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Social Policies
IN THE MAKING

A Dynamic View of Social Problems

BY

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PREFACE

HUMAN BEINGS have never before been called upon to cope with such rapid changes, to meet such urgent challenges to personal adaptability as now. Never have social institutions been more torn between demands of the present and of tradition. Never before has the individual been expected to decide so many questions for himself without the guide of precedent, for society now fails to define adequately the situations with which he must come to terms. Never have young people been asked to bridge so wide a gap between dependent childhood and self-regulated adulthood, to leave so completely the family nest and neighborhood environs and go out into a world of strangers.

But in contrast, never has life offered so much variety, stimulation, breadth, and personal freedom. Never has man been able so completely to master the natural universe in which he is placed or to cover so much space in so little time. Never have so many peoples of varying backgrounds and racial strains come into close contact, or so many colorful and diverse cultures become cross-fertilized. Never has mankind had such an opportunity to achieve a world culture in the broader spheres of political administration.

There are still many peoples and many cultures, but the time has come when there must be one world in a more real sense than at any previous time in human history. Contemporary American youth must now include not only the continent but the world in their domain of movement and activity.

The college-trained must be at home in many groups and understand the customs and values of other groups and peoples along with their own. Institutions of higher learning must therefore prepare young people to function in all social climates and to take their place in a world society.

But this is not a book of sermons. It is designed to orient youth to the major social forces operating in modern society and show how they affect individual adjustment and social problems. It is an analysis of contemporary social problems as they emerge

from the experience of man in a rapidly changing culture which roots deeply in a more stable past.

Emphasis is placed on problems of our time not merely for the purpose of describing symptoms of maladjustment but rather in order to present the social forces that have caused them to emerge in their present form and to point out ways in which these forces may be employed to ease adjustment. We are still inclined to be too much disturbed about the symptoms of maladjustment, too little about the deeper forces that produce the symptoms. We see the rash on the social order, and treat it with salves and ointments instead of recognizing it as an allergy and changing the diet. The treatment herein is therefore in a broader sense a summary of the social trends of our age and an attempt to understand their meaning for the present generation in terms of personal adjustments, social problems, and needed changes in the social structure.

In style the book is designed for the college student in the lower division who is usually escorted through one of three courses: social problems, social pathology, or social science orientation. Either course is at best a smattering presentation of many problems rather than a penetrating analysis of any. The most one can hope to achieve is to develop a point of view, a perspective for understanding.

To help in this vital objective, Part I gives a brief survey of the disturbing forces of a dynamic society which are the underlying cause of the numerous symptomatic manifestations called social problems.

The approach is dominated by a socio-cultural point of view rather than an eclectic one. While much can be said in favor of the latter from the standpoint of scientific neutrality, it is pedagogically weak as a method of approach at the sophomore level. Confusion rather than understanding is likely to result. The merit of a unified approach is that focusing attention on a point of view makes the broader outlines of social forces and resulting problems stand out distinctly in the student's mind. The merit of an approach centered about socio-cultural forces is that it stresses that phase of the problem situation to the understanding of which social scientists have made a significant contribution. Moreover, because the folklore of our culture is dominated by biological and psychological concepts, the student already overvalues these forces. The socio-cultural view, therefore, has most

to offer in the way of revolutionizing the student's thinking in the field of social problems. This approach should establish in his mind the view that there is an essential cultural unity in these problems. He should also be able to see that major social reforms must come in the socio-cultural realm if more effective personal and social adjustments are to be realized.

When a group recognizes a phenomenon as a social problem, it is already on its way to a solution. Modern man has never been content to leave unchallenged a situation which he recognizes as problematic. He begins seeking a remedy. Awareness of difficulty is in itself a hopeful sign. It is in this fringe of consciousness that change and inventions come. Redefinition of situations is continually extending the fringe and thus recognizing new social problems. Once, for instance, it was thought sufficient to keep a man from starving to death; now a guarantee of a job and an annual wage is considered the remedy for the poverty that results from inadequate income.

Our approach is therefore constructive even though our attention is focused on problems. It recognizes that the social forces which produce problems are often the beginning steps in a necessary transition to a new integration required by broader changes in the social and cultural framework. Our plea throughout is that rational social policy replace the outworn folkways and mores that still dominate many phases of behavior and administration where social science has offered a better guide.

Social policy involves (1) a redefinition of situations, (2) a location of the forces producing maladjustments, and (3) correction through rationally conceived procedures. In our society this often calls for social reform and social legislation. Youth must be challenged to action in these directions and not left with a feeling that modern society is so hopelessly disorganized that no effective action can be taken.

Acknowledgment is made to the following magazines in which I have published in article form various passages or sections reproduced herein: *Social Forces*, *Survey Midmonthly*, *School and Society*, *School Review*, *Clearing House*, *Current History*, *Forum*, *National Parent Teacher*, *National Digest*, and *Digest and Review*. I wish also to express my appreciation to Miss Dorothy Boyland for preparing the index.

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
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PART I

DYNAMIC PROCESSES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY



Press Association, Inc.

The human maze is becoming ever more complex, demanding more effective social organization.



PART I

DYNAMIC PROCESSES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

THE FACTORS of social causation must of necessity be selected by some pragmatic standard. The forces bearing on the life of man, his society, and his culture are legion and as ancient as human experience. One can found an analysis of social change on far distant forces or, nearer home, on forces which are currently active. In this book attention is directed to those forces which seem to be most immediately connected with maladjustments in current society and of which an understanding is the first step toward better adjustment. Certainly mobility, urbanization, rapidity of cultural change, the appearance of secondary-group society, and the dominance of secular philosophy — natural results of the industrial and agricultural revolutions — are some of the most dynamic forces productive of both problems and progress in the Western world, particularly in the United States.

We concern ourselves, therefore, in this introductory section with (1) the kind of culture man has built about him, once relatively simple, now extremely complex; once relatively static, now dynamic in tempo as compared with primitive or strictly agrarian cultures; (2) the kind of population aggregates in which man lives, once essentially rural and scattered, now essentially urban and dense; (3) the kind of residence that characterizes man's habit of life, once stable, rooted in the same community for a lifetime, now highly mobile; (4) the kind of group experience that characterizes man's associations, once primary in character, now essentially secondary; once intimate, but now to an increasing degree impersonal; and (5) man's conception of the universe and of his place in it, once based on a belief in the miraculous, now on science; social control once rooted in divine authority, now in the precepts of men.

CHAPTER 1

CULTURAL CHANGE

The Growing Complexity of Culture

IT WOULD hardly be stretching the facts of history to say that complexity of culture is the best measure of man's progress. There have always been those who were ready to argue that naked man at birth is free and that civilization everywhere is a chain of bondage. Rousseaus have rebelled and Thoreaus have taken to the woods to live by quiet ponds, but in their escape these persons have sought to cultivate what they chose of the fruits of culture, not to destroy culture itself. Anthropologists have written wistfully of the beauty of the life and customs of primitive people of simple culture, but when they live among primitives they are likely to sleep on air mattresses and use gasoline camp stoves.

Although culture has developed with rapid strides in the industrialized parts of the world it is far from having reached the stagnant and dismal state described in Stephen Leacock's ironic essay "The Man in Asbestos," wherein humanity having achieved perfection strives only to maintain the *status quo*. In that imaginary world new inventions were not sought. Enough asbestos suits had been manufactured to last forever. There was no death. Men lived on cautiously forever, avoiding the risk of getting broken. There was no quest for youth and beauty, for there was no marriage or need of marriage. Without death there was no need for birth. The natural universe having been completely conquered, there was no need for improvement in culture.

The growing complexity and effectiveness of man's culture is revealed in the cultural ages which mark the great epochs in history. The first steps are defined by man's successive use of different structural materials: (1) stone, (2) iron, (3) steel. The later developments are marked by his harnessing of energy to drive machines: (1) steam, (2) electricity, and (3) atomic power.

In increasing the complexity of external arrangements, such

new developments also act as important forces in bringing about diversity in man's customs, conventions, morals, and folkways. But each age marks a step forward in man's conquest of nature and in his dominion over space and time. Each brings him nearer the goal of a controlled natural environment. Each vastly increases the complexity of material culture.

We should note that change in nonmaterial phases of culture — customs, conventions, etc. — is a result not only, perhaps not even primarily, of the growing complexity of material culture. Man's conceptions of the universe have also changed immeasurably, and along with these changed conceptions have come new notions of social arrangements, of morality, of religion, of law, and of other aspects of social control.

For millenniums man conceived of the natural world as being static, as having no force of change within itself. Change was considered a miraculous occurrence, and nature and man were thought of as being in the hands of capricious gods. Man did not conceive of himself as a culture builder, able to master the natural environment and subject it to his will through invention. The conception of the world as governed by natural law, a cultural conception that evolved slowly in man's thinking, is no less important, though it is less tangible, than the invention of processes for making iron and steel. Or again, the evolutionary theory, which transformed man's conception of the natural world from a world of stability to one of eternal flux and change, is no less significant than the harnessing of electrical energy. It is significant that the cultural concept of evolution in its fuller development was soon applied, beyond the realm of nature, to man's social relations and economic developments. So also with the theory of relativity. This was a dynamic cultural invention not only in the field of science but also in the field of morals and philosophy. The conception of a relative as compared with an absolute morality has been epoch-making in human experience.

These developments in material and nonmaterial aspects of culture are interdependent. One may be cause and the other effect, or vice versa. As related aspects of culture they supplement and reinforce each other. Our age has been especially impressed with the dominance of material culture change because this has been so obvious and so rapid.

Both ancient myth and modern science are ways of satisfying man's inquiring mind by providing explanations of how things

have come to be as they are and why natural forces behave as they do, but the perspectives opened by the two methods of explanation are worlds apart. The mythical conception calls for avoidance and placation: humor the gods, provide sacrifices, be wary of offending them if you are to achieve success and avoid evil. The scientific conception calls for enlightenment, invention, and vigorous attempts at control. It places before man an unlimited universe for understanding and mastery. Man faces life, not in a mood of resignation and fear but in one of defiance and faith.

The Cumulative Nature of Culture

Someone wishing to stress the cumulative nature of culture has said that the modern eighth grade schoolboy knows more than Aristotle knew. His was no effort to prove that the average child of today is born with more ability than the average Greek of Aristotle's time, but rather to point up the fact that the race has learned a great deal since that time and that much of our accumulated knowledge is now so commonplace that by the age of fourteen the average youngster has acquired it as a matter of course. The eighth grade schoolboy cannot make the integrations of knowledge or manipulate abstract symbols as the great Greek philosopher did. But what did Aristotle know of gasoline engines that run from a spark inside; of machines that float over the highways at sixty or more miles an hour on rubber cushions filled with air; of the laws of physics, mathematics, and chemistry that make the flight of heavier-than-air craft possible? Even the telephone and the radio, which modern youth takes for granted, would bewilder Aristotle if he were suddenly to appear on the scene.

One could fill pages with the common knowledge and experience of the eighth grade schoolboy which would baffle not only a man of 350 B.C. but our own great grandfathers. Our fathers saw the radio come; we have seen the appearance of television. Our fathers saw flight made practical; we see the emergence of travel in the stratosphere at speeds and under conditions that bring the fantastic ventures of Buck Rogers of 1940 so near to reality that Buck's ventures have to be pushed even further into the realm of imagination. To our grandfathers the world of Aristotle seemed small and simple indeed. Our grandfathers' world now seems to us narrow, circumscribed, and elementary.

We naturally expect that the world in which we ourselves live will, twenty years from now, seem simple compared with a world in which rocket planes may already be out of date and superforts may be interesting relics of the barbaric years of World War II.

This cultural accumulation is the result of the invention of new cultural traits and of the borrowing of traits from other cultures. Both processes have been greatly expanded in the modern world. It is a general principle that the more inventions are made, the more can be made, since one invention leads to a series of others. Moreover, the more elaborate the culture of a people, the more place they are likely to find in it for borrowed elements from other cultures. Both invention and borrowing therefore speed up change.

Chapin[1] has cited evidence to indicate the usual pattern of cultural accumulation in both material and nonmaterial culture. In the field of material culture he uses the example of the sulky plow, tracing its development from the time it became a marketable product and showing the number of improvements added by periods. He finds that the number of additions tends to increase for a period after an invention is put to use and then gradually tapers off. For example, from 1855 to 1859, thirty-five new patents were issued on the sulky plow. Additions multiplied until the period of 1880 to 1884, when 164 patents were issued. The rate then fell off rapidly. By 1920 to 1923, the last period studied, only three patents were added.

In the field of nonmaterial culture Chapin describes a similar cycle. For example, he traces the number of cities adopting the commission form of government. In the year 1901 only one addition was made to the number of cities having this form of government, which was then relatively new. By 1913, fifty-three other cities adopted the plan in a single year. The rate gradually fell off from that peak until 1923, when only two cities adopted it.

Practically all the examples he cites, both in the material and nonmaterial spheres, show that there is an initial period of slow accumulation of new culture traits; a middle period, when the growth curve goes up rapidly; and a final period, in which new additions are few, indicating that a stage of relative perfection

[1] F. STUART CHAPIN, *Cultural Change*, Chapter 12. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1928.

has been reached. The greater the number of basic inventions made in a culture, the more numerous are these cycles of invention leading to the development and perfection of particular material objects or machines.

Added to the inventive process there is, in an age of world contact and communication, extensive borrowing of culture from other peoples and places. The importance of this force in cultural change in our society can best be appreciated by a contrast.

Corporal Margaret Hastings, a WAC who survived a bomber crash in Hidden Valley, an isolated primitive area of New Guinea, describes the natives' reaction to the Americans' more efficient tools [2]:

> Every piece of equipment we had in camp fascinated the natives. Yet they wanted none of it. They would use a good GI axe or jungle knife when working for us. But they reverted to the stone axe the minute they had anything to do for themselves. They were too smart to permit a few chance visitors from Mars to change the rhythm of centuries.

Here was a people who had never been disturbed by contact with different ways of life. They had no use for the new even when its greater efficiency was demonstrated.

When one speaks of modern society as dynamic, he actually means that modern society has developed the techniques of inventing and borrowing culture as no society has ever done before. By applying these processes of change, modern culture grows rapidly and changes quickly. It becomes ever more inventive and ever more complex.

Personality in a Complex Culture

Ogburn [3] has asked a penetrating question: "Has the speed of cultural change become too great for man?" Can this animal stand the rapid shift of culture that is characteristic of a modern world? Can he stand readaptation to the machine, readjustments to new ideas and philosophies, new arrangements of marriage and of family life? Is the burden of civilization becoming too great for him to carry?

[2] MARGARET HASTINGS, "A Wac in Shangri-La." *The Reader's Digest*, 47:11, November, 1945. (Condensed from an International News feature.)

[3] W. F. OGBURN, *Social Change*, Part V. Viking Press, New York, 1923.

If civilization is a burden, the burden has certainly become greater from generation to generation. From a different point of view, however, one may say that the accumulation of things and ideas which each new generation has to work with is greater and that actually, therefore, the lot of man has been made easier. Humanity, especially in the Western world, has as a matter of record acted on the second philosophy. There has been an increasing tendency to replace the natural by the man-made, to give man a life superior to that which nature people have possessed. Every improvement that man has made throughout the ages is due to the fact that he is not satisfied with nature. He has the audacity to assume that he can improve upon it.

In the early days there were those who made dire predictions concerning the effect of the automobile on man the animal. They said that he would almost completely lose his capacity to move, that his legs would shrivel up from lack of vigorous exercise. When Edison invented the incandescent bulb, men were afraid to use it for fear it would blow up and kill them. Morton, discoverer of anaesthesia, was driven to insanity by persecution. The men who persecuted him feared that putting men to sleep would endanger their souls by robbing them of a last chance for repentance before they underwent an operation. Leading physicians and ministers were in the vanguard of the attacks. Contraception by artificial means likewise was condemned as unnatural, and therefore as destructive and immoral; yet birth control has become almost universal. There are those now, in the early days of atomic energy, who claim that man will destroy himself or blow the earth away in one great explosion.

It is natural for man to fear the new; all animals fear that with which they are not familiar. But the gadgets which men have feared in the beginning have in the end proved to be their servants. Not a single invention that man has ever made is natural. To condemn a thing because it is not natural is to condemn all of civilization. It is true that man has made many things that he has not used wisely. It is true that some of his inventions have been used for destruction rather than for development and progress. But if one takes a long look at history, it is hard to be pessimistic regarding the outcome of man's tinkering with the natural universe or with his own culture. In general, the result has been human improvement: reduction in toil, an increase in leisure; reduction in want, poverty, and famine, increase in satisfactions



Keystone

IN THE MEMORY OF ONE GENERATION!

Little wonder that Western man believes in change and has an unmoved faith in his ability to bring about material progress through invention.

and abundance. In fact, the peoples who have gone furthest with inventions, who have mastered nature most extensively, are the ones who possess the greatest economic security. They dominate the peoples who still live near to nature and who have not employed to any great extent the artificial devices by which modern men live. Many inventions, during the period when man is adjusting to them, cause social problems and put personality under great stress. If, however, they were condemned and outlawed on this ground, there could be no change or progress, no improvement in human life.

Maladjustments caused by the invention of new machines and new moral philosophies are actually indicative of new areas of progress and improvement. We bemoan the invention of the cotton picker when we see that it may throw many thousands of Negro and white sharecroppers out of a job. But who wants to perpetuate the sharecropping system in America? What did the Negro and white sharecropper ever have that was worth maintaining? A meager subsistence almost on the same level as slavery. A life that is the nearest American equivalent to serfdom.

It is better to face the issues and make the readjustments necessary to provide employment and a reasonable wage than to outlaw the cotton picker and persist in the old pattern simply because change is painful.

Many break under the strain of a rapidly changing culture. Some cannot stand the pace. In certain areas American culture has speeded up to the point where all persons may be under considerable strain. The physical pace of feet on the city street, for example, is much more rapid than the leisurely pace in the small town. The hurry and bustle of New York shows that life in the metropolis is keyed to an entirely different tempo from life in Centerville, where neighbors have time to talk on a street corner and stand around in little groups after the Sunday sermon visiting with neighbors and exchanging anecdotes. But there are many who have accommodated themselves to life in New York City and find it vital and worthwhile. Such centers are the focus of creativeness of modern life.

