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LIGHTS ON VEDĀNTA

A Comparative study of the various views of Post-S'aṅkarites, with special emphasis on Sures'vara's doctrines.

WITH A FOREWORD
By
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FOREWORD

Dr. Veermani Prasad Upadhyaya has just brought out his volume 'Lights on Vedanta'. I write these few lines as a foreword most gladly not only because he happens to be a distinguished colleague on the staff of this University, but especially because I am of opinion that a work on this difficult subject, which needs considerable elucidation, should be brought to the notice of the students of Darśana, who seek light on Vedanta. A casual reading is enough to make it clear that the work is the result of intense hard work and devotional study of the subject spread over years, during which not only views and opinions expressed by the various commentators have been weighed and scrutinized, but the original texts gone through and accurate knowledge obtained therefrom. The study is thus deep as also extensive.

The quest of reality and the understanding of its nature have been the headache of philosophers from the time man began to probe into the 'how and why' of his existence. Dr. Upadhyaya in his chase for the same has not merely contended himself by repeating the views of various authorities, but presented in his characteristic style his own understanding of the nature and problems of reality. He sheds some new light not seen so clearly before in almost every chapter.

S'aṅkara is a landmark in the clear enunciation and elaboration of the system of Philosophy known as the Advaita Vedanta. He set the mind thinking vigorously and the question has often been posed by scholars-what after him ? Has there been a super-structure on the same or has knowledge remaind stagnant at that ? Dr. Upadhyaya has not only answered that but illumined the hitherto dimly lit epoch of post-S'aṅkarite period in the development of Vedanta.

Sureśvara one of S'aṅkaras's followers and believers of his system has not only defended S'aṅkara's theory but tried to expound his fundamental principles. In fact he has given to S'aṅkara's Advait philosophy an original exposition known as Ābhāsavāda. To elucidate and amplify Sureśvara's Ābhāsavāda has been another intellectual attempt of the present work of Dr. Upadhyaya. To dive into the mass of Sureśvara's literature, elucidate it and interpret it has been a difficult task. Dr. Upadyaya has vigourously defended Sureśvara.

To claim any originality of thought in the sense of enunciating a new theory is a tall claim, which no Indian philosopher has ever made. Everything seems to find roots in the literature of the hoary past and the originality everytime has lain in weaving a new web from the old threads enabling in a better and clearer understanding of that, which has seemed uninterpretable hitherto.

The author through his special mode af expression has made a solid contribution, which will carry the knowledge of the students of philosophy of Vedanta far and deep. There will be differences of opinion on the views expressed herein, as is but natural in philosophical matter, but I have no doubt about that the learned work will inspire not only the Darśana-śāstrins of the Sanskrit Department but also scholars of modern philosophy, who are equally keen to make further contribution to the understanding of the vexed problems of Advaita Vedanta.

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PREFACE

India has produced many systems of philosophy and even one system has been interpreted in several ways so as to give rise to numerous schools on the whole. Attempts have been made at presenting the fundamental doctrines of these systems in English by many European and Indian scholars, who with a gift for lucid expression and admirable command over the language have succeeded in popularising the real spirit of the general phases of these philosophical thoughts. The Advaita view, as enunciated by the illustrious founder of the school, namely, Śaṅkara, has been brought out in general and its importance among the various systems of Indian Philosophy also has been envisaged and emphasised. But it remains still an unfulfilled task to set forth the salient features of differences, worked out by the subsequent interpretors and followers of Saṅkara. Without the valuable works of his disciples and followers, who expounded his thought in various ways, the Advaita system would not have occupied the important place, which it does now.

It is a matter of supreme satisfaction that in recent years a large and increasing improvement has been manifest in the general taste of the reading public and interested scholars for the Advaita system of philosophy, which is responsible for new expositive works constantly pouring out in the field. It is universally admitted that the mass of the Advaita literature grew rapidly and enormously in the Post-Saṅkara period as a result of keen competitions going on between different schools of Vedanta and of controversies tenaciously carried on by their staunch adherants by way of charges and counter-charges. It is no doubt a fact that for those, chiefly interested in philosophical thoughts, argumentation or wordy warfare has no great value and what is of supreme importance is the principal tenets of the system. Nevertheless, the work of the post-Saṅkara Period, which are replete with the said kind of literature, cannot be ignored, since in it are embedded the development and the interpretations of the underlying principles of the Advaita system. Sundry minor metaphysical controversies, which once intensely agitated the keenest intellects, may now possess only a historical interest for the superficial readers. But to bring the doctrines, wrapped up in them, into proper light is the need of the day. As the

general tenets of the Advaita system have already been worked out and lucidly presented in English by eminent scholars such as Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Dr. Das Gupta and others. So what we more particularly need at present is an author-wise specialisation in the works of the prominent Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins.

An attempt in this direction, that is, at the presentation of the philosophy of Advaita with special reference to any one or more of the Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins has been already started by Dr. Āśutoṣa Śāstri and Dr. T.M.P. Mahādevan. The above-named writers, however, have made an exposition of the Advaita doctrines as developed and expounded by writers of a much later period among Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. But nothing critically valuable has been done so far about the immediate successors of Śaṅkara, who are traditionally accepted to be his direct disciples and exponents of new schools. There is a yawning gulf between Śaṅkara and his direct disciples, on the one hand, and the great names in the history of Advaita such as Vidyāraṇya[1], Madhusūdana Sarasvati[2], Citsukhācārya[3] and others. So an exposition of the Advaita philosophy as interpreted by Śaṅkara's direct successors remains an unexplored field. Of all his direct disciples, traditionally admitted to be so, Sureśvara figures as the most prominent, as he has left behind a number of works, which, furnishing sufficient data, provide enough scope for reconstructing a complete system of the philosophy in the light of his most substantial and valuable contributions to the Advaita system. No doubt many of the special features of his views have become almost shrouded in the subsequent overwhelming growth of the Advaita literature, still his importance remains unquestionable when one takes into account the great progress effected by him in the Advaita system through his marvellous interpretations and original contributions as the first exponent of the Ābhāsa-theory. Although much of what may be/treated

1. His works are : (1) विवरणप्रमेयसंग्रह, (2) सूतसंहितटीका, (3) पञ्चदशी, (4) अनुभूतिप्रकाश, (5) अपरोक्षानुभूतिटीका (6) जीवनन्मुक्तिविवेक, (7) ऐतरेयोपनिषदीपिका, (8) तैत्तिरीयोपनिषदीपिका, (9) छान्दोग्योपनिषदीपिका, (10) बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्भाष्यवार्त्तिकसार, (11) शंकरदिग्विजय.
2. His works are : (1) सिद्धान्तबिन्दु, (2) संक्षेपशारीरकव्याख्या, (3) अद्वैतसिद्धि, (4) अद्वैतरत्नरक्षण, (5) वेदान्तकल्पलतिका, (6) गूढार्थदीपिका, and (7) प्रस्थानभेद.

his original contributions may strike now as something not unfamiliar and mostly as common views of Advaitins by reason of their being actually incorporated and easily available in later works, yet it is an endeavour worth undertaking to examine critically all the works of Sureśvara side by side with those of other exponents of Śāṅkara monism and delineate the important aspects of the Advaita philosophy as revealed through them by way of interpretation of the Advaita system. This attempt will not only save the trouble of scholars, unavoidably entailed in wading through the said voluminous works in order to deduce and decipher their original cotributions to the Advaita system but will also secure an easy access to the secrets of the system, which have been here and there disclosed by Sureśvara and other Advaitins in the course of their convincing and intelligent interpretation thereof.

Sureśvara occupies a very important place among those followers of Śaṅkara, who successfully tried to defend his system from the attacks of his opponents and expound the fundamental doctrines thereof in a very convincing and marvellous manner. It is, therefore, that he is looked upon with great reverence by all the reputed Advaitins[1] of the Post-Śaṅkara Period such as Vācaspati, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Citsukhācāryā, and others, who themselves are regarded as master minds in

1. (a) सर्वज्ञात्ममुनि—संक्षेपशारीरक—A. IV, 62.
   (b) प्रकाशात्मयति – P. P. V. (views quoted without directly referring to his name .
   (c) आनन्दबोध—N. M.—P. 333 and P. 357.
   (d) विमुक्तात्मा—I. S —P. 255 and PP. 374-75.
   (e) अमलानन्द —Kalpataru—P. 921.
   (f) चित्सुखाचार्य—T. P. Ps. 9, 112, 346, 348, 381 and 383.
   (g) विद्यारण्य—V. P. S.—Ps. 31, 75, 205 and 114 ; Pancādaśī—VIII-12.
   (h) अप्पय्यदीक्षित— S. I .—Ps. 407, 418, 473, 374 and 89 (without mentioning his name) ;
   (i) मधुसूदनसरस्वती—A. S.—Ps. 469, 483, 495, 515, 558, 885 and 696; S. B.—Ps. 220, 222, 255, 340 and 350 etc. ; V. K. L.——Ps. 12, 17, 25, 26, 27, 60 and 84.
   (j) ब्रह्मानन्द—Laghu-Candrikā, Comm. on A. S.—P. 483 ; N. R.—Ps. 221, 223, 259, 272, 273 and 343.
   (k) रामाद्वय—Vedānta-Kaumudī & others.

Śāṅkara Advaita philosophy. The very fact that these writers quote him in their important works clearly establishes the priority of Sureśvarācārya as well as the authoritativeness of his works. Moreover, he is recognised as one of the original writers of Advaita Philosophy in as much as he represents a special school, which is known as 'Ābhāsa-Vāda', in interpreting the essential doctrines of Advaitism. The fact that Sureśvara considered it to be his chief task to interpret, amplify and vindicate the thoughts of his divine master, Śaṅkara, is evident from his own verses[1].

When we recognise Sureśvara and other interpreters of Śaṅkara Advaitisa as original writers in the field of Advaitic Literature, we do not forget that they merely claim to interpret in their own way the thoughts of their predecessors in Advaita philosophy. If one denies originality to them on the score that they are mere interpreters, one will have to deny the same even to Śaṅkara, for he too claims to formulate and represent systematically the Advatic thoughts to be found in the Upaniṣads, the Gīta and the Brahma-sūtras. No Hindu philosopher would venture to commit the sacrilege of presenting some truths as absolutely new and original, since every one necessarily traces his thoughts to the Vedas and claims only to expound the valuable instructions and doctrines contained therein.

Sureśvara is a prodigious writer and is credited with having left behind a large number of works, out of which the following are available at present :—

(1) Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika,

(2) Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika,

(3) Pañcīkaraṇa-vārtika,

(4) Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra-vārtika, called Mānasollāsa

and

(5) Naiṣkarmya-siddhi.

As the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika, the most prominent of all his works, is exceedingly voluminous and almost unmanageable,

---

1. B. B. V.—PP. 2072-73, VV. 23-25 ; Sambandha-Vārtika—P. I. V. 2 ; N. S.—A. I. P. 8, V. 5 ; A. IV. PP. 203—5, VV. 76-77 & V. 74.

I had to devote several years to the proper study and assimilation of the work. The main consideration, constantly looming large before my eyes in this endeavour of mine has been to elucidate and amplify the Ābhāsa-vāda, which is regarded as the original contribution of Sureśvarācārya and has not been analysed and explicated as yet, simultaneously with the other two equally important schools of interpretation, namely, Pratibimba-vāda and Avaccheda-vāda so that a detailed and comparative study of all the important doctrines, involved in Śāṅkara Advaitism, may be possible through the perusal of this one text. To these have been added the views of later Advaitins also on the various topics with the result that the text on the whole presents a very lucid and comprehensive account of all the salient features and aspects of Śāṅkara Advaitism so far as its doctrinal side is concerned. Thus the present work seeks to fulfil a great desideratum felt in the field of Śāṅkara Advaita system of philosophy.

I also propose to make an apology here that in weaving together the subtle threads of different views, scattered here and there in the works concerned, I had sometimes to develop them in such a manner as might lead one to mis-understand what is mere exposition to be pure supplementation. But it may be assured with the fullest conviction that nothing more than what was actually and exactly gleaned from the thorough perusal of the entire works of the great names in the history of Sāṅkara philosophy has been put together as their original contributions throughout this work. The above-noted fact has also stood in the way of its proper documentation, for citations either prove too copious to be incorporated in the foot-notes or do not exactly bring out the intended conclusion if wrested away from the whole work and studied separately as isolated and independent extracts. This much it may be emphatically averred that this work is the net result of repeated studies and thorough assimilation of all the important works of Śāṅkara Advaita Philosophy, analysed closely and examined critically.

I may be pardoned also for making repetitions of certain central doctrines, which I have deliberately done for two special reasons. In the first place, in doing so I have followed the Upaniṣadic method of treatment, in which, according to the six-fold rules of exposition and interpretation, laid down by the Mīmānsakas (षड्विधतात्पर्यनिर्णायकलिङ्ग) अभ्यास, that is, iteration is considered to be a very important factor in as much

as it draws the attention of the reader to what are intended to be discussed as the main doctrines or tenets in the treatise. Secondly, it serves the purpose of relating the central doctrines or views to each of the topics of discussion in its different relevant aspects.

I crave pardon also for purposely avoiding the treatment of historical problems such as Maṇḍana—Sureśvara equation and Viśvarūpa—Sureśvara equation etc., as they fall outside the desired scope of the present text, which is intended to present a detailed treatment of only the doctrinal side of the Śāṅkara Advaitism as expounded by Sureśvara and others. This much, however, may be unhesitatingly stated that a perusal of the entire works of Sureśvara leaves no room for any doubt about the view that Maṇḍana and Sureśvara were two distinct and prominent personalities in the field of the Advaita literature, the former being a predecessor to Śaṅkara and differing from him in views on many topics of the Advaita Vedanta and the latter being his contemporary and disciple and a staunch follower and supporter of his views.

Lastly, I regret that ample misprints have unavoidably crept into the text. For these I crave the indulgence of the reader.

———————

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		Pramāṇa-mālā.
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4.	Anandānubhava :	Padartha-tattva-nirṇaya (unpublished).
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24.	Śaṅkara :	Upadeśa-sāhasrī;

		Viveka-cūdāmaṇi.
		Memorial edition of his works (Śrīraṅgam).
		His minor works (Poona).
25.	Sadā-nanda :	Vedānta-sāra.
		Advaita-brahma-siddhi.
26.	Sadā-nanda :	Svarūpa-prakāśa (unpublished).
		Svarūpa-nirṇaya (unpublished).
27.	Sarvajñātman :	Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka.
28.	Sri-harṣa :	Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya (with commentaries : by Śaṅkara Miśra, Vidyāsāgara and Citsukha, unpublished).
29.	Sāyaṇa-mādhava :	Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha (with commentary by V. Sastri Abhayankar).
30.	Suresvarācārya :	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika.
		Taittiriyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika.
		Pañcī-karaṇa-bhāsya-vārtika.
		Dakṣinā-mūrti-stotra-vārtika, also called Mānasollāsa.
		Naiṣkarmya-siddhi.
31.	Troṭakācārya :	Troṭaka-stotram.
32.	Vimuktātman :	Iṣṭa-siddhi.
33.	S. Rādhā-kriṣṇan :	History of Indian philosophy and his other works.
34.	Surendranāth Das Gupta :	History of Indian philosophy. (5 volms).
35.	Hiriyanna M. :	Outlines of Indian Philosophy.
36.		The Essentials of Indian Philosophy.
37.	Chatterjee S.C. & Dutta D.M. :	An introduction to Indian Philosophy.
38.	Dutta D.M. :	Six ways of knowing.
39.	Bhattacarya K.C.	Studies in Vedāntism.
40.	Kokileśvar Sāstri :	An Introduction to Advaita philosophy.
41.	Sircār Mahendra Nāth :	Hindu Mysticism.
		The System of Vedāntic Thought.
		Comparative Studies in Vedānta.
42.	Vidhuśekhar Sāstri :	The Āgama-śāstra of Gaudapāda.
43.	Āśutoṣa Sāstri :	Post-śaṅkar Dialectics.
44.	T.M.P. Mahādevan:	The philosophy of Advaita (with special reference to Vidyāraṇya).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1.	A.B.S.	...	Advaita-Brahma-Siddhi (Calcutta pub.)
2.	A.S.	...	Advaita-Siddhi (Bombay pub.)
3.	B.S.	...	Brahma-Siddhi (Madras pub.)
4.	B.B.V.	...	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika (Poona pub.)
5.	C.S.	...	Citsukhī (Bombay pub.)
	or T.P.	...	Tattva-Pradīpikā (Bombay pub. 1931)
6.	M.V.	...	Manasollāsa-vārtika (Bombay pub.)
7.	P.P.	...	Pañca-pādikā (Banaras pub.)
8.	P.B.V.	...	Pañcīkaraṇa-bhāṣya-vārtika (Banaras pub.)
9.	P.P.V.	...	Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa (Banaras pub.)
10.	S.B.	...	Siddhānta-bindu (Banaras & Poona pubs.)
11.	S.L.	...	Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha (Banaras pub.)
12.	T.B.V.	...	Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika (Poona pub.)
13.	V.K.L.	...	Vedānta-kalpa-latikā (Banaras pub.)
14.	V.P.	...	Vedānta-paribhāṣā (Bombay & Calcutta pubs.)
15.	V.P.S.	...	Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha (Banaras & Andhra pubs.)
16.	I.S.	...	Iṣṭa-siddhi (Baroda pub.)
17.	N.S.	...	Naiṣkarmya-siddhi (Poona pub.)
18.	N.R.	...	Nyāya-ratnāvalī, Commentary on Siddhānta-bindu by Brahmānand, (Banaras pub.)
19.	N.M.	...	Nyāya-makaranda (Banaras pub.)

VIEWS

1. R. D. Ranade, Late Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad University :

   A contribution to the development of post-Śaṅkarite Advaitism and to the theory of Ābhāsa as Sureśvara's distinctive contribution to the development of Advaitic thought.

2. Prof. Satkari Mookerjee, Ex-Head of the Dept. of Samskrit, University of Calcutta, and Director of Pali Research Institute, Nalanda :

   I think that the work, when published, will be regarded as a distinctive addition to the modern literature on Vedānts.

3. Pt. Gopinath Kaviraj, M.M., Banaras :

   From my personal association with Pandit Veermani, both as a Pandit of the old school with a zeal for intensive scholarship and as an orientalist of the modern type with a critical and analytical turn of mind, I have formed a high estimate of his abilities and attainments.

   Credit is undoubtedly due to the writer for having faithfully expounded Sureśvara's peculiar views, especially those on the Unity of Being and on Abhāsa.

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

Necessity for discussion of the Problem of Reality:

What is found in general of the various schools of Indian Philosophy is that they all set out with the avowed purpose of discovering an avenue of escape once for all from the morbid state of mundane existence—the perpetual scene of appalling miseries with only a sprinkling of the so-called passing pleasures here and there. Happiness is an occasional episode in the general drama of miseries and that too never a pure pleasure but always a mixture of misery. It is a fact undeniable that human beings in the world are helplessly caught up in the vortex of unending deeds and their inexhaustible consequences and are inextricably involved in the cycles of alternatively recurrent births and deaths. Human life, with its innumerable and invidious gradations in all its aspects, fierce and uncontrollable forces and conditions, adverse and unpleasant situations and circumstances, an unceasing dissatisfaction with present possessions and ever-increasing cravings for fresh attainments, presents a sickening spectacle to any serious thinker. A very vivid picture of the miserable human life from its embryonic stage to that of its last moment has been drawn by Sureśvarācārya in his work, namely, Taittirīyopaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Vārtika.[1]

An absolute end of all miseries and other accompanying evils of human life is the deepest yearning of the suffering humanity. To satisfy this crying hunger of humanity, the different systems of Indian Philosophy arose, which are essentially so many beacon-lights, showing converging path-ways to one and the same goal, namely, Mokṣa (i. e., perpetnal liberation from our emperical existence and evils of life) and designed to suit different levels of understanding and tempera-

1. T. B. V. Brahmavalli, Khaṇda I. pp. 85-90, vv. 88—121.

mental strata and varying tendencies of human minds. They are, therefore, not to be looked upon as isolated and conflicting systems, but are to be regarded as gradual stages in the evolution of philosophical thought, comprising various solutions of the said common problem and intended to suit the different susceptibilities of individual intellects, the innumerable trends of human minds and the successive stages of spiritual advancement.

Not only the problem but also its solutions, explored and elucidated by most of the various systems, are common. The solution is that an absolute cessation of all kinds of miseries and sufferings, inseparably interwoven with empirical life and its so-called pleasures here as well as hereafter, can be brought about only by "Tattvajñāna"[1]—a true knowledge of Reality. The conception of this Tattva (i.e., Reality) is not exactly the same, but it differs in accordance with the fundamental doctrines of each of the various systems. It is, therefore, unequivocally urged by almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy that only a supreme realisation of the ultimate Reality or Realities can put an end to the otherwise unending human miseries and redeem the bound individual soul permanently from the sordid shackles of recurring births and deaths. In consonance with the said common aim and solution of Indian philosophical systems, philosophy has to be defined mainly as an exposition of the essential nature of Reality. So the fundamental problem, which lies at the root of all philosophical questions, is the determination of the true nature of Reality or Realities, the realisation of which results in emancipation. In view of its paramount importance, a survey of the problem of Reality and the solutions, offered by the important branches of Indian Philosophy, is proposed to be discussed at the very outset. The solution, offered by the three schools of Śāṅkara Advaitism also in this context,

1. B. B. V., A. I, B. IV. p. 513, V. 405; Anandagiri's commentary thereon; B. B. V., A. I., B. IV, P. 695, V. 1055; P. 439, V. 57; p. 441, V. 68; A. IV, B. II, p. 1359 V. 35; B. B. V., A. II, B. I, p. 887, V. 4.

will be brought out in due course, which will serve as a nucleus for a clear understanding of other related philosophical doctrines also.

Commonsense and Realistic View of Reality :

Ordinarily and even, according to some Realistic schools[1] of Indian Philosophy, it is understood that all things, which are cognisable in some way or other or can serve any purpose in the realm of empirical things with all their pragmatic values, are real, and it does not matter whether they exist temporarily or permanently or come earlier or later in the empirical order of things (Prakāśamānatvam Arthakriyākāritvam Vā Sattvam). This view of reality makes its sphere entirely co-eval with that of knowability, as it assures that all that are knowable in any way are not only existent but real also. According to it, the flickering flame of a candle is as real as the inextinguishable light of the Eye of the Sphere, i. e. the Sun. But such an assumption of the nature of reality obviously suffers from a defect of obliterating the distinction between reals and illusions recognised as such in the empirical sphere ; since both the illusion and what is ordinarily accepted to be as real in the empirical plane are equally cognisable during their manifestations as contents of some empirical knowledge or other. But no sensible and serious thinker will be prepared to accept the parity, arising from the above conception of Reality, of empirical truths and illusory appearances such as rope-serpent and nacre-silver etc., though both of them are assuredly on an equal footing as knowables. To solve this difficulty, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems[2] resort to the two-fold classification of cognitions as valid and invalid ones and set up 'being the content of a valid knowledge' as the criterion of reality.

According to Praśastavāda,[3] the author of the Vaiśesika-

1. Bhāmati (Nirṇaya Sāgara edition) pp. 21-25.
2. Nyāyadarśana (Cal. 3ed. Edition)—A. 2, Ā. 2, S. 18, p. 122 ; Nyāya-Vārtika (Banaras Chaukhambha Edition) A. I, A. I, S. 1, p. 9.
3. P. P. B., P. 16.

Bhāsya, all reals are characterised by 'is-ness', knowableness and namability. Whatever is real has its own is-ness (Astitva or Swarūpa-sattā) and is knowable and namable also. It is neither something, which can never be an object of knowledge and has no existence of its own, nor a mere name or linguistic fiction, which has no corresponding reality expressed thereby.

Śridharā[1] explains this is-ness as an existence, which singles out and signifies every object with its specifying identity and distinctive individuality, and without which it would be neither what it is nor different from what it is not. This is-ness, which implies that every real thing must possess a distinctive self-identity, is nothing but the very nature of every reality. What may be ascertained to be the nature of a thing exactly constitutes its is-ness, which is unique, individual and inseparably essential. This concept of is-ness seeks to emphasize that the real has an intrinsic character and a distinctive self-individuality.

This existenee, which is revealed through the concept of Sattā, i.e., is-ness and which belongs to all categories without exception as their very essential individual nature, is to be distinguished from Sattā, the widest generality known as "Para Sāmānya', i. e., a 'synthetic and nnitary principle' belonging to the first three categories, namely, substances, qualities and actions only.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems, a generality has been admitted as a separate category for explaining the uniformity of experiences (Anugatākāra-Pratiti) with regard to a set of objects, which, inspite of their individual differences, are called by one class-name. Every generality serves the purpose of bringing together and connecting a number of individual objects under one class-concept and is inherent in all of them as a common characteristic. Accordingly, existence as the widest generality is the most comprehensive principle, unifying and bringing together all substances, qualities and actions under

1. N. K., p. 16.

one class-concept as existents and pointing out their community of nature and alike participation in this common characteristic, inspite of their individual differences and distinctions. But existence as the narrowest is-ness is the most limited particularistic principle, determining and specifying every real object with its striking self-identity or particular self-individuality and establishing its unique nature and character so far as its own existence is concerned. Thus this existence as is-ness is a criterion and conclusive proof of reality inasmuch as the real must be a 'definitely determined fact', an object of knowledge and a denotable entity, distinctly the same all the time.

Again, existence as the widest generality is attributable to three categories only and not to the remaining four, although the latter also are felt and judged by all as existing in some way or other and consequently classified categorically. This bifurcation on the basis of existence as generality and existence as individual nature can be explained by a clear-cut distinction between the two. The distinction lies in the fact that existence as generality is related to the three categories through 'inherence', an eternal relation, technically known as "Samavāya"; whereas existence as is-ness is connected with all the possible categories not through any such relation but by dint of being a distinctive nature of every real object belonging to any category whatsoever.

In the Nyāya-Bhāṣya,[1] existence as is-ness has been analysed to be the accompanying factor of and ascertainable by cognition (Upalabdhi). This is picked up in the Nyāyā-Vārtika[2] as chiefly responsible for every object being known in a particular way exactly as it exists. Raghunāth Śiromaṇi[3] in his commentary on the work, written by Pakṣadhar Miśra on Akhyāti-vāda, defines this 'is-ness' as a 'relation to a particular period of time'; whatever is known to be related to a particular time is ipso fasto not only existing but real also.

1. N. D., A. 2, Ap. 2, S 18, p. 122 and S. 22, p. 124.
2. N. V., A. I, Ap. 1, S. 1, p. 11.
3. Âloka-ṬĪkā, P. 878 and p, 879.

The question naturally arises here as to how the categories, other than those, which are not related to existence as generality, are experienced as existent. Śridhara, the author of Nyāya-Kāndalī, has given an explanation, which may be too technical to be intelligible to an ordinary reader. He says that categories such as generality, particularity and inherence (Sāmānya, Viśeṣa and Samavāya) do not stand in need of being in direct relation to existence as generality on account of not forming some class or other, but they have an existential character, which is their own, spontaneous and independent. Existence in their case is a peculiar particularistic phase (Svātma-sattva), which is different from existence as generality, indicative of the one common class-concept and inherent in substances, qualities and actions only. The notion of the same existential character as is associated with existence as generality about them is only an imposed one so far as other categories are concerned. This imposition is inspired by a subjective necessity to bring together all such realities under one head as are not negative in character. So finding the above explanation not very satisfactory, the later writers on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems made an attempt at explaining this existential character in categories, which do not directly participate in existence as generality, by describing them as co-existent with the generality in a common substratum (Sāmānādhikaraṇya). In other words, the first three categories (i.e. substances, qualities and actions) possess existence as generality as inherent in them or directly related to them through inherence and the remaining categories with the exception of Abhāva are connected with it through the indirect link of co-existence (Ekārtha-vṛttitva)[1], that is, as being coexistent in some common substratum possessing existence as generality. Thus even those realities, which do not contain existence as generality inherently in themselves, are sought to be linked up therewith indirectly in the aforesaid manner. In fact, this bifurcation carries with it the significance of dividing categories

[1] Kiraṇāvalī—Bhāskara, p. 44.

and placing them on two different footings. The first three categories are capable of exhibiting some general common characteristics or other, uniting them as members of some particular class or other; whereas the next three categories are peculiarly particularistic, admitting of no such binding and unifying general common characteristics.

Besides existence as is-ness, discussed above in full details, the fact of being the content of any kind of valid knowledge is another criterion of reality. It is perfectly gratuitous to assume the existence and reality of a thing, of which no body has had or can have any knowledge. For if it did exist, it could have been known by some body, at least by the Omniscient Being To affirm existence is to affirm knowledge. There can be no possible ground for positing the existence of a thing and at the same time denying its knowledge; because assertion of its existence is inconceivable except through knowledge. In this system everything, that we truly know, does really exist and whatever may be the kind or contents of a particular valid knowledge, its object is necessarily real.

Knowledge may be valid or invalid, and, accordingly, its object is to be determined and evaluated as true or false respectively. But this point has to be kept in view that in the latter case not only reality but existence too on the given particular spot and at that particular time is denied of the object. Consequently, this classification of cognitions as valid or invalid ones and the corresponding determination of their objects as real or unreal respectively does not militate against existence and reality being universally and invariably coincident. It also accounts for the distinction between reality and appearance in as much as the former is real just where and when it is known; whereas the latter is real not where and when it is known but somewhere else and with reference to some other time.

These realistic schools, in firm loyalty to different sources of valid empirical experiences, refuse to accept one eternal

Existence as the only underlying and absolute Reality, in which all differences are beginninglessly rooted as Its diverse appearences, by which they are sustained so long as they appear and in which they are finally absorbed as nothing else besides this one Reality, but acknowledge all existing and knowable entities as independently and separately real. A valid knowledge and existence as is-ness are sufficient criteria of reality and transitoriness or permanency of a thing with regard to its existence is immaterial, since origin and destruction of a thing are not incompatible with its interim reality. Existents may be eternally real or temporarily so in consonance with the durations of their existence, but real they are in both the cases. Every product, whether lasting very long or flourishing only shortly is bound by two kinds of non-existence, antecedent and subsequent ones (Prāgabhāva and Dhvansābhāva). Nevertheless, it has a reality between the two so long as it exists. These systems recognise plurality of realities on the basis of particularistic self-individualities. Every object of knowledge has an existence as is-ness and a reality of its own. There is no such thing as one Absolute Reality running through all empirical entities, which are only so many pseudo-realities or appearances arising on the basis of the former through Avidyā. But everything validly knowable is surely existent and decidedly real.

The Buddhistic view of Reality :—

The realistic schools of the Budhistic system steer in the middle of the two extreme views[1] of destructibity (Ucchedavada) and eternalism (Śāśvatavāda), the former holding that nothing exists permanently and that an object is absolutely non-existent before its origin and is capable of complete annihilation on its destruction; while the latter maintaining that there can be no absolute annihilation of whatever comes into manifestation and that whatever exists exists for ever, that is, even prior to its so-called origin. The Buddhistic schools, namely, the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas discard the said views as

1. Dighghanikāya-Brahmajāla Sutta, P. T. S., p. 14 and p. 34.

impossible extremities by urging that the fallacy lies in taking a thing as a 'being', which in reality is only a 'becoming' in an uninterrupted series i. e., uninterrupted 'flux' or 'flow'.

Existence, according to these schools, has been often compared to the light of a lamp or the stream of a river, which appears to be steady, but is really flowing and fluctuating in nature.[1] There is nothing, which can be said to be existing continuously and constanly, but whatever exists exists in 'flux' or flow only with its every successive moment or point (kṣṇa)—unique and self-defined—coming immediately and uninterruptedly upon the heels of its preceding one so as to allow neither any continuity of one and the same entity nor any gap or interval between any two succeeding moments or points. This is a very peculier conception of existence unparalleled in any other system of philosophy. The notion of constancy or continuation is due to uninterruptedness of succession of what is ordinarily deemed as existing constantly in undisturbed series. There is an unimpeded and uniterrupted succession in the form of series only but no continuation of one and the same thing. This is exactly what is to be understood by the momentary nature of all kinds of existence, according to the Buddhistic systems. If it is such, there can be no pure production or destruction from the true metaphysical point of view but only an uninterrupted succession, that is every moment, combining in itself both the rise and the end of an entity in itself, interruptedly succeded by the same kind of combinations in the next moments as well and this is technically known as "Paticca-Samutpāda". The so-called production and destruction after a constant endurance for some time, shorter or longer, are mental constructions and are designed to suit and satisfy our ways of thinking and fulfil the practical purposes of life. If a thing emerges at one moment or instance, it is no more at the next. In the matter of reality there is nothing like constancy or pure

1. Abhidhammotha Saṇgha, p. 33 and its commentary Navanīta, p. 122; Mahāvagga, Chap. 1.

existence even for a moment, but it is only a continuation as a series for any length of time, as the case may be, which gives rise in our mind to the illusion of sameness and constancy. So as a matter of fect there is nothing constant and continuous in the process from the 'clay' to the 'pot' or vice versa and it is equally wrong to say that the 'pot' was potentially contained in the 'clay' or that the former originated de novo and is quite different from the latter. Another characteristic of existence is that it is "Anātma" in as much there is no ultimate substratum underlying or running through the flux from the 'clay' to the 'pot' or vice versa, which may be described to be the soul, the eternal existence or the absolute reality, and accordingly, it is the 'flux' or flow only, which exists in its uniterrupted series and this is what is to be understood by reality.

Thus reality, as maintained by these schools, is neither eternal nor capable of being annihilated, but it is essntially a 'flux'—dynamic through and through. It is examined in two ways: (1) as it is in-it-self, that is, from the view-point of reality absolutely as such (Pāramārthika-sattva) and (2) as seeming existence or appearance, that is, from the view-point of reality as gradually phenomenalised in the process of manifestation or knowledge (Sāmvṛtika-sattva). The first one is the said unique moment, shorn of all its mnemonic elements, which directly present itself to pure sensations only and is free from any of our mental suppositions or superimpositions (Apūrva and Kalpanāpoḍha) and the second one is the object as defined and particularised ordinarily as worldly experiences such as a tree or a table etc. This is the doctrine,[1] upheld by the Sarvāstivādins or the realistic schools of Buddhism, including both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrantikas. The difference about the conception of reality as upheld by the two schools, however, is that, according to the former, a real is perceptible, while accordidg to the latter, it is never so but, inferrable only as a whole, as nothing can be perceived wholly.

1. "Buddista Logic" by Th. Stcherbetsky, p. 181.

(*b*) *Yogācāra-view of Reality*:

The conception of the nature of existence, according to the Yogācāra School or Vijñānavāda, is a development upon the former views. It denies an independent and external or objective existence of all knowables. The appearance of an object as existing externally, that is, independently of and apart from the comprehending mind is only an illusion. Thus what really exists is the idea (Vijñāna) only in its uninterrupted flow or flux, as described above. Not only the object but also the comprehending mind is a stream[1] of momentary self-revealed ideas or conscious states, flowing in an uninterrupted succession. The momentary acts of consciousness flowing in succession are known as Pravṛtti-Vijñāna. But what is revealed to us as the conscious subject or "I" is only a co-ordination of the above acts in the form of a synthetic unity appearing as Self, which is technically known as Alaya-Vijñāna. The appearance of different manifold objects as contents of our empirical experience is due to residuary impressions of past experiences, which lie embedded in the said Âlaya-Vijñāna and is responsible for projecting various forms out of it. The self-revealed stream of ideas or conscious states is really and essentially altogether free from objective forms; but in consequence of the said impressions, stored up in and clinging fast to the Âlaya-Vijñāna or mind, it flows out in innumerable varieties as so many forms, which in popular parlance are described as objects. These are regarded as the inherent impurities or imperfections of the Pravṛtti-Vijñāna. When the self-revealed flow or stream of ideas (Pravṛtti-Vijñāna) is purged of these impurities, that is, objective forms, it shines in its own pure radiance or refulgence and this is the true form of Reality, recognised by this school, which reveals itself in the state of Nirvāna, as conceived by them.

The Vijñānavadins admit three kinds of existence or forms of reality: "Parikalpita", "Paratantra" and "Parinis-

1. Tattvasaṅgraha (G. O. S.) Prastāvanā, p. 29.

panna" or "Pāramārthika" In our ordinary experience, a thing cannot be conceived to exist unless possessed of some characteristics, attributes or qualifications; but these characteristics, attributes, qualifications and specific signs or fixed forms attributable to them are only mental constructions. So objects thus characterised and qualified in various ways are "Parikalpita" in as much as they have nothing corresponding to them in reality so far as their characteristics and attributes etc. are concerned.

Again, the whole phenomenal world, according to popular parlance, is "Paratantra" as considered in the light of its origin and existence etc. External objects have only imaginary existence; because they are accepted as arising from their respective causes and conditions and, therefore, dependent for their origin on others. But a real thing is neither brought about nor depends on any cause and condition whatsoever. Asaṁga analyses the nature of "Paratantra" phenomena in a different way. According to him, it is so due to imaginary subject-object division. As pointed out above, the Âlaya-Vijñāna, though assentially pure in nature, becomes polluted or defiled by impressions and thus dichotomizes itself into two kinds as 'I' and 'this' as subject and object respectively. But this division is only a figment or the imaginary creation of the so-called mind (Swacitta-Parikalpanā), which has been accustomed to think in terms of the tripartite devision and thereby create imaginary appearances (that is, external[1] objects) from beginningless times.

The reality, technically called Parinispanna, however, is above these two and is pure, changeless and self-evident. It is the above-mentioned pure stream of ideas, flowing in interrupted succession and manifesting itself only at the stage of Nirvāṇa.

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1. Vide—Mādhyamika-vṛtti (B. T. S.) pp. 93-100; pp. 137-138; Prajñā Pārmitā, Parivarta 18, pp. 341-351; Aṣṭa Sāhasrikā, Bodhicaryāvatāra Ix 155, p. 359, pp, 503,-505, Mādhyamika Vrtti, pp, 259, 279.

(c) The Mādhyamika view of Reality :

The Mādhyamika school[1] of Buddhism or Śūnyavāda, which is regarded as the logical culmination of the Vijñānavāda epistemology, advances still further and negates the existence and reality of even 'ideas'. Its exponents argue that if ideas, i.e., 'Vijñānas' only are real, and all external objects as such are unreal, ideas alone, that is, bereft of their corresponding objects, would also prove unreal and impossible ; because being relative in nature, they necessarily pre-suppose and imply objects for their reference and support. This school agrees with the Yogācāra in holding that the world, as accepted originally, is constituted by relations and is dependent on causes and conditions and as such it cannot but be concluded unequivocally to be unreal. For instance, heat and light cannot be said to be the essence of fire, for both the heat and light and fire are the result of a combination of many conditions and what depends on conditions can never be the true nature or essence of anything. That alone is ascertainable as the true nature or essence of anything, which in no case depends on another for its origin and existence, and since no such essence or nature can be established as originates and stands independently or by itself, nothing existing as possessed of some nature or other can be determined to be real at all.

A general misunderstanding prevails about this school, on account of which the Mādhyamika view used to be represented as identical with 'nihilism' and now-a-days also as the 'doctrine of relativity'. This school no doubt repeatedly and variously aims at proving that the agent (i.e. the knower), the object (i.e. the known) and knowledge being mutually inter-dependent, if one of the three is proved to be false, the others also must be so (just as if any of the three—the mover, the moveable and the movement is proved false, the remaining

1. Mādhyamika vṛtti (B. T. S.) pp. 93-100 ; pp. 137-38 pp. 259-79 ; prajñā-Parmita ; Pārivartā 18, pp. 341-51 ; Aṣṭa-Sāhasrikā ; Bodhicaryāvatāra, pp. 503-505 ;

also are automatically proved so). On the basis of such arguments one may be naturally led to think that, according to this school, nothing is real, but this will be only an indiscriminate conclusion. After a careful and close study of the original works of this school, the true philosophy of this system can be estimated to be that in the way of general acceptance whatever is known as existing or as non-existing or both (that is, existent-non-existent) or non-both, that is, neither existent nor non-existent, is not real. What is real (in the absolute sense) is undeterminable in thought and language and transcends all the four possible alternative modes of thought and expression, accepted in popular parlance. What this school aims at establishing is that nothing posited in any of the aforesaid four ways or alternatives of expression or description, which necessarily involves the conditionality and relative character of things and their nature, can be held to be real, but the real is indeterminable and unascertainable in any way; because determination always connotes the idea of dependence and thereby of unreality. The difference between this indeterminable and devoid, i.e. Śūnya of the Mādhyamikas, and the transcendent and aspectless Plenum, i.e. the Brahman of the Advaitins, as Reality is that the latter is essentially realisable as Sat, Cid and Ananda and this comprehension is of the nature of intentive realisation in its highest peak, which too automatically passes away as the last streak of appearance, leaving Brahman as the only Reality or Residue.

The Sāṅkhya View of Reality:

The Sāṅkhya system recognises two kinds of ultimate Realities, namely, Puruṣa and Prakṛti. A very important point of distinction between these two ever-existing and always real entities can be shown to be that Puruṣa is a transcendent and immutable Reality, while Prakṛti is an immanent and ever-changing Reality. Puruṣa by nature is unsusceptible of any change, but Prakṛti is always modifying itself either homogeneously (Swarūpa-pariṇāma) or heterogeneously (Virūpa-pariṇāma).

Thus Prakṛti exists in two ways: as subject to successive changes either (1) into dissimilar and heterogeneous forms during the creative order, or (2) those into similar and homogeneous ones as each of its three constituent qualities, being in a state of equipoise or equilibrium, but, nevertheless, is modifying and reproducing itself incessantly into series of its own distinct forms, i.e., Sattva changing into series of Sattva, Rajas changing into series of Rajas, and Tamas changing into series of Tamas—a state, which is just another name of Prakṛti. Thus the transcendentally real Puruṣa is immutably ever-existent or eternal (Kūtasthanitya); whereas the ever-modifyingly real Prakṛti is ever-existent or eternal as series of successive modifications—homogeneous or heterogeneous (Pravāhānitya). This mutation of Prakṛti is conceived by the modern school of the Sāṅkhya system as the inherent nature of Prakṛti itself but was considered as due to Time (महाकाल) by the old school of the system, which recognised three ultimate entities—Puruṣa, Prakṛti and Kāla and defined mutation as a fact in time (Kāla-Samvandharūpa). According to the system, the fundamental essence as well as its modification or the cause as well as its effect are equally real.

The Sāṅkhya system recognises a complete identity between reality and existence by reducing what is known in other systems of philosophy as 'non-existence' to mere 'non-manifestation' and altogether dispensing with 'destruction' as accepted by those schools. It affirms that whatever exists (whether as the cause or as the effect) exists for ever (that is, either manifestly or potentially). According to this system, there is no production of anything de novo and the so-called production of a thing is merely manifestation in an explicit form, which was previously in an unmanifest condition, but, nevertheless, existing implicitly and potentially and real as its cause even then. Similarly, there is no destruction of a thing at any time, as it survives even after its non-manifestation or disappearance implicitly and potentially in its causal form. The two kinds of non-existence, antecedent and subsequent respectively, to the so-called origin and destruction of things

(प्रागभाव and ध्वंसाभाव), by which the 'reality' of all products is held to be hedged and hemmed in by the Naiyayikas and the existence thereof locked up and tightened restrictedly between them are not admitted by this school at all. Here they are substituted by two kinds of existence : actuality and potentiality, that is, explicit, manifest and gross form, or implicit, unmanifest and subtle form of being. The idea contained in this theory has been expressed almost exactly in the same language by modern philosophers as well. "Development is coming to light of what is latent and hidden" or, as Aristotle would say, 'it is the transition from potential to actual being' or in Hegel's words 'it is the passage from the implicit to the explicit.'

This conception of existence and reality constitutes the cardinal point of distinction between the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya systems ; because, according to the former, an object may be existent temporarily or permanently but real in both the cases so long as it may endure and unreal before its origin and after its destruction, if it is not eternal ; whereas, according to the Saṅkhya system, all entities are eternally existent (whether immutable or mutable) and always real. This system differs from the schools of Buddhism in as much as it does not accept the momentary existence (objective or subjective, or extra-mental or mental) in the form of uninterrupted flux or flow as reality but holds that whatever is real is constant, unitary and lasting for ever. Thus eternality being the essential nature of every form of existence in this system, everything, which exists in all certainty, is not only ever-existent but always real also. This conception of reality is evidently established by the theory of Satkārya-Vāta, advocated by this system.

The Advaita-view of Reality—

The Advaita-system is not satisfied with any of these conceptions and criteria of reality, which are founded merely on face-value of things and their relative perspectives and pragmatic truths and concludes the universe to be 'Anirvacanīya' just like any other recognised illusion. It seeks to establish that Reality is not eternal only but absolute, unalterable and immutable also. Changes of any kind and modifications of

any nature whatsoever must be regarded as (false) limitations, (essentially identical) reflections or (seeming) appearances but not Reality Itself. Thus it recognises only one Eternal Existence or Absolute Reality[1] and all others than It unexceptionally non-real.

The world not a reality but as appearance, proved on the analogy of Illusion :—

The unreality of the world, which the Advaita system follows as an inevitable conclusion from a comparison of the so-called real empirical objects with illusions[2], recognised as such even in the realm of relativity. A careful and thorough analysis would at once reveal that what is true of illusions is exactly true of the so-called real empirical entities also. There are two vital points about the nature and causality of illusions, which it is necessary to bring out and emphasise to substantiate the remark.

In all cases of illusions such as nacre-silver, and garland-snake etc. an outstanding common feature, noticeable generally, is that one and the same empirical object seems to assume several appearances[3], through Avidya about it, as various illusory objects without undergoing in itself any real change whatsoever. The same law of causation, viz., outcome of numerous appearances simultaneously or successively from one and the same Reality, through Avidya in and about It, applies wholly to the empirical creation also. Another remarkable and distinctive feature of illusions, observable in every case thereof, is that the cause, which is necessarily the basic reality and

1. B. B. V. p. 1616, V. 1328, P. 1615, V. 1326, p. 1616, V. 1327 ; p. 1596 V. 1105.
2. B. B. V, A. II, B. V, P. 1132, V. 130, A. I, B. 4, P. 578, V. 693, A. 2, B. 4, P. 1072, V. 236, A. I, B. IV, p. 661, V. 1140, A. II, B. III, p. 1033, V. 248, A. II, B. I, P. 916, V. 174, A. II, B. IV, p. 1071, V. 229, A. I, B. IV, P. 661, V. 1138 and V. 1140.
3. B. B. V., A. II, B. IV., p. 1048, V. 88, A. III, B. V., p. 1251, V, 78, A. I, B. IV, p. 478, V. 252.

relatively more real, is the source, the seeming sustenance and ultimate ground of absorption of its effect, the appearance, and that the effect is an appearance over it, differentiated and specialised in mere name and form, and having no separate existence or reality of its own but simply emerging from, apparent over, and lastly immersing in the cause, as if it never existed. The cause,-substratum or basic reality-maintains its unaffected presence and uninterrupted continuity throughout, that is, both prior and subsequent to the appearance as well as during the projection or apparent accretion and superimposition of the latter due to Avidya, which itself is nothing but an Avidyaka appearance and appearance only.[1] Thus every illusion is a sheer suppression and substitution, that is, a seeming outward expression of the cause projected over the latter by, out of and due to Avidya. But the cause does not suffer on account of this accretion or appearance as an effect in any way. Correspondingly, the cause of an illusion is the basic substance or substratum thereof as the underlying and sustaining reality, preceding, concurring with and surviving it and existing all the time unaffectedly. The same remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to all empirical entities also, which seem to come into and pass out of existence sooner or later.

The world, inspite of its amazing varieties and appalling diversities, is capable of philosophical analysis, leading to the formulation of certain uniform principles of a universal nature. These principles or generalisations about the nature of the universe as a whole are found to be identical with those about illusions.

To illustrate, all objects from the biggest mountain to the tiniest insect can be reduced by the application of proper modern scientific methods to ultra-microscopic particles composing the earth, but the particles of earth endure all earthly products as their underlying substrata. Similarly, various ornaments made of gold and silver etc., when melted and reduced to their intrinsic metal, lose their apparent shapes, but the metal remains

1. B. B. V., A. I, B. IV., P. 490, V. 303 ; A. IV., B. IV., P. 1769, VV. 289-90.

unchanged throughout and emerges through the said process as the enduring principle or basic element of the said varieties of products, having different names and forms. Again, the earth and metal also in their turn, when disintegrated, revert by way of involution to the original forms of their respective causes or basic substances and the latter too, when further resolved, make room for their own deeper causes to come out as the surviving reminiscences and so on.

Thus all things, when destroyed, revert to their own basic substances,[1] that is, their respective causes, after having existed for some time as diverse appearances thereof and concealing or enshrounding them for a shorter or longer period of time but not for ever. In the last analysis, however, the ultimate Basis, common Cause or underlying Essence of all evolutes or appearances cannot but be admitted to be one only, which has no further cause of its own and is not, therefore, an appearance of anything else and as such. It must be only one and unrelated.

This ultimate[2] cause is the Reality[3] proper, which, unrealised on account of Avidya and, as appearing in and through the latter and its modifications, gives rise to appearances of an unending diversity, i.e., empirical entities of the universe and thereby of further illusions also. So the one way of explaining the appearance of the universe and its undeniable producibility and perishability sooner or later in consonance with its nature, analogous to that of illusions, is to hold all empirical entities[4] to be so many diverse appearances of only one Reality, which is technically known in Advaita terminology as Brahman. From the stand-point of Avidya, this one

1. B. B. V., A. IV, V. III, p. 1648, V. 1520; A. II, B. IV, p. 1082, VV. 295-99.
2. B. B. V., A. I., B. IV, p. 522, V. 443; A. I, B. III, p. 357, V. 52.
3. B. B. V., A. II, B. I, p. 914, V. 164; A. II, B. I, P. 916, V. 174.
4. B. B. V., A. II, B. I, P. 931, V, 266; p. 688, V. 1280.

Reality may be envisaged to be the ultimate cause of the universe only so long as appearing in and through it, but from the stand-point of Itself, It is one, undifferentiated and unrelated Unity, pure Being or bare Essence (all others being Its various appearances in the empirical order and unexceptionally unreal as such in the true sense of Reality).

Again as between two ends, that is, the Absolute Reality and the last product or appearance, all intervening causes may be analyased as comparatively pervasive, permanent, pure, subtle, general, deep, unassociated and undivided, while their effects as comparatively limited, temporary. impure, gross, particular, apparent, related, and discrete. This generalisation, applying unexceptionally to all multiples of the universe, also gives a clue to their nature as being only pseudo-realities or appearances of the one ultimate Reality, Brahman, through Avidya in and about It. Even the elements,[1] which are recognised by the Realistic schools to be the ultimate material cause of all worldly objects and eternal such as atoms etc. are no exceptions to this rule. Water (the liquid state), the forerunner of Earth (the solid state), is in comparison to the latter more pervasive and permanent etc.; Fire (the radiant state of matter), the forerunner of Water, is comparatively more pervasive and permanent etc.; Air (the gaseous state), the forerunner of Fire, is still more so; Âkāśa (the ethereal state), the forerunner of Air, is the most pervasive and permanent etc. of all the five elements.

The one conclusion, which may be derived from this generalisation, is that gradually higher values abide beneath the series of passing phases, more permanent substances endure below the less permanent ones, less changing entities underlie the more changing ones and comparatively more real substrata, though essentially only apparent, pervade the less real surfaces

1. B. B. V., A. II. B. IV, p. 1082. V. 294; A. III, B. VI, p. 1278, V. 13.

until Brahman, which is one, eternal, unchanging[1] and unrelated and the only absolute Reality, is realised, sublating all others as equally and unexceptionally so many appearances and surviving as their sole Residue[2] or ultimate substratum. Thus by the side of this Reality, which appears to be the final cause of all appearances so long as they are not sublated by Its supreme realisation, all other intervening or intermediary causes are only so many successive stages and so-called realities in the gradual evolution of appearances.[3] It may be safely concluded, therefore, from what has been said above that all[4] empirical entities are merely diverse appearances of one and the same Reality, ensuing from Its non-realisation and consequent upon Its wrong realisations (which are technically known as Ajñāna and Mithyājñāna) and finally sublatable by Its realisation. Thus a deeper investigation unmistakably shows that beneath the hard crust of concrete and discrete appearances lies hidden one Absolute Reality as their common Substratum and on the loom of this Reality Avidya weaves peculiar and innumerable patterns of appearances, which become manifest, change from moment to moment and pass away, constituting the universe with its distinguishing marks and dominant notes. The whole universe is, therefore, an array of causes and effects, a distribution into names and forms and a diversification into innumer-

1, B. B. V., A. IV, B. III, P. 1687, V. 1737; A. I, B. III, p. 361, V. 68.

2. B. B, V., A. I, B. IV, p. 622, V. 942 and p. 623, V. 946; A. I, B. IV, p. 745, VV. 1579-80; A. III, B. V, p. 1251, VV. 74-75; A. II, B. IV, p. 1103, V. 421.; A. II, B. IV, p. 1618, V. 1342; A. III, B. IV, p. 1211, V. 25.

3. B. B. V., A. II, B. I, P. 916, V. 175; p 1033. VV. 247-48; A. I, B. IV, p. 696, V. 1319; A. I, B. IV, p. 522, VV. 483-44; A. II, B. III, p. 1002, V. 63; A. I, B. IV, P. 100, V. 1342.

4. B. B. V.. A. I, B. IV, p. 661, V. 1149, p. 699, VV., 1318-21; A. II, B. III. p. 1033, VV., 247-48, A. IV, B. III, pp. 1614-17, VV, 1321-1336; A. I, B. IV, p. 696, V. 1318; A. IV, B. III, p. 1620, V. 1353.

able centres and units—all being only so many phenomenal projections of Avidya and diverse appearances of Absolute Reality without any exception.

The unreality of the universe not irreconcilable with ordinary experiences:

The aforesaid conclusion about the unreality of the universe need not be considered as utterly inconsistant and irreconcilable with our ordinary experiences to the contrary. What the Advaita system, as interpreted by its exponents such as Sureśvara and others, aims at is that the world is not absolutely real. It states that howsoever the universe may appear to be real in the realm of relativity, it is no reality at all in the absolute sense of the word. The one Reality[1] Itself, unrealised through Avidya, gives rise to all phenomenal pseudo-realities, which for all practical intents and purposes appear to be real when estimated by a scale of empirical values. Hence all realities in the empirical plane arise from the non-realisation of Reality and misconception of values and continue to appear so only so long as the Reality Itself remains obscure. They are no realities[2] but are mistaken and appraised as realities until Reality[3] Itself is realised. So everything of the universe appears to be conditionally real, i.e. real until realisation of Reality.

Innumerable images of the moon may be seen to be quivering on the rippling surface of water. They appear real enough only so long as their cause, the moon, is not perceived. But the images cannot be seen unless the moon illumines the surface of water and, truly speaking, they are nothing but the moon unrealised. The forms of snake and earth-crack etc.,

1. B. B. V., A. II, B. III, p. 1003, V. 65; A. II, B. IV, p. 1073, V. 239; A. II, B. I, p. 916, V. 174; A. II. B. III. p. 1023, V. 189.
2. B. B. V., A. II, B. I, P. 915, V. 173; A. I. B. IV, P. 661 VV. 1140-61.
3. B. B. V.. A. II, p. 915, V. 172; A. I, B. IV, p. 702, VV. 1349-50 A. I, B. IV, p. 522, V. 443 and p. 695, VV. 1314-16.

super-imposed on one and the same garland through various modifications or imputations by Avidya in and about it, may appear to be real[1] enough only so long as the garland, the cause of all those appearances, is not properly realised as such; but even during their actual manifestations they are essentially nothing but the garland unrealisd. Similarly, empirical entities[2] too, when analysed and examined thoroughly and properly, (i. e. from the view-point of Reality proper), will have to be declared finally nothing but apperances of the one underlying Reality. The very fact that all empirical entities are surely conditioned by the limits of time and space and are defined and specified by different names and forms goes to prove that all of them (including even those, which have to be treated as beginningless on account of serving as primordial casual factors in the order of creation) are limited and unquestionably transient. Hence their reality is only apparent[3] and not absolute. This limitation of the nature of their existence is obviously derogatory to their reality; because "Reality", according to the Advaita system, as explained by Sureśvara and others, runs counter to any limitation or dependence on anything else whatsoever. Brahman[4] as "Reality" cannot be similarly explained away or dispensed with, since all the so-called reals and illusions, being finite, limited and transient as appearances or pseudo-reals, do presuppose and point to an unlimited eternal Existence or absolute Reality as their common basis, subsistence and sole surviving Being, without which they would not have appeared diversely at all even when they appear.

The greatest contribution of the Advaita Vedanta is that 'Being' and 'Becomings' or 'Unity' and 'Diversities of the

1. B. B. V., A. I, B. IV, p. 661, v. 1140; A. IV, B. III, P. 1599. v. 1233.
2. B. B. V., A. I. B. IV, p. 661; V. 1140; A. IV, B. III, p. 1592 V. 1233.
3. B. B. V. A. II, B. III, p. 1003, V. 65.
4. B. B. V., A. II, B. III, p. 1029, V. 224; A. I. B. IV, p. 579, VV. 725-27; p. 608, V. 874; A. II, B. I, P. 978, V. 552; Sambandha-Vārtika, P. 267, V. 999; P. 268, V. 1001.

Universe' can be logically explained as concurrent and not as irreconcilable with each other; because the former is 'Reality' and the latter are only appearances. It points out that if there are passing phases, there must be an enduring Essence; if there are seeming and changing entities, there must be also an underlying and unchanging Existence; if there are perishable and evanescent events as becomings, there must be also an imperishable and eternal Substratum as Being; if all are gross or only relatively subtle or subtler, there must be also one, transcendentally subtlest; if all are mediate (पराक्) in the sense that they depend upon something else for their knowledge or manifestation, there must be also an ever-immediate or a priori Immediacy (प्रत्यक्); if all are necessarily and unexceptionally interwoven with misery, though appearing to be pleasant or unpleasant in varying degrees and proportions under different circumstances, there must be also one, eternal, unalloyed and unsurpasable Bliss. To sum up, if there are diverse and relative appearances, there must be also one and absolute Reality. There is not the least contradiction in holding that what is in itself trans-temporal may express itself through temporal processes, or what is unlimited may appear through spatial limitations or that what is trans-phenomenal may be the source and ground of all phenomena, or that what is above the chain of causation and effectuation may be the ultimate source and substratum of the entire chain of causes and effects, constituting the universe, and all this simply on account of Avidya. On the other hand, it offers a very satisfactory explanation of all contradictions, exhibited by the universe both exoterically and esoterically in respect of uniformities and diversities; changes and continuations; destructions and survivals; manifestations and disappearances; manifoldness and oneness; limited existences and one, ever-same and unending continuity; fleeting, finite and various cognitions and pure, self-luminous and infinite Consciousness and passing and ambivalent emotions and eternal and unalloyed Bliss. The Advaita monism, according to Sureśvara, establishes that while maintaining Its transcendental nature or pure and simple Oneness, the absolute Reality, as appearing in and through Avidya, holds up the whole gamut of diverse appearances or empirical entities through Its original and corresponding Appearances, permeating and pulsating through all of them as their sustaining ground or elixir of life, and it is thus that the emperical

entities also appear in the empirical plane to have existence and manifestation of their own as concrete and diverse objects, knowable variously through different kinds of cognitions and proving variously the source of the so-called wordly pleasures and pains etc. So there is no logical inconsistency[1] in acknowledging a world of innumerable relative truths and pragmatic values (from the standpoint of avidya), on the one hand, and also recognising, on the other, only one Absolute Reality, Brahman, unrelated, immutable, impartible and immune from all possible kinds of differences (from the stand-point of Reality Itself), since the two apparently contradictory conclusions are based on two different view-points. Quite in conformity with these two view-points both the immanental and transcendental aspects of Brahman are usually dealt with in the discussion of Brahman's nature. The purport is that so long as we are in the region of Avidya, which is marked by the duality of existence, the triad of knowledge and the variety of experiences, the immanental aspect looms large in the eyes of an ordinary man, who can form no higher conception of Reality, the Brahman, than as the creator, the Maintainer, the Destroyer, the Controller, the Witness or in short, "the Lord of all, the Master of all beings, the Guardian of the creation, the Embankment that steadies all these worlds so as to prevent their falling into utter confusion." But when Reality is realised in Its essential and absolute nature, the higher conception, cancelling the former one as erroneous, is at once revealed, in which there is neither Avidya, nor the original Appearance of Reality, nor the universe, nor any lordship and controllership etc., all of which evidently arise only in relation to the universe.

