

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_210378

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 821.01/585^P Accession No. 26301

Author Duffy John.

Title Philosophy of Poetry 1945

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
VOL. LXXXIII

A PHILOSOPHY OF POETRY

BASED ON THOMISTIC PRINCIPLES

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PARTIAL
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

REV. JOHN DUFFY, C.S.S.R., M.A.,
OF THE BALTIMORE PROVINCE



THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1945

Imprimi potest :

MICHAEL A. GEARIN, C.S.S.R.,
Superior provinciae Baltimorensis.

Die 9 Maii, 1944.

Nihil Obstat:

CHARLES A. HART, Ph.D.,
Censor Deputatus.

Die 9 Maii, 1944.

Imprimatur:

MICHAEL J. CURLEY, D.D.,
Archiepiscopus Baltimorensis.

Die 9 Maii, 1944.

COPYRIGHT, 1945 BY
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

PRINTED BY
WORMAN PRINTERY INC.,
TEUTOPOLIS, ILL.

To
My Mother and Father

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION.....	ix
FIRST PART—THE NATURE OF BEAUTY	
CHAPTER	
I. ONTOLOGICAL BEAUTY.....	3
1. General Observations.....	3
2. Being and Its Attributes.....	7
3. Beauty and the Attributes.....	26
4. Relational Beauty.....	27
5. Summary and Conclusion of Chapter.....	35
II. THE EXPERIENCE OF BEAUTY.....	38
1. Introductory.....	38
2. The Beautiful Object and Appetite.....	42
3. The Act of Contemplation and Appetite	51
4. The Interplay of the Faculties in Beauty	52
5. Sensory Knowledge and Appetite.....	59
III. CONCLUDING STATEMENTS.....	63
1. Intuition.....	63
2. Beauty a Transcendental Attribute.....	68
3. Conclusion.....	76
SECOND PART—THE NATURE OF A FINE ART	
IV. THE, PSYCHOLOGY OF ART.....	81
1. The General Notion of Art.....	81
2. Reality and the Response of the Fine Artist	85
3. The Final Cause of the Making.....	88
4. Habits in General.....	92
5. The Habit of Art.....	98
6. Art and the Will.....	104

7.	Art and Sensory Cognition and Appetite ~	108
8.	Conclusion.....	122
V.	THE METAPHYSICS OF ART	125
1.	The Artefact as Proceeding from Efficient Causality.....	125
2.	Relation of the Artefact and the Artist's Purpose.....	131
3.	The Measure of the Perfection of the Artefact.....	139
	THIRD PART—THE NATURE OF POETRY	
VI.	THE GENESIS OF A POEM.....	143
1.	Introductory.....	144
2.	Poetic Contemplation and Its Objects ____	145
3.	Inspiration.....	158
4.	Sketch of Poetic Creation.....	160
5.	Brief Outline of the Matter and Form of a Poem.....	164
VII.	THE OPERATIVE WORD.....	170
1.	The Will.....	170
2.	The Formation of the Poem.....	173
VIII.	THE METAPHYSICS OF POETRY.....	183
1.	Matter and Form of a Poem.....	183
2.	Words	188
3.	The Being of a Poem.....	210
IX.	THE EXPERIENCE OF THE POEM.....	216
1.	The Poet's Experience.....	216
2.	The Reader's Experience.....	221
X.	CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	236
1.	Fragmentary Poetry.....	236
2.	Poetry and Imagination.....—	238
3.	Poetry and Meaning.....	240
4.	Conclusion.....	241
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	248
	INDEX.....	254

INTRODUCTION

This study of the nature of poetry is not undertaken from a literary—that is, a Creative and critical—standpoint.

It is an attempt to outline the essence of poetry from a metaphysical and psychological approach. In saying that it is based on Thomistic principles, I may be accused of a certain measure of presumption. St. Thomas had extremely little to say on the nature of poetry. His scattered texts I have assembled, and correlated with his general principles on art, and his rather cryptic statements on beauty. I trust I have not compromised any of his general doctrines by a misapplication of his principles.

The dissertation is divided into three parts. Since poetry is concerned with the making of a beautiful artefact, and with the experience of its beauty, the first two parts take up the questions of the Thomistic concepts of beauty and art, as a preliminary for establishing the nature of poetry.

There are varying interpretations of what St. Thomas held on the nature of beauty. I have adopted the interpretation that beauty is a transcendental attribute of being, distinct from truth and goodness, showing some justification for this assumption. It is by no means an original attitude. Something is said on the nature of ontological beauty, the experience of beauty, and relational beauty—that is, the foundation in the object for its appeal to the mind.* The place of the will in the experience, and the question of intuition are treated.

The main problems in art—since St. Thomas' views on the nature of art in general are rather well-defined—are

two: the intellect's knowledge of material singulars, and the exact meaning and extent of the *recta ratio*. The first of these problems is shrouded in impenetrable difficulties, and I have adopted the traditional, though perhaps unsatisfactory, view of the question.

Under the question of poetry, I have first outlined the nature of poetic creation, endeavoring to explain its acts in the light of what may be called "the operative word." It will be seen that, presupposing the existence of a contemplated poem in the poet's mind, the actual expression of this is largely a matter of memory and concentration, in the way in which it is explained in these pages. The problem of the metaphysics of a poem is the problem of its being, the nature of words, and the matter and form of a poem. I have then gone on to point out the nature of the poet's experience of the beauty of the poem, and the reader's, with the differences to be noted. It is perhaps in the understanding of the reader's experience that the most important notions on the nature of poetry will be found. A very brief treatment is given to modern poetry.

The question of the nature of poetry is in truth a vast question. I admit the inadequacy of the treatment given to such questions as inspiration, the nature of words, modern poetry, etc. I have said nothing about the usual kinds of poetry—epic, lyric, and so on; but these can be worked out from the principles given in Chapter VI, under "Poetic Contemplation and Its Objects". It was difficult to see, when writing the thesis, which points were actually the most important. With only a limited time to devote to the question, I was naturally forced to space my attention so as to cover, at least in essential outline, the basic principles of the creation and experience of poetry. Many separate dissertations could be devoted to the entire subject. In my optimism, I fancy that such separate inquiries will do no prejudice to the principles I have laid down in the most general terms.

Permission to quote from *The Note-books and Papers*

of Gerard Manley Hopkins and the *Poems* has been kindly granted by the poet's relatives and the Oxford University Press.

I acknowledge a great debt of gratitude to my Religious Superiors for the opportunity of pursuing graduate studies at the Catholic University of America, to the Rev. Dr. Charles A. Hart under whose guidance this thesis was written, and to the Rev. Robert J. Slavin, O.P., and Dr. Rudolf Alters, for careful reading of the text.
Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas,
March 7, 1944.

FIRST PART

THE NATURE OF BEAUTY

CHAPTER I

ONTOLOGICAL BEAUTY

1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

God is Beauty. Creatures share in beauty: that is to say, creatures-share in the perfections of God; and as God is by His nature purely beautiful, by the same token His creatures are beautiful, to the extent that they share in His nature. God is Beauty, because He is absolute Being, for being and beauty are convertible.¹

Creatures have beauty to the degree that they have being. All that exists, therefore, and to the extent that it exists, is beautiful. And therefore God, who exists by the very force of His nature, who exists without defect of being, is supremely beautiful; and creatures, whose existence is limited by the very force of the limited nature to which existence is given, are beautiful indeed as far as they exist, but for that very reason are beautiful to a degree.

But what is the nature of beauty? To say that it is convertible with being is to shroud it immediately in mystery. For being is finally inexplicable. We see what being is, in the sense that we know, in the cold light of intellection, that all that is or can be is being. But this is not a fundamental explanation. Being is the structure upon which all knowledge rests. It is the foundation of all ideas, judgments, and reasoning. It is implicit in every idea, as the

*We Div. Now., c. 4, lect. 5: "...nihil est quod non perticipet
pulchro et bono, cum unumquodque sit pulchrum et bonum secundum
proprium formam."*

final resolution of all ideas, since knowledge begins from reality. It is involved in every act of love, as the final ground of all desires for union. It is the sum and substance of every objective and subjective reality, of all thought, all desire, and all movement. It is the predicate of God and the universe. It is God; it is the universe: not indeed in the same way, but analogically. If beauty then is convertible with being, can we say what it is, with any kind of fundamental explanation? We can (it seems to us) give some kind of working definition of beauty, stating its constituents from a knowledge of its appearance in things and its effect upon the beholder. But we cannot say ultimately why beauty is what it is, any more than we can move on to explain why being is being, after we have seen and stated simply what being is: namely, whatever is or can be.

So it is with all the transcendental attributes of being. What oneness is, what truth is, what goodness is, we can state in deliberate language, seeing intellectually what is meant. Yet can any created intellect see, with the same native ease of intellect, why oneness and truth and goodness must be such? Only the infinite Mind, compassing in a pure eternal act the entire essence and existence of His being, can comprehend the why of being and its attributes. Only God can understand the necessity of being: He alone can see the reason for being, for He is His own reason for being; and He comprehends this reason, not by any separate act, but by the very force of His being at all.

It is beyond our power to comprehend why beauty must have such and such a makeup, even though we may presume to say that beauty is of such and such a nature. Yet at the same time we need not say why it must be such, if only we see to a degree what it is. When asked what beauty is, we need do no more than point here and there, to nature, to a poem, to a human person.

Rhodora! if the sages ask thee why
This charm is wasted on the earth and sky,

Tell them, dear, that if eyes were made for seeing,
Then Beauty is its own excuse for being.²

Beauty, objectively, is really identified with things. But, just as in the case of truth and goodness, it is more than things. Objectively, indeed, or ontologically, beauty is nothing more nor less than things themselves. But subjectively, or from the position of the mind to which these things appeal as beautiful, beauty is something more. It has a qualifying note attached to it; for things, by their very nature, have a reference to person; and while that which makes them ontologically true, good, and beautiful (namely, the form) is one and the same, yet according as the form is differently related to the person, the aspects of being are distinct. And while things related simply to the intellect are true, and the same things related simply to the appetite are good, these self-same things, related to both intellect and will (in a way which we shall later explain) are beautiful.

Beauty, then, though it is things, is things as particularly related to person. And, as we shall indicate, though ontologically all things are beautiful (to the extent that they exist or are perfect), and *can* be seen as beautiful, yet we know that not all things are actually seen as beautiful. And this creates a cleavage between ontological beauty and the experience of beauty.

It may be set down by anticipation what we mean by the experience of beauty. It is a state of the soul. It is not in every way the same as the state of simple knowledge, nor the same as the state of simple love or desire or delight. But it partakes of both these states, in that it is the state of knowledge (but deep knowledge of an individual), and the state of delight (but delight, not directly or unqualifiedly in the ontological object, but in the mere dwelling of the mind

²R. W. Emerson, *The Rhadora*. Emerson would perhaps have seen these lines in a different light than a scholastic sees them.

upon it).³ It is a state which reconciles the intellect and will in a united operation; a focussing of two faculties in mutual support of the one end—delight in cognitive union with things. "When powers are directed toward the one object" says the Angelic Doctor, "one helps the other."⁴

In the experience of beauty, sensory cognition and appetite, and the emotions play their specific parts. For these operations too are melted into a unified consciousness of splendid being, and serve to support the spiritual faculties of intellect and will in their fastening upon the object. What we say about these points will be met in Chapter II.

Now we will limit ourselves to an examination of the objective aspects of the experience—that is, of beautiful being as such. The contemplation of beautiful being will be unfolded in Chapter II. But as a consideration of objective beauty is bound to run over at times into brief considerations of the experience of beauty, we will be excused in those cases where a better grasp of objective beauty calls for a reference to the experience of beauty.

Art is an operative habit, qualifying the practical intellect in its conception of the correct way of making particular things, as we shall see.⁵ In the second part of this general philosophy of poetry, it will be seen that things which are made by an artist may be divided into two general classes: useful products and beautiful products. Poetry is a beautiful product. Hence it is bound up with the nature

³*y Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3. a. 3, quaestiuncula 3, Sol. II: "...apprehensio potest dici delectationis causa dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte ipsius apprehensi,.. Alio modo ex parte ipsius apprehensionis..." *Summa Theol.*, I-II q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um: "...pulchrum (dicitur) id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet." But this delight is not simply in the mere operation of the knowing powers, but—as the latter citation implies—in the contemplation of an object. See p. 51 above.

⁴*I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, ad lum: "...quando ordinantur (potentiae) ad idem obiectum, tunc una iuvat aliam..." Crf. also *Der Ver.*, q. 22, a. 12.

⁵Cf. p. 98 below.

of beautiful being- as such. And so we here go on to a study of beautiful being as such; and after that, to fill out our understanding of ontological beauty, and round off the approach to art and poetry, we will inquire into the contemplation of beautiful being.

2. BEING AND ITS ATTRIBUTES

Common experience confirms that the relish of beautiful being is an awareness of a presence—the presence of an individual and unusually perfect reality. It is an experience beyond the casual experiences of every day: a meeting of person and some splendid being. It is our contention all along that ontological beauty and being are convertible; and that, if the other attributes give us a view of being in this or that way, the attribute of beauty affords a fuller view of being to the mind, and is therefore a deeper penetration into the mysterious core of reality. To appreciate this, we must examine being itself, and then see it in the light of its attributes of unity, truth, and goodness. Then we shall be in a position to see in what relation beauty stands to being and the other attributes.

Firstly, then, as to being itself. Real being is whatever exists or can exist independently of human thought. And this offers the first and most extensive division of real being into actual and possible. Whatever exists independently of human thought is real. Whatever can so exist, to the extent that it can, is also real. Hence, possible being partakes of the nature of reality. It is true, of course, that possible being in itself is nothing; but as far as it has some reference to an actual being, which is its cause, and which carries this possible within its own reality as an effect within its cause, possible being is removed from the state of mere nothing. For in as far as it is precontained ideally and virtually within its cause, it shares in the reality of its cause, and is to that degree not nothing but real. This

ideal precontaining or pre-existence means that the possible is conceived within the mind of its intelligent cause (and ultimately within the Divine Mind) as an idea; and virtual pre-existence means that the possible exists equivalently in the efficient power (ultimately in the Divine Power), which can bring it to pass. Seen in this light, possible being, unlike nothingness, is in some measure positive, for it has a relation to actual being, and takes its reality from its ideal and virtual pre-existence in the actuality of its cause.

In contradistinction to real being, we have logical. This is what exists and can exist only dependent[^] on the thinking mind. It enjoys no formal existence apart from thought, and cannot so exist: as animality, in itself, does not formally exist except in the mind, in contradistinction to real beings belonging to a genus.

There are two senses in which the term "being" can be used: as standing for "thing", and as signifying a "mode of existence". There are two kinds of things: real and logical. There are two modes of existence: real and intentional (or ideal or intramental). Real existence is that enjoyed by a real thing in the extramental order. But this real existence may be either actual or possible. Actual real existence is that enjoyed by an actual extramental thing. Possible real existence is ultimately reduced to ideal existence and a simultaneous real existence in the power of a cause capable of making actually extramental what is ideally existent. Ideal existence is that enjoyed by anything as far as it is known, or contained in an idea.⁶ For example, a real rose, as soon as it is known, "acquires" an intramental or ideal existence. This ideal containing is a substitute presence of the rose. This is of extreme importance to the nature of poetry. Ideal existence arises when a thing is known in any way whatever—hence, through either intellectual or

⁶However, as we shall immediately point out, this intentional or ideal existence is enjoyed likewise as far as a thing is contained in sensory knowledge.

sensory cognition.⁷ It may be pointed out that a logical thing has no formal existence except in the mind, though there may be a reason in real things for this intramental being. The mode of existence of a logical thing is intentional. It may further be indicated that one can speak of actual and possible intentional existence, according as a thing is actually known, or capable of being actually known: as when one possesses in habit or memory a knowledge of something.

The nature of intentional being is purely that of signification: for it refers to something as far as it is known in any way. Thus, in the case of a poem—let us say, Bryant's *To A Waterfowl*—the things which the poet writes of (and the poet generally writes of real rather than logical things): the bird, the evening, have, or had, or can have a real existence apart from thought. But as soon as they were known by him, they "took on" an ideal existence. The concepts and images, which are a substitute presence of these objects, point by their very nature to them; and the poet, seeking to express his experience of them, employs the instrumentality of words, and causes similar images and concepts in the reader's mind. And these images and concepts, awakened in the reader's mind, again point to things, depending on the reader's experience of reality. The same is true when the poet writes of purely possible or fanciful things. But whatever he writes of, the things take on ideal being, whose whole nature is that of signification. And if we speak of splendor in connection with beautiful being, the splendor which the images and concepts enjoy is from their full relation to what they signify.

It is evident then that what constitutes mere being as such is an essential reference to existence: to existence of any kind, whether ideal, or actual real or possible real.

Coming now to the attributes of being, we ask whether

⁷Coffey, *Ontology*, Logmans, Green and Co., New York, 1926; p. 45.

the consideration of being from the angle of any single attribute, or of all, will shed a fuller light upon being. It is obvious that such a viewing cannot help but illuminate. In the first knowledge of being, the mind is conscious of mere thing as distinct from nothing. In this awareness there is no explicit perception of the attributes of being.⁸ But these attributes are present implicitly in the general notion of thing, and need only be made explicit. The attributes are not accidents, but they are the thing itself under different aspects. They are enumerated, according to the way in which St. Thomas derives them:⁹ *res, unUm, aliquid verum, bonum*. Of these, *res* (denoting the thing under the aspect of essence) and *aliquid* (denoting the thing as divided from other things) are not considered as throwing a progressive light on being. The other three attributes are the ones dealt with expressly in any lengthy consideration.

As to the first attribute of unity. Being as one is the thing as actually undivided in itself. It is an attribute of the thing considered in its totality. Whatever exists or can exist must have oneness, in the sense that it cannot be divided and remain that thing. It is an absolute attribute. Unity is conferred by the efficient cause as far as the latter contributes actual being to the effect. It is found in the thing according to the form of the thing, which is the measure of the thing's perfections, hence of its existence and unity.

When we speak of the unity of that artefact which we call a poem, we may consider several kinds of unity, according to the different ways in which we may speak of the being of the poem. We may regard the poem as far as it conveys to us a knowledge of the subject matter about which the poet writes. And here, the unity will be a kind of reflective unity: that is, since the ideas, images and

**De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 1: "Ens est id quod primo cadit in conceptione mentis."

**De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 1.

words signify some subject matter—e.g., an autumn woods—they will, to a certain extent, reflect this unity. But if we consider the ideas, images and words as related to the poet's mind, then—since it is the efficient cause which imparts the unity to the artefact—the unity of a poem will be that which is impressed upon it by the maker. But if we consider the poem both in its relation to its subject matter and to its maker, the unity will be both reflective and impressed unity. The unity of, a poem, according as we later define the being of a poem, is the unity of the interrelated ideas, images, and words as meaning their object.

But for general purposes, we can make a few metaphysical statements about the unity of an artefact. Since an artefact is a product, its unity is a unity impressed upon it by its maker. The unity which all finite things possess in their constituted being is a caused unity. In the artefact, there is a unity deriving from the accidental form, which, as the source of the specific perfections of the artefact as artefact, holds the composite effect together as this kind of accidentally perfected thing. There is a unity too of individuality, deriving from the individuating principle, marking this artefact off from others in the same species. There is further a oneness of things as far as they are incommunicable supposites, deriving from the source by which they are made incommunicable in their *esse*.^w In these three cases we are using "unity" in three different senses. We use it first in the proper sense of a perfection, viz., actual indivision; secondly, in the sense of a limitation (and here 'oneness' is the most proper term in English); thirdly, again in the sense of perfection—incommunicability, though this is obviously distinct in notion from actual indivision. Thus, formal unity, or actual indivision, is a gathering together of specific perfections, individuation is a

¹⁰There are conflicting views as to the source of this incommunicability. It is a problem which for our purposes does not demand a definite statement.

limiting- to one of a species, supposition is a sealing apart of the one individual of the species.

As far as the maker is the efficient cause, through active influence, of the being or becoming of the effect,¹¹ in some way the unity which the product enjoys must be related to him as efficient cause. The sculptor, for example, has such a relation to the formal unity, the individuality, and the incommunicability of the statue. The matter is marble.¹² The form is the accident of shape. The matter, i.e., the marble, is the limiting principle whereby this product is this one of the species called Statue. The shape is the principle whereby the product has its specific perfections as statue. The marble, as receiving the specifying perfection of figure, limits figure as such and individuates the statue to be this statue, and not another. The incommunicability of the statue results from something *sufosis*-essential, whereby it is not simply this statue as distinct from all others, but the subject of its own action and passion. In what way does the efficient cause contribute to the formal unity, the individuation, and incommunicability? The formal unity derives from the influence which the exemplar in the maker's mind has on the form of the product, as far as the exemplar becomes operative, or is conjoined with the maker's will and power.¹³ This is a dynamic

¹¹Cfr. *Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas*, F. X. Meehan, Catholic University Press, Washington, D. C. 1940; p. 184 and 199 if.

¹²F. *Meta.*, lect. 2 "... *...aes statuæ et argentum phialæ sunt causa per modum materiae.*"

¹³The exemplar is not itself a cause, but is an aspect of efficient, formal, and final causality. It is an accident, a part of the maker. As an operative idea in his mind, it is part of his efficiency, and may therefore be reduced to efficient causality. As directive of his will, it may be considered from the standpoint of final causality. As that which the maker imposes on the matter, it may be considered an aspect of formal causality Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 1. The exemplar of a poem, as we shall point out in its place, is not simply a conception of a form, but also in some sense of the matter of a poem. (See p. 164ff.).

influence. As far then as the maker produces the shape of the statue by accidental changes in the marble, he is the cause of the formal unity of the statue through the operative exemplar: and here, as we say, the exemplar is taken as implying-, the exemplary cause, the will, and all other directive and executive activity under the control of the will and the exemplary cause. But the individuality of the effect is less directly under his influence: first, because nature gives him his matter'already existing:¹⁴ secondly, because his concern is directly with perfection. However, since this perfection (of figure) cannot be realized without a knowledge of that of which it is to be the perfection, the maker has a knowledge within him of the conditions of the matter.¹⁵ And this knowledge exists at least implicitly in the exemplary cause. So the influence which the maker has upon the individuality of the effect is rather oblique than direct: the influence, namely, of a disposition of the matter for the direct purpose of carrying the accidental perfections. It is different, however, when we come to the incommunicability. For here the actual existence of the product as this statue, existing in its own right, seems to be the direct effect of the maker. For it is he who contributes to the becoming of the statue; i.e., he contributes to that actuation of the essence of the statue by accidental existence, whereby it is rendered incommunicable in its being as

¹⁴*Quodl. VIII*, a. 2, "De pertinentibus ad naturam": "... hoc tamen interest inter formas exemplares quae stant in mente divina et in mente artificis creati: quod creatus artifex agit ex praesupposita materia ..." Also *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 5, response: "... artifex non producit artificiatum nisi secundum formam, quia materiam natura praeparavit."

¹⁵*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 78, a. 2, resp: "Forma... artificialis est similitudo ultimi effectus, in quem fertur intentio artificis; sicut forma artis in mente aedificatoris est forma domus aedificatae principaliter, aedificationis autem per consequens." Hence, for the realization of the effect, the matter must be taken by the mind in conjunction with the intended form.

this statue. Such accidental existence is caused by the maker in the very disposing of the matter for the direct purpose of accidental perfection. In this way, therefore, the maker is a direct cause of the perfection of incommunicability, which is something distinct from its limitation of individuation. It is he, as efficient, who seals the statue apart. Thus the maker is the direct cause of the formal unity and incommunicability, but the indirect or dispositive cause of the oneness of individuality.¹⁶

Let this brief consideration of unity suffice for the time being. We will only add that a poem differs from a statue, for example, in that it is a production which seems to be wrought within the poet; and as the ideas, images, and so forth, belong to him as accidents, their unity would appear to involve a deeper relation to the maker than the relation of the statue's unity to the sculptor.

We will consider truth next. There are several ways of speaking of it. Fundamental truth is nothing more than the being itself, considered apart from relation to any intellect.¹⁷ We may next speak of truth as the agreement of thing and intellect.¹⁸ On the one hand we have ontological truth, in which the agreement is of the thing with the intellect, as much as the intellect is the cause and measures the thing. In this respect, all things are ontologically true with respect to God, as far as He is their cause and measures

¹⁶In all this, formal unity, individuality, and incommunicability are taken only in the sense of accidental unity and oneness. For example, such formal unity is not to be confused with the unity deriving from a substantial form. But it is analogous to this, and in a real sense dependent upon the substantial unity of the marble, since the accident of shape adheres through quantity in the substance.

¹⁷*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 1, resp.: "Uno modo (veritas definitur) secundum id quod praecedit rationem veritatis, et in quo verum fundatur; et sic Augustinus definit in lib. Solil. (cap 5): Verum est id quod est."

¹⁸*Ibid.*, loc. cit: "Adequatio rei et intellectus."

them.¹⁹ Similarly, "artefacts" are ontologically true as regards the maker.²⁰

Logical truth is the agreement of the intellect with the thing. This again has two respects, as far as God knows all things; and as far as the human intellect (we do not consider Angels) has knowledge of things and is measured by them. The truth which God has of things is not dependent upon them nor consequent: it is knowledge through creation. But human logical truth is an adequation which is caused by assimilation (*as-similatio*, a becoming like the thing). Assimilation being the cause of the adequation, it is, as St. Thomas says, the cause of cognition.²¹ But since this likeness must be caused, the intellect is dependent upon that which causes it.²²

Briefly, the *intellects agens* (agent intellect) is an active power, having it within itself to form a likeness (a formed *species intelligibilis impressa*, informing the possible intellect to a likeness which it expresses in a concept, a *species intelligibilis expressa*) of the object which is known. But this object must be presented to it through the imagination, so that the image acts as a material and instrumental cause of the formed likeness; and in this way the intellect is dependent upon its object. To point another fact: this

¹⁹*Op. cit.*, q. 1, a. 2, resp: ".. sed stint (res naturales) mensuratae ab intellectu divino, in quo sunt omnia creata, sicut omnia artificata in intellectu artificis."

²⁰*IbicL*, loc. cit: ".. intellectus noster est mensuratus, non mensurans quidem res naturales, sed artificiales tantum."

²¹*Op. cit.*, q. 1, a. 1, resp: "Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam; ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis."

²²*Op. cit.*, q. 1, a. 2, resp: ".. intellectus speculativus, quia accipit a rebus, est quodammodo motus ab ipsis rebus; et ita res mensurant ipsum."

likeness is according to the forms of the objects known,²³ so that the adequation of the mind with the thing consists in a likeness which rests on the form of the thing, being in the intellect as a known form, or as under intentional existence.²⁴

Everything *can* have ontological truth in regard to the human intellect, but for this we must first have the agreement of the mind with the thing. This second is logical truth; the first is ontological, with respect to man's mind.²⁵

We would like to say something about this latter ontological truth. The reason for the adequation of the thing with the human intellect can be looked at in two ways. Because things agree with the Divine Mind, they are not only actually true in that respect, but they are likewise

~*S<winma, *Theol. I*, q. 16, a. 2, resp: "Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus, inquantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma ejus, inquantum est cognoscens. Et propter hoc per *conformitatem* intellectus et rei veritas definitur."

²⁴This touches the very problem of knowledge. We do not intend to go into the problem. We accept the union by knowledge as far as St. Thomas outlines it, and we follow the explanations given to this outline by the commentators. Knowledge is a union of mind with thing, this union being effected through forms, so that the form of what is known is united with the knowing intellect, not as the form exists in extramental reality, but as it is abstracted from the image. This intentional form *means* the formal aspect of the thing, and this meaning is the union. Sense knowledge is analogous to intellectual, but properly speaking sense does not possess truth, though it knows things; for it does not know things as true, since it cannot reflect upon the adequation between the known thing and that which it has within itself. Vd. *Summa Theol.*, 1, q. 16, a. 2; *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 9. St. Thomas, however, speaks of one internal sense in a special way when he considers, in the latter article from the *De Veritate*, whether truth is in the sense. This appears to be the *vis cogitativa*, of which much will be said in the course of these pages.

²⁵Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 8, resp. Also vd. Mercier, *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, Herder Book Co., St. Louis, 1928; vol. 1, p. 460; no. 61 under Metaphysics.

potentially true \With respect to the human intellect, since the Divine Mind so orders things that they can cause an adequation between themselves and the human intellect, and after such adequation they agree in reality with the human faculty. But to look at this adequation in another way: man's power of knowing is based on the fact that the human intellect is a reflection of the Divine, and when it operates as it should (attaining logical truth), it resembles the Divine knowledge of things; and therefore, as things are true in His respect, they are true in respect to the creature. The difference is that the human intellect does not create the correspondence of things with itself, but it must first have a caused logical truth, derived from things as its instrumental and material cause, and from its own power to fashion an adequation of likeness. Thus the human intellect is first measured by things before it measures them. The maker, on the other hand, causes the adequation of the work with his intellect, and in this respect is somewhat like God, although he does not completely cause the thing as God does.²⁰

Truth principally belongs to intellect, secondarily to things,²⁷ for absolutely speaking, if you removed all intel-

²⁰*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 8, resp: "Patet ergo quod veritas in rebus creatis inventa nihil aliud potest comprehendere quam entitatem rei, et adaequationem ad intellectum, et intellectus ad res..., quod totum a Deo est; quia et ipsa forma rei, per quam adaequatur, a Deo est, et ipsum verum sicut bonum intellectus, sicut dicitur in 6 Ethic... quod bonum uniuscujusque rei consistit in perfecta operatione ipsius. Non est autem perfecta operatio intellectus, nisi secundum quod verum cognoscit; unde in hoc consistit ejus bonum, inquantum hujusmodi. Unde, cum omne bonum sit a Deo, et omnis forma, oportet etiam absolute dicere, quod omnis veritas sit a Deo."

²⁷*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 16, a. 1, conclusio: "Verum cum sit terminus intellectus, sicut bonum appetitus, veritatem omnem in intellectu esse oportet principaliter, secundario autem in rebus secundum ordinem ad intellectum, a quo dependent."

lect, things could not be true, since they would not have a term of correspondence.²⁸

Truth does not formally exist in the first operation of mind, called simple apprehension, forming the abstract essence, *quod quid est*, which is externally expressed in the shape of the definition.²⁹ It is only in a judgement that truth essentially consists, the act of combining and dividing; and in a simple apprehension there is truth only *secundum quid*.³⁰ It is a fact that the mind does not stop at simple apprehensions. Its proper object is indeed essences, but essences as existing in particular, material reality. And, as the Angelic Doctor says, the intellect does not actually understand a material singular, except by turning itself to the phantasm from which it abstracted.³¹

²⁸*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 2, resp.: "...etiam si intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur verae in ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, quod est impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo veritatis ratio remaneret."

²⁹*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 3, resp.: "(verum) per prius invenitur in actu intellectus componentis et dividētis quam in actu intellectus quidditates rerum formantis." Cf. also *Swnma, Theol.*, I, q. 16, a. 2; 7 *Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7um.

³⁰*J Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad Turn: "...prima operativae (intellectus) respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius. Et quia ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in quidditate...ideo veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in signo ejus, quod est enuntiatio, et non in prima, vel signo ejus quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid." Vd. also "Truth is in the Judgement," by G. B. O'Toole, *The New Scholasticism*, Jan. 1943, vol. XVII, No. 1.

³¹*Swnma, Theol.*, I, q. 86, a. 1, resp.: "...etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxerit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit." Again, *op. tit.*, q. 84, a. 7, resp.: "...necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum objectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem." As the fruit of this converse activity, the intellect predicates the abstracted species of the existing real, by combining the universal nature and the essences of the proper accidents and of other accidents, as far as the mind turns itself to these last. In such activity, the intellect refers its synthesized species to the ex-

What the Angelic Doctor stresses is that the mind first knows the real, and only secondarily the intelligible species, which is a formal sign of the real.³² And in this connection, it is to be emphasized that ideas are not barriers, but bonds with the real. They put the mind *in union with its object*. Certain enemies of Thomism are fond of confusing truth with what they call "abstraction". We do not say that the mind agrees, or can agree, in every detail of likeness with its object.³³ And when the mind has knowledge of a real object before it, though it gets this knowledge by a process of abstraction, \what it abstracts is then predicated immediately of the real before it, and the consciousness is focussed upon the object, and only by further reflection is

isting particular, through the image which is a formal sign. In this way an existential judgement is formed. Such a judgement, on the other hand, is distinguished from an essential judgement in this: that the latter combines two or more abstracted formalities (called isolates) without explicit reference to a particular real in which these exist, though even here the intellect depends upon the imagination. An existential judgement is either singular or particular; an essential is universal.

³²*Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 85, a. 2, resp: "Et sic species intellecta secundario est id quod intelligitur; sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res, cujus species intelligibilis est similitudo."

³³The likeness in the intellect is such after a universal manner. But man has also sense faculties, in which the likeness is after a singular, sensible manner. And as man has these two likenesses, or intentions, or meanings, within the one conscious, personal soul, the intellect is aware, by recourse to the image, of the singular which is meant there, of which it predicates its own likeness or meaning. These likenesses are both formal signs; i. e., they do not attract attention first to themselves, as other signs do. And the consciousness therefore is not of things (ideas and images) which have meaning, but of things (the objects themselves) which are meant. The mind then has composite knowledge of singulars—the intellect knowing directly the universal aspects, and indirectly the singular aspects of the object. And when the intellect has truth about an object—i. e., when it knows the *esse* as well as the *essence*—it gets this truth by a knowledge (through reflection) of the correspondence existing between what is known in sense and intellect together and the real object.

it upon the likeness in the mind. Logical truth is simply the term used of the agreement of mind with reality, when the mind recognizes, by reflection, this agreement; and its first condition is *knowledge* of the real, a knowledge achieved by abstraction. Such knowledge is best described by the term "abstractive", rather than "abstract".

St. Thomas says that the form (taken for both substantial and accidental form) is the principle according to which things are capable of causing an intentional likeness in the mind. The accidental, sensible forms, as under intentional existence in the sense, are what unites the sense faculties of cognition with the real: so that these formally (not instrumentally) mean the individual, sensible object. The substantial form (taking in conjunction with it the *materia ut in communi* and the inseparable, proper accidents), as under intentional existence in the intellect, is what unites the intellect with the real. Form, therefore, is the principle of adequation: the form as it exists in reality, and the form as it is within the mind and means the real. And if we speak of a certain splendor of form in connection with beauty, this means, as we shall see, a high degree of intelligibility and sensibility in the thing, according to which the thing is capable of producing a great degree of likeness to itself within the mind, inasmuch as the intentional forms quite fully mirror the real, and have a splendor corresponding with the thing which instrumentally causes this intentional splendor.

In speaking next of goodness, we quote first from St. Thomas, to indicate how he derives the attributes of being. "There are said to be additions to being, as far as they express some mode of being which is not expressed in the idea of being as such. And this can be in two ways." (First, when the mode which is expressed is some specific mode of being, such as substance.) "Secondly, as far*as the mode which is expressed is a mode following generally upon all being, and this mode can be taken in two ways: in one way, as far as it is consequent upon all being *in itself*; in

another way, as far as it is consequent upon all being *in relation to some other thing*. If we take it in the first way, we do so as far as it expresses something either affirmatively or negatively in the thing. ." (Affirmatively, as far as we take being in the affirmative mode of its essence, called by the distinctive term *res*.) "But negation, consequent upon all being absolutely" (or *in se*) "is undividedness; and the term *unum* expresses this. . . But if the mode of being be taken in the second way, that is, as far as it has reference to some other thing, we can understand this also in a two-fold way: in one way, as far as one thing is divided from another; and this is expressed in the term *aliquid*; in the second way, according to a proportion between one thing and another; and we cannot have such a correspondence unless we find something which is ordained by its very nature to correspond with all being. And this is the soul, which is in some way all things. . . Now, in the soul we have the cognitive and appetitive faculties. And so the correspondence of being to appetite is expressed by the term *bonum*. • . The correspondence of being to intellect is expressed by the term *verum*".³⁴

³⁴*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 1, resp: "... aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, inquantum exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit: uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis.. Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generaliter consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest; uno modo secundum quod consequitur omne ens in se; alio modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc dicitur, quia exprimit in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative. Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia ejus, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc nomen *res*.. Negatio autem, quae est consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio; et hanc exprimit hoc nomen *unum*.. Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet, secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen *aliquid*.. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente. Hoc autem est anima,

It is evident from this that St. Thomas is speaking of the attributes as far as being is related to the human soul, according to which all being presents now the aspect of truth and now the aspect of goodness. He is not speaking, in other words, of the states of the soul itself. For it is to be noted that he speaks of being corresponding now with appetite and now with intellect, and not vice versa. The distinct states of the soul are, of course, implied; but he is primarily concerned with the, aspects of being. It is further to be noted that he speaks of being in relation to us, and not to its cause. We can say that inasmuch as being is caused being, it has the logically distinct relations to its cause of unit existence, truth, and goodness according as we speak of the maker's efficient, exemplary, and final causality.

In connection with the attributes, we refer again to the *De Veritate*.^{3*} St. Thomas says that the attributes (considered not as attributes but as *additions* to being), are only logical additions, but the relations of the soul to things, which are considered now as true and now as good, are real relations; hence they bespeak real additions to the soul. But if we say that the attributes do not really add to the being, this does not impugn the notion that things are *really* true and good, for the attributes are really one with the being; but the being is really related to its cause, and it is really true and good because of this real dependence. But the *addition* of truth and goodness, as an addition, is made by the mind; and the *distinction* of these from each other is again made by the mind, and is a virtual incomplete distinction.

The foundation for the various aspects which being may unfold to the soul is, on the part of the being itself,

quae quodammodo est omnia..In anitfa autem est -vis cõgnitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen *bowum*..Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen *verum*."

35Q. 21, a. 1.

the form. And thus, as the attributes are the being, they are measured as the being is measured—according to the actual form. All that is in the thing is its being—all its essential and accidental reality: both existing matter and form, and accidents. But as it is through the form that the whole being is what it is, so it is through the form, that the whole being is ontologically true and good, and related to the soul. On the other hand, the foundation for the attributes on the part of the soul is in the capacity of the intellect to know and of the will to love and desire—the inclination of the intellect to comprehend being, now as ontologically true (following on logical truth), and now as personally good or good in itself; and the inclination of the will, upon the apprehension of being as good, to move towards it.

Concerning goodness, we must first say that it presupposes existence.³⁶ This may be correlated with the notion that goodness is what all things seek, but inasmuch as all things seek their own perfection, and perfection bespeaks a degree of existence, goodness therefore, taken in its most fundamental sense, is based upon existence. Thus St. Thomas argues: "Goodness and being are the same in reality, but they differ only logically. Thus: the notion of goodness consists in this, that it is something desirable. And so Aristotle says that goodness is that which all things seek" (or, in the rendering of W. D. Ross, "that at which all things aim"). "But it is evident that everything is de-

³⁶*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 6, a. 3, ad Sum: "...bonitas rei creatae non est ipsa ejus essentia, sed aliquid superadditum; vel ipsum esse ejus, vel aliqua perfectio superaddita, vel ordo ad finem." Also *De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 3, resp: "Considerando ergo verum et bonum secundum se, sic verum est prius bono secundum rationem, cum sit perfectivum alicujus secundum rationem speciei; bonum autem non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse quod habet in re; et ita plura includit in se ratio boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per additionem ad illa; et sic bonum praesupponit verum, verum autem praesupponit unum..."

sirable according as it is perfect; for all things desire their own perfection. In the degree that everything is actual, however, to that degree it is perfect. And so it is clear that in the degree that a thing exists, to that degree it is good; for existence is the act of every essence" (pointing a distinction between *ens* and *res*). • "Wherefore, etc.,"⁸⁷

Under the notion of goodness two things are included: perfection, or self-goodness; and perfecting, or goodness to others. In the text from St., Thomas given immediately above, the emphasis was upon the first aspect of goodness, perfection, or self-goodness. Whatever is perfective of something is to that thing a *bonum sibi*: and so its constituted being, and everything which is suitable and connatural to the thing, are good to the thing.³⁸ At the same time, the thing, related to something else as appropriate and connatural to it, has the second aspect of goodness, perfection of other things. It is because all things are ordered to an end by the Divine Will that, being perfectible, they have natural appetites, or tendencies towards what is perfective of them. When we come to man, we posit in him a tendency higher than these natural appetites (which he nevertheless has in common with all other things), namely the intellective appetite, the will, which operates on the apprehension of something as appropriate and perfective. This is in strict accordance with the intellectual nature of man. Man has also sensitive appetites, which, while similar to

³⁷*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 1, resp: "...bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem; sed differunt secundum rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod sit aliquid appetibile. Unde Philosophus dicit (*Ethic.*, lib. 1, c. 1) quod 'bonum est quod omnia appetunt.' Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum; nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum autem unumquodque est perfectum, inquantum est in actu. Unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens; esse enim est actualitas omnis rei.. Unde, etc. I."

³⁸*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, resp: "...unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum."

the sensitive appetites of the brute, are dissimilar to the extent that they belong to a rational soul.

We may speak further of formal and active goodness.³⁹ Formal goodness is simply the goodness of a being in itself, its constituted being as caused by some agent, ultimately by the Divine Will. This is the same as perfection, leaving aside the notion of perfecting of other things. So a thing, says St. Thomas, is perfect, first as far as it exists, secondly as far as accidents besides its act of existence are added to it. . .thirdly as far as it attains. . .its end.⁴⁰ Formal goodness, in its purest «ense, is found in the last of these; for it is clear that then a thing is simply good when it is completely what it should be, i.e., when it has the being, or perfection, intended for it by its agent, ultimately by the Divine Will. Active goodness, on the other hand, is the aspect of being as far as it is perfective of something else.

Finally, St. Thomas says that the good consists of mode, species, and order to an end. By this he means that everything created and belonging to the visible universe, by the very fact that it exists as a caused thing, includes in its notion of goodness these three aspects.⁴¹ By "mode" is meant the determined existence of a thing, which is controlled or modified or limited by two things, the efficient cause and the limiting principle of the species—the matter. By "species" is meant the constitution of a thing in its species through the form, which unites with the matter as determining principle with the determined one. The form is received into the thing according to some modification or limitation by the matter. Thus, an existent species (in the meaning of nature) is singular, in which the form is limited by the matter to an individual of the species (in the mean-

³⁹Vd. Mercier, *op. tit.*, Vol. I, p. 469.

*⁴⁰*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 6, a. 3, resp: "Perfectio autem alicujus rei triplex est. 1. quidem, secundum quod in suo esse constituitur. 2. vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia superadduntur... 3. vero..per hoc quod aliquid aliud attingit sicut finem."

⁴¹*Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 5, a. 5; *De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 6.

ing of class). By "order" is signified the relation of a modified and specified thing to an end. And a perfect thing is one in which nothing is lacking in these three aspects,⁴² the last of which presupposes the former two, since nothing is caused except for a relation to a conceived/end, which it must realize.

3. BEAUTY AND THE ATTRIBUTES

Finite things stand between their Supreme Cause and those other things on which they have some effect. Thus they have a double relation. It is this two-fold relation which discovers for us the logically distinct aspects of unity, truth, and goodness. As far as the Divine Agent is efficient, and Himself one, things exist according to some mode of participated being, and are unit things, being measured by the oneness of God. As far as the Divine Agent is efficient according to an exemplar, and is Himself eternal Truth, things exist according to some mode and species of participated being, and reflect the Divine exemplar, being measured by the Divine knowledge, and showing the aspect of ontological truth. As far as He is efficient according to some known good end, and is Himself this end, He orders the existence of all things to Himself, and things exist according to some mode and species of participated being, and reflect the finality of God, being measured by the Divine purpose, and showing the aspect of ontological goodness as far as they attain their end. Of these three aspects, it is clear that goodness says the most. If then we know the

*²*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 5, resp: "Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis." Whereupon, St. Thomas proceeds to apply this to things,...showing how the good consists in mode, species, and order to an end, and concluding with: "Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in *perfecto esse*, consistit etiam in modo, specie, et ordine." As things, then, consist of mode, species, and order to an end, without however perfectly realizing their full capacities, they are good and perfect only *secundum quid*.

caused goodness of things, we have the fullest knowledge of them.

Now a thing is beautiful for the same reason that it is good—as far as it attains its end. But the end of an artefact—the kind of beauty we are interested in⁴³—is attained completely and perfectly in the very fact of its objective existence.⁴⁴ Its end is to be according to some conceived end of perfection, which is achieved *in toto*, and does not need to ask for ordination to something outside of what it really is in itself, since its end is already achieved in its being. This is its ordination to an end: to be a *perfect* expression of what is conceived. In such a case its final cause is identified with its being. Therefore, just as for goodness, so for beauty: it consists in mode, species, and order to an end, with the note that this end is not something outside of the actually realized being then and there, as we see in the case of man, whose beauty as man is not achieved until he attains his final end—although he is beautiful to a degree as he progresses toward that end.

4. RELATIONAL BEAUTY

We have called this section relational beauty to distinguish it from ontological beauty, which is derived from a

«St. Thomas, in *Summa Theol*, 11-11, q. 145, a. 2; q. 180, a. 2, ad Sum, speaks of man being beautiful as far as he acts according to reason, so that his beauty consists in his goodness. But, as we point out presently, the goodness and beauty of an artefact do not consist in the working toward an end, but the artefact has already attained its end in its perfect existence. On the beauty of man, see also *In Epist. I ad Cor.*, c. 11, lect. 2.

⁴⁴/7 *Ethic.*, lect. 4: "...opera quae fiunt ad artibus, habent in seipsis quod pertinent ad bene esse artis. Cujus ratio est, quia ratio est ars recta factibilium... Facere autem est operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam. Talis autem actio est perfectio facti. Et ideo in hujusmodi actionibus, bonum consistit in ipso facto..." Thus, the artefact, as far as it is a perfectly made thing, is the good end of the agent.

relation of the thing to its cause, and the experience of beauty, which is the state of the soul. Relational beauty is mid-way between these. It has two connotations: the relation of the thing to the soul, and the relation of the soul to the thing. In this number we are concerned only with the first. We point out here that the ground for the relation of the beautiful thing to the soul is one with the ground for the relation of a thing to the knowing mind, namely, splendor, or a degree of cognoscibility.

When speaking of beauty, St. Thomas consistently uses the words 'consonantia' or 'proportio' or 'ordo' or 'situs partium', or the like. In his commentary on the Psalms, he says that beauty consists in proportion and a certain splendor according to form.⁴⁵ In his commentary on the Divine Names, he requires clarity and consonance (with which he correlates order and unity).⁴⁶ In the commentary on the Canticle of Canticles, he speaks of proportion of the thing to the perceiver.⁴⁷ In a sermon outline for Christmas, he speaks of brightness, figure and location of parts.⁴⁸ In the commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, he speaks of integrity, clarity and 'commensuratio' (in the same sense as proportion).⁴⁹ In the commentary on St. Paul, he speaks of clarity and proportion.⁵⁰ In the commentary on the Sentences, he requires consonance, clarity, and integrity⁵¹ (in the sense in which it is mentioned in the Ethics). In the beginning of the *Summa Theologica* he speaks only of proportion.⁵² Later on in the same work he maintains clarity, proportion, and integrity, (this time in the sense of perfec-

⁴⁵In *Davidem*, ps. 44: Speciosus forma...

⁴⁶De *Div. Nora.*, c. 4, lectiones 4, 5, 6, 8.

⁴⁷In *Cant. Cantie. Expositio*, (sectio secunda, Tractatus Primus), c. 1, Ad intelligentiam...

⁴⁸*Sermones Festivi*, 77, in *Nativitate Domini*.

⁴⁹*IV Ethic.*, lect. 8.

⁵⁰In *Epist. I ad Corinth.*, c. 11, lect. 2.

⁵¹*Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, solutio.

⁵²*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad him.

tion, explaining that things which are *diminuta*, or defectively small, are ugly)." Later he makes no mention of the requisites.⁵⁴ Clarity and proportion are given later.⁵⁵ And the same two are repeated in what seems to be his last statement of the question.⁵⁶ There are other scattered references, which we need not consider.

From these citations proportion is never omitted. We must first say something then about order and proportion. According as the end of a thing is determined for the thing, the being is said to have an order to this end. Now the end may be viewed as either actually attained in the very existence of the thing, in which case we have esthetic order,⁵⁷ achieved by the thing's actual and perfect conformity to its conceived end—that of perfect expression of an idea; or as to be attained, either in serving some other thing, or in self-development. This latter is teleological order. For the realization of this order, there must be a certain proportion of parts within the thing (as in esthetic order), or proportion of the thing to that which it will perfect or which will perfect it (as in teleological order). Esthetic order is the same as mode and species—individual existent matter and form, with order of subsidiary or accidental parts to the whole.

Esthetic and teleological order are both founded on the same thing, the form. As it is the form which gives the formal unity in everything, it is likewise the form which gives order, for there is no proportion of part to part, and of parts to the whole, without unity; and as the thing must first be ordered within itself, before there can be any proportion between itself and an end outside itself, it is the

⁵³*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8, resp.

⁵⁴*Op. cit.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum.

⁵⁵*Op. cit.*, II-II, q. 145, a. 2, resp.

⁵⁶*Op. cit.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad Sum.

⁵⁷On esthetic and teleological order, see Mercier, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 557.

form which first explains esthetic order, and then the order of things to things.

Gredt says that the perfection of a beautiful thing is that kind of perfection which springs from order or harmony of part to part.⁵⁸ In all things, it must be said that there is harmony of parts to parts, but in some things such consonance is more conspicuous. This is so because they more closely arrive at the perfection of their existence, and communicate more perfectly in the exemplar of perfection—or the ideal order—from which they were principled. Every natural thing—to set these apart from artificial things—reflects the perfections of God. The entire universe, as a Divine artefact, possesses order of part to part; and everything in this ordered pattern itself—to the degree that it exists and reflects its Cause—possesses intrinsic consonance. The artist himself must so produce his artefact that it mirrors the ideal order within his mind. Nothing is so obvious about human creation as the deliberate arrangement of the artefact in a harmony of part to part.

St. Thomas says little about perfection or integrity, in connection with beauty. In the *Summa*, he speaks of the Son of God as meriting the appropriated name of Beauty because He fulfills the requisites of integrity, consonance, and splendor. It is clear that the Holy Ghost does not merit the name if we speak of consonance and splendor. It is difficult, however, to see why integrity should belong properly to the Son, and not to the Holy Ghost. Perhaps the clearest statement on the relation between consonance and integrity, or perfection, is that given by Gredt—what we shall designate as ordered or harmonious perfection. In

⁵⁸*Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, Joseph*Gredt, O. S. B., Herder and Co., 1932; vol. II, p. 29 (no. 643, *Metaphysica Generalis*): "...pulchritudo, utpote specialis bonitas, fundatur super specialem illam perfectionem, quae est harmonica partium consonantia."

this sense, harmony as a conspicuous perfection may be appropriated to the Son.⁵⁹

This harmonious perfection is the source of splendor. Splendor, clarity, or effulgence, is one with cognoscibility, whether this -lbe intelligibility, or what we must call—for lack of a better term—sensibility. The more perfect anything is, the more it can be known. And as harmony is a perfection, the more harmonious a thing is, the more splendid it is. Of the three properties (perfection, harmony and effulgence), effulgence would seem to say the most, for it subsumes harmonious perfection. It is interesting to note that the treatment of beauty in the Divine Names immediately follows the treatment on light.⁶⁰ Light makes all things beautiful.⁶¹ But we must take it in an analogical sense, the prime analogue being sensible light. Yet if it is used as meaning intelligible effulgence, it belongs essentially to God, and is appropriated to the Divine Word.⁶² Whatever may be said of the relations between harmonious perfection and splendor—namely, which is the essential factor—the relation of harmonious perfection to splendor as its cause seems clear enough.

