above all there has developed the intelligence which enables man to adapt means to ends, and thus to meet the conditions of survival.' Thus Professor Gillin comes to define social pathology as "the study of man's failure to adjust himself and his institutions to the necessities of existence to the end that he may survive and meet fairly well the felt needs of his nature." [1]

Now the areas in which man has failed to adjust himself to the necessities of existence and happiness will constitute our field of social pathology or the field in which handicaps and disadvantages are most marked. Samplings of these will both illustrate our problems and give the basis for further study.

One of the areas which has not commonly been considered pathological is that of the effect of alcoholic liquors upon the individual and the group. Now the use of intoxicating liquors must be recorded as a handicap in so far as it impairs the individual's capacity or usefulness or prevents him from equal competition or undermines his physical and nervous resources. It must be considered pathological in so far as it makes an abnormal person out of a normal one, leads the kind-hearted individual to become the criminal, makes the lover a brute, or the brilliant mind stupid. It is both handicap and pathology in so far as it leads to accidents on the highway, to crime and prostitution in the community, to poverty and disease in the family. So much has this problem come to the forefront in recent years, the American Association for the Advancement of Science has set up an Institute for Research in this field, members of which are representative of both the physical and social sciences. This age-old problem, of course, has been attacked already through both government and morality, such that it has constituted the basis for many of America's greatest reform movements and in particular the ill-fated prohibition amendment to the Constitution.

The aggregate of social problems which are commonly treated as pathological makes a long catalogue, the very enumeration of which is an object lesson in social study. Professor Gillin clas-

## THE NATIONAL FARM TENANT PICTURE, 1940

| Area | Number of Tenants | | | Percent of All Tenants | Percent of Farms in State and Region Operated by Tenants |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Total | White | Non-whites * | | |
| UNITED STATES | 2,361,271 | 1,844,015 | 517,256 | 100.00 | 38.7 |
| *Northeast* | 97,198 | 94,582 | 2,616 | 4.12 | 10.4 |
| Maine | 2,519 | 2,516 | 3 | .10 | 6.5 |
| New Hampshire | 1,054 | 1,054 | 0 | .04 | 6.4 |
| Vermont | 2,344 | 2,344 | 0 | .10 | 9.9 |
| Massachusetts | 2,265 | 2,206 | 59 | .10 | 7.1 |
| Rhode Island | 309 | 308 | 1 | .01 | 10.3 |
| Connecticut | 1,518 | 1,513 | 5 | .06 | 7.2 |
| New York | 19,544 | 19,485 | 59 | .83 | 12.8 |
| New Jersey | 4,035 | 3,913 | 122 | .17 | 15.6 |
| Pennsylvania | 27,096 | 27,000 | 96 | 1.15 | 16.0 |
| Delaware | 2,929 | 2,657 | 272 | .12 | 32.6 |
| Maryland | 10,994 | 9,236 | 1,758 | .47 | 26.1 |
| District of Columbia | 12 | 10 | 2 | (†) | 18.5 |
| West Virginia | 22,579 | 22,340 | 239 | .96 | 22.7 |
| *Southeast* | 1,110,496 | 646,214 | 464,282 | 47.03 | 37.0 |
| Virginia | 47,107 | 34,303 | 12,804 | 1 99 | 26.9 |
| North Carolina | 123,476 | 81,482 | 41,994 | 5 23 | 44.4 |
| South Carolina | 77,184 | 32,990 | 44,194 | 3.27 | 56.1 |
| Georgia | 129,850 | 80,772 | 49,078 | 5.50 | 60.1 |
| Florida | 15,668 | 11,465 | 4,203 | .66 | 25.2 |
| Kentucky | 83,824 | 81,447 | 2,377 | 3.55 | 33.1 |
| Tennessee | 99,735 | 78,656 | 21,079 | 4.22 | 40.3 |
| Alabama | 136,224 | 78,573 | 57,651 | 5 77 | 58.8 |
| Mississippi | 192,819 | 56,750 | 136,069 | 8.17 | 66.2 |
| Arkansas | 115,442 | 68,989 | 46,453 | 4 89 | 53 3 |
| Louisiana | 89,167 | 40,787 | 48,380 | 3.78 | 59.4 |
| *Southwest* | 310,234 | 269,995 | 40,239 | 13.14 | 10.7 |
| Oklahoma | 97,821 | 90,346 | 7,475 | 4 14 | 54.4 |
| Texas | 204,462 | 171,852 | 32,610 | 8.66 | 48.9 |
| New Mexico | 5,811 | 5,769 | 42 | .25 | 17.0 |
| Arizona | 2,140 | 2,028 | 112 | .09 | 11.6 |
| *Middle States* | 536,798 | 533,201 | 3,597 | 22.73 | 27.4 |
| Ohio | 61,422 | 61,097 | 325 | 2.60 | 26.3 |
| Indiana | 52,210 | 52,097 | 113 | 2 21 | 28.3 |
| Illinois | 91,982 | 91,653 | 329 | 3.89 | 43.1 |
| Michigan | 31,800 | 31,649 | 151 | 1.35 | 17 0 |
| Wisconsin | 42,928 | 42,900 | 28 | 1.82 | 23.0 |
| Minnesota | 63,817 | 63,725 | 92 | 2.70 | 32.3 |
| Iowa | 101,484 | 101,452 | 32 | 4.30 | 47.6 |
| Missouri | 91,155 | 88,628 | 2,527 | 3.86 | 35.6 |
| *Northwest* | 254,891 | 253,331 | 1,560 | 10 79 | 9.9 |
| North Dakota | 33,377 | 33,274 | 103 | 1.41 | 45.1 |
| South Dakota | 38,398 | 38,102 | 296 | 1.63 | 53.0 |
| Nebraska | 63,947 | 63,808 | 139 | 2.71 | 52.8 |
| Kansas | 70,222 | 69,940 | 282 | 2.98 | 44.9 |
| Montana | 11,642 | 11,493 | 149 | .49 | 27 8 |
| Idaho | 11,153 | 10,985 | 168 | .47 | 25 5 |
| Wyoming | 3,638 | 3,582 | 56 | .15 | 24.2 |
| Colorado | 19,138 | 18,876 | 262 | .81 | 37.2 |
| Utah | 3,376 | 3,271 | 105 | .14 | 13.3 |
| *Far West* | 51,654 | 46,692 | 4,962 | 2.19 | 4.9 |
| Nevada | 516 | 490 | 26 | .02 | 14.4 |
| Washington | 14,462 | 13,830 | 632 | .61 | 17.7 |
| Oregon | 11,277 | 11,058 | 219 | .48 | 18.2 |
| California | 25,399 | 21,314 | 4,085 | 1.08 | 19.1 |

* Non-white includes Negroes, Indians, Chinese, Japanese, and all other non-white races.
(†) Less than .01.

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 662, pp. 711–713.

sifies all these failures to adjust under four major headings, namely, the pathology of the individual, the pathology of domestic relationships, the pathology of social organization, the pathology of cultural relations; and the breakdown of economic relationships.

While many of his 33 separate groupings of problems are comprehended in our general picture of American problems and while most of them are interrelated, it may be well to look at this list and then to select one or two special problems for more detailed illustration. Thus, undoubtedly the ten problems listed in the pathology of the individual are concrete at the same time that they illustrate the interrelationship of our various problems to each other and the significance of individual and social differences and, therefore, of tasks for the institutions to tackle. These handicaps of the individual are: sickness, blindness and deafness, disablement, drug addiction, alcoholism, mental deficiency, mental disease, suicide, personal disorganization.

So, too, the maladjustments within the area of domestic relationships are indicative of differentials and handicaps that are manifestly measures of disadvantage: widowhood; divorce; desertion; dependent and neglected children; the social pathology of childhood and adolescence; illegitimate parenthood; immorality and vice; prostitution; vagabondage; old age; the unmarried. In the field of social organization the problems of urban and rural disorganization and of class and race and international disorganization indicate the extreme nature of certain modern situations.

In the field of economic relationships, poverty and dependency and unemployment may or may not be pathological, but they do always represent handicaps and disadvantage, while the employment of women and children may become a special problem of maladjustment. So, too, the pathology of religion, of crime and delinquency, and the breakdown of moral standards may reflect a social pathology or they may reflect primarily normal products of certain social policies or organizations.

The cataloguing of so long a list of problems all designated as pathological, however, also reflects the weakness of featuring the pathological base for so many problems of adjustment. To put together all of these types of maladjustment as pathological exhibits is to say little more than that every aspect of individual and group life is susceptible to pathological developments. This

is a specialized subject and should be so studied. On the other hand, the great body of our social problems should be studied in relation to the normal development of society to the end that causes may be discovered and a preventive economy established before such maladjustments come to the point of pathology. Yet it must be evident that we may get a clearer view of many social problems by looking at them in concentrations which intensify the handicaps or disadvantages. From a long list we may illustrate with three or four.

There is, for instance, the social problem reflected in our "institutional" population, nearly all of whom have already reached some degree of pathological condition. The size of this problem is reflected in approximately 1,250,000 people. So important is this group that although scarcely more than one percent of the total population of the nation, several of the groups are constantly publicized before the nation as its chief problem. So the criminal. So the congenital defectives. So the poor. Hence the ratio of importance is much greater than the proportion of the whole, thus indicating the intensifying of a problem.

Of the types of institutional groups, we may well look at them from the fivefold viewpoint utilized by the National Resources Committee in their study of consumer incomes in the United States. Their estimates are that in 1935-1936 there were somewhat more than 500,000 mental defectives, about 100,000 physical defectives in institutions, a little more than 200,000 prisoners and delinquent adults, more than 150,000 dependent and delinquent children and about the same number of dependent adults.

The nature of the problems involved may be indicated by an examination of the types of institutions which house these "problem" groups and by inquiring as to how many additional individuals in the nation suffer from the same handicaps but are not in institutions. Thus not all mental defectives are confined in insane asylums, homes for the feeble-minded and hospitals for epileptics. Not all physical defectives are living in tuberculosis hospitals or in schools for the deaf and blind or in children's hospitals. Not all adult offenders are confined in jails, penitentiaries, workhouses, and reformatories for men and women. Not all dependent and delinquent children are living in orphan homes and

reformatories for juvenile delinquents. And not all dependent adults live in almshouses and homes for the aged.

We must, therefore, follow up the social problem involved in these further if we are to make appraisal of the real nature and size of each. Thus, poverty and dependency have assumed quite a different and larger significance within recent years from merely the older concepts of dependent folk, unemployables and people headed for "over the hill" to the poorhouse. Yet we must still study the problems of poverty. And it is well to take the larger view exclusive of dependents living in institutions, for they constitute a very small portion of the nation's tragic poor at the present time. Utilizing Gillin's definition of poverty as a condition in which a person does not maintain a standard of living high enough to provide for himself and his natural dependents to function well in the society in which he lives, and checking the total population during and since the depression, it is quite possible to estimate a poverty load of 25,000,000 or 30,000,000 people. This, of course, is a relative sort of estimate, but, even so, is a staggering consideration for the American people to face. For the parents who cannot provide their growing children with adequate facilities and equipment and often with adequate food and clothing represent a peculiar kind of pathos never planned in the American dream of opportunity. Yet here and there throughout the nation, on farm and in towns, in cities and in villages, and moving hither and yon over the country are millions of poor people, poor now with prospects of continuing poor. If we wish to measure this poverty, we turn naturally to the incomes of families and individuals, on the one hand, and to relief figures, on the other.

Keeping in mind the limitations of most studies of income and living standards, and the extraordinarily high standards set by urban America for the comfort, convenience, and necessities of American families; and keeping in mind also the special cumulative results of the depression years, we still have to record an appalling inventory of poverty in the nation. Taking the estimates of the National Resources Committee's study of *Consumer Incomes in the United States* as a basis and utilizing the usual definition of poverty, we would have to estimate that nearly half of the people of the United States are below or near the marginal line of poverty. That is, if the urban estimates of the necessary

income for adequate functioning be accepted, say around $1,500 a year for the usual family, 65 percent of all the families in the nation register below this point. This manifestly cannot be a really pathological exhibit, yet when nearly a sixth of all the families receive less than a third of the minimum for an acceptable standard of living and when more than 40 percent receive less than two-thirds of the necessary income, the situation reflects wide economic and social maladjustment. These facts have perhaps been uncovered only in recent years by depression studies, and it is quite likely that the nation has had for a long time a much larger ratio of poverty than was known.

Now, on this basis of estimating poverty, we must assign as causes, not the usual ones primarily, but the twin causes of unemployment and low pay as the basic explanations. Thus, our problem becomes a comprehensive one involving social and economic factors quite beyond the mere problems of individual differences, sickness, mental and physical handicaps, climate and poor land, inefficiency, lack of skill and training, and the usual catalogue of deficiencies. These causes still operate, but the major reasons are lack of adaptation of the people to the living resources and geography of the nation, and to maldistribution of goods and to imbalance between production and consumption, between abundance and scarcity. These problems begin to assume unusual major proportions in almost every approach to national progress. The verdict grows apace that the American dream cannot be realized when perhaps a half of all the people are thus handicapped by economic insufficiency.

Another of the more recent measures of poverty is found in the extent and character of public relief. Figures are available over a period of years for the study of relief in both urban and rural areas to almost any extent desired. There are monthly reports, yearly reports, summaries for various periods of time, studies of different regions, and many interpretations of these studies as listed in Book II. We need, however, to present the general picture of these new measures of American poverty. As in other instances, we begin with some sort of measure of the size of the problem, and we note, for example, that, first of all, there is an abnormally large load of relief, but that as in other problems the variation is very great in different cities and rural areas. For in-

NUMBER OF OFFENSES KNOWN TO THE POLICE PER 100,000 INHABITANTS, JANUARY TO DECEMBER, INCLUSIVE, 1943, BY STATES

| Area | Murder, Non-Negligent Manslaughter | Robbery | Aggravated Assault | Burglary—Breaking or Entering | Larceny—Theft | Auto Theft |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Northeast* | | | | | | |
| Maine | 2.61 | 16.8 | 6 3 | 277.9 | 697.3 | 196.5 |
| New Hampshire | 1.62 | 5.7 | 8 1 | 110.0 | 370.4 | 34.0 |
| Vermont | | 9.4 | | 111.1 | 625.9 | 62 0 |
| Massachusetts | .64 | 16.3 | 10 0 | 219 7 | 429 8 | 163 4 |
| Rhode Island | .97 | 6.7 | 11.0 | 219.3 | 459.5 | 155.0 |
| Connecticut | 1.28 | 22.3 | 16 6 | 329.2 | 776.2 | 169.5 |
| New York | 2.30 | 11.7 | 27.9 | 138.9 | 465.4 | 106 9 |
| New Jersey | 2.17 | 24.1 | 44.3 | 259.8 | 436.4 | 140.7 |
| Pennsylvania | 2.95 | 30.2 | 22.8 | 187 7 | 326 2 | 111.4 |
| Delaware | 2.39 | 121.8 | 17.5 | 409.9 | 1,330.8 | 228 4 |
| Maryland | 10.52 | 62.5 | 124.4 | 247.7 | 659 3 | 263 9 |
| District of Columbia | | | | | | |
| West Virginia | 2.39 | 69.1 | 101 6 | 292 5 | 590.0 | 124.5 |
| *Southeast* | | | | | | |
| Virginia | 15.56 | 94 3 | 178 6 | 520.2 | 1,477.7 | 292 4 |
| North Carolina | 12.82 | 42.9 | 435.7 | 375.1 | 1,038.2 | 174 4 |
| South Carolina | 12.70 | 30.9 | 110.9 | 317.6 | 1,340 6 | 197.3 |
| Georgia | 16.22 | 69.7 | 91.2 | 367.5 | 1,314.0 | 220 8 |
| Florida | 15.83 | 54 0 | 118.8 | 511.1 | 1,284.7 | 266 0 |
| Kentucky | 10.37 | 84.7 | 110.3 | 479.4 | 974.1 | 233.3 |
| Tennessee | 15.24 | 59.8 | 87.5 | 356.5 | 810 8 | 232.2 |
| Alabama | 19.44 | 42.2 | 96.4 | 386 3 | 879.6 | 174.8 |
| Mississippi | 14.66 | 49.8 | 169 4 | 332.6 | 966.9 | 143.5 |
| Arkansas | 11.86 | 47.4 | 89.4 | 241.8 | 902 2 | 157 4 |
| Louisiana | 11.33 | 31 7 | 102 2 | 132.8 | 530.5 | 229.8 |
| *Southwest* | | | | | | |
| Oklahoma | 6 64 | 47.7 | 54 5 | 404.6 | 1,219.4 | 194.4 |
| Texas | 14.46 | 41 9 | 102 2 | 428 0 | 1,238.7 | 211.9 |
| New Mexico | 4.19 | 38 8 | 66.1 | 373.3 | 1,101.0 | 219.2 |
| Arizona | 8.56 | 98.4 | 76.3 | 535.7 | 2,228.3 | 376.6 |
| *Middle States* | | | | | | |
| Ohio | 4.79 | 58 4 | 30.3 | 303 3 | 826.5 | 169.3 |
| Indiana | 3 53 | 43 4 | 49.7 | 363.0 | 1,049 0 | 249.0 |
| Illinois | 3.85 | 80.8 | 37 5 | 239.3 | 466 8 | 89.6 |
| Michigan | 3.76 | 71 2 | 73 1 | 347.0 | 1,041.3 | 195.1 |
| Wisconsin | 1.10 | 7 7 | 5 6 | 163 9 | 827.3 | 103.5 |
| Minnesota | 1.41 | 13 0 | 6.6 | 170 6 | 560.4 | 101.5 |
| Iowa | 1 11 | 10 5 | 4.3 | 169.9 | 679.3 | 126.0 |
| Missouri | 5.79 | 36.0 | 50.4 | 234.9 | 635.8 | 101.7 |
| *Northwest* | | | | | | |
| North Dakota | | 7.4 | 3 3 | 157 8 | 624 7 | 182.5 |
| South Dakota | 1 53 | 12 2 | 5.3 | 261 7 | 851.6 | 174.7 |
| Nebraska | 2.84 | 12 5 | 26.9 | 189.4 | 713.1 | 190.3 |
| Kansas | 3 68 | 28 9 | 16 6 | 309.2 | 802.9 | 161.2 |
| Montana | .60 | 51 1 | 18 0 | 219.3 | 1,012.9 | 179.0 |
| Idaho | | 23.2 | 9.0 | 282.3 | 926.2 | 286.8 |
| Wyoming | 8.77 | 14.0 | 10.5 | 152.6 | 1,026.1 | 124.5 |
| Colorado | 4.46 | 67.5 | 27.0 | 488.7 | 1,261.4 | 194.0 |
| Utah | 5.71 | 44.5 | 31.4 | 511.4 | 1,725.1 | 332.0 |
| *Far West* | | | | | | |
| Nevada | 13.00 | 55.2 | 6.5 | 666.1 | 1,998.4 | 376.9 |
| Washington | 3.12 | 56.1 | 24.7 | 482.4 | 1,437.2 | 507.8 |
| Oregon | 3 58 | 93 9 | 40.8 | 628.9 | 1,811.0 | 422.6 |
| California | 4.11 | 117.5 | 59 9 | 482.4 | 1,556.5 | 542.8 |

Source: U. S. Department of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 14 : 2 (1943), Table 28, p. 68.

stance, measured in terms of relief in May 1934 to the total population in 1930, the extremes range from 55 percent of the total population on relief in Butte, Montana, to less than 10 percent in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, taking 79 cities sampled as representative of the American picture. In the story of *Urban Workers on Relief,* it is pointed out that no definite pattern determined by size, geographic location, or type of city appears to exist in relation to the ratio of persons on relief to the general population of 1930. 'If the 79 cities are divided into 4 groups of equal size on the basis of the proportion of the population on relief, both large and small cities are scattered among the 4 groups, that is, among those with the highest proportion of the general population on relief, among those with the lowest, or among the two intermediate groups. Cities from each of the four geographic regions, namely, eastern, southern, central, and western regions, also fall in each of the four quartile groups. . . .

'Cities of a diversified economic character such as Baltimore, Charleston, and Atlanta appear among the one-fourth of the 79 cities having the heaviest incidence of relief as do specialized industrial cities such as Butte, Mont., Douglas, Ariz., and Shenandoah, Pa. At the lower extreme, among the one-fourth with the lowest incidence of relief, are San Francisco, a commercial city, and such specialized industrial cities as Detroit, Mich., Paterson, N. J., Gastonia, N. C., and Gloversville, N. Y. This does not mean, however, that economic conditions are not one of the most important explanations of the extent of relief in most communities, but rather that any broad classification of cities obscures many city differences in this respect. A more intensive study must be made of such characteristics and of economic conditions at any given time to explain differences in relative magnitude of the relief problem. Furthermore, other factors are also effective in determining the proportion of the population receiving relief. These include local administrative policies, community attitudes toward acceptance of relief, availability of public relief funds, and certain social factors such as the racial composition of the population. Only a careful analysis of each city can, therefore, adequately answer some of the questions as to why the incidence of relief is greater in some cities than in others.'[2]

Not only are there great state and regional variations, but the

incidence of race and cultural groups is of importance, once again explaining some of the causes and factors contributing to the problem of poverty. The story reflects the fact that, in contrast to the large majority of white households among those on relief in most cities, in the cities in which Negroes or other races were of importance in the general population they constituted a larger proportion of the relief group than they did of all families in 1930.

'In 46 of the cities, Negro households constituted 5 percent or more of all households on relief in May 1934; in 28 cities they were over 20 percent of the relief load; in Norfolk they were 80 percent. Again, perhaps more important than the actual proportions are the relative proportions of Negroes as a part of the relief load compared with their ratios in the population of 1930. In all of these 46 cities the ratio of Negro households to all households on relief was above their ratio in the total population of the city in 1930. The degree to which they appear to have been disproportionately present on relief differed widely among these cities. In Charleston, for example, Negro households were almost the same proportion of the relief load as of the population of 1930, whereas in Akron, they were 20 percent of the relief, but only 4 percent of the total population. These are extremes; in general, Negro households were on relief in larger proportions in northern cities relative to their importance in the city populations than in southern cities. Explanations for these differences are numerous, but the most likely appear to be local administrative policies, local attitude towards relief, relief standards, and the availability of funds for relief needs.'[3]

Another contribution made by the new statistics is found in the fact that the American picture of rural relief has featured what is now being called rural slums, sometimes more marked than urban slums. Thus a special study of Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture, published by the United States Department of Agriculture, states that it is a conservative estimate that one-third of the farm families of the nation have standards of living so low as to make them slum families. In the studies of problem areas and in the larger studies of farm tenancy in the South and of migrant workers in the Far West, poverty and insufficiency have been discovered and analyzed to an extraordinarily surprising degree. Here, again, there are problem areas in which more than

half the people are on the margins. This reminds us again of the complexity of the problem and of the interrelation to our old series of problems of land utilization, planning, and social welfare.

An inventory of the status of disadvantaged farm folk in the nation gives the following summaries, startling to examine and affecting directly nearly 30,000,000 people: There were in 1929 approximately 1,700,000 farms which yielded gross farm income of less than $600; a few more than 900,000 farms that yielded less than $400 income; and almost 400,000 farms that yielded less than $250. There were in 1935, 2,865,000 tenant families on American farms, the total members of which constitute a population of approximately 13,000,000 people. Approximately 3,000,000 persons move from farms to towns and cities or from towns and cities to farms each year. Over 1,000,000 farm families move from one farm to another each year. During the depression, at least 3,500,000, or more than 1 out of every 4, rural families in the United States had received public assistance at some time.[4]

Another example of a social problem which assumes far greater significance than its ratio to the total population is that of crime and delinquency. We classify the criminal as handicapped and disadvantaged because of the various contributing causes, such as heredity, physical and mental deficiencies, moral inadequacies, environmental surroundings, lack of educational and family relationships, and others. But the criminal represents especially the handicap to society and his influence is measured by what he does or may do to society. Thus in the modern world, in addition to the age-long types of crime against person and property, there is the new sweep of organized crime, of rackets, of kidnapping and the accompanying corollaries of social disorganization and hazard. Hence, the delinquent child must be regarded especially as one disadvantaged and as a challenge to society both to treat him and to eliminate, so far as possible, the causes for his delinquency. To this end, there are hundreds of agencies and organizations striving to reduce delinquency and crime and there has grown up a literature of more than 10,000 titles in this field.

There are, of course, many other samplings of handicaps which would have to be presented if the whole picture is to be seen. More than a million folk in the United States handicapped by the

great war reflect many millions in other countries and in the younger generations coming on.

There are many handicaps reflected in regional situations in which children of some states have less opportunity for education and health than those in other states.

And there are cumulative handicaps of the millions of landless folk and their children who reflect the un-American ideal of less promise and prospect than their parents—handicapped through cultural heritage.

. These and other phases, however, may be studied further, first in the totality of our economic and social situation as presented throughout the book and more especially in the further sources and suggestions presented in Book II. But in whatever area of study or action the challenge is again that of making democracy effective in the unequal places, and we shall have to look forward to effective programs of public welfare and social planning to which we shall turn our attention in Part Four. All of this is bound up with the future of our leaders and of our institutions, to which we shall immediately turn our attention.

## *Chapter XVII*

# *LEADERS*

EMERGING from the drama of conflict and depression and doubt of the last few years, two parallel purposes now seem everywhere clear and dynamic. These are the motivations to conserve, develop, and make more useful the two great sources of the good society; namely, our natural wealth and our human wealth. It is fortunate that these two great purposes are being more and more envisaged as inseparable in any adequate program of continuing education and planning.[1] The movement, in one sense, is the reflection of a new leadership, just as the previous neglect was an index of lack of leadership here.

The problem of the conservation and development of the human resources of the nation is, however, quite different from the same problem with reference to its natural resources. For here the people are acting for and upon themselves. "Of, for, and by the people" was not spoken of government alone, but of the whole, powerful drama of the people in action and in conflict with social change and their institutions. Mediocrity and superiority, feeble-mindedness and brilliancy, integrity and weakness, uprightness and crookedness, demagoguery, and statesmanship—all are of the hazards and prospects, the liabilities and assets of the new day. There are the ever-recurring questions not only of who shall inherit the nation, what sort of people will multiply and replenish the earth, but also, who shall lead the people? What sort of leaders shall guide the race? Will they be able to draw up plans through which all the people of whatever sort many function and be protected both from exploitation and from themselves? Or will they, through new mechanized media of control, exploit the people in new and more dramatic ways?

For the multitudes of people are greater and more militant; they are more susceptible to mass movements due to the multiple sensatory influences; and they are not well enough educated to resist the excitement and appeal of the emotions. People who be-

come hysterical over a radio drama about Mars invading the earth can be mobilized quickly for almost anything. These people—the great human wealth of the nation—are alike the hope and despair of stable society, the raw materials for fabricating a new culture. Here they are: faddists and militant idealists, pragmatists and dreamers, workers and drones, antis and pros—a great multitude leading the multitudes. Prohibitionists and evolutionists, anti-prohibitionists and anti-evolutionists, vivisectionists and anti-vivisectionists; dietists and nudists, vegetarians and perfectionists, pentecostalists and Christian Scientists, spiritualists and atheists, Mennonites and Millerites, Adventists and Ethical Culturists, Holy Rollers and Theosophists, Russellites and Shakerites, New Thoughtists and quacks, psychologists, new and old, members of the House of David, and of other houses galore. And they club together: Black Shirts and Brown Shirts, Ku Kluxers and one-hundred percenters, anti-race and anti-Catholics, EPICS and Utopians.

And these are no respecters of places. They abide and abound in golden-crowned, purple-velveted New York or in million-peopled, million-dollared competing Los Angeles and San Francisco. They come from temperamental Louisiana or white-haired Virginia or stern-faced New England or realistic Pennsylvania or West Virginia. They cluster in the big cities and they flourish in isolation. They come from the Southeast and the Southwest, from the Northeast and the Northwest, from Middle America, from countryside and village, from farm and factory. They hatch up crazy schemes in California and Carolina, in Georgia and in Maine, in lake region and desert, such that ridicule, one region of another for their mass leaders and followers, assumes the proportion of the traditional pot and kettle black-calling names.

And what wealth and variety of leaders—call the roll of yesterday, today, and tomorrow. The great and the vivid, mingled with the small and stupid, lesser men often overshadowing greater characters: Lincoln and Washington and Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, Alexander Dowie and Jack Johnson, Aimee Semple McPherson and Huey Long, Mary Baker Eddy and Lyman and Henry Beecher, William Lloyd Garrison and Oswald Garrison Villard, Harriet Beecher Stowe and Susan Anthony, Alvin York and Chauncey Depew, John Sharp Williams and James K. Vardaman, Tom Watson and Cole Blease, H. L. Mencken and Bishop

James Cannon, Clarence Darrow and Dwight Morrow, Lucy Stone and Ida Tarbell, Walter Lippmann and William Allen White, Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Charles Beard and Rex Tugwell; William Green and "C.I.O." Lewis, Hugo Black and Carter Glass; Nicholas Murray Butler and Glenn Frank, Harry Woodburn Chase and Mayor LaGuardia, Alfred Landon and William Borah, the two Deweys, philosopher and prosecutor respectively; the Vanderbilts and the Morgans, the Astors and the Rockefellers, the Wideners and Andrew Mellon, the Gates and the Hills and the other "sixty families"; John L. Sullivan and Gene Tunney, Joe Louis and Max Baer, Babe Ruth and Helen Wills Moody, Bobby Jones and Red Grange, Ruth Elder and Byrd and Lindbergh, Henry Ford and Thomas A. Edison, Stuart P. Sherman and Eddie Guest, Will Rogers and Will James —but why try to picture them?

Call the roll of the New Deal or of the New Literati or of the "liberals" or of the D.A.R. and the sponsors and advisory members of a thousand committees. Harry Hopkins and Ellen Woodward, Henry Wallace and Will W. Alexander, Robert Jackson and Tommy Corcoran, Felix Frankfurter and Walton Hamilton and their bright boys and girls who dream dreams and see visions. Or call the roll again of Townsend and the old folks, of Du Pont and the Liberty League, of music-campaigning, "pass the biscuit" Ohio Governor of Texas. "Of and by and for the people," they were and are and ever shall be nation without end. In ferment and conflict, tea party, revolution, Civil War, Sacco-Vanzetti, Dayton, Tennessee, Passaic, New Jersey, Scottsboro, Alabama, white supremacy, humanism, technocracy, strikes and feuds—profiteers and chiselers, philanthropists and patriots. "Of and for and by the people"—the stuff that human institutions and human life are made of.

Or this picture and problem of leadership may be vividly seen from the portraiture of the states and their leaders, of institutions and their founders, of movements and their sponsors. The history of a state is the story of its leaders and the rise of institutions is the emergence of leaders. A Horace Mann and Massachusetts education, a Justice Marshall and the traditions of law, a William Harper and a University of Chicago; Columbia's Burgess and the beginnings of graduate university work; a G. Stanley Hall and a

Hopkins' importation of German science; a Jane Addams and the new social work movement; a Booker Washington and the great upsweep of racial harmony; a sensitive William Edward Burghardt Du Bois and the N.A.A.C.P.; a William Knapp and the farm extension movement; and in lesser places everywhere, and in lesser institutions and movements has been the measure of leaders.

And what of the states? Here are Virginia and Ohio, mothers of presidents, Virginia of eight, Ohio of seven. But surely Massachusetts would lead in some great areas, let us say in the long roll of cabinet members with 35? Not at all, for New York counts no less than 50. Yet here Virginia had only 18 and Ohio only 14. Roll call again, states of the presidents: Virginia eight, Ohio seven, New York four, North Carolina three, two each for Vermont and Massachusetts, one alone for New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, New Jersey, Iowa. Roll call of states, pictures of the cabinet members 200 strong. A strange and interesting incidence of leadership clustered in a few states. In their order: New York, 50; Massachusetts, 35; Virginia, 18; Maryland, 17; Kentucky, 16; Pennsylvania, 16; Ohio, 14; Iowa, 11; Georgia, 8; Delaware and South Carolina, 5 each; North Carolina and New Hampshire, 4 each; Louisiana, 3; Vermont, 2.

There were other pictures of the states and their leaders more intimately drawn and locally known. Some were *Who's Who,* some were demagogues, many were orators and educators, many were giants of the business world, others were prominent in education, religion, journalism. No more interesting America could be found than a picture of the 20 most influential leaders in each state, what they did, and how they ranked at home and in the nation. No such picture has ever been presented comparing the state leaders, yet the new era is in the way of demanding just such an inventory of state and regional leadership. In so far as the picture has been presented, it is a picture of the past with its grand old men and of the present and future—a picture of new leaders for old for the most part, new recruits yet untried. There has been a shifting of notables from the old states to new, from New England and East and South further westward. In 1930 the highest ranking states in the ratio of "Who's Who" per 100,000 population were in the order of New York, Massachusetts, Con-

necticut, Nevada, New Hampshire, and the lowest five, Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, with the median states such as Minnesota, Missouri, Virginia, Oregon.

If there is a more interesting picture of personnel in the states than that group of 20 varied leaders, it would be that of the state legislatures. Here is Americana indeed, rich and varied, such that there never has been anything like it! Yet inventory and classification showed them approximating the mythical average American; mostly lawyers, but also merchants, farmers, church members, Rotarians, Kiwanians, Americans first. Their distinction lies in what they can do with their power and glory and in a certain prevailing "lawyerness" about their goings and comings. In the midst of them are extraordinarily able individuals and unbelievably stupid men, and they all together furnish as much entertainment, dilemma, limitation and problems, uncertainty and discouragement, as any other group in the nation. There is yet to be written the masterpiece portraying the state legislature in the United States. They deadlock and they quarrel, they legislate and they repeal, they trade and they caucus, politicians de luxe, American vintage of the 1930's. Self-nominated, they represented the people of their own states, with ears close to the ground, more potent as leaders than all the Einsteins and Deweys and savants.

Yet there appears everywhere some subtle change in the qualities of the modern leader and in the demands which contemporary America places upon him. The American hero of the 1930's was no longer the military strategist or the millionaire "success" man who had made his way over all obstacles. These were barely being recorded in the annals of the nation except as part of the record, or as examples of what ought not to be. It sometimes seemed doubtful whether there were many dominant leaders. Yet there were hundreds of men and women of greater capacity than many of the earlier heroes. It was a changed nation, with its changed and complicated system which demanded new instrumentalities. In the old days leaders were often big because they contrasted with the littleness of their followers. Not so in a world of increasingly equal opportunity for education and participation in social control. Thousands of America's most prominent men were discredited for doing the very things which had been the mode of earlier days. Here again the picture was a puzzle as to

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what sort of leadership would be required for the next period and how it would operate. One of the trends in public administration had been toward the dominant executive, yet the people had not always followed. The transitional stage was such that there was universal complaint of too few leaders as, for example, men big enough to lead the Republican or Democratic party to successful achievement.

The passing of the old order of a necessity abounded in tragedy and pathos. Again, the copybook maxim that "time and tide wait for no man" was never so apparent. There were the grand old men, perfect specimens of a system, "men of wonderful charm, . . . but they were singularly lacking in an understanding of the spirit of their times and country—they fell because they neither had nor sought contact with the average man and sternly set themselves against the overwhelming current of democracy." Perhaps this was equally applicable to financier, politician, young heir to fortunes, professor, lawyer, doctor, minister. It was said again and again that the captains of industry had proved themselves incredibly inept in the knowledge of men, institutions, and even economics. The spectacle of a Morgan and the other great financiers before the committees at Washington in 1933 was a picture incredible to the old order. Yet the picture was not finished and the country awaited the next steps with eager interest wherever the people were thoughtful enough to wonder.

If we are inclined to doubt the significance of the new demands or opportunities for new types of leaders, we may well catalogue the dominant leaders of the present, in America or throughout the world. Einstein, universally valued as a great leader in science, is no leader in Germany or America or anywhere else. In Professor Bogardus' list of 100 leaders, voted by some 350 judges selected for the purpose, approximately 70 are scholars, scientists, artists, musicians—men who have exerted great influence, but who if living today—and those who are living—exert little influence in the councils of nations. Many an individual, incidentally provided with an audience through special privileges of books or radio or governmental position, suddenly assumes extraordinary leadership of great numbers of people who often follow blindly. And all the people now may hear what all the other people hear in radio talks heard everywhere. Thousands of individuals clamor for lead-

ership with no other reason than that they want to lead and that they can control the avenues of approach to the people.

And here we have, of course, the age-long process through which some men lead and others follow, with the intensification of the problem through radio and other communicating agencies. Professor Giddings used to explain this phenomenon of leadership and of the accompanying exercise of power through a very realistic sociological interpretation. Thus he would point out: 'Some individuals react more quickly than others, as all those who have experimented in psychology know, and some are more resistant than others. Given an opportunity to seize a new advantage like that of taking up free land in this country, or the opportunity that is offered from time to time by the discovery of mineral wealth, as the discoveries of gold in California in the 40's and 50's, and later in the Transvaal, and still later in the Klondike of Alaska, the persons who react to opportunity of this kind react with a great deal of difference. Some are quick, some are persistent, some follow the crowd. One result is that the individuals who are quick in their reactions to opportunity, and persistent, are the ones who shape up a situation which the others have to conform to as they straggle in later, and these firstcomers and first profiteers of opportunity usually become for the time being a ruling group. They may not continue to be the ruling group, but if they do, they bring others in with them.

'When once a leading group and a ruling group, ruling in the sense that it shapes the situation to which others have to adapt themselves and in the long run controls the opportunity, has made itself pretty secure in its position, then privilege always does arise. It is not in the nature of man or things that those who have taken quick advantage of opportunity and who have shown a cleverness in using it that other men do not show should resist temptation to get advantage for themselves thereby. . . . Privilege grows up because the men who have seized opportunity and have begun to be a ruling class are desirous of having the greatest possible following and the greatest possible strength which they may use against any rival faction or any competing group that desires to seize power and will seize it if it can. And there is one fundamental way in which human beings get this following. A man puts himself in the position of asking rights and privileges

of the ruling group, and the group says to him, "All right, you can be let in, you can have our privileges and protection provided you are our man, we can count on your loyalty, your fealty to us." And that is the way the groups strengthen themselves. It is a bargain of give and take; we let you into the privileges of this group on one condition, that you are loyal, that you serve us, that we can count on your support under any circumstances; whether we are right or wrong, you are our man. That comes to be generally accepted even by people who question its morality. When these psychological phenomena have worked themselves out to some extent, you get privileges. For example, take the group first on the ground when the new discovery of precious metals is found; do they leave things in such shape that the latecomers will pick up good opportunities to work for nothing? Not by any manner of means. They stake it out and become owners of it, and others coming in later have to pay money for the privilege of getting in.

'When a ruling group becomes strong enough, it becomes aggressive; it adds to its opportunities and increases its privileges by deliberately wresting goods and other things from other people. It engages in a small way or a big way in the business of appropriating whatever it can lay its hands on, and in time a very strong class is built up.'[2]

It is of the greatest importance in an age where democracy appears everywhere to struggle for survival to watch out for the new leaders of whatever sort and to study the backgrounds upon which great leaders have built their power. Ogburn has presented the case for the "great man" theory of history. The great man theory of history has been so general that not only has written history been centered about great men, but some outstanding individual has been acclaimed as the most important factor in each high peak of human achievement. Professor Ogburn calls attention to the confusion between greatness as inherited through biological processes and greatness in personality developed through social incidence. He concludes that the potentialities of greatness are common and constant. This conclusion is in accord with our other chapters in which we urged a more comprehensive study of social incidence and social organization.

Professor Ogburn estimates that the great achievements of these

personalities have depended upon two cultural situations. The first is a favorable cultural environment in which achievements may be performed. The second situation is that of social valuations of the group. He continues: 'These different social conditions that affect the production of greatness include the social forces, which usually mean the dynamic element arising from the impulses of a plural number of human beings, impulses organized into particular habit mechanisms in different cultural media. Social valuations represent probably very well these social forces, for men do what the group values. These group valuations are quite integrally related to and dependent upon the accumulation of cultural elements at any one time; for instance the status of the industrial arts has much to do with determining the social valuation of commercial enterprise. The social conditions are therefore very closely related to the social forces.'

In previous chapters we have called attention to the lessening influence of physical environment, race, and other factors in the modern world due to social change. The comprehensive organization of society with its elimination of distances and time and its coordination of activities reduces the exclusive influence of single factors. Without lessening the importance of society's developing leadership, the same tendency will probably be true with reference to the great man of the future. Professor Ogburn's conclusion states the problem:

'The role of the exceptional individual in the social process and the relative dependence of social change and achievement on social forces or the great man will no doubt be a subject of debate for some time to come. But these results of recent researches do seem to clarify the analysis. Our conclusions are that greatness must be conceived in terms of inherited qualities and environmental traits. The distribution of inherited qualities appears to be such that the inherited abilities of greatness should be plentiful and constant, facts which minimize the importance of the great man, biologically conceived. On the social forces side, there are two important factors that affect great achievement, the existing cultural materials and the social valuations. These two factors vary greatly over time and by places, and hence may be called causes of great achievement. They are of the nature of social forces. Great men are thus the product of their times. They in turn influence their

times, that is, their achievement influences the times. The great man is thus a medium in social change. The phenomenon of the great man varies in the different kinds of social activities, and each situation should be separately analyzed as to the relative strength of the different factors. In some cases psychological traits of personality are more important than others. These factors at the present time are only with great difficulty susceptible of precise measurement. But certain extended observations indicate that the production of great men and their influence are strongly conditioned and determined by the particular existing stage of the historical development. The great man and his work appear therefore as only a step in a process, largely dependent upon other factors.'[3]

We have pointed out something about the influence of the leader upon his state or his institution or his movement. We should go even further and note that in the history of communities and movements the dominant personality has usually constituted the greatest individual factor. This is true in influencing individuals as well as groups. If the personal judgment of several thousand college students be summarized it will be found that far more of them have been influenced by a single leader or person than by any institution except the home and family. Sometimes the influence of the dominant personality is good and sometimes it is bad. Sometimes he is teacher, preacher, doctor, athlete, friend, chum. Sometimes he is statesman, sometimes demagogue. So important is the problem of leadership in the common community that men are accustomed to despair of effective work or to expect great things in proportion as there is poor or good leadership. For, just as it is the nature of some individuals to lead, so it seems to be natural for the great majority to follow. The possession of qualities of leadership, therefore, gives men enormous power and lays upon society a great obligation for the proper training and development of the individual. One of the most important studies that can be made is an exhaustive inquiry into the inheritance and personalities of community leaders. Here is a man who for twenty years has been leader in school, church, political, and banking circles; and he has kept the town split from end to end. He is the dominant, "righteous" sort of man. But is he a good leader? Here is a man who keeps his state con-

stantly alive and tense by opposing every constructive act for social progress; who lives upon the propensity of men for following picturesque personalities and "anti"-agitations. Is he not a bad leader? Here is the great man" theory, all too real and destructive. Our great leader becomes a shibboleth to hinder thinking and to breed intolerance. This is, therefore, a time when genuine consideration of the problems of leadership will be of special value. In this chapter a few of these considerations will be suggested.

Much could be said concerning the great-man theory of history as it has affected the past. Here it is important to note that society is perhaps gradually changing its conception of what constitutes leadership. And in its new ideals of leadership there may be hope for the elimination of the demagogue. There are many aspects of this transfer of emphasis, and many grounds, therefore, for crudeness and poverty in the transitional stages. Of course it has long since been recognized that leadership has been transferred from kings to people and that we no longer educate for royalty. But what has become of the leader with "authority," whether in government, in church, in industry or elsewhere in which the bigness of the leader is measured by the subjection of his followers? What has become of the dominant leadership of the church? Is there being transferred from capital to labor much of the important leadership of the future? Has there been a transfer of leadership from country life and agricultural groups to city and industrial folk? Is the dominance of lawyer and politician being taken over by farmer and worker? Has the one-man superdomination epoch given way to the crowd, and, if so, how much mob and how much democracy? Has the family surrendered its leadership to other agencies? What will be the effect of woman's enlarging leadership? Is the leadership of youth encroaching upon that of maturity? Is Mr. Babbitt taking the place of the former man of professional distinction?

It would be well if the common man were to hold the leaders of social science in greater respect than he has done in the past. While the physical scientist and the social scientist may not combine the qualities needed for general social and political leadership, we must recognize and esteem the qualities of such men. Discussing "individuality in research," Mr. Carmichael says: 'Openness and plasticity of mind, even to age, is a general characteristic

of men of genius. A desire for truth is their fundamental possession and they are not deterred from its pursuit by petty inconsistencies. Socrates was delighted when confuting others; and, if found in error, was no less pleased when confuted. In his mind no evil was so great as false judgment concerning the just and the unjust.' Glenn Frank, in his *The Outlook for Western Civilization,* interprets the ideal of the creative leader in an effective way: 'The creative scholar has an insatiable appetite for facts and an insistent reluctance to draw conclusions. To this modesty of scholarship the world owes a debt it can never discharge. I realize the importance of suspended judgment in the work of the scholar, but it seems to me that we must also face the fact that a civilization will starve on a diet of suspended judgment alone. The scholar can never turn dogmatist. He must ever hold his conclusions open to revision in the light of further research. This does not, however, do away with the fact that, unless civilization is to play into the hands of selfish interests and social inertia, society must evolve some technic for using the results of scholarly research in the determination of its basic policies.' President Eliot has well said that 'the pioneers of science like the pioneers in exploration and colonization must find their way through pathless regions. It is only later generations that build smooth roads and railways for the transportation of inattentive multitudes where the pioneer trod alone and watchful.' Mr. Pearson points out a neglected factor: 'Training, intellectual power, physical fitness, application and integrity are requirements which need no explanation. Stability is a trait which is often given too little weight. Some of the ablest men are affected with a restlessness which impairs their usefulness. We need investigators who will devote a lifetime, if necessary, to a single problem instead of pursuing the latest scientific fad.'

The leader in science, however, is ordinarily not so dominant and influential as other types. Of these types the political leader is perhaps the most common and powerful at the present time. Professor Charles E. Merriam has been studying for a number of years the problem of leadership in American politics with a view to discovering ways of developing more intelligent and better trained leaders for the future. A second purpose of his study is to enable people at large to discriminate in the choosing of leader-

ship. Professor Merriam has studied many American leaders in respect to their general background, their physical and intellectual capacities, their sensitiveness to prevailing tendencies, their quickness of perception and action, their facility in group combination, their ease of personal contact, their ability to dramatize, and their courage. In his book, *Four American Party Leaders,* he has applied this method to Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Bryan. The student will do well in studying the whole problem of leadership to read stories of these four great political leaders, just as in his study of the scientific leader he will do well to read many of the sketches in *American Masters of Social Science,* listed at the end of this chapter.

The student may, of course, make further studies of the qualities of leadership in various modern biographies. He will find the lives of modern Americans like Edward Bok or Henry Ford or Thomas R. Marshall or Herbert Quick full of distinctive qualities. Or he might find great profit in the study of ancient leaders as depicted in Plutarch's *Lives.* Or he might select at random such great military and political leaders as Julius Caesar, Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, Napoleon I, Bismarck, Cavour, Disraeli. In these leaders he would find ample evidence of the qualities which are demanded by those who follow. Besides the dominant personality he would find versatility, diversity of interests, fierce energy, the indomitable will, the unquenchable ambition, keen foresight, smooth diplomacy, a taste for duplicity, the power of organization, the ability to inspire confidence and devotion. Or the student might study other qualities of leadership as set forth in the doctrine of expediency preached by Machiavelli in *The Prince.* Over against these types and qualities of leadership the student will be constantly contrasting the requirements of the modern leader.

The study of ancient leaders as found in Plutarch's *Lives* will not only make familiar the old types of leaders but will help the student further to contrast vividly the qualifications of the new leaders as opposed to those of the old. What were the qualities which distinguished Themistocles, Coriolanus, Alcibiades, Pericles, Mark Antony, Caesar, Demosthenes, Cicero, Aristides? While there were manifest in these leaders the usual qualities of physical and biological fitness, intellectual alertness, industry, persistence,

ambition, fortitude, courage, were they not different in many respects from the modern leader? Were they not more impetuous, vehement, intolerant, lavish, cruel, selfish, self-willed, inhuman, ignorant, unscrupulous, treacherous, insolent? Were they more susceptible to flattery, more ruthless in the attainment of personal ends, more pompous, more given to pleasure seeking, more "wordy"? Were their qualities of simplicity, happiness of disposition, friendliness, sociability, patriotism, poise, sympathy, kindness, good humor, merely secondary traits serving as means to the satisfying of indomitable will? Or is the student to conclude that their qualities were not only the products of the age but necessary reflections of what the people expected of their leaders? In this case we might study these leaders again under the several categories of their ideals of justice, courage, pride, enthusiasm, subtlety, stoicism, austerity, learning, honor, morality, and find the same consistency of strong personality and equipment, but manifested in a different environment. Thus we come back again to the influence of the leader upon social custom and morality and the influence of social conditions upon the leader. Types of leadership must vary with changing social conditions.[4]

This premise of the changing nature of leadership is borne out by a statistical study of various *Who's Who* in this country and elsewhere. Thus, in America the figures show that earlier leaders were recruited largely from the field of politics and public affairs. Later they were more representative of business and industry. Apparently now they tend to increase in the field of government and public administration with the prospect of a combination of the two. There are, therefore, many questions needing to be answered. What will be the effect of the radio in giving power and position to leaders who otherwise might not rise to eminence? What will be the effect of this radio power upon the behavior of new leaders? Is the "big man" to be a figure of the past except as he becomes a dictator? Are the thousands of leaders in science, technology, literature, capable of exerting the dominating influence which a few leaders in politics originally exerted? What will be the effect upon leadership patterns if government tends to become the rule of persons rather than of constitutions?

# *PART THREE*

## *THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE PEOPLE*

### *Chapter XVIII*

### *INSTITUTIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD*

If we characterize the institutions as buffer between the individual and his environment, this is one way of calling attention to the importance of institutions in a modern world where environment is so complex and changeable as to overwhelm the individual. If we point out further that the institution should serve especially as a buffer between the people and rapid social change, this is one way of indicating the continuing need of strong social institutions at a time when science and technology are working such tremendous changes in all walks of life. As buffer between the people and their changing environment the institution would appear to assume a larger and larger role in the totality of modern society. Here, again, the illustration from American society is impressive.

Yet this very change and technology create new problems for the institutions themselves, so that most institutions appear to be more concerned with their own form and survival in the changing world than they are with the welfare of the people for whom they exist. Here indeed is dilemma of the first order—problem for the institutions, problem for the people. For, if the institutions must expend their energy and devote their processes to their own ends, what is happening to the people in their midst? Yet this is apparently the case. For what ancient institution, whether family or government or industry, is not in the throes of some titanic struggle for survival in the modern world?

How realistic this struggle is may be seen by glancing at prevailing changes and conflicts which go on in and among our in-

## EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRACY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

From Charles A. Beard's "The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy"
Adapted from *Educational Policy*, December 15, 1938

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| What new circumstances in our national life call upon educational leadership to reconsider its position and obligations in and to society? | (a) The need for highly technically trained workers; (b) the raised age for young workers, (c) the transformed structure of the family, (d) the shorter work hours; (e) social problems, (f) depression, (g) World War; (h) crime problems. |
| How must the adjustment in the school's program be made to meet these demands? | Since the educational program at present is largely traditional, there must be adjustment to meet contemporary conditions and opportunities in terms of public interest. |
| What does the history of our nation show concerning the attitude of our great leaders with regard to education? | The history of our nation shows that education was deemed indispensable to popular government and public happiness. |
| What educational philosophy has prevailed through the development of our nation? | Our educational philosophy has been adapted to the spirit of the age, changing as the spirit changes. |
| What new interests and ideas demand educational readjustments within our schools? | (a) Multiplications of the functions of political government, (b) tenancy, (c) conservation, (d) corporate ownership, (e) nationalization of industry and agriculture, (f) unions and production associations; (g) disintegration of family life, and (h) regulatory functions of government, (i) establishment of scientific knowledge, (j) development of the field of social science, (k) change in the course of foreign relations. |
| What is the nature of education and its obligations? | Forever affiliated with education is the inscrutable urge of aspiration and creative intelligence which gives elevation to daily duties and seeks the improvement of the heritage Education guards industry, patience, self-denial, and consideration for others, and at the same time stimulates imagination, originality, and invention, by which the treasures of mankind are enlarged and enriched. |
| What is the business of education? | The primary business of education in effecting the promises of American democracy, is to guard, cherish, advance, and make available in the life of coming generations the funded and growing wisdom, knowledge, and aspirations of the race |
| How important is the teaching of an acceptable code of behavior to boys and girls? | There is nothing in a chemical fact, or in a financial fact, which necessarily instructs the learner in the right use of it. The schools deal with the enduring stress of human life, as well as with its enduring values Education is concerned with the whole of life and the best of it. The acknowledged leaders of education in all ages have been in fact ethical teachers. |
| How concerned should education in the public schools of these United States be with democracy? | Democracy nourishes the free spirit of science. Democracy rests on ideals, institutions and economy, the production and distribution of wealth In turn education is the foundation of democracy Education cherishes and inculcates its moral values, disseminates knowledge necessary to its functioning, spreads information relevant to its institutions and economy, and keeps alive the creative and sustaining spirit without which democracy would perish. |
| How important is it that the public schools should teach boys and girls how to live together in a democracy? | Education must prepare youth for associational life and activities With organized industry on one hand and organized labor on the other every individual is faced with collective responsibilities Then, too, education must prepare citizens for participation in associational government. |
| How is education distinguished from propaganda? | Propaganda "in the broadest sense is the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations" which may take "spoken, written, pictorial or musical form." In actual practice, however, propaganda is misrepresentation or partial representation for the advantage of special interests. The propagandist places the interest of his group above all other interests He puts forward opinions as facts and closes his mind to truths that do not serve his purpose. Education tolerates none of these methods. |
| What are the conditions requisite for the discharge of their obligations by the schools? | If the schools are to carry out their obligations certain conditions must exist. "If education is to realize its true goal, it cannot confine itself to an academic discussion of life—it must become a part of life itself." Educational liberty has a constitutional foundation in every state, and no school board is bound to obey a legislative act that is judged by proper legal authority to violate the constitution under which it operates. |

stitutions and our moral and esthetic standards. Thus we come back again and again to seek balance and equilibrium between the past and the present, between science and tradition, between men and institutions. A part of the dilemma of the American people in the crisis of the 1930's was reflected in the paradox of what they called "American" and what they were doing that was, by the same token, zestfully "un-American." Here were powerful psychological complex and conflict, fruits of great changes in both technical and cultural America, not yet sensed and adjusted to individual and institutional life. The people clamored for conformity to the American tradition, the American ideal, the American doctrine, the American system, the American philosophy, at the same time and with the same eloquence with which they proclaimed the breakdown of the old American way, the outmoding of the present order, the "tottering to the ground of the old system" which made absolutely inevitable the New Deal and the abandoning of the old America which men would know no more forever. College alumni wanted "the old college" to remain as it was in their day; the business man, doctor, lawyer, farmer, thought the religion of his mother was good enough for him; luncheon club speakers, organized business and professional folk spoke nonchalantly of the preservation of American manners and morals, the sanctity of the home, the glory of the American tradition, with scant sympathy for newfangled ways and social reform or interference with American individualism.

What they did, as soon as ever they could conclude with admonition and eloquence, was indeed the new America. Now speeding at seventy miles an hour to a football game and to denounce the college for a losing team; now by airplane hither and yon; now quick summer trip to London and back; now golf or touring or movie the Sabbath livelong day; or radio sermon or light entertainment for 60,000,000 listeners, Radio City to the uttermost parts of the nation. They read books on sex, on murder, saw sex movies and crime thrillers in such abundance as never existed in the old American days. Yet they were proud that they were "as American as turkey and cranberry sauce." They were proud that they had made of America the greatest nation on earth and that they had worked hard to give the nation a life more abundant in the search for new reaches of multiple

activities. They longed for a sense of satisfaction and security as of the earlier days.

Still something was wrong somewhere. Nostalgic yearning for the good old days could not meet the demands of changing times and institutions from which came abundant harvest of dilemmas. There were many who affirmed that it was the people who could not change, rather than the institutions. Certainly the problem of America in the next period was essentially a crisis of both. The limitations of the people contributed to the difficulty of designing the new blueprints of progress but also made absolutely imperative planned specifications to follow. It came to pass, therefore, that there was no greater and more dramatic picture than that which portrayed the changing ways of the nation and its people. These included many a new and dramatic product of what the human wealth of the nation, working with natural wealth and technological wealth and artificial wealth, had wrought in institutional modes of life and what changes the great technology had imposed upon the nation's social institutions and attitudes. The ways of the nation of the 1930's in striking contrast to what was called the American way of earlier days constituted basic groundwork for the new planning which must come or for dictatorship, chaos, or revolution instead. A long list from which here are samplings: There were the old clear motivation and the new confusion; the old scarcity and the new abundance; the old security and the new fear; the old personal-contact control and the new corporate power. The new interdependency was contrasted with the old self-sufficiency, the new artificial wealth with the old natural bounty; the new secondary occupations with the old primary work; the new high standards with machine production in contrast to old low standards with hard personal work; the new impersonal anonymity contrasted with the old personal life relationships.

And further, the mass picture reflected a civilization so complex and intricate and so fabricated with collective action as to lose the individual. The old emphasis upon the individual struggle and upon the spirit of mankind seemed to be submerged in emergency action and social planning. And especially the tempo was in contrast with that of the Jeffersonian era. James Truslow Adams catalogued an impressive list of contrasts, some of the

pairings of which were: The old self-discipline and the new self-expression, the old rest and the new restlessness, the old saving and the new spending, the old liberty and the new prosperity, the old self-reliance and the new dependency. And paired against each other, earlier and later, were solitude and gregariousness, simplicity and luxury, restraint and ostentation, solidity and show, integrity and success, wise giving and easy generosity, affection for the old and desire for the novel, old thought for new impressions, old ideas for new facts. And there were still more for the searching: indoors for outdoors, knowledge of things for knowledge of nature, riding for walking, city ways for rural, movie-made children for discipline-conditioned conduct, etiquette of the advertisement for training in the home. Nevertheless, many of the contrasts chronicled new reaches in both work-ways and play-ways, in the appreciation of beauty, in the mastery of bigness, in the insistence upon precision and standards, in the acquisition of knowledge, and in ideals of progress undreamed of in the earlier days. Hosts of others like them were logical products of the rise of American civilization, playing as yet unknown parts in the picture.

The world of manners and ways of living was so new and different from the old that America was wont to entertain itself with contemplation of the "only yesterdays." Magnificent cultural entertainment, hilarious enjoyment of what was top form yesterday. Uproarious laughter at what was considered shocking in the nineties, "believe it or not," "strange as it may seem" reactions to the commonplace superlatives at the turn of the century. An early Ford model young as the century, younger than the youngest child of those who viewed it as a curiosity indeed. No wonder the manners and ways of the earlier America hold little reality for this generation.

There was of old the first President of the United States, picturing most minutely in his own careful handwriting, in letters a thousandfold, details of family life, of health and good cheer, of a long and tedious trip to the nation's capital. 'The day is come,' he wrote, 'and the hour at hand, or very nearly—when our journey will Commence for Philadelphia. From the stage driver's account, the Roads in places, especially between George Town and Baltimore are almost unpassible. This circumstance, and

the desire of not injuring my horses, will make my movements very slow,—and they may be precarious as Giles is very unwell—and my bungling Smith, has lamed one of the Horses that draw the Waggon in shoeing him.' 'Slow-moving journey, animal power for stagecoach pilot, contrasting picture of ways of doing things then startlingly different from the way the President of 1933-1939 and his helpers did things. Radio talk to the nation. Multitudes of photographers and reporters giving the nation pictures of what was happening. Telegraph and wireless, a thousandfold dictated letters and memoranda, thousands of helpers telephoning across the nation, near and far. The voice of the people, cabinet members and little cabinet, advisers and counsellors speeding all over the nation in trains and in planes by the thousands of miles to reconnoitre for the nation's business.

In the prevailing attitudes of the people toward life and ideals, toward religion and sex and conduct, there have manifestly been great changes. The whole nation at one time was fundamentalist. Yet in the 1930's the fundamentalism of America was more articulate than real. The nature of religion had changed as was indicated in the picture of the churches. The circulation of newspapers and periodicals was tremendous, and the radio was constantly pouring forth pronouncements and information. Eleven leading periodicals had a circulation of a million or more, while in 1930 there was a reported circulation of 33,000,000 for the major periodicals. Religious periodicals and discussions lost in favor of scientific and educational. Of the scientific discussions, the practical and applied aspects predominated even as was presented in A Century of Progress, at Chicago, where the application of science through invested capital to the practical uses of life was the dominant feature. The nature of the religious literature had changed to the more worldly and less other-worldly concepts of religion. The Bible received less than half the attention it had at the beginning of the century. Traditional religion had been transcended by new discussions of science, religion, and God. There had been an increase in psychical research and spiritism with a flood of new "isms" and organizations. Formal propaganda for atheism made some headway in books, periodicals, discussion, and organizations, but the American picture still had no reputable place for it.