Three views of Advaitins on Reality:

Advaitins in general hold three kinds of views about Reality:

Sattaikya-vāda, Sattā-dvaividhya-Vāda and Sattā-Traividhya-vāda.

1. B. B. V., P. 1245, VV. 34-40; P. 1246, VV. 42-45; P. 1247. VV. 50-51; P. 1036, V. 8; P. 1214, V. 41; P. 1102, V. 416 and P. 1103, VV. 419-23.

From the Advaita point of view there is only one absolute and unlimited Reality, Brahman. All other things are decidedly only apparent and whatever reality they seem to possess is derived from the 'Sat', i. e. Eternal Existence, the Brahman, which underlies all of them as their common Substratum and essential Reality. While this view of Śankara is accepted by all Advaitins, there is a difference of opinion as regards the recognition of separate phenomenal or seeming realities, which the empirical objects and their illusions appear to partake of and possess during the appearances in the empirical plane.

Extremists of the Advaitic outlook hold the view that Reality is one and admits of no degrees or differentaition and that besides this one Reality, the Brahman, there is no other separate or distinct reality of any other kind and nature whatsoever, belonging even to empirical objects, not to speak of their illusory counterparts. Even when on account of Avidya we apparently comprehend relative and distinct realities of particular objects in our various ordinary experiences, it is the one absolute Reality, pervading and permeating concurrently and correspondingly through all of them as their underlying Essence that is being apprehended apparently as so many appearances, comprising multifarious entities or pseudo-realities of the universe, cognisable independently and severally as such through various cognitive processes and seeming to possess consequently distinct self-individualities and separate realities of their own. So the finite and separate realities apparent in diverse and discrete empirical entities, are not distinct realities of empirical objects themselves, but as a matter of truth, they are so many apparent manifestations of the one basic Reality underlying all of them as their common Substratum. This view is ascribed to the school, which follows "Adhiṣṭhānānubedha-rīti", that is, the process of pervasion and shooting up on the surface of the underlying Reality through all, appearing out of It as diverse projections consequent upon Its partial obscuration by Avidya. Thus the exponents of this view do not tolerate the recognition

of any separate or empirically distinct type of phenomenal realities, as one and the same Reality is enough to explain all realities. The view, propounded by such extremists among Advaitins, is known as *Sattaikyavāda.*

Followers of a typical but less extreme type of Advaitism flourishing long before Śankara, who has the credit of having formulated and given a lucid and elaborate exposition to the long-standing principles of the Advaita monism, maintain that every entity of the universe arises along and is co-terminous with its cognition. No object has an independent, durable and continuous existence even in the absence of its cognition. Such Advaitins are known as Dṛṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi-Vādins. According to this school of Advitism, only two kinds of Sattā (i.e. Reality); Pāramārthikī and Prātibhāsikī are admissible, since every empirical object is only as much an illusion as what is ordinarily recognised to be so by those, who recognise the existence of the world as such. Obviously, this school too does not recognise any constant or continuous and separate phenomenal realities even in the realm of emperical existence The view, expounded by such extremists among Advaitins, is known as Sattā-Dvaividhya-vāda.[1]

The less radical among them, however, do not share this view. They argue that when we cognise any of the discrete objects of the universe such as chair and table etc., what we actually apprehend is the distinct reality of a particular object as associated with a particular place and definite moment or period of time. Although such a reality, that is, a reality of anything other than the Brahman cannot be recognised to be absolute, yet it will be inaccurate to deny it of any nature whatsoever. So they enunciate the view of 'three kinds of reality'.— one pure and absolute and two others impure and relative, which are phenomenally classified into empirical and illusory appearances. Brahman is pure and absolute Reality, essentially

1. P. P. V., PP. 31-32 ; Tattva-dīpana, P. 129 ; Brahmānandī-Comm. on A. S., PP. 393-94 ; P. 402 ; P. 442 ; S. L., PP. 307-8 ; A. B. S., P. 209 ; Vedānta-paribhāṣā, P. 168 and PP. 170-71.

transcendent, unrelated to and unaffected by Avidya and its manifold modifications or possible projections. It exists eternally by Its own undimmed glory and in Its own undiminishing splendour. But as appearing in and through Avidya and its multifarious modifications, It seems to be manifest in multiple ways, orders and forms of worldly existence, constituting diverse relative realities, manifold practical truths and various pragmatic values. Further, when the effects of Avidya, different in varying circumstances, begin to function, the secondary reality or pseudo-reality i.e. any of the existents of worldly nature and order, which to the empirical consciousness appears to be real for all practical intents and purposes, sometimes undergoes a further state of depletion or deterioration and gives rise to further appearances as illusions when all the necessary conditions thereof happen to be present. The absolute Reality, which is Reality proper, shines behind empirical reality as its Substratum and the empirical reality in its turn, though apparent and secondary as compared to the absolute Reality, stands likewise as the back-ground of verity behind the illusions, which are appraised as erroneous even according to emperical scale of values or realities. Nevertheless in this view also the absolute Reality is the only Reality in true sense of the word, for even though the empirical and the illusory entities are recognised as having separate and distinct types of realities in their own respective orders as a matter of concession to the normal thought and consciousness, yet such realities are only pseudo-realities essentially and that these pseudo-realities even during their persistence are subordinate to and ultimately based on one absolute Reality. Those, who uphold this liberal view of reality, apportion and classify Sattā into three grades by recognising, besides the deep underlying absolute Reality (Pāramārthikī Sattā), two other kinds of discrete realities—empirical and seeming (Vyāvahārikī Sattā and Prātibhāsikī Sattā)—determinable according to the nature of the causal circumstances and the possible moment of their sublation. When, besides the one common Substratum or

absolute Reality, the Brahman, Avidya alone or along with its modifications brings about materially the appearance of objects and the appearance is not to be sublated by anything short of Brahma-realisation, it is to be regarded as having an empirical[1] type of reality (Vyāvahārikī Sattā), superior to the seeming reality (Prātibhāsikī Sattā) as an illusion but inferior to the absolute Reality (Pāramārthikī Sattā). But when, in addition to the said cause, other factors necessary for the outcome of illusions such as various kinds of defects in the knower and the senses etc. also combine and the appearance is sublatable in the very empirical order of existence, the object is to be deemed as having an illusory existence or seeming type of reality (Prātibhāsikī Sattā), inferior even to the said empirical one. Both these kinds of inferior realities, empirical or illusory, cease to appear as realities when the absolute Reality is realised ; but so long as this Reality Itself has not been realised, the incidental appearances themselves masquerade as having different and discrete realities and various pragmatic values and interests. This view is known as "*Sattā-Traividhya-vāda*", which is obviously a concession to the popular belief and common conception of values, attached to worldly objects of various empirical categories. The said theories about 'reality' are attributable to the Advaitins, who admit the stability, continuity and independent objective existence of the Creation (Sṛṣṭidṛṣṭi-vādins) and uphold the empirical life of each individual and all eventualities and enjoyments as entirely due to the mass of karmans, inseparably sticking to the subtle psycho-physical organism of each individual until their fructification or eradication (Prati-karma-vyavasthā-vādins).

The recognition of the three kinds of realities, however, should not be regarded as contradictory to or incompatible with the non-dualistic doctrine of the Advaita system ; because this division is based on the value, nature, standard and empirical

1. A.S.—P. 433, L. 3. ; Brahmānandī, P. 402, L. 6. and P. 393, L. 6.

order of phenomenal realities in accordance with different standpoints and evaluating scales. No doubt the highest or absolute value is nothing but eternal Existence, pure Consciousness and unalloyed Bliss and all these are one only. But in the lower plane of appearances, all the four appear to be distinct from one another and it is this distinction, which is responsible for the false conception of values. If varying degrees, attributable to empirical entities of diverse status and positions in their different strata and orders of appearance. Accordingly, value has been defined in several ways: 'it is a matter of interest', or 'the peculiar relation between any interest and its object', or 'the fulfilment of desires', or 'an adaptation to environment', or 'a relation between the organism and its environment', or as consisting in 'the fulfilment of the biological tendencies and instincts, which lie behind all desires and feelings', or 'a relation of universal harmony'. All these definitions, the Advaita Vedanta asserts, suffer in some way or other from a very narrow and distorted view of the essential nature of things. It is anomalous to say that something is good and beautiful, still existent only at a certain period of time but not at another, real but existing only conditionaly and relatively but not independently and absolutely and shining only imperfectly and ephemerally but not fully and eternally. Truly speaking, value has no meaning as apart from existence, subsistence or reality, consciousness and bliss. To recognise value is to realise existence and reality etc. This is the most important contribution of Sāṅkàra philosophy. So absolute Value is eternal Existence, pure Consciousness and unalloyed or unexcellable Bliss, judged from the absolute standpoint of Reality Itself, but examined under the perspective of Avidya, i.e. the empirical view-point or relative yard-stick these are innumerable empirical values and even inferior to them, some further shallow and seeming values ascribed to illusory manifestations. This is the significance of the threefold division set forth above.

Sureśvara, an exponent of one of the most important schools of interpretation of the Advaita philosophy, has tried to lay down definite criteria of Reality. He is the first follower of Śaṅkara, who is credited with the enunciation of the theory of 'Ābhāsa' and, according to him, the world is as much an appearance[1] as any illusion from the viewpoint of absolute Reality and assentially there is not the slightest disinction between the appearance of an empirical entity and, an illusion thereof, recognised as such ordinarily. "The one is as good or bad as the other." But we are accustomed to think of the continuous and comparatively permanent empirical objects as real and the occasional and fleeting illusions as unreal. In fact this is a distinction, based merely a long-standing belief, which is one of our fundamental and natural instincts, stored up from life to life and fed upon the finite experiences of false glories, relative values and seeming realities of empirical entities. If any difference can be made out at all, it is that the original Appearance of Reality in Avidya is a primordial one and all empirical objects are consequent primary appearances thereof, while the further Appearance of Reality in any of empirical entities is a subsequent one and all illusory objects are consequent secondary appearaces thereof. By 'Secondary appearance' is to be meant a further appearance of the 'Primary appearance' (as an empirical object) arising from Reality through Avidya in its doubly vicious circle: first through itself and then through any of its modifications through the process of double non-realisations and false realisations. Let us illustrate this remark by a concrete instance. A garland, which is pseudo-real in nature, is a primary objective appearance of Reality in an empirical way but its further appearance as a snake through the said process of double functioning is a

1. B.B.V., P.1245, VV. 34-37 and V. 40; P.931 V. 266; P.1252, V. 79; P.1615, VV.1324-26; P.1614, VV. 1319-21; P. 1616, V.1332; P.1024, V. 191; P.914, V. 164; P.688, V. 1280.

secondary appearance in an illusory way. This point will be elucidated at a greater length later on in its proper place. Here this much will suffice to say that if the said primariness and secondariness of appearances are to be accepted as the basis of gradation, the world may very well be estimated to be of a higher type of the so-called reality than that of illusions. In other words, if in the lower plane of the so-called real existence, that is, empirical or relative existence, appearance itself is to be given the name of and loosely recognised as reality, the threefold classification of 'Reality': one as Absolute Reality or Reality proper and the other two as pseudo-realities in the form of primary and secondary appearances of that Reality and distinguished as empirical and illusory objects may be systematically upheld even according to the Ābhāsa school of Sureśvara. But this will be only a technical classification, as Sureśvara does not accept that Reality Itself can extend or emerge out to emperical objects, not to speak of illiusions, but what emerges and multiplies as the said objects is Its underlying Appearance on the plane of and in correspondence with Avidya and its multiple modifications. So the Appearance of Reality may be described to be expanding in larger and larger circles and thereby developing variously in innumerable diverse outer forms so as to give rise to the universe in its unending orders and varieties. Thus if *from the standpoint of Avidya* the term 'Reality' is used in a comprehensive but loose sense so as to include even Appearance as such, the aforesaid classification may be admitted, but from the standpoint[3] of Absolute Reality Itself, used in the correct sense of the term, Reality is only one and does not admit of any differentiation or gradation. Then it may be safely concluded that Sureśvara recognises only one kind of Reality, i.e. the Absolute Reality and, besides this Reality proper, all else are appearances without any exception. So he may properly estimated to be supporting 'Sattaikya-vada' as assessed from the Reality view-point. But this theory, however, should not be confused and confounded with the Dṛṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi-

Vāda as already explained above. It is not Reality but the Appearance of Reality, which is the main point and plank of all phenomena and phenomenal manifestations as the universe. But there is another interpretation of Abhāsa-vāda, attributed to him by his followers, according to which the phenomenal realities are to be judged from the view-point and in terms of appearances and he may consistently be recognised as a supporter of 'Sattā-traividhya-vada' also, as appearances can be easily classified into three kinds, corresponding to the three kinds of Satta—Pārmārthikī, Vyāvahārikī and Prātibhāsikī. This is the distinctive feature and one of the principal contributions of Abhāsa-vāda, which should not be lost sight of in discussing any doctrine of Advaitism, as expounded and explained by Sureśvara.

The world, according to Sureśvara, is Abhāsa or appearance but neither Pratibimba nor Avaccheda, i.e., neither reflection nor limitation :—

Having shown in the foregoing pages that in the final analysis—both philosophical and scientific—the entire creation, i.e., mulitiples of empirical entities as well as illusions constituting the universe, are attributable to one ultimate Principle both as their ultimate cause and the final ground of their absorption, it is now to be explained how the manifold diversities and changing appearances that confront us in our daily experience have evolved out of that one ultimate Principle and how is the latter related to the former. The vital problem for philosophy is to determine how the one underlying Principle, i.e., the ultimate cause, seems to manifest Itself as an unending panorama of the variegated scenes and sights of the visible universe, and how that single Ultimate Cause brings about the appearance of manifold effects in the shape of countless varieties and orders of empirical entities and even further illusions.

It is only by philosophical and scientific investigation of a few typical instances of empirical phenomena and further

illusion that we can get a clear grasp of the inter-relations of that Ultimate Cause and the long chain of intervening links of causes and effects, the sum total of which is known as the universe. It is a principle recognised as axiomatic both in philosophy and science that an effect is always contained in its cause and nothing that is not subtly present in the cause can any how appear as its effect at any time, although an effect need not necessarily contain the whole of its cause ar the cause need not appear wholly as its affect. Reasoning on the basis of this axiom, it has been shown above how the entire universe and the phenomena thereof can be traced to the one Ultimate Cause. The following examples will suffice for elucidating and illustrating the said remark.

(a) The flash and report and the capacity for destruction by gun are present in the charge of gun-powder as cause in a latent state. The concussion only helps to make the cause manifest itself as an effect.

(b) The different colours of the spectrum both visible and invisible are only partial effects produced on account of the dispersion of white light by the prism. By means of a prism what seems a ray of white as ordinary light is resolved into its' varying component colours. Light of all the visible colours that are dispersed by the prism and even more than that were present in the original white light. What we see as the effect of the dispersion is only a part of the entire radiation and nothing that was not contained in original white light.

(c) The instance of the moon and its multitudinous reflections along with the surrounding sky on the rippling surface of water or that of a garland and its numerous appearances such as snake and earth-crack etc. is familiar to all. In the former example, the relationship between the original object (Bimba), the moon, and the images produced by it on the sheet of water is that of a cause and effects. Tne moon is the cause and the images are effects. The moon reflected on

the rippling surface of water comes to be manifest as manifold images, which are all only reflectional appearances. In the latter example, the garland is the cause and the snake and earth-crack etc. are effects. They are all appearances arising from their common cause, the garland, through its ignorance. Both these kinds of appearances have no existence apart from their underlying cause.

(d) We see water in a mirage at a distance. When we get nearer, we are disillusioned and find no water but only a heap of burning sands. Here the effect, i.e. the appearance, is a thorough illusion even in the realm of empirical realities. The water that appears to be seen is no more present over the burning sends just as the snake in the garland or the piece of silver in the mother-of-pearl that we mistake them respectively to be are really not there.

(e) A magician or a hypnotist annouces his performance to begin at 8 P.M. It is past nine o'clock, but the hypnotist is not present on the stage. An impatient and angry audience greet him after 9 P.M. and give expression to their resentment. But gently and quietly he enters and tells them to open their watches and look thereon. To their utter amazement and discomfiture they find, it is just 8 P.M. After another feat, he asks the audience once more to open their watches and they find, it is ten o'clock. Thereon, he quietly retires from the stage. In this strange phenomenan, the minds of the audience being under the spell of the hypnotist, they observe sights, which cannot be reconciled to precedent and subsequent circumstances. The audience have been the witnesses of the illusion of their own minds.

The first three instances are objective empirical phenomena, in which the human mind has remained in the position of an observer and investigator; whereas in the last three, it has also been reseinded as a factor of the objective phenomena and its states have themselves become the objects of philosophical investigation.

In all the instances, cited above, it is to be found that there is an appearance obscuring an underlying something, which is comparatively real. The effect is as enshrouding appearance and the underlying somthing enshrouded thereby is its cause, as ordinarily recognised by the human mind. Since the ultimate Principle, otherwise known as Brahman, and the universe stand in the relation of Reality and appearance or cause and effect (the former appearing to be the cause only in Its immanental aspect), a thorough philosophical examination of this relation is necessary. The nature of this relationship has been sought to be explained in three ways by the followers of Śankar. These three ways are the same as the three schools of interpretation of the fundamental Advait doctrine, namely, (1) Pratibimba-Vāda (Reflection-theory), (2) Avaccheda-Vāda (Limitation-theory) and (3) Ābhāsa-Vāda (Appearance-Theory),

(1) Pratibimba-Vāda :—

The first relationship is that of an image or reflection and its original source or prototype, respectively known as the Pratibimba and the Bimba. The Pratibimba is a reflectional appearance, i.e. the original appearing by way of reflection as separate and distinct from itself. It is real in the same sense as the Bimba, being identical with the latter. The original by itself is the Bimba and the same reflected in any receptacle is called the Pratibimba. Both the reflection of the original and the receptacle, in which It is reflected, intertwined and combined together form a unitary appearance and are called Pratibimba, In the case of a human face reflected into a mirror, the entire object, e.i. the face, which falls on the reflecting surface of the mirror, is retarded back into the field of vision of the eye. The Pratibimba ordinarily appears to be different from and other than the Bimba; only because it is wrongly located as such and misjudged together with its Bimba in ordinary experience as two independent realities. The reality of the Pratibimba, as expounded by

Padmapādācārya[1] and Prakāśātman[2]-the chief exponents of the Reflection-theory-follows as a matter of course and has to be necessarily admitted; because when the constitution of a Pratibimba in the said manner is closely examined, it can not be held to be different essentially from the Bimba. It has to be taken as a reflectional emergence of the Bimba itself. In the above-noted example of a moon reflected in the ripples of water, it is the reflectional emergence of the moon together with its physical environment as superimposed upon the surface of the water that constitutes the Pratibimba and this is only wrongly estimated by the cognising mind as something different from the moon, the Bimba, in the sky. A proper investigation into the source and the said process of reflection would at once reveal and lead to the conclusion that the Pratibimba is essentially identical with the Bimba and hence as much real as its original. Accordingly, it may be generalised that the effect is only a reflectional appearance of its cause, the original, and essentially identical with the latter. Viewed from this stand-point, the whole universe—animate and inanimate—is in essence absolutely identical with its ultimate cause or original source, i.e., Brahman-the absolute Reality-although the ultimate cause remains incognisable, being enshrouded or obscured by Avidya; while effects or reflectional appearances only are knowable as innumerable diverse empirical realities. But where and how does this misunderstanding or wrong judgment of the location etc. of the Pratibimba arise? Obviously, it relates to the attitude of the cognising mind, but deeply examined it is all due to Maya or Avidya—the standing receptacle of Primordial Reflection and playing beginninglessly behind the whole universe—one of whose modifications the mind itself is, which is the seat of all misunderstandigs and wrong judgments. One and the same Bimba, the Absolute Reality,

1. P.P., (Pages 21-22) A.S., P. 443.
2. P.P.V., (2.)

is superimposed upon, that is, reflected in the various modifications of Avidya differently in suitable ways, answering to those modifications and these reflections along with so many reflecting surfaces constitute what is ordinarily understood to be innumerable entities and varieties of the universe.

(2) Avaccheda-Vāda :—

Another theory of interpretation of the relation between Brahman and the universe is known as Avaccheda-vāda or limitation-theory, which stands altogether on a different footing. According to this, the one unlimited Reality, Brahman, comes to be viewed as limited and diversified variously on account of different limiting adjuncts, viz., Avidya and its innumerable modifications. There is neither any reflection nor appearance of Cit (Pure Consciousness) but only delimitation of the unlimited Absolute Reality, which is the same as Cit and Ananda through the Avidya of the Jīva. Avaccheda is a conceptual limitation of the unlimited through Avidya. The universe seems to be there owing to this Avidya in the Jīva and its objective appearance is only an instance of misconception. The basic tenets of this school of interpretation were for the first time adumbrated by Maṇḍana Miśra but formulated and fully developed later on by vācaspati Miśra. The doctrine of this school is sought to be established on the analogy of Ākāśa. Ākāśa is an unlimited and all-pervading continuum but on account of different limiting adjuncts comes to be perceived as enclosed finite portions of sky such as "Gṛhākāśa" and "Ghaṭākāśa" etc. of various sizes and descriptions. Similary, the one unlimited Reality is misconceived as limited realities or finite existences on account of various and innumerable limiting adjuncts i. e. Avidya and its modifications such as minds etc. In the above-noted instance of hypnotism, we find that the minds of the audience have been thrown into a state of trance or paralysis and their activities suspended for a while. They see as real something, which in the normal condition of the mind they would have surely taken to be unreal. There is a temporary

perversion of the subject's mind. This one instance is enough to convince us how misconceptions may arise through the unceasing operations of Avidya and consequent perversion of minds. Applying the reasoning of the above instance to that of the Brahman and the universe, this school may be described to be reasonably holding that finite objects of the universe are only limited appearances or limitations of the unlimited Absolute Reality, Brahman, and that all these apparent limitations or appearances are due to something, which is ever responsible for distorting the mental vision of the subject. The whole universe proceeds out of this undefinable obscuring and distorting something regarding the nature of the unlimited Absolute Reality. This unaccountable something is technically called Avidya or Ajñāna which is located individually in every Jiva.

A serious objection is raised against this school of interpretation as to how can the Jiva, which itself is nothing but a limited appearance of the unlimited Reality through the limiting adjuct, the mind, can be the substratum of Avidya, since the mind is one of the modifications of Avidya and as such cannot precede Avidya to serve as its substratum at the root and in the beginning of creation. In other words, the puzzle of reciprocal dependence, requiring each other's presence as preceding each other for its eventuation and manifestation (Anyonyāśraya) cannot be easily solved; because without an appearance of the mind there can be no formation of the Jiva or the individual soul and without a manifestation of the Jiva, i.e. the individual soul there can be neither Avidya for want of any substratum nor its further modification as mind. One solution has been offered, by Amalānanda Sarasvati in the work, namely, "Kalpa-taru-parimal" as follows. During dissolution the whole universe, including even minds in question, is absorbed in Avidya and continues as imbedded therein in subtle, residual or subliminal forms. At the beginning of the creation thereafter what serves as the substratum of Avidya then is the individual soul having as its

limiting adjunct not the mind as fully developed later on but Avidya-the subtle form of the mind carrying on and containing all the residual or subliminal impressions of previous experiences undergone through the mind in past lives at the pre-dissolution period. When the mind remains absorbed in Avidya, what remains of it even then is only the subtle and subliminal impressions of the sum total of all experiences or illusions accumulated during the entire span of the previous empirical existences or mundane lives. It is this, which serves as the limiting adjunct for the formation of the Jiva at the beginning of the creation and thereby occasions a fresh functioning of Avidya, including its modifications such as fully developed mind etc. The further modification of Avidya as fully developed mind contributes through its experiences to the next residual impressions of experiences or illusions of the afore-said nature. In this way the circle goes on moving in beginingless series like that of seeds and trees, the previous seed being the cause of the subsequent tree and that tree in its turn being the cause of the next seeds and so on (vījaṅkuravat pravaharūpaṇa anādi). A similar solution of a relevant question has been attempted by the author of the Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, which establishes and emphasises that the identity of the individual soul is not disturbed and the continuation of the individual life is not broken even though the limiting adjunct involved in the constitution of the Jiva changes somewhat formally during the three states of experiences in human life. The essential unity of the limiting adjunct is not at all affected, inspite of formal variations in its subsistence in changing states. This uninterrupted unity explains the fact that an individual soul remembers experiences belonging to the dream-state or the state of deep dreamless sleep even during the immediately subsequent waking state and that the knower does not change, although the objects of knowledge are changing every time.

1. K. P., P. 17, lines 25-28

Ābhāsa-Vāda :—

Third theory of interpretation regarding the said relation is described as Ābhāsa-vāda (the appearance-theory). According to this school, of which Sureśvarācārya is the chief exponent, the universe with all its phenomenal truths or pseudo-realities is as much appearances as illusions but with this difference that the former are primary appearances and as such recognised to be real; while the latter are secondary appearances and as such considered to be unreal ordinarily even in the realm of relativity or plane of phenomenalism. Just as between a man in the state of trance and same in the normal state of mind certain appearances are known respectively as real to the former and illusory to the latter; similarly the phenomenal appearances or pseudo-reals of the universe seem to be real for all practical intents and purposes to the Avidya-ridden person but cease to appear as real to the same on realisation of Absolute Reality, which instantaneously sublates Avidya and all that it projects and entails. The Primordial Appearance, immured in Avidya, is the perennial source or inexhaustible medium of all other manifold Appearances, answering to the multiple modifications or possible projections of Avidya. Avidya is both the modifying medium and the effectuating principle. It is the energising power and the diversifying force responsible for eliciting diverse Appearances from the Absolute Reality, corresponding and suitable to itself and its multifarious modifications. Avidya and its innumerable modifications serve as the various backgrounds, receptacles and media of the said Reality-Appearances and thus account for diversities or innumerable varieties of the universe. In other words, Reality as appearing primarily and directly or indirectly in Avidya and its numerous modifications constitute the backbone of all further outer appearances. These original Appearances of Reality ensconced in their receptacles-Avidya and its manifold modifications emerge into further outer and fresh appearances, diversely known as the phenomenal or emperical entities and into still further ones, recognised as

illusions. These animating Appearances are, so to say, the 'Elixir of life' and the sustaining power, so far as Avidya and its modifications are concerned in as much as they enliven and sustain their said receptacles or back-grounds. It is they, which ceaselessly bubble out into pseudo-realities in multifarious forms over the calm and constant bottom of Absolute Reality. They together with their media and receptacles-Avidya and its manifold modifications-bolster up de nove appearances that collectively constitute what is denoted by the term 'universe', ordinarily differentiated into animate and inanimate, real and illusory etc. Thus every object of the universe is a de novo appearance of the ultimate Reality, the Brahman, through the said process and all causal factors and conditions involved in various forms in the evolution of manifold appearances are summed up in one term, i.e. Avidya. This seeming appearance, technically called Abhasa, can be distinguished in its technical sense from the above two kinds of appearances, i.e. reflectional (Pratibimba) or limitary (Avaccheda) ones in innumerable ways. Pratibimba, i. e. reflectional appearance is identical with the Bimba, i.e. the original, and hence as much real as the latter. In the case of an Avaccheda, i. e., limitary appearance, only limitation is conceptual and unreal but what comes to appear as limited is essentially unlimited and real. Abhāsa, i. e., a seeming appearance on the other hand, is neither identical[1] with the underlying reality nor is itself real in any sense. What appears through the reflection of Reality in Avidya and its modifications is essentially nothing but Reality Itself, but what emerges from the Appearance of Reality in and through Avidya is not Reality Itself but something de novo inexplicably elicited therefrom and appearing to be an established fact or a veritable entity only until the realisation of Reality. It is an apparant and fresh eventuation or externalisation lasting upto realisation of Reality. Reflection is real substantially all the time, but appears to be

1. B. B. V., A. 2, B. 3, P. 996, VV. 21-22.

unreal on account of being misjudged as distinct from its original; while appearance proper is at no time real (considered from the stand-point of Reality), but, being a further and fresh elicitation from Reality appears to be as good as real. Thus production or manifestation is only an apparant emanation of something indescribable from Reality through Avidya and destruction or termination is either submergence and absorption thereof into its said source of appearance of sublation of all appearances once for ever instantaneously on the realisation of Reality respectively as it is either the case of Dissolution or that of Emancipation (i. e. Pralaya or Mukti).

The main thesis of the Advaita system is absolute non-dualism, which can be established only on proving all that appear to be other than Reality as essentially identical with the latter or utterly unreal. Identity can be, therefore, established and concluded in four[1] ways: (1) either on superimposition of one thing upon another, (2) or on sublation of what is appearance out of the two, the other of which is reality and emerges finally as the sole surviving facture, (3) or on proving a state of apposition between two things, related as substantive and adjective, (4) or when there is an essential unity between two entities, though appearing to be distinct from each other. The last alternative is a case of identity proper. Out of these, the identity through superimposition is common to all the said three schools as prevailing in and governing the empirical state of existence, but while the Pratibimba school accepts the method of *identity proper*[2], the Ábhāsa school adopts that of *sublation*[3]—complete or partial-in order to explain and establish the doctrine of non-dualism. In other words, non-dualism in the case of the Pratibimba-school is arrived at through identity proper, that is, on account of the Pratibimba being realised as essentially identical with the Bimba; whereas, according to the Ábhāsa-

1. A.S., P. 425, L. 14-15.
2. P.P.. P. 22; P.P.V., PP. 238-39; S.L., P. 89.
3. M.S., Chapt. II, V. 29; S,L. Chapt. I. P. 88.

theory, the same conclusion is arrived at in another way; because all empirical entities, being appearances and consequently indescribable either as real or unreal or both, are entirely and instantaneously sublated on realisation of the absolute Reality, the Brahman, and what is ultimately left after sublation as the sole Residue[1] or surviving Essence is Brahman, shining spontaneously in Its pristine splendour as Eternal Existence—the essential Non-dualism or Pure being, free from all kinds of differences, limitations and relations. In this connection, it may be concisely remarked that both the theories of partial or full sublation are advanced and upheld to interpret the non-dualism in conformity with the two kinds of explanation of the nature of Ábhāsa by the followers and successors of Sureśvara. This point will be elucidated subsequently in its proper place.

Even as regards identity through superimposition, necessarily acceptable in the empirical order of existence a distinction between the school of Ábhāsa and Pratibimba may be pointed out. It is admitted by the Advaita System that Adhyāsa[2] or superimposition (of the apparent on the Reality and vice-verse) involves two kinds of identity—existential and relational, technically called as Ekatvādhyāsa and Sansargādhyāsa respectively. According to Pratibimba-theory, however, the identity arising from super-imposition is directly between the Bimba and the Pratibimba; whereas, according to the Ábhāsa-school, this identity is direct only between the Appearances of Reality and all other than Itself, known as Anātmā, that is, Avidya and its various modifications or possible projections and only indirect between the two, i.e., Reality and the latter as pseudo-realities and that too in consequence of the non-discrimination of Reality from Its own Appearances in the latter, resulting in a false show of identity between the two.

1. B.B.V., PP. 490-91, VV. 303-6; P. 622. V. 942.
2. V.P.S. (Andhra Univ. Pub.) Varṇaka I. P. 17.

Moreover, identity of both kinds, i. e., existential and relational, is possible in the case of the superimposition of the Pratibimba on the Bimba, as the Pratibimba can have neither any real relation to nor any existence apart from the Bimba in the real sense, but with regard to the superimposition of the Bimba on the Pratibimba only the relational type of identity can be held to be possible, as the Bimba, i. e , Atman, being Itself Absolute Reality or Eternal Existence and unrelated and independent as such, has no real relation to anything else in any way. According to the Abhasa-Theory, however, between Cidābhāsas, that is, original and corresponding Appearances of Reality of pure consciousness in and through Avidya and its various modifications, both kinds of identity are equally acceptable as a result of the mutual superimposition of the one upon the other, since neither of them does really exist or has any real relation to each other (both being equally appearances and as such only Avicāritasansiddha[1], that is, existing and veritable only apparently and conditionally till the Realisation of Reality. So far as Reality or Pure consciousness is concerned, It is essentially above both Its Appearances - inner and outer. Owing to non-discrimination from its own inner Appearances underlying Avidya and its various modifications, It may appear to be identical with the latter, serving as receptacles of those Appearances in the realm of Avidya or relativity, but this does not establish any direct identity and considerable association of the universe with Brahman, the Absolute Reality, at all and as such the said superimposition need not be admitted between these two also to explain the appearance of the world. Some followers, however, say that although only the Appearances of Pure Consciousness are directly related to the universe, yet an indirect association of the latter in an apparent manner (तादात्म्योपहितरूपेण) cannot be denied even with the Brahma, the Pure Consciousness, in the context of appearances.

1. B. B. V., P. 698, V. 1329; P. 1112, V. 484 ; P. 1106, VV., 422-23.

One more striking point of distinction between the schools of 'Pratibimba' and 'Abhāsa' is as follows. The superimposition of the Bimba is what exactly constitutes the Pratibimba, but the superimposition of the Pratibimba or reflectional appearance is an unreality, as the Pratibimba has no distinct reality of its own in any absolute sense of the term. To illustrate the remark, the superimposition[1] of the Crystal on its apparent redness (on account of the close contiguity of some red flower) is what is known as Pratibimba in this case, but the superimposition of the said redness on the crystal is clearly an unreality and nothing more than that. Thus the Pratibimba, being essentially the same as the Bimba, is to be deemed essentially as nothing but reality; whereas the Abhasa is a de novo outer manifestation, which can be held to be neither identical with, nor different from, nor both from Reality as a result of Reality appearing in and through Avidya.

Dṛṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi-Vāda as compared to Ābhāsa-Vāda :—

It will not be out of place to clear up a very important point here that as an exponent of Ābhāsavāda Sureśvara is not to be misunderstood as an upholder of Dṛṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi-Vāda. Ābhāsa is not the same as Dṛṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi, which is a purely conceptual construct, Commensurate and co-terminous with its actual apprehension or occasional cognition but an abiding entity, enduring until the realisation of Reality. The permanence and continuation of Ābhāsa as an established and veritable fact until the realisation of Reality are unquestionable and hence it will be obviously wrong to hold 'Ābhāsa' in its technical sense to be the equivalent of 'Dṛṣṭi-Sṛṣṭi', according to which the universe is a series of interrupted and occasional manifestations, arising and terminating simultaneously with their cognitions of the Jiva or the experiencer, of course associated with different empirical bodies.

Reality, according to Sureśvara :—

Sureśvara delineates 'Reality' (or 'Vastu'—the term

1. A. S., P. 443, Ls. 10-11.

repeatedly used by him to signify it) to be one[1], which exists by Itself and is altogether independent, self-subsistent, unchangeable. What is not existent or real on its own account can never become so by virtue of its relation to another.[2] Anything admitted to be non-existing at any time, under any condition or any circumstance and yet real only during its appearance is simply inconceivable. Sureśvara ironically remarks that such an absurd notion can come out of the brains of the so-called great ones[3] alone (i. e., the Naiyāyikas and other exponents of the realistic school). Whatever is transcient and changing any how, at any time and under any circumstance or condition cannot be Reality. What changes is only appearance, but behind it there is an essence which is reality and which does not change. Similarly, whatever is dependent on another in any way can have no real existence of its own but only a derived[4] or apparent one like garland-snake and nacre-silver etc. and it is, therefore, to be treated as a mere seeming expression or appearance of some reality—an underlying independent existence unrealised. Hence existence or reality in its true sense has to be accepted ultimately not only as independent and unrelated but one, eternal and absolute also. Existence, manifestation and reality which are observable in the empirical plane, are not of objects themselves but are appearence of the one fundamental and foundational Existence or Reality, Brahman. It is Self-revealing Pure Consciousness and unalloyed and unexcellable Bliss too, but seems to appear in and through Avidya and its multiple modifications in diverse empirical forms. No such independent existence or absolute reality can be predicated of phenomenal appearances, as they are undoubtedly and unexceptionally of a

1. B. B. V., P. 520. VV. 433-35; P. 913, V. 163; P. 306, V. 26; P. 1031, V. 232; P. 662, V. 1146.
2. B. B. V., P. 1660, V. 1593.
3. B. B. V., P. 578, V. 425.
4. B. B. V., A. 2, B. 3. P. 1023, V. 189; A. 4. P. 1610, V. 1292;

changeable, transcient and negatable nature. So the one, unchanging, invariable, eternal and independent, Existence behind all changing, passing, transcient and dependent empirical phenomena is the only Reality and this is known as Brahman in the Advaita Vedanta terminology. Thus the one logical way of accounting for the appearance of the world without any inconsistency with the Pure Non-dualism, is to hold that the one Eternal Existence or Absolute Reality, Brahman, is apparently expressing Itself as so many empirical entities and illusory objects. So the central doctrine of the Advaita System may be philosophically concluded to be that the one Transcendent[1] Reality runs apparently through all diversity and that the phenomenal objects are only so many seeming expressions or appearances of this Reality but have no real existence or reality of their own. Reality is absolutely one, pure and transcendent. What is empirically, relatively and limitedly known is appearance only and Reality underlies all appearances as the sustaining Existence, revealing Consciousness and unlimited and unsurpassable Bliss behind all finite realities, empirical cognitions and numerous varieties of feelings and other mental states.

This conception of Reality, besides explaining Its true nature, also clears up a mass of prejudices, accumulated against the Advaita Vedanta, in accordance with the materialistic tendencies of the modern age. This system is ordinarily charged with denouncing the world with all its prospects and prosperities as utterly unreal and illusory, requiring humanity to keep itself unconcerned with and aloof from all of them. But it should be clearly understood that the Advaita Vedanta, even as interpreted by an extreme Advaitin like Sureśvara, does not dispute and doubt the acknowledged order of things in the realm of pseudo-realities or relativity & phenomenalism. It does not claim and endeavour to establish that the world does not exist at all and that it is devoid of any conditioning

1. B. B. V, A. 4, B. 3. P. 1588, V. 1178, P. 1589, V. 1185; P. 1576, V. 1105; P. 1863, V. 868.

cause, practical utility and pragmatic value for one, who is under the spell of Avidya. On the other hand, it admits and appraises the worldly phenomena as they are with all their empirical, ethical, moral and spiritual values from purely empirical point of view and further regards them as a means to the highest goal, Mokṣa, and as indirectly leading to the Realisation of Absolute Reality, if a right attitude towards it is kept up by the seeker of salvation. But rising above the stage of relative and apparent realities and practical utilities or pragmatic values, the Advaita Vedanta further asserts on the ground of their origin and termination, changeability and temporal, spatial and objective durability and differences that they have no existence and reality of their own apart from the Brahman, and the Brahman is the only ultimate Reality or the sole substratum and Source and the Ground and Goal of all appearances.

From this description of Reality, repeatedly available in Sureśvara's works and already explained above fully, it can be easily made out that the Advaita system does not deem the mere fact of existence and manifestation as the inevitable guarantee or conclusive proof of reality because existence and manifestation may be either finite, dependent and conditional (i.e., appearance) or infinite, independent and unconditional (i.e, Reality). So the criteria[1] of '*Reality*', in conformity with Sureśvara's conception about It may be laid down to be unconditionality, unchangeability, eternality, independence or self-subsistence and freedom from differences of any kind; while those[2] of '*appearances*' conditionality, changeability, perishability, dependence or pseudo-existence and differentiability. In other words, the true test of '*appearance*' is that it does not exist independently, at all times and unconditionally; whereas Reality, says Sureśvarācārya, is timelessly, unconditionally and independently so. It is sheer anamoly to

1. B.B.V., P. 1616, V. 1328; V. 1333; P. 662, V. 1146; P. 368, V. 104; P. 707, V. 1375; T.B.V., P. 73, VV. 33-35; P. 164, V. 67; P. 115, V. 12.
2. B.B.V., P. 1616, V. 1327; P. 663, V. 1147.

say that a certain thing is true or real at one time but not so at another. That, which is not true or real by itself or on its own account, cannot become so even in relation to or in consequence of its association with something else. That, which does not exist and is not real at any particular time or space and under all conditions and circumstances, cannot become so at any other time or space and under certain conditions and circumstances whatsoever. So finite existence, limited manifestation, changeability and transcience are possible only in the case of an appearance. So long as the one, absolute, underlying and ultimate Reality[1] is not realised, the manifolds of the universe will surely continue to appear to be established facts and real or veritable for all practical purposes and this is exactly what Sureśvara means by describing the universe as *Avicārita-Sansidha*'[2]. So from the standpoint of Avidya[3] and in the realm of relativity Sureśvara does not dispute and deny the pseudo-reality or appearance of the universe and the acknowledged order of evolutions with all their various pragmatic prospects and values.

Brahman as Sat-Cit-Ānanda :—

Having attempted in the foregoing pages a systematic presentation of Sureśvara's view about Reality, it is proposed now to discuss the essential nature of "Brahman", which is simultaneously and ever 'Sat', 'Cit' and 'Ananda'. Absolute Reality or Eternal Existence, of which the universe is a series of manifold appearances, cannot Itself be either unconscious or dependent on something else for Its revelation. If all things, enshrouded in non-manifestation on account of Avidya, are to be made manifest, they can be so done only by some underlying self-Manifest Being. This standing source of manifestation cannot but be Pure Consciousness and this Pure Consciousness must be self-revealing and ever-effulgent in order that the defect of

1. BB.V., P. 1033, VV. 247-48.
2. B.B.V., P. 1616. VV. 1327-28; P. 662, V. 1143.
3. B.B.V., P. 1616, V. 1328; PP. 662-63, VV. 1147-47; P. 1610, V. 1292; P. 1617. V. 1335.

infinitum ad regress may not arise. Again, if things of the universe are not always the cause of delight because of their limitations and even the so-called worldly pleasures are not unmixed with sufferings and not unsurpassable by still higher pleasures, there must be an ultimate, unalloyed, unlimited, unsurpassable and eternal Bliss, of which the worldly pleasures are only faint shadows or echoes. So Absolute Reality must be independent, unconditional, self-complete and self-subsisting Eternal Existance (Sat), self-revealing, self-luminous, and ever-effulgent Pure Consciousness (Cit) and unlimited, unexcellable and unalloyed Bliss (Ananda). It will not be out of place to remark here that the said three different terms, uniformly employed to explain the essential nature of the one Reality, Brahman, are not intended to signify so many really distint attributes or traits of nature inherent in the Brahman, but they are simply supplementary to one another and jointly express and explain only one idea. In popular parlance, each of these words expresses no doubt a distinct idea of its own, but with regard to Brahman they all conjointly convey a single idea, only through different approaches in conformity with the requirements of ordinary experience (upadheyasaṅkarepi upādhyasaṅkarāt). As applied to finite empirical entities, the terms—existence or reality, knowledge or consciousness, delight or happiness denote altogether separate and different notions. But in connection with Brahman-unlimited, infinite and absolute, the same terms lose all their denotative differences, prevalent in common parlance, and merely supplement one another in conveying fully one complete idea about the one, pure and absolutely undifferentiated Brahman. In empirical life to exist is one thing, to be cognisant or conscious is another and to be delightful or happy is still another, because these terms are then respectively denotative of limited existence or finite appearance, definite cognition or modal comprehension (वृत्तिरूप-ज्ञान) and worldly delight-transcient and unexceptionally

interwoven with sorrows—as well as passing pragmatic satisfactions. But Brahman, the Reality, which, as explained above, is absolutely independent of anything else either for origin and existence or for manifestation or for delight, cannot but be eternal, unlimited, self-same, self-sustained and self-revealing Consciousness and Bliss Itself and as denotative of an idea about such an Alsolute Reality or Brahman-Eternal Existence, Pure and self-luminous Consciousness and unlimited, unsurpassable and unalloyed Bliss—all the three terms cannot but aim at indicating one, simple and undifferentiated idea. In other words, in the case of the Absolute or Transcendent Brahman, what is Eternal Existence is also Pure Consciousness, and what is Pure Cousciousness, is also Unalloyed Bliss and all this is only one and the same Brahman and hence in reference to such a Brahman, free from all possible kinds of differences—similar, dissimilar and inherent, these terms must be accepted to be undistinctive and mutually supplementary, intended to explain and signify the idea of one self-complete inexhaustible unity. Distinctions between existence and consciousness or between conciousness and happiness prevail only in the sphere of limitations, as all objects are necessarily limited and finite therein, but with reference to one Absolute Reality, which is illimitable, all the three—Existence, Consciousness and Bliss are one and one only.

Truly speaking, in order to avoid the misunderstanding of dualism necessarily involved in the idea of a substance and its quality Brahman, described as 'Sat', 'Cit' and 'Anand', has to be explained as 'Existence, Consciousness and Bliss' but not as Existent, conscious and blissful. If Brahman were to be regarded as existent or real, conscious and blissful, i. e., possessing existence or reality, consciousness and bliss as Its qualities, the question of the relation subsisting between the two—the substantive, Brahman, and Its attributes or qualities, existence and consciousness etc., and the consequent contingency of dualism would creep in and this will obviously

militate against the doctrine of pure monism, regardfully maintained by the system. The conception of existence or reality etc. severed from the objects, possessed of them and known as existent or real etc., is suitably applicable only in the case of worldly entities, which derive their terminable existence and relative reality from another (that is, Reality proper, the Brahman) and are only, therefore conditionally and limitedly existent and real. To avoid all these complications the true nature of pure, eternal and absolute non-dualism, Brahman is explained in this system to be by nature Eternal Existence or Absolute Reality-self-sustained and absolutely independent—so that no question of differentiation might arise therein in any way. Thus one, absolute, unrelated and undifferentiated Brahman Itself is held to be Existence, Consciousness and Bliss and in order to indicate and inculcate this Pure Unity, these words have to be employed in response to the logical demand of the empirical way of thinking but must be understood as devoid of their differentiating tendencies.

A. Brahman as Sat, that is, Eternal Existence or Absolute Reality :—

(i) Sat is Ananugaṭavyāvṛtta[1] :—

The metaphysical system of the Advaita Vedanta starts with explaining the diversity of world with its innumerable disparities and immense gradations and culminates in the establishment of Pure Unity or Bare Non-dualism, which transcends all differences, relations and limitations whatsoever. Accordingly it has been delineated repeatedly above that the relative world with its vast varieties and endless possibilities, being impermanent, transcient, limited and conditional

1. B. B. V., P. 1441, V. 368; P. 1814, V. 569; P. 1794, V. 447; P. 1750, V. 164; P. 1699, V. 1815; P. 1051, V. 110; P. 1032, V. 240; P. 1037, V. 14; P. 1214, V. 38 & V. 41; P. 1102, V. 411; P. 1251, V. 73; P. 1950, V. 10; P. 948, V. 371; P. 994, V. 12; P. 580, V 730; P. 901, V. 88; P. 565, V. 656; P. 1111, V. 473.

cannot but be appearances and as such necessarily presuppose something, eternal, unlimited and unconditional as its underlying basis or sustaining Reality, on which are pitched up the passing phases of this universe like ordinary appearances such as snake and earth-crack etc. on the one pseudo-real garland. This ultimate and Absolute Reality is called in the Advaita-Vedanta terminology Brahman, i.e., the vast, unbounded or unlimited and absolutely undivided and indivisible. Whatever division is attributed to It in philosophical disquisition is only a concession to the limitations of normal experience of thought and senses. Hence so long as the world of thought and senses persists, the Absolute Reality, which is one and undifferentiated, cannot but be regarded in dual[1] and inter-related aspects of immanence and distinction. Even ordinarily in any case of causal relation between two things, the cause must be held to be both immanent in and distinct from its effect. Without immanence the effect cannot be attributed to its cause. Again, without distinction the effect cannot be related to its cause; because the very idea of relationship necessarily implies and presupposes distinction. So as an Ultimate Cause of all appearances, Brahman has to be described as both immanent in and also distinct from all appearances so long as the appearances are lingering on these all in all in the empirical state of existence.

Thus both the aspects[2] of immanence and distinction or inclusion and exclusion are inter-related and relative, as they stand in logical necessity of something else to be permeated by and excluded or distinguished from the Brahman. But Brahman —absolute and aspectless—which transcends[3] (to use some word in order to express an idea about what is really inexpressible) both these aspects even, is the only Reality in its true sense, all

1. B. B. V., P. 915, V. 173; P. 1081, V. 290; P. 1834, V. 691; P. 792, V. 1349.
2. B.B.V., P. 915, VV. 170-73; P. 714, V. 14-15.
3. B.B.V., P. 714, V, 1414; P. 1023, VV. 186-88; P. 1152, V. 29; P. 1647, VV. 1516-17; P. 1950, V. 9; P. 996, VV. 21-22.

others being only Its appearances. This aspectless Brahman is a synonym of what has been referred to repeatedly so far as the one ultimate and underlying Reality, the non-realisation of which has resulted in all kinds of empirical and illusory appearances beginningless and interminable, making up the whole of universe. Thus it follows undoubtedly that the terminological distinction such as (i) "Anugata", that is, immanent in all worldly entities through its Incidences or Appearances immured in Avidya and its various modifications. (ii) "Vyāvṛtta", that is, distinct from those worldly entities or appearances, which are known as Parāk or Anātman,[1] i.e., other than the Soul, and (iii) "Ananugata-vyāvṛtta[2]", that is, the Reality proper, transcending these two aspects even as absolute and aspectless—is in response to the logical demand of explaining the appearance of the world and also of keeping Brahman above all divisions, limitations and relations so as to ensure and maintain inviolably the doctrine of Pure or Abstract Nondualism, indisputably sought to be established by the Advaita system. So the employment of terms such as "Anugata" (i.e., related to the world), "Vyāvṛtta" (i.e. distinct from Anātma) and "Ananugata-vyāvṛtta" (i.e. Unrelated and Aspectless or Transcendent) is merely a formal attempt (for the purpose of clear grasp) at distinguishing and analysing logically what is in reality indistinguishable, indivisible and absolutely one and above all logical analysis. Brahman as *Immanent* is involved in the world as its source and sustenance through its Incidences or Appearances and the same as *Transcendent* is unconcerned with and absolutely unrelated to anything else, utterly conspicuous by absence from the standpoint of Reality, and this statement is neither paradoxical nor involves any logical inconsistency, as the two positions are clearly based on two different stand-points of "Vastu-Vṛtta" and "Tamo-Vṛtta" (i.e., standpoints of Reality and Avidya respectively). In other words, the representation of

1. B.B.V., A. 3, B. 4, P. 1226, W. 108-111.
2. B.B.V.; A. 1, B. 4, P. 565, V. 657; A. 2, B. 4, P. 1051, V. 110.

one and the same Reality-Consciousness-Bless Brahman as *Immanent*, that is, pervading, permeating and pulsating through all worldly entities and as Transcendent, i. e., beyond the reach of all of them is not any assertive proposition but only explanatory or reconciliatory of two apparent contradictions: the world appearing to be real to normal human experience on the one hand and Brahman, the only Reality recognised by the Upanisadic texts on the other. Thus the Transcendent, Absolute and Aspectless Brahman, as recognised by the system, is not only essentially one, unrelated, unlimited, immutable and inexhaustible but also free from the logical and metaphysical incongruities, involved in its dynamic conception as held by some Buddhistic, Śaivāgama and Tāntric schools of Indian philosophy. To put the idea succinctly, there is not the least contradiction in maintaining the Brahman to be one Transcendental Reality but only apparently running through all seeming diversity.

A further analysis of the point, discussed so far, may be made as follows. 'Immanence' is truth or reality in relation to all appearances of the world and so is 'Distinction' too till the dualism of Atman and Anātman or Pratyak and Parāk is not dissipated by supreme Brahman-realisation. Both 'Immanence' and 'Distinction' appear to be true so long as Truth or Reality Itself has not been realised. In other words, the whole universe together with its series of causes and effects is an appearance of Reality, arising from non-realisation[1] thereof. But when Reality proper is fully realised, not only Avidya but also the universe with all its apparent-truths and empirical realities[2] are sublated and Brahman-Transcendent, Absolute and Aspectless-remains the one Truth-in-Itself or the only

1. B. B. V., P. 1132, VV. 130-32; P. 1080, V. 282; P. 914, V. 164; P. 462, V. 178; P. 668, V. 1170; P. 669, VV. 1178-79; P. 1108, VV. 453-56.
2. B. B. V., P. 1211, V. 24; P. 1108, VV. 453-54; A. 4, B. 3, P. 1648, VV. 1522-23; A. 1, B. 4, P. 668, V. 1171; PP. 669-70, W. 1179-83.

Reality in its absolute sense. It is immutable, indivisible, inexhaustible and always, invariably and unconditionally the same, that is, Eternal Existence, Pure Consciousness and Absolute Bliss. This explains how Brahman which is absolutely undifferentiated and Aspectless, comes to be viewed in aspects more than one merely by way of explaining appearances without involving any detraction from its nature. Though appearing to be immanent, It maintains Its oneness, purity and unrelatedness always and remains uniformly and invariably above all disturbing influences and differentiating elements of the empirical order.

Accordingly, any attempt at defining the Absolute Reality, Brahman, as all-pervading and distinguishable from all that appear to be other than Itself in the realm of relativity proves unquestionably and utterly futile. By the term "Anugata", as already discussed, is to be understood that, which is identically continuous or running through all particulars; while the term "Vyāvṛtta" is quite antithetical and means that, which is distinct and particular. If so, what immanence[1] or distinctness can be predicable of Brahman, when nothing[2] else other than It really exists or is really apart from It. Thus immanence in and distinction from all appearances, i.e., empirical entities and illusions are obviously meaningless and unreal from the view-point of Absolute Reality. So when all appearances are sublated on realisation of Reality, there remaining nothing else, in which and from which Brahman may be said to be respectively 'immanent' or 'distinct', Brahman is realised as one Pure Being, Bare Essence, or simple Unity, wholly devoid of all relations, divisions and limitations.

(ii) Sat is Pratyak[3] :—

Brahman is Pratyak or Pratyagātama, that is, one, which

1. B. B. V., P. 914, VV. 164-66.
2. B. B. V., P. 913, V. 163.
3. B. B. V., P. 465, V. 189; P. 565, VV. 656-58; P. 561, V. 673; P. 577, V. 716; P. 579, V. 728; P. 580, VV. 729-31; P. 582, VV. 739-40; P. 583, VV. 748-49; P. 622, V. 942; P. 623, V. 946; P. 627, VV. 966-68; P. 629, VV. 974-77; P. 631, V. 983; P. 641,

is unconditionally, immediately and spontaneously manifesting or revealing Itself through all. If one tries to analyse even his ordinary experiences of emperical life, a clear contrast is sure to be perceived between himself, always playing the role of knower as 'I' and invariably present in all his various experiences, and objects always appearing to be something other than himself knowable as 'this' and changing on each occasion of cognition. Objects and their experiences are changing, multiple and transitory in their nature but the experiencing self is immediately and invariably present throughout. Thus the immediacy of the experiencing self in comparision to objects of experiences is undeniable. But such experiencing selves or individual souls, being associated with different organs and bodies as adjuncts, come to appear as many and even one individual soul has different states of existence owing to different conditions of its adjuncts. (1) During deep sleep (Susupti) all external and internal organs are absorbed in Avidya, the sole functioning adjunct at the time; (2) During dream-stage (Svapna), the adjunct mind, besides Avidya, functions both as the subject and the object. In the waking state (Jāgaraṇa), Avidya and all its modifications, i.e., the entire psycho-physical organism with the senses, are functioning in their fully manifest condition. There is an undeniable consciousness of these distinct states but there are no differences in the state of Consciousness Itself. In fact the division of appearances as subjects and objects is only formal and structural, coming out or disappearing gradually in the process of evolution or involution respectively. This distinction goes on widening and becoming

V. 1035; P. 668, VV. 1170-71; P. 700, V. 1341; P. 703, V. 1356; P. 712, V. 1404, P. 710, V. 1396; P. 1024, VV. 191-92; P. 994, V. 11; P. 924, V. 232, P. 1110, V. 467-& 471; P. 1106, V. 441; P. 1078, VV. 88-89; P. 1030, VV. 227-28; P. 1027, V. 209 & 213; P. 1897, V. 1073, 1075 and 1077; P. 1847, VV. 765-66; P. 1834, V. 691; P. 1835, V. 694; 1750, V. 163; P. 714, P. 1413.

more and more vivid as one passes out of the state of deep sleep to the waking state and the same goes on narrowing and becoming more and more indistinct as one slides on from the waking state to that of deep sleep, wherein it lies dormant and summed up as Avidya. At last it is altogether obliterated by the realisation of Reality, the Eternal Existence or the only Existence from the view-point of Absolute Reality. In view of the above fact, it has to be accepted that there is an unchanging, immediate, unmodified and uninterrupted Pure Consciousness, underlying all kinds of experiences and illuminating cognitions and all facts of cognitions–subjective as well as objective. So Pure Consciousness, the Brahman, must be held to be unconditionally and unlimitedly most immediate to all, as even all intervening and obstructive factors of cognitive finitude or causes of mediacy, difference and limitation—such as time, space and discrete objects—too necessarily presuppose Pure Consciousness for their own conditional and limited manifestation or appearance, direct or indirect. To put it more clearly, in the realm of our finite experience some objects and their cognitions appear to be immediate under certain necessary conditions. But this cannot be so unless they are held to be appearances of Pure Consciousness, which is Itself Immediacy—eternal and unconditional. All this is from the epistemological standpoint.