As much as this harmony is the source of splendor, it may be said that it is likewise the ground for relational

⁵⁹*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8. The Son possesses consonance in being the Image of the Father by origin, splendor in being the Word of the Father, and perfection in having in Himself, truly and perfectly, the nature of the Father. Perhaps perfection is not predicable of the Holy Ghost from such a standpoint, as far as He proceeds from Father and Son together. It is difficult to see St. Thomas' meaning.

⁶⁰*De Div. Nom.* c. 4, lect. 5: "Postquam Dionysius tractavit de lumine, nunc agit de pulchro, ad cujus intellectum praeexigitur lumen..."

⁶¹*In David.*, ps. 25, v. 5: "...relucet in eis gratia divina quae pulchrificat sicut lux, sicut dicit Ambrosius, quod sine luce omnia turpia sunt..."

⁶²Cfr. *In Evany. Joannis.* c. 1, lect. 4; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8 (1 in resp.).

beauty, or the reason why the beautiful object makes a specific appeal to the person. But inasmuch as splendor subsumes order, it may itself be taken as the more immediate ground for this appeal. Thus we say that sensibility and intelligibility are the ground for the appeal which beauty makes to the soul. In order that a thing make its appeal to the mind, it must be knowable. But a thing is knowable in the degree that it is actual. "Everything is known through this, that it is actual; and thus the actuality of a thing is, as it were, its light."⁶³ And as it is actual according to its form, so it is splendid according to its form. When we speak of artefacts, the notion of form must be applied analogically: for the splendor of an artificial thing springs from an accidental form—though this form is supported by the substantial form, and is unintelligible without it. For the actual experience of beauty, as we shall see, this splendor must be proportioned to the individual mind of intellect and sense.

This relational effulgence of the object—or its capacity of producing a likeness of itself in sense and intellect—trails with it, as it were, the manifested harmonious perfection.⁶⁴ It does not seem necessary that the mind, in order to experience beauty, be aware of the harmonious perfection of the object. Nevertheless, this splendor is manifestive of its source. A thing which possesses such actuality and such harmony as make it abundantly splendid, exercises a certain compulsion on the mind which is proportioned to it by habit, and as it were, controls the gaze of the mind to apprehend it *sub ratione pulchri*.

When we say then that the object is splendid as it is intelligible and sensible, we mean that it is knowable by intellect and sense in varying degrees, according as the sen-

⁶³Lib. de Causis. lect. 6: "Unumquodque CQgnoscitur per id quod est in actu: et ideo ipsa actualitas rei est quoddam lumen ipsius."

⁶⁴?i Evang. Joannis. c. 1, lect. 3: "...de quocumque nomen lucis dicatur, ad manifestationem refertur, sive ilia manifestatio sit in intelligibilibus sive in sensibilibus."

sible and intelligible light of the object are apprehended. We do not limit this sensible light to corporeal light, of course: for the term light is taken in an extended meaning, to cover knowability in every degree. The sound and odor of things, in being actualities, are cognoscible by intellect and sense together, by intellect in a universal manner, by sense in a singular material manner, and by the composite mind in a universal and singular manner together.

If we are to give any phrase which will cover ontological beauty, we say that it is simply being, with harmonious perfection and splendor. And as all things are beautiful to the degree that they are perfect, the measure of a thing's objective beauty is its actuality. Yet not all things are apprehended as beautiful. Yet if it were possible for the mind to abstract from all else, and contemplate the perfection of a thing, it would be in a way to experience its beauty. The fundamental reason for the absence of the experience is not so much in reality itself as in the apprehending mind. And if we can apply a phrase to cover relational beauty, we say that it is splendor: but as we shall immediately see, this is a splendor of being, or a splendor according to a thing's proper form.

As we saw, sometimes St. Thomas omits splendor when he speaks of beauty, but never order or proportion. Yet when he discusses beauty at length, as in the *Divine Names*, he is careful to include both. Whatever implications may be attached to these omissions, it can certainly be argued that if we are to speak of the foundation of experienced beauty, in order to distinguish it from the foundation of final goodness, we are forced to consider splendor. For splendor is related to intelligibility, and beauty is also so related, as we see from the distinction of St. Thomas when he compares beauty and final goodness.⁶⁵

⁶⁵>*Summa Theol*, 7, q. 5, a. 4, ad lum: "... bonum proprie respicit appetitum; est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt; et ideo habet rationem finis; nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam..."

Again regarding splendor, there are two phrases we can employ: splendor of being (*splendor entis*TM), and splendor according to a thing's own form (*splendor secundum propriam formam*). The latter phrase gives us the source of this splendor; the former tells us what is splendid, or simultaneously intelligible and sensible.

The phrase splendor of form (*splendor formae*) means the same as *splendor secundum propriam formam*. The precise phrase *splendor forma*[^], cannot, so far as we have been able to ascertain, be found in the works of St. Thomas. There is a treatise on beauty and goodness, only doubtfully ascribed to him,⁶⁷ in which the phrase *splendor formae* is found/⁵⁸ Actually it means the same as *splendor secundum formam*, but we think it is open to misunderstanding—unjustified, certainly, but still a misunderstanding. For it might seem to imply that the beauty of a thing in relation to a subject apprehending it is only in its form, and not in its whole being *according* to its form, which we emphatically reject. The phrase, if it is used, should be used in its context—splendor of form shining on the proportioned parts of matter. But a short phrase is what we are looking for: and this can be either splendor of being (*splendor entis*) or splendor according to form (*splendor secundum formam*). The latter has the advantage of using a phrase of St.

⁶⁶This phrase is used by Sortais. Vd. *Traite de Philosophie*, by G. Sortais, t. IT, p. 673.

⁶⁷"De Pulchro et de Bono"; *Opuscula Omnia Genuina quidem nee non Spuria*; Peter Mandonnet, O. P., Tomus V, *Opuscula Spuria*; P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1927.

⁶⁸*Op. cit.*, p. 420: "...pulcrum in ratione sui plura concludit: scilicet splendorem formae substantial vel actualis supra partes materiae proportionatas et terminatas, sicut corpus dicitur pulcrum ex resplendentia coloris supra membra proportionata; hoc est quasi differentia specifica complens rationem pulcri." It is, worthi quoting a little further. "Secundum est quod trahit ad se desiderium, et hoc habet in quantum est bonum et finis. Tertium est quod congregat omnia, et hoc habet ex parte formae cujus resplendentia facit pulcrum."

Thomas, when he says that everything is good and beautiful according to its own form.⁶⁹

It is evident that, although, generally speaking, a thing possessing a fulness of being because of its proportion to its cause, is in a position to bring about a likeness of itself in the human mind as such, still there must be a suitability, or proportion of the thing to the particular mind.⁷⁰ And at the same time, the more enriched with habits of particular beauty an individual mind is, the more capable it is of being measured by the beautiful object, and of enjoying the otherwise hidden splendor.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER

The attributes of being are transcendental predicates of being, as far as every being is really one, true, and good. These attributes, considered as additions to being, are obviously logical additions. Under unity we considered formal unity (the perfection of oneness deriving from the substantial form, and in an analogous way from accidental forms), individuality (limitation of specific perfections to one of a class through matter, taking matter analogously as any principle of individual limitation), and incommunicability (perfection of incommunicable being, whereby the thing becomes the subject of its own action and passion).

⁶⁹Z)e *Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5: "...unumquodque (est) pulchrum et bonum secundum propriam formam."

⁷⁰Thus St. Thomas, commenting on the words in the Cantic of Canticles: *Padchriora sunt ubera tua vino*—which he treats as addressed to the Church—observes that the teachings of philosophers, when not *tempered* to the listeners, lack the beauty and sweetness which characterize the tempered simplicity of the Church's teachings. *In Cant'. Cantic.*, c. 4, middle: "...doctrina tua praevallet doctrinae Philosophorum, quae non temperat se proportion! audientium, sed continet se in quadam austeritate et excellentia verbi cum ponderositate sententiae: ideo hujusmodi doctrina dicitur vinum, non lac, quia caret dulcedine."

Of truth, we said that it is taken in different ways: as ontological (the correspondence of a thing with intellect, ultimately with the Divine Intellect, or with the intellect of the human maker, or with the knowing mind insofar as it is capable of causing logical truth), and as logical (the correspondence, by an intentional likeness, of the intellect with the thing, when the intellect knows this correspondence). Again, we took goodness in several ways: the appetible appeal of the particular thing's own being or perfection to itself, or the appeal to the appetite of something else. Formal goodness is the perfection of a thing in its constituted existence. Active goodness is the order of a good thing to something else. Perfection is correlated with goodness, and is graded according to the degree of being in a thing. The active goodness of certain things attracts the perfectible subject under the impulsion of strict final causality; whereas beauty, while it has an active goodness, has the aspect of formal causality—of which we will say something presently—and does not attract with the same species of final causality as other things. Goodness presupposes existence, for only what is actual is good. It presupposes unity and truth. It consists of mode, species, and order to an end.

Of beauty, we said that it consists of mode and species, the order to an end being realized in this mode and species.⁷¹ It has a certain teleological order, at the same time: a proportion to a knowing mind, as perfective of this mind through esthetic knowledge. It is perfective likewise of appetite, in a way which we shall inquire into later. This teleological order is the same as relational beauty, or the active goodness of the beautiful. Relational beauty bespeaks the foundation for the relation which the beautiful

⁷¹Incidentally, in the *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 12um, St. Thomas speaks of the beautiful being "modificatum et specificatum", which we render as mode and species. "Ex hoc enim ipso quod aliquid appetit bonum, appetit simul pulchrum et pacem: pulchrum quidem, in quantum est in seipso modificatum et specificatum..."

thing has to the mind. This foundation is a degree of sensibility and intelligibility, which we render as splendor of being, or splendor according to the form of a thing. This splendor springs from the ordered perfection of the beautiful object. Thus, ontological beauty is being as possessing ordered perfection and splendor. Relational beauty fastens upon the second attribute; and splendor subsumes ordered perfection.

CHAPTER II

THE EXPERIENCE OF BEAUTY

1. INTRODUCTORY

If we reflect upon our experiences, *it* will be seen that when we say, "This is beautiful", we can mean either a simple admission of objective perfection, or a distinct experience of this perfection—the esthetic experience. In the latter we imply a distinct relation of the soul to the thing, of which the two characteristics are (in varying degrees) knowledge and pleasure. It is our task to look into this relation of the soul to the thing.

If the mind of St. Thomas concerning ontological beauty and relational (of the thing to the soul) is hard to interpret, it is doubly so when we speak of the experience of beauty. While, for example, the words "that may be called beautiful whose very apprehension pleases"¹ seem to be quite clear, there have been various views on the meaning of apprehension and pleasure, so that some have called the experience that of goodness, others that of truth, others that of both truth and goodness together, others that distinct experience called the experience of beauty; and some have said that the pleasure is only of the natural appetite of the senses and intellect, others that of sense, intellect, emotion and will together, and others again that the will prepares and completes the state of delightful contemplation. Our contention is that it is a state of delightful con-

¹*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um: "...pulchrum autem dicitur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet."

templation, in which the intellect has relatively full knowledge through the intuitions of sense, this knowledge (on both sensible and spiritual levels) being apprehended as a good and given to the will as a *bonum* and the will influencing knowledge to continued activity, joining with the natural appetites of sensible and intellectual knowledge. It is thus a state of mingled knowledge and love, but love of the knowledge of the thing rather than love of the thing.

We indicate the mind of St. Thomas by two texts from the *Summa*. In the first, the article concerns whether the good has the nature of final cause. The answer is that it must have such a nature, for the good is what all things desire, and this bespeaks the aspect of final causality. One of the objections, however, states that the good cannot have the nature of final causality but rather of some other causality; for Dionysius says that the good is praised as beautiful; but a beautiful thing connotes the nature of formal causality. The answer to this objection is as follows. "The beautiful and the good are indeed one and the same in the thing, because they have their foundation in the same thing, namely the form; and for this reason a good thing is praised as beautiful; but they differ in their notion." (That is, as we shall elaborate, the experience of beauty is different from the experience of the good, and thus there is a distinction between them.) "For the good by its nature refers to appetite: for the good is what all things desire." (Here the force of the word *appetunt* is based on its relation to the previous word *appetunt*.) "And thus it has the nature of an end; for appetite is, as it were, a certain movement toward the thing." (Thus the real, as a good, has a direct proportion to the appetite, which it perfects.) "The beautiful, however, refers to a knowing faculty; for those things are called beautiful which please in being seen; wherefore a beautiful thing consists in due proportion, because sense delights in things well proportioned as in what is like itself." (That is, in what is conatural to it.) "For sense too is a kind of reason, just as

every knowing faculty. And because knowledge comes about by a becoming like, and similarity looks to form, the beautiful thing properly belongs to the nature of formal causality/²

There is no doubt whatever that here,- among other things, St. Thomas sets the experience of the beautiful apart from the experience of the final good, for the latter directly relates to appetite and draws the appetite to itself, while the beautiful thing, precisely as beautiful, is directly related to some knowing faculty, and relates to appetite only indirectly. We will refer to this text in a moment.

The second text occurs in an article asking whether the good is the only cause of love. The answer is that, since what is connatural and proportionate to a thing is a good to it, the good necessarily is the cause of love. "It must be said, as was said before, that love pertains to the appetitive power, which is a passive faculty. Wherefore, its object is related to it as the cause of the movement or act. And so that must by its very nature be the cause of love which is the object of love. Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as was said, love bespeaks a certain

²*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad lum: "... pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem fundatur, scilicet super formam; et propter hoc bonum laudatur ut pulchrum; sed ratione differunt; nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum; est enim bonum, quod omnia appetunt; et ideo habet rationem finis; nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur, quae visa placet; unde pulchrum in debita proportionem consistit: quia sensus delectantur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus: nam et sensus quaedam ratio est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, similitudo autem respicit formam; pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis." We use our own translation here and throughout the whole thesis. Incidentally, it is extremely difficult to know the precise force of a word like 'ratio', and we may be in error as we render it. Perhaps the best way of checking on such matters is to consult the standard English translation of the *Summa* by the English Dominican Fathers.

connaturality or complacency of the loving thing toward the loved: and that is a good to everything which is connatural and proportionate to it."³

The third objection (in this article) to the good being the only cause of love is that in the *Divine Names* it is said⁴ that the beautiful thing likewise is loved. The answer to the objection is as follows. "The beautiful thing is the same as the good, differing only in aspect. For since the good is what all things desire, it is of the nature" (or notion or aspect) "of the good that the appetite be set at rest in it." (Here the emphasis is on the pronoun 'it'.) "But it belongs to the notion of the beautiful that the appetite be set at rest in the viewing or knowledge of it." (The emphasis is on 'knowledge' of the thing.) "Hence, those senses especially are concerned in beauty which are most cognitive, namely sight and hearing, ministering to reason; for we say 'beautiful sights and sounds.' But of the sensible objects of the other senses we do not use the name of beauty; for we do not say 'beautiful tastes or odors.' And so it is clear that the beautiful adds to the good a certain relation to a knowing faculty; so that a good thing may be called that which simply" (or directly) "pleases the appe-

³*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, resp: "Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum est, amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde objectum ejus comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris objectum. Amoris autem proprium objectum est bonum: quia, ut dictum est" (in another question)" amor importat quamdam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum: unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum. Unde relinquitur quod bonum sit propria causa amoris".

⁴The Latin translation of Dionysius' *Divine Names*, used by the Angelic Doctor, says: "Omnibus igitur est pulchrum et bonum desiderabile, et amabile et diligibile." St. Thomas paraphrases this: "...ex quo pulchrum et bonum est finis omnium, consequens est quod pulchrum et bonum sit amabile ab omnibus, desiderabile et diligibile: quod objectum desiderii et amoris est pulchrum et bonum." *De Div. Nam.* c. 4, lect. 9.

tite, and a beautiful thing is that whose very" (or mere) "apprehension pleases."⁵

There are two things to be kept distinct: the beautiful object, and the act of contemplation. We shall first consider the relation of the beautiful object and the appetite, as we find it in these two texts. Then we shall speak of the act of contemplation and the appetite.

2. THE BEAUTIFUL OBJECT AND APPETITE.

Regarding the text which we have just given, as far as it speaks of the beautiful object: the beautiful object is a cause of love, not in itself, but in its being apprehended. Further, the appetite meant is not the natural appetite of a knowing power, but the elicited appetite,—if we understand the words in the body of the article: "love pertains to an appetitive power, which is a passive faculty."⁶ Again, the beautiful object is objectively one with the good, but the notional distinction is that the final good itself rests the appetite, whereas the beautiful object, if it has any relation to appetite, has only an indirect one, and does not itself rest the appetite, but the knowledge of it does. Therefore, the difference is that the cause of love being a good, in the one case this good is directly the object itself, in the other

⁵*Summa Theol*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum: "...pulchrum est idem bono sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus. Sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus; unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes; dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum non utimur nomine pulchritudinis; non enim dicimus pulchros saporos aut odores. Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad vimi cognoscitivam; ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cujus ipsa apprehensio placet."

⁶Refer to footnote 3, p. 41.

case it is directly the apprehension of the object, and the object as a principle of this apprehension.

From a comparison of the two texts from the *Summa*,⁷ this much is clear: the thing, experienced as beautiful, has not the perfect nature of final causality, for the thing does not itself directly draw the appetite to itself. Hence St. Thomas was speaking in both texts of objective beauty, first explaining how the beautiful thing, in its real entity, is not an end which is sought, and not itself a cause of the resting of appetite. He then went on to speak of the experience of beauty, explaining in the first citation that the objectively beautiful thing is related to the soul through formal causality or knowledge, and that the psychological reference to it is to a thing as an object of knowledge. In the second citation, while he preserves the nature of love in the experience, he insists that what is loved is not the object directly or simply, but directly its being apprehended.

St. Thomas says⁸ that whatever is connatural and proportionate to a thing is a good to it and an object of love. Knowledge is connatural to man, and so too is any object of knowledge as far as it is proportionate to man: therefore, knowledge and the known object are in this respect good, and objects of love. Now there is a union with things by the knowing faculties, and a union by appetite. The union in knowledge is effected by intentional species. The union by appetite is a moral union, through an affection (*&fectus*). This moral union with the object in the esthetic experience is effected, as far as the will (and in an analogous way, the sensitive appetites) are carried to the object precisely as it is a good to know. In this respect the beautiful object is a good, an object of appetite as other things are. While it exercises final causality, this causality must be qualified with the note that it is a final causality attracting simply to knowledge, or intentional possession.

⁷Hefer for these texts to footnotes 2 and 5, p. 40, 42.

**Summa Theol*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, response; q. 26, a. 1 and 2.

The moral bond therefore does not join the will and the object directly or simply, but with a qualification—as far as the object is a good to know.⁹

Gredt observes that the beautiful is a quasi-species of good.¹⁰ And Cajetan calls the beautiful a kind of good.¹¹ St. Thomas must be interpreted as Cajetan interprets him, for he says, in effect, that the beautiful is a qualification, or determination of the good.¹² It does not seem correct, however, to say simply that the beautiful is a good in being the good of the intellect. This would be the same as making the beautiful the true.¹³ But the beautiful is also related to the will: *quae visa placent*. This is to imply that in the experience of beauty the will is necessarily involved. Thus, in the text quoted in footnote 5 above, the beautiful object

⁹Op. cit., I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum: "...bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet."

¹⁰Op. cit., vol. II, p. 28: "Pulchrum est quasi species boni..."

"Cfr. his Commentary on the *Summa Theol*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum.

¹²*De Div. Nom.*, c. 4, lect. 5: "...pulchrum addit supra bonum ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam..." In the *Summa Theol*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum, he says the same thing, but introduces the qualifying term "quemdam": "...pulchrum addit supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam..." A *certain* relation: the insertion of terms like "quoddam", "quasi", "quodammodo" seems, to our way of thinking, an indication of analogical attribution. It is to be noted, moreover, that when we call the beautiful a "kind of good", we do not mean that the beautiful is the same as the good (logically): we hold a virtual distinction between the good and the beautiful: just as we hold the same distinction between truth and goodness, even while we say that truth is a kind of good—or, as St. Thomas says—a *certain* particular good. Cfr. *Summa Theol*, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad Sum: "...verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universal! bono, ut quoddam bonum particulare."

¹³Perhaps this is the reason why St. Thomas says the beautiful is founded on a certain (quemdam) relation to a knowing power (vd. footnote immediately above), namely, such a relation as simultaneously involves the will.

is a cause of the act of appetite; but here the appetite which is meant cannot be the natural appetite of a knowing power, but the elicited appetite. For, as he says in the body of the article, "love pertains to an appetitive power, which is a passive faculty."¹⁴ Thus, the good of the intellect (and of every knowing faculty)—i.e., knowledge, and the thing as far as it is an object of knowledge—becomes the good of the will. The reference of the object to the will is indirect—through the knowing faculties.

An object, as known, perfects the knowing mind. But it is not the object as it exists in itself which thus perfects, but it is the species of the object.^{ir>} This again is not actually the existent species, but the species as it exists in the mind, an intentionally-existent species, abstracted from the real.¹⁰ Such an abstracted species in the experience of beauty indeed means the existent real, and this is the bond of the knowing mind with the real—but the real object as it exists in itself does not perfect the mind.

On the other hand, the will goes out to things as they are in reality, or in their real existence. And in this moral union, the will is qualified or perfected by the real as it exists in itself. But in the experience of beauty, the will

¹⁴*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, resp: "...amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde objectum ejus comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius." The objection is raised, as we said before (p. 41), that the beautiful is a cause of love: St. Thomas does not deny this, but explains that the object is loved as it is a good to know.

¹⁵*F. Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, quaestiuncula 3, solut. II: "...nulla autem apprehensio, inquantum hujusmodi, est contraria vel repugnans apprehendenti; immo est perfectio ipsius: quia species quibus fit apprehensio, sunt perfectiones apprehendentis."

¹⁶*Q. Ver.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad lum: "...perfectio veri attenditur secundum rationem speciei solum.. bonum vero.. (est) perfectivum secundum rationem speciei et esse simul." If this is true of a *verum* it is similarly true of a *pulchrum*, as far as both are related to the soul under the same aspect—formal causality, with the addition, in the case of beauty, that knowledge is a known good.

is morally united with the object *through* the union by knowledge. Hence it is not carried simply to the thing as it exists in itself. An object attracting the will with direct and simple finality—a finality not reduced to the finality of knowledge—does not present to the person the same formal aspect as an object apprehended as a good to know. There is therefore a distinction between such finality and the finality of other goods, for other goods attract to themselves, apart from the simple knowledge of them.

A correlative term for the "good in every form" is value. Thus knowledge is valuable, quite as much as other things which are apprehended as valuable, though it is valuable in a different way. Beauty is similarly valuable: that is, an object apprehended as beautiful has its own specific value, and attracts the will in the manner we have said.

Now an object apprehended as a term of knowledge may present two aspects, as it is apprehended *sub ratione veri*, or *sub ratione pulchri*. In the first case the will is not necessarily involved. In the second case, it is involved, and the will is carried to the thing under the aspect of a good to know, or the aspect of beauty. In calling the beautiful then a kind of good, we say that this means something more than the fulfillment of the natural appetite of a knowing power. For the moral union or affection of the will is necessarily implied. And the beautiful, then, as a kind of good—or as a direct term of knowledge and an indirect term of appetite—can only be called an esthetic good, or an esthetic value, a good of delightful contemplation. We are aware that the term "esthetic good" seems to say no more than "the beautiful". But in saying, first that this esthetic good means more than the fulfillment of a knowing capacity, and that it involves the will, and secondly that the will is not carried to the thing directly or simply, but with a qualification—that is, through knowledge—we introduce a connotation in the term "esthetic good" which

sets the object apart from the simple object of knowledge as such and from the direct object of the will.

In the commentary on the *Divine Names*,¹⁷ St. Thomas notes that the beautiful is the same as the good in the real order, affirming that the beautiful exists with internal consonance (esthetic order), and splendor. We said that order causes splendor: for the harmonious perfection of a thing qualifies the object as capable of comprehension by intellect and sense. This relation to a knowing power (which we may call the teleological order of the beautiful) is the active goodness of the beautiful thing. Since the good and the beautiful are one in reality, the good likewise exists with consonance and splendor, though when apprehended under the aspect of a good as such it refers simply to appetite, while the same thing apprehended as beautiful is perceived simply as a good to know, and involves the will in this particular aspect. The Angelic Doctor says further that the beautiful is apprehended as possessing these attributes of harmony and splendor.¹⁸

We think the following distinction, however, should be inserted here. It is seen from experience that not every apprehension of the beautiful involves a knowledge of the ordered perfection of the object. It may be argued that unless the mind does apprehend the object in such a way, there can be no experience of beauty. But this does not necessarily follow. For there still remains the attribute of splendor. Thus, through the compulsion of sensibility and intelligibility, as proportioned to an individual mind, the mind can apprehend the object as a rich individual being. But on the other hand, to apprehend the ordered perfection is to give the mind the rational basis for its delightful con-

¹⁷*De Div. Nam.*, c. 4, lect. 6.

¹⁸*Ibid.* "Quamvis autem pulchrum et bonum sint idem subjecto, quia tarn claritas quam consonantia sub ratione boni continentur, tamen ratione differunt: nam pulchrum addit supra bonum ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam illud esset huiusmodi."

templation. For then the mind perceives the source of this splendor. Splendor, as we said, is a *lumen manifestans*, a light revealing the ordered perfection of the object. It trails with it a manifestation of this perfection. Persons who are habituated to the apprehension of beauty in every degree, or to this or that kind of beauty, are enabled to apprehend this ordered perfection immediately, and without the initial effort at analysis. The artist is thus habituated to apprehend the source of splendor. This does not mean a distracting analysis in the experience itself. But once the analysis is made, the mind then delights in the perfect individual being before it, having established a rational foundation for its delight.

Or again—and this seems to be the general reaction of all—the mind is first flooded with the light of knowledge, apprehending being as individual and delightfully knowable; and upon this may follow an inquiry into the foundation of the objective and mental splendor. This second step is entered upon by those who are interested in beauty quite apart from the *pleasure* which comes in the knowledge of individual being.¹⁹ There are some to whom beauty—the beautiful object and the state of soul—is valuable only as it is pleasurable, or a *bonum delectabile*; and this is a sentimental and egocentric attitude. To such persons the rational foundation for delight is of little interest. And it can be said that the perfect purity of the esthetic experience is scarcely ever granted to them.

A *bonum honestum*—a disinterested good—is a good considered apart from pleasure in its possession. Such a good is always a real (not an apparent) good. In its strict sense it means a spiritual object, such as virtue or intellectual

*⁹The artist, it may be pointed out, must examine the ordered perfection of his object, if he is to learn from it how to achieve the splendor of his own works. Perhaps there is no such thing as an artist who knows congenitally, so to speak, without any study of other works, just what is to be done to achieve the splendor of his own: we do not know.

knowledge. But it is also used of other goods which are suitable, apart from pleasure. For the beautiful thing to become such a good, the mind prescind from the object's pleasurable aspect, though this is simultaneously present and known.

Knowledge itself is such a good, and so is the object of knowledge. In the experience of beauty the person does indeed apprehend both the object and the state of soul as pleasurable goods. But the person may delight in these things simultaneously as pleasurable and disinterested goods, but in this "order—that the disinterested good is his primary end. Nevertheless, pleasure is the note which distinguishes the experience of beauty from the simple contemplation of objective perfection.²⁰

We think it can be said that the natural *issue* of the esthetic experience—since it is a knowledge of objective perfection—is a direct love of the object as a good in itself. This is especially true when the object is a moral good: and thus St. Thomas says that spiritual beauty is a *bonum honestum*.¹ Sensible beauty is less properly a *bonum*

²⁰St. Thomas says that every *bonum honestum* is in some measure a pleasurable good. *Summu Theol.*, II-II, q. 145, a. 3, resp: "...omne utile et honestum est aliquantulum delectabile." Vd. also *op. cit.*, I-II, q. 33, a. 3; q. 31, a. 5. He says further that the viewing of the most beautiful object, when the faculties are perfectly disposed, results in great pleasure. (He would seem to be referring principally to the experience of sensible beauty through sight, but the principle can be extended) *IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, quaestiuncula 3, sol II: "...Philosophus dicit in 10 Ethic, (c. 6) quod perfectissima, ac per hoc delectabilissima, visio est visus optime dispositi ad pulcherrimum sub visu cadentium." The reference in St. Thomas' works is *X Ethic.*, lect. 6: "...tunc perfecte sensus operatur quando est operativus sensus bene dispositus ad aliquid pulcherrimum, id est convenientissimum eorum quae seipsi subjacent." Further on, he speaks of delight of operation in every faculty, the highest being in the operations of intellect. The intellect is well disposed, in the case of beauty, when the ministrations of sense nourish the intellect with material for a close union with perfect being.

²¹**Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 145, a. 2.

*honestum*²² This is a state of soul consequent on the experience of beauty. The object as a *bonum honestum* then can be taken in two senses: as a good to know, and as a good in itself. In the first case we have the experience of beauty attended by distinctive pleasure,²³ though pleasure does not become the primary end of the will; and the object is indirectly related to the will, through knowledge. Thus knowledge and its object are disinterested goods. In the second case, we have the experience of goodness properly: the object as a good in itself, directly terminating the will. It may be that the perfection of the esthetic experience consists in this consequent disinterested love of the good.²⁴

Finally, if beauty itself is called a disinterested good, this may be taken either as an object possessing the formality of beauty, or as knowledge of the beautiful—in either case, apart from personal pleasure as a primary end.

²²*Ibid.*, resp.

²³The commentator on *Genesis* (found among the works of St. Thomas, Parma Edition, vol. XXIII) says of the words in *Genesis*, "And the woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold" (c. 3, v. 6), "Et ponuntur tria quae sunt in cogitatu, quae solunt movere affectum: scilicet bonum utile, quod ponitur cum dicitur, 'bonum ad vescendum': bonum honestum cum dicitur, 'aspectu delectabile'." *Expos. in Genes.*, c. 3, 'Vidit igitur mulier'.

²⁴*The irradiation of the Divine Light of intelligence in us was given to us as a means of knowing the good. In *David.*, ps. 4, v. 5: ("Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine"): "Ab hac veritate Dei refulgit similitudo lucis suae in animabus nostris. Et hoc est quasi lumen, et est signatum super nos, quia est superior in nobis, et est quasi quoddam signum super facies nostras, et hoc lumine cognoscere possumus bonum." And knowing the good, we may go on to love it. Ernest Dubois, C.S.S.R*., *De Exemplarismo Divino* (ex Typographia Delia Pace, Philip Cuggiani, Rome, 1899; Tome 1, p. 44): "Unum autem pertinet ad ipsam substantiam objecti cujus cognitio placet; verum est de se objectum solius intellectus, bonum est de se objectum solius voluntatis; pulchrum est de se simul objectum intellectus et voluntatis, et ita est medium amoenum, quod delectabiliter nos ducit a vero ad bonum..."

3. THE ACT OF CONTEMPLATION AND APPETITE

Contemplation, we said, is classed as a disinterested good, and—as every *bonum honestum* is a pleasurable good—its exercise is pleasurable. Contemplation is a proper end of the will, as much as knowledge is called a particular good.²⁵ We said that the experience of beauty implies a union of knowledge and appetite. What the appetite rests in is not the real, but the intentional, possession of the object. The end of the will therefore is the same as the end of the natural appetite of the knowing mind, knowledge. This is no contradiction, for, as St. Thomas remarks,²⁶ one and the same thing can be referred to different faculties, under different aspects. Thus contemplation is not only the end of the intellect (and participatively of the sense), but the end of the will.

What we must emphasize, however, is that knowledge is always knowledge of something: "*cujus ipsa apprehensio placet.*" Both the state of knowledge and the object of such can be desired by the will: but with this difference, that the object is not loved, in the esthetic experience, directly for its own sake, but for the sake of knowledge. Such contemplation may be a *principle* of love of the object for its own sake, as we indicated.²⁷

²⁵*Summa Theol*, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad Sum: "...voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus: quia et ipsum verum, quod est perfectio intellectus, continetur sub universal! bono, ut quoddam bonum particulare." / *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, ad Gum: "...voluntatis obiectum est bonum. Bonum autem habet rationem finis. Finis autem est et contemplationis et actionis. Et ideo voluntas non tantum se habet ad partem activam, sed etiam ad partem contemplativam."

²⁶*Summa Theol*, I-II, q. 11, a. 1, ad lum: "...nihil prohibet unum et idem secundum diversas rationes ad diversas potentias pertinere. Ipsa igitur visio Dei, inquantum est visio, est actus intellectus; inquantum autem est bonum et finis, est voluntatis obiectum..."

²⁷*Summa Theol*, I-II, q. 27, a. 2, resp: "...visio corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi; et similiter contemplatio spiritualis pulchritudinis vel bonitatis est principium amoris spiritualis."

Perhaps the most distinctive mark of the esthetic experience is the resting of the will, or fruition. This fruition is only brought about when that which is desired is possessed. And in the esthetic experience this condition is fulfilled. For knowledge of the object is relatively perfect, as the object is possessed in contemplation. The soul and the object have met: there is no note of "future" in the experience but only a "now"—the joy of peaceful possession. This does not mean that the will is dormant or unconcerned, for fruition is an activity: not that of appetition (from "petere", to seek), else we could not predicate will of God, but simply joy in possession.

It may appear that we have given too much consideration to the spiritual faculties in the experience, to the disparagement of the sensory faculties. In the following pages we shall give more consideration to these faculties, to complete the treatment of the experience.

4. INTERPLAY OF THE FACULTIES IN BEAUTY.

The experience of a beautiful thing seems to be a sudden and complete grasp of the sensibility and intelligibility of the thing. It would require a much longer discussion than the present to analyze the interactions of sensory cognition and intellect, emotions and will. We must speak then in general terms. In later sections of this thesis we speak in more detail of these interactions.

It seems to us that there are two essential factors in experienced beauty (not in known beauty, then, or metaphysical contemplation): conscious pleasure, and some reflection upon the proportion between the beautiful object and the knower. By this we mean that first, the knowing faculty must also know that this perfection is actually being fastened upon in knowledge; secondly, this knowledge is pleasurable, as well as the object arousing it. From this knowledge proceeds the activity of appetite, seizing upon

the knowledge and the thing together as pleasurable goods.²⁸ We do not think there is any error in positing these factors; in the first place, because of the unanimous voice of the commentators on beauty, who invariably fix upon one thing at least—some kind of pleasure in the experience; and in the second place, because of the notion that if the mind is conscious of the ontological perfection of the object, but is not conscious of its own state of fulfilled knowledge, there is no consciousness of a personal good, but only metaphysical contemplation; and if the note of personal good is lacking, there is no consciousness of a pleasurable good, and pleasure cannot be predicated of the experience; whereas the consciousness of fulfilled knowledge bespeaks some manner of reflection upon the proportion of the perfect thing to the knowing mind. We are not saying expressly whether this refers to sensory knowledge or to intellectual, or to both: we come to that now.

It is difficult to determine from the Thomistic citations on sensible beauty, just how far the intellect and will are concerned—but we see the *implication* of intellect and will when he speaks of spiritual beauty.²⁹ Thomistic commentators, however, presuppose that the intellect is the chief evaluator, and the senses are in an ancillary position.³⁰

²⁸This is not to conflict with the notion that the object and esthetic knowledge may be loved as disinterested esthetic goods. (See p. 49.) Every disinterested good is pleasurable in its possession, and pleasure is predicated of the esthetic experience, while pleasure need not be primarily loved.

²⁹As in the *Summa Theol.*, II //, q. 145, a. 2.

³⁰*Summa Theol.*, //—//, q. 180, a. 2, ad Sum: "...pulchritudo... consistit in quadam claritate et debita proportione. Utrumque autem horum radicaliter in ratione invenitur; ad quam pertinet et lumen manifestans, et proportionem debitam in aliis ordinare. Et ideo in via contemplativa, quae consistit in actu rationis, per se et essentialiter invenitur pulchritudo..." This text is sometimes used to show that St. Thomas held the intellect as the essential evaluator of beauty: but the text is obviously speaking) of ontological and not "psychological" beauty: a person is really beautiful according- as his way of life

We are inclined to this interpretation of his mind, especially where the experience of beauty is more than a trivial passing experience. For when the experience is a great good, the whole person is concerned, and this implies lively consciousness, and such a consciousness necessarily involves the activity of intellect. The sense, at the same time, has an activity and pleasure of its own, which is not to be neglected.

Things which are connaturally beautiful to man are such as make their appeal on both sensible and spiritual levels together. What the senses are concerned with is the apprehension of the singular sensible aspects of the object; what the intellect is concerned with is the intelligibility of the object. But there is something further. There is sensible pleasure in the experience. This pleasure is apprehended by the intellect as a personal good, and thus the sensible pleasure of knowledge becomes a direct object of the will (and at the same time a direct object of sense appetite).

We said that in experienced beauty there are two things: the object and the act of contemplation. If we speak of sense and intellect together, there is the object of the senses and the object of the intellect (materially the one object, but formally different), and the act of the sense and the act of the intellect. The intellect can uncover the

is well-ordered according to the spiritual brightness of reason. (Cfr. //--, q. 145, a. 2, resp.) Another text sometimes brought forward is from St. Thomas' commentary on Aristotle, / *Ethic.*, lect. 1: "... sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cujus proprium est cognoscere ordinem. Nam et si vires sensitivae cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis." In the context, the last clause has a quite different meaning from the isolated way in which it is generally given. St. Thomas is speaking of the order of one thing to another, not of order absolutely. And it may be that the cogitative power can apprehend order within a sensible thing itself. Moreover, in the *Summa Theol.* 7, q. 5, a. 4, ad lum, St. Thomas says: "...nam et sensus quaedam ratio est; et omnis virtus cognoscitiva."

reality of the object before it, depending on the ministrations of the senses. This is an abstraction of the intelligible form, the common matter, and the -proper accidents, and their predication of the sensible real. But it can go on to uncover the intelligibility of the external accidents, according as these are richly represented in the ministering image. It can also reflect upon the sensible operations (for they are real and ordered and intelligible), and Observe the order between them and their object. At the same time, it can apprehend its own operations and the proportion between them and their object. These apprehensions—of the object as richly sensible and intelligible, and of the ordered activity of sense and intellect—are reflected upon as personally good, and thus become an object of the will. The sensitive appetite and emotions themselves operate toward the end of pleasure, and they are known by the intellect and committed to the will as valuable. The consciousness, as experience shows, is of a perfect pleasure-giving object and of the pleasure itself, with some emotional activity and a consent and fixing of the will. The consciousness of a perfect object implies sensitive knowledge of the external accidents, and intellectual knowledge of the splendid individual being.

It is the intelligible form of the object which is the determining factor of the intellect's contemplation. But this form is expressed, in reality, through sensible accidents. And as these are fully apprehended, sensitive knowledge is a great likeness of the object, and the intellect's contemplation is accordingly conditioned to a richer assimilation to the object as intelligible. And as it is according to the real form that the object is all that it is, the assimilation to this object through an intense adequation by sensible and intelligible forms within the soul implies a profounder knowledge of the real as *this* thing, and as a precious individual of its class.

In the real order, the beautiful object possesses order and splendor: the order causes this splendor or sensibility

and intelligibility. In the esthetic experience, the order to the faculties of cognition causes a certain splendor of mind: that is, the active goodness of the object causes sudden and appeasing knowledge. From this results the attractive good of sensible knowledge and contemplation. Thus, we have first the condition of knowledge and truth, and then the experience of a pleasurable good.

Being, as in sensible things, is what the intellect properly thirsts for on earth: it has partial satisfaction of this thirst, not in exhausting all the intelligibility of the thing, but in approaching perfect assimilation. It is enough for the intellect to know what the thing is, and then to attend to it simply and fully, as this individual of its class, through the delightful cognitions of sense. There is a desire to hold the state as in the beginning. And in the beginning it is a profound contact, through the awakened senses, with real being: the *fact* of a thing, and the fact of pleasure in viewing it with sense and intellect.

The place of the will in these operations seems largely to be neglected in many treatments of beauty.*¹ Only one, so far as we know,³² has given it lengthy consideration. He seems much closer to the facts of experience, when we remember that the will is a faculty whose function is auxiliary and complementary, to assist the whole person in encompassing reality.³³ We do not mean that the will is absolutely *needed* that the intellect and senses attend to their object, for the object itself may often exercise a certain natural compulsion on sense and intellect, which easily draws out their activity. But we say that by the very fact that

³¹The place of the emotions is likewise overlooked. We are guilty of the same neglect ourselves, but the limitations of the present thesis will not allow for any extensive treatment. ..

³²Thomas Gilby, O.P. Cfr. *Poetic Experience*. Sheed and Ward, New York, 1934.

³³Cfr. Gilby's "Thought, Volition and the Organism", *The Thomist*, Jan., 1940, Vol. II, No. 1.

knowledge is a great good, the person's will cannot help but be therefore involved.

To speak of the satisfaction of the natural appetite of intellect (or sense), and to disregard the cooperating complacency of the will, is to our mind an incomplete analysis. Everyone is aware, from his own experiences of beauty, that it is he, the person, who is pleased. And if something is a delightful good to the person, it is an inadequate explanation to say that this delight is the simple satisfaction of intellect or sense, redounding to the person. For the person possesses a³ power whose very operations are love, desire and fruition. The fact of experience is that we do not merely know fully—and that is all that can possibly be meant by the "delight" of the natural appetite of a knowing power—but that we love, desire, and enjoy. And such conscious movements cannot be explained except by including the will.

St. Thomas speaks of delight (and the delight of the will is called joy)—¹⁴ furthering the activity of mind. There is also a "delight" of every operation, hence of sense and intellect, according to which they linger in their operations.—" In the beautiful, the "natural delight" (fulfilled activity) of these faculties is an object of the will, and the good of the intellect and sense becomes the good of the will, producing joy. The will, we said, tends to things as they really are: hence, it is attracted to the reality of esthetic contemplation as it really is in its proper nature. But the

³**Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 31, a. 3, and a. 4.

³⁵*Ibid.*, a. 4, resp: "...agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius attendit ad ipsam et diligentius eam operatur: et secundum hoc dicitur in 10 Ethic, cap. 5, quod delectationes adaugent proprias operationes, et impediunt extraneas." But it is, as we say, only the elicited appetite which really delights. Note that St. Thomas says "*agens, quia delectatur...*" However, in various places, he speaks indifferently of the person and the faculties themselves as delighting: e. g., "*sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis...*", from *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, lum.

intellect's proper nature is to know things as they really are. Thus, the position of the will is a perfective aid to intellect as it inclines to know the object as it really is; and so it rests in the perfection of the intellect as this faculty sees more of the real through the sharp ministrations of sense. Moreover, it delights in the same way in the activity of sense knowledge, and in both sense and intellect together as a composite and harmonious knowledge. *De ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus. Sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in ejus aspectu sen cognitione quietetur appetitus.* The will then perfects intellect and sense in their fixing upon the simple fact of a splendid and orderly real.³⁶

Is all this sufficient to qualify the state of soul as distinct from the state of truth and the state of simple love of the thing as a final end? We think it is. For this state appears as one in which intellect and will, sense and emotion function together toward the one end, and the will rests in the state of fulfilled knowledge. When we have truth as such, it is irrelevant whether or not the will inclines to the

³⁶It may be added that the knowledge of how perfect a thing is implies a mental comparison of the object with some idea of perfection, according to the person's own development of this idea. In such a comparison the person sees the perfection of the object by an analogy with some prime analogue. This does not mean that the object suffers because of the comparison: its proper perfection is seen more completely. It may be, as it is with certain people, that the prime analogue is the First Cause and the infinitely Beautiful. Again, some may confound the ontological beauty with the state of delight they experience in seeing the object, and grade the beauty of things according to the pleasure which they principle. A great deal could be said on this matter. One point we emphasize is that the object is not beautiful simply by reason of the beauty of some higher analogue with which it is instantaneously compared; but everything, says St. Thomas, is beautiful according to its *own* form. Ultimately, however, the viewing of objective beauty in the light of the infinitely Beautiful serves to enlighten the perfection of the particular object, as well as throwing light on the perceived Beauty of God.

state of contemplation as a good.³⁷ When we have desire of a thing for real possession, it is irrelevant whether we know a great deal about its objective perfection. Moreover, in the state of desire for real possession, there is a division in the faculties of intellect and will, so that it is not sufficient for the will that the intellect possess, but there is an inclination to possession by other faculties, and the person is not at rest until the thing is really possessed.³⁸

Not so in esthetic contemplation. There is no striving for something not already possessed. There is conscious complacency in a profound desire being realized. Some have said that in the experience man forgets himself and fastens only on the object. This may be so, but we are inclined to think that without this consciousness of the soul in relation to a perfect object, there can be no conscious esthetic experience. What would appear to be forgotten is all else but the relation between the soul and the object.

Something further should be said about the senses in the experience, in a separate number. Their delight seems to be what initiates the experience.

5. SENSORY KNOWLEDGE AND APPETITE.

Man is a substantial unit of body and soul. In the esthetic experience as we ordinarily enjoy it, the objects are presented to us in rich sensible expression. This sensuous reality is part of the whole being presented to the person. It is a connatural object of the senses.

³⁷*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 1: "Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui respondeat, quae quidem correspondentia adequatio rei et intellectus dicitur: et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur." •

³⁸Dr. Gerald Phelan, in "The Concept of Beauty in St. Thomas", *Aspects of the New Scholastic Philosophy*, Benziger, 1932,—one of the finest discussions of beauty that has appeared in recent times—considers the distinctions among the states of experienced beauty, truth and goodness.

The sensitive appetites are spontaneously awakened when the sense faculties operate toward a connatural good. But the emotions—which seem to be at least modally distinct from the appetites—bespeak some knowledge of this fulfilled operation of the senses as personally valuable. When the person perceives the sensuous proportions in the thing, and the actual proportion between this object and the operations of sense, the consciousness is of the thing and the operations as personally good, and emotion ensues. We can only qualify this emotion as "esthetic". ,

In the citation from the *Summa*,TM the words "beauty consists in due proportion" include (as far as we can fully interpret them within the context immediately following) ontological or esthetic order and the teleological order of proportion to sense. "*Because* sense delights, etc.", implies this proportion of the sensible aspects of the thing to sense cognition, as we see if we paraphrase the clause: because sense has a natural appetite for what is connatural to it, i.e., for things with great sensible order, which gives rise to a certain sensible splendor (or sensibility) in direct proportion to sense cognition. For, as he says, sense too is a kind or reason. The force of this clause is derived from the meaning we put upon "*sicut in sibi similibus*" (as in what is *like* itself) and "*quia cognitio fit per assimilationem*" (for knowledge is effected through a *becoming like*). Thus, as sensible knowledge is a becoming like the thing, so, while there is a sensible proportion within the thing, and a proportion to the senses, there is likewise a proportion within the knowing senses and a proportion of the senses to the beautiful thing: hence there is a likeness all around, the senses knowing the thing because they and the thing are united by an intentional likeness. And this in an application of the principle of all knowledge, a correspondence be-

³⁹J, q. 5, a. 4, ad lum: "...pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus quaedam ratio est; et omnis virtus cognoscitiva..."

tween the thing and the knowing subject. This is not a correspondence which is reflected on by the senses themselves, since they do not possess truth or reflection. But the apprehension of experienced beauty is perfected by a power which can reflect upon the proportion of the thing to the knowing subject and vice versa: the first condition for the experience of beauty being, as we said, the state of truth.

As to the senses delighting in knowledge, or in the satisfaction of their natural appetites: it would seem at first, from the text given above, that St. Thomas predicated delight of the sensible knowledge, without reference to the will. But this text should not be taken alone. If we speak of delight without reference to the conscious appetite of will, we must use the term analogically. But in certain other texts, where St. Thomas speaks more at length of the delight in sensible operation, we find him justifying (at least implicitly) this delight on the strength of some reference to the *person*, and he does not leave this delight in the mere sensible operations. "For every sense there is a delight. . . as is seen from the fact that *we say and experience* sights as delightful, say the viewing of beautiful figures; (and that *we experience*) sounds (as delightful), say sweet melodies/"⁴⁰ Again ". . . an operation is reinforced by its own delight. . . For we see that *people* who perform with delight every work of the reason, are the better able to reach conclusions about individual matters. . . And the same holds for other types of people—e.g., *those* who love the musical arts, and take delight in them, and *those* who take delight in the art of construction, and so of all others—by the very fact that *they* delight in such work, they enjoy a

⁴⁰It *Ethic.*, lect. 6: ". . . anima non operatur, sed homo operatur per animam..." And so: "... nihil differt (ad propositum), utrum ipse sensus operetur, vel homo.. in quo est sensus." Then later: "... secundum unumquemque sensum est delectatio.. per hoc quod dicimus et experimur visiones esse delectabiles, puta pulchrarum formarum; et etiam auditiones, puta suavium melodiarum."

great increase (to activity) for their proper work."⁴¹ And he tells us that *man* delights in the odors of roses and lilies.⁴²

St. Thomas says that we do not speak of beautiful odors and tastes.⁴³ But certainly we speak of these things today. And we have just given a text from St. Thomas himself on delight of odors as suitable to man simply in themselves. It is moreover conceivable that a man born blind and deaf may have a well-developed sense of beauty according to touch.

⁴¹X *Ethic.y* lect. 7: "...operatic per propriam delectationem confortatur... Videmus enim quod illi qui delectabiliter operantur quodcumque opus rationis magis possunt singula dijudicare... Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis, sicut de *his qui* amant musicalia, et delectantur in eis, et de *his qui* delectantur in arte aedificativa, et de omnibus aliis, per hoc quod *g&udent* in tali opere, magnum augmentum faciunt ad proprium opus."

⁴²// *CaeL*, lect. 14: "...*homo* delectatur secundum olfactum in odoribus rosarum et liliorum, non autem alia animalia: et huiusmodi odores sunt convenientes hominibus secundum seipsos, aliis« autem animalibus non conveniunt: nee odores delectant canes nisi causa alimentum, sicut nee colores." And *Summa TheoL*, I, q. 91, a. 3, ad Sum: "...*solus homo* delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilibum secundum seipsam."

***Summa TheoL*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad Sum.

CHAPTER III

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS

There are two points to be discussed, and we will discuss them as briefly as possible. They are intuition and beauty as a transcendental attribute.