But isn't modern man becoming immoral? Hasn't he lost all sense of duty and obligation? Can civilization survive without more sacrifices on the part of human beings, more devotion to duty, less addiction to pleasure and enjoyment? Moralists frequently point to the fall of Rome as due to the fact that a generation of pleasure seekers paid too much attention to sensuous enjoyment, too little to duty and obligation. In similar vein they comment on other civilizations that flowered and then passed into eclipse. But these same commentators overlook the fact that hundreds of local cultures have never even attained a place in history. Many primitive peoples have failed to become inventive, to adapt themselves to new demands, and they no less than the Romans have passed completely from the focus of human action. It is doubtful whether a civilization which persists in the old patterns, resisting change and clinging to the past, can survive in the modern world of close contact and quick communication.

A creature with man's inventiveness does not have the choice of accepting or not accepting the new and modifying his way of life. He must adopt the new or be overwhelmed by it. He cannot, in an age of rapid cultural change, stand idly by and ignore the new; he must increase his pace to accept it or be lost. As we consider the questions of whether man can adapt to change in material culture and whether morality can survive in an age of

rapid change, we are forced to answer in the affirmative. We are forced to face the fact that man will either have to survive in this kind of world or not survive at all.

That man is capable of the necessary readjustments is indicated by the fact that Western man, at the focal point of invention and change, is as good a physical animal as can be discovered anywhere in the world. That he breaks nervously under the strain indicates that he faces serious problems. But in spite of all the stress of a complex culture, there is evidence that Western man remains the most advanced, the most intelligent, and the most alert and forward-looking by virtue of the very fact that he lives in a world where new ideas are welcomed, where invention is a part of the normal process, and where the pace of life is speeded up. He may die of high blood pressure; but it is better to die of high blood pressure at sixty-five than to die of tuberculosis at thirty or of dysentery at six months. In spite of the strain of living in the most inventive part of the world, length of life there has been so extended that the average individual can look forward to sixty-five years of life.

By contrast, in India, where a simple agrarian culture still prevails, where invention is not a normal part of life, where change is slow and imposed largely from the outside, where tradition is binding, and where ideas remain the same through the centuries, the average length of life is approximately thirty-three years and millions die of famine periodically. The only relief is provided by the British shiplines and railways, which are able to bring in provisions from parts of the world where machine civilization has developed an efficient agriculture and made possible the building up of great food surpluses.

Those who advocate the simple life and describe its charm should confine themselves to fiction or biography. They should avoid a careful scrutiny of history; for the simple life has been too often a life of want, suffering, misery, and untimely death. This does not mean that we should blind ourselves to the overwhelming problems which a rapidly changing culture faces in morality and social control, in personal and social adjustment. It means merely that human cultures are never perfect, and that we do modern life an injustice if we worship a past which was far worse. Rapid cultural change and the increasing complexity of culture are at the roots of many, in fact of most, current social problems. But this would be no argument for doing away with

culture change and returning to a simple life even if we had the choice, which we do not. It is rather a challenge to us to understand this force of modern life and reconcile ourselves to it. By so doing we can help direct cultural change toward desired goals and thereby bring progress out of change.

Civilizations have always been made up of the shreds and patches of man's tinkering. They heap on man burdens as well as blessings. But the very tentative nature of culture constitutes its genius and is the key to its potentialities for improvement.

Folkways to Technicways, Mores to Social Policy

Sumner[4] a generation ago described with great realism the folkways and mores which he considered to be the foundations of society. The modern sociologist can no longer accept this description as anywhere near adequate. In certain aspects of life the folkways and mores described by Sumner persist, but they are at every point challenged by the forces described in this chapter. In place of the folkways — that is, the old tried and tested customary ways of doing things that were accepted in rural societies for generations — have come machine ways of doing things, referred to aptly by Odum[5] as "technicways." More properly we refer to this whole field of ways of doing things as "technology," since machine skills have come to dominate the field of work practices in the modern world. Folkways in many fields have been unable to survive in the face of applied science and technology.

Neither can traditional mores be employed as a satisfactory explanation of the majority of behavior patterns in the field of morals today. They have been challenged on the one hand by what Odum[6] has described as the "stateways." Certainly more and more fields once handled by custom, taboos, and traditional morality are now handled by social legislation. Other realms of behavior which are still less formally controlled are left to the mores, but we find in these areas that confusion rather than acceptance prevails. All these realms are becoming vulnerable to intelligent social policy. The justification of mores is their

[4] W. G. SUMNER, *Folkways.* Ginn and Company, Boston, 1906.

[5] HOWARD W. ODUM, "Notes on Technicways in Contemporary Society." *American Sociological Review*, 2:336–346, June, 1937.

[6] HOWARD W. ODUM, "Lynching, Fears, and Folkways." *The Nation*, 133:720 ff., December 30, 1931.

sacred antiquity; the justification of social policies is their present utility.

Cultural Change One Dynamic Force in Social Problems

The Sumner philosophy, which viewed folkways and mores and the process by which they evolved as immutable social laws comparable to the laws which rule in the field of natural science, is descriptive of life in slow-moving primitive and more simple agrarian cultures. Their persistence in such cultures gives not only the mores but also the folkways and the tools about which the cultures are built a deterministic influence over life. The sacredness they acquire by virtue of their long persistence tends to make them immune to the challenge of intelligence and the forces of change. It is not surprising that Sumner was accused of propagating an "enervating fatalism" when applying them to a machine age. More appropriate to the conditions of today was the philosophy of Lester F. Ward,[7] who emphasized "telesis" rather than deterministic mores and stressed the supreme merit of change produced by intelligence and rational action. Even more explanatory of contemporary forces is the philosophy of W. F. Ogburn, who finds machine civilization uprooting folkways and mores and forcing man tardily to invent "adaptive culture" through the application of intelligence to problems. But folkways still persist and mores must be reckoned with. Even our society, with all its boasted freedom from tradition and custom, has its roots in the past. The forces of inertia so vividly described by Sumner have been rudely shocked but not completely overthrown.

The forces working against inertia are more comprehensive than those outlined by Ogburn in his *Social Change*, which stresses especially the impact of material culture on nonmaterial culture and on other phases of social organization. Change in the material culture, due to modern inventive techniques, as he shows clearly, is a dynamic force producing modern social problems, but it is only one disturbing force. His "culture lag" is not an adequate explanation of all modern social problems as some overenthusiastic users of the phrase seem to imply. Equally important are several other forces. Those which are emphasized in addition in this book are: (1) urbanization, with a resulting dense spatial

[7] LESTER F. WARD, *Dynamic Sociology*, 2 vols. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1883 and 1897 (second edition).

concentration of people; (2) mobility, which frees modern man from the claims of locality; (3) the shift from primary-group experience to secondary-group experience, with the resulting anonymity which frees the individual from obligations to intimate neighborhood and community groups; and (4) the secularization of attitudes, which gives man a "this-world" rather than an "other-world" outlook and thereby shifts his attention from the traditions of yesterday to the promise of tomorrow.

These forces must be placed on a par with material and nonmaterial culture change as disrupting influences in man's living arrangements and in many phases of his folkways, mores, traditions, and customs. All five of these processes — that is, cultural change and the four processes outlined above — are of tremendous importance in disorganizing the folkways and mores as well as the personal habit and attitude patterns at the basis of personal integration. The impact of these processes explains in large measure the quest for new ideals, the seeking for more rational foundations to replace ancient usages.

In the struggle to find a new foundation for social order, a new basis for social control, men have resorted to social legislation aimed at increasing welfare and human well being. As yet, however, there are few well-defined social policies growing out of man's new experiences in a world of change and movement. Social order is at present a mixture of old usages and of new techniques for regulation. And personality development is for many a task of absorbing, first, the ancient usages in primary groups and then of trying, later, to assimilate the often contradictory ideals and new objectives of secondary groups. Every man feels the claim of customs and traditions in his quest for new ideals, and he senses the inertia of the folkways as he seeks the adoption of new techniques.

Review

1. Has increased complexity of culture characterized only material culture? Discuss.
2. Differentiate between the mythical and the scientific conception of life.
3. How do they differ in effect on man's effort to control the natural universe?
4. How does culture accumulate? Explain the cycle of cultural accumulation.

5. Discuss the statement, "The speed of cultural change has become too great for man."
6. Can change which causes a series of maladjustments be progressive? Cite an example.
7. Discuss fears of the atom bomb in the light of man's fears of earlier important inventions.
8. Refute the statement, "Morality cannot survive in an age of rapid change."
9. Discuss the proposition, "Urbanized man must adopt the new or be overwhelmed by it."
10. Compare the merits of the simple life and of living in a complex culture.
11. How can the course of cultural change be directed toward desired goals?
12. Why have many of the folkways and mores failed to survive in our time?
13. What is meant by the term "technicways"?
14. Contrast mores with social policy.
15. How did Sumner and Ward differ in their essential conceptions of social problems and what man might do about them?
16. State Ogburn's view of the central cause of modern social problems.
17. Outline five major forces of modern society that produce social problems.
18. What is social legislation and how is it employed in a complex society?
19. State the central problem of personal adjustment in modern culture.

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CHAPTER 2

URBANIZATION

ONE OF THE most significant social forces of our age is the rapid growth of cities and the changes thus brought about in the experience of mankind in the Western world and more particularly in America. Man has hitherto lived mainly in open-country settings; his personality has been formed in intimate local groups. The great cities of the ancient world were small indeed compared to those of the twentieth century. Rome under Augustus is estimated to have had a quarter of a million to a million inhabitants. Carthage and Alexandria may have had something over half a million.[1] Today, on the other hand, New York City has over seven million in the city proper; in the metropolitan area are more than eleven million.

In the modern city secularism has developed most fully; there man has become most free from subservience to natural and supernatural powers. There, local groups lose their meaning, and the person next door remains a stranger. Life in the metropolitan community is a new kind of social experience: it encourages a different kind of social participation and shapes personality for a different kind of social structure than does geographically isolated rural society.


The Growth of Cities

At the outset it is well to recognize that urbanization is not an independent phenomenon but a combination of many factors. Behind it lies the expansion of means of communication and transportation, which makes it possible for large numbers of people to live divorced from immediate contact with the soil, and the expansion of numerous forms of industry, which makes it possible on the one hand to process all forms of raw materials

[1] NILES CARPENTER, *Sociology of City Life*, p. 19. Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1931.

and on the other to maintain a relatively luxurious standard of living. Throughout the Western world cities grew as industry and commerce called for population concentration.[2] In other words, density of population has come to signify urban development.

The dividing line between rural and urban population is set by the United States Census at the 2500 point. Open country and places of less than 2500 people are classified as rural; centers



Data from United States Census
1944 data are census estimates for the civilian population


PER CENT OF POPULATION LIVING IN RURAL AND URBAN AREAS, 1790–1944

Rural places are those having a population under 2500; urban places, those having a population of 2500 and above.

having 2500 or more inhabitants are considered urban. On this basis the growth in ratio between the urban population of the nation and the rural is shown graphically in the accompanying chart for the period since the census of 1890. In 1790 only 5.1 per cent of the population was urban, 94.9 per cent rural. A hundred years later over a third was urban and less than two-thirds rural. Throughout the present century urbanization has increased until at the time of the most recent census, in 1940, well over half, 56.7 per cent, was urban. The estimated proportions in July, 1944, were 59.6 per cent urban and 40.4 per cent rural.

This shift is in itself significant; but even more significant for an understanding of the forces of modern society is the concen-

[2] A. F. WEBER, *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century*, Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, No. 29. Columbia University Press, New York, 1899.


METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940
Dept. of Commerce
Bureau of the Census

tration of population in large metropolitan centers. These have come to dominate the population structure, the social and economic activity, and the behavior patterns of the nation. At the end of the depression decade of the nineteen thirties, it is true, metropolitan growth seemed to have passed the peak and was tapering off. This clearly was not the case, however, as one may see from the table, which takes into account estimated population shifts of the World War II period.

POPULATION IN PLACES OF 100,000 OR MORE, 1930 TO JULY 1944[3]

Places	*1930 Per Cent of Total Population*	*1940 Per Cent of Total Population*	*1944 Per Cent of Total Population*
1,000,000	12.3	12.1	——
500,000–1,000,000	4.7	4.9	——
250,000–500,000	6.5	5.9	——
100,000–250,000	6.1	5.9	——
All Places of Over 100,000	29.6	28.8	31.0


Furthermore, as we can see from the accompanying map, the metropolitan centers are concentrated for the most part at important breaks where land and water transportation meet. They are on the eastern seaboard and Great Lakes primarily, although port cities looking toward the Orient have grown most rapidly since 1940.

The Meaning of the Population Shift

What then does it mean to have the dominant part of a nation's population in cities? This vital question has certain far-reaching economic and cultural implications.

In the first place, if we study the chart on the following page, we note a shift in the occupational structure of the nation. Agriculture now employs less than one-fifth of the paid workers; sixty years ago it engaged half of them. At the same time the proportions in trade, transportation, industry, commerce, and allied occupations have greatly increased. Even since this chart was prepared the proportion in agriculture has dropped. After

[3] Census estimates for 1944 include only civilian population and are for the entire group of cities.



SHIFT OF WORKERS FROM AGRICULTURAL TO NONAGRICULTURAL PURSUITS, 1820–1940

the close of World War II little over 15 per cent of those gainfully employed were in agriculture. In other words, the agricultural and industrial revolutions have made life apart from the soil possible for more than four-fifths of the gainfully employed of the nation: in 1787 the surplus food produced by nineteen farmers was required to feed one city person; during recent years nineteen farmers have been able to produce enough food for fifty-six nonfarm people in the United States and ten people living abroad, a total of sixty-six people.[4] The change means that society has accumulated numerous techniques for the production of consumable goods.

In the second place, great cities have become, in a vital sense, the nerve centers of the nation from which emanate the controlling influences of trade, commerce, news, entertainment, and education. They set the pace of change; in them are focused the inventive energies of industry and manufacturing. The occupations that bring prestige and honor are for the most part

[4] S. H. MCCRORY, R. F. HENDRICKSON, and Committee, *Technological Trends and National Policy*, p. 99. National Resources Committee, Section on Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1937.

city-centered. Even the staid rural community, though it may criticize the city and its personality types as a pastime, yet envies the glamour of its life.

In a real sense, the city has become the center of the culture and intellectual life of the nation. In it are gathered the art treasures and the patrons of art. From it come the most popular radio programs; in it live those of great talent in music, art, and drama. Those who have reached the pinnacle of fame may seek the quiet of a pastoral setting in which to use the brush or pen, but the youth climbing up dares not resist the magnetic attraction of the great city.


Thirdly, since the city is the world of the man-made and the rural is the world of the nature-made, the two are vastly different in the effects they have on the psychology of man, on the daily ritual of his habits, on the values he holds uppermost. The two worlds represent, for instance, differences in domestication: no rural dweller would wear blinders and plug his ears at night to keep out the sights and sounds of his environment while he sleeps.

Again, the shift urbanward is indicative of the growing number of secondary, impersonal group relations and of the decline of elemental, primary group relations in contemporary society. The intimate, homely, social virtues and vices of yesterday are being replaced by the impersonal, sophisticated, competitive patterns of an anonymous people; the simple, occupationally homogeneous society of yesterday is giving way to the highly complex and somewhat stratified society of a heterogeneous occupational world.

A still further result of the population shift is that American culture is in a broad sense a unity which no phase of life escapes. There is no North or South, no East or West, no farm or town or city culture. The dominant patterns tend to overshadow life, stamp it with certain characteristics, and point invention, social movements, and even personality formation in a definite direction. And these dominant American patterns, we repeat, are and have been for more than a generation primarily urban rather than primarily rural.

The Merging of Rural and Urban Culture

In direct contradiction at many points to these increasingly dominant patterns are the old established patterns of rural culture



HOUSTON, TEXAS, FROM THE AIR

Will an air age remake American cities, changing fundamentally the pattern of urban growth as did the railroad and automobile?

which resist change and maintain a deep anchorage in the local customs of rural people in all areas, but more especially in areas somewhat isolated from the impact of modern means of transportation and communication. These patterns are rooted in an ancient past, in the experience of the race, an experience which has been basically rural.

As a result there has been a clash of two patterns struggling for ascendancy. Rural patterns have given way rapidly before new, urban patterns. This reached its climax in the United States during the World War I period, when the automobile, in the course of less than ten years, took possession of rural America. In the first decade of the century, if one can divide history so arbitrarily, the horse and buggy made their last stand, as did also many of the other traditional phases of rural civilization. The decade from 1910 to 1920, because of a combination of forces far beyond the control of the farmer, saw a radical transition which made it inevitable that the newly powerful and overglorified patterns of urban industrial culture would become the

ascendant ones. Agriculture became a competitive economic enterprise, oriented to a world market in a sense it had never been before. The farmer consequently swam in wealth if he ever did in this culture or in any other. The automobile ceased being the curious toy of a progressive few and came into almost universal use among prosperous American farmers. The decade from 1910 to 1920 also saw unprecedented developments of surfaced roads. The rural free delivery increased from a few thousand miles in 1900 to over a million miles in 1920. The parcel-post system, inaugurated in 1913, put the farmer in more direct touch with the mail-order house and was thus a blow to the cross-roads general store. The local neighborhood, which had formerly been self-centered and self-contained and to a considerable extent self-sufficient recreationally, educationally, and in its religious life, began to turn toward the town and city. Thousands of open-country churches closed their doors. The consolidated school movement made great gains. This also oriented the neighborhood about a larger community, took the child beyond the scope of local control, and gave both him and his parents a wider horizon. Soon a large proportion of rural youth, who had not participated extensively in secondary education, were attending high school.