There was a considerable change in attitudes toward sex and birth control. There was a flood of sex books, some orthodox and authentic from the medical viewpoint, many frankly overfeaturing sensational promise of revelations which would appeal to old folks and young folks. Many emphasized the old art of love as it would be made new, translated to America from the older eastern patterns. Fiction continued to feature sex with a new frankness, and by 1933 a thousand books had been published which in pre-war days would have been declared obscene. There was many a contest between censor and author and publisher which added to the gaiety of the 1930's, with much of the episode frankly pragmatic. It was, however, a long way from the old puritanic code of silence on sex matters to the scores of published books in the 1930's dealing with the sex techniques. The picture varied, now a seeming crest of interest, now a receding wave, but always the recurring current of literature calculated to interest a society seeking excitement and satisfactions of life. Undoubtedly, however, the picture of the 1930's showed changes and gains which made the old ways impossible of return.

Perhaps the most vivid of all the changing pictures of formal attitudes was that toward prohibition, which constituted one of the most remarkable turn-about-face episodes in the annals of the nation. It was another of those pictures in which the nation's effort to abandon well-formulated folkways failed. The remarkable kaleidoscopic episode of the noble experiment reaffirmed the conclusion that whenever there is conflict between folkways and stateways, the folkways always win. The New York picture of Broadway's hundred thousand parade led by the picturesque Mayor Walker featuring "We Want Beer" was the key to the national repeal. Yet the picture was mixed again. There were millions of Americans still prohibitionists, many others who continued to use the controversy for political or religious issues; and the nation as a whole had nonchalantly awaited repeal with no plan for control perfected for the next experiment.

Call the roll again and again for the extraordinary range of character and activity of this vigorous, lusty people, needing direction, zestful of life. Change and change. The America of the 1930's could boast no John L. Sullivan and Jake Kilrain in a 75-round, bare-fist fight, but it could point to million-dollar Tunney-

Dempsey gate receipts, and to Joe Louis, the brown bomber, annihilating German Max Schmeling in less than one round. It could picture more marathons of pole-sitting, dancing, walking; and it could boast of the spectacle of a million hitchhikers thumbing their ways up and down and across the country. It could boast of a new Mae West and it could get excited over "Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?" and listen world without end to Amos 'n' Andy. It could enjoy the spectacle of the Chicago Century of Progress featuring skyrides overlapping the Hall of Science, the cars being christened Amos, Andy, Madam Queen, Kingfish, Lightning, rather than dignified with the names of stars or inventors or scientists. It could laugh at Moon Mullins and Andy Gump and worry over Little Orphan Annie and listen everyday to radio's featuring of the Orphan Annie Episode. There were waiting lines for both Mae West and "Green Pastures." There was a public to buy millions of copies of funny books, of crossword puzzles, "ask me another," or of *The Story of Philosophy* or *Anthony Adverse* or *Ann Vickers* and *Main Street,* and *Gone with the Wind.* And there was demand for millions of *True Stories* and Macfadden magazines and multiplied variety of sex appeal publications.

It was a long way from the old folk dances to the modern Murray dancing lessons, or from the square dances to the Big Apple or to the public pattern of the million participating dancers throughout the America of the post-war period. But in between there were romance and art and all manner of variety—barn dance, cotillion, two-step and cakewalk, merry widow waltz and tango, one step and hesitation, turkey trot and walk trot, maxixe and fox trot, bunny hug and grizzly bear, Charleston and black bottom, shimmy and Cuban rhythm, and the hosts of new steps, model changing like automobiles or styles of bathing suits. And contrast between the America of the 1933's and the old Barbary Coast so great as to defy measurement.

In all of the prevailing characterizations of America it was difficult to find an adequate picture of the mass laboring group. Throngs of people, white-faced and tense, went to Washington but the poor man was not with them. Plans and books and theories were legion but the poor man was not in them, save in abstract theory. Women's clubs, service clubs, libraries, schools, all

went their way but the poor man was not with them. Yet his numbers were multiplying and the same country which could turn out 90,000 football fans could hide its thousands of unemployed and poor somewhere in the public relief picture. The states that could send their special football trains across the states could not muster funds to match federal relief. The same county-site towns all over the nation which crowded its public squares with new automobiles could not help its poor people in the American way of life. Here was fashion that somehow must change and change quickly in the *mores* and folkways of the upper groups of American citizens. And the change would require more than the American way of keeping in uproar about a Sacco-Vanzetti or Scottsboro episode. It would have to go deeper than picturesque and sentimental sympathy for the far-off unfortunate.

For here again were fundamentals in a nation questioning survival of its tradition. Growing out of changing ways of doing things, of changing attitudes and conduct, of ideas and motivation, and part and parcel of the nation's folkways, were multiple dilemmas in each of the chief institutional modes of life. They were social dilemmas which again challenged the American system. Professor Tufts had referred to them as parts of America's social morality. In the family there were four conflicts in the *mores* of sex and marriage: first conflict, repression or expression; second conflict, biological maturity versus cultural demands; third conflict, physical factor in sex versus emotional refinement in love and reflective control through reason; fourth conflict, individual freedom and social pressures. There were six dilemmas of business: first, market standards of quality; second, market standards of price; third, the profit motive versus public welfare; fourth, competition versus combination, free competition versus fair competition; fifth, advantages and perils of economic power; sixth, speculation versus giving an equivalent, something for nothing versus earning. Likewise, there were four conflicts of interest between employer and employee: first, how much to profits and how much to wages; second, how much is a day's work; third, which party shall bear the risks; fourth, which party is to determine shop conditions? There were other conflicts in attitudes toward property and wealth, toward government, toward law and lawlessness, to-

ward temperance and the vices, and a great range in dilemmas of public and private morals.

In order to illustrate these institutional problems of the people and to simplify our presentation, we have been accustomed to limit our discussion to six major institutions: the *home and family;* the *school and education;* the *church and religion;* the *state and government; industry and work; community and association;* all of these focused, of course, upon the setting of American democracy. Acting upon these and fabricated by them is, of course, a vast jungle of attitudes, beliefs, patterns of behavior, codes and manners, techniques and procedures, traditions and near-institutions, baffling and bewildering alike to social scientist, moralist, publicist, leader, common man.

Now each institution has its relatively generic and organic structure and function, more or less constant in the long road of human evolution, in contrast to the temporary form, medium, or local instrumentality through which such structure and function survive. Thus the *home* is the physical abode of the *family;* the *school* represents the multiple housing and organization of *education;* the *church* is the tabernacle of *religion;* the *state* is the organization of *government.* If *work* is a law of life and growth, *industry* is the way of work. Recreation, fellowship, association, collective action are society itself for the multiple expression of which the *community* has grown to be the nearest total symbol.

There have been great variations and changes in the forms and organization of these institutions, but the institutions themselves change slowly. And there are innumerable unnecessary conflicts between the form and principles involved. Government and sovereignty in some form abound everywhere, but the form is constantly changing. It has changed radically of late in Germany and Russia. So, too, the form of the home, log cabin to mansion, has varied greatly. The rural home and the city home; home of rich man and poor man; home in America and home in India have differed greatly, yet the family, with varying stages of development, is the same basic unit of society no matter what type of new home arrangements may have developed. The school might be the much-romanced little red schoolhouse or it might be one of the many "million dollar" high schools or a great university; yet the processes of education are always fundamental to

survival and progress. And as to religion there are more than 200 creeds and denominations in the nation reflecting different forms of worship and representing the religious forces always powerful in America. And of forms of government in the United States there were no less than 250,000 separate governing, money-appropriating bodies to indicate variation in form and function. And of industry, the industrial revolution and technology are ample illustration of changing forms for fundamental processes. Of community forms and sanctions there was no end—blue laws and regulations, organizations for recreation, fellowship, esthetics, social work, civic endeavor—basic avenues for conflict between new and old.

Within each of these institutional modes of activity there grow up scores of patterns and standards, codes and customs and manners for the guidance of men, deep-grounded, slow-changing: marriage and sex codes, etiquette and honor, sanction and taboo, parental control and standards of living in the home. In American public education, learning will make us free, college is the thing! And of vocational and technical education, with a hundred patterns of teaching and administration in the school, there is no end. And still new religions, worship and ritual, faith of the fathers, moral and spiritual dictatorship, multiplied the forms of religious expression. Money and banking, trade and credit, multiple minor institutions, free private enterprise—business was for business, not for health—patterns for the industrial order. Language and literature, a thousand "societies" and organizations, east side and west side, folkways and *mores,* consolidated the ways of community expression. Laws and precedents, constitutions and charters, were multiplied institutional ways of social control by government.

Working through these institutions, and created and developed by them, were the leaders of the people, brilliant and stupid, imaginative and dull, statesman and demagogue, stubborn to move, and varying notably from time to time, and from environment to environment. Also working upon institutions and created by them were the forces of science and invention and social change itself, no respecter of things old or new. And over and above these were the forces of social incidence, the "acts of God" and of the elements which man had not mastered, the eternal puzzle of human nature which he had not yet diagnosed—mankind speak-

ing new languages, swept on through new techniques, driven by old, old impulses, into new ways of all flesh.

Now the problems of institutions are multiplied by the increase of technology and science, as we have pointed out, so that there is always disorganization when the demands of artificial society and supertechnology are greater than the capacity of the institutions themselves. Yet a great many of the problems of the institutions arise over the stubborn allegiance to form of tradition as opposed to the merits of generic institutional values. Thus the dogmas of religion have often been instrumental in the defeat of Christianity. Inflexible patriarchal household rule has often broken up the family. Traditional curricula in the school and failure to recognize individual differences in pupils have often defeated the ends of education. Fighting over forms of labor organization has often negated the great opportunities of work, while stubborn allegiance to traditional paternalistic patterns has often defeated the ends of industrial order. Bureaucracy and totalitarianism are forms of the state which enslave the people and defeat the ends of good government.

Thus, specific problems of institutions emerge from changing conditions, so that one task of the student is to design technical, workable ways which will tend to bring about balance and equilibrium between the old forms and the new demands. In the family are, therefore, problems of divorce and marriage, of birth control and greater opportunity for women. In the church are problems of interpreting and administering the social gospel. In the school are problems of meeting the demands of community and home and industry to take over more and more functions.

And focusing upon all the other institutions are the new demands upon government and new dangers to government inherent in the increasing tendency to make the form of the state supreme as an end rather than as a means to serve the people. The function of all our institutions is to serve mankind, not as an end but as a means, yet the trend of government toward the totalitarian state is a natural and logical reason both because sovereignty and power reside alone in the state of all institutions and because of the greatly increasing scope of governmental activities gradually touching nearly all phases of life. We shall, therefore, examine, first of the great institutions, government in relation to democracy and particularly with reference to the American scene.

## *Chapter XIX*

# *GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY*

PRESSING and vivid in the midst of all the dramatic episodes of world events of the 1930's and especially in the American scene is the perennial question as to whether democracy will survive, whether the democratic nations can hold their own in a world threatening dictatorship, and whether society can find the happy margin between governmental control and governmental service. Throughout the whole scene, too, is the sure trend of government to comprehend within its services and technique more and more of the life and labor of the people, so that we come to seek perhaps as never before a new balance and equilibrium between individuation and socialization. Because of these and especially the increasing conflict between government and business, our first task of examining the great institutions is that of appraising the state and government in relation to the world setting and more particularly in relation to American development.

In the United States, the American "system," the American tradition, "the American Dream," all have usually been considered synonymous with American democracy, which in turn has been inseparably associated with the government of the nation and what it has vouchsafed the people. Here, again, the national picture runs parallel to the larger societal premise which assumes that government is the most comprehensive of all the institutions and more nearly than any other institution touches the life of the people at all points. If, therefore, the American nation has been synonymous with the exemplification of democracy, would it not be possible for all practical purposes to make the study of American government the study of that sovereign societal arrangement which we call democracy?

For the student of contemporary society, however, the problem is not quite so simple. Nor, even for the general student of the American scene, can the problem be delimited to the single concept of democracy or the capitalistic system of the United States.

At the very least we must study the ideals and aims of the earlier American government, the changing functions and scope of this government, the role of democracy in it, the relative success and failure of democracy, alternatives for democracy if it will not work, special features of Fascism, Communism, Socialism, and the multiple variations of these forms of government. And, finally, we must inquire as to the meaning of all these in relation to the great societal problems of new adjustments between totalitarian governments and the other institutions.

Something of the changing nature and problems of government may be suggested in the simple review of the changing government of the nation within the first third of the twentieth century. Perhaps no picture of America has been more startling or impressive than that of the expansion of government and government activities and the consequent trend toward centralized control. From the Jeffersonian ideal of simple government, the United States had traveled an incredibly long and devious road. To take a few examples: From the personal recording of a relatively few short and simple documents in the earlier days of the nation, it was publishing in 1930, through its superintendent of documents, the amazing total of 100,000,000 pieces of literature, with some of the reports aggregating more than 1,000,000 words. This is not so fundamental, however, as that reflected in the chief picture of governmental expansion as found in the tax bills which the American citizen was called upon to pay. In two decades the tax bill had been increased by something like $10,000,000,000, or about 400 percent. Moreover, total government expenditures had not stopped with tax moneys, a fair average estimate being that about a third more was expended than would be available from tax moneys.

The catalogue of itemized expenditures was itself a fair inventory of the expanding functions of government. Federal contributions to states and consequent supervision; state control and supervision of education, highways, prisons, public health, public welfare; inspection and supervision of foods, drugs, dairies, industries; supervision of utilities, corporations, basic operations in coal and oil fields; cooperation with aeronautics, coastwise and ocean shipping, scientific research, service to agriculture and industry; legislation protecting children, women, labor; and more recently social security, federal equalization funds, public works, public relief,

and agricultural adjustment. All of these and many more represented the cumulative trend of a great governmental change before the revolution of the early 1930's when the catalogue had become almost synonymous with essential economic activities.

However, centralization, consolidation, scientific specialization, executive control, beginnings of controlled economic processes had set in before the New Deal era as had also the rumblings against taxation, the desire to shift responsibility of government, large-scale competition, the failure of criminal justice, the protest against surplus wealth, and the dominance of business over government. Thus the picture of the emergency America of the early 1930's was one superimposed upon a screen and background which had appeared to be developing for just such a product. The nation would be wealthy in proportion as it had a well-ordered government conserving and promoting the well-being of its citizens. The United States did not have such a government. If, therefore, such a government was the measure of a democracy, then again, by another count, the picture of American democracy was one of confusion.

If wealth and welfare be again appraised as synonymous, America had become immensely wealthy in many of its other institutional modes of action. Among the special items of institutional wealth were its public welfare and social work activities. The trend toward centralization, sometimes called the great balance wheel or stabilizing force in modern complex democracy, was reflected especially in public welfare systems in the states where reorganization of state governments for more economical and more effective services on behalf of the general welfare of the people was considerably accelerated. In recent years the development of state systems of public welfare, in particular, reflected some of the most progressive tendencies. On the one hand, public social work on behalf of children, widowed mothers, the poor, the aged and infirm, the physically handicapped, the socially handicapped, prisoners and delinquents, and the subnormal members of the population, was provided for in systems capable of utilizing the best of public administration in government and of professional social work methods and techniques. More than two-thirds of the states have reorganized state boards or departments under the welfare designation.

Developments went still further in that they were providing, on behalf of government, practical and technical ways of meeting the

many social maladjustments which arise from the bigness of our civilization, the inequalities which arise from economic cycles and depressions, and those which arise from the natural inequalities and deficiencies of a complex ethnic and racial population. This objective was sought through new legislation and methods for supplying and administering public relief, for taking care of the old and infirm, and for pointing toward unemployment and health insurance in cooperation with private business. A majority of the states had enacted some sort of legislation on behalf of workmen's compensation and old-age relief, while Wisconsin in 1931 had blazed the trail for unemployment insurance.

There was more and more the insistent demand that social science, and in particular economics and political science, working through social technologies, discover and make effective ways in which equable cooperation between private philanthropy and social work and public welfare should work out the problem of social welfare in such a way as to reduce greatly the hazards and fear of unemployment, old-age dependency, and the basic stirrings of revolution which well up from gross inequalities unjustly concentrated on the working man and his family. So fundamental was this aspect that it was freely predicted that public relief would have to be provided or else far greater governmental expenditures would be required for armed control of the suffering millions. To work out this situation was one of the major problems of the time alongside those of taxation, reparations, and disarmament.

In law and legal institutions, for instance, it was not the passion for individual liberty and freedom of contract and sanction that dominated the stage. It was rather the great multiplication of laws and their changing nature—laws to protect the individual and the public in the matter of safety from accident, work, automobiles, foods, fire, criminals. Another great body of regulatory and mandatory statutes centered upon such problems as zoning, radio, airplanes, commerce, transportation; still another great body of social legislation centered around constitutional limitations. The quantitative picture of American law and legislation was somewhat like that of artificial wealth, too big to count except in the aggregate. A million and a half decisions upon which the lawyer appealed to the judge for precedent; an annual increment large enough to fill 170,000 printed pages which would print up into 500 good-sized

books. What the total of recent years would be was a matter of imagination and conjecture as were the millions of cases tried in the various types of courts of the nation. Again, there were more than 350 occupations in the cities for which the law required license to operate, and there were nearly 500 other modes of occupational regulations for which the law must provide.

There was much talk of the breaking down of the law and of justice in the courts. There was a great increase in the number of lawyers up to 1930 to the point of exceeding the number in medicine or the ministry, with, however, a decrease setting in for the first years of the 1930's. American social and political action was often reported as being dominated by lawyers, especially the state and national congresses. Something new and in proportion to the new business technology was the corporation lawyer, working for powerful clients, at home, abroad, in state and federal capital. There were important pictures of private interests affecting legislation. There were accusations that the common man failed to receive the same sort of justice as the wealthy. Here again the nation's complex system, its lack of social equilibrium, the growing opportunities for injustice were among the important factors which contributed to the need and the fact of gradual revolution in the nation. Altogether, the picture of the law in the early 1930's was such as to offer a good average part in both the confusion of the day and in the beginning of a new social constitution for the ends of social planning and social justice. If flagrant injustice, incredible evasion of the law by the privileged, graft and racketeering were the dominant notes in the alarmists' trend, equally on the other side the accelerating study, reform, and reconstruction of courts, procedure, criminal justice were signs of the times.

Even in the 1920's the problems of the unequal places and unequal folk were represented as multiplying so rapidly in the fertile soil of unprecedented change and technology that it was predicted that "the inequality of 'equality of opportunity' would likely become the dominant characteristic" of the changing nation. And in accordance with the Jeffersonian mandate, it was pointed out that whenever that growing minority which represents gross inequality tends to become a majority, then existing government is likely to be overthrown.[1]

Since that time the sweep and the speed of change, technology, science, and invention have augmented the unequal places by 10,000,000 unemployed and their families, begrudged the common satisfactions of wholesome living and loving; by millions of youth in school and out, with no outlook worthy of American ideals; by 2,000,000 prehandicapped depression babies; by 5,000,000 marginal folk on land and in urban fringe; and by 10,000,000 of minority groups growing more articulate as the years go by. From the viewpoint, therefore, of the visible ends of democratic achievement, it would appear that we are rapidly approaching the margin of limits beyond which democracy does not and cannot exist. For these reasons and because of social tensions and of multiple currents and forces now at work, it is imperative that we examine as critically as possible not only the probability of bridging the chasm between the concepts and ideologies of what has been called the American dream and its successful implementation through political democracy, but also to explore the availability of whatever alternatives may be possible.

The general premises of our discussions assume specifically the American democracy of the United States, rather than merely a general concept and philosophy of democracy. They assume some sort of answer to that critical current questioning as to what really is Americanism. The American characterization, however, applies to the underlying philosophy as well as to the historical recording of actual practices of democracy.

The American ideology seemed to assume first of all a political democracy with economic freedom. Within this framework was the "American dream" of every man with his opportunity for development, the lowest to the highest, the highest with only the limits of genius or skill. The American ideal seemed to have implied, therefore, the sociological ideal of superior mankind which sets a premium upon individual variates from type, upon developed personality, upon the contribution of the genius or superior person who was to attain eminence through these self-same channels of opportunity which in turn was to be made possible through freedom and through the nurture of well-equipped institutions.

The setting and the procedures for American democracy, however, seemed to comprehend other definitive elements from which the present status is derivative. These include the assumption of

CLASSIFICATIONS FOR DISBURSEMENTS OF 100 FOUNDATIONS AND COMMUNITY FUNDS, 1921 AND 1930, AND TOTAL FOR THE DECADE 1921 TO 1930, FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, RELIGION, LAW AND GOVERNMENT, RACE RELATIONS, MISCELLANEOUS, AND ADMINISTRATION

| Functional Grant | 1921 | 1930 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| *International Relations* | $ 726,713.59 | $ 950,822.17 | $8,131,940.46 |
| General and Unclassified | 395,584.35 | 374,778.35 | 2,992,472.05 |
| Institutes | | 115,000.00 | 429,017.61 |
| Research | 95,226.69 | 161,670.71 | 1,755,622.42 |
| Conferences | | 21,727.77 | 85,369.18 |
| Associations | 162,745.53 | 156,072.90 | 1,778,356.44 |
| Publications | 61,636.35 | 106,910.94 | 875,107.19 |
| Anti-Militaristic | | | 67,057.89 |
| International Libraries | 11,520.67 | 14,661.50 | 150,937.68 |
| *Religion* | 751,980.09 | 714,799.72 | 7,574,976.46 |
| Unclassified | | 1,550.00 | 75,011.00 |
| Churches | 30,438.86 | 295,681.16 | 1,686,444.04 |
| Missions | 78,534.13 | 4,053.12 | 2,232,587.31 |
| Religious Education | 145,479.00 | 253,739.11 | 2,108,787.14 |
| Religious Associations | 497,353.10 | 47,276.33 | 1,143,864.52 |
| Conferences | 175.00 | 8,250.00 | 27,282.45 |
| Surveys | | | 3,500.00 |
| Publications | | 500.00 | 6,000.00 |
| Morals | | 99,800.00 | 279,200.00 |
| Pensions | | 3,500.00 | 12,500.00 |
| *Law and Government* | 444,741.70 | 1,161,082.15 | 6,709,100.73 |
| Law | 82,999.46 | 368,901.38 | 1,780,760.28 |
| Public Administration | 225,359.95 | 359,335.03 | 1,366,099.93 |
| International Law | 135,382.29 | 182,482.76 | 1,607,623.17 |
| Methods of Promoting Change | 500.00 | | 46,956.12 |
| Conferences | | | 2,000.00 |
| Publications | | 247,337.98 | 998,257.89 |
| Training in Citizenship | | 525.00 | 22,410.00 |
| Radical and Labor Movements | 500.00 | 2,500.00 | 884,993.34 |
| *Race Relations* | 7,119.27 | 77,650.81 | 936,365.33 |
| Associations and Organizations | 750.00 | 65,010.70 | 872,430.95 |
| Research | | 3,641.25 | 24,341.25 |
| Conferences | 3,000.00 | 498.86 | 7,748.86 |
| Publications | 3,369.27 | | 4,494.27 |
| Libraries | | | 15,300.00 |
| Institutes | | 8,500.00 | 12,050.00 |
| *Miscellaneous* | 7,712.86 | 14,557.33 | 244,809.14 |
| Prizes | | 4,278.76 | 128,825.32 |
| Care of Animals | 7,712.86 | 935.00 | 13,738.86 |
| Monuments, Flowers, etc. | | 8,022.57 | 73,836.99 |
| Miscellaneous and Unknown | | 1,321.00 | 28,407.97 |
| *Administration* | 1,149,114.53 | 2,486,175.81 | 16,164,354.21 |

Adapted from Lindeman, E. C., *Wealth and Culture.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936, Appendix, pp. 68–135.

limitless frontier areas and resources; of a magnificent agrarian culture later to be well balanced with industry; a ruthless exploitation of nature and the unquestioned mastery of a chosen people over racial minority groups; a group analogy to individual freedom in sectional achievements; the assumption of continuing strong genetic stocks of people in generous reproduction rates with no planned population limits in view; and the assumption of a certain national isolation and self-sufficiency.

Within these American premises there is still the assumption of a distinction between the concept of democracy which represents attainable ideals, and the actual visible ends of organized democracy which represent at most direction and approximation. This means a full recognition of the difference between theory and practice, between dominant ideas and actual institutions. It is assumed further that no matter what the present chasm between the theory and the practice of democracy may be in fact, the concept must be preserved as constituting the greatest promise of the ultimate attainment of the reality of the democratic process. Our definition, therefore, must be found somewhere within the limits of a merging of concept and theory with the reality of social process, in which will best be approximated the attainable ends of an enduring democracy.

On the basis of such distinction between the concept and theory of democracy and the reality of the process, and measuring practical results in the social ends of equality rather than in ideals or mere political framework, the present United States does not approximate the democratic ideal in practice. It is not so necessary to cite commonplace evidence to support this assumption as it is to indicate a sort of framework of inequalities and how they have grown up from the earlier American days. For here is a nation in which the per capita wealth of the highest group is a thousand times that of the lowest; the per capita personal income tax of the highest state is more than a hundred times that of the lowest; and if personal and corporate income be considered, the highest state is 120 times that of the lowest; while if the per capita income as measured by net incomes of $50,000 or over be considered, the highest state is more than 400 times that of the lowest. The states with the largest number of children to be educated have less than one-tenth the money for this purpose that the states with the small-

est number have. And so on and on, measured by more than 200 ordinary gauges of status, the index of inequality in the states and regions ranges anywhere from 2 to 500.

To cite more specific samplings, there is scarcely approximation to democracy in the life of many of the minority peoples in America. There is little semblance of democracy, either cultural or political, for 12,000,000 Negroes in the United States, or for 18,000,000 white folks in the South who must educate more Negro children than all the children of all races in the wealthier Far Western Region. There is no equality of opportunity for tenant farmers and their children, or for the millions of families who, through no fault of their own, submerged below the American standard, are told that they cannot have children. There is no semblance of equality and fraternity in the millions of displaced folk turned adrift from farm or mine or factory or shunted from one age group to another. There is no democracy for the millions who, following the American dictum to save, have lost everything they had and have broken under the strain. There is no equality for the millions of depression handicapped children already being conditioned to un-American standards and ideals. And there is little in current American democracy to appeal to the college youth who can look forward to very little in prospect for the immediate future.

A fundamental reason for the continuing of this American faith as exemplified in democracy is the increasing conviction, arrived at from much observing and gathering of evidence, that the present alternatives being tried in the rest of the world do not appear to approximate the ideals of equality and opportunity even so much as the American system; and even though they succeed in lands of their peculiar conditioning, their ideologies and form do not carry with them the basis for social organization competent to achieve the highest American human welfare. Furthermore, preliminary experimentation in regional problems and special areas of American dilemma have not indicated their availability at the present time for successful application. Within the framework of our American premises, even though the goals of these alternatives conform to the ideologies of the greatest good to the greatest number of people, the difficulties in the way of their implementation are greater than those of our own democratic organization.

Moreover, the great deficiencies of American democracy and in-

equality are explainable in terms of logical and inevitable sequences to circumstances, policies, and action which will not continue to obtain in the American picture. Consequently, there is yet the supreme challenge for American institutions to achieve qualitative results in the next era as they have achieved quantitative results in the past.

The hypothesis of this discussion is that the present gross inequalities and chaos are due to failure to achieve orderly transition from the old America to the new, and that in all probability the motivation and the attainment of such orderly transition in the present period will constitute the sole definitive democracy of the next few years. Inherent in the period will be the essence of both the democratic problem and any alternative solution which may prove necessary. It is likely that in the transition period and its motivation will be found not only crisis, tension, and travail, but also the supreme experiment of western civilization.

Under such premises it is not possible at this time to predict what the new forms of our democracy may be or what substitutes may be available. The further premise of our discussion is, therefore, that the alternative to present American democracy will be orderly transitional democracy, with more than ever the titanic struggle for equilibrium and balance between conflicting forces, such as individuation and socialization, and between theory and practice.

This problem of transitional democracy, like the other aspects of the American experience, is reflected in the past history of the nation as well as in the current dilemmas which condition future economic and social arrangements. There was first of all the transition from the Jeffersonian small nation of rural states, of one or two regions of simple motivation, of homogeneity of people, of few occupations, with small individual fortunes centered chiefly in farm and forest, in land and homes, to the present very large nation of urban and industrial majorities, in greatly differing regions with complex motivation and heterogeneity of population, with hundreds of varied occupations, with large individual fortunes, with fabulous salaries, with corporate holdings and wealth.

There was a transition from slaves to free men in sectional realignment, and it was not orderly.

There was and is a transition from agrarian culture and rural

folk to industrial life and urbanization; from isolation to international contacts and back to nationalism; from lack of education to universal education; from illiteracy to a new literacy fearfully and wonderfully fabricated.

There was the transition from the rule of the few to the dominance of the many; from a man's world to a new world in which women assume increasingly larger influence; from the authority of the elders to the questioning of youth; from state and local priority to federal centralization; from the human, man-land, man-labor emphasis to technology; from ideologies to science.

And there was and is finally the transition from depression and emergency to recovery and reconstruction.

In the present transitional period, partly as a result of the elemental factors mentioned and partly responsible for them, there appear to be certain parallel complex forces or movements, sometimes almost merging the one with the other, sometimes in conflict and cross currents. These multiple forces may be the guarantee of continuing democratic processes; or, if subtly utilized by demagogue and mass pathology to merge the folkways with new and powerful stateways, they might easily result in the destruction of the American ideals.

One of a half dozen such major forces may be assumed to be the movement toward violent revolution, in which the restless, resistless tides of dissatisfied folk are focused upon the overthrow of present institutions. In America the catalogue of possible constituents here is relatively long. In the nation at large there are agrarian discontent, labor restlessness, minority groups, and the intellectual discontent of the professional agitator. In the regions roundabout there are the Negro, other minority groups, the disinherited tenant or miner, the industrial worker, the local demagogues, and the extraregional agitator.

On the other side is the movement toward fascism and dictatorship. In the failure of "recovery" or of a better planned and ordered democracy would inhere the strength of fascism or its equivalent. In such a move, so the argument runs, would appear ways and means of satisfying youth, "solving" economic problems for the business man, fighting "communism" and "radicalism," giving the feeling of power and importance to the multitudes, releasing sufferers immediately from poverty and despair, releasing the pub-

lic from thinking, encouraging the protest against high browism, realizing the hopes of a great nationalism, and producing action now. Toward the attainment of these ends the pattern of dictatorship, if the planned democratic order is rejected in the United States, would bring to bear the subtle and almost irresistible combination of a quick mass spiritual transformation and a rapid, almost complete regimentation of the people, such that the folkways would come mysteriously and suddenly to coincide with the stateways.

A third powerful force is what appears to be a sort of mass pathological and messianic current which sweeps along a mixed company of idealists and discontents, a chief characteristic of whose programs is flight from reality in constantly shifting expediency programs.

There is then the powerful current of folk allegiance to the demagogue, whose power is in his technique rather than in his principles, and whose influence may be turned at any time in whatever direction appear to be merged the greatest number of forces capable of being utilized by him.

There is, again, the great current directed by the playboys, supertechnologists, who seek new experimentation every morning, new games of human direction every night. With little economic or cultural background, they appear to be oblivious of the fact that there has been a past, or that society evolves through equilibrium and balance. They are the ideological dictators de luxe.

There is, then, the great, deep current of laissez-faire millions who represent the logical product of a great and wealthy nation perpetually hoping for peace and prosperity, without doing anything about it.

There is finally a possible major current in the regional discontents and motivations of the different parts of America whose orderly integration into the American democracy of the new era may well constitute the balance wheel, or whose disintegration might permit of chaotic movements subversive of American ideals.

This situation, however, we must remember not only represents a typical American paradox, but is symbolic of the realities of a complex societal evolution. The presumption would be that the multiplicity of these movements, together with the two-party system in the United States, would militate strongly against either

communistic revolution or fascistic dictatorship. Yet the combination of demagogic leadership and mass social pathology working in the framework of gross deficiencies and discontent may easily result in anything but orderly transitional democracy.

Our last series of assumptions will continue the mixed picture of American paradox. The first of these is that, because of the extraordinary complexity of the situation, the requirements of the next few years appear to be relatively clear. That is, because of our peculiar American conditioning and cultural equipment, because of the bigness, the speed, the complexity, and the technology of modern civilization everywhere, because of the sheer enormity of the nation's wealth and resources, because of the limitation of experience, training, and character of its mixed peoples and divergent regions, because of the sweep of its tragedies and dilemmas and the irreconcilable nature and the immaturity of its epidemic of "isms," panaceas, propaganda, rumors, claims, interests, demands, ideologies, motivations, and plans, the specifications of next steps appear relatively clear. There seems to be only one way to provide for the rational regimentation of irrational society, and that is through the orderly planning of societal organization.

The specifications of such social planning appear to be fourfold. First of all, of course, there must be some sort of mastery—mastery of resources and forces. Second, such mastery implies knowledge of these forces and scientific work in their inventory and direction. This means realistic, hard-boiled adaptation to the spirit and technique of the age. It means further that there must be balance and equilibrium: between the individual and the group, between the old and the new, between folkways and stateways, between the nation and the states, between rural and urban, between agriculture and industry, between production and distribution. In the third place, there must be some sort of referendum to the people such as will recognize diversity of interests, parties, states, regions, and races.

This means that an orderly planned society for America will provide for the reintegration of its several diverse regions into the national economy in order to obtain both unity and adequacy of economic and social life. These conclusions are based, furthermore, upon observations relative to the evaluation of society in general and especially of recent developments in Europe, as well

as upon American premises. In simple language, finally, our assumption seems to be that there will be no democracy or formal alternative to democracy in the United States for the next period, say, 12 years of two 6-year priority schedules, but that the definitive nature of our political and cultural activity will be found in the gigantic struggle of the American people to evolve an orderly democracy through the planned mastery of its great transitional period.

In other words, the exact form of democratic organization strong enough to meet the needs of our present confused American civilization does not now exist. It is, therefore, the task of the social sciences and their techniques to help discover the basis and form for such organization. Consequently the assumption seems warranted that the concentration of all major efforts of all parties and regions should be focused upon such orderly planned procedure as may reasonably be expected to receive the general sanction of the people. This is the supreme test of democracy set in competition with the other alternatives of chaos, revolution, supercorporate control and centralization, socialism, communism, and fascism.

Of the measures and prospects of the new America we shall write more in our chapters dealing with social planning and with the promise and prospect of the American nation. Testing grounds and testing times for American democracy may well constitute key words for the new era.

## *Chapter XX*

# *INDUSTRY AND WORK*

WE HAVE called attention to the fact that to many students of the modern scene the chief struggle in the 1930's, following the crest of the economic achievement of the 1920's, was that between business and government, between the order of economics and the forces of government. Yet, even in contemplation of the government's role in the depression and reconstruction, it was customary to assume the economic status as key to recovery and to measure the nation's capacity always as of the crest of 1929. Thus, we come again to see the drama of the changing nation as reflected in the titanic struggles of the early 1930's.

Whether all this be true or not, so vivid has the picture of the economic world become, so rapid and sweeping have been its recent movements, that the whole drama of the national life appeared to focus upon economic policies and procedures, and upon such corollaries as security and employment. Here was the amazing picture of the erstwhile dull and prosaic economic theory of production, distribution, use, control of goods, and the operating processes of the economic order, suddenly becoming chief actors in the nation's greatest dramatic episode. If the American picture be viewed again as a great symphony, powerful in the grand manner, it seems clear that the slow gradual national movement was reaching a swelling crescendo in the titanic struggle for economic survival. Here were crash of fortunes, destruction of values, conflict of nations, breaking up of old patterns, disillusion and death of financial adventurers, tragic cost to posterity, imminent chaos.

In earlier days and in the stereotyped patterns of American progress the formula for the artificial or capital wealth of the nation would have appeared to be a simple one. Natural wealth plus technological wealth, with the normal incidence of the people at work in free private enterprise, would constitute the logical picture of the nation's artificial wealth. That is, the picture of the

nation's invested capital, its industry, its costs and assets, its bank deposits, and the other parts of the world's created goods would be largely a matter of the amount and kind of science, technology, and management which had come into the picture. What were the products of land and their uses? Of mines and forests and streams? What of railroads and ships and factories and stores? What of capitalist and investor and banker and millionaire? The picture would show so much wealth here, so much there; the absence of it in one place, abundance in another; a big increase here, smaller increment there, all flowing freely and unmolested, save by competitive processes, through the channels of national free private enterprise. It was a picture to boast about, to present as a supreme entity, characteristic institution of the New America, the flowering of the activities of a great and satisfied people.

Of this characteristic economic picture there were many stock Americana. One was the rise of the common man and of the rugged individual from low station to high with every man's goal the ownership of home, or home and farm, or success in his chosen vocation with accompanying comforts, convenience, social standing in the community such as would come from duly rewarded thrift and industry. Another vivid picture, perfect flowering of the American system, was the rise of the millionaire, the increase in wealth of the middle class, and the ambition of every man somehow, someday, to attain financial eminence. Few more characteristic and absorbing episodes could be found than the magnificent evolution which followed the third of a century following the death of Lincoln in which "rich men grew to millionaires and millionaires becames masters of hundreds of millions of wealth." William E. Dodd has pictured it: 'Fortunes pile high upon fortunes. The scattering millionaires of 1860 multiplied till they were like the sands of the sea in number. Men travelled first in special cars, luxuriously fitted out, then in special trains with private diners, parlour cars, smokers, and with liveried servants to attend their wants. They built yachts that only monarchs like William II could rival. Their palaces occupied blocks and double blocks in the great cities, costing often millions of dollars and requiring more than princely incomes to keep them going. Not only in the cities did these mansions rise. In the favored parts of New England, in the Adirondacks, or upon the high ridges of Pennsylvania

beautiful summer homes and vast private parks advertised the presence of men it were worth-while for ordinary mortals to cultivate.'

Although times had changed a great deal since the post Civil War multiplication of millionaires, the ratio of increase had appeared to be even greater in the period following the World War. It had been estimated that 20,000 millionaires had risen and flourished during that period. In 1929, there were 513 multimillionaires with taxable incomes equal to or greater than $1,000,000; 1,482 with incomes equal to or greater than $500,000; 4,053 with $250,000; and 14,677 with $100,000. And there were thousands of executives receiving salaries of from $50,000 to $200,000, while exceptional cases recorded salary and bonus payments up to $2,000,000 a year and $5,000,000 in a five-year period. Here, again, was a traditional high goal to be sought by the youth of the land.

Other evidences to indicate that the economic drama was still the chiefest interest of the nation could be found in the stated programs of A Century of Progress in 1933. The theme of the Exposition, to present a hundred years of progress in science and what it had done for society, was interpreted in their selling campaign to exhibitors and subsequently interpreted as their chief contribution to Chicago, as being the supreme opportunity for invested capital to demonstrate what it had done for the raising of standards, for the making available of science to the common people, and for transforming the world in which we live. The Exposition was in substance a fascinating picture of that segment of American progress, with minor roles to education, social welfare, art, literature, religion. Confirming the judgment of the Exposition were the verdicts of students and philosophers. Thus Professor James H. Tufts, in a new and sweeping appraisal of America's social morality and dilemmas, had classified the nation of the 1930's as being in a third or economic stage as contrasted to the earlier religious and political stages.

Then the scene changed quickly, so that in the later depression days of the 1930's the picture of America featured the banker and millionaire as at least among the most prominent of the malefactors of the period, which seemed an incredible and unfair turnabout-face from the attitude of a period so recent as the early 1930's. This seemed characteristic of the nation's way of seeing a

part of the picture as the whole. But it was also a part of the tendency to make of the depression a complete entity of itself. So prominent was the depression emphasis that it was often remarked that the people and rulers of America appeared not to be cognizant of the fact that the nation had ever experienced a past. A state of national emergency existed. It was an economic emergency. No matter what else—if there was anything else—happened, there was no picture save one which would point the way out at any cost. Such was the nation's concentration on this picture that, when President Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, which was commissioned to present a social inventory of this nation *not* in an emergency but in a long-time trend, produced its comprehensive study, it was difficult for the nation not to judge it solely by what could be focused on the current depression. Serious as was the emergency of the early 1930's, tragic and devastating as was its havoc, a picture which presented only the economic debacle was inadequate even as were the earlier economic patterns of simple cause and effect. New economic patterns were being fabricated; no doubt about that. Yet the heart and body of the picture comprehended the whole background and evolution of the American system; the social forces which had been long at work; the colossal size to which the economic picture had grown; the extraordinary complexity and ramifications which appeared for the time quite beyond the mastery of men.

For here was a literal giant of the western world which had waxed strong and powerful and big, face to face with the age-old evolutionary problem of saving itself from bigness and artificial growth and technology and from the stupidity of the too-quickly and too-powerfully grown nation not adapting itself to either its own nationalistic economy or to international economic environment. The economic picture was not only one of bigness—a nation with perhaps a twentieth of the world's population boasting of doing half the world's work, of producing more than half of the world's many commodities, of owning 40 percent of the world's gold supply and of owning colossal wealth, but of a nation incredibly confused and entangled in its own economic and financial difficulties. It could boast of the long, long count of from $240,000,000,000 to $300,000,000,000, unaccountable dollars of wealth, but it had multiplied its debts until it owed more than $200,000,-

000,000 or something like four-fifth as much as the aggregate market value of its property. Its debts, if suddenly called, would take a five-year income to pay them off.

Another way of looking at the picture was that for every dollar owned there was a debt of 80 cents or more and for every dollar of income probably a half dollar was required for debt service. Debts for the individual and their unyielding interest and curtailment payments represented a load which made the essential difference between the United States of the 1930's and other periods of depression. There was in much of the reconstruction picture relief in which the farmer or merchant or homeowner, or state or nation or municipality was being urged to solve problems of heavy indebtedness by piling up more indebtedness. And taxes, which could not longer be paid, had grown to equal a third of the income of a nation which was not only mortgaging its own property for debts but also much of its future to the third and fourth generations of them that were to follow.

The villain of the piece, stupendous change and vast yawning distances between the ideals and situation of the earlier days and the present, continued to hold the center of the stage. The nation which Washington had implored to keep free from entangling alliances and which Jefferson had admonished to leave its manufacturing to Europe now had $26,000,000,000 overseas investment, had developed into a creditor nation to the extent of more than $11,000,000,000, and had at one time been the leading export nation of the world with the greater part of its exports, except cotton, consisting of manufactured goods. And its annual manufactured products for 210,710 establishments in 1929 had reached an aggregate value of product of $70,137,459,000. These manufacturing establishments employed 8,807,536 wage earners and paid them an annual amount of wages of more than $11,640,000,000. Jefferson had designated such "artificers as the panderers of vice and the instruments by which the liberties of the country are generally overturned"; but the NRA required them to be paid higher wages than many teachers' salaries. As if in response to Jefferson's admonition that "for the general operations of manufacture let our workshops remain in Europe," the nation boasted of no less than 16 industries rated as "billion dollar babies."

That was of course only a small part of the entire picture. One

feature at which the European visitors marveled was that so small a proportion of the people controlled so large an amount of wealth and that the inequalities of income stood out in such incredible contrast. A close inspection of the picture revealed a group representing 1 percent of the population owning 60 percent of all wealth while a number not exceeding 13 percent of the population owned 90 percent of the wealth. Or if one examined the picture still more minutely, he could find 80 individuals holding nearly 300 directorships in over 200 corporations which in turn had total assets in 1931 of more than $47,000,000,000, which was more than a fourth of all the corporate wealth of the nation. Or to see still another part of the picture 200 corporations controlled nearly half of all the corporate wealth of the nation while less than 500 controlled 90 percent of such wealth. Furthermore, the greater part of the surplus wealth of the nation and especially its control was centered in the Northeastern Region of the nation. Thus, of the taxable incomes of $1,000,000 or more, 388 out of the total of 513 were in the Northeast, of which 276 were in New York; and of 1,482 with income of $500,000 or more 1,082 were in the East. Still more concentration was reflected in the picture of incomes of $100,000 or more, of which New York had 5,538 as contrasted to the next high states of Illinois and Pennsylvania, which had less than 1,400 each. There were countless other unusually interesting aspects of the picture, such as, for instance, the banking and financial system which could accommodate transactions for $300,000,000,000 worth of property, for $200,000,000,000 worth of debts, could report actual banking deposits of $40,000,000,000, and yet the total amount of money in the United States was only $9,000,000,000.

This amazing picture of the economic nation was understandable only through the continued and exhaustive examination of its history and development: giant industry taking the place of declining agricultural opportunity; rapid urbanization transforming a nation overnight; the development of early American free private enterprise into a gigantic modern industrial capitalistic system; the swift onrush of machine industry; the increase of specialization and the spreading out of labor; the concentration of business and industry into larger units with resulting scientific management and business organization; the organization of labor and the struggles between capital and labor; the rapid rise of

speculative production and of the credit economy which has distinguished the nation. These were all normal, sometimes slow-moving, sometimes rapidly moving, developments which resulted in what appeared to many to be a lasting prosperity and an invulnerable capitalistic regime.

But there were many other elements entering into the picture. There were the quantity production of the post-war period, the change of the United States to a creditor nation, the complex of international situations, the high-powered selling and credit era, the hectic speculation epoch of the late 1920's, and many others. Then came the cyclical self-perpetuating depression process. There had been the accredited overproduction which had resulted in overselling and overstocking. There was a saturation point beyond which the people could not buy, beyond which the merchants could not stock, beyond which the bankers could not lend, beyond which factories could not operate, beyond which workers could not be employed, beyond which wholesale unemployment set in, beyond which buying power began to ebb, beyond which there were no profits, beyond which the people could not pay debts or taxes, beyond which confiscation began to mount, beyond which a fourth of the nation's workers were not only out of work and incapable of buying goods, but millions of the best citizens were of necessity on the nation's public relief roll.

One-third of all the banks of the nation failed between 1930 and early 1933, in most communities the majority of the wealthiest citizens had lost both wealth and prestige, half the people had been "ruined" financially, thousands had died of the strain, other thousands had broken under it, and still other thousands had committed suicide in ways more numerous and devious than the nation had yet witnessed. Many other thousands had resorted to every known device for survival until the faith and morale of the nation were at the cracking point. New highs were reached in the tragic multiplication of wanderers and transients, and in the mass treatment of those under the relief program. Multiplied millions of public money took the place of former private philanthropy, the stream of which had dwindled down to a trickling, sluggish flow.

The picture was made more serious and more vivid by the world-wide depression and by epochal events transpiring in other nations, by the ominous threat of still more tragic chaos and by

the constant fear of war. Men began to question the social order. No one could point the way out. The capitalistic system in America was at stake, pointedly challenged by individuals from practically all classes of people. The past was forgotten save in condemnation. All manner of remedies and sure-fire panaceas were poured upon the nation while sinister forces lay in wait for the spoils. Thousands of conscienceless individuals and groups stood ready to rebuild their fortunes on the calamities of the unfortunate host of the nation. The overwhelming defeat of President Hoover in the fall of 1932 showed the stock American picture of the people holding one man responsible for the troubles into which they had rushed headlong of their own accord. No man, it was agreed, could be elected in the face of 15,000,000 unemployed who held him responsible. It was a grand picture of a confused democracy in a confused world if there could be found those who stood afar off and viewed it as a master struggle of humans and human institutions against tremendous economic odds.

By the spring of 1933, under the popular dictum of President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the country demanded action and demanded it now, the Congress of the United States had declared with rare unanimity that an emergency existed in the nation, that the nature of the emergency was economic, and that drastic wartime measures were necessary to meet the situation. No more dramatic scene had probably been enacted in the history of the nation than that at Washington under the early days of the New Deal administration. Rushed through both houses were scores of public acts calculated to save the country from economic bankruptcy and chaos and from what appeared to be the threat of complete breakdown of its institutions. That the picture of the ship of state was one in which it was being buffeted by violent economic storms was evident from an inventory of the Public Acts, beginning with such examples as Public Act No. 10, the AAA; No. 68, the ICA; No. 75, the FCA; No. 30, the USES, together with the giant NRA, FERA, the HOLC, the TVA. The Home Owners Loan Act, the Banking Act, the Securities Act, the Railroad Act, the Economy Bill, and a multitude of subdivisions with their series of concrete set-ups and empowering provisions, were forerunners to an extraordinary series of later arrangements and

administrative technics, such as the Resettlement Administration, later the Farm Security Administration; the Rural Electrification Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Housing Administration, and scores of others.

The picture showed not only the speedy enactment of these provisions but the amazing spectacle of the American people clamoring for their Congress to confer upon the President powers commonly reputed to be the most extraordinary that any nation had ever conferred upon an executive. It was completely revolutionary in the American annals. Here was a new sort of picture in which perhaps fourscore specific grants of optional power were concentrated almost solely upon the organization of industry, with the exception of a small number intended to promote economy in the federal expenditures, the provisions for which appeared in the opposite direction from those directed toward private business and free enterprise. The preamble to the earliest emergency declaration, subsequently known as NRA, expressly declared the policy of Congress to be limited to the promotion of the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the several purposes: to promote cooperative action among trade groups; to induce and maintain united action of labor and management; to eliminate unfair competitive practices; to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacities of industries; to avoid undue restriction of production; to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power; to reduce and release unemployment; to improve standards of labor; to rehabilitate industry otherwise; to conserve natural resources.

The early picture revealed varied impressions. First, there could be no turning back. Something had to be done. This was the method selected for recovery. It must be supported. It was to be experimental and temporary; therefore every citizen could support it with a free conscience and every citizen therefore must support it, even as a war measure. Certainly the NRA had done much; how much no one could tell. What else could have done as much? In many respects these were the continuing viewpoints throughout the decade, even in the cumulative revolt against the New Deal.

The other side of the picture was that there could be found little

unanimity of the belief that these national "administrations" were the enduring "way out." North, East, South, West, city, country, business man, professional man—everywhere there was doubt and skepticism. Yet it was possible in the early fall of 1933 to stage one of the greatest peace-time parades on record of the NRA, with a quarter million marchers on Fifth Avenue. That was the American way, and it surpassed the beer parade of the year before by many thousands.

But it was a confused picture, with its parts not yet geared together as of a machine that had been designed. It was not a national plan. It was scarcely an approach to planning. There was neither agreement among the officials nor complete confidence in the experiment except as an important trial and error method. Certainly, with such sudden emergency planning it was not possible for the most expert of administrators to see very far ahead. Like the national culture, it gave promise of very unequal development, one part working well, another lagging, still another not working at all. Its industrial and economic superemphasis has been pointed out already. Its purpose was twofold—immediate recovery and permanent reconstruction. Yet, with the almost tragic sense of immediate need it was wont to forget emergency realities in the contemplation of reform. Its newly appointed administrators did not always understand the different regional variations and problems.

There were many other danger points. In the first acts of this drama, with its sweeping action to reduce competition and production, to promote higher pay and shorter hours, to increase employment and buying power, there did not appear to be adequate consideration for the recovery and maintenance of much that America had denominated its highest ideals and cherished endeavors. Education, scientific research, the professions, the upper brackets of service, did not appear in the early provisions of the New Deal, which was not to apply to employees of public schools, or to other city, county, state, or federal workers. It is characteristic of the American picture that these weaknesses were later corrected, but at first the school janitor might work for long hours and low pay alongside a fellow worker of private enterprise who profited from the Code. The laborers on state capitol grounds or on work of state-owned institutions might receive a third of the wages required

to be paid laborers on public works projects. Teachers who had devoted many years to professional training were to receive less than many unskilled workers without experience; less than factory workers with experience.

Under the literal operation of the Code it was possible for four groups of workers on contiguous projects to receive different pay. The road worker, the relief worker, the gin operator, might be receiving from three to five times as much as the farm laborer in a nearby field. An illiterate stone mason might receive pay at twice the rate of the maximum teacher's pay in some states where the balanced budget had brought about drastic local curtailment. Likewise, thousands of public employees were discharged, salaries were reduced, extra work was added so that there was a resulting lowering of morale as well as of purchasing power. Teachers, architects, engineers, university students, and various professional folk were often seen in the picture of public relief work on roads or forests or buildings or just jobs anywhere, anyhow.

This appeared to be the flowering of the combined incidence of the depression; of economy campaigns of business groups making school and health the scapegoat; and the belligerent protest of the common man against taxes and frills. The United States Chamber of Commerce, for instance, campaigned for less taxes, shorter school terms, reduced curricula, lower salaries and more work for teachers. They wanted to go back to the good old days. Again, thousands of youth were turned off from jobs through the working of codes only to be thrown on communities with inadequate school and leisure-time equipment. They could not work; they could not go to school; what could they do? Provisions for vocational training, for night and extension schools, and for recreation centers were cut off. There was little money for books. Youth could not learn to work in school, nor in industry, so that the prospect of his coming of age equipped for either work or wise use of leisure appeared as one of the paradoxes of this American epoch.

Money in abundance there was for public works on material things. Parks and forests were to be developed for increasing the wealth of the nation and for the entertainment of those who had money to go to them. But for public service in playground and schools and libraries and in many of the vital places of need and danger there was an abundance of scarcity. An unemployed

teacher or physical director could be put to work on roads and bridges and forest paths that were not needed, but he could not be employed in places of tragic community needs or paths of the new citizenship and leisure civilization which were being created by the recovery administration and by the march of democracy. Health and the moral and spiritual life and limb of the nation might be endangered, but there was no recovery or relief money here. It was an incredible picture which the public did not at first see, and later wondered how long before disaster would be forestalled. Was it necessary, they asked, to bring about cultural bankruptcy as a result of economic bankruptcy by unbalanced mandates? And what, the serious thinkers were asking, would be the mood of a citizenship of youth growing up under such morale? Would American youth follow German youth in a resistless tide of emotional allegiance to whatever came along?

The later programs of the politico-economic New Deal reflected a greater consideration for these fundamentals. Especially, the Federal Relief Administration invited the states to evolve plans that were sound and workable for the employment of the "white collar group." Even so there were thousands of teachers and specialists in recreation, music, and other allied fields whose whole world had toppled suddenly before them. Not half of the college graduates and postgraduate students could look to the future with confidence. This situation, however, appeared as a joint logical product of the depression and of a society which had grown up with little design and whose major emphasis upon economic values had led gradually but surely to such a climax. Many observers thought they saw in the picture the natural drama of the national evolution and that it would lead inevitably to still more tragedy. For the American way, they said, had been the way of ruthless competition under the guise of individualism and free opportunity. The American ideal had been one in which the mastery of money had subtly become the chief of folkways under the guise of high standards of living, national progress, and world leadership. The American system had permitted a fraction of a percent of the people unguided to control nearly all of the wealth and social institutions which in turn continued to magnify economic ends which in turn had now defeated themselves.

But either the American people would never acknowledge

frankly the economic control of their institutions or else they were actually deluded into believing they followed the noble star of the earlier American ideals. The picture often appeared as an epitome of hypocrisy. Many thought they saw in the great episode of the 1930's the key to the future of the nation. It might be the beginning of the end of capitalism and the American way, or it might be the first stages of such radical departure and social planning as would make the great experiment a continued success. Whatever else might be said, or whatever might happen in the future, the United States of the 1930's was still an experiment in democracy. As such it must be pictured.

This tendency to picture the whole of the nation as an economic emergency, productive of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry which burdened interstate and foreign commerce, was more than a new declaration of mercantilism and a challenge to recovery; it was also an occasion for examining the whole of American industry which had grown so powerful that it continued to appear as the master of the nation. In the carrying out of the hundreds of specific procedures and in the employment of thousands of paid and volunteer workers, it became imperative to inventory more fully the state of the nation's industry. Such an inventory inevitably combined in the picture the number and kind of industries but more than that a continuing examination of the history and development of American industrial institutions.

Thus in the earlier stages of the organization of the National Recovery Act, reference was made to the ten major American industries as the basis for the formulation of first codes of fair practices. Immediately there was inquiry everywhere as to what were the ten major industries. Nobody seemed to know. If the picture was of manufacturing industries only and featured the employment of labor, they would rank in 1931 somewhat as follows: cotton goods, foundry and machine shops, steam railroad repair shops, steel works and rolling mills, lumber and timber products, boots and shoes (not rubber), bread and bakery products, electrical machinery, knit goods, women's clothing.

If, on the other hand, the index was one of value of products, the ranking was as follows, the first eight having products of more than a billion dollars worth: meat packing, wholesale motor vehicles (excluding motorcycles), petroleum refining, printing and pub-

lishing (newspaper and periodical), steel works and rolling mills, women's clothing, foundry and machine shops, bread and baking products, electrical machinery, and cigars and cigarettes. If, again, another standard index were used, showing the value added by manufacture, the ranking would be still different: printing and publishing (newspaper and periodical), foundry and machine shops, cigars and cigarettes, bread and bakery products, electrical machinery, women's clothing, printing and publishing (book and job), steel works and rolling mills, motor vehicles (excluding motorcycles), and motor vehicle bodies and parts.

Something of the bigness and variety of the American picture of industry was indicated by an entirely different ranking if a list were prepared showing the rank of industries including both manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The order so reported appeared to be: railroads; textiles and their products; machinery, not including transportation equipment; public utilities, including power and light, telegraph, telephone; electric-railroad and motor-bus operation and maintenance; iron and steel and their products, not including machinery; forest products; construction and building; mining and quarrying; food and kindred products; transportation equipment, air, land and water.

Still once again the variety of the picture could be seen from the classification of American industries, showing a list of more than four hundred types from which distinctive features of cooperative codes must be considered. Within less than three months there were approved no less than 125 codes. In addition to the great variety in kinds of industry, there were important problems involved in the range of size and the difference in organization and administrative procedures between the large and small establishments. All of these aspects of the industrial picture were fundamental to the main picture of the nation and "the way out" of its difficulties and "the way on" to the next stage of development. They were fundamental to the appraisal of the essential differences between the America of 1933, for which new ways of operation were logical, and the old America, upon which the present American system was based and from which present mixed procedures evolved.

The same was true of the agricultural situation. Although there had been the phenomenal increase in the industrial ratio of the

nation to its agricultural activities, there had also been a phenomenal increase in all agricultural production, in both variety and quantity, since the turn of the century. There was quantitatively still a magnificent basis for some sort of recovery which might rebuild an agrarian culture. There was still land a-plenty and the depression had resulted in a backward trek to the country of millions of folks, such that in the spring of 1933 it was estimated that there were living on the farms of the nation no less than 32,242,000 people, the largest number in the history of the nation. During 1932 the increase of over a million farm population was in contrast to the substantial losses which had been continuous from 1910 to 1930.

This trend was of particular significance in the economic picture of the 1930's in view of the emphasis placed by the recovery acts upon reduction in agricultural production. There were many observers who believed that the depression would start a permanent movement toward a return to the farm as a way of life. The government itself had appropriated millions of dollars to experiment with agricultural reconstruction and resettlement. The Tennessee Valley Authority contemplated experiments in decentralized industry, while the whole forestry program looked toward substituting better lands for submarginal lands, which in the long run would increase production. The emergency gardens of the depression had contributed millions of dollars worth of home-grown foods and had initiated thousands of families again into the ways of soil culture and living at home. Thus, the picture was promising a puzzle for those who could predict. What would be the effect of a great natural trek back to the farm, plus an apparent national movement away from the cities, plus a trend toward the combination of self-sufficing agriculture for workers in establishments of decentralized industry, plus the mandatory provisions for relief gardens, plus the drive for increased purchasing power of factory workers for farm and garden produce, plus the drive for reduction of crop areas? It was perhaps more like a jig-saw puzzle to put together, except that there was no original finished pattern for which the parts had been fabricated.

The agricultural picture remained, however, one of the most fundamental of the nation's critical points of tension. There were the urbanites complaining that the President was shaping his gold

policies to meet the demands of western farmers for parity prices, and there were the farmers on strike, disgusted with the President's refusal to fix prices. The farmer's situation ranked as an "organic" crisis, and more so because of an almost complete breakdown of what had always been considered secure. Pictures and pictures. Although there had been a steady decrease in the number of farms operated, in the number of acres of crop land, in the number of most livestock, especially hogs, horses, sheep, beef cattle, during the decade from 1920 to 1930, there was in the early 1930's still the most serious surplus that had yet existed. Practically all farm products were being produced at a loss. There was a still more serious situation in many regions, namely, there was no market at any price. And since the old American adage that the nation depended upon the farmer for its food and prosperity still held true to a large degree, the nation was clearly in a paradoxical quandary with too much food, too many good farmers, too many poor farmers, but with the prosperity missing. And prosperity, the farmers thought, should come to all alike in the nation.

Like the industrial picture, agriculture was one of great size and of great range and variety. Samples of values of major commodities were adequate for comparisons with manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Agriculture and its related industries still employed nearly a fourth of the nation's workers. Its billions of dollars' worth of value of products included, in 1929, hay and forage, worth $1,188,000,000; cotton lint about $1,218,000,000; dairy products, $1,800,000,000; corn, $1,962,000,000. The nation's hogs aggregated $1,500,000,000; beef cattle with a little more than $1,000,000,000; wheat worth $841,385,000; tobacco, $286,000,000; and garden vegetables $226,000,000. Aggregate figures, however, reflect little of the picture except to denote its size and general nature and to give bases for comparison and for reconstruction measures.