1. INTUITION

Our contention is that, within the Thomistic exposition of human knowledge, there is no room for any internal cognitional comprehension of the beautiful object which is not through intentional species and judgements. For a comprehension without intentional means, the object itself must be really, not intentionally, present to the knowing subject. Never once—so far as we have been able to ascertain—does St. Thomas speak of comprehension of an object by intellect or internal senses without intentional species—unless it be in the knowledge which the soul has of itself, and of its operation.

It is to be noted that our emphasis here is upon intuition as a *pure* intuition—a comprehension of an object in such wise that no intentional species whatever acts as a bond between the knowing person and the object. It is held by soonfe Scholastics that the Beatific Vision is of such a nature—a knowledge without intentional species. But it must be maintained that, as far as knowledge on earth is concerned, the mind acts through intentional species, for

such is the nature of its present condition.¹ Albert Steiss gives a consideration to the question of esthetic intuition.² Emmanuel Chapman, probably in the same sense as Maritain, says: "The beauty of the splendor of form lighting up the integrity, perfection, proportion, harmony, and their equivalents, of a material being can be enjoyed without the elaboration of concepts, though the latter may be germinally present, by means of a sensible intuition which puts the intelligence, through the senses, in direct contact with it."³

We do indeed speak of intuitive concepts: i.e., ideas formed immediately from an extramentally present object. But this is not the form of intuition to which we take exception. Many non-Scholastics speak of intuition in a sense which eliminates the presence of all concepts. None of them, however—to the best of our knowledge—has ever satisfactorily explained this supra-conceptual knowledge, and few have ever defined exactly what they mean by the term. The great amount of insistence which many lay on the non-conceptual and non-reflective character of the experience is not a demonstration. But we maintain that the experience can be fully accounted for on a conceptual and reflective basis: and if it can, there is no justification for multiplying problems.

The position which calls for non-conceptual intuition rests, we think, on a certain disparagement of the ordinary limitations of our human intellect, or an impatience with its

¹Maritain speaks of an esthetic intuition. He says, e.g.: "...the splendor or radiance of form glittering in the beautiful thing is not presented to the mind by a concept or an idea, but precisely by the sensible object, intuitively apprehended and having transmitted to it, as it were by an instrumental cause, the radiance of a form." *Art and Scholasticism*, Scribner's, New York, 1930; p. 161 ff. We must admit our inability to grasp exactly what he means.

²Cfr. "Outline of a Philosophy of Art", *The Thomist*. Jan., 1940, vol. II, no. 1.

³"The Perennial Theme of Beauty and Art", *Essays in Thomism*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1942; p. 340.

inability to see things except by a process. And it disregards the fact that the conceptual and reflective operations of intellect in everyday life are by no means laborious and ineffective. A little thought convinces anyone that he is continually judging, with amazing instantaneousness. And for such a process the intellect does not move with difficulty, step by step, but many of the steps are suppressed because the intellect has formed habits (i.e., retained and foregone conclusions or convictions), which spring into instantaneous consciousness, and supply for many parts of the process. The intellect is a spiritual power, capable of reflecting upon its own acts. If the instantaneous extinguishing of a match when dropped into water is, in reality, a quite complex phenomenon, we should not deny the same immediacy to a spiritual operation, nor even to the operations of imagination. But the principle stands that, unless the known object is *really* and *directly* present to the intellect, there can be no intuition.

There are times when no process seems to take place, but the first contact with a thing is the full revelation of its being. But we must not forget that there is such a thing as sensible delight, and it calls for no reflection to feel and know the shock of sudden great music or a sensuously worded and imaged poem. This is, as far as we can see, the only intuition in the experience: the knowledge of the pleasurable experience itself: we know that we are being pleased. Yet this is only a fragment of the beauty of the whole, and is not to be confused with the full delightful contemplation of perfect being. The attention to pleasurable emotions is sometimes taken as the essential experience, but emotion holds only a ministering and complementary place in the entire experience. It is our view—and we think we interpret the mind of St. Thomas correctly—that the esthetic experience is a species of full knowledge about an individual being in which senses have rich knowledge (after their own manner) of the thing, and the intellect uses these apprehensions of the sensible individual to improve its own ap-

prehension of the thing as a striking singular of its class: but that this knowledge by intellect is through concepts and judgements. It is, as we say, delightful knowledge, on the sensible and spiritual planes together.

What a pure intuition of another thing must be like, we cannot imagine: unless we liken it to the soul's intuition of itself when it acts. But even this is of little help, for esthetic "intuition" is a question of an intuition of *another*. Nor can it be said, if we have interpreted St. Thomas correctly, that even the external senses enjoy a pure intuition of their objects. There is always some intentional form acting as a bond between the faculty and the object.⁴ Even if we speak merely of seeing, as apart from reference to the internal senses (which are certainly intentional and not intuitive), this is an intentional activity;⁵ and it is certainly such if we speak of perception, for the internal common sense is concerned here,⁶ or perhaps, as Mailloux indicates,⁷ the cogitative power.⁸

⁴Consider *Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 78, a. 3, resp: "...Est autem duplex immutatio: una naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale; sicut calor in calefacto: spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale, ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus... etc." Concerning touch, he says, *ibid.*, ad 4um: "tactus immutatur naturali immutatione, et *non solum* spiritual!..." This is a disputed question, but we incline to the opinion of St. Thomas.

Ibid. j. a. 3: "...in quibusdam sensibus invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu..." But there is, even in sight—as later physics teaches, though St. Thomas did not know of it—an *immutatio naturalis* also.

**Ibid.*, a. 4, ad 2um: "...immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit."

⁷Noel Mailloux, O. P., "The Problem of Perception"; *The Thomist*, April, 1942, Vol. IV, No. 2. p. 266.

⁸There is a legitimate usage of the term 'sensory intuition'; for it is said of sense, that, unlike intellect, it does not work by a process

The most that can be reasonably said is that the object is known through relatively perfect intentional forms—which are not instrumental, but formal, signs. Experience shows this in the apprehension of sensible beauty: for the eye lingers upon its object of light or color, or the ear attends more fully to sound, as it does not do in ordinary situations; and the composite mind is flooded with a pleasurable consciousness of this singular thing as a perfect individual of its class. It is a consciousness which demands a reflective knowledge of what the thing is (and only intellect can account for this), of this thing as this sensible individual (and only sense can account for this), and of this sensible individual as a perfect individual of its class (&nd this implies the composite mind, or sense and intellect together).

We must not play down the importance of habit in the experience. This is an extremely intricate phenomenon. In experienced beauty, the instantaneous coordination of habit, directed toward the immediate appreciation of this or that object, creates what might be called affective knowledge, or knowledge exercised *per modum naturae vel inclinationis*: knowledge by way of nature (second nature, in ordinary language) or inclination.⁹ The reason for calling it such rests finally in the accumulation of habits. A habit is for the perfection of a faculty, and gives an inclination to the faculty to operate easily (or instantly) in a definite direction, as if it were its nature to do so. Thus, the acquired habits of enjoying certain types of music, or poetry, etc., serve in the instantaneous recognition of a suitable

of abstraction. It is in this comparative sense that we have used it in the course of our development. It is, indeed, a precious kind of knowledge, distinct from intellectual, and its service in the apprehension of the beauty of a material particular is not to be underestimated. Yet, as we pointed out, sense knowledge itself works through intentional species.

⁹Cfr. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 6, ad Sum, for an example of this type of knowledge.

object. There is no process whereby the reason must laboriously analyze the perfection of the object, or have the attributes of harmony, and so on, pointed out to it by someone else. And as, by instantly awakened habits, the senses and intellect are immediately aroused and occupied by the fact that a suitable object is present, and immediately apprehend the situation as personally good, the sensitive appetite and will seize upon the pleasurable situation. But habits do not imply the absence of intentional species or of instantaneous inferences: but they are foregone conclusions which are retained and awakened in their character as conclusions, and simply obviate the necessity of repeating a process of involved rationalization which had been gone through in the past.

2. BEAUTY A TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTE

When I say, "This is good", or "This is beautiful", I can mean one of three things, or all three. Let us take the statement, "This is good". I can mean either an admission of ontological goodness simply, or I can mean that I perceive the thing as relationally good to me, or I can mean that I see this relational goodness and desire the good. In the first two cases, we have not the experience of goodness, but metaphysical contemplation. In the third case, we have experienced goodness. The same is true of the statement, "This is beautiful". In seeing the objective perfection of a thing simply, or in seeing this thing as relationally beautiful (potentially) to me, we have metaphysical contemplation. But if I mean that I see this relational beauty, *and* experience delight in this seeing, we have experienced beauty.

If now I endeavor to settle whether beauty is a transcendental attribute, I can ask, "Is beauty, as a matter of fact—i.e., ontologically speaking—predicable of all things?" We are considering here a particular meaning of the attribution of beauty to all things—namely, is it admissible, be-

cause corresponding with fact, to attribute ontological beauty to all things, whether or not we experience this beauty? We reply with St. Thomas, on a metaphysical principle, that beauty is attributable to all things, as far as they exist: for they are caused by the Uncreated Beauty, and—like every effect—share in an analogous likeness to their Cause, according to the measure of their being.¹⁰

But if I use attribution in another sense, I ask, "Is beauty attributable to all things, first, because I see the relational beauty of all things, as they are *capable* of being experienced as beautiful: secondly, because I *do* experience the beauty of all things?" The answer to the second is obviously no, as experience shows. To the first we answer that there may be some who regard all things as capable of being experienced as beautiful, and who therefore call all things beautiful, but such an attribution rests on a supposition that is false. For we simply cannot know all reality, and are therefore in no position to be able to experience the beauty of all reality.

We say then that beauty is attributable to all reality, not as far as we do experience the beauty of all things, but simply from a metaphysical principle that all things must be ontologically beautiful according to the degree of their being. And on the other hand, beauty, as attributable to all things as far as we actually experience their beauty, is not actually attributable to all things, but only potentially so: and in this sense beauty is not an actual, but a possible, transcendental attribute.

The same reasonings and distinction apply to the question: "Is goodness attributable to all things?" But there is this difference: the experience of goodness is far

¹⁰*De Div. Norn.*, c. 4, lect. 5: "...pulchrum dicitur hoc quod participat pulchritudinem, pulchritudo autem participatio primae causae, quae omnia pulchra facit. Pulchritudo enim creaturae nihil est aliud quam similitudo divinae pulchritudinis in rebus participatis..." (And, at end): "...nihil est quod non participet pulchro et bono, cum unumquodque sit pulchrum et bonum secundum propriam formam."

more general than the experience of beauty, and thus the attribute of goodness, when predicated of things because we have experience of their goodness, approaches more than beauty to the nature of an actual transcendental attribution.

Thus, ontologically speaking, beauty and goodness are equally attributable to all being because things are beautiful and good in the measure that they exist. But psychologically speaking, beauty is less attributable to being than goodness.

Is beauty distinct from truth and goodness? Among all the attributes of being there is what is called a virtual distinction, with an imperfect foundation in the thing. Since ontological beauty is a transcendental attribute, it should itself fit the requirements of this virtual distinction. What we are concerned with here is not the experience of truth, goodness and beauty. And we are not supposing any real distinction among these attributes, for that is impossible. But it is a question of a number of distinct concepts of the one reality (being), but distinct in such a manner that they are not mutually exclusive but rather include each other implicitly. Moreover, the formalities represented by each concept are so indissolubly bound up with one another, that it is impossible for them to be realized separately in nature. And the reason why the mind makes the distinction, is found in the being itself, though this foundation is imperfect.

The concept of beauty is included implicitly in the concepts of truth and goodness, in the sense that beauty is convertible with being, as truth and goodness are. The three are thus convertible with one another. One cannot possibly exclude the other, for that would be to predicate truth transcendently of being, and yet deny goodness and beauty as transcenental predications of the same being. The formalities represented by these concepts—ontological truth, and so on—cannot be separately realized in nature, in the sense that we could have true being which is not also good and beautiful. The distinction that is made among them is not

purely mental, but has a foundation in being itself, though an imperfect one: as far as being is differently related to the person according to intellect, or to will, or to both together, the mind conceives of truth, goodness, and beauty as if they were metaphysical parts which are united together in a metaphysical composition. Yet these parts are present in the thing not actually as parts, but only potentially or *virtually*.

Something should be said about the relation of being to the soul in its experience of beauty. In what sense is the object the cause of the experience? In experienced beauty, there is some decided relation between the person and the thing. We know that not everything is experienced as beautiful by a person: and one instinctively turns to the object to explain the fact.¹¹ The examination of the object reveals that, though it does possess a certain degree of perfection, this is not sufficient to produce the esthetic state. Much has been written to expose the objective requirements for the experience of beauty: harmony, integrity, and brilliance, as in St. Thomas' view. These requisites, if taken alone, will not explain the experience of beauty, though they may well account for the presence of ontological beauty. But something further must be sought. For it is evident that, while this or that object does actually possess the established requisites for objective beauty, the person beholding the object, and admitting the presence of this objective beauty, need not experience delight in this seeing, but may simply possess metaphysical contemplation in a greater or less degree.

We said that in experienced beauty the appetite must fasten upon the state of knowledge as a singular good.

¹¹We are not speaking of the case in which a thing is experienced one day as beautiful, while the next day it is only admitted to be itself beautiful, but without the pleasurable state attending the viewing of it. In such a case we rightly turn to other things rather than to the object—to physical or psychic circumstances within the person himself, or similar things, distracting and indisposing the soul.

Something then must explain this awakening of appetite. Directly, it must be the state of knowledge itself. But we may ask: why is it that not every act of knowledge awakens the appetite? And the obvious reply is that esthetic knowledge—while not, in our opinion, distinct in kind from other knowledge—is a more adequate comprehension of individual being. We have already said sufficient on this state of knowledge as one of unusual consciousness of the perfection of an individual thing, explaining this by stating that the sensible and intentional species are richly proportioned to the real, the sense apprehending a strikingly sensible individual, and the intellect receiving the intuitions of sense (if they may properly be called intuitions) to fulfill its own comprehension. We said that the will delights in this activity, as it also delights in the entire affective state—of emotions and its own activity. When the state of consciousness is analyzed, as best it can, it is found to be a state of pleasurable harmony, explained by the full interaction and cooperation of sense, intellect, emotions, and will in the "seeing" of a perfect object.

If then the state of knowledge directly explains the awakening of appetite, what will explain the state of unusual knowledge itself? It can only be some relation between the object and the knowing faculties. But it will not suffice to say that the perfection of an object, as *generally* suitable for the human faculties, will explain the filling up of sensitive and intellectual knowledge. But what we say is that the relation of *this* object to *this* person's faculties will explain the fulfilment of knowledge in an individual case. And it is only an object which has unusual proportions of sensibility and intelligibility to a particular subject which will call forth esthetic consciousness. And this proportion exists in a two-way relation, a suitability of the object to the subject, and of the subject to the object. The more fundamental proportion is in the latter relation: for it is ultimately the subjective suitability which explains the individual differences in the experience of beauty, since, if

all people of every age and disposition were equally proportioned to the reception of a beautiful particular, all would invariably experience the beauty of the same object—leaving room (as we said) for distracting circumstances within and without the person. And this subjective suitability must not be taken as merely well-developed intelligence and sharp senses, but intellect and senses disposed in a definite direction by varying habits of beauty-appreciation: so that what is beautiful for one person and not for another rests finally upon cultivated habits.¹²

But here we wish to maintain one further condition. The mind must apprehend the relation between its own state of fulfilled knowledge and its principle, the perfect real. It is not, then, a simple knowledge of objective perfection, brought about by rich assimilation to the real. But what is necessary is that the mind must apprehend its own knowledge as a personal good, in order to evoke the appetites in the direction of this good. Such a reflection upon knowledge implies at the same time a reference to the principle of this personal good. It is a reflection which need not rise into explicit consciousness; but unless the mind knows, however obscurely, that it knows fully, we cannot speak of an awareness of a personal good—hence of conscious pleasure in the state. And the natural issue of such reflection is at the same time a reflection upon the suitable object which principles the state of fulfilled knowledge. A person experiencing joy in the presence, say, of a flower, does not only know the flower as a perfect individual flower; but he knows too that he knows the object in a way in which he does not commonly know it; and knowing both the flower and the state of uncommon knowledge together, he experi-

¹²On the other hand, there are certain common experiences of beauty which do not call for individual explanations. Here habits are not the solution. And in the case of children we do not postulate habits, so that, generally speaking, what attracts one will attract the majority.

ences joy in this meeting of mind and thing. This cannot very well be demonstrated; but it seems to us a necessary process of the entire esthetic experience, and it develops and prolongs the experience.

Thus, what explains the state of unusual knowledge, and awakens the appetite, is a perceived two-way proportion between the object and the apprehending faculties. Outside of this there seems no way of explaining the distinction between metaphysical and esthetic contemplation in the presence of an object.

Regarding that relation between the object and the apprehending faculty, which we call knowledge, a tremendous literature has accumulated. One of the fundamental issues is: is there a casual connection between the object and the knowing mind? Common sense shows that there is some definite connection. But what it is will perhaps never be explained. Perhaps the simplest way of speaking of the relation, while avoiding the difficulties of detailed distinctions, is to say that the relation of the object to the knowing mind is one of principle or origin. This does not touch upon the agent intellect, but concerns only the principality of the external object—whatever this principality may be. We are in no position to explain or comprehend what such a relation is. We merely take the common sense notion of a definite relation between the object and the mind, and the Scholastic exposition in criteriology, and say that the relation of the first to the second is that of some kind of principle, and the relation of the second to the first is that of real and immediate knowledge.¹³ Man has not yet comprehended the implications in those two concepts, relation and principle—and perhaps he never will.

Now it goes without questioning that the experience of beauty is in some way distinct from the experience of goodness; for, as we said, in the former experience as such there

¹³Cfr. *Knowledge and Object*, E. F. Talbot, O.M.I.; Catholic Univ., of America, 1932, espec. p. 97 ff.

is no movement to the thing for real possession. And yet this experience is at the same time some experience of goodness. But we said that what is apprehended as a direct and simple good, is the attracting state of knowledge. Moreover, the known object, as far as knowledge of it is a term of appetite, invokes the will, though the will is carried to it through the knowing mind.

Again, this experience is in some way distinct from the experience of truth. For in the former there is an act of the will to enjoy the state of knowledge, and in the latter as such there is no such fruition—or if there is, to that extent it is one with the esthetic experience. And inasfar as the experience of beauty is knowledge, it is one with the state of experienced truth.

In what relation does the object stand to the three distinct experiences? We have said that the extramental object has some kind of principality in the state of knowledge. The same can be said with regard to the state of love and desire. In the case of love and desire, the object is directly related to appetite. But regarding the experience of beauty, the object is directly related to the knowing faculty, and indirectly to the appetite: for here, what is directly related to appetite is the state of knowledge about the real. The principality of the beautiful thing then in reference to appetite is indirect, as far as its direct principality to knowledge conditions the awakening of appetite.

To posit this conditioning is not to take away all influence of the real on the will, but only the direct. We should recall that what explains the esthetic experience is the apprehended proportion of the thing to the knowing mind, and vice versa. And as the proportions are unusual, the act of sensible and intellectual knowledge is accordingly magnified, and as there is reflection upon this knowledge as a personal good, appetite, *on this condition*, is evoked.

It is because of the obvious differences between the principalities of truth, goodness, and beauty, that some claim that beauty is not a transcendental attribute. But

this is not a legitimate basis for denying its transcendental nature. It is simply an insistence that *relational* beauty cannot be predicated of all being. This is certainly true, for not all being is proportioned to everybody—and this is true of relational goodness. And it is true that not everything is experienced as beautiful, or can be, since there is generally lacking the necessary two-way proportion—and the same is true, in a lesser degree, of experienced goodness. But we are not justified, for this reason, in denying that things are ontologically beautiful.

To sum up: there is a virtual distinction, with an imperfect foundation in reality, among the concepts of ontological truth, goodness, and beauty; there is real distinction among the states of simple knowledge, love or desire of an extramental reality, and the pleasurable knowledge of a thing; in experienced beauty, the object has a direct relation to the knowing faculty, and an indirect and conditioning influence on appetite, and therefore does not itself directly explain the distinction of knowledge from that of pleasurable or esthetic knowledge, but explains it only on the condition that the proportion of the object to the mind and of the mind to the object is actually great, and perceived to be such.

3. CONCLUSION.

A lengthy conclusion and summary is not necessary for our purposes. But we put down the following definitions of beauty. What must be borne in mind in these definitions is that they are couched in the most general terms, and are to be applied in individual instances according to the kinds and grades of being, the degree of knowledge of particular beauty, and the apprehension of the object and its knowledge as a suitable good. The infinite complexity of the state, to our way of thinking, cannot simply be put aside in favor of an unexplained intuition, whatever that may be.

And the complexity of the state, if genetically intricate, does not bespeak a complex consciousness, as we have pointed out.

Ontological beauty is being. If we say it is being as possessing ordered perfection and splendor, this is only to make explicit what is implicit in the notion of ontological beauty: it does not imply that ordered perfection and splendor are properties of being as really distinct from being, since everything, as far as it is in being or act, does enjoy a corresponding measure of ordered perfection and splendor. Relational beauty* is splendor of being, or splendor according to a thing's own form, meaning by splendor sensibility and intelligibility. The experience of beauty is consciously pleasurable knowledge of a perfect thing. Of a perfect thing: but we should add that this means rather a knowledge of a thing apprehended as a perfect thing, whether this apprehension corresponds with the facts or not. For, as we know, we may be mistaken about the perfection of an object; yet, in supposing it perfect, we may have an esthetic experience. The connection between relational beauty and the experience is a two-way proportion of the splendid object to the mind, and of the mind to the object: but a proportion which is apprehended, in order to awaken the consciousness of a personal good, and involve the resting of appetite in the state of uncommon knowledge, and in the object as a principle of this knowledge.

SECOND PART

THE NATURE OF A FINE ART

CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART

The general Thomistic notions on art are quite numerous. They are reducible to several definite principles, and of these we will make extensive use. The application of the general notions on art needs special understanding when we come to poetry, and much of what we say in the present part must be qualified later. But it is only in the light of the general ideas on art that we can properly appreciate the nature of poetry.

1. GENERAL NOTION OF ART

St. Thomas calls art an intellectual habit.¹ This is to depart at the outset from any notion that art is skill. According to St. Thomas, interpreting Aristotle, art is in the practical intellect, according as it is directed to making something in particular.² But skill is a qualification of the execution of what is in the mind. It means a facility of the hands, or—in general—of the body, in the instrumental external expression of what is already mentally conceived and inwardly expressed. Art is a mental facility, skill is manual or corporeal dexterity.

¹*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 3.

²*VI Meta.*, lect. 1: "...principium rerum artificialium, quod est in facienlſe, est primo intellectus, qui primo artem adinvenit; et secundo ars, quae est habitus intellectus..." *VI Ethic.*, lect. 3: "...contingens aliter se habere dividitur in duo: scilicet aliquid quod est agibile, et aliquid quod est factibile ejus. . ."

Very often art is taken to include the operations of intellect which it perfects. Strictly, however, it is a qualification of the practical intellect, according to which this faculty is readily capable of conceiving the right way of making a thing, or of making something with a proper plan.³ The internal sensory faculties must also be said to be qualified dispositively by the habit of art.

In the age of St. Thomas, it would seem that all the arts were ordained to some use. This meant that they were ordained (since they had been invented for these uses) either to serve the necessities of life, as the mechanical arts, or, in the case of logic, to act as an introduction to some higher science, or finally to give pleasure to mankind. The speculative sciences (especially wisdom) were set apart from these, because their end was self-contained speculation.⁴

St. Thomas, following a long tradition, spoke of liberal and servile (or mechanical) arts. The liberal arts were properly sciences, and merited the name of arts only because they served some further use, and were governed by determined rules. Metaphysics in its highest sense was not called

³*VI Ethic.*, lect. 3: "...idem est ars quod habitus factivus cum vera ratione."

⁴*I Meta.*, lect. 1: "Cum igitur plures artes sint repertae quantum ad utilitatem, quarum quaedam sunt ad vitae necessitatem, sicut mechanicae; quaedam vero ad introductionem in aliis scientiis, sicut scientiae logicae: illi arifices dicendi sunt sapientiores, quorum scientiae non sunt ad utilitatem inventae, sed propter ipsum scire, cujusmodi sunt scientiae speculativae. Et quod speculativae scientiae non sint inventae ad utilitatem, patet per hoc signum: quia...acquisitis vel repertis omnibus huiusmodi, quae possunt esse ad introductionem in scientiis, vel ad necessitatem vitae, vel ad voluptatem, sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae ad hominum delectationem: speculativae non sunt propter huiusmodi repertae, sed propter seipsas^{1*} At the same time, the speculative sciences were not equally self-contained, but only wisdom in its purest sense, i. e., theology, since its object was supreme, was ordered to no other science. Cfr. */// Con. Gent.*, c. 25, Item quod est...

an art: it did not serve, like the mechanical arts, the necessities of life; it was not ordered to the pleasure of mankind; nor was it governed by definite rules, for these were already presupposed in logic. Thus logic, mathematics, rhetoric, grammar, and the like were called both sciences and arts. But the term 'art' properly belonged to the servile arts. Again, the qualification 'liberal' and 'servile' was based on the comparison that logic and so on were exercised within the soul, which is free, while the arts strictly so called were executed through the body, which is under service to the soul.⁵

We have a certain difficulty with regard to those arts which are ordained to the pleasure of mankind, whose end is a certain relaxation of the spirit. Perhaps these arts were what would we should call today the Fine Arts, whose end was simply beauty, inasmuch as beauty consists in the quieting of appetite through knowledge of a particular quality.⁶ But St. Thomas does not expatiate on the differences between what he calls the servile arts and these pleasurable arts, but he sets them both in opposition to the liberal arts—the liberal, and especially wisdom, although this is not itself an art.

There is little or no help on this question of the existence of Fine Arts, as far as St. Thomas is concerned. An immense amount of historical acumen would have to be

⁵Cfr. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad Sum; q. 47, a. 2, ad Sum; / *Meta.*, lectiones I and 3. An excellent study of the varying notions of the liberal arts in the Middle Ages will be found in *Speculum*, Jan., 1942, vol. XVII, no. 1: "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages", by Richard McKeon, published by The Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge, Mass.

⁶*Meta.*, lect 3: "... (ars quae est) ad voluptatem, quae in quadam vitae quiete consistit." Cfr. also St. Thomas, *VIII Polit.*, lect. 2, 3, for many observations on the pleasure of music. This "vitae quies" does not seem to refer to those arts called "pulmentaria et pigmentaria": cfr. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3um; *VII Ethic.*, lect. 12.

brought to the question of whether or not there was any general notion, at the time, of the art of beauty, or the fine arts as such, as distinct from what we call today the useful arts. Maritain has this to say: "It is interesting to observe that the Ancients in their classifications allotted no separate place to what we call the Fine Arts. They divided the arts into servile and liberal, according as they required corporal labor or not, or rather. . . according as the *work to be done* was in one case an effect produced in the matter (*factibile* properly so called), in the other a pure spiritual composition remaining in the soul. Sculpture and painting on that score belonged to the servile arts, music to the liberal arts where it had arithmetic and logic for neighbors—for the musician arranges intellectually the sounds in his soul, as the arithmetician numbers and the logician concepts."⁷ And he remarks in a note to this section: "The truth is that the division of the arts into the arts of the beautiful (the Fine Arts) and the useful, however important it may be in other respects, is not what Logicians term an 'essential' division; it derives from the end pursued, and the same art can quite well pursue usefulness and beauty at the same time. Such, *par excellence*, is the case with architecture."⁸

One thing is certain: today we face the fact that there are arts whose primary end is beauty, as distinct from what is today known as utility. But it is to be noted that beauty itself has a definite serviceability. The general Thomistic principles on art and beauty will suffice to ascertain the nature of an art whose primary end is the making of a beautiful artefact. Before considering the nature of art, we shall speak of reality and the response made to it by the fineartist.

⁷*Art and Scholasticism*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930; trans. J. F. Scanlan; p. 21.

**Op. cit.*, p. 155, Note 39.

2. REALITY AND THE RESPONSE OF THE FINE ARTIST

The maker of beautiful things is generally a particular type of person. He is endowed with—or he may indeed acquire—specific sensibilities. With this, he has a concept of beauty *in universali*, developed from experience. The appeal which reality makes to him is not the appeal of truth—which pertains to the natural scientist, the mathematician, and the metaphysician, according to the degrees of unity and truth in the things which they contemplate; nor is it the general appeal of the goodness of things, which is common to all men, according to their desires and needs; but it is the appeal of things as beautiful, and (as consequent on this) as good in themselves.

No artist is independent of reality, any more than others are. He cannot prepare his ideal visions within his own personality, as if these were not based on reality, and in a very true sense found somehow *in* reality. Even when he turns inward to contemplate ideal forms, these forms are touched with the light of their real foundation. Moreover, every such creation is colored, however faintly, by the play of memory, and this bespeaks experience, and experience begins from reality.

In most instances, the artist is born with certain physical and psychical predispositions to the beauty-aspect of reality. It is not a question of great intellectual and moral endowments. But the position is that, for one thing, he enjoys acute sensibility: we do not mean sensuality. Sensuality implies that the person makes the sensible values of reality or experience *bona, honesta*, or ends *propVer se*. Properly orientated—to the First Beauty—the artist's appreciation of the sensible beauty of the universe is good. And if He sincerely loves beauty in every form, he may easily rise to Supreme Beauty as his ultimate good, when he looks from the participated beauty of creatures to essential and causal Beauty.

It can be said—dispositively speaking—that the greatest artist is the one who appreciates all beauty in its own measure, and who, while cherishing a love for each kind of beautiful being, orders his appreciation according to the proper hierarchy of beautiful being: from merely sensible beauty to the intellectual and moral beauty of man (the natural in subordination to the supernatural), and so to the supernaturally revealed beauty of God. But essentially—whatever type of beauty they appreciate—all artists are disinterestedly concerned with beauty in some form, the wider the form the better. And it is certainly true at the same time that the artist does enjoy a heightened awareness of the sensible beauty of the universe. In fact, it seems that the higher the contemplation of the artist—i.e., the more he is ravished with the beauty of God—the more acutely aware he becomes of the sensible beauty of the universe: since his contemplation of Divine Beauty enriches his conception of beauty *in universali*, and thus prepares his soul for beauty in all its manifestations. The deordination to carnal beauty as an end *propter se* is not in the nature of the artist as such: it springs from the defect of prudence, i.e., from a defect in the *man*.

The artist is said to capture the beauty of God as reflected in the visible and invisible universe. He is a determiner of beauty, as God is the creator of all beauty. He need not be aware that his work is to capture this divinely-originated beauty. It is a capturing only in the sense that what he contemplates and creates has its primary origin in the Beauty of God, and that, without the Beauty of God, his own expressions could not be beautiful. Without Beauty, no beauty, whether in the works of nature or in the works of man.

We need not indicate that the appeal which the sensible beauty of nature makes to the musician may be different from the appeal made to the sculptor: in the one case, sound; in the other, shape and movement. Perhaps the

poet is a more universal type, and is aware of much that the musician or sculptor may not be aware of in their respective outlooks. From these sensible predispositions, the artist develops, as we said, a conception of beauty *in universal*.

By the time the young artist is first prompted, for one reason or another, to do his own creating, he brings to his task a certain number of basic qualifications. But it appears that—with some singular exceptions—the artefact remains more or less on the lower sentimental registers, because of the limited experience of reality. As time goes on, and the sensibilities are improved, and the memory and cogitative power are enriched, and the spiritual faculties command a more general view of life and reality, the meanings which the artist can put upon his matter begin to assert greater control over the medium of expression, and the artefact begins to stand in its own right as a more perfect and individual thing, with more dominating unity, and with the deeper analogue of splendid meaning and desire introduced. The mature artist has thus reached a point where he grasps the real around him in the fuller richness of its individuality and in its deeper personal significance, and he is the better qualified to create an individually perfect thing which can be experienced as such by others.

In the genesis of an artefact, we have first the predispositions of the artist, reaching to reality in a way which gradually determines his sensory faculties of cognition, and his intellectual awareness of beauty *in universali*. Of the sensory faculties, the memory and *vis cogitativa* are of paramount importance, as will appear in the course of these pages. With his sensible contemplation, appetite and emotion are awakened. Penetrating these activities are the spiritual operations of intellect and will: a concomitant spiritual contemplation. We shall next consider the final end of the artist in creating, and then the nature of art in the activity of creation.

3. THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE MAKING

We may speak first of the end of the work (*finis operis*) and the end of the artist (*finis operantis*). The end of the work—or more precisely of the act—is the artefact itself. The end of the artist being that for the sake of which he works, we may speak of several kinds of final causes, according to the various purposes he may have. There is first the end *which* is intended (*finis qui*), as opposed to the *finis cui* (the end for which, or for whom he works). The *finis qui*, or the end which is intended, is 'the artefact itself. The *finis cui*, or that for which he works, is the thing" or person that is to benefit by the making; and this may be the artist himself, as far as it is a pleasurable good to make the artefact, or as far as his reputation may be increased, or the like; or it may be some other persons, for whose delight he works (as, for example, the community); or it may be a building or the like, which will benefit by the addition of his artefact.

Again, we may speak of the *finis quo*—i.e., the actual attainment of the end *which* is intended, or the actual production or realization of the artefact.⁹ It may be said that the artefact and its realization are actually the one end in reality, though we may regard the artefact from two viewpoints, in itself, and in its achieved production.¹⁰

Again, we may speak of proximate and remote ends. The proximate end will be the artefact itself, if it serves some further end. The remote end is either intermediate or ultimate, and the ultimate end is either relatively or ab-

**Summa Theol.*, I, q. 26, a. 3, ad 2um: "... finis est duplex, scilicet *cujus* et *quo*... scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei; sicut avaro est finis pecunia, et acquisitio pecuniae." Also, *op* cit.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 8*, q. 2, a. 7; q. 11, a. 3, ad 3um.

¹⁰*Op. cit.* I-II, q. 11, a. 3, ad 3um: "... finis dicitur dupliciter: uno modo ipsa res, alio modo adeptio rei. Quae quidem non sunt duo fines, sed unus finis in se consideratus, et alteri applicatus..."

solutely ultimate. The intermediate end will be some end to be achieved through the making of the artefact—such as fame, or the like—when such an end is not ultimate, but referred to some other end. The absolutely ultimate end is the greater glory of God. The relatively ultimate end is the last purpose in a particular line of action, as fame, money, the artefact itself, and so on.

Finally, a primary end is the principal end among many, and is attractive enough to make the artist create. A secondary end is an accessory end, and does not attract the artist with the force of a primary end. It is clear that these divisions overlap, and are drawn up only on a consideration of the same ends from different viewpoints, resulting in divisions that are complete in themselves, and employ correlative terms, as proximate, intermediate, and ultimate.

It is impossible to say in general what end or ends may move the individual artist to creation. The only principle we can fasten on is this, that the perfect correspondence of the artefact with its exemplar is present to every artist as an end (whatever kind of end this may be), and is the only norm which measures the perfection of the artefact and the perfection of the artist as a maker. However, it seems safe to say that the average artist works also from pleasure, and with the end of principling delightful contemplation in others. There are then three goods: the work or artefact itself, pleasurable creation, and the causing of delight in others.

What are the interrelations of these three goods? The artefact, it may be allowed in the case of the average artist, is the *finis qui*, the end which is sought. The artist himself and the beholder are each a *finis cui*, a person to benefit. The actual realization of this artefact is the *finis quo*, and fruition or happiness is the direct result of this realization. Or we may say that the primary end is the production of the artefact, and the pleasure of creation and the delight of others are secondary ends.

Another way of putting this is to ask what that good is, whose attainment rests the will of the artist. And we say that, generally speaking, the will of the artist rests in the perfect production of the artefact. The pleasure of creation, we may suppose, is generally not the primary end, since if pleasure be not expected, the production of the artefact still is undertaken. The same applies to the secondary end of principling delight in others, since—as we see, after the artefact is completed—the artist still unquestionably delights in the thing, even though his satisfaction suffers somewhat from the failure to please others. Perhaps the artist works just as faithfully, even though he anticipates no response from others.

To put this in its full light, we say as follows. The artist, in experiencing the beauty of things, is drawn to the love of things as perfect individual realities. This act, we said, is consequent upon the experience of beauty, and is its perfection. It may indeed be said that the more the experience of beauty brings home to the mind the full ontological goodness of individual things, the more the will goes out to them as desirable in themselves. And it may likewise be said that the person of artistic sensibilities is proportionately drawn to the goodness of those particular things whose beauty he experiences. Furthermore, since it is beautiful things he loves, beauty itself becomes a *bonum honestum*, a disinterested good. This does not mean beauty in the abstract, for the abstract is not loved, but what is loved is real things possessing the abstractable formality of beauty. And according to this he loves all beautiful things precisely because they are ontologically beautiful. Again, he has a progressively developing notion of absolute beauty, according to his experience, and by this dimly realized standard he measures the beauty of all that he experiences, and the beauty of what he contemplates for creation.

Now, even though it be said that the primary end of the average artist is the artefact itself, we can still ask: but

why does he create the artefact? In what way is fruition bound up with this making? Under what aspect is his love drawn to the artefact, as a good to be made? It seems to us that the ultimate end which attracts him, or that particular aspect of the artefact as a primary good to be made, is the artefact as a singularly beautiful thing. It is thus his love of beauty in a particular form which explains his movement to creation, and which suffices of itself to attract his efficiency. And if we speak of pleasure in this creating, we may distinguish it into the pleasure of making, and the pleasure of achieving the beautiful artefact. The pleasure of making is not sufficient of itself to explain his moving to creation, though in individual cases it may suffice. And regarding the pleasure of achieving the beautiful artefact, this—while it may be looked forward to—is the fruition of possessing the good, and is consequent upon the production. As his love for the artefact as a good to be made flowed out of his love for all beautiful things, so his fruition or happiness flows out of the possession of the end, or the achievement of the desired artefact. And we suppose that if the artist loves the artefact as a disinterested good, he cannot help loving it at the same time as a personal and pleasurable good, as it has proceeded from him, and is in that sense a part of him. Thus the Angelic Doctor speaks of the love which artists (like all men) have for their works, because they love their own being; but there is a correlation between the artist's being and his action; and as the action is in the thing acted on, so he loves the object for the reason that he loves himself.¹¹

¹¹*IX Ethic.*, lect. 7: "Omnis.. .artifex diligit proprium opus... quia omnibus hominibus est eligibile et amabile suum esse.. .Esse autem nostrum consistit in quodam actu. Esse autem nostrum est vivere, et per consequens operari. Unde unicuique est amabile operari opera vitae. Faciens autem in actu est quodammodo ipsum opus facientis. Actus enim moventis et agentis est in moto et patiente. Ideo diligunt opus suum.. .artifices.. .quia diligunt esse."

It remains to emphasize again that no general rule can be set down to explain the movement of individual artists. But it would seem from the nature of their work as the making of beautiful things, and from the disinterestedness with which they devote themselves to their creation, even apart from any pleasure in the work, or in spite of having their works ignored, that an explanation somewhat like the above must be posited.

We add finally, that the artefact may or may not come up to the expectations of the artist. And it may not measure up to his dimly visioned concept of the utmost beauty he can make; but it approaches this, and if it touches upon this ideal, it becomes what the artist calls his masterpiece.

4. HABITS IN GENERAL

In the most general sense, a habit is an accidental perfection. It perfects its subject either entitatively or operatively. It is placed in the category of quality, perfecting a completed substance in some accidental way, in its being or in its operation.^{15*} The four kinds of quality are habit and disposition, natural capacity and incapacity, affective qualities and affections, form and figure. But we are here interested only in habits.

A habit is distinguished from a disposition in being a more permanent quality. We must divide habit into two kinds: entitative and operative. An entitative habit is a permanent quality, disposing a thing well or ill in its substantial entity. Strictly speaking, the term habit more properly belongs to the order of operation as such, and not to the order of entity as such. A good operative habit is a permanent perfection (permanent, that is, in relation to a

¹²For the most complete treatment of the habits in general, cfr. St. Thomas' *Summa, Theol.*, I-II, qq. 49 to 59; *Ethic.*, lib. II, VI; *I Meta.*, lect. 1 to 3, *passim*; *De Virtut. in Communi*.

disposition) of a faculty, whereby it is readily capable of performing its proper work.¹³

The perfections which any operative habit confers on its subject (or faculty) are three: determination of the faculty, by reason of which it will operate (when the habit actually influences the faculty) in one way rather than another; facility of operation in this determined way; and delight in this determined operation. These are briefly given as uniformity of operation (or stability), facility, and pleasure.*⁴ It does not follow that, simply because a faculty of cognition enjoys the qualification of an operative habit, it will actually operate in this determined manner. All that is claimed is that the faculty is in a way to operate easily and pleasurably in a certain manner.

When we speak of an operative habit of man in its most rigorous sense, it is chiefly of a free faculty of the good that we speak. It is principally the will, therefore, which can be qualified by an operative habit. But as far as a faculty can be applied by the will one way or another to a variety of objects, it is said to be capable of operative habits. Thus the intellect (the *intellectus possibilis*) can be qualified by habits; so too the internal apprehensive and ap-

¹³De Virt. in Comm., a. 2, resp: "...habitus est perfectio potentiae." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 49, a. 2, resp: "...qualitatum quaedam sunt naturales...quaedam autem sunt adventitiae...Et hae quidem quae sunt adventitiae, sunt habitus et dispositiones, secundum facile et difficile amissibile differentes." *Ibid.*, ad Sum: "...ista differentia difficile mobile non diversificat habitum ab aliis speciebus qualitatis, sed a dispositione." Cfr. also Commentar. of Silvius on St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 49; q. 50.

¹⁴De Virt. in Comm., a. 1: "...habitibus virtutum ad tria in indigemus. Primo ut sit uniformitas in sua operatione; ea enim quae ex sola operatione dependent, facile immutantur, nisi secundum aliquam inclinationem habitualement fuerint stabilita. Secundo ut operatio perfecta in promptu habeatur...Tertio ut delectabiliter perfecta operatio compleatur: quod quidem fit per habitum; qui cum sit per modum cuiusdam naturae, operationem sibi propriam quasi naturalem reddit, cum sit per modum cuiusdam naturae, operationem sibi propriam quasi naturalem reddit, et per consequens delectabilem..."

petitive faculties of sense; and, in the most extended meaning, the external senses can be habituated, as far as the will customizes their operations. In the cultivation of operative habits, then, it is because the will penetrates, so to speak, the other faculties, that these can receive a stable determination. Once the treasure of such a determination is stored up in a power, under the initial influence of will, the faculty may lean of itself to one way of operating. The cogitative power, for example, once stably informed to regard particularized sensible beauty, can operate in this determined way with ease and delight, apart from a conscious reference to the superior appetite—though, as it seems, this sensible appreciation immediately invokes the superior appetite.

It is properly the will then which is qualified by habits. And these habits receive the strict name of virtues. Accordingly, a virtue, taken simply, is a qualification of the will, whereby the will is in a good way (we are not concerned with bad habits of the appetite, or vices) to operate towards its proper object, the good under the formal aspect of the good.¹⁵ Now the work of the will is to incline towards a good. It is here that we note the fundamental difference between the habits of will and other operative habits. St. Thomas says that a habit can be called a virtue for one (or both) of two reasons: either because it gives the readiness to operate in a good way, or because it actually inclines to a good operation, and determines the faculty to actually pro-

¹⁵*De Virt. in Communi*, a. 12, resp: "...quia bonum magis congrue competit parti appetitivae quam intellectivae; propter hoc, nomen virtutis convenientius et magis proprie competit virtutibus appetitivae partis quam virtutibus intellectivae..." St. Thomas speaks likewise of the sensitive appetite sharing in the nature of strict virtue by a participation in the superior part of the soul (*ibid.*): "Pertinet ad rationalem partem non solum appetitus, qui est in ipsa parte rationali, consequens apprehensionem intellectus, qui dicitur voluntas: sed etiam appetitus qui est in parte sensitiva hominis, et dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Nam etiam hic appetitus in homine sequitur apprehensionem rationis, inquantum imperio rationis obedit; unde et participare dicitur aliquantulum rationem."

duce its good work. This second qualification is designated by the Angelic Doctor as the giving of good use.¹⁶ It is only a habit qualifying the faculty of inclination, or the will (and, analogously, or by participation, the lower appetite), which will tend to determine the perfected faculty to actual operation. This is quite obvious, since a perfection qualifying the very faculty of inclination must imply an actual inclination as the very capacity which it confers. This is the nature then of the moral habits, that they not only give the proximate readiness to operate well, but an inclination to the good operation 'itself, inasmuch as they perfect the inclination of the appetite to operation.

All habits concern a good.¹⁷ They put the faculty in readiness to the good of the faculty itself: operation. But good may be taken in two ways, *simpliciter* (or strictly), and *secundum quid* (in an analogous way). It is only the good of the will which is called a good *simpliciter*, since its object is a good under the formal aspect of a good. But the goodness predicated of other objects—say of the objects of the speculative intellect—is only goodness in a relative and not an absolute sense—i.e., relative to the faculty itself, whose object is not referred to it under the formal aspect of a good.¹⁸

The intellectual virtues (virtues *secundum quid*) in

¹⁶*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 1, resp: "...duplici ratione aliquis habitus dicitur virtus.. uno modo quia facit facultatem bene operandi; alio modo quia cum facultate facit etiam usum bonum; et hoc... pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus."

¹⁷*Ibid.*, loc. cit: "...omnis virtus dicitur in ordine ad bonum..." And he goes on to distinguish virtues into those perfecting the intellect and those* perfecting appetite, according to the good of these faculties.

¹⁸*De Virt. in Communi*, a. 12, resp: "Bonum.. hominis est et bonum cognitivae et bonum appetitivae partis. Non autem secundum eandem rationem utrique parti bonum attribuitur. Nam bonum appetitivae parti attribuitur formaliter: ipsum enim bonum est appetitivae partis objectum: sed intellectivae parti attribuitur bonum non

general qualify the intellectual faculty. (Later we will speak of the sense faculties of cognition participating, in their own manner, in the perfections of intellectual habits.) But every habit is differentiated by the formal aspect of the object of the faculty perfected by the habit, so that—while the faculty remains the one faculty—it is perfected in distinct respects according to the varying aspects of its object.¹⁹

Thus, St. Thomas, following Aristotle, designates intellection (*intellectus*), science (*scientia*), wisdom (*sapientia*), prudence (*prudencia*), and art (*ars*), as the habits of the intellect.²⁰ The first three are habits of the intellect as speculative; prudence and art of the intellect as practical. The good of the speculative intellect is three-fold: the (speculative) consideration of the first principles of speculation and action²¹ (for which consideration we have the natural

formaliter, sed materialiter tantum. Nam cognoscere verum, est quoddam bonum cognitivae partis; licet sub ratione boni non eomparetur ad cognitivam, sed magis ad appetitivam: nam ipsa cognitio veri est quoddam appetibile. Oportet igitur alterius rationis esse virtutem quae perficit partem cognoscitivam ad cognoscendum verum, et quae perficit rationem appetitivam ad apprehendendum bonum; et propter hoc Philosophus..distinguit virtutes intellectuales a moralibus: et intellectuales dicuntur quae perficiunt partem intellectualem ad cognoscendum verum; morales autem quae perficiunt partem appetitivam ad appetendum bonum. Et quia bonum magis congrue competit parti appetitivae quam intellectivae; propter hoc, nomen virtutis convenientius et magis proprie competit virtutibus appetitivae partis quam virtutibus intellectivae."

¹⁹*Ibid.*, loc. cit., ad 4um: "...ubi est alia ratio boni, est alia ratio objecti quantum ad habitum, sed non quantum ad potentiam; propter quod contingit in una potentia multos habitus esse."

²⁰Cfr. VI *Ethic.*; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, aa. 1 to 4.

²¹*De Virt. in Com.*, a. 8: "...prima principia, non solum in speculativis, ut: Omne totum est majus sua parte..sed etiam in tferativis, lit malum est fugiendum, et hujusmodi; haec autem naturaliter nota sunt principia totius cognitionis sequentis..." Here St. Thomas is speaking of the first principles of action as far as they are speculatively known by the habit of intellection, called also intuition. Cfr. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, resp.

habit of intellection); the speculative consideration of the truth of material things in the light of their proximate causes (for which we have the habit of science); and the speculative consideration of the truth of all things in the light of their highest causes (for which we have wisdom). And even though we call these habits speculative—in contradistinction to practical—they are still operative habits, for they perfect the intellect in its operation of speculation.

The good of the practical intellect is the practical consideration of truth—consideration with a view to physical action. It invokes *the* speculative intellect, indeed, but it calls for the viewing of universal truth in the light of particular and practical truth. But this good is two-fold, the practical consideration of deeds to be performed (in which consideration the practical intellect is fortified by prudence), and the practical consideration of works to be made (for which the practical intellect has art).

A word about a basic difference between art and prudence. We have said that the intellectual habits do not give an inclination to operation. In the case of art, the operation is the consideration of how a particular artefact should be made. In the first place, then, a man is not artful in this or that situation, merely because he possesses art. But it is only under a movement of the will that his intellect, as spontaneously fortified by art, does conceive of the right way of making a particular artefact. Further, another movement of the will is needed that this practical consideration should flow over into external act. But regarding prudence, which—because it shares in the nature of a moral virtue—of itself presupposes a rectitude of will, its perfecting of the practical intellect not only makes a man prudent in his consideration, but gives the good use of this consideration.²²

²²*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 4, resp: "Ars autem facit solum facultatem boni operis, quia non respicit appetitum: prudentia autem non solum facit boni operis facultatem, sed etiam usum, tamquam praesupponens rectitudinem appetitus." *Ibid.*, a. 3, ad 2um: "...ad

5. THE HABIT OF ART

Art, like prudence, is concerned with particular contingent things. For both, there is a rule existing in the universal reason, called the *recta ratio*—the proper plan. For prudence, this standard is naturally given by the habit of intellection, as far as this habit determines the universal reason in its recognition of the first principles of action: good must be done and evil avoided. The habit of prudence specifies this universal norm, inasfar as it first qualifies the cogitative power, or particular reason in its perception of a contingent good to be done, and this contingent judgement is reached by the universal practical reason, to specify the first universal principles of action. This contingent judgement forms the minor of a syllogism.²³ In this reaching

hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet, requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem..." Cfr. also *De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 7, resp.