From the ontological point of view also the same conclusion will be arrived at. All phenomena of the universe, being so many appearances, derive their existence and manifestation from the One Reality, Brahman, and must be, therefore, immediately[1] and identically connected with It. The so-called different causes or different effects in the empirical plane, being the successive intervening stages in the gradual order of the evolution of appearances, are only

1. B. B. V., A. 1, B. 4, P. 565, VV. 657–59; N. S., A III, P. 116, V. 11 and P. 118, VV. 14—15; P. 149, V. 71; B. B. V. P. 1394, V. 102.

conditionally immediate. But as the Reality, the ultimate Source and Substratum of all, without which nothing could have gained appearance at all, Brahman is unconditionally most immediate to all. Just as the garland[1] pervades or runs through all its appearances such as the serpent or earth-crack etc. as their common underlying reality, occasioning their so-called existence and manifestation and is immediate to them all; similarly the one Reality, Brahman[2], pervades, permeates and pulsates through all empirical entities, or appearances unexceptionally and is invariably immediate to them all. But the said garland also is only a pseudo-reality and an appearance from the view-point of Absolute Reality. Thus all, i.e., both illusions and the so-called real empirical entities, being appearances[3] alike, are ultimately dependent on the one Absolute Reality, Brahman, recognised by the Advaita system. So the one Reality or Pure Consciousness—Brahman—is the only immediate, owing to which all others, directly related to each other in the empirical order of creation or evolution of appearances, appear to be conditionally immediate. To put it more clearly Brahman is Pratyak or Immediacy unconditional and apriori—and all others are Parāk, that is, mediate and indirect and only conditionally appear[4] to be immediate at times as appearances of this Immediacy. Sureśvarācārya is of opinion that a priori[5] Immediacy and pure Oneness also are to be regarded as another explanatory phases of the essential nature of Brahman like Reality and Consciousness etc. He further holds that this Immediacy is not to be deemed as relative like the

1. B. B. V., P. 582, V. 739.
2. B. B. V., P. 1211, VV. 24-25.
3. B. B. V., P. 931, V. 266; P. 698, V. 1329; P. 699, V. 1334; P. 432. V. 23; P. 1048, V. 88; P. 1868, V. 901; T. B. V., P. 131, V. 12.
4. B.B. V., P. 549, V. 577; Sambandha-vārtika, P. 219, VV. 792-93.
5. Sambandha-Vārtika, P. 247, V. 908.

"Mahatta[1]" or all-pervasiveness of Ākāśa, which is so only in comparison to limited Ākāśas such as "Ghaṭākāśa" or "Paṭākāśa" etc. But Brahman is Immediary Itself and a priori.

(iii) Sat is "Svamahimsiddha" :—

Brahman is self-established[2] (Svatahsiddhe). All, other than Brahman, owe their origin, existence and manifestation to It. So the bewildering mass of phenomenal diversity, not being real in the true sense of the term in the light of the above criteria, necessarily presuppose any invariably, imperishably and independently enduring Entity. This eternal Entity being the ultimate cause of all world phenomena must be absolutely self-sustained and independent that is, Itself Eternal Existence. So Brahman, as conceived by Sureśvara, is not only the highest metaphysical principle but also an undeniable logical necessity. Even in our common experience we make a distinction between a mountain, which is popularly believed to be real, while a mountain appearing in the form of clouds is ordinarily taken to be unreal. The difference lies in the fact that while the so-called real mountain is one, which has an empirical existence, the illusory mountain has none but is dependent on the clouds for its origin and existence etc. But these distinctions are only popular notions, The philosophical truth[3] is that even the so-called real mountain also has no independent existence of its own. Ultimately, if there is anything which exists independently and eternally and is absolutely self-subsisting, it is Brahman.

(iv) Sat is beyond[4] Time and Space :—

Absolute Reality or Brahman is free from all kinds of limitations. It is an eternal plenum of 'Sat', 'Cit' and

1. Sambandha-Vartika, P. 247 V. 907.
2. Sambandha-Vārtika, P. 268, V. 1002; P. 269, V. 1004; P. 264, V. 985; P. 219, V. 794; P. 218, V. 791; P. 283, VV. 1083-84; B.B. V., A. 1, B. 4, P. 579, VV. 726-27.
3. B. B. V., A. 4, B. 3, P. 1449, V. 415.
4. B. B. V., P. 1230, V. 134; P. 565, V. 659; P. 698, VV. 1131-32; TBV P 73.

'Anand' essentially beyond the ripples of dynamic expressions. It transcends time and space, because time and space are the products of Avidya and gain currency only in the phenomenal world or the realm of passing appearances wherein every thing is sought to be explained in limited existence or origin, endurance and destruction etc. Time and space are the outcome of Avidya and are only indicative of limitation, division, succession and remoteness or contiguity in appearance. Time and space, into which the worldly objects seem to be scattered and dissected with their innumerable divisions and limitations, cannot have any real relation to the unrelated and unlimited Brahman, the Eternal Existence. They are needed to account for the limitations and respective orders in appearances of the changing phenomena or series of events, occuring in succession or simultaneity. But the one, immutable, unlimited and invariable Reality must be beyond both of them. One of the greatest contribution of Sureśvarācārya is that he has assigned an indubitable position to Brahman by establishing It both as the source of and above all seeming expression or appearances, i. e., the phenomenal world. Time and space are also within the range of appearances and as such they too gain[1] their ground on the basis of Reality, which is ever Pure Consciousness as well. The trans-conceptual character of Brahman or Absolute Reality keeps it above all kinds of relations[2]. Being devoid of any antecedent and subsequent non-existence, Brahman is unrelatable or unassignable to time and space. No worldly phenomenon exists for all times and in all spaces. It is necessarily preceded and succeeded by non-existence except at any specified period of time and place. But these limitations of time and space cannot bind the eternal and unconditioned self-luminous Consciousness. Various kinds of non-existence can have some meaning with reference to objects, which appear to be existent empirically and condi-

1. Sambandha-Vārtika, P. 267, V. 999.
2. B. B. V., A. 4, B. B. P. 1448, V. 413., P. 1449, V. 415.

tionally, but not to what is Eternal and Unconditional Existence and Ever-shining and Self-luminous Consciousness. The conception of 'Time' and 'Space' arises from the logical necessity of accounting for the order of diverse appearances from one Brahman, which is at the root of as well as above all passing evolutions and is Itself eternally Immutable and Invariable. The mere invariably Static or Immutable Presence[1] of Reality with modifying and ever-operating Avidya is enough to explain all evolutionary changes and passing appearances. So Brahman must have a priori acceptance and recognition above all causal factors, differentiating elements and limiting conditions that start and terminate with the order of evolutions. It cannot be denied, doubted or questioned in any way. It can have neither any beginning nor any end; because, being Eternal Existence or Absolute Reality, It cannot have non-existence at any time or place and, being Ever-shining Self-luminous Pure consciousness, It cannot[2] be subject to non-manifestation in any way. As Eternity and Reality, the inexhaustible source of all appearances It is Itself sourceless and transcends not only time and space but all empirical conditions, limitations and relations.

(v) Sat is "Svārtha[3]" or Self-subservient:—

Without an Eternal Existence the whole empirical life of will and purpose would be stultified. All purpose is based on some Reality and looks towards It as an end to be realised. If time in its course were to hurl all its products into utter nothingness, if there were no unlimited and unchanging Reality as the eternal back-ground, against which all happenings or producibles are appearing

1 B. B. V., A. 2, B. B. P. 1029, VV. 223-24; Sambandha-Vārtika, P. 269, V. 1005; P. 219, VV. 792-93.

2. Sambandha-Vārtika, P. 268, VV. 1000-1000.

3. B.B.V., P. 520, V. 433; P. 910, V. 141; Sambandh-vārtika, P. 287, V. 1083.

as defined in time and space and specified[1] by various names and forms, in which all relative phenomena or series of passing sequences have been gaining ground beginninglessly and towards which all becomings or appearances are drifting as their final ground of absorption or the limit of their sublation (Atta), the very notion of appearance and purpose would be frustrated. This unchanging ultimate Reality and eternal ground and goal of the whole creation is Brahman, which is independent of other things and on which all other things are directly or indirectly dependent.

It has been established repeatedly so far that the world is nothing but a series of passing appearances. The world as such necessarily takes its stand upon and is subordinate and subservient to some Reality, namely, Brahman, which is altogether independent and self-complete. The reality of the world has to be assumed, as otherwise no pragmatic purpose—'the volitional demands of our empirical self'—can be either fulfilled or frustrated. But no such assumption is necessary and possible with Brahman, as It is not only Eternal Reality but unlimited Bliss as well. Thus there can be no interest[2] or purpose for such Brahman, which is Itself pure, unsurpassable and unlimited Bliss and the realisation of which is the highest pinnacle of all achievements. If for a bound individual self-one of the appearances of the same Brahman—there can be any supreme purpose, it is the realisation of unity with the same, which would put an end to the otherwise unending miserable empirical existence or human life, torn with diverse desires and pragmatic purposes consequent on the non-realisation of this Bliss. All pragmatic purposes appear to be so only so long as this Eternal

1. B.B.V., P. 1034, VV. 253-54; P. 1132, V. 134; P. 669, V. 1177; P. 860, V. 340.
2. B.B.V., P. 1048, VV. 89-91; P. 641, V. 1035.

Reality, the pure Bliss, has not been realised. So Reality Itself being pure and undifferentiated Non-dualism, cannot but be self-subservient.

(vi) Sat is Kūṭasṭha[1] and Apariṇāmi :—

It has already been proved above that Reality is Eternity and implies an Existence without beginning and end. But nothing in this phenomenal world can be really without beginning and end and absolutely unchanging. If such an Entity exists, it cannot be so without transcending the conditions of finite existence. Reality, the Brahman, can alone be so, as proved above, and hence it must transcend the conditions of finite existence. Eternal existence must be Its very essence and, in order to be absolute and interminable, It must also be unchangeable. Changes and modifications always accompany limitations. Anything changing or undergoing modifications in any way cannot be eternal or exist independently. Brahman has no different successive phases or modes of being. The various and varied objects of the world are fleeting and changing ; because their manifestations do not last eternally nor are they cognisable everywhere and under all conditions and circumstances. The fact that all phenomena of the universe are varying and ever-changing necessarily presupposes as well as proves that there must be a permanent or eternal Existence, which only is absolutely incapable of changes and variations. While all others are changing[2], this absolute Reality is invariable, immutable, unalterable and eternal Existence or, in other words, Kūṭasṭha.

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1. B. B. V., P. 1107, V. 450 ; P. 927. V. 244 ; P. 920. V. 200 ; P. 1307, V. 104 ; P. 926, V. 235 ; P. 937, V. 304 ; P. 938, V. V. 305-9 ; P. 1629, V. 1409 ; P. 1543, V. 906, P. 1310, V. 123 ; P. 696, V. 1321 ; P. 361, V. 68 ; P. 706, V. 1369, ; P. 707, VV. 1375-76 ; P. 491, VV. 304-5 ; N. S. A, III, P. 116, V. 11 ; and PP. 118-19, VV. 14-17.

2. Samvandha-Vārtika, P. 268, V. 1000.

(vii) Sat is Attributeless[1]:—

Brahman is neither void nor possessed of any specific form or quality etc. but a plenum. From the references made by Sureṣvarācārya in his Vārtika on the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad it becomes evident that there were many earlier Vedantins, who attributed some particular eternal form or other to Brahman. In absence of sufficient data or evidence, no attempt can be made at tracing out the exponents of these views and developing or discussing their theories fully and distinctly. On the basis of meagre hints[2], available in the said references, only this much can be said that some held Brahman to be of purely white colour; others maintained It to be of purely blue colour; still others recognised It to be of purely yellowish red colour like flames of fire; still others conceived It to be purely of fast green colour like an emerald and yet others regarded It as of purely red colour like Japākusuma flowers. Similarly, they also ascribed other attributes such as particular sound and touch etc. to Brahman differently in accordance with their own theories. Sureśvarācārya criticised and rejected all these theories together with one sweeping remark that there is no limit to such baseless fancies, particularly of those, whose minds are obsessed by ignorance and intellects deflected by their fanciful speculations and unverified suppositions, according to their own sweet will. Such theories, he says, can never stand to reason in face of clear Scriptural statements, which declare Brahman to be absolutely devoid of all attributes and forms.

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1. B. B. V., P. 704, V. 1364; P. 623, V. 945.
2. B. B. V., PP. 1812-13, VV. 562-64.

B. Brahman as Cit, i.e., Pure Consciousness :—

(i) Cit is eternal[1] :—

The fact that Cit (i.e. Pure Consciousness) is eternal is the necessary presupposition of any statement about knowledge. Even for the purpose of argument Consciousness cannot be assumed to be having beginning and end. An appearance must be invariably and respectively preceded and followed by its prior and subsequent non-existence. But no such non-existence of Consciousness, the Reality, can be conceived of, since the supposed non-existence of Consciousness too would require to be revealed by Consciousness as witness. While proving the eternality of Consciousness, Sureśvarācārya says that nothing such as the knower or the known etc., other than Anubhūti, that is, Pure Consciousness can be posited as existent at all without the recognition of eternal Consciousness. The knower and the known etc. are variable and changing, but what is invariably present and unchanging behind all these is Pratyak-Samvit, that is immediate and pure Consciousness. Hence it is impossible to establish or deny anything without the pure Consciousness or independently of It, just as serpent and earth-crack etc., appearing over the garland, cannot be recognised without the garland itself. It may be, therefore, concluded that what is eternal Existence or absolute Reality is pure, immediate and self-luminous Consciousness also.

(ii) Cit is self-luminous[2] :—

It is the supreme virtue or prerogative of knowledge, which is essentially Pure Consciousness, that it reveals[3] and establishes all that exists empirically in any way. Without it no manifesta-

1. B.B.V., P. 712. V, 1403; P. 1647, V. 1515,
2. B.B.V., P. 488, VV. 292-93.
3. A.B.V., P. 1029, VV. 223-24.

tion or appearance of anything would have been or would be possible. It is the Light of all lights, the only source of all manifestations and the centre behind all illuminating factors recognised as such in the popular belief. It is the Reality as well as pure Consciousness. It is the Light or the Consciousness that illuminates and sustains all empirical entities and even further illusions. But for this Light even the appearances as empirical realities, not to speak of illusions, cannot be comprehended. But for this Light, declares the Upaniṣad, there can be no light in the Sun and the Moon etc. Hence that, without which other things cannot be apprehended, cognised or manifested, must be self-luminous and all-revealing. It is, therefore, held to be unconditional and a priori Immediacy (Pratyak). All other things, whether discursive cognitions or their discrete objects, appear as immediate for the time being; because this one Consciousness, which is Immediacy Itself, comes about to appear in and out through them whenever the necessary epystemological conditions of directness or immediacy happen to be combined fully and fulfilled variously. Even in the case of all kinds of indirect cognitions or experiences, this immediacy of Pure Consciousness apparently expresses Itself of course only half-revealed but not fully, in as much as the obscuration of Avidya (enshrouding the object-Appearance of Consciousness) in that case is removed only partially, i.e., in respect of the non-existence of the object (Asattvāpādakājñāna) but not in respect of its non-manifestation too (Abhānāpādakājñāna). So all emprical experiences or finite cognitions are only so many appearances[1] of the one, absolute, infinite and pure Consciousness and, though apparantly different from it, are essentially nothing other than the ever-same, eternal and infinite Immediacy, that is, pure Consciousness. The result of the contact between an object and its proper sense or sense-relation is to occasion Vṛtti (psychosis)—the

1. B.B.V., A. 4. B. 3. P. 1650 V. 1533; P. 1651, V. 1535.

mental modification, which helps the underlying Consciousness to reveal Itself by removing the obscuration of Avidya in and about It, underlying a particular object, on the one hand, and the partially modified inner organ, on the other. The theory of perception will be discussed at length in the chapter dealing with Epistemology. For the present it will suffice to say that only presentations or appearances of Consciousness within the mental modes or psychoses, empirically known as cognitions, are subject to origin and end but not Consciousness Itself, whose essential nature is self-luminosity and immediacy.

Brahman as absolute Reality or eternal Existence incidenting Itself on the various modifications of Avidya gives rise to appearances as various empirical entities and is ultimately responsible for their so-called constancy, permanency, value, reality and existence, which seem to be belonging to objects of the universe. In the same manner, Brahman as Pure Consciousness, incidenting Itself on and appearing in and through various modes, into which the mind is transformed as a result of its actual intercourse with or mere stimulation from a particular object—external or internal, appears as particular states or forms of cognitions (Vṛttijnāna). The modal appearances of Consciousness, known as so many empirical cognitions, are subject to origin and termination, but the pure, eternal and absolute Consciousness[1] (Svarūpajñāna), which is the Essence or Reality of all finite appearances or manifestations—subjective, objective and modal—is un-generated, indestructible, ever-shining, self-luminous and immediate. Thus Brahman, being

1. B. B. V., A. 1, B. 3, P. 361, V. 68 ; A. 4, B. 3, P. 1687, V. 1737 ; P. 1616, V. 8453 ; P. 1637, V. 1456 ; P. 1628, V. 1402 ; P. 1629, V. 1406 and V. 1409 ; P. 1589, V. 1185 ; PP. 1631-34, VV. 1429-38,

self-luminous Consciousness and Immediacy Itself, the idea of Its being an object of any kind of knowledge—introspective or extrospective—is denied ex-hypothesis in this system.

This essential self-luminosity of eternal and infinite Conscionsness, as admitted by Advaitins, is to be distinguished from the empirical self-luminosity of passing and finite cognitions, as accepted by followers of the Prābhākara school in the Mīmānsā system. The followers of the Prābhākara system hold that only all cognitions, which are the attributes of and different irom the self, are necessarily self-luminous and that whenever any cognition arises, it manifests, besides itself, the Self as its locus and any external or internal object, as the case may be, as its content. Together with the revelation of a self-luminous cognition, there arises a simultaneous manifestation of all the three aspects of a cognition—the knower, the known and the knowledge (Tripuṭī-Pratyakṣa), Bhāratitīrtha, the author of Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, while criticising this Prābhākara view of self-luminosity, begins with a volley of questions: is the Self immediate or immediately manifest as the locus of cognition merely because of its relation to cognition as such or because of its being the content of cognition? None of these alternatives is plausible. The Self is not to be held immediate either as the locus or content of a cognition; since one and the same entity cannot play the diametrically opposed double role of both the cogniser and the cognised. Even if it is so assumed for the sake of mere argument, the question arises as to whether the Self is manifested by its attribute, cognition, as the locus together with the other content, namely, the external or internal object (being cognised at the time) simultaneously or one after another. If the Self and the object proper are manifested at different times (that is, one after another), its relation to the object cognised in the form "This is known by me" would become unaccountable. If the cognition of the Self and that of the object proper are held to be concurrent or simultaneous, no explanation can possibly be offered for

two such cognitions arising simultaneously as apprehending two contrary contents, namely, the subject and the object. So simultaniety of two cognitions being inexplicable and there being no third alternative possible, this view is rendered utterly untenable. The existence of a mere relation between the Self and the self-luminous cognition can be of no avail in manifesting the former, if it is altogether different from the latter; because if the manifestation of the Self is brought about by the cognition, this would mean production of another lumination and there would ensue the possibility of regress ad infinitum. So self-luminosity is the very essential nature of Consciousness as Brahman, which is the underlying Reality and essential Unity behind the said tripartite apparent division of empirical cognitions.

(iii) Cit is undifferentiated[1] and indivisible:—

The self-luminosity of Brahman has been defined in many ways by later Advaitins of the Post-Śaṅkara period. Sureśvarācārya does not enter into any unnecessary hair-spliting in the matter. He tries to explain it by saying that Consciousness is essentially immediate, undifferentiated and indivisible. The fact that Consciousness is not revealed by anything else external to or different from Itself does not mean that It is an object of Itself or revealed by Itself. To suppose that It is an object of Itself would be to deny that It is self-evident; because such a supposition necessarily implies the assumption of an internal or inherent differentiation, some part of Consciousness being the revealer and the other part of the same being the revealed. Pure Consciousness is self-evident and hence any conclusion against Its self-luminosity, derogatory to the very self-evidential character of Pure Consciousness, the one Reality, cannot be entertained. So it

1. B.B.V., P. 577, V. 716; P. 1030, V. 225; P. 1229, VV. 127-28, P. 1230, V. 132; P. 1221, V. 84.

must be held that pure Consciousness is not only self-luminous but also altogether undifferentiated and indivisible. It differs from empirical cognition or experience in this, that "It installs identity in place of the divisions of the latter". In other words, It is essentially one, undivided and pure and this absolute Unity or bare Simplicity, the Consciousness, is never essentially disturbed, diminished or destroyed. The divisions of subject, object and their knowledge are true of the limited cognitions or finite experiences of empirical life, but they can have no meaning for the indivisible and eternal Consciousness, which is one, ever-shining, inextinguishable and essentially immediate. Pure Consciousness or absolute Reality is a plenum and continum—one and uninterrupted—essentially beyond all ripples of multiple, discrete and finite expressions or appearances It is beyond the three-fold distinctions, viz., the cogniser, the cognition and the cognised, observed in all cases of ordinary experience. It is not subject to the law of origin, growth, decay and extinction, applicable to finite entities. It really can never suffer any obstruction or impediment from anything in any way. It is always of the nature of Consciousness, which never decreases[2] or increases on account of any extraneous circumstance. It is unceasingly self-effulgent, unconditionally immediate and absolutely undifferentiated.

C. Brahman as Ananda[3] or Bliss :—

Ananda is Pure, unlimited and unexcellable Bliss :—

Brahman, the absolute Reality, is not only pure and self-luminous Consciousness but is also unexcellable and eternal Bliss—(Nitya-niratisayānanda). The happiness, derivable and experienced from objects of sense, is an

1. B. B. V., P. 1221, VV. 83-84.
2. B. B. V. A. 1, B; 4, p. 654, V. 1099 : pp. 1631-34, VV.
3. B. B. V., P. 947, V. 362 ; T. B. V., P. 118, V. 47 ; 1419 38 ; Sambandha-Vārtika P. 268, V. 1000. P. 116, V. 38.

appearance of Bliss.

Starting from the man and going upto the Prajāpati, this happiness increases hundred-fold times in each succeeding stratum of Beings : the piṭṛs, the jitaloka-Piṭṛs, the Gandharvas, the Devatās and the Ajān Devatās. This gradation of happiness is thus dependent upon the proportion of the Sattva-quality and the purity of mental medium. The greater the Sattva quality and higher the mental purity, the greater will be the proportion of Brahman-Bliss. But essentially and intrinsically the Brahman-Bliss is one, eternal and unexcellable.

The acquisition of any desired object or the achievement of any desired aim contributes to happiness in the world. In this way, happiness is ordinarily mistaken to be dependent upon attainment of the desired objects or aims, but unlimited Brahman-Bliss, which every one in reality is, is not to be sought after elsewhere. The individual seems to be deprived of the Bliss owing to the non-realisation of Brahman. Every Jīva is essentially the eternal Bliss but happens to be hankering after happiness and labours to seek it in other things or sources. The attainment of a desired object does not itself constitute happiness but it contributes to happiness by occasioning a serene state mind, into which the Bliss—aspect is reflected. Experienced agreeably it is pleasure, while a ruffled state of mind felt disagreeably is pain. So different degrees of the sattva quality and the nature of psychoses are the determining factors of the different degrees of happiness. The obscurations by Avidya of the three explanatory aspects of Brahman's essential nature varies in degrees. Of these three the Bliss-aspect (i. e. Anandānsa) remains most obscured and 'the Sat' the least so,

It should not be questioned here as to how out of the three inseparable aspects of the essential nature of Brahman only two should be revealed and one should remain still obscured. When water is put on fire, out of the two inseparable attributes of fire only one of them i.e., heat is manifest in water and the other, i.e., light remains obscure even then. Similarly, in every case of direct perception the obscuration over 'Anandāns'a' is not removed, and this is why happiness is not always experienced along with cognition, although the Consciousness-aspect (Cidans'a) is necessarily revealed. This Bliss-aspect is revealed through preponderance of the Sattva quality, accompanied by a desire for attaining a particular object. Removal of the obscuration over 'Anandāns'a' is 'universally proportionate' to the Sattva quality (both as one of the permanent constituents of human nature governing the whole life and also as the transitory part, occasionally stimulated and manifested dominantly in a particular moment). Thus variation in the experience of happiness depends on the extent, to which the obscuration by Avidya over Anandāns'a is removed. Moreover, human happiness depends upon the angle of vision as to how a particular object is looked upon in life. That is why one and the same object sometimes affords pleasure at one time and causes misery to him at another or causes pleasure and pain simultaneously to different persons at one and the same time. The real essence of happiness is Brahman—Bliss, but averted from the real essence of happiness and accustomed to seek It outside during the course of many past lives, a human mind by sheer force of habit or on account of its deeply imbedded instincts approaches external objects for happiness. Thus diverse instincts and predispositions of human minds are also responsible for bringing about differences in degrees and limitations in the context of pleasure. Being dependent on external objects and extraneous conditions, the worldly happiness, although it is an appearance of the Brahman-Bliss, becomes limited in scope, relative in nature and subject to origin, growth, decay and end etc. as revealed through psychoses

of the internal organ. One deludes himself by thinking that happiness lies in external objects. The truth is that our Atman[1], the Brahman, Itself is the home of all happiness and the only locus of love—real and unconditioned, as declared by the scriptural test "Tadetat Preyah putrāt, preyah Vittāt, Preyah anyasmāt sarvasmāt" etc. While commenting on this passage, Visvarūpācārya, who is identified with Sureśvara, observes "Dearer than wealth is the son; dearer than son is the body; dearer than the body are the organs; dearer than the organs is the vital air or 'Prāna'; much dearer than the vital air is the Self". Since nothing can be real apart from the absolute Reality, the realisation of the absolute Reality must be held as the dearest and capable of conferring the highest and the purest joy; because one reveals then that the pure Bliss is oneself. The nearer a thing is to the Atman, the dearer it is than others, and the dearer a thing is to any individual Self, it is the greater cause of happiness to him. So the intensity of love that an object merits and the extent of joy that it can give, is dependent on its proximity to the Atman, the Brahman. In reality, only the Brahman is pure and unlimited Bliss and It is so always.

Accordingly, the happiness that one finds in objects of sense is only an appearance of Brahman-Bliss, a sparkle or semblance of absolute Bliss; and the shadow or appearance can never be a substitute for the Substance or Reality. The worldly happiness is never free from the impression caused or the influence exerted by the medium[2], the mind or its modification (i.e. the psychosis), in the process of its emergence. Psychoses are of three kinds: the calm or sober state (Sāttvika), the ruffled or restless state (Rājas) and the inert or dull (Tāmas) state i.e., the pure, the virile and the dull in correspondence with

1. B.B.V., PP. 1046-47, VV. 79-83.

2. T.B.V., P. 118, VV. 47-50.

the three Guṇas—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

In all these psychoses there is an appearance of the Consciousness-nature of Brahman, but the Bliss-nature appears only in the calm and sober psychoses. In the other two varieties of psychoses the Bliss-nature remains enshrouded owing to disturbing and distracting impulses surging therein, but it becomes best manifest in Sattvika psychoses, which are pure and illuminating by nature.

Gradations of joy (Nyūnādhika-bhāva) are superimposed on the worldly delights in accordance with the degree of purity or impurity of the reflecting mind. The purer a psychosis is, the more intense the manifestation of happiness is. When the Rajas and Tamas over-balance and over-power the Sattva, the Bliss-nature remains obscured totally and miseries etc. becomes manifest instead. Consequently, as incidented through the media of differeut psychoses, the Brahman-Bliss appears as limited and multifarious. The one and the same Brahman-Bliss appears in diverse forms and in varying degrees in different Beings from the highest Prajāpati to the smallest ant. But the diversity is not inherent in the Brahman-Bliss, the Brahman; there are no grades in 'Real Happiness or Bliss' per se. The appearance of Brahman-Bliss varies in proportion to the Sattva quality. present in the transmitting receptacle, the mind. Thus the Prajāpati[1], having the greatest amount of Sattva, manifests bliss in the highest degree, but the ant, having the least amount of Sattva, manifests it in the least degree. In reality, there is no inherent variation or gradations in the Brahman-Bliss Itself but this variation or gradation is discernible only in the course of its appearance. Among the earthly beings, the man has the privilege and capacity of experiencing the greatest amount of happiness.

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1. T.B.V., P. 135, VV. 33-34.

Happiness is subject to origin, growth, decay and extinction; whereas Brahman—Bliss is absolutely independent of anything else, unlimited, unrelated and free from or beyond origin, growth, decay and end etc. In other words, Brahman-Bliss is one, eternal, indivisible, unexcellable, ungraded and ever-immediate.

Concluding Remarks :—

It has already been observed that the conception of unity, which is necessarily implied in that of Brahman *does not in any way admit the idea of differentiation*[1] *in any form whatsoever.* It is pure Essence, abstract Unity or bare Simplicity, wholly devoid of aspects, attributes, limitations and relations. Differences together with the principles, which are assumed to explain the same, have no place in Śankara's conception of the absolute Brahman. Devoid of all activity, all motion and every sort of causal efficiency, the supreme Unity or simple Being stands by Itself in Its pure integrity above and beyond the current or ripples of the phenomenal world, which touches at the most only Its Appearance, according to the extreme absolutist view of Sureśvarācārya, and Reflection or limitation, according to other Advaitins. On analysis, it may appear that no idea or object is simple in its essential constitution but consists of heterogeneous elements, entering into its composition, The supreme Unity, the Brahman, is pure Simplicity Itself and as such is beyond all analysis and differentiation whatsoever. Being indivisibly self-luminous, It shines alone in Its pure Essence, revealing Itself eternally. It is a continuum unbroken even in Its manifestation by the appearent varieties in experience in relation to Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. To make the idea still clearer, it may be definitely posited that

1. B. B. V., P. 1229, VV. 127-28; Sambandha-vārtiky, P. 284, V. 1073.

It is not only one and unique but homogeneous and simple in essence also. It becomes, therefore, evident that this theory of absolute and pure Reality leaves no room for the play of any real power, attached to Itself either as identical with or inherent in It as an aspect of Its activity. The play of an unreal power (i.e., Avidyā), which lies[1] at the bottom of all appearances and is itself also a mere appearance, is certainly not denied in this system. But it must be understood that this, not real from the view-point of Reality, does not in any way detract from the absolute Purity and unsullied Unity, which the Brahman is. This absolute Reality, which is ineffable, illimitable and indeterminable, is, of course, generally spoken of in the scriptures in terms of 'Sat', 'Cit' and 'Ānand' etc. But it does not mean that these different terms really represent different aspects in Reality, for, as it has been pointed above, Reality as such is aspectless and free from all vikalpas—i.e., differences, relations, and limitations. The discription is, therefore, a concession to the intellectual way of thinking and serves to facilitate the human mind, which only purified through the proper process of perfection can grasp the otherwise unseizable, the elusive or the incomprehensible. Being *Ekarasa* (homogeneous) and *Akhanda* (indivisible and impartite), the one absolute Reality, which is eternally Pure Consciousness and unexcellable and unalloyed Bliss also, is indescribable ordinarily. Whatever description one may give has a sure bearing on the limitations of personal consciousness, seeking to approach it. So Brahman is neither void nor possessed of any specific eternal form or attribute but is ever *plenum* (Pūrṇa) as Sat, Cit and Anand and *inexhaustible* and *unaffected* even in Its seeming presentations in diverse forms, caused through Avidya. It is inexhaustible ; because It never undergoes any modification nor has any division, limitation or relation whatsoever. So the three terms imply only one Plenum and Continuum beyond all Time, space and diversity.

1. B. B. V., P. 357, V. 52.

It will be important to note that Sureśvarācārya prefers to add or supplement two more terms, 'Ekatva' and 'Pratyaktva' to 'Sat', 'Cit' and 'Ananda' as the essential nature of Brahman, in order to explain fully the idea of the pure Unity, which Brahman is in Its essential nature. So the essential nature of Brahman is also 'Immediacy' and 'absolute Secondlessness or pure Oneness'. This is why the knowledge, arising from the Mahāvākyas is accepted to be a direct revelation, as Immediacy, being the essential nature of Brahman, the knowledge thereof springing even from the verbal testimony cannot but be a direct one. Sureśvarācārya further says that 'Immediacy' and 'Oneness' are not to be treated as relative, like the all-pervasiveness (Mahattā) of Ether, which is so only in comparison to limited 'Ghaṭākāśa' 'Paṭākāśa' etc., as Brahman in reality is ever and unrelatedly immediate.

Significance of 'Neti Neti':—

Thus absolute Reality is essentially pure Consciousness and pure Consciousness is essentially also pure Bliss—one and immediate. All these several terms with different connotations and implications in ordinary experience jointly seek to explain the one, homogeneous and indivisible Unity represented by Brahman, which, being aspectless, incomprehensible and attributeless, is ordinarily inexpressible. So the best way of describing this unpredicable and incomprehensible is via negatia or through negatives (Neti Neti) by calling it infinite, immutable, indivisible and inexhaustible etc. To distinguish the absolute Reality or transcendent Truth from Itself as apparently involved in dynamic expressions, it is natural to take resort to the negative process. The terms 'Neti Neti' indicate the impossibility of knowing the unknowable or predicating the unpredicable through ordinary concepts or modes of expression, prevalent in the empirical order

1. B. B. V.; PP. 1023-33, VV. 183-250; P. 1036 V. 8,

of life. Positive knowledge or expression is in a sense a limitation, for it implies the dūality of the experiencer and the experienced, the denotative and the denoted. The concept of 'Neti Neti' denies the possibility of such knowledge or expression with regard to Brahman. It denies the possibility of indicating the absolute Reality by means of clear-cut or definite characterisations. All characterisation is thought-description and Reality eludes or evades the grasp of thought. The phrase 'Neti Neti' denies that Brahman is not what meets and is comprehended by the organs-inner and outer. Even the highest stretch of imagination and the finest sensibility can neither feel nor touch It. It is beyond, quite beyond the grasp of human faculty or psychic apparatus. But the denial of knowability in concrete sense does not commit Advaitism to agnosticism (Śūnyavāda). The denial of attributes and qualifications to Brahman does not reduce It to voidness or in any way consign Advaitism to agnosticism; because the expression 'Neti Neti' does not deny Reality in its transcendental and absolute nature. In other words, it denies knowledge in the sense of discursive and mediate reasoning as well as existence as possessed of certain empirical characterisations or limitations of the so-called reality i. e. reality, which is misunderstood as such during empirical life, but is not pure and self-luminous Consciousness or eternal Existence (that is, absolute Reality) as such, which Brahman essentially is. What it aims at is that the Brahman—the pure Unity—cannot be grasped by the ordinary process of knowledge, which necessarily implies limitations and divisions[1], as It transcends all limitations and divisions. All[2] assertion, denial and doubt are depen-

1. B. B. V., A. 4, B. 4, P. 1858, V. 838.

2. B. B. V. A. 2, B. 3, P. 1029, VV. 223-224; A, B. 4, PP. 580-81 VV. 729-33; P. 485; V. 282; P. 432, V. 23; Sambandha-Vārtika, P. 268, VV. 1000-1002.

dent on the self-established Absolute Reality—the Pure Consciousness—for its own substantiation or establishment and manifestation and hence can never touch It. Thus the knowledge of this Trans-conceptual Truth or proper realisation of this Absolute Reality is possible only via negatives, which serve the purpose of raising It up from the level of phenomenal positive and negative categories, through the Mahāvākyas, and finally help Its revelation in Its full splendour in the pure mind of a deserving and earnest seeker.

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CHAPTER II

The Creative Power in Reality.

Necessity for the assumption of Maya or Avidya as the Ultimate Cosmogenetic Energy or the Universal Creative Power, rooted in Reality :—

In the preceding chapter an attempt has been made at explaining the nature of both Reality and appearances, i e. Brahman and the universe. It must be evident therefrom that, according to the Advaita system of Philosophy, Brahman, which is absolute Reality, pure and self-luminous Consciousness and eternal, unalloyed and unsurpassable Bliss is not only always unrelated, unchanging, immutable and unlimited, but, as set forth by Sureśvara, is ever one and a priori immediate also. It exists by and for Itself and, absolutely speaking, is ever Itself only, i.e. devoid of all kinds of differences-inherent, similar or dissimilar-and dissociated with any thing else-innate or foreign to It. Nevertheless, so long as we misconceive ourselves to be really what we empirically appear to be, i. e. within the world and a part thereof and beset with all that it implies and related to whatever is superimposed on us thereby, and surrounded by appearances beyond and other than ourselves, these appearances-innumerable in varieties and illimitable in possibilities-cannot be left unexplained, of course in a manner not irreconcilable with bare and pure Oneness, which Absolute Reality always is. No explanation of such appperances as based on and arising from the one Reality but not militating against It as essential Oneness is possible without the assumption of Maya or Avidya, underlying all cosmic and supercosmic eventualities, movements and manifestations in relation to all Time and Space.

Maya is the sole governing Power, the common effectuating Principle and ultimate universal Condition to all appearances, i. e. the universe. It is both obscurative and

projective functionally and beginingless and inscrutable ontologically, but not eternal and interminable absolutely. The multiplicity and diversity of appearances are due to its immense potentialities and unrestricted capacities and illimitable varieties and possibilities of its modifications and their combinations, responsible for its incessant functioning in infinate ways as the inexhaustible source of all efficiency, energy, effectuation and diversification etc., underlying the entire scheme, structure, organisation and order of appearances as sc many simulacra or entities of the universe. It is the sum—total of all causal factors, conditions, circumstances and accessories, that may have to be imagined to explain the universe both ontologicallv and epistemologically. The series of obscurations and projections, emerging from this Principle or Power, together with corresponding original Appearances or Scintillations of Reality—the Pure Consciousness—inseparably inumered therein, gives rise to all phenomenal appearances, recognised as various empirical entities, and also to further appearances sometimes known as illusory objects. Thus all entities of the universe-whether of the cosmic or supercosmic order and even within the former of the empirical or ilusory nature—are, according to Sureśvara, only diverse appearances, appraised as so many real or illusory entities from the view-point of relativity and arising from and lasting up to the termination of Maya. But all of them are ultimately based on one and the same Reality in as much as they always emanate from the original Appearances or Scintillations thereof in and through the said Universal Power and its multifarious modifications, in consequence of mutual actions and reactions of the two upon each other. In other words, they come out and are recognised as innumerable and diverse objects of the universe as a result of the Appearances of Reality in combination with the various modifications of the said Power being constantly materialised or phenomenalised into further subtle or gross appearances and the latter being incessantly galvanised, enlivened and sustained by the former.

Thus the innumerable modifications of the said Power not

only serve as necessary receptacles and various backgrounds but are also responsible for evoking sympathetically and separately original Appearances of Reality, exactly suitable and correspondingly answering to themselves, which are ensconced therein as their constant enlivening and sustaining substrata. These original Appearances of Reality, the Pure Consciousness, pervade, permeate & pulsate through Maya and its various modifications, which serve as something like so many material embodiments in relation to them and the two together give rise to further appearances-subtle or gross, which, being manifest in various materialised or phenomenalised forms of empirical existences, are evaluated as diverse entities and so-called realities of the universe. These resultant subtle or gross appearances, though projected and put up by Maya on the basis of one Reality only, are diversified in manifestations on account of the different combinations, forms and metabolism of the modifications of Maya, coupled with corresponding original Appearances of Reality therein. In this process of phenomenalisation, so to say, Maya functions as the inscrutable and inexhaustible energy, power, cause, condition or whatsoever may be presumed to be indispensably necessary for the purpose and the same together with its innumerable modifications, function as the requisite background, receptacles and material or phenomenal ingredients, while the original Appearances of Reality underlie them as their galvanising and sustaining substrata, 'elan vital' or 'elixirs of life' and both of them, inseparably intwined, give rise to the appearance of the whole universe or simulaera of Reality. This process of phenomenalisation on account of the said mysterious, invisible and imponderable combinations is repeated every time as a common condition to the involution or emergence of every empirical entity and its further appearance as an illusory object, but with this difference that the nearer an appearance is to the said ultimate sources, viz., Reality and Maya, the more permanent, veritable, valuable and real it strikes as an entity of universe and the remoter it is from the said ultimate sources, the less enduring, veritable,

valuable and real it seems to be, as compared to the former, till the last strata of appearances are recognised to be illusory even in common parlence. Thus every appearance is without any exception an outcome of the said combination or causal process and a projection of Maya on the basis of one and the same Absolute Reality. It is evident from all that has been said above that the resultant appearance, being a de novo apparent manifestation, can be determined to be neither distinct from nor identical with the basic Reality, but is nevertheless undeniable both ontologically and epistemologically as existent, veritable and valuable in the empirical order of things until the realisation of Reality, whereupon there are neither appearances nor Avidya, assumed as their explanatory factor. So, besides the one Absolute Reality, there has to be assumed a universal effectuating Principle, energising Power or diversifying Factor. Thus assumption of Maya is the only solution to the question, which unavoidably arises as to how this one unchanging, immutable and unrelated Being or absolute, aspectless and transcendent Reality is to be related to the complications of diverse becomings, fleeting changes or pseudo-realities in the form of innumerable appearances as multiple empirical or illusory entities.

The importance of Maya-Vada[1] comes out in this connection in as much as Maya or Avidya has to be inevitably assumed and admitted in order to explain the diversity of appearances from cosmogonetic, ontological and epistemological points of view, though recognised only perfuntorily in the Advaita Metaphysics as a mere stepping stone to the ultimate realisation of Eternal Existence, which is pure and self-luminous Consciousness and unalloyed and unsurpassable Bliss as well, in confirmity with the doctrine of Absolute Monism. It is thus that the Advaita system proves logically the necessity of assuming a certain Principle or Power, underlying the whole universe as its ultimate causal factor, which accounts for both the non-realisation of the one absolute Reality and further

1. B. B. V., A. IV, B. IV, P. 705, V. 1365.

wrong realisations over and out of It as various simulacra or entities of the universe. This universal Principle or Power is technically called Maya and is held to be capable of serving as the causa materia and the back-bone of all appearances or becomings and of explaining the metabolism as well as both the modus operandi and the modus vivendi underlying all appearances of empirical entities and illusory objects

To attribute any kind of causality in an absolutely real sense to the immutable, unrelated and transcendent Being, the Brahman, will be logically absurd save and except through another agency, principle or power, assumed for the purpose, owing to which Brahman, though Itself absolutely one and unrelated, appears to be occasioning and holding up diverse, discrete and finite appearances as innummerable animate and inanimate objects of the universe and, though Itself non-cause, a-logical, a-material, trans-temporal and supra-spatial, appears to be the cause of and logically, materially, temporally and spatially related to the whole universe. This is why Reality, the Brahman, is viewed in two aspects: (i) immanental or relational and (ii) transcendental or absolutory.

Maya explains also the fundamental contrast between the Brahman and the universe, i.e. Reality and appearances in as much as the former is eternal, immutable and self-subsisting Existence, self-luminous and pure Consciousness, unalloyed, unsurpassable and unlimited Bliss, One and a priori Immediacy: whereas the latter are non-eternal, fleeting, dependent, manifestable through various cognitive processes and full of miseries with only a sprinkling of the so-called pleasures here and there.

A question naturally arises as to whether this limitation, relatedness or finiteness is a self-imposed act on the part of the Absolute Reality or merely an erroneous conception or an apparent association owing to the said extraneous force or power, to which the Absolute Reality has no essential relation. If the former is the case, how can the immutable, attributeless and transcendent Brahman alone be

believed to be capable of acting and ceasing to act during creation and dissolution (सृष्टि and प्रलय) respectively. If the middle is the case, where and how does this erroneous conception arise at all with regard to the one Brahman, having nothing else apart from Itself. If the last is the case, why should the results and errors of an alien force or power have any bearing on the self-presentative character of the essentially and eternally one and a priori immediate Brahman and why does not this alien force or power pollute and vitiate the essential nature of Reality and militate against the doctrine of pure non-dualism, so regardfully sought to be established and expounded by the system. A solution of all such and other questions is offered by Sureśvarācārya, the exponent of Ābhāsa-vāda, in a very simple and satisfactory manner. He clarifies the whole position by declaring Avidya also to be an appearance[1] and as such 'Avicārita-sansiddha'[2], that is, appearing to be veritable and real for all practical intents and purposes and to be ceaselessly functioning only until the realisation of Reality Itself. Moreover, according to him, Reality is not directly involved in Maya or any of its modifications and projections, but only Its original Appearances[3] are so. It is these original and sympathetic Appearances, which as innermost currents or the beds of Maya and its modifications, are responsible for bolstering up various appearances as diverse entities of the universe and further as illusory objects. So even though all appearances are necessarily

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1. B. B. V., A. IV, B. III, P. 1624, V. 1377, P. 1567, V. 1111; P. 1614, V. 1320; A. II, B. III, P. 1024, V. 191, A. I, B. IV, P. 499, V. 341: P. 506, V. 374.

2. B. B. V., A. I, B. IV, P. 522, V. 444; P. 497, V. 332, A. II, B. III, P. 1024, V. 1921; P. 1029, V. 224; A. III, B. VIII, P. 1295, V. 31; A. III, B.V., P. 1246, V. 42; A. IV, B. IV, P. 1771, V. 307; A. I, B. IV, P. 668, V. 1170; P. 698, V. 1329; P. 700, V. 1341; A. III, B. IV, P. 1229, V. 131; A. IV, B. III, P. 1443, V. 382; P. 1144, V. 385, A. I, B. IV, P. 582, V. 741.

3. B. B. V., A. IV, B. III, P. 1143, VV, 382-84; A. IV, B. III, P. 1624, V. 1377.

pervaded by one Reality through the channel of Its original and sympathetic Incidences or Appearances, the pervasion also is of the nature of appearance only and not of that of any actual association or real relation. Obviously, in association with such an inexplicable, apparent and conditionally veritable Principle or Power, namely, Maya. the one absolute Reality suffers nothing as the perennial source of empirical or illusory appearances and Its apparent relations there-with. All possible faults and foibles, blemishes and blunders, limitations and contradictions and impurities and imperfections do not cling to Reality[1] and affect It in any way or mar Its essential purity, unrelatedness and oneness but adhere to and characterise appearances only in all possible ways. It is to be noticed in the case of what are reckoned even ordinarily to be appearances, i e. illusions, that attributes, relations and diversity of appearances such as snake and earth-crack etc. have nothing to do with the underlying garland and do not affect and sully its essential nature as such in the least The garland uninterreptedly continues to be in its own essential nature, i.e., as one and the same or nothing else but garland only, altogether unaffected and unrelated even when unknown as such on account of Avidya it is appearing to be various illusory objects, namely, snake and earth-crack etc Similarly, diverse appearances of the universe do not tarnish and stain Brahman, the Absolute Reality, which is ever the same, i. e., transcendentally and essentially unaffected, unrelated and one only, even though It always seems to be appearing as related to them while appearing in and through Maya and the various phenomenal projections thereof through the process of mutual superimposition between them and the corresponding original Appearances of Reality during the creative order, since It is so not related directly but indirectly, i. e., through Its corresponding Incidences or Appearances only. By merely incidenting Itself or appearing in and through Maya and the multiple modifications thereof, Reality proves sufficient to explain all appearances, since for

1. B. B. V., A. 1, B. IV, P. 578, V. 724; P. 470, VV. 213-14.

an appearance all that is needed is the mere presence of Reality and Maya or Avidya in and about the same, that is, unknown as such and, therefore, being known as something else. No actual relation or association is at all necessary to bring forth appearances together with their media and causa materia, that is, world-facts and the world-process. So the explanation is brought home to one's mind when this exact significance of Abhāsa-Vāda,[1] as expounded by Sureśvara, is clearly understood.

Significance of Māyā as Abhsāa :—

The circle of non-realisation, consequent wrong realisation and resultant non-realisation and further wrong realisation and so on is the domain as well as the distinctive characteritic of Maya. So long as this circle moves on, every one of us is helplessly caught up in the complications or immersed in the morass of Maya. Maya is the land of all relations, the region of all relations, the cause of all differences and varieties and the inexhaustible source of all similarities and contrasts, uniformities and disparities and harmonies and disharmonies etc. noticeable as striking features of the universe.

Both non-realisation and wrong realisations are the essential trait of Maya, but the former is only negative in nature in as much as it merely conceals or obscures the underlying Reality or the so-called reality, while the latter are constructive in character in as much as they build up various kinds of unreal appearances thereupon. The former prepares the ground for the latter and the latter are its further accretions and aggrandisations and the two together, coming immediately upon the heels of each other, serve as the warp and woof in weaving peculiar and diverse patterns of appearances as innumerable empirical entities and further illusory objects. Maya keeps on modifying itself constantly in innumerable ways on the basis and strength of the corresponding Appearance of Reality therein right up to the realisation of Reality, whereon Maya peters out automatically,

1. B. B. V., A. 1, B. IV, P, 579, VV. 726-28.

being no longer required to be assumed as an explanatory of appearances over Reality. This realisation is the last mile-stone for the end of Maya and it results into a disruption of all appearances, an extinction of all meanings and values, pragmatically attached to them, and, in short, a termination of Maya for ever. But so long as this mile-stone is not reached, the unceasing and diverse modifications of Maya, sustained and galvanised by co-extensive, corresponding and sympathetic Appearances of Reality therein, continue pouring forth and holding up appearances further and further, phenomenalised and manifested as various entities of the universe. At the bottom of all these appearances there has to be assumed a governing power or regulating force, which is technically termed as Maya or Avidya in the Advaite system of Indian philosophy. It serves as an all-pervasive and deep-rooted Principle, explanatory of all empirical existences, pragmatic values, finite experiences, permanent or passing emotions and thoughts, passions and prejudices and activities and conducts etc. Thus logically and cosmologically Maya is unquestionable and undeniable along with Reality as the sourceless source of all appearances with incalculable varieties, countless characteristics and immense possibilities. Inspite of being a source of all appearances, it is itself an appearance only, a supposition or super-imposition. It is held to be endowed with unlimited, undefinable and inscrutable capacities and potentialities and figures as supreme, indeterminable, powerful and anything that one may choose to style it (save and except as Reality) to establish it as the primordial and uncaused cause of the universe. But all this is possible only uptil the realisation of Reality, by which it is shattered into utter nothingness and sublated once for ever so much so that it is then concluded to have never existed at all. Prior to this eye-opening, sublimating and Brahmanising[1] revelation through realisation, it dominates the whole field of our existence and experiences as an irresistable, inexhaustible, unassailable and

1. The term 'Brahmanising' is a new coinage in the sense of transforming into 'Brahman'.

undefinable Power, owing to which Reality—the Eternal Existence, Pure Consciousness and Absolute Bliss-appears to have been divided and limited into finite existences, disparate and discursive experiences and passing and alloyed pleasures, interspersed with and alternatively substituted by innumerable varieties of other feelings and sentiments.

Very often a charge is levelled against the Advaita system of Philosophy that it requires us to believe in contradictory terms, that is, theoritical unreality and practical reality. Philosophically, all our activities and achievements, being based on the manipulations and manœuvres of Maya, have to be envisaged as so many unreal appearances, though all the time from the cradle to the grave we are absorbed in them with an honest belief that they would bring some interesting and valuable results and real and practical prospects in life. But a thorough aquaintance with the philosophical doctrines of the system, as expounded elaborately by Sureśvara, would atonce reveal to any serious thinker asto how this system is perfectly scientific and fully logical at every stage, as shown below.

As regards Reality the Advaita Vedanta analyses that there are only two alternatives logically possible: either It is realised or not realised. The true test of realisation is that it would reveal the realiser to be essentially the realised, i. e. Reality Itself by putting an end to all appearances apart from or other than It. Non-realisation, on the other hand, would mean not only a non-revelation of Reality as such but also a sustained manifestation of manifold appearances with warped layers of endless varieties instead thereof. So the fact that we are in the midst of multiple and diverse appearances can logically lead to only one conclusion that we are in a state of non-realisation, which has been beginninglessly lingering on with us owing to Maya, ever functioning both obscuratively and projeetively. So long as the diversity of appearances and consequent orders and gradations of relative truths and pragmatic values stand unsublated and our empirical life continues to be the centre of all our activities and aspirations, we are

decidedly not in realisation of Reality, which is one, absolute and transcendent, and if so, the only other possible alternative, justifying this state of existence of ours, is that we are caught up in the clap-trap of inexorable and insurmountable Maya, which is responsible both for obscuring Reality and projecting various appearances as the universe instead thereof uninterruptedly. Whether one feels and admits it or not, it is an undeniable and unquestionable fact that every one of us is definitely immured in Maya or enmeshed in Avidya, without which the entire sphere of our thoughts, judgements, convictions, feelings, emotions and activities-based on super-impositions, suppositions and consequent pragmatic view-points, remains unexplained. To check the current of all fundamental conceptions and considerations and consequent contaminations and imperfections of empirical life, the only way is that Maya must be repudiated radically. Unless and until the effects of Maya are got over, no amount of prudence and prudery can be of any avail in persuading us, the Avidya-ridden, to believe that the empirical entities are only appearances and that the worldly pleasures and achievements are no pleasures and achievements respectively in a true sense of the word.

Just as there is a shadow with the shine, similarly there is Maya or Avidya with Reality. The two are not mutually contradictory and unaccomodating to each other. Rather the former supports, accomodates, establishes and presupposes the latter by providing a scope for its presumption and recognition as the necessary pre-requisite to all appearances, i.e. the universe. There can be no opposition between Reality and Maya, but the same lies between the realisation of Reality and the latter, as repeatedly shown above. The realisation of Reality presupposes the continuation of Maya, which is indispensable for the conception of spiritual progress, culminating in final emancipation. Maya in relation to Reality is like a shadow inseparable from the light. Although light and shadow persistently go together, yet the latter ceases to exist when she former happens to be seen directly. Similarly, Brahman and

Maya go together respectively as Reality and Power, but the latter is sure to be sublated when the former is realised directly. No doubt in every case of ordinary knowledge too there is some sort of realisation or other of Reality, the Pure consciousness, but it is so only indirectly, i.e., through an ordinary cognitive process, involving sense-relation, impurity and imperfection of the inner organ and enough of the 'augean stable' of obscuration by Maya or Avidya even on an individual scale still persisting (although its gross outer layer happens to be shaken off for the time being on every occasion of empirical knowledge).

Maya not only sets forth and sustains non-realisation or obscuration of Reality but projects and props up wrong realisations also, promoting and prolonging thereby dualism and differences, contradictions and conflicts, oppositions and contrasts, and uniformities and disparities etc. So by the realisation of Reality not only Avidya is dissipated but all that Maya or Avidya brings in its trail such as limitations, relations, differences, co-existences, exclusions, oppositions, conflicts contradictions and contrasts etc. also is wholly exterminated tracelessly along with their sustaining appearances.

Nodoubt Maya is an 'appearance' but it is a primal appearance, natural to and incessantly clogging and coiling round Reality, the Brahman All other appearances spiring from this primal appearance and the process of their emergence is succinctly stated to be that they are phenomenalised, particularised and bolstered up by Maya or Avidya as the creative energy and enlivened, galvanised and manifested by the original Appearances of Reality with their sustaining essence and unceasing stimulus or 'elan vital.' It prevails imperiously and develops diversly, displaying on the continuous film of the non-realisation of Reality vast, various and veritable wrong realisations as empirical and illusory appearances, which imply and sum up the range

1. B. B. V. A. IV, B. III, P. 1624, V. 1377; P. 1567, V. 1111; P. 1614; V. 1320; A. II, B. III, P. 1024, V. 191; A. I, B. IV, P. 499, V. 341; P. 506, V. 374.

of the whole universe. The moment Reality is realised, this vast film is wrapped up once for ever and there is neither Maya nor any appearance any more. It will not be out of place to mention here that the non-realisation of Reality is not an isolated and simple function but it is a combined and complex one, being necessarily accompanied by wrong realisations in the form of pseudo-realities or illusions and this is what is exactly signified by the two-fold power of Maya-obscurative and projective, which are mutually undifferentiable and inseperable. In fact the two powers constantly act and react upon each other in such a manner that any attempt at establishing priority of the one and posteriority of the other is sure to prove futile in as much as they are concurrent, co-extensive and mutually influencing, contributory and stimulant.

To sum up, the logical necessity for the assumption of Maya or Avidya is linked up with the aforesaid combination of non-realisation and wrong realisations, which easily and convincingly explain all complications and cover the complete range of apparent manifestations or seeming emanations out of and over the one Reality, which are recognised and accredited as innumerable entities of the universe. Maya has no independent existence or existence worth the name like Reality. Its existence being of the nature of presumption or assumption in the aforesaid manner, it is as much an appearance as any other empirical entity or illusory object, although this appearance is the ultimate source as well as a condition, precedent to any other empirical or illusory appearance. No much condition, precedent to this primal appearance also is necessary, since it stands for and is the sum total of all, which, besides Rsality, may be possibly required for any appearance over the absolute Reality or any of Its so-called real further offshoots and so nothing else is needed for appearance as Avidya, which primordially, beginninglessly and apparently goes along with Reality till realisation of the latter. It is merely a presumptive postulation, a suppository assumption, an epistemological

exposition or a logical explanation, calculated to explain the otherwise inexplicable universe. It satisfies the natural curiosity to know the why and how of appearances, constantly confronting us and making up what the man seems to have become empirically and finds himself to be constantly surrounded by. Apart from its explanatory nature, logical justification and presumptuous recognition Maya can claim no existence or reality whatsoever. As the appearance of diversity in the essentially underlying Unity or pure, simple and bare Oneness can neither be ordinarily denied nor possibly explained otherwise, Maya has to be acknowledged as existing and functioning at best right up to the realisation of Reality, which is pure and absolute Nondualism, but the same is determined to have never existed at all when the very possibility of its presumption is precluded by the realisation of Reality, emerging and surviving as the sole Residue of all appearances thereafter. This is why Maya is held to be both beginningless and terminable. The two ideas cease to be self-contradictory in the case of Maya, which enjoys a unique position in respect of its existence and recognition only as an explanatory factor. Appearances being undoubtedly there in the form of the universe without any knowledge of its beginning, Maya has to be assumed as beginningless, but when the necessity of explanation and assumption of Maya is no more, Maya also is no more and when Maya is not there, appearances also can not be there. This is the clear logic behind Advaitism and Avidya in the Advaita system. Thus Maya or Avidya is then rendered as utterly inconcievable and incapable of being considered to have ever existed at all. This is the significance of the sublation-theory with special reference to Ābhāsa-Vāda in its technical sense. Neither the existence nor the destruction of Maya is a concrete fact, but its existence is presumptuous or suppositional and its sublation is epistemological. So it may be concluded from all that has been stated so far that all appearances[1] whether empirical or illusory are projected out on the strength and in the light of

1. B.B.V., A. 11, B. IV, P. 1103, VV. 422-23.

the underlying Appearances of Reality (Cidābhāsas) by Maya, which also is merely an appearance and only apprently associated with the former as Its undeniable logical counterpart or appendix until the realisation of Its pure non-dualistic nature. Again whatever may be going on in the world of appearances through Maya in the pre-realisation period, the inescapable fact remains that Reality is essentially one and nndiversified behind all apparant manifoldness and diversity.