Thus, more vivid than all the combined estimates of quantity or money value was the picture of a single week in October when 24,000 carloads of 27 varieties of vegetables rolled on and on in an incredible transfer of gardens to cities. It seemed perhaps more incredible that carrots and spinach, oranges and grapes would be pouring from California and Texas into a hundred cities and hamlets of the Carolinas, or that solid car loads of milk in glass refrigerator cars would be rushed from Wisconsin to Florida, than

## AVERAGE VALUE PER FARM OF SPECIFIED FARM PRODUCTS SOLD OR TRADED, 1939 (Dollars)

| State and Region | Farms Reporting | Average per Farm (dollars) | Livestock | Dairy Products | Poultry and Poultry Products | Other Livestock Products | Field Crops | Vegetables (harvested for sale) | Fruits and Nuts | Horticultural specialties (sold) | Forest Products (sold) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U S... | 5,617,068 | 1,190 | 551 | 422 | 158 | 159 | 646 | 436 | 442 | 4,495 | 142 |
| *N E.* . | 546,655 | 1,510 | | | | | | | | | |
| Maine . | 33,206 | 1,268 | 175 | 523 | 418 | 116 | 1,141 | 224 | 210 | 3,441 | 251 |
| N H. . . . | 13,927 | 1,390 | 282 | 986 | 1,050 | 165 | 221 | 262 | 314 | 3,534 | 398 |
| Vt . | 21,409 | 1,542 | 265 | 1,355 | 263 | 219 | 243 | 177 | 422 | 3,477 | 278 |
| Mass | 26,513 | 2,360 | 456 | 2,179 | 1,258 | 455 | 630 | 732 | 966 | 5,967 | 246 |
| R. I. | 2,669 | 2,854 | 396 | 2,933 | 1,039 | 376 | 916 | 572 | 432 | 4,394 | 249 |
| Conn | 16,875 | 2,588 | 306 | 2,228 | 1,191 | 257 | 1,519 | 570 | 600 | 8,138 | 173 |
| N Y | 139,567 | 1,737 | 246 | 1,216 | 414 | 149 | 494 | 672 | 506 | 5,685 | 154 |
| N. J | 23,038 | 3,232 | 492 | 3,284 | 1,161 | 276 | 1,087 | 1,215 | 913 | 6,895 | 132 |
| Pa | 148,974 | 1,329 | 290 | 784 | 329 | 128 | 485 | 390 | 240 | 4,993 | 155 |
| Del .... | 8,240 | 1,971 | 160 | 808 | 1,315 | 148 | 395 | 316 | 660 | 5,115 | 192 |
| Md | 36,974 | 1,490 | 284 | 959 | 347 | 81 | 634 | 443 | 426 | 4,903 | 172 |
| D C | 54 | 9,479 | 1,220 | 19,476 | 1,993 | 3,204 | 168 | 1,125 | 185 | 8,834 | |
| W. Va. ... | 75,209 | 404 | 244 | 206 | 87 | 46 | 162 | 123 | 251 | 3,407 | 145 |
| *S E.* | 2,089,480 | 590 | | | | | | | | | |
| Va .. | 151,929 | 713 | 273 | 246 | 146 | 60 | 454 | 273 | 359 | 3,406 | 190 |
| N. C. . | 255,016 | 781 | 104 | 206 | 62 | 77 | 742 | 164 | 124 | 2,617 | 181 |
| S. C | 131,405 | 665 | 121 | 289 | 63 | 82 | 562 | 212 | 201 | 1,883 | 157 |
| Ga.. . . .. | 205,947 | 594 | 140 | 232 | 54 | 122 | 443 | 130 | 165 | 3,027 | 202 |
| Fla | 53,825 | 1,494 | 320 | 2,242 | 179 | 166 | 480 | 1,591 | 1,094 | 2,935 | 182 |
| Ky | 217,968 | 588 | 281 | 142 | 47 | 51 | 424 | 165 | 69 | 4,142 | 107 |
| Tenn... | 227,935 | 471 | 202 | 168 | 46 | 45 | 308 | 120 | 91 | 2,225 | 107 |
| Ala . | 220,439 | 349 | 123 | 169 | 39 | 103 | 252 | 115 | 60 | 4,213 | 131 |
| Miss. | 279,301 | 413 | 108 | 210 | 33 | 103 | 356 | 126 | 54 | 2,013 | 118 |
| Ark. . | 203,746 | 581 | 138 | 124 | 61 | 58 | 529 | 102 | 158 | 1,403 | 86 |
| La | 141,969 | 635 | 153 | 712 | 37 | 108 | 549 | 132 | 216 | 1,797 | 109 |
| *S W.* . | 601,094 | 1,109 | | | | | | | | | |
| Okla.. | 167,050 | 873 | 374 | 186 | 78 | 83 | 549 | 138 | 77 | 5,035 | 47 |
| Texas | 389,155 | 1,128 | 679 | 255 | 98 | 568 | 619 | 263 | 211 | 2,888 | 99 |
| N M . . | 28,271 | 1,509 | 1,322 | 384 | 97 | 401 | 899 | 234 | 190 | 2,590 | 128 |
| Ariz | 16,618 | 2,373 | 1,369 | 1,136 | 251 | 187 | 2,954 | 1,798 | 430 | 2,541 | 63 |
| *M S.* . . | 1,562,669 | 1,491 | | | | | | | | | |
| Ohio | 210,116 | 1,208 | 508 | 353 | 185 | 81 | 546 | 400 | 218 | 5,235 | 143 |
| Ind | 171,482 | 1,266 | 640 | 268 | 152 | 48 | 630 | 315 | 153 | 4,145 | 104 |
| Ill. .. | 202,340 | 2,050 | 809 | 340 | 138 | 61 | 1,374 | 512 | 231 | 6,102 | 92 |
| Mich . | 170,108 | 1,045 | 309 | 419 | 151 | 122 | 440 | 359 | 358 | 3,025 | 119 |
| Wis .. . | 178,243 | 1,341 | 373 | 794 | 140 | 226 | 318 | 205 | 167 | 4,163 | 100 |
| Minn.. . | 187,883 | 1,602 | 580 | 450 | 191 | 71 | 795 | 374 | 98 | 4,965 | 90 |
| Iowa | 206,156 | 2,486 | 1,417 | 297 | 187 | 61 | 1,220 | 283 | 53 | 8,219 | 82 |
| Mo . | 236,341 | 908 | 504 | 183 | 117 | 48 | 591 | 195 | 98 | 4,656 | 71 |
| *N. W.*.. | 569,230 | 1,664 | | | | | | | | | |
| N D .. | 72,262 | 1,389 | 390 | 222 | 84 | 79 | 935 | 171 | 32 | 4,779 | 76 |
| S D. | 68,858 | 1,397 | 771 | 200 | 120 | 124 | 669 | 239 | 35 | 7,924 | 82 |
| Neb . | 117,302 | 1,637 | 1,063 | 176 | 126 | 81 | 707 | 173 | 96 | 4,127 | 62 |
| Kan..... | 147,927 | 1,376 | 710 | 204 | 123 | 62 | 778 | 194 | 120 | 3,100 | 55 |
| Mont | 38,439 | 2,187 | 1,350 | 309 | 111 | 700 | 1,351 | 286 | 180 | 3,740 | 195 |
| Idaho . | 40,673 | 2,063 | 852 | 367 | 128 | 442 | 1,361 | 600 | 371 | 1,121 | 177 |
| Wy. . .. | 13,717 | 3,349 | 2,566 | 328 | 138 | 1,354 | 1,401 | 330 | 97 | 1,178 | 195 |
| Colo | 46,207 | 2,199 | 1,490 | 350 | 174 | 549 | 1,211 | 697 | 373 | 4,714 | 181 |
| Utah . | 23,845 | 1,672 | 865 | 345 | 575 | 721 | 725 | 352 | 333 | 3,483 | 54 |
| *F. W.* . | 247,940 | 2,731 | | | | | | | | | |
| Nev. . . | 3,103 | 3,626 | 3,108 | 1,019 | 332 | 1,154 | 1,008 | 393 | 127 | 2,313 | 248 |
| Wash..... | 69,834 | 1,682 | 422 | 542 | 374 | 224 | 1,569 | 722 | 1,075 | 2,747 | 146 |
| Ore. . . | 54,213 | 1,781 | 755 | 495 | 364 | 320 | 1,185 | 876 | 588 | 2,527 | 213 |
| Calif..... | 120,790 | 3,741 | 1,657 | 2,535 | 1,024 | 586 | 3,091 | 3,552 | 2,006 | 5,851 | 220 |

Source: U S Bureau of the Census, *Census of Agriculture, 1940*, Vol. III, Table 13, pp 1019–1020.

that solid trains of Florida produce poured a steady stream from garden and grove into New York and Chicago. Yet the 1933 pictures were still stranger episodes for the American farmer. There was the federal government purchasing millions of little pigs and 200,000 sows soon to farrow, rushing them to the slaughter pens lest they multiply and replenish the earth; paying the farmer millions of dollars, first, to plow up 10,000,000 acres of growing cotton and later not to plant the cotton at all.

There were as usual contradictory pictures of the future of agriculture. One was a picture of the new agriculture as predominantly machine farming, on large farms owned by commercial concerns with ever-increasing use of inventions and fewer men. There would be the cotton picker which would do the work of 40 Negroes or the multiple purpose corn harrow or threshing machine which might do the work of 100 men. It was pointed out that by 1930 over half of all farms had automobiles, about 15 percent had trucks, besides a great many other types of farm mechanical equipment. On the other hand, the picture was presented, following actual facts of 1933 trends, to show that whenever the big farms owned by banks and insurance companies were sold the tendency was invariably to break them up into smaller units. The statistics showed a regular decrease in the size of farms. Likewise, during the depression years the use of machine cultivation had decreased tremendously. The great decrease in exports threatened to make commercial farming unprofitable, while there seemed to be a definite trend toward self-sufficing farming, with very large increase of the balanced live-at-home operations. These trends were as yet unmeasurable; what was vivid and measurable was the plight of the farmer.

Farm mortgages aggregated $8,500,000,000, nearly as much as the total money in circulation in the nation. Forty-two percent of all farms were affected by mortgages which totaled about one-fourth of all farm land values. Here, as elsewhere, there were great regional differences. Sixty percent of these mortgages were in 11 states, largely in the great Middle States farming area. Nearly one-sixth of the farms were mortgaged up to three-fourths of their value. There was the picture of a single federal land bank owning 1,100,000 acres of land and operating more than 4,000 farms in three states only, with the reasonable prospect of doubling the

amount before the end of 1934. Here were actual indices of the farmer's plight. How was he to pay debts which had more than doubled out of an income cut half in two? Or how could he pay anything with his products selling far less than cost, his state and federal government forcing him to increasingly high costs of equipment and inspection, and confiscating his herds of cattle in disease eradication programs? Couldn't someone, he asked again and again, work out the answer?

There were farm mortgages of $8,500,000,000, but they were a small part of the total mortgaged nation. Urban mortgages represented an indebtedness of $35,000,000,000, or a little more than four times that of farm loans, and aggregated 60 percent of the current value as opposed to 24 percent for farms. Three-fifths of all mortgages and real estate securities were in trouble. With a 50 percent decrease in income and a 40 percent decrease in rentals, how were these debts to be paid? Worse, how could the property be saved at all? And there was a huge family indebtedness of more than $11,000,000,000, so that nearly a fifth of the family budget must be allotted to interest and amortization. Industrial corporations had an indebtedness of $10,500,000,000, perhaps a fifth of tangible assets. Railroads showed a long-time debt of $13,000,000,000 and were still borrowing money from the government. Their net earnings were short more than $350,000,000, which would be required to pay interest and maturing bonds. Here was stark contrast to the early romance of railroads, fortune makers, remakers of the nation. Here were symptoms of America's critical problems, fruits of technology and changing times, of bad management, and of personalities ill suited to their jobs.

The picture of America's indebtedness was an extension of the picture of her rapid expansion. Thought for the morrow appeared little in the fabrication of the national debt of $130,000,000,000 to $200,000,000,000. "Bigger and better" was quoted in derision, yet the slogan was characteristic. Moreover, such motivation implied an endless process, with no limits. Pictures and pictures: the colossal dealings in foreign securities and trade; multiplying tools of production for foreign consumption; colossal real estate developments throughout the nation; the trend toward corporations and other consolidated efforts, such as banks, newspapers, the rise and increase of chain stores. There were more than 7,000 chain stores

## NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER IN THE LABOR FORCE, FOR STATES AND REGIONS, UNITED STATES, 1940

| Area | Population 14 Years Old and Over | In Labor Force | | Not in Labor Force | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Number | Per-cent | Number | Per-cent |
| UNITED STATES | 100,972,196 | 52,840,762 | 52.3 | 48,131,434 | 47.7 |
| *Northeast* | 31,599,922 | 16,953,814 | 53.7 | 14,646,108 | 46.3 |
| Maine | 639,116 | 328,235 | 51 4 | 310,881 | 48 6 |
| New Hampshire | 385,541 | 206,619 | 53 6 | 178,922 | 46.4 |
| Vermont | 272,592 | 138,503 | 50 8 | 134,089 | 49 2 |
| Massachusetts | 3,441,495 | 1,843,624 | 53.6 | 1,597,871 | 46.4 |
| Rhode Island | 569,573 | 321,494 | 56 4 | 248,079 | 43.6 |
| Connecticut | 1,371,297 | 775,677 | 56 6 | 595,620 | 43.4 |
| New York | 10,908,255 | 5,979,597 | 54.8 | 4,928,658 | 45.2 |
| New Jersey | 3,352,712 | 1,857,061 | 55.4 | 1,495,651 | 44.6 |
| Pennsylvania | 7,679,746 | 3,987,737 | 51 9 | 3,692,009 | 48 1 |
| Delaware | 211,588 | 116,065 | 54 9 | 95,523 | 45.1 |
| Maryland | 1,420,954 | 770,914 | 54 3 | 650,040 | 45.7 |
| West Virginia | 1,347,053 | 628,288 | 46.6 | 718,765 | 53.4 |
| *Southeast* | 20,185,505 | 10,596,246 | 52.5 | 9,589,259 | 47.5 |
| Virginia | 1,963,929 | 1,035,404 | 52 7 | 928,525 | 47 3 |
| North Carolina | 2,492,735 | 1,342,117 | 53.8 | 1,150,618 | 46.2 |
| South Carolina | 1,301,701 | 730,818 | 56.1 | 570,883 | 43.9 |
| Georgia | 2,233,841 | 1,236,398 | 55.3 | 997,443 | 44.7 |
| Florida | 1,456,028 | 790,311 | 54 3 | 665,717 | 45.7 |
| Kentucky | 2,037,815 | 993,485 | 48 8 | 1,044,330 | 51.2 |
| Tennessee | 2,115,165 | 1,067,228 | 50 5 | 1,047,937 | 49.5 |
| Alabama | 1,975,752 | 1,015,744 | 51.4 | 960,008 | 48 6 |
| Mississippi | 1,518,543 | 820,100 | 54 0 | 698,443 | 46.0 |
| Arkansas | 1,381,969 | 683,491 | 49 5 | 698,478 | 50 5 |
| Louisiana | 1,708,027 | 881,150 | 51.6 | 826,877 | 48.4 |
| *Southwest* | 7,153,364 | 3,629,460 | 50.7 | 3,523,904 | 49.3 |
| Oklahoma | 1,701,823 | 805,949 | 47.4 | 895,874 | 52 6 |
| Texas | 4,738,743 | 2,465,918 | 52.0 | 2,272,825 | 48 0 |
| New Mexico | 358,965 | 177,719 | 49 5 | 181,246 | 50 5 |
| Arizona | 353,833 | 179,874 | 50.8 | 173,959 | 49.2 |
| *Middle States* | 27,917,763 | 14,381,761 | 51.5 | 13,536,002 | 48.5 |
| Ohio | 5,442,164 | 2,759,925 | 50.7 | 2,682,239 | 49 3 |
| Indiana | 2,659,550 | 1,327,345 | 49 9 | 1,332,205 | 50.1 |
| Illinois | 6,311,628 | 3,362,522 | 53.3 | 2,949,106 | 46.7 |
| Michigan | 4,036,149 | 2,128,291 | 52.7 | 1,907,858 | 47.3 |
| Wisconsin | 2,405,769 | 1,225,233 | 50.9 | 1,180,536 | 49.1 |
| Minnesota | 2,149,710 | 1,112,325 | 51.7 | 1,037,385 | 48.3 |
| Iowa | 1,953,297 | 949,412 | 48 6 | 1,003,885 | 51.4 |
| Missouri | 2,959,496 | 1,516,708 | 51.2 | 1,442,788 | 48.8 |
| *Northwest* | 5,584,490 | 2,767,578 | 49.6 | 2,816,912 | 50.4 |
| North Dakota | 465,566 | 238,068 | 51.1 | 227,498 | 48.9 |
| South Dakota | 477,082 | 236,273 | 49 5 | 240,809 | 50.5 |
| Nebraska | 1,008,527 | 499,491 | 49.5 | 509,036 | 50.5 |
| Kansas | 1,393,039 | 674,287 | 48 4 | 718,752 | 51.6 |
| Montana | 426,479 | 225,001 | 52.8 | 201,478 | 47 2 |
| Idaho | 386,656 | 192,373 | 49.8 | 194,283 | 50 2 |
| Wyoming | 185,649 | 98,984 | 53.3 | 86,665 | 46.7 |
| Colorado | 854,459 | 423,575 | 49.6 | 430,884 | 50.4 |
| Utah | 387,033 | 179,526 | 46 4 | 207,507 | 53.6 |
| *Far West* | 7,978,609 | 4,170,351 | 52.3 | 3,808,258 | 47.7 |
| Nevada | 86,679 | 47,041 | 54.3 | 39,638 | 45.7 |
| Washington | 1,391,040 | 714,538 | 51.4 | 676,502 | 48.6 |
| Oregon | 876,045 | 455,515 | 52.0 | 420,530 | 48.0 |
| California | 5,624,845 | 2,953,257 | 52.5 | 2,671,588 | 47.5 |
| District of Columbia | 552,543 | 341,552 | 61.8 | 210,991 | 38.2 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940*, Series P-4, No. 2, Table 1.

STATE DIFFERENTIALS AND PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL INTERNAL REVENUE AND FEDERAL RELIEF, 1940, COMPARED WITH POPULATION

| Area | Relief Funds | Internal Revenue | Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.0 |
| *Northeast* | 31.07 | 42.58 | 30.9 |
| Maine | .53 | .29 | .6 |
| New Hampshire | .34 | .17 | .4 |
| Vermont | .13 | .09 | .3 |
| Massachusetts | 4.99 | 3.23 | 3.3 |
| Rhode Island | .46 | .51 | .5 |
| Connecticut | .77 | 1.57 | 1.3 |
| New York | 11.37 | 19.72 | 10.3 |
| New Jersey | 2.37 | 3.88 | 3.2 |
| Pennsylvania | 7.31 | 8.71 | 7.5 |
| Delaware | .10 | 1.50 | .2 |
| Maryland | .72 | 1.96 | 1.4 |
| District of Columbia | .32 | .53 | .5 |
| West Virginia | 1.66 | .42 | 1.4 |
| *Southeast* | 14.28 | 17.08 | 21.5 |
| Virginia | .75 | 4.21 | 2.0 |
| North Carolina | 1.33 | 6.16 | 2.7 |
| South Carolina | 1.09 | .20 | 1.4 |
| Georgia | 1.61 | .71 | 2.4 |
| Florida | 1.61 | .84 | 1.4 |
| Kentucky | 1.55 | 2.77 | 2.2 |
| Tennessee | 1.47 | .67 | 2.2 |
| Alabama | 1.15 | .32 | 2.2 |
| Mississippi | 1.04 | .12 | 1.7 |
| Arkansas | 1.00 | .16 | 1.5 |
| Louisiana | 1.68 | .92 | 1.8 |
| *Southwest* | 8.84 | 3.74 | 7.4 |
| Oklahoma | 2.58 | 1.08 | 1.8 |
| Texas | 5.21 | 2.48 | 4.8 |
| New Mexico | .53 | .08 | .4 |
| Arizona | .52 | .10 | .4 |
| *Middle States* | 29.31 | 27.47 | 27.1 |
| Ohio | 5.28 | 5.73 | 5.2 |
| Indiana | 2.55 | 2.40 | 2.6 |
| Illinois | 7.82 | 8.00 | 6.0 |
| Michigan | 4.16 | 5.38 | 4.0 |
| Wisconsin | 2.23 | 1.62 | 2.4 |
| Minnesota | 2.57 | 1.28 | 2.1 |
| Iowa | 1.68 | .47 | 1.9 |
| Missouri | 3.02 | 2.59 | 2.9 |
| *Northwest* | 6.46 | 2.02 | 5.6 |
| North Dakota | .41 | .03 | .5 |
| South Dakota | .45 | .04 | .5 |
| Nebraska | .97 | .39 | 1.0 |
| Kansas | 1.33 | .42 | 1.4 |
| Montana | .54 | .13 | .4 |
| Idaho | .41 | .08 | .4 |
| Wyoming | .14 | .06 | .2 |
| Colorado | 1.58 | .67 | .8 |
| Utah | .63 | .20 | .4 |
| *Far West* | 10.10 | 6.85 | 7.5 |
| Nevada | .08 | .08 | .1 |
| Washington | 2.25 | .59 | 1.3 |
| Oregon | .68 | .27 | .8 |
| California | 7.09 | 5.91 | 5.3 |

Source: *Statistical Abstract, 1942*, Table 6, pp. 4–5; Table 452, p. 430; Table 200, p. 202.

of all kinds with approximately 160,000 unit stores variously distributed throughout the country. There were at least 50,000 units of another type of grocery cooperative chain store, 700 strong. One of the most interesting phases of American life in the 1920's was the chain store development. First, the community was proud to boast of its chain stores. Then they multiplied; then followed the big war of words and discussions centering around the chain store and its influence upon community life. The chain store was a demon, and it was a saint; it was a backward move; and it was an index of new economic achievement; it was a community builder and it was a shirker; it was all bad and it was all good; and it was an American economic institution. Drug stores, grocery stores, five and ten cent stores, filling stations dotting the corners of the landscape with all manner of structures, ugly and graceful, box and colonial, sanitary and dirty, life in the United States.

The astonishing picture of consolidation in the United States was reflected in the merger movement. In manufacturing and mining more than 8,000 concerns disappeared; 4,300 in public utilities, and nearly 1,800 in banking. An indication of the size to which consolidation had grown was found in the spectacle of 200 out of the 300,000 non-financial corporations controlling nearly half of the corporate wealth and nearly a fourth of all wealth of the nation. They were an integral part of the American system which had brought the nation to a crisis. They determined much of the national economy to affect smaller companies, to fix prices, to control policies, to develop or retard communities and regions, to direct institutions. Like other feature pictures of the nation, this one portrayed critical problems challenging the whole capitalistic system in America. It was estimated that at the current rate these corporations by 1950 would control practically the entire wealth of the nation. Even as early as 1930 it was estimated that 2,000 individuals, themselves subject to no control, were able to direct and control half of the nation's industry. Furthermore, the large corporation had come to dominate or influence practically all the industry of the nation and, together with the great banking consolidations, had come to direct budgets, determine appropriations, and greatly influence states and cities through their financial power.

The range and vividness of the picture were further reflected in

the names and nature of these 200 corporations which in themselves gave a fair picture of the transformation of natural wealth by technological wealth into artificial wealth. Here were gross assets of more than $67,000,000,000 distributed among 40 to 50 public utilities, 37 of which were electricity and gas; 40 or more were railroads; 27 chemical industries, of which 20 were petroleum. The others: food products, drugs, tobacco, 13; machinery, 10; automobiles, 4; electrical equipment, 2; metals, 17; rubber, 4; transportation, 2; paper, 3; mercantile, 9; and real estate, textiles, lumber, glass, leather, 1 each.

This picture of the corporation suggested the oft-repeated query of the 1930's as to whether in the next period of American development economics would dominate government or government economics. The American way had been to combine the two, sometimes to the indirect overdominance of politics by business. It would not be easy to change the picture. Yet here was another test of planning. A number of corporations employed more workers and had larger budgets than most state governments. Thus, the United States Steel Corporation employed nearly eight times as many people as the State of New York; the American Telephone and Telegraph Company more than ten times as many; the General Motors Corporation ten times as many as California. The NRA was providing an admirable test in its endeavors to obtain satisfactory codes from the coal, automobile, steel, and other great industries. Yet the corporations were having their troubles. There were the crisis and plight of great insurance companies; the public protest against the high-salaried officials of many corporations; the banking uproar in New York and Washington. Would the corporations submit to government direction when prosperity returned?

But the economic picture was too big and too complicated to describe in any one way or place. As in other aspects of American life it was cumulative. The postwar boom, then short depression. Then swift uprise of prosperity, but with agriculture not sharing equally; the decline of agriculture; the increase of manufacturing plants and equipment; and the rise of industry, commerce, transportation; then fantastic rise of prices, expansion, credit. The resistless power and movement after the war reached its grand climax, its supercrescendo in the crash of 1929, from which point

from $150,000,000,000 to $160,000,000,000 in values were wiped out amidst hectic scenes of disorder. Later sad decrescendo of broken lives, suicides, disaster, discouragement; then again faint hope, then hopelessness, and then back again toward crisis and a possible new crescendo of revolution or chaos in the early 1930's. Again and again, the query: Why was a third of the nation's wealth in values gone, yet real wealth in physical resources, food, goods, clothing, houses, production capacity still available for not only the 1929 index but more?

The pictures multiplied. The characterization of distribution as faulty and out of date was a pathetically inadequate commonplace. The technocrats still expected to save the nation by a new equilibrium here. Wages dropped off by 1932 such that in agriculture the index went from 170 to 110 and in manufacturing from 228 to 162. Wholesale prices had fallen since 1921, in farm products from 140 to 77, and in manufactured products from 160 to 100. From 1929 to 1932 there was a rapid fall in price level from 97.5 to 66. Thus came technocracy attacking the price system and demanding rewards and values in terms of energy. There was continued fluctuation of prices, wages, profits, money units, climaxed by the nation deserting the gold standard in March 1933. There was the strange picture of thousands of panicky folks minded to hoard gold like misers of old, one hoarding unit aggregating $4,500,000, estimated to weigh nine tons. And the federal government brought itself again to the point of combating another good old American liberty by making it a crime for a citizen to keep his own gold. Then still later the government, although owning 40 percent of the gold supply, went on the market for more.

The picture of gold, however, was one like unto the banking system, whose deposits are many times the amount of actual cash on hand. The banking picture, however, was even more dramatic, with a phenomenal rise in the number of banks, in consolidation, in increase of deposits from $32,000,000,000 to $49,000,000,000 in a decade. From 1900 to 1931 the number of branch banks increased from 111 to 3,463. Then came the investment of funds in unsound securities and foreign stock and the illegal use of money for speculation. Thus the banking system which was to have been a public service joined the national orgy of profit

making until the crashing crescendo was reached in the failure of a third of the nation's banks, and such wild scenes of disorder and subsequent tragedy as the nation had hitherto not experienced. Once again the nation had failed the common man in being no longer able to guarantee its citizens the security of their savings. Something had to be done about it. The unprecedented bank holiday of March 1933 was decreed. But there was no way out of the tragic injustice to millions of blameless folk; there was left only the added evidence for the demand for drastic reconstruction. Could the nation make a good plan and carry it out?

There were other pictures—the tug of war between the inflationists and their opponents. The grant of power to the President acted as some powerful psychological force both to retard and to hurry up the process; back and forth, back and forth, like the events of the later Hoover administration and like the United States' participation in the London Economic Conference. There would be no inflation. There might be inflation. There should be inflation. There would be inflation. There was inflation. In the meantime, the sad picture of the destruction of the 1929 speculation tornado had little effect in stemming another stock market crisis in the early summer of 1933. The total number of shares changing hands in a single day exceeded any day in 1929. The people had learned little. They wanted to gain back what they had lost, and they set the stage for another stupendous spectacle. Values rose, prices soared, but buying power and employment lagged, banks withheld their loans, the wheels could not move. There was still something that must be done about it. The latter-day American passion for gold and wealth could not be so simply guided as the earlier American passion for land. Here were other dilemmas to be met.

Still the picture could not be completed. If a chief incident in the financial catastrophe had been the drastic decline of foreign trade, the nation now seemed bent on turning back toward economic nationalism. Its exports were falling off in unexpected ratios, the indications being that about three-fourths of the foreign trade had been lost. From 1929 to 1930 there had been a decline in foreign trade of something like $2,250,000,000. For the first four months of 1933 imports were $362,615,000 as compared with $524,230,000 for the corresponding months of 1932. There had been a

billion dollar foreign defaulting which brought up again the ever-recurring battle of the tariff, the contest tugging back and forth, the contestants being both Americans and foreign nations, with their own tariff walls, their mandates to build up deficiency areas, and their tendencies toward nationalistic economics. The picture was again a mixed one. The Democratic Party, proclaiming for low tariff, had granted its President power to place an embargo on any foreign goods which would compete to the disadvantage of American industries such as were operating under the minimum-wage and maximum-hour agreements. Conflict between personalities; turn about face at the London Conference. Cotton country, bulwark of low tariff, protesting loss of export cotton necessary for balanced economy.

There was, then, of course, the perennial problem of taxation many times intensified. What was to be the margin between public service and private gain? The age-old problem had been accentuated by the rising tide of taxation and expenditures and by the depression, the necessities of which made tangible the groundwork for new consideration of all taxes. The picture most common was one in which the citizen, particularly stimulated by commercial groups and demagogue, was consistently denouncing the "government" for spending money for public works and expansion which the self-same citizen had earlier urged upon the government under the plea of progress, under the influence of the prosperity-forever era, and under the traditional pattern of politics and self-interest. Yet the citizen rarely, if ever, alluded to his part in coercing the government to embark upon the same general scale of overproduction and expansion as the nation of free private enterprise had adopted. And so the taxes rose and rose; income declined and declined. The taxes could not be paid under the old values of the dollar. Here, again, dilemma and conflict striking at the foundations of the republic.

There was one extraordinarily vivid picture of Americans concluding in the very early Thirties that they had so over-built their roads that now perhaps for many years no new roads could be anticipated. Indeed maintenance would tax the capacity of finances. Roads, they chorused, had ruined the states; streets and extensions had bankrupted the cities. Yet within so short a time as six months there was to be projected another tremendous road building pro-

gram calculated to help bring the nation out of its depression and for the most part eagerly seized upon by the public. And, as was customary, the calamity and the benefits alike befell the majority of the people who would pay the bill. If the government could bring back prosperity, could reshift the burdens of debts through some changing value of the dollar and through governmental co-operative financing, then the debt could be paid. Otherwise, the people would challenge the present order more determinedly than they had yet done.

In all of these economic aspects of the American drama the people, after all, were the chief actors. Benefit and calamity alike befell them. In them lay the seeds of revolution as well as the capacity for democratic government. Moreover, this artificial wealth, in addition to its connotation of welfare, was the product of the work of the people upon the natural wealth of the nation through the tools of education, science, technology. But the American way had involved more than the simple economic products of labor and capital. Unrestricted competition in free enterprise, with a nation of such tremendous resources and frontiers, had magnified the role of the dominant individual. He was not only permitted to attempt maximum accumulation of wealth, but he became the ideal of the republic. When powerful technology and mass corporate character were added to dominant personality, the consequences were no longer merely the results of old economic theories, of supply and demand, of profits and wages, of prices and quality, of hazard and security. The results were social dilemmas more than economic problems.

Thus, the government's query into the salaries of the executives of 20,000 corporations was no longer primarily a matter of corporation efficiency; it was fundamental to new social codes. It was not merely a concern of economics that the salaries of 80 executives of insurance companies averaged $55,000 a year; or that the salaries of the five largest companies averaged $135,000, or that a steel corporation paid an executive $5,497,000 in five years, or that an executive of a tobacco company could make as much as $2,000,000 in a single year of salary and bonuses. Nor was the plight of the tobacco growers in the fields and cabins or the investments of millions of policyholders in insurance companies merely concerns of successful farming or business operations. Sixty-five million policy-

holders were citizens expecting the guarantees of the pursuit of happiness through security of their funds. The fact that a bank president could receive as much as $1,700,000 in a year had some social bearing upon the thousands of American citizens who had lost their savings and investments.

Again, the plight of the railroads or the coal mines or the insurance companies or banks, in so far as it was the fault of their administrative personalities, involved more than scientific management or economic soundness. It involved social codes basic to social stability and balance. It involved a reexamination into the conflict between individual freedom and social justice. It involved a new inventory into the relationships between profit and wages and of the human wealth of the nation and the role which the people play both as creators and creatures of a democratic civilization. And so on and on. The competitive problems of a million retailers involved living standards in ten thousand communities. The adjustment of a million men on strike in a reconstruction year required more than economic techniques. The chief dilemmas were social, not economic, political, or moral in the sense that they related primarily to the nation's human resources. On the one hand, what was happening and would happen to the people? On the other, it would take the best that the nation could muster in leadership, training, and all human resources to overcome the extraordinary obstacles in the way of recovery and reconstruction.



*Photo by Don Becker*

Technology: The metropolitan shadow of a great fear silhouetted against twilight.



*Photos by Farm Security Administration*

Institutions: Can the schools do the job? Would a federal equalization fund help?



## *Chapter XXI*

# *THE SCHOOL AND EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRACY*

NEXT to government and industry perhaps no institution reflects such a vivid picture or constitutes such a basic factor in the development of civilization in the United States as public education. The picture of American education is especially prominent in relation to the two great public forces of government and industry through which public education must receive its sanction on the one hand and its support on the other. The present major role of education is, however, the product of a later development, since for a long time and in various regions of the nation education was considered a matter of family and of private concern. Then came the American movement for public education, which assumed almost the proportions of a folk religion and an open sesame to success and happiness. This evolution of the school and education from simple beginnings to the extraordinary proportions of the present America is also representative of the long road of education from earlier and pioneer times to later and maturer stages of civilization. The problems of education, too, in the modern world, are symbolic of most of man's social problems of adjustment, so that as never before the schools, the colleges, the universities, and adult education are challenged to direct mankind away from the errors of the past into new reaches of human society.

One way, perhaps oversimplified, of testing the value placed by the people upon education, in addition to noting the tremendous strides in the last few decades, is to note the fact that the people are willing to pay for this great service to their democracy. What the people pay for they are usually persuaded has supreme value in their development, protection, and happiness. It happens, therefore, that no institutional picture in the nation had appeared more impressive and vivid, no national wealth more promising of great returns, no American activity had shown greater advance than that

of public education. Public education had long been acclaimed a great American institution just as equality of opportunity for the common man had been called the American ideal. Now America had flourished; its education, public and private, had swept forward in a steady march of victory. Public schools, vocational education, universities, colleges, extension and adult education, professional education, commercial education—these had made the nation blossom like the rose. It was an amazing spectacle—beautiful buildings, artistic grounds, consolidated schools, transportation, the employment of millions of people in the promotion of construction work and community development. More than 30,000,000 people in the school business in so short a time reflected an astonishing picture to the European observer—a matter of fact to Americans. A million were teachers, a million were college folks, and beyond these another million worked at the job—P.T.A. members, educational committees of civic and service clubs, members of school boards.

And the educational associations reflected peculiarly American pictures de luxe. The N.E.A. with its thousands of members and its two great annual meetings: one about the time of the birthday of the Father of the country, devoted to the Department of Superintendence; the other about the time of the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, the great summer gathering of teachers themselves. Never did such meetings flourish! Rarely could there be found a more impressive conclave than the clans of distinguished superintendents and principals and college professors and presidents as composed those February meetings. Never more colorful picture overflowing with enthusiasm, ideals, the zest for service and more knowledge, contacts and experience, than those Fourth of July weeks of the N.E.A.—held now West, now East, now South, attuned conveniently to provide recreation and entertainment for the tired teacher and a profitable convention for boards of trade in the cities where they abode for the week.

And of the state educational groups other American pictures. Every state had its educational association with its officials and committees, meeting hither and yon throughout the state, following in general the ideals of the N.E.A., giving admirable forum for promotion work and fellowship, and platform for professional speakers and specialists. And, again, teachers' clubs and associa-

## THE SCHOOL CHALLENGES BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

**An Analysis of Certain Desirable Relationships That Should Exist Between Schools and Employers**

Edwin A. Lee, *Director*, National Occupational Conference, *Occupations*, March 1937, p. 485

| *The School Aim* | *Business and Industry Aim* | *Business and Industry Are Challenged* |
|---|---|---|
| 1. to develop each individual to his highest potentiality. | 1. to develop sales or production to its highest potentiality at lowest cost to owners or stockholders. | 1. to permit development of individual potentiality of its employees within the framework of profit-motive. |
| 2. to help each individual to discover that work which he is best fitted by temperament, capacity, and planned education to do. | 2. to select from all available sources those individuals most likely to return greatest values for wages or salaries paid. | 2. to accept responsibility not only for selection of workers but also for cooperation with schools in occupational adjustment of youth and adults. |
| 3. to train for occupational competency in the vocation chosen under school conditions, where feasible in cooperation with business or industry when the relationship is possible or effective | 3. to train only for those knowledges and skills which are peculiar to the business or industry involved, and then only in terms of making the individual a better worker, *per se*. | 3. to cooperate with schools at every point possible in devising and carrying out sound and efficient programs of occupational education. |
| 4. to induct trained individuals into business or industry at the level at which they are proficient and under the most favorable conditions for future growth and advancement. | 4. to select for vacancies or new positions those best qualified to perform the particular tasks or jobs involved. | 4. to work with schools and public employment services to the end that increasingly the vocational schools and classes shall be, in fact, the most dependable source of supply of new employees. |
| 5. to up-grade ambitious and capable individuals through adult classes, either in public schools or in cooperation with business or industry. | 5. to advance and promote from within on the basis of performance, and evidence of desire to grow and improve. | 5. to foster and encourage in every legitimate way a policy which recognizes and rewards evidence of growth and increased efficiency. |
| 6. to re-train for new or different work those who, because of technological, economic, or accidental reasons, find themselves unemployed or unemployable. | 6. to recruit new workers mainly from youth and the physically capable. | 6. to examine the employment possibilities for mature and physically handicapped men and women, and to adopt a policy of including a certain proportion of such on the payroll. |
| 7. to develop its program of occupational education on adequate study and analysis of needs and trends in business and industry. | 7. to set up standards for employment, sometimes based on adequate analyses, frequently based on rule-of-thumb practice or personal idiosyncrasies, and not infrequently based on artificial and sometimes amateurish requirements. | 7. to cooperate with educators in carrying on continuous and thorough research concerning such items as: occupational trends, job requirements, unemployment, aptitude and trade tests. |
| 8. to make each individual within his capacities a productive, economically independent, personally satisfied citizen of democracy. | 8. to distribute as widely and as continuously as possible socially desirable services or commodities at a profit sufficient to attract or create capital. | 8. to subordinate the profit-motive to the human-element motive. The interesting fact is that almost without exception such subordination results in better business and better industry. |

tions in counties and cities throughout the nation, pictures de luxe of professional, educational America. And of school journals a multitude: from the official organ of the N.E.A. and of each state association to the many professional and specialized journals of education published by universities, agencies, private groups on to the bulletins of a hundred university departments and schools of education, teachers colleges, and the United States Bureau of Education, later the United States Office of Education. And still other pictures of the normal schools, teachers colleges, schools of education, departments of education, state departments of education through which the training of teachers and the administration of education were promoted. How these grew from the original, simple psychologies for teachers and departments of pedagogy constituted one of the most interesting of all American progression. Yet by the early 1930's the picture was revealing too many teachers and too many training places for them; whether because of the depression only or whether from a genuine overproduction the nation was earnestly inquiring. For this was becoming one of the basic complaints of the American public.

Still the educational picture grew and grew. A thousand groups and societies and associations, commonly called learned societies, flourished. Associations of college professors and of special college teachers—of English, of French, of mathematics; national learned societies of the social sciences—economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, history; associations of law schools, of schools of commerce and business, medicine, of libraries, of college registrars, of college and university auditors, of associations of colleges and universities, national, state, regional. They had their big part in the making of America the nation of meetings, one-time promise of the perfect fellowship and technology. But this, too, the great American public was protesting and was gradually reducing the travel expenses for its educational servants.

America had taken its education seriously, believing that the essential wealth of a nation would be found not only in the education but the proper education of its people. And the nation was practicing what it preached, at least until the great confusion of the 1930's and the reaction against the schools which might have been the beginning of a reactionary preaching of a new era. For education was the nation's chiefest of industries. Upon its educa-

tion by 1930 the nation was spending more of its tax money than upon any other general activity except that of war, which was, after all, an exception due to the World War and after. Of the total tax moneys collected from federal, state, and local sources, $2,164,598,000, or nearly 21 percent, were spent for education compared with $2,646,612,000, or 27.7 percent, which went for war—the two making up nearly half of the nation's budget of tax money expenditures. Of expenditures of states for operation and maintenance 40 percent was for education in 1931. Whether this expenditure, on a wave of public clamor for the reduction of taxes, was responsible for the great reaction against the American way of education in the early 1930's, or whether it was due to overproduction, overexpansion, supertechnology, or was just primarily an integral part of the depression and a point of natural saturation, the nation was making vigorous inquiry. Also whether this reaction was temporary or relatively permanent was a question that was not answered. It looked to be relatively permanent to the extent that educators must needs reconstruct both the basis and the machinery of their schools and to the extent that social security and public welfare expenditures were in the way of rivaling educational expenditures before the end of the 1930's.

The picture of the educational expansion during the first third of the twentieth century was relatively easy to present, such was its magnitude, so sweeping its advances, so clear-cut its parts. The nation had grown and multiplied. Its children had multiplied in proportion. The American ideal was as of every parent with ambition to see his children completely educated as the goal of citizenship, as the sure goal to success and happiness. Not only that, but the nation tended more and more to decrease child labor and to compel schooling. Thus of children between 10 and 15 years of age the ratio employed ranged from 18.4 per thousand in 1910 to 4.7 in 1930. Add to these factors the rapidly increasing facilities for education, the expanding organization of educational forces, the organized labor movement, and the rapid increase in wealth and ability for sending children to school, and the result was easily understood. Thus, to begin with the lower schools, the enrollment in public elementary and secondary schools had increased from 15,500,000 to a little more than 25,500,000. The value of school property had multiplied many times faster, from a mere $550,000,

000 in 1900 to the staggering amount of $6,211,327,000 in 1930, or, as some figure manipulator would put it, more money than Catullus could have stored away had he saved six dollars a day from the days of the Roman grandeur to the America of the 1930's.

The picture of higher education was in some ways even more pronounced. From 1900 to 1930 the attendance in institutions of higher learning had increased 314 percent, as opposed to only 62 percent increase in the population. It was an amazing advance unprecedented in the annals of any educational system on record. There had been a similar increase in the nature and number of subjects of the curriculum, the nature and number of buildings and equipment, in the high standards required of teachers, and in the technical administration of school work. Million dollar high school buildings were the pride of small cities and large. Music rooms and play rooms, art studios and gymnasiums, swimming pools and cafeterias, workshops and playgrounds were brilliant items in the picture. In the earlier days of the century a million dollars toward college endowment made a notable contribution. By 1930, twenty-thirty-forty-fifty-sixty-seventy-eighty million dollar total endowments were being recorded in comparative estimates of the wealth of universities and colleges. Not the least impressive of all the pictures was that of library development, public, urban, college and university; the rise of the American Library Association, and the multiplication of books and reading.

Reaction against education was not limited to the public schools. Higher education in particular had come in for its share of questioning. What was the end of this college education, anyhow? Couldn't it do better by youth than it was doing? College education seemed not to fit young men and women for adequate living or liberal thinking. And the professional and commercial schools overdid the thing. College faculties, so the critics said, were aloof, interested in their own subjects, not interested any longer in their students. There were too many college graduates anyway. And besides, the college professors were too liberal in their teachings, and something should be done about it. Almost every sort of charge was hurled at the colleges. They were too classical and apart from reality. No, they were dipping too much into the practical world with too many courses. They were devoted largely to athletics. Their extra-curricular activities were too many. They

cost too much and they were not sympathetic with the people. They were run too much by the alumni and the politicians, their presidents were too autocratic. They were, like other institutions, bearing the brunt of depression assaults and would have to adjust themselves, take stock, and go forward on the new basis. Yet they undoubtedly had overproduced, even as had all America.

Such was a part of the picture before the 1930's, before the cry of "the deepening crisis in education" had become a chorus. By 1933 thousands of teachers were unemployed, not a fourth of college graduates of the current years could find employment of their choice, hundreds of university men and women with advanced graduate and professional degrees were afloat, while whole segments of budgets and activities were being curtailed. Out of a total of 700 typical cities at least one-seventh either reduced or abolished instruction in art, music, home economics, health service. Libraries were undernourished, librarians were not being utilized, money for books was lacking. Nearly 2,000 rural schools were closed in 24 states. Funds for the upkeep of buildings and plants had become exhausted. It was a situation for which the New Deal had as yet developed no codes or appraisal. If education was the way of democracy, then democracy was confused and at the crossroads on still another count.

Needless to say, this situation was symbolic of not only our general problems, but more specifically of the problems of American education. Everywhere the question was being raised as to whether education was succeeding in any measure commensurate with the need and opportunity. What was to be the nature of the changes in objectives, methods, scope of the new education for the new America? It became, therefore, a problem of the first magnitude to inquire into the essentials of the education of the next period of American development. An adequate understanding of the differences between current problems and those of earlier periods made it clear that the old essentials of knowledge and education must be magnified into better education and more knowledge. The nation having committed itself to universal education and to the full measure of democracy found the need for more and not less education. Yet it was clear also that the nature of that education must somehow be different in many respects from that of the past. The citizen must not only have a wider range of knowl-

edge but he must know how to discriminate and judge values and he must be educated for an increasingly larger use of leisure time. And education for citizenship, or education for the well-rounded community and for human adequacy, was manifestly more important in the new day than exclusive formal education primarily for college or profession.

These added demands of education included other elements which ranked high among the emergency needs of the day, one of which would be the *possession of skill and technical equipment.* In the increasingly complex and rapidly changing civilization of the planned society there could be no substitute for skills and technical knowledge and for the capacity to apply science to social ends with the same scientific methodology and high standards as we have applied science to the discovery of knowledge. Such skill and techniques, however, would emphasize the "social technology" and social inventions and adaptation more than the pure scientific discoveries in order to meet the tests of sweeping physical technologies.

Inseparable from this emphasis upon skills necessary for the mastery of the new frontiers would be *capacity for adaptation,* adjustment, and readjustment in a constantly changing world. It seemed clear that one reason for the indescribable confusion of the 1930's was the fact that the nation was not prepared for such changes as had swept in upon it unawares. Such qualities of adaptability would, of course, comprehend the capacity for reasoned experience as substitute for panic, fear, and emotional action.

This implied still other qualities, one of which would constitute a third characteristic, namely, *social and moral courage.* There did not appear any substitute for the socio-moral qualities which alone could equip the citizen for functioning in the complex modern world. It was not the machine or technology or quantity production which endangered civilization so much as it was the use which might be made of them. It would require special motivation no less in quality or power than that of the earlier "American dream" to harness the technology of the "Machine Age." The margin between personal gain and the social good was everywhere paramount in the complex culture of the new society's future. While social legislation was essential for uniformity and for the enforcement of sovereign covenants, and for guaranteeing the social

good to be above benefits to the individual, social legislation could never achieve the same permanence of civic righteousness as could be wrought through the qualities of social morality, which would require more of the quality of courage than of form and fashion.

Yet *patriotism and loyalty* were still prime qualities. Even in the new nationalism, however, patriotism would cease to be a narrow Americanism or nationalism or sectionalism. It would mean rather such consistent alignment to state, regional, and national purpose and programs as would insure continuity, dependability, and effectiveness in the pursuit of the justifiable ends of government. In the readjustments and struggles incident to crises and frontier developments, the qualities of *tolerance and patience* would be at a premium. Dogmatism and emotional extremes would retard both the processes of reconstruction after crisis and the normal advance forward in the new era. This was especially true in a period of confusion when so many experiments were being proposed, when such conflicting advice was being given, and when too much legislation was likely to be enacted. To make the folkways harmonize with the stateways into a well-synchronized social order, with all of its regional units working in harmony, would tax all the tolerance and patience which the citizen could develop and conserve.

The complaint had often been made that the new generation appeared to lack *purpose and motivation*. If that was true, it was of course in contrast to the earlier days of the nation. Yet it was generally assumed that those who predicted the mastery of machine over man had failed to reckon with the power of national purpose and the concerted determination of mankind. It seemed likely that there would be a revival of purpose, idealism, and spiritual drive necessary to meet the new demands. Finally, perhaps now as never before, there would be needed the best of *physical conditioning and morale*. The new frontiers would require physical stamina, a strong race of people, the utilization of the advances of science in food and nutrition discoveries, the products of recreation and public health, and all that improvement of the population which a sound culture in a sound civilization promotes.

So important had this criticism of education become and so critical the unemployment of college graduates and of men and women in the upper brackets of skill and training, that both the national government and national private agencies began to focus

upon realistic inquiries into the prospects and dilemmas of the American educational system and its various units.

The federal government's National Youth Administration and the President's Advisory Committee on Education were representative of the concrete realistic approach to the problem. The basis upon which the National Youth Administration was created was set forth in a declaration of policy citing the American tradition as follows:

'The general aim and purpose of this Act is to provide that the traditional American ideal of opportunity for youth be preserved. In the past, the Federal Government opened new fields for the enterprise and initiative of generations of American youth and made possible the development of this Nation through such legislation as the Homestead Act of 1862. With the closing of the physical frontier, this outlet for the initiative of the Nation's youth disappeared. Because of circumstances beyond their control, many young people in the United States are now being denied the opportunity for gainful employment as they reach maturity. Because of similar circumstances, many others are being deprived of the education and vocational training to which they are rightfully entitled and which the general welfare and future well-being of the Nation require that they secure. Without renewed opportunity for these young people on a Nation-wide scale, the American ideal of opportunity for youth can no longer be served. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to promote the general welfare, to make it possible for the youth of the United States to obtain once more these economic and educational opportunities. . . .'[1]

The President's Advisory Committee on Education, set up in 1936, was instructed to inquire into the problems and dilemmas inherent in the "whole subject of Federal relationship to state and local conduct of education." The recommendations of this Committee were summarized in a note on "Education in the National Life."

'Among the major social objectives of the immediate future, special emphasis should be placed upon the provision of improved educational services for all children. The American people are committed to the principle that all of the children of this country, regardless of economic status, race, or place of residence, are en-

titled to an equitable opportunity to obtain a suitable education, so far as it can be provided in the public schools. The principle has never been fully realized in practice. . . . Also in the immediate future, emphasis should be given to the provision of adequate facilities to meet the special needs of youth. Ways must be found and placed in effect to prevent situations such as now obtain, in which millions of young people leave the schools without adequate preparation for life and are not absorbed into useful occupations for periods often of several years. . . . There must also be provision for enlargement of the educational and cultural services needed by adults. . . . The Committee is convinced that the Federal Government must continue and expand its efforts to improve and enlarge the social services, including education, and that it must exercise a large measure of constructive national leadership, because in no other agency can representative national leadership be vested. . . .'[2]

Another significant national inquiry was that of the Educational Policies Commission appointed by the National Education Association and the American Association of School Administrators and having the close cooperation of the American Council on Education and the United States Office of Education. Three of its publications have had wide circulation, namely, *The Purposes of Education in a Democracy, The Structure and Administration of Education in a Democracy,* and Charles A. Beard's *The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy.* So, too, conferences and celebrations of universities and colleges have featured the changing role of education in a changing world such that the dilemma of education, high and low, has come to assume the proportion of one of the major problems of American democracy.

Here as elsewhere the discussions have assumed the proportions of debate. There is as yet no complete agreement on curriculum, objectives or methods. Yet in general there has seemed to be a relative consensus of opinion that, since the social adaptation of the individual to changing society is a first objective, the social sciences must assume an increasingly important role in the curriculum and that the sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences must approximate a nearer harmony and balance in the education of the future.

The assumption here is, of course, that a more realistic devel-

opment and functioning of the social sciences is what is needed in the new era. This conclusion is concurred in by the physical scientists. Many of our new books in the field of biology and natural history have their conclusions focused upon the social implications, and there are emerging many new biological recommendations for the social order. Indicative of this also was the following resolution, passed in December 1937, by the Council of the American Association for the Advancement of Science:

'WHEREAS science and its applications are not only transforming the physical and mental environment of men but adding greatly to the complexities of their social, economic and political relations. . . . *Therefore* be it resolved . . . that the American Association . . . make as one of its objectives an examination of the profound effects of science upon society. . . .'

Many of the engineers are implying that unless the social sciences can do the job perhaps it will have to be done by an extension into social engineering. In our colleges and universities, the departments of English and romance languages in the guise of literature are sometimes apparently teaching more and better social problems than some of the social sceinces, and the public at large is clamoring for the sociologists, economists, and political scientists to make effective their professions in the field of both discovery and mastery.

A recent study of the application of teachers in New York City for positions in the schools showed an almost complete reverse from the order of other years, namely, a majority seeking to teach history, economics, sociology as opposed to the early majorities in English and mathematics. This tendency is also reflected in both the increased enrollments in the social sciences and in many instances the attitude of students towards these social sciences and towards new courses. The principal point here, however, is that the trend in nearly all aspects of modern life and education appears to make the reexamination of the nature and place of the social sciences in the college curriculum inevitable.

This leads us to inquire into the nature and scope of the social sciences in which perhaps the larger emphasis upon social and societal problems is placed over against the older emphasis upon subjects and disciplines. Manifestly, the social sciences brought over from Europe and constituting the groundwork of a great

and distinguished American university education are no longer adequate. Manifestly, merely classical economics based on an outmoded English, isolated economy of mercantilism and with very little relation to the dynamic world of American culture is no longer satisfactory. Manifestly, also, the new public administration is transcending much of the classical political economy, and the new history supersedes the purely documentation methodology. So, too, the earlier sociology of abstract theories is being transcended by a more realistic attack upon the understanding and direction of social situations.

It would seem that from the viewpoint of colleges and universities the social sciences, partly learning from the physical sciences and partly adapting themselves to the emergencies of the new order, must frankly be developed on a twofold basis and function. That is, we must frankly separate the two functions of social studies, one as science and research and the other as tools and educational and planning procedures. In the case of the physical sciences, although scientific discovery through pure science and research have constituted the glory of the academic subject, mechanical invention and scientific technology through the use of invested capital applied to the modern world have constituted the compelling contribution of the sciences to contemporary society. The assumption would be, of course, that the new era will demand for the mastery of the new social frontiers capacities and techniques commensurate with those of the physical sciences and technology, which have so transformed a quick, changing world during the last half century.

What then is the role of the school and education in these great tasks? To answer this question it is necessary to understand the societal function of the school and the nature of its work. In the words of a single definition, adapted to modern situations and social change, what is the school? In general, we may say that the school has two larger purposes, the one having to do with the transmission of knowledge and wisdom to society and the other having to do with individual and social guidance. In terms of society's basic concepts, the school is that institution through which is transmitted to each generation the wisdom of the race and through which the individual and society receive guidance in continuous efforts for adjustment and progress. According to this

concept knowledge alone does not constitute education. Nevertheless, it should be clear that adequate guidance of the individual and the race must be based upon knowledge and experience of the past and of the present. Whether or not this concept of the school and of education is adequate to the needs of the student of social problems may be tested by simple application to modern situations.

In our attempts to define the school or the family or the church or the state it is important that our concepts of each of these institutions be stated in terms of exclusive function. That is, if it is the primary function of the school to transmit knowledge and give social guidance, manifestly this ought not to be the primary function of the church or the family or the state, each of which must have its primary function clearly defined and correlated. Nevertheless it is very important to understand each of the institutions in relation to the others. This is particularly true of the school because of its central guiding position and of its contact with the whole population. We are often able to measure the efficiency of the school in accordance with its success in strengthening the other institutions and in coordinating its work with theirs. That school, we say, is not a good school which does not, through its organization and curriculum, make for better homes and families, for better industry and work, for better citizenship and government, for better social morality and strong personality, and for better community. This is an excellent way of gauging the importance of the task which we conceive it to be the function of the school to perform.

The new school, for instance, finds itself called upon to take over some of the original tasks of the home and family. Such tasks will vary in accordance with the types of community and with changing social and economic conditions. In some industrial centers, for example, the school may provide not only lunches for children, but also kindergarten and nursery facilities which will take care of them while their mothers are at work. The school may provide medical and physical inspection of children, and by effective organization and good personnel do far more toward the prevention of disease and the promotion of health than the parents acting alone could do. The school may then go further and furnish clinics for the mother, for the preschool child, and for

parents in general. The school may give information and instruction in home economics, in matters of diet and hygiene, and in the beautification of home and grounds. And, through its evening meetings, its recreation programs, its parent-teacher associations, and its other social activities, the school may provide some entertainment and pleasure for the parents as well as the children. In these ways and many others, such as through boys' and girls' clubs, and through school credit for home work, the school not only takes over much of the work originally done in the home but becomes a strong ally and friend of the whole family.

The school, once again, becomes in its coordinating work with the family and other institutions a community agency and a community center. Thus not only as it relates to the home but throughout the community the school becomes the key institution. The modern plan of having the school plant used all the week and all the year is an effort not only to see that the people get the fullest value for their investment but to offer the school as a little community through which recreation, instruction, and inspiration may come hand in hand to old and young alike. The newer athletic programs, parent-teacher associations, debating societies, mothers' clubs, father-and-son banquets, and many other similar features make it possible for the community to feel that it really does own the school as its best social servant. The tendency of the school to go back into the home and give education and cooperation to the older folks as well as the young, its efforts in general adult education and in teaching the unlettered to read and write, as well as its evening and continuation schools and its vocational guidance, all conspire to make the school a living institution serving the community. The school which does not so serve its community is no longer rated a good school.

In the ways already enumerated and in its special training for good citizenship, the school becomes also a chief asset of the state and of government, from which in turn it has secured, in modern times, its major support. In addition to its general service to the community and citizenship, of which we have spoken, the modern school sometimes becomes the voting precinct. But perhaps its most distinctive contribution to citizenship is its curriculum, which emphasizes more and more the social studies. Civics is no longer merely a course in civil government, but a course in

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FARMS REPORTING DWELLINGS LIGHTED BY ELECTRICITY, 1930 AND 1940, WITH PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN NUMBER OF FARMS REPORTING ELECTRICITY, 1930–1940, FOR STATES AND REGIONS, UNITED STATES

| Area | 1940 | | Percent Increase in Farms with Electricity 1930–1940 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Farms with Electricity | Percent of All Farms | |
| UNITED STATES | 2,032,316 | 33.3 | 141.6 |
| *Northeast* | 368,055 | 58 1 | 200.3 |
| Maine | 21,124 | 54.2 | 163.5 |
| New Hampshire | 11,184 | 67.6 | 181.6 |
| Vermont | 12,873 | 54.6 | 170.2 |
| Massachusetts | 26,648 | 83.5 | 166.2 |
| Rhode Island | 2,511 | 83.3 | 131.5 |
| Connecticut | 17,494 | 82.7 | 193.0 |
| New York | 106,804 | 69.7 | 194.1 |
| New Jersey | 21,695 | 84.0 | 161.4 |
| Delaware | 3,699 | 41.1 | 237.0 |
| Pennsylvania | 98,937 | 58.5 | 216.8 |
| Maryland | 18,351 | 43.6 | 200.7 |
| West Virginia | 26,735 | 26.9 | 501.6 |
| *Southeast* | 391,562 | 17.3 | 438.4 |
| Virginia | 44,348 | 25.4 | 340.9 |
| North Carolina | 71,196 | 25.6 | 474.5 |
| South Carolina | 28,764 | 20.9 | 474.1 |
| Georgia | 43,958 | 20.3 | 586.2 |
| Florida | 16,472 | 26.5 | 253.8 |
| Kentucky | 42,288 | 16.7 | 395.5 |
| Tennessee | 40,519 | 16.4 | 404.8 |
| Alabama | 35,725 | 15.4 | 553.1 |
| Mississippi | 27,670 | 9.5 | 577 4 |
| Arkansas | 23,435 | 10.8 | 457.6 |
| Louisiana | 17,187 | 11.5 | 411.8 |
| *Southwest* | 134,442 | 20.7 | 370.3 |
| Oklahoma | 28,280 | 15.7 | 349.5 |
| Texas | 93,577 | 22.4 | 409.5 |
| New Mexico | 6,554 | 19.2 | 387.6 |
| Arizona | 6,031 | 32.7 | 164.3 |
| *Middle States* | 746,854 | 44.6 | 255.5 |
| Ohio | 143,436 | 61.4 | 747.2 |
| Indiana | 95,575 | 51.8 | 315.1 |
| Illinois | 87,611 | 41.0 | 255.9 |
| Michigan | 133,095 | 71.0 | 382.6 |
| Wisconsin | 95,158 | 51.0 | 204.4 |
| Minnesota | 59,838 | 30.3 | 256.4 |
| Iowa | 86,786 | 40.7 | 188.5 |
| Missouri | 45,355 | 17.7 | 224.3 |
| *Northwest* | 181,431 | 30.2 | 181.4 |
| North Dakota | 11,446 | 15.5 | 184.9 |
| South Dakota | 12,845 | 17.7 | 141.6 |
| Nebraska | 34,886 | 28.8 | 163 2 |
| Kansas | 41,549 | 26.6 | 200.5 |
| Montana | 11,688 | 27.9 | 329.5 |
| Idaho | 26,384 | 60.4 | 206.0 |
| Wyoming | 5,184 | 34.5 | 452.8 |
| Colorado | 19,735 | 38.4 | 210.1 |
| Utah | 17,714 | 69.7 | 112.3 |
| *Far West* | 209,918 | 75.0 | 150.4 |
| Nevada | 1,812 | 50.7 | 159.1 |
| Washington | 60,082 | 73.6 | 176.4 |
| Oregon | 38,010 | 61.5 | 206.6 |
| California | 110,014 | 82.9 | 128.0 |
| District of Columbia | 54 | 83.1 | 80.6 |

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940*, Vol. III, Table 23, p. 541.

## INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940

| Area | Colleges and Universities | Professional Schools | Teachers Colleges | Normal Schools | Junior Colleges | Negro Institutions | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES | 664 | 254 | 169 | 57 | 434 | 108 | 1,686 |
| *Northeast* | 194 | 97 | 53 | 34 | 57 | 12 | 447 |
| Maine | 6 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 15 |
| New Hampshire | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 8 |
| Vermont | 6 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 10 |
| Massachusetts | 27 | 13 | 12 | 6 | 10 | 0 | 68 |
| Rhode Island | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Connecticut | 7 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 27 |
| New York | 47 | 30 | 3 | 16 | 6 | 0 | 102 |
| New Jersey | 11 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 34 |
| Pennsylvania | 50 | 25 | 13 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 97 |
| Delaware | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Maryland | 14 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 31 |
| District of Columbia | 9 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 26 |
| West Virginia | 9 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 20 |
| *Southeast* | 137 | 28 | 27 | 4 | 109 | 79 | 384 |
| Virginia | 14 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 12 | 7 | 43 |
| North Carolina | 18 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 19 | 11 | 53 |
| South Carolina | 15 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 | 33 |
| Georgia | 14 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 11 | 46 |
| Florida | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 14 |
| Kentucky | 11 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 16 | 2 | 40 |
| Tennessee | 22 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 8 | 8 | 47 |
| Alabama | 9 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 27 |
| Mississippi | 8 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 18 | 6 | 34 |
| Arkansas | 9 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 25 |
| Louisiana | 10 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 22 |
| *Southwest* | 38 | 8 | 17 | 0 | 58 | 13 | 134 |
| Oklahoma | 10 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 18 | 1 | 36 |
| Texas | 25 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 36 | 12 | 86 |
| New Mexico | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 |
| Arizona | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| *Middle States* | 189 | 87 | 44 | 7 | 105 | 3 | 435 |
| Ohio | 46 | 14 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 66 |
| Indiana | 22 | 10 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 41 |
| Illinois | 35 | 33 | 9 | 3 | 19 | 0 | 99 |
| Michigan | 19 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 40 |
| Wisconsin | 14 | 5 | 10 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 34 |
| Minnesota | 15 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 36 |
| Iowa | 24 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 36 | 0 | 64 |
| Missouri | 14 | 11 | 7 | 0 | 21 | 2 | 55 |
| *Northwest* | 60 | 11 | 17 | 7 | 44 | 1 | 140 |
| North Dakota | 4 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 11 |
| South Dakota | 7 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 16 |
| Nebraska | 12 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 24 |
| Kansas | 19 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 21 | 1 | 44 |
| Montana | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 10 |
| Idaho | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 8 |
| Wyoming | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Colorado | 6 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 17 |
| Utah | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 9 |
| *Far West* | 46 | 23 | 11 | 5 | 61 | 0 | 146 |
| Nevada | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Washington | 10 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 22 |
| Oregon | 10 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 20 |
| California | 25 | 21 | 7 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 103 |

Source: U. S. Office of Education, *Educational Directory, 1940*, p. 6.

social living. Instruction is no longer merely the mechanical learning of by-laws and constitutions and forms of government, but becomes an active observation of and participation in the forms and processes of local government and public welfare. And in times of war and stress the teachings of patriotism and emergency cooperation have been centered around the school program. In that part of the school curriculum devoted to citizenship the student will find a special field for further study.

One of the most difficult situations in which the modern school finds itself is that relating to the teaching of religion. Since religion and morality have for ages been closely connected, it is but natural that many should expect the school, one of whose purposes is to guide its pupils into strength, character, and social morality, to give religious instruction. This is especially natural, since formal schools originally grew out of the religious institutions and because in America, for instance, the churches were the pioneers in almost all forms of education.

In an inquiry made recently of the superintendents of schools in all the large cities in the United States, each was asked to specify in the order of importance the greatest needs and most difficult problems of his school. Summarized and tabulated in order, it was found that their replies emphasized most of all the importance of character and moral education. Here, then, was a sort of emergency task thrust upon the schools from the church because of the complexity and swiftness of modern life. Is this not, many inquire, a matter of religion? On the other hand, a fundamental principle of American government is the separation of state and church. The public school, supported by the state, cannot therefore teach religion without great danger. Added to this is the confusion caused by the numerous denominations and sects in this country and the well-known difficulty of teaching religion without teaching personal beliefs and denominational doctrines. There are involved, also, the conflict of sects within the Protestant church and differences between the Protestant and Catholic. Here is danger of the school becoming, not a coordinating and harmonizing institution, but a divisive influence. This problem the schools are now working upon, and the student of society will find in it an important opportunity for his best efforts.

Toward no phase of modern life, however, has the school been

called upon to redirect its curriculum more radically or to exert itself more practically than toward industry. The early beginnings were limited to simple training of the hand through minor vocational studies and manual training. Then followed a more serious attempt to equip the student for his work in life. From these efforts came new courses and new departments and particularly experiments in vocational guidance and vocational instruction. In this field the school has been especially effective in its continuation classes for people already at work, its part-time classes, its evening and extension teaching, and in its cooperation with farm and industrial agencies. Important alongside these phases of the school curriculum is the work in actual instruction in the social sciences through which information and interpretation concerning the place of industry in modern society have been given an important position. Thus, again, the school becomes one of the chief allies of modern industry, which in turn often recognizes the school through endowment and other forms of cooperation and support.

The school, with its educative processes and programs, must not only be closely related to the major social institutions and to society at large, but must also bring to bear effective efforts for the interpretation and control of all other social forces. To illustrate with the classification of social forces used in this volume, the school must needs interpret to the individual and help the individual to master the physical environment, inherited physical and social difficulties, adjustments between individuals and races, and the development of personality and leadership in the midst of a growing democracy. Of especial importance is the emphasis of the school upon individual differences, upon special aptitudes, and upon the development of personality. The attempt to adapt folk of various sorts to an equally various social environment is a new and difficult task which, however, the school welcomes into its enlarged program. The utilization of natural sciences for the interpretation and mastery of the physical environment is balanced by the newer emphasis on the social sciences to interpret and master the social environment. And, finally, the whole process and program of education recognizes the newer task of interpreting human culture and education in terms of human growth and modern social progress. Here will be found a place in the

curriculum not only for traditional culture but for direction of the new leisure time, which is of growing importance in the modern era. Here also will be opportunity for the direction of general social forces and social processes and for the determination of social values.

We have called attention already to the epochal contribution of the whole concept of public education as a fundamental part of democratic service to all the people. We come now to the important problem of maintaining not only a financial support but an enthusiastic indorsement by the people of the whole program of education. Here again modern change has been so rapid that many of the people are skeptical of the school's new program, and they find in it so much conflict between the old and the new that they pause in their support and become critical in their attitude. One of the chief social problems of the present day, therefore, is the interpretation of modern science and education to the adult population. Some method must be found of bridging the distance between modern social institutions and professional leadership on the one hand, and the great mass of common folk on the other. For, modern ideals, terminology, and technique of education, of government, of social organization, and even of business in our advancing civilization are now cast far beyond the present understanding of the people, who at the same time are charged with greater active participation and larger responsibility.

This distance, we maintain, is due primarily not to differences in intelligence but to various other causes. If one distinguishes carefully between the selected common man and the mass, one finds much evidence to indicate that many of the folk reveal a greater power of social intelligence than many of the learned. The distance that separates institutions and technicians from the people is due, in addition to differences in education, in experience, in opportunity, to the power of tradition, to the blighting influence of the political and ecclesiastical demagogue, to the limitation of social technique, to inadequate social leadership, to the normal rise of specialisms, to the multiplication of knowledge and social tools, and to other differences incident to rapid social and economic change. Furthermore, the social scientist and professional technician have a knowledge of social conditions entirely

inadequate to the opportunities and obligations of the present era. They, therefore, fall short of their capacity for social guidance and direction and seem unable to diagnose the present social situation. In addition to his inadequate equipment in knowledge and data of experience there is evidence to indicate that the technician is inclined to be dogmatic, denunciatory, narrowly personal, or that he will rush into action or advice prematurely, hence contributing much to misguidance as well as something to guidance.

The school and society, therefore, find themselves faced with the peculiarly new task of discovering the people. What, conversely, are the problem and the situation with reference to the process of self-discovery and self-expression by the great numbers of so-called common folks everywhere? Is the present situation normal or abnormal, desirable or undesirable, the natural outcome of years of pointing toward democracy and education, or a miscarriage of normal expectations? From the viewpoint of the greater society and democracy, and allowing for all the existing fear and uneasiness on the one part and social unrest on the other, the whole situation seems both natural and desirable. The people for the first time in the history of society are all, it might be said, in college and university. They have come into the range and acquisition of new knowledge and much of it. They have been begged and coerced into getting knowledge and using it, and have begun the stirrings of response. The college youth struggling with his convictions and new knowledge has come to be considered a normal and standard type of successful reaction to college education. We have praised him for his struggle to grow and to think, to react to the new and to find himself, approving this attitude as a most hopeful sign. What more natural than a similar reaction on the part of the whole people, who now have more knowledge and are perplexed with more questionings than the former college student ever experienced? What more logical and natural result of the great educational process could have been brought about? Why then surprise, pessimism, fear, unwillingness to meet the very situation for which we have waited?

If it is true that knowledge has been only half carried to the people, and if many of our leaders have still less well-digested

conclusions than they, and if the educational and social order is not supplying enough well-trained leaders to direct the millions of new folk-students, and finally if they have no alternative but to follow, for the present, the demagogue and misguided enthusiast, it must be clear that this is not the final fruit of democracy or education or social science but simply a stage in their yet undeveloped technique. Could there be greater offense on the part of the social scientist than to make final judgments based on his present meager data and experience, or calculated from observation of pitifully few generations in the whole long cultural process?

A final point of emphasis with reference to the place of education in social problems is the fact that since the beginning of human society education has been one of the most important, most significant, most interesting of all the activities which have to do with the ends and achievements of society. Education, therefore, is not in this sense a procedure, a technique, but a societal function, giving the race the sum total of experience and wisdom of the past, correcting our evaluations, multiplying our values, and, according to the Giddings' concept, contributing to the following ten objectives: the development of confidence, emancipation from fear, control of mental disorders, the development of controls, emancipation from ignorance, the acquirement of knowledge, realistic thinking, emancipation from beliefs, enlightenment and public opinion, enlightenment and citizenship.

This is in contradistinction to education as merely the school and to the pedagogical aspect of education, which trains the individual only. Even so, it is interesting to note the analogy between the education of the individual and society in the Giddings' sense. He says, for instance:

'A man's head may be packed full of miscellaneous facts and notions that he has obtained from books, and he may have passed many examinations with credit, and yet be a shockingly uneducated person. An educated man or woman is one who has found out most of the more important ways in which human beings have made fools of themselves, and has thought about them long and seriously enough to have acquired an aversion for them. An educated person knows what ideas and practices have become almost universally discredited among civilized people, what ones

are generally discredited although considerable groups here and there yet cling to them, what ones are becoming discredited, and what ones are discredited by experts who have made an exhaustive study of them.'

Another Giddings' point of emphasis on education is somewhat as follows: Society is not interested in whether you, John Smith, are individually well educated, whether you get along and make a fortune or have good health. Society is not interested in you at all as an individual, *but* society is interested, and, in a democracy, means to guarantee that every you and every I shall have an education tending to guarantee that you get along and make progress and have good health, success, etc. Like the insurance companies, society is not interested in whether Sam Smith or John Jones has a particular length of life, but they are interested in seeing that all men insured with them are so protected and developed as to conserve health, longevity, etc. This becomes, therefore, a societal force, a policy, an activity, a major function, rather than merely a technique.

It is in this sense that, in American democracy, the nation is willing to pay for in terms of millions of dollars, in terms of more than any other expenditures except war—to pay for this societal force, function, activity.

It is in this sense that we must keep in mind that education is a means and not an end, and, in so far as the N.E.A. or the advocates of great school buildings or any others tend to make the school an end in itself or education an end and institution in itself, it is likely to become stratified, artificial, supertechnical, and presently run amuck against the wishes of the people.

Thus, in America public education is the keynote to democracy, first, in just that sense that we have been speaking of, namely, that it is *the* societal force which nearer than anything else comprehends the possibilities of the great ends of society, amelioration, socialization, individualization, encouragement of the deviate from type, etc. It is, therefore, the force through which American ideals have been and must be developed.

We sometimes ask a series of questions as a logical emphasis upon education.

What is society and what is *it* good for? The purpose of so-

ciety is to develop, conserve, promote a superior mankind, a greater human welfare, the continuity of human and social evolution, etc. Society is an end, not a means.

What is democracy and what is *it* good for? Democracy is a tool of progress. Human progress consists in the mastery of physical, societal, and technical forces and the resulting social order and human use ends through which continuity of the evolution of human society is maintained. Democracy is a specific social order designed to conserve, develop, strengthen, and give representation continuously to the basic units which go into the making of society and civilization. Democracy is, again, a means to an end, the end of which is a better society.

What is education and what is *it* good for? In terms of the above explanations, education then becomes the key societal force. Any people willing to pay these millions of dollars and develop organizations and techniques ought to keep this constantly in mind —that education is the societal tool and not an individual tool. If education is looked upon merely as a pedagogical device or school or technique of individual instruction only it would be very much limited. This does not mean that the school and methodology do not still remain the chief tools of education itself, but the distinction ought to be emphasized over and over again in the modern world. Thus, for instance, if the totalitarian state takes over education as a social force, it is easy to see how the school might become a special tool for the special ends of the totalitarian state.

Another special reason why education is the chief keynote of democracy is that it trains the individual not as *the* individual, but as a unit in which all individuals are raised to the level competent to become participating members of a democracy. According to the American standard, public education, therefore, becomes the shibboleth, the supreme key to democracy, on the ground that universal education would give us citizenship competent for democratic control.

If we contrast the American democracy with Italian or German fascism, we note that the leaders and the people are not educated in the sense that America wants education, and that in each case, as well as in Russia, it is the mass, uneducated groups that have been made the tools of undemocratic government, just as in Amer-

ica it would be the mass, uneducated "mob" who would subvert democracy.

These modern cumulative interpretations are entirely in accord with the whole historical evolutionary processes in which education has always been an important, interesting, essential activity, function, and force of societal development.

## *Chapter XXII*

# *THE CHURCH AND RELIGION*

The role of religion in the history of American civilization, like that of religion in the development of all earlier society, has been a powerful one, but also one of contrasts and paradoxes. America was founded to a considerable extent on the motivation of religious freedom and the fabric of its earlier history was all interwoven with the threads of religious tenets and worship. Yet the political nation, which was to be America, was also to be kept separate from religious affiliations. Certainly, however, we must list in our catalogue of authentic historical Americanisms the element of religious influence. And a review of the church and religion in the nation not only helps us interpret much of what has happened but reveals here, as almost everywhere, tremendous changes, from some of which emerge very realistic problems to be faced.

We must pause here to point out to what extent religion and the church constitute the basis of social problems, or how they have been and are instrumental in the treatment of social problems, or how they have contributed to the fabric of American democracy as it has developed up to now. In so far as religion is a dominant factor in determining and maintaining attitudes toward individuals and society it is, for our study under the plan of this volume, a very important factor. In so far as religion determines and colors attitudes which in turn affect the policies and destinies of whole peoples, religion is a social problem. In so far as religion is an important part in the building of institutions, in social conflict, in divisive and unifying processes, in contributing to the spiritual and creative urge of people, it is a fundamental social problem. In so far as the church constitutes one of the major social institutions, it becomes a major social problem for the purposes of this volume. One need but examine the course of past events to illustrate these statements.

The influence of Christianity, for instance, upon the whole fabric

of government and of other institutions is a case in point. Another case in point is the history of education with its beginnings in religious ritual, and as late as the modern era the church's major influence in establishing higher education in this country. Indeed, the history of peoples cannot be written without an important part being devoted to religion from primitive man to the present time. Nor can the modern social problems and conflict be understood or attacked without a thorough knowledge of the backgrounds upon which religious sanctions have been built. Therefore it is important to review briefly something of the place of religion, and afterwards of the church, in the products of our modern civilization.[1]

So, too, the picture of America has been in the earlier days one with Christianity always in the foreground. The Constitution of the nation and of all the states, the procedures of courts, the language of many of the laws, all paid homage to God as the guiding spirit of the nation. It was a nation of destiny, set forth by divine guidance to lead the world into a greater attainment of the good life and a greater glory to God. Thanksgiving Day was as American as the Fourth of July. "For God and Country" was symbol of supreme patriotism. The Sabbath was holy, and in it there must be no work. Blue laws and the non-continental Sabbath were basic to the earlier culture. Colleges and universities of the nation were founded by the church, and later state and municipal institutions were grounded deep in the religious faith. Harvard and Columbia, Yale and Princeton, Chicago and even the state universities were grounded in the Christian tenets. The church was long the arbiter of the national destiny and chief supporter of national institutions and conduct.

The picture of religious organizations was in another respect characteristic of the nation. From the earliest days American individualism and diversity of interests and beliefs as well as the heterogeneous origins of the people had flowered in a great number of denominational organizations. By 1930, there were no less than 212 separate organizations, although less than half of these had as many as 7,000 members each. Although in 1870 the people were 99 percent Protestant, by 1930 the Roman Catholics led with more than 19,000,000 members, followed by the Methodist Episcopal Church with nearly 4,000,000, the Southern Baptist with a

little more than 3,250,000. Other Protestant churches of considerable size were the Negro Baptist and the white Methodist Episcopal Church South, with more than 2,000,000 adult members each. There were about 4,000,000 Jews. Yet all told every five out of eight of American members were still Protestant.

The churches had multiplied their wealth in buildings and endowments and their membership had nearly kept pace with the population. Yet the control influence of the church nowhere appeared as comparable to its influence in the earlier days of the nation. The church swept into great prominence in 1918 with its powerful agitation for prohibition, and was as completely swept out in the early 1930's. The church's ratio of influence in art, in education, in politics was less dominant than in the earlier centuries. Thomas Jefferson had protested the mixing of church and state and the bigotry of certain religious leaders, and the nation had finally followed his admonitions with recurring bigotry and conflict varying by regions and decades.

With reference to the church in the changing America there was evidence of a very definite move of the churches to adapt themselves to the new conditions. There was also evidence of an increasing role of the church in society as well as a diminishing one. And while there had been declines in religious interests, there were still, however, 44,000,000 church members or nearly as many as all the gainfully occupied of the nation. Their youth organizations had reached 6,000,000 young people, and their property was valued at no less than $7,000,000,000. There was a gradual development toward emphasizing social aspects of religion among the churches, with considerable conflict in the twenties between the group commonly designated as fundamentalists and those designated as modernists.

The social emphasis took three main directions. One was upon the social gospel as opposed to the traditional emphasis upon dogma. Another was the emphasis placed upon social and industrial problems and upon the concepts of social justice. This emphasis was reflected in research, study and commissions, encyclicals and organized representation, as well as through the pulpit. A third was the emphasis upon social service, out of which had grown important executive organizations and national conferences on social service among both Protestants and Catholics. Among

Protestants there was organized "A Church Conference of Social Work," meeting with the National Conference of Social Work, "to contribute to the development of scientific methods in the social work of the Protestant churches and councils of churches in the United States." There were also 14 Protestant bodies which maintained executive organizations for the promotion of social service. The Catholic social work was represented by a number of special organizations and particularly by the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the National Conference of Catholic Charities. The Jewish Welfare Board was an organization with somewhat similar purpose in the field of social work, and other groups were developed in the Jewish ranks.

Nor would the picture of American religion and morality be complete without featuring the American ethics, standards, and ideals. The old copybook exhortations and stories were characteristic of a picture in striking contrast to that of the new period. Without raising questions of merits or demerits, many of the old folkways had been of late less in the foreground. They included the magnifying of truth, industry, persistence, dependability, economy, appreciation of the value of money, of hard work, the hitch-your-wagon-to-a-star exhortations, courage, ambition. There were the old standards of Sabbath observance, of religious worship, of honesty as the best policy, of conservatism, of simplicity, of inspiration. There were the old personal contact, the spoken word, the cordial personality, the inter-family relationships, personal dominance and forcefulness and all that group of motivating forces which made America's dominant, strong-willed leaders. The sweep of bigness and technology had brought other folkways and *mores* necessary for survival.

As in America, so in the world at large there have been extraordinary changes. Contrast the Russian and German attitudes toward Christianity with its extraordinary influence both upon their earlier government and upon their culture. Thus Professor Herbert von Beckerath, himself a distinguished German scholar, ascribes to Christianity the chief role in the making of western capitalistic culture. So, too, the historians, William E. Dodd and William H. Dunning, give the same emphasis. Thus Professor Dunning, after tracing the history of political theory from its earliest stages, says, 'Then came Christianity upon the scene. As

this faith rose to influence and power its teachings transformed political as well as other philosophy. God and His scheme of creation gradually became recognized as the first cause of man and all human affairs. The divine will fixed the character and operation of social institutions.' That is, if Rome ruled nations, God ruled Rome; if nation ruled men, God ruled nation; if there were human rulers, they ruled by the will of God. If, again, there were human laws, they were sanctioned by the divine law. Law and institutions made by man were indirectly from God. There were two distinct systems of rules for mankind: that of the temporal was from man, and that of the spiritual from God. Man must be subject to man, ruler, or government, sometimes church, sometimes state, but always with authority from God. There could be no questioning of the right of God, and consequently government found its sanction and emphasis in the ruler's right derived from God rather than in consent of the people.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries arose the doctrine that by nature—God's nature, it is true—all men are free and equal; and if equal, then God's authority must not operate through any one superior being, but must reside in all the people. For two centuries thereafter the interpretation of nature, on the one hand, and the quarrel of creeds, on the other, brought about a lessened regard for divine authority. This was followed by an enhanced individualism and democracy, forerunner of more modern tenets of government. The nineteenth century found one of its main tasks in the attempt to harmonize the two doctrines of authority and sovereignty, on the one hand, and of individual freedom, on the other. Neither nature nor God seemed directly adequate, so that the influence of Christianity was exerted indirectly through interpretation, reason, righteousness, morality, history, liberty, justice. Finally, the larger concept of society was held to be the arbiter. What sort of society, then, became the question of importance. In the last of the nineteenth century we find abstract theories developed—the inherent power of society as an organism, the natural rights of the individual, the separateness of state and government from religion.

But at various periods there remained underlying in the minds of the foremost theorists the great idea of God, which was assumed to be dominant as the basic concept. Even Rousseau, who

sometimes attacked Christianity as an anti-social force because it separated men from the things of this world, defended the fundamental values in Christianity, such as belief in God, a future life, happiness for the good and punishment for the wicked, the sanctity of social laws and contracts, and "no tolerance of intolerance." Hobbes, who thought that political sovereignty was supreme, felt that "the truth of God's word must prevail in the long run without recourse to restraint"; he was convinced that the Christian virtues of complaisance or pardon, modesty, mercy, forgiving disposition were all conducive to peace, which after all was the purpose of law—to substitute peace for war. Bodin, who believed that God and justice were factors controlling political life and institutions, considered, according to Professor Dunning, "a belief in a supernatural being important for the welfare of the State." In his estimation, however, the details of creed were of little importance, and force at best could be but an indifferent instrument for the maintenance of uniformity of religion among citizens. Locke, who thought that, since the worship of God was a means of eternal salvation, it was entirely outside the realm of the state, nevertheless declared that the atheist is not reliable when it comes to promises, contracts, and oaths which bind human society. Montesquieu reasoned that religion was outside the bounds of human compulsion; yet he discussed Christianity in a spirit of reverence as "unquestioned divine truth." Calvin asserted that the duty of secular leaders "begins with piety and religion," and the very spirit of the Reformation had to do with the relation of man to God. Luther preached the doctrine of passive submission to the established political and social order, though in a different way from the later Tolstoi. In Luther's view secular power was sanctioned by God as controlling those who were not Christians; Christians themselves did not need it. Melanchthon held that natural law included those principles of the human mind which concern the existence of God, our obedience to Him, and the principles concerning "civil institutions which promote His glory." "The first object of all government is the knowledge and glory of God." And so with others.

The doctrine of the divine right of kings grew out of the doctrine of the divine character of secular government which was held by most of the greater reformers. Later the divine right of the

people came in through the same channel. God sanctioned royalty as a convenience to the people—kings by divine right of the people. Thus the underlying concept of God and of the principles of Christianity went on and on, continuously interwoven with the secular theories.

Bryce states that four outstanding contributions of the Gospel to democracy are discernible. These are that the Creator has given each individual a special divine worth; that in the Creator's sight all souls are equal; that the inner life or "kingdom of heaven" within the individual is supreme; and that it is the duty of God's creatures to love one another. The first of these, he says, applies to freedom of conscience or spiritual liberty, obedience to God being greater than to man; the second implies human equality or equal rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; the third has to do with purity of life and motive; and the fourth with the Christian community or brotherhood of man. Each of these influences has been used well and used badly.

Aside from these commonly recognized influences of Christianity upon the state, there are at least two other types that must not be omitted. The first of these is the general influence which Christianity has had in giving the individual his newest place in the world of equal opportunity, and its influence upon the other institutions—the family, the school, the church, industry, and the community. When the state comes to pass its laws for the protection and nurture of the family it does so because the family and the ideals thereof have shown the need. When the state comes to legislate for universal education it does so not because it simply wants to educate, but because it recognizes what education means to a democracy and assents to the democratic practice of giving every individual an equal chance in life. When the state legislates with reference to industry it is for the same general reason. The whole modern fabric and technique of government have changed because of the demands of these institutions upon it. Similarly the ideals of these institutions have colored and strengthened the policies of the state in many ways, and in respect to many human activities, government itself thus being a fine complex of all the institutions, guarding their rights, nurturing their needs. The fact, therefore, of Christianity's having had much to do with present standards and forms of the family, of

education, of community and neighborliness, and with Christian principles in industry and race relations, is further evidence of a very great total influence upon government.[2]

When we come to examine the programs of the modern church and religious organizations, we face quite a few important social problems. If the church and religion which have been so dominant in the past development of the nation now recede, what is to be the substitute? Will it be that of Russia or Germany? If the Catholic Church is not influential in certain matters in such countries as Italy and Germany, how can other religious groups expect to continue their influences?

Yet among the most virile and vigorous of American currents is still that of its religious bodies and of their programs for social justice and social welfare. Here is the Federal Council of Churches sending out its monthly bulletin on *Information Service,* providing one of the best current literature studies of social problems in the nation. "What," it asks, "is the position of the church on labor, on agricultural readjustment, on race, on farm tenancy, on cooperatives?" The citizen and the student may find a liberal education on the major social problems of the day here with always an excellent, selected list of readings, abstracted and with the religious interpretation often appended. So, too, in the current annual volumes of the national publishing houses, religion ranks high up toward the top.

We have referred to the increasing emphasis upon the social gospel and this trend is measurable both in the literature and in the organizations at work for world unity and fellowship. In their symposium on *The Church at Work in the Modern World,* eight authors have attempted to give attention to the operation of Christianity as a total movement in contemporary culture. They point out that in the presence of the profound changes of modern life, the church is under the necessity of redefining its function and method of work. 'It is attempting to carry on its work in the modern world with an ideology, techniques, and social arrangements that grew out of past cultural situations but which no longer correspond to the realities of the present scene. In reconstructing its program the church cannot, therefore, appeal to precedent, but must rely upon an empirical, experimental, and creative facing of the facts of the present changing social situation.'[3]

Of the trends in the Protesant Church which they note, the following bear upon our study of social problems, namely, *a new conception of religion, the church as a social institution, the concept of a unified parish, an appeal to a wider range of interests, toward a greater corporateness, the social outlook of the church,* and *the church's relation to other institutions.*

So, too, the new textbooks on social problems recommended by the Catholic Church for college and university study, the encyclicals of the Pope, and the special utterances on modern world crises are symbolic of the challenge to the church which is being felt throughout the civilized world. Not only is the church looking toward world peace and fellowship, but also toward the implementing of religion in the better ordering of world affairs. How these ends are being sought will constitute the theme for the special student who may wish both to examine many facts and to inquire into the future of great religious movements which may appear.

Symbol and reality alike is the role of the Catholic Church in the world of European conflict. So much has this appeared to be the case that Werner P. Friederich has included the Catholic Church alongside the League of Nations as one of "two great international organizations" and points out how, while still an important force in European politics, it 'is beset with many difficulties. It was to be expected that nations which believe in dynamic growth and evolution should clash with the Church and the League, both of them institutions that are rather conservative and repressive. In Russia and Red Spain on the one hand and in Nazi Germany on the other hand, Catholicism has found enemies that are resolved to curtail the political power of the Church and to restrict it to religious affairs alone. Only Italy of all dictatorial powers has managed to come to terms with the Vatican, for everywhere else national politics, education and culture are so thoroughly influenced by the Catholic Church that many Europeans envy America for the clear-cut and unambiguous separation of the state and the church that is to be found there. Germany's and Russia's efforts to extol the political above the spiritual community have naturally caused a closer understanding between the different Christian faiths than would have been possible a few decades ago; yet because of its compact organiza-

tion and unquestioned leadership, the Catholic world represents a more formidable obstacle to the secular innovations of the modern dictators than the widely divergent and disorganized Protestant sects of Northwestern Europe.'

For the student of the American scene and especially of social problems there is increasing need to look at religion from the viewpoint of society and social change and at the church as a social institution. There is an increasing tendency to relate the church to reality, as, for instance, to ask whether there is direct correlation between a city with the highest ratio of church buildings and membership which also has the highest rate of crime and pathology. But there is also the contrariwise question as to whether, after all, the church should be held responsible for what the other institutions ought to do. There are those who question the efficiency of trying to make the minister a specialist in sociology, agriculture, industry, and economics, and the church people administrators of social policy. After all the role of religion may still be different, and there are many questions to be answered here.

Even so the student of society may well profit by an inquiry into the sociological measuring of religion, both for what he will learn and for what he may contribute to the all too superficial study of the problem. Religion is still the most powerful of the folkways. In his *New Frontiers of Religion,* Arthur L. Swift, Jr., defines the sociology of religion as 'the scientific study of the origins of religion as a social institution, its development, the varying forms it has assumed and the functions it has fulfilled with special reference to the scope and meaning of these functions in themselves and in relation to the functioning of other contemporary social institutions. In other words it is an effort to find out what in fact are the tangible social characteristics of those forms of organization which are called religious, how variously they began and grew and what differences they have made and are making in the social structure of which they are a very real part.'[5]

In this framework of the *New Frontiers of Religion,* Professor Swift emphasizes the church as the product of social change, even as we have continuously had to relate most of our problems to this elemental factor and as the Committee on *Recent Social Trends* envisaged all problems as primarily the product of change. Yet

he also points out the importance of the church as the cause of social change in the state and in the world at large, and especially on some of the "new frontiers" of the church in education, child education, and psychology.

Predictions in the field of religion and church trends are rarely accurately made. Thus, in the face of the constant prophecy that the church membership in the United States was rapidly declining, Professor Swift quotes estimates for the ten-year period up to 1936 as showing a gain larger than that of the population, the former being 1.68 percent and the latter .98 percent. He concludes that the church's seemingly unquestionable loss in social status is offset by its steady gains in membership, its vast wealth, the success with which it has weathered the depression and the fact that it has more ministers than it can afford to employ.

## *Chapter XXIII*

# *THE HOME AND FAMILY*

MUCH of the story of the American people may be told in the biographies and drama of its families, and much of the character of the population may be seen from the family groupings today. This is true whether we are studying the great migrations to the West in terms of cultural history or whether we read the great novels of American life centered around the episodes of many a typical family, or whether we seek realistic pictures of today. This key place of the family in American development coincides, of course, with the theoretical assumptions that the family is the basic institution upon which all society has been built. The role of the family in historical America, too, in contrast to its changing status, parallels the changing role of the family in most places the world over as earlier cultures grow into more mature civilizations and as individuation tends to give way to cooperative processes. Here, again, the American emphasis upon the family in its development of a powerful nation has conformed to the sociological theory that the family constitutes a first unit of social study and planning.

From the first settlements throughout the early twentieth-century flood of immigration the American people have been a unit in emphasizing the family as the basic institution of society. Old European stocks, new immigration stocks, Protestant, Catholic, refugees from debt, seekers after freedom from political bondage —all alike laid the family foundation of the nation. The family was also a religious sanction, based on Scripture and revelation, and it was a great economic institution in the agrarian days of the republic and later. There were patriarchal rules of control; children were economic assets. Old-age insurance was found in the good fortune of many boys and girls to serve the needs of parents. Families were large, they lived in a rural home, worked at home and in the fields, spent little money; young people married early, "two could live as cheaply as one." They remembered

the Sabbath to keep it holy, went to church and visited kinsfolk. Sex was taboo in the open, its contribution to the richness of living as yet incidental. Divorces were few, assuming proportions of discredit or scandal, and were hard to get.

Then time, technology, change. The family by 1930 had come to average only about 3.5 of parents and children in the American home, exclusive of relatives or dependents. City families were more in number and less in size than country families. Conditions of multiplied city life had commonly been estimated to be uncongenial to the bearing or rearing of children. In some parts of some cities there was evidence which led some students to predict that the time would come when parents with children would live outside the great metropolises and that the city schoolhouses would ultimately not be needed. In the American family of the 1930's one out of every six marriages was ending in divorce; one out of seven or eight married women earned money outside the home, which was an increase of more than half since the World War. In addition, more than a third of the families contributed more than one gainfully occupied member, and one-tenth of all families furnished more than two workers. And the home as the base of occupation, of supplies and of industries had long since passed except in rural and isolated areas where home industries still survived on a small scale. Marriage came later; the family was more expensive.

Children were no longer considered financial assets to the family since the days of compulsory education and of the elimination of child labor. Even on the farm the cost of "raising" and educating the child was such as to change the economic status of the family from its old position. Moreover, late marriage, the employment of women outside the home, greater freedom of women, increasing knowledge and practice of birth control, increasing standards and costs of living, decreasing earning capacity of children—all these had contributed to a greatly decreasing birth rate and to the multiplying of childless families in the nation. In the cities perhaps one-fifth of the families and in the country one-twelfth were broken families in the sense that there was only one parent left in the home. About half of the families of the nation did not own homes and moved often, and in the cities about a fifth of all families lived in apartments. The family worked away from

home, played away from home, and moved often from home to home, so that the picture of American home life in the 1930's was not the same as the old idyl of "God Bless Our Home" mottoes hanging over the door.

On the other hand, there were aspects of family life that pointed toward new heights of family values. New types of houses and equipment had brought comfort and convenience more nearly within the range of every family; new ideals and practices of sex had enriched the emotional aspects of family life; the experience of women in industry and office and trade had helped to raise standards of living. Yet this had not been fully satisfying according to prevailing testimony, so that there was a general trend back toward marriage under new conditions.

Alongside many other ways in which society was trying to strengthen the home and the family recent study and efforts towards the improvement of housing ranked high. Significant trends in recent years were indicated in the 11-volume reports of the President's Conference on Home Ownership and Home Building. One of these was the more economic utilization of land through social planning. Another was putting housing, long neglected, in the rank with other mechanical inventions and the application of scientific research and management to home planning and home building. Important strides were being made to facilitate home ownership through redistribution of the tax burden, and improved methods of financing, including industrial housing, the reclaiming of slums and blighted areas, the improved means of transportation, the development of power facilities, the increased use of invention, and shop fabrication are all important items. Altogether, there had been considerable progress towards lowering the cost and making possible a greater home ownership, towards bringing to the common man the utility and esthetic features formerly confined to the wealthy, and toward coordinating through study and research social problems and housing. It had been freely admitted that for all practical purposes a "revolution" in housing methods was imminent. The pictures of fabricated houses of new form and materials still seemed afar off—how much was due to the depression and how much to supertechnology was not yet clear. Yet, through the stimulation of the federal government in the 1930's American housing progress was likely to become an epoch

in the nation's history. Federal aid in loans and housing administration, together with the cooperation of planning groups, gave promise of a new era.

Some of the indices of progress in both the development of the home and the family may be measured in terms of technological advance and some of the handicaps may be indicated in terms of technological influences which take members of the family away from the home. If we look at the physical home, that is, the housing arrangements, it is relatively easy to add up recent changes to net an almost total gain. Thus the modern home has gained in general esthetic standards and in conveniences, so that it is often pointed out that the humblest factory worker may now have more comfort and luxury than the richest of the earlier nobility. Some of the measurable indices of gain are: windows and lighting systems, refrigeration and heating facilities, plumbing and sanitation, running water and vacuum cleaners, telephone and radio, books and literature, medicines and gadgets of convenience and health, comfort and convenience in kitchen and bedroom through a thousand inventions, the elimination of drudgery and the increase in quality of foods and equipment, better arrangements for financing, more safety from fire and disease. These and scores of more detailed measures within each class of improvements are eloquent testimony to progress in the home. Over against these, of course, are some things often considered liabilities, such as noise from radio and automobiles, canned food for home cooking, the limitations of apartment living, the standardization of furniture, the elimination of the fireside, the drain of installment buying, the lack of porches and play places and others.

The picture of the family itself as it abides in the tabernacle of the physical home also reflects many gains and some losses which, however, are questions of divided opinions. In general, for instance, divorce, the reduced birth rate, the services of community kitchens, the drawing power of employment of women outside the home, the "emancipation" of women, the higher education of women and many other changed procedures are usually listed in both the column of gain and of loss. For undoubtedly, the loss of children is important sociologically, yet also is the better ability to rear and educate fewer children. Undoubtedly

divorce frees woman from a certain slavery and suffering but it also makes for instability in the family. So, too, the increased opportunities of women are listed as a supreme index of progress, yet it contributes to fewer children and more divorces. Undoubtedly there are losses in the religious and educational and economic training of children which have been transferred from the home to other institutions; yet undoubtedly, too, the training is better in most instances when undertaken by the church and the school. Undoubtedly there are dilemmas in the problem of movies for children and of other leisure-time activities due to the change from homework and education to legislative provisions against them. Yet again there is more education, wider training, and more play. Scores of other illustrations may be studied in more detail in order both to see the prevailing picture of the American home and family and in order to study its problems and dilemmas.

Again, we turn to the size of the problem by cataloguing the number of families and something of their relationships and standards. By the middle 1930's it was estimated that there were nearly 30,000,000 families of two persons or more in the United States. The exact number reported by the National Resources Committee's Study of Consumers' Incomes in the United States was 29,400,300 having an aggregate number of 115,906,000 persons, or about 91 percent of the total population. Some 10,000,000 men and women were living separately in rooming houses, hotels or as one-person families, while some 2,000,000 were classified as institutional groups. Among these families and individuals there was, of course, a very great variation in incomes. Nearly one-third had annual incomes under $750 with an average of about $471. This would be the "lower third." The middle third ranged from $780 to $1,450 a year with the average of about $1,075. The upper third had incomes from $1,450 up to over $1,000,000.

The romance and struggle of the American family might well be epitomized in the story of income as well as in the income variations among rural and urban dwellers, farm tenants and owner, and families of the different ethnic and racial groups. Breaking down the groupings into lower and higher income brackets, it is possible to present a picture of more than 1,000,000 families receiving under $250 a year totaling little more than $100,000,000, while at the other end of the scene a hundred families receive nearly

twice as much as the million families in the lower brackets. Again more than half of the families receive an income of less than $1,250. Or again, 14 percent of the families receive less than $500; 42 percent less than $1,000; 65 percent less than $1,500; and 87 percent less than $2,300. Further examination shows that about 40 percent of all the families receive about one-sixth of the total income and that the top one percent receive about the same. Or, to make another grouping, the highest tenth of the families receive about 36 percent of the aggregate income, while the lowest 10 percent receive less than 2 percent of the aggregate.

There is also great variation between rural and urban families. About 30 percent of all families are in cities over 100,000 population and they have an average-size family of about 3½ members, and they have a median income of more than $1,600. Middle-size and small cities constitute a little more than 96 percent with an average family of 3.7 and a median income of about $1,300.

Rural non-farm counties have families about the same size of smaller urban families and with median income nearly as large, while in farm populations, about a fourth of all families have a family average of 4.5 and an income of less than a thousand dollars. There are, finally, great regional differences with the Southeast and Southwest having the lowest income of all the regions.

Marriage and divorce are key indices to the prospects and status of the family. It is interesting to note that there has been a constant increase in both marriage and divorce in the United States during the last half century. In 1890 about 54 percent of the men and nearly 57 percent of the women were reported as married, whereas, in 1930, 60 percent of the men and 61 percent of the women were reported as married. Of all the people in the United States in 1930, in addition to the 60 percent married, 34 percent of the men were reported single and 26 percent of the women with, however, 11 percent of the women widowed and less than 5 percent of the men. In all 1.1 percent of the men and 1.3 percent of the women were reported as divorced.

Facts with reference to marital status vary greatly with the several regions as also in various countries and cultures. Thus, Reuter points out that the percentage of people married is about 50 percent higher in Bulgaria than in Sweden and about one-third higher in France than in Sweden. He points out also the fact that the

proportion of Frenchmen divorced is six times that of Englishmen.

The United States, however, probably holds the preeminence in the ratio of divorces and this rate has been steadily increasing. Gillin gives statistics to show a steady increase from the first figures available in 1887 when there were 5.5 divorces per 100 marriages performed to 1926 when the figures were up to 16.3.

It is always important to check these current trends and changes with the backgrounds of the historical development of society and the theoretical concepts of social values and practice. This is especially true of the family which has been considered the smallest and basic group-unit of society just as the people themselves have comprehended the organic units of population study. The family is the first of the "little societies." It is the first essential in the physical perpetuation of the race. It is the first in the evolution of the race. It is the first in the "social health" of peoples. It is the first in the origin of the other institutions. Beginning in the family were the organic inheritance and evolution of society. Beginning in the family was education. Beginning in the family was industry. Here also were the beginnings of government, of communities, of religion. In the history of the family is found much that is most representative of the story of mankind. But before looking at the historical development of the family, and its relation to the family's present status and form, we may well begin our study of family problems by an examination into the functions of this institution.

For the time being we may omit any distinctions between primary and secondary functions as commonly described in the special works dealing with the family. For the time being, also, we may avoid the use of technical terms and classifications in order to introduce the subject in conformity with the previous discussions in this book and with the final conclusions reached. Through such informal classification of functions we may judge the efficacy of the modern family and attempt to measure some of its standards and needs. We proceed, therefore, to classify the functions of the family as they tend to correspond with the sixfold institutional mode of life already defined, and to discuss some of the problems and standards arising out of these functions, together with their relation to the survival of the monogamic family. The functions are:

*Organic:* The reproduction of the race; continuity of stocks.

*Educational:* The beginnings of education; primitive education; elemental beginnings in modern home.

*Religious:* The beginnings of formal religion; early religious training of the child; spiritual nurture.

*Political:* Beginnings of the state; obedience and authority; citizenship; democracy.

*Industrial:* Beginnings of industry; economic division of labor; inheritance of private property.

*Social:* Training in social nature; altruism; the beginnings of community.

Judging by this representative list of functions, what constitutes a high standard of family life? Are the changing home conditions of today altering the elementary essentials or affecting modern standards? What is a sociological family, anyway? What is meant by a high standard of living? Can the great majority of present-day families be measured by some such standard as suggested in the continued classification given below? Is it possible by studying briefly such a classification to learn about the modern family and its needs?

*Organic:* Father and mother, duly constituted man and wife, with children; the perfect standard being more than one child and of both sexes; cleanness of blood and good health; normal love.

*Educational:* A standard of living adequate to give children opportunity for education; physical equipment; the desire and appreciation for educational values; parental cooperation in school work; adult education and cultural opportunities.

*Religious:* Freedom to worship in accordance with dictates of conscience; standard of living adequate to permit participation in worship upon a satisfactory social basis; the spiritual ideal in daily living and in training children; cooperation in proper religious efforts.

*Political:* The democratic family—neither father all-powerful, mother all-dominant, nor children uncontrolled, but all sharing in the family order; participation in civic activities and support of good government.

*Industrial:* Gainful occupation insuring a standard of living for food, adequate and of the right sort; clothing, adequate and of the right sort; housing, adequate and in good social neighborhood;

health and comforts; proper hours and no harmful child labor; sharing in the constructive rewards of work; savings and investments.

*Social:* Adequate use of leisure time, with recreational and cultural opportunities; pleasure and recreation in the home: participation in community activities.

It is generally agreed that many of the fundamental problems of society are also fundamental problems of the family, so representative is it of the processes and problems of human association. It is readily seen from the above classifications that the problems of the home and family are closely related to the problems and concerns of the other institutions, so that not only must the home and family cooperate with other institutions in order to stand on a high level, but the other institutions are essential if the family is to maintain its high standard through changing times. Here, however, are some of the elementary family problems, listed in accordance with the sixfold plan of institutional classifications.

*Organic:* The problem of population; size of family; birth control; divorce and separation; eugenics and selection; companionate marriages.

*Educational:* Preschool education; kindergarten; mothers in industry; vocational education; sex education; education for home making; higher education for women.

*Religious:* Breakdown of religious sanction; substitutes for religious influences; the Sunday School and religious instruction; the newer freedom; the youth movement.

*Industrial:* Child labor; women in industry; physical and moral conditions of work; minimum wage; minimum hour schedule; city conditions; irregularity of hours.

*Political:* Parental control, instruction and guidance; woman's part in government; readjustment of home values; late marriages.

*Social:* Uniformity of marriage laws; readjustment of men and women to newer concepts of woman's rights; the single standard of morality.

It is understood that "the home and family" in this discussion mean our present-day American monogamous family, with whatever changing problems of the home may center around it. This does not mean, however, that the student should not make such inquiry into the evolution of the family as his time may permit.

## PERCENT GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE AGGREGATE PERSONAL INCOME OF THE FARM AND NON-FARM POPULATION, 1929

Adapted from Leven, Moulton, Warburton. *America's Capacity to Consume*, Table 16, p. 172

| State and Region | Income of Entire Population | Income of Non-Farm Population | Income of Farm Population* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Southeast* | 10.00 | 8.60 | 24.30 |
| Virginia | 1.14 | 1 04 | 2 12 |
| North Carolina | 1.09 | 0.88 | 3.21 |
| South Carolina | 0.50 | 0 40 | 1 44 |
| Georgia | 1 09 | 0.95 | 2 55 |
| Florida | 0.86 | 0.81 | 1.40 |
| Kentucky | 1 13 | 1.04 | 2.13 |
| Tennessee | 0 99 | 0 88 | 2.02 |
| Alabama | 0.95 | 0 82 | 2.29 |
| Mississippi | 0.63 | 0 41 | 2.82 |
| Arkansas | 0 63 | 0 44 | 2.51 |
| Louisiana | 1 00 | 0.92 | 1.85 |
| *Southwest* | 5.20 | 4.40 | 12.70 |
| Oklahoma | 1 31 | 1.14 | 3 00 |
| Texas | 3.34 | 2.83 | 8.44 |
| New Mexico | 0 22 | 0.17 | 0 68 |
| Arizona | 0 35 | 0 32 | 0.68 |
| *Northeast* | 42.50 | 45.40 | 13 60 |
| Maine | 0 56 | 0 53 | 0.93 |
| New Hampshire | 0.33 | 0 34 | 0 25 |
| Vermont | 0.25 | 0 23 | 0.49 |
| Massachusetts | 4 51 | 4 87 | 0 86 |
| Rhode Island | 0.66 | 0.71 | 0.11 |
| Connecticut | 1.76 | 1 87 | 0 62 |
| New York | 18.61 | 20.03 | 4 25 |
| New Jersey | 4 37 | 4.71 | 1 04 |
| Delaware | 0 34 | 0 36 | 0.21 |
| Pennsylvania | 8 56 | 9 09 | 3 15 |
| Maryland | 1.42 | 1.46 | 0 93 |
| West Virginia | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0 86 |
| *Middle States* | 28 50 | 29 00 | 23.40 |
| Ohio | 5 74 | 6 00 | 3 13 |
| Indiana | 2.17 | 2 17 | 2.18 |
| Illinois | 8 17 | 8 62 | 3 62 |
| Michigan | 4.53 | 4.72 | 2.68 |
| Wisconsin | 2 18 | 1 99 | 4 13 |
| Minnesota | 1 71 | 1.61 | 2 66 |
| Iowa | 1 31 | 1 19 | 2.49 |
| Missouri | 2.57 | 2.57 | 2.56 |
| *Northwest* | 4.60 | 3.70 | 13 00 |
| North Dakota | 0 31 | 0 20 | 1.45 |
| South Dakota | 0 32 | 0 22 | 1 26 |
| Nebraska | 0 78 | 0.67 | 1.99 |
| Kansas | 1 17 | 0 97 | 3 21 |
| Montana | 0 41 | 0.35 | 1 09 |
| Idaho | 0 30 | 0.20 | 1 26 |
| Wyoming | 0 19 | 0 15 | 0.57 |
| Colorado | 0 78 | 0.70 | 1.58 |
| Utah | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.65 |
| *Far West* | 8.90 | 8.50 | 12 60 |
| Nevada | 0.10 | 0 09 | 0.16 |
| Washington | 1 43 | 1.34 | 2.35 |
| Oregon | 0.78 | 0.71 | 1.50 |
| California | 6.56 | 6.35 | 8.64 |

* Includes income from non-agricultural sources.

These figures should be compared with those used in the study of *Consumers' Incomes* published by the National Resources Committee in 1938 and quoted in Chapter XXII.

## PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME, BY GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS AND STATES, 1929

Adapted from Leven, Moulton, Warburton. *America's Capacity to Consume*, Table 17, p. 173

| State and Region | Entire Population | Non-Farm Population | Farm Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Southeast* | $365 | $535 | $183 |
| Virginia | 431 | 594 | 182 |
| North Carolina | 317 | 472 | 167 |
| South Carolina | 261 | 412 | 129 |
| Georgia | 343 | 532 | 147 |
| Florida | 548 | 577 | 419 |
| Kentucky | 398 | 605 | 148 |
| Tennessee | 346 | 529 | 137 |
| Alabama | 331 | 527 | 141 |
| Mississippi | 287 | 530 | 173 |
| Arkansas | 311 | 503 | 185 |
| Louisiana | 438 | 603 | 186 |
| *Southwest* | 564 | 683 | 366 |
| Oklahoma | 503 | 699 | 243 |
| Texas | 531 | 690 | 298 |
| New Mexico | 476 | 549 | 354 |
| Arizona | 744 | 795 | 567 |
| *Northeast* | 881 | 946 | 366 |
| Maine | 645 | 689 | 474 |
| New Hampshire | 652 | 689 | 379 |
| Vermont | 633 | 761 | 351 |
| Massachusetts | 975 | 976 | 898 |
| Rhode Island | 881 | 881 | 859 |
| Connecticut | 1,008 | 1,028 | 630 |
| New York | 1,365 | 1,417 | 493 |
| New Jersey | 1,002 | 1,011 | 704 |
| Delaware | 1,315 | 1,550 | 368 |
| Pennsylvania | 815 | 865 | 305 |
| Maryland | 799 | 881 | 323 |
| West Virginia | 485 | 602 | 157 |
| *Middle States* | 715 | 854 | 262 |
| Ohio | 795 | 893 | 255 |
| Indiana | 614 | 748 | 221 |
| Illinois | 987 | 1,091 | 299 |
| Michigan | 869 | 983 | 283 |
| Wisconsin | 682 | 807 | 389 |
| Minnesota | 610 | 802 | 248 |
| Iowa | 485 | 659 | 214 |
| Missouri | 675 | 851 | 189 |
| *Northwest* | 590 | 703 | 426 |
| North Dakota | 422 | 588 | 302 |
| South Dakota | 420 | 614 | 268 |
| Nebraska | 521 | 698 | 281 |
| Kansas | 569 | 686 | 376 |
| Montana | 698 | 856 | 435 |
| Idaho | 609 | 647 | 559 |
| Wyoming | 777 | 841 | 648 |
| Colorado | 690 | 772 | 470 |
| Utah | 600 | 629 | 496 |
| *Far West* | 921 | 953 | 818 |
| Nevada | 1,000 | 1,041 | 811 |
| Washington | 841 | 887 | 651 |
| Oregon | 757 | 817 | 563 |
| California | 1,085 | 1,066 | 1,246 |

Every student of social problems should take at least one full course on the history of the family and the marriage institution. In this chapter, however, there can be only a brief inquiry into the historical development, sufficient to show how the present monogamic family is the product of race wisdom and survival. Has, then, the present form of the family, monogamy, been adjudged the supreme form through which the ideal and survival of the race may be attained, and if so what other forms have been tried? We may list:

*The indefinite family:* In which sex relations are indefinite, sometimes formative, sometimes promiscuous.

*The patronymic family:* In which descent is traced through the father's line, sometimes in connection with polyandry.

*The metronymic family:* In which descent is traced through the mother's line; an early stage of the family.

*The patriarchal family:* In which the families and groups remain subservient to the male head of the kinship clan.

*The matriarchal family:* In which the tribe of the woman remains dominant.

*The polygynic family:* In which a man may have several wives.

*The polyandric family:* In which a woman may have several husbands.

*The polygamic family:* In which either man or woman may have plurality of partners in the marriage state.

*The group marriage:* In which several men marry several women, but specific enough to differ from general polygamy.

*Proprietary monogamy:* In which the marriage of one man and one woman is a matter of more or less forced relationships.

*Voluntary monogamy:* In which the marriage of one man and one woman represents the ideal of both social sanction and individual happiness.

The student of modern social problems will find one of the most interesting of all his fields to be the present tendencies in the American family. It is better to examine quietly some of these tendencies, with their import and backgrounds, than to become emotionally excited about them. Indeed, many of the tendencies which are reputed to be bad may well turn out to be very valuable assets. For instance, there are the following tendencies which seem to strengthen the modern monogamic family:

*Development* of the monogamic ideal through education, public

opinion, enrichment of the human qualities in marriage, rather than through legal enforcement alone.

*Extension* of freedom of women in the home, realizing in practice the desirable division of labor and privileges which constitute the ideal status of monogamy.

*Extension* of freedom of women outside the home in social, civic, vocational, and industrial opportunities, thus developing and deepening the sense of tolerance and sympathy between men and women.

*Extension* of ethical concept of the readjustment of life and labor as between men and women, allowing, among other things, increased opportunity for acquaintance between men and women and thus making for better sexual selection and durable family relationships.

*Standardization* of marriage and divorce laws.

The following tendencies seem to complicate the problems of monogamy in addition to the influences of modern inventions.

*A retrogressive* and paradoxical tendency toward the extension of sex freedom in the direction of indefiniteness of sex relations, thus bringing growth to neither individual nor society.

*A tendency* of the minority toward antisocial ideals of freedom from childbearing and the identification, instead of the equalization, of opportunities of the two sexes.

*Tendencies* toward instability of the family due to home conditions brought about by social, economic, industrial, and urban situations.

*A general* unrest and tendency towards pessimism in current discussions, and a readiness to consider the "drifting home" or the broken family as normal.

How will society bring out of the conflicting currents and processes the proper adjustment of family relationships? How will the modern woman movement contribute to the strengthening of the family? How may the youth movement be turned into an asset of great strength? These and many other questions may be answered in many ways by study and observation. If one looks again to the history of the family, it may be seen very clearly that the present youth movement as well as the woman's movement are but logical developments. We have pointed out again and again how "authority" has assumed less and less control in all phases

of society. In turn we have had participation, cooperation, and democratic representation. In the home, for instance, there were the old days when the father was completely dominant. Woman had little power or right in many decisive issues. It was but natural, therefore, that when she did assume equal privilege and responsibility there would be some tendencies towards extreme action and some conflict. In the same way, the old regime gave the father power of life and death over the children, and even in quite recent times the child had practically no rights. It is but natural, therefore, that when authority in this sense is eliminated the youth movement appears sometimes to go to extremes. As a matter of fact, the family is but becoming democratic even as other institutions. Neither matriarchy nor patriarchy, nor yet paidarchy, as now seems to be the case, but democracy, should be the portion of the family.

The present complaint that the family is ruled by children and youth, having come into what we have just called a stage of paidarchy, is based upon perhaps a very normal development. In the church, authority is no longer dominant as it used to be. In the state and society at large, no individual or monarch has the right of life, death, property, and happiness over any other individual. Thus authority in the despotic sense has gone and has been transferred through judicial processes and representation to the group itself. In industry there can no longer be slavery; "hiring and firing" and wages and hours are no longer merely individual matters. Likewise, in the school similar developments have taken place, corporal punishment, for instance, being banned by formal regulations in most systems. It is inevitable, therefore, that authority in the home should become qualified in much the same way that it has in other institutions. The transformation, instead of leading to poorer training of children and the disorganization of the home, ought to be guided into the same democratic channels as are being sought in other institutions. Thus children, given more responsibility and more participation in the ordering of their own affairs, ought to develop into stronger individuals and better citizens. Thus the child welfare movement, too, giving new emphasis to the place of the child in human society, ought to develop stronger individuals. We ought rather to rejoice, therefore, that the family, even as other institutions, is becoming one of the

units of democracy, and that through the new order it will see its functions set forth in clearer relations to the individual and to the other institutions. All of this, however, must depend upon a better training for parenthood and homemaking and a better understanding on the part of men and women of each other and of the newer demands. These problems will be discussed in the next chapter.

It must be admitted, however, that the home and family seem to be passing through a critical stage of readjustment. We have pointed out some of the dangers which face the family because of the tendency of many individuals and institutions to confuse superficial form, as found in custom, habits, and life in the home, with the more fundamental relationships of the family itself. Because of the changing situations in which women and children find themselves in their home life, and in which the old customs and habits are necessarily altered, there are many who seem inclined to feel that the family itself is in danger. Because the home life and the inherited standards of men, including the double standard of morality, have often enslaved the individual members of the family, some students have argued, therefore, that the family itself was at fault. Manifestly this is no more true than to say that the institution of government is wrong because certain forms of government do not render justice to their citizens. There has arisen, as a consequence, not only a general complaint and pessimism about the family, but a wholesome desire to check up on the entire situation. In this demand for free discussion and more study there has naturally arisen the need for reviewing the bases and the advantages of the present monogamic form of the family. Growing out of this discussion also are scores of definite suggestions, some philosophical, some visionary, some reverting to primitive times, nevertheless many which justify careful study and inquiry in the establishing of a proper basis upon which judgment may be formed.[1]

Among the more recent trends in the field of family relationships has been the movement for parenthood education and for instruction, in the universities and for the public, in marriage. Pioneer in this field is Professor Ernest R. Groves whose many works have been distributed to an audience of millions of Americans, young and old, striving to know more and to achieve more successfully the happy ends of the married life, basic to the family

and to the continuous evolution of society. Professor Groves, giving something of the history of the development of this new field and writing concerning the request of the students of the University of North Carolina for courses in marriage, points out that if 'the students had little realization that they were widening the function of the college in asking for the course in marriage, they were still less conscious that what they sought was an innovation as a content of instruction. It would have been easy to build a course for them that would have brought together sociological theories as to the origin of marriage, discussions of the history of marriage, and ethical counsel pointing the way to matrimonial success. This was not what the men wanted because it provided little practical help in planning their marriage career, and it was this assistance in working for their own happiness that they sought. Their motive had appeared in their plea to the President when they asked that as the college prepared them to earn a living, to be good citizens, to enjoy and appreciate culture, so also that it help them in another major undertaking in life, marriage.'[2]

Professor Groves emphasized the comprehensiveness and difficulty of this task by suggesting that an adequate course in preparation for marriage cannot be added without the support of a large number of interested specialists. Illustrative of those who have been willing to cooperate and of the wide range of specialism is the following picture.