²³:**Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 51, a. 1, ad 2um: "...electio particulars operabilis est quasi conclusio syllogismi intellectus practici... Ex universali autem propositione directe non potest concludi singularis, nisi mediante aliqua singulari propositione assumpta. Unde universalis ratio intellectus practici non movet nisi mediante particulari apprehensione sensitivae partis..." To understand the force of this, a number of cross references to St. Thomas' commentaries *De Ammo*, and *In X Libros Ethic*, are needed. VI *Ethic.*, lect. 1: here St. Thomas distinguishes between the universal and the particular reason, the latter being the cogitative power, which is concerned with particular contingent things: "Unde et inter partes animae sensitivas ponitur una potentia quae dicitur ratio particularis, sive vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium." Again, III *De Anima*, lect. 14, he speaks of the universal practical reason not moving to action of itself, but only through sensitive apprehensions flowing into an irascible or concupiscible passion. And later, *ibid.*, lect. 16, he speaks again of the universal and particular reasons, saying that, If both of these may be said to move, the universal is the prime but quiescent cause, while the particular is the proximate cause, of particular activity: "Haec autem (particularis) jam opinio movet, sed non autem illa quae est universalis. Aut si utraque movet, illa quae est universalis,

down of the universal practical reason to particular judgments, the habit of prudence expedites the intellect to the recognition and acceptance of the particular judgement. This rule of prudence is set against the rule of art, by calling it the *recta ratio agibilium*, while art is the *recta ratio factibilium*.²⁴ A workable paraphrase of the Latin might read: prudence is the ready ability of the mind to arrive easily at the right way of acting; art is the ready ability of the mind to arrive easily at the right way of making a thing. This paraphrase brings to light the fact that in the definition given by St. Thomas, art and prudence are designated as *ratio* (plan, or notion), which is not the habit, but the fruit of the habit, since the habits give the intellect the ready ability to arrive at this perfect directive notion of what is to be done or made in a particular instance. However, no misunderstanding is likely to arise from such a transference, especially if we recall that a habit is most perfectly comprehended when it is actually perfecting a faculty.²⁵

For art, as for prudence, there is a correctness of practical knowledge existing after a universal manner in the practical intellect, and with this there is a particular and contingent representation in the cogitative power. The former stands to the latter as the prime principle of correctness, the last appeal. And as for prudence, so for art: the representation in the cogitative power is the proximate mover to execution, as compared with the quiescent rule in the universal practical reason;²⁶ although the movement to

mouet ut causa prima et quiescens, particularis vero ut causa proxima, et quodammodo motui applicata. Nam operationes et motus in particularibus sunt; unde oportet ad hoc quod motus sequatur, quod opinio universalis ad particularia applicetur." The service of the particular reason is of extreme importance, and we shall refer to it frequently throughout the following pages.

²⁴Summa TheoL, I-II, q, 57, a. 4, resp: "...ars est recta ratio factibilium, prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium."

²⁵De Nat. Verbi Intell. (Opusc. XIII): "De perfectis autem ratione habitus est, quando actui conjungitur."

use, in the case of art, depends upon the appetite, fortified by some virtue such as justice.²⁷

The contingent judgement performed by the cogitative power must somehow be reached and handled by the universal reason, otherwise the universal reason will have no way of particularly understanding its universal norm. As St. Thomas says: "The speculative intellect considers a thing as true or false in a universal way, which is a consideration taken simply; but the practical intellect (considers a thing) by an application to the particular work to be done, since operation (or work) regards particulars."²⁸ The question is how the intellect, in turning to practical consideration, concerns itself with individual particular things. This touches a very abstruse problem. In a general way, without going into any minute and distressing analysis of the problem,¹ we may say simply that the universal reason has recourse, by a reflex act,¹⁰ to the particular judgement in

⁻³//7 *De Anima*, lect. 16: "Haec autem (particularis) jam opinio movet, sed non autem ilia quae est universalis. Aut si utraque movet, ilia quae est universalis, movet ut causa prima et quiescens, particularis vero ut causa proxima." St. Thomas is speaking of prudence, but the reasoning should also apply to art.

⁻⁷VI *Ethic.*, lect. 4: "..circa artem requiritur virtus moralis, quae scilicet rectificet usum ejus. Potest enim esse quod aliquis habeat usum artis quo potest bonam domum aedificare, tamen non vult propter aliquam aliam malitiam. Sed virtus moralis, puta justitia, facit quod artifex recte utatur arte sua." Cfr. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 2um.

¹⁵//7 *De Anima*, lect. 12: "..intellectus speculativus considerat aliquod verum esse vel falsum in universali, quod est considerare simpliciter: intellectus autem practicus applicando ad particulare operabile, quia operatio in particularibus est."

²¹>Cfr. "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars," Rudolf Alters, *The Thomist*, Jan., 1941; vol. III, no. 1.

³⁰St. Thomas makes use of the phrases 'convertendo se ad phantasmata', 'conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata', 'per quamdam reflexionem', 'applicando se*', when speaking of the intellect knowing the singular material thing indirectly, through recourse to the phantasm. Cfr. *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 5; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 1; q. 86, a. 1, for instances of such usage.

the cogitative power. This particularized judgement is received into the universal reason,³¹ not however in the same direct contingent terms as qualify it in the cogitative power, but after a universal manner, since everything is received after the manner or nature of the recipient. In this elevation, the particular judgement is the concern of the intellect taken as practical, and it then serves as the minor of a practical syllogism. This entire syllogism, with its many steps, is equivalent, in the relation of all its terms, to the proper plan of making—*recta ratio facibilimn*, but still in an inchoative and universal way. Yet the universal reason does not stand apart from the contingent judgement of the cogitative power after it has abstracted its universal concepts and judgements: since, for *actual* understanding of its own practical judgements which it has derived from the cogitative power, the intellect must continually see its reasoning in the light of the contingent judgements in the cogitative power: it must keep in touch with this faculty, if its reasoning is to have any directive value as an operable plan. It is true that the universal *recta ratio* can be considered apart from its principle in the senses; but this is a barren consideration as far as practical directive value is concerned.

The cogitative power, it is said by the Angelic Doctor, prepares the phantasms for the intellect;⁵² its judgements therefore, will stand to the agent intellect as proximate principles of universal practical consideration. Between the two powers there must be a certain "continuation", whereby the intellect makes use of the collations of the sense faculty for its own contact with a particular operable object, presented in its contingent aspects within the ima-

³¹*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 51, a. 1, ad 2um: "Ex universal! autem propositione directe non potest concludi singularis, nisi mediante aliqua singular! propositione *assumpta*"

³²*Il Con. Gent.*, c. 73: "Virtus cogitativa non habet ordinem ad intellectum possibilem quo intelligit homo, nisi per suum actum quo praeeparantur phantasmata ut per intellectum agentem fiant intelligibilia actu et perficientia intellectum possibilem."

gination and cogitative power as a possible particular artefact. It is said, in fact, that the particular reason is valueless in man, by itself, without the supervision of the intellect.³³ Indeed, it is only because of a certain redundancy from the universal reason that the particular reason is able to discourse and judge (analogously to intellect).³⁴ To get a completely intelligible picture of the practical worth of the particular reason, this faculty must be seen as standing in continual reference to the universal reason.

How then are we to understand the phrase *recta ratio* in the case of art? It must be taken* as referring principally to the practical intellect, and as belonging dispositively

³³**De Vi/rt. in Comm.*, a. 6, resp. Here St. Thomas compares the natural judgements of brutes and the natural judgements of man, and, while he does not use the term particular reason, the context makes it clear that only this faculty is meant by a natural judgement in man. He says that while the good of the brute is invariable, in man's case it is continually variable according to particular circumstances, and for the discernment of particular goods more than an invariable natural sense judgement is needed. And so: "...naturale iudicium... est uniforme, et ad huiusmodi bonum quaerendum non sufficit; unde oportuit in homine per rationem, cujus est inter diversa conferre, invenire et dijudicare proprium bonum, secundum omnes conditiones determinatum, prout est nunc et hic quaerendum." Again, in the probably Thomistic *De Pncipio Individuationis* (*Opusc. XXV*): "... (ratio particulars) per sui *conjuwctionem cum intellects*, ubi est ratio ipsa quae confert de universalibus, participat vim collativam." Again, in the *Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 81, a. 3: "Ipsa... ratio particularis *nata est* moveri et dirigi in homine secundum rationem universalem." At the same time, he says elsewhere, *VI Ethic.*, lect. 9, that the particular reason enjoys an absolute judgement about particular contingents. But on the whole, it seems that while this faculty may have a spontaneous judgement about particulars, the immediate cooperation and interpretation of the intellect would seem to follow in any conscious act of judgement about particulars.

³⁴*Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 78, a. 4, ad[^]Sum: "... eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis, sed per aliquam aifinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quamdam refluentiam." Cfr. 77 *Con. Gent.*, c. 73.

to the particular reason and other internal senses.³⁵ And the complete understanding of the phrase will include both the universal and particular reason, so that the *recta, ratio* of a thing to be made is a multiple *ratio* or plan, involving first: the practical (universalized) judgements of the universal practical reason; secondly: the contingent judgements of the particular reason (and with these, the instrumentality of other internal senses); thirdly: the indirectly particularized (though still universal) judgements of the universal reason, formed by abstraction from the particular judgements of the, particular reason; fourthly (and most perfectly, as this involves the first three steps): the integrated syllogistic plan existing not simply in the universal reason, but in both the universal and particular reason together, as far as these stand in the relation of support to each other.³⁶

³¹³In speaking of the relation of memory and the cogitative power to the habit of science (and we may extend it to art), St. Thomas says, // *Con. Gent.*, c. 73: "...homines inveniuntur promptiores..ad scientiarum considerationes, secundum diversam dispositionem virtutis cogitativae et imaginativae. Sed ista promptitudo dependet ab illis virtutibus sicut ex dispositionibus remotis..." Concerning prudence, he says, *Summa Theol.*, H-II, q. 47, a. 3, ad 3um: "...prudentia non consistit in sensu exteriori..sed in sensu interiori, qui perficitur per memoriam, et per-experimentum ad prompte judicandum de particularibus expertis; non tamen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in subiecto principali; sed principaliter quidem est in ratione, per quamdam autem applicationem pertinet ad huiusmodi sensum." The same reasoning applies to art, for, like, prudence, it is a habit of the practical intellect, and can be predicated of the internal senses only dispositively or instrumentally.

³⁶V7 *Ethic.*, lect. 2. St. Thomas asks whether the speculative and practical intellect are one and the same. He answers that they are, but the practical intellect implies the cooperation of the particular reason, since it terminates in a particular operable: "...intellectus practicus principium quidem habet in universal! consideratione, et secundum hoc est idem subiecto cum speculative, sed terminatur ejus consideratio in particular! operabili. Unde Philosophus dicit in tertio de Anima (lect. 16, at end) quod ratio universalis non movet sine particular!."

There is one further point regarding this *recta ratio*. Taken strictly, this is the same as the intentional form in the artist's mind. When St. Thomas speaks of the artist's measure of the thing to be made, he almost invariably speaks of that intentional form, according to which the artefact is to be informed, so that this form or idea is not representative of the matter of the artefact. This offers a certain difficulty to our way of thinking, if it is taken strictly. What we think must be said is that the form is the principal representation in the artist's mind, but with this there must be some very definite notions of the matter of the artefact, and all the individuating notes. Since the artist's first concern is with the perfecting of a thing, the primary rule, or the most ultimate norm of all he does will be the pure intentional form. But subsidiary to this will be the intentional forms in the internal senses, as well as many other accessory forms in the intellect.

After briefly considering art and the will, we will take up the interrelations of sensory cognition-and-appetition for the formation of the *recta ratio*, in order to complete the picture.

6. ART AND THE WILL

We said previously that the formation of a plan for making, as well as the execution of this plan, call for movements of the will. It is to be noted, first, that this need not imply a strong movement of the will, since the predispositions in the artist's senses and intellect arouse in their own right the movements of sense appetite and will, and the will receives a certain direction from the sensory movements. However, it is finally up to the will to regulate these lower appetites, whose movements are justified as long as they are

not allowed to overthrow the rational appetite.³⁷ Furthermore, the carrying out of the plan sometimes calls for an insistent movement of the will, due to discouraging obstacles: in which case the will is fortified by some moral virtue.

The best way of seeing all this is to speak of the interactions of intellect and will, presupposing (as we say) the interrelations of universal and particular reason, and of the passions and will/* In a particular situation, an artist is presented with a beautiful object—whether extramental or recollected or the like—which suggests to him, in a general way, its serviceability in artistic creation. He apprehends this possible creation as a *bonum honestum*. This is called a simple apprehension of a good. It is spontaneously followed (with no possibility of freedom) by a first movement of the will, called a simple willing. This is to be expected, since, as we endeavored to show in the case of the average artist, creation is to him a *bonum honestum*, on the strength of his love of all beautiful things and of such as are beautiful through his efficiency.

The second act of the intellect is called a judgement proposing this good as an end. At this point the personal reference enters in. The artist considers creation not simply as a good in itself, but as a good in respect to him. It is a deliberate act, and embraces the judgements of whether or not this particular creation is possible for him, and whether it is morally allowable. It means that the artist judges this creation as itself a *bonum honestum* and as a *bonum*

³⁷/77 *De Anima*, lect. 16: "...appetitus inferior, etsi aliquid de motu proprio retirieat, movetur tamen naturali ordine, motu appetitus superioris, et motu rationis deliberantis. Si autem e converse accidit, quod appetitus superior transmoveatur ab inferiori, hoc est praeter ordinem naturalem. Unde et hoc facit peccatum in moribus, sicut peccata sunt monstra in natura."

³⁸The movements of the will and intellect, as we treat them here, may be found in certain Scholastic text-books, or commentaries—e.g., Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Revelatione*, Ferrari, Rome, 1932, p. 284—and are based on St. Thomas' discussion of the movements of the will in the *Summa Theol.*, I-II, qq. 9 to 17.

delectabile, but in this order, that the creation as a *bonum honestum* is his primary and (relatively) ultimate end, sufficient of itself to move his will to love it and desire it. We need not deal with the morality of the creation, as this would involve a very long" consideration. Upon this act of the intellect follows the act of the will, called an intention. It is a movement to something *in concreto*, whereas the first movement is to something—rather in the abstract, or better, in a universal way.

Thirdly, there is a judgement of the general ways in which the artefact may be realized, called counsel (*consilium*). It is here that the habit of art fortifies the practical intellect, and accompanies all its successive acts. It must be remembered that the drawing up of a mental plan for an artefact implies an intention to actual execution of the plan⁰ even though it be a remote intention, and does not become actual until later, under the movement of the will called active use. And the will, in its previous act of intention (above), is perfected, and continues to be perfected, by some virtue—notably justice; for justice implies fidelity to the plan in its being¹ carried out. We might add that hope likewise fortifies the will in the drawing up of the plan as it progresses, according as obstacles are encountered. Following upon the act of counsel is the will's act of consent, accepting in general the indiscriminated ways in which the artefact may be achieved.

There is then the act of the intellect, called the judgement discriminating among all the general means and fastening upon the best. It is evident what an important part the particular reason plays in such a judgement. This is followed by the act of the will called election, a volitional acceptance of the best way of making the particular artefact. At this point there may be some sub-division drawn

⁵⁰*De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 7, ad lum: "Intellectus...practicus ordinatur sicut in finem in alium exteriorem actum: non enim consideratio de agendis vel faciendis pertinet ad intellectum practicum nisi propter agere vel facere..."

up, but to introduce them here would make for confusion. What can be said about this judgement of the intellect is that it is the last practical judgement before execution: he *judicium practico-practicum*.

There is then the act of intellect called a command (*imperium*). This is essentially a judgement, but with an element of volition: this artefact is to be made.⁴⁰ This is followed by the act of the will, proceeding to the actual execution, called the active use, for the will now uses the faculties necessary for the realization of the conceived artefact.

Finally, we must add the judgements formed during the attainment of the end—what is called the passive use, in which the judgements of the intellect are used by the will in the achieving of the end. The end is actually achieved—i.e., the artefact itself—when it is completely realized in actuality. This is called *adeptio* or *consecutio*. The act of the will thereupon is fruition. In the passive use, we must speak likewise of all the instrumental faculties below intellect. In this *iisus passivus* the habit of art continues to perfect the prolonged practical consideration and the executive operations.

Inasmuch as the movement to execution comes about through the activity of the will, this faculty, says St. Thomas, is the principal cause of the artefact, while art is a secondary cause.⁴¹ But he says elsewhere that the intellect is the principal cause.⁴² The complete view of the principal

⁴⁰*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 17, a. 1.

⁴¹*7 Sent.*, d. 38, a. 1, solut: "Est ergo iste processus in productione artificiali. Primo scientia artificialis ostendit finem; secundo voluntas ejus intendit finem illum; tertio voluntas imperat actum per quem educatur opus. Patet. quod principalitas causalitatis consistit penes voluntatem quae imperat actum."

⁴²*VI Meta.*, lect. 1 (middle): "...principium rerum artificialium, quod est in faciente, est primo intellectus, qui primo artem adinvenit; et secundo ars, quae est habitus intellectus; et tertio aliqua potentia exequens, sicut potentia motiva, per quam artifex exequitur conceptionem artis."

cause will include both intellect and will as related faculties, in their acts of *imperium* and *usus activus*.

7. ART AND SENSORY COGNITION AND APPETITE

St. Thomas says, "Those in whom imagination, memory, and the cogitative power are better disposed, are better disposed for intellectual activity/"⁴³ Again, "Since the internal (sense) faculties of apprehension prepare its proper object for the possible intellect, therefore, by the good disposition of these faculties—with which disposition the good disposition of the body cooperates—a man is rendered readily capable of intellectual activity. And thus an intellectual habit can be in these faculties secondarily, though it is principally in the possible intellect."⁴⁴ Again, "Those who have soft flesh, and consequently a sensitive touch, are of apt mind. . . And thus from the fact that a person has a more sensitive touch, it follows that, taken in itself, he has a more sensitive nature, and consequently, is of better intellect" (or more sensitive intelligence, so to speak). "For good sensibility is a disposition for good intellect."⁴⁵

From this it is clear—and we see it from our own experience—that there can be a relation between definite sen-

⁴³*Siwnma TheoL*, I. q. 85, a. 7: "Illi..in quibus virtus imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa est melius disposita, sunt melius dispositi ad intelligendum."

⁴⁴*Summa TheoL*, I-II, q. 50, a. 4, ad Sum: "..quia vires apprehensivae interius praeparant intellectui possibili proprium objectum, ideo ex bona dispositione harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectus secundario potest in his viribus. Principaliter autem est in intellectu possibili."

⁴⁵*II De Ammo.*, lect. 19: "..qui..sunt molles carne, et per consequens boni tactus, sunt bene apti mente..Unde ex hoc quod aliquis habet meliorem tactum, sequitur quod simpliciter habet meliorem sensitivam naturam, et per consequens, quod sit melioris intellectus. Nam bonitas sensus est dispositio ad bonitatem intellectus."

sitive dispositions and a certain mental outlook. It is not a case wherein there is an uncontrollable constraint exercised upon the higher faculty through a lower. Still, there is a tendency given to intellectual behavior by sensible dispositions, and this tendency is a help to the artist in the perfect forming of a plan or *recta ratio*. A cursory examination of the part played in this intellectual formation by the internal senses will be serviceable. We will not speak of the external senses, but will concern ourselves chiefly with perception, value-judgement, and emotion, in relation to the spiritual faculties. The points we wish to make are the following:

- a. that the *vis cogitativa* is not only the faculty principally concerned in sense perception, but also the faculty directly dealing in particular judgements about contingents.
- b. that this faculty perceives particular values.
- c. that emotions are awakened upon these value-apprehensions.
- d. that the emotions have a certain influence back upon the internal senses and the will.
- e. that both intellect and will in a sense penetrate the lower faculties.
- f. that in the formation of the *recta ratio* the intellect is affected by and employs the judgements of the *vis cogitativa*.^{4G}

*⁶We are indebted to the following sources for most of what we say in this entire section: "The Problem of Perception", Noel Mailloux, *The Thomist*, April, 1942 (vol. IV, no. 2): "The Internal Senses in the Process of Cognition", George P. Klubertanz, *The Modern Schoolman*, Jan., 1941 (vol. XVIII, no. 2): and to a number of articles by Rudolf Allers: "The Vis Cogitativa and Evaluation", *The New Scholasticism*, July, 1941 (vol. XV, no. 3); "The Cognitive Aspects of Emotion", *The Thomist*, Oct., 1942 (vol. IV, no. 4); "Intellectual Cognition", *Essays in Thomism*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1942; "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars", *The Thomist*, Jan., 1941 (vol. III, no. 1).

A. *The vis cogitiiva* is the sensory faculty concerned with perception and particular judgements about contingents. In the first place, there is a difference between perception and sensation, for the latter gives only a consciousness of sensory stimulation as produced from reality. In sensation, there is no question of the significance of the sensible appearances or objective configuration. The common sense, "which is the center of convergence of all sensory activity, presents us with an organic and living synthesis that is the conscious reproduction of the objective configuration."⁴⁷ But perception "attains the substance/⁴⁸ Its object is what is sensible *per accidens*: "that is, the concrete substance. . . What appears to us is the concrete substance, upholding this very complex structure" (the synthesis of accidents, *sensibilia per se*), "with its qualifications, its determinations. . . No material detail escapes this total view: the nuances are precise, the lines clear, the outlines sharp."⁴⁹

Perception is called experimental knowledge. But it is two-fold: immediate experimental knowledge (simple perception), and discursive experimental knowledge. The latter bears the name experimental knowledge in the more proper sense. Both of these operations belong to the cognitive power (the particular reason). The first operation is analogous to the operation of the universal reason which is called "*intellectus*" (in the sense of simple apprehension), the second to the operation which is called "*ratio*" (discursive reason). Thus, in the case of the particular reason, the immediate experimental knowledge is a simple perception: a man, a house (though such objects are not compre-

*⁷Mailloux, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

⁴⁸/6wi, p. 280. This, however, seems questionable. Perhaps it can be understood in the sense that the intellect cooperates with perception. St. Thomas does say, however, that the *vis cogitative*, apprehends "*individuum ut existens sub natura communi.*" (// *De Anima*, lect. 13) See footnote 70 below.

*»*Op. tit.*, p. 277; p. 281.

hended under the intentional form of abstract nature, which is the fruit of the intellect). The discursive experimental knowledge is a bringing together of individual *intentiones*, and reaches "a judgement of fact, a beginning of scientific generalization, or a concrete judgement of value."⁵⁰

In this discursive experimental knowledge, the images are stripped of many of the contingent notes, and put in proximate readiness for the illumination of the agent intellect. Thus it is that the particular reason gives the last touch to the images before they are submitted to the intellect.⁵¹

For this discursive operation of the faculty, the simple perception is not the sole material on which the faculty works, but memory also supplies its store. Memory itself is not said to be experimental knowledge; nor is imagination: but as far as these may be the object of the cogitative power in its bringing together of individual meanings or *intentiones* they are a part of experimental knowledge.⁵²

⁵⁰Op. tit., p. 277. The reader who is interested in analyzing the Thomistic vindication for these statements may refer to the article we cite, which gives numerous references to the works of St. Thomas, of which the principal are: // *Post. Anal.*, lect. 20; *I Meta.*, lect. 1; *II De Anima*, lect. 13; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4.

⁵¹// *Con. Gent.*, c. 73: "Virtus cogitativa non habet ordinem ad intellectum possibilem quo intelligit homo, nisi per suum actum quo praeparantur phantasmata ut per intellectum agentum fiant intelligibilia actu et perficientia intellectum possibilem."

⁵²// *Post. Ana.*, lect. 20: "Ex memoria autem multoties facta circa eandem rem in diversis tamen singularibus, fit experimentum." St. Thomas goes on to speak of the formation of the principle of art in the universal reason through many particular experiences—which formation, as we said previously, stands to a particular artefact to be made as the principle norm (*principium*) of correct creation. "...experimentum nihil aliud videtur, quam accipere aliquid ex multis in memoria retentis. Sed tamen experimentum indiget aliqua ratiocinatione circa particularia, per quam confertur unum ad aliud, quod est proprium rationis.. Ratio autem non sistit in experimento particularium; sed ex multis particularibus in quibus expertis est, accipit unum commune quod firmatur in anima et considerat illud absque

It is not that the cogitative power commands these memorial images, but that, generally speaking, in every perception there is an awakening of memory images. For a thing is always experienced in a context of past experience, however obscure this context be.TM The perception, or the recollection of a man or a place operate in a field of consciousness which is haloed by many past experiences or memories. The discursive power of the particular reason appreciates the object in this memorial context: it brings together the meanings (*intentiones individuates*) of the simple perceptions and the stored-up meanings of memory, seeing these individual meanings in a relation.

In the teaching of St. Thomas, following a long tradition, memory is a faculty distinct from imagination.^M As specifically distinct from imagination, memory acts by way of recognizing an image of a past event as past. The possible intellect also has a memorative capacity.⁵⁵ It is sometimes said that in St. Thomas' view imagination alone has the capacity of retention and reproduction, and memory acts solely by recognition. St. Thomas indeed credits imagination with retention and reproduction. But he likewise says that memory is capable of storing up the individual *intentiones* of the *vis cogitative*^{^TM} And these can be invoked by

consideratione alicujus singularium, et hoc accipit ut principium artis et scientiae." In a particular instance, when this norm is to be used, recourse must be had to the particular reason, to expedite the universal reason in its application of the universal practical norm to a particular operable.

⁵⁵Cfr. *Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics*, Joseph Marechal, S.J., Burns Gates and Washbourne, London, 1927; p. 11; p. 22.

TM*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 4.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 6. Strictly, intellectual memory only retains and reproduces ideas: it does not apprehend them under the aspect of pastness, which is an activity proper to sensory memory. ,

⁵⁶In speaking of the brute's *vis aestimativa*, St. Thomas says: "Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur *vis aestimativa*; ad conservandum autem eas *vis memorativa*, quae est thesaurus quidam hujusmodi intentionum." And regarding the correspondingly superior estimation in man, he says: "Ex

the laws of association, as we shall see later. Both imagination and memory then have retentive and reproductive capacities, the memory retaining and reproducing past value-judgements of the *vis cogitativa*, and recognizing them as past. The imagination, however, retains and reproduces past perceptions, without being capable of recognizing them as past, which belongs properly to the memory.

Reminiscence is another function of memory, but it implies the active cooperation of the intellectual and sensory memories. Moreover, it works through the sensory memory, as far as this faculty stores up and reproduces the past value-judgements of the *vis cogitativa*⁵⁸ and recognizes them as past.

The act of imaginative production, as distinct from reproduction, presents images of things not previously perceived or experienced: it needs the cooperation of intellect. We will speak therefore of reproductive (or representation-al) images, productive images, and memorative images: in this last, recognition of pastness is demanded.

B. *The cogitative power apprehends particular values.* If we are to follow St. Thomas, this faculty must be credited with the ability of apprehending this or that particular object as good, harmful, or—in general—valuable/⁵⁹ It is by no means a distortion of the mind of St. Thomas to include under these value-judgements the judgement of particular sensory beauty/⁶⁰ Indeed, from certain texts of the

parte autem memorativae non solum habet memoriam, sicut caetera animalia, sed etiam reminiscenciam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, *secundum individuates intentiones.*" *Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 79, a. 4.

**Ibid.*: "...reminiscenciam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum individuates intentiones." Cfr. *De Memoria*⁶¹et *Reminiscencia*, lect. 8.

⁵⁸Cfr. *Summa, Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, resp.

⁵⁹John of St. Thomas, commenting on the *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 30, a. 3, did not hesitate to specify 'honores, divitiae, spectaculorum delectatio' as objects which the particular reason adjudges as good and suitable.

Angelic Doctor, where he speaks of man delighting in his senses and sensible things for their own sake,⁶⁰ we may argue that the particular reason, as distinguished from the estimative sense of brutes, can apprehend particular beauty, as well as other contingent values.⁶¹

It seems true at the same time that the particular reason can be determined, through innumerable experiences, to such value-judgements. Thus, we may imagine a person hearing a piece of music for the first time. For him, it becomes an experience of beauty. The simple perception is qualified by the discursive operation of the same faculty, the particular reason, with the note of particular beauty. The perceptual images are stored up in imagination, and the value-judgements of the discursive operation are stored up in memory. Later, he hears the piece again. The perceptual process awakens the memory images, by association, and the perceptual and memorial images are brought together by the discursive operation of the particular reason. But these memory images are the stored-up images of a previous value-judgement. And as such they recur in the new context. And in this sense the particular reason is determined, through many experiences, to particular value-judgements. This determination we can call a habit, for it

°Cfr., e.g., *Summa Theol*, II-II, q. 141, a. 4, ad Sum: "In aliis ..animalibus ex aliis sensibus non causantur delectationes nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus..Homo autem delectatur secundum alios sensus, non solum propter hoc, sed etiam convenientiam sensibilibum... sicut cum delectatur homo in sono bene harmonizato." Cfr. also *Ibid.*, /, q. 19, a. 3, ad Sum; /-//, q. 35, a. 2, ad Sum; //-//, q. 167, a. 2; *VIII Polit.*, lectiones 2, 3. Indeed, it would seem that in the famous text on beauty from the *Summa Theol*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad lum, St. Thomas had in mind principally this apprehension by the particular reason—although, as we said when treating of beauty, this appreciation does not go forward without the interpretation and appreciation by the spiritual faculties.

⁶¹"..with man, perception is a source of disinterested enjoyment, of esthetic enjoyment. For him alone knowledge is a delight." Mailoux, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

determines a faculty to operate in a certain way with ease and pleasure.⁶²

It is easy to understand then, what serviceability the value-judgements of the particular reason can lend to the universal reason, when the artist is confronted with the problem of a particular creation. Though the art of the universal reason is the prime and quiescent rule of the artefact, this rule becomes effective only on the cooperation of the lower reason—and this faculty is expedited by its habits of particular value regarding the beauty of this or that determination of the artefact.

C. *Emotions are awakened upon these value-apprehensions.* When an object is apprehended as valuable, we are simply saying that the object has an interest for the person, that it has a *personal* meaning for him. Now, while it is true, as Rudolf Allers points out,⁶³ that the full appreciation of a thing as personally significant demands the insight of intellect, yet the sensible appreciations of the particular reason as serving the intellect in this intimate personal judgement must register to some degree in the sensitive appetites. On the other hand, the appreciation by intellect itself cannot help but evoke the activity of the sensitive appetite, together with the rational appetite. Thus, at least dispositively, the value-judgements of the particular reason awaken the activity of the sense appetites. And taking both the universal and particular reason together in the realization of personal value, once such a value is apprehended, emotions are enkindled.⁶⁴ Experience shows this

*²*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 50, a. 3, ad Sum: "...in ipsis interioribus viribus sensitivis apprehensivis possunt poni aliqui habitus secundum quos homo sit bene memorativus, vel cogitativus, vel imaginativus."

⁶³"The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars", *The Thomist*, January, 1941, p. 159.

⁶⁴St. Thomas says that the mere perception of a particular does not engage the appetites, but only the apprehension of the object as good or bad, suitable (and we think this is the insertion-point for particular beauty) or harmful. *III De Anima*, lect. 4 (at end): "...appetitus non patitur neque movetur ad simplicem apprehensionem

to be so, even though it happens that the emotions be obscure. This evaluation may, as a matter of fact, be scarcely detectible in reality; yet it should not therefore be labelled as 'sub-conscious/ It may not call for reflective processes of the intellect, and may therefore be styled 'sub-rational', since no elaboration or reflective reasoning is demanded in situations which we habitually associate with personal significance.⁶⁵ The universal reason itself can be habituated to the appreciation of this or that as personally valuable; and possessing such a habit (formed initially through the ministrations of the particular reason), it can operate instantaneously, without reflection, since this is included in the notion of a habit as a perfection of a cognitive faculty. However, we are aware from experience, that emotions are not always the natural concomitants of value-appreciation; but generally speaking, this is the case.

Regarding emotions themselves, these are to be distinguished from the simple movements of sense appetite: for they are the conscious correlates of these appetitive movements, or those conscious states by which we become aware of the movements of sense appetites. They thereby serve to make the person particularly aware of a situation or object as personally significant. They do indeed presuppose the (perhaps unreflective) realization of value; but they also help to deepen one's awareness of value. This leads us to the next point.

D. *Emotions have a certain influence back upon the internal senses and upon the will.* We say that the effect

rei, qualem proponit phantasia. Sed oportet quod apprehendatur sub ratione boni vel mali, convenientis vel nocivi." Such an apprehension is attributable to the discursive operation of the particular reason—with the concomitant interpretation of intellect, which sets going the performances of the appetitive powers, and thus indirectly evokes emotion.

⁶⁵Cfr. Allers, "The Cognitive Aspects of Emotion", *The Thomist*, op. tit., p. 632.

(or one of the effects) of emotion is to deepen one's consciousness of an object as in some way personal. It cannot help but act in such a manner, since the apprehended object is the cause of the emotion. It is not that the emotions perform any cognitive activity; but, in the sense that they incline the cognitive powers to fasten more securely upon the particular aspect of the object, they have an effect upon cognition. This effect registers through the particular reason in its first and second operations, especially in the second or discursive act. It moves the memory through the particular reason, as far as perceptual images and value images awaken the memory by association. The influence of the emotions on the will is effected through the particular reason and thus through the intellect.⁰⁰ On the other hand, the will has an influence on the appetites and emotions. Whether this is a direct influence, or is achieved through the intellect, and thus through the particular reason, it is difficult to say. Perhaps it is in the latter way; and we refer the reader to a passage in St. Thomas, which seems to support this opinion.⁰⁷

^{GG}Cfr. *Summa Theol*, I-II, q. 77, a. 1, resp: "...passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio et iudicium aestimativae... unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur; unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem appetitus sensitivi, et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus est semper sequi iudicium rationis." This is to speak of the influence of emotion on the will: we have said that the awareness of a particular value bespeaks some appreciation by intellect from the beginning": and this intellectual appreciation of itself involves the will and some degree of emotion. But the *continuation* of emotion has such an influence on will as we have stated.

^{f17}*Summa Theol*, I, q. 81, a. 3. He speaks of the lower appetites and emotions as obeying the intellect in regard to their own acts, and obeying the will in regard to activity upon the apprehension of something as harmful, suitable, and the like: flight, possession, etc. He says nothing definite about the will in the former case, but one might argue to its place.

E. *Both intellect and will in a sense penetrate the lower faculties.* This involves a very profound problem: the interrelations of spiritual and material faculties. There is no question of the fact of their interrelation, as there is none of the substantial union of body and soul. But it remains mysterious how such a thing can be.⁶⁸ Perhaps no solution will ever be reached. Meanwhile, we are left with the fact of an interrelation, and a number of Thomistic descriptions, based on phrases like "reflexio", "conversio", and "continuatio"—according to which the sensible and spiritual faculties are said to touch each other. This is the only sense in which continuation can be taken, since a spiritual faculty must always remain spiritual, and a material faculty material, with no possibility of a third type of faculty which is both material and spiritual—since it must be one or the other—forming* a continuation between them.

While it is certain that the particular reason does not transcend the category of sense,⁶⁹ yet it has, says St. Thomas, a certain eminence in man by a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, according to a kind of overflow.⁷⁰ He speaks of the relations of the particular

TMRudolf Allers covers the question admirably in "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars," *op. cit.* He suggests the lines along which some solution of the problem may be reached, while discountenancing solutions which fall back upon the union existing among spiritual and material faculties by reason of their belonging to the one selfsame soul. The use of such terms as "reflexio", "continuatio", etc., as he correctly asserts, are merely descriptive; and as these terms are met in St. Thomas, it must be said that the Angelic Doctor himself has not solved the fundamental problem. Had he lived longer, perhaps he would have solved the difficulty.

⁶⁹)// *Con. Gent.*, c. 73: "...cum virtus cogitativa habeat operationem solum circa particularia quorum intentiones dividit et componit, et habeat organum corporale per quod agit, non transcendit genus animae sensitivae."

⁷⁰*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 5um: "...eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis, sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quamdam refluentiam." Also, // *De*

reason and the universal reason in the case of a particular work to be made. The passage deserves to be quoted at some length. "The mind" (i.e., the intellect) "mingles itself *per accidens* with singulars, as far as it is continuous with the sensitive faculties, which are concerned with particulars. This continuation is two-fold. First, as far as the movement of the sensitive part terminates at the intellect, as is the case in that movement" (of knowledge) "which is from things to the soul; and so the mind knows the singular by a certain reflex movement, inasmuch as, knowing its object, which is a universal nature, it returns to a knowledge of its own act, and beyond this to the species which is the principle of its own act, and then to the image from which the species was abstracted; and in this way it gets some knowledge of the singular. Secondly, as far as that movement" (of knowledge) "which is from the soul to things begins from the intellect, and proceeds into the sensitive part, inasmuch as the intellect rules the lower faculties; and thus the intellect mingles itself with singulars through the mediation of the particular reason, which is a certain individual faculty given the alternate name of cogitative power, and which has a definite bodily organ. . . . But the universal judgement which the intellect has concerning things to be made" (or done) "cannot be applied to a particular act except through some mediate power which apprehends the singular, so that a kind of syllogism may thus be drawn up, the major of which is a universal, which is the intellectual judgement, the minor a singular, which is an application of the particular reason, and the conclusion a singular *electdo*."⁷¹

Anima, lect. 13: "...cogitativa apprehendit individuum, ut existens sub natura communi: quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subjecto."

⁷¹*DE Ver.*, q. 10, a. 5, resp: "...mens per accidens singularibus se immiscet, inquantum continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia versantur. Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam; et sic mens singulare

Regarding- the mingling of the will among the senses, this is something that follows from the nature of the mingling of the universal and particular reasons. It would seem, as we indicated previously, that the influence on the sensible emotions would come about through the influence of the will on the choice or attention of the intellect, and thereby on the particular reason, with a consequent effect on the emotions, which—as St. Thomas says—are consequent on the acts of the particular reason.⁷²

This penetration of the higher faculties into the lower is one of the most important doctrines of St. Thomas regarding human cognition and appetite. And since, in this penetration, the particular reason figures so conspicuously, it is curious to see how often this faculty is overlooked by certain commentators in their treatment of human cognition as expounded by the Angelic Doctor.

It is our contention, now, that in the mind of St. Thomas there is no strict independence of the particular reason, but it is naturally ordained to cooperate with the universal reason. Such a conclusion must be reached if one examines all the texts in which the Angelic Doctor speaks

cognoscit per quamdam reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognoscendo objectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est actus sui principum, et ulterius in phantasma a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de singulari accipit. Alio modo secundum quod motus qui est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires; et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione particulari, quae est potentia quaedam individualis quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet mediam cellulam capitis. Universalem vero sententiam quam mens habet de operabilibus, non est possibile applicari ad particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam apprehendentem singulare, ut sic fiat quidam syllogismus; cujus major sit universalis, quae est sententia mentis; minor autem singularis, quae est applicatio particularis rationis; conclusio vero electio singularis operis..."

⁷²*Summa ThcoL*, I, q. 81, a. 3, resp: "Unde ab ea" (i.e., ratione particulari) "natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus."

of the particular reason. We cannot claim to have come across every such reference, but among those which we have found the particular reason is invariably associated with the universal. Moreover, though it may be possible for the particular reason to operate instantaneously, without reference to the universal reason, it does not seem possible that the same activity can continue without invoking the activity of intellect, or intellectual awareness. It is true that such intellectual activity may be obscure, but that does not argue against its presence, especially when we remember that man is not a simple sensitive being, but his nature is a substantial unity of sensitive and spiritual being. As Rudolf Allers points out, "There is no perception, in the true sense of the term, in which the intellect does not take part."⁷¹ And again, regarding the term "extension" (*continitatio*), "This term only expresses the fact that there is an undoubted cooperation of the sensory faculties and the intellectual powers, and a penetration, as it were, of the latter into the former in such a way that, even a simple sensory operation has a certain amount of intellectuality admixed."⁷¹ St. Thomas speaks of the cogitative power needing to be determined and perfected in man, for the reason that—unlike the absolute service of the estimative power in the case of animals—this power is humanly worthless (because man's relation to individual things as good or harmful changes under changing conditions), unless the higher power support it.⁷¹

⁷³"The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars," *op. cit.*, p. 143.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁷⁵*De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 6, resp: "...non sufficeret homini (naturalis appetitus boni, nee) naturale iudicium ad recte agendum, nisi amplius determinetur et perficiatur." And if this is true of prudence, it is true of art for the same reasons. It is clear that this text cannot be used to vouch for the dependence of particular reason on universal in every instance. An explicit text of this nature can scarcely be found, unless it be from the *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 5um: "...eminentiam habet cogitativa.. in homine.. per aliquam affinita-

F. *In the formation of the recta ratio the intellect is affected by, and employs the contingent judgements of the particular reason.* We do not think anything further need be said on this point. It follows from all we have pointed out. The intellect not only employs the phantasms given it by the particular reason for the work of intellection, but because these are qualified by the note of particular value, it understands this qualitative relation obtaining among them. The intellect itself has its own value-apprehensions concomitantly with those of the particular reason, as well as possessing certain habitual appreciations formed by innumerable experiences.

St. Thomas says that the intellect can command the phantasms which it needs to reach particular conclusions.⁷⁰ This is itself problematical, but we experience the fact. More will be said of this when we come to poetry.

8. CONCLUSION

What then is art? What is the plan, or *ratio*, or "vision"? What is the "form"? Art, we said, is a habit of the practical intellect, perfecting this faculty in the practical consideration of a work to be made. And as the practical intellect cannot be understood except in the light of the

tern et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quamdam refluentiam." In the probably Thomistic *De Principio Individuationis* we read: "... (ratio particulars) per sui conjunctionem cum intellectu, ubi est ratio ipsa quae confert de universalibus, participat vim collectivam."^t

⁷⁶*Suiftnma TheoL, II-II*, q. 173, a. 2, resp: "... secundum imperium rationis disponuntur phantasmata in ordine ad id quod est intelligendum." // *Con. Gent.*, q. 73: "...post speciem in (intellectu possibili) receptam, indiget (phantasmate) quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae speciei, unde se habet ad phantasmata sicut causa efficiens: secundum enim imperium intellectus, formatur in imaginatione phantasma conveniens tali speciei intelligibili in quo resplendet species intelligibilis sicut exemplar in exemplato sive in imagine."

interrelated universal and particular reasons, art belongs principally to the universal reason, and participatively to the particular reason. In the universal reason, the rule which is formed under the habit of art is said to be quiescent, as distinguished from the contingent representations in the particular reason, since the universal reason does not move except through the particular, which is directly concerned with particulars. The universal reason knows the general rules of the particular craft practised by the artist. The particular reason presents the individual contingent aspects of the work to be made.

The *ratio* may be taken as the complex of universal rules possessed by the higher reason. The multiple representation in intellect and sense, of the work to be made, in its particular and universal aspects, may likewise be understood as the *ratio*. Art itself is sometimes taken for this *ratio*, in both the first and second meanings. And taken thus, art is the *correct* plan, the *recta ratio*, of the work to be made, since it belongs to art to perfect the intellect in its judgements of the suitability of this or that contingent aspect of the contemplated artefact, while it also perfects the particular reason, inasfar as this faculty can be said to participate in the combining and dividing nature of intellect. The "vision" of the artist may embrace all that art embraces in this final sense, or may simply be (and most properly is) the representation itself, in intellect and sense, of the work to be made.

The "forma" mentioned frequently by St. Thomas, taken strictly, is the exemplar of the real form of the artefact. It is the representation of accidental perfection—shape, tone, and the like, but after a universal manner. But it may also be extended as far as the *ratio* and even art itself are extended, since it implicates a knowledge of the entire artefact, as far as may be, in its universal and contingent aspects.

The perfection of the habit of art consists in its fortifying of the universal intellect in the acceptance or rejection

(according to the general rules of the craft) of this or that particular modification, as given by the particular reason, whether in creating the plan, or in executing it.

Thus the artist knows in general what the rules of good carving are, from his love and study of particular works, and from his own experiments. Under the impact of some urge to create, or the shock of a genuine inspiration, given him either through present reality or some recollection, he has immediately a composite representation in sense and intellect together of the situation or object. This composite representation may be called a remote plan or *ratio* of the artefact. The habit of art instantaneously perfects these faculties, under the impulsion of the good of creation, so that the formation of a particular plan begins. Through the "continuation" of the universal with the particular reason, he concludes, step by step, as to the suitability of this or that shape, with the composite representation and the general rules of his craft to direct him. The emotions may figure in the creation, by serving to draw the attention to the particular beauty of this or that modification. The process is one in which he reechoes the word of Omnipotence on the morning of creation: Let there be light. He shapes the stone: there is light, sensible and intelligible. All along the line, in the functions of the particular reason as it discerns particular values of beauty, the memory and imagination are utilized, the particular beauty is apprehended, and the suitability of what is thus apprehended is passed upon by the universal reason.

CHAPTER V

THE METAPHYSICS OF ART

We do not intend to go into the question of the being' of artefacts-in-general to any great extent. We will make only such general observations as are necessary to prepare the way for the consideration of Poetry, where we will be at pains to discover the being of a poem. We must first say that the treatment of the being of an artefact in general involves at the same time some discussion of efficient causality in art. This could have been partially considered in the previous chapter, but even there we should have to understand that efficiency in the light of the metaphysics of an artefact. We treat the question here, in brief, and shall consider the artefact as proceeding from efficient causality, the relation of the artefact and the artist's purpose, and the measure of the perfection of the artefact.

1. THE ARTEFACT AS PROCEEDING FROM EFFICIENT CAUSALITY

If the exemplary form—as a representation of the entire artefact in its universal and contingent aspects, or of the full effect intended by the artist¹—is that according to

iSumma Theol, *II*, q. 78, a. 2, resp: "Forma artificialis est similitudo ultimi effectus, in quem fertur intentio artificis: sicut forma artis in mente aedificatoris est forma domus aedificatae principaliter, aedificationis autem per consequens." Thus the representation of the artefact *in fieri* (or of the making) must imply a directive knowledge of the entire artefact.

which the artefact is to be made, the person (as the *principium quod*, or the principle which acts), the nature of the artist (as the *principium quo remotum*, or the remote principle by which the person acts), and the will (as the *principium quo proximum*, or the proximate principle by which he acts) are the efficient cause of this making. The faculties which are employed by the person, and imperated by the will, are instrumental causes, through which the action of the agent is exercised. The intellect must itself be called a proximate principle by which the agent acts, in the sense that it gives direction to the will. But inasfar as it is itself moved by the will, in this respect it is an instrumental cause.

In this sense we may consider intellect and will as each a principle by which the agent acts. But the will is an efficient principle, and the intellect, taken in itself, a formal principle. It is when the intellect is, so to speak, joined with the will, or moved by the latter, that we may speak of it in relation to efficiency. Similarly, the form, taken in itself as a perfection of intellect, is a formal cause; but when—as being spiritually one with the intellect²—it is, as it were, joined with the moving will, it becomes an operative form. As moved by the will, it is an instrumental cause; as giving direction to the will, it shares in the efficiency of the will, and in this sense is an efficient principle.

Another way of treating the formal cause (or the exemplar), taking it as a perfection of intellect, is to indicate that, strictly speaking, it is not in itself a distinct kind of cause, but is an aspect of the efficient, final, and intrinsic (or real) formal causalities. As being conjoined with the will, it is an aspect of the agent's efficiency; as being the representation of the artefact, which is the intended good, it attracts the will, and is an aspect of final causality; as being that, under intentional existence, which is achieved in

²) *e Nat. Verbi Intellect.*, (opusc. XIII): "... (intellectus est) unum agens, cum quo et species ipsa efficitur unum spiritualiter in participando vitam ejus..."

reality through the disposition of the matter, it is an aspect of the real or intrinsic formal causality.

The sensible form, or species, in the sense faculties is itself, properly speaking, an instrumental cause, since the lower faculties are ordained to be moved by the higher. Nevertheless, as far as the practical intellect necessarily implies the particular reason (and with this the imagination and memory), the sensory faculties, as themselves perfected by the species which represent the particular contingent aspects of the intended artefact, may be said to share in the principality of the intellect. Thus the sensible species are, by participation, certain aspects of the efficient, final, and real formal causalities. But regarding the latter causality, the sensible species are not representative of the substantial form, as the intelligible species may be. Comparing the intentional forms in intellect and sense, they are both representative of an accidental form of the artefact, but intellect represents this in a universal way, sense in a particular way. On the other hand, the intellect has an intelligible species of the substantial form of the artefact—of stone, or the like, which it needs to direct it in the giving of the accidental form of shape.

The efficient causality in art is said to be the impressing of a form upon external matter. First, we observe that it is a question of some accidental perfection (and this is the meaning of form as taken here),³ being given to a substantial thing, a complete substance, like stone or bronze.⁴ The form which is impressed is said to be an operative form

³*De Virt. in Comm.*, a. 3, resp: "...subjectum accidenti subijcitur, sicut quaedam potentia activi; unde et accidens forma dicitur." *IV Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 1, solut. I: "...omne completivum quodammodo formale est respectu ejus quod completur."

⁴*V Meta.*, lect. 2: "...aes statuae, et argentum phialae sunt causa per modum materiae." In *VII Physic.*, lect. 5, St. Thomas speaks of the form of an artefact as an accident—e.g., shape, or something similar. But the receiving of such an accident by the artefact is not to be called an alteration, but a *perfection*, since—by an analogy to substantial forms—an accidental form gives to an artefact its speci-

which the mind conceives. This opens up an immense field of speculation, involving the problem of how something which exists in the mind can be said to be impressed at all on external matter. But this "impressing" does not imply the procession of a form from the mind to the world of reality. What does "proceed" is the action of the efficient cause, which is in both the agent and the thing acted on. This is to say that the causality of the efficient cause consists in an influx by way of action." But the intentional form acts as a directive measure for the disposing of the extramental real, and the simultaneous inducing of an accidental form. This inducing (or drawing out) of a form is the whole efficiency of the artist, and it is carried on accord-

fic being as an artefact. "Forma..dicitur quae dat esse specificum artificiato. Formae enim artificiatorum sunt accidentia.. Si domus perficitur per hoc quod lateribus ornatur aut cooperitur, ridiculum est dicere, quod domus alteretur quando cooperitur aut lateratur. Est etiam manifestum quod alteratio non est eorum quae fiunt inquantum fiunt: sed unumquodque perficitur et fit, inquantum accipit formam propriam et figuram: non est ergo alteratio in acceptione figurae et formae.. Formae artificialium sunt figurae vel aliquid propinquum; et ideo propter similitudinem huiusmodi formarum et figurarum ad formas substantiales, dicit Philosophus, quod secundum acceptionem formae et figurae non est alteratio, sed perfectio."

¹»"Efficient cause alone, in the proper sense exercises its causality 'per modum actionis', so that it can be said of it exclusively that action is its mode of influx..." *Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas, op. cit.*, by Francis X. Meehan; p. 188. "An efficient cause.. is a productive cause or an acting cause; a cause which, by action, contributes being to, or to the being or becoming of, another." *Ibid.*, p. 187. The other causes contribute according to their own manner of influx, the extrinsic formal cause (or exemplar) sharing in the causality of the efficient, final, and intrinsic formal causes. For an exhaustive study of causality, cfr. Meehan, *op. cit.*, pp. 169 to 239. It is not our intention to discuss the nature of action, passion, and motion in efficient causality: the problem is extremely difficult, and controversial. We refer the reader to the work cited, p. 222, ff. Hardly anything would be gained by an application of the general principles of efficiency to the question of creation in poetry, which has its own problems in creative efficiency.

ing to a direct disposing of the matter in the light of a directive exemplar, or intentional form.⁶ This production of a new specific perfection is attributed to the artist as to a true efficient cause, in the order of secondary causes, and to God in the order of primary cause.