The theory if Maya-Avidya equation :—

The differentiation between Maya and Avidya is of a much later origin in the history of the Advaita literature and does not find place in the works of the two great disciples of Śankar, namely, Sureśvara and Padmapādācārya, who are credited with having enunciated and formulated two different schools of Advaitism, known as 'Ābhāsa-Vāda' and 'Pratibimba-Vāda' respectively and having left behind an appreciable literature, which goes a great deal to supplement some of the most important links of the system. Accordingly, Sureśvara upholds the theory of equation between Maya and Avidya and recognises Avidya to be one only. He criticises the view of the two-fold classification[1] of Avidya, namely, Agrahaṇa (i.e. non-conception) and 'Mithyā-grahaṇa' (i.e. false conception) of Brahman by Jīvas, occuring in the Brahma-siddhi[2]. He asserts very strongly that Avidya cannot but be one only as having for its abode and content one, impartite, undifferentiated and indivisible Brahman. This need not be considered as incompatible with Sureśvara's views of 'Nanā-Jīva-Vāda' and 'Jīvan-mukti', which will be subsequently discussed at their proper places. Avidya is primordially and essentially one but operates variously without losing its essential oneness[4]. This operational diversity or

1. B.B.V.—P. 509, V. 386; P. 521, VV. 439-40.

2. B. B. V., P. II. B. IV, PP. 1055-66. VV. 799-201; See also Nyaya-Kalpa-Latikā or Vidyā-sāgari (unpublished commentaries on B. B. V.) and Ānandagiri on this verse; T.B.V., P. 83, V. 76.

3. B.B.V.—Sambandhe-Vārtika, P. 57, V. 181.

4. B. B. V., P. 509, V. 386; P. 52, VV. 439-40.

functional varieties merely explains the ways of its modifications and operations, serving as separate psycho-physical organisms for individual self and also as diverse parts of the necessary apparatus of the universe-mechanism, but does not in the least detract from its fundamental unity or essential oneness.

Sureśvara, while describing the inexplicable nature of Avidya, says that logically it can be held to be neither 'niraṅśa'[1] (i.e. partless) nor 'sāṅśa' (i.e. having parts). But the very denial in both the ways gives a scope for treating it to be partless, i.e., as being 'Niraṅśa' essentially and possessed of parts, i.e., as being 'Sāṅśa' functionally, that is, as operating diversely in the empirical plane and order. Thus there is no logical inconsistency in holding Avidya to be one and undifferentiated, even though it is envisaged to be diverse and having innumerable parts, phases and aspects in consideration of its multiple modifications and various particular functional operations. For instance, the subtle psycho-physical organism (Liṅga-Śarīra), one of the modifications of Avidya, is particular to each individual and a separate entity by itself. But the diversity of its modifications does not militate against its essential unity, as its ever-increasing modifications and functional outputs are essentially identical with it. To sum up, Avidya is one existentially, though appearing to be diverse functionally.

Definition and Nature of Avidya :—

From what has been established above, it is evident that Avidya is defined by Sureśvara as one, which appears to be real and an established fact until Reality is not realised (**अविचारित-संसिद्ध**)[2] and which ever sustains both the non-realisation of

1. P. V., P. 23, V. 41.

2. B.B.V., A.I, B. IV, P. 522, V. 422 ; P. 497, V. 332 ; A. II, B. III, P. 1024, V. 1921 ; P. 1029, V. 224 ; A. III, B. VIII, P. 1295 ; V. 31 ; A. III, B. V, P. 1296, V. 42 ; A. IV, B. IV, P. 1771, V. 307 ; A. I, B. IV, P. 668, V. 1170 ; P. 698, V. 1329 ; P. 700, V. 1341 ; A. III, B. IV, P. 1229, V. 131 ; A. IV, B. III, P. 1443, V. 382 ; P. 1444, V. 395 ; A. I, B. IV, P. 582, V. 741.

Reality and consequent wrong realisations as its very life-breath. Besides this significant exposition of the nature of Avidya, Sureśvara has attempted at defining it ordinarily in many other ways also. One defining and distinctive[1] feature of Avidya, quite in confirmity with its nescience-nature, is that it cannot admit of and brook any kind of empirical enquiry, reasoning or proof, as it is naturally opposed to all evidences and thought-processes, all of which are substantiated and supported at its anvil and hence always presuppose it, as they proceed on to any possible extent. The non-realisation[2] of Reality constitutes its another remarkable feature. It is the cause[3] of all non-realisations and wrong realisations, but is itself neither negative nor positive in nature ; because it is definitely productive of all projections and sublatable ultimately. The failure[4] of the jīva to realise and regard itself to be essentially nothing but the one Reality, the Brahman, is obviously the function of this Avidya. It is owing to this insuperable, unsuppressed and ever-functioning Power, the Avidya, that the one Reality, Brahman, ever continues to be appearing as diverse entities of the universe inexhaustibly and interminably until Its direct realisation. It is the ultimate stage[5] or terminating point of apparant involutions or disappearances in the upward process of merger, leading to dissolution into the socalled real Primordial cause, which is the highest level to be touched by the involutionary tide and in which all producibles or apparant evolutes, being gradually merged in their surviving and similarly disappearing respective causes, are finally absorbed. It is the main spring of all apparent evolutionary and involutionary tides or the only source of all cosmogonetic operations in their both onward and upward processes, respectively responsible for springing up or shrinking in of the whole universe. It is naturally but apparently ever appendant to Brahman in the sense that it

1. B. B. V.—Sambandha-Vartika, P. 54, V. 181.
2. B. B. V.—A. III, B. III, P. 1193, V. 95.
3. B. B. V.—A. I, B. IV, P. 705, V. 1368.
4. B. B. V.—A. II, B. IV, P. 1103, V. 421.
5. B. B. V.—A. II, B. IV, P. 1103, V. 418.

does not arise from without, and it has to be assumed as intrinsically associated with Absolute Reality, the Brahman, i.e., in connection with and with reference to Reality under the logical necessity of explaining the appearance of the universe. It is beginningless but apt to be sublated by Vidya, i.e. the realisation of Reality. So long as the outlook, insistent upon the recognition of empirical appearances as practically real and valuable is persistently continuous, Avidya, being not only obscurative but projective also, has to be affirmed as a positive Power, apparently natural to and consistent with Reality Itself. But when the other outlook arises simultaneously with the realisation of Reality, Avidya is snipped off, sublated or rooted out radically so much so that it is then negated to have ever existed at all in any way. No contradiction lies in holding Avidya to be beginningless and yet sublatable[1]; because it is beginningless as natural to Reality and sublatable as being fundamentally opposed[2] to Vidya in respects of cause, nature and effect. *Avidya* is of the nature of non-realisation accompanied by wrong realisations, while *Vidya* is the final realisation, that dissipates all wrong realisations. Avidya is inferred from attachment and non-discrimination etc.; whereas Vidya is to be concluded from detachment and discriminating discernment etc. Avidya perpetuates bondage, but Vidya brings about release. Avidya cannot admit of any cognitive process as the source of its establishment, while Vidya, being a direct intuitional realisation, is the outcome of the most sublime, refined and distilled cognitive process, starting with 'Śravaṇa' (i.e. an ascertainment of the true purport, resulting from a thorough grasp of the sublime scriptural passages and the Vedanta literature), passing through 'Manana' (i.e. a constant reflection with the aid of reasoning, leading to removal of doubts etc.) and culminating in 'Nididhyāsana' (i.e. a profound contemplation and consequent mental concentration, eventually consummating

1. B. B. V., A. IV, B. IV, P. 1871, V. 921.

2. B. B. V., A. IV, B. IV, P. 1870, VV. 915-16; A. 11, B. 1, P. 949, VV. 366-78; Sambandha-vartika, P. 288, V. 1088.

in realisation). Just as an antecedent non-existence (Prāgabhava) is held to be both beginningless and terminable by the Nyaya system and some such other thing is accepted to be so by other systems also, similarly Avidya in the Advaita system is described as having no beginning[1] but sublatable in the said manner. Being projective of the universe, to which no beginning can be ascribed, and associated with Reality, which is Eternal Existence, Avidya has to be recognised as beginningless. But being founded on presumption only as an explanatory factor, it is sure to be sublated, when the ground of the presumption is taken away.

Proof of Avidya :—

Avidya is not to be established by any of the ordinary cognitive processes, which always presupposes it as a necessary causal factor or subjective, instrumental and objective background and which curbs and cripples it or suspends and sets it back through various vṛttis on every occasion of kuowledge and finally crucifies it through the last, finest, purest, and most direct intuitional Brahma-Vṛtti or the realisation of Brahman. As an appearance it can be described to be neither identical with nor different from Reality and really it is not there at all from the view-point of Absolute Reality, but still it appears to be there as something other than and also natural to Reality and as such it cannot be known, proved and revealed through any ordinary cognitive process of empirical knowledge. So, being nearest and natural to Reality it is held to be 'Sākṣibhāṣya[2]', that is, comprehensible as being inspired and revealed by the witnessing Consciousness, which is Reality Itself. All this is possible about it, as no logical explantion, justification or consistency is needed for Avidya, which is only an appearance itself. But as it projects out all other appea-

1. B. B. V.—A. I, B. IV. P. 503, VV. 358-59; Sambandha-Varṇika, P. 218, VV. 1088-89.

2. B. B. V., A. I, B. IV, P. 700, V. 1341 Sambandha-vartika, p. 56, V. 177 ; N. S., P. 147, V. 66.

rances, including Time and Space, which also are general factors thereof, and serves as an unimpeachable source of justification and explanation of all contradictions, exhibited by the universe as the pair of opposites and in several other ways, Sureśvara very critically remarks about Avidya, saying[1] that this is the distinctive feature of Avidya as Avidya that it cannot brook enquiries and figures supreme as the Supreme Soul or Brahman Itself. If may be concluded, therefore, to be, 'Nityānubhava-mātra-sanɜiddha", i.e , founded on and revealable only by Pure consciousness. Incapability to face any empirical proof or cognition is but an ornament of Avidya.

Locus and Object of Avidya :—

From what has been stated so far it is crystal-clear now that Avidya is not real absolutely, though appearing to be so empirically. It has the same kind of existence and reality as any other empirical object has. Thus there is no question of its really lying anywhere. The only question is as to where can it apparently abide ? Once this question is thus clarified, all complications disappear. Avidya implies like Jñāna some one, to whom it belongs (Āśraya) and some object, to which it refers (Viṣaya). Just as a knowledge is incomplete without any subject and object, similarly Avidya too requires someone as its substratum, to whom it belongs or characterises, and some content, which is governed by it. According to the majority of Advaitins, including Sureśvara, Reality, the Pure Consciousness, Itself is both the subject and object of Avidya. So if Avidya is admitted to be abiding apparently anywhere, it must be so in and about Reality, the Brahman. The existence of Avidya does not militate against the unrelatedness and pure unity or simple oneness of the impartite, immutable and unrelated Brahman. The individual soul cannot be held to be

1. B. B. V., Sambandha-vartika, P. 57, V. 181.

2. B. B. V., P. 460., V. 168 ; P. 462, V. 179 ; P. 700, VV. 1341-42 ; Sambandhi-Vārtika, P. 57, V. 182 ; P. 288, V. 1090 ; B. B. V. P. 412, VV. 315-16 ; T. B. V.,P. 131, V. 12 ; B. B. V., P. 1866, V. 892 ; P. 1617, V. 898.

the abode of Avidya (as accepted by Vācaspati), since the Jīva, being wholly or partially an appearance, according to Sureśvara, pre-supposes it as the necessary condition.

Further, Avidya has to be supposed as uncaused and, therefore, beginningless in time, as any cause assigned to itwould be likewise an appearance and itself unaccountable without Avidya. That Avidya has a cause is a self-contradiction, because every appearance-subjective, objective and cognilive in nature is appearance and as such explicable only through Avidya. Hence the very realm of causality is the realm of Avidya. Again, Avidya, with a beginning would require another Avidya as its cause and thus there would be obviously the contingence of regress ad infinitum. Avidya has no beginning, as it is beyond time and space. Time and space, which are general factors of temporal and spatial apportionments and inter-temporal and inter-spatial differentiations and specifications in the order of appearances, are flutters and figments of Avidya. So Time and space cannot apportion and specify Avidya in any way and without any reference to a particular time and space, Avidya can have neither beginning nor any empirical location. It is not an adventitious factor, arising independently of Reality, the Brahman, but arises on the basis of and with reference to Brahman.

Brahman—the Absolute Reality as well as Pure Consciousness-Itself is the object of Avidya ; because the question of non-realisation rests in and refers to Reality only. As a general rule, that is to be regarded as the object of Avidya, which being realised Avidya with regard to it is sublated. It is the supreme knowledge or intuition of Reality, the Brahman, which sublates the indescribable Avidya fully and finally. Being posterior to Avidya, which conditions and projects them as various appearances, empirical things severally or jointly cannot be the objects of Avidya. All objects of the universe are occasioned by non-realisation of and wrong-realisations about Reality, the Brahman, and are to be deemed nothing but

appearances, though they figure as established and veritable facts so long as this state of affairs lingers on. Thus it is Brahman—the ground and goal of all finite existences and appearances—and It must be held to be both the support as well as the object of Avidya.

Functions of Avidya:—

While accounting for the appearance of the universe, three terms, namely, 'Ajñāna', 'Mithyā-jñāna' and 'Saṁśaya-jñāna' are usually avilable in the Vārtikā-literature of Sureśvara. Of these three, the first only is used as denotative of the very nature of Avidya and the last two as expressive of the results of its functioning. Mithyā-jñāna is a decisive or determinate wrong realisation or mis-apprehension, while Saṁsayajñāna is a doubtful wrong realisation of the Reality, in consequence of Its non-realisation as such. So the statement that the universe is an appearance out of the One Reality, Brahman, through Avidya[1] means that it is an appearance arising as the uninterrupted series of diverse wrong realisations of the one Reality, Brahman, consequent upon its ever-continuous non-realisation. These wrong realisations are nothing but fresh appearances arising from the modifications of Avidya, in which the galvanising original Appearances of Reality, the Pure consciousness, remain immured. Thus non-realisation is the cause[2] and decisive or doubtful wrong realisations are the results, and effects, being essentially identical with their cause in this system, they are only further developments and affrandisations of Avidya. Thus Avidya is factually one and undifferentiated, though functionally diverse and different. Avaraṇa and Vikṣepa are the words, which came to be used generally in the later Advaita literature as denotative of the functions of Avidya, but Sureśvara prefers to use Ajñāna

1. B. B. V., A, II, B. IV, P. 1108, V. 455.

2. B. B. V.—A. I, B. IV, P. 705, V. 1368, A. IV, B. IV, P. 1850, VV. 787-88; P. 1866, V. 892, P. 1867, V. 898.

3. B. B. V.—P. 509, VV. 385-86; P. 705, V. 1316.

and Mithyājñāna only by way of an explanation of the world-appearance. Mithyājñāna or wrong realisation is sometimes a doubt and mostly a certainty—and it is immaterial whether an appearance is a doubt, a determination, illusion or any other form of experience but in every case it is no batter than an illusion[1] unmistakably recognised as such in popular parlance.

In any case of an accepted illusion even, Avidya obscures the so-called real, the underlying substratum of that illusion, and projects samething else erroneous over it. Thus Avidya as operating even in the empirical realm not only screens and suppresses the so-called real from view but also displays a different object as an appearance instead thereof. Moreover, an illusory object is not made up of some material constituents or component parts, but it is a sheer projection and product of Avidya, functioning on the strength and in the light of an object-defined-Consciousness or Consciousness non-discriminated from Its own original Appearance in a particular modification of Avidya, which puts up the primary appearance as the so-called real empirical object or the substratum, underlying that particular illusion. So on a proper analysis of its make-up Avidya will have to be determined as its substance and the said object-defined-Consciousness, passing for an empirical reality, as its basis. When this Avidya, responsible for obscuring the so-called real empirical object securing as the substratum and projecting some appearance or appearances thereon, is sublated by the proper realisation or a true knowledge of that so-called real empirical object, the illusory object also is instantaneously and necessarily sublated, disrupting all appearances projected thereby. Similarly, the material constituents or component parts of any empirical object too, being only appearances, though invariably antecedent in order, every entity of the universe also has to be accepted as a sheer projection and product of Avidya. As all empirical entities are series of appearances, arising simultaneously or successively through Avidya of one and she

1. B. B. V.—A, II, B. IV, P. 1108, V. 455.

same Reality ultimately, both doubtful and decisive wrong realisations have to be recognised ultimately as identical with one undifferentiated[1] Avidya. Thus the functional diversity of Avidya does not affect its essential unity.

Relation of Avidya to Brahman and the Universe :—

How is Avidya related to Brahman is one of the most puzzling problems of the Advait system. Different Advaitins have attempted to solve it from different angles of vision in accordance with the various schools of the interpretation of Advaitism.

Three views advanced by the three schools of Advaitism, which are remarkably notable in the entire field of the Advaita-literature, are worthy of consideration in this connection.

Padmapāda and Prakāśātman, exponents of the Vivaraṇa-school, maintain the relation between Brahman and Avidya to be that of both "Āśryāśrayibhāva" and "Viṣaya-Viṣayibhāva" that is, the relation of 'the substratum and the sustained or the subject and the predicate' and that of 'the object and the predicate'. Vācaspati, the exponent of the Avaccheda-school, holds the relation between the Jīva and Avidya to be the former one, and between Īśvara and Avidya to be the latter one. Sureśvarācārya, however, accepts Avidya to be naturally and intrinsically or inadventitiously present in Brahman and while holding the latter to be apparently both the subject and object of Avidya, ingenuously tries to establish a new relation to be subsisting between the two. This originality on his part deserves to be explained at length. As pointed out above repeatedly, Avidya like its offshoot, the entire universe, is an appearance and so the relation between Brahman, the Reality, and Avidya, an appearance of the nature of a constantly universal power naturally attached to the former and vitalised and enlivened by the underlying Appearance of the former as its very soul or Reality (Atmā), cannot

1. B. B. V.—A. IV., B. IV. Pi 1866, V. 892.

be but that of 'Reality and the one having it to be so, that is, founded upon Brahman as Reality'. The phrase, used by Sureśvara to convey the sense of this relation is "Ātmātmavattva"[1] This type of relationship, according to him, extends even to all projections or modifications of Avidya with this difference that there is a dual aspect in the relationship of any of the products of Avidya with Brahman in as much as this relationship is possible through Avidya, without whose functioning the universe could not have come into existence at all; whereas the relationship of Avidya with Brahman is direct or immediate, that is without any intermediary. It is in view of this direct relationship that the inherence of Avidya in Brahman has to be acknowledged. In this connection, it may be remarked that this apparently conflicting description about the nature of Avidya, which assumes its existence ab ante but denies its persistence after Brahma—realisation, is the logical outcome of the two-fold intellectual position, which recognises Brahman (from the view-point of Absolute Reality and Consciousness) as unrelated and trancendent and at the same time (from the standpoint of Avidya or limited reality) as related, being the underlying substratum of the said universal power and phenomena—whether explicit or involved—as infinite potencies in the womb of Avidya In other words, these two apparently self-contradictory concepts about Brahman are clearly reconcilable in accordance with the two stand-points, namely, Vastu-Vṛtta (i.e., viewpoint of Reality) and Tamo-Vṛtta (i.e., viewpoint of Avidya), recognised by Sureśvara. Thus from Reality-standpoint[2] Brahman is eternally unrelated and unlimited and from Avidya-stand-point or Appearance-standpoint[1] It is apparently related to Avidya, which is ever intrinsi-

1. B. B. V.—A I, B. IV, P. 508, V. 381 ; P. 706, V. 1370 : P. 16.
(1) B B. V.—A. I. B. IV, P. 512, V. 403; A. II, B. I, P. 950, V. 383; P. 938, VV. 305-6 and VV. 308-9; P. 1611, V. 1302; P. 1589, V. 1179 & V. 1181; P. 1872, V. 928.

2. B. B. V.; P. 1616, VV. 1332-33; P. 1617; V. 1335; P. 1245, VV. 36-37 & 34; P. 950, V. 383; P. 955, V. 411; P. 1243; V. 24.

cally present in It as Its nature and power so long as it is not aublated once for ever by realisation of Reality. Reality-standpoint is revealed only on the realisation of Reality, but so long as Reality Itself has not been realised, it is Avidya-standpoint, which guides and governs the whole sphere of our empirical life and experience. It is reasonable also that Avidya-ridden should judge, appraise and evaluate things from the view-point of Avidya and according to the scale of relative realities and empirical values. Thus "Tamovṛtta" i. e., Avidya-view-point is cosmological and epistemological view-point; while 'Vastu-Vṛtta"i. e. Reality-standpoint is trans-cosmological and purely monistic stand-point. There is no clash between them, as the two belong to two different stages of existance, one prevailing in the Pre-realisation period of life and the other obtaining in simultaneously with the realisation of Reality.

It is necessary to clear here a very popular distinction, obtaining in and pervading the entire range of our experiences between Ātman and Anātma. Ātman is Pure Consciousness and It is so called; because, being essentially of the nature of Pure Consciousness, It is the very Essence or Reality of all other things-animate and inanimate. Every thing else appearing to be other than this, that is, unconscious or insentient and hence capable of being manifested by a knowledge, is Anātma. The threefold division observeble in every case of knowledge, based on the said dichotomisation together with the instrument, is a distinctive feature of all cognitive appearances. Otherwise, how can there be any division or classification of the one Pure Consciousness or limitation of the one Absolute Reality. In the realm of appearances Reality appears to be divided and distinguished subjectively, objectively and cognitively. This tripartite division is manifest in appearances through the media-the various modifications of Maya or Avidya. As the tide of apparent evolution spreads onward and onward, the said threefold differentiation emerges

1. B. B. V., P. 1617, V. 1336; P. 499, V. 340; P. 1620, VV. 1353-66; P. 511, VV. 395-96.

out and out and becomes clearer and more distinct. But as involution starts in the reverse order and appearances are gradually absorbed into their respective causes or their socalled underlying realities, the said division begins to fade and shrink and the lines of subjectivity, objectivity and cognitivity draw nearer and nearer. At last, when Reality, the Pure consciousness, is realised, the threefold apparent distinction is altogether dissipated and the lines of subjectivity, objectivity and cognitivity converge and are ultimetely purified and merged into one, that is, Pure Consciousness. Pure subjectivity and pure objectivity are absolutely identical with Pure knowledge as Pure Consciousness. Differentiation starts and ends with appearances and necessarily implies impurity, relativity and limitation, arising from different media or various receptacles. In Pure Consciousness there can be no impurity, division and limitation-subjective, objective and cognitive.

Consciousness or Being, immanent in the whole universe as the Creator, Controller and Witness etc., is called "Īśvara", i. e. the Supreme Soul or God and the same, individually persistent and inhiviting a particular psychophysical organism as the experiencer and enjoyer etc. is known as "Jīva", i. e. the individual soul. So for the purpose of all empirical experiences and enjoyments, Atma, i. e. the Jiva, is the experiencer and enjoyer or the subject of all experiences and enjoyments and 'Anatma' is something experienced and enjoyed or the object of all knowledge and enjoyments and this apparent tripartite division (i. e., the knower, the known and the knowledge, being the subiective, the objective and the cognitive appearances respectively) lasts only so long as Reality, the Pure Consciousness, is not realised.

Different views of Advaitism about causality of the universe.

All the Advaitins do not subscribe to the view that Iśvara is the supreme ultimate cause of the universe, some of them holding that Brahman, the Pure Consciousness, Itself is apparently the cause (vivartopādāna), others advocating that

It is the constituent-cum-instrumental cause (Abhinna-nimitta-pādāna) of the universe and still others maintaining that the entire universe is the fabrication of the Jiva's individual intellect. In this connection, three schools, prominently traceable in the Advaita system of phllosophy, are particularly worth mentioning. There is one school, which attempts to define Īśvara and Jīva as being the prototype or original (Bimba) and reflection (Pratibimba) in Avidya respectively. According to it, Pure Consciousness alone, appearing as both of them (that is, Iśvara as prototype and Jiva as reflection) and also functioning as the Witness of all, is Upādāna-Kāraṇa of the universe. There is another school, which distinguishes Iśvara from Jīva as being reflections (of Pure Consciousness, the original) in Avidya and mind respectively. According to this school, Pure Consciousness, qualified per accidens by the state of being the prototype of reflection in Avidya, is the Upādāna-Karaṇa and Witness of the universe. Sureśvarācārya, the exponent of the Vārtika-school or Ābhāsa-Vāda, holds the view that Īśvara and Jīva are to be differentiated as the Abhasas, emanating from Pure Consciousness, the Absolute Reality, as appearing in Avidya and mind respectively and it is Īśvara, who is both the witness and the Upādāna-kāraṇa of the universe. The first two views are attributed to the author of Vivaraṇa and Sarvajñātma-muni, the author of Saṅkṣepa-Śārīraka, respectively. There is yet another school of Vācaspati, which cannot be omitted or ignored in this context. This school holds that Pure Consciousness, as seeming to be the support or substratum of Avidya, is the Jīva i.e. individual soul and the same as appearing to be the object of Avidya is Īśvara. So Īśvara and Jīva, though different as qualified per accidens by seeming to be the object and subject of Avfdya respectively, can be held (as counterparts of one and the same thing) to be essentially identical, just as a 'ghata' i. e., an earthen pot, in the terminology of Nyaya, is different as qualified by two different Upādhis-'ghaṭatva' and 'dravyatva', but is, nevertheless, essentially one and the same entity. It

is the Jīva, which, according to this Avacheda-vāda of Vācaspati Miśra, is accepted to be the Upādāna-kāraṇa of the universe, as the universe is nothing but the Brahman, wrongly conceived as such by the Jīva through its Avidya.

The above differentiation of views is, accoring to Brahmānanda's[1] commentary on the well-known standard work, namely, Advaita-Siddhi. Siddhāntaleśa,[2] however, records these views somewhat differently, which are given below as exactly and literally as possible. According to the followers of the Vivaraṇa-school, Brahman, qualified by Maya and possessed of qualities such as omniscience and omnipotence etc., that is, Iśvara is the cause of the universe. The author of Saṅkṣepa-Śārīraka upholds the view that Brahman through Maya is the cause of the universe. Maya, though subsidiary to Brahman and helpful in bringing about the appearance of the universe, is not the cause of the universe, but it serves merely as the 'Dvāra' or the intermediary link between Brahman and the universe and continuously runs through the latter as the modifying factor. Vācaspati Miśra maintains that Brahman, objectified by Avidya, is Iśvara and the same, appearing variously to the Jīva according to different modifications of Avidya, is the cause of the universe.

There is obviously a clash between the views of Appaya-Dikṣita and Brahmānanda as regards the Upādāna-Karaṇata of the universe, according to the Avaccheda-Vāda of Vācaspati Miśra, as the former attributes it to the Jīva and the latter ascribes it to the Brahman as objectified by Avidya in the Jīva, that is, Iśvara. Brahmānanda says that Iśvara also may be called the cause of the universe, as being essentially identical with the Jīva, which is primarily the Upādāna-Karana on account of being the substratum or subject of Avidya. Both these views[1] may be supported by the most important work of Vācaspati

1. Brahmānandī—Comm. on A.S, P. 483; S.B.—PP. 225-27.

2. S.L.—P. 59 and PP. 75-77; P.P.V.—PP. 222, 224 and 231.

Miśra, namely, Bhamati[2]. There is also no difficulty in reconciling them, as they are based on two different conceptions of Upādāna-Kāraṇatā (स्वनिमित्तकारणीभूताज्ञानाश्रयत्वेन स्वोपादानकारणाज्ञानविषयत्वेन वा). The Jiva may be held to be the apparent material and instrumental cause (Nimittopādāna-karaṇa) as the substratum of the said Avidya and Iśvara may be maintained to be the same as the object thereof. There is, however, one difference and it is that, according to the former, Avidya is only the instrumental cause, serving as the defect of the knower (प्रमातृगतदोषविषया) and not the material one, while according to the latter, it is the ever modifying material cause also.

In the Pañcadaśī,[3] Bhāratitīrtha also expounds what is known as 'Ābhāsa-vāda, but he obviously differs from Sureśvara in his conceptions about Īśvara and the Jīva. According to him, Consciousness, as appearing in Maya, is to be called Īśvara, while the same, as appearing in Avidya, is to be known as Jīva.[3] The distinction between Maya and Avidya is this, that in the former there is predominance of pure Sattva and in the latter there is an exhuberance of impure Sattva.

Sureśvara's view on the problem of the world-causality :—

Sureśvaras view, as adumbrated by Brahmānanda, has already been given above. On a close examination of his own works, it may be safely concluded that Sureśvara assigns the causality of the world to Īśvara and puts both Īśvara and Jīva alike in the realm of appearances. Leaving aside Īśvara, the causal appearance, all other empirical entities and iilusory manifestation are alike effectual or resultant but respectively primary and secondary appearances; and Avidya, being the indispensable source of the emergence of all appearances, the causality of Īśvara as being the appearance of pure Conscious-

1. Nyāya-ratnāvalī—Comm. on S B.—P. 231, Ls. 12-21; Brahmānandī—Comm. on A.S.—P. 199, Ls. 2-4.

2. Bhāmati—P. 253, L. 18, P. 257, L. 5, P. 378, Ls, 7-10.

3. PD. VIII, 27-31.

ness therein is established unquestionably. Sureśvara's oft quoted verse[1] in this connection is "अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम् । अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्मकारणमुच्यते ॥" He aims in this verse at emphasising 'Dvārata', meaning thereby that but for this Avidya no appearance would have been possible at all. Avidya is solely responsible for the original Appearance of Brahman into in it, serving as the cause of the whole universe, although from the view-point of Reality there is no scope for any causality in as much as there is nothing else other the one unrelated Reality, the Brahman and Avidya itself, being an appearance, can have no reality of its own apart from or other than Reallty, the Brahman. Further, he affirms that Īśvara - the Appearance of Consciousness or the Consciousness indiscriminately undistinguished from Its Appearance in Avidya - is the Upādāna-karaṇa of the universe. What he means by saying so is that Avidya and the Appearance of Consciousness therein are jointly the Upādāna-karaṇa like the two conjoined strands of a rope, the former being responsible for eliciting various Appearances from the one Pure Consciousness, exactly suitable and answering to its own modifications, and the latter for galvanising and enlivening the former by imparting[2] the so-called existence or reality and manifestation to those modifications of Avidya. Thus Reality through Its original Appearances and Avidya throught its multifareaus modifications jointly bring about fresh appearances as manifold entities of the universe.

Suresvara tries to clear up a very important point in this connection by saying that the discussion of several views, aiming at defining both Īśvara and Jīva in different ways, need not lead any one to a doubt as to which of these conflicting views is to be taken as conclusive and authoritative one. The division of that, which is really indivisible and impartite, in order to explain the appearance of the universe (which cannot be abruptly discarded as altogether unreal), has to be

1. B B.V. - A.1, B. IV, P. 505, V. 371, P. 430, V. 15, P. 430, V. 15.
2. T,B.V. - PP. 104 - 5, VV. 85 86; P. 131, V. 12; P. 132, V. 16

assumed as a matter of necessity. Different theories have been formulated by way of an explanation of the said apparent division in accordance with different standa-points and methods of approach of each school and they need not matter much, as they are merely explanatory and not assertive of any final truth in themselves. Though only various conceptions or fabrications of human mind, they are at first useful in elucidating the nature of different catagories manifest in the empirical plane, and atlast in driving the seekers's mind at one and the same Reality. Any method[1] whatsoever, says Sureśvārācārya, which contributes directly or indirectly to the grasp and realisation of Reality is perfectly sound and all such ways of interpretations, though different from and disagreeable to one another, are to be adjusted and reconciled as seeking to establish one and the same Truth as their ultimate goal, which is decidedly one, absolute and transcendent Reality.

It seems very necessary to mention that of all the above views the one expounded by Sureśvara sounds most satisfactory; because, according to his theory of Ābhāsa, Reality Itself remains dissociateed, unrelated and unlimited and thus it is,only Its appearances, which are actually associated with all divisions, relations and limitations, necessarily involved in the empirical order of finite and fleeting appearances or diverse and discrete eventualities.

Conceptions[2] *of Iśvara and Jīva :—*

The Appearance of Consciousness in Avidya, underlying it as the animating reality, identically associated with it and indiscriminatly undifferentiated from Pure Consciousness, makes even Pure Consciousness, though essentially ever-unrelated, appear to be identically related to Avidya;

1. S.B. PP. 255 - 56.

2. B. B. V.—A. II, B. IV, P. 1103, V. 417, P. 1104, VV. 424-27; PP. 1090-92, VV. 345-54, P. 1003, V. 65; A. II, B. III, P. 993, V. 7; A. II, B. I, P. 924, VV. 224-25 and the Comm. Ānandagiri thereon; P. 923, VV. 216-18, P. 918, V. 187 & 189, A. IV, B. III, P. 1446, V. 398 and

and such an Appearance of Pure Consciousness in Avidya or even Pure Consciousness, thus indiscriminately undifferentiated from Its own Appearance in Avidya and thereby apparently rendered as identically related to it, is called Īsvara. Similarly, the Appearance of Pure Consciousness in Buddhi (one of the modifications of Avidya), underlying it as the enlivening reality, identically linked up with it and indiscriminately indistinguishable from Pure Consciousness, makes even Pure Consciousness, though essentially ever-unrelated, appear to be identically related to Buddhi; and such an Appearance of Pure Consciousness in Buddhi or Consciousness, thus indiscriminately undistinguished from Its own Appearance in Buddhi and thereby apparently rendered as identically related to it, is called the Jīva. चिदाभासविशिष्टाऽविद्या-संबलित ईश्वरः। अज्ञानोपहितात्मनोऽज्ञानतादात्म्यापन्नस्य आत्माऽविविक्ताज्ञानोपाध्यन्तर्गताभास ईश्वरः। अथवा अज्ञानोपहिताऽज्ञानतादात्म्यापन्ना तद्गतस्वाभासाऽविविक्ता चिदीश्वरः। चिदाभासविशिष्टव्यष्टिबुद्ध्युपहितो जीवः। बुद्ध्युपहितात्मनो बुद्धितादात्म्यापन्नस्य आत्माऽविविक्तबुद्ध्युपाध्यन्तर्गताभासो जीवः। अथवा बुद्ध्युपहिता बुद्धिगतस्वाभासाऽविविक्ता बुद्धितादात्म्यापन्ना चित् जीवः।

The above two alternative definations naturally give rise to two conceptions about Īsvara and Jīva etc., which, though apparently different, are essentially identical. Thus as an appearance, Isvara is illusory, phenomenal and unreal and shares the nature of becomings only. But as Pure consciousness, undifferentiated from Its original Appearance in Avidya, and hence only apparently rendered as identically related to the latter, Īsvara is of the the nature of both Being and becomings or Essence and appearances. This is the metaphysical difference brought about by the above interpretations. The latter view, however, is more supported by Surésvara's texts than the former one.

P. 1447, VV. 402-6; P. 1431, V. 310; P. 1437, VV. 344-47; P. 1439, VV. 351-57; A. III, B. IV., P. 1222, V. 86, A. I, B. IV, P. 506, V. 376, P. 535, V. 504, P. 556, V. 614; P. 457, V. 152 and its Comm. Anandgiri; A. IV, B. III, P. 1442, V. 373 and P. 1443, V. 379-84; Brahmānandī Comm. on A.S. – P. 483; S. B.—PP. 219-20.

In other words, one and the same Consciousness, as appearing in and through Avidya and innumerable minds, seems not only qualified as it were by those differentiating receptacles or limiting adjuncts, but, indiscriminately undistinguished from Its own various Appearances therein (answering to those diverse receptacles), also appears to have become identical with and related to those receptacles and comes to be variously known as Iśvara and Jīva in popular parlance. Thus in the primary sense of the terms, both Iśvara as well as innumerable Jīvas or individual selves are merely appearances of Consciousness, the Reality, in Avidya and various Buddhis respectively, but in the figurative sense, they may be defined to be even the Pure Consciousness, appearing to be identically linked up with the said various receptacles on account of Its indistinctness from Its own undiscriminated Appearances in them. It is remarkable to note here that the above two interpretations are in confirmity with the two sets of texts that may be culled from Sureśvara's original works.

Sākṣi and Antaryāmin :—

A remarkable point to be noted here is that, according to Sureśvara, Īśvara is not only the Creater but also the Sākṣi[1] i.e. the witness and Antaryāmin or the Inner Controller of the universe. We have seen above some of the ways, in which the Sākṣi has been conceived and defined variously by Advaitins. It is necessary to mention some other important views about the same before attempting to bring out the conception of the Sākṣi, maintained by Sureśvara.

The author of the Vedanta-Kaumudi[1] holds that the Sākṣi is nothing else but the Īśvara, which permits the Jīva to do or refrain from doing on act at times, but which is itself

1. B. B. V.—A. IV, B. III, P. 1443, V. 383; A. III, B. IV, P. 1222, V. 86, A. II, B. III, P. 994, V. 10; A. I, B. IV, P. 500, VV. 344-45; A. IV, B. III, P. 1438, V. 350, A. III, B. IV, P. 1222, V. 86, A I, B. IV, P. 506, V. 374.

indifferent and devoid of all activities. Though only Īsvara in some form or other, the Sākṣi is altogether unconcerned with causality. In manifesting Avidya etc. it is inner to the Jīva.

The author of Tattva-suddhi[2] tries to explain the nature of Sākṣi in another way. "Just as the thisness of nacre (in the stock-example of the nacre-silver) appears to belong to silver, even so the Sākṣi, which is really of the constitution of Brahman, appears to belong to the constitution of the Jīva.

Some Advaitins define the Sākṣi to be the Jīva itself, qualified per accidens by Avidya (अविद्योपहितोजीवः) The Jīva, being in its own nature free from attachments, indifferent and luminous, can be possibly held to be of the nature of the Sākṣi with its agency etc. merely imposed on it owing to its appearing to be identified with the internal organ (by way of superimposition).

Some others[4] maintain that Sākṣi is the Jīva, not as conditioned by the omnipresent Avidya, but as conditioned by internal organ. In other words, Consciousness, qualified by the internal organ, is the Jīva-the Pramātā or cogniser and the same, as merely conditioned per accidens by the internal orgain, is the Jiva-Sakāi.

In the three chapters of Pañcadasī, Bhāratītīrtha has tried to define 'Sākṣi' in many ways. In the Kūtaṣṭha-dīpa[5], he defines Sākṣi 'as' Kuṭastha, (i. e.) immutable, unchanging, eternal, and flawless Consciousness. Ordinarily objects are known through psychoses or mental modifications about and in accordance with them. But from the absence of psychoses that of Consciousness also cannot be concluded. So It has to be admitted that the immutable Consiousness is not only 'the silent spectator of all the changing moods and

1. S. L P. 188,
2. Ibid P. 190.
3. Ibid P. 191.
4. S.L. P. 193.
5. P. VIII, VV. 3, 20, 21, 24, 25.

the fleeting moments, but is also the foundational Consciousness, which reveals the existence as well as the non-existence of psychoses'. In the Nātaka-dīpa[1]. the Sākṣi is 'compared to the lamp set on a dramatic stage'. The lamp illumines the manager of the drama, the actors and the audience without any distinction and it shines even when the stage is cleared up of all of them. In the same manner, the Sākṣī reveals the egoity, the intellect and various objects and shines in its own lustre even when they are non-existent. Just as the lamp on the dramatic stage shines without being in the least affected by the movements of the actors and the audience, similarly. the Sākṣi reveals all passing or changing things both within and without invariably as a permanent and unchanging Consciousness. In the Citradīpa a fourfold classification of Cit has been adopted and the concepts of Brahman, Kūṭastha. Iśvara and Jīva are explained and illustrated. Brahman is unconditioned like Mahākāśa. Kūṭastha is immutable and unchanging, but appears to be conditioned like the ether, say for instance, limited by a pot. In water, contained in a pot, the sky is sometimes reflected along with clouds and stars, scattered and strewn therein. The sky in the water, contained in a pot, is a reflection of the ether at large, so even the sky in the clouds, which are constituted of subtle particles of water, is a reflection of the same ether. Both are reflections, but the difference lies in this, that the sky in the water is a small one and the sky in the clouds is a large one. Similarly, both the Iśvara and the Jīva are reflections, but the former may be compared to the sky in the clouds and is omnipresent, being the reflection of Consciousness in the omnipresent Avidya, while the latter may be compared to the sky in the water of a pot and is finite, being the reflection of Consciousness in the finite mind, which belongs to a partioular body.

Citsukhācārya[1] makes a distinction between the Sākṣi, which is the Seer, independent of the instruments of valid

1. Ibid X, VV. 10-12, 14.

knowledge, and the Pramātṛ, which is the cogniser, dependent on the function of the means of knowledge. The former cannot be included in the latter, as during Suṣupti it manifests Ajñāna, inspite of the absence of the instruments of valid knowledge. Its being subsidiary even to empirical usage cannot be denied, since the Sākṣi is included in the Jīva-Self even then. Desire etc., being super-sensuous and constituents of the mind, can be cognised neither by senses nor by the mind and they establish what is other than these but responsible for bringing about their perception and this is known as the Sākṣi or the witness. The Sākṣī is neither what is characterised by (विशिष्ट) nor what is only marked out by (उपलक्षित) Avidya. But it is that, which has Avidya for its unassociated adjunct (उपाधि). In other words, Pure consciousness Itself, neither defined nor specified and singled out but merely qualified per accidens by Avidya is the Sākṣi. Pure Consciousness Itself functions in the murky atmosphere of Avidya as Sākṣi in relation to all, that are witnessed by It. The Siddhāntalesa adds that It is so as identified with the Jīva. Thus the ever-immediate Pure consciousness, Brahman, which, as identical with the Jīva, is called the Sakṣi.

Sureśvara envisages the Sākṣi[2] to be neither of the nature of the Brahman nor of that of the Jīva but holds it identical with Īśvara. According to him, the Brahman or Pure Consciousness—one and aspectless as Reality—appears prominently as two kinds of Empirical Self, namely, Īśvara and Jīvas, out of which the former, as functioning differently, comes to be viewed in two more aspects, that is, as Sākṣi and Antaryāmin. As qualified by Avidya and thus responsible for the outcome of the whole universe—manifest or unmanifest, mova-

1. Tattva-Pradīpikā—PP. 381-82, Nayana-Prasādinī-Comm. thereon; I. S., P. 325; S. L., P. 186.

2. B B. V.—A. IV, B. III, P. 1439, V. 356; P. 1438, VV. 350-52; P. 1392, V. 91; A. I, B. IV, P. 505, V. 372; P. 506, V. 374; P. 500, VV. 344-45; P. 457, V. 151; A II, B. III, P. 994, V. 10; A. IV, B. III, P. 1429, V. 295; Nyaya-Ratnavali-Comm. on S. 13. PP. 272-73.

ble or immovable, sensient or insensient—the Primal Appearance of Consciousness is called Iśvara. The same, as qualified per accidens or conditioned by Avidya and functioning as the witness of all, is called Sākṣi, while the same, as qualified per accidens by Avidya but functioning as the Inner controller of all, is known as Antaryāmi (चिदाभासविशिष्टाविद्याविशिष्ट ईश्वरः, तादृशाविद्योपहितः साक्षित्वेन साक्षी माया-तत्कार्य-नियन्तृत्वेन अन्तर्यामी च) So there is no essential difference between Iśvara, Sākṣi and Antaryāmin, but these are merely different names, given to one and the Supreme Soul, as functioning differently.

There are two modes of characterisation and distinction : one, in which the distinguishing feature is actually associated with the distinguished, while the other, in which the former, though not really related to the latter in any manner, still serves to define and distinguish the latter. The term 'विशिष्ट' stands for the one and 'उपहित' for the other mode of distinction. For example, the quality 'redness' distinguishes any substance, actually possessing it, but the dark patch of cloud, obscuring the Sun, characterises it, though not in contact with it or forming part of it, as the cloud is in a very low layer of atmosphere. Thus 'redness' is a quality (विशेषण) and the substance is a possessor (विशिष्ट), while the patch of cloud is a mere remote and accidental adjunct, only seemingly qualifying, i. e. qualifying per accidens (उपाधि) and the Sun is apparently characterised or qualified per accidens (उपहित) by the said patch of cloud.

Explanation of the world-causality :—

For a single product two reciprocally independent Upādāna-Kāraṇas are impossible and hence it has to be upheld that Brahman and Avidya in combination respectively through Origional Appearences and multiple madifications constitute the Upādāna-kāraṇa of the universe. There are three[1] possible ways of such a combination. Firstly, alike the two conjoined strands in the case of a rope, both are jointly the Upādāna-kāraṇa of the universe, in a relation of equal primacy, Brahman

1. V.P.S. V. PXXI, P. 263.

serving in respect of superimposition of existence and mgnifestation and Avidya serving contribnting to the display of inertness and change. Secondly, the indeterminable and unobstructed Potency, called Maya, is alone the Upādāna kāraṇa; and, as potency is invariably dependent on the potent, Uādāna-kāranatā is thus extended presumtively even to Brahman, that seems to possess this potency. Thirdly, since the superimposed Maya has in reality no existence other than or apart from its Substratum, Brahman, Brahman as the Substratum is thereby associated with the Upādāna-Kāraṇata, which belongs directly to Maya alone, According to the first view, Upādāna-Kāraṇatā in the principal sense belongs to the Brahman, qualified by Maya; in the second and third views, it is only figurative in the case of Brahman. Thus in accordance with all the three views the causality of the world is Svarūpa-Lakṣaṇa or the definition of the essential nature of the Upādāna-Kāraṇa (in the principal sense of the term) in the case of Avidya, but it is Taṭastha-Lakṣaṇa or the definition per accidens of the Upādāna-Kāraṇa (in the figurative sense of the term) in the case of Brahman.

Sureśvara also accepts the joint[1] Upādāna-Kāraṇatā of Brahman and Avidya but in the form of Īśvara. In other words, Brahman Itself is in no way the cause of the uuiverse, but primarily Its Appearance in Avidya or figuratively, as It appears in and through Avidya, is responsible for the appearance of the universe. To make it clear, Brahman, unrealised and wrongly realised through Avidya, that is, as appearing in and through Avidya and its modifications constitutes what is known as the so-called real universe. The Appearance of Brahman or Brahman through Its Appearance in Avidya is the cause in as much as It energises, Vitalises or enlivens Avidya and its modifications by imparting[2] existence or so-called reality and manifestation to them; and Avidya is the cause

1. B. B. V., A. IV, B. III, P. 1439, V. 355; A. III, B. IV, P. 1222, V. 86.

2. B. B. V., P. 1023, V. 189.

in as much as it projects the phenomenal world out of the Reality through Its non-realisation and wrong realisations and is responsible, by way of its various modifications, for the diverse forms, in which the universe has been gaining appearance beginninglessly in the empirical order. There could have been no Appearances (of Reality) without Avidya, because it is Avidya, which elicits so many corresponding Appearances (from Reality) in itself and its modifications through itself and contributes diverse forms to those manifold Appearances; and hence Appearances of Reality or Reality through Its Appearances alone could not have sufficed to serve as the cause of the universe, as they are themselves unaccountable without Avidya. In absence of Reality and Its Appearances, Avidya as well as its modifications could not have even appeared to be real, existent and manifest at all; because it is the Reality, which, through Its Appearances, imparts life-force, so to say, to all the lifeless projections or projected forms of Avidya by making them appear existent,[1] real and manifest, though in reality they have no existence, reality and manifestation of their own at all. To sum up, suppression of Reality and drawing up and diversification of Appearances from It by offering itself and its modifications as their necessary receptacles are the assets of Avidya and to enliven Avidya and its modifications by appearing through them so as to make them appear as existent, real and manifest empirically is the contribution of Reality.

Sureśvar's originality in explaining the initial or unmanifest stage of creation :

Creation ban be divided into three stages : (1) the unmanifest stage, (2) the manifest but subtle stage and (3) the gross stage.

Prior to creation (during dissolution) Avidya is unmanifest and undifferentiated, containing all the phenomena of the universe in their germinal state. At the advent of creation,

1. B. B. V., P. 661, VV, 1140-41.

when Avidya is stirred up by the fructifying Karmans of all individual beings, it remains only unmanifest upto certain stages of its modifications, i.e., before the actual manifestation of uninterfused or unquintupled subtle elements. These stages of gradual evolution from the unmanifest condition towards the manifest one have been briefly but beautifully and originally summarised by Sureśvarācārya in one of his verses, which was later on interpreted and explained at some length by Rāmādvaya in his work, "Vedānt-Kaumudī"[1], (still unpublished). They have been elucidated by Rāmādvaya in the following manner :—

(i) Emergence of Supreme Knowledge (or omniscience) as the first power (**सृष्टयवसरोद्भूतेन सर्वप्राणिविषयेण ज्ञानविशेषणमाया-विकारेण ईश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञत्वम्**).

(ii) Manifestation of Universal compassion in the Creator (**सर्वप्राणिविषयककरुणाविकारः**).

(iii) Actuation of Maya already disturbed (**नुन्नमायाविषय एव प्रेरणाविकारः**).

(iv) Excogitation as regards the way to the fulfilment of achievements (empirical or supreme) of all bound beings (**कथं प्राणिनां पुमर्थो भवतीति विचारो विकारविशेषः**)

(v) Decision regarding the said way as lying only through creation (**सृष्ट्यैवेति विचारफलो ज्ञान-विकारः**).

(vi) Rise of the Creative will in the Supreme Lord, i.e. Iśvara, resolving "How shall I create this" (**कथं सृजामीति ईक्षणविकारः**)

(vii) Emergance of conative impulse with reference to the method of creation (**सृष्टिविषयककामनाविकारः**).

(viii) Condensation or materialisation, leading to actual manifestation in the succeeding stage (**किञ्चिदुपचय उच्छूनताविशेष-स्थानीयो विकारः**).

(ix) Actual manifestation of subtle and unquintipled elements (**वीजाङ्कुरवदनभिव्यक्त-रूपान्नादिशब्दतः पृथिव्यादिविकारः**).

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1. Vedānta Kaumudī (unpublished) :—
"सर्वज्ञकरुणानुन्ना विचार-ज्ञान-कामनाः ।
ईक्षणोपचयान्नादिरूपेणाथ विवर्त्तते ॥ "इति वार्त्तिककृद्भिः सङ्गृहीता विकाराः... ।

Īsvara or the Supreme Lord, being associated with (1) Avidya, qualified by undefined and undeterminable special potencies, (2) Kāma, the desire to create the world—necessary for the fulfilment of the various achievements of all beings - and (3) the Karmans of creatures, the causes of the diversity of the world to be created, brings out (of unmanifest Avidya) the five elements, which are then unquintuplicated (अपञ्चीकृतभूत).

The Stage of the Subtle Creation :—

At this stage of the origin of the subtle elements, there emerges an apparent differentiation as Hiraṇyagarbha and as Sūtra on the basis of dualism in Sakti (namely, jñāna and kriyā) as supra-cosmic Buddhi and supra-cosmic kriya-Śakti respectively. In other words, Sūtrātman, or Brahman, appearing in and thus qualified per accidens or conditioned by the unquintuplicated and subtile five fold elements collectively (समष्टिरूपेण) as a whole and becoming identical with them as nondifferentiated or undistinguished from Its own Appearances in them, comes to be called, 'Hiraṇyagarbha'[1] as identified with supra-cosmic Buddhi, possessed of the supreme potency of knowledge, and 'Sūtra' as identified with Supra-cosmic kriyā-Śakti or prāṇa, possessed of the *Supreme* potency of Action.[2] This is the macrocosmic division of the unquituplicated subtle elements. These very subtle elements at this stage—(possessed of the constituent qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas but having the predominance of Sattva in them—are severally modified (व्यष्टिरूपेण) in various ways (in accordance with the previously accumulated karman of each individual soul) into the forms of different pure substances, endowed with the powers of knowledge and action. The portion of each of these pure substances, in which the power of knowledge is predominant, is called the inner organ, which functionally different, comes to be distinguished as the mind or intellect (बुद्धिर्मन इति द्विधोच्यते) and the portion of the same pure substance,

1. B. B. V.—A. I, B. IV, P. 431, V. 18, P. 457, V. 152 and its Comm. Ānandagiri ; A. IV, B. II, P. 1371, V. 79.

2. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-Vārtika and Ānandgiri P. 431 p. 451, VV. 151-152.

in which the power of action is predominant, is termed as the vital breath (Prāṇa), which is functionally distinguished as having five varieties, known as Prāṇa, Apāna etc. Thus the unquintuplicated elements appears to be transformed and further divided microcosmically into different Antakharaṇas or inner organs and Prāṇas, possessed of the *limited* potency of knowledge and action respectively. Brahman as appearing in each of these inner organs and qualified per accidens or conditioned by it, as indistinguishable from Its own Appearance therein, and thus appearing to be identical there-with, appears to be viewed as so many different individual souls as the inner organs may be. This is the microcosmic division of the unquintuplicated elements.

Thereafter, arise all the sensuory and motor organs, together with the subtle objective world of sense, corresponding to each of them, out of the stuff of the rudimentary Buddhi-cum-Prana of the preceding stage. To put it more clearly, a pair of senses, distinguished inter se by the power of (producing) knowledge and action (and respectively recognised as the sensuary and motor organ) comes to be evolved from each of these unquintuplicated elements, i. e. to say, the senses of ear and speech from Akāśa, those of touch and hands from Vāyu, those of eyes and feet from Tejas, those of taste and excretion or Pāyu from jala and those of nose and procreation from Pṛthivī. There is a difference of opinion with regard to the origin of the Motor senses, namely, Vāk and Pāda. Some hold that the sense of speech is the product of Tejas and that of feet is that of Ākāśa. But Madhusūdana Sarasvatī differs from this view and maintains that the sense of speech must be deemed to be product of Ākāśa, because like the ear, it is a sense responsible for the manifestation of sound and that the feet must be regarded as the product of Tejas; because the eyes are observed to be cured of a disease and restored to their normal condition as a result of the treatment, applied to the feet.

The stage of the gross creation :—

It has been clearly shown above that the karmans of indi-

vidual beings, prone to be fructified, are the primal[1] factors, responsible for stirring up the serene state of the unmanifest. But with the creation, so far manifest, no fructification of Karman is possible, as it necessarilly requires three factors ; (i) Īsvara ; the dispenser of retribution, (ii) the material world, which is the scene of retribution and (iii) the plurality of individual souls, which undergo retribution in each new existence or body for the works done in the previous lives. Thus the elements, so for transformed, being incapable of creating enjoyments without the mediation of the gross body—the receptacle of retribution or enjoyment—and the object of enjoyment become quinquepartite for the purpose of further modification into the varioue forms of the gross and multifarious phenomena of the world. Thus in consequence of the multiple modifications of the interfused elements, animated and enlivened by the correspondingly various Appearances of Brahman in them, the discrete and diverse phenomena of the universe appear as existent and real for all practical purposes and pragmatic values. As regards the rest of creation, there is nothing special about Suresvara's treatment.

Analysis of the three states of experiences by the Jīva :—

The entire empirical experiences of a jīva in this world are usually divided into three states—Waking, Dreaming and Sleep—(जाग्रत्, स्वप्न and सुषुप्ति). Suresvara has given a clear and consistent account of these different states more particularly in 'Pancīkaraṇa-Vārtika'[1] and 'Mānasollāsa'[2] than in any of his other Vārtikas.

(A) जाग्रत्—The most distinguishing feature of the waking state is that the entire perceptual machinery is operative in it and that one cognises the various worldly phenomena by means of the mind and the senses, whose effectuating condition is brought into operation under the influence of (Consciousness in the form of their presiding deities. The waking phase is not a

1. P. V. pp. 12-24, VV. 13-43.
2. M. V. pp. 92-93, VV. 23-25

unitary state but a series of states—all characterised by the same common features. During this state, the external objects, constituting the contents of our cognitions, appear as existing independently of our minds and real to all intents and purposes. Here the body—consciousness and the relation (though in truth only unreal) between the psycho-physical organism and the consciousness, called the Jīva—linked up erroneously as indentical with the former owing to lack of discriminating discernment (from its own Appearance therein, as explained above) are clearly, constantly and conspicuously present. Every cognitive process, whether direct or indirect, is complete, as it necessarily implies a blend of three distinct or clearcut aspects, namely, the instrumental, the objective and the consequential (**प्रमाण, प्रमेय** and **फल**), besides the subject or the knower as 'I', which is the indispensable and the unchanging part of the whole psychological apparatus. In short, this is the state, which gives full scope to all the diverse and discrete phenomena of the world in their perfect grossness and clear distintions. The Jīve is known as 'Visa' as the experiencer of this state.

(B) *Svapna* :—

When the Karmans, which engender the multifarious objects of enjoyments in the waking state, cease to function and those, responsible for giving rise to enjoyments in the state of dream, become operative, the individual soul passes from the waking world into the dream-world. In dream-state, the senses are complately at rest, lying dormant, as they are not then acted upon by the presiding deities, which function during the waking state. *Svapna* is defined by Sureśvara as the appearance of Consciousness through the mind as the subject on the one hand as the object and the means of their knowledge on the other, namely, the dream-phenomena and their cognitions or psychoses, arising through the aid of the residual impressions of waking-experiences on the cessation of all sense-functionings. During this state the false notion of identity of the Consciousness, called the jīva, with the gross physical body is overpowered by

the Tāmasi Vṛtti of Avidya, Svapna torpor, and the said Consciousness continues to be erroneously linked up as identical only with the subtle body, the mind (on account of the oft-repeated non-discrimination from Its Appearance therein). There is a difference of opinion among the later Advaitins as to what is the Upadana-kāraṇa of dream-objects. According to some, all dream-objects are the direct modifications of the mind stored up with the residual impressions of their previous experiences, while, according to others, it is Avidya, which transforms itself both as the dream-objects and their cognitions or psychoses. Out of these two views Sureśvara holds that the dream-objects are the modifications or product of the residual impressions, embedded in the mind as a result of the waking experiences. Another difficult problem, which has been solved variously by later Advaitins, is as to what is the substratum of the dream-phenomena. Some hold that the individual soul or the Consciousness, conditioned or limited by the mind, is the substratum thereof. Others maintain that Brahman, the Consciousness conditioned or limited by Primordial Avidya, is the substratum of all dream-appearances. There in still another view, according to which, Brahman or pure Consciousness Itself, as specified by the mind, is the substratum under consideration. Of these the first and the third are practically identical, since the Brahman or Pure Consciousness as limited by the mind in the third view is of the same nature as the jīva-consciousness in the first one. Thus the controversy regarding the (**अधिष्ठान**) reduces itself to two alternatives only that either the individual or the undifferentiated Brahman-Consciousness, specified by Avidya, is the '**अधिष्ठान**' The important distinguishing feature of the first view is that on waking up all the dream-objects are cancelled, for the real basis of the illusion—the jīva—is known in the waking state. According to the second view, however, there is technically no cancellation, (**बाध**), since the '**अधिष्ठान**', that is, the Consciousness specified by Avidya, continues to be unknown. So there is merely a cessation or removal (**निवृत्ति**) but no sublation of

1. M. V. P. 93, V. 25 and its Comm. Vṛttānta.

dream-phenomena in the waking state, which is hostile to the continuance of dreams. Abhyankara[1] in his commentary on Siddhāntabindu attributes the first view to the Pratibimba school and the last to the Avaccheda-school. The second view may be ascribed[2] to Sureśvara, an exponent of the theory of Abhāsa, according to which all phenomena of the three states are appearances of One Reality, Brahman-Consciousness. The fact that dream-experiences are particularly private to each individual is to be explained by saying that although they have for Adhiṣṭhāna the Reality, embraced by nonrealisation of Pure Consciousness, associated wieh Avidya, or the Consciousness as appearing in and through Avidya, that is, Īśvara, they are brought about by the mental residual impressions of that particular jīva or individual. In other words, dream-objects are the Appearances of Consciousness, through Avidya, in the modifications of a particular mind, aided by its own residual impressions. The dream-state is marked by an absence of body-Consciousness and greater freedom from the limitations of space and time. The objects are indeed the traces (संस्कारमात्र) of the waking state, but the utmost latitude is enjoyed in their combination and sequence. Even in the absence of external objects the revealing or illuminating function of the spirit (ज्ञानशक्ति) is unimparied and this unmistakably shows that space, time and other empirical categories are only accidental to knowing.