During the same decade from 1910 to 1920 thousands of hamlets, cross-roads towns, small railway towns, and boat landings disappeared. They had been built to fit the railway-water transportation system and the horse-and-wagon haul of the preceding generation, and an automobile age either had no need for them or needed them in new locations. The farmer was no longer wedded to his nearest trade center. With the new freedom the automobile brought, he could more quickly and more easily go fifty miles to a distant metropolis than he once went five miles to the cross-roads. Now he could choose not only his town but his merchants. By virtue of being able to choose merchants and towns, his tastes were also changed. No longer was he content to satisfy his needs from the counter of the general store which offered a few pieces of practical merchandise but no great range of selection. Soon, in the trade centers, department stores were replacing the general store. In these new stores one could get almost anything he wanted; in fact, even the women's tastes could be satisfied. And those tastes were becoming more complex as country women came in contact with town and city women, saw motion pictures, and suddenly grew style conscious. No longer

were they content to shop entirely from the Montgomery Ward catalog or to buy yard goods at the dry goods counter. One might list such changes for a considerable space and still not exhaust the facts of a brief period in our rural development.

The changes which suddenly came to flower between 1910 and 1920 have continued. Although some were temporarily retarded during the worst days of the depression of the 1930's, probably more farm people are buying store bread, store clothes, canned, boxed, and packaged goods today than ever bought them before. In more progressive rural communities one cannot differentiate the farm woman from the town woman by her dress on the streets, her manners, or her interests. Rural women have taken on a degree of sophistication characteristic of others of their age and sex, and they now associate as equals with citizens of town and city. The decade of the thirties carried the process a long step further when the nearly universal use of the radio dealt a heavy blow to colloquial speech and pronunciation and brought the distant world daily into the farm home.

Rural Personality in an Urbanized Society

All sociological analyses are made on the premise that each person is in a vital sense a product of his local culture. Any change in that culture involves a readjustment of personality. From this standpoint the transitions of our century have been very expensive to rural people. As traditions of rural culture have been upset, persons who were anchored in them have had to rebuild their life on new foundations. This fact is, of course, superficially most evident in cases involving migration to the city. Many rural youth of the last generation and those in more isolated regions in this generation were trained by informal as well as by school experience to live in a relatively static society, to function in a simple world. They are rudely shocked by the transfer to an outside culture which becomes necessary when they migrate to find a job, and they are obliged, in a very literal sense, to rebuild life.

On the other hand there is little doubt that the past two generations of rural youth have been the center of much conflict in the parental home itself, where they have bridged the gap between the geographically isolated life of yesterday and the new rural life of today.

The conflict has been still further emphasized by the lag in time of adoption of urban culture traits by isolated folk cultures. The old have resisted what youth has readily accepted, and have opposed changes for a long time before yielding to them.

In their attempts to imitate city levels of living, farm folk have suffered, too. Their incomes have not often permitted their attaining the level of comfort and luxury they see in advertisements, motion pictures, and even in the conspicuous consumption of the more favored urban classes. This frustration represents a basic change in the farmer's life philosophy. Agrarian cultures emphasize production rather than consumption. It has always been said that a good farmer will build a new barn before a new house. The barn has to do with production, the house with consumption — using up rather than producing wealth. As urban life has come to overshadow rural life, the farmer like the city man wants to buy and use more things. His satisfactions come increasingly from so doing and not from pride in growing crops and raising livestock. He is not so likely to buy on an installment contract in order to live beyond his income and put on front, but neither is he content with a self-sufficing farm. He still grows wheat and could use it as it comes from the field; but he wants his Wheaties, too. The simple life, so much praised in the stories and drama of yesterday, has lost its rich significance for those who view the luxury of their more fortunate fellows. The older generation may be content in the habits of their simple lives, but not youth who see motion pictures, listen to radio programs, or go to high school. These youth demand sheer stockings, Ford cars, and gasoline to run the cars. Such things are not the products of the simple life but of a cash income.

The rural man, like the urban, is now aware of the fact that he is not as self-sufficient and self-reliant as his grandfather was. He is still self-employed in most cases — a characteristic which the urban dweller has lost — but he is dependent on markets and prices, upon urban prosperity and world conditions. Without an effective union to replace his former independence and to gain power and self-determination for him, he has become increasingly willing to accept national agricultural policies and government controls. Survival, he has found, is better than self-sufficiency when one cannot have both.

The old folk-cultures of rural society achieved adaptation but lacked inventiveness; the new metropolitan culture specializes

in inventiveness but often is lacking in adaptation. In the old rural order self-sufficiency was achieved by toiling steadily through long hours, by playing a shrewd hand against nature; in the newer economy men live by matching wits with men. There is often little relationship between hours of toil or strenuousness of work and economic reward. In the older society one achieved ruggedness of character and steadfastness of purpose, as well as status in the community, by vigorously attacking his natural environment and conquering it; in the newer cultural community a different set of social definitions prevails and status comes, not so much by conquering environment, as by achieving success in a vocation accepted as superior, or by acquiring great wealth through the manipulation of highly artificial social values.

In the older rural economy there was little competition for goods, power, or status; seldom did the farmer recognize himself as a competitor with his neighbor. In the new metropolitan economy competition has become a major process; races, social classes, individuals within the same profession, and those in different professions, are all engaged in a mighty struggle, each recognizing that the rewards, whether enviable jobs, much wealth, or social honor, are so scarce that only a few will attain them.

In the geographically isolated rural culture personality was rigid, habits inflexible, attitudes often dogmatic because they were so seldom challenged. In the metropolitan environment personality is flexible, tolerance of differences is characteristic, and every attitude is qualified by reservations.

Rural cultures historically have dealt with natural phenomena — breeding, birth, life, death; soil, sunshine, weather; the endless round of seasons bringing seedtime and harvest. Urban cultures are mechanistic; men deal with men and machines. Nature is mediated by civilization so that life goes on relatively unaffected by seasons, birth, and death. These differences in ways of life affect the psychology of men and the values they hold uppermost in life.

The differing effects of the rural and the urban environments upon personality have been interestingly stated as follows[5]:

> Deeper in my opinion than the differences between individualistic or laissez-faire economics and socialism, deeper even than the differences between capitalism and communism, are

[5] O. E. BAKER, *Farming as a Life Work*, U.S. Agricultural Extension Service, Service Circular 224, p. 6, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1935.

those between rural and urban attitudes toward life. The farmer tends to think in terms of plants and animals, of birth and growth and death. The city man, on the other hand, tends to think in terms of wheels and levers and machines, or of buying and selling. Whereas agriculture is founded on life processes, particularly as influenced by soil and weather and the laws of inheritance, urban occupations are founded on manufacturing and commerce, and the activities are mostly carried on indoors. To the city child milk is associated with a bottle, not with a cow; an apple comes from a box, not from a tree; and these early impressions influence, I believe, the ideas of later life.

As a consequence the farmer's philosophy of life is primarily organic, whereas the city man's philosophy usually is mechanistic. The farmer lives in a natural world, the city man in an artificial world. Because of his occupation the farmer's thoughts are largely biological, whereas the city man's thoughts are largely physical or economic . . .

Perhaps because of the open air and the contact with nature, perhaps because the farmer sees the stars at night and observes the progress of the seasons, perhaps also because of stronger family ties, farmers and farm women tend to think of the past and the future; city people, it seems to me, tend to think more about the present.

Social Control and Urbanization

From time immemorial cities have been looked upon as the seats of wickedness and vice, corruption and criminality, degradation and sin. As a matter of fact, urban life has weakened those traditional sanctions of rural areas that made life orderly and enforced obedience to authority; it has put social control to its severest test.

In the stable rural society of yesterday control was exercised with few formalities and mainly through gossip and local opinion. Many of today's social problems were never recognized as social problems at all. Family and neighborhood assumed responsibility and handled such matters as juvenile delinquency on a personal basis. Most members of the community were thus kept in line without resort to law. Law was employed to define property rights rather than as an instrument of social control.

Law has, however, taken on a new meaning in the modern city. It has become the major device for social regulation, for

in an anonymous world one cannot depend upon gossip and upon the wishes and opinions of friends, relatives, and neighbors to keep a man in the right course.

The city is the focus of the most serious social problems of the nation. Criminality as a profession is best represented in the urban "racket" and in white collar crime. Juvenile delinquency, too, is most common where neighborhoods have disintegrated and local community controls broken down. The breakdown of the family has led to divorce, desertion, and prostitution. Even in the more common vices of mankind such as drinking and smoking, the city leads. The American Youth Commission study[6] of more than 13,500 Maryland youth showed that 60.4 per cent of young men in farm communities drank, 63.2 per cent of city young men. Of rural young women only 33.3 per cent drank compared to 53.3 of city girls.

A more recent study[7] of 403 native-born, single white girls between fourteen and twenty-four years of age from rural and urban areas in the Middle West, found that urban girls smoke and drink in a larger proportion of cases than do rural girls. The results of this study are shown in the chart on page 31.

But one cannot fully measure the morality of urban society by such statistics. It has developed its own rational morality, based on a necessary regard for others, on more tolerance of difference than provincial people have ever had. The ideals of the urban family are much higher, for example, as far as individual welfare and happiness are concerned, than were those of the traditional rural family. If it fails to attain these ideals, divorce results. There has been of course a great deal of failure in the making of the new morality but perhaps it offers something better than tradition has provided. In any case we must come to depend upon it because traditional morality is no longer accepted by the masses of Americans.


Ross's classic comparison of rural and urban morality, written many years ago, is still pertinent[8]:

> The rural neighborhood rarely offers more than one or two levels of opinion upon the conduct of its members. Usually


[6] HOWARD M. BELL, *Youth Tell Their Story*. National Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1938.

[7] EVELYN M. DUVALL and ANNABELLE B. MOTZ, "Are Country Girls So Different?" *Rural Sociology*, 10:263–274, September, 1945.

[8] E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 28–29. D. Appleton-Century Company New York, 1920.



PERCENTAGE OF GIRLS WHO SMOKE, BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE



PERCENTAGE OF GIRLS WHO DRINK, BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE

it applies a single standard sound enough but mediocre. Individuals with a strong bent either upward or downward chafe under unstimulating self-complacent neighborhood opinion and migrate in quest of countenancers, models, and appreciators. The city, on the other hand, offers circles which differ immensely in their standards of right and of excellence. At every stage of descent into the pit one finds cronies, while one will hardly rise so far into the empyrean as to find himself without comrades. In the city, therefore, one's possibilities whether for good or for evil more fully develop. Angel or devil, hero or sneak, doer or loafer, miser or spendthrift, sage or fool — each more fully attains the limit of his nature than he is likely to do in the rural community.

Urbanization and Economic Security

In the rural community of yesterday there was no organized welfare program. There was little provision for relief. Such provision as was made, was made for the indigent. Relief programs and various welfare programs are the product of an urban-industrial society in which men have lost contact with their families and in which families have lost a sense of responsibility for their members. In a commercialized society cash alone stands between a person and need. In a society without neighborhoods, one can borrow only if he has security.

As rural society has taken on these impersonal traits, and also the commercial patterns of an urban-industrial society, the same means for providing social security have been found necessary in the rural community as in the urban. No longer is land enough, because the farmer does not live from the land; he, too, lives from the grocery store. He no longer provides his subsistence; he also buys a considerable part of it in a tin can. He no longer farms with animal power, but must make a heavy outlay for gasoline or fuel oil before he can raise and market a crop. He has become almost as much a part of a competitive world-wide economic system as the factory owner, and as much subject to its risks. His wealth, too, is identified with the fluctuations of distant markets and financial exchanges of national and world monetary systems.

The country man of other centuries identified his security with long hours of toil. His life was built about the three values: work, land, and family. In these he felt economically and psychologically secure. These core interests were the basis for life organization. It was assumed that the man who went to work early in the morning and finished his chores after sunset would succeed, and that he and his family would be able to live from the land.

Such a work philosophy is in direct contradiction to much urban labor philosophy. While the urban proprietor may hold somewhat the same work-property values that the farmer has held, the masses of those employed by others want the greatest wage return possible for the least work possible. A good deal of urban expenditure is made in an attempt to impress others with one's prosperity rather than to acquire tangible property and real estate and thereby guarantee one's self-security.


The essential difference in the two philosophies has been graphically portrayed in a humorous article[9] by a city-reared girl who married a Montana sheep rancher and took up life on the western farm. She describes her shock on learning that on the farm sheep, and not the wife, come first. "If you have an idea that you are more important than sheep, a sheep ranch is no place for you."

The greater value of the family in rural than in urban culture will be stressed in a later chapter. Suffice it to say here that the rural family has been and is an economic, social, and educational

[9] HUGHIE CALL, "Sheep Come First." *Saturday Evening Post*, March 27, 1937; condensed in *Reader's Digest*, pp. 100–104, August, 1937.

unit in a more vital sense than the urban family. In rural society family and farm are one. Members live and work together and understand each other's life in a way not characteristic of urban life where economic activity is separated from the family and social activity is removed from the fireside.

The contrast in basic values, outlined above, is by no means so distinct and clear cut as two generations ago or even one generation ago. The values of the new metropolitan culture are permeating the immediate rural hinterland of the city first and then extending out to the more remote areas which yield last to the predominating values of our national culture.[10]



Bell, "Youth Tell Their Story"

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE YOUTH DISSATISFIED WITH WHERE THEY LIVE?

This chart shows comparative proportions of village, town, farm, and city youth who are dissatisfied with the place where they live. The desire to escape villages and towns is even greater than to leave farms. More young women than young men want to leave farms. Few youth in cities and urban suburbs want to leave them.

The weakening of the self-sufficient economic security of rural life, while it has brought new risks and problems to the farmer, has brought him much also that history will call progress. His horizon has been expanded so that it takes in more than forty acres, the cross-roads school and church, and the hamlet store. The American farmer is, probably more than any farmer in the world and more than any farmer in history, a citizen of the world,

[10] This is demonstrated in E. DE S. BRUNNER and JOHN H. KOLB, *Rural Social Trends in the United States.* McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1933.

well read in its problems and with as much knowledge and understanding as the average man of town or city. The American farmer is able to give his wife and children advantages such as peasants of other cultures could never dream of providing. He has rightfully shared in the luxuries that a highly effective machine culture has been able to provide. He has remade his life and become adjusted to a new world which he undoubtedly finds more stimulating, interesting, and worth while than farmers of yesterday found their world to be.

The satisfactions of yesterday had to come from contentment in one's local environment. Undoubtedly many people of past generations were frustrated and defeated because that local environment was not appealing or because there was no escape from the depressing influence of the narrow confines of their world. On the other hand the farmer and especially farm youth today may readily escape from an environment which he finds frustrating, and seek room elsewhere for the development and expression of such special talents or such special interests as he possesses.


The Future of Urban Society

There have been and there will be periods when back-to-the-land migrations will be popular, but such movements have been and will be temporary. In spite of a generation of propaganda for rural industry and for the transfer of manufacturing from great cities to small communities, the concentration of industry in large cities continues.

There is always a group who tire of urban life and who find rest and peace in some shack in the abandoned countryside, but many of these are people who have already made their name and money in the city. There are others who drift back and take up part-time farming. There are still others who want to have their families in the country while they themselves work in the city. All large cities are reaching out to take in the surrounding hinterland, but as they do they make it city.

No doubt cities will continue to sprawl out as they have been doing for three decades, growing more rapidly in the outlying zones than in the central city (see chart); but that the life of these suburban dwellers will in any vital sense become more rural is doubtful. Man is rapidly becoming a city-domesticated creature. He likes it for the most part, and is willing to pay the price for the

things he does not like about it. Personality and social institutions in America will be geared more and more to conditions in city life. Rural youth, when they reach working age, will continue to seek fame, fortune, and romance in the city, thus feeding it a continuous stream of new population and productive energy. Urbanization, as Barnes [11] has concluded, marks a major turning point in the cultural and social history of mankind. It has left the farmer, as it has left the city man, with many adjustments to be made.



W. F. Ogburn, "Social Forces," May, 1946

HOW BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, HAS EXPANDED

This picture of Baltimore's expansion since the coming of the automobile is representative of the expansion pattern of American cities. Between 1930 and 1940 while 140 cities gained 2,452,728 people, the metropolitan area outside the central cities gained 2,910,180 people.

Review

1. Comment on urbanism as a new way of life for mankind.
2. What historical factors have produced urbanization?
3. Contrast factors in population density in the ancient and in the modern world.
4. Give data showing the extent of the shift in population from rural to urban areas. Is the trend in this direction likely to continue?
5. Where are metropolitan centers concentrated? Why?
6. Explain briefly the economic implications of the population shift.
7. Discuss cities as nerve centers of the nation.
8. How has urbanization affected man's associational experience?
9. What is the basic difference between rural and urban culture?
10. Would you say that urban or rural culture is dominant in the United States? Discuss.

[11] HARRY ELMER BARNES, *Society in Transition*, pp. 559–560. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1939.

11. Discuss some basic developments which served to bring rural America into closer contact with urban America.
12. Why are rural youth the center of so much conflict in contemporary America?
13. Discuss other problems of the urban orientation of rural life.
14. Contrast folk and urban cultures with regard to inventiveness and ability to assimilate the new.
15. Compare the core values of rural and urban culture.
16. How has the farmer reacted toward material invention? Toward nonmaterial culture change?
17. How does the concept of law differ in rural and urban society?
18. Why is the city the central point of many serious social problems?
19. How do rural and urban peoples compare in moral outlook?
20. Contrast the traditional philosophy of security held by the farmer with that of industrial society.
21. In what way has progress compensated the farmer for the weakening of his self-sufficient economic security?
22. Will urban society continue to expand? Discuss.
23. Would you recommend land settlement for veterans or for people on relief? Defend your answer.

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CHAPTER 3

MOBILITY

WHEN ONE TALKS of mobility he is thinking of its opposite, stability, as well; for the one is understood better as it is compared and contrasted with the other. The one is motion; the other, lack of it. The one is going somewhere; the other, going nowhere. The one implies "out" or "up"; the other, only "here."

For reasons of history and experience, Americans value mobility above stability. It is well enough for the European farmer to point to his old stone house and tell you it has been in the family for four hundred years and that throughout twelve or fifteen generations there has always been a member of the family in charge of the dwelling and the farm. But the American takes little pride in this; he shows you what he just acquired, and dwells a great deal on what he is going to have tomorrow or perhaps where he is going to be.