*Clinic Service:* Miss Gladys Gaylord, Executive Secretary, Maternal Health Association, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio.—*Psychiatry:* Arthur Ruggles, M.D., Chairman, National Committee on Mental Hygiene, Butler Hospital, Providence, Rhode Island; Abraham Myerson, M.D., Harvard and Tufts Medical Schools, Boston, Massachusetts.—*Child Guidance:* Dr. Phyllis Blanchard, Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Dr. Ada Hart Arlitt, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.—*Biology:* Dean C. F. Jackson, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire; Dr. Raymond Pearl, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.—*Population:* Dr. Warren S. Thompson, Oxford, Ohio.—*Law:* Dr. John S. Bradway, Legal Aid Clinic, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.—*Birth Control:* Eric C. Matsner, M.D., Medical Director, American Birth Control League, Inc., New York City.—*Medicine:* W. Raney Stanford,

M.D., Durham, North Carolina; LeRoy Parkins, M.D., Boston, Massachusetts.—*Obstetrics:* Robert A. Ross, M.D., Duke Medical School, Durham, North Carolina.—*Gynecology:* Emil Novak, M.D., Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, Maryland.—*Urology:* Roger Graves, M.D., Boston, Massachusetts; William Coppridge, M.D., Durham, North Carolina.—*Household Economics:* Dr. Benjamin R. Andrews, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City; Dr. Margaret G. Reid, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa.—*Social Statistics:* William F. Ogburn, Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.—*Consultation:* Rev. Oliver M. Butterfield, Lecturer, Author, Consultant, Marriage and Family Problems, New York City; Dr. Robert G. Foster, Advisory Service to Women, Merrill-Palmer School, Detroit, Michigan.—*Religion:* Dr. L. Foster Wood, Secretary, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, New York City; Rev. Edgar Schmiedeler, Director, Family Life Section, National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D. C.—*Sex Education:* Dr. Maurice A. Bigelow, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City; Dr. Winifred Richmond, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C.—*Women's Interests:* Grace L. Elliott, Author, New York City.—*Heterosexual Problems:* A. A. Brill, M.D., New York City.—*College Administration:* President James L. McConaughy, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut.—*Social Psychology:* Charles A. Ellwood, Professor of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.—*Neurology:* Raymond S. Crispell, Neurologist, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.—*Home Economics:* Helen Atwater, Editor, Journal of Home Economics, Washington, D. C.—*Parent Education:* Ralph P. Bridgman, Director, National Council of Parent Education, New York City.

## *Chapter XXIV*

# *THE COMMUNITY—RURAL AND URBAN*

THE beginnings of America may be pictured in the Mayflower Compact and much of its early history, described in the stories of its communities, frontier towns, growing cities, isolated settlements, and thousands of villages scattered throughout the 48 states. The community has been symbolic of self-government, of local initiative, and of the essential virtues of Americanism. So, too, in the search for ways and means of making economic adjustments and guaranteeing security, the cooperative community is being tested as never before.

In all these pictures we envisage industrial communities set over against agricultural communities, the village over against the city. So, too, the community has often been symbolic of social problems as well as social life in general. More than all this, in the community itself, as an integral part of the total society, are involved many of the technical problems of public welfare and public health, public education and public finance, and of crime and pathology, recreation and citizenship. Still more, the community is symbolic of the interrelations of all the institutions somewhat as the government is symbolic of the development, direction, and protection of the other institutions. For in the community will be found living laboratories and processes of the home and family, the school and education, the church and religion, industry and work, government and public administration, and of all that long catalogue of minor social arrangements as embodied in community groups, clubs, fraternal orders, cooperative societies.

Perhaps there is no more appropriate way to introduce our discussion of the nature and problems of the community than with the example of a community pact entered into a little more than three hundred years ago, which is the archetype of all our American democracy and free institutions. For the Mayflower Compact not only represents an ideal of a community of men and women coming together for certain very definite and inclusive purposes of

association and welfare, but also it is appropriate to the plans and purposes of this discussion of community and government, in that it reveals the true basis and method of community and government working together.

'In the name of God, Amen. Doe by these presents solemnly and mutually, in ye presence of God and one of another, covenant and combine ourselves together in a Civil body politick for our better ordering and preservation and furthermore of yet ends aforesaid and By Verture Hearof do enact, constitute, and frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, Acts, constitutions and offices from time to time as shall be thought most meete and convenient for ye general goode of ye colonie. Unto which we promise a due submission and obedience.'

We may point out further how the community is linked up with not only government but with the other institutions. Just as in the beginning of our government, expressed in the Mayflower Compact and a year earlier in the "General Assembly" at James City in Virginia, community and government were inseparably linked together, so in our present-day efforts to give renewed energy and meaning to democracy we must find in community and government the hope of greater achievement. Group self-government in the community is but the modern result of socially-minded citizens organizing for "better ordering and preservation." For government in a democracy is of the citizens themselves, here and now in their midst, and not something apart and mystical. As the government is, so is the service of the citizen. The individual in the community may wrongly think he can separate himself from his government; but if there be poor government, whether in health, education, protection, convenience, or any other respect, the citizen suffers. And poor government in the community, conversely, can be corrected only by the citizens themselves. Community organization, therefore, becomes one of the chief modes of good government.

The same is true of democracy itself. A great America composed of thousands of communities must, of a necessity, render its democracy through its communities. To quote Follett, "The technique of democracy is group organization." And former Justice Louis D. Brandeis expresses a similar sentiment when he affirms that 'the great America for which we long is unattainable unless

that individuality of communities becomes far more highly developed and becomes a common American phenomenon. For a century our growth has come through national expansion and the increase of the functions of the federal government. The growth of the future—at least of the immediate future—must be in quality and spiritual value. And that can come only through the concentrated, intensified strivings of smaller groups. The field for the special effort should now be the state, the city, the village. . . . If ideals are developed locally the national ones will come pretty near taking care of themselves.' One may test the efficacy of democracy simply by observing the institutional services which it renders to the citizen in his community, in his home, in his school, in his work.

Even the school, with its redirected programs for the teaching of active citizenship, finds the community, in the long run, its arbiter. For the school can be no more democratic than the community in whose image it is fashioned and the teachers whose training the community fosters; nor can the quality of its democratic education be much different from that of the community responsible for its personnel and government. This conviction has led Professor Joseph K. Hart to conclude that "the democratic problem in education is not primarily a problem of training children; it is the problem of making a community within which children cannot help growing up to be democratic, intelligent, disciplined to freedom, reverent of the goods of life, and eager to share in the task of the age." For the school and education, more than any other force perhaps, can make and remake the community after the fashion of socially-minded, self-governing and mutually participating groups. The school can offer its instruction and its plant for the centering of community activities and for the promotion of community knowledge and spirit. The school can teach its citizenship with these ideals in view and upon the actual working basis of community projects and community interest. The teachers and administrative officials themselves will become better grounded in the fundamentals of local and state government and will thereby become better teachers and better officials.

The community, therefore, becomes for the school the greatest laboratory of citizenship. While it is true that the school itself may become a little democracy, utilizing its organization and its

functions in the promotion and practice of self-government, the real laboratory for democracy must be in the community. Here are all the institutional modes of life as expressed in the home, the school, the church, the state, and industry or work. Here are the scores of "little states" themselves. Here are opportunities for organic democracy, political democracy, and educational democracy. Here are citizens in the making and older citizens in the remaking. Here are problems of association and recreation; of government and politics; of employment and leisure; and of all the other human interests. When, therefore, the school can know its community and its citizens, and when the community can know its school and the school's work, new forces will have been released for the bringing up of well-trained citizens for the future.

It must be very clear, therefore, that the community is an institution. For some time we have considered only four major institutions that make for civilization and social progress—the home, the school, the church, and the state or government. To these we have now added community and industry. If one wishes to test the power and significance of the community as an institution, he need but inquire into the possibilities of the family without community support; or of the school, or government, or of the church where the community is divided; or of conditions of labor where the community takes no thought for the welfare of its workers. Or, again, what of the opportunities and obligations of play and recreation; of general social life and pleasurable association; of voluntary organizations and benevolent societies; and of the many forms of association not included in the other institutional modes of life? For almost unlimited good or evil have been many of the community's contributions or neglects in the field of its own responsibility to its growing citizens. But even as the community must contribute to its fellow-institutions, so must the home, the school, government, the church, and industry contribute their utmost to making the community a better place in which to live. This correlation of the institutions is one of the finer tests of communal democracy.

If there were further doubt as to the meaning of community, it would be necessary only to trace its development and influence in the past, to note its present molding of democracy, and to look forward to its growing power in local, national, and international

development. The history of peoples, of course, begins with the family; from the family grew, through association and cooperation in community efforts, the phratry, the gens, the clan, the tribe, the confederation, the nation, the empire. These organizations arose out of the imperative need of community cooperation for purposes of defense, subsistence, worship, special projects, and others. Association and the community of effort have been the beginning and the mode of survival. Where no community cooperation could be effected survival was barely possible; community, therefore, becomes in its spirit and form a fundamental in the development of all society and government. The spirit of community is essential. The American nation had not realized, prior to the World War, to what extent it was a community of communities; the aggregate of community organization and effort during the war made the total national power. And if one looks to the future, to possibilities of the international mind and international relations, it is very clear that community of interests and organization must be the only mode of relationship. The larger communities of fellowship, learning, labor, and others, will contribute to whatever technique may be discovered that will make for world peace and brotherhood. The school, in its promotion of community citizenship, draws on its age-old resources and is therefore working in harmony with its fundamental history and principles.

It is very clear, also, from all the above viewpoints, that the individual good is inseparably bound up in the community. If the aim of all our democracy and social progress be the highest possible development of the individual, through his social personality and relationship, it will be seen that the community's relation to the individual is fundamental. There have been individuals and families who believed that they were independent of the rest of the community; that they could live their own lives heedless of the needs and limitations of the community. Came the day when disease or vice or poverty which they and the rest of the community had allowed to permeate the group disproved their theory. There have been families who held that no responsibility was theirs toward other families or toward the community's care of its members. And the day has come when disease or vice, permitted by them in the community, has entered the home and taken away all that was dearest in their lives and purposes. No individual or

family can remain isolated from the community, and it becomes, therefore, not only a duty but a privilege and honor for every individual and every family to join hands in making the community a noble example of democratic opportunity. Even as in the history of the community, so today the individuals and groups who do not cooperate in communal democracy scarcely survive in the long run.

Of special importance, and illustrative also of the task of democracy, is the close interrelationship of community with community. Evidence of this is abundant. It is clearly manifest in the school, where one community, having neglected its duty to the child, sends it on to another community; it is evident in the counties, where one county, having neglected its opportunities for rendering health and education service to its children, turns them over as burdens to another county. It is evident in the matter of work and morals; in progressive and nonprogressive tendencies; and wherever communities touch in social relationships. It is very clear, therefore, that each community must find a positive obligation in developing its highest organization and service, and likewise must contribute wherever possible, by example and participation, to the promotion of the highest development of community welfare everywhere. The very basis of uniform citizenship and democracy rests upon uniform community development and services everywhere.

The community as a type of "little society" may be studied somewhat analogous to the whole of society and recapitulates much of the experience of the people. Thus, there is a rural community and an urban community. The rural community problems may be studied somewhat after the fashion of the nation, namely, its background of physical resources, its people, its institutions, and its planning. So, too, the urban city finds its background in situation and location and its growth and development in the basis of technology and change, while its people and its institutions epitomize the modern society and especially in terms of complexity and problems of adjustment. We shall, therefore, look at the American community primarily in these two aspects, namely, first, the rural community, and, second, the urban community.

Exclusive of the problems of land conservation and use, the farm and the farmer, of course, are the basis and background of country life. The farm and its management in modern times will consti-

tute a far different problem from that of early pioneering days. Farm accounting, farm management, the diversification of crops, plant breeding, livestock breeding, horticulture, and all the other varied activities of the modern farm become subjects for sympathetic understanding and scientific study. The transformation from the small farm to large or commercialized farming may become a modern phenomenon. On the other hand, the breaking up of the old plantations and the trend in many places toward small farms and suburban homes provide another field of study and avenue of approach to the future. Once again the recognition of the personalities of the farmer and his family, and the task of making farm life itself highly valued and country life attractive, lie in fields which have not yet been adequately developed.

After all, however, the success of the farmer in diversifying and growing great crops will be short-lived unless he is successfully related to and tied in with the public at large. That is, what shall it profit a farmer to have bumper crops without a market; and how shall he buy of the goods and social culture of the outside world unless he can translate his work into money? The major problem of buying and selling immediately arises; for the farmer, in much of his present situation, must sell his goods cheaply and buy his supplies at high rates. The farmer must sell at such time and in such ways as the outside public chooses to buy. On the other hand, he must often buy what outsiders wish to sell him rather than what he wishes or needs. In attempting to meet this difficult problem of markets the farmer faces at once another larger problem involved in good roads and transportation. For again, what shall it profit the farmer to have bumper crops and the city man to be in need of them, if means of accessibility and transportation are out of reach of both? Thus the modern movement for good roads, for low bus and freight rates, and for eliminating the distance between country and city assumes larger economic and social importance. Dependent also to a large extent upon good roads and closely related to it is the whole problem of communication of the farmer with the outside world. His church, his newspaper, his reading, his entertainment, his contact with modern movements are all interrelated with these essential problems of getting country and town together in wholesome ways.

The business problems of the farmer and the financing of good

roads are, after all, dependent upon money. This has been a key difficulty in the past and still is to a large extent in the whole "solution" of our country-life problems. In times past the farmer has been unable to get money, although often money has been plentiful. When he has obtained money he has often been forced to pay exorbitant rates of interest or credit prices. Country life has therefore suffered and along with it the nation. Farm credits are at the present time one of the most important and critical problems facing the two political parties. Likewise the task of building good roads through rural areas, where properties are rated low and populations are sparse and taxation is unable to bear the cost, has been insurmountable until recent years. This problem is being solved jointly by federal, state, county, and community cooperation and financial expertness.

Many students have thought that individualism and lack of cooperation on the part of rural folk were characteristic distinctions between country and city population. Certainly lack of organization and cooperation in rural areas has been at the bottom of their lack of power to compete with urban communities. In the matters of ordinary farm work, of buying and selling, of taxation and finance the farmer has had to go his way alone. The tobacco growers of the two Carolinas and Virginia organize excellent cooperatives and experiment only to go down in temporary defeat because of a large number of factors incident to lack of leadership, prejudice, individualism, and tradition. The cotton cooperatives, the peanut growers, the fruit growers, and others struggle through similar difficult situations. On the other hand, the California fruit growers have developed one of the oustanding examples of cooperation, until they have now a large national and international organization for the success of the fruit grower back home and the satisfaction of the world of buyers. This whole problem of rural organization and cooperation lies at the heart of much needed future study and work in rural America.

Once again the farmer and his friends, the farmer and his family inquire whether, after all, country life is to be worth while if, even with his business success, there can be no large measure of that social life, health, education, and general satisfaction which comes from the happy community. Once again, there are many students of the country-life movement who feel that this is the

heart of the situation. Unless farming can be made profitable on the one hand, and country life attractive on the other, how, they ask, can we hope to keep young people on the farm or enlarge our present rural population? It is not only the general social life in the country but the problems of health and sanitation which must needs have attention. It has commonly been assumed that because there was plenty of fresh air, pure water, wholesome food supplies in the rural areas, therefore the country population must necessarily be more healthy. Many statistics are available to show that because of this assumption health and sanitation have been neglected in rural areas. Many statistics have shown how death rates in the country and a large morbidity rate as well, together with poor hygiene, poor dieting, overwork, exposure, and many other natural causes have lowered the vitality of rural populations. This with the frequent absence of a country physician and of general medical service makes the problem of health a very important one in the new era.

The central institution of the country community, as perhaps in all communities, is the school. Just as the rural school in the past has been neglected, so today it is being idealized and emphasized. It is gratifying to know that remarkable progress is being made in thousands of country schools and communities. And yet there still remains not only the most important educational problem but the most difficult one. The old country school educated the child away from the country, and much of the old ideal remains. However, the new school is educating for the farm and country; for the love of country life and appreciation of its possibilities; for nature study and the essentials of living in the country; for the love of animals and farms; for living and doing things in the country; for building up the old homestead and holding on to it; for buying and building new homesteads; for leadership in the country as well as in the city; for adapted manhood and womanhood. And with it all the new school proposes to teach the fundamental branches with more efficiency and permanence than ever before and to correlate them with farm and home life.

Few aspects of the rural life situation have had more consideration in recent years than that of the rural church; for the rural church which has been for years the center of country life finds itself, like other cultural agencies of country life, losing ground.

It is necessary to note here the importance of the church as a central institution of country life in the past in order to study its future prospects. The church of the open country in rural America has been the hub of religious, social, and cultural life at once. Its Sunday meetings, its midweek prayer meetings, its all-day conferences, its revivals, as well as the dominant position which the minister of the gospel formerly held, have given it the central place in much of country life. Now that conditions have changed so rapidly the country church finds itself in a dilemma. There are many reasons for this situation. There are some who believe that the church has not kept pace with the world's progress. There are some who think that at bottom the great problem is one of finance. When, therefore, farm life is not maintained, the church will not be maintained. Others point out the lack of leadership, others the automobile and good roads with their distracting influences; still others point to the growth of cities and suburban communities.

Another important problem of country life is that of developing and maintaining civic spirit and group cooperation in rural areas. We have called attention to the difficulties involved in the isolation, bad roads, individualism, and fixed custom commonly prevalent in rural areas. We have called attention also to the lack of and need for more social satisfactions and fellowship in the country. One of the important problems of the country community, therefore, is that of civic interest as expressed in school, women's, and men's clubs, boys' and girls' clubs, public lectures, community meetings, and whatever other means there may be of bringing together its members. The country newspaper is an ancient and honorable institution which one could wish to see placed upon a more substantial basis. If the country newspaper could be made the official organ of community schools, of churches, of clubs, of farm and home demonstration agents, and if it could have the cooperation of civic-minded folks throughout the countryside, it might well become a great medium of civic development. Other agents of civic development might be found in bulletins, posters, and means of publicity from state and national departments of public service.

There are several important reasons why the subject of country womanhood should be listed as an element in the country life

problem and as being distinctive from the problem of womanhood in other areas. In the past the isolation of the country, the difficult farm tasks, custom, tradition, lack of conveniences, and other situations have made the lot of the farm woman a difficult one. Her loyalty and cheerfulness, her energy and charm, her great capacity as the mother of large families have given her a central place in the development of American population and country life. Nevertheless, the strain of this pioneering life has not been without its results in mental and physical ill health. For the future, the question might well be raised as to whether or not the new farm woman, developing from the newer opportunities of the farm girl, may not, through modern conveniences, begin to enjoy a larger freedom more substantial than that of the overstimulated city woman. Here is a problem worthy of much study: How may the country woman, sharing in all the elements of farm and home life, and aided and abetted by modern transportation and communication, establish for herself a new species of the active life full of work and play?

The opportunities of the country home and family for normal adjustment in the modern era are great. Here again the student will find great contrast between situations as they are and as they might be. In many sections of rural America, especially where tenant farms abound, there are low standards of living and many difficulties in the home and family situations. The income of the farmer is almost pitifully small. Home improvements have not kept pace with farms and barns. The restlessness of children and youth adds to the difficulties of the country family. The movement of many of the best families to town and city has laid still other burdens on those who are left. On the other hand, the country family offers an unusual opportunity for the new type of democracy in the modern family which would allow father, mother, and children to share in the ownership, management, and direction of family and farm affairs. The newer country life, if it can be evolved so as to protect the mother and children in matters of health and happiness, may well be adapted to the effective readjustment of family conditions in the modern world.

We have referred to the common fallacy in which it has been assumed that because there was abundance of pure water, pure air, and pure food in the country therefore these great resources

would result in the best of health throughout rural areas. We have pointed out how, because of this assumption, each of these factors has often been neglected. In much the same way the beauties of country life and the inherent spiritual values which come from soil and stream and hill and vale are so taken for granted that much of their influence is lost. There is, therefore, great opportunity for renewed efforts to appreciate the beautiful in the country, to beautify roads and bridges and farms and home, and to make all these common necessities important elements in the new country life. In much the same way, too, the values which come from closeness to nature, from the romance of land and crops, from wholesome work and the independence of the farm have been not only minimized but wholly overlooked. Perhaps the greatest single need in the whole country-life situation is that of somehow re-establishing the inherent value of country life and its opportunities for work and growth in the minds not only of country folk but of society at large. A similar problem is that of somehow developing and giving recognition to rural leaders and of establishing in the general opinion of society the place of rural leadership in the whole fabric of the nation. It would be difficult to find four problems which would net a greater return for social study and social work than these problems of *rural esthetics, rural values, the development of rural leadership,* and *the recognition of rural leadership.*

There used to be a sort of proverbial expression common in colloquial speech—"dead as a country town." There has grown up a general attitude toward country life which ascribes to it backwardness, lack of energy and nonprogressiveness. The farmer and his community are commonly thought of as being particularly negligent in the careful planning of his home, his grounds, and his towns. Here again the ideals of constructive rural building are very much in contrast to the present conditions in most rural communities. There ought to be more than simple campaigns to plan, to plant, to paint. Rural planning, like city planning, ought to take on new proportions. Pride in one's community, pride in country life, perhaps something of the booster spirit for rural areas, ought to take the place of the defense mechanisms which have too often prevailed. Cooperation with governmental agencies, of which there are many, ought to become an important plank in the plat-

form of rural folk, so that the new country life might utilize not only its own resources and the needs and demands of city life but also all the social agencies available for making cooperative effort effective. We come, finally, then to our starting point of measuring the country community. To what extent may we develop our rural community in such way as to realize our ideals for the farmer, for good roads, for communication, for rural finance, for cooperation, for health, for social satisfactions, for better schools, for better churches, for more effective civic efforts and country newspapers, for happier womanhood and families, for more beautiful countrysides, for leadership and the appreciation of all that country life offers, and for civic cooperation with all the institutions of society?

As in the case of the rural community, it is possible to study the urban community through a somewhat arbitrary division of its structure and functions. We have already pointed out how the urbanization of civilization constitutes one of the main features of modern times. Alongside the equally epochal industrial processes the growth of cities has tended to work great transformations in society. The city has affected all phases of man's life. The growth of population, the concentration of industries, and the physical location and development of cities have contributed largely to the character of commerce and industry. The city has become a social pattern through which social evolution is carried on. Intellectual life and habits, social life and customs, moral standards and order all evolve out of the city and revolve around it. The death rate, the birth rate, health, and recreation become special problems among congested populations. New communities, new neighborhoods, new ethnic groups, and other classes grow up to make the city the most complex unit of modern society. We are accustomed to speak of the city as the most advanced form of civilization. Likewise, we are accustomed to contrast the city with the country. And the rapid growth of the city and the migration of the people from the rural areas to the urban areas have brought about rural life problems of a distinct type. America, only a few generations ago primarily rural, with rural habits, customs, and economic basis, has now come to be a nation with more than half of its population living in the cities. Social conditions in the city are special conditions. They represent much of artificial civilization.

They are often admittedly such as to encourage the prevalence of vice, crime, poverty, dependency, and other social evils.

The forms of organization differ widely in different cities; the service departments and divisions are almost as numerous as the cities themselves. But the fundamental services of the city to its constituency are in general the same for all cities, although means for meeting its needs vary widely according to local conditions. The principal municipal services may be classified in the following divisions: general administration, city planning; public works; public health, sanitation, and housing inspection; charities, corrections, and public welfare; civic uplift and general social services; private services in the municipality; and services to the rural communities adjacent. The story of what is included in each of these will be told in a brief outline of principal topics under each division, the summary of which will give the complete story of the city's services. Is it worth while to know of these fundamentals? Will such knowledge offer a guide to the citizen's effective inquiry, study, and use of the ballot?

That the general administration and government of a corporation spending millions of dollars are most important services, requiring great responsibility and efficiency, is not infrequently overlooked when this corporation happens to be the city government of all the people. And yet this is precisely the most essential of all chartered corporations for the people. The general administration not only supervises the execution of all acts and services but includes many important special branches. There is the legislative branch, with all its clerks; there is the executive branch, consisting of the mayor, manager, superintendent or other head of the government with his executive boards and commissions, with the treasurer or chamberlains, and with the solicitors or other legal advisers; there is the judicial branch with such municipal courts, courts of justice or other courts, and coroners, together with sheriffs and marshals, as do not belong to special departments; and finally there is the election of officers and the upkeep and management of government buildings and properties belonging to the people.

It is worth something to the administration officials to know that the people whom they serve are acquainted with the duties being performed. Methods of cooperation and study include: citizen inquiry into facts and procedure, citizen expert aid to officials,

vigilance as to election and nomination of officers, citizen advisory service, citizen research and publicity, through bureaus of municipal research, economy and efficiency commissions, national and local municipal leagues, voters' leagues, political clubs, societies for the study and promotion of good government, committees of "one hundred," academic or scientific societies, civil service committees or commissions; taxation committees; and general accounting or business organizations of whatever sort. Exhibits, surveys, publicity campaigns, and cooperation in budget-making may also enlist the activity and help of the common citizen.

The financial methods obtaining in the city administration contribute much to the efficiency or inefficiency of municipal services. Among the most important of these services is that of budget-making, through which the program of the year is too often marred instead of made. Important alongside the budget-making is the system of accounting, which includes office accounts, cost accounts, operative records, forms of reporting, filing systems, mechanical aid and general facility in keeping books for the public. Poor bookkeeping is no more justified in the public's business than elsewhere, but rather less justified. Important also is the method of financing public improvements; while the method of assessing and collecting revenue constitutes a tremendous task for public services. Nowhere more than here is the demand for efficiency and business government more apparent and urgent. Forms of research and cooperation include: citizen interest in budget-making, cooperation in making estimates of the needs of the several departments of city government, study and inquiry into the elimination of wasted or unwise expenditures, expert assistance by business men and women, use of business methods in city government, planning of finances, programs for taxes and bond issues, stimulation of official interest in new methods of revenue, suitable distribution of license requirements, cooperation in introducing an itemized system of expenditures apart from the budget, watching public service corporation franchises, helping to use revenue from public utilities, the giving of special gifts and endowments.

The scientific planning for the present and future of the city constitutes as much a part of its services as do carefully made plans for the success of any business organization; and more because the city involves the welfare in life, health, and comfort of

many more people than does any private organization. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to plan for recreational facilities in parks and playgrounds; for transportation facilities in the location and construction of lines and terminals, and in the direction and expansion of streets, for factory facilities with reference to segregation and enlargement, for workmen's homes with reference to the welfare of the city and the workmen, and for both civic and industrial centers with reference to general civic and industrial efficiency. It would be inexcusable to allow the city to grow up without recreation; to allow the street car companies to select routes, and the railroads, terminals; to allow the proprietors of factories to plan only for their own gain; or even to allow the landlord to ignore the rights and wishes of the laboring classes within the city. Planning ahead not only brings future efficiency and welfare but prevents untold waste of time, energy, and money with the consequent ills of maladjustment. It is therefore good business.

Forms of research and cooperation include: citizen interest and inquiry into future needs of the community; preservation of grounds, trees, and other natural resources; preservation of spaces and avenues for expansion; obtaining properties for reasonable expenditures; prevention of congestion; extension of roads and streets; promotion of the beautiful; planning of housing communities; planning for factory districts; planning for wholesale trades; bettering the quality of workingmen's homes. Such improvements are brought about through municipal improvement associations, city planning committees, city-beautiful leagues, playground associations, garden associations, workingmen's clubs, women's municipal leagues, local organizations of whatever sort. Surveys, exhibits, conferences, publicity, cooperation, facilitate the enlistment of public interest.

Sanitation is the preventive work looking toward health efficiency and includes inspection of congested areas, disposal of garbage and sewage and the general cleanliness of the city, as well as the sanitary inspection of houses and premises and plumbing. The supervision of buildings is concerned with the plans of construction and plumbing for both sanitation and safety, and construction and inspection of buildings with reference to fire prevention. Such supervision may require the adoption of provisions in accord with model building plans and regulation in accordance with city planning

as already outlined. Forms of cooperation and study include: citizen interest in a clean city; in the elimination of dirt and filth and ugliness; in the prevention of disease; in clean streets and clean back yards; in clean vacant lots; elimination of the fly and mosquito; in better housing conditions; in better water supply; in better drainage. The elimination of insanitary and unhealthful conditions is encouraged by housing associations, visiting associations, relief associations, civic clubs, city improvement associations, special days, clean-up days, exhibits, propaganda, instruction, cooperation with schools, study and surveys, publicity.

The list of public health services comprises medical inspection services to control contagious diseases, hospital services, food inspection service, meat inspection service, milk inspection service, infant welfare services, laboratory services, and finally statistical services. Failure to control contagious diseases is responsible for epidemics and a constant high death rate; failure to provide specially for infant welfare work in the summer results in the death from preventable causes of hundreds of little children; failure to provide adequate laboratories cripples service in most of the divisions of health work; and a failure to provide statistical services results in the city having no standard or record by which to measure its work or progress. Forms of cooperation and study include: citizen interest in a community program to banish disease and build up an enviable health record, better hospital facilities, fewer contagious diseases, fewer infant deaths, better vital statistics. Cooperation in lowering mortality and improving health is secured through visiting nurse associations, physicians' clubs, baby-saving campaigns, societies for the prevention of disease, milk and ice funds, the distribution of dispensaries and medical centers. Campaigns, exhibits, clinics, instruction, special days, propaganda, publicity, cooperation help to bring before the public a recognition of the importance of health programs.

The demands upon the city for relief services fall into three general divisions: those having to do with charities within institutions supported by the city, that is, indoor relief; those having to do with charities administered in the homes of the needy, that is, outdoor relief; and those coordinated with the new federal and state security programs. In the smaller cities charities are almost entirely outdoor, local or county almshouses taking care of the

other needs. In connection with the charity services which the city may render, two other aspects are important: the first has to do with relief by prevention, through city planning, employment bureaus, insurance and savings systems, juvenile agencies and others; and the second concerns efficient cooperation with private charities and philanthropy, this itself constituting an important, and, in many cases, the principal means of charity work by the city.

Services relating to corrections are those having to do with prisons, penitentiaries, and reformatories, together with the criminal courts, juvenile courts and other modes of dealing with offenders, especially youthful offenders. Perhaps of more far-reaching significance than any other single service to be rendered is the problem of corrections. Forms of cooperation and study include: citizen interest in a normal population, the elimination and helping of defectives, dependents, and delinquents; relief for the needy, prevention of vice and crime, correction for the curable, welfare for the people. Such work is carried on through associated charities, homes and hospitals, juvenile corrective and protective associations, big-brother movements, clubs for boys and girls, work and help for the aged, visiting associations, juvenile courts, and literally hundreds of methods of charity, consisting of contributions, supervision, visiting, follow-up work, study, earnestness, direction.

The public safety of the city is commonly considered under two heads, the services being classified as police protection and fire protection. The police department has varied obligations to perform, including its own efficient organization and control, the training and equipment of officers and recruits and effective rules and regulations governing safety service. It has in addition to vigilance in the apprehension of criminal offenders the regulation and control of street traffic, transportation, and the use of streets; the special assignment of the control of vice, and efficient methods for the detection of harmful forces through both secret and open investigations. The police departments in American cities have been specially subservient to politics and graft, and have thereby retarded the progress of cities. The fire department has not only to perform its duty of fire fighting, for which it must have an efficient organization and administration, but it must also take special steps toward fire prevention. Through this latter service a new efficiency awaits the redirected fire forces. Forms of coopera-

tion and study include: citizen interest in making the community a good place in which to live, elimination of crime and vice, elimination of bad influences, elimination of unnecessary loss by fire, programs of safety first and always. These are brought about through police commissions, societies for the prevention of vice, societies for protection of the family, prison commissions, societies for protection of children, safety-first societies, fire-prevention societies. As an aid in such protective programs there is a need for study, propaganda, publicity, punishment, cooperation.

Under the division of public works are the highways with their construction, inspection, and maintenance; the cleaning and sweeping of streets and the accompanying organization and management of labor; and the disposition of sweepings and street garbage and other waste. Next come sewers, with their construction and maintenance and the disposal of sewage, and of course the organization and management of labor. There are also the public utilities, such as the municipally-owned water and light plants, with their construction and maintenance and all public buildings or other property connected with them. Within the fields of public works the American city in the past has been often noted for its inefficiency and waste; and no field perhaps would repay a careful study more than this. Forms of cooperation and study include: citizen interest and aid in establishing adequate and satisfactory communication, transportation, public utilities, elimination of waste and graft, economy as respects the public satisfactions and comforts, efficiency in public service. The interest in improvement for the public benefit is evidenced by good roads committees, good roads days, street improvement associations, national highway commissions, engineering societies, building associations, citizens' inquiry committees, work-together societies, other organizations of many sorts. Surveys, exhibits, demonstrations, publicity, conferences, special days, cooperation, represent the enthusiastic concern of the people in the advance toward public improvement.

Recreation has well been called the physical basis of social organization, and yet most communities pay little special attention to organized recreation. The large cities are notable exceptions, recognizing public recreation as a fundamental concern of city government. A proper recreational system will provide for parks, large and small, for playgrounds and organized play, for the

perfection of the school play system, for social centers, and for the supervision of all public recreational places. Forms of cooperation and study include: citizen interest and help in making a wholesome and joyous community; in utilization of leisure time, directed play, helpful amusements, physical and mental welfare, a better race of citizens. The recreational interests of the people are represented by recreation committees, playground associations, story-tellers' leagues, dramatic associations, social center committees, music and festival associations, park commissions. Active participation takes form in play, drama, pageantry, garden and playground exhibits, social centers, festivals, lecture courses, organized athletics.

Public education in this classification consists largely of the public schools and would seem to be self-explanatory. And yet the services to be rendered by the public schools, with the accompanying complex problems of administration, are far greater than the ordinary citizen has any practical conception of. These services include the efficient organization and administration of the school system both from without and from within, the problem of selecting efficient teachers without the rule of politics, the problem of equipment of teachers, the problem of selecting a practical curriculum with varied courses of study, the problem of grading and classifying school children, the problems of retardation and of special schools, night schools, vocational schools, cooperative schools, schools for defectives and all others, the problem of the health of the child, with adequate medical inspection, the problem of general school hygiene, including the buildings and grounds, heating and lighting, ventilating and seating, sanitation and comfort, together with recreation and playgrounds, the problem of the wider use of the schoolhouse for social services to the community, the problem of citizen and patron cooperation; and with all these and many others, the specific problems of utilizing moneys, the supply department itself being a considerable business. Finally, the efficiency of all these services will depend largely upon the great problem of selecting and organizing the board of education, this having constituted for many years the greatest of administrative tasks. What a tremendous field for citizen cooperation and civic service! Forms of cooperation and study include: citizen interest in the schools, cooperation with teachers

and boards, improvement of the school plant, efficiency in correlating school and home, improvement of school sentiment, larger opportunities for school work, better attendance. Educational interests are facilitated by home and school leagues, public education associations, parent-teacher associations, school visitors, kindergartens, medical inspection visitors, school garden associations, pedagogical associations. The actual working out of the results of an active educational interest is demonstrated by visiting, study, contributions, school lunches, exhibits, cooperation.

More and more the modern city is recognizing its general obligation to perform as many social services, other than the technical and mechanical duties of city government, as are possible under existing circumstances. Among these services are the operation of public libraries and reading rooms, of civic centers, the supervision of weights and measures, the organization and administration of the city markets, the inspection of food supplies, the adoption of civil service and pensions for employees, and many other similar efforts. That there will be found a means and an avenue for increased efficiency and social service in these civic efforts cannot be doubted. And yet with all the formal and organized services of the city, complete efficiency is not possible without the thorough coordination of official with private services. Cooperation with the churches, with the hospitals, with the charities, with the women's clubs, with all civic clubs, with private educational institutions or public institutions other than municipal, with chambers of commerce or other booster organizations, and with all other private resources are essential to an effective and productive city organization. Civic education and civic consciousness are synonymous with these efforts, which are themselves coordinate with formal municipal services.

But the city must not only be city-building within its own domain, but country-serving in its relations toward the surrounding communities upon which it depends for support and expansion. This is true both to insure its own permanence and welfare and from the higher obligations of social service to society. In this capacity the city can aid the rural districts in greater or less degree and in varying ways, by increasing efficiency in farming, in merchandise and exchange, in transportation, in communication, in rural finance, in better cooperation and organization, in

health and sanitation, in adding to the social satisfactions of country life, in aiding the rural church and rural school, in general civic education and publicity, in promoting the welfare of country womanhood, the country home and family, the beautification of the country, in the recognition of rural leadership and rural values, in building up communities by promoting cooperation with governmental functions. How the farm demonstrator, the educational leader, the road expert, and many others sent by the city have made over the rural districts is now a matter for record. That every city must consider this aspect of its efforts is synonymous with the assertion that every city wishes to grow and to provide efficient services for its people.

# *PART FOUR*

## *TESTING GROUNDS FOR THE PEOPLE*

### *Chapter XXV*

### *THE WORLD OUTLOOK*

WITHIN recent years many of our European scholars have turned toward America with whatever of hope they have envisaged through the gloom of threatened war and chaos in European civilization. "If," they seem to say, "civilization and democracy can be saved, America must do the job." This is one way of looking at American social problems in a world setting. It is, however, scarcely more than has been assumed in historical America, which was founded on the basis of a pioneering democracy. Yet it reemphasizes the hopeful significance of the American experiment and the vividness of our problems.

It does more than this, however, in that it indicates the inseparable relationship betwen the American nation and the world at large. It emphasizes again our constant reiteration of the fact that, although our laboratory for study is the American scene, it is not possible to understand American social problems without knowing something of their backgrounds in world society. And it is no longer possible to "chart the course of empire" in isolation and separateness from the rest of the world.

This emphasis upon the world outlook, moreover, goes still further and points out the need for all study and planning to conform to sound principles of social theory on the basis of world society today, and to seek enduring stability in terms of world relationships and of balance and equilibrium between and among many conflicting forces. Thus, we picture American social problems always, in so far as may be possible, in the threefold set-

ting: first, of the geography and culture of an American continent; second, in the setting of the world of nations; and, third, in the setting of contemporary society in its struggle for mastery in the newer and bigger world of technology.

We have already examined the American picture somewhat in detail in relation to its own national setting. We come now to look a little further into its setting in the almost universal tempo and technology of the contemporary world and to ask questions as to how this America in this contemporary world differs from other Americas of other periods; and subsequently we come to ask fundamental questions about an enduring equilibrium to be achieved in the new era.

Our studies seem to point clearly to a sort of sixfold characterization of the present period as being distinctive from other periods and, therefore, basic to all our problems. First, there is the sheer distance between the old and the new, chasm of contrast between the swift-moving drama of current western civilization and the slow journeyings of mankind toward his earlier cultures. Second, there is the physical bigness, the sheer mass spectacle of civilization in the modern world as yet unmeasured. Third, not only speed, bigness, and complexity, but also technology and change are the new masters dominating the scene as they have never done before.

Fourth, there is, therefore, a chasm of distance between modern artificial society and supertechnology, on the one hand, and the capacity of the people and their institutions to adapt and absorb, on the other, which appears to be greater than ever before in the history of human culture. Fifth, yet in spite of this unprecedented distance between the folk and technological progress in the present transitional society, the articulation and power of the masses are such as heretofore have not been recorded. There is, in the sixth place, therefore, widespread confusion bordering on despair, lacking in focus of faith and motivation, such as has not been apparent in recent periods.

More specifically, the technological backgrounds from which many of our social problems arise may be approached by stating that the complaint is frankly against the dominance of technology and bigness over human welfare and social evolution. It is a complaint against material technicways of speeding up evolution

helter-skelter and the lack of social technicways to direct those forces. It is a search for some type of balanced economy which is also primarily a "culture" which will serve as a medium for the continuing sweep of science and technology, which in turn can be made to serve, rather than exploit, mankind. Thus, we come to conclude that we must ascertain what are the settings of contemporary society which lead to imbalance. What are these basic factors in modern society and in the nation in particular which indicate such complexity and difficulty as to make imperative a new American way of seeking balance and equilibrium in a demoralized economy? For it seems clear that the chief points of tension are found in the imbalance and near chaos of the present order. The situation has been characterized in a thousand ways; conflict and paradox, confusion and doubt multiplied. Yet the keynote is one of lack of equilibrium and balance, and it seems possible to distinguish perhaps a dozen major foci of equilibrium, balance, margins, around which cluster the critical problems of the current social emergency. These include the following:

First, a new equilibrium between individuation and socialization, between individualism and cooperative effort, between variation and standardization. This is not merely the old issue of rugged individualism and unrestricted competitive endeavor in conflict with the demands of complex society, or of the old individual rights and freedom out of gear with the new demands of social justice. It is not the one or the other but a working balance between the two. It is a species of irony that many whose teachings and emphasis throughout the whole American educational and political system have stressed the importance of personality, leadership, the socially adequate and strong individual, should now be talking in terms of rugged individualism being a thing of the past. The issue goes still deeper and involves a working balance between races, between men and women, between age groups in the population and in occupational technology. It is the age-long societal issue now brought to multiple foci by modern conditions.

Second, it involves further the organic problem of balance between the stateways and the folkways, between legislation and education, between coercive procedures and voluntary cooperation. How much will the people and their institutions stand for? How

far can the nation go in opposition to the folkways which never yet lost out in conflict with stateways? How wise is the technical government employee who characterizes the religious feelings of the people as "obscene" or whose main tenet is to regiment all the people of all ages and conditions and regions with the same routine and standards? Whether right or wrong, the people hold some values higher than life.

Third, this involves, again, equilibrium between the state and other social institutions of a free people. To what extent is the state, with its increasingly dominant role, to be supreme over industry, for instance? There are many who see in the contest between the dominance of industry over government or of government over industry the supreme test of the immediate future. Here the problem is one of a working equilibrium. Again, to what extent shall the state be supreme over education, religion, family life, and personal habits of the people, definitive balance between social planning and the state-controlled economic order.

Fourth, the tension of imbalance here includes further the balance and margin between nation and states, between federal aggregates and power and regional autonomies, between regional contribution to the nation and sectional advantage, in which are involved various aspects of regional resources and their use, equalization of opportunity, margins of abundance and scarcity, efficiency and deficiencies. Here are involved the fundamentals of state's rights, still powerful in American constitutional framework.

Fifth, once again these will involve a new equilibrium between mass rule and representative government, between geographic and occupational representation, between minority propaganda and majority rights; and again between politician and expert, between ignorance and inefficiency over against training and economy. Here is involved the essential issue of workable measures of governmental reorganization and the consolidation of functions.

Sixth, these in turn involve the marginal measures of further centralization and decentralization in other aspects of American life: corporate control and individual rights, the limits to bigness and monopoly, big business and small industry. Is the analogy of the limits of bigness in the animal world valid in suggesting planned growth of societal life?

Seventh, the balance between resources and their exploitation,

again, challenges a new sort of planning as does that between optimum programs of production and maximization of efforts, between production and distribution abundance economy and scarcity economy.

Eighth, these in turn are interrelated with an equilibrium between technology and humanity, machines and men, science and common sense, artificial society and folk-capacity.

Ninth, this equilibrium is in turn inseparably related to the need for a new sort of balance between work and leisure. What sort of equilibrium can be worked out for an America long conditioned to appraise work as the supreme law now suddenly commanded to seek more leisure and less work?

Other points of tension and imbalance include that between industry and agriculture, between agrarian culture and urban life, between land and people, as well as ownership and use of wealth, profits and price, money and credit, security and dependency, capitalistic economy and the socialistic orders.

In all of these problems are involved the orientation and constantly changing balance between the old and the new, transition and continuity, attitudes and values, science and morality, technology and tradition. So important have these factors appeared that at one time or another, by one group or another, perhaps each one has been appraised as of sufficient importance to constitute the chief focus of new action or the chief disturbing element reputed to have thrown society out of gear.[1]

Now all this lack of balance and equilibrium are not only throwing out of gear the normal economic and cultural processes of the American people at home, but they have involved, are still involving, and are sure to continue to involve the nation in world affairs, which may, at most, any time shake the foundations of the whole national outlook. As a matter of fact, this nation's participation in the World War would not and could not have happened except for the great technological achievements, which, on the one hand, involved the nations of Europe in conflict and subsequently made it possible for America to transport millions of men and resources across the Atlantic. Thus, over half the people of the world were at war, 10,000,000 men were killed, untold thousands suffered immeasurable losses, the foundations of faith, of democracy, of Christianity were all shaken. The spec

tacle of 65,000,000 men using the machines of technology to destroy mankind in international warfare has since been revivified by the threat of a greater war, involving more people, more tools of death, and the new folkways of war which permit the destruction of families behind the lines. America at peace suddenly decides to arm for the protection of the whole continent in defense from technical tools of war that know no limits of Atlantic or Pacific.

There are other ways in which the world outlook may be the arbiter of our programs and policies. One is the tension which has arisen over the threatened conflict between the "democratic nations" and the dictatorships. Questions flow quick and hard as to whether America must take its stand with European democracies or remain isolated. There is, therefore, because of this world outlook constant comparison with America and the European nations, their resources, their wealth, their people, their freedom, and their government. All this accentuates the realistic meaning of what is American, yet continuously affects the changing tempo of the American institutions. The world outlook, here as elsewhere, may work both ways. That is, the nation looks abroad and studies relief, cooperatives, public welfare, and compares the American scene, sometimes to adapt European methods, but more often to turn thumbs down. Nevertheless, the world outlook there cannot be minimized. On the other hand, the upheaval of European and Asiatic nations throws back upon America a steady flow of problems. People must have refuge. Markets must be replaced. Debts must be collected. Propaganda must be watched. Actual dangers must be anticipated. Liberty must be preserved. Out of these the two traditional schools of thought gather momentum—the one clamoring for America self-contained and the other for international brotherhood. And the end is not yet.

There is another way in which the significance of the world outlook may be illustrated. Time was when Hitler's powerful drive to rebuild a great Germanic people, with his ruthless methods and blind zeal, would have constituted just another example of primitive struggle or earlier drive to build a race or a nation. If it succeeded or if it failed, the record became a part of history and the survival of the mightiest prevailed. Today the world interrelationships are such that there can be no isolated issue of

mere race struggle or national expansion, because ruthless power and purge run contrary to the *mores* of much of the rest of the world. Not only this, but the rest of the world, thanks to technology, can interfere. This interference, therefore, is quite likely to extend its influence to all nations and, therefore, to American policy. If we wish to make of American history a vivid example, it could be pointed out that "the world" would not now "stand for" the American way of conquering the Indians any more than the "North" would stand for slavery in the "South" or the world will agree to Germany's frightfulness against the Jewish people in the 1930's.

Another way to look at America in its world setting is to study its history. It is easy to see the earlier idea of national interest, as Beard calls it, and the earlier isolationist period. Then came expansion and empire and wars. Then World War and peace and the pendulum swinging back and forth in contradiction, now for isolation and peace, now for international union and peace, now for armaments to match the European nations, and so on and on to still unknown turns. In all of this there are ever present the seemingly simple facts of profound significance, in which American economy must surely change the world landscape. If the American people constituting a tenth and less of all the people consume half of the world's manufactured commodities or resources in certain major fields, then America's world outlook is going to be powerfully important.

Many other aspects of the world outlook may be catalogued in the framework and the studies of the League of Nations, ranging from child welfare and the requisite quantities of milk consumption to the technical problems of trade agreements and war policies. The whole catalogue of international agreements and of the rapidly changing continental geography may well serve as the frame of reference for a separate study of America's world outlook. So, too, the trends to unity and cooperation between the two Americas represent another important factor in the world outlook of the United States of America. Indeed, the catalogue of world problems and situations is long enough and technical enough to constitute a very special field of study.

Let us, therefore, look at a few representative and fundamental situations through which the world outlook of American social

problems may be clearly reflected. Perhaps we may best first begin with certain socio-economic international relationships which are everywhere accepted as key problems. Thus it must be clear, that in spite of the appeal for economic nationalism, for "America self-contained," the American economy of the 1930's is interrelated with other economies of other nations in most of its fundamental aspects. This is true of agriculture, as witness the decline of foreign consumption of American cotton and its powerful effects not only upon the South but upon the nation as a whole. There are many other similar commodities—wheat, corn, livestock, fruits—which reflect dilemmas of what to substitute for foreign markets, or how to regain those markets, or what to do for the farmer whose whole welfare and efficiency are affected. In the case of cotton, for instance, the whole cultural economy of the South is likely to be transformed, and what is to hinder this changing economy from throwing out of balance the dairy or hay or wheat economy of the other regions and affecting the whole fabric of culture?

This is true likewise of our manufacturing, as may be illustrated again in scores of instances. The United States in the 1930's, contrary to Thomas Jefferson's admonition to leave the factories to Europe, has built a national total production plant of extraordinary capacity output for raw materials, for manufactures, and for technical services. Now any international situation which restricts trade, which restricts production, which restricts general economic activity, will again restrict the abundance economy of consumption for production. This means not only economic chaos but cultural deterioration, lower standards of living, lack of opportunity, social maladjustment.

Or again, suppose we look at some of the principal commodities upon which American prosperity so much depends and compare the ratio of exports to domestic consumption to get a partial picture of what is involved. Thus to select a small number which affect the economy of a single region we note that an average of more than a third of certain commodities is exported: nearly 45 percent of phosphate rock, nearly 50 percent of gum rosin and turpentine, over 40 percent of cotton, nearly 40 percent of tobacco leaf, nearly 40 percent of lubricating grease, and nearly a third of lubricating oil.

Another major point of contact in the world outlook is that of immigration. The present generation forgets or perhaps has never envisioned the picture of a million immigrants pouring into the land of the melting pot in a single year. Now manifestly the other extreme of a very small number being admitted is a policy resulting from certain emerging problems. Professor Giddings used to say that, regardless of what was right or wrong, best or worst, the nation had to choose between large streams of foreigners, implying lack of adaptation and a less democratic government, or fewer immigrants and a greater unity and democracy. Now with world upheaval the nation is again faced with a choice of opening its doors to refugees from various parts of the world. This situation manifestly is not a domestic problem but involves the whole European situation in which the nationalities are often classified as "The Haves," "The Have Nots" and "The Powers." Thus Werner P. Friederich arranges his *Political Problems in Present-Day Europe* under these categories, listing "The Haves" as France, England, and Russia; the "Have Nots" as Germany and Italy; "The Powers" as the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente, Poland and the Balkan States, Albania, Hungary, Ireland, Spain and Portugal; and "The Spectators" as Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian countries. Around the changing cultural, political, and geographic landscapes of Europe revolves many a problem of American policy.

This suggests again the problem which we have emphasized over and over again, namely, the essential values of comparative political and economic systems now being urged upon the nations and now in cooperative struggle for dominance or survival. We have pointed out how for the first time American democracy must actually compete now with general theories of socialism and communism, with the specific communistic socialism of the Soviet Union, with the nazism of Germany and the facism of Italy and with the emerging consumers cooperative movement, much of which had its momentum overseas. One of the most illuminating pictures of the United States in the world setting has been presented by M. E. Tracy in a vivid technique of four parallel columns for Italy, Germany, Russia, and the United States in *Our Country, Our People, and Theirs.* Challenging the United States to survey its problems in the world setting he compares area and

resources, population, agriculture, mining and manufacture, labor, business and trade, finance, living conditions, transportation and communication, education, culture, recreation, the family, health, government, defense, law enforcement, crime and penology, and human rights. He concludes that the study of these situations should enable the people to answer the supreme questions of the hour. Specifically Tracy points out:

'This is not the first time in which democratic people have been challenged to stand by their principles under great strain. From the beginning, democratic philosophy has been ridiculed and sneered at as impractical and inefficient. Every so often, some group has risen to question its workability, not only on the outside, but within those countries where it had been adopted. Every so often it has been called upon to defend itself, not only against propaganda, but sometimes against physical assault. The Monroe Doctrine, for instance, was established to prevent autocracy from recapturing Latin-America, and to give the people of Latin-America an opportunity to develop and perfect democratic institutions without interference from abroad. We cannot hope to preserve democracy by adopting an easy-going passive attitude toward those who would destroy it. Neither can we hope to preserve it by flying into an excess of passion and pursuing policies contrary to the basic principles on which it rests. It must be preserved as it is, or it will not be worth preserving. And that includes those fundamental rights which represent its real foundation.

'The task requires patience and forbearance. It requires a steadfastness of faith which refuses to be narrow and intolerant for the sake of expediency. It requires the maintenance of free discussion and free expression, no matter how disagreeable or irksome they may appear. It requires a consistent refusal to invoke repressive measures and discriminatory laws, no matter what the temptation. Such measures and such laws only weaken democracy by giving its critics a chance to say that it cannot take its own medicine.' [2]

There is, of course, in the world outlook, in addition to the European scene, the two other great areas of world contact, namely, kaleidoscopic picture of the Far East and the changing scene in the Americas. Thus the American Council of Pacific Relations held seven conferences in the United States in which the testimony

of three hundred participants pointed to "a great need for arousing American public opinion to a clearer appreciation of new conditions and to careful weighing of the suggestion whether measures of a kind not envisaged in our traditional Far Eastern policy may be necessary to promote the long range interests of the United States in the Far East." Concerning the unity of the two Americas in a solid front against trends toward totalitarianism, Secretary Cordell Hull's utterances at Lima in December of 1938, as reported in the current Associated Press dispatches, state some of the problems. He declared American nations were 'keenly aware of the threat to their principles and institutions which has arisen elsewhere in nations holding alien ideas which they seek to impose by force or extend by deception. Unless I mistake the prevailing attitude here, the American nations are determined to defend these institutions and principles of their own choice. . . . In our measurement of and attitude toward contemporary affairs and future prospects there are exhibited broader visions and broader views than sometimes prevailed in the past. I sense much less rivalry, whether between countries or individuals, than in previous conferences.'

It is evident that this chapter does not purport to offer a treatise on international relations or technical problems of world relations. Its purpose is to present the setting with samplings enough to indicate problems and subsequently in Chapter XXX to indicate references for further study. Manifestly, we must not forget, however, the technical problems of war and peace, of trade agreements and compacts, of the League of Nations, and of many other organizations and agencies devoted to the promotion of a world community of nations as one of the ends of the adequate society to be sought in the long run.

Finally, the world outlook is reflected in many of the major questions which the student and citizen are trying to answer. Here are a score of problems which appear to be standard "world problems" even as we attack them in the American setting:

The fear and prospect of war.

Racial or ethnic group discrimination as exemplified in the situation of the Jews abroad.

The maldistribution of wealth, income, opportunity.

Democratic survival from the attack of the totalitarian states.

Maldistribution of power or the crisis of power in the world today.

Interracial participation and equal social status in society in the United States as exemplified in the Negro problem.

Equalization of opportunities between races and classes.

The crisis of capital versus labor.

The propaganda menace.

The problem of land.

Freedom versus security.

Reconstruction of educational functions and methods in the United States.

The qualitative and quantitative distribution of population.

The rising tide of unemployment.

Equilibrium between technology and human culture.

Measures of progress and regression.

The role of minority groups in the world today.

The margin between capitalism and socialism.

The problem of a substitute for Christianity in western civilization.

Yet perhaps the one problem which looms above all others is that of world order and world peace. How to balance people and resources, culture and economics, situation and national autonomy in the regions of the world and yet insure world organization to prevent war—that continues to be world problem No. 1. We have already indicated the increasing importance of regional arrangements and we have indicated the crises in race, in labor, and in the relation of business to government. Now our problems must continue to focus also upon organization and planning for the desired ends.

## *Chapter XXVI*

# *PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK*

THE earlier American provisions for the general welfare and the public weal have long since been supplemented by the more dynamic demands of technical public welfare and social work, American style. From general assumptions of mutual aid and philanthropy, the nation has evolved through its several stages of "social welfare" ideals—first to a great national ideal and organization for philanthropy and "charity," then to the dual system of private and public aid, and now to the increasing dominance of social security through public assistance, relief, and public welfare organizations of state, city, and county. Such a trend, however, represents more than change; it is symbolic of the cumulative problems which contemporary society finds in its catalogue of "musts" and represents a sort of summary of all our American problems. In the trend also may be reflected the ever-increasing role of government in all matters relating to human readjustments in a world of industry and technology. In the trend, too, is especially reflected the multiple conflicts and rearrangements within areas of economic and political activities. Within this framework of social welfare, too, may be found much of the basis and motivation of all the major problems and tensions of a world in a gigantic struggle for survival.

Now the testing grounds for the people in the years to come will be many. Manifestly they recapitulate the whole range of institutions, organizations, and procedure through which mankind is trying to push forward toward ever-changing goals. Of these testing grounds we have selected four as representative of the composite social problems of contemporary society. One we have already discussed in "The World Outlook." Now we come to the broad field of social welfare with its special aspects of public welfare, public health, and public administration. All of these comprehend fundamental objectives and problems of democracy and security and the organization and procedures through which these

are to be attained. They are in line with the historical backgrounds of American democracy and they look forward to the utilization of science and social science, technology and social planning in a world striving to master the sweep and power and tempo of the contemporary scene. All of these are partially in conflict with and partly profiting from the experience and procedures of European civilization.

Few of the current trends are more fundamentally related to the development of America's social policy than those which we will discuss under the technical term of public welfare. As a special technique of government, public welfare comprehends the technical social welfare functions and services of local, state, and federal government and is a specialized extension of the social work field and technique formerly comprehended in American philanthropy. It not only has its roots deep in the American heritage, but our whole quest for social justice, past and present, is vitally concerned with the philosophy and organization of modern public welfare. The underlying principles and the actual practice of democracy are involved. Public welfare administration is tied in closely with the structure of governmental finance; its technique is inseparably bound up with social amelioration and social control. The rights of the individual and the sovereignty of the state are involved as are also the marginal points between cooperative enterprises as found in voluntary community social work, on the one hand, and governmental assistance, control, and supervision, on the other. This ratio of cooperative effort is of the greatest importance in the evolution of the economic, political, and social organization of society. It involves also the technology of modern business and economics as well as the newer movements toward economic and social planning. And public welfare, as a technique of modern democratic government, is being challenged to meet the impact, on the one hand, of sweeping changes brought about by science and invention, and, on the other hand, of enthusiastic advocates of rapid changes in social and political institutions. It is, therefore, vitally concerned with the theoretical aspects of American institutions and with the practical solution of many of her problems.

How public welfare came to be what it is constitutes one of the most interesting stories of the last half century; and especially

vivid have been the developments of recent years. Both the gradual changes and the more recent developments are fundamentally related to our whole civic life, and they are to a great extent the logical result of cumulative forces. A world of science and invention being continuously and breathlessly transformed by the quantity application of this same science and invention has resulted not only in remaking the physical world, but also in changing and extending the world of social contacts and relationships. The necessary readjustments, therefore, extended throughout the whole range of human endeavor—social attitudes and philosophy; social practice and social organization; social legislation; national and international relations, to which must be added the more intimately routine tasks of everyday life and work, and the manner of recreational and cultural living.

The results of these changes and readjustments were everywhere apparent. There was the continuous general social evolution from old ways to new. There was the greatly increased aggregate of social activity and the multiplication of social hazards. The obligation of society to provide increasingly for uniformity in the equality of opportunity was immediate. There were labor and family readjustments incident to the sweep of modern technology, and many other imperative institutional readjustments. And there were the shifting cycles of economic and social emergency, everywhere challenging the student and the expert to reconsider anew many old issues and to examine new ones as well. A natural product, therefore, was an increasing emphasis upon a social welfare which should be attained through social science and social research, and the application and utilization in the enrichment of life and in the better ordering of society.

This increasing emphasis upon social welfare, however, was also the result of cumulative forces over a considerable period of time. It is true that rapid changes and economic depression had accentuated the demand for stocktaking and had challenged the world of leadership to show cause why it should not explain the current situations and point the way to permanent adjustments. Nevertheless, this swelling tide of social inquiry had risen steadily with each recurring season of national development. The growth of democracy witnessed fundamental changes in the underlying philosophy of social welfare in democratic government.

This grew up alongside the phenomenal development of public education, which itself at one time had been considered charity. Other tides of influences swept on: the growth of higher education, of professional schools, of adult education; the wide distribution of knowledge through the greatly increased publication of books and periodicals and through radio education; the influence of communication and mobility of the people as it affected interstate and inter-community problems. And there were the larger developments reflected in the growth of a leisure class, the increased leisure time for many others, and the great increase and storing up of surplus wealth incident to a rapidly developing nation. All of these developments were conditioned somewhat by the aftermath of the great war, by various economic and social conflicts following in the new period, and by the rapid extension of special techniques into the social field as well as in the industrial and commercial world.

Other gradual developments included various minor changes in economic organization and the use of invested capital; the shift to the cities and the problems incident to changing land utilization; the changing role of labor and labor groups; tremendous changes in the field of medicine and public health; sweeping changes in public administration and the extension of governmental function with accompanying increases in expenditures; radical shifts in the whole field of law and jurisprudence; a swelling tide of social legislation; the rapid rise of specialization in various fields of government and public endeavor; and great strides in professional social work and the extension of philanthropy. These and other developments were influences to focus the attention of the public upon social values and especially upon social welfare and its attainment with a minimum of costs of government.