(C) *'Suṣupti'* :—

The state of deep sleep (सुषुप्ति) is of utmost importance in the Advaita system, as revealing both आत्मा and अविद्या—the two ultimates (respectively real and unreal) of the Advaita Vedanta—in their pristine and unmodified form. When the Karmans occasioning the states of waking and dreaming lie dorment and the senses as well as the mind with all the traces of previous

1. Comm. on S. B. by Abhayankara (Poona publication) P. 117, Ls. 10-11.

2. Nyāya-Ratnāvalī—Comm. on S. B. PP. 411-12, Ls. 10-1.

3. B. B. V., PP. 487—90, VV. 288—302.

experiences, gathered therein, and the potency of knowledge, serving as its distinctive characteristic, (ज्ञानशक्त्यवच्छिन्न) not only cease to operate but are merged in the ultimate causal factor, Avidya, there arises a state, called Suṣupti, in which the Jīva, tired of the enjoyment of various objects in Jāgrat and Svapna, enjoys complete rest. Simultaneously with the mind, which becomes absorbed in the cause, Avidya, in this state of deep sleep, the individual soul—properly describable as the Consciousness appearing in the mind and identical therewith through non-discrimination of its own Appearances therein so long as the latter is appearing—also becomes for the time being one with the Supreme Soul or Consciousness as appearing in Avidya and indiscriminately viewed as identical therewith. Thus during this stote, there is unification of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul, but there is no confusion of different individual souls, perchance going into deep sleep at the same time, and one particular individual soul experiencing deep sleep does not wake up as another, since the mind even then survives, of course in the subtle or causal form, and the nucleus of individuality is thus unconfusedly kept up. In other words, the particular Upādhi-responsible for limiting consciousness as a particular Jīva-exists potentially even then.

As all the definite sources of distinct knowledge, being absorbed, turn out to be unavailing, no kind of definite empirical cognition of any object can possibly arise at that time. Hence there is a total absence of special cognitions whatsoever at this stage of experience, the highest one during bondage. But it does not mean that this is a state of utter void or no consciousness, because there is evidence not only for the existence of the Atman, Pure Consciousness, but also of a positive object, though undifferentiated and indeterminable, namely, Avidya. The said evidence is offered in the form of the common subsequent state of consciousness (परामर्श), arising immediately on one's waking up from deep sleep "I slept soundly or happily and I was not knowing anything" (सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्). According to the Vivaraṇa school of Addvaitism and its followers,

the said judgment is a remembrance, resultant from the experience during deep sleep comprising three things only—Consciousness or Ātman, Ajñāna and Bliss. The 'I' (i.e., अहम्) is an empirical addition distinctive of the remembrance, since the 'I' alone can know the state subsequently by remembrance in view of the fact that all apperception is invariably expressed self-consciously. The absence of any specific knowledge and that of pain during Suṣupti are cognised through presumption (अर्थापत्ति-प्रमाण-द्वारा) from the presence of Avidya in its bare and unmodified form and of Bliss respectively. In the state of deep sleep or Suṣupti there are no particular objects on the one hand, successively confronting the subject on the other. Distinctions on the objective side do not exist. There is only a presentational continuum or the totality of objects in the form of Avidya. Hence she subject also, though present in a merged condition, cannot distinguish itself from the objective continuum. Thus the distinction between the subject and the object is not made out. Such an experience cannot but be unitary and immediate. It is in a definite contrast with our ordinary empirical consciousness, wherein we have knowledge of differences both subjectively and objectively and also of the distinction of the knowing subject from the object known. The content of empirical consciousness, available in the other two states, is always one out of the multiple presented phenomena. Even perception is of this nature; it has a definite content distinguished from other objects. But the sleep-experience (सुषुप्ति-ज्ञान), on the other hand, has for its object the positive undifferentiated and indeterminate entity, namely, Nescience or Avidya—the ultimate source of or the totality of all worldly objects or objectivity attenuated and stripped off manifestly from all empirical variety and lapsing into a homogeneous mass, in whose womb all phenomena are lying there in a causal condition so far as the particular jīva in that state is concerned. This Avidya, forming the content of sleep-experience can be posited to be neither different from nor identical with Atman or the witnessing supreme consciousness, neither real nor unreal

nor both and so on. Hence Suṣupti may be described, according to Suresvara, as that state of cognitive consciousness, in which, besides Atman, there is Avidya only with an absolute absence of all specific cognitions and the mind also absorbed therein and subsisting merely in a subtle or casual form, like the huge gigantic tree existing in the form of a tiny seed.

The sleep experience (सुषुप्तिकालिकज्ञान) may be described as indeterminate and primordial. All other empirical experiences are to be evaluated as emerging from it as mere determinations of the indeterminate continuum presented in this state. Its significance rightly understood, Suṣupti should be taken as the starting point of the explanation of the empirical world and its various experiences. When evolution commences, the first vṛtti or mode that arises is that of Avidya.

It will be highly interesting to remark here that there is a difference of opinion among Advaitins with regard to the nature of the cognitive consciousness, arising immediately after one's getting up from sleep: 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्.' This subsequent state of consciousness in the first moment of the working phase with reference to the previous state of deep sleep is regarded as memory by most of the followers of the Advaita system, but, according to Sureśvarācārya, it is only a 'Vikalpa'. Sureśvara defines Suṣupti to be the state of 'bare Avidya', qualified or characterised by the absorption of all its products (as in the state of dissolution) and complete or unexceptional absence of all specific empirical cognitions or psychoses at that time (so far as the particular Jīva existing merely in causal form in that state, is concerned). So he says that this bare Avidya, which is ever (that is, so long as not sublated by the supreme Realisation of Brahman) and directly associated with pratyak and is like its abode only ever-present but never a past or future thing, cannot form the subject matter of a memory to any one waking up from deep sleep. Consequently its cognition in the state immediately subequent to that of deep

sleep is 'Vikalpa'.[1] The term 'Vikalpa' has been interpreted in various ways by different commentators. Brahmānanda, while explaining the relevant passage, quoted in the Addvaita-siddhi, takes the term as meaning a determinate experience[2] (सविकल्पकाऽनुभव), having for its contents (1) oppositeness to Jñāna and (2) the nature of necessarily referring as its object to something or other (ज्ञानविरोधित्व-सविषयकत्व) as predicates and Ajñāna or Avidya as the subject, Just as a cognition is experienced necessarily and invariably as Jñāna and having something for its object, similarly Ajñāna or Avidya also is necessarily to be comprehended as being opposite to Jñāna and having something for its object. But these characteristics of Ajñāna, says Madhusūdana, cannot be experienced in Susupti on account of there being no 'I' (i.e. अहम्), without which there can be no determinate knowledge at that time. Brahmānanda, however, is of opinion that the general rule of Ahaṅkāra being the indispensable condition to all cases of definite and determinate experiences does not apply to Ajñāna and hence the existence of 'I' in its proper form is not necessary at all for the comprehension of Ajñāna with all its said distinguishing attributes. Anandagiri[3] in his commentary on the proper verses of Sureśvara, dealing with Suṣupti, explains the term 'Vikalpa' as meaning that kind of cognitive consciousness, which is induced by conventional expressions, though devoid of any corresponding object (as interpreted by the yoga system—(शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः). In this case, the form of knowledge "न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्" will have to be understood as of the said Vikalpa type—a cognition having no corresponding object to it in reality, though even words may be used to denote the same—since the said chacteristics (ज्ञानविरोधित्व-सविषयकत्व), which are referred to, were conspicuous by absence during

1. B.B.V.—A.I, B. IV, PP. 488.90, VV. 297-302.

2. Brahmānandī—on A.S. P. 558, Ls. 2-18; Nyāya Ratnāvalī—on L.B. PP. 34-36; PP, 421-22 Ls. 7-17 and 1-3; Svarūpa-Prakāśa (unpublished Paricceda I.

3. Anandgiri Comm. on B.B.V., P. 490. V, 301.

Suṣupti. Whatever may be the interpretation of the term 'Vikalpa', this much is certain that Sureśvarācārya does not admit the consciousness, subsequent to one's deep sleep **'न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्'**, to be a *memory*, (**स्मृतिरूप**) but only a determinate and direct experience or 'Vikalpa' as explained above.

The Vivaraṇa School upholds the view that the said **'परामर्श'** is a recollection, arising from the residual impression of the indeterminate experience undergone in deep sleep, having for its contents Ajñāna, happpiness and Ātman (or witnessing self) through separate psychosis for each of them. The difficulty which looms large in accepting this view is that of Ajñāna or Avidya, being continuously present even after Suṣupti, cannot constitute an object of memory, which invariably refers only to a past thing. This difficulty is sought to be solved by saying that Suṣupti is Tāmasī Vṛtti, which ceases on one's waking up, and the consciousness reflected into it will also then be described as having ceased and that there can be no objection in maintaining it to be recollected afterwards with all its associates. According to this school, even an indeterminate experience can leave behind residual impressions.

Madhusūdan Sarasvatī is not satisfied with this solution and offers his own explanation, steering in the middle of the two possibilities of admitting the **परामर्श** in question to be a memory or experience. He says that during deep sleep Ajñāna as qualified by the Tāmasī Vṛtti, called Suṣupti, is experienced and on one's waking up the qualifying part (**विशेषणांश**) goes away and thereby even the qualified whole ceases to exist in its entirety. Thus it may be safely held that the **परामर्श** under consideration is memory so far as the qualified Ajñāna is concerned and not so far as Ajñāna alone is viewed. He further says that it is immaterial whether three Vrttis as each of all the three, experienced in deep sleep (**साक्ष्यज्ञानसुखाकारास्तिस्रः**) separately or only one as Susupti, comprising all of them, may be accepted.

Sureśvara, however, discards all these explanations as unten-

able and boldly asserts in clear terms that there can be no Vṛtti or cognitive psychosis at all during Suṣupti and hence there is no possibility of any subsequent memory thereof in the waking state. This assertion may be deemed to be his original contribution to the Advaita system and a noteworthy departure from the doctrine expounded and accepted by majority of Advaitins. According to him, Avidya bristling with and animated by Appearance of Reality and illumined by Consciousness, called Sākṣi, as appearing therein, as well as 'Bliss' are all that subsist during Suṣupti and no Vṛtti is necessary for the manifestation of either Avidya, which is in constant and direct touch with its only 'illuminating factor' Sākṣi or 'Bliss', which, being Pure Consciousness, is self-luminous. Even in the waking state Avidya in manifestable by the witnessing self (साक्षिभास्य) and the internal organ or 'I' added to the परामर्श in question serves merely as a gap-filler indispensable for any determinate experience in the waking state. The use of the past tense in the from of the परामर्श may be justified as referring to the total absence of all sorts of empirical cognitions or cognitive psychoses as well as to the absorption of all the products of Avidya in it, which during Suṣupti were predicable of the same Avidya as the object of the परामर्श under discussion (अतीतयावद्वृत्तिज्ञानाभावाऽतीतसमस्तकार्योपाधिनिवृत्तिसहिताऽविद्या) The Jīva technically called Prājña in this state, may be called the experiencer only as merged in the Supreme soul. This is in brief the elucidation of 'Suṣupti' attributed to Sureśvarācārya by his later interpreters.

In unequivocal words Sureśvara declares that all that[1] are experienced during all the three waking, dreaming and sleeping states are appearances and as such changing and perishable but Reality over and behind all of them is one, unchanging and imperishable. The individual soul, which also in reality is the unchanging, immutable and pure Consciousness, Brahman, only, becomes empirically mobile and involved in various experi-

1. B. B. V., A. I, B. IV, P. 488, V, 294.

1. B. B. V., P. 931, V. 264 ; P. 490, V. 299 ; P. 491, V. 304.

ences of the said states as the subject definitely as a result of the lack of discriminating discernment of the Jīva or the Consciousness (as appearing in the mind) from its own Appearances and coneequent false eense of identity with the various receptacles or limiting adjuncts of those Appearances namely, the different minds in different bodies. Th,s lack of discriminating discernment is due to Avidya, which is thus ultimately responsible for all phenomenal appearances from one underlylng Reality, the Brahman.

Thus all the finite experiences of the individual soul may be described as due to Adhyāsa, which is of the nature of the knot of Cit and non-Cit or the true and the untrue end in words of Sures'vara consists in the seeming expression of the one Reality as diverse appearances, which are ordinarily believed to be so many reals of the phenomenal world. This Adnyāsa explains not only the life-experiences but also the post-mortem lives and migratory movements of the soul (Devayāna and Pitṛyāna'. All these are not discussed here, as Suresvara does not contribute or add anything new to the general theories of the Advaita System on these points, which have been amply discussed by many other writers on the general philosophy of the Advaita School.

CHAPTER III.

Some Aspects of the Advaita Epistemology

Preliminary Remarks & Importance of Vṛtti :—

Before descending into details of the Central Doctrine of the Advaita System, viz., the way to and nature of Brahma-realisation it is essential to examine the various theories of Perception and Illusion, expounded by the system. No enquiry about the method of knowing the One Absolute Reality, Brahman, can be started before the ordinary perceptual process and the distinction between perception and illusion are understood.

"Epistemology is portal to philosophy" and the epistemological position of the Advaita system forms a necessary link to the process of Brahma-realisation. It may be remarked that the Advaita theory proposed to be discussed hereunder to the revelant problem are based almost on all the standard works[1] of the school and not necessarily on those of Sureśvara only, whose views also have been sought to be set forth at places, as brought out from the data available in his works. Although a discussion of all these views may strike one as somewhat irrelevant, yet in view of the importance of the subject matter as a stepping stone to the main problem, Brahma-realisation it would be meet to incorporate them entirely in in the body of the present thesis.

The Advaita Vedanta recognises Reality to be Consciousness—Pure, undivided, eternally self-shining, one and immediate. Its essential character is eternity, unlimitedness and self-luminosity. This self-luminosity has already been distinguished from that, recognised by the Prābhākaras of the Mimansa School in as much as it is transcendental, undifferentiated and unconditional, while the latter is relative, integrally

(1) Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, Siddhānta-Bindu, Siddhānta-Leśa, Advaita Siddhi and other works.

differentiated (as Tripuṭi) and conditional. Even the perceptual consciousness is not the result of the interaction of a sense and its object on mental activity, but only its manifestation is occasioned by the mental mode or psychosis; and the mode, being limited and definite, is responsible for our having limited and definite perceptual cognitions. Just as the solar light is revealed on being reflected in and against a dark back-ground; similarly the Eternal Light or Pure Conciousness also necessarily requires some background such as the mind for Its empirical manifestation through appearing there in. The back-ground does not generate the light but only helps its revelation or manifestation in different forms. Thus perception is not produced by the mind but is essentially pure and quiescent as Brahman. Nevertheless one and the same Reality or Pure Consciousness, Brahman, appearing through the different constituents of cognition, comes to be viewed as the subject, the object and their knowledge and as its manifestations occur through limited psychoses and under the limitations of time and space etc., Its relative and apparant presentations are also naturally limited, finite and well-defined as the so-called definite and passing perceptual cognitions in our empirical life. Although there is a difference between the undefined and unspecified knowledge[1] of Brahman and the abrupt and limited perceptual knowledge in the empirical plane, yet even in the case of the latter the knowledge by itself or essentially is the same as in that of the former i.e., Pure Consciousness, but only its manifestations are limited and diversified and differentiated in nature. All this is expressed in another way by saying that "Perception as an (apparently) processless accomplished cognition is Brahman Itself of course in the murky atmosphere of sensation, which, however, is only our limitation". Consciousness is the essence of all things and it is really Consciousness, the Brahman, within whose embrace the universe is gaining appearance as the so-called existence diversely.

1. See P. 11—Brahmānandi—on Advaita Siddhi and P. 114, Ibid.; B.B.V., P. 1131, VV. 124-25.

Hence the phenomenal objects, constituting the material world, must be held to be maintaining their appearance and existence as pervaded and permeated by corresponding Appearances of the eternal Reality underlying all of them. The particular states of Consciousness are due to different Vṛttis or mental modes. These mental modes or psychoses are so many modifications of the mind in accordance with the various modes and forms of objects, which it reaches and encounters through the channel of senses, encounter and pervade. Mind or Antahkaraṇa, according to the Advaita Vedanta, is not a 'tabula rasa', a mere recorder of impressions gathered from without. It is not at all passive in perceptual process. It is dynamic unity and is ever active in receiving the forms and impressions of objects. Thus the tendency of the mind is to flow out (partially and not fully) through the sense channels and pervade the object; and its nature is to take the moulds of the object, be modified accordingly and manifest the underlying consciousness. This modification or transformation of the mind in various ways, as it meets diverse objects, is called Vṛtti, which not only resembles the object in form but also acquires distinction and definiteness in exact correspondence with the object.

A mental mode or psychosis—manifestative of Consciousness—may be due to an external object or to an internal one, viz., the mind itself or any of mental attributes[1]. The attributes of mind such as pleasure or pain etc. are held to be perceivable only together with the mind as the subject and never alone. So in cases, where the object happens to be the mind or antahkarana itself or any of its attributes, the mind need not stream out but it undergoes modifications in its own place. In other words, the mind has the capacity of being modified either into the form of any external object or of itself in association with any of its attributes. In the case of the latter, the outgoing of mind is not required. Consequently, the outgoing of the mind is not to be deemed as the essential condition of the formation of Vṛtti. Whatever is needed is an impulse or

1. Vedānta-Paribhāṣā (Bombay edition), PP. 78-82.

stimulus from any object, aroused by any of the senses or by itself under the insinuation, persuation and urge of Dharma-dharm[1].

The resultant perception is immediate in any case of perceptual knowledge, but the difference lies in the fact that an external object is accepted to be "जीवभास्य" i.e., capable of being illuminated or revealed by the percipient Consciousness or the subject-Consciousness, manifested as identical with the object-Consciousness through psychosis; while the internal object such as the mind and any of its attributes etc. or, in brief, all, in cases of which no outgoing of mind through the sense-channel is necessary on account of those objects lying beyond the range of our senses and being identical with or directly associated with the mind, are maintained to be Sākṣi-bhāṣya i.e., capable of being illuminated or revealed by the witnessing Consciousness[2] alone.

Determinants of Perceptual and Objective Directness:—

Directness of perceptual cognition is determined by identity between the Vṛtti-Caitanya and the Viṣaya-Caitanya and that of perceptual object by identity between Pramātṛ-Caitanya and the Viṣaya-Caitanya. The three above-named consciousness can be better explained by an illustration. Just[3] as the water of a pond, though really without any form of its own, coming out of the pond and extending to different localities assumes forms such as rectangular, square etc., in accordance with those localities, similarly, the Antahkarana, pervading the localities of various objects, assumes different forms according to them and the one formless Consciousness reflected in them also appears in diversified forms. The Consciousness, underlying the mind in its original seat is called subject-consciousness (Pramātṛ-Caitanya), the Consciousness, unnderlying the mental

1. B.B.V., P. 1391, VV., 86-89 V.P., P. 29 (Bombay Edition); Sikhamani. P. 59; Mani-Prabha. P. 60.
2. V.P., PP. 81-82.
3. Vedānta Paribhāāṣa (Venkateśvara Press, Bombay). P. 57; see also Siddhanta-Vindu (Benares edition) PP. 262-263.

flow, that modifies itself in accordance with the objective form and serves as the connecting link between the mind and the object, is called Pramāṇa-Caitanya or Vṛtti-Caitanya and the Consciousness, underlying the object, connected with the mental modifications, is called Prameya-Caitanya or Viṣaya-Caitanya, that is, the object-consciousness. "All determinate knowledge is a self-abnegation, involving as it does a stratification of the pure Consciousness or Caitanya into three forms: Pramātṛ-Caitanya or determinate self-consciousnes, Vṛtti-Caitanya or modes of consciousness and Viṣaya-Caitanya or empirical object."[1] The psychosis or mode lasts only as long as the contact between the sense, through which the mind goes out, and the object continues or until another opposite or superseding Vrtti arises. Thus Consciousness (whether percipient or witnessing) seeming through or immanent in any of the innumerable, determinate and fleeting forms of psychoses, appears accordingly definite, limited and vanishing in consequence of the cessation of the Vrtti. This is, in brief, the theory of perception, advanced by the monistic system of Advaitins.

Sarva-Jñatva and Alpa-Jñatva differentiated: —

In this connection, it will be relevant to throw some light on the omniscience of the Supreme Soul (सर्वज्ञत्व) and parviscience (अल्पज्ञत्व) of the individual self. Although Avidya, endowed with the dual capacities of obscuring Reality and of projecting something else out of It is associated with both the Supreme Soul and the individual self, directly or indirectly, according to different theories, yet it exhibits the trails of imperfections only in respect of the Jīva or the individual self, but never with regard to the Supreme Soul, which, in spite of the said association, is held to be omniscient and omnipotent etc. These imperfections or limitations, technically called "कञ्चुक" in the monistic system of the Tantra school, are enumerated to be five[2] (namely, Kāla, Avidyā, Rāga,

1. Studies in Vedantism, by K. Bhattacarya.
2. Matṛka-Chakra-Viveka (Saraswati Bhawan series) Chapt. III, V. 16, P. 75.

Kalā and Niyati). But the Advait system concentrates on and takes into account only two of them, i.e., parviscience (अल्पज्ञत्व) and parvipotence (अल्पकर्तृत्व) of the Jīva. All experiences and cognitions of the Individual self are decidedly limited in all the three ways (i.e., spatially, temporally and objectively) and broadly divisible into two kinds: direct and indirect. To account for the directness or immediacy of perceptual cognition the formation of Vṛtti or psychosis is admitted to be an indepensable factor, although the outgoing of mind is not considered to be an essential condition, as shown above in some cases. But the direct and all-pervading knowledge or omniscience of the Supreme Soul is not dependent on any Vṛtti and requires to be explained as such.

Different theories about omniscience :—

The different theories, advanced by Advaitins about omniscience may be classified into two broad divisions: one affirming this unlimited omniscience to be of the very nature of Consciousness and the other recognising it to be a reflection of Consciousness into the transformation or modification of Maya.

Bhāratītīrtha explains the omniscience of the Supreme Soul by saying that the Supreme Soul as the Consciousness having for its adjunct Maya, which contains in it the impressions of the intellects of all beings as the primodial and indispensable source of all of them, is in constant touch with what is happening in the minds of all and ever witnessing the contents thereof. The author of Prakaṭārtha says that just as the Jīva is determined to be the knower by dint of its association with the adjunct, antahkaraṇa or mind, whose transformations or psychoses arising in response to and in correspondence with external objects, catch the reflection of Consciousness and constitute the finite cognitions of the Jīva ; similarly the Supreme Soul is maintained to be Omniscient on account of its association with the adjunct, Maya, which not only incessantly unfolds the phenomenal universe in its predestined order but also undergoes transformations in exact correspondence therewith, and whose tarnsforma-

tions, replete with the reflection of Consciousness, constitute the omniscience of the Supreme soul. Jñānaghana-Pāda, the author of Tattva-Śuddhi, improves upon the former view and seeks to establish the omniscience of the Supreme Soul with reference to the future as well as the past times on the pattern of the memory of the Jīva. Even prior to the actual manifestation of the whole creation, he says, Maya in accordance with the unseen potencies (अदृष्ट) of Jīvas is modified into the forms of the ante-comprehensions of all objects, to be gradually manifested in their predestined order, and the Brahman, being the witness thereof, plays as an instrument to the said modification. It is thus that the Brahman as the Supreme Soul, being reflected in the transformation of Maya, has a knowledge in advance of the phenomenal world. Moreover, just as even past objects are cognised by us through recollection; similarly, even the past phenomena of the world, once vividly cognised through the eye of Maya in the manner mentioned above, are remembered even later on by the Supreme Soul through indelible impressions, left behind by the previous knowledge about them. The Vṛtti, Primordial psychosis, involved in all these theories of omniscience is to be distinguished from the ordinary Vṛtti or psychosis, in as much as the former is one, all-comprehensive and independent (of the necessary conditions or circumstances of the ordinary process of empirical cognition), while the latter is diverse, discrete and dependent (on the empirical conditions or circumstances of the ordinary process of cognition). The former is the modification of Maya in Situ and in proximity with the 'Cidansa' of the Supreme Soul (while in proximity with the 'Sadansa' being responsible for unfolding the innumerable phenomena of the universe) whereas, the latter is the modification of the mind mutatis mutandis in association with the percepient Consciousness, Pramātā or the Jīva. Ramadvaya, the author of Vedānta-Kaumudī, sets aside all these theories as unsatisfactory. He denies omniscience to be cognition through psychosis (वृत्तिज्ञान-रूप). If omniscience also, he says, is to be dependent on psychosis and is a mere reflection in the transformation of Maya like the

ordinary cognition of the Jīva, it will have to be admitted as perishable, because the said transformation must be subject to adsorption in the same way as the gross elements etc. are in accordance with the scriptural statement "One alone without a second". In that case there will creep in the contingency of the cessation of omniscience at the time when there is on transformation as well āas of the consequent impossibility of creatorship in respect of the primordial conative impulse or observation, (ईक्षण), which is of the form of the first transformation of Maya and also in respect of the gross element etc. also, which are necessarilly preceded by that Īksaṇa. So he holds that omniscience is just of the very nature of Consciousness, the Brahman (स्वरूपभूत ज्ञानरूप), and spontaneously arising in relation to all that is created or manifested. It extends up unrestricted to all, that have been already created or are still to be created, because they arise and exist in the form of impressions like a sketched but unfinished picture, painted on the wall of Avidya or Nescience. The views upheld by the three important schools may be singled out and separately stated. The exponent of the Vivaraṇa School holds that the omniscience of the Supreme Soul is direct in respect of the present object of the nature of remembrance about the past ones. and inferential as regards the future ones. Vācaspati, who recognises neither the theory of reflections nor any vrtti of Maya for the purpose, maintains that although Brahman illuminates all by virtue of 'Svarūpa-Caitanya' and thus Consciousness, which is Brahman Itself (स्वरूपचैतन्य), is not the product of any thing, yet as specified by what is to be cognised (दृश्यावच्छिन्नरूपेण) it is held to have been effectuated by Brahman. In other words, the Supreme Soul is omniscient, because all cognisable phenomena of the universe (being products) are identically related to It as the Brahman.

At the hands of Sureśvara, however, the problem of omniscience receives a new explanation in confirmity with his

1. See Nyāya Ratnāvalī, P. 260 ; P. 269.

Abhasa-theory. According to him, all other than Brahman, the one Absolute Reality and Pure Consciousness, are necessarily appearances. But the common medium of all appearances out of the Reality is Avidya. Since all objects of the universe or emergent appearances are possible only through the Appearance of the Reality or Pure Consciousness in Avidya, Īśvara the Appearance of Consciousness or the Consciousness as appearing in and though Avidya-becomes the unavoidable causal link for all empirical entities or events and as such Īśvara may be held to be omniscient without recognising any transformation of Avidya as the supersensuous psychosis, emplanatory of the directness of omniscience.

Necessity of psychosis for the perceptual knowledge of Jīva:—

It has been established above how the knowledge of the Supreme Soul is perpetually persistent, all-embracing, unconditional and irrespective of any psychosis as indispensably necessary for its genesis. But for all kinds of finite cognitions belonging to a Jīva (whether immediate or mediate), Vṛtti (psychosis) is regarded as the necessary condition by the Advaita system. There are two important views about the conception of a Jīva: one affirming it to be the Consciousness, having for its adjunct the internal organ and the other defining it as the Consciousness, having for its adjunct Avidya. In consonance with its anjunct the Jīva has been held to be either all-pervading or limited. According to the first view the Jīva is all pervading and is held to be the agent of the manifestation of objects directly, while, according to the second view, the Jiva is finite and is regarded to be the agent of the manifestation of objects only indirectly, that is, through its identity with the object-defined Consciousness, which is really responsible for the illumination of objects. Even the all pervading Jīva is accepted to be either veiled or unveiled. As there are different theories regarding the nature of the individual soul referred to above, the functions of the psychosis would be different in accordance with the nature of the individual soul in each theory. Just as

N. R., P. 269; B. B. V., P. 1222, V. 86 and V. 90.

objects like green grass etc., although experienced to be not combustible by pure fire, are consumed by fire when associated with an iron ball; similarly, pot etc., though not revealed or manifested by the pure consciousness of the Jiva, which is always present everywhere, are manifested by the same, when associated with a psychosis with regard to a particular object. Thus a psychosis, like the switch of the electric light, is essential for the connection of the Jīva with a particular external object through the mind (Antahkarana).

According to those, however, who regard the Jīva not to be omnipresent but finite, having the internal organ for its adjunct, there is no question of the Jīva actually and directly coming into association with an external object. But a psychosis is even then indispensable for manifesting and establishing the non-difference of the Jīva from the Brahman-consciousness, as defined or specified by the particular object. In this case, the distinct function of psychosis may be ascertained to be that of manifesting the said non-difference or identity and thereby of bridging over the gulf between the Jīva and the external object or of cementing the two disconnected or unconcerned subjective and objective consciousness by the bond of union.

The third alternative is that the Jīva, though omnipresent, is not self-manifest, being obscured by Avidya and consequently unable as such to manifest the object. But in consequence of the rise of a psychosis in respect of a particular object, the obscuration of the Jīva caused by Avidyā, is simultaneously, removed with reference to that object and that Jīva only. In other words, the Jīva becomes manifest as a subject there not alone but also manifesting that particular object at that particular time and space. So the function of psychosis, according to this theory, is that of removing the obscuration, caused by Avidyā, with regard to a particular individual soul, which without the psychosis remains enshrouded and unable to manifest itself as well as any object. To sum up, the psychosis is necessary for the ordinary cognition of the Jīva either for constituting a relation or for manifesting non-difference or for removing the obscuration spread by Avidyā.

Of the three schools of interpretation Vācaspati[1] school recognises the function of Avidya to be the removal of obscuration only (आवरणभङ्गार्था), the Vivaraṇa School[2] the establishment of relation (उपरागार्था) and Sureśvara[3] the manifestation of identity (अभेदाभिव्यक्त्यर्था) between the subjective and objective Appearances of Consciousness. The removal of obscuration is a common factor of recognition, as the function of Vṛtti is accepted by all Advaitins to be the removal of obscuration, spread up by Avidya. In the Advaita-Siddhi Madhusūdan records and observes Sureśvara's departure from the view of Śankara as expressed in Upadeśa-śāharī in as much as the former holds the Consciousness, appearing through an object, to be its illuminative; whereas the latter maintains the Consciousness, reflected in the psychosis, to be so.

Different theories about psychoses serving as constitutives of a relation between the subject and the object :—

The relation, which is brought out and established by a psychosis, is held to be only that of a subject and an object (विषयविषयिभाव) by some; that of conjunction caused by another conjunction (संयोगजसंयोग) by others, because when the psychosis is in conjunction with the object, there results through the channel of psychosis also a conjunction between the Jīva and the object; that of conjunction between a cause and a non-cause, resulting from the conjunction of an effect and a non-effect (कार्याकार्यसंयोगजन्य-कारणाकारणसंयोग) by still others; because from conjunction of the psychosis, which is an effect of the mind comprised by a Jīva, with the effect, which is not an effect of the mind, comprised by the cognisant Jīva, there results a connection between the Jīva, comprising the mind, which is the cause of the psychosis, and the object, which is not caused by the mind, comprised by the cognisant Jīva; that of a super-

1. N. R., Page 184, lines 17–28.
2. P. P. V., PP. 72-73 ; N. R., P. 184, lines 10-12.
3. A. S. P. 483, 1-2 ; P. 479, lines 1-3 ; Brahmanandi (in the same page) lines 1-28 ; N. R., PP. 272-73 ; Sambandha

impositional identity (आध्यासिकाऽभेद) by still others, since what is intended by this sort of relation is the indication of identity with objects through the manifestation of non-difference of the consciousness, conditioned by the internal organ, from the Consciousness, specified by and apparently identical with the object.

Different theories about the psychosis as manifestative of non-difference :—

As regards the view, attributing to Vṛtti the function of the manifestation of non-difference to the psychosis, three theories are particularly worth mentioning. Some hold that on account of the psychosis, arising in respect of a particular object, the consciousness conditioned or defined by the internal organ, becomes identical with the consciousness, underlying or specified by the object and the identification of the two : object-defined and percipient consciousness, is what is called the manifestation of non-difference, resulting from the psychosis. Strictly speaking, it is the object-defined consciousness, which really manifests the object, but owing to the said identification of the Jīva with the object-defined consciousness, the Jīva is held to be the source of the manifestation of the object in common parlance. Others maintain that the manifestation of non-difference, brought about by the psychosis, cannot be the said identification of the two kinds of consciousness, because so long as the differentiating adjunct, namely, antahkaraṇa, the internal organ, (like the mirror in the case of a face, reflected therein) endures, the two kinds of consciousness : one, defined by the object and being in the position or of the nature of the prototype (the Brahman) and the other, specified by the internal organ and being in the position or of the nature of the reflection (the Jīva) cannot be anyhow identified. So, what happens is that the object-defined consciousness casts its reflection in the proximate part of the psychosis, pervading the object, and it is the identification of the Jīva with this reflection—really responsible for the revelation of the object—which is meant by the said manifestation of non-difference, resulting from the

psychosis. According to this view, the distinction of the three well-known aspects of cognition—Pramātā, Pramāṇa and Prameya—also is clearly explainable, because the Consciousness, reflected into and defined by the internal organ, its psychosis and the object are respectively called to be the knower, means of knowledge and the object known. There is a third view, according to which what manifests objects through a direct relation of superimposition is the Consciousness, which is in the position of the prototype and the real substratum or basis of all objects (the so-called manifestation of objects being only an external seeming expression of the underlying self-manifest pure Consciousness). Although there is an apparent difference between the Jīva and the Consciousness, underlying the object, as characterised by its being the prototype, yet essentially or in its true nature the Jīva is identical with the other Consiousness (which is object-defined and a prototype) as Consciousness, not characterised but only indicated per accidence by the condition of being the prototype. So it is this essential identification, which alone is the non-difference, contemplated for the present purpose. This identification is not brought about but only reveald by removal of obsouration, caused by Avidyā.

Different theories about the psychosis as the remover of obscuration:—

As already explained above, the psychosis is held to be indispensably necessary also for the removal of obscuration, produced by Avidya. Of this removal of obscuration various explanations have been offered by different exponents of the Post-Śankara Advaita system. Most of them, which are very interesting and important, are briefly set forth hereunder. Some say that the psychosis brings about the removal of obscuration caused by Avidya—spreading over and affecting the Consciousness in Its entirety—only partially, that is only in relation to the object, corresponding to and regarding which the psychosis is formed, like the dissipation of a part of the total darkness by the light of a glow-worm etc., or rolling up of a mat or a sudden retreat of a fearful and confused soldier.

Others say that if Avidya is once partially destroyed, there can be no fnrther obscuration in future to the extent of that part of Consciousness, which once happens to be immune from obscuration, and with reference to that object, which is thus once brought out of non-manifestation, and the object should then continue being known ever there should be no re-obscuration. So with regard to Avidya, that obscures the all-pervading Consciousness in Its entirety, the said removal means Avidya being dispelled partially, that is, with respect to that particular object-defined Consciousness only, which is associated with the psychosis. In other words, the psychosis is of the nature of effectuating the cessation of obscuration, cast by Avidya particularly on that object-defined Consciousness, which is in the condition of actual association with it and it is, therefore, that the object is released from non-manifestation, consequent upon the rise of the psychosis only, which sets aside the obscuration arising from avidya so far as the consciousness defined by that particular object is concerned.

Vimuktātman, the author of Iṣṭasiddhi, holds[1] that there are as many homogenous individual Ajnanas or ignorances about each object as the possible cognitions about it can be. According to this theory of the plurality of Ajnanas, it is not the primodial or primal Avidya, which is partially set aside by psychoses, but its off-shoots—particular modes or homogeneous individual ignorances about each object—enshrouding the common object-defined consciousness, are individually or particularly cast away by each of the different psychoses in respect of that object each time. For instance, the psychoses, formed after the mould of the object, say,'pot', sets aside that obscuration only, which is produced by the particular individual ignorance of the moment (when the cognition arises), screening the pot-defined consciousness. So if the obscuration of a single individual ignorance is once removed by a single psychosis, the object again relapses or is set back into non-manifestation,

1. I. S., PP. 63-64; T. P., P. 384; S. L., p. 126; S. V., p. 120, V. 392.

owing to its being obscured or enshrouded by another homogeneous individual ignorance, concerning the same object and ever ready to enshroud the Consciousness defined by the object turn by turn, as they are still to be dispelled by their own corresponding cognitions in future. These individual ignorances are also beginningless like their cause, the primary Avidya.

Some serious objections are raised against this theory. In the first place, the first perception alone of the pot, say for instance, will dispel all individual ignorances (enshrouding the consciousness) in respect thereof; because there is no determined or restrictive feature in the cognition itself in order that only one particular ignorance may be disturbed and dispelled by that cognition and not others. Secondly, the object cannot be directly perceived, unless all ignorances, enshrouding the Consciousness defined thereby, are completely removed. Thus the defect of the removal of obscuration once for ever, rendering all future cognitions of the object impossible, is not explained away by this theory. So some Advaitins maintain that just as, according to the Naiyayikas, although there are many antecedent non-existences (प्रागभाव) of the cognition, regarding one and the same object, and even when one cognition of the object is produced, only one of those several antecedent non-existences is destroyed, yet there is the knowledge or cognition of that object, similarly, although, when a single cognition arises, only a single ignorance is removed, yet in spite of the presence of other ignorances, which do not stand in the way of the manifestation of the object by that particular cognition (the particular ignorance obstruction of the cognition having been already dispelled by the psychosis) there is a full manifestation of the object without the least hindrance.

Others, finding this theory self-contradictory in as much as the object is deemed to be direct and immediate, inspite of remaining non-manifest owing to obscurations by other undispelled ignorance, hold that all ignorances do not obscure the object-defined Consciousness simultaneously (because, one alone,

being sufficient to obscure it, others will be present there in vain) but successively. So at the time when one cognition arises, there is only one ignorance enshrouding the object-defined Consciousness (others being either in abeyance or about to issue forth from the Primordial Avidya) and the obscuration of that one only is removed by the psychosis. Simultaneously with the cessation of that psychosis, another ignorance creeps in and obscures the consciousness, defined by the object. But at the time of the rise of the Brahman-realisation, the Primordial Avidya, the source of all individuai ignorances, being dissipated' all of them are together crushed, shattered and sublated absolutely.

Still others, however, object to the assumption of multiple homogeneous individual ignorances, lying in abeyance or in a subtle form and awaiting to issue forth in a successive order for obscuring its common object one after another on the simple ground that every ignorance by nature inevitably requires the presence of any corresponding object for its reference and hence all of them, if they exist at all in any form, gross or subtle, must together obscure the object-defined Consciousness all the time and not successively and at different times. So they maintain that only one ignorance is dispelled at a time and others are simply scared away for the time being. Just as in a place, where many people are assembled together, the thunder, perchance suddenly falling down on some one, scatters away the rest of them too, or the medicine, specifically curative of the complex disease, called 'Sannipata', while chiefly affecting and remedying only one prominent trouble or complaint (constituent of the disease) cures or drives away all other accompanying troubles or complaints as well; similarly, the psychosis (or the so-called cognition by virtue of being the reflection of Consciousness) while casting off or dispelling once for ever only one ignorance, scares away and thus overpowers the remaining homogeneous individual ignorances also so long as it lingers on. Thus when there is an absolute removal of one

ignorance only through psychosis, there is dispersion and subjugation or neutralisation of other accompanying homogeneous ignorances as well by the same. The subjugation (अभिभव) consists in counteracting the obscuring capacity of undissipated ignorances, besides the one absolutely removed, so long as the psychosis or the resultant cognition lasts. The phrase 'manifestation of non-difference' includes both of the said removal as well as dispersion amounting to subjugation.

No explanation is offered by this theory with regard to a continuous stream of cognition of any object (धारावाहिकज्ञान); because in this case the second and all other subsequent psychoses or cognitions would be proved futile, and because no obscuration is left to be removed by them, the entire obscuration being set aside even by first psychosis or cognition through the dual process of removal and subjugation. So some Advaitins maintain that just as when one light goes out, the darkness subjugated by it, sets in again; similarly at the time of juncture, when the first psychysis will go out and the subsequent one will step in, the ignorance, only subjugated by the first psychosis and let loose by its cessation, will set in instantaneously and spread its obscuration upon the object-defined Consciousness (it is difficult to say only for what shortest part of time). In other words, at the time of the cessation of one psychosis and the rise of another with regard to one and the same object, the ignorance, that was in the condition of subjugation and is let loose simultaneously with the cessation of the subjugating psychosis, has the same fate as the darkness has at the time when one light goes out and another comes in. Howsoever short-living and momentary the obscuration may be, but it is there, which is to be set aside by the subsequent psychosis or cognition, stepping into the foot-steps of its antecedent one.

Ānandapurna Vidyāsāgara, the authhor of Nyāya-Chandrikā-the well-known commentary of Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khādya-asserts that there is a destruction of a particular ignorance by a particular psychosis or cognition but no simultaneous subjugation of other obscuring ignorances as well. So even in the case of a

continuous stream of cognition, the second and other subsequent psychoses are fruitful enough in destroying or dispelling a single ignorance, confronting each of them. The question of the non-manifestation of an object even on the rise of a knowledge about it, owing to its obscuration by other undispelled ignorances, does not arise; because all the homogeneous ignorances do not obscure the object together and all the time, but one does so at a time and others remain simply abortive so far as its obscuring power is concerned. So when one psychosis arises, it dispels the ignorance, working at that time, and thereby brings about the manifestation of the object, without subjugating other ignorances, which are yet to operate and obscure the object at other times in their own turns. Ignorances, being modes of the primary Nescience or Avidya, have temporary limited obscuring capacities. So it may be averred in general that owing to temporal differences, inherent in them, ignorances exercise their veiling power not always but in their respective times or instants only and the different psychoses or cognitions destroy or dispel those ignorances as such, that is characterised per accidens by their own respective times or instants, in which only they happen to obscure the object severally and successively. Thus even with regard to the one continuous common object (in the case of the धारावाहिक ज्ञान), the psychoses arising in succession subsequent to the first mental mode, set aside the ignorances of their own respective moments and are, therefore, not to be deemed as abortive or superfluous.

There are others, who admit qualitative differences in homogeneous ignorances so far as their obscuring capacity is concerned. They hold that the ignorance, dispelled by the first psychosis or cognition, only veils the bare nature of the object or its pure existence (सत्तामात्र), but other ignorances, to be dispelled by subsequent psychoses, obscure the object as qualified or particularised by space, time and such other attributes or properties as accrue to it after the previous cognition of the object. Whatever is known once is known for ever and what is known more next time about it is the time, inter-

vening between the previous cognition and the one in question, change of space and such other new attributes, properties or qualifications, acquired by the object in the meantime. So the later psychoses or cognitions destory, if at all, the ignorance, regarding the time, space etc. of the object and never its bare existence. The advocates of this theory discountenance the dissection or cutting up of a single cognition (in the case of धारावाहिक ज्ञान) into discrete instants or of one enduring or persistent psychosis (standing as long as the cognition lasts) into several successive psychoses. They also affirm alternatively that if, even according to this theory, a succession of several psychoses in the above case is assumed and all the psychoses arising after the first one have to be admitted as not setting aside the obscuration of any ignorance at all, there is nothing seriously objectionable ; because this much is undeniable that that they are evidently devoid of any probative value in as much as they manifest an object, which is already known through the first psychosis or cognition.

Some say that the ignorances, responsible for the obscuration or non-manifestation of objects are to be classified into two kinds : one lying in the object and the other abiding in the subject or the person. The former is the material cause of the projection of new extraneous things over and above its locus and is to be presumed from the fact of its said products and the latter makes us feel ignorant about something and is to be ascertained from our experience "I do not know this." This classification of ignorance on the basis of their functional differences as well as those of location is necessary ; because such an assumption solves the difficulties as to how the ignorance located in the person can be the materiel cause of the projection of something associated with the external object and also how the ignorance, abiding in the external object, can be responsible for the experience of the person "I do not know this."

Others, however, contend that the ignorance, abiding in the person alone, like the film in the eye, obscures objects

as well. There is no evidence for presuming an ignorance of a different kind, abiding separately in the object, and such an ignorance cannot be possibly postulated too. as the object being inert and insentient cannot be the abode thereof. As regards the possibility of the transformation of Avidya or ignorance, seated in the person, so as to project something new associated with the object it can very well be supported on the analogy of the projection of a contrary size in a tree, when the ignorance about it is removed by mediate cognition. Just as according to Vācaspati Misra, the whole universe is an illusory manifestation of Brahman, who is the object of the ignorance located in the Jīva, similarly the projection of other illusory objects such as serpent or earth-crack etc. over the rope is possible through the ignorance abiding in the person.

There is, however, a third view, which insists on supporting the ignorance to be present in the object, screening like a piece of cloth that covers a thing, over which it may be spread, and unfolding appearances such as the serpent or the earth-crack etc. through its own modifications. The importance of this view lies in the fact that it seeks to establish transformation of the ignorance, just where it is located, into appearances, gaining ground therein. It meets the objection as to how can the ignorance, abiding in the object, be illumined or manifested by साक्षि, the witnessing self, which is associated per accidens with the internal organ, the primary Nescience or Avidya, by saying that these modes are also the products of and hence identical with the primary Ignorance or Nescience and as such it can be held to be manifested by साक्षिचैतन्य. In this connection, the authority of the Vivaraṇa school is cited, which declares in an unequivocal language that although what is involved in the general experience "I am ignorant" is the Primary Ignorance, while the experiences. embracing particular objects, such as "I do not know the nacre" etc., have for their contents the modal ignorace (अवस्थाज्ञान) yet the two (i.e., primary and modal ignorannces) being essentially non-different, even the modal ignorance, present in the object, is manifested by the witness alone.

Concluding remarks:—

From all that has been said above it may be definitely concluded that the Advaita system recognises 'psychosis' as the necessary condition for the manifestation of all kinds of finite cognitions of the Jīva (whether immediate or mediate). The various functions of Vṛtti to be gathered from the above views may be summarised as follows. The Vṛtti or psychosis is useful in bringing about (1) obstruction or suppression of Avidya or (2) sublation of Tūlājñāna, that is, particular Ajñāna or (3) deflection of the particular state of Avidya or (4) partial dissipation or incapacitation of Avidya or (5) scattering away of Avidya like a timid warrior (in as much as Ajñāna is able to function only in the absence of the moment of Vṛtti or (6) contraction of Avidya like a mat (in as much as Avidya proves obstructive of manifestation only in the moment of the subsistence of Vṛtti, subsequent to that of its origin). The difference between the last two views lies in this, that according to the former, there is an instantaneous dispersion of Avidya like a timid warrior on the rise of Vṛtti; whereas, according to the latter, Avidya is snipped off in the moment, subsequent to that of the rise of Vṛtti, like the folding up of a mat, subsequent to its contact with any hand.

Thus in harmony with the above theories about the utility of Vṛtti and confirmity with the three alternative conceptions of the Jīva, according as it is either all-pervasive and unveiled or all-pervasive but veiled or limited, the psychosis is held to be indispensably essential for the purpose of serving as a connecting bond between the Jīva and the object, of setting aside the veil of ignorance on the consciousness, defined by the object, and of manifesting the object-defined consciousness as identical with the percipient consciousness. The distinction[2] between the two kinds of mediate and immediate cognitions is respectively based on the unification or identification of two factors that is, the subjective consciousness and modal consciousness and of

1. A.S., P. 487, Ls. 10-11.
2. A. S., P. 490, Ls- 14-17.

all the constituent factors of knowledge, that is, the subjective consciousness, modal consciousness as well as the objective consciousness. Unification or identity of the triad is possible only after the outgoing of the mind to the object through the sense-channel in the case of objects, remote from it, and its modifications into the particular forms of psychoses, similar to and co-existent with their respective objects. So it is the condition and nature of the psychoses, formed internally or externally, which determine the mediacy or immediacy of cognitions regarding various objects.

Having discussed in main the theories of perception we are naturally led to the topic of "Illusion", which is perception but the perception of an illusory nature and hence an illusory perception or perceptual illusion.

The Advaita Theory of Illusion :—

Theory of illusion, advanced by Advaitins, is known as "Anirvacanīya-khyāti." The Advaitins assert that, what is known as an illusory object is a peculiar and indescribable one, produced out of the Ajñāna or nescience of the substratum-the consciousness, conditioned by the 'nacre' in the stock-example of the nacre-silver. Two prominent features of the object of illusion must be emphasised at the very outset. First, the object of illusion cannot be real even from the common-sense view-point ; because the final revelation of the substratum and the subsequent cancelling knowledge, which emerges as its corollary and demolishes the existence of illusory objects for all times whatsoever, render such a reality impossible. Secondly, it cannot be dismissed as altogether unreal ; because such an absolutely unreal cannot form the object of perception and no one can dispute its presentation as such in actual cognition in the realm of relativity. In every case of illusion, over and above the appearance of a particular illusory object, there is an accompanying assurance that there is something real, direct and immediate underlying it. During illusion it is the appearance itself, which is through ignorance conceived to be this real something. But

cancellation repudiates all such unwarranted misconceptions and establishes the real to be something else beneath and underlying all such appearances. For explaining the fact of appearance, the illusory object must be there, and for explaining cancellation it must not be real. It cannot be either real or unreal absolutely. Hence the theory, advanced by the extrimists in Buddhism —Sūnyavadius, becomes unacceptable; because we know an object to be illusory only on the basis of some other reality, to which the appearance owes its so-called existence and manifestation. Two facts, appearance and cancellation, are unquestionable and no theory can be held valid, which fails to explain or ignore either of them. So the Advaitin chooses the golden mean of calling the illusory object 'Anirvacaniya' (indescribable and unique). We may very well postpone the discussion of the status of the illusory object in detail here. Indeed an inexplicable silver, to fall back upon the stock-example, is produced, which cannot be assigned a real existence as its substratum-nacre has (though a so-called one). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied to have some existence co-eval with appearance. This is what is meant by the phenomenal or illusory existence, as distinguished from the conventional existence, conventionally real existence, which Śankara and his followers do not desist from attributing to the world.

What happens in the case of the illusory object such as the silver, for instance, is that the nacre is perceived first only in the dim and blirted light of perception, that is, it touches only the shadowy fringe of determinate consciousness, and all its aspects, therefore, are not grasped by the perceiver[1]. It is seen as something but not as a particular thing. It appears as something white and sparkling, shorn of its distinguishing feature or differentia, that is, the generality (शुक्तिकात्व), whose manifestation would have strangled the stimulation of the impression of silver and thus precluded the possibility of the appearance of the same through Avidva. So the Avidya or

1. See pages 136-137-Vedanta Paribhasa (Venkateswara Steam Press Edn.)

nescience, operating in respect of and responsible for the non-manifestation of the distinctive feature of the nacre (शुक्तिकात्व), together with two other factors: (a) the contact of the sense with the nacre in general, that is, as stripped off from its said distinctive feature or generality and perceived only as something and (b) the impression of the silver, stimulated by observance of similarity and engraved indelibly on the perceiver's mind, brings about the appearance of the silver. In other words, the nescience governing the non-manifestation of the distinctive feature of the nacre (इदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्थशुक्तिकात्वप्रकारिकाऽविद्या) and abiding in the content-defined Consciousness (that is the Consciousness, underlying the 'this'-aspect of the content) identical with the Consciousness of, that is, defined by or underlying the cogniser and aided by the residual impression of the silver, stimulated by the sight of similarity in respect of glitter etc. (on account of the sense being defective or the auxilliary cause such as the light etc. being dim and inefficient or some such other thing) modifies itself into the form as well as the psychosis or the apparent cognition of the silver. Thus Avidya has a dual function. On the one hand, it hampers the manifestation of certain features, which are distinctive of the underlying reality, and, on the other, it projects or brings about the appearance of new features, extraneous to it. The question of the absence of the material particles of the silver does not arise; because the Advaitins do not admit the reality of the material stuff even. The material stuff as well as the so-called real silver rightly seen at its proper place and time are as unreal as the appearance; because ultimately every thing directly or indirectly is to be traced to Avidya alone as the only modifying or the material cause of the whole phenomenal world. The silver, presented by Avidya, being incapable of any contact with the sense-organ, cannot be cognised in the ordinary course of perception. Hence to solve this difficulty it is admitted by the Advaitins that the same Avidya as is responsible for projecting out the silver modifies itself also as the psychosis of the silver (रजत-तत्प्रतिभास). Similarly, the appearance of the

serpent and its psychosis etc. are also unfolded by Avidya. Thus in every case of illusion, there are two separate objects and two modes; one is the mental mode or psychosis having the unparticularised so-called reality as its object and the other is the mode, exhibited by Avidya and having the apparent as its object.

The question then arises that if there are two objects and two modes, distinct and derived from different sources—the mind in one case and the Avidya in the other—how is it possible that we get one knowledge expressed by the term 'this is silver' and the like? The answer[1] is that although there are two distinct objects, yet they are so blended with each other that they appear as one object only. The presentation of this oneness of the object is due to the fact that the two modes, though different, being products of the mind and the nescience, are so blended together that the consciousness, manifested through them, reveal their respective objects—the one conventionally or empirically real and the other illusory—as identical. The knowledge thus derived appears and flashes as one to all intents and purposes. This is the mutual identification of the real and unreal (सत्यानृतपरस्परा ध्यासरूप-मिथुनीकरण), forming the main plank of the Vedantic thesis, formulated by the Advaitins. All this is according to one text of interpretation.

According to another text,[2] other elements being common, one difference is clearly emphasised. The Avidya-abiding in and swaying the Consciousness underlying or defined by 'this'—aided by the stimulated impression of silver—(aroused and enlivened by the sight of the similarity between the nacre and the silver), modifies itself as the 'silver'; whereas the Avidya—abiding in and domineering over the Consciousness, underlying the mental mode or the psychosis of 'this', getting an impetus from the idea of the previous experience of the silver, manifesting it at

1. See page 652—Advaitasiddhi.
2. See page 653—Advaitasiddhi—Nirṇayasāgara Edn.

its proper place, modifies itself as the 'mode of the silver'. It is, therefore, that Brahmānand explains the nature of illusion as 'the perception or consciousness, characterised by the two modes mutually identified'. The former, Avidya or nescience produces silver, the false identity with the 'this'—the unparticularised nacre. Not only that, the substratum, that is, the nacre, shorn of its distinctive feature and perceivable as 'this' also in its turn appears as falsely identified with the unreal or apparent silver; because illusioned people experience the two as having known mutually identified with each other—(इदं रजतं रजतमिदमित्याकारकाऽनुभवद्वयाऽनुव्यवसायात्). Similarly, the latter Avidya in its turn produces the mode as the silver, as well as the two false identities between the two modes—one being mental, evoked through the regular process of the mind, and the other, prompted and presented by the nescience. Thus in the case of illusion, the Consciousness underlying the substratum, is unfolded only partially by the mental mode and remains veiled in respect of its particular aspect. The ignorance or nescience, concerning the unrevealed particular aspect, projects the illusory object as well as its false manifestation or apparent cognition.

The post-Śankara Advaitin believes in mutual false identification[1]. Not only the illusory product of Avidya appears in a false identity with the substratum, but to the substratum also is attributed a false identity with the illusory object. But this false identification of the substratum with the illusory object is admitted as confined only to its relation and not to itself. In other words, the substratum per se cannot be held in its turn to be falsely identified with the super-imposed or illusory; because this will be yielding to the position of Śūnyavāda. But its false identification can be maintained only as related to its apparent aspect as related (संसर्गतो नतु स्वरूपतः). This is the view, shared by most of the writers on the Advaita-Vedanta, and according it, the Avidya or nescience produces five effects: (1) silver,

1. See Brahmānandī Comm. on Advaita-Siddhi, PP. 38-47.

(2) the identity of the Silver, (3) the relation of the generality with the Silver, (4) the identity of the substratum, 'this', and (5) the relation of its attributes.

Brahmānand[1] stears in the middle course and holds that the substratum is also in its turn falsely identified with the illusory or apparent not in its absolute character but as characterised by its relatedness to the false identity with the apparent (तादात्म्यप्रतियोगित्वोपहितरूपेण). A phenomenon has not only an intrinsic and absolute aspect but also a relational one. Hence the assumption of the unreality of the substratum also in its relational capacity cannot affect its reality in its absolute sense and run counter to the universally accepted and the most important and basic doctrine of the reality of the substratum, so highly emphasised and preserved by the Advaita Vedanta. Thus the substratum may remain the so-called real intrinsically and absolutely at its bottom, but, nevertheless, it may be held as false in its relational capacity. According to this view, the Avidya or nescience may be said to be responsible for the presentation of the identity of the silver, the silver as related to the identity, the 'this' containing the identity of the silver, the identity of 'this', the 'this' as related to the identity and the silver, containing the identity of 'this.'

The author of the Sankṣepa-Śārīraka holds a queer view. He draws a distinction between the 'support' and the 'substratum' (Adhāra and Adhiṣṭhana) and maintains the mutual false identification of the apparent with the support and vice versa, rendering thereby both of them unreal, in the light of the Consciousness, characterised by the support; because all false identifications or Adhyāsas take place only in the knowledge. The 'substratum', according to him, is that, whose Ajñāna or nescience is responsible for the production of the illusory object and the 'support' is that, which appears as the seeming characteristic thereof. In the particular case of the presentation of illusory silver, Consciousness-underlying 'this'-being that, whose ignorance projects the silver, is treated as the 'substratum' and

1. See Brahmānandi Comm. on Advaita-Siddhi, PP. 38-47.

so is the case everywhere; while the 'this' being what characterises the sustenance of ignorance, namely, Consciousness, underlying itself, is the 'support'. Since the manifold appearances, constituting the world, are ultimately only falsely identified with the pure Consciousness or the one Reality, Brahman, and are due to Avidya or Nescience in and about the pure Consciousness, the illusory objects may be described as having their common substratum, the Brahman. Thus the Sākṣi or pure Consciousness, whose Avidya yields the existence and appearance of the world, is the 'substratum'; whereas the qualified Brahman, that is, the Brahman, appearing as such in relation to Avidya, which is incessantly eliciting from it the phenomenal world on account of the mere presence of the Brahman and the Brahman thereby being characterised as the supporter of Ignorance or Nescience, is the 'support' and is held to be false as such. But as it is not essentially different from the 'substratum'—the pure Consciousness—on the strength and in the light of which Avidya goes on unceasingly turning out the varied and various appearances, the unreality of the qualified Brahman does not matter at all or militate against the view of the one Absolute Reality, maintained by this school. It is, therefore, that the author adds to the definition of the 'मिथ्यात्व' the term "Being different from the substratum" (अधिष्ठानभिन्नत्वे सति). Thus the Brahman as the 'substratum' remains unaffected, that is, pure and quiescent and eternally real and shining, but the qualified Brahman, the support, is not real but only falsely imagined.