Here is the house he lives in; but he will tell you he does not own it. Does he expect to spend his lifetime there? Probably not, if the winters are cold. He will tell you that he expects some day, when he gets tired of this and can afford it, to follow the birds southward and sun himself like a mud turtle on the sandy beaches of California or Florida.

Here is his job. He earns good money. Certainly he expects to keep that! No, only until he can get a better one. The boys at the top started here. He expects to get somewhere, too. And so he dreams of climbing up, plans and works for it. If the opportunity doesn't come when he thinks it should, he draws his pay and seeks what he thinks is a more promising situation.

Two Kinds of Mobility

Mobility is of two general types: *Horizontal Mobility*, which implies territorial migration, movement from place to place, and changes in social position of equal degrees of status; and *Vertical*

Mobility, which implies movement in an upward or downward direction, usually referred to in America as "climbing the social ladder." Horizontal mobility involves a change in physical or social location; vertical mobility, a change in social status. The two kinds are related. Peoples who are highly mobile territorially, tend to break through the bonds of stratification that hold older, more stable societies in fixed social layers.

American civilization can be understood only as one appreciates the fact that the American people have throughout their history been one of the most migratory peoples on earth. Partly as a consequence of this, they have also believed in the traditions of an open-class society; that is, of a society in which stratification, such as exists in the older caste systems, has been largely destroyed. In America a man has been free to climb upward, without being handicapped by rigid customs which bind him to the position of his birth.

The twin traditions of mobility have found expression in two famous phrases. The tradition of horizontal mobility has been best expressed in Horace Greeley's famous exhortation, "Go West, young man; go West." This phrase implied that the West was a world of opportunity in which a man could claim an empire for himself and possibly win it. The philosophy of vertical mobility is embodied in Emerson's equally popular phrase, "Hitch your wagon to a star." This implied that youth should look upward, climb the ladder step by step to the highest pinnacle he can see. The same idea is expressed in another phrase that has been fully as suggestive, "There's always room at the top."

Opportunity to move outward and to climb upward represents a vital freedom of our democracy. In none of the older areas may people move so freely over the boundaries of states and nations as on the American continent. In few areas have men also been so free to climb upward, with access to the means by which they could realize their dream. The traditions of outward movement and upward climbing express values which have actually been realized by masses of Americans.

Psychological Advantages of Migration

The personality too closely confined to a locality stagnates in the dread monotony of old routine. The endless expanse of the road opens new channels of stimulation, breeds an awareness of

the bigness of life. During the 1940's the war-made opportunity to migrate brought psychological release to thousands who were dammed up in the confines of a local environment throughout the depression days of the 1930's when the avenues of movement, both upward and outward, were blocked.

Even defeated groups, labelled "destitute migrants," often find a happy escape from their difficulties in the anonymity of the road. Migration brings release from their accepted status, offers escape from defeat. If they move to an environment of strangers, they are permitted to start life over, a psychological advantage which may more than compensate for the hazards and privations of the road, a psychological advantage which, in fact, is denied those who remain anchored in their old communities fenced off by the attitudes of their neighbors behind a pale of social inferiority.

For every volume, scientific and popular, written on the disastrous consequences of migration during the depression decade, a comparable one could be written describing with equal vividness the defeat, frustration, and suffering caused by the blocking of the avenues of movement for tens of thousands who endured a forced stability. Their corroding idleness and compulsory inactivity became a source of personal and family conflict, an element in their despair and defeat.

For every case history of a migrant youth who rode the rails during the crisis of the early 1930's, dissipating his energy in aimless migration, others could be written, many of them with a rural setting, of frustrated youth who turned in upon themselves and were consumed by an introverted type of degeneration in which the mind preyed upon its own miseries. Frederick Jackson Turner, the historian, in his famous works on the American Frontier advanced the thesis that movement to the frontier acted as a safety valve for social friction and social unrest. All migration does, even when the frontier has receded into history. It is movement itself that brings release. The frontier can be imaginary and still relieve frustration.

Too often mercenary-minded Americans are inclined to consider migration a failure if it does not bring easy economic gain, overlooking the fact that many of the most stable also fail. Stability, in some cases, is motivated by the easier access to relief funds that fixed residence gives to the economically dispossessed.

Those who dream of a stable population in a democratic

nation where everyone is stimulated by numerous indirect contacts with the larger world through movie, press, radio, and casual travel, are hoping for the return of a world which can never exist as long as democratic processes operate freely. Dry up the channels of communication; destroy the institutions of free public education; alter the dynamic character of an industrial society — then and only then can the dream of a stable and at the same time a happy society come true.

There can be little contentment with forced confinement to the local group for those who by virtue of education and a taste of mobile experience have faced the challenge of the road. It is true that the road offers many hardships to those of low economic status, but so does the abode. Stability is no guarantee in itself of prosperity, even though rolling stones traditionally gather no moss. Certainly sharecroppers of the cotton plantation have not purchased opportunity by their stability. In fact, it is doubtful whether their lot is in any sense better than that of the migrant laborers of the Far West drawn from over half a continent by the "factory-farm." And the stable farm-laborer of the West who is condemned always to live beyond the railroad tracks, is not a whit more happy, more prosperous, or more optimistic than his transient brother. The transient and his child can at least escape caste stigma by running away from it. He can daily bury his past in the strange surroundings the road offers. One cannot be surprised that many of the defeated homeless, like the wealthy with their three abodes, find release in movement.

Movement develops facility in adaptation; facility in adaptation breeds a desire for the conquests of the road. The taste of new experience calls for further new experience. Breaking the fetters of local environment once so tightly entwined about the person, brings a freedom from locality that is permanent. Few people who have moved ever become as completely a part of the new community environment as previously. They join with reservation in its activities and organization. Those who move frequently develop a degree of objectivity that is impossible in those who always stay. Any degree of movement permits a degree of contrast; old and new environments are compared. Multiply this experience and one eventually has the "hobo mind," whether on the bum or the millionaire status, the mind that views all locations with that degree of criticism of which only those who have seen many localities are capable.

Migration has an educative value all its own. The grasp of an individual on life, his consciousness of its possibilities, is measured in considerable part by his mobility. The happiness of the alert mind is determined by its territorial compasses, both by vicarious means and by overt action. This is so because the tendency of our type of civilization is to develop personalities that are happy only as they function dynamically in relation to the greater society.

Many an individual has been first shaken from complacency by some experience of the road, some struggle of adjusting to a new environment. Take, for example, the millions of young men and women who during World War II saw America for the first time, and the millions of other young men who saw not only America but distant peoples and places as well. Many of them will never be content to spend the rest of their lives in the home neighborhood. Even those who remain settled will have a grasp of space and of society they could never have had if they had not traveled widely. A typical instance is that of a young woman who during World War II visited her fiancé completing his second year in the army. Before the war both had lived in the same locality without the experience of travel or migration. In the army the young man had been moved from camp to camp in the United States and Alaska. When the young woman returned to work, she said, "I should like to be released. John's outgrowing me. I've got to get more experience, to get acquainted with more situations and places." She resigned and took a job in a distant city in an attempt to destroy in herself the sense of narrow provincialism that her limited experience had caused. In this way she felt she would keep pace with John's development which was brought about by migration and extensive new contacts.

Migration inevitably brings contact. Sometimes this contact leads to conflict; always it leads to contrast. Mobility must therefore have an awakening effect upon the mind. It cannot but enlarge one's horizon and extend his grasp of space. Those who never move are like children in their comprehension of space. The widely traveled person is one who is most likely to understand the diversity of human behavior and the utmost limits of human possibilities.

Nothing so quickly destroys one's indentity as migration. With the destruction of identity goes caste. Mobility helps one escape confining local standards and handicaps of social heritage. The break with family and old associates of the neighborhood erases

old lines of distinction. Anchor people in the community for a lifetime — for generations — and the tracks become the permanent dividing line between the successful and the unsuccessful, the "haves" and the "have-nots." It is then that the curse of the parents is visited on their children to the third and fourth generation through channels of social tradition. The man in the new community passes for what he can do, for the way he works and behaves, or by some other criterion of his own making. The youth whose parents have high social status has little advantage unless he has the other qualities that go with success. The youth of low parentage has unlimited opportunity to jump to new social status unhampered by local community attitudes or by the restricted standards of the primary group.

Peoples of the world who have developed the greatest speed and ease of movement have become the most powerful and the most wise. The ability to move freely gives them a grasp upon resources beyond their own boundaries; freedom of migration brings stimulating contacts which permit borrowing ideas, customs, and technologies, from all peoples of the earth. Lack of ability to move freely limits people to the confines of their local environments and shuts them out from the stimulating influence of the larger world outside.

Migration and the Community

Migration also has benefits for the community. Students of society have always recognized in contact and movement the larger forces of social change, in fact, its dynamic force. People that are isolated geographically or by tribal or national boundaries have been retarded in culture, stagnant in their civilization, unprogressive and backward-looking; whereas mobile peoples have seen many ways of life, sampled the diversity of numerous environments, and consequently become masters of men and space. Mobile peoples, because they borrow freely, become more objective, are able to select from the various cultures of mankind, and therefore to improve and modify their own. They are masters of space because they know geography, and at the same time, by virtue of its conquest, have learned how to make the most of its resources and opportunities.

The isolated rural community in the United States is made alive in part by the outward migrant keeping up contacts back


home through personal letters and return visits. His experience is shared vicariously, in a measure, with those who remain at home. This has undoubtedly been a factor in awaking remote areas and in producing change and progress. Without the "mobile equilibrium" characteristic of American society, dense pockets of population would stagnate in the more isolated regions. For example, the movement out of the Appalachian and Ozark mountain regions serves as an automatic, even though imperfect, form of adjustment. Dam up that outward flow, and problems in those regions reach the proportions of crises.


But if migration offers some relief to the isolated community, it also offers much to the receiving community. True, the migrant brings problems to the new region, but he also brings manpower, youth, ambition. Often these migrants attack the new environment with energy, enterprise, and optimism that older settlers do not have. If this stream of migrants were shut off, many communities, especially the large metropolitan centers, would be begging for workers.

From a national standpoint, ready mobility of population is the secret of production strength. Never before in our history was this so forcefully brought home as during the years of World War II. The power of a nation in any modern age is measured by its effective mobility. Shifting industrial power calls for shifts of large units of population, and in emergency situations the almost instantaneous shift of great armies of workers is the essence of success and victory. Such mobility has always been the living, dynamic force of our ever-growing and ever-changing industrial order. Without this fluid equilibrium, there could be no boom industries, for such industries depend on their magnetic power over America's mobile labor force.


As an aid to internal migration the government during World War II introduced subsidized migration on a major scale. The Federal government paid the transportation of many workers and their families from areas of surplus manpower to areas of manpower shortage. Especially heavy was the subsidized migration from the Appalachian–Ozark mountain region, and from the deep South to commercialized agricultural areas and to war industries.[1] Certain industries themselves also subsidized the migration of workers in order to meet manpower shortages. These

[1] For an analysis of one of these programs read PAUL H. LANDIS, "Internal Migration by Subsidy." *Social Forces*, 22:183–187, Dec., 1943.





BIRTH-RESIDENCE INDEX: 1940



migrations between regions during war time are graphically shown by the maps on page 45, which were prepared in the Bureau of the Census for a paper, "Demographic Aspect of World War II: Migration," presented by Henry S. Shryock, Jr., and Hope T. Eldridge at the meeting of the American Sociological Society in Cleveland, Ohio, on March 1, 1946.

Wise and forward-looking governments have always stimulated the development of new means of transportation and travel. Roads, railroads, shiplines, and now the airlines are built or encouraged by government through tax subsidy. Speed and ease of movement, not only of people but of goods, is one of the first essentials of a great civilization, and one of the first prerequisites to occupying a place in world affairs.

Western Peoples Have Been Migratory Peoples

One of the major contrasts between the Orient and the Occident during the past three hundred years has been the degree of overseas movement of the two great peoples. The rapid growth of population and the conquest of resources during this period is one of the most amazing phenomena of all history. Since 1820 the United States alone has received some thirty-eight million immigrants from western Europe. These immigrants joined in the sweep of men across this continent in quest not merely of land or gold but of a personal future more attractive than Europe offered. They found what they wanted in the way of status, in the realization of ambition, of wealth, position, and equality, through movement to new lands. Thompson estimates that Europe sent out some sixty million immigrants, of which the Western Hemisphere has received some fifty-seven million. As a result one-third to one-half as many people of European origin live outside Europe as in Europe.[2]

By contrast consider Japan, which in recent years has imitated the West most effectively. It was not until about 1900 that Japan became aware of the possibilities of emigration. By that time most of the potential areas for settlement were already occupied by Anglo-Saxons and closed to Asiatics. In spite of all the attempts of the Asiatics to plant colonies and thus build a basis for world trade, Japan by 1930 had only 1,756,497 of her people

[2] WARREN S. THOMPSON, *Population Problems* (third edition), p. 376. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1942.

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, TOTAL IMMIGRATION FROM RESPECTIVE NATIONS, AND PEAK YEAR, DURING 126 YEARS BEGINNING 1820 AND ENDING JUNE 30, 1945[3]

Country	*Total 126 Years*	*Peak Year*
Germany	6,028,787	1882
Italy	4,720,158	1907
Ireland	4,591,990	1851
Great Britain	4,269,045	1888
Austria-Hungary	4,144,507	1907
Russia	3,343,539	1913
Canada and Newfoundland	3,059,234	1924
Sweden	1,218,332	1882
Norway	805,555	1882
Mexico	800,929	1924
France	606,018	1851
West Indies	473,965	1924
Greece	431,681	1907
Poland	416,430	1921
China	383,541	1882
Turkey	360,643	1913
Denmark	335,557	1882
Switzerland	297,835	1883
Japan	277,949	1907
Portugal	258,978	1921
Netherlands	254,919	1882
Spain	171,338	1921
Belgium	160,684	1913
Rumania	157,326	1921
South America	127,969	1924
Czechoslovakia	120,766	1921

[3] During early years, mainly prior to 1920 and particularly for Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, figures given cover arrivals from countries as then constituted. Separate figures for Poland are not given from 1899 to 1919. Beginning with 1920, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for the first time, are shown separately in immigration statistics. During early years, Canada and Newfoundland are shown as British North American possessions. Prior to 1900 (mainly from 1830 to 1870) the number for the United Kingdom not specified is included with Great Britain. From 1820 to 1868, immigration from Sweden is included with numbers given for Norway.

Data for years 1820 to 1934 are from "Immigration into the United States, 1820 to 1934," *Handbook of Labor Statistics*, Bulletin No. 616, p. 260, Washington, 1936. Data for subsequent years are U.S. Department of Labor, Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics for the respective years.

living abroad.[3] Less than a million had emigrated from the native land, the rest having been born abroad. Japanese emigrants living abroad numbered less than one year's natural increase; only 2.7 per cent of all Japanese lived abroad.


The Growth of the United States by Immigration

The phenomenally rapid growth of the population of the United States, due in its early years largely to immigration from Europe, is a part of the American tradition. Between 1790, when the first census was taken, and 1820 the nation increased from less than four million to more than nine and a half million. This migration was from northern and western Europe and the British Isles. During the first decade of the twentieth century, when immigration reached its peak, the average rate was almost a million a year. The new influx was predominantly from southern and eastern Europe. The Asiatic migration was never large, but it also was at its height during the first decade of the century. The principal sources of immigration and the peak year for the various nationalities are shown in the table on page 47.

It was only after the rigid restrictions of the early 1920's that the Canadian and Mexican migrations reached the high point. The Immigration Act of 1924 set as an annual quota from European countries 2 per cent of the numbers of nationals in this country at the time of the 1890 census. That meant that about 150,000 people, excepting those from other American nations, could come each year. This brought to an end the great migrations from other lands. The restriction came, however, only after the country was already populated by peoples representing many different nationalities, so that the physical variations and social patterns of many lands have been blended in this melting pot.

These many traits have made the American social pattern a new civilization, unique, colorful, and progressive. It is true that many of the immigrants had been peasants or poor workingmen who mortgaged their future in order to secure a steamship passage; but here, challenged by the opportunities and freedoms of an under-populated continent dominated by the traditions of an open-class society, the most humble lost their past and were ac-

[4] Ryoichi Ishii, *Population Pressure and Economic Life in Japan*, pp. 209–210. P. S. King, Ltd., London, 1937.



Brown Brothers

STATUE OF LIBERTY


First step in bridging the cultural gap between the Old World and the new. Marginal men are those in the process of bridging two cultures.

cepted for what they were able to achieve through their own effort and determination.

Streams of Internal Migration

East to West: Settlement in the United States began along the Atlantic seaboard, but by the close of the Revolutionary War

the frontier had already advanced to the Appalachian Mountains. This boundary in turn was pushed back rapidly so that by 1850 the original colonies had lost more than two million people to the states lying between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River.[5] After the Civil War residents as far west as Ohio began



National Resources Planning Board *

NET MIGRATION, SINCE BIRTH, OF NATIVE WHITE POPULATION, 1930

* From *The Problems of a Changing Population*, p. 85; map copyrighted by C. W. Thornthwaite in his *Internal Migration in the United States*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934.

shifting still farther westward so that by 1930 five million persons born east of the Mississippi were living somewhere west of that river.[6]


This western migration, which is often thought of as historic, still exists although now it is directed primarily to an industrial rather than to an agricultural frontier. The fact is that the first half of the 1940's saw by far the largest migration in American history and the predominant movement was still westward. According to census estimates,[7] 15,300,000 civilians migrated out-

[5] *The Problems of a Changing Population*, p. 83. National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D.C., 1938.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] "Civilian Migration in the United States: December, 1941, to March, 1945." Population — Special Reports, September 2, 1945, Series P-S, No. 5. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C.

side their county during the years of World War II. In other words, 12 per cent of the total civilian population of the nation were living in a different county in March, 1945, than in December, 1941. These statistics do not include people who moved out of the county during that interval of a little over four years and who moved back again before March, 1945. In addition, twelve



National Resources Planning Board

MIGRATION BRINGS IMPORTANT POPULATION ADJUSTMENTS

Rural areas would soon be overcrowded without it as this chart shows. The data show the estimated percentage increase in the rural farm population from 1930–1960 if there were no migration across state lines.


million men and women in the armed forces migrated, making a total migration in the nation of 27,300,000 during the period. The census, commenting on this migration, states, "Never before in the history of our country has there been so great a shuffling and redistribution of population in so short a time."