The habit of art directs and determines the artist in this ultimate disposition of the material, for it fortifies the mind in its attention to the universal and particular exemplar, as well as serving in the solution of particular unforeseen difficulties in the actual execution. The realized sensible and intelligible splendor (subsuming integrity and order) is thus indirectly attributable to the habit of art, and directly to the will, as far as this faculty, being drawn by the good of the represented sensible and intelligible splendor, becomes operative and commands the instrumental faculties.⁷

⁶St. Thomas, commenting on Avicenna incidentally, speaks of four kinds of efficient causes, *perficiens*, *disponens*, *adjuvans*, and *consilians*. The disposing efficient cause is, e.g., the man who prepares the material for the inducing of the form, and he merits the name of efficiency only in a less proper sense than the man (*perficiens*) who actually induces the artificial form, by inducing "the final disposition, upon which the form necessarily follows." V. *Meta.*, lect. 2: "Perficiens autem dicitur causa efficiens, quae ultimam perfectionem rei causat, sicut quod inducit formam substantialem in rebus naturalibus, vel artificialem in artificialibus, ut aedificator domus. Disponens autem quod non inducit ultimam formam perfectivam, sed tantummodo praeparat materiam ad formam; sicut ille qui dolat ligna et lapides, dicitur domum facere. Et haec non proprie dicitur efficiens domus; quia id, quod ipse facit, non est domus nisi in potentia. Magis tamen proprie erit efficiens, si inducat ultimam dispositionem ad quam sequitur de necessitate forma..."

⁷*I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, solutio: "Est ergo iste processus in productione artificiatum. Primo scientia artificialis ostendit finem; secundo voluntas ejus intendit finem illum; tertio voluntas imperat actum per quem educatur opus, circa quod opus scientia artificis ponit formam conceptam. Unde scientia se habet ut ostendens finem, et voluntas ut dirigens actum et informans opus operatum.. Patet.. quod principalitas causalitatis consistit penes voluntatem quae imperat actum."

This accidental form is said to exist potentially in the matter—e.g., shape in stone, tonal vibrations in a violin. The number of possible forms is limited by the nature of the material itself. When the artist disposes the stone, he arranges it in esthetic order (according to whatever intentional form he contemplates),⁸ and thus draws out, or educes new shapes from the potentiality of the stone, for the appearance of a new sensible and intelligible light.

Out of the formless stone, when the artist united him-
self with stone,
Spring always new forms of life, from the soul of man
that is joined with the soul of stone.

The material, or substantial thing on which he works, is (as we said) conceived indeed, but only in conjunction with the form. Not that this material is purely accessory, for it truly supports and conditions the accidental form through quantity. But it is rather perfection than limita-

⁸It might be questioned, in passing, what esthetic order there is in a deliberately chaotic or (not to beg the question) disorderly statue or painting, or piece of music. It should be borne in mind that, whatever the proportion of a piece of art to the individual beholder, if it perfectly represents the pattern in the artist's mind, to that extent it is perfect, and therefore ontologically beautiful: its caused proportions perfectly carry out the intended exemplar. It is another question to ask of the relational beauty of such a thing to the individual beholder. If it is possible for such an individual to apprehend the exemplar which inspired and directed the artefact, then—removing all inhibiting circumstances, such as prejudice—he will perceive the objective beauty of the artefact, and is in a position to experience its beauty. St. Thomas has this to say: "An image" (*imago*, in the generic sense of artefact, though directly it seems to mean a statue) "is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents a thing, although it be an ugly thing." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8, resp: "Unde videmus quod aliqua imago dicitur esse pulchra, si perfecte repraesentat rem, quamvis turpem."

⁹T. S. Eliot, *Collected Poems*, ("Choruses from 'The Rock'"); Harcourt Brace and Co., New York, 1936; p. 206. Eliot, if we infer correctly from his writings, is acquainted with Thomistic philosophy.

tion which the artist meditates; and as the material is the limiting principle of the accidental form and the latter is the perfecting principle, the material is meditated as far as it is perfectible. There is thus an interplay between this matter and form, inasfar as the perfecting form depends upon adaptable matter, and the artist cannot afford to ignore the conditions of the matter: as the violinist cannot afford to ignore the conditions of the violin, the tension of the strings and the bow, the position in which he holds it, and the general state of the instrument for the playing of perfect melody. But the artist's direct intention is to produce perfection, and this is done through the form. His interest is not in the stone or the violin in themselves, but in the shaping of stone, or the playing of the violin.

2. RELATION OF THE ARTEFACT AND THE ARTIST'S PURPOSE

St. Thomas speaks of disposition and providence regarding God. "We can consider two kinds of order in things: one according as they proceed from their origin" (or cause), "and one according as they are ordered to some end. Disposition then applies to that order by which things proceed from their principle: for things are said to be disposed according as they are established in various grades of being by God, as the artist variously arranges the parts of an artefact; and thus disposition seems to belong to art. But providence bespeaks the order of things to an end, and so divine providence differs from divine art and disposition: for divine art concerns the production of things, but His disposition concerns the order of these products" (to one another, we add) ; "and His providence concerns an ordering to the end of the artefact" (or the entire universe as His artefact, whose end is God Himself). "But since all that is in the made thing is brought into a unity by the end of the artefact; and the ordering to an end is closer to the end than the ordering of parts to one another, and in a sense the

cause of this latter; therefore providence is in a sense the cause of disposition; and for this reason the act of disposition is frequently attributed to providence/¹⁰

Though St. Thomas distinguishes divine art and disposition, he says that disposition belongs to art, and by disposition he means the ordering of things to one another, as the artist orders part to part in the artefact. Another statement we wish to use is that providenceⁱ—or the ordering of the thing to an end—is in a way the cause of the order of parts to parts. Applying this to the artist and the artefact, the procession of the thing from his causality is directed according to a final purpose. This ordering bespeaks a certain providence (from *pro-videre*, whose execution is governance: and in this latter we are not interested). This providence determines the disposition or esthetic order of the artefact.

Now we insist that, in contradistinction to the final purpose of a useful artefact, the beautiful artefact has not the end of really perfecting some other thing, but its end may be two-fold: to be a perfect expression of the operative exemplar, and to principle delightful contemplation in

¹⁰De Ver., q. 5, a. 1, ad 9um: "...in rebus potest considerari duplex ordo: unus secundum quod egrediuntur a principio; alius secundum quod ordinantur ad finem. Dispositio ergo pertinet ad illum ordinem quo res progrediuntur a principio: dicuntur enim aliqua disponi secundum quod in diversis gradibus collocantur a Deo, sicut artifex diversimode collocat paries sui artificii; unde dispositio ad artem pertinere videtur. Sed providentia importat illum ordinem qui est ad finem; et sic providentia differt ab arte divina et dispositione: quia ars divina dicitur respectu productionis rerum; sed dispositio respectu ordinis productorum; providentia autem dicit ordinem in finem artificiatum. Sed quia ex fine artificii colligitur quidquid est in artificiatum: ordo autem ad finem est fini propinquior quam ordo partium ad invicem, et quodammodo causa ejus; ideo providentia quodammodo est dispositionis causa; et propter hoc dispositionis actus frequenter providentiae attribuitur. Quamvis ergo providentia ne sit ars quae respicit productionem rerum, ne dispositio quae respicit rerum ordinem ad invicem; non tamen sequitur quod non pertineat ad practicam cognitionem."

others. In this principling of delight, it may indeed seem that the artefact is itself really perfective of the beholder: but whatever may be said of such perfecting, it is not one and the same with the perfecting of such things as are made by the mechanical arts. For this reason, we called the beautiful thing a good, but—to distinguish it from the good strictly taken, which draws to itself for some kind of real possession—it is a good to know: an esthetic good, invoking the will through knowledge.

However, we spoke likewise of the relatively ultimate end of the artist himself, and said that—speaking for the average, and certainly for the great, artist—this end is the disinterested good of beauty which he knows and loves. This good *in universali* is particularized in a given instance by a contemplated beautiful artefact. The love of this particularized beauty prompts him to its execution.¹¹ The *finis operantis* (the end of the artist) is thus one with the *finis operis* (which is the artefact); and in the real order these become identified, the artefact being the realization of lov of particularized beauty.

The purpose of creating a perfect expression of the exemplar, as against the end of principling delight in others, is the primary end, sufficient of itself to move the artist's will. These two ends together determine the esthetic order or the disposition of the artefact. But, unlike the useful artefact, the end of service to others is not the chief determinant, however far this intended proportion modifies

¹¹(St. Thomas speaks of the artist discovering art from his heart, and then of the proceeding of the artefact from this. The point is not to be labored, but we insert the citation by way of illustration, rather than support. / *Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2um: "...in egressu artificiatorum ab arte est considerare duplicem processum; scilicet ipsius artis ab artifice, quam de corde suo adinvenit; et secundo processum a»tificiatorum ab ipsa arte inventa." The fact is that St. Thomas speaks elsewhere of art being discovered primarily by the intellect. Cfr. VI *Meta.*, lect. 1: "...principium rerum artificialium ..est primo intellectus, qui primo artem adinvenit..." But it remains that unless love enters in, there is no movement to creation.

the esthetic proportion; but the chief determinant is the realization of the exemplar as particularized beauty. Thus providence, in the case of the maker of beautiful things, can be taken in two sense: as the ordering to the end of principling delight in others, and as the ordering to the end of perfect expression of the exemplar. This second being the principal or primary end, it deserves the name of providence strictly, since it principally determines the esthetic order, or disposition of the artefact.

It is seen then that providence and disposition are realized together in the beautiful artefact, which is not the case with useful artefacts. This is the same as saying that the operative form or exemplar is realized *in toto* in a beautiful creation, and the artefact is perfect *simpliciter*. This is not true of useful artefacts, whose exemplar stands to the artefact as imperfectly realized—becoming perfectly expressed only progressively, as the artefact serves its end. And such an artefact is perfect *secundum quid*.

We also spoke previously of the pleasure which the artist may derive in the making. We said that this may be designated either as a *finis cui* (the pleasure of making as a good to him) or as a secondary end (as against the primary end given above). Again, this could have been considered when speaking of the psychology of art, but we postponed it to this section because it is bound up with the artefact as an individual thing of beauty. Now we think it safe to say that, comparing the experience of those things, beautiful as they are, of which the artist is not the cause, with the experience of those beautiful things which are caused by him, the latter is for the artist the deeper penetration into the beauty of a thing, and the deeper realization and love of its perfection. In such creation he is brought closer to the knowledge and love of what for him is beauty absolute.

This is so, if we recall that the experience of beauty is a deep knowledge of individual things as individual, and no penetration into being is so supreme as that which is had through operative knowledge. For knowledge is deepest

when the causes of things are known. But the artist is himself the cause of the artefact, and by his exemplary, efficient and final causality he measures the goodness of his effect. This does not mean that he may not have a more profound experience of the beauty and goodness of other things, especially when these are in a higher order than the artefact. But proportionately speaking, the satisfaction which comes through operative knowledge is more complete than that which comes through the principled knowledge of other things.

Operative knowledge of an effect is, so to speak, distinct in kind—or at least qualitatively different—from the principled knowledge of other things. Since knowledge is through intentional species, the more adequate are the species the more the person knows the thing. But the species in operative knowledge are enriched with innumerable individuating notes, such as are not always found in principled knowledge. Ultimately, man's operative knowledge is itself principled from the real, and his work is a reflection in some measure of many past contacts with individual realities, whose beauty and goodness he has experienced. But the artefact itself is more intimately known through operative species, and the world of reality, to which the artist turns his attention as a partial exemplar of the artefact, becomes more profoundly known through the force of his attention to its individuality.

Now it cannot be doubted that, generally speaking, such knowledge is a pleasurable good. For the artist, it is the experience of the beauty and goodness of what he is creating, and pleasure is not absent from the experience. But this pleasure as such does not appear to be the primary end of the artist, when we consider that it may well be lacking, and yet the creation moves forward. The primary end seems to be, we said, the realization of particular beauty. The love of beauty as a disinterested good, and as associated with the particular artefact to be made, is the prime mover, or efficient cause, for it qualifies the will. The will, moving

under desire for the yet-unrealized end, impels the actual creation. And when the end is attained, the will rests in a state of fruition. There is a pleasurable good, derived from the realization of the artefact. But this pleasure as such is not the primary end, though we do not doubt that it is anticipated, and forms an object of the will's fruition when attained. But the primary end would seem to be the realization of an artefact purely because it is beautiful, and quite apart from the presence of pleasure in the creation, or the expectation of it while the artefact is being achieved.

There is a further point to be mentioned in this section. A good thing, it is said, consists in mode, species, and order to an end.¹² Since everything that exists is good, a beautiful artefact consists of mode, species, and order to an end. But there is this difference between the goodness of mechanical artefacts and that of beautiful artefacts. In the case of the former, the order to an end is to be taken as the order of real perfection of other things. In the case of the latter, this order to an end is not the order of real perfection, as far as the thing is simply apprehended as beautiful. A good thing, as good—such as a mechanical artefact—is perfective of something not only according to its species, but at the same time according to its real being, or its existence. But a beautiful thing, since it is related to the person through knowledge, is perfective of him only through its species, and not through its real being.¹³ That is to say,

¹²*Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 5, a. 5; *De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 6.

¹³Cfr. *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad lum. St. Thomas speaks of the perfecting of a being through the good, and through the true. The person is perfected in different ways by the good and by the true: in the first case, we would say, he is perfected by the thing as it is in the existential order; in the second case, by the thing as it is in the intentional order, as far as the thing is known through species. The same is true with regard to the perfecting of the person by the beautiful: it is a perfecting by the thing as it is known: "...secundum ordinem causae perficientis (bonum et verum se habent) dissimiliter: non enim verum habet ordinem causae perficientis ad omnia entia, sicut bonum: quia scilicet perfectio veri attenditur secundum rationem

what perfects the person is the species of the object, not as it is in the real order (for this would be a pure intuition), but as it is in the intentional order. The relation of a mechanical artefact, therefore, as far as it is a good to something, is that of real perfection: the relation of a beautiful artefact to the beholder is that of intentional perfection.

We said before that in a beautiful thing, the order to an end is identified with the mode and species. By mode and species we meant, following St. Thomas, the existing thing of matter and form. To say that the order to an end is identified with this beautiful thing, is to understand as follows. Considering the order to an end, apart from the end of principling delight in others, as the perfect expression of the exemplar, then—according as this end is achieved in the actual artefact—it is not ordained to something beyond what it is in itself, and therefore its order to an end is identified with its present and perfect existence. A mechanical artefact has an end which it has not actually achieved in its immediate creation: the end of being put to some real use, and according as it achieves this end, it becomes perfect *simpliciter*. But the beautiful artefact is just such a thing—a simply perfect thing, according to the artist's intention. This is the condition on which a beautiful artefact can make a distinct appeal to the person, that it is perceived as perfect *simpliciter*. It is likewise the measure according to which a mechanical artefact can principle delightful contemplation—i.e., according as it is arrested by the mind, and seen to be, as it were, perfect *simpliciter*, as a perfect expression here and now of what it was intended to be, apart from its actual use.¹⁴

speciei solum: unde immaterialia solum possunt perfici vero, quia ipsa tantum possunt recipere rationem speciei sine materiali esse; bonum vero cum sit perfectivum secundum rationem speciei et esse simul, potest perficere tam materialia quam immaterialia."

¹⁴The beauty of nature falls into this category. It cannot be said that the Divine Artis made the universe perfect *simpliciter*, for it is ordained to, an end which is not realized, except progressively, and

If, on the other hand, we consider the end of the artefact as the principling of delight in others, then—since the artist keeps within himself, after the production, this particular secondary end, it may be said that the artefact, in this respect, only achieves its end progressively, and its order to an end is not identified with its mode and species. Yet it is to be noted that it is itself not really affected in being known: it remains only logically related to the person beholding it. It is all that it should be, whether known or not, according to the primary end of the artist, and the knowledge of it cannot advance it towards any end in the order of its own being. In this respect it is, as it were, out of time, and eternal, like the order of ideal beauty which it reflects. Once the artist has caused the artefact according to the demands of ontological and relational beauty, the artefact is entitatively perfect, and its principling of delight can in no way qualify its perfect existence. It exists as an individually perfect image of its exemplar—a thing in which the matter (taken analogically) is oversplendored by the form (again in an analogical sense), and which, by the very force of its proportioned sensibility and intelligibility, is secondarily ordained to an audience as capable of principling delightful contemplation.

part is ordered to part in the proportion of real perfection and perfectibility—so that goodness is the bond of all creation. Yet we prescind from this unrealized perfection, and arrest creation in its condition of esthetic order. We do not experience the beauty of spring simply in understanding the serviceability of blossoms to the progression of summer and autumn, though this is intermingled. But we fix upon the present perfection, harmony, and light of all things. *In Evang. Joann.*, c. 1, lect. 5: "Sicut in artificiato manifestatur ars artificis, ita totus mundus nihil aliud est quam quaedam repraesentatio divinae sapientiae in mente Patris conceptae." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 36, a. 2, resp: "... in ordine creaturarum productarum decor divinae sapientiae manifestatur." Cfr. *Exposit. in Genesim*, c. 1. The work is doubtfully Thomistic. The reference is to the words: And God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good: v. 31.

3. THE MEASURE OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ARTEFACT

Since that which measures the perfection of a thing is its end, and the thing is perfect as it accords with this end, the perfection of the beautiful artefact is found in the degree to which it realizes the exemplar from which it was principled. It is nothing to the point to call an artefact imperfect because what it expresses is imperfect. In the order of a beautiful artefact as such, its whole being is the expression of what the artist contemplates. Thus a piece of music, though it strike the ear as unpleasant, is nevertheless a perfect artefact, if it bears out the exemplar which measures it.¹⁵

This is to place the artefact in the order of similitude. For it exists as a likeness of its exemplar, as the universe is a certain likeness of its Divine origin. In this respect, artistic creation is one with the verbal expression of internal thought, and therefore it belongs in this capacity to the category of truth: the making of a thing in correspondence with the mind. The term 'metaphysical' truth is the proper term to use, with the note that the artist's mind (like the Creator's, but with great differences)¹⁶ measures the

157 *Periherm.*, lect. 3: "Alio autem modo res comparantur ad intellectum sicut mensuratum ad mensuram; ut patet in intellectu practico, qui est causa rerum. Unde opus artificis dicitur esse verum inquantum attingit ad rationem artis; falsum vero inquantum deficit a ratione artis. Et quia omnia naturaliter comparantur ad intellectum divinum sicut artificiata ad artem, consequens est ut quaelibet res dicatur esse vera, secundum quod habet propriam formam, secundum quam imitatur artem divinam."

TM*Quodl.* 8, a. 2; ("De Pertinentibus ad Naturam"): ".. hoc tamen interest inter formas exemplares quae sunt in mente divina et in mente artificis creati: quod creatus artifex agit ex praesupposita materia; unde formae exemplares quae sunt in mente ejus, non sunt activae materiae, quae est individuationis principium, sed solius formae, a qua est species artificiati: et ideo hujus formae exemplares non respiciunt directe artificiatum quantum ad individuum, sed quantum ad speciem solum; formae autem exemplares intellectus divini

thing. On the part of the artist, this activity resembles moral truth, in the sense that it measures what is expressed. There is some argument for this in noting that, as moral truth is founded on justice, so is artistic truth; and, as St. Thomas remarks, the virtue which should fortify the will in the carrying out of the plan, so that the work be a good work, is justice.¹⁷ We may say that it is artistic justice: hence, the artist is to be called a good artist according to his fidelity in execution, and the work is to be called perfect according to its correspondence with the exemplar.

There is a great real which could be added to complete the inquiry into the nature of the beautiful artefact, such as its ontological and relational beauty. But as we are primarily interested in the nature of poetry, these considerations may be left to the next Part, where we shall speak of the ordered perfection and splendor of a poem, and the proportion of a poem to the reader.

sunt activae totius rei et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam.," Cfr. also *Quadl.* 7, a. 3.

¹⁷*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 2um: "Manifestum est enim, quod artifex per justitiam, quae facit voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat."

THIRD PART

THE NATURE OF POETRY

CHAPTER VI

THE GENESIS OF A POEM

Combining the First and Second Parts, we will endeavor to establish the nature of Poetry. It is evident that a poem is a beautiful artefact, and so we will not be concerned with the making of a useful artefact. Obviously, however, a poem has a use: but this does not mean that the purpose of its making is a kind of utility, beyond its simple beauty. Its beauty is in a very definite way its own utility.

It shall be our purpose to examine what the making of a poem really is. All that we have said on efficiency, the place of the exemplary cause, and art, is presupposed, and we shall apply these principles in an inquiry into poetic creation. In this connection it should be noted beforehand that other artefacts, with the exception perhaps of music, exist outside the mind, while a poem does not, except in the way of external words, which are the signs of its intramental existence, and the instruments for communicating it. Other differences will appear as we proceed.

Since the beauty of a thing is objectively identified with the thing itself, the objective beauty of a poem must be one with the poem itself. To understand what this beauty is, we must therefore inquire into the being of a poem. But since the being of a thing is best understood in the light of its causes, we will first inquire into the genesis of a poem. After that we shall be able to determine what a poem is, and understand its objective beauty, which should correspond to a *splendor entis*, or a *splendor secundum propriam formam*.

Our development on the Nature of Poetry will include the following points: the Genesis of a Poem, the Operative Word, the Metaphysics of a Poem, the Experience of a Poem, and Concluding Remarks.

1. INTRODUCTORY

The poet, actually approaching the task of making a poem, comes to the work with many decisive qualifications: with a vague or a relatively clear concept of what he is to say, with a fundamental motive for creating anything at all, with the ability to carry through the creation by reason of the habit of art, and with a compelling and continuous desire to carry it through.

Now there are several facts at the basis of creative work. There is the personality of the poet. Much has been written on this subject,¹ with a good deal of emphasis on the subconscious mind—whatever it may be. The one thing certain is, that the experience of splendid reality, and the creation of poetic beauty, are personal—not simply because, according to the Scholastic axiom, "acting and being acted on refer to supposites" (or "persons" in our case)—but because these experiences touch the deeper levels of the mind and affections, and awaken profound self-consciousness. This is true if we recall that the mind, in knowing other things, knows itself at least implicitly; and we can argue to an explicit self-consciousness when the very activity of knowledge becomes intense. This is the case when the poet experiences the splendid real, and when he contemplates the splendor of a possible poem. He achieves this consciousness quite easily, because habit has made him sus-

^xOne of the best-known contributions to the poet's characteristic mentality is Herbert Read's *Form in Modern Poetry*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1933. But it is scarcely a definite contribution however widely it be acclaimed. It labors, for one thing, under the difficulty of ambiguous language and illdefined terms. The subject deserves long investigation, and the last word may never be said.

ceptible to experience of this kind. Thus his natural disposition, and his acquired ideology or interpretation of reality are factors which aid in this profound self-consciousness. Such is the nature of the poet that he envisions the beauty-aspect of reality in the terms of poetry, as it were. It is for this reason that his works are stamped with personality, as the works of every artist are; but more so in the case of the poet, since he handles ideas and images which proceed directly from the soul.

Innumerable experiences of the splendid real go a long way in preparing the poet for creation, in this sense, that such experiences enrich and determine his concept of reality, as least under the aspect of beauty or perfection; and the wider is the analogy under which he sees individual splendor, the deeper is his penetration into the mystery of being—the blaze of Being, as Chesterton admirably says.²

2. POETIC CONTEMPLATION AND ITS OBJECTS

The object of a poem is what we shall call, indifferently, the content of a poem. This object can be sensible or spiritual. By a sensible object we mean whatever falls directly under the senses—e.g., a sensible object in nature, a hill, a sunset, the human body, and the like. Thus the object of the following lines from Shakespeare, is a sensible object:

O Prosperina!
For the flowers now that frightened thou let'st fall
From Dis's wagon! daffodils,
That come before the swallow dares, and take
The winds of March with beauty; violets dim,
But sweeter than the lids of Juno's eyes
Or Cytherea's breath; pale prime-roses,
That die unmarried, ere they can behold
Bright Phoebus in his strength, a malady

²*Saint Thomas Aquinas*, G. K. Chesterton; New York, Sheed and Ward, 1933; p. 239.

Most incident to maids; bold oxlips and
 The crown imperial; lilies of all kinds,
 The flower-de-luce being one.³

Sensible beauty, as possessed by such an object, is the harmonious perfection and effulgence of a sensible thing. A spiritual object is such as falls directly under intellect, and its beauty is the harmonious perfection and effulgence of spiritual being. This is two-fold, intellectual beauty and moral. Intellectual beauty⁴ is the perfection, order, and effulgence of an intellectual being as such. This has sometimes been called the splendor of truth. It is the same as the beauty of thought or of ideas proceeding with order towards the state of certitude. We say that it is the beauty of an intellectual being as such, meaning thereby the activity of intellect as opposed to the activity of the will. Moral beauty is the perfection, order, and effulgence of volition, or of the movements of the will as they tend towards the Absolute Good.

It may be well to speak here of a certain participation in intellectual and moral beauty. The act of contemplation—or wisdom, when it is turned towards the Infinite Truth—possesses beauty essentially.⁵ But according as the poet's

**The Winter's Tale*, IV, 4.

⁴To speak of intellectual beauty is not to impugn the notion that all beauty is intelligible. Thus sensible beauty is intelligible. The divisions we give above are based on ontological beauty, and are not to be confused with the actual experience of the beautiful, which, as we say, belongs principally to the intellect.

⁵*Summa Theol.*, 11-11, q. 180, a. 2, ad 3um: "... in vita contemplativa, quae consistit in actu rationis, per se et essentialiter invenitur pulchritudo: unde et Sap. 8, 2, de contemplatione sapientiae dicitur: *Amator factus sum formae Ulius*." ("I became a lover of her beauty.") Moral beauty, says the Angelic Doctor, following the above remark, possesses beauty participatively: "In virtutibus autem moralibus inventiur pulchritudo participative, inquantum scilicet participant ordinem rationis." Be it noted, however, that the moral beauty of divine love is a complement and perfection of the beauty of divine contemplation. Vd. *ibid.*, a. 1, resp. Moreover, since man and his

mind proceeds in the direction of Eternal Truth, the poem itself, as far as it mirrors this contemplation, possesses such participated spiritual beauty according to the content and procession of its ideas.⁶ The matter of a poem, as we shall define it in its place,⁷ is the words, images, and ideas of the whole; its form is the union of these; and its being therefore is not precisely like the being of certain other artefacts, whose matter is extramental and sensible; for ideas are themselves spiritual realities, and as they are sometimes ordered in a certain pattern to signify various degrees of spiritual contemplation (and this contemplation ends in its purest state in active supernatural wisdom), so the poem itself possesses in part a spiritual beauty in a higher or lower degree according to the object, procession, and effulgence of its ideas.

Thus, for example, the superb poetry of the Book of Wisdom, or the beginning of St. John's Gospel, or the climax of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, must be said to possess, besides the sensible beauty of imagery and sound, and the ordered beauty of sound, imagery, and ideas, the spiritual beauty of thought.

Instances of such sublime intellectual beauty are abundant in the poetry, say of Francis Thompson, or in the later poetry of T. S. Eliot. In his *Anthem of Earth*, Thompson sings:

acts are beautiful according as they more truly bear the image and likeness of God, and the *perfection* of this likeness is found in virtue, so the perfection of spiritual beauty is found in moral beauty. Vd. *Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 93, a. 9.

⁶St. Thomas speaks of the intellect of the artist becoming an exemplar of a particular work. Thus the mind of the poet, as far as it becomes an object of the poet's reflection—and his will may likewise be deflected on—is a partial exemplar of the artefact. *De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 2: "Si autem intellectus artificis aliquod artificiatum produceret ad similitudinem sui ipsius, tunc quidem ipse intellectus artificis esset idea, non quidem ut est intellectus, sed inquantum intellectum."

⁷See p. 183.

. Death, wherewith's fined
 The muddy wine of life; that earth doth purge
 Of her plethora of man; Death, that doth flush
 The cumbered gutters of humanity;
 Nothing, of nothing king, with front uncrowned,
 Whose hand holds crownets; playmate swart o' the
 strong;
 Tenebrous moon that flux and refluece draws
 Of the high-tided man; skull-housed asp
 That stings the heel of kings; true Fount of Youth,
 Where he that dips is deathless
 Pontifical Death, that doth the crevasse bridge
 To the steep and trifold God; one mortal birth
 That broker is of immortality.⁸

Shelley, quite apart from whatever Pantheistic views he held in others of his works, celebrates the universe as a reflection of God in the conclusion of his *Adonais*:

That Light whose smile kindles the Universe,
 That Beauty in which all things work and move,
 That Benediction which the eclipsing Curse
 Of birth can quench not, that sustaining Love
 Which through the web of being blindly wove
 By man and beast and earth and air and sea,
 Burns bright or dim, as each are mirrors of
 The fire for which all thirst; now beams on me,
 Consuming the last clouds of cold mortality.⁹

Father Gerard Manley Hopkins writes of the Incarnation:

Now burn, new born to the world,
 Double-natured name,
 The heaven-flung, heart-fleshed, maiden-furled
 Miracle-in-Mary-of-flame.
 Mid-numbered He in three of the thunder-throne!
 Not a dooms-day dazzle in his coming nor dark as he
 came;

**The Poems of Francis Thompson*, Oxford University Press, London, 1938; p. 270.

⁹Second last stanza of his *Adonais*.

Kind, but royally reclaiming his own;
A released shower, let flash to the shire, not a lightning of
fire hard-hurled.¹⁰

Concerning that less lofty intellectual beauty, which shares in the pure beauty of wisdom, we mention only one example out of thousands. The English poetry of the past was rich with this type of beauty, while it is regrettably absent from much of the poetry being written today.

The night has a thousand eyes,
And the day but one;
Yet the light of the bright world dies
With the dying sun.

The mind has a thousand eyes,
And the heart but one;
Yet the light of a whole life dies
When love is done.¹¹

St. Thomas, referring to Richard of St. Victor,¹² speaks of six kinds of contemplation, according to which the mind may ascend through creatures to the contemplation of the Trinity. First, contemplation according to the imagination alone, when we attend to sensible things (*perceptio ipsorum sensibilium*, says St. Thomas) ; secondly, in the imagination, according to reason, as when we consider the order and disposition of sensible things (*progressus a sensibilibus ad*

¹⁰*Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, Oxford University Press, London, second edition; 1940; "The Wreck of the Deutschland", stanza 34, p. 22.

¹¹*Great Poems of the English Language*, compiled by W. A. Briggs; Tudor Publishing Co., New York, 1932: "The Night Has A Thousand Eyes", Francis W. Bourdillon; p. 1103.

¹²The passage referred to by the Angelic Doctor, is the following: *De Gradibus Contemplationis*, Richardi S. Victoris, lib. I, c. 6; *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, Migne, vol. 196, p. 70 (1855). Richard of St. Victor treats of the same subject in his *De Praeparatione Animi ad Contemplationem*, cc. 5-23, *passim*, and cc. 72, 74, 86, 87; Migne, *ibid.*, p. 1, ».

intelligibilia); thirdly, in the reason, according to the imagination, when we are elevated to invisible things through the viewing of visible things; fourthly, in the reason, according to the reason, when the mind contemplates invisible things of which imagination is ignorant; fifthly, suprarational contemplation, but not praeterrational, when we know by divine revelation such things as cannot be fully comprehended by human reason, though reason may receive them; sixthly, suprarational and praeterrational contemplation, as when we know by divine illumination those things that seem repugnant to human reason, as, e.g., the things that are told us concerning the mystery of the Trinity.¹³

Richard of St. Victor says of the first kind of contemplation, that the mind runs freely hither and thither over the appearances of sensible things—their multitude, greatness, diversity, beauty, and sweetness (*jucunda*)—without the investigation of reason.¹⁴ In the second degree the reason investigates what is in the imagination, seeing the rea-

¹³*Swnma TheoL*, //-- q. 180, a. 4, obj. 3: "... Richardus de Sancto Victore...distinguit sex species contemplationum: quarum prima est secundum solam imaginationem, dum attendimus res corporales; secunda autem est in imaginatione, secundum rationem, prout scilicet sensibilibus ordinem et dispositionem consideramus: tertia est in imaginatione secundum rationem, quando scilicet per inspectionem rerum visibilium ad invisibilia sublevamur; quarta autem est in ratione secundum rationem, quando scilicet animus intendit invisibilibus, quae imaginatio non novit; quinta autem est supra rationem, non tamen praeter rationem, quando ex divina revelatione cognoscimus ea quae humana ratione comprehendere non possunt. Sexta autem est supra rationem, et praeter rationem, quando scilicet ex divina illuminatione cognoscimus ea quae humanae rationi repugnare videntur, sicut ea quae dicuntur de mystico Trinitatis." In the reply to the objection—which concerns not these states themselves, but the way in which true contemplation may be predicated of them—St. Thomas speaks of them as steps leading to the ultimate contemplation of God, which is found in the sixth degree. His paraphrase of the various degrees is substantially the same as Richard's, except that he speaks of the first step as the "*perceptio ipsorum sensibilibus*."

¹⁴Richard of St. Victor, *De Gratia Contemplationis*, lac. tit.

son, order, disposition, cause, mode, and utility of sensible things. In the third degree, the reason is elevated to invisible things by using the imagination, so that it sees invisible things under the likeness of visible images. It would seem that the first two degrees of contemplation, as St. Thomas handles them in his reply, are carried on under the guidance of the cogitative power. We said that he speaks of the first degree as the perception of sensible things, which would seem to be the "simple apprehension" of the cogitative power. The second degree of contemplation would seem to call for the discursive activity of the same faculty, which is a kind of reason, and merits the name "particular reason" therefore. But again we say that neither the first nor the second act of this faculty seems capable of functioning without the consequent and interpretative activity of the intellect. Be that as it may, we wish to observe the following points regarding the poet's contemplation of things, and the creation of a poem.

Some poets are given to the second kind of contemplation, others to the third, others to the fourth, some to a number of kinds, some to the fifth, and relatively few to the sixth. The object of these varying states becomes the content of the poem—that which is signified through the inter-related ideas, images, and words. Now while the poet who contemplates (according to the fourth kind) those things of which imagination is ignorant—the soul itself, the activity of intellect and will—he must turn to imagination in order to proportion this contemplation to others. The same is true of the two highest grades of contemplation. The poet given to the second kind is largely what we should call a sensuous poet—with no disparagement in the term—whose work is a procession from the simple regard of the sensible aspects of things. The third type of contemplation and creation is perhaps the most common of all, for it is frequently said that the poet sees in the visible things of the universe invisible realities, such as the splendor of the human soul, love, beauty itself, great moral goodness, and the like, and

that he expresses these realities as they are found in the visible universe. Concerning the first kind of contemplation, which is the perception of sensible things, this scarcely pertains to poetic contemplation and creation, though there may be a certain admixture of it in what is called today the poetry of the subconscious, wherein a stream of images proceeds from the mind in apparent chaos. Yet we doubt whether these disjuncted images are quite so unrelated as at first appears: and we say that such poetry of the imagination is created through the discursive acts of the cognitive power, under the guidance of intellect, which possesses a pattern (however seemingly formless) for the entire artefact.

We may here insert a classification of poets according to the degree in which the poet's own soul (or personality, to take it widely) becomes the content of his contemplation and creation. Thus we have the objective poet, whose intellect and will are indeed in some measure reflected in the artefact—since this is inevitable in all deliberate creation—but not as these are direct objects of contemplation and expression. He contemplates the universe quite apart from any personal reference, except as it is itself beautiful and a good to know and express. There is the subjective poet, whose contemplation is largely turned inward to his own soul and its thoughts and appetites. And there is the type who combines these two, and whose contemplation and creation have as their object both the universe and the soul in express relation to it. But whatever the type of poet, it can be said that each is absorbed in the fact, the wonder, reality, strangeness of his particular object.¹⁵ One poet

¹⁵ St. Thomas speaks of poets and philosophers both wondering at things, the philosopher seeking the true ultimate causes of things, the poet postulating fanciful causes. But St. Thomas was speaking of the early Greek philosophers who were poets. *I Meta.*, lect. 3: "Causa autem, quare philosophus comparatur poetae, est ista, quia uterque circa miranda versatur. Nam fabulae, circa quas versantur poetae, ex quibusdam mirabilibus constituuntur. Ipsi etiam philoso-

may combine all three types in a single work, or throughout different periods of his career.

St. Thomas, in the beginning of his commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics,¹⁰ compares the different parts of Logic¹⁷ on the basis of the degree of reason and certitude found in their exercise and caused in others by the one who uses them. He speaks of Logic as an art, and divides it into judicative (or analytic, which causes certitude, and it is subdivided into prior and posterior analytics), dialectic (which causes belief, opinion, or probability), rhetoric (which causes the mental state of suspicion), and poetic (which causes a mere declination of the mind, and estimation,¹⁸ to one represented aspect of a thing). Thus the parts of Logic are judicative, dialectical, rhetorical, and

phi ex admiratione moti sunt ad philosophandum." This is scarcely what we mean by the poet being absorbed in the wonder of his object, although he may indeed view the object in the light of the oversplendoring of the First Cause of beauty. But we mean that viewing of the *reality* of the object which is concerned with the existence of things as well as the essences. His contemplation, even when turned inward, is real contemplation as opposed to abstractive, concrete as opposed to abstract. Chesterton, in his *Saint Thomas Aquinas* (p. 228), indicates this when he says: "That *strangeness* of things, which is the light in all poetry, and indeed in all art, is really connected with their otherness; or what is called their objectivity." Though the soul's contemplation of itself, while it is real, is not objective contemplation.

^{3C}7 *Post. Anal.*, lect. 1.

¹⁷For the historical outlines of the relations among logic, dialectic, rhetoric, and poetic in the Middle Ages, vd. "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages", Richard McKeon, *Speculum*, *op. cit.*; and for a note on how these were accepted in St. Thomas' system, see especially p. 22 ff.

¹⁸St. Thomas says: "Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam repraesentationem, ad medium quo fit homini abominatio alicujus cibi si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicujus abominabilis." *Ibid.* This "existimatio" may be the operation of the cogitative power, since this faculty is an estimative faculty. Rousselot renders this as the *sensus cogitativus*. Cfr. *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1935; p. 162.

poetical. Poetry, taken on the basis of the degree of knowledge which it causes, is placed last.¹⁹ But this is not to argue that what poetry treats of is itself false, or impossible of intense contemplation, or that the creation of it does not spring from a contemplation of sublime reality,²⁰ or that the reading of a poem cannot issue into the same sublime contemplation. St. Thomas speaks of the way in which the content is presented to the mind, and of the degree of demonstration in this presentation, which is obviously negligible. The proof of the content of the poem is outside the poem itself. Since a beautiful artefact, when proportioned to others by the maker, aims at principling delightful contemplation, it is not logical conviction which the artist intends to produce, but the delight of contemplating a perfect expression of what is conceived.

However, we have a certain misgiving at this point. It is not true that every poet intends simply to please by perfect representation. His art very largely ascends into the sphere of rhetoric or persuasion, as rhetoric itself makes use of the properties of poetry.²¹ It is hard to conceive of the Angelic Doctor composing his hymns for the Office of Corpus Christi simply to delight by a perfect representation of the vision in his soul. So he mentions that the office of the poet is to lead others to virtue through a previous repre-

¹⁹*Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 1, a. 9, obj. 1: "Procedere autem per similitudines varias et representationes, est proprium poeticae, quae est infima inter omnes doctrinas."

²⁰One need only refer to the poems of the Angelic Doctor himself to see that poetic contemplation can be lofty. Consider, for example, the concluding stanza of his hymn at Matins for the Office of *Corpus Christi*:

Te trina Deitas unaque poscimus,
Sic nos tu visita, sicut te colimus:
Per tuas semitas due nos quo tendimus
Ad lucem quam inhabitas.

²¹Cfr. "The Province of Rhetoric and Poetic", W. J. Ong, *The Modern Schoolman*, Jan., 1942; vol. XIX, no. 2.

sensation.²² By this St. Thomas sets the end of poetry apart from that of the other parts of Logic, by placing its purpose in the moral order, and not the order of knowledge as such.²³ The poet does not aim at persuasion to belief, or argumentation about the truth of what he says, though he may sometimes assume such rhetorical and dialectical purposes. But his primary concern is a disinterested concern with beauty. Though St. Thomas speaks of virtue as the end to be reached through the beauty of representing virtue—and Dante seems to have carried out his *Divina Comedia* on such a principle—it seems justifiable to extend virtue so as to include beauty itself as a *bonum howestnm*: beauty in every form and degree, the represented beauty of a wild-flower, or the Blessed Trinity, or the Divine oversplendoring of all the universe. By enriching the reader's concept of absolute beauty, the poem produces in him a love of beauty *in universali*, and a desire (perhaps dim and unexpressed) of contemplating* Supreme Beauty. Perhaps the mind of St. Thomas was that the poet's work was fully justified as it pleasingly represented intellectual and especially moral beauty, which, by the very force of its beauty, could become the goal of the recipient's will.

We said above that a poem may possess a degree of

²²*I Post. AnaLy* lect. 1: "Nam poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam praecedentem repraesentationem."

²³Cfr. "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," *op. tit.*, p. 25, where mention is made of Roger Bacon's distinction of poetry into *poetica docens* and *poetica utens*. "Roger Bacon...distinguishes both rhetoric and poetic into two kinds, a theoretic rhetoric and poetic (or *rhetorica docens* and *poetica docens*) which are parts of logic, and an applied rhetoric and poetic (or *rhetorica utens* and *poetica utens*) which are parts of moral philosophy." This seems to us a highly valuable distinction, for *poetica docens* refers to poetry as far as it conveys some degree of knowledge about what is said, while *poetica utens* refers to the influence on the will through the poem itself: both aspects of a poem, it seems to us, should be considered, for every poem influences the will at least to the extent of initiating a love of beauty as such in the will of the recipient.

intellectual beauty as its object is more or less spiritual, and its ideas proceed with a certain order in the direction of wisdom. But this must not be taken as conflicting with the notion that the poet does not primarily aim at convincing another of the truth of what he contemplates. His end is the making of a perfect (hence a beautiful) reflection of his contemplation: it may be that he is himself persuaded of the truth of what he envisions, but to convince another of its truth by a rational exposition belongs to those arts whose end is knowledge as such. The best he can hope for in this respect is that the beauty of the content and manner of the poem will, so to speak, seduce the listener-⁴ into the state of belief. It occurs to us that Francis Thompson strove to influence belief in others concerning Catholic Dogma by a compelling representation of its beauty.

It may be said then, employing the traditional three aims of human art in general—to teach (*docere*), to move (*movere*), to please (*placere*),—that the poet does not aim at the first as such, but primarily at the third, and with the hope that the affections may be moved at least to the love of beauty as such.²⁵ But the individual poet may likewise

²⁴⁷ *Sent.*, prologus, q. 1, a. 5, ad Sum: ". . . poetica scientia est de his quae propter defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi; unde oportet quod quasi quibusdam similitudinibus ratio seducatur: theologia autem est de his quae sunt supra rationem; et ideo modus symbolicus utrique communis est, cum neutra rationi proportionate." It is difficult to know what St. Thomas means by the defect of truth in poetic knowledge, unless one considers what he says in the beginning of the posterior Analytics. Thus it is seen that the presentation of the content of the poem—as far as strict demonstration is concerned—has little or nothing to do with the search of the reason for what is connatural to it, namely logical demonstration. Vd. also *Summa Theol.*, *MI*, q. 101, a. 2, ad 2um.

²⁵/n *Epist. I ad Timotti.*, c. 4, leek 2: "Simplices autercumelius inducuntur repraesentationibus quam rationibus. Unde in miro bene repraesentato videtur delectatio, quia ratio delectatur in collatione. Et sicut repraesentatio in factis est delectabilis, ita repraesentatio in verbis: et hoc est fabula, scilicet dictum aliquod repraesentans, et repraesentando *movens ad aliquid*..." St. Thomas speaks of the moving

intend to teach, and to move to action, though in these respects he departs from the specific end of poetry. His art, properly speaking, deals in the beauty of an experienced "fact", which in the expressing he endeavors simultaneously to communicate to others.

We spoke also of moral beauty, and a certain participation in this which a poem may possess. Moral beauty is rendered as "a due proportion in word or act, in which the light of reason shines forth."²⁶ Thus, to the degree that the poet's words indicate a will which is turned in some manner towards the Infinite Good, it may be said that the poem enjoys a spiritual moral beauty, apart from the splendor of its manner or expression. The content of a great deal of poetry betrays the movement of the will towards infinite Beauty and Goodness. In this sense we may speak of the moral beauty of profound human sadness, the splendidly reasonable "devotion to something afar from the sphere of our sorrow."²⁷ All this is what we should call affective poetry—and we need not give any examples, except to indicate that Our Lord's discourse at the Last Supper would appear to be the supreme example of pure moral

of the will on the basis of the end for which poetic fables or myths were originally invented: "ut inducerent ad acquirendum virtutes, et vitandum vitia." (*Ibid.*) This is not the end of the major portion of modern poetry, or poetry since the time of the Renaissance. The only moving of the will, as far as pure poetry is concerned—that is, poetry which does not adopt the end of rhetorical persuasion—is to the love of beauty.

²⁶*In Epist. I ad Corinth.*, c. 11, lect. 2: "...in actibus humanis dicitur pulchritudo ex debita proportionem verborum vel factorum, in quibus lumen rationis resplendet." Cfr. also *In David.*, ps. 25, v. 5, "Domine dilexi decorum domus tuae..." and ps. 44, v. 2, "Speciosus forma prae filiis hominum..." and *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 145, a. 2.

²⁷Shelly, "To—", beginning "One word is too often profaned". Perhaps great music likewise betrays the desire of the heart for perfect beatitude, and a sadness over its continual postponement: we do not know, and we scarcely dare to speak about the nature of any particular art other than poetry.

beauty. There is also, as we said, intellectual poetry—what is more frequently called metaphysical poetry. And there is sensuous poetry, descriptive of the sensible appearances of things. One may speak of a poem possessing moral beauty through a splendor of aspiration, or a splendor of sadness or of love; of a poem possessing intellectual beauty through a splendor of thought; and of one possessing sensible beauty through a splendor of imagination about sensible appearances. By splendor we mean the compelling intelligible or sensible appeal to the mind which is found in the perfect expression of spiritual or sensible beauty.²⁸

One poem may combine all three types of beauty; just as the one poem, in different sections, may be objective, subjective, and objective-subjective. Thus a poem may be an expression of objective spiritual beauty, or subjective spiritual beauty; and again, an expression of the objective beauty (whether sensible or spiritual) of other things or persons, but in relation to the poet's own thoughts and appetite. It would be impossible to lay down any definite margins to circumscribe the work of an individual poet; and almost every poet combines the three types of beauty, but in varying degrees of emphasis on intellectual, moral, or sensible beauty. Finally, whatever the content of their poems, all poets are specifically the one kind of artist, and

3. INSPIRATION

It is possible for the poet to court poetic inspiration—and perhaps it is not so infrequent as we imagine—by deliberately looking for a suitable subject for poetic creation, either in extramental reality or within the mind itself. But what one generally understands by poetic inspiration is the sudden unsought precipitation in the mind of a suitable subject—the germinal idea of a poem, as it

²*Cfr. First **Part**, p. 31.

their poems are beautiful to the degree that they express perfectly whatever the poetic contemplation fastens upon, were. A great deal of speculation could bear upon this phenomenon. But perhaps not much more could finally be said than that this inspiration is a trick of suggestion and the awakening of memory, along with the recognition of the presented idea as capable of poetic treatment—a recognition which is instantaneous, due to a long-developed habit of art. It may be that the mind, turning upon other matters than poetry, dwells upon something which evokes a related image and concept. The habit of art or beauty-recognition permits the poet to acknowledge immediately the possibility of the "vision" being further contemplated for its beauty and adaptability for creative development.

But once the initial idea is gathered, whether by genuine inspiration or by a deliberate search, the process from that point on is the same for every poet, as we shall presently outline. The judicious poet, apprehending the particular creation as a disinterested good, out of his love of beauty as such, and simply willing this good of creation, may not propose it as a personal good for one of several reasons²⁹—because he considers the particular creation outside his ability, or lacking in the kind of beauty which he prefers, or too trivial, or morally bad. In general, it may be said that the poet will value a particular creation as a personal good, according as it is capable of bearing out the kind of beauty to which he is most attracted, spiritual or sensible, or both. He has, we say, a concept of beauty as such, which for him is ideal beauty, abstracted from innumerable experiences of particular beauty. This may be called a remote *ratio* of all his poetic creations. As a particular experience more perfectly communicates in this ideal beauty, it is apprehended* as personally valuable for expression. This leads us to our next considerations.

²⁹Refer to "Art and the Will", p. 106.

4. SKETCH OF POETIC CREATION

Let us suppose that the poet has sometime or other experienced the sensible beauty of an autumn tree standing before a house.³⁰ He has a personal outlook on reality: a concept of beauty as such, and a scale of personal values or an ideology. Objects which appear as singularly beautiful, by the very fact that their value is powerfully and intimately brought home, take their place in his general scheme of values. They are measured against the concept of beauty as such, and, as it were, contract this universal concept to an individual instance. They are received into a personal ideology, and colored by the soul's reaction to them. Suppose he values all created beauty as a manifestation of the perfections of God: he sees the tree as oversplendored by a relation to the Divine Reality, and in that aspect it is assumed into a context of personal values.

But let us add that, out of a habit of devotion, he views the tree prayerfully, as an instrument, so to speak, which he can use for giving glory to God: he considers the object as colored by another value, oversplendored by his own relation to God. In this consideration, the person of the poet is more intimately concerned, the tree becoming a kind of objectification of prayer. He considers the tree in the following multiple relations: This tree is beautiful, oversplendored by the beauty of God; it gives Him objective glory; it lifts my affections to Him in praise.

The experience remains impressed in his sensible and

•¹⁰The reader will be indulgent if I presume to use a composition of my own for illustration of the genesis of a poem. It is not a very good poem; but the psychological state attending its conception and creation is fresh in my memory. To speculate on the poet's* state of mind without some such help as this would be quite worthless. Even if the state of soul in the composition of this poem may be vastly different from that surrounding the creation of an admittedly good poem, there is a certain generic likeness, on the strength of which some general description may be constructed.

intellectual, i.e., retentive, memory: in sense memory as an experience (founded instrumentally on the cogitative power) of the tree as sensibly beautiful, with all its richness of sensible notes; in the intellectual memory as an experience of a tree as beautiful in a universal way, and as colored by its relation to his universal scheme of values; and in the composite memory (i.e., in sensory and intellectual memory together) as an experience of the tree in this multiple manner of both sense and intellect together. As far as this experience was brought home to him as rich in personal significance, there was, at the time of the incident, also an awareness by the poet of his own personality, a consciousness of his own value, with emotion springing from the entire experience. This self-knowledge, touched with the note of value, is itself stored up in intellectual memory. When the experience is recalled in its complexity, this multiple constellated knowledge reappears (more dimly than before) in its context of values, and some degree of emotion is again awakened.