To fall back upon the original question of the oneness of the knowledge, in spite of there being two objects and two modes, it will not be out of place to mention the various views[1] on the point. First, the identity of objects leads also to that of the knowledges. Secondly, just as the 'silver', being the modification of Nescience lying about and partially enshrouding the Consciousness, characterised by the nacre and revealed only as 'this' is manifested as identical with 'this';

1. See pages 652-655 Advaita Siddhi (Nirṇaya-Sāgar Edn.)

similarly the apprehension of the silver, being the modification of the Nescience, obscuring the Consciousness—characterised by the mental mode or psychosis of 'this'—is manifested as identical with the psychosis or its resultant cognition.[1] Accordingly, although there are two modes, yet the identity, thus established, leads to the oneness of the knowledge. Thirdly, the mode, born of nescience, cannot constitute any necessary form of cognition in the proper sense and give rise to any separate additional cognition or knowledge; hence there is only one knowledge. Strictly speaking, that only is to be called the 'comprehension' or cognition, which dispels the ignorance about something and unfolds the consciousness underlying it. How can the mode, being an imaginary representation, sprung from the ignorance, be deemed to be such. Hence out of the two modes only the mental mode is able to manifest knowledge; whereas the other remains only ineffective as such, with the result that its rise does not disturb the oneness of knowledge. Fourthly, although there are different modes, yet the revelation of the object, occasioned by the identity of the subject with the object, being one and the same, this only reveals both the undistinguished nacre as 'this' and the apparent silver, as one object. It is the object-defined Consciousness, manifested as identical with mind-specified Consciousness by psychosis, which only is held to be capable of revealing an object; because unless the cover, obstructing and enshrouding the glow of Consciousness and standing between the subject and the object is removed by the mental mode, the knowledge cannot emanate in its fullness (that is, as containing the three-fold aspects of the knower, the known and the knowledge). The mode of ignorance may very well distinguish the silver from the 'this' but cannot play the roll of the mental mode or psychosis in the genesis of knowledge. So in spite of their being two distinct modes, the source of the manifestation of knowledge is only one, and the knowledge thus occasioned, therefore, is one and the same. According to Nṛsimhāśrama-

1. Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha (Andhra Edn.) 1, iviii-lix. p. 42.

Pādācārya, no emergence of the psychosis of the substratum and its experience in an indistinguished form, immediately previous to the presentation of the illusory object, is essential for an illusion, as nobody experiences two modes of knowledge in an illusory perception. Such a previous rise of the psychosis of the substratum in an unparticularised form is not one of the causal factors; and it is due mainly to a defective sense-intercourse. It is not possible in cases like those of an illusory appearance of blueness in an accumulated water or that of yellowness in a conch-shell; because neither the presentation of a substance, destitute of any colour, previous to that of the illusory is possible nor can the previous presentation, involving the experience of the native dim whiteness in the water or pure whiteness in the conch-shell can be accepted. Hence it should be granted that the theory of the previous rise of the mode of consciousness as 'this' and subsequent production of silver and its manifestation by Nescience is untenable. What really happens is that while the mode of the mind or psychosis is still in making, the Nescience about to be modified as 'silver', being set into action by the defective sense-intercourse, projects the silver simultaneously with the rise of the mode of consciousness. This mental mode rising at a time, when the 'this' has come to be identified and associated with the silver, embraces the 'this' as embodying silver and hence the knowledge of the silver also is made possible on account of the sense-contact having taken place with the 'this' as connected with or identified with the silver. Although there has been neither any actual sense-contact with the silver as 'this' nor any independent sense-contact with the silver alone as such, yet its perceptibility is rendered possible on account of the sense-organ having encountered the 'this' as identified with the silver. The difference in the process, according to this view, may be analysed to be that in this case what sets Avidya into action, resulting in the manifestation of the illusory object, is not the mental mode or ordinary psychosis but the sense-intercourse, instrumental to the rise of the knowledge of the object unparticularised.

The theory of perception according to Sureśvara :—

The great name in the history of the Advaita literature, Sureśvarācārya, very often represented as the author of the Vartikas, is credited with starting a new theory of interpretation, called Ābhāsa-Vāda, which has an all-round influence over all the topics handled by the system. According to him, everything appears to be existent and manifest owing to the Incidence or Appearance of Pure Consciousness pervading and enlivening[1] it. Thus incidence or Apperance of Consciousness underlies all objects uninterruptedly, accounting for its life and being so long as it may last.

Whenever any object is brought into contact with any particular sense, capable of grasping it, the mind through its channel partially oozes or flows out to the object, pervades it and undrgoes modification, according to the form or mould, exhibited thereby. This outgoing of the mind and assuming a form similar to that of an object is illustrated in the Advaita texts by molten copper or the water of tanks etc. The mind is compared to the solar light of the gem etc. and is held to be succeptible of contracting and expanding in no time. The mental mode or psychosis arises as pervaded by the Appearance of Consciousness in it, being essentially and incidentally due to it like any other object of the universe In this connection it will be necessary to clear up one doubtful point. It is not certain whether the outgoing of the mind to the object (which is admitted by the Vivaraṇa School in clear words) is approved by Sureśvara as well. In accordance with his one verse[2], if literally interpreted, it will have to be concluded that he is in favour of the object transmitting its mould through the sense organ to the mind and it is this transmission of a distinct mould through the sense-organ by an object and consequent

1. B. B. V., P. 1053, V. 124, P. 1393, V. 99 ; P. 1391, V. 86 ; P. 1392, V. 93 ; P. 1614, V. 1320 ; P. 1024, V. 191 ; P. 327, V. 127 ; P. 327, V. 129.
2. B.B.V., PP. 1827-28, VV. 651-53, PP. 1391-93 VV. 86-97 P. 1392, V. 93.

establishment of a direct contact between the mind and a particular object, which account for the immediacy of the perception as distinguishable from other kinds of indirect cognitions.

In any case, the psychosis is held to be indispensably necessary for establishing and manifesting an identity between the Jīva—the Incidence or Appearance of Conciousness, cast and settled into the internal organ—and the Incidence or Appearance of Consciousness, permeating the object as its inmost reality. It is the Consciousness, whose Incidence or Appearance is set within the object (विषयावच्छिन्नाभासप्रतियोगिचित्) and is constantly associated therewith, that really manifests the object, but the Jiva, the subject—Appearance of Consciousness, or the Cidabhasa, involved within the subject. is held to be so, owing to its identity with the object—Appearance of Consciousness, disclosed or manifested by the psychosis for the time only so far as that particular object is concerned.[1] It is, therefore, that a particular object only is known by a particular subject at a time and not another or by another. Simultaneously with the rise of a psychosis in respect of a particular object, there ensues through that psychosis, connected with the subject or the Jīva, on the one hand, and with the object, on the other, an identification of the two Appearances of Consciousness, pervading the subject and the object of the knowledge. Thus all the three—subject-Appearance of Consciousness, the object-Appearance of Consciousness and the Appearance of Consciousness pervading the particular psychosis or immanent in the particular psychological process[2]—constitute one unit (एकलोलीभावापन्ना) for the time being and the cognition arising under these conditions is called perception. This unity of Appearances even for the time being is possible only through the psychosis,

1. Advaita Siddhi (Bombay edition) P. 483 B.B.V., A. IV, B. III, PP. 1391-93, VV. 86-99 PP. 1233-34 VV. 149-155 etc. Nyay Ratnāvalī,, P. 272.,
2. B.B.V. P. 496 V. 328, P. 582, V. 743 T.B.V. P. 63, V. 91, See also the verses 92 and 93 in the same page aud the verse 14 in P. 111. The whole process is clarified in Advaita Siddhi,

transformed out of the mind, when through the channel of some sense or other it reaches, encounters and pervades the object, and it does not militate against the Appearance maintaining at the same time their adjunctive (औपाधिकभेद) differences. In other words, in spite of the Appearances, forming one unit and being identical for the time being. that is, so long as the psychosis lasts, there is no confusion of the tripartite division, universally admitted in all cases of cognitions; because it is maintained even then by the three aspects of Cidabhasa, constituted by the three correspondent different adjuncts, namely, the internal organ, its modificatiou or psychosis and the object and these three aspects are respectively called the khower, means of knowledge and the known or the pramātā, Pramāṇa and Prameya.[1] To put it more clearly, the Pramātā or the percipient (Cidābhāsa) is the Incidence or Appearance of Consciousness, underlying the unmodified part of the mind, Prameya or the Viṣaya-Cidābhāsa is the Appearance of Consciousness, constantly pervading the external object and Pramāṇa or Vṛtti-Cidābhāsa is the Incidence or Appearance of Consciousness, involved within the modified part of the mind or psychosis (which forms the necessary link between the subject and the object) implanted in the psychological process. Thus psychosis may be deemed to be an indispensable apparatus of perception, without which there can be no direct or immediate knowledge of anything in the Advaita Epistemology.

The theory of complex pervasion.

Both the Consciousness and the object pervade the mind through their Incidence or Appearance and mould respectively.[2] The Appearance of Consciousness as well as the mould of the object coincide in the same mental mode, whenever formed in consequence of the mind coming through the sense-channel into contact with an object, and through that mode containing the

1, Advaita Siddhi. P. 489. Sidhāntabindu (Benares edition) PP; PP. 265-266. Vedānta Paribhāṣhā—PP. 55-56.

2. B.B.V., A. IV, B. III, P. 1392, V. 94.

forms of both—the Consciousness and the object as Appearance and mould respectively—the mind is held by sureśvarācārya to be permeated by both Cit and Viṣaya simultaneously in all cases of perception. Besides the occasional Appearance of Consciousness in the modified part of the mind, there is a constant Incidence or Appearance thereof, imbedded in the mind, which is pre-existent to psychosis and is called Pramātā or percipient in relation to it. This subject-Appearance of Consciousness (प्रमातृचिदाभास) is comparatively permanent, but the objective form or mould imprinted in the mind or mental modification is occasional, for it is brought about by Dharmā-dharm of the person concerned, only when the object happens to come into contact with one of his senses and the mind through the channel of that sense goes out and pervades the object or lying intact where it is and takes the same form as the object has. The Consciousness, qualified per accidens and conditioned by a particular object or the Consciousness, whose Appearance is constantly caught up in that object and which has become thus identified with the object on account of Its non-discrimination from Its own Appearance set into the object, reveals the object only when the psychosis manifests the two different Appearances of Consciousness or Cidabhasas: one set or stamped in the mind (as subject) and the other in the object-as identical for the time being (चिदाभासोपश्लिष्टवृत्तिप्रयोज्यान्तःकरणनिष्ठाभासाऽभेदाऽभिव्यक्त—विषयगताभास-प्रतियोगि चैतन्यम्)[1]. In other words, the said object—appearing Consciousness, when manifested identically with a particular mind—appearing Consciousness by psychosis, reveals the object, that is, makes itself appear as known under the name and form of the subject then and there by that mind-appearing Consciousness as the knower. Thus the essential condition of every perceptual knowledge is that all the three Consciousnesses as appearing in the particular mind, the particular object and the particular psychosis (बुद्धि-तद्वृत्ति-विषयैतत्त्रितयगताभास) should constitute

1. Nyayā-Ratnāvalī, PP.272-273.
PAdvaita Siddhi P. 483.

one unit (एकलोलीभावापन्न) for the time being and the function of Vṛtti is to bring about an identity between the two appearances of Consciousness in the particular mind and the particular object (अन्तःकरणचिदाभास-विषयचिदाभासद्वय).

Determinant of immediacy :—

In every case of perception, both the perception and its object are known to be immediate or direct. It is a basic tenet of the Advaita Vedanta, elaborately interpreted by Sureśvara that only pure Consciousness is unconditionally and absolutely, immediate. In a sense It is the only thing that is immediate and that It is so always. The empirical objects such as chair, table etc. are perceived and become immediate on the fulfilment of certain conditions, e.g. the contact of the sense-organ with the object and the emergence of a psychosis etc. This immediacy, which is temporal and occasioned by certain circumstances, necessarily pre-supposes a primordial "Immediacy", which is not engendered at all. The possibility of the two entities, subject and object, getting acquanited with each other is a common ground. The distinctions, subject and object (Pramātā and Prameya), have their basis in a unity, which serves as the meeting ground of both; they are its limitations. The knowing subject (Pramātā) is the Consciousness, appearing in and circumscribed per accidens or indicated by the psychical mechanism, Buddhi (बुद्धिगताभासप्रतियोगि चैतन्यम्)[1], the content is the Consciousness (in reality the same but different as) appeaaing in and circumscribed per accidens or indicated by the particular object (विंषयगताभासप्रतियोगि चैतन्यम्), Their coming together and being manifested as identical in cases of empirical perception are brought about by psychosis or an appropriate modification of the mind, reaching out to the object through the outlet of the sense-organs and assuming the same form as it has. It is wrongly believed by the common folk or by philosophers that the sense-organs or at least the mental modifications illumine things and constitute the so-called perception-

1. B.B.V., P. 1232, V. 144; P. 1233, V. 149 and 151 etc.

immediacy. What illumines the object, which together with the mind and its modification form one unit for the time being, is really the Consciousness, merely appearing within and indicated by the object, and the necessary condition for that is the emergence of psychosis through an actual sense-contact or mental relation. To attribute to the sense-organ or the mental modification any such power of illumination is very much like ascribing vision to a hole in the wall, through which one may happen to see and whose nature and size in a sense determine what he could see. Hence it is said only in a figurative way that the Antahkarana-Vrtti, mental mode or psychosis, is knowledge; because it determines knowledge. But it does not itself constitute knowledge in reality.

Perception is distinguished from other types of knowledge such as inference etc. by the fact that here there is the contact of the Vṛtti or psychosis with the object or, technically speaking, there is the identity of the vṛtti-Appearance of Consciousness with the object-Appearance of Consciousness; because both the vṛtti and the object occupy then one and the same place and the Consciousness, appearing in and qualified per accidens by them, become for the time being identical with them on account of non-discrimination from their own Appearances in them. This may be concluded to be the governing condition of the immediacy or perceptuality of the knowledge (ज्ञानगतापरोक्ष्य-प्रयोजक). In inferential and other mediate types of knowledge no such direct contact (between the Vṛtti and the object) ensues. But it must be distinctly understood that, according to Sureśvara, the immediacy of knowledge does not necessarily depend upon its being engendered by any of the sense-organs, as is generally held, but on the nature of the present object. It is, therefore, that the knowledge, derived from the Mahavakyas, though obviously verbal, is not mediate as usually expected, but is consistently immediate and direct. However, as a general rule the governing condition of knowledge being perceptual may be laid down to be the immediacy of the object to the percipient Consciousness or the jīva, engendered either by the manifesta-

tion of the said itentity (अभेदाभिव्यक्तिप्रयुक्त) or the rending of of the intervening veil between the object and the subject (तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणाभिभवेन) or the establishment of a relation between the object and the Jīva, which, though infinite, is not the material cause of objects (तत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारा चैतन्यस्य तदुपरागेण). Out of these alternative conceptions regarding the specific function of the Vṛtti, consequent on and suitable to the different conceptions about the Jīva (whether it is all-pervasive or limited.), Suresvarācārya maintains the function of the Vṛtti to be the manifestation of identity, so long as it exists, between the subject-Appearance and the object—Appearance of Cit (अन्तःकरण-गताभासानुयोगिक-तत्तद्विषयगताभासप्रतियोगिकाऽभेदाभिव्यक्ति) and thereby bet-the Consciousness, as circumscribed per accidens by the mind, and that, as qualified per accidens by the object, which, though in reality one, become different as identical with their limiting adjuncts (owing to non-discrimination from their own Appearance in them as receptacles).

This identity, manifested by the mental modification, serves as the indispensable factor of the immediacy of an object. In other words, the objective condition, governing the immediacy of any present and perceivable (वर्त्तमान and योग्य) object (i.e. विषयगतापारोक्ष्यप्रयोजक), is that its existence should be identical with (and not different from) that of the apprehending Consciousness. There is, however, one exception and it is that for the immediacy of illusory objects and mental states such as pleasure and pain etc., which are regarded to be manifestable by the witnessing Consciousness, the service of Vṛtti is not accepted to be necessary at all. Leaving aside the cases of exceptions, all empirical objects, without any exception, where the empirical individual Jīva functions as the perceiver, the condition of immediacy (viz., the existence of the object not being different from that of the perceiver) is brought about by the mediation of a Vṛtti. The being of the object is none other than that of its substratum (Adhiṣṭhāna) that is, directly the Appearance of Consciousness in the object and indirectly (that is, through its non-differentiation) the Cons-

ciousness, appearing therein and circumscribed per accidens or specified thereby, the Jiva, and the Pramātā through a particular and approximate modification of the mind gets identified with the object—Consciousness for the time-being and to that extent. Thus the being of the particular object, as a result of the rise of the psychosis, becomes non-different from that of the perceiver, and hence, although, according to Sureśvarācārya, it is the Appearance of Cit or Consciousness in the object or Cit Itself, as appearing in and conditioned per accidens by the object (i.e., on which the object is superimposed and from which it derives its seeming existence or reality as well as manifestation) that really manifests the object, yet the Jiva is held to be the subject of the manifestation of an object by reason of its being identical with the said object-Consciousness for the time being so long as the psychosis lasts.

Vṛtti-Vyāpti and Phala-Vyāpti :—

In this connection, it seems necessary to explain the two terms, 'Vṛtti-vyāpti' and 'Phala-vyāpti'—applied to an object, perceived. As explained above, in every case of perception, the mind gets out to the object through the outlet of a sense-organ, pervades it and assumes the same form as it has. This pervasion of an object by a mental modification or psychosis, is called 'Vṛtti-vyāpti.' But, as said above, merely the contact of psychosis is not enough to manifest an object in as much as the psychosis merely determines the form etc. of the knowledge but does not itself constitute the knowledge and so the appearance of the object-Consciousness in that psychosis (वृत्ति), which together with the mind (अन्तःकरण) and the object happen to form one unit for the time being, is further needed. This appearance of the object-Consciousness in the psychosis (वृत्त्याभासमात्रं विषयगताभासप्रतियोगिचैतन्यं तदाभासो वा) is known as Phala—the net result or final outcome of the definite functioning of the mental process, which consists in bringing about the revelation or apprehension of the object or cognition in its due vividness. The Appearance of the object-Consciousness in the psychosis is

recognised as the Phala or the resultant empirical cognition as it arises only after the genesis of the psychosis. To sum up, in a sense all the four necessary aspects or phases of a perceptual knowledge—the subjective, objective, instrumental and consequential—are appearances or only seeming aspects of Immediate and Self-luminous Consciousness, the Brahman, which is in reality Aspectless and Indivisible. From the stand-point of Reality, Cit Itself may be regarded as Pratyakṣa-Prama[1], one, undifferentiated and not engendered at all; from the view-point of Appearance or empirical usage, the fruit that is generated in the external objects of perception is not pure Consciousness per se, but it is only the Appearance[2] of the Object-conditioned Consciousness in the psychosis, identical with the object on account of occupying one and the same space and flourishing simultaneously, that is, in the present time; because Pure Consciousness existed even prior to the perception of any object and will continue to do so even after the perceptual process has come to an end and the perception has disappeared completely. This exposition of the nature of the Phala or result of a perceptual process seeks to explain away an apparent contradiction, which is noticeable in the following statements made by Sureśvara at different places in his works. In verse 159 and 230 of the Sambandha-Vārtika he says that Consciousness (संवित् or अनुभूति) Itself is the point of all perceptual process. In verse 128 (pp. 1229 of the B. B. V.) he affirms that the phala as well as all other aspects of a perceptual knowledge are only appearances, as no division is in any way possible with regard to one Pure and Indivisible Consciousness, Brahman. What Śureśvara means to convey through these apparently self-contradictory statements is that in reality there is only one indivisible Pure Consciousness, but all empirical cognitions with their four-fold aspects are so many appearances of this very one Absolute Pure Consciousness and that, though apparently different from It,

1. B. B. V., pp. 488 Sambandha-Vārtika, pp. 70, V. 230; pp. 51, V. 139.

2. B. B. V., pp. 1053, V. 126; pp. 496, V. 328.

are essentially nothing other than this one eternal and immediate Consciousness, as an Appearance, really speaking is nothing but the Reality unknown through Avidya.

The theory of Illusion :—

As regards the theory of illusion, Sureśvara has nothing to add to or differ from the general one, advanced by the Advaita system, save and except this one but remarkable point that in order to generate an illusion nothing other than[1] Avidya such as the (1) apprehension of the general feature, (2) non-apprehension of the distinctive feature (3) and recollection of the illusory object, need be regarded as accompanying causal factors. Thus, according to Sureśvara, in order that there may be an illusion, residual impressions of one's past experiences regarding the illusory object do not constitute one of the necessary causal factors. Avidya has got both obscuring and projective energy (technically called 'Ajñāna' and 'mithyājñāna' by Sureśvara), and these are enough to explain the appearance of any illusory object. The difference between the so-called real empirical object and the illusory one lies in this, that the latter is a secondary appearance, while the former is a primary one. To explain this preposition, it will be sufficient to say that it is the Consciousness, appearing in and through the particular object—serving as the receptacle or adjunct of that Appearance—say for instance, nacre, (in the stock-example of illusion) that reappears in the nescience, enshrouding the Consciousness in respect of the distinctive feature of the socalled real object (शुक्तिकात्वावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्थाविद्या) that makes up and accounts for the appearance of the illusory object, silver; and hence this illusory silver may be called to be the secondary appearance in comparison to the primary appearance of the Consciousness as nacre. The realisation of the so-called-real nacre in the given example would sublate the nescience, occasioning the silver and its cognition, and annihilate only the secondary appearance of the said Consciousness as silver with the result that the nacre, which

1. B.B.V. pp. 483-485, VV. 274-279; pp. 523, VV. 446-49.

is itself an appearance, would continue to appear as such (the primary appearance as nacre having been not annihilated or disturbed in the least). Thus silver is an appearance of the appearance (i.e. nacre), though at the time of its perception it appears to be an objectively varitable entity, adequate to satisfy the demand of pragmatic life and when it is negated, what survives is the original appearance only; and the negation of silver is nothing but the unknown nacre becoming known, as all negations of appearances are only the realities or the Reality i.e. (so-called or Absolute)[1]—the Adhiṣṭhāna—realised. When the primary appearance or the so-called reality—the Adhiṣṭhāna,—underlying the secondary appearance is realised, the illusory character of the silver is established. The silver, which was perceived as anobjectively real existent, comes to be detected as non-existent not only for the present moment, but also when and where it happened to be perceived as real. Thus the illusory character of the silver is proved in respect of both the past as well as the present presentation and it might be, therefore, inferred to be so also in respect of future also. This is a brief analysis of perception and illusion in accordance with the theory of 'Abhāsa', advanced by Sureśvarācārya, as an original interpretation of the Advaita monism.

Nature of 'appearances' according to Sureśvara :—

It is commonly believed that causes such as defective eye or dimness of light etc. is enough to explain a illusion or appearance. But the Advaitin is not satisfied with this explanation and seeks for a material cause also. If the appearance or object of illusion has no reality and existence of its own in as much as it is subsequently sublated as existing for all times by the realisation of something, underlying it as its reality (so-called or absolute respectively as it may be the case of either a worldly illusion or of the world as illusion), there must be some ground—the underlying reality—to account for its existence

1. B.B.V. pp. 916, V. 174, pp. 1017, V. 210
See Vedantā-Kalpa-Latikā pp. 27.

and appearance and also some other factor, which is responsible for the non-realisation of the 'ground' as well as for its wrong realisation or apprehension as the object, appearing over and above it. The latter, responsible for suppressing the ground and showing up in its place something else, the appearance, is known as Avidya in the Advaita Vedanta terminology. It is so called; because it is of the nature of Neseience or ignorance of the real object (i. e., the ground), misapprehended through it. Thus Avidya is not only an obscurative or suppressive factor but a creative principle also, assumed under the logical necessity of explaining the appearance of the Universe, and it modifies and expresses itself both as knowledge and object, since it is solely responsible for both of them simultaneously. It is impossible that knowledge can be real, when its object is not so, for the relation between the two is organic and constitutional and the two are alike appearances of one and the same Consciousness, of course arising through different media. Avidya being a 'creative principle', is held to be 'Bhāva-rūpa' and 'Avicārita-sansiddha' by Sureśvara in the sense that it figures and operates as an established entity of undeniable varity so long as it is not sublated by Brahma-realisation.

Differentiation of empirical appearances from illusory ones:-

One may question as to wherein lies the difference between the so-called real empirical objects and illusory ones, if both are alike appearances. It cannot be urged that the difference between the empirically real objects and the unreal illusory ones lies in the latter being the sole products of Avidya; because such a differentiation would amount only to giving a new name to the cause of illusory objects without indicating any substantial difference in the nature of these appearances and the so-called realities of the world, which are also primarily the projections of Avidya. The fact that the illusory objects are afterwards sublated by knowledge of the underlying emipirical reality also does not establish any important point of differentiation, since the empirical objects even are ultimately sublatable by Brahma-realisation.

This much, however, can be asserted that the empirical objects are something which have sprung from the Primordial Maya and have been uninterruptedly continuing in series from times immemorial. They have, therefore, assumed the position of permanently real entities and are undoubtedly and unhesitatingly appraised and evaluated as such by Avidya-ridden people; whereas the illusory objects such as nacre-silver or rope-serpent etc. spring from a particular Avidya or phase of one and the same Avidya, screening or enshrouding the Consciousness, defined by the unparticularised object as the so-called underlying reality and is recognised as unreal even in the empirical plane.

In defining and proving the world to be 'Mithyā', Madhusūdan Sarasvatī emphasises its dual nature: sublatability and identity with the 'Sat' or underlying reality, the former arising from Avidya and the latter from the ultimate substratum, Brahman—the one Eternal Existence or Absolute Reality ultimately holding up all appearances in relation to Avidya.

Nṛsiṁhāśrama-Pādācārya in his work 'Advaita-Dīpikā' rightly remarks that neither Brahman—the Pure Consciousness and beyond all modifications and associations—nor Maya, being itself a mere appearance and perishable, alone can bring forth and explain the appearance of the world. Thus both the so-called real world of plurality and illusory appearances are alike accepted to be 'Mithya' or unreal, as the various projections of Avidya ultimately out of one and the same Reality whether directly or indirectly and primarily or secondarily. This much only can be said in particular about the latter that its causal factor, Nescience, is short-lived (lasting only so long as the socalled underlying reality, which also is only appearance from the view-point of Absolute Reality or Reality proper is not realised). Moreover, it is entirely exhausted in and is coterminous with its appearance; whereas the so-called real empirical object is supposed to be existent even when its appearance is not offering itself, and its uninterrupted continuity in series is ordinarily undiscernible and undeniable. Again the illusory

object may be deemed to be private to a particular individual, as it is 'Keval-Sākṣi-bhāṣya'; whereas the so-called real empirical object is experienced in common by all and may be regarded to be so in consequence of 'inter-subjective' construction, and being cognisable by 'Pramāṇas' equally available to all.

Sureśvara offers a new and original explanation on the point. Te reject the explanation that the universe is either 'Sat' or 'Asat' or 'Sadasat' has a positive implication and this implication is inculcated by him in the terms of 'Avicārita-Sansiddha' a phrase, which is frequently used by him to describe the nature of Avidya and its products or modifications (i.e., the entire universe) as appearances. Avidya and its product, the universe, are 'Avicārita-Saṁsiddha' in the sense that Reality, wrongly apprehended, constitutes what is known as the universe, as the latter is due to the suppression of Reality and showing up in Its place what are known as the various objects of universe by Avidyā. The rope-serpent appears to be real only so long as the rope is not realised. Similarly, all empirical objects of unquestionable varity and usefulness from the standpoint of Avidyā appear to be real only so long as the only Reality, the Brahman, is not realised. A distinction between the so-called real empirical objects and illusory ones, according to Sureśvara's Ābhāsa-Vāda, can be made in as much as the former are *primary appearances* and the latter *secondary ones* and the former are objects of common experiences and the latter are private to particular persons.

Nevertheless, both are equally appearances and Brahman which is Pure Consciousness, undivided, unlimited, destitute of attributes and eternally and inexhaustively self-luminous, is the sole Reality, on the basis of and incidentally to which all these appearances have been gaining manifestation in the realm of relativity beginninglessly. Like any other empirical object, even an illusory one has an objective reference, since Avidyā shows it as existent not within the mind of the percepient but on the spot, where the thing, so misapprehended, lies. This nature of existence saves it from being characterised as subjective. Thus,

unlike the school of Realism, the Advaita system recognises it as private to each self and, unlike Subjectivism, refuses to accept it as purely mental. It is denied only as Reality proper but not as 'epistemological realism' or something logically existent till its appearance, though sublatable by the realisation of the so-called underlying reality even in the eyes of those, who are weltering in the realm of relativity. That it is not subjective but still private to an individual requires no explanation. The explanation is not far to seek and it is that although an illusory object is not the manufacture of any individual mind, yet it is the product of a limited phase of Avidya, enshrouding a particular object-defined Consciousness and operating together and along with the mental mode of an individual, which shows it to be construed and imagined as it were by an individual mind. Consequently, it remains an object of appearance for a particular individual alone. This is the significance of describing it as 'Keval-Sākṣi-Bhāsya' and not knowable through any of the ordinary sources of knowledge operating in respect of the so-called real objects of the universe, which are the same for all.

Explanation of 'Mithyātva' :—

All appearances—whether empirical or illusory—are objective, but, nevertheless, indescribable as 'Sat', 'Asat' or 'Sadasat'. That they are objective does not mean any independent existence of their own, for in the Advaita Philosophy object and knowledge are only two names given to appearances of one and the same Consciousness, expressing Itself through different constituencies or media in the process of epistemological realisation. So the question that particularly arises is as to what is the exact significance of 'Mithyātva', attributable to appearances. A reference to the five definitions of 'Mithyātva' would at once reveal that there are five views advanced and enunciated by Advaitins on the point. Brahmānand adds a note[1] in his commentary on the Advaita-Siddhi in this connection that out of these, the first three explanations have come from the

1. 'Brahmānandī (Comm. on A. S.), pp. 206, Ls. 5-6 (Verse).

Vivaraṇa[1] School, the first being ascribable to Padmapādācārya—the author of 'Pañca-Pādikā' and the remaining two to the author of 'Pañca-Pādikā-Vivaraṇa'. the fourth definition is attributable to Citsukhācārya[2] aud the last one to Ānanda-bodhācārya.[3]

According to the first definition (सत्त्वाऽसत्त्वात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वम्) Mithyātva or inexplicability of an appearance consists in its being other than what is unsublatable eternally and still appearing to be real somewhere (at any time) त्रिकालाबाध्यविलक्षणत्वे सति क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वम्

The second definition: "प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वम्" which may be explained and amplified as "स्वनिष्ठनिरवच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् मिथ्यात्वम्" implies that inexplicability consists in not existing at all in any way whatsoever even where it is ordinarily presumed to be existing,

The third definition: 'ज्ञाननिवर्त्त्यत्वम्', which may be explained and amplified as 'अज्ञानप्रयुक्ततत्संस्कारान्यतरस्य यः स्वप्रयोजकज्ञानसमानविषयकत्व-स्वाश्रयकालपूर्वत्वोभयावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽत्यन्ताभावो ज्ञानाधीनस्तत्प्रतियोगित्वम् मिथ्यात्वम्' means that inexplicability consists in being sublatable by the realisation of Reality (whether so-called in the case of worldly illusion or absolute in the case of the world-illusion itself). This definition is originally associated with the author of Pañca-Pādikā-Vivaraṇa, but has been later on discussed and interpreted in a new way by the author of 'Iṣṭa-Siddhi'

The fourth definition: "स्वाश्रयनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम्" which has been explained by Madhusūdan Sarasvati as "स्वात्यन्ताभावाधिकरणे एव प्रतीयमानत्वम्" in order to distinguish it from the second definition which obviously appears to convey the same idea as signified by it, aims at establishing "Mithyatva" or "Anirvacanīyatva" to be nothing but appearing to be real just where the illusory objeot or appearance does not exist at all.

1. Pañca-Pādikā, pp. 10; Pañca-Pādikā-Vivaraṇa, pp. 33.
2. Tattva-Pradīpikā, pp. 79.
3. Nyāya-Makaranda, pp. 125.

The difference between the second definition and the present one lies in this, that, according to the former, inexplicability consists in non-existence where it seems to exist definitely (under the influence of Avidyā); whereas according to the latter the same consists in its apparent existence and manifestation just where the thing does not exist absolutely.

The last definition: "सद्विविक्तत्वम्" which has been explained and clarified by Brahmānanda as "अविद्यादोषनिष्ठ तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्याजन्यज्ञानकारणतानिरूपकान्यधीविषयो यस्तदन्यत्वं मिथ्यात्वम्", inexplicability consists in being other than the one, whose knowledge is different from cognitions, not derived from the Sublime Scriptural passages such as 'Tat Tvam Asi' etc. and generated by ordinary minor defects, inclusively pervaded by the crowning defect—Avidya—as the primordial cause of all of them. It may be noted here that the actual wordings of this definition used by Anandbodhācārya in his work, namely, Nyāya-Makaranda[1], are different, although the spirit of both the definition is one and the same. In the said work, he defines 'Anirvacanīyatva' as being governed and generated by Avidya, the eradication of which with that of all its effects or modifications is technically known as "बाध" (i.e. sublation) 'सविलासाविद्यानिवृत्तिरेव बाधस्तद्गोचरत्वम् अनिर्वाच्यता' However, this definition of 'Mithyātva' is followed by the school of Vācaspati, as clearly mentioned in his commentary[2] on the Advaita-Siddhi by Brahmanand.

1. N. M. , pp. 125.
2. A. S. , pp. 206.

CHAPTER IV.

Ethics & Way to Brahma-realisation

Importance of Ethical and Moral Discipline :—

Before discussing the way to Brahma-realisation, the main sheet-anchor of Advaita, it is necessary to remove a doubt, which many people seriously entertain about the utility of Ethical and Moral Disciplines in the Advaita Vedanta Philosophy. There are many superficial readers, who run away with the notion that, according to the Advaita Monism, there is no scope for moral and ethical endeavours. Of what value is the toy-elephant to one, who knows it to be a toy, but this is an unwarranted conclusion, which must be repudiated at the very outset. As already explained many a times above, the Advaita Vedanta disputes and discards nothing of human experiences and practical life; on the other hand, it regards ethical and moral discipline as the first rung of the ladder, leading ultimately to Brahma-realisation, It would be doing an injustice to the system, if one ignores this great value, which this system definitely assigns to ethical actions. As a matter of fact, it is of supreme importance and indispensable in the first stage. Whatever may be the ultimate value of the world and its achievements and prosperities, the discharge of Scripture-ordained duties is undeniable before one can claim to be entitled to tread on the path, leading to Brahma-realisation. Mental purity, cerimonial sanctity and ethical excellence are necessary pre-requisites and one, aspiring for Brahma-realisation, must first lead unremittingly amoral life. It is only selfish actions, says Sureśvara, which are of no utility in the path to Mokṣa, since they bring about only empirical consequences and conveniences. But all moral actions, obligatory and occasional rites, are indispensable, as they are indirectly conducive to Brahma-realisation. No doubt the direct path to perfection or Mokṣa lies in and through the supreme knowledge of Brahman;

because Avidya, which is the root cause of the appearance of all limitations and imperfections in the Jīva and responsible for all empirical experiences and movements, can be uprooted by realisation of Brahman, in and about which it lies. But Karma is useful in as much as it prepares the ground for Brahma-realisation through mental purification, perfection, spiritual fitness and stimulation of desire for Brahma-realisation.

Achievements[1] *through Scripture-ordained Karma :—*

Karma—Nitya and Naimittik—serve the purpose of purifying the mind. They strengthen our control over the senses and mind (जितेन्द्रियता). They induce that calm and collectedness of the mind (by stilling and suppressing all passions), which is the necessary condition of fitness for Brahma-realisation. They remove all obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge about Brahman. The Devatas, who otherwise would have remained unpropitiated and thus would have created serious obstacles in the way of Brahma-realisation, are appeased and satisfied through the performance of obligatory and occasional actions. From the individual point of view the Devatas are presiding deities of the senses and their indiscriminate repression would result, as modern psychologist would put it, in the creation of 'complexes' which are surely hindraness to Brahma-realisation. Moreover, they create an absolute apathy towards the world by revealing the true nature, that is utter unreality or valuelessness, thereof. Lastly, they evoke and stimulate an ardent desire for Supreme Realisation.

Even among the Kāmya Karmas, says Sureśvara, virtues as well as those, done without any attachment for their fruits (which are called 'Yoga' by him), are useful, in as much as they also sometimes help the mind in making it free from its impurities and in producing a lasting detachment from the world, its pragmatic values and so-called pleasures. The performance of obligatory Karmas is deemed to be the first necessary step towards Brahma-realisation. It sanctifies the body, turns

1. B.B.V., A. IV, pp. 1891-96, VV. 1041-67; pp. 1815, VV. 577-80.

it into a "Divine one" (ब्राह्मी तनुः) and removes all impurities and imperfections of the mind, on account of which it remained averted from the realisation of Reality (ज्ञान-बहिर्मुख) from lives to lives. Thus through such Karmas one gets rid of egoistic and selfish impulses, which lead one into sensualism, sins, strifes, self-defiling passions, which feed and foster the germs of pleasures, pains, hopes and fears etc. and particularly all attachments and desires for empirical life and its falsely attractive prospects and pleasures or for the whole worldly phenomena, which distract, debase and sully or stain the mind through their contact. Such actions prepare the ground for Brahma-realisation by equipping the mind properly for its emergence. To realise Brahman, a Jīva has to be fit. A Jīva, who is much attached to the things of the world, cannot be in a position even to conceive of the Brahman as the sole Reality and the phenomena of the universe merely as so many appearances. So discrimination and consequent detachment are essential for Brahma-realisation and these arise as a result of Karmans. Hence this equipment or fitness of the mind for self-realisation consists in its being immune from all imperfections and unhealthy elements, which are detrimental to the true estimate and evaluation of the so-called prospects and pleasures of the world, in detecting and discerning the true nature of the worldly phenomena as mere appearances and finally in relinquishing all attachments for them (as such), which strengthen the bondage of the individual soul by means of their consequent selfish actions and their fruits, necessarily enjoyable here and hereafter. In other words, when the mind is once purged of all impurity, unhealthiness (विषयाभ्यासजाऽस्वास्थ्य) and evil tendencies, not only the world loses its charm, the false intellectual curiosity about it is deadened or silenced and replaced by truth-vision (or vision necessary for search of truth), but also there arises a strong determination to renounce the world of only a seeming nature once for ever and an ardent desire for the realisation of the Reality, the Brahman, which only can bring permanent peace and lasting happiness to the seeker.

To this extent, the utility of the performance of obligatory and occasional Karmas is undeniable and in view of their purificatory and preparatory effects on the body and the mind, nothing of rites, rituals, religious vows, austerities, sacrifices and gifts etc. should be spurned, neglected or overlooked by the seeker. The forty-eight purificatory ceremonies (संस्कार) are also useful in producing a wholesome effect on the body and the mind, conducive and favourable to self-realisation. At one place Suresvarācārya goes to the extent of saying that the world is not necessarily evil, but it depends on the particular person to use and handle it properly or improperly so that it proves either for good or for evil. Just as a leaf of the Apāmārga[1] plant is experienced as soft and agreeable, if touched in one way, but rough and unpleasant, if touched in another way; similarly the world also can be experienced to be proving either as an obstacle in the way of Brahma-realisation or as favourable and conducive to the same, according as it is looked upon either with attachment or with detachment respectively by a person. By means of regular and devoted recitation of one's own section of Scripture, austerities, oblations, sacrifices, Mahayajnas, and all other ethical endeavours the body is transformed into a divine one. So ungrudging toleration of the 'pairs of opposites' (तप), charities (दान) and performance of virtuous deeds and all obligatory and occasional Karmas (in the present or previous life or lives) are useful as preparatory for any seeker.

Pre-requisites of Brahma-realisation :—

Acārya Śankara has laid down the following four-fold pre-conditions or pre-requisites of self-realisation :—

(i) Discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal (नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक),

(ii) Renunciation of desire for fruits here and hereafter (ऐहिकामुष्मिकफलवैराग्य),

(iii) Attainment of the six-fold spiritual qualifications : (1) शम, (2) दम, (3) उपरति, (4) तितिक्षा, (5) समाधि, and (6) श्रद्धा,

1. B.B.V., P. 433, V. 27.

(iv) Longing for liberation (मुमुक्षुत्व).

The first step towards realisation consists in clearly distinguishing the eternal and enduring from the perishable and passing. This discrimination shatters the glamour of worldly phenomena and attraction for empirical prospects and pleasures. So long as this discrimination has not been properly cultivated and reared up in one's mind, his senses are sure to entice him away and drag his mind externally. Thus this discrimination really checks the individual attachment for worldly things and their values. Detachment is the result of discrimination. With the latter growing on more and more intensive and powerful the former also grows so accordingly. The significance of detachment is not merely negative. But it helps also the growth of positive virtues or spiritual qualifications in the man. One, who has developed detachment, has nothing to fear. Consequently, he attains perfect equanimity of mind, complete self-control and so on. As regards the six spiritual qualities, which are necessary for qualifying one to adopt the direct means to Brahma-realisation such as श्रवण and मनन etc., Sureśvarācārya[1] proposes some change in the order (between the first two) and explains them elaborately in his own way. So according to him, the order and interpretation of these six spiritual virtues will be as follows :—

(A) Spiritual qualities concerning those actions, which are discretionary with a seeker :—

(a) दम -(Self-imposed) Restraint on the activities of sensuory and motor organs and thereby acquisition of complete self-control over them as well as over passions.

(b) शम -Similar restraint on the activities of the mind and thereby attainment of equanimity and tranquility of the mind and internal calmness and peace. It may be noted here that Sureśvarācārya prefers to reverse the order ; because it is only when the senses

1. B.B.V. A.IV, B.IV, P. 1918, V. 1203.

are controlled that the mind also can be brought under full and necessary control, resulting in equanimity.

(c) उपरति -Renunciation of (or detachment from) all forms of actions and their results.

(d) तितिक्षा -Fortitude and tolerance.

(B) Spiritual qualities concerning those actions, regarding which a seeker has no option but to perform :—

(a) समाधि -mental concentration, leading to quiescence.

(b) श्रद्धा -Strong belief, inveterate or burning faith in the ideal.

Consecutive stages of the path of perfection[1] :—

Sureśvarācārya has analysed and arranged in a successive order all the consecutive stages of the path of perfection, beginning with the pre-requisites and ending with supreme realisation in the following way :—

(1) Performance of compulsory or obligatory actions (नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठान).

(2) Purification and equipment of the mind (चित्तसंशुद्धि)

(3) Knowledge of the evanescence, utter unreality and valuelessness of the world and empirical life (संसारासारताज्ञान).

(4) Desire for renunciation of the utterly unreal and worthless world (संसारपरिजिहीर्षा).

(5) Abandonment of all the three possible kinds of human seekings or aspirations in human life (एषणात्रयत्याग)

(6) An ardent desire for self-realisation (विविदिषा).

(7) Actual renunciation of the world as far as practicable as a consequence of the said desire (विविदिषासंन्यास).

(8) Resort to positive means, leading to the desired Brahma-realisation, namely, (श्रवण, मनन and निदिध्यासन)

1. B.B.V.-A. I, B. III, P. 167, VV. 98-99; A, II, B. IV, P. 1035, VV. 2-5.

(9) Brahma-realisation (ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कार) and complete renunciation of empirical life as a result of the seeker's awakening (विद्वत्संन्यास).

(10) Mokṣa, the summum bonum, or restoration of the Jīva to its real essence, that is, Brahman.

According to the above ladder of Brahma-realisation नित्यकर्मानुष्ठान,[1] that is, the performance of compulsory or obligatory duties is the first task to be fulfilled by every seeker after Mokṣa. This regular and sincere performance of prescribed obligatory Karmans, accompained by thorough abstenance from proscribed Karmans, leads to the rise of an ardent desire for supreme knowledge through the purification and equipment of the seeker's mind. As regards Kāmya Karmans such as sacrifices etc. (even virtues only), says Sureśvarācārya, they also subserve the purpose of revealing the world or empirical life in its true colours, i.e. as the root of all evils and sufferings or of even stimulating the desire for Brahman-realisation. To sum up, charities, fortitude or tolerance, fasting (in the comprehensive sense of abstenance from all experiences of empirical life), and all kinds of moral and ethical observances or practices purify and prepare the seeker's mind for Mokṣa and create an ever-increasing desire for Brahma-realisation at all costs or sacrifices. Even meditations prepare the ground of spiritual fitness for Brahman-realisation and a sustained practice thereof is useful for diverting the mind from the phenomenal world and hence only preliminary to the principal means of Brahma-realisation, namely, Śravana and Manana, etc. However, when as a result of the performance of obligatory Karmas and moral and ethical practices the seeker succeeds in having his mind free from all impurities and perfectly equipped for receiving Brahma-realisation, he gradually develops in himself an idea of complete detachment (वैराग्य) towards the world. He is no longer an aspirant for the world, which is too much with others, still steeped in Nescience, and tries to renounce it gradually as much as he can. First of all, he gets rid of ordinary human

1. P. 18gl., V. 1040.

seekings and, rising above them, loses so much hold of the world on himself. Then arises the stage of a burning desire for knowledge and its accompanying renunciation, which is also only subsidiary to Brahma-realisation like the said detachment.

A question may be put here that while defining the function of obligatory rites or Karmans as being mental purification and equipment and the desire for Brahma-realisation they are determined to be subsidiaries to Brahma-realisation, here it is the abandonment or renunciation thereof that is held to be the subsidiary. The question of conflict between the two statements need not be raised; because both of them are subsidiaries with reference to different stages, that is, earlier and later times, in which each is to be accomplished. Up to the purification of the mind, rites are to be performed, and thereafter they are to be abandoned. Thus after the attainment of mental purification, the relinquishment of Karmans is the necessary step in progressing towards Brahma-realisation. The previous performance of कर्म was intended to bring about this state of mind, in which all Karmans are to be definitely renounced or eschewed so as to be capable of advancing further in the path of perfection. By the term 'लोकैषणा' is to be understood all verbal, mental and physical activities, directed towards the accomplishment of any worldly achievement or prosperity and includes 'Kriyās' or actions as well as 'Kārakas' or their incentives. This renunciation of Karmans and their fruits is consequent upon the mental detachement, which the seeker has already achieved at this stage, as explained above. Owing to his mind being fully disgusted with and wrought upon by the past impressions of the sufferings of the empirical life, the seeker grows eager to relinquish the world as far as practicable. Thus detachment is the internal cause (अन्तरङ्ग-साधन) and renunciation is the external one (बहिरङ्ग-साधन) through which the seeker is advancing towards his goal, namely, Brahma-realisation. Although both rites and renunciations are equally subsidiaries to Brahma-realisation, yet rites, through the channel of purifying the mind, are remote auxiliaries in respect of Brahma-jnānā, whereas renunciation is

comparatively a proximate auxiliary, through the channel of bringing about or occasioning the stage of "Śravaṇa" etc. without the intervention of any other intermediary link. There are four possible[1] kinds of Karmans : (1) Prohibited (प्रतिषिद्ध), (2) Selfish (काम्य), (3) Punitory (चापल) and (4) Obligatory or compulsory (नित्य). Of these, the first two kinds are renounced by the seeker or Mumukṣu just in the very first stage of his performing only obligatory rites. The third kind is also left long before the stage of renunciation. So it is only the last kind of Karmans (i.e. compulsory duties) which remain to be spurned at this stage by the seeker. With his mind, purified and purged of all evil tendencies, and his heart set on Brahma-realisation, he begins to think fearlessly of the consequences of 'omission' (of obligatory Karmans), as what is the use of persisting in the performance of even these Karmans, whose performance or non-performance does not at all help him in getting rid of the world, the empirical life and its immense and unending sufferings. So he atonce naturally abandons all obligatory Karmas even.

This stage of renunciation, accompanying the desire to know (विविदिषा-सन्यास), is to be distinguished from the later stage of pertect renunciation, accompanying Brahma-realisation (विद्वत्संन्यास), in as much as, while in the latter stage of final renunciation it is just part and parcel of the knower's very nature (स्वरूपभूत) and arises without any effort on the part of the knower or realiser and is full of calmness and quiescence on account of the quelling of all the disturbing influences and elements; whereas in the former stage of preliminary renunciation it is something to be cultivated and strengthened by the seeker as the necessary and comparatively auxiliary means to Brahma-realisation. It has been said above that the discernment or detection of the world as appearance and perishable and unreal as such is not negative in its effect but, through it renunciation helps the growth of all spiritual virtues such as "Śama and Dama etc." in the seeker's mind.

1. B.B.V. – A.IV, B. IV. P. 1919, V. 1208.

Sureśvarācārya has vehemently criticised the acceptance of Sanyāsa at ones sweet will as a mere formal final order of life. According to him, no body is entitled to it unless he has become really fit both mentally and spiritually for renouncing the world. He sincerely advises such people to satisfy all their natural cravings and propensities in the three previous orders of life first and after having thus quelled and subdued their evil mental tendencies through actual satisfaction and continuous control, try to come to this exalted final order of life ultimately through the proper channel of (1) नित्यकर्मानुष्ठान, (2) चित्तसंशुद्धि, (3) संसाराऽसारतापरिज्ञान and (4) संसारपरिजिहीर्षा After this stage a seeker is fully qualified to adopt and practice Śravana and Manana etc.

Utility of Karma, according to other Advaitins and Sureśvara:—

Before embarking upon a new problem it is necessary to close this topic with the elucidation of all the important views upheld by different Advaitins about the utility of Karma. Vācaspati Miśra holds that the performance of prescribed Karma sub-serves Vividiṣā, i.e., the desire for Brahma-realisation. The author of the Panca-padikā-vivaraṇa maintains that it sub-serves Brahma-realisation of course not directly but through the intermediary channel of renunciation of Karma and resort to Śravaṇa and Manana etc. If abandonment of actions is the necessary link between the purification of the mind and Brahma-realisation through Śravaṇa and Manana etc. according to both the views, the question crops up as to wherein lies the distinction between them. The two views are differentiated from each other by saying that although even on the view of Karmans, sub-serving Brahma-realisation, all actions have to be relinquished, as a matter of necessity, yet the sub-servience of Karmans is accepted as extending upto Brahma-realisation through the intermediary channel of renunciation of Karma and Śravaṇa etc. and the prescribed Karmas are considered as a rule contributary to

1. B.B.V. – A, IV, B. IV, P, 1851, VV. 577-79.

Brahma-Jñāna through the said channel; whereas on the other view the sub-servience of Karma is recognised to terminate finally on the stimulation of an ardent desire for Brahma-realisation and Karmans are not considered to be contributory as a rule to Brahma-realisation, which depends entirely on renunciation of Karma and proper conduction of Sravaṇa etc.

Sureśvara upholds the doctrine[1] of Karma, being subservient to merely Vividiṣā, i.e., desire for Brahma-realisation, and emphatically asserts that after causing mental purification all kinds of Karma have to go away like clouds towards the close of the rainy season. The complete channel of perfection has been laid down in the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi in the following manner :—

(1) Performance of compulsory Karmans, (2) consequent accumulation of Dharma, (3) Destruction of sins (4) mental purification (5) Correct understanding of the nature of universe as appearance (6) desire for Mokṣa (7) Inquisition into its means (8) Renunciation of Karma and incentives thereof (9) Practice of Yoga or mental concentration (10) Exclusive concentration on Pratyak or Brahman, (11) Knowledge of the true purport of the sublime scriptural passages, through the process of Sravaṇa etc. (12) Brahma-realisation and sublation of Avidya and (13) Final absorption in absolute oneness with Brahman.

The theory[2] *of Mokṣa through Karma :—*

The Mimansa school establishes the attainability of Mokṣa only through Karma. This school is chiefly concerned with the interpretation of the religious rites and their resultant fruits and with the Mokṣa, attainable through the path of Karma. Karma, according to this school of philosophy, is not only responsible for bondage but can also put an end to it. The Mimaṁsakas lay down the process of Mokṣa through Karma in the following manner. A seeker after Mokṣa should abstain

1. S.L. 402-8; B.B.V. A.IV, P. 1911, V. 1160.
N.S., 1-50 and 51 (P. 32); B.B.V., A.IV, B. IV, P. 132, VV. 1024-26.
2. Sambandha-Vartika, P, 19, VV. 41-42.

from Kāmya (selfish) and Pratiṣiddha (prohibited) Karmans, but he should never give up the performance of Nitya and Naimittika (obligatory and occasional) ones. Just as there accrues sin from indulging in prohibited actions, similarly, there ensues sin also as a result of not performing obligatory acts. So a seeker after Mokṣa must not only avoid the error of commission (of prohibited and selfish acts) but he must also try to keep himself away from the error of omission (of the obligatory and occassional acts). Scripture is the sole authority in the matter of religious duties. What it prescribes one must perform and what it prohibits one must avoid; otherwise he will have to remain involved in the cycle of recurring births and deaths for ever. "The law of Karma" operates with inexorable rigidity whether in national or international or individual life. By abstenance from selfish and prohibited or proscribed acts no fresh sins are to be incurred and no fresh fruits are to be accumulated. The fruits of past Karmans, which occasioned the present body and keep on bringing about its various enjoyments, as well as others, already accumulated, are completely exhausted together with the termination of the body, in consequence of the performance of obligatory and occasional acts. Thus there being no fresh Karma in the stock, whose fruits still remain to be enjoyed, the desired Mokṣa will ensue automatically after the falling off of the present body.

Criticism[1] *of the theory of Mokṣa through Karma :—*

While criticising this theory Sureśvarācārya ironically remarks[2] in the very beginning that such words are aptly to be uttered at the highest pitch of their voice by those, whose minds are puffed up or inflated with the false pride of their superior wisdom and whose intellects are fully bedimmed and obscured by the profuse quantity of smoke, inhaled in sacrificial halls. He denounces this view as defective in many ways. In the first place, he questions as to what would be the conception of

1. Sambandha-Vartika, PP. 20-51, VV. 46-158.
2. N. S., P. 15, V. 22.

Mokṣa through such Karmans. If it is 'restoration to the individual soul of its essentially real nature, as the jiva is essentially only Absolute Brahman (स्वरूपतो ब्रह्मैव), the question arises as to whether the individual soul or Jīva was in reality only Brahman even before this restoration or not ? In other words, does this restoration represent a fact or not ? If it represents a fact, it would not require and depend on any cause such as Karma for its mere happening. If it is not a fact, that is, if the individual soul was not essentially Brahman even prior to its restoration, it would be wrong to hold that the individual soul is reinstated as Brahman through the sustained performance of karma in the prescribed order. The true nature of anything is always that, which invariably persists so long as that thing lasts and not that, which exists only upto or arises abruptly at a certain time and under particular conditions. Moreover, if the individual soul were not in reality Brahman originally, no amount of Karma would be of any avail in turning it to be so subsequently, as no cause can bring about the said fictitions restoration. Thus restoration of the individual soul to its essential nature, i.e., its Brahma-Bhava, although it never was Brahman originally and essentially, would be an absurd and untenable proposition.

If it is held that Mokṣa consists in an absolute elimination of imperfections, accruing to an individual soul on account of its constant contact with the external world through its psychophysical organism from lives to lives and that it is Karma, which brushes aside all the said imperfections (विषयाभ्यासजास्वाथ्यापनुत्यर्थम्) and thereby occasions the attainment of Mokṣa, the question arises pertinently as to what is the cause of such a contact or trail of associations, resulting in imperfections. If it is something inherent (i. e., independent of any cause) in the individual soul, it must be held to be enduring for ever and interminable. If so, any kind of Karma, being helpless to extricate the individual soul from the said contact, cannot effectuate Mokṣa at any time. But if merits and demerits (धर्माधम) are maintained to be the cause of the said contact of the individual soul, which is essentially unrelated in accordance

with the scriptural statement 'असङ्गोऽयमात्मा', and of its being dragged into the empirical life and different migratory states, the same question would crop up as to what is the cause of the accumulation of Dharmādharm even in a Jīva. If the association of the individual soul with Dharmādharma is inherent, it would be interminable. If it is not so, nothing can bring it about and change the essentially unrelated Jīva into a related one. Like the Bhallātaka fruits (भल्लातकफल), which colour a white and spotless piece of cloth and turn it into that of another colour, there is nothing, which may turn or transmute the essentially unrelated Jīva into a related one, that is, really associated with Dharamadharma and thereby with the empirical life and the phenomenal world. Even the most sagacious and expert craftsman cannot change Ether and Air, which are not of the nature of jar etc., into jar etc. If the individual soul is essentially related, that is the doer and enjoyer etc. by nature, it is needless to talk of Mokṣa; because the nature of anything is unalterable and interminable like the heat of the Sun. There can be no sense in calling an essential attribute 'nature' but at the same time maintaining it as mutable and terminable. Moreover, the object divested or shorn of such an attribute or nature would cease to be itself, and become non-existant like a sky-lotus. So just as fire can never be bereft of its heat without being itself destroyed, though it may cease to blaze up for the time being, being obstructed by any preventive or counteracting factor (प्रतिबन्धक) such as Mantra or herb etc., similarly the individual soul, if it is doer and enjoyer etc. by nature, must continue to be so ever and Mokṣa, which is the contrary of कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व, would become out of question and ever unattainable.

It may be urged that during the period of actuality or actual presence of कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व, the individual soul is in bondage and during that of potentiality or implicit presence thereof he is in a state of Mokṣa, but this explanation too is unsatisfactory and rejectable. Potentiality and actuality (शक्ति and कार्य) cannot be held to be either as absolutely different from each other or quite identical with each other or partially both different

and identical in reality, and are, therefore, unaccountable. If शक्ति and कार्य are accepted to be altogether different from each other, the invariable concomitance between the two, arising in the form "This is potency and this is the effect", and the consequent relation of the cause and the effect between a particular pair of things would become impossible; because any pair of two absolutely distinct things such as 'cow' and 'horse' etc. cannot be connected with each other through the relation of the cause and the effect. Moreover, if potentiality is the presence of the effect in its cause, when it is inoperative, the very relation of the cause and the effect in such a case would become absurd; because nothing by itself (वस्तुमात्र), if not producing any effect (अकुर्वत्) or not being produced by any cause (अक्रियमाण), deserves to be related as a cause and an effect respectively. Śakti and Kārya cannot be maintained to be identical; because, firstly, there can be no relation of cause and effect between one and the same thing and, secondly, the destruction of Kārya would lead to that of its Śakti too, as they are identical. When Śakti is lost, that of which it is the Śakti (Śaktimat) also would lose existence and this would lead to the undesirable conclusion of 'नैरात्मवाद'—accepted by the annihistic Buddhistic school of philosophy. Hence without the full and final destruction of Karttṛtva and Bhoktṛtva etc. neither actually nor potentially there can be any possibility of Mokṣa. If it be urged that Mokṣa is not the absolute destruction of either Śakti (potentiality) or Kārya (actuality) but merely non-manifestation of the effect, that is, कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व etc., (स्वरूपनाशो न मोक्षः किन्तु कर्तृत्वाद्यनभिव्यक्तिः) owing to the absence of all its necessary causal conditions, this also would be equally untenable; because the causes of the effect in question such as Dharmādharma, etc. will not cease to exist even after Mokṣa. Moreover, between a cause and its effect Śakti invariably constitutes and maintains a relation as between fire and heat and so when Śakti and its efficacy (अतिशय) are unimpeded during Mokṣa, there is no reason why the effect should not take place even then like heat, emerging from fire. If the effect is, as a rule, dependent on

Śakti or all its fixed causes (शक्तितन्त्रं वा पुष्कलकारणतन्त्रं वा), for its origin, there should be an incessant manifestation of the effect, like that of heat in the summer. If the effect is independent of Śakti or all its fixed causes (शक्ति-पुष्कलकारणानिरपेक्षम्), the unsoundness of the view would be unavoidable ; because the effect would then never be produced like cold in the summer. Further, how can it be called an effect at all, if it is not dependent on its causes for its origin ? Thus the Mokṣa of any description cannot be established as attainable through Karmans.