Nor was this increasing emphasis upon social welfare limited to the professional social worker, the technical expert in government, the student in the classroom, or the scholar in social science. The churches were making social welfare a part of the gospel; the women's clubs were studying it; advertising agencies were capitalizing the ideals involved in the term; it was constantly recurring as a feature in periodical literature; the politicians were asking about its meaning; the newspapers were writing about it;

and the distinguished editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature* in 1930 was setting forth the dictum that the characteristic feature of the present era may well be this emphasis on social welfare—"the great American promise," the "buffer device which ameliorates the inevitable maladjustments of our economic system." Social welfare, so the emphasis implied, was the way not only of relief but of attaining individualism in a world of mass struggle.

An understanding of the meaning and implications of this developing technical social welfare, as opposed to the popular general terms "human welfare" or "the public good" is basic to an appraisal of the changing stages and present status of public welfare. For social welfare is not just general welfare or child welfare or welfare work, or welfare economics of many other special usages. It is expressed primarily through social work and public welfare and mutually definable with them. Social work is clearly the chief technique of social welfare, but public welfare as public social work is clearly the principal governmental technique through which social welfare is to be attained. A recognition of its theoretical and technical nature is essential both for understanding the problems involved and for arriving at practical classifications and functions. The public welfare movement has contributed much to such an understanding just as this gradual evolution of the social welfare concept and practice has largely conditioned and interpreted public welfare itself. It is not implied here that there is full agreement concerning the meaning and functioning of social welfare so much as that there is general insistence that its many aspects be focused and integrated. The great number and variety of opinions held by both laymen and specialists, in contradistinction to accurate concepts, together with the record of constantly changing philosophies and practices in the past, as well as the overlapping of classifications, are themselves essential to any fair appraisal of the great stage of integration. Indeed they are a part of the present status.

With these considerations in mind, however, social welfare may be characterized by three definitive attributes. It is first of all both product and process of that group of social achievements commonly designated by the descriptive term of *amelioration.* Historically this means, as Professor Giddings has put it, that

"society has ameliorated the human lot almost beyond the powers of imagination." Theoretically, it has to do with the functional performance and achievement of society, looking toward reproducing itself in each succeeding generation with more and more of the "normal," "strong," and "good," and less and less of the "abnormal," "weak," and "bad," with the natural corollary of furthering human welfare and of conducing to human happiness. Practically, it has been conceived of variously as having to do with the giving of relief, with the treatment of the abnormal, with raising the standard of living, with community action looking toward physical and moral well-being, with the attainment of democracy as the rich and abundant life.

The ameliorative nature of social welfare may be illustrated by reference to special social welfare activities of institutions whose main function is not social welfare. Thus, the school is a social welfare agency in so far as its efforts are ameliorative rather than educational; the church is a social welfare agency when ameliorating the living lot of the people transcends religious action; government is a social welfare agency, as in the case of public welfare, in so far as its functioning is primarily ameliorative instead of administrative. This social welfare element of government is illustrated in the underlying political philosophy expressed by Governor Franklin Roosevelt in 1931 when he said, 'Modern society, acting through its government, owes the definite obligation to prevent . . . dire want of any of its fellow men and women who try to maintain themselves but cannot. . . . To these unfortunate citizens aid must be extended by the government—not as a matter of charity but as a matter of social duty.'

In the second place social welfare is characterized by its emphasis upon *social deficiency*. This involves not only remedial efforts toward cure and custody but equally the preventive programs looking to the future. This social deficiency includes also the various physical, mental, and conduct conditioning which results in special handicap or behavior; and it may apply alike to the individual, to the family, or to the neighborhood group. Thus social welfare as it relates to social deficiency looks toward the socially deficient offender against society, the mentally handicapped, those whose economic substance is insufficient for social endeavor, as well as those physically handicapped whose lot has commonly

been that of the defective and dependent or who are unoccupied in the everyday walks of life. Illustrating again by the institutions, the school becomes a social welfare agency when its efforts are directed toward the socially deficient, such as the mentally deficient, special classes, or school lunches for the poor. The church is a social welfare agency when it ministers to the maladjusted and the unfortunate members of society through physical services. The state becomes a social welfare agency when it undertakes custody, treatment, and cure of its socially deficient citizens and when it works to protect society from the weakening effects of social deficiencies in the future.

In the third place, technical social welfare implies *supplementary effort* of service, of resources. This may be supplementary to the resources of the individual or the family or the community. The family may need help to maintain a standard, the individual may need help in readjustment, the community may need help in a crisis. It may involve special aid or resources given by an agency or society or institution to any individual or class whose ordinary personal or institutional regimen is inadequate for the desired standards of living or conduct. The criminal or offender must have supplementary force and guidance from the state or city; the aged and infirm must be aided by private or public agencies; the orphaned children must be supplied with homes; the handicapped must be rehabilitated through supplementing resources. Again the institutions: There may be a social welfare part of the school whenever its activities are directed toward supplementing the activities or resources of the home or the family or the community, in such work as medical inspection, visiting teacher work, playgrounds and recreation. The social welfare part of the church is reflected in its programs of relief for those who need assistance. The social welfare part of government, public welfare, is reflected in the supplementary efforts of the state necessary for juvenile courts and probation, corrective institutions, prisons, hospitals for the mentally deficient, homes for the poor.

This technical delimitation of social welfare may be illustrated by the reverse side of the institutional efforts which are not primarily "social welfare" in function. The teaching program of the school with its curricula and administration does not emphasize either social deficiency or supplementary effort, but rather

## TRENDS IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND PROCEDURE OF PUBLIC WELFARE *

| *Older Concepts and Practices* | *Trends in the 1930's* |
|---|---|
| **RELIEF** | |
| Paupers boarded out to the lowest bidder | Special homes and supervised outdoor relief |
| Unclassified local almshouses and workhouses | Classified almshouses an adjunct to other forms |
| Supervisory state boards of charity | State departments of public welfare |
| Indiscriminate giving and eligibility test | Adequacy in relief given upon analysis of the need |
| Local care only | Local administration subject to supervision |
| Little attention given to the individual | Emphasis upon case study and individualization |
| Goal remedial or to prevent voluntary pauperism | Constructive planning for rehabilitation and prevention |
| Private and public agencies competitors | Private agencies supplement through experimentation |
| Haphazard, wasteful methods | Increasing economic emphasis |
| Institutional isolation and physical custody | Community cooperation and social treatment |
| No supervision of administration of outdoor relief | Outdoor relief administered through trained case worker |
| Local indoor relief without state supervision | Administered by local unit but supervised by the state |
| No care and planning for mother or child | Tendency to give mothers' aid in their own homes |
| Children placed in institutions | Forty-six states provide for mothers' aid |
| Aged given doles and almshouse | Scientific solution with old-age pensions and group insurance |
| **PENOLOGY** | |
| Promiscuous herding of prison inmates | Special classification of prisoners, individuation of treatment |
| Little purposeful work on behalf of individuals | Development of probation, parole, and special institutions |
| Poor conditions for health and sanitation | Special attention to health conditions and hygiene |
| No system for appraising the offender | Mental and physical examinations |
| Few records of individual's histories | Adequate records of history of individuals |
| Punishment for vengeance or repression | Planning for rehabilitation and prevention |
| Policy based upon prejudice and emotion | Scientific study and accurate knowledge the guide |
| Jail and house of correction | Reformatory and classified farm colony |
| Sentences and treatment on basis of crime alone | Scientific appraisal of offender's specific needs |
| Definite sentence with unconditional release | Indeterminate sentences with probation and parole |
| Solitary confinement and no provision for employment | Provision for training and work and earnings |
| Prisoners farmed out to contractor or lessee | Special work with occupational therapy |
| **THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED** | |
| Demonology held as the basis of insanity | Insanity looked upon as disease or mental sickness |
| Insanity looked upon as a disgrace | Voluntary admission to hospitals |
| Judged only by its outward manifestations | Establishment of psychopathic hospitals |
| Mechanical restraints and repression | Individual treatment, non-restraint, occupational therapy |
| Treatment chiefly blood-letting, sedatives, cathartics | Good food, massages and physical exercise |
| Detention in jails and almshouses; congregate plan | Colony or cottage plan with therapeutic occupation |
| Custody the sole purpose of institutions | Purpose curative so far as possible |
| Committed at trial by "jury of peers" | Legal commitment but with expert medical advice |
| Individual committed only when he becomes deranged | Early discovery and commitment for adequate treatment |
| Attitudes and treatment sentimental or mystical | Scientific treatment of the mental defective |
| Cause attributed to a mystery, supposedly possessed of the devil | Research through clinics and other means |
| Feeble-minded classified with the insane and poor | Separate classification for the feeble-minded |
| Unsegregated in poorhouse and jail | Segregation on farm colony, or special institution |
| Mass institutional grouping | Graded division in colony system |
| Custody and restraint the main functions | Classification, training, and treatment |
| Education based on idea of backwardness | Special vocational training or occupational therapy |
| Discovery by chance and emergency | Discovery through routine examination, reports |
| No attention given to propagation of defectives | Research to determine and prevent increase of defective strains |
| **CHILDREN** | |
| Motives in child care—pity for his condition | Scientific appreciation of children |
| Unclassified workhouse, poorhouse, or orphans' home | Segregated care with individual treatment and preventive social work |
| Children boarded out, apprenticed, indentured | Scientific home finding, placement, supervision |
| Subsidization of private orphanages, local care only | Child care lodged in state departments |
| Illegitimate child without rights | The illegitimate child the ward of the state? |
| Blind and deaf neglected or in almshouses | Vocational training of the blind and deaf |
| Crippled children neglected or in almshouses | Medical attention and special training for crippled children in hospital boarding schools |
| Feeble-minded children in almshouses | Custodial and educational colonies for feeble-minded |
| The delinquent child dealt with as criminal | Dealt with as salvable individual |
| Fixed sentence for delinquent youth | Juvenile courts and special treatment |
| Prearranged penalties and treatment | Probation, parole, indeterminate sentence |
| Punishment and custody the chief emphasis | Treatment placed upon the needs of the child |
| | Re-education and prevention the chief emphasis |

* Adapted from Howard W. Odum, Chapter 24, "Public Welfare Activities," pp. 1236-1238 in *Recent Social Trends.*

the regular functioning of the educational system of society which expects all of its children to go to school. The school, therefore, is not a social welfare institution, since this is a distinct function and its efforts and expenditures are definitely classifiable elsewhere. The ecclesiastical program of the churches in which worship is the chief emphasis assumes no deficiency or supplementary service because its major function is directed toward all individuals and groups and its budget and organization are directed to this end. The building of highways by the state, the financing of a government, the conserving of natural resources, the programs of sanitation and health are predicated upon the services to all the people in all normal ways. The community organizations which emphasize city or social planning, civic endeavor, education, and promotion are not social welfare agencies stressing social deficiency or handicapped groups. Chambers of commerce, service clubs, such as Rotary or Kiwanis, women's clubs, and scores of social organizations in all the states, are primarily not social welfare agencies. They illustrate by contrast the technical meaning of social welfare when and if they branch off into special committee efforts looking toward social welfare work.

The public welfare movement in the United States has evolved gradually alongside this general development of the social welfare emphasis and attains its definitive nature as a part of the social welfare movement. *Public welfare is the government's social welfare work.* It takes on special significance and power in so far as modern democratic government assumes larger and larger responsibilities and powers for the development and protection of its people. Government, in the setting of modern social research and political science, is inseparably bound up, therefore, with the whole social movement and with the demand for projecting technical social welfare programs in their proper perspective. Just as the modern social sciences must keep up with changing economic and technological developments which make necessary many changes in modes of living, comfort and culture, so public welfare has reflected its important trends in the effort to adjust itself in service, technique, underlying philosophy, and in its administration to make democracy more effective in the unequal places.

In the development of American institutions private social work and philanthropy have been the chief instruments of social wel-

fare. Within more recent years social work has been strengthened greatly by social research and the application of the social sciences to human problems. Thus strengthened, professional social work is still the chief technique of social welfare. Public welfare, as reflected in its present status and trends, is a large and integral unit of social work and will, therefore, be defined simply as *the social work part of government,* whether national, state, city or county. As evidence in support of this concept may be cited two distinctive trends in public welfare, the one, its assumption of the standards and procedures of professional social work, and the other its development from incidental, irregular activities to regular full-fledged, "standard" functions of government.

This concept embodies the socio-political emphasis and definition. That is, public welfare is a definite part of government in that it is paid for exclusively out of public moneys and is a technical part of public administration. Public welfare, on the other hand, is primarily social in its emphasis and objectives in that it seeks technical organization and procedure to promote the ends of government which are synonoymous with "the achievement of satisfaction and happiness of the people." Through the reduction, elimination, and prevention of misery, suffering, and poverty, public welfare, again, is essentially political in that it sets up definite organization, technique, and procedures for attacking the inequalities, which are everywhere present in all life, and which if not taken into consideration are likely to undermine democracy and lead to revolution. Its emphasis, again, is socio-political in that it attacks the fundamental, continuous problem of adjusting the individual to the group and becomes a part of that social control represented by government, necessitated by contingencies of many social changes involved in the family, child welfare, industry, and cities, and others represented by this whole study of trends.

Public welfare assumes again the social emphasis in so far as it is a basic protective function of government. As Professor Heer points out, public welfare 'seeks to protect society against extreme deviations from the minimum social standards upon which the success of democracy depends. In furtherance of this end, it may deal with individual deviates, giving them relief and succor, attempting to cure, correct and develop them, or, as a last

resort, restraining their possibilities for harm. On the other hand, it may attempt to minimize the occurrence of socially harmful deviations by attacking the conditions which produce them.'[1]

Now if we keep in mind our earlier American assumptions in which wealth and weal were to be synonymous, it is important to note both the development of philanthropic use of wealth for "charity" and "welfare" and the subsequent increasing emphasis upon the public support of this service which was more and more being interpreted not as a charity but as an obligation to the common man. For among the distinctive American institutions, philanthropy had ranked high. The American picture of the early 1930's showed a count of no less than 350 foundations whose annual grants had aggregated more than $50,000,000 and the twenty largest of which had assets of $800,000,000. Of their appropriations, more than a third was allotted by 42 foundations to medicine and public health. Approximately $3,000,000 went for social welfare, including child welfare and other specialized welfare activities. Here again a catalogue of the thousands of grants constituted a fair inventory of the needs and problems in the social work field. The picture of private and community voluntary giving in the early 1930's was of special interest in view of the quick shifting from private relief as the chief American way to the almost universal demands for public relief.

The degree to which the public welfare movement has increased can be measured by noting its general increase and its conformity to the trends of government and public administration. The trend toward centralization, sometimes called the great balance wheel or stabilizing force in modern complex democracy, was reflected especially in public welfare systems in the states where reorganization of state governments for more economical and more effective services on behalf of the general welfare of the people was considerably accelerated. In recent years the development of state systems of public welfare, in particular, reflected some of the most progressive tendencies. On the one hand, public social work on behalf of children, widowed mothers, the poor, the aged and infirm, the physically handicapped, prisoners and delinquents, and the subnormal members of the population, was provided for in systems capable of utilizing the best of public administration in

government and of professional social work methods and techniques. More than two-thirds of the states have reorganized state boards or departments under the welfare designation.

Developments went still further in that they were providing, on behalf of government, practical and technical ways of meeting the many social maladjustments which arise from the bigness of our civilization, the inequalities which ensue from economic cycles and depressions, and those which follow from the natural inequalities and deficiencies of a complex ethnic and racial population. This objective was sought through new legislation and methods for supplying and administering public relief, for taking care of the old and infirm, and for pointing toward unemployment and health insurance in cooperation with private business. A majority of the states had enacted some sort of legislation on behalf of workmen's compensation and old-age relief, while Wisconsin in 1931 had blazed the trail for unemployment insurance.

There was more and more the insistent demand that social science, and in particular economics and political science, working through social technologies, discover and make effective ways in which equable cooperation between private philanthropy and social work and public welfare should work out the problem of social welfare in such a way as to reduce greatly the hazards and fear of unemployment, old-age dependency, and the basic stirrings of revolution which well up from gross inequalities unjustly concentrated on the workingman and his family. So fundamental was this aspect that it was freely predicted that public relief would have to be provided or else far greater governmental expenditures would be required for armed control of the suffering millions. To work out this situation was one of the major problems of the time alongside those of taxation, reparations, and disarmament.

Important alongside the problems of technical public welfare a prominent part of the larger field of the social welfare of the people is that of public health, now much in the foreground because of the increased importance of health in the nation and because of the manifest trend toward public medicine. That is, just as there was an irresistible movement from private "charity" to public welfare, there appears to be a similar movement in public health, in so far as it affects the great mass of people for

whom the costs or opportunities for medical care are lacking. This will undoubtedly be one of the chief testing grounds of the people within the near future and represents a major problem. Here again, the trend and the problem represent the inevitability of change and complexity alongside the extraordinary progress made in medical science and in public health and sanitation.

To many visitors the exhibit of medicine and health in the 1933 Chicago Century of Progress Hall of Science was both the most extensive and vivid of all pictures presented at that cross-section picture of the America of the 1930's. Anatomy, sex, diseases, children, women, hospitals, clinics, vitality, public health, state and federal programs, and a thousand-and-one items were convincing that America was health conscious. The people were expending millions and millions of dollars, were educating new thousands of physicians and nurses, and striving to make a world of less suffering and better health, of longer lives. The marvels of science and invention were nowhere more vividly portrayed or more generally examined. Like education, there were reactions against public medicine, some of which were due to the large expenditures of federal, state, and local governments. The high cost of living and the high cost of dying had come to be popular titles for magazine and forum discussions. Here as elsewhere figures were big, change was rapid. Undoubtedly, the adaptation of medicine and health in the new planning would constitute one of the most difficult problems. Here again was dilemma of distribution of services to all the people. The scene was set for well-to-do and upper middle group. That was to be the size and nature of expansion.

By 1931, 6,613 hospitals had been admitted to the American Medical Association register, over 4,000 had clinical laboratories and X-ray departments, while the 6,000 clinics had provided for 30,000,000 visits annually, for the treatment of all kinds of diseases. There had been printed 50,000,000 pamphlets on venereal disease alone in a single year, and by 1931 there were 850 clinics for social diseases for which millions of dollars had become available for the government and other services. The federal government itself provided no less than twenty-five agencies dealing with public health, with a budget of more than $13,000,000 in 1931. Every state in the union provided a state department of health

and spent more than $1,000,000,000 for the work. Municipalities and counties spent still more, ranging as high as $1.50 per capita. Services had been extended to mental health as well as physical. In two short decades the mental hygiene movement had grown until every state except two had some sort of organization. Psychology and medicine had joined hands and entered the activities not only of health, but of religion, of the courts, of industry, and of family relationships. By 1931 there were nearly a half million beds in hospitals for mental diseases, most of which were in state hospitals. What the ultimate picture of public health and medicine was to be in the new social technology and planning was a problem which confronted the nation with new force in the face of the millions of unemployed and destitute in need of services for which they could not pay.

There were similar developments in the large field of public administration beyond these special fields of public welfare and public health. Yet these must either be studied as special aspects of government and democracy or they may be examined in connection with our other great testing grounds, namely, technology and planning. Here as elsewhere our problems are closely related and inseparably connected with the fundamental problems of democracy and the dangers which threaten it in the modern age.

## *Chapter XXVII*

# *SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL PLANNING*

IN ALL our studies of American social problems we are at once confronted with the difficulties of presenting new ways of doing things and in particular the prejudices against studying and planning for human welfare as we do for economic development. We are reminded over and over again that we must not contemplate such terms as social technology and social planning, although there is unanimity of opinion that technology and planning in the physical world constitute the factors which dominate the modern world. A stock inquiry which congressional committees have been accustomed to make of specialists was whether or not they were "blueprint" planners. Now in any other field the blueprint of workable specifications would be the first requirement for acceptable workmanship. The student of social problems, therefore, and the public at large must both examine these fears and having analyzed them must become so realistic in study and work as to overcome the superficial objections to fundamental concepts. If possible, these concepts should be interpreted, tested, made part and parcel of the democratic folkways.

Now the logical premise upon which social technology and social planning are projected as one of the major testing fields of the people and their organizations in the future is simply that survival and progress are to a great extent dependent upon society's ability to match physical technology with social technology, the composite of which is social planning itself. We have catalogued many of the achievements of science and technology in the modern world and have called attention to their effects upon nearly all of our contemporary society. We have also presented certain critical questions which emerge from the impact of technology upon our culture. It seems generally agreed that this influence is such as to constitute one of the supreme testing

grounds for the people in their struggle for mastery of the new frontiers.

The testimony is of many sorts presented by many people. Not only the vivid and superlative phrases set to catch the attention of a world of readers and listeners at large but also the matured conclusions of scientists and historians give credence to the theory of the impending danger. One writes about "civilization as a death dance," another about "world chaos" due to science; another symbolizes a "troubled world," another the race between civilization and chaos, and another the "decline of the West." These are not merely the symbols of "costs of progress" or "the tragedies of civilization" or society and its discontents, but they represent a growing determination of students everywhere to inquire realistically into the dilemmas which all but overwhelm contemporary society.

In substance the questions ask whether it is true that in the present tempo and magnitude of science and technology the demands exceed the capacity of the people and their institutions to absorb and adjust and that therefore the consequent disorganization and confusion are inevitable. Unless, so the reply may well be, society works out an enduring balance and equilibrium through the new reaches of social planning. Is there not, after all, a limit to which speed for speed's sake, or new for the zest of achievement, or change for the satisfaction of thrill, or technology for individual advantage over the social good, can be multiplied without endangering the survival of the civilization which was both creator and creative? What is to be the verdict in the case of scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions themselves in so far as they are pursued for their own sakes? The thrill and exaltation of multiplying inventions beyond the dream of man; of speeding cars and airplane, record breaking and magnificent; or perfected machinery to replace man; of substance to make and substance to destroy life—all of these and hosts of others illustrate the difference between the pure science of olden days and that which creates an exacting, flooding technology which is forever demanding a little more and a little more of society.

We are, therefore, projecting our planning hypotheses on the same threefold assumption which runs throughout the volume, namely, first, that there is at the present time a general crisis in

modern society, resulting from a changing civilization, the world over, and in particular a changing western culture; second, that there is at the present time a conflict in the more specific realm of free institutions such as nations have not faced for several centuries; third, that there are still emergency and crisis in the United States such as will continue for some time to test the endurance of American institutions. It seems clear, therefore, that the subject of social planning must be given the most careful consideration possible from both the popular viewpoint of public interest and interpretation and from the scientific viewpoint of social study and social action. On the one hand, there can be no success without an extraordinary effort in adult education, carrying to the people the power of both fact and thinking; and on the other, here is supreme test for all the techniques and mastery of social science.

The assumption seems justified, therefore, that in the next period of development in American culture there will be an increasing emphasis, in both social study and social action, upon the concept and techniques of social planning. Social planning, however, will first of all be projected on the basis of a continuing American democracy. If democracy can be made to endure, what will it take? Is it possible to provide this balance wheel to avoid dictatorship of either individual or of the mass? Therefore, such social planning will comprehend a working equilibrium in the whole culture process and function, featuring a series of priority schedules, in contradistinction to a mere social *plan* or to a planned economic order constituted as a single project in which inheres the sovereign power to execute. It will utilize the full capacity of a social engineering competent to build not only new structures for the nation but to carry in the meantime the traffic of all the institutions in a transitional society and within these institutions to permit of orientation, spontaneity, flexibility.[1]

We have already emphasized the strong prejudices against social planning and in our discussion of democracy and government we pointed out the dangers which threaten the nation if this balance wheel of national and regional planning is not utilized. Yet it must be clear that it is not easy to demonstrate to a skeptical world either the values of planning or the dangers in not planning. Nor are skepticism and objections merely straw men set up by alarmists and emotionalists, but they represent the actualities of a great

American public composed of common man and professional folk, of individuals and organizations. It is important, therefore, to project the social planning concept and technique not only upon the very realistic foundations of the present emergency but upon the framework of American institutions. American social planning, while specifying an ordered society with more and more controlled processes, nevertheless calls for cooperative and coordinated design of, for, and by all institutions and all regions rather than by government alone through centralized autocracy. It is an extension and transubstantiation of the first great American experiment in social planning, namely, the Constitution of the United States. And while there will be a continuous increasing role of government in both range and function, the definitive American society will continue to be one in which democracy is sought through the better ordering and coordinated specifications of all institutional forces—government, education, industry, religion and social values, the family, voluntary community effort.

By the same token, mere economic planning will not suffice for a nation whose dilemmas are also cultural in their genesis and implications and whose civilization seeks to provide a richer cultural heritage for a free people. Social planning will be radical in the sense that it goes to the roots of things; in the sense in which Professor Giddings used to portray: "We need more of that kind of radicalism that is many-sided, not one-sided; that strikes deep and is not content to grow on the surface only; a radicalism which includes complete intellectual honesty, a courage that will not be stampeded, and a sincere desire to use the social engineering way of doing things instead of the smashing easy way." Social planning in America will be just as American or un-American as the genius, ability, and motivation of its social scientists and leaders direct in their heroic efforts to conserve for the nation as much as possible of the Jeffersonian democracy of the simple rural culture to which will be added the building of a still greater democracy for the vast, complex, urban, and industrial America of the future.[2]

We have tried to illustrate the distinctive but realistic nature of planning with certain examples of regional-national efforts made during the early 1930's. For it is important to show the difference between the slow-moving process of mass education and the accelerated definite planning programs in which specified results are

to be attained in specified areas through specific, technical tools and units of work. We may illustrate in the case of certain programs for agricultural and rural reconstruction in the Southeast, where there is ample factual evidence to show the practical and realistic features of the sort of planning which emerges from the present study. We select, for example, diversification of crops and livestock farming, soil erosion work, and rural electrification. For many years the land-grant colleges and their extension divisions have promoted these and other improved methods and practices through general education, through classroom, and through extension demonstration. The results have been notable in the upraising of standards. Yet the quantitative results have been proportionately extraordinarily small as compared to the need and the total possibilities. And in the decade from 1919-1929 livestock actually decreased in practically all of the Southeastern States.

Then came that particular part of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration which provided specific ways in which the farmer could profitably retire parts of his land from cotton culture in return for which he could grow feed crops to be utilized on his own farm. Two things have happened. One is that every state has increased its livestock and feed crops from 1930 to 1935, and large numbers of the farmers are so pleased with the change that they propose to continue such diversification. If we can assume the figures from the farm census, showing increases from 1930 to 1935, are actual measures of the effectiveness of technical planning, the results are convincing. In increase of all cattle and all hay and sorghum for forage the cotton states range from 25 to more than 40 percent. Thus, South Carolina increased its acres in hay from 217,441 to 668,426 and its tons of hay from 168,456 to 420,431. Its cattle increase was from 235,163 in 1930 to 385,179 in 1935. Alabama increased its acreage of hay from 464,696 to 906,286 and its tonnage from 364,853 to 657,603. The increase for its cattle was from 681,298 to 1,125,208. North Carolina's increase for hay acreage was from 552,976 to 1,009,344 and its cattle from 467,012 to 684,266. Louisiana's increase in hay acreage was from 163,668 to 351,876 and its cattle from 618,503 to 1,081,697. On the contrary, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Virginia, where no program was in force, show very little increase. Manifestly, the permanent results will depend upon a longer time continuance of these practices

which in turn will depend upon similar technical ways for balancing production and consumption through home consumption and adjusted markets.

A similar measure of soil erosion transformation work is found in the actual number of counties which utilize soil erosion technical units in the remaking of millions of farm acres and the prospect of many counties in which the trend is toward the ultimate terracing of nearly all farms in the county. Rural electrification, too, is progressing through actual units of construction provided through definite specifications and arrangements which insure great extension into many new areas. Thus, the increase in land values, the increase in income and subsistence production, hand in hand with the increase of the attractiveness and profitableness of farm life, are attained as visible ends of technical planning for the same ends for which the general education programs can only set the ideals. Similar achievements are desirable in forestry, in flood control, in cooperative arrangements, in home ownership, and in the higher brackets of education and community organization.[8]

The range and functions of social planning may be further illustrated by citing some of the different functional levels of planning. That is, the nature of planning organization and work will depend upon what the planning is for, on the one hand, and the level of administrative planning, on the other. Let us look first at the general functional levels.

And let us begin with *Water Planning,* to which so much attention has recently been given because of floods, drouth, navigation, and power. First, then, in the general framework of water planning would be *rivers.* Within this framework again are *flood control, soil surface preservation, power, navigation, provisions for fish and waterfowl, polution problems, irrigation, recreation,* and *water supply.* Apparently, many of these functions are combined. Certainly, for instance, the great technology which carries water hundreds of miles from the Colorado River to Los Angeles involves water supply, irrigation, farming, recreation, and can be utilized satisfactorily only through planning.

In each of these subdivisions of physical functional planning, it must be clear that there will be required science, skill, technology, organization, management, and that *specifications* and facts will be of the essence of the job. Things do not "just happen" in so

great a project. So, too, the other aspects of water planning provide still more illustrations, such as the planning and utilization of lakes, big and small, seacoasts and shores with their corollaries of sea boats and climate, resorts and recreation.

Another level of physical planning is that of *Land Planning,* with of course *land use* and *conservation* as prominent functions. Here are involved not only technical matters of rural and urban zoning, but also of good and poor lands and the problems of moving people from poor land to good land. Involved also are the great problems of soil erosion and waste, of diversification of crops, of forestry and its use and abuse, of parks and playgrounds and recreation, and of wild life conservation through new uses of poor lands.

A third level of physical planning might well be that of *Minerals,* including coal and gas, oil and gas, metals and the other hundreds of lesser minerals, such as we have discussed in earlier portions of this book. Here, of course, again, the motivation of conservation as well as of utilization is important alongside the availability of resources of power for the people at reasonable costs.

Again, there is another major functional level of planning in the field of *Communication* and *Transportation* which challenges the best of the combined forces of technology and social organization. New highways and byways of a nation, continent crossing and recrossing avenues for the people, for trailer and truck, scenic highway and freight ways in competition with the railroads constitute epic builders of the frontier domains of America. The extraordinary quantitative picture of automobiles and trucks, of buses and trailers we have already presented; yet the increasing complications of local, state, interstate, regional and national problems require more study and planning than has yet been attempted. So, too, with special agencies of communication, the radio, telegraph, telephone, and television, already the immensity and complexity of the problem are taxing the capacities of present arrangements. More than these, there are still other problems of free speech, of censorship, of publishers' agreements and of various aspects of the regulation of public utilities.

Then there is *Economic Planning,* often considered synonymous with all planning. But even within the framework of a democracy there can be no gainsaying the necessity for more planning

than we now have. Planning for prosperity is a standard objective. Planning for balanced economy is another. Planning for balance between production and consumption, between scarcity and abundance, represents another important phase. Again, modifications of capitalistic competition and cooperative society are fundamental aspects. Planned money, taxation, hours and wages' regulation, truce between capital and labor, truce between business and government—these and many other aspects are self-evident areas for economic planning.

There is then, finally, to cite one more larger functional level, *Cultural and Social Planning* proper, in which are involved population policies, social security, public welfare and public health, public education and public libraries, the plight of marginal folk, race and ethnic problems, and a host of others commonly neglected.

Now it must be clear that social planning on these functional levels will require social planning on another level, namely, governmental and administrative. These levels correspond to the structural organization of American life and will comprehend the following levels of approach: national planning, regional planning, state planning, county planning, metropolitan and urban planning, rural planning, community and neighborhood planning, such that the fundamental principles of American democracy will be maintained in that each unit will find representation, opportunity, the chance to work and utilize its resources.

It is on these levels of administrative planning that we must come to seek practical organization and support for realistic planning in all the functional levels inherent in American social problems.

And we begin, of course, with the national level which must contemplate not only the planning for physical resources but for the whole policy of human relations, which we have been summarizing in terms of social problems. And in addition to the very imminent and practical need for getting things done, this planning business rests on certain fundamental theoretical aspects. For instance, one of the most frequent questions being asked in the public pulse is whether "the democracies" can survive the totalitarian threats of contemporary society. The answer, in terms of this chapter, would be to the effect that if they can survive it will be possible through some new balance wheel to bring about equi-

librium between and among the conflicting forces. In the United States, there would be needed such a balance wheel between the executive and the judicial levels of government, between the judicial and the legislative, between the federal centralization and the states, between Washington and the people. Such a balance wheel, the assumption of this chapter is, would be found in a national planning board duly constituted by the people and working through the due channels of government rather than solely on the instructions per the executive branch. Our assumptions would go further and provide that there would be, then, working with such a national planning council still other councils, state, regional, urban, county, in proportion as needs and activities made advisable.

We have suggested the composition, the authorization, and the functions of such planning groups in our "Toward Regional Planning" in *American Regionalism*. The substance of this framework of planning appears sound and its get up practical and economical. For the national planning board, the following general specifications would seem to be appropriate within the American framework and system. Legislation creating the board as recommended by the President would be passed regularly by Congress, and hence would reflect a referendum to the people. The board would be entirely expert and advisory, with no executive or administrative power, and would report directly to the President. It might well consist of seven members, of whom three would be full-time, salaried experts chosen from the fields of social science, engineering, and public affairs, with salaries adequate to secure the ablest specialists in the field. The other four members would be selected from the nation at large in the general fields of politics, the press, agriculture, industry, and would receive only a *per diem*. An adequate staff would be provided, including executive assistants and associates, research specialists, draftsmen, and secretaries. The functions of such a board would in general be threefold. The first would be to act in the service of the President and of the Congress and provide information, facts, planning programs in special projects initiated by the President or Congress. The second function would be to carry on a continuous social inventory of the nation somewhat after the manner of *Recent Social Trends*, so that there would be an authentic research-planning group working all the time, not only in designing and planning research, but in utiliza-

tion of the vast research agencies and statistics of the present federal organizations and departments. The third function would be to make contacts and cooperate with the regions and states, and to carry on adult education and promotion and continuous referendum and publicity to the people. Some members of the planning board would continuously be sensing the various situations in the different states and regions, as well as interpreting the nation to the President and Congress to the nation. It would be understood that research and plans would result in recommendation, action upon which would, however, always come through the regular administrative, judicial, or legislative function of government, and through the several regional and state agencies within which they were appropriate.

In this third function of promoting regional planning and for cooperating with state and regional agencies, the national planning board should have available a moderate amount of funds for allocation to the state and regional planning boards in accordance with definite and common sense cooperative arrangements within each of these. Although the suggestion is clearly "academic," such a planning board might well save the nation a great deal of money in so far as it would be competent to undertake the research and investigation now provided for in the scores and scores of congressional investigating committees and of isolated, overlapping and duplicating research agencies within the nation. Here would be opportunity better to implement the work and training of the expert in government without turning the government over to the scientists and students.

The second type of planning board in logical order is the state planning board, the general specifications and functions of which would in analogous measure tend to follow the general provisions set forth in the national planning board, except that all members of the state planning board would be voluntary and non-salaried. Each state planning board would, however, have in miniature an expert staff consisting of an executive official, research and planning associates and assistants, draftsmen, and secretarial staff. The state board would be official in the sense that it was constituted by an act of the Legislature, subject to the Governor's office, and with minimum appropriation for organization and for matching moneys with the national planning board. In general, the num-

ber of members should be the same as for the national, namely, seven, of whom not more than four should ever coincide with the official departmental heads of state government. The functions of the state planning board would again tend to be of the same threefold objectives as the national planning board; that is, its first function would be to assist the Governor in the work of planning and directing his state program. The second function would be to carry on a continuous program of study and planning for the state itself. The third would be to cooperate on the one hand with city and county planning boards within the state and regional and federal planning boards outside the state.

The third major type of planning board is the regional planning board, which should be less formal and less active than the national and state planning boards. In general, the desired objectives could be attained by the division of the nation into a minimum-maximum number of major regions which combine the largest possible degree of homogeneity measured by the largest possible number of economic, cultural, administrative, and functional indices, for the largest possible number of objectives. These areal divisions having been determined, the major regional planning boards might well be constituted as follows: one ex-officio member from each state planning board; one representative from the national planning board; two representatives from the region at large; and one ex-officio representative from each of the specialized, technical, subregional planning groups already at work in the region, such as, for instance, the TVA or special river-valley, or interstate compact groups.

Thus, to illustrate from three of the six divisions of the nation, utilized in this volume, the *Southeast Planning Board* would consist of eleven ex-officio members from the states, one member of the national planning board, two members at large, and one member ex-officio from the Tennessee Valley Authority, and if and when progress is made on other special subregional planning groups, such as the Lower Mississippi, an ex-officio member from this group. The *Northeastern Planning Board* would be chosen similarly with a special ex-officio member from the present New England Planning Board. The *Far Western* group would consist of four ex-officio members, two at large, one from the federal government, and one each probably from the Columbian Basin

and Los Angeles County Planning Board, or other similar planning groups.

Such an arrangement would be flexible enough to allow adequate cooperation with the proposed seven river valley authorities and would not conflict with them. It would also give an adequate number of members to insure a satisfactory quorum, would give ample subgeographic representation, and would give adequate provisions for coordinating the work and keeping a clearinghouse of regional information. The function of the regional planning board would thus be even more advisory and general than the others, still following the general threefold objectives; that is, it would first of all focus upon its regional problems and planning, serving particularly as a buffer between the national planning board and the state planning board. In the second place, it would seek to keep continuously a preview of facts and situations and a preview of trends in the region with a view to coordinating the work of the states with that of the nation. In the third place, it would have the peculiar task of cooperating with state and subregional planning boards. For such a function, the staff of the regional planning board would be relatively small, including a permanent executive official and a minimum staff of research and planning associates. Such a planning board would be primarily one of coordination and would meet perhaps not more than twice a year. Under its auspices, however, might be held various regional conferences and subregional group conferences for coordination of the many state and national and district advisory efforts.

Although these three major planning boards constitute the backbone of the national-regional planning procedure, it is assumed that city, county, and districts within each individual state would provide for such planning boards and services as either the local, state, or regional associations might promote or encourage. The provisions of national and city planning boards are being more or less standardized, so that the best that can be done is to select continuously the most satisfactory type of board and procedure. The other two types of planning boards would naturally be combined; that is, instead of arbitrarily assuming and attempting to provide for a county planning board for each county, manifestly the most effective plan would be to set up a series of contiguous counties with which to comprehend the problems and programs

of particular areas of the state and to join forces in a special program of research and planning over a period of six to twelve years. Such a program would comprehend the maximum advantages which coordination of federal, state, local, of official and voluntary educational planning programs will provide. Such a program would constitute experimentation and exploration from which ultimately the best results and plans for each county might be obtained. At the same time, it would pool resources to the best possible advantage.[4]

Now, of course, we all know that we must not expect too much, too soon, of such proposals. Yet they are of the essence of matching the physical technology with social vision and skills, and these definite suggestions constitute the basis for enumerating and "solving" some of the major social problems. They represent concrete and realistic answers to some of our questions. They conform to the structure of American democracy and they look to the welfare of all the people. There appear no objections to such an extension of the American system, except that "it won't work" or "it can't be done." One answer is, of course, approximation and continuous effort. Another answer is that neither has democracy or fascism or Christianity or education or marriage "worked." Another answer is that exploration and study of these practical workable ways of doing things will result either in their development and use or in the discovery of better ways—which, after all, is the objective of the student of social problems. The most that can be done within the purposes of this volume, therefore, is to attempt to see the nation and its problems and dilemmas in some such picture and motivation as will recapitulate its problems in terms of logical next steps. Thus, we continue in the next chapter asking about American dilemma and promise.

## *Chapter XXVIII*

# *AMERICAN DILEMMA AND PROMISE*

If we seek to summarize the promise and prospect of the America of tomorrow within the framework of dilemma and challenge there appear, ranging from the very comprehensive and total picture to the very specific constituent problems involved in the several composite parts of the total picture, to be three main levels of approach. The first, of course, is the general theme, in the grand manner, which we have so often emphasized, namely, the continuity and unity of development of the United States through a fine equilibrium of geographic, cultural, and historical factors, in which will be found the testing grounds for American democracy and also, according to most observers, the hope of Western civilization.

Within this larger framework there is then the second main level of approach to be found in the twofold problem, again, in the grand manner, of adapting and constantly readjusting the people and their institutions to the living geography and resources of the American continent and of securing liberty and freedom in the attainment of these ends. This same sort of major problem and prospect would seem, by way of illustration, to apply to the great Canadian portion of the American continent as an expanding physical base for the continuity and unity of a great British civilization. These symbolize problems of policy and involve the great forces of social incidence inherent in world situations as well as in domestic dilemmas.

Finally, within the framework of each of these larger prospects are the specific and concrete problems that constitute the component units which go into the making of the whole fabric of our civilization and of progress or regress toward stated and attainable ends. These are the "problems" that cry out for more tangible "solutions." Without effective work in providing actual, technical ways of meeting these problems it will not be possible to attain the essential promise of the New America now everywhere so

much sought and in many quarters believed to be immediately attainable. This chapter will consider primarily the first two levels of general approach and will leave the third level to the realistic summary of problems already presented in the volume and to the techniques of study and definition provided in Book II which is arranged for with a view to a fine degree of cooperative effort between teacher and student or between the teaching method and that part of the American adult public desiring to go into more facing of facts and more action.

Now, reviewing the episodes and struggles of the most recent crises of the 1930's, it would seem that to the extent that the dilemmas of the United States were couched in the form of eager and perplexing questions they tended to reflect a twofold character. *First,* would Western civilization survive? Would democracy in the United States be able to meet the critical demands of the modern world of speed, bigness and technology? Would the nation be able to meet the more specific demands of its domestic conflicts and of the European crises? There were, it was true, scores of minor questions opportune to the day and times. But the enormity of the main question could not be doubted. *Second,* what was to be the way of recovery and reconstruction? What were to be the practical, workable, technical ways through which the nation would rebuild its own fortunes and reconstruct its place in the world of nations? Modified forms of these questions were constantly exploring the degrees and ways to which progress was being made through trial and error, success and failure, legislation and education, at Washington and throughout the uttermost parts of the nation. To what extent has the nation recovered? Was it pointing the way toward enduring democracy? In what places and aspects of its life were there greatest tension and dilemma and in what places did failure seem impending? What programs were succeeding and which were doubtful? What other ways gave promise of succeeding where former ones had failed? When failures seemed apparent, what were the causes? When mistakes had been made, how could they have been avoided? What were the chief dangers inherent in the contemporary scene?

There were other corollaries of this twofold query. First, what was it that brought the nation to this point of dangerous emergency and of doubtful recovery? Which of the ways of national

recovery to be employed would surely avoid the elements which had contributed most to the demoralized nation of the depression era and which would surely contribute to permanence of reconstruction and to the perpetuation of the American ideals and character? And what coordinated plans and programs would constitute the permanent character of recovery and of remaking a great nation?

Now to answer these questions was obviously the task of social science and social technology. There must surely be more than the routine education, political science, government, and propaganda of the past. To discover so large a body of truth relating to the development of the nation and to the chartering of its future was apparently a task which could never be done save through the instrumentality of a new and dynamic social science. Somewhat commensurate with the physical sciences, to utilize scientific information in the designing and executing of actual, practical, technical, workable, permanent plans was manifestly the task of the new social technology. The degree and method by which the new ways of recovery and reconstruction must be built upon, but also transcend, the old ways, were essentially a problem of both social science and social technology. Here, again, was supreme testing ground of the people and their institutions. Just as the nation had ample physical resources and technology to guarantee an abundant life for the people if only they could be adequately utilized, so the nation had ample resources for its cultural development and social direction if only it could be brought to develop and utilize these resources. Could the nation, sensing its backgrounds and experiences, conserve these gains and yet, through new reaches of skill, leap forward to new attainments?

Whatever else might have been reflected in this changing American picture it was clear that any demand of the people for a quick and simple solution of their dilemmas was unreasonable. There could be no royal road to recovery; no simple way to reconstruction. There could be no ignoring of the actualities of the past, the realities of the present, or the prospects of the future. Here was stark reality, inclusive, sweeping, the substance of life, and the resistless tide of evolution. The powerful drama must move now slowly, now swiftly, surely, toward its ending, like some cosmic onomatopoeia, its telling and its action alike in the long drawn

out tension, the repetition of its ever-changing fortunes, the seeming endlessness of indecisive struggle, the lack of clarity, vision, focus.

Moreover, three things were self-evident in the picture beyond the peradventure of a doubt. The first was that in the drama of the time was to be found everything that civilization could offer in challenge and opportunity. It was all there: the sweep of things to come, the tick of time, the march of evolutionary processes, heroic proportions, unyielding technology, speed, bigness, excitement, survival, struggle, social conflict, romance, comedy, tragedy of the Greek, tragedy of the modern.

But what to do about it was the second consideration which emphasized the supreme task of social study and guidance. One thing was increasingly clear to an increasingly larger American public, and that was that the full measure of future happiness, prosperity, stability, survival could be somehow found in a better designed and planned society. Toward the specifications of such progress was to be the goal of united endeavor, the nature of the specifications to depend upon the best that the nation could offer in intelligence, experience, motivation, skill, concreteness, organization, mastery of emotional currents, and social incidence.

The third self-evident truth was that the task was so big, the hazards so great, the problems so organic that it would tax both time and the limits of social technology and the skill and endurance of the people. The alternative outcomes appeared to be chaos and the road back, or violent revolution and tragic waste, or dictatorship of mass or class or iron hand to the permanent defeat of an American democracy fit for the American dream. A part of the American drama was generic, recapitulatory of the past, reminiscent of other crises, fabricated of great emotional and spiritual forces, unthinking enthusiasms, contagious novelty, fear and terror, sweeping tide of mass motivation. Yet another part was new and different—the difference of bigness, speed, technology which would abide no mere drift or *laissez faire* of old. There could be no flight from reality in an era that demanded achievement without consequent disaster.

Whether the drama was characterized as American civilization or American epic; whether it was likened to American picture or American symphony; or whether the colossal struggle appeared

designed for progress or drifting for decline, there were everywhere apparent great moments, magnificent vitality, exciting and intriguing acts such as might engage the energies and entertain the great hosts of American people of whatever sort. If it was heroic action that was wanted, there were storm and stress enough for all the hosts of he-men in the nation. If it was bigness and speed, the picture was preeminently "American." If ideologies and thrills were wanted, there were ample numbers and kinds for the keen eyes, ambitious and fiery youth of the period. If excitement, action, suspense and tension, swift-moving life and death and Nemesian fortune were what was wanted, they were multiplied seventy times seven in the American way of life. If beauty and light and hope were wanted, there was ample field for all the militant idealists that America could produce. And there was in prospect superabundance of outlets for the increasing efforts and organizations of the American woman and for the traditional showdown for all the pioneer qualities that had been America's or for all that she had boasted to have possessed.

It was a magnificent picture from any angle. It was a powerful drama no matter how the action was accommodated. It was a great day to be living, and it was a great world to be living in. There would be no better stage than the United States, no better actors than the people of this nation; no more powerfully accommodated action than that which was to grow from an adequate sensing of this magnificent reality. There were no more heroic ways to live, no better ways to die. In the picture were all the commonplace elements inherent in eagerness to know the end, in the mass sympathy for suffering and tragedy, in the curiosity of the morbid, in the hope of national recovery and personal security. Never was such a stage set; never such action; never such threatened mass disaster, counting its tragedies by the tens of thousands; never such hope and adventure, anticipating new glories and new gains; never such contrasts and paradoxes to confound the mighty and the simple. Panic and stampede, despair and fear, stirrings among the people, rushing hither and yon, group on group, nation on nation, world in flux.

The American picture was inevitably covering over its stark reality with incurable romanticism or forever portraying parts of the picture for the whole, or emotionally sensing the here and now

as all of eternity. It was difficult for the people to sense the immensity of the drama; the inherent difficulty of the tasks ahead. There was yet to be comprehended the greater reality of all the facts; yet to be perfected, the working blueprints of progress fabricated upon these facts, if the glory of the American picture was to be realized. America faced the whole reality, not part of it. Not all of time was then or now. A thousand years were still as a watch in the night. Time was still of the essence of reality both in the long look ahead and in the detailed technical planning for recovery. Again, not all of America was one, nor North, nor East, nor West, nor South; yet all. Not all America was government; not all of government was taxation or budgets; neither was it all politics. Politics was not all graft and corruption. It was an American way of life, Emersonian real and earnest. Government was no longer a simple synonym for democracy, neither was it merely a paper plan of supersovereignty. It was still of and for and by the people who were neither all scoundrels nor all saints.

And there was yet the zest of the intellectually curious folk eager to look at the fascinating spectacle of civilization in the making, of understanding its historical backgrounds, and of learning by what devious and long roads we had come to our demoralized state. Here were rich archives and source materials beyond compare. Here was an illimitable laboratory for study and experiment, rich in materials and equipment, challenging the physical sciences, challenging the social sciences. In it might be viewed objectively a world of social and moral dilemmas and of changing folkways; it might be the twilight of the nations or it might be the dawn of the new human epoch; "anything may happen"; what is it that will? Understanding the facts, seeing wisely the present confusion, sensing the logical products of the sweep and power of great processes and forces—there were intellectual exercises exciting enough to lead the "way on." In the catalogue of forces and processes, what was old, what was new? What was first and what was last? What was true and what was false? Manifestly the picture was one of the fruits of great forces. There was the early mastery of frontiers, reflecting great purpose and will but little design and planning. There was the later immeasurable and accelerated technology—science, invention, machines, management. And in the midst were the unprecedented impact of world movements and

international forces, cumulative mass emotions and questionings, brewing unforeseen storms of social incidence and leaving a nation different from anything that had gone before.

There was, moreover, in the American picture of the early 1930's the ever-recurring motif of contrast and paradox, inseparable in tempo and rhythm and power from that of chasm and contrast and quick-moving change from old to new. For here was incredible spread of want and formless confusion in the midst of unprecedented wealth and technological order. The picture of America had been synonymous with the inventory of a wealthy nation indescribably wealthy in actual real wealth, in multiplied paper wealth, and in the reputation of the people as wealth makers and dollar worshipers. But the picture included more, at least in the earlier days and always in the stated ideals and concepts of the American dream of democracy. This additional quality of the wealth picture was found in the old meaning of the term in which wealth signified the great social objective of welfare, of the public good, the common weal. Thus, America was to be a wealthy nation dedicating its resources and its efforts to a new world of nations in which it was destined to become the great leader. This early ideal and concept represented in reality both a remarkable motivation and groundwork for a possible social analysis, technology and guidance commensurate with the Jeffersonian constitutional technique for guaranteeing liberty and equality of opportunity.

But this greater wealth picture was never completed. Some of it had been relegated to idealism or trampled under foot after the days of John Quincy Adams. Some of it had fallen by the wayside ever and anon through the decades as a quick-prospering, powerfully developing nation moved on and on. The wealth of the public weal was a composite good of multiple units all of which must be geared together in a planned development and none of which must be exploited for possible advantage or public woe. The failure of the nation to complete such a structure of wealth was not intentional so much as it was a failure to translate the elementary idealism of the early motivation into the reality of understanding, analysis, and technical ways of attaining a well-balanced social and economic equilibrium alongside the phenomenal increase of wealth.

But the results were the same regardless of the explanations, for this wealth of the nation was of many sorts multiplied. There was the magnificent picture of the natural wealth of the nation in all its richness and variety. There were the phenomenal growth and mastery of the technological wealth of the nation. Product of these two and the activities of the people, who were at once the creators and creatures of the human wealth of the nation, was the incomparable abundance of artificial wealth of the nation. Product of the interaction of all these and of the processes of change and incidence was the institutional wealth of the nation, including a vast array of state and regional variations, through which it had commonly been assumed the nation could be measured and characterized. Here then was the problem-picture—to inventory not only the length and breadth and sweep and power of the wealth of the nation; not only the range and power and action of the drama of its development; but also the fundamental points of failure, of lack of balanced and harmonious development; the natural and logical explanations of the American crisis of the 1930's; and most of all, to find sure ways to complete the picture, to sense the happy ending of the great drama.

It was evident that such an American picture puzzle required a threefold approach for its understanding and solution; that there were at least three great acts of multiple scenes to the powerful drama. The first was the portraiture of the American scene as it actually was in all its vivid and manifold variations and intensity. The second was to understand how the nation came to be as it was and through what logical sequences and extraordinary incidence the rising action of the 1930's had developed. The third was to find the way out of danger and on into the next successful efforts to bring order out of chaos, happy ending to crisis and conflict.

For the realistic tasks ahead there was accordingly no American cult of perfection possible. There was no sure trail to social reconstruction. Human nature could not be changed overnight. Exploiters had not become extinct. There was still conflict between labor and capital. Races could not be transformed in a generation. Youth and emotions, spirit and temper still abounded. The people could not be driven. The mistakes of the centuries could not be blotted from the records of cause and effect. What might have

been or what ought or ought not to have been were no respecter of what was. No body or cult had received legacy of immunity from error. Men who did not know could not do. Many men who knew much could still do little in new fields of experience and demand. Nor could little men without experience do the work of big men of great experience. And, after all, there were few men experienced in the ways of the new world. Men and women skilled in the art of writing or teaching or searching for truth were not thereby necessarily masters of government or business or politics. Master minds of business were often childish in matters of social guidance; social idealists were often naive in their planning for business. Engineers and scientists knew too much and too little to rebuild the social structure.

And so, on and on and on. Thus, still once again the recurring motif of contrast and paradox continued, now featuring incurable romanticism, now sensing new realism, now registering progress, now threatening regression. The American picture reflected not only stark realism based upon facts but included an increasingly larger number of Americans who were more and more aware of the situation and were committing themselves to a realistic facing of the facts. There were more and more facts which were being added up and studied. The results were mandates for appraisal, mandates for planning ways out of dilemma; for designing reconstruction specifications; for drawing up blueprints of progress. There must be ways and those ways must be found. And with the growing volume of evidence there was also an increasing urgency for more coordinated action, for more unity, for more surety of attainment. Such urgency was assuming dramatic proportions. It might appear as a great chorus in the American grand manner, or it might turn into an army of protest, devastating and destructive unless the Rooseveltian "action and action now" could be turned into workable specifications for permanent recovery, avoiding the dilemmas of the artificial and the over-technical demands upon society and a free people.

On the other hand, sometimes it seemed not only possible but likely that the national crisis must run its course in cyclic *laissez faire* traditional fashion since for the most part the American people appeared powerless to direct its course into channels of immediate recovery and permanent reconstruction. Yet the American

tradition had been one of mastery over difficulties. Such mastery, it was true, had been gained with great purpose and sacrifice without much design and plan. Now that the limits of planless mastery had been reached, could the nation comprehend its realistic inventory, envisage the fundamental requirements of stability and permanent social well-being, and adjust itself to the new demands of social planning necessary for survival?

Yet, in spite of all this confusion, complexity, and slow-moving action it was now possible from the inventory of the nation, its wealth and its problems to point with relative clearness to next steps. Through processes of elimination it was possible to indicate definite directions and probabilities of social planning and of social guidance. It seemed possible that these directions and probabilities could be indicated in a series of relatively direct and logically recapitulatory questions, rhetorically implying the simple "yes" or "no" answers.

Is it true that the United States has ample natural resources and wealth to meet all the needs of all the people now and for many generations to come?

Is it true that in the wealth of American technology there is to be found ample technical organization and managerial skill to derive from these resources such abundance of goods and services as will provide all the people with not only the bare necessities of life but abundant comfort, convenience, leisure, and high standards of living?

Is it true in reality, however, that millions of Americans are not only without these comforts, conveniences, and luxuries, but also without the essentials for adequate survival of body, mind, and morale in spite of the great abundance of technical skill and natural wealth?

Is it true also that the nation is still possessed of money and abounding in wealth enough to make possible the utilization of this technology and natural wealth in such way as to turn production capacity into adequate channels of distribution and consumption?

Is it true, however, that this wealth is not available for adequate use; that most of it is concentrated in a few places and persons; that millions of Americans are becoming poorer and poorer; that

millions of other Americans are on the verge of poverty; and that many others are becoming richer and richer?

Is it true that these conditions are resulting in multiplied unnecessary inequalities for many of the people and for too limited opportunity for millions more; in increasing injustice throughout the nation; in well-nigh universal lack of security; and in widespread confusion, unrest, distrust, bordering on despair?

Is it true, therefore, that the nation has reached a stage where it is not guaranteeing to its citizens that perfect union, justice, domestic tranquillity, general welfare, and blessings of liberty vouchsafed in the preamble to the Constitution, or that safety, happiness, and rights unanimously specified in the Declaration of Independence?

Is it true again that the nation cannot continue to survive under conditions so inalienably contrary to the foundations of its democracy, and under circumstances which are draining the vitality of its people and destructive of the ends of democratic government?

Is it conceivable, therefore, that the American people will continue much longer not to heed the Jeffersonian injunction that it was not only their right but their duty to provide through new government "new guards" for their future security?

Nevertheless is it true that there is no general agreement on the part of the American people as to next steps best "to institute new government" such as would "seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness"?

There are other questions the answers to which are not quite so apparent but which have important bearings upon the direction which American reconstruction will take? Is it true that the "cultural" outlook in the nation seems no surer of utilizing the vast possibilities and promise than that of the economic? Is it possible to gear together economic and cultural elements and classify the principal factors which have been responsible for the dilemmas of the 1930's? Can the nation then concentrate upon the fundamental differences of the next period of development and chart the nation's course away from the dangers inherent in the combination of old policies and procedures now manifestly inadequate?

And still the queries continue. Is it true that both Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian democracy, as well as the Constitution of the

United States, were grounded in conditions almost entirely different from the America of the 1930's?

Is it true that the nation's natural wealth and its artificial wealth have been developed through rapid helter-skelter individualistic wealth and profit-seeking competition, with little design and planning and through the exploitation of both physical and human resources?

Is it true that science and invention have been concentrated primarily upon mechanical and industrial development through technologies made possible by the use of invested capital without regard to the social consequences? Is it true, therefore, that neither government nor capital has adequate control over essential economic processes, and that other social institutions have forfeited much of their control over social trends?

Is it true, therefore, as a result of superachievements in the development of resources and wealth and the expansion of science and invention and of their application through technology that the civilization of the 1930's has become so big and complicated and technical and so rapidly changing that the American people found themselves impotent to direct its main currents or to understand its major implications and trends?

Is it likely, therefore, that the changes which are everywhere recognized as imperative and imminent cannot be worked out through a continuation of the old American policies? Is it equally likely that the outcome would be disastrous if left to the logical processes of drift and *laissez faire?*

Is it true, however, that the nation still believes essentially in the American dictum that with united effort any achievement is possible? Is it true that perhaps a majority of the professional groups in public life, in universities, in jurisprudence, in education, in social work, in business are at times frankly skeptical of the ability of the nation to survive the crises of modern democracies?

Nevertheless, is it true that the nation is in nowise yet ready to give up its belief that the capitalistic system can be reconstructed and adjusted to the next stage of American development? By the same token is it true that socialism has as yet comparatively little following? And communism still less? Is it likewise true that although there are considerable talk and discussion about revolution that there is nowhere any widespread sense of impending revolution?

And that fascism and dictatorships are still discussed as virtually academic questions? But that there is approximate unanimity toward organic revision to the end that the rich must bear more burden of taxation and that the farmer must find adjustment through some ameliorative channels?

Is it true, however, that as social tension increases dilemmas multiply, security recedes yet further in the distance, the American drama grows more tense and exciting, more problematical as, through the process of elimination, promising solutions, one by one, recede to leave a startlingly small number of possible ways of recovery and reconstruction?

It is probable, therefore, that there is left only a single major program, namely, concentration upon comprehensive social planning, such as will meet the realistic demands of progress through the utilization of all available facts, through the coordination of the greatest number of diverse forces? Is it possible that the ultimate effectiveness of such social planning will reside in its provisions for flexibility and constant inventory and for the equivalent of a new social constitution technically and practically adapted to the requirements of the new civilization?

Is it possible, through planning through the duly constituted channels, to achieve the new order in peace without the war-time techniques of dictatorship? Peace-time victories are harder to achieve. There is less of glamor and show. There is less of heroic talk and romance. The ends in view appear less tangible and material. The dangers and rewards seem more commonplace. Emergencies seem ever possible to be put off, and the impending crisis is less visible. There is no dictatorship of government or compulsion of public opinion to drive us on. There is not the keen conscience of patriotism manifest toward the great social principles and ideals of peace times that there is toward physical combat in times of war. There is not the same scrutiny and safeguarding of the public weal against selfish interests, foolish plans, and drift in peace times that there is in times of war. There are not as adequately integrated and organized social forces and agencies as become the fruits of war. And there is less agreement as to objectives and techniques concerning the realities and nature of crisis and emergency.

The American picture intensifies other limitations to national recovery or survival without comprehensive long-time, well-geared so-

cial planning. There is the ever-present twofold obstacle of a lack of equipped personnel and leadership, on the one hand, and the inevitable weakness and unreliability of human nature under the stress of mass emotion and conflict. Whatever else may be debatable, it seems clear that it is not possible to get together any group adequate in numbers, training, and experience for the new social order who can or will agree on fundamentals of principle and action unless there are already provided the specifications to be followed. The politicians cannot do the job. The professors are not equal to the task. Business man, publicist, social worker, the social scientist, educator have not been conditioned by knowledge or experience for practical administration in the incredibly complex social structure of the new world. All together they can contribute to the making of a social design of the better-ordered society, but they cannot, on short notice and under mass pressure, successfully guide the nation permanently out of its danger.