Some time later he feels the desire to create: a desire which is habitually entertained, and waits for an appropriate opportunity to become actual. The experience of the autumn tree suggests itself. He reconsiders the experience: he supposes he has the ability to make a poem out of its recollection. He remembers what he thought and felt, in a somewhat indefinite manner: the beautiful tree, oversplendored by the Divine Reality, giving objective glory, and lifting up the affections to God in glory. In this multiple reflection, theory may disentangle three *rationes*, although as interrelated they form the one *ratio* or exemplar. There is, as we said, the universal concept of beauty as such; the poet's universal scheme of values, or his personal ideology; and the intentional presence of the experienced tree. But the concept of beauty and the scheme of values are contracted to the individual experience; and the recollection of the experience, in its context of objective beauty and subjective or personal reaction, forms the immediate

exemplar of what is to follow.

In speaking of Art and the Will,³¹ we spoke of the intellect as accepting creation as a personal good in an act called 'a judgement proposing this good (of creation) as an end/ followed by the will's acceptance called an Intention'. There follow then two acts of intellect and two of will, concerned with the ways (in general) of carrying out the exemplar, and the best way among these. Perhaps what can be understood here is the consideration of poetic-forms of execution in general—lyrical or the like, the rhythmic pattern, rhyme-scheme—and a final choice of the most appropriate means for the particular case. In these considerations, the habit of art facilitates the mind. This is to be taken as the complexus of rules in the universal reason, as related to the particular problem: the universal norms of poetic craftsmanship, derived by study and practice. The choice of the best way of expressing the exemplar perfects the formation of the *recta ratio*, and this latter is understood as the multiple representation in sense and intellect of the recollected experience, the conception of the best way of expressing this "vision", and the presence of the habit of art as guiding the intellect in the choice of the best solution in, the problems of such expression. Thus the mind possess not simply a *ratio* or pattern, but a *recta ratio* of the end to be achieved. Moreover, once the expression begins to be formed, the habit of art fortifies the universal and particular reason in the choice of particular expressions.³²

When the immediate exemplar is formed, under the guidance of the habit of art, the intellect judges, after the manner of a command: This work is to be done, in a way analogous to the Creator commanding: *Fiat lux*. The will, in following upon this imperative judgement, moves to actual execution with what is called *usus activus*_t (active use), for it uses the faculties necessary for the realization

³¹See p. 105.

³²Refer to ISecond part, p. 98, for the treatment of art, and the *recta ratio*.

of the exemplar. The simplest way of speaking of the execution is to speak, for the time being, of the poet, rather than the will. Now in this execution, we must remember that it is not a question of words only which the poet seeks. But it is a construction primarily of ideas, to carry out in singular expression the deep meaning of the contemplated experience. Now for such an embodiment, the imagination is needed, for the making of the poem chiefly centers about singular and particular ideas, and for these a very *definite* recourse to imagination is required. But since the poet employs words as the signs of his mental acts, these too are sought in imagination. Indeed, it can be said that the word, the image, and the idea appear simultaneously in consciousness, through the command of the searching intellect.

The poet is not content until he feels he has exhausted the possibilities of the exemplar in this particular embodiment. The process of creation goes on until the last word is written. Throughout the process the poet is employing operative knowledge, which we will investigate later.[^]

The manuscript of the poet may or may not show numerous deletions and revisions, false beginnings, tentative substitutions, whole passages rejected.³⁴ At length, out of the gropings of the mind, as under the influence of the will and the emotions, arises the poem, signified externally in words. Perhaps the initial stanza is a written expression of a singular introductory statement, uttered by the mind to itself:

Now to the glory of the Holy Ghost
The golden aspen by the door
Burns in a clear and blinding blade of light
As it has never burned before.

The succeeding stanzas introduce related statements

^{aa}See p. 170.

^{s4}We suggest that for a real grasp upon the meaning of the poet's operative knowledge, nothing could be better than an intelligent study of the various drafts of a poem.

and develop them carefully, until the last ideas perfect all the previous statements. In such a case, the last statement is like the force of any final term in a judgement,³⁵ qualifying the whole in such a way that the judgement is not actually concluded until this term is conceived and predicated.

This, out of all the smouldering woods around,
Is my elect and soaring flame,
To lift, until its drifting light is laid,
A spire of splendor in His name.

Pass by, O ruined and resplendent hills,
With all your hot tumultuous blaze!
My heart has touched a dearer dancing-ground
Near one forgotten shaft of praise.

Too gold, too loud is your oppressive light.
But here a simpler flame is flung,
That carries Godward through the cry of blue
The gathered glorying of my tongue.

5. BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE MATTER AND FORM OF A POEM

The exemplar exists in both sense and intellect simultaneously. We spoke of the exemplary form of an artefact,³⁰ and said that, strictly speaking, it is a representation after a universal manner (and therefore principally in the intellect) of the accidental perfection to be contributed to the matter. Though St. Thomas says that the form (or idea) in the artist's mind, in being productive only of the form of the artefact and not of the matter, is representative

³⁵St. Thomas thus notes that in the words of consecration in the Mass, there is actually no efficacious significance until the last word is said, since this qualifies the entire signification in a particular way. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 75, a. 7, ad Sum: "...ista conversio... fit in ultimo instanti prolationis verborum; tunc enim completur verborum significatio..." Also *Ibid.*, q. 78, a. 5, "Et ideo..."

³⁶See p. 104.

only of this form,³⁷ yet we must add that there is a directive species in the particular reason, and some intellectual knowledge of the matter, conjoined with the principal intentional form. And so we said that the term 'form' can be extended to cover all that the *ratio* or exemplar covers in its widest meaning.

Now there are some differences when we speak of the exemplar, and the matter of a poem. For while the matter of the sculptor is some extramental substantial reality, the matter of a poem seems to be within the mind itself. Moreover, we think it can be said that the exemplar in poetry is productive of both the matter and form of a poem, and thus is directly representative of these. At the same time, of course, the matter and form of the poem are not purely created by the poet, since all his ideas and images are at least remotely principled from external reality.

This multiple exemplar may also be called a *verbum mentis* (a word of the mind, an expressed concept), in an extended sense. We say "extended", first because it is not a simple concept, but a complexus of judgements; secondly, because it exists in intellect and sense together. A *verbum mentis*, to be actually understood by the person, is always related to some simultaneous image, in which it is reflected.¹⁸ But the *verbum* of a poem, as it exists in sense, is present to the mind with greater clarity and insistence, as it were, than are the cooperating images of other concepts, so that the mind turns its attention to both the spirit-

³⁷Cfr. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 11, resp. *Qwodl.* VII, a. 3: "Et quia artifex homo per formam artis non producit materiam, sed materia praesupposita inducit formam artis; forma artis quae est in mente artificis non est similitudo artificiatum nisi quoad formam tantum..." And he adds, as the ground on which we posit the existence of an intentional representative and productive species in the particular reason, "...unde per eam non cognoscit artificiatum in particulari, nisi formam artificial per sensum accipiat..." Vd. also *Quodl.* VIII a. 2.

³⁸Cfr. // *Con. Gent.*, c. 73; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 7; q. 86, a. 1.

ual and sensible species, with equal attention, and sees them as mutually related, one being a reflection of the other.

This complex word is an operative word,³⁹ productive of the matter and form of the poem. To see this, we must here go into the matter and form of a poem for a little while—and we shall go into this at greater length in the *Metaphysics of a Poem*—and examine the nature of the operative word after this consideration.

There are several ways of speaking of the matter of a poem. For instance, one may regard reality itself as in a certain sense the matter, inasmuch as reality is said to be oversplendored by the mind. But this hardly seems correct. For in no sense is reality really changed or perfected by the mind: it is a purely extrinsic perfection which is contributed by knowledge, and the junction of reality and the mind cannot make a real artefact. Or one may speak of voiced or written words as the matter, as much as they are oversplendored by meaning. This approaches the view which we adopt, but it needs to be understood correctly. For external words are signs of the "passions of the soul,"⁴⁰ and while they are related to what they thus signify, they cannot be taken alone as constituting the fundamental matter of the poem.

To see what the matter may be, let us first insist on the difference between the passions of the soul—the movements or changes of knowledge—and the external signs of these. Propositions are signs of judgements, expressed in external words. Not every sentence is a proposition, but every sentence—or arrangement of external words making complete

³⁹We hope no ambiguity will arise from our use of the term "word" for the multiple exemplar in intellect and sense. Where we mean, by the term, a word as ordinarily understood—a voiced or written or imagined word—which is the prime analogue in this analogous use of the term, the context will make it unmistakably clear.

⁴⁰The passions here are to be understood principally as concepts, according to St. Thomas' understanding of Aristotle: / *Periherm.*, lect. 2.

sense—is a sign of the passions of the soul, since the movements of thought, while *remotely* based on judgements, do not always take the form of judgements in the mind. And thus we have forms of thought which, conjoined with movements of the will, are expressed externally in forms of question, command, exclamation (to gain attention from another), and entreaty.⁴¹ Neither an external proposition nor any of the forms of sentences mentioned just above can be the fundamental matter of the artefact, for they are signs of something internal, and to stop at them is not to get a complete understanding of the constituents of the artefact. Thus, a strict consideration cannot accept external reality as the matter, nor stop at the voiced or written signs.

Now consider the passions of the soul themselves. What is principally meant by these passions is the activity of intellect. But we may likewise speak, by implication, of the movements of appetite and the activities of the internal senses. What is that element which, in being given formal perfection according to the directions of the exemplary word, constitutes the matter of the poem? We think that the matter is all the ideas and images derived from attention to this exemplary word, and arranged according to this word.

We have just spoken indirectly of the intrinsic form of the poem—arrangement—which joins with this matter to perfect it according to the exemplary word. This form is the binding together of all the ideas and images, or *"*intentions*" in intellect and sense. The ideas and images, as unconnected, have no relation among themselves. But they are brought into relation according to the exemplary word, as far as the force, prevailing among the ideas and images of this exemplary word itself, is communicated to the ideas and images of the poem. The intrinsic form of the poem, or the intentional binding of one idea to another, of one

⁴¹/ *Perih&rm.*, lect. 7.

image to another, and of all the ideas and images to one another, is a reflection, as it should be, of the form of the exemplary word. But this very perfection of intentional binding is limited, as we should expect, by the matter which it accidentally perfects.

Thus, the matter of every "sentence"⁴² of the mind is every mental term employed. The form of every such sentence is the relation between the terms, or their binding together through predication. This binding gives perfection, order, and a resultant splendor, or intelligible (or sensible) meaning. It is said that in a judgement the matter is the subject and predicate, the form is the copula "is". This copula is not to be understood as itself a third term: it means simply the predication made by one term of another. The same is true of every act of the mind. In such a joining of terms, these terms stand in the light of each other, and are formally perfected in each individual case by the relation given to them through predication.

For example, the matter of the judgement "The golden aspen by the door burns in a clear and blinding blade of light" is the subject "aspen" (with its qualifying notes), and the predicate "a burning thing" (with its qualifying notes). These ideas, apart from each other, have their own formal element. But in the judgement, the form is the predication of "burning thing" of "aspen". In this predication, the ideas are given perfection—with that particular perfection which springs from order or proportion, and which results in splendor or determined cognoscibility. Or in the internal sentence "Pass by, O ruined and resplendent hills, with all your hot tumultuous blaze", the matter is the ideas taken singly, "things that pass by," and "hills" (qualified by the notes "ruined, resplendent, blazing"). The form is the binding together of these, so that they receive proportioned perfection, resulting in splendor.*" In all

⁴²We say "sentence" in order not to limit the cognitive acts to judgements alone, but to include the mental acts expressed in external commands, entreaties, etc., as we said above.

the internal sentences, as bound together, there is an obvious reflection of the complex exemplar.

The material, out of which the exemplar itself was fashioned, is the experienced real, as recalled from memory in the case we have given. It is the real under intentional existence, evoked from habitual retention to actual consideration: the recollected autumn tree before the house, as singularly and personally known. By the one act, whereby the mind considers its concept of beauty as such, and the habitual scheme of personal values, it reflects likewise upon the recollected experience: the three are contemplated together in explicit relation, giving rise to the complex exemplar. Out of an attention to this exemplar springs the matter and form of the poem. Since the production of this matter and form is an intricate phenomenon, we will devote a separate chapter to its consideration.

CHAPTER VII

THE OPERATIVE WORD

1. THE WILL

St. Thomas says that a canticle is an exultation of the mind, or the soul, breaking forth into voice.¹ Something similar must be said of poetry. This overflow into expression is the fundamental mystery of verbal creation, or poetry. Now unless the exemplar becomes operative through conjunction with the will, it is unproductive. Perhaps the following will serve as an explanation of the initial movement to creation.

We say that the exemplar is a composite word of the mind, containing in a multiple reflection the intentional experience, not only in its sensible qualities, but also as it is colored by the concept of beauty as such and the poet's scheme of values. Thus it is a mental complexus of the entire experience.² Now the soul knows itself through its

**In David.*, proemium: "Hymnus est laus Dei cum cantico. Canticum autem exultatio mentis de aeternis habitis, prorumpens in vocem."

²It is to be noted that the experience need not be one that previously took place between the poet and some definite extramental reality. We can speak of constructed exemplars too, as much as the poet, through his imagination, can construct an experience, and react to it as he would if it sprang directly from extramental reality. Such, it would seem, is the original experience of the *Divfna Commedia*. But even here—and the instances are perhaps more numerous than we suspect—the imagined experience is founded on reality, and many disparate real experiences supply the imagination in its constructions. We can speak then of recollected and constructed pro-

acts: hence, through contemplation of this exemplary word. It knows that which it contemplates as an indistinct pre-containing of possible beauty, and this awakens the will to love, and a desire for the actualization of this possible beauty. Such movements of the will might be called, for purposes of analogy, spiritual emotions. It is here that creative knowledge begins, under the influence of the will. With the spiritual emotions, we may guess the presence of emotions proper, on the sensible level. This is not a phenomenon unique to poetic creation: it belongs to the general phenomenon of "problem-solving". The exemplary form, regarded in itself, is a formal cause or principle: but related to the will, it shares in the efficiency of this faculty. It is only, as we said, under the influence of love and desire that the exemplar becomes operative.³

The Angelic Doctor speaks of vital movement and impulse in connection with the Holy Ghost. Creatures, he points out, are said to be in God in three ways, as they are related to their principle, the Father (the unprincipled Principle), to their exemplar, the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, who contains things after the manner of will. Things are thus related to the Father as to power (*ex ipso*) to the Son as to knowledge (*per ipsum*), and to the Holy Ghost as to will (*in ipso*). The relation of the Son to the act of creation (which is, as a matter of fact, only an appropriated relation, since it is the three Persons *in communi* who operate *ad extra*) is like the relation of art to the artist; the relation of the Holy Ghost to the act is like that of the will of the artist. But the act of the will is more proximate to the work than either power (the Father) or knowledge (the Son). In a similar way, the movement of the poet's will is

duction, as well as of the much rarer instance of a poem being fashioned immediately in the presence of the real. What holds for any one of these productions holds for all, with the note that the last type derives assistance from the real extramental presence of the real itself as a partial exemplar: much as a model serves the sculptor.

³Cfr. *Second Part*, "Art and the Will", p. 104ff.

more immediate to the poem than either the exemplar as such or the power to work. And his will thus contains and conserves the work, and the will's activity is that which, though actually posterior to power or knowledge, really completes these in actual operation.⁴

He says elsewhere: "The Spirit of God is usually taken in Scripture as the Holy Ghost, who is said to have 'moved over the waters' not in a bodily way, but as the will of the artist moves over the matter which he wishes to inform/"" By an extension of the analogy, we may speak of the artist's will moving* over the exemplary word, although this word, as we understand it, is not the matter of the poem.

Under this initial movement, the intellect—guided by the exemplary word—commands the imagination, as St. Thomas says.⁵ It is a phenomenon we are all aware of. The poet's task is one of intense concentration, wherein the exemplary word contains a vague knowledge of what should

⁴⁷ *Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5um: "Operatio autem et conservatio rerum a Deo completur per voluntatem et bonitatem ejus: quia voluntas inter tria, scilicet potentiam, scientiam, et voluntatem, proximus est ad opus: et ideo *in ipso* appropriatur Spiritui Sancto, qui procedit per modum voluntatis, et cui bonitas appropriatur; cum haec praepositio *in* dicat habitudinem ad continens et conservans. Sed *per ipsum* appropriatur Filio; quia *per* denotat causam formalem; et ars, per quam sicut per formam operatur artifex, Filio appropriatur. *Ex ipso* autem propter habitudinem principii, quam importat haec praepositio *ex*, appropriatur Patri, qui est principium non de principio." Cfr. also *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8, resp. (4).

⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 66, a. 1 (response to the 2nd objection under the 'contra'): "...spiritus Domini in Scriptura non nisi pro Spiritu Sancto consuevit poni: qui aquis superferri dicitur, non corporaliter, sed sicut voluntas artificis superfertur materiae quam vult formare."

**Summa Theol.*, H-II, q. 173, a. 2, resp: "In imaginatione autem non solum sunt formae rerum sensibilium, secundum quod accipiuntur a sensu, sed transmutantur diversimode, vel propter aliquam transmutationem corporalem (sicut accidit in dormientibus et furiosis) vel etiam secundum imperium rationis disponuntur phantasmata in ordine ad id quod est intelligendum."

be said.⁷ There is a certain searching within the mind for definite and striking expression of this exemplar. It is a case of the mind possessing a word (exemplar), and, facilitated by art, seeking to utter a further word, more concrete and particular, to embody a rich reflection of the more remote and less particularized word.

2. THE FORMATION OF THE POEM

The actual expressing results, we think, from four things: the intellect knowing in a general way what should be said, the will moving the intellect to operation, the acts of mental attention to the exemplary word as it exists in intellect and sense, and the phenomenon of association. Experimental psychology has the duty of exploring these mental states. There are, as psychologists are aware, many problems in this searching which are, perhaps, irreducible "mysteries", since, for one thing, it seems finally inexplicable how the undoubted fact of cooperation between intellect and sense actually takes place. One workable explanation—and even this seems to some psychologists not a satisfactory explanation⁸—seems to us to rest on the composite nature of the human mind, as rooted in the simple soul, according to which an operation in a higher or lower faculty

⁷The words of St. Thomas: "the artist knows through the constructed exemplar what has to be effected" might be used to illustrate this statement. *De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 2: "...per formam excogitatum artifex intelligit quid operandum sit."

⁸Cfr. "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars", by Kudolph Allers, *op. tit.*, p. 160. To this article, the article by Noel Mailloux ("The Problem of Perception", 07?. *cit.*), and *Psychology*, by Michael Maher, S. J. (Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1926; Ninth Edition) we are indebted for the development in the following pages, while we admit the possibility of having misapplied their theories. We have gathered something likewise from Maritain's *Art and Poetry*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1943 (especially from the lecture "Freedom of Song," p. 71 if.), and Behn, *The Eternal Magnet* (trans. G. N. Shusher), Devin-Adair, New York, 1929; p. 222 ff.

may, by a kind of "reverberation", influence a concurrent operation in the other. Under the heading of the operative word, we will consider five points.

A. The poet *attends* to the word. This attention is directed by the natural appetite of intellect and the influencing rational and sensory appetites, focussing on the one end. As much as the contemplation of the composite word is apprehended as a good, the appetites influence continued contemplation or attention—though the sensory appetite has not the principality of the will. This attention is simply the sustained contemplation of the recollected experience—or of the constructed experience, as the case may be. It is so obviously essential to the actual creation of the poem that we need not delay over it. The appetites hover, so to speak, over this deliberate contemplation: "as the Spirit of God moved over the waters."

B. There is a mysterious power in the mind, based on habit: the power of *association*. It belongs to intellect,⁹ to imagination,¹⁰ to memory¹¹ and to appetite, both volitional and sensory.¹² It is chiefly in connection with memory that association is emphasized, and for which certain rules have been drawn up. Two of these rules are important in our consideration. 1. (the law of similarity) that the mind in

⁹Cfr. Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 198. The laws of association were known to Aristotle, and were considered by St. Thomas in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Memoria et Remiscentia*. Locke, Hobbes, Hume, James Mill, John Stuart Mill and Bain made varying use of these laws. Almost any modern work on elementary psychology makes mention of them. Maher (*op. cit.*, p. 201 ff.) outlines the theories up to his own lay. Cfr. also Brennan, *Thomistic Psychology*, *op. cit.*, p. 130 if; Gardner Murphy, *Historical Introduction to Modern Psycholoffy*, (Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1938), p. 18, 106 ff.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 165 ff.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 179-207.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 183. We think it can be predicated of the cogitative Dower also, though Father Maher fails to say anything of it—chiefly because he neglects this faculty, giving only three references to it in his work.

the presence of any mental state tends to reproduce the like of that state in past experience; 2. (the law of contiguity) that the mind in the presence of an object or event, whether actual or ideal, tends to recall other objects and events, formerly closely connected in space or time with that now present.¹³

These same laws can, with modification, serve the imagination,¹⁴ the cogitative power, the intellect and appetites. To bear out this statement, it is only necessary to recall that habit is the psychological basis of the laws of association, and all these powers are determinable by habit. Thus the following general postulate applies to all: "Any group of mental states which have occurred together or in succession, tend to be reproduced simultaneously, or in the original order."¹⁵

Now the exemplary word is in both sense and intellect in different ways, and *as if* in a single source—because of a relation between these powers. The sense is aware of the sensible properties and particular value of this word; the intellect is directly aware of the universal properties and universal values, and indirectly (by reflection) of the sensible representation. When either faculty attends to its object, then, according to the laws above, associated representations arise. Thus the ideas in the intellect suggest similar ideas, and the images similar images. But when ideas appear in the intellect, the images from which they

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 181, ff.

¹⁴The imagination has reproductive (or representative) and productive (or constructive) activities—the former presenting intentions of things previously experienced, the latter of things not previously experienced as such. Both these activities figure in the expression of the exemplary word. But we should not confuse these acts with the perceptual act, which acts as an object is *really* present. Perception, as we pointed out, is, however, properly attributed to the cogitative power in its first act.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 389.

were habitually¹⁶ abstracted would seem, by the same mysterious power of association, to rise simultaneously into consciousness, though they may doubtless be changed to some extent from what they were before. Similarly, if there is an influence from above, there would seem to be a like influence from below; and if sensible attention to imagination awakens a constellation of associated images, the conceptual activity which has habitually followed on the presentation of these images to the agent intellect would seem to be repeated. Couple with this the fact that the intellect is actively attending to the word with an obscure expectation of what it is looking for, and we understand that it exercises a certain control over its own activity and that of sense.¹⁷ In seeking its singular ideas, the intellect receives the associations of the imagination, and forms its

¹⁶We lay emphasis on the word *habitually*. For it is clear that when an idea is formed, the same image from which it was once abstracted need not appear concomitantly in sense. (Vd. R. Allers, "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars", p. 117.) But it is conceivable that images which have been habitually associated with certain concepts may arise in consciousness when the mind deliberately turns its attention to these concepts.

¹⁷This expectation of what, the intellect is looking for is involved in so much obscurity that it is idle and perhaps impossible to expatiate on it, or solve its mysteriousness. To say that the multiple *verbum mentis* is light, and the splendor of the mind (as St. Thomas speaks of the concept as "*lux et splendor intellectus*," *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 8), and that it contains implicitly all that is explicitly derived out of it by contemplation, is not to solve the problem. But the fact remains that attention to the word results in solution. Anyone who has had any experience in the creation of poetry will admit the following: a concentration on a "vision", a theme, an exemplary word (using these interchangeably), a preconception of the probable length of the poem, of the general progression to a dimly envisioned climax, of the "sound" of the poem in its half-guessed progression. These things are sometimes called the "feel" of the unexpressed poem: a dim awareness of the progression of the poem in its thought and emotion, leading to a conclusion in which the possibilities of expression are climaxed.

singular and particular ideas as they are mirrored in the images.

Robert Frost, a very real, if not a very great, poet, says that the awakened material is "snatched from some previous order in time and space into a new order with not so much as a ligature clinging to it of the old place where it was organic." And again, the material must have the greatest freedom "to move about in (the poem) and to establish relations in it regardless of time and space, previous relation, and everything but affinity."¹⁸ This is only natural, for the poet's mind is rooted in past experience through innumerable memories. Whatever memories, kindred in some degree to the exemplary word, are chosen, they have as their context not the real in which they were experienced before, but the context of the poem, and nothing of their order remains (or should remain) which will injure this context.

What sense does then is to attend to the word as it is solely concrete and singular, and to receive its associations. What intellect does is something more. For not only does it attend to the universal aspects of this exemplary word, but firstly, in understanding the singular ideas passively contained in the exemplary word, it has an indirect attention to every corresponding image in the multiple word; secondly, in knowing obscurely what is to be sought, it attends to the singular ideas of the word for further suggestions, and with this expectation it reflects on the activity of the imagination, and thus has an indirect control over this activity; thirdly, it assumes what associations are given to it by sense, taking them up in a universal manner; fourthly, it reflects upon the imagination, and sees these abstracted notions in the light of their source, thus forming its further singular and particular ideas; and fifthly, according to the

¹⁸*Collected Poems of Robert Frost*, Halcyon House, Garden City, N. Y., 1942; Introduction ("The Figure a Poem Makes"); Henry Holt and Co., New York (copyright).

habit of art, it combines all its associated ideas on the strength of their relation to the exemplary word. Thus the absolute direction of all the activity comes from the operative intellect, which knows obscurely what is to be sought, draws assistance from its own habits of association, and employs the imagination's own activity of habitual association. It is pertinent to note that, properly speaking, it is not the faculties of the person which perform these activities, but the person through the faculties.

C. The *cogitative power* combines the associate images, and apprehends their particular value. Noel Mailloux (in his "Problem of Perception") does not seem to leave room for such activity, except as actual *perception* takes place. But it appears that the value-judgements of the cogitative power can be performed, even if the images are reproductive and productive: if this cannot be, we do not see the reason for limiting it thus. We spoke several times of the intellect's employing these sensible *collationes*. If the intellect does assume these judgements, it must also assume their note of value. Sensible values, when they are apprehended by intellect, awaken the movements of will and some degree of emotion. The intellect then is likewise aware of the volitional and emotional affections, as well as of the value.

What is the result of this double appetite? While the will, and to some extent the emotions, are the impelling force behind the movement to creation in the beginning, as much as the possible beauty of the poem is presented to the appetite as a good, then, as the beauty of the poem begins to appear, and is presented to appetite as an accomplished good, the will enjoys a partial rest or fruition in this attainment. But this partial attainment likewise stimulates the will to renewed desire and hope, and such movements have an influence on intellectual and sensory contemplation, pressing the intellect and internal senses (particularly the cogitative power) to continued contemplation. Emotion is not always a help to activity; but properly controlled by

reason, it can further contemplation. So the poet views what he has thus far expressed with a certain satisfaction; and the completion of one fragment impels to continued effort.

D. A probable association likewise exists in the case of *emotion* and *volition*. As the poet contemplates the multiple word, the activity of the appetites is known to the mind. And perhaps certain other states of appetite are awakened by association of similarity. If this is so, the very presence of the new appetites will suggest the states of cognition that previously attended them, if this attendance was habitual. The mental state would be quite obscure. But we suppose everyone has experienced the like phenomenon: a vague feeling within the mind, an emotional or volitional "remembrance" (suggested by some previous emotion or volition) without a definitely apprehended object, which seems to seek for its cause until it suddenly strikes upon it. This is possible in the instance of the poet, who has experienced particular movements of appetite many times over, in the apprehension of particular values, and in whom these movements, as related to definite apprehensions, are stored up in the form of habit. Anyone who has had experience in the writing of poetry must admit the possibility of an obscure feeling searching for its object. And this is no small help to the poet, in seeking out some probable expression he desires.

E. We distinguished the acts of *production* and *reproduction* in imagination.¹⁹ It is commonly said that the poet's search for expression is directed toward the productive (or constructive) imagination—i.e., of images of things not previously experienced as such. This is doubtless true of a great deal of his investigation. But we think too much emphasis may be laid on that, and not enough on the fact that he attends also—perhaps principally—to the drawing

¹⁹See p. 175, footnote 14.

up of images of things previously and explicitly experienced, however far apart the separate experiences may have been.²⁰ If the productive imagination cooperates, this means that the poet *combines* these representative images, to produce *intentiones* of things which he may not have experienced as actually possessing these predicated attributes in reality: though there is generally a ground in reality for making the predication. The combination of these is oftentimes fortuitous—at least apparently so, since we can hardly speculate about individual instances—as when the image of a shower, arising into consciousness after the image of the Divine Word's descent among men in His Incarnation, (both having been drawn from reality) is luckily found when it is joined with the second image to suit the exemplary word.

*A released shower, let flash to the shire.*¹

F. With every image, either there appears a *word*, or the memory (or the dictionary) is searched until a word, perhaps unsatisfactory at first, but set down tentatively, is found. It might almost be said that the word appears simultaneously with the image, so accustomed is the poet to associate certain words with certain images. If the right word is not found, this would seem to argue that the mind has not clearly uttered its own internal ideas as yet, because the images from which the intellect abstracts are them-

²⁰If these reproductions are recognized as images of past objects, this bespeaks the specific activity of memory. Both imagination and memory have retentive and reproductive capacities: memory retains and (by association, or the mysterious command of the searching intellect) reproduces images of objects once experienced as individually valuable. Memory, then, when it is specifically active as distinct from imagination, recognizes an image as that of an object either valuably experienced, or simply perceived, in the past. It is to be remembered, however, that this does not mean a consciousness of an image as an instrumental sign; for these images are always formal signs, and the consciousness is focussed upon an *object* as once experienced.

²¹Gerard Manley Hopkins, *Poems*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

selves indistinct; or because, while the concept and image may be clear, it may be difficult for the memory to recall the most expressive word. The habit of art perfects cognition in the recognition and selection of the suitable word. On words we shall say more in another place.

.

Positing all these interrelated acts, the poem moves from point to point until the whole is made, always under the regency of the operative word and the habit of art, in the probable way we have outlined

Poet! still, still thou dost rehearse
In the great *fiat* of thy Verse,
Creation's primal plot;
And what thy Maker in the whole
Worked, little maker, in thy soul
Thou work'st, and men know not.

Thine intellect, a luminous voice,
Compulsive moved above the noise
Of thy still-fluctuous sense;
And Song, a water-child like Earth,
Stands with feet sea-washed, a wild birth
Amid their subsidence.²²

One final question. May we speak of the active will and emotions as part of the exemplary word? They are consequent to the mental representation, and only in this sense can they be a part of the word. But if we consider the word in its character as efficient (the *operative* word) the movements of appetite are an essential part of it. Yet they are not "words" in the proper sense. Thus St. Thomas says that *verbum* belongs properly to a manifestation of intellect; a manifestation of the will is a *verbum* only metaphorically, and thus the Son is called a Word properly, but

²²Francis Thompson, "Carmen Genesis", *op. tit.*, p. 227.

the Holy Ghost only metaphorically.²³

What we have said on the genesis of a poem may seem like an attempt to further obscure what is already so obscure, and perhaps ultimately inexplicable. But our effort has been to see in what terms the "intuitions" of the poet's mind in creating may be somewhat explained through an analysis of all the possible factors concerned. And we conclude that these intuitions are finally reducible to a great complexity of rapid subliminal inferences, beginning from habits of association, and obscurely guided by the intellect, the will and the emotions. The habit of art, itself acquired by numerous experiences in expressing the profound half-formed word of the mind, gives the poet an unfaltering guidance in recognizing the terms which will bear out this word in explicit objective expression.

²³De Ver., q. 4, a. 3, reap: " .. nomen verbi proprie dicitur de eo quod procedit ab intellectu; quod vero ab intellectu non procedit, non potest verbum dici nisi metaphorice; inquantum, scilicet, est aliquo modo manifestans... et ideo Spiritus sanctus non potest dici verbum nisi metaphorice, secundum quod omne manifestans dicitur verbum."

CHAPTER VIII

THE METAPHYSICS OF POETRY

From whatever source the poet derives the initial word through which he works, it is a compelling word, seeking to express itself, as it were, in a more defined and concrete word. And as this word exists in both intellect and sense, it is a sensible and spiritual matter which is produced—images and ideas, and words as signs of these. The binding together of all this matter is the intrinsic form of the poem: a communication of the exemplary word to the poem through this form.

In this chapter we shall consider the artefact in itself, as a composite of matter and form, in which there is a splendor of being, or a splendor according to the intrinsic form. This will include also an idea of the characteristics of beauty, harmonious perfection, and splendor. We shall also investigate words, and what the being of a poem is. In the next chapter we shall speak of the delightful contemplation of the artefact, from the poet's side and the reader's.

1. MATTER AND FORM OF A POEM

We begin with a poem, "October", by Robert Frost, chosen because its simplicity will ease our inquiry.

O hushed October morning mild,
Thy leaves have ripened to the fall;
To-morrow's wind, if it be wild,
Should waste them all.
The crows above the forest call;

To-morrow they may form and go.
O hushed October morning mild,
Begin the hours of this day slow.
Make the day seem to us less brief.
Hearts not averse to being beguiled,
Beguile us in the way you know.
Release one leaf at break of day;
At noon release another leaf;
One from our trees, one far away.
Retard the sun with gentle mist;
Enchant the land with amethyst.
Slow, slow!
For the grapes' sake, if they were all,
Whose leaves already are burnt with frost,
Whose clustered fruit must else be lost—
For the grapes' sake along the wall.¹

The exemplary word, as far as we can reconstruct it, would appear in its objective contours as follows: This is a day which should move slowly, as all beautiful things should, in order not to sadden us with a suggestion of winter, or at least not to ruin what is already so near to ruin. It is immediately clear how difficult it is to lay one's finger exactly on the exemplary word. This is true of all but the most obvious poetry. But it is what we should expect from the nature of the case. We know indeed the objective word which proceeded from the productive word: but inasmuch as this latter is, in its own contours, only made explicit as the poem is created, we cannot expect to recreate it in its original character.

As to the matter of the poem. We pointed out previously that, strictly speaking, external words are not the fundamental matter. But as far as they are signs of the cognitive acts of the soul, they are a part of the matter; but ideas and images are the proper matter. This distinction, however, if forced, becomes idle; because no poet, We suppose, works without the external expression of these ideas

¹Robert Frost, *op. dt.*, p. 40.

and images. Moreover the very sound of the words—their actual, and not imagined sound—is, according to the intention of the poet, a part of the full effect. It may even be said that the arrangement of the poem on the written or printed page is accessory to the full effect, though in a rather negligible degree. While a strict consideration would first demand a treatment of the ideas and images as the matter, for practical purposes we can confine ourselves to the external words, as they appear upon the page above.

The matter then is every word of the poem. But immediately we must qualify this and say that the matter is every word and group of words, from simple words, to phrases, to clauses, sentences, and related sentences. This does not mean that the entire poem is the matter: for the poem is actually more than all its words together. It means rather that the matter, to appear paradoxical, is the *entire* matter: every word and group of words. As we shall see, the expression "a group of words" itself implies more than matter, for grouping is a binding together, and this is the form of the poem.

Moreover, every word, even taken singly, is both material and formal. Its matter—as we see if we refer to the matter and form of an idea—is its notes, its form is the union of these. And as the conjoined matter and form of anything gives rise to the nature of the thing, so the union of these notes gives rise to the nature of a word—namely, a sign, or a thing having meaning or content.

Again, every group of words in itself is material and formal: its matter is the individual words, its form is the binding together of these, or predication, giving a meaning to the whole. The nature of a group of words then is related meaning of its object. And here we observe that the nature of each word in the group is taken over and used by the form of the whole, to give rise to another thing, a group with meaning. In this case, neither the formal nor material element of each word is destroyed; but the higher

form assumes these elements, and uses them as its own matter.

The reasoning is the same for clauses, sentences, and related sentences. So we can analyze the entire poem. What we emphasize, to return to the original statement is, that the matter of the entire poem is every word and group of words, from simple words, to phrases, and so on, to related sentences. The form of the entire poem is the binding together of *all* the matter. And this means that this highest form does not destroy the material and formal elements of each of the individual parts, but it assumes all these as its own matter. The binding together of all these gives rise to a new thing, with its own nature, a giving of meaning.

In the making of the poem, the exemplary word is that according to which the matter is united through an intrinsic form. This exemplary word is the final reference, and every external word, as it is found through imagination and employed, presupposes an implicit judgement: an inference of its ability to bear out, within the structure of the whole poem, a fragmentary reflection of the light within this word. So of every part of the matter. And the intrinsic form of the poem is only complete when every possible part of the matter is regimented, and related to every other part through the form, according to the demands of the operative word. Whatever meaning then constitutes the nature of the poem will be a reflective meaning of the operative word in all its complexity.

*O hushed October morning mild,
Thy leaves have ripened to the fall. .*

Such a word as "hushed" has many notes, and the uniting of these by the mind gives the meaning of the word to the mind. The meaning of each word, with all its notes united by an act of the mind, is used by the poet with the meaning of every other word, and all the words so united within the poem are qualified by the form of the whole. This form

does not destroy the notes of each word, nor their relation (hence, not their nature or meaning); and thus it is possible to have a vastly intricate implication in a poem, by reason of the richness of meaning (founded on the notes) of every word.

The matter should limit the relation of all the parts, and result in an artefact which is individual. The matter being every word and group—that is, the meaning of each—then the relations which *can* obtain among them are realized only as far as the individual meanings allow. And this will result in an artefact which, while it enjoys a certain perfection through its entire intrinsic relation, is yet a limited thing—something with a certain contributed perfection of meaning, and yet a certain limitation. It is the function of the form to manipulate the individual meanings in such a way that the meaning of the whole will have a splendor resulting from this perfect manipulation.

It is only in such a making that the operative word becomes definitely known.² But be it noted in this connection, that the poem exists as something apart from the operative word—not indeed unrelated to the latter, but distinct in the measure that it is expressed by, or proceeds from, the operative word.³

²As Maritain says—though we take his words with certain reservations—"The creative idea..has its structure and contours expressed to the mind, its objectivity fashioned and uttered, only in the work itself that it produces outwardly.. It is an intellection having for *concept*, for intelligible fruit engendered..the work itself that is made, the object..of creative knowledge." *Art and Poetry*, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

³Thom & St. Thomas, is saying that the exemplary word first proceeds from the mind, and then the artefact proceeds, or is produced, according to a *likeness* of the exemplary word: "...verbum conceptum in mente artificis per prius intelligitur procedere ab artifice, quam artificiatum, quod producitur ad similitudinem verbi concepti in mente." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 33, a. 3, ad lum.

2. WORDS

A word is a sign. A sign has three connotations: we may speak of the thing itself which is the sign, or of that which is signified, or of the relation between the sign and that which is signified, namely signification, or meaning.

We may divide signs on the basis of their origin—i.e., whether they are signs found in the very nature of things, or whether they are instituted and agreed upon: natural and arbitrary signs. Thus smoke is a natural sign of combustion, a flag an arbitrary sign of a nation or the like. Again, we can divide signs according as they point immediately to the thing signified, without first attracting notice to themselves, or as they first attract such notice and then point to the thing signified: formal and instrumental signs.⁴ Thus an idea is a formal sign of its object, a railroad signal an instrumental sign of an approaching train. In this latter case, reflection upon the connection between the sign and its object is required, and the sign thus first attracts to itself as an instrument of signification. This may be an implicit reflection, as in the example of a railroad signal, based upon experience, which results in habitual knowledge. In the case of instrumental signs, the mind shifts its attention from the sign to the thing signified, and back again, intermittently. This is certainly true of words, as observation testifies. But when an idea is expressed in the mind, there is no such original reflection upon the idea as a sign. Even if the mind turns its attention to the idea afterwards, it remains a formal sign. The same is true of images.⁵ The fact that habit makes it easy for the mind to associate

⁴A third division into practical signs—which effect what they signify, as a Sacrament signifies the giving of grace, and effects this giving—and speculative signs, which do not effect what they signify, is not servicable for us here.

⁵Gredt speaks of the *species intelligibilis expressa* as a formal sign: it is not clear whether he allows the *species sensibilis expressa*, or the image, as a formal sign. Cfr. *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 369, no. 468, 1.

an instrumental sign with its object does not justify us in passing over the first instantaneous inference which is present in the mind. Only on the condition that a sign carries the attention immediately to the thing signified, without any initial attention (whether explicit or implicit) to the sign itself as a sign, can it be called a formal sign: and of these there are only two, ideas and images.

As to words: these are signs of the "passions of the soul". St. Thomas, commenting on this, says that vocal *sound* is something natural. But words are signs by human institution/ As for the "passions" (or actions, changes) of the soul, when these are understood as affections or movements of appetite, there are certain natural signs of these, as the sigh of a sick person. There may be arbitrary signs—words—of the same affections. But when this is the case, the words signify something more than the mere movements of appetite. For words are signs, by human institution, of the concepts of the mind.⁷ Words then are arbitrary, instrumental signs of thought. It may be added that a written word is a sign of a spoken word: but the distinction is not important enough to delay us.

The word is said to signify the concept immediately, and the thing mediately, or through the concept.⁸ Gredt

D. Barbedette allows the image in the eye and the imagination as formal signs. Cfr. his *Philosophia Scholastica*, Berche and Pagis, 1937; tome I, p. 26.

«/ *Periherm.*, lect. 2: ". . . vox est quoddam naturale, nomen autem et verbum significant ex institutione humana. . ."

⁷*Ibid*: "...oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes significant." E. M. Edghill's translation of Aristotle's *De Interpretation* speaks of spoken words as "the symbols of mental experiences." (*The Basic Works of Aristotle*, Random House, New York, 1941; p. 40.) This is equivalent to Thomas' rendition, "intellectus conceptiones."

⁸*Ibid*: "...voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate, et eis mediantibus res." *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 1: "...nomina non significant res nisi mediante intellectu..." Cfr. also *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 13, a. 1, resp; a. 4, ad lum.

points out a distinction here, however. He says that a word more principally signifies the thing thought about, for the concept, represented by the spoken or written word, more principally signifies its object (since it is a formal sign), and only indirectly connotes itself. By the one signification, the word signifies the concept and through this the thing, but in such a manner that it more principally signifies the thing than it does the concept.⁹

This is to speak of a word as uttered (or written). It is an objective sign. When the word is received by another, it is only through an idea that the thing signified is known. In this case the word is first perceived as a thing itself; then it is seen in its force as sign, when the recipient knows, by the one signification, the thing and what is thought about it. The uttered word as such is a sign only of the speaker's and not the receiver's thought. The word, when received, completes its office as an objective sign of a thing and a thought about it, when its essence as a sign and its objective signification are known, thus leading to the thing.¹⁰ This is what constitutes a word as an instrument of communication: it is an objective sign, and serves its purpose when it is known in its character of signification. The word is a sign not only of something, but to someone. As uttered, it is an expressed sign, with objective signification; as heard or seen, it is a perceived sign, with received signification.

It is obvious that words are also signs of images, in the sense that ideas are formed through the instrumental efficiency of images, and are accompanied by them. Moreover, since with every imagination there is some movement of sense appetite,¹¹ however obscure, when the object is appre-

⁹Gredt, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 19, no. 19.

¹⁰*De Ver.*, q. 12, a. 7, ad 5um: "...in eo qui ex signis scientiam accipit, signorum cognitio est via ducens ad res ipsas."

¹¹J *Periherm.*, lect. 2: "...intelligere nostrum non est sine phantasmate, quod non est sine corporali passione." Perhaps St. Thomas means by the last phrase only a change (impression and expression) in the sensory faculty of imagination. The principle is true, however,

bended as valuable in some particular way, or as harmful and the like, words are, in this sense, signs of such movements.¹² But we must insist that the word means the thought and the thing thought about, and only by consequence, or implication, the image and appetite. In a like sense, words may be signs of the movements of the will, by the consequence that what is expressed is expressed because the will moves to this; or again, as far as the words express affections concerning what is thought about. In poetry there are innumerable instances of this, and they abound in what we have called affective poetry, when the words signify not only a thought about the object, but a thought qualified by desire, aversion, or the like.

St. Thomas speaks of three ways of using the term "word". It may signify the concept, the external or vocal word, and the word as imagined.¹³ There is a distinction between a concept and a *verbum mentis*, called also a *verbum cordis*. It is the *species intelligibilis expressa* under a special aspect—i.e., regarded as that in which the object is expressed and actually known.¹⁴ It is this *verbum mentis*

that when an object is apprehended sensibly, under the aspect of some particular value, a corresponding movement of sensory appetite is awakened. (III *De Anima*, lect. 4, at end. Cfr. footnote 64, p. 115, above). Sensible perception alone does not bespeak a consequent movement of appetite.

¹² St. Thomas applies "passiones animae" in an extended sense, for every activity of knowledge and appetite; but the principal signification is thought. / *Periherm.*, lect. 2.

¹³ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 34, a. 1, resp: "Sic igitur primo et principaliter interior mentis conceptus verbum dicitur; secundario vero ipsa vox interioris conceptus significativa; tertio vero ipsa imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur."

¹⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 27, a. 1, resp: "Quicumque autem intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum quod est conceptio rei intellectae ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex ejus notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat; et dicitur verbum cordis, significatum verbo vocis." *Ibid.*, q. 107, a. 1, resp: "Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi; nam ipse conceptus mentis interius

which most purely merits the name word, for it more fully signifies the thought and the object in relation to the thought. When we speak of the operative word of a poem, it is this *verbum mentis* which we mean; although, as has been seen, it includes also the representation in the internal senses. The uttering of this word is a kind of self-communication, the person speaking to himself in silence about the object known.

The principles we have thus briefly set down are in general the principles which accord with the Aristotelian psychology as somewhat elaborated by the Angelic Doctor. Plato and the Stoics, it might be granted, initiated the first

verbum vocatur." Hence, it is called a word by an analogy to the spoken word. On the distinction between the expressed species and the *verbum*, vd. Maher, *op. cit.*, p. 310. It must be said that the concept and the *verbum* are one and the same thing, under different aspects, and St. Thomas sometimes calls all expressed species words of the mind, without distinction. (*De Differ. Verbi Divini et Humani; SnnHia TheoL*, 7, q. i34, a. 1, response, footnote 13 above). In the *De Ventate*, q. 10, a. 3, response, he says that there is no *verbum mentis* without actual knowledge: but, according to the conditions of our present knowledge, no idea is actually understood without recourse to the imagination. Vd. *Summa TheoL*, I, q. 86, a. 1, resp. Since the *verbum mentis* therefore implies the presence of an image as a foundation, so to speak, of the concept, it can be said that the *verbum* in human understanding is a multiple word, in intellect and sense together. While in thoery, the idea and the image can be contemplated apart, in practice the two exist simultaneously, the image being a reflection of the concept. // *Con. Gent.*, c. 73, "Intellectus enim possibilis": "Alio ergo modo se habet intellectus possibilis ad phantasma quo indiget ante speciem intelligibilem: et alio modo postquam recepit speciem intelligibilem; ante enim indiget eo ut ab eo accipiat speciem intelligibilem, unde se habet ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum movens, sed post speciem in eo receptam, indiget eo quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae speciei, unde se habet ad phantasmata sicut causa efficiens: secundum enim imperium intellectus, formatur in imaginatione phantasma conveniens tali speciei intelligibili in quo resplendet species intelligibilis sicut exemplar in exemplato sive in imagine."

important inquiry into the nature of words. Aristotle made some general observations in the *De Interpretation*. In the neo-Platonic and Augustinian interval between the age of Aristotle and the twelfth century there were periods when emphasis was laid upon the relations between language and the theory of knowledge. The sublime treatment of what Plotinos spoke of as the *vois* (the "mirroring eikon)"TM—a treatment which, it would seem, was bound to have a persuasive but misleading influence on the Christian mind—may have somewhat directed the mind of Augustine to a Christian exposition of the Word of God. Certainly his adherence to a Christian conception of the Platonic Divinity would have dictated the concern he took in the nature of the Divine Idea or Logos, as committed to the Church through the Gospel of St. John. Analogies borrowed from the spoken and imagined word, and the human *verbum cordis* (the concept) were fruitful sources of illumination in his great work on the Trinity.

Such theologians as St. John Damascene, St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure manifested, in different degrees, an interest in the elucidation of the Divine Word. The Angelic Doctor himself, approaching the question in the theological tradition of Augustine and the philosophical tradition of Aristotle, had an exposition to offer which, if much briefer than Augustine's, nevertheless made its own contributions to the speculation. St. Thomas had sufficient acquaintance with the Platonic outline of epistemology to enrich his own expositions by criticism of the Platonic notions. Moreover, he could profit by the epistemological conflict which had begun to burn about the end of the eleventh century, principally through the attacks of the Nominalists on the nature of the universals in Scholastic Realism.

Perhaps the first important medieval contributions to the study of words came from Peter Elias, and especially

¹⁵Siegfried Behn, *The Eternal Magnet*, op. cit., p. 106.

from Pierre Abelard.¹⁶ It can be supposed that the medieval interest in grammar, and the theological discussion of the Sacraments as signs, added to the natural interest in religious symbolism and the continued illuminations of the *Verbum Dei* through the *verbum mentis* in human cognition, encouraged speculation on the nature of language. But with this went also the investigations in observational psychology, as carried out, e.g., by St. Albert the Great, and earlier by John of Salisbury who made observations on perception and imagination which cannot but have effected the Scholastic Realists who followed him.

While it is true that the nature of words is based on the questions of the nature of the universals and the psychology of human knowledge—questions which can be explored rationally and defined in rational philosophy—yet no one can presume that observational psychology had nothing new to offer to the questions. The approach of St. Thomas, therefore, while its derivative conclusions were partially supplemented by the broadening disputes of his own day, and have come to be fundamentally justified in later experimentation, was necessarily limited. But the approach itself was eminently reasonable, beginning as it did from a correct knowledge of man as a substantial unit of body and spiritual soul, and from a theory of knowledge which, while necessarily enveloped in problems, is the most satisfactory exposition of human knowledge which the Aristotelian tradition has offered.

It is with the establishment of experimental psychology in the laboratory and clinic that new interest in the nature of knowledge, and new contributions to speculation have come to be. So much experimentation has been done in the realm of thought, volition, imagination, emotion and lan-

¹⁶The reader is referred to the edited works of Abelard, Ueberweg-Heinze, vol. II, 11th edit., 1928; B. Geyer. For information on the medieval question of language, cfr. "Erkennen und Sprechen bei Thomas von Aquin", *Divus Thomas*, Freiburg, 1938, vol. 16, p. 161, by V. Warnach, O.S.B.

guage—from a scientific and esthetic approach—that neo-Scholastic psychology could not afford to neglect the findings.¹⁷

Perhaps the most influential philosophies outside the Scholastic tradition which are used to interpret a hundred or more years of experimental findings, are the Behavioristic and Positivistic, which supplanted the associationist philosophy, and—apart from their opposition to Scholasticism—conflict today with the various forms of Idealism and Kealism. One of the predominant trends in certain forms of Behaviorism is to interpret thought as a purely sensory phenomenon, in which thinking is the same as inner sensory speech. We are not concerned in such a thesis as this with the interpretations which non-Scholastics make of the findings of experimentation: this is not a comparative study, but a tentative exposition of what we think St. Thomas might have said on the nature of poetry. The existence of concepts as spiritual entities—qualities of the spiritual faculty of intellect—is something which a thesis of the present dimensions must assume, rather than prove. But once as-

¹⁷The principal names linked with experiments and speculations which have pointed out new facts in the realm of appetite and knowledge, and emphasized certain neglected traditional notions, would start with Wilhelm Wundt, and include such men as E. B. Titchener, A. Binet, A. Bain, W. Stern, J. Piaget, E. B. Holt, J. B. Watson, O. Selz, E. G. Husserl, K. Buehler, S. Freud, P. Marechal, T. V. Moore, L. Wittgenstein, and others. To these must be added Locke, Hobbes, the Mills, and—in the modern literary school—C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, W. Empson, J. M. Murry, and a host of others. The reader is referred to the bibliography for some of these names. S. I. Hayakawa, at the end of his *Language in Action* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1941) gives a brief bibliography of some literary and scientific psychologists. An outline of the history of what has come to be called Semantics as allied to the psychology of language may be traced in Gardner Murphy's *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*, *op. cit.*; or in Desire Mercier's *The Origins of Contemporary Psychology* (Washbourne, London, 1918), or C. Spearman's *Psychology Down the Ages* (MacMillan and Co., London, 1937).

sumed, the identification of a concept with any sensory quality of the mind, or of the organs of speech or sensible expression, cannot be accepted. The idea, the image, and the external word are three really distinct expressions made by the human soul through distinct faculties. Nevertheless, they have this in common: they are expressions about an apprehended object, about the one object apprehended under different formalities.