Much of it was long distance: of the civilians more than half, or a total of 7,800,000 crossed state lines; and approximately 3,600,000 moved from one of the three major regions to another. This interregional migration is shown in the pictographic chart on page 52.

It will be seen that the West made a net gain of 1,200,000 civilians, the South lost about 900,000, and the North lost about 300,000. Unlike prior movements westward, it was preponder-

antly a migration of women: 7,100,000 were women and 4,700,000 men. The absence of men in the armed services, of course, accounts for this situation. This war migration between regions, although involving greater numbers than any previous one, is typical; it is an established pattern in American life.

CIVILIAN IN-MIGRANTS, OUT-MIGRANTS, AND NET MIGRATION FOR REGIONS: DECEMBER 1941 TO MARCH 1945 *




* "Civilian Migration in the United States: December, 1941, to March, 1945." Population — Special Reports, September 2, 1945, Series P–S, No. 5. Bureau of the Census.

Rural to Urban: Even before the agricultural West had disappeared as a goal for human quest, there were cities — young, vigorous,. expanding — the focal points of American industry, throbbing with life, rapidly developing to meet the needs of a nation that multiplied by millions each decade. The second major stream of internal migration followed close upon the settlement of new Western lands, the movement from rural areas to towns and cities. It has been characteristic for several decades and has been the predominant movement throughout this country. Each year from one million to almost four million people move from rural areas to towns and the great cities. There is also a counter-

movement of those who drift back to rural areas but with one notable exception — the year 1932, when the movement to the country actually exceeded that to the city by about 266,000 — it is usually only a fraction of the other. The rural-urban migration, its extent and direction, is dramatically portrayed in the figure below.

What does this movement mean? It is in reality a picture of industrial opportunity and opportunity for vertical mobility


MOVEMENT TO AND FROM FARMS, UNITED STATES, 1920–45



United States Department of Agriculture; Bureau of Agricultural Economics

offered to the masses throughout this century. The migration of farm and small town youth to cities during the last two generations, since the geographical frontier vanished, has been motivated in large part by the desire to find fame, fortune, and prestige. The rural youth sees in the city opportunities which challenge his ambitions and interests. He sees those who have succeeded, and he hopes to do the same. With the exception of the great depression of the 1930's the city has represented the hopes and dreams of millions of American youth. On the other hand, the shift backward toward the farm during that period reflects the sudden termination of industrial opportunity during the nation's greatest economic crisis. With this notable exception the city with its industries and large employing business and serv-

ice organizations has, during this generation, offered the new opportunity once offered by rural land settlement. Generally speaking the larger the city, the greater its magnetic power; the smaller the place, the greater its migration loss. The picto-



Landis, "The Territorial and Occ bational Mobility of Washington Youth"

ALL AREAS SEND YOUTH TO THE METROPOLIS

Loss of young men from places of various sizes to cities of over 100,000 population at the time of taking their first job. Based on a study of 950 civilian young men in the state of Washington. Youth in the open country around the towns are included, since data are based on home town address.

graphic chart shows the loss of youth from places of various sizes to centers of 100,000 or over.

Every state and every city in the nation has been vitally affected by these currents. For example, of the 6,900,000 persons living in New York City in 1930, 700,000 were born in other states; 2,400,000 in foreign countries; and 3,800,000 somewhere in New York State. About half of the native-born migrating to

New York City from other states were born in Southern and Midwestern states, the rest in closely adjoining states.[8]

Vertical Mobility in America

America is a land of amazing biographies — of youth reared in poverty climbing to the highest position of honor and authority in the nation, the presidency; of immigrant lads who acquired fame and fortune unhampered by the meager start their families were able to give them. The *American Magazine* for many years has specialized in featuring stories of men who have attained greatness in this land of vertical mobility. Our national heroes, for the most part, are men who were born without privilege and without distinguished ancestry. They started with only their courage and determination — and the invitation of a social order which challenged a man to obtain for himself all he could get and which was ready to honor him for the success of his efforts rather than beat him down and hold him in place by the traditional barriers that in so many older societies limit a man to the status of his own family.

One need not comment at length on the dynamic effect of the tradition of vertical mobility on the creative energies of man. The American people have been noted for their inventiveness, their daring, their optimism, their courage; their ability to meet emergencies, to solve problems, to tackle the future without fear. These traditions have been a powerful motivating force acting as a leaven in American society to make it vital. These traditions are also significant for understanding individualism as it has developed in America, a creative, forward-looking, optimistic individualism, based on self-confidence and the faith men here have that their efforts will be rewarded by success. In fact we do not merely hold the ideal of social climbing before every man but we prod him toward its attainment. We not only tell him that the world is there for him but we set him on the road to gaining it. We not only preach that youth should hitch his wagon to a star but we censure those who fail to do so.

Thus we cultivate a dissatisfaction with things that are and thus we make men live for things that are yet to be. There is

[8] HAROLD F. DORN and FRANK LORIMER, "Migration, Reproduction, and Population Adjustment." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 188:288–289, November, 1936.

little use in American life for a man who has arrived; much for the man who is on the way.

This spirit of climbing has been cultivated for nearly three centuries. The downtrodden and oppressed, the defeated and culturally dispossessed of Europe dreamed of America, that almost fabulous land where common men were kings, where there were no high-caste men and low-caste men, where there was no aristocracy of birth, no royal blood, no titles of nobility passed on by inheritance, no butlers by birth, no barbers or farmers or tradesmen, no lords or peasants — but just people. And in these centuries, literally millions have realized a large part of their dreams.

Mobility in the Future

That the speed and ease of territorial movement in tomorrow's world will probably exceed today's is accepted as a fact. Through modern air transport the average man may soon hope to enjoy the privilege of world travel, when a trip around the globe will be a day's journey instead of one of many weeks or months. Trips across the continents will be measured in minutes instead of days. Man even dreams of visiting planets in the empyrean. Such travel will destroy provincialism and make for a true world order and thus reinforce the certainty of continuing horizontal mobility.

At the same time new inventions are paving the way for a revolutionary development of industrial and economic life, which will open many doors of opportunity to youth. Whether the average man expects to have the opportunity to make a fortune that would have been his in a pioneer society, is doubtful, but that the masses of men can expect more than the average man has ever before expected is a certainty. There is little evidence indeed that the United States is approaching a time when society will be stratified into rigid classes, and men be held in their place by custom. The tradition of vertical movement will surely be kept alive and remain a vital factor.

We must remember of course that American society has occasionally become disillusioned with the ideal of social climbing. One such time was the great depression of the 1930's, when many were seriously frustrated because the chances for migration and therefore for vertical mobility were cut off. It is clear now, however, that this was a temporary situation; the disillusionment

ended as new opportunities for movement both outward and upward developed. To avoid a repetition of discouragement it is possible that our society should promise youth less and thus prepare them more realistically for the kind of world they are likely to have to enter; and yet so long as new frontiers of industry create new opportunities for each generation, it is not likely that our ideals of social climbing will be tempered to any great extent by the hard fact that many youth actually have to start at a lower level than their parents and during certain periods many of them remain on a lower level.

Personality in a Static Versus Mobile Culture

It is hard for the American youth to visualize a man who is born to his place. He looks upon the society of India with its rigid system of stratification as a curiosity in the modern world. He cannot understand a people who will say to a man, "This is your place," regardless of his ability or ambition. There is, however, something to be said for such a society from the standpoint of the accommodation of the individual. An individual knows his place and accepts it. His personality is developed to fit the particular scheme for which his life is ordered.

A mobile society, by contrast, tears the roots of men from the familiar soil of childhood. As they climb beyond the social and economic level of their parents, their personalities are placed under a great deal of strain and stress. Many find themselves in unfamiliar situations for which their previous training has given them no adequate background. There is an old saying that it takes three generations to make a gentleman. While we do not have gentlemen in America in the traditional sense, we have many young people who in the course of their lifetime transfer from a simple rural culture to the complex formalities of urban life or from a home of poverty to one of comfort or luxury and find themselves faced with the problem of acquiring the habits and attitudes of those in more favored social circles. We have numerous Cinderellas who have married the prince of their dream and in so doing found themselves thrown in social positions where the expectations of life were far different from those for which the girl was prepared by the training of her own childhood experience.

Sometimes America has been described as a nation of neurotics. If it is one, the cause may partly lie in the stress and strain

that mobility places upon the individual personality as it is called upon to make numerous new adjustments. In return both the young man and the young woman have obtained new liberties. For freedom to seek one's ambition in life as one will, one must pay the price of choosing alternatives and making decisions. In this respect, all modern youth make decisions which youth in stable societies had made for them by their elders and by the body of traditions which forever surrounded them. Those youths grew up in the familiar certainties of a tried and tested social order; American youth, in contrast, grow up amid the uncertainties of a social order which leaves a great deal for every man to decide for himself.

Another cause of our so-called neuroticism is the strained relationships that result from major migrations even within a nation. Newcomers who invade an area in great numbers are conscious of strangeness and must face the hostility that has been the lot of strangers from time immemorial. The Oakie and Arkie in California, the drought migrant in the state of Washington, the mountain "hillbilly" in the city encounter much the same attitudes that white immigrants and racial minorities experience.

Then there is the added strain of uncertainty as to the outcome of the move, for not all migration achieves its objective of greater economic and social gain. This, added to the natural homesickness of people in a new area, intensifies personality problems.

The extent to which lost motion and probably frustration result from rural-urban migration is suggested by Vance.[9] He calculates that for the period from 1920 to 1925 it took fourteen million moves in both directions to give a net movement to cities of 3,300,000; for the interval from 1925 to 1930 it took eighteen million moves to give a net movement to cities of 2,900,000; for the interval from 1930 to 1935 it took thirteen million moves for a net movement to cities of 500,000.

Mobility as a Source of Social Problems

No force is of greater significance to social problems in the United States than the twin traditions of migration and of social

[9] RUPERT B. VANCE, "Research Memorandum on Population Redistribution within the United States," *Social Science Research Council Bulletin 42*, p. 105. New York, 1938.

climbing, horizontal and vertical mobility. Its extensiveness and its merits have been stressed to show how integral a part it has been of American history, and how vital it is still as a dynamic element in our social order and in the life of the person. It has been suggested in the last section that the struggle of competition involved and the new and strange situations encountered often have the effect of putting personality to its supreme test.

Few socio-cultural systems have promised man so much as ours; perhaps none has ever put under such severe strain the man who takes the values of social climbing seriously. In our kind of culture men make of the upward struggle a life habit. They find no place to rest and say, "This is enough." Those who fall short of their goals sense defeat and humiliation even though they have done well by their capacities and opportunities. The hard struggle with geography long since gave way to our present number-one problem of adjustment, the problem of social adjustment, the problem of a man's feeling at home with his fellows.

The very dynamic force of mobility described as being so constructive has also been an important factor in making a nation of supercriminals, of neurotics, and of the mentally diseased. We shall study later those who have made crime a profession, capitalizing on the competitive tradition of social climbing; hospitals bulging with the mentally diseased, many of whom have found the strain of adjusting to a mobile society too great; marginal men, forced by their international or interregional migration to bridge two cultures. We shall study the strain of transfer from simple rural cultures to complex urban ones, from religiously oriented settings to coldly objective secular ones.

Stable societies have deep moral roots in the traditions and religious beliefs of the ancestors whose graves on the hillside are a constant reminder to the new generation of the ancient landmarks the fathers have set. In a mobile society only memory ties youth to the past, and memory without reminders fades. A mobile man's morality must come from within, for he is freed of the compulsions of the local group. Mobility tests the moral fiber of a person and of a nation. A mobile period is one of moral breakdown.

So one might elaborate on the problems inherent in mobility, but these are not a major concern of this book. Here interest lies primarily in understanding the dynamic forces of American

society, forces which are essentially constructive and forward-looking but which in the lives of many and in many aspects of our culture prove disruptive.

Review

1. Discuss mobility as a factor in American psychology.
2. Differentiate between horizontal mobility and vertical mobility.
3. What are some of the advantages of migration as contrasted with stability?
4. In what sense has the western frontier been a safety valve for Americans?
5. How is the ability to adapt facilitated by mobility?
6. Discuss the broadening effect of migration on personality.
7. What effect did World War II have on the mobility of population in the United States?
8. Is migration beneficial to the community? In what ways?
9. Why have forward-looking governments been interested in facilitating movement and travel?
10. What is meant by "mobile equilibrium" in our society?
11. How does the ready mobility of the population affect the nation as a whole?
12. Compare Orient and Occident with regard to migration patterns during recent centuries.
13. What were the chief sources of the European migration to the United States? Indicate the peak period for migrations from these nations.
14. Discuss probable effects of the "melting pot" experience of the United States.
15. Compare the current westward migration with that of earlier decades.
16. In the interregional migration which regions gain most? Lose most?
17. Why do people migrate from rural to urban centers? Compare these motivating factors to those influencing the westward migration of the nineteenth century.
18. Present data on the origin of the population of New York City.
19. Comment on the psychological effect of the tradition of vertical mobility as a culture pattern. Contrast the outlook of this society with one rigidly stratified.
20. What of the future with respect to America's dual traditions of mobility?
21. What part does mobility play in provoking problems of personal adjustment? Social problems generally?

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CHAPTER 4

PRIMARY TO SECONDARY GROUPS

THE RACE was cradled in small, local groups in which every man was interested in his neighbor's doings and people were enough concerned about each other's comings and goings, loves and hates to gossip about them. Such intimate face-to-face groups are known as primary groups in contrast to the larger groups wherein a man may feel himself a stranger.

Life for the child still begins in the most primary group of all, the family. For the child there is still the play group, and perhaps the neighborhood, for children get around and get acquainted wherever they go. But as the child reaches adolescence and the early years of youth, he begins to transfer to secondary-group situations in which strangeness and a degree of anonymity are characteristic. This for many begins as they enter the large city high school or, in the case of rural young people who have gone to one-room schools, as they enter the large consolidated high school.

The transfer to the work world, too, is for most young people a long step from a life surrounded by primary-group influences to one in which secondary-group experience dominates. This transition is most severe for young people of rural and small-town areas who migrate to large cities seeking work and thus break connections with the warm, intimate, local neighborhood in which their personalities have their roots. They must adapt their lives to daily contacts with strangers. They perhaps find places in offices or factories which seem cold and unfriendly. Even the urban church group seems to lack the warm touch of the country or small-town church where everyone shakes hands with everyone else and where all stand about for a friendly chat after the sermon is over. In the city church all feel like strangers. No one shakes hands, unless perhaps the preacher hurries to the door to greet the visitors or one of the trustees is appointed official greeter.

These are but homely examples of two kinds of group experience, the primary-group and the secondary-group experience, as they exist in modern society. Even in rural areas, however, where migration is becoming common, neighborhoods break up and cause life to lose its intimate character. Nevertheless, rural life today best typifies primary-group experience, while urban life, especially in the metropolis, best typifies secondary-group experience. All of life has some of both kinds of contacts, but urbanization has increased man's secondary-group experience.

Adult life is, for a great many, spent in secondary groups, although every man tries to build around himself a primary group in whatever situation he is placed. Few feel comfortable except when surrounded by a primary group wherein they sense sympathy and personal interest. There is a great deal of meaning to the phrase "feel at home."

Hotel dwellers are probably most completely divorced from primary groups. A study of people who live in hotels describes them as being without the attachments that make men feel at home:

> In the metropolitan hotel the guest is only a number. His mark of identification is a key and his relation to the host is completely depersonalized. His status, in so far as he has any, is almost entirely a matter of outward appearance and "front." The bellboy and waiter judge a guest largely by the size of tip he is likely to yield. Even the barbers look at him in a cold, hungry, calculating way. The personal hospitable relation between landlord and guest in the inns and taverns of the past has been replaced by impersonality and standardized correctness. The huge hostelries of our great cities have all the comforts and luxuries that science can devise; but they have lost, as have many other institutions, the friendly individuality of an earlier day.
>
> The modern hotel dweller is characteristically detached in his interests from the place in which he sleeps. Although physically near the other guests, he is socially distant. He meets his neighbors, perhaps, but does not know them. One may be ill and die without producing a ripple on the surface of the common life. One loses his identity as if a numbered patient in a hospital or a criminal in a prison.
>
> But the human being is like a vine. He is made to have attachments and to tie onto things. If the tendrils are broken it is a great loss. Hotel dwellers have, to a large extent, broken

these attachments, not only to things and to places, but to other people. They are free, it is true; but they are often restless and unhappy.[1]

A Picture of Life in a Primary Group

In the rural area of the days before the automobile, neighborhoods and groups of relatives often got together for special days



General Electric Company

"SILK STOCKINGS IN THE MORNING? IMAGINE!"

With the weakening of the primary group, society has lost a powerful force in social control — gossip.

and celebrations. The entire group knew each other. They were all there from the youngest baby to the oldest grandmother. They talked of their common life and problems, the crops, the livestock, the children, the weather. All faced the same daily routine. All had the same life. If one suffered, all came to his assistance. If death visited, all were there to pay their last

[1] NORMAN S. HAYNER, "Hotel Life and Personality." *American Journal of Sociology*, 33:784–795, March, 1928. Appears also in ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Personality and the Social Group*, pp. 113–114. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929.

respects. Even the smallest incident was the affair of all. If a cow broke her leg, or someone butchered, all knew it and each had an opinion about it.

Everyone had a reputation, for his neighbors and nearby relatives had watched him long enough to know what to expect from him. They even knew when he went to the fields in the morning and when he returned at night. He was a hustler, or maybe a good-for-nothing. Whichever he was, they knew; and because they knew, the man saw himself as they knew him. The hustler had to be in the field at six on a summer morning. He knew it was expected of him.