Equally powerful and insuperable obstacle to quick undesigned action is the traditional danger of demagogue, the excesses of exploiters, the ignorance and emotional excitement of the masses, multiplied many times in the American picture because of their increasing participation in social control, their partial education, and their accessibility through communication and transportation to the center and heart of things.

In addition to the specific requisites of American social planning, already presented, there are reflected in the American picture certain recapitulatory specifications which have to be met if adequate results are to be achieved. It is assumed, of course, that the needs will be met for developing the nation's great resources and for such adequate and equitable distribution of the essential goods of life and labor as will insure a greater balance and equilibrium in society. The specifications will provide amply for the continued development of science and technology and will go further than has yet been attempted in drawing up workable programs which will insure social science and social invention a more effective matching of physical science and invention and a closer coordination of the physical and the social sciences.

But social planning, to be effective in any abiding order, must go further and base its specifications upon capacities and human factors inherent in the people. There must be harnessed the great organic

and resurging energy of the folk society, the common man, the whole people, who are yet, as they have always been, the seed bed of nations and the dynamics of changing cultures. Always the resistless tide of the people constitutes the definitive balance of power. To ignore such power is to invite disaster. On the other hand, specifications will not fail to take into consideration the limitations and capacities, the culture complexes, biological backgrounds, and the geographic environments of the people who constitute the mass energy of the nation. In these factors will be found the safeguards of scientific social planning, of specifications of sheer reality of fact and relationship, of social technology which after all is nothing more nor less than technical and practical ways of attaining social ends.

Thus promise and prospect are measured largely in terms of recapitulation of our problems of physical and cultural backgrounds of the people and their institutions, and of the supreme testing of the people in the midst of all these complicated and changing factors. If anything else is to be added it will appear perhaps only as variation or extra emphasis. Thus, for instance, a high motivation toward next steps, a really scientific knowledge of the situation, an uncompromising allegiance to the framework of American civilization, a more realistic understanding and implication of regional factors and problems, a practical approach to the reintegration of agrarian culture in American life, a search for a better-balanced economy, and back again and again to the conservation and development of our resources and the training and development of all the people. For all this we go back again and again to our fundamentals already presented, and forward to the more detailed and technical consideration of each problem as outlined in the closing part of this book.

Yet it remains to be said that as yet there is to be found nowhere in the American picture any such specifications or popular motivation for planning as has been shown by national inventory to be essential for America's survival and welfare. This then is to be the next gigantic task, no more hit and miss, immature playing with the destinies of America's millions of men, billions of money. Here is momentous action for American pioneers on new social frontiers, requiring all the strategy, skills, experience, techniques that the nation can muster.

This, then, is to be the technical task for turning confusion into

symphony, dilemma into mastery. This is the way of making available at last the nation's cumulative resources in research and social science. Nor will it be more prosaic anticlimax to dramatic action. For the American way is still the way of paradox and contrast; it is also the way of mastery and action. Yet, the American picture reflects little chance for a continuation of the nation's course, except through the inventory and reinventory of its powerful and complicated drama and through the matching of technology with more comprehensive and effective social technology—social study, social invention, social planning, social action—both symbol and actuality of a new social constitution. The picture reflected no other way. The United States will watch and wait with anxiety; the nations of the world will watch and wait with anxiety. Destiny and disaster are at stake, awaiting the skilled and unified group which will fabricate a new mastery of America's physical and cultural capacities. Inventory again vast resources; measure the length and breadth and power of technology and change; call the long roll of leaders and zestful people; review the kaleidoscopic yesterdays, rich in cultural heritage and conflict; sense impending tragedy and harness the hopes and faith of America's millions. The picture is always the same. There must be planned mastery. There must be resources in facts and findings; in ways and means; in personnel and skills; in science and social science.

For ideology is not enough; for action is not enough; audacity is not enough. Everywhere the picture reflects deficiencies in the hard, long processes of intellectual effort and technical skill. There must be colossal preliminary work preparatory to the new social reconstruction. There must be capacity for purposeful control from without the tides of emotion and action; there must be measured ways of determining margins of capacity in each stage of democratic control; there must be scientific selection of elements left and elements right; there must be measures for the conservation of what has been gained in the nation's whole experience, and in particular for conserving the recent gains; there must be ample preparation for next steps when first steps have failed. And there must be checks and control for the impatience and immaturity of intellectual and common man alike.

For waiting, are resistless tides of people, resurging spiritual power of youth and race; mass emotions and folk impatience nigh unto

floodtide; intolerance, tension, despair, desperation, revolt, ominous. What is it that will speedily bring America to full motivation and capacity for such united action as will provide for the new mastery? What is it that will impel the nation's leaders to design and follow such new and adequate steps as will bring this next act of its drama to happy ending? Is it crisis and disaster? Or concerted will and purpose? Or science and knowledge and technology? Or is it all of these and something more, intangible and powerful, which can inspire the bridging, by social technology and purpose, of that sheer chasm of contrast between the old and the new?

Yet questions and answers must go beyond the level of generalizations and ideologies.

Can America produce for peace as for war?

Can business and government so cooperate as to assure abundance for all the American people, and for world needs, as they cooperated on war production?

Can America both direct the education and readjustment of its millions of war workers and service youth and at the same time give them freedom to help direct?

Can America pool its agencies and organizations effectively in the minimizing of race conflict?

Can America avoid the bases of revolution which have so continuously contributed to world strife?

Can the people of the United States find and follow the "road away from revolution"?

Can the United States recapture the high motivation of its earlier years at the same time that it adapts to a new world order of international cooperation?

Can the United States achieve a regional balance of culture and economy as between rural and urban life, agriculture and industry, occupational opportunity and resources, centralization and decentralization?

Can America attain a balance between its isolationist tendencies and its world wide obligations? And can America work with all the nations?

The continuing search for answers to these questions will provide American youth a testing ground for all their energies, enthusiasm and high purpose and for a realistic facing of facts and trying to do something about them.

# BOOK II

# THE STUDY AND TEACHING OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

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## *Chapter XXIX*

# *MORE MEANINGS AND IMPLICATIONS OF "SOCIAL PROBLEMS"*

In our comprehensive picture of American social problems as presented in this volume, we have constantly reminded our readers that there are many different aspects of the same problem and many different ways of studying them, and that more detailed suggestions for study will be needed to supplement the selective representative phases included in each chapter. We have pointed out that it is not possible to study all problems nor to study every phase of each problem except through a high degree of specialization. The main part of the volume, therefore, consists of a more general sweeping picture with such itemization and catalogues of problems only as could be included in a single volume of this sort.

Yet it must be clear that many students will want to go further with their inquiries and will want to consider more technical problems and will want to check them with as many scientific methods as possible.

Now, because of the great importance of accurate definitions and usages in any realistic and scientific work, we must come at once to the very serious but engaging task of defining our terms and of seeking reality in all our methods of study and presentation. This means that we must adopt usage which will apply to all of our problems from whatever angle of approach. It means that we must seek accurate definitions and concepts which can be utilized consistently throughout our search for truth and our endeavor to provide practical mastery over problems and dilemmas. This means that we must seek the answers to our questions through approved scientific methods, which are not always the easy, emotional ways of facing facts. It means that we must seek the adjustment of our problems through the sound and enduring ways of social organization and public administration rather than through the transient and shallow ways of propa-

ganda. Yet this does not mean that our terminology must be unintelligible or that our approach must be isolated from the reality of the people at large or that there may be no purposive quest for truth and its consequent utilization in social guidance.

In this search for reality of meanings and usage, we begin by noting a pair of primary but distinctive meanings of our key-word "problem"; both the actual usage and implications of which are implied in this work. The first meaning envisages the problem in the *scientific* sense and the second in the *ameliorative* sense. Here are two relatively distinctive types of "problems," the differentiation of which will enable us the better to understand and to classify our problems, and by the same token will enable us to come more directly to realistic conclusions and to point to more effective action than we should otherwise be able to do.

If we oversimplify the concept of our scientific problem, we may characterize it by saying it is primarily the search for the answer to a question. The scientist does not care what the answer to this question may be or how the solution of his problem may turn out. He does care tremendously that he shall find the right answer. In other words, the statement of the scientific problem takes some such form as this: given a situation, accurately described, in a given setting similarly described, to find the answer or the "solution" to a problem inherent in these situations. Or, again, if certain facts are known or knowable and these facts are related to certain other facts, we want to know the meaning or "solution," regardless of whether this meaning shall be translated into action or not; regardless of whether this meaning is desirable or undesirable; "good" or "bad."

Or we may turn briefly to the usual lexicon type of definition. Perhaps the general encyclopedic definition of the term "problem" will best pave the way for a clearer illustration from the social field. "Problem" here implies "a question proposed for discussion and answer"; or, again, a problem in mathematics is "a solution to be effected such as that of the construction of an equilateral triangle having a given line segment as its side, or the finding of the mean proportional between two given numbers." Ample other simple illustrations may be found in the textbooks in mathematics, physics, statistics, economics, by referring to the countless

"problems" listed for the student to "solve" as evidence of his mastery of both principles and techniques of his subject.

We may illustrate again through what may seem an over-simplification of a case, in which the problem in the general scientific sense is contrasted with the "ameliorative" problem. Here, for instance, is a community problem due to a group of adolescent boys breaking out window panes in the school house, committing various petty offenses and acting after the fashion of amateur organized hoodlums, attempting petty larceny, disturbing the elders, and in general reflecting a fine prelude to delinquency.

Now the scientific problem is primarily one of the universal situation involved in adolescent equipment and behavior. The scientist, in this instance perhaps the sociologist or the psychologist, is interested to know the answer to the problem of adolescent behavior everywhere, under all sorts of conditions, some constant, some greatly variant from others, but all reflecting a genuine problem: Given youth, with exuberance, animal spirits, in a setting of certain family and racial heritage, psychologically conditioned in certain ways, what is the diagnosis of the situation, what is the answer to his problem, what is the solution to his dilemma? The scientist for the time being is not interested in the community's trouble, except as this case will be one in a series of finding the answer to the adjustment of youth to the community everywhere. The scientist is not interested in the cost to the community or the disturbed sleep of the elders or the morals of the youngsters. It might be quite likely that the scientist would want to see a few more window panes shattered in order that he might observe accurately as nearly as possible all the conditions under which this problem of behavior finds its setting. Primarily, he wants to know the answer. Having found it, however, he will gladly give it to that other group which is interested in the ameliorative problem—namely, what is to be done about it.

Now the "problem" in the ameliorative sense implies a situation or a series of situations in which there is obviously maladjustment as between individuals and individuals, individuals and groups, or individuals and institutions. The problem becomes a question of the solution inherent in the ways or skills or techniques of adjustment. In other words, the student or the worker here is very much interested in what shall be done about it. He

is very much interested that what shall be done will be the best possible adjustment. He is interested that the solution shall be "good" and that it will be enduring; and that it will prevent a similar problem from arising again.

In the case of the hypothetical group of adolescents he is interested not only in the youth themselves to the end that they shall be normally and wholesomely adjusted to their environment; to the end that they shall not become delinquent; but he is interested in the community problem of organization and welfare, and he is interested in developing tools and techniques which may be more or less universally applied elsewhere. The scientist studying this problem may be the sociologist, the biologist, the psychologist, the physician; the worker interested in this problem of adjustment may be the social case worker, the psychiatrist, the educator, the juvenile court judge, the recreation specialist. The sociologist does not attempt to "solve" the problem of adjustment, but rather to get and give the facts, to tell how to get the answer; the social worker does attempt to make the adjustment and his adjustment will be permanent and effective in proportion as his solution is based upon facts and realities. The working together of these two groups from the two different angles of solution is of the utmost importance in the mastery of all our social problems.

These distinctions and their significance will appear more and more clear as we discuss the extended catalogue of our American problems. Yet it may be well to illustrate with still another example, such as race, for instance. Now the scientific problem involved in race is the answer to the questions of race cultures, race conflicts, race capacities, racial experience, and all that long catalogue of inquiries set up by the biologists, the anthropologists, the psychologists, the sociologists, as well as the educators, eugenicists, geneticists, and others in the search for truth about racial origins, differences, and race relations. They want to know what the answers are regardless of what is to be done about it or regardless of where the answers lead. This is the scientific search after truth. On the other hand, the ameliorative problem is quite different. For here is a problem, now of minority groups, now of exploited race-groups, clearly not only maladjusted, but so maladjusted as to reflect injustice, inequality of opportunity, and various exploitations subversive of the high social and ethical ideals

of society. The worker is very much interested that something shall be done about it, and he is interested that the best possible methods and techniques for solving this ameliorative problem shall be evolved and utilized in conformity with the facts of reality and of permanence.

Now, in order to define our problems more clearly and also to build up a scientific and logical approach to our whole study of American problems, we need to note another pair of meanings, indicating similar distinctions between two other types of problems, illustrations of which, however, may be the same as for the scientific and the ameliorative problems. This second pair of fundamental types of problems are the "social" and the "societal," terms utilized so effectively by the dynamic dean of American sociologists, Franklin Henry Giddings. Here, again, these distinctions are not merely academic or valid only to the scientific study of a problem. They are fundamental in the framework of all practical programs of amelioration. The societal problem is one which comprehends the whole of the long evolutionary and time process and also applies to society everywhere throughout the world. The social problem, on the other hand, comprehends the situation "here and now," within a limited specific area, susceptible to laboratory study, on the one hand, and to ameliorative effort, on the other.

Every social problem, of course, has its historical, evolutionary, cultural, and, therefore, societal background. Societal problems are not susceptible to quick, integral solutions or adjustments. They belong to the category of slow-moving, evolutionary processes. Social problems, on the other hand, are usually susceptible to such adjustments. Yet through the continuous working out of multiple social problems we do arrive at generalizations and policies which bear upon the gradual evolving adjustments comprehended in the total societal process. Manifestly, these distinctions are of the greatest importance, not only in building up a unified body of scientific knowledge about our social problems but in the actual programs of amelioration, in which successful attainment is clearly possible through the social-units approach.

Now we may illustrate this distinction, as we did in the comparison of scientific with ameliorative character, with the problem of race. The societal problem involved in race comprehends the

whole age-long process and product of race development, race conflict, race prejudice, race differentials, and race exploitation, with the resulting conditioning of cultures and attitudes. Manifestly, one does not attempt to solve the societal problem of race on some bright morning or in a series of conferences or through social legislation. But one does expect to make effective readjustments where, for instance, the Negro race constitutes a particular social and local problem of conflict or injustice or regional handicaps, or where the Japanese problem on the West Coast, or the Mexican problem in the Southwest, or the ethical-racial problems of the great cities of the Northeast multiply the dilemmas of social adjustment. The student, on the one hand, and the worker, on the other, may both look with optimistic expectancy toward success in the attack upon social problems; they must look for disillusionment and disappointment if they seek quick solutions to the organic, cultural-historical societal problem of race.

We may illustrate again with another problem, a little more abstractly conceived, namely, the problem of liberty and freedom. Without stopping at this point to note distinctions between the terms as implying technique and essence we may note the societal and social implications of this universal problem of the freedom of the individual and the human spirit. We note first of all the age-long societal problem of equilibrium between individuation and socialization; between the rights and privileges of the individual and the claims and obligations of society. But more than this, there is the premise that freedom and opportunity are basic to societal evolution and the societal problem is one of working out equilibrium and balance between the individual and the group in an age of bigness, complexity, urbanism and technology, which tends to lose sight of the individual and his role in cultural evolution. Here, then, is a fundamental scientific and societal problem to determine the continuing role of the individual in social evolution and to answer the question as to what will happen if this freedom perishes.

On the other hand, the social and ameliorative problem is different. Given a world of totalitarian trends and supertechnology encroaching more and more upon the freedom of the people and the human spirit; and given this encroachment localized in particular areas and societies; and given a situation in which the tend-

ency may be accentuated in America, the social and ameliorative problem is *what to do about it and how.* In this social problem aspect we apply our study and programs to special areas such as freedom of the press, freedom of speech, test areas in opportunity for education and work.

Or, again, the social and ameliorative problem may be envisaged by the study of situations in which some people have freedom and others do not—the Negro in America, the Jew in Germany, the immigrant everywhere, or the poor and unemployed, the farm tenant and the displaced miner. *What to do about it?* Or there is the social problem of technical freedom. Theoretically, the farm tenant is free to do as he pleases, the unemployed may vote to his heart's content, but he is not free to pursue any normal course of equality of chance without the economic opportunity to work and maintain his family. What to do about it is a supreme social problem of industry and labor and economic reform.

Similar to race and liberty might be mentioned the great organic societal problems involved in sex, sometimes called the most difficult of all problems; religion, often catalogued as one of the most universal; sovereignty and government, often characterized as the most fundamental; or war characterized as the greatest of all the tragedies of errors of mankind. Manifestly, no sensible student or worker seeks to solve these problems over night, rather leaving them to the gradual but sure evolutionary processes, aided by the contributions of satisfactorily solved *social problem-aspects.* The student and the worker both expect to contribute to the solutions of special local areas of tension and maladjustment in these great universal fields, and consequently may look forward to both a dependable science of society and a realistic program of social development and amelioration. It is true also that the existence of the societal background of most of our social problems renders them more difficult of solution, but it also aids us greatly by showing us the nature and kind of backgrounds which illumine such specific problems.

Toward the classification of our problems and the approximation of effective study and work, we need to go still one step further and utilize another twofold classification, somewhat analogous to the societal and the social. That is, our modern problems are likely to have a broader significance as they appear, on

the one hand, in contemporary society throughout the modern world and, on the other, as they have the special stage setting of America. Throughout the world today, and especially in western civilization, there are fundamental problems of contemporary society, such as problems of liberty, of sovereignty, of race, of labor, of wealth and poverty, of international relations, of natural resources, of population and migration. They are contemporary social problems in that they are everywhere crying for solution. In all of these, then, there are the more specific American aspects of each problem, always, of course, set in the background of world conditions, but essentially for scientific and for practical purposes comprehended in the American laboratory.

To return to our illustrations, there is, of course, the world problem of colored races, but there is the more imminent American problem of the Negro and his part in the nation. Knowing the world background and the changing tempo of contemporary society is of the greatest importance to the student and the writer and will give him a more scientific and cosmopolitan viewpoint; but in both his science and his ameliorative work, it is the American laboratory where he must work and find his success. It is so with other contemporary American problems, such as the organization of labor, the redistribution of wealth, the role of woman in society, the solution of which, of course, will contribute to the sum total of social science and of social amelioration. In the sense in which American civilization represents the vanguard of progress, American problems become the key to contemporary society.

Equipped with these very practicable and workable distinctions and concepts for our scientific study and practical implementation we need still certain other specifications. The first of these is that the scientific approach assumes facts and more facts; research and more research, in which knowledge is sought through tested scientific methods. Here the base upon which solutions are grounded is always that of facts, over against emotion or opinion. Another specification is found in the requirement that in all our efforts toward amelioration, we shall utilize the reliable techniques and skills which the professions have provided.

There is, finally, still another specification which we must explore more fully. It is that our work must be essentially and inherently realistic. This means more than the Darwin-Pearson dic

tum that science is merely common sense or the Giddings' way of doing things, which is the realistic facing of facts. It is more than the mere contrast between idealistic schemes and realistic programs. It is more than merely the distinction between things as they are and as we think they are or should be or as they might have been under other conditions. It is more than the difference between wishful thinking and checking with the facts. It is more than the distinction between metaphysical *theorizing* and workable *theory*. Because it is all of these and more we need to look a little more carefully into the essential quality of reality as it conditions the outcome of attack upon both our scientific and ameliorative problem.

The key to our specifications of realistic study and work is found in the insistence that facts of one sort must also be understood in relation to facts of another sort and that in the realism of social problems as well as in mathematics the whole must equal the sum of its parts. In the social world this is even more true, because of the social interaction of the various parts of society and of the effects of interstimulation among human beings that do not apply in the case of physical science. We may illustrate an essential type of realistic approach by referring to our American ideal of equality. True enough, here is a fact; we have stated the premise that all men are created equal. Yet the realities are that Joe Louis can K. O. any number of college professors; few people can pass a football like slinging Sam Baugh; not many people can sing or dance or dig and hoist as can a few. Few there are, if any, equal to Paderewski on the piano, Caruso in the opera, or Robert Frost in living poetry. No two individuals have "equal" fingerprints. People are different in their occupations and tasks, in their states and regions, and in their natural and cultural heritage. In the contemplation of these facts, therefore, what might be *is not,* that which might not be *is;* that which is true under one set of conditions is not true in another.

Not all of America is one, for instance; nor North, nor South, nor East, nor West; nor farm nor backwoods nor submarginal land and folk. It is not Wall Street or Fifth Avenue or Lake Shore Drive or Hollywood or cotton mill village or mining town or men in prisons, or Negroes in chains. America is not all industry; neither all urban nor all rural; not all white, not all

black; neither young nor old, male nor female. Not all of farm life is dung heap or dank, dark smell; neither pink apple blossoms in a meadow by the brook. Not all of industry is the blowing of morning whistles or the beating down of American labor folk; neither is it all price and profits nor paternalistic patronage. Life in the United States is still "of and for and by the people" who are neither all scoundrels nor saints, neither all morons nor wise. America is not the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Nor is all of America American; part of it is of other lands and people; so yesterday, so today, perhaps more so the day after the morrow of economic nationalism.

Because, however, this realistic aspect of science and amelioration is so important, we may well turn briefly from our impressionistic illustrations to go a little further into a statement of what we mean by reality. Ignoring for the present the rich and noble heritage of realism and reality in the fields of philosophy, literature, esthetics, criticism, our first assumption, beginning with the simplest of definitions, is that reality is synonymous with the factual, the actual, with life and situations as they are. Yet we must keep in mind that facts and truths are at least of two categorical sorts. One is the objective, the numerical, the measurable. The second is the coordinate truth of experience, relations, perspective.

One illustration of this may be found in the popular field of science. Dr. J. C. Merriam in his recent presidential address at the meeting of the Carnegie Institute pointed out that in recent decades mankind has raised the question as to what it is that has been lost in this world of science, technology, bigness, speed, artificiality. The implication was that not all of science or truth is expressed in terms of the numerical, measurable, quantitative units of the laboratory. 'We have come,' Dr. Merriam said, 'now to learn that a forest is not just broad feet per acre, but consists of all the elements of life, from the most insignificant to the greatest. So it is with the whole natural world. The physico-biological environment is not just atoms, rocks, chromosomes, plants and animals. It is also the picture of these things composed by nature in the millions of years during which the perspective of space, time, color and movement and growth was being defined.'

We may return again to our illustration of facts of race for instance. We agree with our distinguished anthropologist, Dr. Franz Boas, when he insists that in all of our discussions and planning for race relations the facts must dominate. The facts are, however, of two sorts. We agree with him again that the facts which the sciences of anthropology, biology, psychology, and sociology have discovered do not justify the conclusion that there are inferior and superior races in the world. These conclusions come from hundreds of laboratory researches in anthropometrical, physical measurement, mental testing, cultural analysis, and the like. They are valid, authentic facts. They constitute the basis for realistic action and thought.

On the other hand, the more imminent and powerful body of facts in the current situation is found in the existence of race prejudice, of race discrimination, of well-nigh universal racial differentials in the economic, cultural, and political world. These are not only facts demonstrable in the field of actuality; they are not only "real" in America, but in the uttermost parts of the world; they are not only powerful in the present world, but they are facts in the sense that high up in the catalogue of the tragedies of error in the long cultural evolution of human society is the phenomenon of race conflict, discrimination, and the exploitation of minority peoples, with its long train of resulting structures, processes, cumulative conditioning and conflict. When, therefore, church groups or other religious groups or social planning and ameliorative programs seek reality in the field of race relations, they must find it in this two-edged and powerful reality of both physical facts and relational experience. This is reality.

There are yet two other aspects of reality with which we are very much concerned in our study of social dilemmas and the way out and the way on. One of these is the fact that there are a great many things which we do not know. Facing the facts, then, in reality means the frank admission that we lack knowledge in many instances. It will do no good to try to fool ourselves or the public in the long run, and it will not only do no good to bluff our way through the world, but it may do a great deal of harm. Now this limitation in knowledge is of two sorts; the one is that in many areas of social tension we have not yet obtained the necessary facts and in some perhaps we have not

even tried to get the facts. But there is another area in which we do not know enough and in many cases, unlike the Socratic wisdom, we do not know that we do not know. We do not know, for instance, what the role of work or struggle or sorrow or adversity is in the development of the individual and the family. When, for instance, we say that this individual or this family is fortunate because there is plenty of money, plenty of comfort, plenty of leisure, while this other individual or family is handicapped because of limitations in all of these factors, either we must do some very careful and skillful defining and limiting of our characterization, or else our generalizations do not appear to conform to the realities of evolutionary or historical experience.

Now, manifestly the reality of not only our findings but of our programs must somehow be geared together with the totality of the situation in so far as it is possible. And because it is not possible in most cases to do this, we come to a final element of reality, which is facing the fact that social problems are ordinarily not "solved," or if solved they leave in their wake yet other problems clamoring for solution because of the adjustments made necessary by the first set of solutions. It is important, therefore, for us to set up some procedure or frame of questions and answers which will most nearly approximate reality in every type of situation and through which we can subject our varied types of problems to scientific and ameliorative approach and through which also the popular mind and the mass of people may find enlightenment and stability in their quest for truth and understanding.

Suppose, therefore, we subject all our "problems" to the one question "What is the answer" and seek to find a satisfactory answer in accordance with the specifications which we have presented. Is it possible to approximate a satisfactory approach which will be satisfying not only with reference to ascertaining the facts, but also with reference to attitudes and action. It would seem quite possible that the question and the answer may very well be effectively implemented through some such fourfold intermediaries as follows:

WHAT IS THE ANSWER?

*First, what are the facts?* That is, what are the facts that prove to be facts? What is the relation of these facts to other facts and to the total situation and to other situations? What facts appear to be missing and what aspects require further study? What are purported facts contrary to actual facts and how have they affected the situation? And other similar inquiries.

*Second, what of it?* That is, what does the problem mean? How after all does the situation appear to be unique, critical, insolvable? How does it differ from other situations and from similar problems that have appeared before? "Is it as bad as they say?" Why get excited about it? Why not face the situation as other people have faced similar situations in other times and places?

*Third, what to do about it?* Yet, having found the facts and having faced the problem with maturity, calmness, and strategy, the way is then really open to do something about it. What are alternative procedures? What steps are desirable, which ones preferable, which ones possible, which ones feasible? What facilities are available? What institutions to clear through? What mistakes to avoid?

*Fourth, what will happen if we do what about it?* This is a form of the question which Giddings was wont to call the most important teaching of sociology, namely, "What else will happen or is likely to happen?" the asking of which he thought might prevent untold error in human affairs.

THE ANSWER:

Approximation through multiple "solutions" and adjustments in conformity with scientific realism, with enduring arrangements, and with continuity of cultural progress.

Equipped with these approaches we are prepared to proceed toward the cataloguing and examination of what appear to be the most important of our American problems and toward the illustration and testing out of all our procedures. And we perceive that there are various levels and sizes and degrees of problems, some more generic, some more specific, some international, some national, some regional, some local; some due to emergency and depression, some due to war and conflict. And we perceive

further that there is no agreement on those which are most important or in the respective roles which each plays in the totality of our civilization or in the methods of study and solution. Yet, provided with such approaches as we have indicated, and equipped with reasonable tools for study and work, we may subject them all alike to realistic inventory and analysis.

Now in the contemplation of all our problems, whether in the large or in the concrete of emergencies, let us go on asking questions, but realistic questions. Let us not try to ask questions that cannot be answered. Almost anybody can do that. Let us not try to be smart with our questions. That is the lazy way of escape from reality. Let us not rise up to fight somebody or destroy some property or start a new war until we have, first of all, answered these questions. Let us not try to be "radical" just for the sake of being radical, but let us go deeper into the roots and the realities of facts and perspective. If, then, the results appear radical, we shall, in the old traditional term "make the most of it." If our premises will bear the scientific scrutiny of the facts, then we are in a position to go forward with sureness and success; if they will not stand the test of reality, they are not worth fighting for.

If, assuming first the reality of scientific knowledge and sound theory, we subscribe to the dictum that the world must be saved by youth and radicals, let us see to it that youth shall not be disillusioned by superficial and unrealistic false prophets, seeking quick answers and sure cures for insolvable problems; or that our genuine radicals shall not be crushed in the mob of hell-benters and Godsakers seeking to tear down a societal structure they never helped to build.

Toward the further study and planning of our American civilization, there is, of course, literature and resources in abundance. So great is the variety and so varied the types of materials and viewpoints that, in the modern day, there must be careful selection and critical discrimination. Yet the student and the citizen may find, as never before, both quantity and quality of books and articles, of programs and plans, susceptible to any reasonable classification and available for almost any sort of utilization.

It must be clear, therefore, that the student must learn to read both widely and critically. By learning to read for what he is

looking for the student can cover a wide range and yet be thorough in his methods. He will ask about his reading: What does the author attempt to say? How well does he say it? What about his contributions? There will be several sorts of sources. One is the larger general list such as we have indicated in the "depression bookshelf." Then the reader will have to hurry over, except in those cases where he is making a specialty of the subject discussed. Then there will be the more specialized books, such as those on population or poverty or race, where statistical data must be examined more carefully. There will then be much reading in the field of current literature, periodicals and newspapers, which afford both a "liberal education" and much specific knowledge on the several subjects.

A sort of standard reading schedule would include something like the following:

*Newspapers.* Always a good daily newspaper read regularly. There is no substitute for this. Add the Sunday edition of the New York *Times* with its magazine and literary supplements and over a period of years one gets a picture of modern civilization.

*Specialized Scholarly Journals.* The learned journals, like the books, afford excellent opportunity for critical selection and wide reading. In sociology, for instance, *The American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, The American Sociological Review,* and *Sociology and Social Research;* in political science, *The Political Science Quarterly, The American Political Science Review,* or *The National Municipal Review;* in economics, *The American Economic Review* or a specialized journal in commerce or industry; in history, *The American Historical Review* or *Current History;* in general social work, *The Survey, The Social Service Review,* and *The Family* or *Social Hygiene* for special social work; *The Playground* for community recreation; and others. The monthly literary periodical, such as *The Atlantic Monthly* and *Harper's.* Other fruitful sources are the national weeklies, such as *The New Republic, The Nation, School and Society, The Independent, The Christian Century;* the book review sections of national newspapers, *The Saturday Review of Literature.*

*Publications of State and Federal Agencies:* Especially important are the publications of such agencies as the National Resources Committee, the WPA research reprints; the studies of the United

States Department of Agriculture, and similar publications of state governmental departments.

If the student or the general reader wishes to undertake a self-grading test, the following questions should be answered:

1. What has the student learned about each subject—"facts that prove to be facts"? This is a classroom test. *Illustrate fully.*

2. What has the student read in each field and what tools of study have been discovered? Has the student learned to use terms accurately? This is a test of equipment. *Illustrate fully.*

3. To what extent has the student *thought* out or on the subjects in question? This is a test of intellectual effort and ability. *Illustrate fully.*

4. To what extent has the student put all this down in writing? This is a test of *creative effort. Illustrate fully.*

5. To what extent has the student been able to make practical application of his reading, knowledge, thinking, to realistic situations? This is a test of social engineering and statesmanship. *Illustrate fully.*

6. To what extent is the student likely, therefore, to become permanently one of a growing group to whom society may look for guidance and social planning? This is a test of citizenship and leadership. *Illustrate fully.*

We now turn to the more specific application of all these things to each of the several chapters of the book.

## *Chapter XXX*

# *THE SEARCH FOR THE ANSWERS*

THIS final chapter supplements, with more detailed questions and references, the sweeping picture of American social problems which we have presented in the body of this work. Manifestly, there are so many and so vivid aspects of these problems that we cannot attempt to study all of them nor to study all phases of each problem selected. Yet we must be representative and critical in two ways: We must present a comprehensive framework adequate to catalogue the major problems of contemporary American society, and we must exercise judgment in both the selection of topics and of sources. We must, in fine, seek a sort of maximum-minimum content and method to guarantee an adequate understanding of our problems and the sensing of their interrelationships and meanings.

Each of the chapters, therefore, will tend to include the following features: *First,* some emphasis upon the differences between the several approaches to the problem represented by the chapter as, for instance, the "scientific," the "ameliorative," the long-time "societal" as contrasted with the contemporary "social" problem. These distinctions are made both as an exercise in methodology and analysis and as an object lesson in realistic study which shows what cannot be done as well as what can be done. The distinctions are, therefore, not merely academic; rather they assure the student of a portraiture of each problem not only in its vivid and living reality of the present, but also in its world setting. If the student understands the long, historical development of the problem he will not be discouraged if quick changes cannot be made, and will therefore be less subject to disillusionment.

A *second* feature will be the presentation of additional questions some of which are based upon special references, the first of which, running throughout the volume wherever appropriate, is *Recent Social Trends.* A *third* feature will present a brief bibliography specifically appropriate to the subject in hand. In all instances the

bibliography is not intended to be exhaustive but specially applicable to this book for its specific purposes. For the most part the books listed represent the newer approaches. A *fourth* feature will indicate the source of special quotations in each chapter.

We proceed, therefore, to the several chapters, with Chapter I requiring a little longer exhibit of questions and citations due to its twofold nature of introduction and content.

## FOR CHAPTER I: THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

On the assumption that all social problems have certain general characteristics in common the Committee Findings of *Recent Social Trends* suggest that "the fundamental principles are that social problems are products of change, and that social changes are interrelated." (Page lxx.) How does this statement illustrate both the "scientific" and the "ameliorative" problem as we have defined and illustrated them in Chapter XXIX? This volume, as cited here, is often referred to as *Trends.*

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Two volumes. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933. (There is also a one-volume student edition containing the identical material of the two volumes.)

Two other statements of the Committee were that "nothing short of the combined intelligence of the nation can cope with the predicaments here mentioned," and always there will emerge "a fresh series of efforts to invent solutions for social problems" (page lxxi). Indicate how this may illustrate the "social" and "ameliorative" aspect of our problems.

The underlying principles upon which each "problem" treated in *Recent Social Trends* was selected was that there must be available statistical data for reasonable objective measurements of the prevailing trends. This would be the "scientific" interest. Indicate places and problems throughout the two volumes in which the "ameliorative" emphasis was featured.

Compare the following textbook definitions of "social problems" with our concepts of "scientific," "ameliorative," "societal," and "social."

'In general a social problem . . . must be somewhat of the same

nature as any other problem. It may be any one of the following or other varieties. There may be a social situation containing unknown conditions, the assumption being that if the conditions were known a solution for the problem would be possible. . . . Again, a social problem may exist where a social phenomenon not only attracts attention but, because of its serious import, requires consideration and action by a group.'—*John M. Gillette* and *James M. Reinhardt.*

'A social problem is a problem which actually or potentially affects large numbers of people in a way so that it may best be solved by some measure or measures applied to the problem as a whole rather than by dealing with each individual as an isolated case, or which requires concerted or organized human action.'—*Hornell Hart.*

'The term *social problem* refers to a social situation which attracts the attention of a considerable number of competent observers within a society, and appeals to them as calling for adjustment or remedy by social, i.e., collective action of some kind or other.'—*Clarence M. Case.*

'Social problems consist of (a) social situations, (b) which are a product of group life, (c) involving a substantial number of persons, (d) characterized as constituting a threat to social well-being, (e) as defined by the *mores* of the group, and (f) which must be dealt with in an organized and concerted way. They are problems in that they constitute a crisis, and social in that they are group products with consequences significant for the entire group, and to be dealt with by group action.'—*James H. S. Bossard.*

Examine selected textbooks from the list given below and compare the catalogue of "social problems" treated by each with the present volume and with each other. From these make up a table of contents for a composite volume.

Beach, Walter Greenwood, and Walker, Edward Everett. *American Social Problems.* Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1934.

Bossard, James H. S. *Social Change and Social Problems.* Revised edition. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938.

Dow, Grove Samuel. *Society and Its Problems.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, revised, 1938.

## SOCIAL TRENDS AS THE BASIS FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

In 1932, the President's Research Committee on Social Trends published two volumes on *Recent Social Trends*, which will be utilized in this volume from time to time, both to point up special problems and to illustrate methods of study. On this page the volume and range of subjects with authors may be examined with a view of seeing the total picture of national problems and also with a view to checking up what may seem advisable to omit or to add if another similar social inventory should be made in 1940. What should be added in order to prepare for a "supercensus" or social inventory of the nation in 1950?

*The Review of Findings* presented the summaries under four major divisions: problems of physical heritage; problems of biological heritage; problems of social heritage, problems of policy.

The more specific problems were discussed at length by forty authors under twenty-nine headings:

*The Population of the Nation*
(Warren S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton)
*Utilization of Natural Wealth*
(F. G. Tryon, Margaret H. Schoenfield, O. E. Baker)
*The Influence of Invention and Discovery*
(W. F. Ogburn)
*The Agencies of Communication*
(Malcolm M. Willey and Stuart A. Rice)
*Trends in Economic Organization*
(Edwin F. Gay and Leo Wolman)
*Shifting Occupational Patterns*
(Ralph G. Hurlin and Meredith B Givens)
*Education*
(Charles H. Judd)
*Changing Social Attitudes and Interests*
(Hornell Hart)
*The Rise of Metropolitan Communities*
(R. D McKenzie)
*Rural Life*
(J. H. Kolb)
*The Status of Racial and Ethnic Groups*
(T. J. Woofter, Jr.)
*The Vitality of the American People*
(Edgar Sydenstricker)
*The Family and Its Functions*
(William F. Ogburn)
*The Activities of Women Outside the Home*
(S. P Breckinridge)
*Labor Groups in the Social Structure*
(Leo Wolman and Gustav Peck)
*The People as Consumers*
(Robert S. Lynd and Alice C. Hanson)
*Recreation and Leisure Time Activities*
(J. F. Steiner)
*The Arts in Social Life*
(Frederick P. Keppel)
*Changes in Religious Organizations*
(C. Luther Fry)
*Health and Medical Practice*
(Harry H Moore)
*Crime and Punishment*
(Edwin H. Sutherland and C. E. Gehlke)
*Privately Supported Social Work*
(Sydnor H. Walker)
*Public Welfare Activities*
(Howard W. Odum)
*The Growth of Governmental Functions*
(Carroll H. Wooddy)
*Taxation and Public Finance*
(Clarence Heer)
*Public Administration*
(Leonard D. White)
*Law and Legal Institutions*
(Charles E. Clark and William O. Douglas)
*Government and Society*
(C. E. Merriam)
*Childhood and Youth*
(Lawrence K. Frank)

The personnel of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends was indicative of the range of interest and technical social study contemplated by President Hoover at the time of the Committee's appointment:

Wesley C. Mitchell of Columbia University as representative of the general field of economics; Charles E. Merriam of the University of Chicago as representative of the general field of political science; Shelby Harrison of the Russell Sage Foundation as representative of the general field of philanthropic inquiry; Alice Hamilton of Harvard University as representative of the field of public health and women; William F. Ogburn of the University of Chicago and Howard W. Odum of the University of North Carolina as representatives of the general field of sociology and social research.

In the search for a realistic picture of American problems and prospects *Recent Social Trends* reflects a comprehensive method and approach to what might be called the first social inventory ever sponsored by the head of a great nation. This study may well be utilized as an example of the increasingly comprehensive and scientific social study of contemporary American society. In addition to its findings and 29 chapters there were 13 monographs treating more fully than the several chapters certain of the areas selected for research.

Yet we must ask a variety of questions about the methods of inquiry and the form of presentation of these volumes. What was the nature of the areas studied and the criteria upon which they were selected? Who were the authors of the several treatises? How do the chapters measure up ten years after their publication? What omissions now seem to limit the work? Should there be attempted a similar study every ten years or would it be better to wait for a sort of semi-decennial inventory in 1950? To what extent have these volumes been utilized by the New Deal? In what respects have the methods of the New Deal students differed from those utilized by the authors of *Recent Social Trends*? Which chapters, if any, now appear to have been wrong?

In general the methodological approach to those inquiries assumed two fundamental premises. One was that the fields for study should comprehend the total framework of the nation, its dilemmas and its prospects. But, in the second place, areas of study were limited to those in which statistical materials appeared to be available. Thus the study was projected as one seeking approximation to scientific quality. It was further projected as an example of the several social scientists, working together upon a major inquiry and seeking to coordinate all their methods. Other questions which the student will need to answer are: What are the chief limitations of this study of American problems? What are its chief excellences? Who were the men and women making the inquiry? What catalogue of names should be substituted for a similar inquiry in the future? This study was financed privately by the Rockefeller Foundation and was sponsored by the Social Science Research Council; would a similar study sponsored and financed by the federal government have been more desirable?

Galpin, Charles Josiah. *Rural Social Problems.* New York: The Century Co., 1924.

Gillette, John M., and Reinhardt, James M. *Current Social Problems.* New York: American Book Company, 1933.

Groves, Ernest R. *Social Problems and Education.* New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926.

——*Social Problems of the Family.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1927.

Hackett, John A. *A Determination of the Major Social Problems of American Life.* New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1927. (Teachers College, Columbia University, Contributions to Education, No. 281.)

North, Cecil Clare. *Social Problems and Social Planning.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1932.

Oppenheimer, John J., and Paustian, Paul W. *Problems of Modern Society.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938.

Phelps, Harold A. *Contemporary Social Problems.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., revised 1938.

Withers, William. *Current Social Problems.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1936.

Compare the volume by the Columbia Associates entitled *Contemporary Problems in the United States* with texts on social problems. Criticize from the viewpoint of the total social and cultural America their 38 chapters in six sections devoted to *Security and the Economic System, The Organization of the Systems of Money and Credit, International Economic Relations, The Organization and Methods of American Business, The Problems of Agriculture, The Problems of Labor.*

Indicate how adequate study as present in *American Social Problems* will prevent the student from being fooled by the conventional devices of "the propaganda menace." The Institute for Propaganda Analysis has presented a series of monthly letters "to help the intelligent citizen detect and analyze propaganda," in which they point out seven familiar devices, namely, The Name Calling Device, The Glittering Generalities Device, The Transfer Device, The Testimonial Device, The Plain Folks Device, The Card Stacking Device, and The Band Wagon Device.

Examine such numbers of the Public Affairs Committee pamphlets as may be necessary to make a critical appraisal of their con-

What are Americanisms? And what of them? A first task in the study of American problems is to inquire more authentically into the meaning of "American." Americanisms may be grouped variously for the purpose of looking at them objectively, as, for example, authentic historical Americanisms in contrast with newer evolving Americanisms. The list below represents an arbitrary selection taken from such quotations as are given on page 20 and from volumes listed on page 12.

American democracy
Anti-militaristic foreign policy
Aristocratic concept of politics
"The American Dream"
Cheap land
Civic responsibility
Close ties with England
Conception of the state as covenant
Constitutional government
"Democracy"
Democracy of the school system
The dignity of the individual
Disregard of law—direct action
Economics of plenty
Equality
Evangelism
Expansion
Fluidity of social classes
Free competition in business
Freedom of expression and assemblage
Freedom of the individual
Freedom in religion and worship
Freedom in speech and thought
Free-will giving and local "charity"
Glorification of the common man
High standard of living and wages
Imitation of England for craving for equality with her
Intermingling of economic and religious issues in political life
Justice to all, privilege to none
Land as the central event of history
Liberty
Local government
Local patriotism
Local responsibility for welfare needs
"The Melting Pot"
Methodism
The middle class as the main element of society
"Missionary fanaticism"
Money-making
Neutrality and the rights of neutrals
Notion of the absolute sovereignty of the people
Opportunity for all
Party government
Personal freedom
Pioneer and frontier
Political action
Politics and political debate
Popular election
Private economic initiative
Prosperity
The Protective Tariff
Public education
Public exposures of abuses in government
The religious factor in politics
Religious motivation and spiritual aspiration
Right to work
"Rights of men against government and domestic tyranny"
Rise in the social scale
Sacredness of treaties
Self-government
Separation of church and state
Separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers of government
Separation of national and local responsibilities
Speculation in land and real estate
"State's rights"
The tradition of the frontier
Tyranny of the majority
Universal education
Universal suffrage

Is it possible to catalogue a similar list of "cultural" Americanisms, such as "absence of class and class-consciousness," "absence of radicalism," "commercialized crime," "dominance of women," "emotional religion," "emphasis on comfort," "materialism," "mobility—restless wandering," "Negro music, dances, and folk-lore," "rugged individualism," "scientific progress," "standardization," "subordination of art to amusement"?

Is it possible to catalogue a similar list of emerging Americanisms, such as "bigness," "speed," "centralization of financial endeavor"?

What are the "Geographic Americanisms"? That is, characteristics which distinguish the United States from European lands?

tribution. What other volumes should be added to the following list, of which a half million had been distributed up to 1938?

*Security or the Dole?*
*Credit for Consumers*
*The Supreme Court and the Constitution*
*This Question of Relief*
*Doctors, Dollars, and Disease*
*Farmers Without Land*
*Saving Our Soil*
*Farm Policies Under the New Deal*
*How We Spend Our Money*
*Income and Economic Progress*
*Labor and the New Deal*
*Our Government—For Spoils or Service?*
*The South's Place in the Nation*
*Restless Americans*
*Readjustments Required for Recovery*
*Colonies, Trade, and Prosperity*
*Steel—Problems of a Great Industry*
*Why Women Work*
*Youth in the World Today*
*Industrial Price Policies*
*Labor on New Fronts*
*Can America Build Houses?*

Another series intended for popular education comprises the *Headline Books* "for Discussion and Study Groups," published by The Foreign Policy Association of New York. Volumes up to 1938 included the following:

*War Tomorrow—Will We Keep Out?*
*Made in U. S. A.*
*Peace in Party Platforms*
*Clash in the Pacific*
*War Drums and Peace Plans*
*America Contradicts Herself*
*Cooperatives*
*10 Billions for Defense—of What?*
*As Latin America Sees It*
*Changing Governments in Europe*
*Machines and Peace*
*Dictatorship*

Another approach to the study of the dilemmas of modern society is through the vast popular literature of the recent depression years in which every imaginable question seems to have been asked and an extraordinary array of panaceas proposed. In Chapter I we have presented "a cross title puzzle" of depression problems and dilemmas in which nearly a hundred volumes are listed. Now the study of these volumes may be from many angles. One is to learn, through simple routine, what is being published. Another is to inquire into the quality of the contributions made and to attempt a critique of methods and contents. Another is to compare the findings of the several volumes which discuss the same problems.

It is possible to group the volumes under convenient headings for the sake of analysis. Thus, there are groups on American dilemmas and prospects; the general discontents of modern society; special problems of democracy; the nature and workings of fascism, socialism, communism; the problem of social planning; problems of international relations; and the host of special subdivisions into economic, social, religious, educational, individual, political problems, etc.

Here again there are many questions to be asked. Who are the authors and why did they write? Compare the backgrounds of Charles A. Beard, Stuart Chase, Walter Lippmann, George S. Counts, and many others.

To what extent have the publishers controlled the nature of the writings? In other words, how many volumes were written because "a book on the subject was needed"?

To what extent is it profitable for the student of American problems to read, in addition to the literature of discussion, American fiction, and especially its regional and "problem" books?

To what extent can the titles of these hundred books be translated into prevailing questions which the American people wish to be answered, as for instance, which way is forward? What is American? Who rules America? What is the road to recovery? What do you mean, world chaos? What is the propaganda menace? What is the American experiment?

How do these popular volumes compare on the one hand with the scientific university monographs and on the other with the publications of the New Deal? Is the trend toward popular presen-

tation of scientific problems a hopeful sign or does it indicate the "folkways" of low-brows?

Which of these volumes has had the largest sales and why?

Among the hundreds of major published treatises on American problems a very large number represent what may be termed the popularly presented contributions of the intellectuals. In many of these, problems are discussed as "intellectual adventure," and the concept of reality is one in which community of ideas is supreme.

As a sample of this sort of book, discuss critically the new 1938 volume, *America Now: An Inquiry into Civilization in the United States* by 36 Americans. (a) What omissions of fundamental aspects of American life? (b) Who are the authors and are they equipped to discuss their subjects?

The subjects discussed are arranged as follows:

*The Arts*
- Amusement:
  - Radio and Movies
- Literature
- Poetry
- Music
- The Theatre
- Art
- Architecture

*Business and Labor*
- Business
- The New Labor Movement
- Economics
- Advertising

*Science and Industry*
- Science
- Industry
- Invention

*Politics*
- Public Opinion
- Radicalism
- Communist Mentalities
- War
- The Law

*Education*
- Education
- Journalism—Magazines
- Journalism—Newspapers
- The Intellectual Life

*Types of Living*
- The Small Town
- Sports
- The Family

*Health*
- General Medicine
- Psychiatry
- Birth Control and Population

*Race*
- Race-Prejudice
- The Negro

*Religion*
- Protestant Faiths
- Catholicism in America

*Supplement* (American Civilization from the Foreign Point of View)
- Oriental
- Mexican
- English

One other type of volume which will afford a realistic approach to American social problems is that of Louis M. Hacker's *American Problems of Today* (New York: Crofts, 1938) with the subtitle of "A History of the United States Since the World War" and in which historical facts and documentation are given as the basis for the study of each situation. Thus the problem of American democracy may be studied in terms of legislative program-making, the establishment of administrative agencies, and of the bare recital of historical facts. This enables the student to form his own conclusions after he has supplemented the historical facts with data about what has happened and how the several programs appear to be working out.

Under Chapter IX the author lists ten "New Deal Agencies." How many of these are concerned with "social problems"? How does the author treat "Capitalism in Crisis" in the historical, documentary way?

What does he mean by "America in two worlds"?

Always there is the dilemma of trying to undertake too much. We are again faced with the realization that we must limit our selections of both topics and readings or else the student will not be able to complete any of his tasks. In the following chapters, therefore, the references and questions will be limited to the minimum for illustration.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER I

1. Louis Adamic. "American Don Quixote." Review of *American Quest.* By Bradford Smith. *The Saturday Review of Literature,* p. 11, September 24, 1938.
2. William Allen White. *The Saturday Review of Literature,* p. 5, May 28, 1938.
3. Hamilton Fish Armstrong. *We or They: Two Worlds in Conflict,* pp. 3, 4.

## FOR CHAPTER II: GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUNDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES

There is such an abundance of new and ever-changing material for Chapters II and III that it is difficult to choose. Not only are

there hundreds of articles, brochures, and books dealing with the living geography of a nation newly conscious of its resources, but also a similar abundance of literature dealing with the historical and theoretical aspects of environment and society, thus indicating the distinction between the current emergent problems and the long-time "societal" problems.

Special reference to *Recent Social Trends* includes Part I of the Committee Findings, namely, "Problems of Physical Heritage," pages xvi-xix. Also Chapter II, "Utilization of Natural Wealth," should be studied in its entirety for more exhaustive treatment of both our Chapters II and III. See page 97 for the total land picture. In particular, the following topics and questions should be considered:

Compare the physical heritage of the United States with that of other countries. What has this to do with the high production of the American worker? What has this to do with international relations as discussed in our chapter on "World Outlook"?

Compare the growth of mineral production and power from 1899 to 1929 with that of population, manufacturing, and transportation, as found on page 61 of *Trends.*

Is it true that the United States with barely 6 percent of the world's area and 7 percent of its population has nearly half of the world's monetary metal, $11,000,000,000 in gold, or four-fifths of the world's automobiles, or two-thirds of its oil? What does this imply in terms of "American problems"?

Two of the most vivid and convincing volumes that have yet been written on the problem of the conservation and the use of natural resources are Stuart Chase's *Rich Land, Poor Land* and Russell Lord's *Behold Our Land.* These should be read in almost their entirety for Chapters II and III. For the present chapter, these questions should be answered:

Show how land in many of its aspects constitutes a social problem.

Discuss the relation of land utilization to American history and democracy.

Is there a fallacy in Stuart Chase's estimate of how long it takes "nature" to make an inch of top soil?

Chapters III and IV of *American Regionalism,* in addition to

the quotation cited, pages 327-328, may be examined for an understanding of soils and water resources.

Other volumes available for such further detailed study as may be desired include:

*A National Plan for American Forestry.* The Report of the Forest Service of the Agricultural Department on the Forest Problem of the United States. In two volumes. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1933.

Lord, Russell. *Behold Our Land.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938.

——*To Hold This Soil.* Publication No. 321 of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1938.

National Resources Board. *Report.* Part II, Land; Part III, Water; Part IV, Minerals. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1934.

References for more theoretical study would include at least one volume on general geographic influences, one on climate, one on soil, and one or more on special American aspects of each of these. The following are representative:

Bews, J. W. *Human Ecology.* London: Oxford University Press, 1935.

Bowman, Isaiah. *Geography in Relation to the Social Sciences.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.

Bryan, P. W. *Man's Adaptation of Nature: Studies of the Cultural Landscape.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935.

Chapman, R. N. *Animal Ecology.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1931.

Chase, Stuart. *Rich Land, Poor Land.* New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936.

Colby, Charles C. (ed.) *Geographic Aspects of International Relations.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Fleure, H. J. *The Geographical Background of Modern Problems.* New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1932.

Huntington, Ellsworth. *Civilization and Climate.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915.

Odum, Howard W., and Moore, Harry Estill. *American Regionalism.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938.

Pomfret, J. E. *The Geographical Pattern of Mankind.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter II.

Smith, J. R. *Men and Resources: A Study of North America and Its*

*Place in World Geography.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937.
Thomas, Franklin. *The Environmental Basis of Society.* New York: The Century Company, 1925.
Webb, W. P. *The Great Plains.* Boston: Ginn and Company, 1931.
Whitbeck, R. H., and Thomas, O. J. *The Geographic Factor: Its Role in Life and Civilization.* New York: The Century Company, 1932.
White, C. L., and Renner, G. T. *Geography: An Introduction to Human Ecology.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936.
Whitney, Milton. *Soils and Civilization.* New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1925.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER II

1. Howard W. Odum and Harry Estill Moore. *American Regionalism,* pp. 327-328.

## FOR CHAPTER III: NATURAL RESOURCES, THEIR CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION

A second chapter is devoted to natural heritage because of the new emphasis which is being placed in America upon the conservation and use of natural wealth as contrasted with the waste and exploitation so common in the past. A main question here is to ascertain the ways in which technological aspects of conservation and use for human welfare constitute social problems.

What is meant by the formula "poor land, poor men"?

Discuss Professor Carl Sauer's intimation that unless something is done to stop the erosion of the soil, certain areas will have to be turned back to "the foxes and briers."

Discuss the vivid statement of some of our conservation enthusiasts that another hundred years of our present rate of waste of soil will render parts of the nation a literal "desert of a past civilization."

What has been the role of H. H. Bennett in the soil conservation program? What other leaders of note?

Compare the present programs toward conservation with the original Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot movement.

Read especially and report on the second part of Chapter II of *Recent Social Trends.* Contrast the "long time" and "short time"

outlook for minerals. Show how this may apply to all aspects of natural resources.

What, if any, comment would you make upon the oil wells on the capitol grounds of the State of Oklahoma and also around the Governor's mansion?

What would be the advantages to agriculture if crude oil supplies were to be rapidly depleted?

What have science and technology to do with all this problem of oil and other mineral resources?

What does Professor Zimmermann mean when he implies that coal in the United States today is a different sort of resource from what it was in the earlier 1900's?

Continue the reading of Stuart Chase's *Rich Land, Poor Land* and compare this work with Russell Lord's *Behold Our Land.*

What is the Farm Chemurgic movement?

Discuss methods of conserving and building the soil.

What is the relation of the National Park Service to conservation?

What national agencies are engaged in the conservation program?

The following books will serve as a nucleus for general study. Special bibliographies may be found in some of these.

*A National Plan for American Forestry.* The Report of the Forest Service of the Agricultural Department on the Forest Problem of the United States. In two volumes. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1933.

Chase, Stuart. *Rich Land, Poor Land.* New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936.

Lord, Russell. *Behold Our Land.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938.

——*To Hold This Soil.* Publication No. 321 of the United States Department of Agriculture. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

National Resources Board. *Report.* Part II, Land; Part III, Water; Part IV, Minerals. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1934.

National Resources Committee. *Drainage Basin Problems and Programs.* Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1936.

Odum, Howard W., and Moore, Harry Estill. *American Regionalism.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States,* Committee Findings, pages xvi-xx; also Chapter II.

*Saving Our Soil.* New York: Public Affairs Committee, Incorporated, 1937.

*Soils and Men.* Yearbook of Agriculture, 1938. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

*Tennessee Valley Authority, 1933-1937.* Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937.

Tracy, M. E. *Our Country, Our People, and Theirs.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

Zimmermann, E. W. *World Resources and Industries.* New York: Harper Brothers, 1933.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER III

1. Stuart Chase. *Rich Land, Poor Land,* p. 40.
2. *Ibid.,* p. 41.
3. National Resources Committee. *Drainage Basin Problems and Programs,* December, 1936, pp. 1-2.
4. "Living Standards Studied in Great Lakes Cut-Over Area." United States Department of Agriculture News Release, October 2, 1938, pp. 1-2.

## FOR CHAPTER IV: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND CHANGE

The readings in this area of science and technology are so vast and the discussions so extensive and popular that it is easy to select titles which will present the case. Many of the volumes listed in our "Depression Bookshelf" of Chapter I feature the popular implications of the impact of science and technology upon civilization.

Of *Recent Social Trends,* readings should include especially the following sections: Part 3 of the Committee Findings and specifically "inventions and economic organization," pages xxv-xxxiv; all of Chapter III, "The Influence of Invention and Discovery," and parts of Chapter IV, "Science, Technology, and Change"; Chapter XIII, "Children"; and Chapter XIV, "Women."

Questions and topics for special consideration would include the following:

What are some of the most profound effects of modern scientific discoveries upon society and the behavior of the people? State the long-time problem as opposed to current emergency.

What, similarly, for modern inventions and technology?

What are social inventions and what new ones are now needed?

What are Ogburn's 150 main effects of radio upon society?

What are the chief effects of science and invention upon the home? The school? The community? The church? Politics? Industry? War? Agriculture?

The Public Affairs Committee pamphlet asks the question as to why the automobile is the No. 1 Radical?

Lewis Mumford's *Technics and Civilization* is a brilliant popular presentation of the evolution of modern technology.

*The March of the Iron Men* presents a vivid picture of the sweeping movement of machine on men.

William F. Ogburn has summarized in *Machines and Tomorrow's World* for the Public Affairs Committee, the report of the subcommittee on technology to the National Resources Committee entitled *Technological Trends and National Policy,* while for the theoretical aspects Ogburn's original *Social Change* is still fundamental.

*Communication Agencies and Social Life,* one of the Recent Social Trends monographs by Willey and Rice, contains a great array of statistical data, some of which are utilized in this chapter.

A special group of new works that may be studied is that of the biologists, medical scientists, and philosophers, who write abundantly on various aspects of science and technology in relation to man.

What are the limitations usually manifest when the physical scientist attempts to solve the social question?

The following books offer a wide range of selection and materials:

Baker, Elizabeth Faulkner. *Displacement of Men by Machines.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1933.

Brinton, Crane. *The Anatomy of Revolution.* New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1938.

Burlingame, Roger. *March of the Iron Men.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938.

Drinkwater, John. *This Troubled World.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1933.

Ely, R. T., and Bohn, F. *The Great Change.* New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1935.

Fels, Samuel S. *This Changing World. As I See Its Trend and Purpose.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933.

Freud, S. *Civilization and Its Discontents.* New York: Robert O. Ballou, 1930.

Gilfillan, S. C. *The Sociology of Invention.* Chicago: Follette Publishing Company, 1935.

Hausleiter, Leo. *Machine Unchained.* New York: The Century Company, 1933.

Jaspers, K. *Man in the Modern Age.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1933.

Link, Henry C. *The Rediscovery of Man.* New York: Macmillan Company, 1938.

Lombroso, Gina. *The Tragedies of Progress.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1931.

McDougall, William. *World Chaos.* New York: Covici, Friede, Inc., 1931.

Merriam, Charles E. *The Role of Politics in Social Change.* New York: New York University Press, 1936.

Mumford, Lewis. *Technics and Civilization.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934.

Ogburn, William F. *Machines and Tomorrow's World.* New York: Public Affairs Committee, Incorporated, 1938.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter III.

Rugg, Harold. *The Great Technology.* New York: The John Day Company, 1933.

Sullivan, J. W. N. *The Limitations of Science.* New York: Viking Press, 1933.