All immediately significative (or categorematical) words, with the exception of proper names, primarily represent an object under the formal aspect of universality or essence. But when such words are qualified by other words, they may be used to designate at the same time an object under the formal aspect of particularity. Words of themselves have no essential connection with the signified object, and cannot be said to give the mind the object, whether *in universali* or *in particulari*, of their own force. Words, we said, are arbitrary signs, though language—i.e., some form of vocal communication—is something based on the natural (or, if you will, the instinctive) needs and desires of man, and therefore something truly natural. Yet a word, received by someone, does indeed give the object, or the content, to the mind, depending upon one's acquaintance with the word.

The primary source of words is the human mind, as it is capable of knowing and being affected by reality, and as it seeks to impart this knowledge and response to others. While it is evident that words are not always necessary—since the soul may express itself through looks, gestures, sighs, and the like¹—yet ordinarily the instrument of set sounds, or of language, is the most effective way of conveying one's responses to things.

It is necessary to make some distinctions, according to the various ends of language. Language, when directed to a social end, has the general purpose of communication. But communication itself may be for various ends:

1. simply to inform (about external things, or one's thoughts and feelings about things) ;
2. also to move another—i.e., to direct his will to some activity:
 - a. by an appeal to reason,
 - D. by an appeal to passion,
 - c. by an appeal to both reason and passion;
3. to please, or give delightful contemplation, by the presentation of a beautiful thing, or by the beautiful presentation of a thing, or by the beautiful presentation of a beautiful thing.

Under these three ends we have words as far as they are *presentative* of an object, as far as they *reveal* or express the utterer's cognitive or appetitive response to things, and as far as they *appeal* to another's cognitive and affective response. Presentation, expression, and appeal are not to be understood as parallelling the three divisions given immediately above: for it is evident that the two divisions intermingle. The beautiful presentation of a thing simply for pleasurable contemplation is the specifying end of *logica* (or *ars*) *poetica*. The beautiful presentation of a beautiful thing is also under this end—while it is clear that the essence of poetry as such need not center upon a beautiful object to be expressed, but, strictly speaking, upon any object.

The various other ends of language except the end of poetry, when language is considered in some degree an art, will determine the other kinds of logic: judicative, dialectic, and rhetoric.¹⁸ Moreover, comparing poetry and these others, on the basis of their subject matter, while rhetoric may have indeed the same subject matter as poetry, judica-

¹⁸The art of grammar is not reduced to any part of logic, but embraces all verbal expression, on the basis of a conformity of the words to the canons of idiomatic order, so that word is related to word in order to express a content as accurately as the custom of the language demands.

tive and dialectic logic are scarcely concerned with the particular as such. But even where the subject matter*of rhetoric and poetry is the same, rhetoric aims beyond the perfect giving of the content, and seeks to create a tension in the will in presenting a good to be attained or an evil to be avoided. Whatever is not poetry, it can be argued, is prose. And perhaps the fundamental distinction between poetry and prose rests in this, to the exclusion of all other distinctions, that poetry is the perfect verbal expression of an apprehended object, whose execution is normally capable of giving principled delight in the mere contemplation of this perfect expression, while prose—to put it negatively—is any other form of verbal expression.

The nature of language as both uttered and received is this: that any form of language, while it is arbitrary in its derivation, yet—because its symbolism becomes fixed and generally agreed upon—has the natural character of expressing the content of the utterer's mind, and of instrumentally giving this content to another mind. But this content is things as known. And thus the nature of language is the giving of content, or the instrumental signification of things as known.¹⁹

Before a word is found by the utterer, the content of the word which is sought is already given to the mind; otherwise the word could never be recognized as the suitable word when it is found. This points to the notion of preverbal thought. We said previously that with every idea there is an image.²⁰ This image need not be, however, an image of a word: it may be a visual, auditory, or kinesthetic image (or the like) of some other object than a word or several types combined. But a verbal image, as we know¹

¹⁹Cfr. "The Problem of Meaning", John A. Osterle, *The Thomist* July, 1943; vol. VI, no. 2, p. 225.

²⁰Some interesting observations, akin to this point, may be found in *The Meaning of Meaning*, C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1936; p. 215.

from our experience, is often lacking when we feel the need of it. Nevertheless, while there is preverbal thought, there would not seem to be any actual thought which is unattended by images of some kind. What is important is that any image—whether verbal or not—has a content, and is a formal, not an instrumental sign, which gives the object to the mind under a particular aspect: a tree as visible to imagination, or as audible, or the like.

But in the case of the poet, what is essential to his work is the formation of *verbal* images. These images have a content, and they represent the poet's effort to make language say what is contained in the other types of images, and in the ideas. Generally, we suppose, the poet transcribes these verbal images, so that the words are not merely imagined, but externalized, words. In this externalization, the words are instrumental signs, or such symbols as instrument the content of his ideas and images.

This instrumentation itself has two purposes: what we might call an objectively symbolic purpose, and a communicative purpose. By the first we 'understand the simple objectification in written (or uttered) words of the content of the poet's mind, so that the words come back to the poet himself in their character as symbols. It is a purpose which is rather well expressed in the phrase, "getting the poem out of one's system." It is a kind of self-communication. By the second purpose we understand what is generally taken as the primary end of the poet's words, a social purpose, the giving of the content of the poet's own mind about things to another. In view of such a purpose, the poet proportions his language to a certain audience. We do not think this is by any means the primary end of the poet's word-searching in many—perhaps in most—cases: though it may very well have been such, say before the nineteenth century. Our position, however, can scarcely be verified without examining the majority of poets; and, as a matter of fact, the point is not of great importance, if it is assumed that in most cases the poet *has* communication in mind,

whether this be his primary end or not. Sometimes, it may be granted, the poet works purely for the sake of being able to utter perfectly what he intends, apart from communication. And it may likewise be allowed that the poet sometimes has in mind what he regards as the ideal receiver of his work: some person or persons yet to be born who will respond to his work as he desires. Such an attitude may sometimes be a kind of defence mechanism; but it serves at any rate to support the poet in the face of an unresponsive audience.

It can be said that the poem exists potentially, or in suspension, within the written words, as far as these are, by their nature as common symbols, capable of instrumentally giving the content to another mind. To return then to the matter and form of the poem: it will be recalled that the matter is all the ideas and images, each as having meaning (i.e., as explained above, as formally giving an object or content) ; while the form is the union of all these in such wise that they have a common or contextual content. This is not simply a physical binding, after the manner of a hoop, or the like, but an intentional binding, or a caused union for the sake of *related (contextual) signification*.

Now, are the external words a part of this matter? It may immediately be granted that they are. But here we must note a distinction. If external words are taken simply in their physical entity as sound, or as ink upon a page, then they are not an essential part of the poem, for in such a case they do not give the content to the mind. But if they are taken in their proper *ratio* or nature as significant or intentional sound or print—in which capacity, while they are instrumental signs, they nonetheless give their content to the interpreting mind—they are a true part of the matter.²¹

²¹We may speak of rhyme, rhythm, alliteration, stanza structure, the "look" of the poem, and such like, as properties of words in their physical entity. Nevertheless, such properties may also have an intentional value, *aiding* in some way in the giving of the content. (Cfr. *The Meaning of Meaning*, *op. cit.*, p. 239.) In another place in

Similarly, their form, as an intentional form, and not a mere succession of sound or print, is the form of the poem. With the same force as the ideas and images which they principle in another mind, they give the contextual content of the poem.

This seems to say that there is a two-fold matter and form, one in the mind, one in extramental symbols. But this is hardly correct. For—as we shall point out in the next section (The Being of a Poem)—the ideas and images themselves, as real being (real spiritual and sensory qualities of the mind), are not the matter of the poem, but these taken as intentional being, formally giving their content to the knowing mind. And thus, what constitutes the matter of the poem, is the multiple expressions of the mind as pointing to their object. External words, while physically demanding the organs of speech or writing for their existence, are truly the product of the mind *in their intentional capacity*, and thus are a part of the matter; while, at the same time, what binds them together for the symbolization of an object is the same intentional binding as exists among the ideas and images.

But are *verbal images* sufficient for the nature of the poem—i.e., to the exclusion of expressed words? The answer to this may seem forced, but we think it follows from what we have just said. Verbal images *are* themselves

this work (p. 210), it is said: "One of the chief distinctions..between poetry and strict scientific prose is that in poetry we must consciously attend to the sensory characters of the words, whereas in prose we need not do so. This conscious attention to words as sound does, however, tend to impede our further interpretations." The reference is to words in their physical entity, and not to them as intentional sound. We would say that while such a thing does seem to take place, at least intermittently, in the experience of a poem, this prescinding from the intentional sound is not an experience of poetry *qua* poetry, but goes over into the experience of "music" in some way. Thus, one of the specific differences between poetry and prose, as we are inclined to believe, cannot be the attention to the words in their nature as physical and not intentional sound. See p. 206 below.

sufficient, without the need of external words. But verbal images are admittedly necessary, from the nature of the poetic art, and other images—when taken apart from verbal images—are not sufficient to constitute the nature of a poem.²² Yet, because of communication, external words are necessary: but this necessity is a conditional one, and the poem must be allowed to exist within the poet's mind independently of this external expression. Once expressed, however, it follows that in their capacity as intentional sound or print, external words will be an essential part of the matter. It is clear, too, that the actual writing serves to hold the developing poem in mind, and without this aid many of the words would be forgotten as the poem proceeds, especially if the poem is of any length. Finally, it may be granted that there is at least a slight difference in value between imagined words and the actual sound of words.

The first procession in the creation of the poem is the development of ideas and "thing" images—images which give the sound, the look, the movement, or in general the particularity, of the object. The next procession is the search for suitable verbal images. There need not be a priority of time in these two processions, but there is a priority of nature. The final procession is the transcription of external words.

The poet searches his memory to find the precise words to convey in a symbol the exact content of his ideas and "thing" images, the words that will contextually give the object under its multiple formal aspects. The poet fre-

²²The existence of poetry can be found only in man. An expression that does not utilize words will be some other art. If it were possible for man to do without words or any other form of external expression, in; communicating what is in his mind, we could fancy an art in which the mind would produce out of an exemplar a contextual succession of ideas and "thing" images, and then—without the need of external expression—could give this product to another mind. Verbal images would not be present. But this, while it would be "creation", would not be poetic creation. Verbal images are of the very essence of poetry.

quently falls short of the suitable words: he cannot help but do so in those cases where the particularity of the object is strongly desired.²⁻³ Again, he seeks the exact words to give contextually his mood, or in general his affective response to an object, and is doomed to some degree of failure.

In the remainder of this thesis, we shall be concerned with the poem as it is an inner expression, in ideas and images, of the content of the exemplar. We will say little about words, whether imagined or externalized. It must be carefully borne in mind, however, that we are not therefore ruling out verbal images and external words as of the nature of the poem. By images we will mean more than "thing" images: we will mean also, and necessarily, verbal images. The external words are signs of what is in the poet's mind, and have as their object or content the same content as the ideas and images, and in this respect are of the same value as the ideas and images. When we say, in the course of the pages to follow, that the ideas and images are signified in external words, we are thereby including external words as an essential part of the poem, as far as they are *intentional*.

It should also be pointed out that verbal images themselves may have as their content either the mere un-intentional sound or shape of an external word, or the intentional

²³Among modern poets in English, there is perhaps no one who has consistently equalled Gerard Manley Hopkins in the success with which he gives the particularity of his object. His ability to do this must be fundamentally ascribed to his use of a vocabulary which gives not only the look of a particular object, but also the feel and sound, and the like—and these aspects of the object often through the choice of a single word—e.g., the words "rinse" and "wring" in the following:

".. .and thrush

Through the echoing timber does so rinse and wring
The ear, it strikes like lightnings to hear him sing."

(Poems, *op. cit.* p. 27, "Spring.") The *contextual* use of such words, at the same time, increases their particularity of content. His vocabulary is largely Anglo-Saxon in origin: and some theorizing might be carried on as to the value of 'Celtic derivatives, in general, in giving the strong particularity of objects.

value of an external word: and thus, what is thereby present to the mind is either the mere imagined sound or look of the word, or at the same time the meaning of the word. The poet's attention, we suppose, fluctuates between these aspects of the imagined word. But the poetic value of the verbal image is in its giving of meaning, and it is in this capacity that a verbal image is principally considered in the poet's mind.

Is the poem, then, an artefact which is wrought within the poet? Essentially, yes. For the external writing or vocalization proceeds from what is already formed within the soul.²⁴ And the vocalization or transcription, as it is *intentional*, belongs essentially within the mind. The poem then must be said to be framed within the poet. And if the external words are called the poem, this is in the sense that they instrumentally contain what is already within the poet's soul, and are capable of principling a content within the mind of another.

There are a few points which remain to be considered. Language is spoken of today as having a connotative and an emotive (or affective) quality. Regarding connotation, it is true that words (w^e are speaking of external words principally, though the same observations apply to verbal images) have the capacity of giving not simply a direct content, but an indirect, by way of suggestion or association. This arises from the fact that definite words become enriched with a number of accessory notes, through a connection in past experience with certain objects and situations. The word "mother", for example, gives the direct or essential content of female parent: but it also connotes, or trails with it—depending upon one's attention at the moment—

²⁴Music, it would appear, is thus exactly parallel to poetry in this respect. (Cfr., incidentally, Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.) But the sound of poetry is an intentional sound: music, however, may have no definite content—but only the content of a perfect order of pleasing sound, unless the sound is fashioned to words or the like.

various shades of accidental meaning, so that the word is indirectly capable of arousing a multiple and personal context.^{2r>} The one word in the poet's case will not always awaken the same accidental connotations in the reader's mind. Contextually, the poetic words aim at eliminating as far as possible the personal connotations of the reader, yet they can never perfectly control the reception. It is of the perfection of the poem that its words be able to exert such a control, but it is actually an impossible ideal, no matter what the poet thinks about it.

The affective quality of poetry bespeaks the awakening of the will and the emotions through the contextual value of the words as they give their object.²⁰ We shall something later²⁷ on the different responses possible in the reception of a poem. Here we indicate that the affective quality of words arises from words as intentional, and as they give the reader an object which is personally valuable to him, or as they so give any object that the mere perfection of this giving is apprehended as a personal good (issuing into what

²⁵G. M. Hopkins speaks of the *prepossession* of a word: what we have here called the indirect or accidental content, as apart from the essential or direct content. Vd. *The Note-Books and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, edited by Humphry House, Oxford University Press, London, 1937; p. 95. This "prepossession", however, seems to import also the affective quality of a word in Hopkins' definition of it.

²⁶This notion of the effect on appetite would seem to involve the distinction we pointed out previously between *poetica docens* and *poetica 14tens* (p. 155). The experience of a beautiful thing, as we were at pains to designate in the First Part, necessarily imports the complacency of the will, and (as an integral concomitant) the awakening of emotion. Thus the end of poetry—as of all beautiful art—ascends into the moral order: but by moral, we do not mean ethical, but the order of appetite. It is an end which presumes necessarily the order of knowledge, however. In *The Meaning of Meaning* (p. 235 ff.) it is said that prose involves the symbolic use of language, while poetry involves the evocative or emotive use. This is true: but we point out that the evocative use presupposes the symbolic use—i.e., *poetica utens* presupposes *poetica docens*.

²⁷See p. 225 below.

we later call the pure esthetic response). Words as physical non-intentional sound cannot have an affective appeal, unless this sound becomes intentional in some way. It may be objected that the mere harmony of vocal sound—rhythm, alliteration, rhyme, and so on—has an affective appeal, quite apart from any poetic meaning. And it may further be urged that such harmony, in some degree at least, is always associated with a poem.

We do not think, however, that harmonious sound can be predicated of every poem, in the ordinary sense of harmonious sound—conspicuous harmony. Rhyme and alliteration, for one thing, are not found in every poem. Nor is strict meter. And regarding rhythm: is there such a thing as poetic rhythm, as distinct from the rhythm of prose? Is it not true that there is some rhythm in all speech, even though it be not clearly detected? The perfection of rhythm, we suppose, may be found in the principle of unity within spoken sounds, so that the greater is the unity amid great variety—and we mean, therefore, not monotony, but unity in variety—the more conspicuous is the rhythm. But to return to the question: is there such a thing as proper poetic rhythm? If this be so, how can it be defined? Where shall we draw the line between poetic rhythm and the rhythm of prose? If it consists in degrees of harmony, who shall say where the one begins and the other ends? The rhythm in Francis Thompson's essay on *Shelley* is conspicuous throughout. But scarcely anyone will call the essay a poetic artefact from beginning to end: it has the immediate use of information and defence, beyond mere contemplation of the perfection of the expression. And there is one section in particular which it may be granted (on the word of the author himself, if for no other reason) is a poetic fragment.²⁸ Yet is there any fundamental dif-

²⁸"Shelley", *The Works of Francis Thompson*, vol. III; Charles Scribner's Sons, New York; p. 18: "The universe in his box of toys ..." Consider also the final paragraph of the essay.

ference in the rhythm? Moreover, Gerard Manley Hopkins constructed his theory of "sprung rhythm", and employed it in his poetry, on the principle that sprung" rhythm "is the rhythm of common speech and of written prose, when rhythm is perceived in them."²⁹ Further, if we hold to a distinctive poetic rhythm, based simply on the physical sound, free verse has only the rhythm of prose. But granted that it has the rhythm of prose, does this detract from the essential poetic value of the artefact?

We are far from denying that the harmony of the physical sound is artistically valuable. But we maintain that, to fix the attention upon this harmony in itself, is to experience the beauty of something other than poetry as such: it is to add an accidental beauty to the poem. We say this, because the reader can entirely prescind from this external physical beauty, and the poem is not essentially affected, though there is an accidental change in the esthetic experience: i.e., the reader puts aside the added accidental beauty of physical harmony.

But what is the emotional appeal which the sound of a poem can make? In the first place, the person can be habituated to associate a value with certain patterns of sound, because of many past experiences: when the pattern is repeated, it is possible for some emotional state to be enkindled, through association with a dimly apprehended value of the past. When a poem is read in public to an audience, there is a noticeable "spell" cast upon the hearers from the beginning, because the hearers expect to be affected by the situation, and because past associations rise somehow into consciousness through the conspicuous rhythm. If the person apprehends the physical sound as valuable, apart from the content of the words, he is responding to something in the general realm of music—or at least in the realm of vocal music, if we must distinguish this from instrumental music.

But there is also an awareness of the sound, as far as

*»*Poems, op. cit.*, "Author's Preface", p. 5.

this is seen to give expression, within its own limits, to the meaning of the poem. There are many elements to consider here, and we cannot go into them: such things as the quantity of syllables; the inflections of questions, of declarative, vocative, exclamatory and optative sentences; pitch; cadence; quality and so on. Now these elements, when properly used by a speaker, are fundamentally dictated by the thought, or in general the meaning of the sentence. They assist the listener in receiving the precise shade of meaning which the speaker intends to impart. Indeed, one can sometimes guess in part at the meaning of a sentence, when one is too far from the speaker to hear the words as words, but only the sounds. Must not something similar be said about rhythm, though not to the same extent? The meaning of a poem, when properly understood, will control the reader's voice as far as habit helps him to register the shades of meaning in his voice: the pitch of the word and the sentence, the cadence, and so on. But cannot the rhythm of a poem be so used by the interpreting person, that the quantity (or dwelling of the voice on a word) and the pauses will assist the reader in some measure in bringing home to his mind the relative importance of words? It is a poor reading which goes along in strict meter, without regard for relative quantity and pauses. And no good poet composes in such a mathematical manner.

Once the poet is, so to say, flooded with the deep meaning of what he is to say, it is natural for his language to fall into a rhythmic pattern, dictated by the realization of the meaning: not a studied pattern, but a pattern arising from his conception of the proper order of the words to convey exactly the shade of contextual meaning. It is his habit of art which must help him to triumph over the rules of a rigid meter (if he chooses a rigid meter) in getting the individual meaning of the phrase or sentence *through* this rigidity: a question indeed of harmony, or unity in variety.

An immense amount of speculation and illustration could be poured into this one question of the intentional

value of rhythm: but we must let the problem pass, reaffirming the principle that the esthetic experience of the sound of a poem, apart from the meaning of the whole, is not the poetic experience—i.e., the experience of the poem as such—but an experience which finds an added and accidental beauty, outside the essential confines of poetry. And we say that a poem is essentially a poem, apart from conspicuous harmony in its physical or imagined sound. And if such harmony is to form an essential part of a poem, it must be taken as in some way giving the poetic content to the mind, and thus enjoying a splendor as it more or less successfully assits in instrumenting this content.

There is a very important deduction from what we have said in this section on words. We wish to distinguish a poetic artefact from a useful verbal artefact. We will not use the terms "a poem" and "a piece of prose", for we think that these words have come to designate verbal artefacts which are sometimes only accidentally distinct. A poetic artefact is a verbal artefact, in which an object is more or less perfectly given through the content of words, and for the immediate end of such a perfect giving or expression. A mediate end may be attached to this making: that of principling in the mind of another a pleasurable contemplation of the rich giving of the object through the words. A useful verbal artefact is such as has the primary end of information, the moving of the will to acton—or, in general, of any use beyond the simple pleasurable contemplation of the perfection of the expression.

According to these definitions, such works of art as novels, essays, or any form of verbal making, whose immediate end is in the category of a relatively rich or perfect giving of a content, for the simple sake of this expression, are, in this respect, poetic artefacts. Thus, a work like *The Yearling*, by Marjorie K. Rawlings, is a poetic artefact. A story with a social purpose is to that extent a useful verbal artefact, while it may be in some part poetic. If we called *The Yearling* a poem, the assertion would, no doubt,

embarrass the reader. For the word "poem" has come to mean a verbal artefact which, generally speaking, must have an important content, and which gives its content in concentrated form, presenting the individuality of the object in few and striking words, and allowing the reader to enjoy an analogous pleasure of poetic creation by drawing out the suggestions within the limited number of words. The esthetic experience of such an artefact is more intense, because the entire situation is less dispersed. The term "poetic artefact" compromises the issue far less than the term "poem".

3. THE BEING OF A POEM.

While this question is actually the most important question in the whole of our treatment of poetry, the position which we take regarding it does not demand a lengthy elaboration. We have said that beauty is a splendor of being, or a splendor according to the form of a thing. Of art we said that its nature—restricting ourselves to a fine art—consists in the making of a beautiful thing. But an artefact is beautiful if it perfectly represents its exemplar. A poem then is beautiful, if it perfectly carries out its exemplary word.

Now the exemplary word is representative of an object. This object, we said, is real rather than logical; for, generally speaking, poetry does not deal in merely logical things. If it deals in possible things, these are still real, as far as the possible can be called real. But this object, as far as it is known, acquires intentional or ideal existence. The beauty of a poem then consists in the perfection with which it mirrors the real as under intentional existence, or, in a word, the perfection of meaning. And thus its being is intentional being. This meaning, however, is the meaning of an imagined thing, as we shall point out.³⁰

³⁰(See p. 222 (below).

To see this in its fulness, we first observe that there is an obvious difference between the being of a poetic artefact and an artefact like a statue. In the latter case, the artefact exists in extramental reality, with a real matter (the substance of stone) and a real accidental form (shape). But the matter and form of a poem do not exist in extramental reality—except instrumentally, on the printed page: though this is clearly not the poem. But the extramental real cannot be said to form a union with the mind, in such a way that this conjoining makes an artefact, the extramental real remaining in its real existence. For the extramental real is only logically related to the experiencing mind, and is not perfected in being known.

There are two ways of speaking of ideas and images, as considered in themselves, and as considered in some relation. In themselves they are real being, qualities of the mind, accidental perfections. But there are several relations in which we can consider them. We can speak of an idea in relation to its object, and in relation to other ideas; so also of images. And further, we can speak of the relation of an idea to its image, and vice versa; and of the relation of the idea and image together to the same object.

It is precisely in some relation that an idea or an image is in a poem. In itself an idea—or an image—is part of the matter of a poem: when it is in some relation, it has been oversplendored by a form, the form of the poem, and in this relation it has a definite meaning. Ideas and images are, by their very nature, representative being, capable of being ordered to mean, conjointly, some object. We are here at the very limit of human analysis: ideas and images mean their objects, not instrumentally, but formally; these objects exist intentionally within the mind, in the ideas and images; the being of ideas and images, as representing their objects, is intentional being, or meaning. Thus we insist that the being of a poem is not the ideas and images as they are real, and accidental perfections of perfectible faculties; but as they are related to their objects and to one another,

in a common end, and thus possess meaning.

Ideas and images as real entities are not the matter of a poem, as the real being of a voiced word, its sound, is not strictly a part of poetic matter: but it is these in their character as signs which constitute the matter. The composite which results from a union of all the ideas and images—or a matter and a form—constitutes the nature of a poem. But ideas and images as interrelated have meaning: and the nature of a poem then is meaning.

Ideas and images mean their object, in the degree that they *are* their objects as under intentional existence. Such is the nature and being of ideas and images as signs. The existence given to them is an existence contributed, through a communication, by the faculties which they perfect, and in which they inhere—intellect and sense. And beyond these faculties, it is the soul and the person which they perfect, and in which they inhere; so that ultimately it is the soul and the person which give them their accidental being of meaning.

The objects of the ideas and images are not really several objects, but the one common poetic object: the object represented by the exemplary word. This is, of course, a complex object. But the point is that the *poetic* object of the poem, "October," which we gave above, is the same for all the ideas and images—an October day as personally apprehended; for they are all integrally related to the one common object, as parts of a whole; and having been united by a common form, they bear out the content of the exemplary word. The ideas and images in both the poem and the exemplary word have thus the one common object or content. But the aspect under which the exemplary word means the object is more general and confused; the poem means this object in more explicit terms, and in a greater depth of personal appropriation. From the operative word proceeds a second *verbum mentis*, more definite, more audible, as it were, than that from which it proceeds.

In the First Part of this thesis,³¹ we spoke of unity in a thing: formal unity, oneness (in the sense of limitation), and incommunicability. Formal unity is a perfection of actual indivision. It is a gathering together of specific perfections. Within the artefact itself, the source of this unity is the form: the efficient cause of the artefact is the extrinsic source of this unity. Thus the poet as efficient cause—and this subsumes the operative word as operative: mind and appetite—impresses a form upon the ideas and images, or arranges them, according to the exemplary word, and thereby efficiently produces the formal unity of the poem, its actual indivision as this poem. The oneness derives again from the matter and the efficient cause. But in the case of the poet, this matter must be said to be produced by the poet himself; while in the case of the sculptor, the matter exists already in nature, which prepares it, so to speak, for the sculptor's immediate dispositions. Thus the poet more closely resembles the pure Creator. But there is still this divergence between him and the Creator: namely, that all his ideas and images are originally principled from reality, and his words are given to him from a common vocabulary. The incommunicability of the poem is a sealing apart of the poem in its individual existence. It is itself, and not another poem. But this incommunicability reposes in the poet's soul, as the source of its existence. At the same time, the poem is communicable, as all ideas and images are. But the point is that the ideas and images inhering in the poet's soul are his, as he gives them existence; and as inhering in him, they are not in that capacity communicable. This is not of much consequence, since as a matter of fact the external words can principle the same ideas and images in the reader, external words being the most common basis of communication between minds.

We spoke likewise of ontological beauty, saying that it is being as possessing harmonious perfection and a resultant

³³ See p. 11 ff.

splendor or cognoscibility. It is according to the form that the artefact is harmoniously perfect and therefore splendid. The formal cause of harmony, as opposed to the material cause of this, is the underlying unity of the poem, which disciplines the various ideas and images. The material cause of harmony is the various ideas and images, precisely as various. But it is according to the form of the poem that there is harmony, for without control there is no semblance of harmony, no consequent splendor of the whole, hence no poem. Ideas and images, as haphazardly arranged, have indeed some perfection of harmony, but not the full perfection of harmony.

From the integral harmony of the ideas proceeds splendor. It is the relation of all the material parts of the poem which makes for definite meaning of the whole. And not only is the poem intelligible, but it is simultaneously sensible, capable of producing a likeness of itself in sense and intellect. This light of the poem is its relational beauty, the proximate principle of producing delightful contemplation in the recipient. It is a *lumen manifestans*, trailing with it a potential revelation of its source—the harmonious perfection of the ideas and images. The reader's mind is flooded with the light of the poem, and may turn to the source of this sensibility and intelligibility, to find the rational basis of its delight. Relational beauty, we said, is splendor of being, as subsuming harmonious perfection, or—as giving the source of the splendor—splendor according to the form of the poem. The being of a poem is meaning. Hence its relational beauty is the splendor of meaning. Later we shall further explain this "meaning".³² This relational beauty is the capacity which the interrelated ideas and images have of producing a likeness of themselves in sense and intellect, by the force of their rich sensibility and intelligibility. The meaning of the poem being the object as valuably known—or as under appropriated intentional

³²See p. 028 below.

existence—the splendor is the power of the object as valuably known to produce a likeness of itself in sense and intellect together. And as it is the ordering of the ideas and images which render them sensible and intelligible as an integral whole, the splendor of a poem is a splendor according to the ordering of all its parts.

This splendor we might call, analogously, a light from the intentional shape of the poem,³³ signified in external words; or a sensible and intelligible splendor from the "music" of ideas and images. *An intentional shape*, producing splendor: for as shape is the impressing of order on the parts of wood or stone, so the shape of a poem is the impressing of order upon the ideas and images (expressed in the ordering of external words), resulting in integral meaning which is luminous to intellect and sense in different ways.

³³There is a profound metaphysical truth in the expression used by Robert Frost to designate, as cryptically as possible, the essence of a *poemiFigure*. Cfr. his Introduction ("The Figure a Poem Makes") to his *Collected Poems*, *op. cit.* While a very brief and obscure statement, this Introduction strikes us as one of the very finest observations in English on the nature of poetry and its creation. Gerard Manley Hopkins established another word: he spoke of "inscape". "But as air, melody, is what strikes me most of all in music and design in painting, so design, pattern, or what I am in the habit of calling *inscape* is what I above all aim at in poetry." (*Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, *op. cit.*, p. 96, Preface to the Notes, by Robert Bridges.) We may speak of the source of this splendor then as figure, inscape, contextual binding, contextual structure, intentional shape, or the like. All these mean the "form", and we may speak of a *splendor secundum formam*.

CHAPTER IX

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE POEM

1. THE POET'S EXPERIENCE

It must first be emphasized that there is a difference between the poet's contemplation of the poem and the reader's, as this and the following section will illustrate. We will first speak of the experience of the beautiful artefact from the viewpoint of its creator.

The experience of beauty, we said, is consciously pre-surable knowledge of a perfect thing. The connection between relational beauty and the experience of beauty is a two-way proportion of the splendid object to the mind, and of the mind to the object, but a proportion which is apprehended as such, to awaken the consciousness of a personal good, and involve the resting of appetite in the state of uncommon knowledge, and in the perfect object as the principle of this state.

The poet's knowledge of the poem as a perfect thing is more complete than any reader's, for he has not simply principled knowledge of the poem, but operative knowledge, as God has operative knowledge of all creatures.¹ The poet,

*/ *Sent.*, Prol. S. Thomae: "Secundum quod pertinet ad Dei sapientiam est creaturarum productio: ipse enim de rebus creatis non tantum speculativam, sed etiam operativam scientiam habet, sicut artifex de artificiatis." Though the Blessed Trinity as such is not reflected in the material creation, creation itself is the effect of the Three Divine Persons, not as distinct Persons, but *in communi*. Yet we attribute certain aspects of the creative act to the distinct Persons, according to our own way of looking at this act; power to the Father, exem-

having the exemplary word within him, appreciates the poem as far as it perfectly concretizes this word. As everything is more clearly known in the light of its exemplary cause,² so the poem is known by the poet. The exemplary cause is not a distinct cause, but an aspect of the efficient, final, and intrinsic formal causes; and in the case of poetry an aspect likewise of the material cause, so that the poet's operative knowledge more closely parallels the creative knowledge of God. As the poet is the efficient cause, and knows the effect through the efficient character of the exemplar; as he knows the exemplar in its aspect of an original similitude of the intrinsic form of the poem; as he knows it in its aspect of material cause, as implicitly containing the matter of the poem; and as he knows it in its aspect of final causality (an end to be realized in expression), so he knows the artefact more fully than the reader. At the same time he perceives the defects in the artefact, and this knowledge is itself a measure of the actual perfections.

The splendor of the poem—a splendor of meaning—is directly proportioned to the poet, since he is its cause. His pleasurable contemplation is thus more profound than the reader's. His is a complete penetration into the meaning of the poem. And this is accomplished even while the poem is being created. His progression is from a dimly realized word to the clarification of this. Poetic creation says Robert Frost, "begins in delight and ends in wisdom/" He

plarism or art to the Son (*In Evany. Joannis*, c. I, lect. 2), volition to the Holy Ghost. Thus, operative knowledge in God implies—as far as we attribute distinct causality to each of the Persons—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Operative knowledge in the human artist likewise implies his power, exemplarism, and volition, the exemplary word becoming operative through conjunction with the will and the other powers.

²And we shall even know ourselves most perfectly in Heaven through the contemplation of the Word. *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 16, ad Ilium: "...perfectius cognoscitur (res) per Verbum quam per se ipsam, etiam inquantum est talis."

continues: "The figure is the same as for love. No one can really hold that the ecstasy should be static and stand still in one place. It begins in delight, it inclines to the impulse, it assumes direction with the first line laid down, it runs a course of lucky events, and ends in a clarification of life—not necessarily a great clarification, such as sects and cults are founded on, but in a momentary stay against confusion. It has denouement. It has an outcome that though unforeseen was predestined from the first image of the original mood—and indeed from the very mood. It is but a trick poem and no poem at all if the best of it was thought of first and saved for the last. It finds its own name as it goes and discovers the best waiting for it in some final phrase at once wise and sad—the happy-sad blend of the drinking song.

"No tears in the writer, no tears in the reader. No surprise for the writer, no surprise for the reader. For me the initial delight is in remembering something I didn't know I knew. I am in a place, in a situation, as if I had materialized from cloud or risen out of the ground. There is a glad recognition of the long lost and the rest follows. Step by step the wonder of unexpected supply keeps growing. . . The figure is the same as for love. Like a piece of ice on a hot stove the poem must ride on its own melting. . . Read it a hundred times: it will forever keep its freshness as a metal keeps its fragrance. It can never lose its sense of a meaning that once unfolded by surprise as it went."³

While the poet ceases to contemplate the poem which he has created or is creating, it exists in his memory, and, as it were, in suspension within the external, written words. In general, a poem is never an objectively beautiful thing until it is evoked from the poet's memory, or resolved by a reader through external words. Music is, in this respect,

³Robert Frost, Introduction to *Collected Poems*, *op. tit.* We need not refer the reader to the sections on the genesis of a poem, particularly The Operative Word, p. 170, to indicate how we have explained this progression from delight to wisdom, through attention to the exemplary word.

like poetry. This is not true of those artefacts which exist extramentally, and not simply in external signs. A statue or a painting is actually beautiful in the ontological order, as far as it is caused beauty, even though it be not experienced as beautiful.⁴

As the poem develops, the poet discovers himself in expressing his inmost apprehensions and desires. This is true, at any rate, of the creation of great poetry. It does not so much mean that he realizes with satisfaction the natural appetites of his intellect, sense, will, and emotions—and this is a certain self-realization—as that he expresses himself to himself out of the obscure desires of his soul for the knowledge and love of Beauty absolute. A poem is a speaking to oneself,⁵ not only in the exemplary word, but also in the *verbum* of the poem, which is a prolonged and deeper self-communication.⁶ Perhaps this is why certain poems—those which are a profound expression of the soul—and there are many instances of this in the last four hundred years⁷—are such vehemently personal and emotional

⁴It is true that beauty is a relative attribute, as truth is; but it has two relations, to an apprehending mind, and to its cause. In the latter relation it has ontological beauty, even though no mind but the Divine be aware of its perfections. The beauty of a poem, however, when it is not actually apprehended, is, in the ontological order, only a possible beauty, and not an actual beauty, as a statue is.

~>De Div. Nom., c. 4, lect. 1: "Manifestum est enim quod conceptio cordis vel intellectus, absque voce est cum silentio; sed per sensibiles voces illud silentium cordis enuntiatur."

⁶As the Word proceeds from the Father as the Father's expressed contemplation of the Divine Nature, so—by a wide analogy—the poem proceeds from the contemplation of the exemplar as an image and reflection of this. It is an expression *cum silentio*, immanent, but virtually transient in sensible external words. We do not mean that poetic creation is an image of the Blessed Trinity, when contemplation is only of temporal things (*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 7). It is only as man knows and loves God that we can speak of an image strictly (*Summa Theol.*, 7, q. 93, a. 7.)

⁷The reason is, in most instances, that God has been taken out of the lives of many, and certain poems express a recognized emptiness

revelations of the heart and mind together.

Maritan says: "As God makes created participations of His being exist outside Himself, so the artist puts himself—not what he sees, but what he is—into what he makes!"⁸ Again: "In proportion as the artist approaches his pure type and realizes his most fundamental law, it is indeed himself and his own essence and intelligence of himself that he expresses in his work; here is the hidden substance of his creative intuition. It is the self of the artist insofar as it is a secret substance and person in the act of spiritual communication, that is the content of this formative emotion."⁹

The poet knows himself through his acts: thus, as the poem develops, he knows that he is being perfected in knowledge, and loves that which perfects him. And in a certain sense, the poet identifies himself with what he makes, and loves it for the reason that he loves himself. "Every artisan," says the Angelic Doctor, "loves his own work. . . And this is especially true in the case of poets, who love their own poems superabundantly (*superabundanter*), as parents love their children. For poems more immediately relate to reason, by which man is man, than do other, mechanical arts. . . . For to all men their own being is an object of preference and of love. For everything, to the extent that it exists, is good. But the good is lovable and an object of preference. Now our own being consists in some activity. For our being is to live, and consequently to operate. For there is no life without some kind of vital operation. Therefore, to carry out the operations of life is something which everyone loves. But the activity of actually making something is in some sense the very thing itself which is made. For the action of the one moving and operating is in the

and a searching desire for Being. Great personal poetry can also revolve around an explicit desire for God, as we see in certain mystical poets, e.g. Francis Thompson.

⁸"The Frontiers of Poetry", *Art and Scholasticism*, p. 95.

**Art and Poetry*, p. 87, 88.

thing moved and acted on. And thus both artisans and poets. . .love their own works, because they love their own being. And this is in the nature of things, namely, that everything loves its own being"¹⁰

2. THE READER'S EXPERIENCE.

Perhaps the examination of the reader's experience will throw the clearest light on the nature of poetry. What we are to say is open to grave misunderstanding unless the force of every qualification we make is properly appreciated. We do not wish to be charged with subjectivism, or idealism; and we cannot be, if the reader follows our reasoning closely.

The ontological beauty of a poem is the ordered perfection and splendor of "poetic being"—i.e., of ideas and images (signified in words) as meaning a valuably apprehended object. It is not the real itself which is the poem. It is not, and cannot be, ideas and images as real qualities of the mind apart from their signification. Ideas and images, as real being, apart from meaning, are actually incomprehensible. Their whole real actual being is signification: as ideas, they are nothing *but* formal signs. Even when the attention of

the mind is turned directly to them after initial knowledge

¹⁰*JV Ethic.*, lect. 7: "Omnis enim artifex diligit proprium opus... Et hoc maxime videtur accidere circa poetas qui superabundanter diligunt propria poemata, sicut parentes amant filios. Poemata enim magis ad rationem pertinent secundum quam homo est homo, quam alia mechanica opera.. .Quia omnibus hominibus est eligibile et amabile suum esse. Unumquodque enim inquantum est, est bonum. Bonum autem est eligibile et amabile. Esse autem nostrum consistit in quodam actu. Esse enim nostrum est vivere, et per consequens operari. Non est enim vita absque vitae operatione quacumque. Unde unicuique est amabile operari opera vitae. Faciens autem in actu est quodammodo ipsum opus facientis. Actus enim moventis et agentis est in moto et patiente. Ideo itaque diligunt opus suum et artifices et poetae.. .quia diligunt suum esse. Hoc autem est naturale, scilicet quod unumquodque suum esse amet."

of their content, they do not become instrumental signs: they remain pure formal signs, incapable of being contemplated except in their content. An idea of second intention means a reconsideration of the content of the idea, not a reflection upon a real modification of a faculty apart from the nature of this modification (i.e., meaning). So too when intellect reflects upon images. But external words can be (and indeed originally are) reflected upon (with at least an implicit reflection) as instrumental signs.

But the ontological beauty is the harmonious perfection and splendor of ideas and images as meaning their object. And their object is not the real as really present: for a sunset as given in a poem is not really present to the reader at the moment as an extramental thing. All that can be said is that the object is intentionally (ideally and imaginatively) present: present within the poem in the ideas and images which mean it; and present (when received) within the mind of the recipient.

We say present within, rather than to, the mind. But this must be understood in a certain way. For every object when known is present to the mind. In the case of an extramental object, which is perceived (through perceptual images),¹¹ the object is present to the mind as an extramental real, because the ideas and images mean an extramental thing.¹² But in the case of an absent object (known not through perceptual images, but through representational and productive and memorative images, and intellectually apprehended through the ministration of such images), the

¹¹Following the view outlined by Mailloux (*op. cit.*), we attribute perception to the *vis cogitativa*. (See p. 110 above). But intellectual activity accompanies this activity of the sensory faculty, from which cooperation we get the full nature of perception. Vd. Maher, *op. tit.*, pp. 126, 149.

¹²In reading or hearing a poem, the printed forms on the page, or the sound of the reader's voice are known through perceptual images, for these things (print and sound) are extramental things perceived as extramental.

object is present to the mind as just such a represented, produced, or remembered object, because the ideas and images mean such an object. Again, strictly speaking, in both cases the objects are likewise within the mind, inasmuch as the objects exist intentionally, or in the ideas and images, which are the objects under intentional existence, and which are within the mind as perfections of intellect and sense. Yet, for purposes of emphasis, in the case of poetry we use the term "within" only in contradistinction to a thing being present to the mind as an extramental thing, apprehended as really present.

Concerning the relational beauty of a poem: this is the splendor of "poetic being", the splendor of a particular kind of meaning—i.e., the rich sensibility and intelligibility of an object given in ideas and images, which mean the object precisely as present within the mind. Again, this is not the splendor of an extramental object, perceived as extramentally present. This splendor is the principle, on the part of the thing, for the experience of the beauty of the poem. It is the sensibility and intelligibility of individual, harmoniously perfect, intentional being, in the sense of striking ideas and images meaning an object precisely as ideally and imaginatively present within the mind.

Here an objection may be raised. Not every poem is constructed from recollection, or produced in the absence of the object. For example, Wordsworth—if we are to give any credence to the title—composed a poem while on Westminster Bridge. Certain poets, we may suppose, sketch, so to speak, from life—in the fields, or in the streets. This is true; and the ideas and images then are principled from the perception of extramental objects apprehended as extramentally present. But however true this be in the case of creation, it is in no wise true of the reception of a poem, unless one happens to be with a poet as he composes a poem aloud, in the real presence of an object. A book of poems, or a recitation of a poem some time after its composition, present objects which are not then and there extramentally

present. It is not a case of the employment of percepts, but of images which are reproductive (or representational). With these reproductive images, there are also productive images, and memorative images.^{1**}

But again, what if a person takes a poem about a sunrise into the real presence of a sunrise? In the first place, we very much doubt whether, generally speaking, the creator of the poem expects, or even wishes, that the reader act in this fashion.¹⁴ But supposing such an instance, it would seem that there are two objects present to the person: the intentional object of the poem, which has its own beauty and principles its own experience; and the extramental object, which is *not* the object of the poem as such. The contemplation of the two objects together is a distinct experience from the experience of the poem: perhaps a deeper experience of beauty as such, but not the single poetic experience.

The poem must be proportioned to the individual mind, the mind must be proportioned to the poem, and the person must apprehend this two-way proportion. The proportion of the individual mind to the poem is the more important, and it depends upon two things: experience, and habit. By habit the reader is rendered easily capable of apprehending the sensibility and intelligibility of a certain type of poem, of poetry of every type. By a wide experience, the person is in a position to apprehend the entire meaning of the poem, for then it is possible for him to appreciate the value of the object as the poet appreciated it. Both of these qualifications may be subsumed under sympathy, habit as a kind of esthetic sympathy, experience as a kind of human sym-

i-⁵cf. p. 235 below.

¹⁴Drama is scarcely ever intended to be merely read, though there are plays written chiefly for this purpose. The creator expects the play to be made extramental. But the state of the soul in the reading of a play is not in every way the same as in the seeing of it. But we let the question pass.

thy. The combination of the two permits a more complete experience.

In this connection, we may speak of three types of response in the reading¹ of a poem; what we can call the response of pure esthetic delight, which is not directed to the content-value of the poem; the response which is simply principled from the content-value, apart from any esthetic delight in the perfection of the expression; and a fusion of these two, principled from both esthetic value and content-value. Now some poets apprehend objects with an indifference to their content-value, and with no other personal appropriation of them except as they are capable of poetic expression, or suitable occasions for the exercise of art. The poet then does not expect the reader to fasten upon the content-value. But most poets—and we contend it without fear of contradiction—not only apprehend an object as it is esthetically valuable, but also as it is valuable in itself, and in some personal reference other than its suitability for creative treatment. In the case of such poems, the value of the object itself, or its personal value to the poet, may not be appreciated by the reader for a number of reasons—e.g., prejudice, or ignorance (as a non-Catholic may have no sympathy for the value of a Catholic theme, and cannot appreciate its value to the poet).

The apprehension of the content value, while it implies a response, does not, as we know, always entail the response of delight. For to appropriate the content of Robert Frost's *Out, Out—*, or Francis Thompson's *To the English Martyrs* is to take a certain sadness or desire from such an appropriation. But here we say that the response springing from such an appropriation, *apart from* the esthetic delight of contemplating an object precisely as richly imagined, is not *per se* the poetic experience; for the same appropriation of the object may be found essentially, outside the specific limits of poetic contemplation. But the specific difference in poetic contemplation is that the mind turns itself to the rich representative character of the contempla-

tion. The ideal of poetic contemplation is found in the perfection with which the person appropriates the content value and the esthetic, but in such wise that the content value is simultaneously contemplated as poetic, or imaginatively present. It seems, however, that in those cases where the content value is very intimately appropriated, the mind will fluctuate, turning at times from the confines of poetic contemplation and prescinding from the imaginative structure of the poem: and such a thing is entirely natural. Nevertheless, for purposes of definition, it must be said that poetic contemplation as such demands an awareness of the object as made richly present within the mind through the striking sensibility and intelligibility of images and ideas.

There are then three responses: the pure esthetic response of delight, prescinding from a personal appropriation of the content value; the response (of delight, desire, sadness, etc.) from the appropriation of the content value *apart* from esthetic delight; and the response (of delight, desire, sadness. .) from the content value, together with the esthetic response of delight. The person may indeed respond simultaneously with esthetic delight and a certain desire or sadness: for the one object may present different aspects simultaneously.

Now it seems to us that the full nature of the poem—its splendor—cannot be apprehended apart from a personal appropriation of the value of the object. For it is obviously the intention of the poet that the contemplation of the reader should approximate his own. It is true, on the other hand, that the poem may be contemplated with delight apart from such an appropriation—i.e., with pure esthetic delight. But in this case we would insist that what is contemplated is not really the intended poem. It is only such if the poet intended nothing but the pure esthetic delight.

In a note to his essay on *Dante*,TM T. S. Eliot observes:

^A*Selected Essays*, Harcourt Brace and Co., New York, 1942, p. 231.

"Actually, one probably has more pleasure in the poetry when one shares the beliefs of the poet/* This is what we have called the response spring-ing from the content-value and the esthetic value together. But he adds: "On the other hand there is a distinct pleasure in enjoying poetry when one does *not* share the beliefs, analogous to the pleasure of 'mastering' other men's philosophical systems." This is what we mentioned as the pure esthetic delight. Mr. Eliot will not admit this as an imperfect appreciation of the poem: and we concur in this, if the poem was simply intended to principle esthetic delight, apart from any assumption of the content-value. But when the poet creates also from a belief in the object as personally valuable in other ways than its mere artistic suitability, the pure esthetic appreciation is not the full appreciation of the poem. Esthetic appreciation is necessary to all true appreciation of a poem: it may be called poetic appreciation. But poetic appreciation, being the apprehension of the *perfect* expression of what is conceived, is conditioned by an understanding of the object, and the perfection of expression cannot be apprehended apart from a *full* apprehension of the object: i.e., from the appreciation which the poet *intended* to principle in others.

Further, as we said a moment ago, the two-way proportion must be apprehended. The knowledge that one is being pleased depends upon a reflection, however dim, of the double relation of principle and principled between the poem and the pleasurable knowledge. If such a reflection does not occur, it is hard to see how the knowledge of the state as a personal good can arise.

We need not repeat in detail what we said about the state of the soul in the general experience of beauty: the place of the *vis cogit&tiva* and emotions, and the principle penetration of intellect into beautiful being, but a penetration instrumented through sense, which has its own knowledge, and delights the will in its own manner. But some

remarks on the esthetic experience of poetic beauty are in place.

What the reader receives is the proceeding *verbum* as meaning an object. His attention is first upon external words as instrumental signs (an implicit reflection), then, through the images and ideas caused by the words, upon the object of the ideas, images, and words. The caused images and ideas are formal signs, and point the mind immediately to their object, as it is meant by these formal signs. Now the mind knows that the object is not really present. It is not a knowledge through percepts; but it is a knowledge through images which mean a really absent but intention-ally present object, a represented object, an object precisely as present within the mind. Such images are "poetic" images, formal signs of an imagined object, conveying the splendor, not of a perceived object, but of an imagined one.