Again such a process of Mokṣa is impracticable and imprescriptible. It is not possible, even for the most strong-willed and enterprising person to take the vow of unflinching avoidance from birth to death of all selfish and prohibited acts, for even the most sincere and diligent have been known to fall into minute errors, in spite of all sagacity, caution and care in the matter of morality. At least such a possibility can be doubted and this itself is sufficient to disprove the proposition, since no one would like to launch upon an uncertain path or a doubtful project, which is particularly not an easy one. It may be said that Mokṣa is sure to be attained through Karmans by one, who somehow ventures and succeeds in treading on this most arduous and uphill path of liberation till the contemplated success, and hence the proposition in itself is unquestionably sound. But being illogical and hypothetical, it can never find favour with the wise, who would always prefer to adopt and follow a certain means to Brahman-realisation such as Jnāna and never a doubtful one, as advocated by the Mimansakas. A wise man can never accept any method, leading to perfection, according to which success is problematic or mere accidental, since success here would depends not on human efforts but on destiny. It cannot be asserted to be definitely within the scope of human efforts on the authority of scriptural injunction even, as there is no injunction anywhere in the scriptures to the effect that he, who longs for liberation (Mokṣa), should avoid Kāmya and Pratiṣiddha Karmas. Hence the abandon-

ment of Kāmya etc. being a mere product of the fancy of the Mimansakas neither by the performance of prescribed rites nor by the abandonment of Kāmya etc. only Mokṣa can ever be attained.

The automatic attainment of Mokṣa as a result of abandonment and performance of the said Karmans is impossible in another way also. Even if heavenly prosperities would cease to result from the ommission of Kāmya and prohibited Karmans, still there is nothing to prevent their origin from other causes or by themselves (अर्थान्तरात्स्वभावाद् वा). If one says that there is no positive proof of their springing from any other cause or spontaneously, such a thing is at least open to doubt and that very doubt is enough to vitiate and disprove the proposition. Moreover, by means of the regular performance of obligatory Karmans one may avoid sins of omission in the present life but there is no evidence that such sins cannot result from other causes or by themselves and there is always a doubt with respect to such sins, arising somehow in future. Again all sins, which yield evil and undesirable results, might be obliterated by the performance of Nitya Karmans alone, but virtues, which yield auspicious and pleasant results such as heavenly happiness etc., will never cease on any account, as they are the very things, primarily aimed at as the necessary outcome of obligatory acts, whether subsequently desired or not by the doer. When these auspicious fruits of virtuous and other noble deeds are sure to arise, Moksa, which arises only at the absolute exhaustion and complete cessation of all fruits, will be rendered impossible. Deeds whether good or bad must yield their fruits and all fruits auspicious or inauspicious and desirable or undesirable must be experienced by the doer, according to the general principal: "whatever a man soweth, that doth he also reap". The Nitya Karmans themselves will stand in the way of the desired Mokṣa by bringing about series of births for the enjoyment of their own fruits. The fruit of performing prescribed acts (i.e. the obligatory and occasional Karmans) is not the

more removal of impediments, already stored up through innumerable lives and bound to breed endless births in future, but such Karmans would themselves bring rewards in addition, as directly mentioned in the Amra-Smṛti. The said Smṛti in a passage in the work, namely, Apastamva clearly and unequivocally establish that even prescribed Karmans produce their own auspicious results. Moreover, possibilities of doubt have alrady been indicated.

Again, so long as the Śakti or Kartṛtva is there, the current of Karma can never be repressed and it will surely keep on producing some result or other ; because in the absence of its result, the cause itself would become non-existent and so far as the cause and the effect are concerned, neither can endure in absence of the other. So Mokṣa cannot be brought about by Karmans. Mokṣa emerges spontaneously on Brahman-realisation but is not caused even thereby, since it is ever existent as Reality, though unrealised through Avidya and thus appearing to be unattained.

Criticism[1] *of injunction as the purport of the entire Scripture* :—

The doctrine of the Mīmānsā School is that the entire Veda has injunction alone for its purport. To the Prābhākaras no proposition would be significant, if it did not refer to any act. Kumārila, though admitting that a word may signify an object, unrelated to action, does not recognise an independent logical status of mere assertive propositions. So the grand Upanisadic statements or Mahāvākyas like 'Tat tvam asi' can not independently represent the ultimate import and aim of the Vedas or Scriptures. If these are to be rendered authoritative at all, they must be understood in reference to a practically valuable statement of the scripture. So it is wrong to say that the Vedanta has the existent Brahman (Siddha-Vastu) for its purport. But the purport of even the Vedanta is the injunction of knowledge, as evident from the scriptural passages such as

1. Sambandha Vartika PP. 60-96, VV. 191-312.

'आत्मावाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः' The host of ritual injunctions has been expounded in the Pūrvamīmānsa, enunciating different results to be achieved by different eligibles. The Uttaramīmānsa is commenced thereafter for an exposition of the injunction about knowledge. Many theories. aiming at establishing the scope of injunction somehow or other even in the Vedanta, have been attempted at and expounded by earlier Advaitins, imbued with and influenced by the Mimansaka views. Before dealing with these theories, as discussed and criticised by Sureśvarācārya, it is essential to set forth his view as regards the true purport of the Vedanta. At places more than one he has vehemently refuted the doctrine that the one purport of the entire scripture is injunction or some sort of action only and that without it there can be no authoritativeness of any part of the scripture. He holds that the scripture is to be classified distinctly into two parts—Karmakāṇda and Jñānakāṇda—having different aims, different methods of attaining them and different persons authorised to pursue those methods. He is alone authorised to study the Vedanta (ज्ञानकाण्डाधिकारी), who has renounced all actions and who is inspired by an ardent desire for getting rid ot the evils of recurring births and deaths by realising the Absolute Reality, the Brahman. On the other hand, he, who yearns after mundane achievements and heavenly prosperities and is devotedly interested in the performance of rites and actions in accordance with injuctions, is eligible for studying the section of the Scripture, dealing with rituals (कर्मकाण्डाधिकारी). To stimulate the desire for realising the Absolute Reality, the Brahman, the regular recital of one's own section of the scripture and the performance of virtuous deeds and obligatory rites have to be carried on, but to attain the Absolute Reality, the Brahman, Karmans are to be totally renounced. Thus in the case of the performer of rituals (कर्मकाण्डाधिकारी) the object is to achieve impermanent prosperities (विनश्वराऽभ्युदय) here and hereafter and the method is to perform the prescribed rites properly and whole-heartedly, while in the case of the aspirant of the spiritual knowledge (ज्ञानकाण्डाधिकारी) the aim is to attain

Mokṣa and the method is to abandon and spurn all Karmans totally and once for ever (after the preliminary stage of spiritual fitness of the Mumukṣu is over). The Advaita Vedanta exerts to facilitate the acquisition of that knowledge, which would exterminate Avidya and its product, the whole phenomenal world. As only the Jñāna of the Absolute Reality—Pratyak, that is, the innermost and unconditionally immediate to all—can eradicate or sublate the primordial Avidya and such a Jñāna or Brahma-realisation requires nothing else other than itself (आत्मोत्पत्तिमात्र) for the sublation of Avidya and all its modifications, injuctions, which are essential for accomplishment of rituals etc., cannot apply to it at all. One may question as to how a person is to be called eligible or authorised for Jñāna, without something being enjoined or ordained to be done by him. Just as there are mandatory texts for rituals, there should be some such texts for Brahma-realisation as well. Sureśvarācārya answered this point by saying that it would be incorrect to assume a common means (such as injunctions etc.) to the attainment of both the temporal happiness or empirical and heavenly prosperities and of final liberation, since the two are essentially and fundamentally different from and opposed to each other. The necessary condition of empirical prosperities is non-discrimination and the result is something producible, definite or limited and transitory or perishable, while the essential condition of Mokṣa is discrimination and the result is something, unproducible, indeterminable or unlimited and eternal, as Mokṣa, according to Vedantins, is Absolute Bliss, the Brahman Itself. What is best is one thing and what is agreeable to those, who are overpowered by Avidya and wallowing in the glamour of the so-called real empirical prosperities and prospects is another, and the best is Mokṣa, which is attainable through Brahma-realisation. He, who elects to have agreeables only, will lose the best and for him is meant the mandatory part of the scripture, dealing with all sorts of injunctions. But to him, who is determined to attain the best, i.e. Mokṣa, the summum bonum or the highest stage of human achievement by realising Absolute Reality, all injunc-

tions and actions are valueless. The objection that there can be no authorisation or eligibility (प्रामाण्यमधिकारो वा) without rites does not stand to reason in the case of knowledge as the means to Mokṣa. All considerations as to authorisation arise only in the carrying out of injunctions (विधिमार्ग) but not in the attainment of Brahma-realisation. When the aim is Mokṣa through Brahma-realisation, the question of authorisation becomes altogether irrelevant; because it can be pertinent only in respect of things, depending on human endeavours, and does not hold good with regard to the supreme realisation of the Brahman, which is independent and self-established as the Absolute Reality, appearing through Avidya as multifarious so-called existents or empirical entitles and in whose case the knowledge as well as the sublation of Avidya are essentially nothing but Brahman, the Pure Consciousness Itself, since the residue, emerging as resultant on Brahma-realisation is Anubhūti or Pure Consciousness only. According to the scriptural passage such as "स च विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मात्मैव etc." Atman, Pure Consciousness, which is really independent and does not stand in need of any knower or percipient (प्रमाता) etc. for Its revelation, appears Itself through Avidya as the knower, the knowable and knowledge also. Though appearing as many on account of different adjuncts, Reality permeating and underlying all the appearances—the socalled three constituents of every perception—is one and the same is Pure Consciousness only. To whomsoever the full, final and supreme Brahman-realisation has once sprung up at any time, it has arisen finally and such a final and supreme knowledge can arise at any time (as in the case of Vāmadeva even while he was yet in the womb). For such Jñāna or Brahma realisation, no injunction, authorisation, restriction or condition—fixed and formal—whatsoever can be necessary at all. Morever, the fruit of injunction is four-fold, (i) production (Utpatti), (ii) acquisition (Āpti), (iii) purification or refinement (संस्कार) and (iv) alteration or change (विकार). Brahma-realisation, as explained above, differs in character from all these results, which are to be acquired

through injunctions. Hence it may be logically concluded that no injunction can hold good to Brahma-jñāna, which is the single purport of the entire Vedanta.

If it is said that the authoritativeness always goes together with making known what is unknown, it must be granted that the part of the scripture known as the Vedanta is as authoritative in the matter of establishing the absolute oneness of Atman as in that dealing with injunctions about mundane and supermundane achievements. There are two kinds of things, either desired to be attained or intended to be discarded. Besides one, which is not yet attained, sometimes even an object, which is already attained but seems to be unattained through Avidya, is desired to be attained as such. Similarly, besides one, which is not surely discarded, sometimes even an object, which is already unconnected but still appears to be connected with someone through Avidya, is desired to be discarded or relinquished by him. Brahmabhāva or the state of being Brahman in reality is not a thing to be attained by an individual soul, because a Jīva is always Brahman essentially but owing to Avidya, Brahma-bhava appears as it unknown and unattained. So on account of its seeming as it unattained, Brahmabhāva has to be attained by an individual soul and this attainment cannot be the result of any action but being a pure and simple case of realisation, is to be attained only by supreme realisation or Jñāna of Reality, Brahman, consequent upon the sublation of Avidya in and about It. It is how even in the case of Mokṣa, which is, truly speaking, nothing but an attainment of eternal, unsurpassable and pure Bliss, the knowledge arising from the sublime Scriptural passages such as 'Tat tvam Asi' etc. has for its content an entity (i. e. Brahman), which does not seem to be already known and attained on account of Avidya and as such it is an object, yet to be realised and attained by the seeker after Mokṣa.

If it is urged that for its authority every scriptural statement must depend on its injunctory signification, then the

latter too must depend on the former for its inherent authority and there will arise the defect of mutual dependence and so on, resulting in the inauthoritativeness of all. Moreover, all prohibitions (or prohibitory scriptural statements) also will lose their authority, since they aim at and mean only indifference, which is surely inaction; and inaction is nothing but the retention of an existing condition, so the authoritativeness must not be held to be confined to passages of injunctory signification only. Again, it should not be objected that the means to realising the identity of the Jīva with Brahman is unreal, since the means is negated or denied as unreal only after the end is achieved and the seeker's aim is fulfilled thereby. The means is not unreal (from the empirical standpoint) prior to realising the unity or absolute oneness of Brahman (which is ever attained but on account of Avidya appears to be unattained). As a matter of fact, the Advaita Vedanta has to be credited with the most supreme authoritativeness in as much as it gives rise to the knowledge[1] (i. e. Brahma-realisation), which is the highest achievement for the Jīva.

The theory of Upāsanā-Vidhi:—

A remarkable school of Upaniṣadic interpretation is clearly traceable in the works of Āchārya Śankara and others. It must have been very popular in those days, as it is evident from the fact of its being repeatedly referred to and vehemently criticised by all Advaitins of that period. One of the important features of this school can be pointed out to be that no distinction between Jñāna and Upāsanā was recognised in as much as an injunction in some form or other was considered necessary for the Brahma-realisation. This school advocated that even if actions or rites as well as injuctions on that account come to be proved unnecessary for Brahma-realisation, they must be held to be essential in reference to Upāsana, which only is efficient to bring about the intuition of Brahman and subsequent Mokṣa through extermination or sublation of Avidya. For this purpose, the

1. B. B. V.—A. IV B. IV, P. 1850, VV. 781-83.

study of one's own section of the scripture and the religious rites prescribed therein, must be performed and injuction also must be admitted and abided by. The exponents and followers of this school thus obviously fall into line with the Mīmānsakas, who, as Hiriyanna puts it, hold that the main purpose of the Veda as a whole is to inspire activity by prescribing something to be achieved and not merely to state matters of fact. The only difference between the Pūrva and Uttara Kāṇdas, according to these Vedantins, is that while in the former what is prescribed is generally a sacrificial act, in the latter, it is meditation, which is purely a mental act. Thus it is injunctive statements such as 'आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः' etc., found in the Upaniṣads that are of primary importance and not assertive propositions like 'तत्त्वमसि' etc., which only subserve them by furnishing the theme for the meditation prescribed. The meditation, if it is to be practised, pre-supposes a knowledge of the nature of the object and necessary details of meditation. The sublime scriptural passages (महावाक्य) such as 'Tat tvam asi' etc. merely subserve the injunctive statements by imparting the knowledge of necessary informations and are thus to be treated as 'Śesa' of the Upāsanā-vidhi. Hence, according to this school, the contemplation of or meditation (उपासना) upon Brahman, accompanied by the performance of rites such as sacrifice etc. and possessed of its three properties or characteristics (devotion, length of time and non-intermission) gives rise toMokṣa, and for this injuction is absolutely necessary.

Criticism[1] :—

While criticising this theory Sureśvarācārya says that meditation cannot be the means to the final realisation of Brahman, which is essentially unrelated to and immune from Avidya and absolutely self-subsisting, independent and one; because meditation necessarily presupposes the distinction of the act, the result and Kāraka such as the subject and the object of meditation, which is impossible in respect of Brahman, whose realisation as the Absolute Reality only can sublate Avidya and all that it brings up in its trail. The gradual stages of perfection

are advancing approaches to the realisation of one Reality and hence meditation, which necessarily involves distinction, cannot be held to be a direct means to Brahma-realisation. Moreover, none of the four possible kinds of results to be derived from any injunctive action can hold good with regard to Brahman. The four forms of injunction are as follows :—

(1)	Utpatti-Vidhi	(Originative injunction)
(2)	Viniyoga-Vidhi	(Injunction of utility)
(3)	Prayoga-Vidhi	(Prodedural injunction)
(4)	Adhikāra-Vidhi	(Injunction of eligibility)

It is easy to determine how none of these injunctions can have anything to do with Brahma-realisation. Brahma-realisation puts an end to all differences and results in the revelation of one Reality only, which is eternal, undivided, indivisible, immutable, self-luminous and self-established.

Injuction admissiable only in the Instrumental Stages, gradually leading to Brahma-realisation :—

Before making any attempt at discussing Brahma-realisation, it is necessary to clear up as to how far Vidhi or injunction is admissible in the consecutive stages of perfection According to Sureśvara, Vidhi, cannot be combined with Jnāna or Brahma-realisation but he does not depart from the general view of Advaitins in admitting some sort of injunction or other upto the gradual stages of instrumentals, indispensable for Brahma-realisation, i.e , from the performance of obligatory duties up to Manana. On the attainment of mental purification and consequent cultivation of a strong and unflinching discrimination between what is eternal (i. e., Brahman) and what are perishable and non-eternal (i. e., all other than Brahman), the seeker after Mokṣa becomes utterly disgusted with and detached from the pleasures and prospects of worldly life. This sturdy sense of detachment is inevitably followed by the determination about the renunciation of Karma or Sanyāsa. The seeker at this stage knows it full well that the performance[1] of obligatory Karma

1. B. B. V., A. IV. B. IV, P. 1920, VV. 1214-16.

would not only entail empirical consequences but would also prove distractive and recessive. Consequently, the idea of renunciation is sure to arise naturally in his mind and it would be all the more accelerated when inspired by the injunction of the scriptural passages about it.

Just as the injunctions about Śravaṇa etc. so also the one regarding renunciation is held to be of the nature of "Niyama-vidhi", i. e., regulative or restrictive one by the Vivaraṇa School, since what is intended thereby is that the proper conduction of Sravaṇa etc. only, can be fruitful in bringing about the desired result, Brahma-realisation, when carried on through the course of Sanyāsa. Sureśvara, however, explains it in a different way and maintains that it should be regarded as merely prohibitory in nature in as much as what is enjoined thereby is nothing more than non-performance of Karma.

Eligibility for and Utility of Sanyāsa :—

A remarkable point may be noted here that Sureśvara is liberal in his views on the point of eligibility for Sanyāsa. He holds that all the three castes,[1] belonging to the Dvija class, are entitled to Sanyāsa and subsequent Śravaṇa etc.

Several theories have been advanced in answer of the question as to how Sanyāsa is useful in the scheme of Brahma-realisation. Some Advaitins hold that like Karma, Sanyāsa also is helpful through averting some evils, detrimental to Brahma-realisation. Others maintain that it is useful by producing an "Apūrva", which helps Brahma-realisation. This view[2] may be ascribed to Sureśvara. As said above, the Vivaraṇa School recognises the utility of Sanyāsa through the aforesaid Niyama or regulation.

Criticism of Injunction about Mano-nirodha :—

There are some, who advocate the attainment of Mokṣa

1. B B. V., A. I, B. IV, PP. 758-59, VV. 1651-53; A. IV, B. W, P. 1889, V. 1029; S. L. P. 432.

2. Sambandha-Vārtika, P. 10, V. 12.

through Manonirodha or Vāsanā-nirodha. As Vāsanas are responsible for the whole empirical life of a Jīva (i. e., all experiences and migratory states), what is needed for Mokṣa, i.e. emancipation is an absolute eradication of all Vāsanas. This view appeals ordinarily as sound, since the attainment of something to be actually achieved and accomplished deserves to be called Puruṣārtha. Hence Manonirodha, being so, may be deemed as Puruṣārtha and not mere Anubhūti or Pure Consciousness, which is eternal, self-same and self-shining. Sureśvara criticises this theory vehemently by adducing several arguments. Firstly, if Mokṣa were to be attained through 'Vāsana-nirodha', no injunction would be necessary for such Nirodha; because like evils, that is, Vāsanas and their causes, even the Puruṣārtha, namely, Mokṣa and its means, that is, 'vāsana-nirodha' may be ascertained and attained through ordinary sources of knowledge. To put it more clearly, the apparent relation of Atman to agency etc., that constitutes its bondage, as invariably concomitant with Vāsanas, i.e. subliminal or residual impressions, arising from experiences during the different states of empirical life such as Jāgrat etc., may be easily comprehended and concluded from the ordinary sources of knowledge such as perception and inference etc. So if Vāsanas can be ordinarily known and established as the cause of bondage, the eradication of such Vāsanas also may be similarly held to be the means to mokṣa and this obviously dispenses with the necessity of any injunction about Vāsana-nirodha as leading to the highly covetable Mokṣa or the summum bonum of life. Secondly, Vāsanas may be past, present or future. None of these requires and can admit of any injunction about it; because an absolute annihilation of all innumerable past Vāsanas at a time is sheer impossibility (to be accomplished in one short human life), the future Vāsanas are yet unaccomplished and the present ones are merely accidental and do not stand in need of any injunction at all. Moreover, there are three possible alternatives, namely, knowledge, repetition of knowledge or injunction about it, which may be determined to be capable of

bringing about Mokṣa through 'Vāsana-nirodha'. The first alternative is not acceptible in as much as if the direct Brahma-realisation is held to be bringing about Mokṣa (whether through the sublation of Ajñāna or extermination of vāsanas), it would be evidently swinging round to the same view and shrinking to the same position as is upheld by the Advaita system. The second alternative is untenable ; because if Jñāna or Brahma-realisation proves incapable of sublating Ajñāna or extirpating Vāsanas, how it is possible that the mere repetition thereof would be able to do so. An injunction about frequency of Jñāna would be equally ineffective, as it cannot improve upon the said Jñāna by way of either adding any new force to it or capacitating it for the sublation of Ajñāna or eradication of Vāsanas. Again during the state of deep sleep i.e. Suṣupti, when all Vāsanas are entirely extinct as lying absorbed in Avidya, Mokṣa does not follow as the necessary outcome of Vāsana-nirodha. From all this it may be safely concluded that Vāsana-nirodha itself is not the means to Mokṣa, but bondage being due to or consequent upon Avidya and sublation of Avidya being possible only through Vidya or Brahma-realisation, nothing more than Brahma-realisation is needed for Mokṣa.

Śravana, Manana and Nididhyāsana :—

Śravana, Manana and Nididhyāsana are recognised as the direct means to Brahma-realisation, but the Advaitins differ as regards the exact significance of these terms, in conformity with their theories, supporting or rejecting injunction about all or some of these approximate means to Brahma-realisation. Vacaspati Miśra, who totally discards injunction about any of them, holds all of them to be of cognitive nature and defines them accordingly. The Vivaraṇa school[1] explains them on a different liue in consonance with its theory of Niyama-Vidhi about Śravana. According to this school, Śravana is the eliminative thought-process, including all such Tarkas or Tu

1. P.P.V., P. 103, LS. 17-21.

quoque arguments as repudiate impedimentals, namely, 'Asambhāvanā' and 'viparīta-bhāvanā' with regard to the verbal epistemological process, through which the purport of the Vedanta-passages is ascertained to be the identity between Brahman and the Jīva. It is more than a more verbal knowledge, arising from the Vedanta vakyas (as accepted by Vācaspati Misra), since it comprises also those rational excogitations, which brush aside all mental defects, namely, Asambhāvanā and Viparitabhāvanā in respect of the Pramāṇas or Vedanta. Vakyas as implying the said identity. Manana sweeps off from the mind the defect of Asambhāvanā as regards the Prameya or the content, i.e., the identity between Brahman and the Jīva by setting aside all contrary proofs and reasonings about the same by means of counter Tarkas (i.e. Tu quoque arguments). It is not merely of the nature of discursive reasoning, which dispels and discards all doubts and anti-thesis, leading to contrary results (as understood by Vācaspati Misra), but it is also what firmly establishes the truth, inculcated by the Vedanta-Vākyas, by banishing all contradictory tendencies, opposing dispositions and distractive instincts from the mind and making it fully drawn toward Brahman in such a manner that it becomes exclusively concentrated and unshakably fixed on Brahman right up to the subsequent stage of Nididhyasana. It is compared to a lamp, which brightens and illumines the mind so as to enable it to grasp the said truth, namely, the bare identity, the abstract simplicity or pure oneness, the Brahman.

Nididhyāsana purges the mind of all "Viparīta-Bhāvanas" still standing in the way of the realisation of Reality, the Brahman. Despite the conviction of absolute oneness, firmly established by Manana, there may be now and then a reassertion of old habits of thoughts, deep-rooted instincts and false notions of empirical glories and pragmatic values—incompatable with the confirmed truth. So it is not a mere contemplation, as defined by Vācaspati, but consists also of an accumulation of all such Bhāvanas or refined mental propensities about Brahma-realisation, that stimulate and foster sustained and exclusive mental concen-

tration, resulting in immediate Brahma-realisation. It is fine, pure, crystallised and final form of mental disposition, which gives way to the succeeding emergence of Brahma-realisation by bringing about and developing the necessary mental concentration and absorption. The author of the Vivaraṇa defines 'Asambhāvanā' as the lack of mental concentration, which is the cause of anti-Brahmatmaikya mental dispositions and 'viparīta-bhāvanā' as the residual impressions, engendered by false notions of superimpositional identity between the self and the body etc.—still lingering on very faintly and flaring up occasionally even after the stages of Śravaṇa and Manana.

Madhusūdana Saraswatī in his well-known work, Advaita-siddhi,[1] explains these terms in his own way. Śravaṇa is defined by him as reflection or rumination of the determining principles of purport such as Upakrama, Upasaṁhāra etc. so as to yield and establish conclusively the purport of the Vedanta-Vakyas to be the said Brahmatmaikya, i.e., identity between the Jīva and the Brahman, as laid down in the Saman-vayādhyāya; whereas Manana is musing on and assimilation of yuktis, i.e. arguments, calculated to dissipate all doubts about the said purport or theme, as elucidated in the second chapter of the Brahma-sutra.

Brahmānand in his commentary, Nyāyaratnāvalī,[2] on the Siddhanta-bindu elucidates Śravaṇa to be of the nature of Tarkas such as "Had not the purport of sentences 'Tat Tvam Asi' etc. been the absolute identity between the Brahman and the self, they would have never brought about or occasioned the supreme Knowledge of the Advaita or one Brahman". Similarly, Manana comprises such Tarkas as tend to strengthen the knowledge, springing from the said sentences, which is of an indirect but decisive or conclusive and unassilable nature. Nididhyāsana is the final set of Tarkas, which convert the said knowledge, arising

1. A. S., P. 867.
2. N. R., p. 428.

from Śravana and Manana, into initial glimpses of the desired direct Brahma-realisation.

Sureśvarācārya, who is inclined towards admitting injunction about Śravaṇa, says that Śravaṇa[1] is the ascertainment of the ultimate purport of the Vedanta-Vakys as being the one Brahman, arrived at with the help of the exegetical rules of interpretation, viz. Śruti and Linga etc. Besides these cannons of interpretation, the Advaita system recognises six other characteristic tests (Ṣad-Linga) for determining the purport of the Veda-Vakyas or scriptural passages. The said marks, determinant of purport, are the harmony of the initial and concluding passages (Upakrmopasanhārau), repetition (Abhāsah), novelty (Apūrvatā), fruitfulness (Phalam), glorification by eulogistic statements or condemnation by deprecatory passages (Arthavādah) and intelligibility in the light of reasonings (Upapattih). Manana[2] is the excogitation of arguments, which dissipate once for ever all mental defects such as the notion of Asambhāvaña etc., with regard to the truth definitely grasped through Śravanā. Even after the estaplishment of the Advaitic Truth as the ultimate import of the scriptural texts through Śravaṇa by casting off the said epistemological doubts (Pramāṇagatā-sambhāvanā) as altogether baseless there is every chance of some other doubts lingering on or cropping up about the possibility of the said truth itself (Prameya-gatāsambhāvanā). Manana is intended to dispel such remaining doubts. It is arguing within one self after apprehending definitely what the Upaniṣads inculcate, with a view to convince oneself that the said Advaitic truth is above all doubts and uncertainties. It seeks to confirm and establish conclusively the appearance-nature of all other than the one Reality, Brahman, by adducing confirmatory arguments as well as those, which tend to demolish all counter reasonings and antethesis. Nididhyāsana[3] may be described to be the preliminary stage of direct Brahma-realisation, arising spontaneously as the

1. B.B.V., P. 1068, V. 214; A.S.—Brahmanandi—P. 867, 80-7-9.
2. B. B. V., P. 1068, V. 214.
3. B. B. V., P. 1069, V. 217 and V. 219; P. 614, V. 894.

result of sustained Śravana and Manana. Sureśvara analyses in clear words the order from Svādhyāya to Nididhyāsana together with their successive results, associated with each of them. According to him, Śravaṇa stands for that mental activity, which leads to the conviction that the Vedanta-texts inculcate one Reality, the Brahman. Manana is the mental operation, producing ratiocinative knowledge, that refutes every possible contradiction from other sources of knowledge as regards the truth established by the scriptural testimony through the process of Śravaṇa. Thus both of them are mediate and rational in character. Nididhyāsana, however, is the starting of non-rational and intuitive knowledge of Brahman. It is the consummation of the preceding stages of Śravaṇa and Manana and the commencement of Brahma-realisation, embracing the initial fringe thereof. It is explained by Sureśvara as the first pure intuitive experience, which sets a limit to the continued process of Śravaṇa and Manana and springs up spontaneously or emerges by itself as the necessary outcome and the net result of the two. Śravaṇa yields definite verbal conviction and Manana occasions advanced intellectual conviction but Nididhyāsana is the culmination of these decisive but indirect convictions into a conclusive and direct intuition about Brahman. Being of the nature of the first unshakable intuition about Brahman, arising from the most intense and exclusive mental concentration thereon, after which emerges the supreme revelation of the ever-revealed and self-shining pure Consciousness, known as Brahma-realisation proper, it is a goal or a high achievement in itself, but even this Nididhyāsana, being only the first or preliminary stage of direct intuition, is only a means to the supreme and final or consummate Brahma-realisation.

The relation of Śravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana :—

Vācaspati upholds that Śravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana are contributory to Brahma-realisation in their natural logical sequence or consecutive order. Śravana is the cause of Manana; because there can be no meditation unless its theme is definitely knowu and Manana is the cause of Nididhyāsana or contemplation;

because it is not possible for a person, who has not reflected, to meditate and concentrate on what he has known and ascertained through hearing. Thus Śravaṇa is the cause of Manana and Manana is that of Nididhyāsana and all of them are causes of Brahman-realisation without any relation of supremacy and subordination per se.

The Vivaraṇa[1] school maintains that Śravaṇa is the principal cause, while Manana and Nididhyāsana, although they are subsequent to Śravaṇa, merely serve to usher in Brahma-realisation and are thus remote auxiliaries as helpful to accomplish the fruit of Śravaṇa, i. e. Brahma-realisation. The subsidiariness of Manana and Nididhyāsana does not consist in their being parts of Śravaṇa in the manner, discussed in the third chapter of the Pūrva-Mimānsa view, but just as with reference to one and the same effect such as jar, the lump of clay is the principal cause and the wheel and the thread etc. are auxilliary ones; similarly Śravaṇa is the principal cause and Manana and Nididhyāsana are subsidiary ones in respect of Brahma-realisation. The author of the Vivaraṇa elucidates this point by saying that Śravaṇa or ascertainment of the meanings of words together with their real significance and purport is the proximate and direct cause of a cognition of the object to be known, but Manana and Nididhyāsana prove to be the cause in respect of Brahma-realisation (in this particular instance) indirectly, that is, through the channel of producing a concentrated state of the mind towards Brahman, occasioned by a propensity of the repeated intermittent efforts at concentration of the purified mind, exclusively inclined or turned towards the same. Thus Śravaṇa, being proximately or directly connected with Brahma-realisation is to be regarded as its principal cause, while Manana and Nididhyāsana, being subordinate and helpful to Śravaṇa in bringing about its intended result, namely, Brahma-realisation are only subsidiaries or auxiliaries to Śravaṇa.

Sureśvara[2] recognises the natural consecutive order of

1. P. P. V., PP. 104-5
2. B. B. V., P. 1069, VV. 218-20.

Śravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyasana and holds them to be contributory to Brahma-realisation as such. According to him, the study of the sacred Vedas creates the proper thinking power about the apparent world as series of appearances and Brahman as the only underlying Reality, whose unrealisation and wrong realisations are solely responsible for the said appearances. Thereafter, Śravaṇa properly carried on under the guidance of an excellent and perfect preceptor, imparts an indirect but decisive knowledge about Brahman and qualifies one for Manana, and the two, repeatedly practised, result into Nididhyāsana, which is an indirect intuition about Brahman, emerging as a consummation of Śravaṇa, accompanied and accentuated or strengthened by Manana. Sureśvara lays stress upon the repetition of Śravaṇa and Manana till they actually consummate and result into Nididhyāsana and admits thereby the stage of Nididhyāsana as directly antecedent to Brahma-realisation and Śravaṇa and Mlnana related to it through Nididhyāsana, which constitutes the preliminary part or fringe of the final Brahma-realisation. Thus Śravaṇa, Manana are co-extensive and the two together with Nididhyāsana are succeeding phases of the one causality or the proximate means to Brahma-realisation.

Injunction about Śravana etc. :—

The question of Vidhi or injunction, about Śravana etc. is a very puzzling one. Vācaspati is totally against supporting any kind of Vidhi with regard to any of them (ie. Śravana, Manana and Nidhidhyāsana). The author[1] of Vivaraṇa accepts Niyam-Vidhi about Śravana, while Sureśvara seems to be in favour of supporting a Vidhi about Śravana, which is determined to be of the kind of Parisaṅkhyā by later interpretators. The Siddhānta-Leśa-saṅgraha records the view of Parisaṅkhyā-Vidhi about Śravaṇa and attributes it to the followers of the Vārtika. The Kalpataru[2] has tried to show that the view of the Bhāmati

1. P.P.V., P. 4; S.L., P. 23.
2. Kalpataru, P. 921.

i.e., the absence of any kind of Vidhi in respect of Śravaṇa, does not really clash with Sureśvara's view, (viz., Parisankhya Vidhi in respect of Śravaṇa) quoted in the Siddhanta-Leśā-Saṅgraha, by explaining away one of the verses of Sureśvara, relevant to the question, in such a manner that no Vidhi of any kind may be possibly concluded therefrom. To me it appears that the whole text[1] of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Vārtika, clearly supporting Vidhi about Śravaṇa, was not before the author of the Vedānta-Kalpataru and this is why he subscribed to this wrong justification. Thus ,although Śravaṇa and Manana may be held to be falling within the pale of Vidhi, according to Sureśvara as the means to Nididhyāsana, yet no vidhi can be acceptable with regard to Nididhyāsana itself, which is of an intuitive nature as explained by him. Even as Citta-Vṛtti-Nirodha or restraint of mental activities towards empirical objects, the popularly accepted meaning of Nididhyāsana, (through which only attainment of Mokṣa is possible, according to the Yoga system) it is not possible to justify any injunction about it as leading to Brahma-realisation ; since such a theory would be obviously in conflict with those scriptural passages, which clearly lay down Jñāna only to be the direct means to Moksa. Moreover, if partial restraint is held to be enjoined, it being easily accomplishable by all, Mokṣa can be ordinarily attained by anybody, and if the total restraint of mind is ordained, that is possible only through Jñāna, for which no injunction is necessary at all. For Nididhyāsana, however, which, as elucidated by Sureśvara, is pure intuitive experience emerging spontaneously out of the properly and repeatedly conducted Śravaṇa and Manana, nothing else is needed at all and there can be no question of any kind of injunction about such a Nididhyasana.

Criticism of injunction about Pratipattî or Jñāna:—

There can be no injunction in respect of Jñāna arising

1. B.B.V., P. 1053, V. 122; PP. 1068-69, VV. 213-20 ; Sambandha-Vartika, P. 221, V. 804.
2. Sambandha-Vartika, PP. 187—194.

from Śravaṇa, accompanied by Manana and Nididhyāsana. In this connection, the question arises as to whether this Jñāna, resulting from Śravaṇa etc. and sought to be established as the subject-matter of injunction is intended to be Śābda-Bhāvanārūpa or Sakṣātkārālakṣaṇa? The verbal knowledge about Brahman cannot be enjoined in as much as such a verbal knowledge that the individual Self is Brahman needs no injunction; since it springs spontaneously to any man, who has passed through the stages of the properly conducted Śravaṇa and Manana etc. (irrespective of injunction) in the same way as the verbal knowledge arises from the injunctions such as "स्वर्गकामो यजेत" without any further injunction. There is further the difficulty of inter-dependence, since no injunction about the knowledge of Brahman is possible without the knowledge of Brahman, just as the injunction "स्वगकामो यजेत" will be meaningless to one, who does not know what heaven is, and no knowledge of Brahman is possible without the injunction about it. Further, if knowledge is to be derived from words, any kind of injunction about it is unavailing and again, if knowledge cannot be derived from words, what help can the injunctions render at all? Thus injunctions have no place in the genesis of verbal knowledge and can be, therefore, concluded to be altogether futile as शाब्दज्ञानोत्पत्तिविधि[1]. If it is maintained that injunctions, though unavailing in respect of the genesis of the said verbal knowledge, have their part to play in confirming the same (शाब्दज्ञानविषयनिश्चय), the question is irresistible as to whether this confirmation depends on words or on something else. In the first instance, the defects pointed out above will recur and in the latter case, the independent and authoritative scriptures would have to be held as depending on something else in confirming the knowledge. Again, if it is contended that the scriptural injunctions are indispensable in as much as they disclose the true purport of the passages by eliminating irrelevent portions thereof, it would be obviously derogatory to the general principle that both in secular and

1. B. B. IV., p. 598.

scriptural practices the true purport is conveyed by the words themselves in accordance with the rules of exejectical interpretation and not by means of any injunction. This also can not be appealingly argued that the injunctions are necessary to affirm the indispensability of knowledge in the attainment of the final aim (पुरुषार्थ) or Mokṣa ; because the injunctions can become quite necessary factors either in confirming that knowledge or in establishing the fruit of knowledge with reference to the knower (प्रमाता) or the connection of that fruit with the object (प्रमेय). None of these alternatives is admissible. The first one is unacceptable for reasons already explained above; the second one is untenable, as the fruit of the knowledge in question is an established fact in respect of the knower; and likewise, the third one also is so, since Brahman is essentially self-luminous pure Consciousness and Apriori Immediacy and as suoh does not stand in need of being connected with any revelation, the fruit of the knowledge, through an extraneous factor. One may argue that if Brahman, which is a self-established truth, is held to be the theme of the Vedanta texts, they would lose their authority on the ground that a passage, which does not deal with any injunction, but simply treats of what is already existent, is to be regarded as explanatory (सिद्धार्थबोधकमनुवादकम्) and can have no authority whatsoever. But the reply is that the acceptance of any injnnction does not solve the problem; because if the Brahman is capable of being realised through other proofs, It would be so even if there are injunctions about It; and if It cannot admit of other proofs, it would remain so even in the absence of the scriptural injunctions. Moreover, there is no hard and fast rule that all passages, elucidating or inculcating a thing, already existent, are necessarily explanatory (यद्यत्सिद्धार्थबोधकं तत्तदनुवादकमेव). In this connection, a question may be put. Is the explanatory character of a passage determined merely by its denoting a thing, already existent, or by denoting a thing, which is known by other proofs ? In the former case, it denotes a thing, already existent, but does not merely explain about it. From the mere

fact that the thing is already existent its knowability through other proofs cannot be assumed. A proof is under no condition dependent upon another, simply owing to its being the proof of an existent thing. Really speaking, the only test of a proof can be that it makes known anything independently of another proof; and any statement cannot be denied its probative value merely for the reason that it establishes or intimates an already existent thing. A proof does not cease to be so, even if it requires the help of another proof. If the subsequent proof is to be called no proof on account of its object having been already established by the first proof, then, strictly speaking, there can be no proof at all any where; since the fact of the content of any proof as being unknown will have to be invariably established first by another proof. Thus every proof needs another proof and is apt to be called no proof for the said reason.

When the Vedānta-vākyas give us a knowledge, that casts asunder all previous misconceptions of duality, how can one discard them as unauthoritative like the well-meant advice of an ardent friend? So, though treating of something, already existent or self-established, there cannot be the least doubt as to their being the highest authority that they necessarily are and should be. It is in the clear and final assimilation of the sublime upaniṣadic passages such as "Tat tvam asi" etc., dealing with the supreme truth, that the highest achievement of human life lies. Accordingly, the authority of sublime scriptural passages is unquestionable and unimpeachable.

Theroy of injunction about Darśanāvṛtti[1] :—

It may be said that Vidhi is unavoidable for the uninterrupted continuation of memories, consequent upon the verbal knowledge of Brahman, brought about by Śravaṇa once and vanishing after its fixed duration like any other empirical cognition, as mere rise of knowledge about Brahman once will not do and it is highly necessary for the Mumukṣu to keep up his knowledge about Brahman with the help of his memories about

1. Sambandha-Vārtika-P. 223, V. 808.

It, once known through Śravaṇa. At the stage of Manana, in which the knowledge about Brahman is strengthened by reflection, refuting the notion of Its impossibility and removing all kinds of possible doubts about It, such an uninterrupted memories about Brahman are apt to be successfully carried on until the final Brahma-realisation emerges, sublating Avidya and its off-shoots i.e., the whole world, once for ever.

Criticism[1] *of Injunction about Darśanāvṛtti* :—

Sureśvarācārya says that such uninterrupted memories about Brahman after Śravaṇa are altogether unnecessary; because Śravaṇa, if thorough, perfect and performed after the fulfilment of all necessary pre-requisites of Brahma-realisation, is itself enough to produce the desired result. If Brahma-realisation cannot result from Śravaṇa etc., it cannot result even after the continuation of memories about Brahman. That Brahma-realisation does not result from Śravaṇa etc. must be due to some deficiency in the said necessary preliminary qualifications and spiritual equipments and a mere continuation of memories cannot do away with the defects or deficienies and improve upon it so as to transmute the resultant knoledge into Brahma-realisation. Moreover, there is no sense in regarding the continuity of memories essential for keeping up the kuowledge about Brahman in view of the likelihood of its vanishing away after its fixed duration like any other ordinary knowledge, since the supreme, self-luminous, eternal and pure Consciousness, which Brahman Itself is, does not stand in need of memories about It, On the rise of direct intuitional knowledge of Brahman or final and full Brahma-realisation through thorough and perfect Śravaṇa of the Mahāvākyas to one, having all the spiritual qualifications and equipments-necessary for Brahma-realisation, the supreme Illumination or pure Consciousness is spontaneously revealed. Hence if Śravaṇa and Manana etc. have been thoroughly, perfectly and properly accomplished, supreme realisation would ensue automatically, for which nothing else such as continuation of memories is needed at all.

1. Sambandha-Vārtika, PP. 223-47, VV.402-910.

Self-revealing eternal Consciousness is sure to emerge therefrom spontaneously as the only Reality or eternal Existence and untainted Bliss. As Brahman is unconditionally and unlimitedly immediate, homogeneous, impartite and ever-present (अपरोक्ष, एकरस and प्रत्यक्तया सदा सन्निहित), for an occasioning of the stage of Its supreme revelation as such, which automatically or spontaneously arises after perfect Brahma-realisation through proper Śravana and Manana etc., no keeping up of the knowledge of such Brahman through continuous memories is at all required. Moreover, if Śravana and Manana etc. prove futile in fulfilling the aim, what can the continuous memories further do ? It is sheerly impossible that a man, who did not die as pierced by Pāśupata Astra, would die merely as struck by a fragile and and useless arrow. Moreover. it may be questioned here whether the uninterrupted succession of memories, arising from the knowledge of the non-empirical self or that, emanating from the knowledge of the empirical self, is enjoined. The first alternative does not stand to reason, as any kind of injunction is incompatible with the non-empirical Atman, which is pure Consciousness and beyond all relations and injunctions. The continuity of memory about the empirical self is useless in as much as the mind together with its modes is always pervaded by the Appearance of Consciousness in it like the solar disc by its rays or a burning iron ball by flames of fire; and the said memories become meaningless for the manifestation of the empirical self, as there is in a way such a manifestation occuring ordinarily and repeatedly in all knowledge in our daily life. In respect of Brahma-realisation, as already shown above, neither memories nor any injunction about them can hold good in any way.

This view is also in conflict with scriptural statements, which decisively affirm that Brahman is to be realised through Jñāna, arising from the Mahāvākyas. Also, when Avidya will be burnt up by the fire of right knowledge of Reality or Brahma-realisation, emanating from Śravana and Manana etc. there can be no scope for the survival of the said repeated memories, impossible in absence of Avidya. If the knowledge of

Brahman even is held to be transitory, even memories about It must be on the same footing like any other memory of an empirical object in its ordinary course. Consequently, the continuation of memories cannot be regarded as an improvement upon the knowledge about Brahman. Lastly, if once the revelation of Brahman, which is immediate and pure Consciousness, has occured, it has occured for ever; and neither recollection nor oblivion are possible with regard to It.

Theories about Jñāna-Karma: Samuccaya :—

All the Vedantins (even among those, who are Maya-vadins) do not agree that Jñāna is the sole means to Brahma-realisation. They accede to the indispensability of Jñāna but they further maintain that Jñāna must be combined with Karman for bringing about Mokṣa. The Jñāna-Kānda like the Karma-kānda should be held to be primarly concerned with any 'Sādhya' or something to be effected. Accordingly, even if no injunction be required for Ātma-jñāna or Brahma-realisation itself, its necessity for Karmans, combined with which only the knowledge, arising from the Upaniṣads, can effectuate the liberating realisation, remains undoubtable. Three views of such schools, advocating the combination of Karman with Jñāna, are referred to and vehemently refuted by Sureśvarācārya in his Vārtikas and Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi. Two of these abvocate with slight variation the same theory of 'Abhyāsa' and 'Prasaṅkhyāna', which are attributed to Brahmadatta and Maṇḍana respectively. Full details and sufficient data are not available so as to reconstruct and interpret Brahmadatta's entire system of Philosophy. However, according to these views, the Upaniṣads also like the Karmakāṇḍas are considered to be essentially injunctive in character. The theory of Prasaṅkhyāna has been discussed at some length by Maṇḍana[1] in his Brahma-Siddhi and also developed later on by Vacaspati Miśra.[2] Amalānanda[3] insistently

1. B.S.-PP. 35-36; Abhiprāya-Prakāśikā Comm. on B.S. (R. N. 8853, Tr. C.S.Mss. in the Govt. Ori. Mss. Lib) P. 47
2. Bhāmati-PP. 51, L. 5, 55 L. 2 and P. 58 Ls. 2-14.
3. Kalpataru-P. 218, Ls. 2-3.

ascribes it to Vācaspati and remarks that Vācaspati understands thoroughly the expression "Scriptural realisation" in the same way as Maṇḍana understands "Brahma-realisation, springing from prasaṅkhyāna". While establishing this view, Brahmadatta takes his stand upon the Upaniṣadic passage "समाहितो भूत्वा पश्येत्", which he interprets as enjoining Prasaṅkhyāna, having for its fruit Brahma-Sākṣātkāra and for its necessary aids and conditions (साधन) the spiritual qualities such as Sama, Dama etc. Mandana cites authoritatively the Upaniṣadic passage, "विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत" as the central teaching of the Upaniṣads. According to these views, the Mahāvākyas are not to be deemed as alone capable of conveying that, which directly brings about final emancipation. The Mumukṣu will have to learn first from the Upaniṣads the truth that the Jiva is really Brahman. But the knowledge of absolute identity between the iudividual soul and Brahman, derived from the Vedanta Vākoas, is an indirect one and it will not do even if aided by Manana or supportive arguments etc. It has to be dealt upon repeatedly or almost constantly with a full concentration of the mind until it is transformed and refined into a direct intuition about Brahman. Here it is necessary to clear up the subtle but substantial difference between the views of Brahmadatta and Maṇḍana on the point. It lies in this, that, according to Maṇḍana[1], the meditation itself is not the means to Brahma-realisation but a different type of Jñāna, distilled, so to speak, out of the previously indirect scriptural knowledge with the aid of meditation is so. Thus the knowledge derived from the Upaniṣadic Mahāvākyas has' to pass through the furnace of meditation till the detractive and recessive elements of relation and mediacy could be brushed away from it and it is refined and transmuted into pure, direct and intuitional realisation of Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman, as conveyed by the Vedanta texts through the process of Sravana and Manana etc. is to be distinguished from one, resulting from Prasaṅkhyāna or repeated meditation, and the distinction lies in this, that tfie former is indirect,

1. B. S., P. 35, Lines 1-8, 25; P. 134; P. 159, Lines 10-13.

mediate and insufficient to occasion Mokṣa, while the latter is direct, immediate and enough to give rise to Mokṣa.

The utility[1] of Karman in the said scheme of combination lies, according to some, in producing a peculiar kind of 'Adṛsta', helpful to the manifestation of Mokṣa and, according to others, they are useful in averting inauspicious and unfavourable evils, detrimental to the emergence of *Mokṣa*. Hence the knowledge of Brahman, as arising through Śravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana alone, will not do, but it must be supplemented and strengthened by Prasaṅkhyāna, which will transmute it into a direct and liberating Brahma-realisation.

One more remarkable point can be gathered from the Vārtikas. Sureśvara holds that two views may be possibly put forward as regards 'Śeṣa-śesibhāva' (i.e., the discrimanation as to what is the principal and what is subservient to it out of the several Scriptural statements). According to the first view, while in the ritualistic portion of the Vedas the injunctive passage is the 'Śeṣi' or the principal statement and others are 'Śeṣas' i.e. subordinate to it, in the Upanisadic portion the assertive propositions like "Tat Tvam Asi" are 'Śeṣi' and the injunctive statements are 'Śeṣas'; because the injunction with regard to Prasaṅkhyāna (which is surely निरूपक-साकाङ्क्ष) is out of question before its object is first explained by assertive propositions in accordance with the general principle—"विशिष्ट-बुद्धिम्प्रति विशेषणज्ञानं कारणम्" so as to satisfy the natural expentancy as to whose Prasaṅkhyāna is sought to be enjoined. This reversal of Śeṣa-Śaṣibhāva also avoids any conflict with the view of the true purport of the Vedantas being the indication of one Absolute Brahman. According to the second view, the injunction regarding Prasaṅkhyāna is only qualified per accidens by having for its object direct Brahma-realisation (आत्मदर्शनविषय-कत्वोपलक्षितप्रसंख्यान), in which case the previous exposition of the nature of the object of the enjoined Prasaṅkhyāna being necessary, the injunctive passage of the Upaniṣad may be

1. B. S., P. 25, Lines 7-8.

maintained to be Śeṣi and the assertive propositions to be Śeṣas, as usual in every case of injunction in the Karma-Kāṇḍa, However, although the Upaniṣadic Mahāvākyas, being nothing more than mere verbal testimonies, could not have themselves occasioned the pure and direct realisation of Brahman, yet with the aid of Prasaṅkhyāna (सहकारिवैचित्र्येण) they ultimately result in the said realisation; and for this Prasaṅkhyāna, injunction is unavoidable.

Criticism of Prasaṅkhyāna[1] *Vidhi*:—

Sureśvara starts his criticism of this view with an unmistakable animus by questioning the possible aim to be achieved through Prasaṅkhyāna. It cannot be the establishment of absolute Reality (वस्तुसिद्धयथम्); because it is in the light of Reality or Appearance of Consciousness that all things are cognised, proved and established; and nothing else can establish this all-establishing and self-subsistant Reality, which is Pure Consciousness. It cannot be urged that the removal of mediacy or indirectness of its object (i.e. Brahman), is the definite aim of Prasaṅkhyāna; because it is Brahman, which, being unconditionally and absolutely immediate, removes the पारोक्ष्य, i.e., mediacy of all by appearing in them; and if so, how can anything else be held to be responsible for removing Its mediacy (when It is never really mediate at all). It is not possible to maintain that the negation of non-existence is the result of Prasaṅkhyāna-injunction, since it is Brahman, the one eternal Existence or absolute Reality, which imparts existence and manifestation seemingly to all apparent phenomena of the world and, therefore, It cannot be made existent on account of the denial of Its non-existence by virtue of the injunction of Prasaṅkhyāna. It is also futile to assert that the removal of Avidya in and about Brahman is the object of the injunction of Prasaṅkhyāna, since Brahman, which is to be spontaneously revealed to a Mumukṣu immediately after a successful application of the means, has no relation to Avidya as such and, moreover, such a removal

1. Sambandha-Vārtika, PP. 220-31; B.B.V., PP. 733-35 and P. 1067.

cannot be the outcome of Prasaṅkhyāna but is decidedly only that of a ज्ञान. It is also not possible to state that the injunction of Prasankhyāna has the aim of occasioning the emancipation of the essentially ever-free Brahman, as Prasaṅkhyāna has obviously nothing to do with emancipation. It cannot be urged that the injunction has the purpose of the dissipation of Ajñāna through Jñāna, since all the Vedantas, that strive to fulfil the same purpose, would become meaningless. The Vedantas cannot have the double function of laying down the injunction of Prasaṅkhyāna, which is something to be effected (साध्य), and of asserting and establishing the identity of the jiva and Brahman, which is an established fact. Moreover, injunction has nothing to accomplish with reference to Brahman, as 'Niyoga' is always concerned with and conducive to any Kriyā, but can have nothing to do with Brahman, which is ever self-same and self-established; and hence, Prasaṅkhyāna supported and urged by such an unavailing injunction in respect of Brahman, is rendered altogether useless, unsupportable and untenable.

If the Upaniṣadic passages are to depend upon prasaṅkhyāna in bringing about Brahma-realisation, they cannot any more retain their प्रामाण्य i.e., authoritativeness whatsoever, since authoritativeness is incompatible with dependence. If all the three (i. e., the Upaniṣads, the arguments and prasaṅkhyāna) are held to be indispensable for the attainment of Brahma-realisation, the question would crop up whether they are so conjointly or separately ? They cannot be so conjointly, since, though arguments and Prasaṅkhyāna may help Brahma-realisation, it is only the upaniṣadic passage that may be held be the cause thereof, just as, though all the three, namely, wick, oil and fire make up what is called a lamp, it is only the fire out of the three that gives light and neither the wick nor the oil does so. If, on the other hand, they are held to be the causes of Brahma-realisation independently and severally, it will be tentamount to the assumption of different causes, leading to the fulfilment of one and the same end, viz. Brahma-realisation. Such an assumption is subject to several defects : Firstly, there will be an obvious superfluity of

the remaining two, when the desired end could be achieved through any one of them alone: secondly, Prasaṅkhyāna and argumentation cannot possibly give rise to a direct Brahma-realisation ; and lastly, this assumption would run counter to and demolish the very combination of jñāna and Karma (ज्ञान-कर्म-समुच्चय), which is recognised and reasoned out so insistently and regardfully by the exponents of these views in order to provide somehow a scope to an injunction even in the origination of Brahma-realisation.

If the invariable nature of the verbal testimony is to convey an indirect or mediate knowledge only, the fact that it is repeatedly dealt upon cannot make it change its nature and yield a direct and immediate knowledge in consequence of being combined with Prasaṅkhyāna. There is no possibility of the rise of even a different type of jñaña, distilled, so to speak, out of the meditation or Prasaṅkhyāna ; because Prasaṅkhyāna itself is not a Pramāna and has no power of giving rise to any knowledge at all ; and, serving as an auxiliary to the mahāvākyas, cannot alter their nature so as to convey precisely the kind of knowledge, required for the removal of Avidya. Just as it is observed even in an ordinary case of illusion that sufficient light alone can illumine the real object and thereby bring about the cessation of illusory appearance but neither argumentation nor any amount of meditation can do so ; similarly, the Upaniṣadic passages themselves only can bring about the revelation of the self-luminous and ever-immediate pure Consciousness through the sublation of Avidya and neither argumentation nor any amount of meditation can have any part to play so far as the rise of direct Brahma-realisation is concerned.

Bhartṛ-prapañca's theory of [1]Jñāna-karma-samuccaya :—

The combination of ज्ञान with karman is possible in many ways. Broadly speaking, it can be classified into three kinds :—

(i) Jñāna-samuccita-karma (wherein karman is predominant)

1. B.B.V. A. III, B. II. PP. 1154-58, VV. 41-62 ; PP. 1852-54 ; VV. 796-810.

(ii) Karma-samuccita-jñāna (wherein jñāna is predominant)
(iii) Karma-jñāna-same-samuccaya (wherein both karman and jñāna are equally predominant).

The former two kinds of combination have been already discussed and criticised. The third view, which is of much greater importance, can be attributed to Bhartṛ-Prapañca. He maintained the theory of 'Bhedābheda', according to which, the ultimate Reality may be described as an 'identity in difference'. Brahman, in his system of philosophy, is not indivisible, undifferentiated, impartite and attributeless, but the 'concrete universal'. To him diversity is as real as unity, of course never independently of and apart from the latter, but only as its aspect, mode, part or effect. Constant references to his interpretations of the different topics in conformity with his own view of 'Dvaitādvaita' have been made by Sureśvara in the whole of the Bṛhadāranyaka-Vārtika. Sufficient data can be gathered from these copious references so as to reconstruct a consistent system of the Dvaitādvaita-philosophy, as expounded by Bhartṛprapañca, but this will be an ample subject-matter of one independent thesis and is too enormous to be incorporated in and also irrelevant to the present work. However, on his view, diversity being real and never to be disearded, Karman remains indispensable throughout in the process of Brahma-realisation. "But a mere adherence to karman means the recognition of only diversity and not also the unity underlying it. So for realising the latter also, which is what the common man misses, jñāna is essential." The ideal set up by him is neither to discharge one's duty for selfish ends blindly nor to remain satisfied with jñāna, as sufficient in itself, but to perform karman as directed to the attainment of the ultimate Reality with a realisation of its full significance. "Though karman is a common feature of the Mukta and the Mumukṣu, the motive inspiring it in the two cases is totally different." He also recognises constant meditation as the means to realisation of the 'Unity in diversity' by destroying the popular immediate belief in the truth of mere diversity, independently of unity.

Criticism of the theory :—

The points of refutation[1], urged by Sureśvara against meditation being the means to the realisation of the Ultimate Reality have already been amply discussed above. The gist of the entire criticism levelled at many places by Sureśvara against Bhatṛprapañca's view of ultimate Reality, is that it is sheer anamoly to maintain both unity and diversity together as real. Reality, as explained above, must be independent and self-subsisting in conformity with Its nature and can allow no difference, division or limitation in Itself in any way. What is Reality in the true sense of the word does not require and cannot be dependent on anything else, different from Itself, and such an Absolute Reality is Brahman, the only Reality, of which the manifolds of the Universe are only so many seeming appearances through Avidya.