And a man's religion was the neighbors' business, too. He could not be absent from the Sabbath school or from church without their knowledge and censure. No long Sunday morning snooze, if he were to be a righteous man!

Even the youngster was subservient not only to his parents' watching but also to the aunt's and uncle's and neighbors' watching. He might evade the parents and slip out for an April dip in the creek, but the chance of his evading all this vigilant group was small indeed. And the rod played its part promptly and effectively. There were few problems of juvenile delinquency!

A restrictive life? Yes, very, if one is accustomed to the freedom of secondary groups where he may move about much as he will. But it was also a life full of meaning to those who lived it. The ties that bound one to it were strong and meaningful. There was not the hunger for companionship and love that lonesome souls in a world of strangers so often sense.

The rural world of the pre-automobile and pre-telephone age did suffer from isolation, but it was geographical, not social, isolation. Life was close and intimate. Every man felt that he belonged. Maybe he was only the small-town reprobate, but even that reputation brought an assured prestige.

A city-reared college student visiting a farm home during a spring vacation wrote his experience in a term paper. An incident he describes illustrates well the meaningful associations of the rural neighborhood:

> Near the middle of the week, Adolf Mann phoned to say that he had a sick cow on his hands, and would Stanley come down and have a look at her. Adolf met us at the barn door and began immediately to explain in no uncertain language his diagnosis of the case. I wondered at the time why, if he

knew what was wrong with her, he had called in Stanley, who didn't know but was inclined to agree with Adolf that it was not the "bloat" but some minor ailment. When he suggested a remedy, Adolf said, "I was thinkin' that was best, too." I thought in my urban way, "Here is a waste of time." But somehow it wasn't. They had chatted amiably over unimportant things, the weather, the farm, the "missus," the kids. I can see now that all Adolf wanted was company. He had not seen Stanley, whom he liked, for four months. He hadn't, as city people do, asked for advice merely to hear someone agree with him. He wanted to renew an old friendship.

Isolation in Secondary Groups

Human beings are nowhere so much alone as in the "crowded loneliness of the great cities," comments Joseph F. Newton, rector of St. James Church in Philadelphia, after reading thousands of letters from readers of his newspaper feature, "Everyday Living."

A student of the city has described the psychology of dwellers of the rooming-house area of Chicago:

> The rooming-house world is in no sense a social world, a set of group relationships through which the person's wishes are realized. In this situation of mobility and anonymity, rather, social distances are set up, and the person is isolated. His social contacts are more or less completely cut off. His wishes are thwarted; he finds in the rooming house neither security, response, nor recognition. His physical impulses are curbed. He is restless, and he is lonely.[2]

This feeling of being alone is certainly not characteristic of all city dwellers and perhaps not even the majority of them. But it is a trait of city living, and may be most intense among newcomers who are suffering from the shock of the transfer from their rural primary groups. Urban life, for many, is a life wherein there is too much strangeness, a life in which special interests are catered to rather than one in which the whole personality is drawn into personally satisfying social situations.

In city life social participation is seldom by families. Almost never are the babies and the grandparents present, or even the young people and their parents. Social life is for age groups.

[2] ZORBAUGH, H. W., *The Gold Coast and the Slum.* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929, p. 82.

The children, the young people, the young married people, the adults, the old people all have their separate gatherings.

Special Interest Groups Have Replaced Locality Groups

Beyond the family, the primary-group associations of yesterday were in the locality of residence. This was inevitable in a world where movement was restricted to the distance a man could walk, ride horseback, or drive with horse and buggy. Today primary-group associations are based on common interests rather than on locality. The young man and woman in the city have their close friends among those with whom they work or have some other common interest. Perhaps it is with a group that enjoys the same recreational interest or has the same hobbies. Adults, also, form their close associations with those of the same church, work, or recreational interest rather than with those in the adjoining homes or apartments. In rural life, too, the old neighborhoods of the horse and buggy period are tending to break down and farm people are selecting their intimate friends from among those with similar interests. Near towns and cities the neighborhoods have broken down most and farmers are increasingly forming associations with people in the towns or in distant neighborhoods with whom they have something in common. In the far outlying hinterland the neighborhood is more nearly intact. In the geographically isolated mountain sections, where the automobile has not become so common, the great family-neighborhood bonds are still strong: kinfolk and neighbors give life its essential meaning, not friends, or pals, or companions.

Individualism Is a Product of Secondary Groups

Individualism, as we know it today, could never have grown in the stable, intimate local groups or in an old-world society. It first developed on the frontier where men were separated from the restraints of family, neighbors, and relatives. In primary groups there are too many curbs on individualism. Innovations are smothered by rebuke or withered by scorching gossip. The new threatens the routine of life in local cultures and is not permitted. But it was not the frontier that brought individualism to its flower in America. The frontier was at best a transitory stage, and soon was replaced by settled communities which re-

instated effective social controls and began the building of a regularized life. It was the American city that brought individualism to its flower.

Secondary-group life in the city has relieved men from the restrictive inhibitions of the intimate group and made it possible for individualism to flourish. In an anonymous world a man may follow his own inclinations and not be too seriously disturbed by what his fellows think. Many a rural youth on leaving the primary group of his younger days has found liberty in the city to "sow wild oats," as the older generation called it. But many such youth also found for the first time an opportunity to escape the reputation of parents and start life with a clean slate.

Because secondary-group peoples have less fear of censure from their fellows, they are more free to venture on new paths. True, some of these paths are forbidden ones, but secondary-group dwellers are also more inventive, more given to developing and satisfying their creative interests as they will.

Character of the Group and the Sense of Security

One of the most effective primary groups of all history was the large family group of rural neighborhoods in agrarian societies. This family group often constituted the neighborhood and provided continuity of experience in the immediate environment going back to the great-grandparent generation. Within the neighborhood-family system was the body of tradition by which the group lived. Respect for the elders and the experience the years had taught them was shared by all. The rules by which they learned to live were known and usually regarded. Before the elders' hand was relaxed in death, the youth had already reached middle age and had children of their own and were in their turn the guardians of tradition, having long since passed through their youthful period of rebellion.

This group offered a sense of belonging, of psychological security, such as men rarely find in the small family of secondary-group society. We make much today of the need of the individual, and especially of the young child, for a sense of security. Great families never thought such a sense was necessary, for insecurity in the modern meaning of the term was practically unknown. Everyone had a sense of belonging.

It is impossible to illustrate from American society today the

depth of the roots of personality in such large family-social systems. The nearest approach we have to it is found in the families of our mountain regions where a sort of hybrid between the ancient familistic and the Western European-American small family, sometimes called the "stem" family, exists. Familistic patterns prevail in the home-family and neighborhood. There are many relatives. Family ties are binding. The authority of parents, which is typical of the familistic pattern, prevails in the family nest. The birth rate is high, but many children migrate from home and become individualistic. One or more of the security-loving children remain at home and take over as soon as the older generation dies. Children who like the individualism offered by urban-industrial society move out and find their chance for it in the larger world. Even these children, however, always sense the security of being able to return at any time. Each of the children feels a responsibility to return to support the home family in case of emergency.

During the great depression of the 1930's thousands of married children and their families, who were thrown out of work in the industrial centers to which they had gone during World War I or the prosperous years of the 1920's, returned home. Out of work in the city, they did not stay to accept public assistance but went back home where they were welcome, even though the home family itself was living in poverty and the cabin walls were bulging with overcrowding. Thousands of mountain cabins sheltered parents, grandparents, and grown children with their little ones. Schools could not hold all the children, and the land could not provide food for all. Public assistance had to be carried into the mountains and other isolated rural areas which were burdened with the cities' unemployed. In having a home to go back to, these members of the large-family primary group felt a sense of security that was to them more meaningful than economic security as such.

Nowhere in literature has the longing of a man for the large family-neighborhood group been more intensely portrayed than in Thomas Wolfe's novel *You Can't Go Home Again.* In it one senses the longing of a man for acceptance back in the intimate system of his boyhood, a welcome which was denied him because of his realistic portrayal of his family and neighborhood in his earlier book *Look Homeward, Angel.*

The person accustomed to the social climate of a secondary

group never has an intimate group to go back to outside the immediate parental family, and he must seek security in life insurance, fraternal groups, protective legislation, and various psychological escapes. If he is strong enough, however, he needs no one to turn to. He is self-sufficient through long recognition of the fact that he is on his own. If severe crisis should overtake him, he may break under the strain which a concerned group might have helped him carry.

Problems of Social Control in Primary and Secondary Groups

In primary groups, as has been implied, the problem of social control is not a major one. Children and youth are subservient to elders. The ever-present censorship of behavior by adults keeps youth in line with the expected patterns of the elders. Divergent behavior is squelched before it reaches dangerous proportions.

Intimate rural groups have always surrounded the individual from birth to death with an effective system of social restraints backed by a system of social control which is for the most part unchallenged. Added to this is the homogeneity of the environment, the similarity of accepted patterns among all acquaintances, which tends constantly to reinforce the accepted patterns. In primary-group societies the individual has been rooted in an environment where he is surrounded by the landmarks of his fathers. All experience points toward the acceptance of that which has been.

The individual coming into the community is expected to conform, so that no new ideas of conduct are introduced. Seldom has this been so well illustrated as in Sinclair Lewis's handling of Carol Kennicott in *Main Street.* She marries Dr. Kennicott and comes to Main Street after her upbringing in St. Paul. She vigorously attempts to awaken Gopher Prairie from its lethargy, but in the end she succumbs to its routine and settles down to have a baby.

Many a youthful "schoolmarm" from the city has to her dismay learned conformity too late, as she has taken her first job in a small community where ideas are standardized. The following humorous account illustrates the situation well:

> In June Kitty Smith graduates from the University of Michigan, thanks to a generous professor who at the last

minute concedes her a D-minus in The Psychology and Technic of Teaching Spelling. In July, when her true love takes back his Sigma Chi pin, she enters her name at a teachers' agency. Early in September she arrives at Caribou, Nebraska, and is assigned the fifth grade at the Henry Wadsworth Longfellow school.

Two weeks later Kitty spends a hot Sunday morning taking a sun bath in a backless bathing suit on the lawn in front of her rooming house; before noon on Monday the principal of Longfellow school reprimands her for dressing immodestly and suggests that she spend her Sunday mornings in church. A month later the principal informs her that she may not smoke publicly in Caribou. On Armistice Day, pleasantly recalling the handsome face of John Strachey who lectured at Michigan last year, she refuses to buy a poppy from a buddy; the fervor thus reawakened leads her to tell the fifth grade that world peace would be wonderful, information which reaches the adjutant of the American Legion post through a son who is doing badly in arithmetic. The superintendent of the Caribou schools now summons Kitty and forbids her to preach communism; he also instructs her not to wear chiffon stockings to school. . . . By February she is nervously aware that the whole Eastern Star is gossiping about her; wherefore, asked by Mrs. Robinson, its corresponding secretary, what kind of party she went to in Kearney last week end, she tells Mrs. Robinson that it is none of her . . . business. Six weeks later, just as the fires of spring are lighted, the Robinson car stops for gas at a combination hot-dog stand and dance hall some miles out of town, and it is unquestionably Kitty whom Mrs. Robinson sees necking with the Jones boy (from the hardware store) in a parked car under the cottonwoods. The superintendent has already heard . . . about Kitty's probable cocktails in Kearney. So now he discharges Kitty for immoral behavior.[3]

In secondary groups birds of many feathers flock together with little fear of punitive measures as long as they keep within the limits of the law. For example, Santa Fe, New Mexico, is a small city visited by many tourists, a town of transient guests bent on recreation and pleasure-seeking. It is a secondary group in an extreme sense during the tourist season. Shorts or bathing suits, cowboy outfits or the finest silks attract no attention.

[3] BERNARD DEVOTO, "Tyranny at Longfellow School." *Harper's Magazine*, 174:221, January, 1937.

A middle-aged man who works outside Santa Fe, understanding the casual nature of all contacts there, told of putting on a small cowboy hat, about six inches in diameter, and walking about the public square to see if it would attract any attention. He reported that no one took the slightest notice. In many towns of equal size only a fraternity man during initiation would have dared to do such a stunt in public. In most small cities his sanity would have been questioned.

But social control in secondary groups has its serious side. While many youth from restricted environments have found the freedom they needed to develop themselves and to create, others have lost their way by virtue of the fact that there were so few social pressures that their liberty became license, their enjoyment debauchery. And great cities have not yet learned how to surround adolescence and youth with protective restraints so that delinquency can be restrained and crime controlled. Law is not an effective substitute for primary group pressures. We shall discuss these questions in later chapters.

The problem of social control in secondary groups is not, however, entirely one of regulating those who grow up in them. Primary-group members are susceptible to a primary-group control that is adapted to their neighborhood and locality; but as they shift by migration to secondary groups, they often find themselves in situations where their own primary-group controls and sanctions are no longer appropriate and certainly no longer in effect. They must acquire new definitions of behavior or be confused. Few primary-group definitions are fully adequate for secondary-group situations.

These facts concerning modern life are significant not merely to the happiness of the individual himself, although it is that phase of experience with which we are primarily concerned in this immediate discussion. An anonymous secondary-group society leaves the individual with so little protection against his own weaknesses that social organization itself breaks down further. Many individuals weaken morally because of the very lack of social restraints in their environment.

The strength of any individual is limited. The extent to which he can live up to the standards of civilized society depends a great deal upon the protective devices that are thrown about him. His very isolation may lead him to seek intimacy in situations which are taboo in more normal social aggregates. For example,

in the world of furnished rooms described by Zorbaugh,[4] where the sense of isolation and detachment is intense, moral fiber breaks and youth disregard the traditional standards of monogamous society. Here in areas in which the whole population changes on an average every four months and where half the keepers of rooming houses have been in charge of their places only six months or less, some 38 per cent of the roomers live as couples, but only 60 per cent of these couples are officially married. Many live together for no other reason than that they want someone to come home to, someone to whom they can tell their day's experience, and in that way give it meaning to themselves.

The very informality of primary-group controls makes for confidence and trust between individuals. At least one knows whom to trust in the group. The inexperienced youth often undergoes a period of disillusionment when he first learns that the primary-group morality of his home setting is not practiced outside and that he has been exploited by a secondary-group acquaintance whom, to his dismay, he trusted.

The problem of primary-group mores in a secondary-group world is not one for the individual only but for the group as well. Few of the old codes of morality, honesty, and integrity have been reinterpreted to fit secondary-group relations. It is easy to apply the golden rule where one knows his neighbors, but less easy to apply it in secondary-group situations. The mores of the folk culture are often used for the exploitation of those possessed of a simple honesty by those seeking political or economic gain in secondary-group situations. There is crying need for the development of a social morality which will motivate men in the secondary group to seek the general welfare along with their personal gain of prestige, power, or wealth.

The old adage, "Business is business," has covered a multitude of the blackest sins, viewed by primary-group moral codes. The implication is that competitive business practice in the secondary group requires a disregard of ethical principles if one wishes to make money. It is reported that Mr. Insull, convicted of swindling stockholders out of millions, stated that his business was to make money. Great cities, with their secondary-group anonymity, have been called "an aggregate of self-centered units

[4] In E. W. Burgess, "The Dwellers in Furnished Rooms." *The Urban Community*, p. 100. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1926.

with no common purpose." "Chicago doesn't know why it exists; it has no soul." [5]

Bernard [6] has cited an example of a Senator being elected to office by the contributions of ten businessmen to a corruption fund. The Senator later was barred from his seat by action of the Senate. During the investigation that led to his disbarment, various supporters were called upon to testify as to his character. Among these was the Senator's priest. He testified that the man was a model husband and father, the implication being that he therefore could not be a bad citizen. Bernard does not question the accuracy of the priest's testimony but he does draw the lesson appropriate to many situations in our society where the shift from primary to secondary roles is so nearly universal:

> (1) It seems to be quite obvious that being a model husband and father (that is, perfection in primary-group relationships) is not the same thing as being a good citizen (perfection in derivative-group relationships); and (2) that if such a man could nevertheless be an acceptable communicant of his religion, this fact seems to be proof positive of the further contention that such a religion has not evolved morally *pari passu* and in keeping with the ethical demands of our complex derivative civilization; it has failed to meet the moral demands of society made upon it for ethical guidance and control; it still lives and teaches on the basis of a primitive tradition and philosophy which is not in keeping with the higher ethical values and idealism necessary to our age. And this is true of any religion which would dare to shelter and defend any man guilty of such serious civic and moral dereliction as was this man, regardless of the name of the religion.
>
> There was also good evidence that this man was a good neighbor in the primary attitudinal sense of this term. He visited the sick and paid their doctors' bills and bore the expenses of funerals for the deceased. He sent fuel to those who had not wherewith to heat their habitations; he bought food for the hungry; he paid the rent for the unemployed in his congressional district; and he whispered in the ear of the judge and secured the dismissal of charges of criminal behavior against his political supporters. All this he did willingly, even

[5] ARTHUR E. HOLT, "Our Common Perversion." *Christian Century*, 52:850, June, 1935.

[6] L. L. BERNARD, "The Conflict between Primary Group Attitudes and Derivative Group Ideals in Modern Society." *American Journal of Sociology*, 41: 611–623, March, 1936.

gladly, and apparently with a genuine feeling of sympathy for the unfortunate. Many American politicians and bosses are similarly kind-hearted and neighborly. But for each dollar that he contributed to the relief of the poor by such direct neighborly services, he took three or five out of the public treasury by devious and civically questionable measures. Being a good neighbor did not make him a good citizen. Yet, the masses of his political supporters — the men he had aided personally while he robbed them publicly — were strong partisans of his and condemned his removal from public life.

In summary, this chapter has stressed the fact that social experience has changed considerably as men have come to live in larger social aggregates where contacts are, for the most part, casual rather than intimate; in a society of mobility where locality no longer binds a man to his long-time acquaintances and relatives, where a man can shed his past as he loses himself in large anonymous groups away from the scrutiny of former neighbors; in a society in which one can choose his friends from among those he works with or meets outside working hours rather than from those born next to him. Increase in problems of social control, strain, and psychological insecurity; increased personal risk and greater need for legal protection; more complete segmentation of life; less complete participation in an intimate group; greater anonymity and greater freedom from obligation — these are some of the counterparts of secondary-group living. Inherent in them are many problems of personal adjustment and of social organization.