As far as the proper operation of intellect is concerned (the abstraction and expression of the essences of material things), it makes no difference whether the thing is really present: though it is a faculty which is in time, it abstracts from time; its proper object is eternal. But it makes a world of difference to the composite mind of intellect and sense, that is, to the knowing person, whether or not the object is really present. It is one thing to the person to have intellectual knowledge of an object, prescinding from its actual presence; it is another to have sensory knowledge of a really present object; another to have sensory knowledge of an absent object; and another to have intellectual knowledge ministered through percepts, and ministered through representations. Speaking *a parte sensus*, poetic knowledge is distinct from perceptual knowledge, and accordingly distinct *a parte mentis compositae*. For the implications of individuality and the mode of existence are different. In poetry, the composite mind has knowledge of an individual object precisely as ideally and imaginatively existent.

The object of the following lines, for example, is not perceived, but imagined.

The noise is hushed within the street;
The summer twilight gathers down;
The elms are still; the moonlit spires
Track their long shadows through the town.¹⁶

Or consider the poetic object in the Allowing.

The sun was warm, but the wind was chill.
You know how it is with an April day
When the sun is out and the wind is still,
You're one month on in the middle of May.
But if you so much as dare to speak,
A cloud comes over the sunlit arch,
A wind comes off a frozen peak,
And you're two months back in the middle of March.¹⁷

These are objects which are found in 'nature'—outside man. But the object may likewise be the mind of the poet; and this is partly true of the second of these quotations. In such a case the mind of the poet is imaginatively and ideally present within the reader's mind. In every case, the reader communicates with the poet, but about different things. In one case, the object is explicitly outside the poet as he creates: he thinks about an imagined (i.e., non-perceived) thing belonging to the world outside his own soul, and the reader's mind is carried to such an imagined object. In the other case, the object is also the activity of the mind itself: the poet thinks about a thought of a thing. The distinction is hard to designate, since in all cases there is activity of thought, and few poetic creations, moreover, are purely objective. But in the first case, the ideas and im-

¹⁶Bliss Carman, "Wayfaring", *Low Tide on Grand Pre*, Small Maynard and Co., Boston, 1905; p. 113. Poetic knowledge works also through an activity of memory, (p. 236), and, as we have sufficiently insisted, through the value-judgements of the *vis cogitativa*.

¹⁷Robert Frost, "Two Tramps in Mud Time," *op. tit.*, p. 357.

ages mean an imagined object in nature, *such* as we find in a purely descriptive poem. In the second, the ideas and images mean a contemplative interpretation of an object. In both cases, the poet contemplates, and the reader contemplates with him: a delightful contemplation of a splendidly imagined object. But in the second case, the contemplation turns not simply upon some object which the poet contemplates, but likewise upon his interpretative contemplation itself. Perhaps the following will illustrate this kind of poetic object:

Not, Silence, for thine idleness I raise
 My silence-bounded singing in thy praise,
 But for thy moulding of my Mozart's tune,
 Thy hold upon the bird that sings the moon,
 Thy magisterial ways.

Man's lovely definite melody-shapes are thine,
 Outlined, controlled, compressed, complete, divine;
 Also thy fine intrusions do I trace,
 Thy afterthoughts, thy wandering, thy grace,
 Within the poet's line.

Thy secret is the song that is to be.
 Music had never stature but for thee,
 Sculptor! strong as the sculptor space whose hand
 Urged the Discobolus and bade him stand.

.

Man, on his way to Silence, stops to hear and see.¹⁸

The object of a poem may also be, as we indicated above,¹⁰ the will of the poet, or the will of another, as it works towards the good. Along with descriptive poetry—which fastens upon the sensible appearances of things—this kind of poetry (called affective) makes up the major portion of poetry. The following is an instance.

¹⁰Alice Meynell, "To Silence," *The Poems of Alice Meynell*, Oxford University Press, London, 1941; p. 176.

¹¹»See p. 157 above.

How do I love thee? Let me count the ways.
 I love thee to the depth and breadth and height
 My soul can reach, when feeling out of sight
 For the ends of Being and ideal Grace.
 I love thee to the level of every day's
 Most quiet need, by sun and candle-light.
 I love thee freely, as men strive for Right;
 I love thee purely, as they turn from Praise.
 I love thee with the passion put to use
 In my old griefs, and with my childhood's faith.
 I love thee with a love I seemed to lose
 With my lost saints,—I love thee with the breath,
 Smiles, tears, of all my life!—and, if God choose,
 I shall but love thee better after death.²⁰

The reader overhears the poet, as it were, communicating in silence about an apprehended object. It will not be irreverent to say that this communication with the poet—all the infinite differences being preserved²¹—is like an admission into the fruitful silence of the Blessed Trinity, as It contemplates Itself and all Its manifestations. It is a letting in of light, or luminous being, as the overhearing of

²⁰Elizabeth Barrett Browning, *Sonnets from the Portuguese*, XLIII; Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1940, p. 43.

²¹And there is an irreconcilable difference, when one overhears a poet like Robinson Jeffers in his worst moments speaking of perversities, or objective blasphemy. Much modern poetry—an indication of an Age which is truly Dark, where the so-called Dark Ages were resplendent—is a degradation of the sublime privilege and duty of the poet: a deordination of the creative faculties, bent on the perfect expression of immorality. *Nam poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam praecedentem repraesentationem.* (*I Post. Anal.*, lect. 1.) And if virtue here can be extended to include beauty as a *bonum honestum*, what love of beauty as such can be inspired through a delineation of lust, man being inclined as he is since the fall of Adam? "Omnis homo amat pulchrum: carnales amant pulchrum carnale, spirituales amant pulchrum spirituale." (*In David.*, ps. 25, v. 5.) And the love of fleshly beauty, when unredeemed by a higher love, can only lead downwards. This is the eternal theme of art and prudence—or better, of the artist and the prudent man, and of the esthetic reader and the prudent reader.

the Blessed Trinity is a letting in of luminous Reality.²² The mind of the reader is fortified with the light of the agent intellect, and flooded with a light principled from reality, as the light of glory in heaven fortifies the intellect for the comprehension of the Divine Light.

The mind apprehends the imagined object through the principle of rich images and ideas as perfectly meaning the object. It knows what is meant, and sees how perfectly the object is "given". This is not to omit the signification of external words, for these mean what the ideas and images mean.²³

We said previously that the recipient need not understand the source of this richness of meaning—the harmonious perfection of all the interrelated images and ideas. But he need only know that he is in the imaginative presence of an individual thing, whose sensibility and intelligibility gives him delight in contemplating. The rational basis of this delight can be unfolded, if the person turns himself from his contemplation for the moment, to examine the poem. This analysis serves to re-establish the experience as a deeper penetration into the full perfection of the poem.

The *dream quality* of poetry. This is a phrase which, for all practical purposes, and insisting that it has little to do with the state of dreaming, describes the nature of poetry and the poetic experience quite well. For it is not a contemplation of really present reality, but of reality *known* to be within the mind, whatever this reality may be: another's mind, another's affections, or things in "nature". The peculiar fascination of the state—and children delight in it repeatedly—resolves into the ultimately inexplicable pleasure that all men have in experiencing the reel precisely as within the mind. For it is one thing—and a better thing as such, though a distinct thing—to hear a sound, or to see

²²Sw>rawa *Theol. I*, q. 68, a. 4, resp: "...quandoque ipsa sancta Trinitas dicitur coelum, propter ejus spiritualem sublimitatem et luce[n]."

²³Cfr. p. 200 ff.

a sunlit mist of snow, and quite another thing to imagine a sound—to hear, so to speak, the silence of sound, or to view an imagined mist of snow.

There blooms no bud in May
Can for its white compare
With snow at break of day
On fields forlorn and bare.

For shadow it hath rose,
Azure, and amethyst,
And every air that blows
Dies out in beauteous mist.²⁴

"For representation," says the Angelic Doctor, "is naturally delightful to man."²⁵ What we have said about the pleasure of representation in poetry is contained in the single word "naturally". The fact that men delight in the exercise of imagination is ultimate, and cannot be explained any more than the natural desire for happiness can be explained.

It is said that the poet can present his object to another more perfectly than other writers can. This is true, if it is a question of two people presenting the individuality of the same object. It has nothing to do with the clarity of demonstration, which deals in the essences of things. The philosopher can produce in a mind a state of certitude. But the poet presents the individuality of things. Moreover, the philosopher can cause exactly the same knowledge in

²⁴Walter De La Mare, "There Blooms No Bud in May", *Collected Poems*, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1931.

²⁵*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 9, ad lum: "Poeta utitur metaphoris propter repraesentationem; repraesentatio enim naturaliter homini delectabilis est. Sed sacra doctrina utitur metaphoris propter necessitatem et utilitatem, ut dictum est." We need not indicate the force of the parallelism between *delectatio* and *utilitas*: but we emphasize that delightful representation has the use that all beauty has, or should have: to create a love of beauty in every form as a *bonum honestum*, particularly a love of spiritual and Absolute Beauty.

another as he has himself. But this is not strictly true of the poet. For since he works from the experience of individual things—facts, places, persons, of which there is no scientific demonstration,—and the reader meets him on the recollections of his own experiences and the precision with which the poet's experience is presented, it is evident that the poet's knowledge is not identical with the reader's. The essential outlines of the experience can be communicated, with a varying number of individual notes.

It may be said that there are, in this respect, two types of poetic presentation: one in which the poet's experience is given in detail, and one in which the essential outlines are conveyed, with only a number of individual notes. In both cases the poem is received by the reader into a context of awakened and dimly-apprehended memories, according to which the notes of the individual words will be in a state of flux. In the first case, less play is allowed to the memory than in the second. The following is an instance of the second case, in which the experience of the reader supplies for what the poet does not present: the object being of such common experience that the poet need not go into detail, and the reader creates the object through individual suggestion.

Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening

Whose woods these are I think I know.
His house is in the village though;
He will not see me stopping here
To watch his woods fill up with snow.

My little horse must think it queer
To stop without a farmhouse near
Between the woods and frozen lake
The darkest evening of the year.

He gives his harness bells a shake
To ask if there is some mistake.
The only other sound's the sweep
Of easy wind and downy flake.

The woods are lovely, dark and deep.
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.²⁰

In receiving such a poem, the reader goes back through flashes of fragmentary memories, producing a kind of general image of snowy evenings—the sound, the movement of falling snow, the dusk—under the guidance of the poem, and representing to his own mind a more or less definite image of the scene given through the poem. This partially created imagination, touched with indistinct memories, is what, for the reader, is made sensible and intelligible through the images and ideas of the poem. The object of the poet is a recollected experience (perhaps a present experience at the time of creation, though this is not ordinarily the case) precisely as recollected. The reader recalls vague experiences of his own, which fuse into the imagined object of the poem. The essential character of poetry remains: for there is communication, through splendid images and ideas, about an imagined object. It is as if the poet took the reader aside, and began: "Do you remember what woods look like on a snowy evening? Don't they look like this?" It is an object, common to both poet and reader, contemplated precisely as imagined and thought about in its absence.

It can be said then that no poem is exactly the same as created and as received; and this is all the more so when the reader's experience is allowed to fill in the gaps left by the poet's delineation. And it is likewise true that the poem does not remain quite the same thing for the poet himself as time goes on. Years, or even only weeks later, his reading of the poem will not duplicate the original reading: for he will bring to the poem a mind which has been somewhat modified by an interval of experience. But the essence of the poetic object, and most of the individuality as previously known, will be the same.

²⁶Robert Frost, *op. tit.*, p. 275.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We shall briefly consider a few problems concerning modern poetry, and then conclude.

1. FRAGMENTARY POETRY

If it were not for modern poetry, we should not have to pose a special problem here: in what sense must we understand the splendor of meaning? For modern poetry suggests the following question: what is the value of obscure poetry? Or is it poetry at all? Wordsworth's *Daffodils* does not present this problem; the plays of Shakespeare, though somewhat obscure at times, are amazingly clear in comparison with, say the poems of Dylan Thomas, or W. H. Auden, or the *Awabase* of Perse, or many of Eliot's poems. To see what the value of such poetry is, we will consider three things: fragmentary poetry, poetry and imagination, and finally poetry and meaning. These three are interrelated, and according to a brief consideration of each we will see in what sense obscure poetry may have a splendor of meaning.

The first thing to point out is that it is presumed that a poem has a splendor of meaning to its creator. But our question here concerns the relational splendor, or the proportion, to a reader. Secondly, there are two kinds of obscurity: one which springs from profound thought, the very profundity making it practically impossible for the poet to present a poem which is intelligible, without serious cogita-

tion by the reader. We are not concerned with this type. There is another kind of obscurity springing from a deliberate suppression of logical sequence, an extensive use of symbolism, and an appeal to what is called the logic of imagination, through the juxtaposition of images which, by the very force of their sequence, are intended to convince the mind. It is this type we are interested in. Finally, we are not speaking of those cases where a poem is unintelligible to one or the other reader, but of the case where it is unintelligible to the class of poetry-readers in general.

Fragmentary poetry we shall call any section within a complete poem which bears a splendor of meaning to the average reader, while the poem as an integral whole remains obscure. In such instances, the person does not grasp the poem as a *verbum*, for the entire matter is not comprehended, and the intrinsic form escapes him. We need not dwell upon the fact of such dissociated splendors. These fragmentary poems—for they share in the nature of poetry, though they are disconnected parts of a whole which is uncomprehended—have a certain sensible and intelligible splendor of their own. But it may be said that a poem which is morally impossible of comprehension by the general run of readers—no matter how splendid may be its fragments—is, from a social viewpoint, bad art.¹

^aThe objection may be raised: but the poet is primarily interested in expressing what is in his mind, and the proportion to an audience is secondary. The poet scarcely troubles whether the average reader comprehends the whole. But then, so much the worse for the poet, especially if he publishes his work. It is sometimes argued that in time the general audience will be educated, through continued reading of the new form of poetry. This is a gratuitous argument, and is verified only when modern poetry is not radically obscure. People who have studied ancient and modern poetry all their lives, without prejudice in favor of the traditional type, are no nearer to an appreciation of modern poetry in its wildest moments than they ever were: it is certainly true in my own case.

2. POETRY AND IMAGINATION

"There is," says Mr. Eliot, "a logic of the imagination, as well as a logic of concepts."² This is true in a certain sense. Eliot himself, in his *Waste Land*, and *Ash Wednesday*, as well as in others of his poems, appeals to this logic. The poet arranges a succession of apparently disconnected images and ideas, which convey to the reader impressions or flashes. The individual images have a meaning. But it is not like the succession of flash-impressions on a theatre screen, whose connection is obvious to the intellect. There is nothing at first for the intellect to fasten upon as a unifying theme: the forms of the individual images and ideas are apprehended: the form of the whole is not. But the reader is desired to lay open his imagination to these impressions, as he would to any flow of pictures. The impression is very much like the sequence of images in a dream.

Now the "logic" of the imagination may be traced to the *vis cogitativa*. This faculty, it is said, apprehends individual, sensible meanings. It is not beyond its capacity to see two images in the light of each other; but it can go no further than seeing them together, and apprehending them together as good or bad, harmful to the person or pleasurable, or valuable in a sensible manner. By previous cooperation with the intellect, it can be informed by habit to apprehend a repeated relation of images as valuable, without the necessary cooperation of intellect, although the intellect is thereupon immediately invoked. But it is beyond its capacity to apprehend the relation of a continued series of individual meanings: this can be done, from one end of a series to another, only by a spiritual power. And the intellect has a

²Preface to *Anabase*, by St. J. Perse; translated by T. S. Eliot, with preface by the latter; Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1938; p. 8. This French poet illustrates what we mean by the sequence of images, with suppression of logical connections.

natural thirst for unity, without which being cannot possibly be comprehended.³ The sequence of a thousand images need not carry any unitary meaning to the intellect. And unless such unification is apprehended, a poem consists only of fragmentary splendor. Such splendor may be in itself pleasurable; but if the poem was intended to have a connected meaning, however obscurely this unity be constructed, the poem itself remains unknown as long as its unity is uncomprehended.

But then it is urged that several re-readings of the poem may eventually disclose the underlying form. This is all very well, if it can be verified in practice. Often it is not. And if the reader does succeed, it is only by a penetrating use—not of the logic of imagination—but of the reason. Granted that the juxtaposition of images has a certain value for the *vis cogitativa*, granted even that emotions may facilitate the solution, it is only the activity of the reason which accounts for the recognition of the poem as a whole.

The reader will come to believe, after a thorough study of the poem, that the poet himself had no form for the whole. This may be untrue, but it is certainly understandable. And if it be true that the poet created haphazardly, without a governing form, and only from the stream of the "subconscious", this is at best a frivolous dissipation, at worst a serious deordination, if a great deal of time was consumed in the creation. It puts sensible pleasure in the order of an end *propter se*, assuming the characteristics of a true *bonum honestum*. The reader who responds to the poet in the same order, is likewise guilty of a deordination of the human faculties. But the poet will possibly reply: But there is a governing form. The reader will answer: Time is too precious; and I have a well-warranted misgiving

³*De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 3, resp: "...unumquodque autem intelligibile est inquantum est unum; qui enim non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus."

that when I finally reach the form, the meaning will be so trivial, that I cannot help feeling both you and I could have spent our time and energy to better advantage.

Where the meaning of the whole is truly valuable, as it is in Eliot, there is a certain justification for the invoking of such a style, for when the whole is resolved, it is seen that a valuable object is sensibly and intelligibly splendid. One wonders, however, whether the meaning would not be given with equal splendor in another way, and with less exasperation to the reader. It is difficult to conceive the poems of Robert Frost borrowing a greater splendor of meaning through an appeal to the logic of imagination.

3. POETRY AND MEANING

What we have said in the two previous sections tells us what should be said in this. All we have said in justification of the nature of poetry as the splendor of meaning of an imagined object seems diametrically opposed to theories which insist that poetry need have no meaning. Such a statement as this from modern theorists must be taken with reservations. What is probably meant is that a poem does not appeal to the mind as a syllogism in Barbara does: and this is indisputable. For the images in a syllogistic process are instruments for the perfection of reason, since man cannot reason without the employment of some form of image accompanying the individual terms. But in a poem, the images are employed for the meaning of an individual object as individual. And the individuality and sensibility of the object are apprehended precisely through the use of images.

It is not to be denied that even when a poem's meaning is not difficult to grasp with a little concentration, the reader may abstract from any effort to attend to this meaning, and fix upon other elements of beauty. Every poem has a definite mood, detectible from the first; similarly,

every poem has a rhythm of its own, and—especially in modern poetry—a splendor of images. Thus the mind can fasten upon the beauty of sound, movement, mood, and images, which will offer what one might call a shadowy meaning. A certain pleasure is found in this, quite similar to the pleasure which children find in the incantation of rhythmical and dimly-understood verses. The delight is based on the flowing sound, the succession of splendid images, and the connected movement of mood from end to end.

But what we emphasize is that there can be no experience of a poem as an integral poem, without the penetration of intellect. It is regrettable that the most radical of the modern poets are carried to extremes. In studying the peculiar appeal of a poet like Hopkins, they fasten upon one aspect to the exclusion of others, forgetting that such a poet is successful because, while being a master of splendid sensibility, he is simultaneously splendidly intelligible, however difficult it be at times to grasp the intrinsic form of the whole: the connecting links are present, the prosody is strange.

4. CONCLUSION

We will sum up briefly all we have said in the three parts of this dissertation. Ontological beauty is objectively the same as truth and goodness. But when a thing is so related to the person that it is pleasurable simply to behold it, or in general, to know it, the thing presents an aspect which is logically distinct from the aspects of truth and goodness. The requirements for objective beauty are not sometime superadded to a thing which is already true and good, but all things are beautiful, and present harmonious perfection and splendor (cognoscibility in the sensory and intelligential order), to the degree that they exist or are actual. This splendor, springing from the harmonious per-

f action, and subsuming the latter as a *lumen manifestans*, is the first ground for the experience of beauty. Not everything however is apprehended as beautiful. But those things which are simply perfect, or are regarded as such, exist with a greater fulness of harmonious perfection and splendor, and thus exercise a certain natural compulsion on the mind.

But for the experience of beauty, the mind itself must be proportioned by habits to the apprehension of beautiful being. In being presented with a perfect object, the mind is flooded with its sensibility and intelligibility, the intellect apprehending the object as a perfect individual and splendid thing through the keen ministrations of the sensory intuitions. The person apprehends the situation as connatural and pleasurable. The will is engaged, and rests in the state of fulfilled harmonious knowledge of intellect and sense—or the perfect knowledge of the composite mind. Thus the beautiful object is directly related to the knowing mind, and through this relation to the will. Emotions, generally speaking, arise from the apprehension of the situation as personally valuable.

If the beautiful object, then, is to be called a kind of good, and yet is to present a logically distinct attribute, it must be designated as an esthetic good. For such an object does not draw the will to real possession, or to a direct moral union, and therefore, while it is a good, it is a qualified good. On the other hand, an object apprehended as true, is a kind of good, the good of the intellect, but not in the same way as the esthetic good; for it does not necessarily engage the will; while the beautiful object does engage the will, through the fulfilled knowledge of intellect and sense.

Concerning intuition, it must be noted that in the Thomistic synthesis—whatever may be said of other syntheses—there is no room for knowledge on earth, even sensory knowledge, which is not through intentional species.* And while, psychologically, our knowledge—and this is especially borne out in esthetic knowledge, to say nothing of

what mystical knowledge may be like—is an immediate knowledge of a perfect individual, genetically, it is a complex mediated knowledge, through intentional species, which will not allow for a pure intuition, however closely it may seem to border on this.

Art is a virtue of the practical intellect, fortifying the universal and particular reason (the *vis cogitativa*) in the formation and carrying out of a correct representation of a work to be made. This representation, as it exists in the universal reason, is a quiescent norm, and includes the artist's concept of beauty *in universali*, the rules of his craft, and the universal aspects of a work to be made. The form of the artefact is in the intellect after a universal manner: but with this form is a representation of the material of the artefact—e.g., stone, again after a universal manner. As the representation exists in the particular reason, it is a representation in a sensible (imaginal manner) of the particular contingent aspects of the artefact. This sensible representation moves the universal reason as regards the intellect's knowledge of the particularity of the artefact to be made; for the universal reason has recourse to this faculty, after a kind of syllogistic fashion, to conclude as to the proper way of making the particular artefact. The composite representation in both intellect and sense is a full exemplar of the work.

The artist's disinterested love of beauty, quite apart from any pleasure he may expect in the making, moves his will to the actual carrying out of the exemplar. The intentional form is said to be impressed upon the extramental material. The perfection of the artefact consists in the degree to which it corresponds to the exemplar. The artist knows the work more perfectly than the beholder, for he knows it through operative knowledge, whereas others must know it through principled knowledge.

While poetry is in most respects similar to every other art, it has some noticable differences, though it is closely allied to music. For it concerns a making which is carried

on within the mind, and is expressed externally through instrumental words, which are the means of communicating the poem. Furthermore, the exemplar in the case of poetry is productive of both the matter and form of the artefact, though obviously this does not mean pure creation, since the ideas and images drawn from the exemplar have originally been principled from reality. The poet works from attention to the exemplary word, from which ideas and images are drawn by association.

Ontological beauty consists in harmonious perfection and splendor. The beauty of an artefact is found in the work as it is a perfect expression of whatever is conceived, a perfection which is qualified as harmonious and splendid, just as everything is harmonious and splendid, as far as it is perfect. The ontological beauty of a poem, taking splendor as subsuming harmonious perfection, is the splendor of ideas and images (signified in external words) as meaning an imagined object. Its sensibility and intelligibility flows out of the harmonious perfection of ideas, images and words, as bound together by a unifying form, on the strength of the operative word (or exemplar). It is a caused beauty, a splendid *verbum*, proceeding from another *verbum* more remote and less individual. This remote *verbum* is drawn from experience. In its formation, the poet's concept of beauty *in iniiverscili* and his personal ideology are contracted to a complex judgement, which exists in intellect and sense together: and from this, after the manner we have outlined, proceeds the poem. Whether the object of which the poet writes is really present at the time of composition or not, once the poem is created, the individual object, surrounded with circumstances, is gone, and the poem represents an absent object. The relational beauty of the poem consists in its proportion to an individual mind, and the foundation of this proportion is in the sensibility and intelligibility of the poem.

The matter of a poem is all the ideas, images (verbal images and "thing" images), and external words. But the

external words are part of the matter, not in their simple physical character as mere sound or print, but in their intentional character—i.e., as far as they instrument the meaning of the poem. The form of a poem is the contextual relation or binding of the entire matter—the intentional shape, as it were, of the ideas, images, and words. Verbal images are of the very essence of that specific art called poetry. The being of a poem may be taken in two ways: as the being of a real object under intentional existence, or as the being of ideas, images, and words as meaning or giving this object. Since the ideas, images, and words are the object as under intentional existence, one may interchange the object and its formal (and instrumental) signs, and say that the being of a poem is intentional being, or the meaning of an imagined object.

A poetic artefact is a verbal artefact, in which an object is more or less perfectly given through the content of words, and for the immediate end of such a perfect giving or expression. A mediate end may be attached to this making: that of principling in the mind of another a pleasurable contemplation of the rich giving of the object through the words. A useful verbal artefact is such as has the primary end of information, the moving of the will to action—or, in general, of any use beyond the simple pleasurable contemplation of the perfection of the expression. The term "poetic artefact" is of wider extension than the term "poem"; perhaps, for practical purposes, one should distinguish them—but this is a distinction which we do not think actually accords with the mind of Aristotle or the Scholastics. The term "poem" has come to mean a verbal artefact which, generally speaking, must have an important content, and which gives its content in concentrated form, presenting the individuality of the object in few and striking words, and allowing the reader to enjoy an analogous pleasure of poetic creation by drawing out the suggestions within the limited number of words. The esthetic experience of such a poetic artefact is more intense, because the

entire situation is less dispersed.

Regarding the reception or experience of the poem by the reader: discarding everything which may flow from the poem as a result—e.g., the turning of the mind and affections to the object, not as it is represented in the poem, but as it is known to exist with its own beauty in the extra-mental world—we fix upon the pure essence of a poem as received, saying that its experience consists in the consciously pleasurable apprehension of a splendidly given object, which is contemplated precisely as being ideally and imaginatively within the mind.

We have deliberately refrained from saying anything about poetry and life, and art and prudence. These questions demand considerations which one may conceive as lying outside the speculative discourse of the present thesis. If we say that a poem is ontologically beautiful as far as it perfectly represents whatever the poet conceives, we are not passing judgment upon the moral or social values of the work. The criterion for such values must be established on other principles than the ones we have given. Nor do we wish to imply that these values are inferior to the purely artistic values. We have not said anything on the notion that the work of art must be a reflection of life, if it is to have any social value; and that the more universally proportioned is the reflection, and the deeper is the contemplation, and the wider is the region of life which is contemplated, the more valuable is the work both in itself and from a social standpoint.

When we *compare* works of art, the measure of the *ontological* beauty of an artefact must be taken not simply from the perfection of the expression, but also from the value of what is contemplated and expressed. Similarly, the comparative measure of the perfection of its proportioned splendor (or *relational* beauty) must be taken not simply from a limited number of individuals to whom it is proportioned, but from the greatest number of individuals to whom it actually appeals. We cannot be accused there-

fore of saying that all works of art are beautiful to the same extent, or that they all have the same degree of relational value: we have spoken throughout only of the essence of beauty, art, and poetry, and have, as far as possible, made general statements, leaving all further practical questions on one side.

In conclusion, we borrow an apology from the Angelic Doctor, with which he concludes his commentary on the *Divine Names*, altering it to suit the case, and accepting its tone of diffidence with far greater justice than the Angel of the Schools, whose principles we have tried to understand and apply. "And now, having expounded the notions of St. Thomas, and still falling far short of his understanding, we ask to be enlightened where we have been in error. And if we have at all approached the truth, we must give the credit to the giver of all good gifts, the one and three-fold God, who liveth and reigneth, world without end. Amen!"⁴

**De Div. Nom.*, c. 13, lect. 4: "Et nos post expositionem dictorum (divi Thomae) longe ab ejus intellectu deficientes, corrigi de non recte dictis postulamus. Si qua autem bene dicta sunt, referendae auct gratiae bonorum omnium largitori, qui est trinus et unup Deus, vivens et regnans per omnia saecula saeculorum. Amen."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Books

- Aquinas, St. Thomas, *Opera Omnia*, Parma, 1852-1869.
- Opuscula Omnia Genuina quidem nee non Spuria*, P. Mandonnet (ed.), P. Lithielleux, Paris, 1927.
- Aristotle, *Basic Works*, Richard McKeon (ed.), Random House, New York, 1941.
- Opera Omnia*, Firmin-Didot, Paris, 1848-1873.
- Barbadette, D., *Philosophia Scholastica*, Berche and Pagis, 1937.
- Behn, Siegfried, *The Eternal Magnet*, (trans. G. N. Schuster), Devin-Adair, New York, 1929.
- Billuart, F. C., *Swnma Sancti Thomae*, Lecoffre, Paris and London, 1874.
- Bittle, Celestine, O. M. Cap., *The Domain of Being*, Bruce Publishing Co., New York, 1939.
- Reality and the Mind*, 1938.
- The Science of Correct Thinking*, 1935.
- Bosanquet, B. *Three Lectures on Esthetic*, Macmillan, London, 1931.
- Bremond, H., *La poesie pure*, B. Grasset, Paris, 1926.
- Priere et poesie*, 1926.
- Brennan, Robert E., O. P., *General Psychology*, Macmillan, New York, 1937.
- Thomistic Psychology*, 1941.
- Briggs, W. A. (ed.), *Great Poems of the English Language*, Tudor Co., New York, 1932.
- Bruni-Zybura, *Progressive Scholasticism*, Herder Co., St. Louis, 1929.
- Cajetan, Thomas de Vio, *Commentaria in Summam Theologicam D. Thomae Aquinatis*, Rome, 1571.
- Callahan, Leonard, O. P., *A Theory of Esthetic*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1927.
- Carnap, Rudolf, *Philosophy of Science*, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, 1937.
- Chambers, Frank P., *The History of Taste*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1932.

- Chesterton, G. K., *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1933.
- Coffey, P., *Ontology*, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1926.
- Consilia, Sister Mary, *The Antecedents of Being*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1939.
- Couturier, Marie-Alain, O. P., *Art et Catholicisme*, Editions de L'Arbre, Montreal, 1941.
- Daiches, David, *Poetry and the Modern World*, University of Chicago Press, 1940.
- De Raeymaeker, L., *Metaphysica Generalis*, I, Lovani, E. Warny, rue Vesale, 1935.
- De Wulf, Maurice, *Medieval Philosophy*, Harvard, 1922.
- Diehl, Joseph A., *De Pulchro et Sublimi*, Monasterii, 1868.
- Drew, Elizabeth, and Sweeney, John, *Directions in Modern Poetry*, Norton and Co., New York, 1940.
- Dubois, Ernest, C.S.S.R., *De Exemplarismo Divino*, Philip Cuggiani, Rome, 1899.
- Eliot, Thomas Stearns, *Collected Poems*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1936.
- *Selected Essays*, 1942.
- Empson, W., *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1930.
- Farrell, Walter, O.P., *A Companion to the Swnma*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1939-1942.
- Frost, Robert, *Collected Poems*, Halcyon House, New York, 1942.
- Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, O.P., *De Revelatione*, Ferrari, Rome, 1932.
- *The One God*, (transl. Dom Bede Rose, O.S.B.), Herder Co., St. Louis, 1943.
- Gerrity, Brother Benignus, F.S.C., *St. Thomas' Doctrine of Substantial Form*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1938.
- Gilbert, K. E., and Kuhn, H., *A History of Esthetics*, Macmillan Co., New York, 1939.
- Gilby, Thomas, O. P., *Poetic Experience*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1934.
- Gill, Eric, *Autobiography*, Devin-Adair, New York, 1941.
- *Beauty Looks After Herself*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1934.
- Gilson, Etienne, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, (transl. Bui-lough and Elrington), Herder Co., St. Louis, 1937.
- *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, (transl. Dowfces), Scribner's Sons, New York, 1936.

- Gredt, Joseph, O.S.B., *Elemenia Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, Herder Co., St. Louis, 1932.
- Gue*rard, Albert, *Art for Art's Sake*, Lothrop, Lee and Shepard, Boston, 1936.
- Hart, Charles A., *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1930.
- Hayakawa, S. I., *Language in Action*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1941.
- Hopkins, Gerard Manley, S. J., *Poems*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1940.
- House, Humphrey, *The Note-Books and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, Oxford University Press, London, 1937.
- Husserl, E., *Logische Untersuchungen*, Halle, 1928.
- Jarrett, Bede, O. P., *Social Theories of the Middle Ages*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1926.
- John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus*, Vices, Paris, 1883.
- Joyce, G. H., S. J., *Principles of Logic*, Longmans Green and Co., New York, 1936.
- Le Roy, fedouard, *La pensee intuitive*, Boivin & Cie., Paris, 1929.
- Maher, Michael, S. J., *Psychology* Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1926.
- Mandonnet, Peter, O. P., *Opuscula Omnia Genuina quidem nee non Spuria*, P. Lethielleux, Paris. 1927.
- Maquart, F. X., *Elementa Philosophiae, Tom. HI-Metaphysica*, Andreas Blot, Paris, 1938.
- MarEchal, Joseph, S. J., *Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics*, (transl. Algar Thorold), Burns Oates and Washbourne, London, 1927.
- Maritain, Jacques, *Art and Poetry*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1943.
- Art and Scholasticism*, Scribner's, New York, 1930.
- A Preface to Metaphysics*, Sheed and Ward, London, 1939.
- Meehan, F. X., *Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1940.
- Mercier, Cardinal, *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, Herder Co., St. Louis, 1928.
- Moore, Thomas V., *Cognitive Psychology*, Lippincott, Phila., 1939.
- Dynamic Psychology*, 1926.
- Morris, C. W., *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*, University of Chicago Press (International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 1, no. 2.)

- Murphy, Gardner, *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1938.
- Murry, John M., *The Problem of Style*, Oxford University Press, 1936.
- Neff, Emery, *A Revolution in European Poetry*, Columbia University Press, 1940.
- Newman, John H., *A Grammar of Assent*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1901.
- Noel, L., *Notes d'Epistemologie Thomiste*, Louvain, 1925.
- Ogden, C. K., and Richards, I. A., *The Meaning of Meaning*, Harcourt Brace and Co., New York, 1936.
- Paget, Richard, *This English*, Kegan Paul, London, 1935.
- Perse, St. J., *Anabase* (trans. T. S. Eliot), Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1938.
- Piaget, J., *The Language and Thought of the Child*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1926.
- Phillips, R. D., *Modern, Thomistic Philosophy*, Burne Gates and Washbourne, London, 1934.
- Read, Herbert, *Form in Modern Poetry*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1933.
- *Reason and Romanticism*, Faber and Gwyer, London, 1926.
- Richard of St. Victor, *De Gratia Contemplationis*, Migne, 1855; vol. 196.
- Rousselot, Pierre, S. J., *L'Intellectualisme de St. Thomax*, Paris, 1908; translation by James E. O'Mahony, O.M.Cap., Sheed and Ward, 1935.
- Russel, Bertrand, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, W. W. Norton and Co., New York, 1940.
- Sanseverino, Cajetan, *Compendium Philosophiae Christianae*, Naples, 1888.
- Santayana, George, *Reason and Art*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1905.
- *The Sense of Beauty*, 1936.
- Seashore, Robert H., *Fields of Psychology*, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1942.
- Sertillanges, A. D., *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Felix Alcan, Paris, 1912.
- Shipley, J. T. (ed.), *Dictionary of World Literature*, The Philosophical Library, New York, 1943.
- Speckbaugh, Paul F., C.P.P.S., *Some General Canons of Literary Criticism*, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1936.
- Stoeckl, A., *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Mainz, 1864.
- Sylvius, Franciscus, *Commentarium in Summam Theologicam S. Thomae Aquinatis*, Antwerp, 1667.

- Talbot, E. F., O. M. I., *Knowledge and Object*, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1932.
- Thompson, Francis, *Poems*, Oxford University Press, London, 1938.
- Toccafondi, Eugene T., O. P., *Metaphysica Generalis I*, La Filografica, Rome, 1936 (ad usum privatum).
- Turnell, M., *Poetry and Crisis*, Sands, The Paladin Press, London, 1938.
- Udell, Sister Mary Gonzaga, O. P., *A Theory of Criticism of Fiction*, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1941.
- Urban, W. M., *Language and Reality*, Macmillan, New York, 1939.
- Van Doren, Mark (ed.), *Masterpieces of America Poets*, Garden City, New York, 1932.
- Ward, Leo R., C. S. C., *Philosophy of Value*, Macmillan Co., New York, 1930.
- Watkin, E. 1., *A Philosophy of Form*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1935.
- *The Bow in the Clouds*, Macmillan Co., New York, 1932.

II. Articles and Excerpts

- Abraham, Leo, "Theory of Meaning", *The Monist*, July, 1936.
- Allers, Rudolf, "The Cognitive Aspects of Emotion," *The Thomist*, Oct., 1942, vol. IV, no. 4.
- "Intellectual Cognition," *Essays in Thomism*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1942.
- "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars," *The Thomist*, Jan., 1941, vol. III, no. 1.
- "The *Vis Cogitativa* and Evaluation," *The New Scholasticism*, July, 1941, vol. XV, no. 3.
- St. Anselm, "Monologium," *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, J. P. Migne, 1853, vol. 158.
- Arnold, Mathew, "The Study of Poetry," *Harvard Classics*, P. F. Collier and Son, New York, 1910; vol. 28.
- St. Augustine, citations *de pulchro*, secundum Indicem Generalem, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*, J. P. Migne, 1842; vol. 11.
- Brownson, Orestes A., "Wordsworth's Poetical Works." *The Works of Orestes Brawnson*, H. F. Brownson, Detroit, 1887.
- Chapman, Emmanuel, "Beauty and the War", *The Journal of Esthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. I, no. 6, Philosophical Library, New York, 1942.
- "The Perennial Theme of Beauty and Art," *Essays in Thomism*, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1942.

- Coleridge, Samuel T., "On Poesy and Art," *Harvard Classics*, P. F. Collier and Son, New York, 1910; vol. 27.
- Cory, Herbert E., "Value, Beauty and Professor Perry," *The Thomist*, Jan., 1942; vol. IV, no. 1.
- Gilby, Thomas, O. P., "Thought, Volition and the Organism," *The Thomist*, Jan., 1940; vol. II, no. 1.
- Hume, David, "Of the Standard of Taste," *Harvard Classics*, P. F. Collier and Son, New York, 1910; vol. 27.
- Hunt, Leigh, "On the Realities of Imagination," *Harvard Classics*, vol. 27.
- Klubertanz, George P., "The Internal Senses in the Process of Cognition," *The Modern Schoolman*, Jan., 1941, vol. XVIII, no. 2.
- Lachance, Louis, "The Philosophy of Language," *The Thomist*, Oct., 1942; vol. IV, no. 4.
- McKeon, Richard, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," *Speculum*, Jan., 1942; vol. XVII, no. 1.
- Mailloux, Noel, O. P., "The Problem of Perception," *The Thomist*, April, 1942; vol. IV, no. 2.
- Marechal, Joseph, S. J., "Abstraction or Intuition," *Revue Neo-Scholastique*, 1929; vol. 31, part 1.
- Oesterle, J. A., "The Problem of Meaning", *The Thomist*, July, 1943, vol. VI, no. 2.
- Ong, W. J., "The Province of Rhetoric and Poetic", *The Modern Schoolman*, Jan., 1942; vol. XIX, no. 2.
- O'Toole, G. B., "Truth is in the Judgement," *The New Scholasticism*, Jan., 1943; vol. XVII, no. 1.
- Peghaire, Julien, "A Forgotten Sense, the Cogitative, According to St. Thomas", *The Modern Schoolman*, Mar., 1943; vol. XX, no. 3.
- Phelan, Gerald, "The Concept of Beauty in St. Thomas", *Aspects of the New Scholastic Philosophy*, Benziger Bros., 1932.
- Rigg, M. G., "The Expression of Meanings and Emotions in Music", *Philosophical Essays in Honor of E. A. Singer*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942.
- Shelley, P. B., "A Defence of Poetry", *Harvard Classics*, P. F. Collier and Son, New York, 1910; vol. 27.
- Sidney, Sir Philip, "The Defense of Poesy", *Harvard Classics*, vol. 27.
- Steiss, Albert, "Outline of a Philosophy of Art", *The Thomist*, Jan., 1940; vol. II, no. 1.
- Theissling-Szabo (ed.), *Xenia Thomistica*, 3 vols., Vatican Polyglot, Rome, 1925.
- Walters, Leonard A., "Poetry Seeking an Understanding", *The Modern Schoolman*, May, 1940, vol. XVII, no. 4.

A PHILOSOPHY OF POETRY

INDEX

- Abstraction, 15, 18, 55, 103, 228.
 Action of artistic creation, 128.
 Appetite, natural, 57, 174; sensitive, 60; volitional (vd. also Will), 61; and emotion, 60.
 Apprehension, esthetic and personal good, 53, 54.
Ars poetica, 153 ff., 197.
 Art, 6, 81 ff., 96 ff., 129; and moral habit, 100; and prudence, 97 ff., 231, 246; and skill, 81; and use, 82; and will, 104, 162; pleasurable, 83; useful and beautiful, 6, 82, 132.
 Artist, and beauty, 85, 90, 145; and final end, 88 ff., 133; and goodness, 85, 90; and intelligence, 85 ff., 108; and perfection, 130; and sensibilities, 85 ff., 108.
Assimilatio, 15 ff., 60.
 Association, 174 ff.
 Attention, 174.
 Attributes, of being, 20; beauty a transcendental, 68 ff; as logical additions to being, 22, 70.
 Beauty (in general); of God, 3, 86; of creatures, 3, 68, 87, 137; ontological, 5, 27, 76; relational, 27, 76; experience of (vd. Experience, esthetic); kinds of, 145 ff; a *bonum honestum*, 90 ff., 48 ff., 105; and attributes, 26 ff., 68; and being, 3; and goodness, 27, 40, 44, 58, 70; and integrity, 28; and mode and species, 27, 136; and order, 27, 28 ff.; and relations, 27 ff; and splendor, 27 ff; and truth, 58, 70 ff., 56; and will, 40 ff.
 Beauty (of artefact): ontological, 134, 137 ff; relational, 90, 138.
 Beauty (poetic: vd. also Poetry): ontological, 214, 219, 222; relational, 169, 214, 224; experience of, 216 ff.
 Being, 7 ff; kinds of, 7, ff; and existence, 8; and its attributes, 7, ff; and goodness, 20; and truth, 14; and unity, 10; of a poem, 210 ff.
 Binding, intentional (vd. also Form of Poem; Shape, intentional): 167, 186, 215.
Cautious, 170.
 Cogitative power (vd. *Vis cogitativa*).
 Comparison of poems, 246.
 Contemplation: esthetic, 38 ff., 51, 54; metaphysical and esthetic, 53, 68, 71; poet's, 145 ff., 216; reader's, 221 ff; six kinds of, 149.
 Content of words, 199 ff.
 Content-value, 225.
 Context of poem (vd. also Signification, contextual), 177, 205.
 Continuation of spiritual and sensory faculties, 101 ff., 118.
Conversio, 18 (footnote 31).
 Delight, esthetic, 52, 56, 59; of natural appetite and of will, 57 ff; in operation, 57, 61.
 Dialectic, 153, 197.
 Dream-quality of poetry, 232.
 Efficient causality of artefact, 125 ff; of poem, 170 ff., 216 ff.
 Effulgence (vd. Splendor).
 Emotion, 60, 65, 115 ff., 161, 170 ff., 178, 181.
 Exemplar of poem, 160, 162, 164, 175.
 Experience: esthetic, 38 ff., 58, 74, 77, 134; of goodness, 40, 46, 50,

- 58, 74; of truth, 46, 58, 74; metaphysical, 68, 71; perfection of esthetic experience, 49, 51, 90; of poet, 216 ff; poet's experience of reality, 144, 160; reader's experience, 221 ff; experience and reader's response, 224, 234; experience and reading" of poem, 235.
- "Feel" of the poem, 176 (footnote 17).
- Finis*, kinds of, 88 ff.
- Form: substantial, 20; accidental, 20, 123, 127; artificial, 12, 123, 127; intelligible, 20, 55, 127; intentional, 67, 104, 127; sensible, 20, 55, 127; and attributes, 22; operative, 127; of poem (intrinsic), 164, 185 ff; of poem (extrinsic), 186; as principle of knowledge, 20; splendor according to, 34.
- Formal causality, 12, 126, 171.
- Goodness, 20 ff; active, 25; formal, 25; self-goodness, 24; to others, 24; disinterested good, 48; esthetic good, 46, 133; pleasurable good, 48; goodness and beauty, 40, 43; goodness and mode and species, 25, 136; and perfection, 24 ff.
- Habits, 92 ff, intellectual, 95 ff; intellectual participatively in sense, 108 ff; moral 94; perfection of, 67, 99, 116, 123; and esthetic experience 48, 67, 73; and goodness 95; and laws of association, 175; and poetic appreciation, 224; and will 93 ff.
- Harmony, 29 ff; and esthetic order, 29; and teleological order, 29; not necessary to apprehend, 32, 47, 232.
- Ideas: association of, 175; and images (vd. also Words), 163, 198 ff; and images as formal signs, 188 ff; and images and words as matter of poem, 164 ff., 183 ff; as being of poem, 212.
- Ideology, poet's, 160.
- Images: association of, 175; verbal, 199 ff.
- Imagination: productive and re-productive, 113, 175 (footnote 14), 179; and association, 174; and memory, 112.
- Individuality, presentation of, 233.
- Inspiration, poetic, 158.
- Intellect (vd. also Mind, Contemplation, Knowledge, Truth): 15 ff; and association, 174 ff; and imagination, 18, 101, 122, 127, 163, 172; and will in creation, 104 ff, 126.
- Intuition, 63 ff.
- Joy, esthetic, 52, 57.
- Justice, esthetic, 100, 139.
- Knowledge, 15 ff; esthetic, 42 ff., 55, 58; and emotion, 116, 120, 178; operative, 134, 160 ff, 170 ff, 216 ff; poetic, 227; principled, 74, 135, 216 ff; *per modum inclinationis*, 67, 116.
- Language: ends of, 196 ff; and affection, 204 ff; and connotation, 204 ff.
- Light and beauty (vd. also Splendor), 31 ff, 231.
- Literature and life, 246.
- Logic, parts of, 153.
- Logic of imagination, 238.
- Love and artistic creation, 106, 124, 133 (footnote 11), 170.
- Matter of artefact, 12, 123, 127, 130; of poem, 164 ff, 183 ff.
- Meaning: as being of poem, 214 ff; and poetry, 166, 185, 218, 240; and rhythm, 207 ff.
- Memory: x, 108, 111, 112, 117, 161, 169, 179; and association, 174 ff; and reading of poem, 235.
- Mind, composite, 19, 55, 58, 67, 173, 175, 191 (footnote 14), 228.
- Mode, 25.
- Notes, of word, 185 ff.

- Object, poetic, 145 ff., 200, 212, 229; as imaginatively present, 222 ff.
- Order, 26; esthetic, 29; teleological, 29; and splendor, 30 ff; as form of poem (vd. also Binding, Context, Shape), 167 ff.
- Passions of soul, 167, 189.
- Perception, 110 ff., 151.
- Perfection: harmonious, 30, 146, 232; and experience of beauty, 47; and integrity 30; and splendor, 48, 145, 146.
- Personality, poetic, 144.
- Pleasure, and esthetic experience, 48, 55, 67.
- Poem, defined (vd. also Verbal artefact), 209, 210, 223, 245.
- Poem and poetic artefact, 209, 245.
- Poem, as a proceeding *verbum*, 173, 187, 212, 219 (footnote 6), 228.
- Poet: and love of poem, 220; and self-expression, 219.
- Poetica docenx et utens*, 155 (footnote 23), 205 (footnote 26).
- Poetry (vd. also Beauty, Being, Ideas and images and words, Splendor): end of, 156, 197, 209; kinds of, 157, 229; fragmentary, 236; and imagination, 238; and prose, 198, 209, 245.
- Poets: kinds of, 152, 158; and philosophers, 152 (footnote 15), 233, 240.
- Presence, imaginative of poem, 222 ff.
- Presentation, poetic: two kinds, 234.
- Proportion, 29, 43, 60; two-way, 74, 224; two-way apprehended, 52, 59, 60, 74, 76, 224, 227; to individual mind, 35, 60, 72 ff; of mind to thing, 72 ff; of poem to reader, 199, 224.
- Providence and disposition, 131.
- Prose, 198, 209, 245.
- Ratio*, 99, 123; *recta ratio*, 98 ff., 102, 123, 162; of poem, 159, 161 ff.
- Reason, universal and particular (vd. also *Vis cogitativa*), 98 ff., 118 ff.
- Relation, as form of poem, 167.
- Representation, 233.
- Response to poem, kinds of, 225.
- Rhetoric, 153, 197.
- Rhyme and rhythm, 200, 206, 208.
- Sensibility and intelligibility, 31, 55, 129, 214, 224.
- Sensory activity and beauty, 52 ff., 60, 108.
- Sensus communiis*, 110.
- Sentences, kinds of, 166, 167.
- Shape, intentional, 215.
- Signification: contextual, 200; objective and received, 190.
- Signs, 188 ff; arbitrary, 188 ff; formal, 188 ff; instrumental, 188 ff; words as, 166 ff., 188 ff.
- Sound, physical and intentional, 200 ff.
- Species and goodness, 25.
- Species intelligibilis*, 19, 127; *sensibilis*, 20, 127.
- Species, perfective of mind, 45, 136.
- Splendor, 31; of being, 34; according to form, 34, 214; of imagined object, 228; of meaning, 217; of poem, 214, 217; and knowability, 31, 124.
- Sympathy, human and esthetic, 224.
- Thought, preverbal, 198.
- Truth, 14 ff; and artefact, 100, 139; and beauty (vd. also Contemplation, metaphysical and esthetic), 46, 57.
- Union: by affection, 43; by knowledge, 16 (footnote 24), 43, 46; esthetic, 51, 52, 56.
- Unity, 10 ff; of poem, 213.
- Value, 46, 113, 116, 160, 170, 175; and emotion, 115; content-value, 225; pure esthetic, 225; value-judgements, 109, 121, 151, 178.
- Verbal artefact, end of, 153 ff., 156, 209, 245.

- Verhwm mentis*, 165, 166, 191 ff.
Verbum, poem as a, 173.
Vis cogitativa, 16 (footnote 24), 87, 98 ff., 108, 110 ff.; 151; and association, 175 ff; and intellect, 103, 118; and value, 113.
- Will: and beautiful object, 40, 42, 45, 72; and artefact, 104 ff; and artist's fruition, 107; and association, 179; and emotion, 117; and esthetic contemplation, 42 ff., 53, 71 ff; and esthetic fruition, 52, 56; and intellect, 172, 178; and meaning, 185 ff; and poem, 171, 172 ff; as a *verbum*, 181.
- Word: exemplary, 160 ff., 162, 164, 175, 184; operative, 166, 170 ff., 181, 192.
- Words, 163, 180, 188 ff., 191; two-fold end of (symbolic and communicative), 199; external, 166, 184, 193 ff., 200, 218; imagined, 199 .