Sureśvara is deadly against the combination[2] of Jñāna and Karman. The Brahma-Siddhi notices seven theories[3], supporting the view of injunction in different ways. They are as follows:— "(1) All the injunctions are divertive in their purpose and tend to turn away from natural activities in the direction of the meditative activity enjoined for the realisation of Brahman; (2) All these injunctions, relating to Karman, are intended to kill desires through the process of enjoyment and cloying and thus to prepare the way for the meditative activity leading to Brahma-realisation; (3) The performance of Karman is necessary to discharge the three congenital debts, whose liquidation is an indispensable qualification for Brahma-realisation; (4) The activities prescribed in the Karmakanda are bi-functional in character and have two distinct functions (संयोगपृथक्त्व-न्याय) by conducing to their respective fruits and to Brahma-realisation; (5) All Karman is intended to purify the mind and make it fit also for Brahma-realisation; (6) Brahma-realisation should be regarded as a purificatory subsidiary to the agent, subserving

1. Sambandha-Vārtika, PP. 113-116, VV. 366-77.
2. B. B. V., PP. 1182-1200, W. 32-132.
3. B. S., PP., 26-28.

the requirements of the various activities prescribed in the Karmakāṇḍa (7) and that Karman and Jñāna are fundamentally opposed to each other and have no inter-relation whatsoever Out of these theories the fourth and fifth may be ascribed to the author of the Brahma-Siddhi and the last one is aseribed to Sureśvara. All the above theories had been discussed in the Vārtikas as well and they have been rejected on the ground that Jñaña and Karma are fundamentally different from each other in respect of the instrumentality as well as the results (साधन and फल), which have been elucidated above in this very chapter. No kind of Karman can ever fit in with Brahma-realisation ; because Brahma-realisation is altogether different from all the four possible kinds of fruits, which are to be accomplished by Karman, namely, origin, acquisition, refinement and change. Mokṣa, being ever-attained but only appearing to be un-attained thorugh Avidya is not to be brought about by any amount and kind of Karma. It is simply to be revealed on the sublation of Avidya-the only obstacle in the way of its self-revealing presentation. So attainment of Mokṣa is merely ascertainment and not acquisition. Thus it may be concluded that Brahma-realisation, which only can sublate Avidya, can bring about Mokṣa.

The Karaṇa or Instrumental Cause of Brahma-realisation :-

There are three[1] prominent views advanced by Advaitins in solution of the problem as to what is the Karaṇa of Brahma-realisation. The earlier Advaitins, Brahmadatta and Mandana, enunciate the view that Prasankhyāna or deep and repeated medition is the Karaṇa of intuition about Brahman. This view later on was adopted and elucideted by Vācaspati, as Amalā-Nand, the author of Kalpatarū[2], remarks that Vācaspati understands through the expression 'Scriptual realisation' in the same sense as Maṇḍana understands 'Brahma-realisation springing from Prasaṅkhyāna'.

1. S.L., pp. 452-56.
2. Sambandha-Vartika, p. 211, V. 762; N. S., i-67 & iii-9; Kalpataru (A.K.S.), p. 56.

Other Advaitins advocate that in accordance with the scriptural statement "दृश्यतेऽग्र्या बुद्ध्या", mind is the direct Karaṇa of Brahma-realisation. It seems that Vācaspati[1], who characterises the mind as a sense organ, also supports this view, holding Prasaṅkhyāna to be its intermediary operation resulting in immediate Brahma-realisation.

Both the Abhasa School and the Vivaraṇa school condemn the above-mentioned views and maintain that the sublime Upanisadic passages or the principal texts of Vedanta are directly the Karaṇa of Brahma-realisation. There is a slight variation in the conception of and relation between Śravana etc. as well as the process of emergence of Brahma-realisation, according to these exponents of two different schools of interpretation, which have already been clarified above. Nevertheless, that Brahma-realisation emanates from the Mahavākyas through the process of Śravana and Manana etc. is the common view of both of them.

Justification[2] *of Direct knowledge from Verbal Testimony* :—

There are Advaitins, who support the view that verbal testimony also can give rise to immediate knowledge. Different theories have been enunciated in order to justify this view. Some hold that words with the help of mind, purified, refined and exclusively concentrated on Brahman in consequence of favourable dispositions and propensities, accumulated through the repeated process of Sravana and Manana etc., do give rise to Brahma-realisation. Just as an ordinary offering of oblations into fire does not produce an 'Apūrva', but the same, when conducted in accordance with the scriptural procedure, does bring about 'Apūrva'; similarly words alone may generate indirect knowledge but the same—aided by the mind, purified, refined and firmly fixed on Brahman—does occasion direct Brahma-realisation. This theory has been adopted and developed by the Vivarana School.

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1. B.B.V., P. 1060, V. 167 ; Sambandha-Vartika, P. 58 ;
2. S.L., pp. 458-62.

Others maintain that just as, although incapable by itself, the mind, when actuated and worked upon by strong and accumulated Bhāvanas i.e., intense broodings, does engender a direct perception of even one's dead wife; similarly, words, accompanied by Nididhyāsana, do occasion immediate Brahma-realisation. This theory is attributable to Bhāvanavādins, whose views have already been elucidated above.

Sureśvara and his followers advocate the theory[1] that words have inscrutable and unlimited power. This theory is known as 'Śabdācintya-Śakti-Vāda', which may be treated as his original contribution to the Advaita philosophy. He maintains that mediacy or immediacy of a knowledge, derived from verbal testimony, depends on the character of an object. Words can give only mediate knowledge of a mediate object but an immediate one of an immediate object. Brahman is Pure Consciousness and A-priori Immediacy. Consequentiy, the knowledge of such Brahman, though derived from the Upanisadic passages through the process of Śravaṇa and Manana etc., can undoubtedly be a direct one.

Lakṣaṇā—the only verbal power adequate to Akhaṇḍārtha-bodha about Brahman :—

The direct knowledge of Brahman is derivable from the Mahāvākyas not through the primary denotative power of words, which can convey the knowledge of the emperical selves only, but through Lakṣaṇā. The conceptions of the Supreme Soul and the Jiva are possible in two ways, according to the Abhāsa theory: (1) Īśvara and the Jiva are the Appearances of Consciousness in Avidya and mind respectively or (2) they are the Consciousness, undifferentiated from Its Appearances in limiting adjuncts or receptacles and thereby mistakenly and indiscriminately identified with the said receptacles. Thus, if the Appearances of Consciousness together with their receptacles or adjuncts are to be understood as the express meanings of the words 'Tat' & 'Tvam', Jahat-Lakṣaṇā only can yield the desired implication, as in this case, there is a

1. B. B. V., P. 605, VV., 859-60.

total abandonment[1] of the primary sense, namely, the conditioning adjuncts together with the Appearances conditioned thereby (both of which are indeterminable, being neither inert nor non-inert etc. and hence unreal only). But if "Ābhāsa" is to be interpreted as the Consciousness Itself, non-differentiated from Its Appearance, with the superimposed attribute of being included in the receptacle of Its Appearance or the conditioning adjunct (आभासश्चोपाध्यन्तर्गतत्वरूपारोपितधर्मविशिष्टा बिम्बचिदेव or आभासश्च उपाध्यन्तर्गतस्वरूपोऽपि तद्धर्मविशिष्टा चिदेव)[2] and thus the two kinds of Consciousness, non-differentiated from Its Appearance in varying adjuncts, are accepted to be the express significance of the words, 'Tat' and 'Tvam', obviously it will a case of जहदजहल्लक्षणा, as on this view, there is relinquishment of only a part of what is expressly signified.[3] This view is more appealing in as much as the coherence of bondage and liberation can be easily explained, according to it, for bondage can be admitted even of Consciousness, the Brahman, through the channel of Appearance, 'like a prince brought up in the family-surroundings of a hunter'.

The method of padārtha-Sodhana :—

The method of 'Padārtha-sodhana', recognised by many Advaitins, finds its place as associated with Manana in the scheme of Sureśvara's process of Brahma-realisation, arising from the Mahāvākyas. Padārtha-sodhan is the method of convincing oneself of the true significance of the words 'Tat' and 'Tvam' by means of eliminating adventitious and irrelevant elements, features or attributes, acquired or gathered around and associated with the bare meanings of these terms through

1, S. B., P. 221.

2. (Ibid) N. R., P. 221.

3. Siddhānta Bindu, PP. 223-224; Nārāyaṇi—the commentary thereon; Mānasollāsa-Vārtika, P. 71. P. S. Both these views may be supported by the following verses from the B. B. V., P. 359, V. 61 and Nyāya-kalpa-latikā-Comm. on the verses—"ईश्वरादेः कल्पितत्वस्वीकारात्कथं यथाभूतार्थबोधित्वं मानानामत्राह ईश्वरादीत्यादि". Ânandagiri's commentary thereon, P. 508. V. 382, P. 1133, V. 135 ; (आभासपक्षे); P. 357, V. 53 and Ânandagiri's commentary on the verse (आभासाऽविविक्तचित्पक्षे)

superimposition. It seeks to discriminate between the Atman and its empirical adjuncts and establish the sole reality of Atman, the Brahman, and consequent apparentness or falsity of the entire phenomenal world. This is the process of explication, as distinguished from that of implication, i.e. Prapancavilayan, recognised by some Advaitins as the means to arriving at a true knowledge of Brahman.

This method is usually regarded as fourfold; but a fifth one also is sometimes added! They are as follows:—

(1) दृग्दृश्यान्वयव्यतिरेक
(2) साक्षिसाक्ष्यान्वयव्यतिरेक
(3) आगमापायितद्वध्यन्वयव्यतिरेक
(4) दुःखिपरमप्रेमास्पदान्वयव्यतिरेक
(5) अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तान्वयव्यतिरेक

These discriminating and convincing Tarkas or forms of knowledge through a rational and confirmatory process have been explained in several texts, namely, Naiṣkarmya-siddhi, Siddhānta-bindu[1] and Nyāya-ratnāvalī-a commentary on the latter, etc. To put the whole thing briefly, they aim at affirming Brahman, on the one hand, to be (1) pure Consciousness, underlying all phenomena consisting of the triad—the knower, the known and the diverse forms of discursive knowledge, (2) ever-same and transcendent Witness, illuminating all that are manifest as appearences in multifarious forms (3) eternal Existence or absolute Reality, the limit of all that come and pass away in the order and realm of relativity and pragmatic values, (4) unsurpassable, unlimited and untainted Bliss as the Soul, the dearest of all other than Itself, unexceptionally tinged will miseries, and (5) the unchanging basic Reality as the common Substratum of all the changing appearances, and at denying the universe, on the other, to be real as being knowable, illuminable, perishable, painful and changing; because the latter cannot appear to be identical with the former,

1. S. B., PP. 429-431 and the commentaries, Nyāyārātnavali and Narayani thereon.

as it necessarily does, unless it is so. It must, however, be clearly understood that this method of bringing out the true implication of the terms, 'Tat' and 'Tvam', as the one Reality, the Pure Consciousness, by eliminating the superficial significatory elements, is confined to Padarthas only (as all Śravaṇa and Manana are held to be so by Sureśvara) and serves the purpose of convincing the seeker that such a Substratum or Reality must be there to explain the otherwise inexplainable appearances. But it does not and cannot convey an immediate and intuitive knowledge of the ultimate Reality, the Brahman, for realising which the full import of the Mahavakya is indispensable and that is possible only at the stage of Nididhyāsana.

Nature and analysis[1] *of Akhaṇda-Vākyārth of the sublime scriptural passage—"Tat Tvam Asi":—*

The import of a proposition is ordinarily of two kinds—'Bheda' or 'Samsarga'-the former involving the distinction of action and its agent etc. (क्रिया-कारक-भेद), expressed by different constituent words of sentences such as "गामानय" etc. and the latter comprising identity between things, denoted by the various terms having similar case-endings (समानविभक्तिक) in appositional sentences such as "नीलमुत्पलम्" etc. Synthetically the Mahavakys such as 'Tat Tvam Asi' etc. deserve to be assigned to the latter type. But the import, derived from the Mahavakyas, is admitted to be of neither of the above two kinds. It is 'Akhandārth', that is, free from all differences and relations, and superior even to an ordinary identity (which is impure and smacks of reconcilable distinctions as requiring two relata) as ultimately implying absolutely pure oneness or bare simplicity, which is above all distinctions of subject and predicate or generic and particular etc.

The process of realising such as a Vākyārtha must be obviously somewhat different from what prevails in ordinary

1. B.B.V.—A. III, B. V., P. 1272, V. 170 ; A. I, B. IV. P. 713-17, VV. 1408-32 ; P. 1882, VV, 981-85.

cases of verbal testimony. Sureśvara recognises[1] three kinds of Sambandha, i.e., relations for arriving at the said 'Akhandārthbodha', namely, (1) 'Sāmānādhikaraṇya', (2) 'Viśeṣya-Viśeṣaṇa bhāva' and 'Lakṣya-lakṣaṇabhāva'. The first Sambandha lies between the terms, which are constituents of the sentence, and is of the nature of apposition between them, which lasts till the end and is gradually distilled, disintegrated and refined into 'Akhandārtha'. The second Sambandha subsists between the meanings, expressed by those terms, and is the relation of subject and predicate or substance and attribute between the things, denoted by them. The third Sambandha applies to the meanings of these terms reducing them to one meaning, Pure Consciousness, and is the relation of the implied and the implying or the indicated and the indicator. All these relations can be illustrated in sentences such as 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः', meaning 'That is this Devadatta'. The appositional relation is applicable to the sentence, as the terms, 'that' signifying Devadatta as related to past time and 'this', denoting Devadatta as related to present time, are intended to refer to one and the same individual. The second relation also can be exemplified in the same proposition, as there is the relation of the subject and the predicate, subsisting between Devadatta, as related to past time (which is the primary meaning of 'that') and Devadatta, as related to present time (which is the primary meaning of 'this'), constituted by the exclusion of their mutual difference (arising from his mere association with past and present times). The third relation also can be illustrated with reference to the proposition. When the distinction between the meanings of the terms—'that' and 'this'- viz. Devadatta, seen sometime before and the same, being seen in the moment concerned has to be discarded as appearing conflicting or incongrous, there arises the third relation of the implying and the implied between these words and their meanings and the identical part, Devadatta, divested of conflicting attributes, viz., being related to different times, as one and the same person, is brought out

1. B. B. V. A. III, B. V, P. 1271, VV. 185-88; M.V.-PP. 70-71, VV. 15-18.

through the recognitive process of implication, resulting in 'Akhaṇḍārthabodha'. Thus the meaning of the sentence is gradually attenuated, reduced, refined and ultimately crystallised into "Akhaṇḍārtha", that is, a bare, unrelated object, namely, Devadatta. Similar is the case with the meaning (i.e. Akhaṇḍārtha-bodha), arising from the sublime Scriptural passage-'तत्त्वमसि' etc. what is true of the recognitive process may be equally so of the realisational process. He says that in sentences like, "सोऽयं देवदत्तः" and "तत्त्वमसि" etc. although words signify qualified entities, yet they ultimately imply one bare object only as their final import. First of all there is an apposition or coherence of what are ordinarily or expressly conveyed by the two terms 'Tat' and 'Tvam' (समानाधिकरण्यान्वय). Then comes the stage of unitary judgment, in which the two express meanings of the words are presented in a combined form, constituting together the relation of the substantive and the adjective (विशेषणविषेष्यता). But the two senses related as such, when closely examined, are found to be partially or wholly unsatisfactory as being conflicting or incongrous and hence the express meanings have to be partially or wholly relinquished, as the case may be, and are succeeded by senses, which turn out to be absolutely one and the same, presented through implication whether exclusive or partly exclusive of the primary significance, as explained above (लक्ष्यलक्षणसम्बन्ध). At this stage emerges the intuitional realisation or immediate realisation of Pure Consciousness (स्वरूपप्रतिपत्ति) sublating Avidya and all that it produces.

An outstanding departure from the view, upheld by Sureśvara and even the majority of other Advaitins, as regards the acceptance of Lakṣaṇā in the process of the "Akhaṇḍārtha-bodha", is voiced forth by Dharmarājādhvarīndra in his well-known work, Vedānta-Paribhāsā.[1] He says that in sentences like, "सोऽयं देवदत्तः", and "तत्त्वमसि" etc., although words, signifying qualified senses, are acceptable as referring only to one portion of their significatory meaning, yet there is no secondary implication,

1. V. P. PP. 275-76 and Commentaries—Śikhāmaṇi and Maṇiprabhā.

as, notwithstanding the fact that the two qualified entities presented to the mind by significance cannot be logically connected with each other to convey an identical meaning, there is no contradiction in connecting two substantives only, presented by significatory power, so as to yield an identity of meaning. Only where one part of the meaning of a word is presented as a qualifying attribute (Viseṣaṇa), implication is admitted in order that the meaning may be presented identically. Thus in sentences like, 'Tat Tvam Asi', there is no secondary implication; because the meanings of the words 'Tvam' and 'Tat' can be presented identically though partially by significance and there is no obstacle to their being thus logically connected so as to mean a unique and absolutely identical thing, namely, Pure Consciousness, the Brahman. So the statement about implication by the traditional teachers in sentences like "Tat Tvam Asi" should be understood as mere tentative admissions.

The gist of the whole argument seems to be that in those cases of predications, where the predicates hold good only of the Viseṣya i.e., subject, but not of the Viśiṣṭa i.e., the subject as qualified in a particular way or of the Viseṣaṇa, that is, Qualification, the predication is to be taken as true of the bare subject only without resorting to Lakṣaṇā or secondary implication. The rejection of the irrelevant and incoherent does not as such constitute the resort to secondary implification; else even statements like 'घटमानय' would have to be interpreted by Lakṣaṇā, since 'Ghaṭatva', which cannot be brought, has to be discarded. But in sentences such as 'घटो नित्यः' the predicate, eternality, being incompatible with the subject and holding good only of the adjectival part, what has to be rejected is the subject and in such cases Lakṣaṇā or secondary implication has to be resorted to. To other Advaitins there seems to be no justification for this distinction of the subjective or predicative rejection (though both of them are partial only) being regarded as the necessary condition of the acceptance or non-acceptance of the secondary implication respectively. On the other hand, if incompatibility or non-application of the predicate in respect

of the qualification (or Viśeṣaṇa) is held to be a sufficient ground for its rejection or relinquishment in respect of such a qualification, there is no reason why the expression "घटो ध्वस्तः" would not apply to the case of an absolute non-existence (अत्यन्ताभाव) of the pot and the term 'पशु' would not be used even for a mouse, as the adjectival parts (i.e. 'Utpatti' and 'loma' respectively in meanings of the terms 'Dhvansa' and 'Paśu', viz. 'उत्पत्तिमद्भाव' and ('लोमवल्लाङ्गूलविशिष्ट'), being inapplicable to the subject, would be abandoned in conformity with the said principle. Arbitrary relinquishment of a part of the primary meaning whether substantive or adjectival is meaningless and unacceptable. Moreover, any relinquishment is possible only as a result of the resort to Lakṣaṇā. So it necessarily presupposes Lakṣaṇā, wherever it has to be made in order to solve the incongruity and incoherence—partial or whole.

A long discussion has been devoted to this topic by later Advaitins such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and others, but this much is certain that the traditional view or the consensus of opinions seems to be in favour of the acceptance of Jahadajahallakṣaṇā or Bhāga-tyāga-lakṣaṇā. Madhusūdana Saraswatī, though recognising the procedure here as consisting of the synthetical relation of the subtsrata to the exclusion of the predication or qualification (Viśeṣana-bādhena Viśeṣya-mātrānvayah), does not refrain from admitting it as a case of Lakṣaṇā. He also offers an explanation for the sense, resulting from the said Lakṣaṇā, not becoming non-principal on that account ; because a sense either other than what is cognised or other than what is not śakya, i. e., conveyable primarily only is to be treated as non-principal, but the sense under discussion here is neither of the two types. The resultant sense in question is not of the former type, as apposition is here between what is cognised and also what is sustained; it is not even of the latter type, as even though a part of the express sense is abandoned, another remains intact and actually enters into syntactical relation. All these questions, which are of later origin, do not find any solution at the hands of Sureśvara,

who seems to be oscillating between the two views of the Jahat and Jahadajahat types of Lakṣanā in conformity with the twofold interpretation of 'Tat' and 'Tvam' as necessitatated by his theory of Ābhāsa.

Accordingly, it will be important to note in this connection that Sureśvara accepts two alternative views as regards the principle of apposition, resulting either in 'sublation' or in 'oneness' (बाधायामभेदे वा सामानाधिकरण्यम्)[1]. If the express denotations of the terms 'Tat' and 'Tvam' are accepted to be the 'Appearances of Consciousness' in Avidya and the mind respectively, the apposition will have to be accepted as truly accomplishable only on the complete abandonment of both the senses, signified by 'Tat' and 'Tvam'. But in case the Consciousness, as conditioned by Avidya, as well as, one conditioned by the mind, being non-discriminated from Its Appearances in them, are respectively accepted to be the express significance of the terms, 'Tat' and 'Tvam', the apposition must be admitted as culminating in the unity of the two senses as one and undifferentiated Being, after the elimination of only the adventitious, superfecial and unreal elements such as Avidya and the mind, the conditioning adjuncts, erroneously identified with Reality (as a result of the said non-discrimination from Its Appearances in them). The force of 'apposition' lasts till the ultimate emergence of the Akhaṇḍa-Vākyārtha as a result of retention only of the common and essential element and rejection of the uncommon and superfecial elements. Of these two, the former is Sureśvara's original method, necessitated by his doctrine of 'Ābhāsa' and the latter is the traditional view, recognised by the majority of Advaitins.

One more point has to be emphasised here that the said process of 'Vakyārthajñāna' is in a sense only explanatory and not assertive ; because it is not to be realised as having been actually undergone by the realiser of the Reality, on whom the

1. N. S., A. II, V, 29; Pañcadasī, VIII, VV. 43-44; B. B. V., PP. 1950-51, VV. 9 14; Anandagiri's Commetaries thereon.

intuitional and immediate knowledge of Reality, the Brahman, dawns not only spontaneously but also as suddenly or quickly as the verbal knowledge arising in the mind of one, who is being instantaneously aroused from his deep sleep on the calling of his name by somebody else, allowing no time for the actual fulfilment of the process, required by the verbal knowledge at all.[1] However, the ultimate intuitional Realisation, known as 'Akhaṇḍa-Vakyārtha' or 'Svarūpa-Pratipatti' is Brahma-realisation proper, the goal of all the preceding conditions and the consummation of all gradual spiritual advancements, recognised as the approximate ways to Brahma-realisation.

It should not be questioned how Brahma-realisation, which itself owes its origin to Avidya, would sublate Avidya; as this realisation is quasi-Reality, objectifying nothing of the empirical entities, but attached exclusively to and braced by Pure Consciousness alone. Moreover, although arising from and flourishing in the region of Avidya, Vidya and Avidya are fundamentally opposed[2] to each other in respect of their causes, nature and consequences. Avidya is fundamentally extrorse or extrusive, being associated with appearances only, while Vidya is introrse or introversive as embracing Reality, the Pure Consciousness only, and dissociated from anything else other than It, that is, appearances. Avidya is obscurative and projective, whereas Vidya is illuminative and sublative. Avidya develops into diversity, but Vidya immerses in unity. Avidya expands till the last point of plurality, while Vidya contracts into the infinitesimal point of oneness, i.e., the only Reality or pure Consciousness as the Residue. In other words, the limit of the evolution of Avidya is the highest stage of grossness through the process of projection, whereas that of the involution of Vidya is the sublimest summit of subtility or finest transcendental state through the process of extrication or elimination, as discussed above. Lastly, Avidya contributes to bondage but Vidya brings about Mokṣa or emancipation

1. B. B. V. P. 605, VV. 859, 861 ; A. S. P. 739 Ls. 12-15.

2. B. B. V. A. II, B. I, P. 949, V. 376, A. III, B. III, P. 1187, V. 60-62.

CHAPTER V.

MOKSA OR SUMMUM BONUM

Preliminary remarks:—

Before elucidating the nature of Mokṣa, it is necessary to recapitulate the conceptions of Īsvara and the Jīva. It has been shown in the foregoing pages that Īsvara is the primary and direct Appearance of pure Consciousness in Avidya and the Jīva is the Appearance of the same Consciousness through Avidya in its product, namely, Buddhi, i.e. intellect. From a perusal of Sureśvara's works it becomes clear that his theory of Ābhāsa as propounded in the Vārtikas, seeks to account for the conceptions not only of Īsvara but also of the Jīva and the Jagat (i.e. world) in a manner interpretable in two ways. What is technically known as bondage is also explicable in terms of this theory. Pure Consciousness as appearing in the beginningless Avidya or Cosmic Nescience, constitutes what is ontologically known as Īsvara—a conception, which has a triple aspect in so far as the Appearance or Ābhāsa of Consciousness in Avidya (अविद्यागतचिदाभास) by reason of its nondiscrimination from Avidya is looked at from a threefold point of view. The terms—Antaryāmin (controller from within) Sākṣi (witness) and Kāraṇa (cause of the world) are really applicable to the same Appearance, the distinction being that of outlook and functions only. When Avidya under the action of Īsvara evolves itself into the form of mind (Buddhi), which is multiple in character, the supreme Consciousness appears again in this as a medium and receptacle and comes to be known as Jīva. This Jīva is the *empirical subject* in relation to the triple function of the mind, namely, knowing, feeling and willing and is recognised respectively as Pramātā (knower), Bhoktā (enjoyer) and Kartā (doer). Similarly, Īsvara, conceived as the *Supreme Subject*, comes to be known as Antaryāmin, Sākṣin and Kāraṇa in relation to the

three-fold functions of Nescience.

Conceptions of bondage and Mokṣa :—

There is really a distinction between Consciousness as qualified and conditioned per accidens by Avidya (अविद्योपहित-चित्) and the same as characterised by Avidya while appearing therein (अविद्याविशिष्ट-चित्), but due to non-discrimination of Consciousness from Its Appearance this distinction is overlooked. Similarly, there is a distinction between Consciousness, as qualified and conditioned per accidens by one of the products of Avidya, namely, Buddhi (बुद्ध्युपहित-चित्) and the same Consciousness as characterised by the same Buddhi as appearing therein (बुद्धिगताभासविशिष्ट-चित्), but due to nondiscrimination, this distinction remains obscure in the Jīva and the natural outcome of this obscurity is that the Jīva identifies itself with the aforesaid product of Avidya (i. e. Buddhi), which is the medium of its self-expression. This false identification gives rise to the notion of bondage[1] and all that it implies. The worldly life with its so-called joys, sorrows and other enjoyments is really a form of this bondage; because it is only when the Jīva gets itself identified with and attached to the psycho-physical organism that there ensues for it all the consequences of empirical existence and association with physical and psychical accompaniments. But its true nature is Existence—Consciousness—Bliss (सच्चिदानन्दस्वरूप) which it has forgotten like a 'prince brought up in a hunter's family (व्याधकुलसंवर्धितराजकुमारवत्).' So the empirical life comes to an end the moment when the said false identification, arising from the said non-discrimination, disappears under the influence of discriminating knowledge. The disappearance of false identity with the mind and absolute freedom from the so-called joys, sorrows and enjoyments etc. is implied in the conception of Mokṣa. Iśvara is never subject to bondage, since, being dissociated from any psycho-physical organism and altogether disconnected with any empirical environment, the false identification, referred to

1. Siddhāntabindu, P. 223; N.R.P. 223; B.B.V., P. 923, V. 218; P. 1624, V. 1377 etc.

above as the root of bondage, is never possible in the case of Īśvara. There is some sort of nondiscrimination even in the case of Īśvara no doubt and it is on account of this that He is described as Antaryāmin etc. But mere relation to Avidya cannot and does not amount to bondage in so far as the Appearance of Consciousness in Avidya is unaffected by the disintegrating, differentiating and binding action of the mind. However, it must be noted that the true conception of Mokṣa, which, as a matter of fact, is nothing but Brahman—the eternal, unexcellable and untainted Bliss-realised, has no provision for the concept of Īśvara. Hence Brahman, the absolute Reality, pure and selfluminus Consciousness and eternal, unsurpassable and unlimited Bliss, unrelated to and unconcerned with all Appearances, is Moksa[1] par excellence. It may be remarked here that Avidya-nivritti is nothing but Brahman, according to Sureśvara, and hence it follows, as a matter of corollary, that Mokṣa, which is described to be Avidyanivṛtti[2] at many places, can be safely depicted as Brahman, realised. Brahman-Bliss, is the Reality, of which all other pleasures of the world are only appearances and Moksa proper is the very Reality revealed for all times or timelessly as free from any obscuration, relation and limitation. Bondage, on the other hand, consists of *Appearance* (*Ābhāsa*) *of this Reality in any form whatsoever and in* the consequent notion of false identity with the whole psycho-physical organism and conceit "bestowed by the Jīva on the host of things, pleasurable and painful, that constitute the empirical or illusory world" as one's own.

The problem of liberation is one of the puzzling questions of the Advaita system. Two questions have to be particularly answered in this connection, according to various interpretations of the Advaita Philosophy. Is individual liberation (एकजीवमुक्ति) possible or only a universal one (सर्वजीवमुक्ति)?

1. B.B.V.—A.III, B. IX, PP. 1347-49, VV. 186-99.

2. B.B.V., P. 1181, V. 23; P. 1183, V. 37; P. 1181, V. 28; P. 1812, V. 559; P. 916, V. 174; P. 1025; VV. 196-98; P. 1027; V. 210; P. 1309; V. 122; P. 1770, V. 301; V.K.L. PP. 26-27.

Does the supreme or final realisation of Brahman sublate all Karmans—unfructified and fructified—or only the former ones, leading to the possibility of 'liberation in the living state' (जीवन्मुक्ति)?

The doctrine of universal liberation is expounded by Appayya Dikṣita.[1] There has been an attempt at introducing this doctrine even in the Ābhāsa theory of the Advaita-interpretation, as evident from the lines of Brahmānanda[1] in his commentary on the Siddhānta-Bindu, in which he discusses two alternative views of the vārtikakāra as regards the 'Adhiṣṭhāna' of all phenomental appearances being either *'Ābhāsa of Consciousness' or Consciousness non-differentiated from Ābhāsa* (वार्त्तिकमते पक्षद्वयम्। तत्र चिदाभासस्य जगदधिष्ठानत्वपक्षे) आभासाविविक्तचित एव जगदधिष्ठानत्वपक्षे.....)[2]. If Ābhāsa or the primary Appearance of Cit in Avidya (i.e., Īsvara) is to be regarded as Adhiṣṭhāna, it would obviously mean that all other appearances are appearances of this primary Appearance as the real. In this case the natural conclusion will be that only the secondary appearances of Consciousness (and not the primary Appearance) will be annihilated by 'Adhiṣṭhāna-sakṣātkāra' or realisation of the substratum and what would ensue as the residue, with whom that Jīva would become one by intuitive realisation, can possibly be only the said primary Appearance or Īsvara. But there can be no direct realisation of the absolute Reality, the pure Consciousness (Brahman) until the primordial Avidya is finally sublated, leading to the emancipation of all jīvas and the sublation of the whole world. But if Consciousness Itself, only erroneously non-discriminated from Its Appearance in Avidya is held to be the 'Adhiṣṭhāna', Its realisation, consequent on the sublation of Avidya and annihilation of Its Appearance in Avidya as well as its product, the mind, constituting the individual soul, would be intelligibly admissible.

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1. Śivādvaita Nirṇaya-PP. 77-79, P 3-2355-3.2356.
2. N. R., p. 259.

On a careful perusal of the original works of Sureśvara Pādmapādā and Vācaspati no doubt can be left in one's mind that the plurality of individual souls and individual liberation are clearly favoured by all of them. The theory of individual liberation does not in any way militate against that of the oneness of Avidya, upheld by him and some of other Advaitins. Although Avidya or Maya is essentially one, yet it has different modes and plurality of potencies, which being responsible for the outcome of different minds in different bodies, account for the multiplicity of jīvas. When any individual soul is released, it will have to be admitted that the particular mode, potency or aspect of Avidya together with its product, mind, is sublated so far as that realiser is concerned, but it lingers on as usual for other jīvas on account of the persistence of its other modes, potencies and aspects, responsible for constituting those jīvas. At the hands of Sureśvara, however, the problem finds a very easy and intelligible solution. According to him, Avidya is inexplicable in the sense that it is not self-explanatory or self-established but only appears to be an established fact[1] on account of the nonrealisation of the one Reality, whose appearance it is. It is not a concrete object so as to be in need of being destroyed[2] either partially or completely, but being an appearance, it is something apparent, coinciding with non-realisation of Reality and subject to sublation on its realisation only. If this sublation of Avidya takes place at all, it ceases to appear as an established fact and its sublation is nothing but the Reality Itself realised. The sublation of Avidya is both commensurate with and consequent upon the realisation of Reality and when it is finally sublated, it is sublated once for ever and completely to one, who has realised Reality, but it continues to appear as an established fact as usual to others, who have not realised Reality. So there is no question of its sublatability to all, if it is sublated to one, who has realised Reality. Thus there can be no conflict between the oneness of Avidya and

1. B.B.V. – A. III, B. V. P. 1245, V. 42.
2. B.B.V. – A. IV, B. IV, P. 1807, V. 529.

the individual attainment of Mokṣa, according to Sureśvara, as it is not a case of destruction but that of sublation and sublation is altogether different from destruction in as much as the former has for its counter correlation or antithesis appearance and is non-concrete, non-factual and nothing other than realisation of Reality, whereas the latter has for its counter correlation some concrete object (as admitted by other schools of Indian philosophy) and is itself also concrete, factual and an independent category.

The problem of Jīvan-Mukti :—

In the Brahma-Siddhi, two conflicting views about the doctrine of Jīvan-Mukti are noticeable : one ruling it out and the other recognising it. The first view holds that Brahma-realisation brings about the total annihilation of all Karmans, the fructified as well as unfructified, and that it is immediately followed by the falling off of the body and complete liberation from embodied existence. The conflict between this view, which supports 'Sadyo-mukti, and the description of 'Sthita-Prajña' in the Gīta is explained away by interpretting the Sthita-prajña' to be a highly advanced Sādhaka, who has closely reached final realisation and not a Siddha, who has already realised Brahman. Śaṅkarācārya[2] clearly maintains that Brahma-realisation completely annihilates only the accumulated and unfructifying Karmans of the past and prevents any future accumulation of Karmans but it does not destroy those Karmans, which are fructifying through the present body of the realiser and are thus to be taken as a life-force, which is bound to work itself out and sxhaust only through its inevitable consequences even in the case of a living realiser, i.e. one, who has already realised Reality. Such a Jñāni or realiser, free from all other kinds of unfructified Karmans and immune from the possibility of incurring new ones but living only fructifying ones—responsible for the commencement of the present body

1. B.S., P. 130

2. Śāṅkare-bhāṣya on Bra. Sū., 4-1-15 and 19 ; 3-3-32.

and its experiences—is known to be a Jīvan-mukta. Śankara does not doubt or alternate the theory of Jīvan-mukti, but the Brahma-siddhi records a hostile view, rejecting it in the aforesaid manner, as logical and compatible with the Śrutis, dealing with the topic of Mokṣa, although there is an alternative and prima-facie case of Jīvan-mukti also set forth with no less definite reference for it. Thus while Maṇḍana stresses on the soundness of "Sadyo-mukti" and criticises Śankara (as evident from the remark of the Kalpataru[1]), he also shows in unmistakable terms preference for Jīvan-mukti. Maṇḍana delineates[2] Jīvan-mukti by stating that the trace of Avidya, which survives in the case of a Jīvan-mukta 'becomes exceedingly attenuated' and entirely incapacitated to occasion mental and physical experiences of a binding nature, though it brings about the semblance of Bhogas, necessitated by Prārabdha-karmans even then. A Jīvan-mukta's body and physical environment are really sloughed off through Brahma-realisation, though they have not yet completely perished. He further asserts that the force of a trace of Avidya can at the most contribute to the continuation of the Jīvan-mukta's body for some time and that this force is altogether shattered and immensely bruised by Brahma-realisation, But Śankaracharya holds that the force of the Prārabdha karmans cannot be hampered and disturbed in the least and must be admitted to run its complete course in full power through bhogas like the force of a darted arrow.[3] Vimuktātman—the author of the Iṣṭa-siddhi, who follows Śankara and Sureśvara in many respects, has chosen to adopt Maṇḍana's position on the problem of Jīvan-mukti; and Vācaspati,[4] who follows Maṇḍana in many respects, has chosen to deviate from Maṇḍana and follow them in respect of Jivan-mukti. Brahmānanda,[5]

1. Kalpataru, PP. 958-59.
2. B.S., P. 131-Line 21-; P. 132, Line 6.
3. I.S., PP. 74-78.
4. Bhāmati 956-59.
5. Laghu Chandrikā (N.S.P.) P. 3, lines 1-5.

who generally follows Śankara and Sureśvara, has shown his definite preference for the view that Jīvan-mukti is only a so-called Mukti and that Mukti, in the strict sense of the term, is Videha-mukti, concomitant with the total annihilation of the world.

Sureśvara[1] in his Vārtikas echoes Śankara's views on the problem of Jīvan-mukti and upholds that only unfructifying karmans are totally terminated but the kind of karmans, which have actually begun to bear fruit through the present body in the form of the sum total of all appearances thereby, is not annihilated by Brahma-realisation. It continues to work itself out till complete exhaustion or full purification, synchronising with physical death even in the case of a Jñāni, but such a Jñāni, free from unfructified karmans and living out only his fructified karmans, is not at all bound by the latter. Brahma-realisation, says Sureśvara, can have no bearing upon the Prārabdha-Karma, which has already commenced its play and must exhaust itself out till the falling off of the body. The force of the fructified karman cannot be abruptly stopped like the force of an arrow, already discharged, or the potter's wheel, already set in motion. It must spend itself out and come to an end with the termination of the current corporal form and present psychic organism. The state of Kaivalya or Videha-mukti, which consists in one's becoming absolutely free from any possibility of living in the present or the future body ensues the moment when the present body of a Jñāni falls off. The persistence of body even after final realisation by a Jīvan-mukta does not in any way constitute bondage; because the enlightened and emancipated soul, that is, a Jivan-mukta, which has realised itself to be Brahman—the Absolute Reality, Pure Consciousness and Unlimited Bliss—and still continues to live in a state of non-discrimination from the unreal Appearance, repeatedly described above, and consequent identity with the psycho-physical organism. To a Jīvan-mukta, the appearance

1. B.B.V. PP. 735-41; N.S., PP. 196-202.

of the body and the world, indespensable for life and occasioned by Prarabdha-karmans (देहाभास-संसाराभास-द्वय), that are to be annihilated once for ever only on the termination of the functioning body, are practically nullified and totally incapacitated in as much as they have no more any reality and value for the Jīvan-mukta. Thus Mokṣa can be established to be purely a personal concern of each individual soul.

The condition of a Jīvan-mukta :—

The final and intuitional Brahma-realisation,[1] arising from the Mahāvākyas through the process of Śravaṇa, Manana and Nididhyāsana, sublates Avidya and all that it entails and implies, excepting the present psycho-physical organism i.e. the body and the mind, which lasts till the originating karmans, fructifying through it, are exhausted. On the sublation of Avidya, responsible through its effect, the mind, for the particular jīva-bhava, the fundamental Appearance of Consciousness therein —constituting the particular jīva —together with all consequent empirical appearances is scraped out altogether so far as that particular jīva is concerned. This does not mean, however, an absolute erasement of the Appearance of Consciousness in the mind, since it still survives in a subtle form, though dead and paralysed for all practical purposes of a binding character. It paters out but persists in an ashy, bruised and disrupted condition, that is, only in as much active condition as necessary for sustaining or supporting the persistent physical and psychical accompaniments, necessary for fructification of the remaining Prārabdha-Karmans. The entire psycho-physical organism continues as usual, but the actuating force or the energising principle, namely, Avidyā—the source of all empirical disturbances in the shape of various appearances, disintegrating influences and their evil consequences—is no more so active as to drag it on in the plane of empirical pursuits and their objects. So there is no Avidya in its full swing of powers and potencies in the post-realisation period but what persists even then is

1. B.B.V., p. 915, V. 173; p. 1060, V. 167.

the faintest crease of Avidya or only so much of the augean stable of Avidya as is necessary for supporting the mere maintenance of the still continuous psycho-physical organism and all that is ordained or destined to be fulfilled through it as the fructification of the Prarabdha-Karmans. Simultaneously with the destruction of this psycho-physical organism, the augean stable of Avidya also is mopped up and all that is with it empirical about the Soul and then what survives of the Soul as its essence, is absolute Reality, pure Consciousness and real Bliss. So in the case of Jivanmukta, whose body and mind linger on even after the attainment of Mokṣa till the complete exhaustion of the Prārabdha-Karmans, the Appearance of Consciousness in and through the said psycho-physical organism, necessary for the maintenance and functioning of the latter, does not constitute any bondage; because Pure Consciousness, which the released soul has realised itself to be, does no longer labour under any false notion of non-discrimination from Its Appearance in and consequent identification with any of the limiting adjuncts. In other words, although the said Appearance is to go away absolutely only along with the termination of the body, yet together with the Jīvan-mukta's mind and psycho-physical environment it is practically annulled and sloughed off then and there, that is, instantaneously after the Brahman is realised by the Mumukṣu as the only Reality. In fact Avidya and its consequent non-realisational effects are enfeebled gradually from the very memont since when a seeker of asobute Reality advances properly on the path of realisation.

So a Jīvan-mukta does not necessarily cease to act, but he is above all selfish and binding acts, as he has no more attachments and aversions, elections and exclusions and fascinations and fears etc. and is immence from all governing motives, impulses, conceptions and considerations of emperical life. The common laws of individual and social, that is, relative morality and the consideration of relative truths and consequent pragmatic values have no more any meaning for the Jīvan-mukta, as they

are significant only for one, who is striving for perfection and not for one, who has already achieved it through realisation. A Jīvan-mukta does no longer aspire for and try to cultivate virtues such as compassion etc., but reveals them by nature like breathing. In short, a Jīvan-mukta is one, who has intuited Brahman, and is thus Brahman, though still appearing in and through the bruised, invalidated and almost ineffective receptacle, the psycho-physical organism, and wallowing, as it were, even then in the murky atmosphere of all psychical and physical accompaniments as usual. Any association with whatever is empirical may be an outward appearance about a Jīvan-mukta to those, who have not realised Reality, but to the Jīvan-mukta nothing of fascinations and fears and prospects and failures, which are binding and delimiting forces of life, exists at all. The Divine Enlightenment or Brahma-realisation dissolves all complications of dienlegrating factors into pure Unity and reduces the duality of Soul and non-soul and mind and matter etc. to pure and simple Essence, free from all kinds of differentiations or bare Oneness, devoid of all differences, characterisations, relations and limitations etc. Thus a Jivan-mukta, though apparently related to the body and the mind, is conceptually and essentially unrelated to them and all their activities, defilements and disturbances. This is the true conception of a Jivan-mukta, according to the Advaita system of philosophy.

For any Soul, that is emancipated or released, the process of time, just as the whole phenomenal world, ceases to have any existence and meaning. All the approximate and proximate means to Brahma-realisation come about in and through time, the compulsory karmans and moral deeds are performed in time; the purification of the mind and the desire to realise Reality, the Brahman, arise in time; renunciation of the worldly desires and their objects, cultivation of spiritual qualities such as शम, दम etc. and constant application to the proximate means—Śravaṇa, accompanied by Manan and Nididhyāsana—take place in time; and even the direct Brahma-realisation,

derived from the Supreme scriptual passages, and consequent sublation of Avidyā as well as annihilation of all other appearances occur in time, but what emerges finally as the residue on the termination of all the finite but necessary spiritual stages is the infinite and a-temporal pure Consciousness, the Brahman, of which all the worldly phenomena are only appearances in and through Avidya, and which is ever-attained to the Realiser but only seems as if unattained throughout the period of bondage owing to Avidyā. To put it briefly, for one, who has attained Brahmahood, "Time also ceases to appear by means of acts in time and at a particular point of time." Strictly speaking, the attainment of Mokṣa in a particular period of time whether on death or at a previous instant (respectively represented by videhamukti or Jivan-mukti) has no meaning to a released Soul (whether jivan-mukta or videha-mukta) but is purely a creation of the imagination of those, who still remain steeped in Avidyā, since for the Soul, which has realised itself to be one with Brahman, which is beyond time, there is no time, not because 'time committed suicide in time', but because for It the appearance of time was not, is not and will never be.

The object of Brahma-realisation :—

It is one of the most difficult problems of the Advaita vedanta as to what is the exact nature of Brahman, which forms the content of intuitional realisation, derived from the *Mahāvākyas*. It cannot be pure Consciousness; because the assumption of Its becoming content of immediate and intuitional realisation would run counter to the notion of Its being transendent and absolute Reality or pure Consciousness, which does not allow any limitation or division of subjectivity and objectivity etc. in Itself. Brahman, conditioned by Avidyā, also cannot be so for the simple reason that the psychosis, characterising Avidyā or any of its products, is held

to be incapable of sublating Avidyā (अविद्यातत्कार्यान्यतराविषयिण्या एव वृत्तेरविद्यानिवर्त्तकत्वम्). Advaitins have offered various solutions of this problem in conformity with the fundamental line, adopted and adhered to by each of them in general interpretation of the Advaita system, but it is not necessary to refer in detail to all of them here, since many of them are identical, though expressed in different words and are mere developments of thoughts in the Advaita literature as, worked out by post-Śaṅkar Advaitins. Hence, only important views, which serve as distinct landmarks in the progress of Advaitic thoughts, are dealt with here. According to Sureśvaracarya, however, the content of the ultimate and intuitional Brahma-realisation, which puts an end to the empirical life and all it entails and implies once for ever, is the Consciousness, not conditioned by any empirical object, but appearing in and conditioned only by the pure psychosis of the Mumukṣu (i.e. the individual going to be released immediately), having for its content and modified and modelled after that Consciousness alone, but not objectifying that Consciousness in any way (वृत्त्यनवच्छिन्न-वृत्त्युपहित-वृत्तिगताभासप्रतियोगिचित्). Brahma-realisation is devoid of the distinction of the knower and the known etc.[1] This last psychosis must be accepted to be comparatively pure, as it is free from the contamination of any empirical objective mould in it and even the mind, whose modification it is, is the mind that has already been purified long before as a result of the performance of compulsory rites and other virtuous deeds and moral duties, which, as Sureśvara says, after directing the intellect to the inner Self through purification, disappear like clouds at the end of the rainy season[2] and is getting distilled more and more as it advances through the process of realisation. However, for the removal of this final psychosis, the last term of

1. B. B. V., p. 494, V. 318.

2. N. S., 1-46, p. 31 ; B. B, V., p. 702, V. 1350,

phenomenal series, nothing else is needed. Just as the powder of Kataka, thrown in water, separates and removes dirt from water and also itself; similarly Brahma-*Sākṣātkāra* or Supreme Brahma-realisation, sublates Avidyā and all its products and also goes away itself. Many other similes have been used in the Advaita literature, which, being too well-known, need not be repeated here.

Nature of Avidyā-Nivṛtti:

The nature of *Avidyā-nivṛtti* is a very favourite question with some critics of the Advaita system, as they make its use as a stumbling block for Advaitins. By proving the impossibility of *Avidyā-nivṛtti*, they attack *Avidyā* itself as a proposition or postulate, which is inconceivable and inadmissible. There are only four possible ways of explaining its nature but non of them, the opponents contend, is tenable. It cannot be 'Sat', since such a conception of its nature would obviously come into conflict with and militate against the monism of the Advaita doctrine. It cannot be regarded as 'Asat' or absolutely nothing, which the Advaitin dismisses as an impossible conception. The third alternative of its being both 'Sat' and 'Asat' is discarded as a self-discrepant notion. The fourth alternative of its being neither of the two, that is, '*Anirvacanīya*' is also excluded on the ground that both *Avidyā* and *Avidyā-nivṛtti* cannot be conceived and characterised in the same manner. "As the negation of Bhāva is Abhāva or other than Bhāva and the negation of Abhāva is Bhāva or other than Abhāva, so the negation of Avidya, which is *anirvacaniya*, must be other than *Anirvacaniya*". Moreover, Avidyā-nivṛtti can be held to be either as identical with Brahman or as different from It. On the former view, being identical with and as eternal as Brahman, it would preclude the possibility of Avidya altogether for the Jīva and there would then be no *Saṃsāra* and hence no need for striving for *Mokṣa*. On the latter view, an obvious contradiction of the central doctrine of the Advaita school, namely, monism, is unavoidable.

In order to solve all these possible objections two prominent views about the nature of Avidyā Nivṛtti have been enunciated by Advaitins. Vimuktātman, the author of the 'Iṣṭasiddhi' formulates the view that Avidā-nivṛtti is of the fifth kind, which may be compared to the 'imaginary number' of mathematicians. He also accepts and supports as an alternative explanation one of the above-noted conceptions and recognises Avidyā-nivṛtti as 'anivarcanīya', since both of them being not realities can be equally explained as such without any fear of contradiction or logical inconsistancy.

The Siddhāntalesa ascribes this view to Ānandabodha, the author of the 'Nyāya-makaranda', who flourished two centuries later than Prakāsātman. In page 357 of the Nyāya-makaranda, a mention is made also of the second above-quoted view, according to which Avidyā-Nivṛtti is 'anirvacanīya' and the commentator, Citsukhācārya identifies this as the author's own view. Without making any long and serious deliberation on this point, this much may be safely pointed out that Prakāsātman, as shown above, formulated and supported both these views long before and Ānandabodha only followed him in enunciating and developing them.

Before making any attempt at the elucidation of the exact nature of Avidyā-nivṛtti, it is essential to make a passing reference to a well-established tradition, which recognises two ways of viewing the Advaita doctrine. One of them is named as 'Bhāvādvaita or Sadadvaita, that is 'Ens-monism'—a doctrine of the Advaita, which recognises only one Absolute Reality (i. e. Brahman) of a positive kind. But this does not exclude negative realities such as Avidyā-Nivṛtti or sublation of Nescience and Sansāra-Nivṛtti or negation of the world—the absolutely irreducible minimums of truth supported by the Upaniṣadic teachings. The monism of the Advaita, which repudiates only a second positive reality, does not come into

clash with the recognition of negative realities such as Avidyā-Nivṛtti and Sansāra-Nivṛtti. This view is attributable, according to Vedantic tradition[1] in Advaita and Dvaita classics, to Maṇḍanamiśra, although he does not use the expression 'bhāvādvaita' in the Brahma Siddhi. Whatever may be the grounds, inspiring the later Advaitins to ascribe this view to Maṇḍana, one thing is certain and evident from the perusal of the Brahmasiddhi that Maṇḍana oscillates between the two views on the point, as he equates Avidyā-Nivṛtti with Brahma-realisation at one place in the Brahmasiddhi and enunciates and glorifies 'Bhāvādvaita' at another, i.e. in the siddhikanda[2] of the same work. Brahmānanda explicates, develops and clarifies this view of Maṇḍana later on. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī also clearly states that this is the view, accepted by Vimuktātman and others for all practical purposes. In sharp contrast to this view of an accomodating type is the other view of an uncompromising nature, which is vindicated and amplified by Sureśvara in his Vārtikas and which denies the reality of all categories—positive and negative—as merely so many appearances of the one absolute Reality, the Brahman. These two views have given rise to different conception of *Avidyā-Nivṛtti* in the post-Sankara Advaita literature.

In the Siddhāntaleśa the view of Avidyā-Nivṛtti, being Atman Itself, is attributed to Maṇḍana as the author of the Brahmasiddhi. But in the Brahmasiddhi one does not come across any passage, which sets forth this view in so many words as available in the Siddhāntaleśa. This much is certainly given there that Ātma-Sākṣātkāra is itself Avidyā-Nivṛtti, i.e. the cessation of Nescience and that this Ātma-Sākṣātkāra

1. A. S., p. 467—वस्तुतस्तु अविद्यानिवृत्तेः पञ्चमप्रकारत्वं च भावाद्वैतत्वं चानभ्युपगमपराहतम्"; Laghu Candrika, p. 885-"नहि तस्या भावाद्वैतं मुख्यार्थः" and p. 326, ls. 12-23 ; V.K.L., p. 26, ls. 3-7 ; 9-5, pp. 83-93 (chapt. VIII) ; Advaita ratna-rekṣaṇa, p. 18, line 14 and p. 22, l. 2, N. M. (Kumb.) Part I, p. 198, l. 1 and Part IV, p. 1, c. 4.

2. B. S., Part I, p. 157.

is nothing other than Atman. Citsukhācārya quotes a line from the Brahmasiddhi and establishes Ajñāna-Nivṛtti to be Brahma-jñāna, according to its author. He holds further that Vimuktātman also supports the same view.

In the Vārtikas,[1] however, repeated statements are avilable, which go to establish unequivocally that, according to Sureśvara, Avidyā-Nivṛtti i.e. sublation of Nescience and Sansāra-Nivṛtti i.e. negation of the world are pure Consciousness, the Brahman, and nothing other than It. Just as the positive silver (in the case of an illusion) is nothing but the nacre, obscured by nescience in and about it, and the negation of silver is nothing but the same nacre, known or realised as such; similarly the whole phenomenal world is nothing but absolute Reality, enshrouded by Avidyā, the Cosmic Nescience, and the negation of the world also is noting but the same absolute Reality, the pure Consciousness, realised. Thus absolute Reality or Brahman Itself is the socalled negation of world, which ceases to have any existence and reality at all with reference to all the three periods of time—past, present and future—for one, by whom this one Reality has been finally realised. Avidya, as already described in the chapter thereon, is inadventitiously associated with Brahman, having It both as its locus and content. It is indeterminable as other than or indentical with Brahman and as lying outside or within It, but it must be assumed in Brahman Itself in order to account for the otherwise inexplicable production and appearance of the unreal world. It is अविचारित-संसिद्ध, that is, worthy of being presumed as existing only so long as the intuitional realisation of Brahman has not arisen. Sublation of such an Avidya, which cannot amount to any actual negation or destruction, cannot but be explained in terms of merely an unshakable and indubious realisation of the one absolute Reality, which totally and absolutely denies or

1. B.B.T., P. 916, V. 574; P. 1025, VV. 1—98; P. 1027, V. 210! P. 1309, 122; P. 1770, V. 301; V.K.L, PP. 26,27, B.B.V., P. 1348, VV.1590-21; P. 306, V. 28; P. 357, V. 52.

2. B.B.V., A. IV, B. IV, P. 1807, V. 529.

excludes the existence and reality of anything, positive or negative, other than itself. Thus Suresvara equates Avidyā-Nivṛtti with Brahman—the absolute Reality, pure Consciousness and unlimited Bliss—and does not allow it any status of independent reality at all. It supervenes as the last term of phenomenal series and, therefore, it appears as something phenomenal but in essence the cessation of Avidya and its products is not distinguishable at all from Itself, as in all cases of appearances unexceptionally nothing new or other than the underlying reality is created and destroyed at all.

Nature of the attainment of Mokṣa :—

Attainment of Mokṣa and abandonment of empirical adjuncts are only "attainment as it were" and "abandonment as it were", brought about by Brahma-realisation, according to Suresvara's theory of 'Ābhāsa'. This point has been clarified by Vācaspati in his well-known work, Bhāmatī, in the following words: "Even a thousand rope-cognitions cannot, indeed, alter the character of the really present snake. In the case, however, of those apparent snakes, which are imposed and are perchance desired to be either attained or abandoned, it is possible to attain them as it were or abandon them as it were by mere intuition of the underlying reality, irrespective of any extrinsic observance, for they exist in super-impositions alone". Brahmānanda also echoes the same voice, when he says "In our doctrine Avidyā-Nivṛtti is not accepted to be any empirical destruction or negation". The cessation or non-existence of Avidyā is altogether null and void in the same sense as its previous existence, accreditted along with Brahman only to account for the otherwise inexplicable phenomena of the world. Avidya is an appearance arising from and lying in about the Brahman, it is the constant Appearance of Brahman in it, which keeps on energising, animating and enlivening it and rendering it fit for all practical purposes in the incessant divine scheme of alternatively recurrent folding or unfolding of the phenomenal

1. Sambandha-Vartika, p. 242, VII. 884-88 ; V. K. L., P. 25.

world. The absolute cessation of this fundamental appearance, namely, Avidyā, which is the colossal condition of the whole empirical life, consequent on its sublation through direct Brahma-realisation, is the conception of Mokṣa in the primary sense of the word; and oneness of the Jīva with Brahman, the absolute Reality, pure Consciousness and unlimited Bliss, is Mokṣa par excellence. Thus the final consummation of the upward progress or spiritual advancement of a Mumukṣu implies the abrogation of the ego together with the whole brood of its limitations or the disruption of a false identity of what is really pure Consciousness-unlimited, unrelated and transcendent—with the receptables of Its seeming Appearances, serving as so many various limiting adjuncts. This is what is implied by Mokṣa, the summun bonum of life, the culmination of all advancements, prosperities and the highest perfection, which means the realisation of one and one only without any second—the plenum of absolute Reality, pure Consciousness and unlimited Bliss.

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Errata

Chapter I

		Correct :—	Incorrect :—
P. 1,	L. 3	over	all
P. 3,	L. 30	-Pāda	-vade
P. 4,	L. 22	unitary	nnitary
P. 12,	L. 24	svacitta	swacitta
P. 15,	L. 18	-sambandha	-samvandhe
P. 16,	L. 29	-vāda	-vāta
P. 17,	L. 16	garland	graland
P. 18,	L. 7	cause as substratum	cause-substratum
P. 30,	L. 7	values in varying	values. If varyging
P. 33,	L. 3	behind	of
P. 41,	L. 2	The third	Third
,, ,,	L. 11	and the same	and same
P. 43,	L. 8	or	of
P. 46,	L. 31	by	of
P. 51,	L. 7	Simulaera	echoes
P. 54,	L. 24	and appear to be	these
P. 59,	L. 26	is	will be

Chapter II

P. 96,	L. 9	of	if
P. 101,	L. 2	serve	serves
P. 103,	L. 4	appearances-that	appearances-and It
,, ,,	L. 26	aggrandisations	affrandisations
P. 104,	L. 9	something	samething
P. 105,	L. 18	abode and the abider	the subject & the predicate
,, ,,	,, ,,	the subject	the object

Chapter III

		Correct :—	Incorrect :—
P. 136,	L. 14	hereunder about	hereunder to
P. 139,	L. 25	and square	square
P. 143,	L. 6	no	on
,, ,,	,, 7	as	aas
,, ,,	,, 16	They exist in the form of impressions and arise	They arise and exist in they form of impressions.
P. 144,	L. 6	of the one Reality	of the Reality
,, ,,	L. 24	adjunct	anjunct
,, ,,	L. 25	all-pervading	all pervading
,, ,,	L. 31	all-pervading	all pervading
P. 145,	L. 24	through the bond of temporary union	by the bond of union
P. 150,	L. 8	to	against
P. 152,	L. 10	the cognition	cognition
P. 157,	L. 17	hold	assert

Chapter IV

P. 182,	L. 18	attaches	assigns
P. 184,	L. 9	karmans	karma

Chapter V

P. 244,	L. 2	Bandha & Mokṣa	bondage & Mokṣa
P. 245,	L. 10	Bliss realised	Bliss-realised
P. 251,	L. 17	a particular	the particular
,, ,,	L. 21	अन्तःकरण (Antahkaraṇa)	mind
P. 252,	L. 31	immune	immence

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