*Technological Trends and National Policy,* a report of the Subcommittee on Technology to the National Resources Committee. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

## FOR CHAPTER V: FROM RURAL CULTURE TO URBAN CIVILIZATION

This problem of rural-urban and urban-rural change is especially related to all of our natural and cultural heritage and must be studied from many angles. It is especially rich in both the problems of today and of the long-time societal evolution. Of the data presented in *Recent Social Trends,* in addition to that quoted, two chapters will constitute the minimum with certain parts of

other chapters. The whole chapters to be examined are Chapters IX and X on "The Rise of Metropolitan Communities" and "Rural Life," while pages 8-17 of Chapter I give a summary of population trends toward the cities. R. D. McKenzie's special monograph on *The Metropolitan Community* and Brunner and Kolb's *Rural Social Trends* in the same series will give the student adequate facts for more detailed study.

Special questions and topics to be considered include the following:

What are the merits of Brunner's theory of village life of the future?

What is the distinction between the ruralizing of city life and the urbanizing of country life?

What are the chief rural trends?

What is McKenzie's theory of the relation of water fronts to metropolitan centers?

In terms of the census, what are metropolitan regions and how many are there in the United States?

List a full page of "Things I Love" in the city, comparable to the page of rural life sentiments quoted from the *Progressive Farmer.*

Of the new volumes on urban problems and culture, Lewis Mumford's *Culture of Cities* is notable and should be examined alongside two or three texts on urban society and the report of the National Resources Committee on urbanism. See list below.

Of the new volumes on rural life and culture, selections may be made from a number of texts as indicated below. The 1938 Agricultural Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, *Soils and Men,* is a masterpiece of comprehensive and useful information.

Brunner, Edmund de S., and Kolb, J. H. *Rural Social Trends.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

Clay, Cassius M. *The Mainstay of American Individualism.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

Gillette, John Morris. *Rural Sociology.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936.

Hacker, Louis M. *The Farmer Is Doomed.* New York: John Day Company, 1933.

Kolb, J. H., and Brunner, E. de S. *A Study of Rural Society.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935.

Lee, Hoon K. *Land Utilization and Rural Economy in Korea.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936.

Loomis, C. P., Lister, Joseph J., and Davidson, Dwight M. *Standards of Living in the Great Lakes Cut-Over Area.* Washington, D. C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1938.

McKenzie, R. D. *The Metropolitan Community.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

Mumford, Lewis. *The Culture of Cities.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938.

Patten, Marjorie. *The Arts Workshop of Rural America.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1937.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters IX and X.

*Soils and Men.* Yearbook of Agriculture, 1938. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

Taylor, Carl C., Wheeler, Helen W., and Kirkpatrick, E. L. *Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture.* Social Research Report No. VIII. Washington, D. C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1938.

Taylor, Paul S. *Power-Farming and Labor Displacement in the Cotton Belt,* Parts I and II, 1937. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

Woolston, Howard B. *Metropolis: A Study of Urban Communities.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER V

1. Frank Frills and Ralph W. Gwinn. *Fifth Avenue to Farm,* p. 1.
2. *Ibid.,* p. 4
3. *Ibid.,* p. 275.
4. Harry E. and Bernice M. Moore. "Problems of Reintegration of Agrarian Life." *Social Forces,* Vol. 15, pp. 384-390, March, 1937.
5. Cf. Howard W. Odum. "The Implications of Radio as a Social and Educational Phenomenon." *The Educational Record,* pp. 13-14, January, 1937.
6. Harry E. and Bernice M. Moore. *Op. cit.,* pp. 385-386.
7. Lewis Mumford. *The Culture of Cities,* pp. 7-8.
8. *Ibid.,* p. 8.
9. *Ibid.,* p. 11.
10. Research Committee on Urbanism. *Interim Report to the National Resources Committee,* p. 2.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
12. Warren S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton. "The Population of the Nation," *Recent Social Trends,* I, 8-9.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
14. Lewis Mumford. *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

## FOR CHAPTER VI: BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUNDS

Here, again, it is very difficult to limit selections of references in a field as broad as the biological and psychological backgrounds of the people. Manifestly, the student cannot become a specialist in biology or psychology. What he must do, therefore, is to become thoroughly cognizant of the existence and significance of these backgrounds and know where to find data when he needs further support. Likewise, he must sense the essential difference between a social problem of race adjustment and the agelong societal problem of race conflict.

From *Recent Social Trends,* the summary in Part 2, "Problems of Biological Heritage," pages xx-xxv, gives a brief statement of the problem. Chapter I on "The Population of the Nation," Chapter VIII on "Changing Social Attitudes and Interests," Chapter XXI on "Health and Medical Practices," and Chapter XII on "The Vitality of the American People" are all important.

The literature on mental testing is so specialized that the student is not expected to know about it, except as he will need to make special studies. Yet the following classification of types of testing should be considered:

*Intelligence:* Binet, Yerkes, Army Alpha and Beta, Stanford-Binet, General Intelligence Delta, National Intelligence Test, Otis Advanced, Otis Primary, Haggerty, Myers, I.E.R. (Thorndike), Pintner-Cunningham, Terman Group, Rational Learning, Mental Maze, Dearborn (A. and C.), Goodenough Non-language, Pintner-Patterson, International, Non-Linguistic Ingenuity, Atkinson, Healy, Porteus, Substitution, "Psychological," "Performance."

*Scholastic:* School Marks, College Entrance, Standard Achievement.

*Personality:* Kent-Rosanoff, Pressey, Downey Will-Temperament, Inhibition, House's "A Mental Hygiene Inventory," various standardized and unstandardized attitude tests.

*Other:* Memory, learning, learning-multiple choice, color preference.

color naming and reading names of colors, Seashore Musical Talent, community of ideas, mental fatigue, reaction time, six speed tests, apparatus, "various."

There are many new discussions of the factors of individual differences. One new book to report on is J. B. S. Haldane's *Heredity and Politics.* Especially Chapter I on "The Biology of Inequality" should be read and reported on.

What evidence does he give to indicate the unwisdom of much legislation on sterilization of humans?

What are the ten groups of socially inadequate classes (page 17)?

What besides good will is necessary to improve the human race?

Another new type of volume is that of Gunnar Landtman's *The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes,* in which he traces from primitive society many of the developments of inequality, such as women and children, age classes, and personal qualities.

Adler, Alexandra. *Guiding Human Misfits. A Practical Application of Individual Psychology.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

Bingham, Walter Van Dyke. *Aptitudes and Aptitude Testing.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937.

Bogardus, Emory S., and Lewis, Robert H. *Social Life and Personality.* New York: Silver Burdett Company, 1938.

Bridgman, P. W. *The Intelligent Individual and Society.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

Buros, Oscar Krisen. (ed.) *The Nineteen Thirty Eight Mental Measurements Yearbook* of the School of Education, Rutgers University. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1938.

Groves, Ernest R. *Personality and Social Adjustment.* New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1931.

——and Blanchard, Phyllis. *Introduction to Mental Hygiene.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1930.

——, —— *Readings in Mental Hygiene.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936.

Haldane, J. B. S. *Heredity and Politics.* New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1938.

Hart, Hornell, and Hart, Ella B. *Personality and the Family.* Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1935.

Landtman, Gunnar. *The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters I, VIII, XII, and XXI.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VI

1. Franklin H. Giddings. *The Scientific Study of Human Society,* pp. 204-207.
2. Quoted from Howard W. Odum. *Man's Quest for Social Guidance,* p. 77.

## FOR CHAPTER VII: REGIONAL FACTORS AND PROBLEMS

Most of this chapter may be found in substance or in form in *American Regionalism* and is used by permission of the publishers. In that volume, too, is a comprehensive bibliography.

In the meantime, from *American Regionalism* give a half dozen definitions of the region; of regionalism.

Compare the philosophy of the new regionalism with the techniques of the earlier metropolitan regionalism.

What is the role of regionalism in decentralization programs?

Make a number of regional divisions of the nation as a substitute for the sixfold division used in this volume.

Illustrate social problems which require regional study.

The following list may be utilized as a sort of minimum reference shelf:

Adams, James Truslow. *America's Tragedy.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.

Bond, B. W., Jr. *The Civilization of the Old Northwest.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

Borg, C. O. *The Great Southwest.* Santa Ana, California: Fine Arts Press, 1936.

Branford, Victor. *The Regional Survey as a Method of Social Study.* Oxford: Holywell Press, 1915.

Cronin, F. D., and Beers, H. W. *Areas of Intense Drought Distress, 1930-1936.* Works Progress Administration Bulletin, Series V, No. 1. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937.

Davidson, Donald. *The Attack on Leviathan: Regionalism and Nationalism in the United States.* Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1938.

Fox, D. R. *Sources of Culture in the Middle West.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934.

Gooch, R. K. *Regionalism in France.* University of Virginia, Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, No. 12. New York: The Century Company, 1931.

Mukerjee, Radhakamal. *Regional Sociology.* New York: The Century Company, 1926.

Mumford, Lewis. *The Culture of Cities.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938.

National Resources Committee. *Drainage Basin Problems and Programs,* December, 1936. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937.

——*Regional Planning, Part I,—Pacific Northwest,* May, 1936. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1936.

——*Regional Planning, Part II,—St. Louis Region,* June 1936. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1936.

——*Regional Planning, Part III,—New England,* July 1936. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1936.

——*Regional Factors in National Planning and Development,* December 2, 1935. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1935.

Neuberger, Richard L. *Our Promised Land.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

Odum, Howard W. *The Regional Approach to National Social Planning.* New York: Foreign Policy Association and Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1935.

——*Southern Regions of the United States.* Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1936.

——and Moore, Harry Estill. *American Regionalism.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938.

Turner, F. J. *The Significance of Sections in American History.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1932.

Webb, W. P. *Divided We Stand: The Crisis of a Frontierless Democracy.* New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1937.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VII

1. Howard W. Odum and Harry Estill Moore. *American Regionalism,* p. 97. (Much of this chapter, as indicated in these references, is almost identical with parts of *American Regionalism,* used by permission of the publishers.)
2. *Ibid.,* pp. 34, 436.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 462-463.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 492-493.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 520-521.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 554-555.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 594-596.
8. It should be noted here that the text for this chapter follows largely that of *American Regionalism*, with selected topics from Chapters XXI to XXV, and is used here by special permission of the authors and publishers.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 415.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 12.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

FOR CHAPTER VIII: THE NEW REALISM OF THE PEOPLE

Most of the statistical material in this chapter may be found in the United States Census and in Chapter I of *Recent Social Trends*. However, the whole subject of population study has assumed such increasing importance that it has become for all practical purposes a separate field of study. The student, therefore, has before him the conventional problem of composition and distribution of the people, but also the new aspects of migration and occupation, of trends toward decrease, of the income and standards of living, and of national population policies.

Of special significance is the world situation and population pressures in different nations and in different regions of the United States.

Something of these newer aspects may be seen from Part 2 and Part 4, pages xx-xxv and lxx-lxxv of the Committee Findings of *Social Trends*. See also Chapter XII on "The Vitality of the American People."

Among the questions being asked and answered, the following need further study:

What is the significance of the decreasing birth rate?

When will the population of the United States tend to become stationary?

What is the long-time "societal" problem as a scientific inquiry as opposed to the current American "social" problem?

Is there any likelihood that the cities will reproduce themselves?

That the intellectual group in the upper brackets of the professions will reproduce themselves?

Is there evidence to indicate that the lower groups will not produce as strong a race as the present generation?

What is the answer to the situation in which the regions which have least wealth produce the largest number of children to educate?

What is the significance to democracy of universal education of the people?

What is the significance of the term "the new realism of the people"?

The following references will help with the answers:

Carr-Saunders, A. M. *World Population.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.

Charles, Enid. *Twilight of Parenthood.* London: Watts and Company, 1934.

Gasset, José Ortega y. *The Revolt of the Masses.* New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1932.

Hallgren, Mauritz. *Seeds of Revolt.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1933.

McCleary, G. F. *Population: Today's Question.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

National Resources Committee. *Population Problems.* Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

——*The Problems of a Changing Population.* Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

Osborn, Frederick, and Lorimer, Frank. *Dynamics of Population.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter I.

Reuter, Edward B. *Population Problems.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1937.

Sarkar, Benoy Kumar. *The Sociology of Population.* Madras: B. G. Paul and Company, 1936.

Taft, Donald R. *Human Migration.* New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1936.

Thompson, Warren S. *Population Problems.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935.

——and Whelpton, P. K. *Population Trends in the United States.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933.

Tracy, M. E. *Our Country, Our People, and Theirs.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

Vance, Rupert B. *Research Memorandum on Population Redistribution within the United States.* New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VIII

1. Carl Joachim Friedrich. "The Peasant as Evil Genius of Dictatorship." *The Yale Review,* Summer, 1937, p. 740.
2. *Ibid.,* p. 735.

## FOR CHAPTER IX: THE WORKERS

Industry is relatively new in the world, but work is as old as man. It is, however, the current "social-industrial" problem that is most acute.

"Labor Groups in the Social Structure," Chapter XVI, in *Recent Social Trends,* gives a comprehensive picture of the range and development of American labor problems. Further questions to be asked and answered include:

What were the chief underlying forces which have produced the most profound effects upon the status of American labor prior to 1930? What since 1930?

Discuss the changes in the structure and function of the American working population from 1900 to 1930. What changes since 1930?

Discuss the ratio of increase in manufacturing output to increase in population.

Discuss changes in the hiring age limits in industry. See page 811.

What is the significance of the standard of living in relation to labor? See page 813. Discuss more recent studies made by the New Deal.

What is the latest readjustment between the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. leaders?

What are the merits and demerits of the sit-down strike?

Other chapters in *Recent Social Trends* include those on "The Activities of Women Outside the Home," Chapter XIV, and "The Status of Racial and Ethnic Groups," Chapter XI.

Discuss differentials in occupations and pay for men and women workers; for white and Negro workers.

Compare the meanings of the term "unemployed" as used in the United States and in Germany.

The following references will contribute to the answers.

Bernheim, Alfred L., and Van Doren, Dorothy. *Labor and the Government: An Investigation of the Role of the Government in Labor Relations.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935.

Brooks, Robert R. R. *Labor on New Fronts.* New York: Public Affairs Committee, Incorporated, 1938.

*Business As a Social Institution.* Proceedings of the University of Chicago Conference on Business Education. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Carroll, Mollie Ray (ed.). *Labor Standards.* Washington, D. C.: United States Department of Labor, 1938.

Daugherty, Carroll R. *Labor Problems in American Industry.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933.

Harris, Herbert. *American Labor.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938.

Ickes, Harold L. *Back to Work.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935.

Leiserson, William. *Right and Wrong in Labor Relations.* Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1938.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters VI, XI, XIV, and XVI.

Stolberg, Benjamin. *The Story of the C.I.O.* New York: The Viking Press, 1938.

Ware, Norman J. *Labor in Modern Industrial Society.* Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1935.

Wolman, Leo, and Peck, Gustav. *Labor in the National Life.* New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

## FOR CHAPTER X: WHO OTHER THAN WORKERS?

The societal problems involved in this chapter are presented in a different way from what is usual. That is, just as there is a fundamental problem of distribution of resources, wealth, and opportunity, so also there is a similar problem with reference to recreation, leisure time, and travel. So, also, there is the fundamental societal problem involved in the role of leisure time in the modern world and the corresponding role of work.

Of course, there is the perennial problem of unemployment and

migration in relation to economic opportunity. And there is the problem of commercial recreation and pressure groups in conference and convention.

It is the belief of many students that there are many problems of adjustment to be made here which have not had sufficient study.

In *Recent Social Trends* some of these questions are answered in Steiner's "Recreation and Leisure Time Activities," in Lynd's "The People as Consumers," in Keppel's "The Arts and Social Life," in Hart's "Changing Social Attitudes and Interests," and in Willey and Rice's "The Agencies of Communication."

Other questions and answers may be studied in the following sampling of references:

Anderson, Nels. *The Right to Work.* New York: Modern Age Books, Inc., 1938.

Armstrong, Louise V. *We Too Are the People.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1938.

Bakke, E. Wight. *The Unemployed Man.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1934.

Calkins, Clinch. *Some Folks Won't Work.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930.

Chapin, F. Stuart, and Queen, Stuart A. *Social Work in the Depression.* Bulletin 39. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937.

Chenault, Lawrence R. *The Puerto Rican Migrant in New York City.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1938.

Coyle, Grace L. (ed.) *Studies in Group Behavior.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937.

Cross, William T., and Cross, Dorothy Embry. *Newcomers and Nomads in California.* Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1937.

Elderton, Marion. *Case Studies of Unemployment.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931.

Gellhorn, Martha. *The Trouble I've Seen.* New York: William Morrow and Company, 1936.

Keppel, Frederick P., and Duffus, R. L. *The Arts in American Life.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

MacDowell, Syl. *We Live in a Trailer.* New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1938.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters IV, VIII, XVII, XVIII, and XIX.

Simpson, Sir John Hope. *Refugees.* Preliminary Report of a Survey. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938.

Willey, M. R., and Rice, Stuart A. *Communication Agencies and Social Life.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

Steiner, Jesse F. *Americans at Play.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

——*Recreation in the Depression.* Bulletin 32. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937.

White, R. Clyde, and White, Mary K. *Social Aspects of Relief Policies in the Depression.* Bulletin 38. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER X

1. Release of United States Department of the Interior, October 23, 1938.
2. Louise V. Armstrong. *We Too Are the People,* pp. 3-4.

## FOR CHAPTER XI: YOUTH

We have already illustrated in Chapter XXIX something of the distinction between a purely scientific study of youth and one with the ameliorative ends in view. In America today the youth problem is essentially a social problem of the present, involving not only security and prospects for youth, but also critical tests of government, education, and industry.

In many ways the problems are new and must be faced anew. And they are different in America from similar problems in Europe.

Why, for instance, would youth movements such as abounded in Germany appear not to be desirable?

Why is *a* youth movement not desirable? Would it be a class movement?

Because of this peculiarly contemporary nature of the problem our references are largely limited to the new approach.

American Association of School Administrators. *Youth Education Today.* Sixteenth Yearbook. Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1938.

Bell, Howard M. *Youth Tell Their Story.* A study conducted for the

American Youth Commission. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1938.
Davis, Maxine. *The Lost Generation.* A Portrait of American Youth Today. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936.
Harley, D. L. *Surveys of Youth.* American Council of Education Study, Series 4, Volume I, No. 1. Washington, D. C.: American Youth Commission, 1937.
Harrison, Leonard V., and Grant, Pryor McNeill. *Youth in the Toils.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.
Melvin, Bruce L. *Rural Youth on Relief.* Research Monograph XI. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937.
Menefee, Louise Arnold, and Chambers, M. M. *American Youth.* An Annotated Bibliography. Washington, D. C.: The American Council on Education, 1938.
Rainey, Homer P., and others. *How Fare American Youth?* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937.
*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter XV.
Robertson, Jack. *A Study of Youth Needs and Services in Dallas, Texas.* Washington, D. C.: American Youth Commission, 1938.
Stewart, Maxwell S. *Youth in the World of Today.* New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1938.
Van Waters, Miriam. *Youth in Conflict.* New York: Republic Publishing Company, 1926.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XI

1. Howard W. Odum. *Man's Quest for Social Guidance,* pp. 291-296, 299-303.

## FOR CHAPTER XII: ELDERS

In much the same way in which our approach to the problems of youth is one of the contemporary American social situations rather than a theoretical, societal inquiry, prevailing problems of old age are very much of the present.

In what respects again are these problems of the aged new?

In what respects are they problems of politics as well as of "welfare"?

To what extent are they "economic" rather than "social"?

To what extent are they more "solvable" than in earlier periods? To what extent less so?

Here, again, we focus our readings on the newer aspects and leave the larger catalogue of references to any who may wish to specialize in this field.

Altmeyer, Arthur J. *Three Years' Progress Toward Social Security.* Release of Social Security Board, August 14, 1938.

Burns, Arthur E., and Williams, Edward A. *A Survey of Relief and Security Programs.* Washington, D. C.: Works Progress Administration, May 1938.

Douglas, Paul H. *Social Security in the United States.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936.

Epstein, Abraham. *Insecurity, A Challenge to America.* New York: Harrison Smith and Robert Haas, 1933.

Gillin, John Lewis. *Poverty and Dependency.* Third Edition. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937.

Martin, Lillien J., and Gruchy, Clare de. *Salvaging Old Age.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933.

Mead, Edward S., and Ostrolenk, Bernhard. *Voluntary Allotment.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters II and XII.

*Social Security in the United States, 1938.* New York: American Association for Social Security, Inc., 1938.

Stewart, Maxwell S. (in cooperation with Committee on Social Security of the Social Science Research Council). *Security or the Dole.* Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Committee, 1936.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XII

1. Warren S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton. "The Population of the Nation." *Recent Social Trends,* I, 26-28.
2. Louis M. Hacker. *American Problems of Today,* pp. 230-231.
3. Arthur J. Altmeyer. *Three Years' Progress Toward Social Security.* Release of Social Security Board, August 14, 1938, p. 2.
4. *Ibid.,* pp. 4-5.

## FOR CHAPTER XIII: CHILDREN

The emphasis upon our problems of children in the present discussion is more one of a societal and scientific problem of population and the quality of the future people than upon the ameliorative aspects of child welfare, which has usually constituted the basis for study.

Why is this emphasis chosen at this particular time?

To what extent is the literature of child welfare relatively adequate?

What are the new long-time societal problems involved in children and programs of child welfare and education?

We have already quoted something from Lawrence K. Frank's Chapter on "Childhood and Youth" in *Recent Social Trends.* In addition to this chapter, there are important references in the Committee's Introduction and in Chapter I on "Population."

The complete list of 37 volumes, published by the Appleton-Century Company, in 1932, has been given in the full-page illustrative picture in Chapter XI. However, it is important to re-emphasize them at this point.

There are volumes on the following: *The Adolescent in the Family, Child Labor, Children's Reading, Education for Home and Family, Home and School Cooperation, The Home and the Child, Nursery Education, Parent Education, Safety Education in Schools, The School Health Program, Social Hygiene in Schools, Special Education: The Handicapped and the Gifted, Summer Vacation Activities of the School Child, Vocational Guidance, Young Child in the Home, Body Mechanics, Fetal Newborn and Maternal Morbidity and Mortality, Growth and Development of the Child, Health Protection for the Pre-School Child, Hospitals and Child Health, Nutrition Service in the Field and Child Health Centers, Obstetric Education, Pediatrics, Psychology and Psychiatry in Pediatrics, Communicable Disease Control, Public Health Organization, Milk Production and Control, the Delinquent Child, The Handicapped Child, Organization for the Care of Handicapped Children, Dependent and Neglected Children, Administration of the School Health Program.*

See also:

Abbott, Grace. *The Child and the State.* Vol. I: *Legal Status in the Family, Apprenticeship and Child Labor.* Vol. II: *The Dependent and the Delinquent Child.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Arlitt, Ada Hart. *The Adolescent.* New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1938.

Educational Policies Commission. *The Effect of Population Changes on American Education.* Washington, D. C.: Educational Policies Commission, 1938.

Forman, Henry James. *Our Movie-Made Children.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933.

Mangold, George B. *Problems of Child Welfare.* Revised Edition. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936.

Morgan, John J. B. *Child Psychology.* New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931.

——*The Psychology of the Unadjusted School Child.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937.

Nimkoff, Meyer F. *The Child.* Philadelphia: The J. B. Lippincott Company, 1934.

Norton, John and Margaret. *Wealth, Children and Education.* New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1937.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter XV.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XIII

1. The Educational Policies Commission. *The Effect of Population Changes on American Education,* p. 28.
2. *Ibid.,* pp. 33-35.
3. Lawrence K. Frank. "Childhood and Youth." *Recent Social Trends,* II, 751-753.

## FOR CHAPTER XIV: WOMEN

The changing emphasis upon societal problems involved in the participation of women in all phases of culture is re-emphasized by recent policies apparently adopted in Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and in Russia, on the other. Among other questions:

Point out contrasts between the Russian and German attitudes and policies with reference to women and discuss the apparent basis upon which they are founded.

To what extent are the same problems considered in similar and different ways in America?

What is *the* societal problem involved and what is *the* American problem?

Miss Breckinridge's chapter in *Recent Social Trends* on "The Activities of Women Outside the Home" and her monograph on

*Political, Social, and Economic Activities of Women* and Professor Groves' discussion of *The American Woman* will give a comprehensive picture of the American situation. These should be reported on adequately.

Other questions and answers may be studied in the following references:

Beard, Mary R. (ed.) *America Through Women's Eyes.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933.

Breckinridge, S. P. *Political, Social, and Economic Activities of Women.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

Groves, Ernest R. *The American Woman.* New York: Greenberg, 1937.

Kurtz, Earl Nicholas. *Woman.* Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1938.

Pidgeon, Mary Elizabeth. *Women in the United States.* Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter XIV.

Roosevelt, Anna Eleanor. *It's Up to the Women.* New York: F. A. Stokes Company, 1933.

White, Sarah Parker. *A Moral History of Woman.* Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1937.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XIV

1. Mary Elizabeth Pidgeon. *Women in the United States,* pp. 5-10.
2. Robert S. Lynd, with the assistance of Alice C. Hanson. "The People as Consumers." *Recent Social Trends,* II, 902-906.
3. Ernest R. Groves. *The American Woman,* p. 1.
4. *Ibid.,* p. 367.
5. *Ibid.,* pp. 367-368.
6. *Ibid.,* pp. 368; 369, 389, 392, 393.

## FOR CHAPTER XV: RACES AND NATIONALITIES

The distinction between the long-time societal problem and the immediate American social problem in the field of race relations has already been discussed in Chapter XXIX. It is very clear that the scientific problem of racial evolution as illustrated in the different races and peoples of the world is a sort of academic prob-

lem compared to the immediate and continuously emerging problems of race in America.

These distinctions are also brought out in the case of such ethnic and racial situations as are involved in the German-Nazi policy of anti-Semitism. In that case, both the long-time societal problem and the immediate national problem are apparent.

In our present volume, although we keep in mind constantly the background of racial heritage and development, thus giving the student an optimistic outlook in so far as he finds he cannot ameliorate situations quickly, we are stressing essentially the American problem. In this, the Negro, of course, has a large part, but no separate chapter was included for the reason that it is more and more important to consider the Negro as an integral organic unit in the whole population of the nation rather than to continue considering him as completely separate.

This policy was also adopted in the case of *Recent Social Trends,* in which the framework for study and factual evidence will be found in Woofter's Chapter XI on "The Status of Racial and Ethnic Groups" and in the corresponding monograph on *Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life.*

There are many questions still to be asked and answered. The first task would be to make a critical analysis of Woofter's work on trends and to supplement it with what has happened since then. Some of the references given below will help.

Another project would be to ascertain the degree of "progress" made in race relations in the United States since 1900.

Another question would be to ask what will be the immediate result and the ultimate result of the Supreme Court decision requiring the admission of Negroes to the University of Missouri.

The student and teacher will choose from the superabundance of problems and questions according to the needs of the particular group, and they will supplement the selected list of books below in accordance with the degree of specialization which is desired.

Bond, Horace M. *Education of the Negro in the American Social Order.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1934.

Brown, Ina C. *The Story of the American Negro.* New York: Friendship Press, 1936.

Embree, Edwin R. *Brown America.* (Special Edition.) New York: Friendship Press, 1936.

Garth, T. R. *Race Psychology.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1931.
Hertz, Friedrich. *Race and Civilization.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928.
Jenness, Mary. *Twelve Negro Americans.* New York: Friendship Press, 1936.
Johnson, Charles S. *The Negro in American Civilization.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1930.
Landtman, Gunnar. *The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.
Moton, R. R. *What the Negro Thinks.* New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1929.
Raper, Arthur. *The Tragedy of Lynching.* Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1933.
*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter XI.
Reuter, Edward B. *The American Race Problem.* Revised Edition. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1938.
Schrieke, B. *Alien Americans.* New York: Viking Press, Inc., 1936.
Woofter, T. J., Jr. (ed.) *Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.
Work, Monroe N. (ed.) *Negro Year Book, 1931-1932.* (Later Edition, 1937-1938.) Alabama: Tuskegee Institute.
Young, Donald, *American Minority Peoples.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932.
—— *Research Memorandum on Minority Peoples in the Depression.* New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XV

1. Elin L. Anderson. *We Americans,* pp. 33-34.
2. T. J. Woofter, Jr. "The Status of Racial and Ethnic Groups." *Recent Social Trends,* I, 554.

## FOR CHAPTER XVI: THE HANDICAPPED

Once again in this discussion of the handicapped and the disadvantaged there may be seen the twofold nature of a problem, one the eternal question of why this individual or that, this family or that family, suffers handicap, misfortune, and "bad luck," and the other the immediate problems of increasing handicap due

to the complexity of the modern world and the problem of what to do about it.

In the case of the former societal problem, folk philosophy, proverbs, and common sayings are eloquent in testimony, ranging from the old assumption that "the poor ye have with ye always" to the conviction that inequalities and abnormalities are punishment for sin.

In the present volume, while stressing the immediacy of the American situation, we have called attention to the importance of analyzing situations to indicate that not all inequalities are merely economic or technological. This is a field that has not been adequately explored nor have the intellectuals or planning groups devised ways and means of adjusting individual difference to uniform action or opportunity. This is one area in which *Recent Social Trends* did not give a special feature on the basis that the data were not adequate. However, there is an unusual chapter (Chapter XXII) on "Crime and Punishment" by Edwin H. Sutherland and C. E. Gehlke, in which the extraordinary conclusion was set forth that there was no crime wave in the United States. The student should check on this and contrast it with other studies.

Other phases of the handicapped may be studied in Sydnor Walker's Chapter XXIII on "Privately Supported Social Work" and Howard W. Odum's Chapter XXIV on "Public Welfare Activities," and to some extent in Charles E. Clark and William O. Douglas' Chapter XXVIII on "Law and Legal Institutions." Other studies will be found in Lawrence K. Frank's Chapter XV on "Childhood and Youth."

Any volume on social pathology and most volumes on general social problems, as listed for Chapter I, will give the student ample additional data to study. In the present case we are again focusing upon a few recent references.

Adler, Alexandra. *Guiding Human Misfits. A Practical Application of Individual Psychology.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

Best, Harry. *Blindness and the Blind in the United States.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

Cantor, Nathaniel. *Crime and Society.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1939.

Douglas, Paul H. *Social Security in the United States.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936.

Epstein, Abraham. *Insecurity, A Challenge to America.* New York: Harrison Smith and Robert Haas, 1933.

Gillin, John Lewis. *Poverty and Dependency.* Third Edition. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1937.

—— *Social Pathology.* New York: The Century Company, 1933.

Glueck, Sheldon, and Glueck, Eleanor (eds.). *Preventing Crime: A Symposium.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936.

Gosney, E. S., and Popenoe, Paul. *Sterilization for Human Betterment.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

Healy, William, and Bronner, Augusta L. *New Light on Delinquency.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936.

Parmelee, Maurice. *Farewell to Poverty.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1935.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters XV, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVIII.

Rustgard, John. *The Problem of Poverty.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936.

Taylor, Carl C., Wheeler, Helen W., and Kirkpatrick, E. L. *Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture.* Social Research Report No. VIII. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

*Third Annual Report of the Social Security Board,* 1938. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XVI

1. John Lewis Gillin. *Social Pathology,* pp. 3-4.
2. Katherine D. Wood. *Urban Workers on Relief.* Part II, pp. 2, 4.
3. *Ibid.,* pp. 4, 6.
4. Carl C. Taylor, Helen W. Wheeler, and E. L. Kirkpatrick. *Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture,* pp. 5-6.

## FOR CHAPTER XVII: LEADERS

In the closing part of our chapter on Leaders we have pointed out the fact that in the past the study of leaders and heroes has been a sort of standard part of the educational procedure. It has generally been assumed that the leader was the "arbiter of destiny." There are those who, like Bertrand Russell, consider some

such element as power to be the dominant force in social development rather than leadership. Many questions are yet to be asked and answered in this field.

The problem of leadership is raised in many new ways in the modern world, one of which is found in the complaint of certain American people that they want constitutional government rather than personal government. The question is raised again in the case of the powerful influence of the dictators. Other questions that must be answered will center around the influence of radio on leadership or the influence of concentrated power or capital or newspaper control.

Here, again, *Recent Social Trends* made no special feature.

The problem could be studied in the long list of recent American biographies, the selection of which would be difficult because of the number and high quality. They would range all the way from William Allen White's brilliant study of Calvin Coolidge entitled *A Puritan in Babylon*, to the more sweeping *Mellon's Millions* by Harvey O'Connor and *Who Rules America?* by John McConaughy.

Agar, Herbert. *The People's Choice.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938.

Bogardus, Emory S. *Leaders and Leadership.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934.

Burnham, William H. *The Wholesome Personality.* New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1932.

Burr, Walter. *Community Leadership.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1929.

Durant, Will. *Adventures in Genius.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931.

Goslin, Ryllis Alexander (ed.). *Dictatorship.* New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1936.

Heiden, Konrad. *Hitler: A Biography.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936.

Hoover, Calvin B. *Dictators and Democracies.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937.

Kellett, E. E. *The Story of Dictatorship: From the Earliest Times Till Today.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1937.

Linn, James Weber. *Jane Addams: A Biography.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935.

Lundberg, Ferdinand. *America's Sixty Families.* New York: The Vanguard Press, 1937.

McConaughy, John. *Who Rules America?* New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1934.
O'Connor, Harvey. *Mellon's Millions: The Biography of a Fortune.* New York: The John Day Company, 1933.
Pitkin, Walter R. *The Psychology of Achievement.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931.
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Thomas, Henry. *The Story of the United States of America: A Biographical History.* New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1938.
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## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XVII

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2. Franklin H. Giddings. *Civilization and Society,* pp. 209-211.
3. Howard W. Odum. *Man's Quest for Social Guidance,* pp. 96-97.
4. *Ibid.,* pp. 84-86, 88-90.

## FOR CHAPTER XVIII: INSTITUTIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD

The long-time societal problem involved in changing institutions is as broad and comprehensive as social change itself. In general, therefore, we have two larger inquiries. One is the problem of change and technology as considered in Chapter IV and Chapter XXVII. The other is the problem of change in the special institutions. We have pointed out that a chief point of tension in the modern world is the problem of change in the institution of government and the philosophies of individuation and socialization.

In this chapter we can only present certain premises in the general setting, provided by the framework of the book, and interrelate these problems and discussions with the other chapters. In *Recent Social Trends* the nearest approach to this subject would be found in Chapter V on "Trends in Economic Organization," Chapter VI on "Shifting Occupational Patterns," Chapter VIII on "Changing Social Attitudes," Chapter XVII on "The People

as Consumers," and Chapter XVIII on "Recreation and Leisure Time Activities." For the bibliography, however, we have taken only a single group of studies, which may serve both as a check back on previous chapters and a check forward on subsequent chapters as methods of study. This series is one by the Social Science Research Council, having to do with changes in the recent American depression.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters V, VI, VIII, XVII, and XVIII.

*Research Memoranda on Social Aspects of the Depression,* published in 1937 by the Social Science Research Council, New York, include the following titles:

Chapin, F. Stuart, and Queen, Stuart A. *Social Work in the Depression.*

Collins, Selwyn D., and Tibbitts, Clark, with the assistance of Arch B. Clark and Eleanor L. Richie. *Social Aspects of Health in the Depression.*

Educational Policies Commission. *Education in the Depression.*

Kincheloe, Samuel C. *Religion in the Depression.*

Sanderson, Dwight. *Rural Life in the Depression.*

Sellin, Thorsten. *Crime in the Depression.*

Steiner, Jesse F. *Recreation in the Depression.*

Stouffer, Samuel A., Lazarsfeld, Paul F., with the assistance of A. J. Jaffe. *The Family in the Depression.*

Thompson, Warren S. *Internal Migration in the Depression.*

Vaile, Roland S., with the assistance of Helen G. Canoyer. *Consumption in the Depression.*

Waples, Douglas. *Social Aspects of Reading in the Depression.*

White, R. Clyde, and White, Mary K. *Social Aspects of Relief Policies in the Depression.*

Young, Donald. *Minority Peoples in the Depression.*

## FOR CHAPTER XIX: GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY

We have emphasized not only in our chapter dealing with government and democracy, but in other chapters as well, the fact that the crisis between the two philosophies of government is generally considered to be the chief point of tension in the contemporary society of the 1930's. It is again the revivifying of the age-long conflict between individuation and socialization. It is, there-

fore, essentially a societal world problem. Nevertheless, in each of the larger nations the issue becomes a contemporary social problem in the sense that adjustments must be made to meet the demands of the present time, especially as relates to economic factors and employment.

A great many people feel that there is both a societal and social problem involved in the current tendency to "live beyond our means" in the quest of government to make adjustments for its citizens.

Others call attention to the fact that the costs of social reconstruction are less than the costs of war and after-war reconstruction, and that whereas expenditures in war are wasted, in times of peace they represent investments in public buildings, public roads, and social institutions. A study that needs to be made is to appraise the value of educational buildings and other institutional property which have been made possible through government cooperation with states and localities.

Another study might attempt to catalogue, on the one hand, the proportion of debts which will actually be repaid to the government and, on the other hand, the movements which have been started that will result in increasing the national wealth.

In *Recent Social Trends* more emphasis was placed upon government and governmental activities than upon any other area of contemporary American life. It will be profitable to make a special effort to report on Chapters XXI through XXIX and to check the facts and findings of these chapters with what has happened in the New Deal since they were written. These chapters are "Government and Society" by C. E. Merriam of the University of Chicago, "Law and Legal Institutions" by Charles E. Clark and William O. Douglas of Yale University, "Public Administration" by Leonard D. White of the University of Chicago, "Taxation and Public Finance" by Clarence Heer of the University of North Carolina, "The Growth of Governmental Functions" by Carroll H. Wooddy of the University of Chicago, "Public Welfare Activities" by Howard W. Odum of the University of North Carolina, "Privately Supported Social Work" by Sydnor H. Walker of The Rockefeller Foundation, "Crime and Punishment" by Edwin H. Sutherland of the University of Chicago and C. E. Gehlke of Western Reserve University, and "Health and Medical Practice" by

Harry H. Moore of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care.

It is important for the student to note here in his study the difference between government as a political institution and as a societal organization, looking towards the development of human welfare rather than as mere order or protection. In this way the student will learn that he cannot attempt to pass judgment on technical matters of government without becoming a specialist, but he can apply his social study to the numerous questions which come up, and he can find the way to profitable answers.

Some of the samplings of the extraordinarily large number of new volumes are given below. Other titles are given in "The Depression Bookshelf" and in the chapter on Leaders as well as Chapter XXVIII on "American Dilemma and Promise."

Bernheim, Alfred L., and Van Doren, Dorothy. *Labor and the Government: An Investigation of the Role of the Government in Labor Relations.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935.

Brant, Irving. *Storm Over the Constitution.* Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1936.

Counts, George S. *The Prospects of American Democracy.* New York: John Day Company, 1938.

Hopkins, Harry L. *What Is the "American Way"?* Washington, D. C.: Works Progress Administration, 1938.

Johnson, Claudius O. *Government in the United States.* Second Edition. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1937.

Jones, F. Elwyn. *The Defence of Democracy.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1938.

Laidler, Harry W. *Socializing Our Democracy: A New Appraisal of Socialism.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935.

Magil, A. B., and Stevens, Henry. *The Peril of Fascism: The Crisis of American Democracy.* New York: International Publishers Company, Inc., 1938.

Merriam, Charles E. *The Role of Politics in Social Change.* New York: New York University Press, 1936.

Nettels, Curtis P. *The Roots of American Civilization.* New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1938.

Odum, Howard W., and Moore, Harry Estill. *American Regionalism.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938.

Phillips, Robert. *American Government and Its Problems.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937.

Rappard, William E. *The Crisis of Democracy.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters XXI-XXIX.
Strachey, John. *The Menace of Fascism.* New York: Covici, Friede, Inc., 1933.
Wooddy, Carroll H. *Growth of the Federal Government.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XIX

1. Chapter added by permission from Howard W. Odum. "Orderly Transitional Democracy." *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 180, pp. 31-39, July, 1935.

## FOR CHAPTER XX: INDUSTRY AND WORK

The long-time societal problem is again reflected vividly in the conflict between economics and government, between labor and capital, and often between agriculture and industry. During the depression of the 1930's a review of the literature and public discussions would indicate that the great majority of people considered the crisis primarily one of economics. The conflict of capital and labor was again revivified, and the internal conflict between and among the different labor groups indicated the depth and range of the difficulties. So intense is the conflict that many students have a way of saying that the chief problem in the United States is whether government shall control business or business control government.

In *Recent Social Trends* many of these aspects are discussed in the nine chapters already referred to in the previous chapter. In addition, Chapter V on "Trends in Economic Organization" by Edwin F. Gay and Leo Wolman and Chapter VI on "Shifting Occupational Patterns" by Ralph G. Hurlin and Meredith B. Givens, as well as Chapter XVI on "Labor Groups in the Social Structure" by Leo Wolman and Gustav Peck are all important treatments of this problem.

Here, again, the list of references is so large and rich that it is difficult to choose. As in other instances, we are citing mostly new volumes.

Berle, Adolf A., Jr., and others. *America's Recovery Program.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1934.

Berle, Adolf A., Jr., and Means, Gardiner C. *The Modern Corporation and Private Property.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

Bernheim, Alfred L., and Van Doren, Dorothy. *Labor and the Government: An Investigation of the Role of the Government in Labor Relations.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. *P.W.A. and Industry.* Washington, D. C.: United States Department of Labor, 1938.

*Business As a Social Institution.* Proceedings of the University of Chicago Conference on Business Education. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.

Carroll, Mollie Ray (ed.). *Labor Standards.* Washington, D. C.: United States Department of Labor, 1938.

Daugherty, Carroll R. *Labor Problems in American Industry.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938.

Gallagher, Michael F. *Government Rules Industry.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1934.

Goslin, Ryllis Alexander, and Goslin, Omar Pancoast. *Rich Man, Poor Man.* (Publication of People's League for Economic Security.) New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935.

Harris, Herbert. *American Labor.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938.

Henderson, Fred. *The Economic Consequences of Power Production.* New York: John Day Company, 1933.

Leiserson, William. *Right and Wrong in Labor Relations.* Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1938.

Leven, Maurice, Moulton, Harold G., and Warburton, Clark. *America's Capacity to Consume.* Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1934.

Lumpkin, Katharine DuPre, and Douglas, Dorothy Wolff. *Child Workers in America.* New York: Robert M. McBride and Company, 1937.

McNair, Malcolm P., and Lewis, Howard T. *Business and Modern Society.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938.

Nourse, Edwin G., and Associates. *America's Capacity to Produce.* Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1934.

Mitchell, B., and Mitchell, L. P. *Practical Problems in Economics.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938.

Patterson, S. Howard. *Social Aspects of Industry: A Survey of Labor Problems and Causes of Industrial Unrest.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters V, VI, and XVI.
Stolberg, Benjamin. *The Story of the C.I.O.* New York: The Viking Press, 1938.
Ware, Norman J. *Labor in Modern Industrial Society.* Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1935.
Wolman, Leo, and Peck, Gustav. *Labor in the National Life.* New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

## FOR CHAPTER XXI: THE SCHOOL AND EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRACY

One way to emphasize the long-time societal nature of the problem of education in relation to democracy and the good life and the good society is to state boldly for the purpose of challenge the conclusion that the school and education are a result and product of other societal processes and agencies rather than an institution which guides society.

There are many ways to study this, and it is of the greatest importance in the contemporary world. In the United States many special phases can be examined. Thus, the extraordinary growth and development of the school system, of the universities and colleges, and of athletics went hand in hand with the quantity expansion and development of the American prosperity era.

Did the schools predict the dangers ahead or did they direct society?

Are the universities and schools in Germany directing the government or is the government directing the schools?

Do teachers in the United States influence business and boards of directors or are they influenced by them?

Do school men and women and teachers influence and direct radio or does radio influence the children and the public at large?

These questions and many others challenge the student to study the new meanings of education and to explain also much of the commonly attributed failure of education. Here, again, the student is studying education in relation to society and not as a pedagogical tool for teaching individuals, which is a subject for specialization.

In *Recent Social Trends,* Chapter VII on "Education" by Charles H. Judd of the University of Chicago gives a vivid picture of the

growth and development of education in the United States and raises many questions. There are many other questions not asked and answered either here or in our chapter. The complaint against education has been so universal of late and the writing so voluminous that once again we select a very small number treating particular current American problems involved in education, most of them new books.

Counts, Geo. S. *Prospects of American Democracy.* New York: John Day Company, 1938.

Educational Policies Commission. *The Effect of Population Changes in American Education.* Washington, D. C.: National Education Association of the United States, 1938.

——*The Purposes of Education in American Democracy.* Washington, D. C.: National Education Association of the United States, 1938.

——*The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy.* Washington, D. C.: National Education Association of the United States, 1937.

Jacks, L. P. *The Education of the Whole Man.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931.

——*A Living Universe.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1924.

Judd, C. H. *Education and Social Progress.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934.

——*Problems of Education in the United States.* McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.

Myers, Alonzo F., and Williams, Clarence O. *Education in a Democracy: An Introduction to the Study of Education.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1937.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter VII.

Russell, Bertrand. *Education and the Good Life.* New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1926.

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1. 75th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. 4611, in the House of Representatives, February 10, 1937. A Bill. "Declaration of Policy," pp. 1-2.
2. The Advisory Committee on Education. "Education in the National Life," *Report of the Committee,* February, 1938, pp. 4-5.

## FOR CHAPTER XXII: THE CHURCH AND RELIGION

For the student of contemporary American society and for those who tend to focus all problems around the ideal of American liberty, it is interesting to note that in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1939 messages he stresses religious freedom as one of the three major world problems at stake in contemporary conflict. Many questions arise: Is this a fair appraisal? If so, has it always been true, or is it more recently accentuated in the development of European situations?

From *Information Service,* January 14, 1939, there is presented a tabulation of church membership reports as of January 1, 1939, in which it is shown that while there has been some reduction in religious bodies there are still some new ones, and the total membership estimated in 1939 is considerably more than that of the religious census of 1926. It is pointed out that the unrest of the time stimulates new movements looking for panaceas or help and success programs. Questions which the student may wish to ask are: What is the relation of religion to old-age and security movements, to cooperatives, to labor organization, and to many other problems?

The statistical summary of total membership in all religious bodies shows a total of 64,156,895, which is a gain of about a million over the last reports available and a gain of several million since the last religious census. Of these, the three great bodies are the Protestant bodies with 35,000,000, the Roman Catholic Church with 21,000,000, and Jewish congregations with over 4,000,000.

Further studies can be made from the detailed figures given in the above reference and from the forthcoming 1936 religious census.

In our general source materials we called attention to *Information Service,* published by the Department of Research and Education of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. To indicate the wide range of information on social problems, given during the year 1938 in some forty issues, the following main headings are tabulated:

Advertising
Agriculture and Rural Life
Armaments
Banks and Banking
Business
Capitalism

Censorship
Child Labor and Child Welfare
China
Church and Social Problems
Church and State
Church Unity
Civil Liberty
Coffee
Conferences
Constitution
Cooperatives
Cost of Living
Courts
Credit Unions
Crime and Criminals
Democracy
Divorce
Economics
Education
Employment
Family
Far East
Finance
Gambling
Health and Hygiene
Housing
Income
Industry and Industrial Relations
Insurance
International Relations
Japan
League for Industrial Democracy
Liquor
Militarism
Monographs
Narcotics
Nova Scotia
Peace
Philosophy
Politics and Government
Prisons
Profit-Sharing
Public Affairs Committee
Public Opinion
Public Works
Publishing
Race Relations
Radio
Recovery
Refugees
Relief
Religion and Health
Religion and Religious Education
Research
Science
Social Action
Social Security
Sociology and Social Work
Stewardship
Strikes
Supreme Court
Graham Taylor
Taxation
Tours
Unemployment
Wages and Hours
War
Women in Industry
Youth

Bower, William Clayton (ed.). *The Church at Work in the Modern World*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935.

Goslin, Ryllis Alexander. *Church and State*. New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1937.

Kincheloe, Samuel C. *The American City and Its Church*. New York: Friendship Press, 1938.

McNeill, John T. *Christian Hope for World Society.* Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1937.
Niebuhr, H. Richard. *The Kingdom of God in America.* Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1937.
*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter XX.
Richardson, Cyril C. *The Church Through the Centuries.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938.
Schilpp, Paul Arthur. *The Quest for Religious Realism.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938.
Stafford, Russell Henry. *A Religion for Democracy.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1938.
Swift, Arthur L., Jr. *New Frontiers of Religion.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XXII

1. Howard W. Odum. *Man's Quest for Social Guidance,* pp. 363-364.
2. Howard W. Odum. "Ideals of Government." Ch. XIX in Vol. IV of *An Outline of Christianity: The Story of Our Civilization,* pp. 237-241.
3. William Clayton Bower (ed.). *The Church at Work in the Modern World,* Chapter I.

## FOR CHAPTER XXIII: THE HOME AND FAMILY

Perhaps the societal problem involved in the study of the home and the family is reflected more in modern times in the new emphasis upon marriage. In particular, this has come to be a problem of social education, so that education for parenthood, courses in colleges and universities on marriage, and many clinics are evidences of this new trend. Early in 1939, even Harvard University has announced that at the request of students it will give courses in marriage.

Among the problems are those of finding the best balance and equilibrium for the family in the new economic and technological world, the needs and rights of children, the work of women outside the home, the problem of divorce, and freedom of the individual.

In *Recent Social Trends,* this problem was discussed by Professor William F. Ogburn in Chapter XIII on "The Family and Its Func-

tions." Related subjects are found in Lawrence K. Frank's Chapter XV on "Childhood and Youth," S. P. Breckinridge's Chapter XIV on "The Activities of Women Outside the Home," Chapter XVII on "The People as Consumers" by Robert S. Lynd, Chapter XVIII on "Recreation and Leisure Time Activities" by J. F. Steiner, and Chapter XIX on "The Arts in Social Life" by Frederick P. Keppel.

Binkley, Robert C., and Binkley, Frances Williams. *What Is Right with Marriage: An Outline of Domestic Theory.* New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1929.

Cunningham, Bess V. *Family Behavior: A Study of Human Relations.* Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1936.

Goodsell, Willystine. *Problems of the Family.* Revised Edition. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936.

Groves, Ernest R. *The American Family.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1934.

—— *Marriage.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1933.

—— and Brooks, Lee M. *Readings in the Family.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1934.

Nimkoff, M. F. *The Family.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934.

*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapters XIII, XIV, XV, XVII, XVIII, and XIX.

Spaulding, Clarence A. (ed.). *Twenty-Four Views of Marriage.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930.

Stern, Bernhard J. *The Family: Past and Present.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938.

Waller, Willard. *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation.* New York: The Cordon Company, 1938.

Westermarck, Edward. *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilisation.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XXIII

1. Adapted from Howard W. Odum. *Man's Quest for Social Guidance,* pp. 243-249.
2. Ernest R. Groves. "Teaching Marriage at the University of North Carolina." *Social Forces,* Volume 16, p. 88 (October, 1937).

## FOR CHAPTER XXIV: THE COMMUNITY—RURAL AND URBAN

The long-time societal problem involved in community relationships is a many-sided one. From the viewpoint of the modern scene, perhaps the most important reflection of this problem is found in the increasing emphasis upon "cooperation," "the cooperative society," "cooperatives," and "cooperative economy." This is somewhat in contrast to the emphasis of the 1920's, which was upon "community organization," which was projected after the war on a somewhat too mechanized basis.

The nature of the community and, consequently, of community work has been greatly changed because of modern communication agencies and technology. There has been much interest in the study of isolated communities and many "surveys" of rural and urban communities. On the whole, however, the study of the community takes the viewpoint of a group representative of society. Thus, some sociologists make the community the unit of study.

Some authorities, such as Edmund de S. Brunner, present the thesis that the future type of community will be more nearly the village than the rural or urban aggregation. This is a viewpoint which will repay much study. Likewise, the relation of the community to the state and to the nation and the larger body politic may be a changing one and may involve the question of geographic representation as well as personal representation in government.

In *Recent Social Trends,* R. D. McKenzie's Chapter IX on "The Rise of Metropolitan Communities" and J. H. Kolb and Edmund de S. Brunner's Chapter X on "Rural Life," together with their subsequent monographs on *The Metropolitan Community* and *Rural Social Trends,* tend to provide adequate material for ample elementary study.

Other studies may be made from a more nearly economic viewpoint through the many publications and agencies of the federal government, looking towards assistance to the farmer and parity in agricultural prices. There is, of course, the long-time societal problem of balance and equilibrium between rural and urban life, as well as the very concrete social problems involved in the various communities themselves.

Anderson, Elin L. *We Americans.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937.
Bridenbaugh, Carl. *Cities in the Wilderness* (1625-1742). New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1938.
Colcord, Joanna C. *Your Community: Its Provision for Health, Education, Safety, and Welfare.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1939.
Gillette, John Morris. *Rural Sociology.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936.
Lynd, Robert S., and Lynd, Helen M. *Middletown.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929.
——*Middletown in Transition.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937.
McKenzie, R. D. *The Metropolitan Community.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934.
Muntz, Earl E. *Urban Sociology.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.
National Resources Committee. *Our Cities.* Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937.
O'Rourke, L. J. *You and Your Community.* Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1938.
Patten, Marjorie. *The Arts Workshop of Rural America.* New York Columbia University Press, 1937.
*Recent Social Trends in the United States.* Chapter IX and X.
Steiner, J. F. *The American Community in Action.* New York Henry Holt and Company, 1928.
——*Americans at Play.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company 1934.
Sydenstricker, Edgar. *Health and Environment.* New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1934.
Wood, Edith Elmer. *Recent Trends in American Housing.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.
Woolston, Howard B. *Metropolis: A Study of Urban Communities* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938.
Zimmerman, Carle C. *The Changing Community.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938.

## FOR CHAPTER XXV: THE WORLD OUTLOOK

A current example of the new emphasis upon the world outlo may be found in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1939 messa to Congress, in which one of the major planks for emphasis a

legislation was that of defense, in which millions of dollars were proposed to develop more than ten thousand war planes and personnel to operate them. This is a concrete and tangible way of emphasizing the fact that isolation is no longer an American possibility. This is usually contrasted with the old statement of George Washington—that America must keep away from entangling alliances, a dictum which until a few years ago was still accepted.

A question involved is to what extent nations and people may maintain their own autonomy and identity and at the same time tend towards world fellowship without war and without primary conflict. The theoretical aspect here is analogous to that of regionalism in the nation. That is, just as the United States is great and strong in proportion as it is a composite unity of diverse regions, so the world would be integrated if the concept of regionalism instead of super-nationalism could be accepted.

In this field current discussions of the late 1930's are so much concentrated upon international affairs that the student might also accept this as the chief problem. Selections of references, therefore, may be made at any length desired. In this chapter we tend to feature references on war and peace as reflecting at the present time the most important question about the world outlook.

Crowther, Samuel. *America Self-Contained.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1933.

Edmonds, James E. *Fighting Fools.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938.

Farley, Miriam S. (ed.). *American Far Eastern Policy and the Sino-Japanese War.* New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938.

Ferrero, G. *Peace and War.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933.

Hallgren, Mauritz A. *The Tragic Fallacy: A Study of America's War Policies.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1937.

Knight, Bruce Winton. *How to Run a War.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1936.

Nichols, B. *Cry Havoc!* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1933.

Norton, H. *Back of War.* Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1928.

Orton, William. *Twenty Years' Armistice, 1918-1938.* New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1938.

Porritt, A. *The Causes of War.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.
Schuman, Frederick L., and Soule, George. *America Looks Abroad.* New York: Foreign Policy Association Incorporated, 1938.
Stone, Shepard. *Shadow Over Europe.* New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1938.
Tilden, Freeman. *A World in Debt.* New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1936.

## FOOTNOTE REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XXV

1. Adapted from Howard W. Odum. "A Sociological Approach to National Social Planning: A Syllabus." *Sociology and Social Research,* XIX, 309, 307-308, March-April, 1935.
2. M. E. Tracy, *Our Country, Our People, and Theirs,* p. 120.

## FOR CHAPTER XXVI: PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK

The fundamental societal problem involved in "public welfare," "social welfare," and "welfare" is not one of "relief" or "charity" or "corrections," but it is essentially that of opportunity in a democratic society. That is, it is no more "charity" to see that the citizen has equal opportunity for health, wealth, and normalcy than for education, which is universally considered a tenet of democracy. An important study here is to catalogue the areas of modern society and give illustrations of how this principle is fundamental in problems of security, employment, and income.

In *Recent Social Trends,* these aspects of modern society were featured especially in Chapter XXIII on "Privately Supported Social Work" by Sydnor H. Walker and Chapter XXIV on "Public Welfare Activities" by Howard W. Odum. Corollary studies are found in Harry H. Moore's Chapter XXI on "Health and Medical Practice" and in Chapter XXII on "Crime and Punishment" by Edwin H. Sutherland and C. E. Gehlke.

Fundamental questions arise, of course, as to the extent to which government can tend to guarantee these services to all the people in any way commensurate with its similar guarantee of education. There are scores of current publications of the more fugitive sort, especially coming from government agencies and social work

agencies, which will repay the student who wishes to specialize.

Other than the chapters in *Recent Social Trends,* the books listed below tend to feature the newer aspects of security.

Armstrong, Louise V. *We Too Are the People.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1938.

Burns, Arthur E., and Williams, Edward A. *A Survey of Relief and Security Programs.* Washington, D. C.: Works Progress Administration, May 1938.

Davis, Michael M. *Public Medical Services: A Survey of Tax-Supported Medical Care in the United States.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937.

Feder, Leah H. *Unemployment Relief in Periods of Depression: A Study of Measures Adopted in Certain American Cities, 1857-1922.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1936.

Geddes, Anna E. *Trends in Relief Expenditures 1910-1935.* Works Progress Administration, Division of Social Research, Research Monograph X, 1937.

Hopkins, Harry L. *Spending to Save.* New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1936.

Kurtz, Russell H. (ed.) *The Public Assistance Worker.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1938.

Lane, Marie Dresden, and Steegmuller, Francis. *America on Relief.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938.

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## FOR CHAPTER XXVII: SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL PLANNING

One way of emphasizing the larger societal problem of social planning is to point out that in the attempt of modern students and statesmen to match physical technology with social technology, scientific inventions with social inventions, the concept of social planning comes nearer comprehending all of these than any other. Social planning is in this sense the answer to the demand for order and stability and for balance and equilibrium in a world in which chaos and instability are likely to result from the undesigned society.

The student must, therefore, work out very clear definitions and concepts of social planning as opposed to specialized economic planning or utopias or isms, and must seek to identify them with a realistic direction of society.

In *Recent Social Trends,* the objectives of the study limited it, in general, to the statement of facts and their projection into the future. This was true both because the President's Committee sought to stay as near as possible within the range of fact and scientific precision and because President Hoover had suggested that planning for the future and reorganization of government would be a separate and second undertaking. It is a fascinating question as to what would have happened if the social engineer, Hoover, had had opportunity to try these plans, had the depression not swept down upon the nation. The analogy is somewhat the same as it was when Woodrow Wilson had planned a great program of domestic reform, which was interrupted almost entirely by the great war.

It would seem, however, that the authors of *Recent Social Trends* should have been willing to project the basis upon which social planning might be successful, and that they might have indicated areas, organization, and types of personnel.

It is suggested that the student work out one or more types of national, regional, state, city, and county planning which would feature the total social and cultural nation, as well as the economic and engineering aspects.

From the abundance of literature, the following are samplings adequate for the general student.

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## FOR CHAPTER XXVIII: AMERICAN DILEMMA AND PROMISE

In this chapter on "American Dilemma and Promise" is, of course, to be found both a sort of recapitulation of what has gone before and a projection into the future. The essential societal problem, therefore, is the question of the survival of American civilization in the world of contemporary society.

To what extent does America epitomize western civilization?

To what extent are the gains of historic civilization reflected in the American promise of the future?

To what extent does democracy represent the only way in which human progress appears to be possible?

To what extent are the past mistakes of the nation handicaps?

To what extent is it likely that social planning can overcome the great difference between the America of Thomas Jefferson's day and of the later industrial technology?

These and other questions are so numerous and imminent that to attempt to list them would be to epitomize everything that we have presented in the book. Nevertheless, a constant review of these questions and a critical search for the exact statement of each problem will go a long way towards enabling the student to find the answers.

On this subject the findings of *Recent Social Trends* closed with the following keynote: 'In the formulation of these new and emergent values, in the construction of the new symbols to thrill men's souls, in the contrivance of the new institutions and adaptations useful in the fulfillment of the new aspirations, we trust that this review of recent social trends may prove of value to the American public. We were not commissioned to lead the people into some new land of promise, but to retrace our recent wanderings, to indicate and interpret our ways and rates of change, to provide maps of progress, make observations of danger zones, point out hopeful roads of advance, helpful in finding a more intelligent course in the next phase of our progress. Our information has been laboriously gathered, our interpretations made with every effort toward accuracy and impartiality, our forecasts tentative and alternative rather than dogmatic in form and spirit, and we trust

that our endeavors may contribute to the readier growth of the new ideals, ideas and emotional values of the next period, as well as the mechanisms, institutions, skills, techniques and ways of life through which these values will be expressed and fulfilled in the years that are to come.'

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