Review

1. Differentiate between primary and secondary groups.
2. Discuss mobility as a factor creating secondary group associations.
3. Why is rural life mostly primary association while urban life tends to be mostly secondary?
4. Distinguish between rural and urban isolation.
5. What is the function of special-interest groups in our society? Are these groups strictly an urban phenomenon? Explain.
6. How is individualism held in check in the primary group? How is it fostered in the secondary group?
7. Compare the sense of security of the person in primary and in secondary groups.
8. Describe the semi-familistic system of early American rural life.

9. Compare the system of social control in primary and secondary groups.
10. Why is it necessary to acquire new definitions for behavior when an individual shifts from primary-group living to secondary-group living? From secondary- to primary-group situations?
11. Can the moral codes of the primary situation always be used as a guide in secondary situations? Explain.
12. Explain the "sowing of wild oats" by young people when they transfer to secondary groups.
13. Is the anonymity young people of rural origin acquire in the secondary group ever advantageous? Explain.

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CHAPTER 5

SECULARIZATION

The Sacred to Secular Trend

ONE NEED NOT look back far in the history of the Western world to find a time when monarchs were thought to represent God on earth, holding their office by "divine right." Their decrees were the will of God for their subjects. Somewhat earlier they themselves were worshiped as gods. One can find this philosophy still persisting in parts of the Orient, where rulers are not mere men but are representatives of God, or even divine themselves. It is a long step from such a philosophy to a society founded on the ballot, from the doctrine of the divine right of kings to "the century of the common man," but Western man has taken that step. The trend away from a sacred and mystical interpretation of life toward a secular and rational interpretation is known as *secularization.*

Secularization as it has developed since the Middle Ages has consisted in substituting for supernatural and theological explanations naturalistic and reasonable ones. This change is one of the most profound affecting mankind and forms the basis of modern democratic government and of our scientific-technological age. In a society based on the divine right of kings there could be no genuinely democratic government in the modern sense. Democracy is built on the idea that the individual has a right to judge political issues for himself. Every man has equal authority except certain ones who may be selected by the ballot to exercise authority for the rest. Such special authority remains only as long as the people wish to retain their rulers in power.

Other institutions besides government have taken on a secular character. The school, in fact the entire educational process, was once dominated by the church. Now, grade and high school education is primarily a function of the state, supported by taxation rather than by gifts and charity. In the college field,

many of the great institutions that were once sponsored by the church — Chicago, Yale, Southern California, Harvard, and many others — have become highly secular, depending on endowments provided by wealthy friends rather than upon church gifts; and distinctly denominational colleges claim each year a decreasing proportion of the total college population.

The aim of education shows a corresponding change. Its purpose today is not to train men to perpetuate the faith; it is to train for democratic citizenship and for economic competence — aims entirely secular. So generally is the secular purpose of education recognized that the protest so often raised a generation or two ago — that state universities were centers of skepticism, atheism, and heathenism — is seldom heard in this generation. Even church colleges, in order to meet secular accreditation requirements, have felt considerable pressure to relax their insistence upon religious conformity in their teachers.

Marriage is another institution which shows marked secularization. Rather than being considered a church sacrament it is with increasing frequency considered a purely civil affair. A marriage ceremony performed by a civil officer is as acceptable as one performed by a minister or priest. The family as such has lost most of its sacred characteristics. The father is no longer priest of the household, presiding over its religious worship. Vastly fewer families than formerly observe the ceremony of family prayers or even grace at meals. The average workman, if he thinks of the matter at all, is more likely to give credit for his food to his own skill and training, or to general economic considerations, or even to his labor union.

Morality too has become secularized to a considerable degree. Morals are considered not as absolute and final, eternally binding and unchangeable, but as man-made, as variable from community to community and from group to group, and to a great extent as having no real relationship to human goodness or survival. The real test of morality has come to be a secular one — not whether an action is right by some sacred principle or tradition, but whether it contributes to the social good.

Even religion is to an increasing degree measuring itself by secular standards. The building of a sense of social obligation, of social justice, of civic righteousness, is considered by many religious groups more important than preparing man for a heavenly paradise. Education rather than conversion, training in

righteousness rather than redemption, is the emphasis of modern religion. The religious crusade of earlier generations is represented in our society only by the activities of certain revivalistic denominations which include a decreasing minority of the population. It is doubtful whether a political leader of William Jennings Bryan's stature could now be found to make a public defense of a literal, fundamentalist interpretation of the Scriptures, as Bryan did in the famous Scopes trial of 1925. Much more than in the past do church leaders recognize and insist upon the religious aspects of scientific thought and the support science can give to development of character. This is not to minimize the importance of institutional religion, nor to discount the supreme value of individual beliefs. It is simply to point out a trend of modern life which can readily be verified by any careful observer.

For religious charity, which emphasized the blessings to the giver, has been substituted state-supported social work and state-financed social security. The whole system of charity has been secularized in the process of transformation so that it is no longer charity. In urban industrial society, an allowance for the old is not a gift of charity but a pension. An allowance for the unemployed wage worker and her orphaned children, for the crippled child, or for the blind is not charity; it is a debt which a democratic people owes to the less favored of its members and which it pays by taxing those who can afford to help. This same philosophy of obligation covers care of the feebleminded, the insane, and those afflicted with certain other forms of sickness, and it will some day no doubt include sufferers from all forms of illness and disease. The tithe to the church has been replaced by the income tax; to a considerable extent the latter serves the same function as the former once did.

Advantages of Secular over Sacred Culture

A "sacred" culture, as opposed to a secular one, is stable and relatively unchanging. It deals with what it believes to be absolutes. The guideposts are traditions, not ideals. The aim of life is to relive traditions, not to reach for ideals and goals previously unattained by man. In it there is no philosophy of experimentation, of invention and progress, no challenge to bigger and better things. In a sacred culture, yesterday is more important than

today; in a secular culture, tomorrow is more promising than today.

Psychologically, sacred culture leaves little room for initiative, individualism, or the rights of man. Authority is unchallenged because it is of God and not of man. Initiative is stifled because man is not regarded as the master of his fate and the creator of his destiny; he lives by prayers and penance, by humiliation and self-abnegation, by bowing humbly to that which must be. The rights of man are not an important consideration in cultures where the will of the gods is the first consideration.

By contrast, secular culture liberates man psychologically. It stimulates initiative by saying that change is inevitable, that by consciously directing the forces of change man can achieve progress. It is inventive and inclined toward experimentation. Its members believe that man has made what we have in the way of improvements and that man can make still greater improvements. Tomorrow's model is grafted onto today's design; today's design is clearly superior to that of yesterday. Viewing social regulations and law as of man's making too, secular society holds that human relations may be improved by human tinkering with the machinery of government, and that a more equitable and harmonious society may thus be built.

Americans, particularly American youth, marvel at the Hindu who stands by while sacred cows wander through marketplace and garden consuming food so badly needed by the hungry masses, or who will let the poisonous cobra go unharmed after sinking its fangs into human flesh. We can hardly understand a sacred culture where individualism, human rights, initiative, self-determination, inventiveness, and change seem to have no place. We are mystified by men who make penitence a profession, lying on beds of spikes, sitting on top of a post, or holding an arm upright until it stiffens and grows in that position. We cannot understand the passive submission of millions to poverty and perpetual hunger, to a high birth rate and an alarming death rate, to famine and want. We cannot, in fact, grasp the significance of a culture which is essentially sacred in its orientation, because we grow up to accept the psychological values of our secular culture, one of the most secular cultures the world has ever developed.

Basic in sacred culture is the belief that the universe is static, and that all of nature is fixed by creation. The physical and

natural sciences, such as they are, merely study and classify this static universe. Secular culture, on the other hand, recognizes nothing in the universe as fixed. It was with the development of the naturalistic, evolutionary view that natural science in the modern sense was born. Science now faced the problem of explaining not only beginnings but change and development as well. Rather than dealing with a fixed universe, it was compelled to deal with one that is ever changing and developing yet subject to natural law. When it was realized that man himself is a part of nature, the foundations for modern psychology and sociology were laid. Man's behavior was seen as susceptible of study and analysis. Instinct replaced the older concept of Adamic nature; instinctive drives, the notion of Satanic leadings and divine inspiration as motivating forces in conduct. Later the notion of instinct was replaced by the idea of conditioning, and related concepts were employed to explain the elemental steps in learning. Secular society thus believes in change. It believes in initiative. It worships individualism. Conformity is expected only to the extent that it is required for group living.

Thus in secular society, no institution survives for its own sake. Is the family good? Then let it serve the happiness of the individual, not merely replace population to assure national survival. Is religion good? Then let it make men who are more fit to live with their fellows, who understand and practice tolerance and good will, who are eager to express their faith through good deeds. Is government good? Then let its only test be its power to help men live together in harmony and peace, to provide services and guarantee the rights of man; not obedience to law, respect for rulers, or loyalty to symbols of nationhood. Are the institutions of property good? Then let them be used not to protect the wealth of the few but to assure the livelihood of the many. Is education good? Then let it be the possession of all, not the privilege of the few who may use it to gain power over the ignorant and exploit their superstitions or fears.

Secular society is, then, dynamic psychologically. It makes an aggressive, extroverted attack on the natural environment and on the traditional culture as well. It casts aside the introverted, passive psychology of the sacred culture. It looks forward rather than backward; it is interested in the here and now rather than in otherworldly considerations.

The implications of these profound differences in the two

forms of culture are obvious. Without understanding that modern society in the Western world, and in urban America in particular, is dominantly secular, one cannot begin to understand the forces that control modern life and form the individualistic personality. At many points throughout this book there will be occasion to refer to the process of secularization and to illustrate it more particularly.

The Effects of Secularization on Personality

One of the most penetrating studies of secularization as it affects personality is that of Becker,[1] who develops his analysis by contrasting sacred and secular in their extreme manifestations. On the one hand the sacred society has its roots in an isolated, essentially rural, and primary-group society wherein gossip is the main force for social control and economic self-sufficiency is characteristic. At the other extreme, the secular society is "accessible," that is, it has numerous contacts: in the modern metropolitan community, all relationships are treated as means to an end; happiness is the goal of life; the egoistic interests of the individual are dominant; there is a maximum of individuation, rationalism, and criticism, a minimum of gossip and other informal means of social control; rationalism and naturalism have prestige; science is given full range.

Becker analyzes the transition from one to the other primarily in terms of population movement or dispersion. He relates personality adjustments to this shift of the sacred personality to the secular culture or of the secular personality to the sacred culture. The person molded by the sacred culture, who finds himself in a secular culture, he describes as a "sacred stranger." This person has been molded for the concrete personal experience of the local primary group and his character formation has been built around the traditions and mores of this group; but he finds himself in the highly individualized metropolitan atmosphere. The "secular stranger," on the other hand, is a person who is molded for the individualistic atmosphere of the metropolis and later transfers to the sacred restrictions of the local rural group.

In modern society, Becker believes, personality adjustment is related more specifically to the transfer of the rural sacred per-

[1] HOWARD BECKER, "The Process of Secularization." *Sociological Review*, 24:138–154; 226–286, 1932.

sonality to the metropolitan secular society. This situation was produced by the Industrial Revolution with its consequent development of metropolitan economy and of rural-urban migration.

He describes four types of personal disorganization that are a natural consequence of the transfer to secular society: (1) the demoralized man, (2) the marginal man, (3) the segmental man, and (4) the liberated man. The demoralized man is the one in process of differentiation and individuation as a result of transfer to secular society. The marginal man is the one who strives desperately to bridge the two cultural situations, clinging to parts of both. The segmental man is one who tries to find expression in erratic gestures and dissipations that involve only a phase of his personality. Such a person may become artistically creative.

The liberated man is one who, because of the freedom of secular culture, develops a personality of great originality and energy. This energy is channeled in a life organization which finds expression in the norms of the secular society. Such individuals have been able to cling to enough of the core-character attitudes of isolated sacred culture acquired in the primary group to become functional members of secular society. Often the new personality is organized about the work drive.

In discussing the secularization of personality as affected by migration, Becker outlines certain factors considered especially deterministic of the rate at which secularization takes place: (1) the degree of maturity of the individual; (2) his temperamental character; (3) the degree of isolation from his own people; (4) the degree of disorganization of his native community after his departure; (5) the death of his parents.

Secularization is not a cure for the individual's problem. He must as a stranger in the new situation either find a new life organization adequate to meet his needs or suffer tensions and unrest. His new personality organization may be more complex or he may in the end regress to a simpler level.

Problems of our Secular Society

In the transfer to secular society our generation has been confronted with many problems arising from maladjustments in social institutions and stresses to individual personality. This situation is a natural one so long as the transition is incomplete.

It must be remembered that social institutions still retain a great deal of the traditionally sacred even though they serve man in a secular age, and numerous individuals are still trained to regard many aspects of life as sacred, only to learn later that outside the family-neighborhood group of childhood these are regarded as entirely secular.

Our culture, in other words, is disorganized, and from this fact arise most of our personality problems. The sensitive individual is torn between the alternatives of two culture patterns and tries to reconcile irreconcilable elements. He has little chance to attain personal integration, which stems in large part from the integration of the culture pattern.

A common example of such problems is found in the field of religion. Many a high school and college student of the past and even of the present generation has sensed the conflict between his basic religious training and the secular emphasis of science in the classroom. This is the stress so clearly described by Walter Lippmann in his *Preface to Morals*. That book considers modern man, who has achieved remarkable freedom from religious and moral taboos but who in doing so has lost his faith not only in the traditions but in life objectives. His defiance of the fundamentalist code and his atheistic tendencies have brought him no peace of mind. Lacking moral authority the man is coerced by the opinions, fads, and fashions of the moment. Without landmarks by which to guide his conscience, he fears losing his way. In cutting loose from his old faith he has suffered disillusionment, cynicism, and a degree of personal disorganization. Although he often found the compulsion of the old order galling, he nevertheless accepted it because it represented the beneficent decrees of a higher, divine power; in the new order he sees that compulsion is still necessary for survival but he resents it even more because it is a compulsion of the group. And, finally, he fails to regain in any purely secular social crusade that dynamic urge for service that is inspired by a vital religion.

The problems arising from maladjustment in social institutions are equally serious. The shift in emphasis of government from sacred to secular has not made it easy to retain respect for government. It has become a purely human affair rather than a system based on the idea of divine right. Many Western societies have missed the strong hand of divinity and have been shaken by riot, revolution, and gangsterism. In the shift of mar-

riage from a sacramental to a civil basis a great deal of seriousness of purpose and stability of intention has been lost. We talk of gin-marriages and have an increasing proportion of annulments — things which do not happen in a sacred culture where marriage is a sacrament. In a case of the family, which is coming more and more to be an expression of romantic love and a desire for individual happiness, the very nature of the foundations threatens stability. Motives and goals are different from those in sacred culture where the family is a religious unit, a property unit, existing for posterity, not for the happiness and satisfaction of man and wife. What place did the Mosaic law make for sexual or psychological incompatibility, mental cruelty or nonsupport? Finally there is the greatest problem of all: can individualism be trusted with racial survival, can a nation with education and birth control made universal replace itself in numbers and survive, will science in a purely secular world lead to survival or to total destruction? We hear threats of the latter unless the latest weapons of war are harnessed by religious and ethical considerations, or unless man becomes peace-loving in sheer self-defense.

The defender of secular society will say that all these personal and social problems are the stresses of transition, that one who is from the beginning motivated by secular values and purely social goals will find them as effective motivations as the sacred values and goals of our ancestors were. Secularization, while it destroys the force of traditional morality and thereby weakens the moral structure of a society, at the same time makes possible a new and broader secondary-group morality based on man's obligation to man in the broader generic sense. It does not always follow, however, that the new morality develops immediately upon the overthrow of sacred stereotypes. This is the point where the social scientist faces a vital challenge in modern society.

We shall better understand the stress a secular age places upon personality and upon social institutions as we pursue this study further.

Review

1. What is "secularization"? How has it developed?
2. What changes have been made in the field of education as an outgrowth of secular influences? In the family?
3. Describe modern religion under the influence of secularization; moral philosophy; charity.

4. Contrast sacred and secular cultures with regard to rate of change.
5. What part does science play in sacred civilization? What part does it play in secular culture?
6. Why is the sacred culture so restrictive of individual initiative?
7. Contrast the values of sacred and secular cultures.
8. What factors are important to the secularization of personality as it is affected by migration?
9. Discuss the problem of personality integration created by secular culture.
10. What has been lost in the shift from sacred to secular culture? What has been gained?

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
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PART II

PERSONAL ADJUSTMENTS TO A COMPLEX SOCIETY



Grand Coulee Dam, United States Bureau of Reclamation

That the Structure of Personality Could Be as Well Designed and as Perfectly Built!



PART II

PERSONAL ADJUSTMENTS TO A COMPLEX SOCIETY

FOLK THINKING dominates the field of personality maladjustment and makes difficult the acceptance of scientific thinking and practice. Deep-seated customs and folklore are the bulwark of zones in which explanation is based on myth rather than on science. In time science overthrows the conceptions of folklore. Since the origin of the germ theory it has done so in the field of physical disease and has set aside for the most part folk practice in medicine. This is not yet the case, however, with mental disease — still called insanity — psychoneurosis, and other such phenomena which carry a superstitious significance rooted in demon-possession and other fears deeply embedded in tradition.

Society has come a long way from thinking that the insane are possessed of devils and from using the feebleminded as court jesters and professional fools; but the greatest obstacle the mentally diseased face yet is rejection by a public which looks upon their condition with suspicion and fear.

War has been a major factor in combating the older folklore. War, by the strain it places upon the person, causes many who were previously in normal health to break. Battle fatigue, to the degree of mental abnormality, has become so common in modern mechanized warfare that the cure of it has been placed in the field of scientific treatment. But even this approach has not fully allayed public superstition regarding it. So far as public tolerance is concerned, it is better to lose a leg and have some physical damage to show for one's injuries than to come out of the army with a psychoneurotic classification.

This is tragedy in an age when many of the most intelligent and sensitive break first under the nervous strain of battle, and when, but for these attitudes in the social group, rehabilitation would be easy. One of the most serious aspects of such group attitudes is that the affected individual holds them himself and stands self-condemned.

So it is with most of the other problems discussed in this book. Racial questions, delinquency, crime, and the handling of the stranger are still too much in the realm of folk attitudes, too little in the field of rational social policy. Improvement is difficult since so many consider folk practices adequate.

Take the field of delinquency and crime. It is known that the most vicious of men are made so by experience, not by breeding. Men learn these patterns in the same way as they learn religious and civic duty. The more personal crimes and vices are, with few exceptions, matters of cultivated personal appetites and habits; the more elaborate criminal activities partake of the nature of social institutions — the racket, for example. The major cost of modern crime is chargeable to those who make of it a highly skilled, even if not a highly refined, profession.

No one who understands the moving forces in American social life has the audacity to attribute criminality to the ape-likeness of an unlucky few born to deviltry, or juvenile delinquency to Adamic nature. By the same token, informed men no longer believe in propitiation, or that delinquency and crime are cured by torture, isolation, or other forms of punishment, any more than intelligent physicians think sickness is cured by bleeding.

Yet a punitive rather than a preventive and corrective justice still dominates our courts and the folklore of criminal administration. The idea that every person is responsible for all his acts by a rational freedom of choice dies hard even in an age when notions of social causation are accepted. As a consequence the general tenor of the folkways is to demand that the guilty suffer in proportion to the seriousness of their crime.

CHAPTER 6

PERSONALITY IN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY

Personality in a Transitional Age

PERSONALITY can be built for stability or for change. If it is built for a stable environment, change is painful; if for a changing environment, stability is boring. There are farmers who feel comfortable only when dressed in their familiar loose-fitting blue denim overalls; there are princes and motion picture actors who boast wardrobes of hundreds of suits of clothes and who never wear the same necktie twice.

The many-segmented personality that functions efficiently in many different situations is the product of a culture which is rich in providing a variety of alternatives and of a group experience which grants freedom to exercise initiative and ingenuity in relation to those alternatives.

There was a time when personality was considered primarily a product of heredity. It was thought man was born with most of the social characteristics manifest in adulthood. Not all these traits were fully developed but the instinctive basis was there to assure proper growth. Nowadays we hold that personality is more than looks and glands, hereditary makeup and predispositions; an accumulation of experiences and attitudes determines its functioning in new situations quite as much as, if not more than, hereditary factors as such. Personality is formed to a large extent by the influences that surround it from birth until death. Biology provides only the raw material.

Personality Defined

Personality, from the point of view of sociology, is the totality of the individual in his physical, mental, and emotional organization as he is oriented for social participation. It is the product,

first, of organic heritage, that is, native physical, mental, and emotional capacities, and, second, of habits, attitudes, and behavior-organization as developed by the interplay of the individual with his environment, that is, the natural, social, and cultural worlds in which it functions.

On the side of biological heritage, personalities vary widely. Individual variations growing from native endowment are called *individual differences.* This term in its broadest sense refers to the infinite variety of physical, mental, and emotional characteristics which separate each person from every other in terms of physical appearance, behavior tendencies, and emotional tone. Differences in physical and mental capacities are so well established that they need not be discussed. Emotional and energy patterns are not so well understood. They are related to glandular characteristics and other factors that are closely identified with the functioning of the animal mechanism itself and that, because of their direct bearing on the energy-output and force of the individual, are as important in his life organization as his looks and state of health.

Numerous attempts have been made from the days of the early Greeks to the present to describe the drive and tone of the individual in terms of some simple classification. No one such classification is adequate, but a number of them are suggestive of the range of individual difference in terms of energy output and body tone.

A recent classification — which may be inadequate but is nonetheless highly descriptive — is that of Plant.[1] It describes factors which he believes from clinical observations to be fairly permanently established in the life organization of the individual by native endowment or by early experience.

He believes that all individuals differ in *alertness.* Some are stolid in their responses to life, being unconscious of many of the social forces about them. At the opposite extreme are persons of the weathervane type who are constantly responding to every influence in the environment. The former type is unexcitable and plods faithfully on his way. The other is excitable, wanting to take part in everything that goes on. The fable of the tortoise and the hare describes both extremes well. Few individuals represent either extreme; all vary in degree of alertness.

[1] James S. Plant, *Personality and the Culture Pattern.* The Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1937.

A second basic trait is *complexity*. At the one extreme are the single-minded persons who take themselves very seriously and have narrow channels of interests. In contrast are those whose personalities are made up of a great many elements. The complex individual can shift from one type of interest to another, and in this shifting can view his previous roles more or less objectively. The single-minded can never stand off and laugh at himself as the complex person can. Great leaders in the political world, like the late Franklin D. Roosevelt, are examples of complex individuals able to fit into many situations. Great research men and artists are often of the single-minded type who pour much of their effort into one line of creative action.

A third trait is *pliability*. By this Plant refers to the tendency to do things according to habit. Some become so established in habits that they can scarcely adjust to new situations. They are not pliable. We often call them "bull-headed" because they are not adaptable. They cling to a purpose, rarely swerving regardless of what happens. They have great determination. At the other extreme is the person who shifts readily in response to many situations. The one type we call strong-willed, the other weak-willed.

A fourth basic trait is *temperament*. Temperament refers to tendencies toward introversion or extroversion. Introverted individuals tend to live within themselves and let the world go by. The extroverts aggressively attack the environment and participate extensively in social experience. In between are the great masses of ambiverts.

The fifth basic trait is *cadence*. By cadence Plant means the speed with which an individual works his way through to a goal in new situations. Some individuals always stumble through life in the rear of every venture they undertake, always making other people wait; at the other extreme are those who run and skip their way, keep appointments ahead of time, and always seem a little ahead of the game.

Personality Integration and the Situation

More important than the field of individual differences for sociological analysis is that great field of personality formation which relates to integration. By personality integration we mean simply the internal consistency of the individual as viewed by

himself. It involves primarily an individual's sense of being a unit. Lacking this sense, he feels within himself the strain and division which lead to the emotional tensions of anxiety and conflict. In its mild form, disorganization — the opposite of integration — expresses itself in mental conflicts centering about problems of choice. In its extreme form, it expresses itself in a complete spreading apart of the segments of the individual's self to the point where he no longer is a functional part of social situations. This extreme we call mental disease or insanity.

Although integration is considered a desirable goal, the completely integrated individual is probably rare. The degree of integration sought by society is one which permits the individual to function usefully and with a reasonable degree of personal happiness. While it is related to individual differences as described above, it is, for those persons endowed by heredity with normal physical, mental, and emotional traits, even more a function of external conditions, that is, of relationships to things, persons, and situations. In other words the personality becomes built into and molded by the natural setting, by the social interaction of the group, and by native culture. The developed personality is integrated in terms of the roles it plays, the social relations of day-to-day experience, the social responses of others, the experiences of acceptance or rejection by other persons, common and familiar cultural traits, common customs, common situations such as the locality, the job, and family relationship.

In a complex society personality integration must be judged, with the exception of those cases in which native endowment in the physical, mental, or emotional sense is clearly deficient, by the effectiveness and nature of these external relationships. Furthermore, it is not only the person's actual place in community and society that is important to his sense of personal integration, but also his conception of his roles. One must seek to understand personality problems not simply or even primarily in terms of individual differences as produced by heredity, but in terms of external experience as it affects the internal sense of unity which the person possesses. This is the point of departure in most current psychoanalytical approaches; it has largely replaced the original concept of conflicts as due to a clash of organic drives (especially the sex drive) and social expectations. It has never been more neatly described than by Cooley's famous phrase

"looking-glass self" [2] which implies that the individual's conception of himself, his own internal consistency, is a direct reflection of the attitudes of his group which show him his place in the social structure.

The Driving Force of Personality

Personality is always invested with a greater or lesser degree of driving force, a striving for realization. This struggle for self-expression is, after the first few months of age, a mixture of innate drive and social motivation. Whatever its source, the organization of the person is determined to a large extent by the degree and character of realization.

W. I. Thomas in his famous study, *The Unadjusted Girl*, [3] analyzed this striving as consisting of four basic wishes oriented toward social objectives: the desire for (1) new experiences, (2) security, (3) response, and (4) recognition. Under the first wish, desire for new experiences, he describes the interest of the individual in trying out the new. Every environment, especially for the child, adolescent, and youth, presents a great deal that is novel, and every individual obtains some thrill from experimenting with the new, even though he sometimes fears elements of it. In the desire for security Thomas recognizes the longing of the individual for roots in a familiar world of attachments to persons, places, and things that he can depend upon. This need is now recognized by child psychologists and students of personality as fundamental. Only as a person has this sense of belonging, does he feel secure within himself. The third striving, for response, involves primarily the desire of the individual for love and affection. Finally, that for recognition describes the whole field of personal endeavor that relates to status seeking and status maintenance in one's group. Every individual must stand for something to others and mean something to others in order to have self-respect and a consciousness that life has significance.

[2] CHARLES H. COOLEY, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (revised edition), Chapter 5. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1922.

[3] W. I. THOMAS, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Chapter 1. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1923. That Thomas was writing in a day when the instinct concept was accepted and that he was probably thinking in such terms, is not important here. Interpreted in the light of current psychological and sociological concepts, his ideas are highly useful.

Adler's emphasis on the theory that abnormal drives of men grow out of organ inferiority — popularized in his universally known concept, inferiority complex — capitalizes on this basic fact of human experience. Although the sociologist does not accept organ inferiority as the basic cause, he finds the concept meaningful. Inferiority complex is nothing more than a constellation of emotionally charged ideas centering about a feeling of social inadequacy that may result from organic defects but quite as readily from other unfavorable social comparisons. By contact with his fellows in numerous situations, the individual comes to feel that he does not measure up in some respect that is vital to his status. In a competitive society a failure to measure up in a vital status-gaining element of personality causes a feeling of inferiority. With some this core of inadequacy becomes a major factor in personal organization. It may lead to defeat; but, as Adler showed, it often leads to compensation, that is, to a focusing of energy in an attempt to overcome the weakness itself or to gain recognition through a substitute achievement.

In the highly competitive social order of the United States, it is an exceptional young person indeed who does not suffer with greater or less intensity from an inferiority complex. As young people extend their experience beyond the primary group and try out new activities, they are certain to compare themselves unfavorably with others in many situations. Inferiority feelings are the natural result. In the autobiographies of college students one more often finds comments about feelings of inferiority during high school and the early years of college than about any other aspect of personal-social adjustment. With maturity the person narrows down his range of interests and contacts, confining himself to activities and associations in which he has proved efficient or successful. Self-confidence replaces fear. Thus most individuals with maturity lose their inferiority feelings or at least temper them to the point where they are not decisive factors in behavior.

Those who cannot shed inferiority feelings may be victimized by them, resorting to social isolation or hermitage, the escape of drink or drugs, hysterical illness and malingering, or make other evasive adjustments to life.

This discussion has implied that motivation is something more than an individual's own personal desires, aptitudes, and inclinations. The social group and the culture of a time and place determine the kind of influences that will set the goal of his striving

for accomplishment. In our society, where wealth and success are emulated, where competition and struggle for position and power are sanctioned, individuals drive themselves almost beyond endurance to achieve these goals. In Hindu society, where the great man is he who can renounce all worldly ambitions, live meagerly, and by so doing grasp the infinite, men torture themselves to lay hold on unseen powers. Innate drives clearly become reinforced by external values and oriented about socially appraised objectives.

Personality Strain in a Complex Culture

Human personality always develops within the framework of a given culture or civilization. Civilizations differ tremendously in the degree to which they permit variations in the human personality. In some the patterns of life are narrowly restricted, in others there are many. As we have just noted, the ideals of goodness which predominate in one culture may call for worldly renunciation, isolation, and meditation on the part of those who would develop the saintly personality. In other cultures sainthood may call for the broadest kind of social usefulness, the most extensive social participation, an emphasis not primarily on worship and meditation but upon creative social action in the interest of human uplift and improvement. In one culture political patterns are ready cut, there is little choice as to who will govern, government is fixed and prepared for the individual before he comes on the scene. In other cultures, political decision is everybody's right; the individual develops broad interests in civic affairs, understands several patterns of political philosophy, participates in political behavior on a voluntary basis, and is a good citizen only if he is informed on political issues.

In some instances, personality is formed to fit a narrow group which has a unique culture of its own. Compared to this in-group, the out-group has a culture which is in conflict, one with which the in-group must forever be at war. The Old Testament Jew is a good example of a people with a strong in-group culture at conflict with an out-group, the Gentiles, whose culture was discounted and whose people were to be avoided. Another example is the Amana Society of Iowa, which until recent years had a unique culture of this sort. It was a communistic order dominated by the rule of elders. Personality was built

about such symbols as modesty of dress, respect for elders, frequent worship, equal sharing of all goods, a common life, and meals at the common table. Within this culture the shaping of personality was markedly different from that of the out-group. When, however, the automobile came and a modern highway was cut through the colony, the traditions and customs which had for two centuries, in Europe first and then in America, provided the personality patterns for Amana youth, dissolved under the influence of contact with the out-group. The break came in the late twenties when the girls began to bob their hair, substitute shorter and tighter skirts for the full long garments of their ancestors, cast aside black cotton hose for sheer stockings, and replace "thee and thou" with the American vernacular and colorful slang. This was followed in 1932 by the reorganization of the colony as a capitalistic corporation.

We infer from this discussion that personality integration is related to the integration of the culture in which the individual lives. In a unified culture, one in which all social definitions — family, neighborhood, and community — are uniform, personality conflict is reduced to the minimum. Some individuals, it is true, will find themselves frustrated by the bare lack of variety in the culture, but for the most part people who have no choice of alternatives are content and, without effort, achieve integration and harmony within their personalities.

By contrast, in a culture which is very complex and in which there are many patterns from which the individual must choose, integration of personality becomes something more deliberate and more conscious. Where there are many choices to be made, the individual finds unity in his personality only as he is able to build his life organization about certain chosen objectives or larger cultural values of his time. In contemporary America, for example, a youth must choose between "Honesty is the best policy" and "Business is business"; a girl must decide for herself whether she will assume all male prerogatives, or cling to some uniquely feminine goals for behavior.

The wide diversity of life patterns in American culture is responsible for a great deal of personality conflict and disorganization. The neurotic personality is common; that is, from the social standpoint, a personality which has not clearly defined its goals and been able to select in harmony with them to the extent of achieving unity and integration. The individual exhausts him-

self in an endless attempt to work out solutions to the simplest of problems.

To be organized effectively and intelligently, personality must be built around certain values which the individual selects from among a great many that predominate in the culture pattern of a highly advanced society. These values will determine for him the goals toward which he applies his energies. They will offer a standard by which he selects the kind of activities to which he will devote himself. The selection of goals will also help him in choosing the kind of associations and associates who will contribute to these ends.

Personality and Social Roles in a World of Secondary Groups

In an extremely complex culture no individual can participate fully in the total life of his time. He must learn to participate selectively, to unify his energies in the direction of certain goals, and to pursue them with determination, leaving for others who have chosen other goals the problems of pursuing other courses of action. This problem of learning to participate selectively, of learning not only what to participate in but also what to leave out, involves one of the great decisions every youth must make. Up to a certain point breadth of participation has value; but it may lead to dissipation of energy and failure to accomplish anything.

Because they determine status in the group, the selection of roles one performs in his society is as vital to his personality formation as his selection of values and goals. Modern society, as has been implied in previous chapters, permits the playing of many social roles unknown in simple society, where stability of residence, simplicity of group relationships, and intimacies of daily contacts are characteristic. A complex society has place for people who play different roles and perform highly specialized functions. It also permits a great deal of variation in social, recreational, and leisure-time activities. It permits association in many groups wherein different interests are characteristic. For this reason America is a land of complex and diversified personalities with highly specialized interests and talents.

It is this complexity of social roles that presents a major difficulty in the problem of personality integration. Many individuals are torn between the habit patterns, values, moral standards, and life goals which become a part of them as they mingle in

groups with varying standards and ideals. The road to integration lies in an effort to harmonize within oneself the various roles he plays as he moves from group to group and from one social situation to another with an increase in age and experience.

This fact is well illustrated in the concept of individualism. There are in reality two kinds of individualism.[4] The first is an *individualism of isolation* which takes the form of eccentricity and peculiarity. It springs from lack of association, as in the case of the sheep herder, the trapper, the prospector, the mountaineer, or the hermit. It is a social warping of the personality brought about by a lack of the corrective influences that come from contacts with people. It has little social usefulness except that it may help the individual to survive in the peculiar geographical environment in which he lives. The second is a *functional individualism.* This kind comes from the cultivated development of various talents and interests. It is creative and relates to the particular kind of social role the person plays in specialized group situations. It is the product of a multitude of social contacts and a variety of social experience. It comes from breadth of personality development rather than from isolation. It is most often found in metropolitan culture, where the person is allowed to make decisions for himself and to vary from the group norm without too much criticism and yet where there is sufficient social influence to keep him from diverging too far from an acceptable pattern. It develops there, also, because in the metropolitan community value is placed on specialization.

The personality of the average rural man, especially if he has participated little in the social organizations of his town and community, is dominated by a rigid set of habits and philosophies that grow out of the sameness of his life. He is incapable of fitting into many social situations common to other human beings. His speech patterns may be abbreviated to fit the colloquialisms of his neighborhood. He is likely to believe in many of the signs and superstitions about weather or other nature phenomena which are so persistent in rural life. Even his heavy stride is adapted to the requirements of his clothing and his world.

Integrated neighborhood groups permit little variety of personality because of intolerance of any variation from the norm.

[4] This is essentially the classification developed by CHARLES H. COOLEY, in his *Social Organization*, pp. 93–97. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1909, 1925.

A simple, homogeneous, and well integrated group is less tolerant of divergent personality types. It is more certain to smother innovations. On the other hand, societies of secondary groups, such as are represented in the modern city, permit the development of the highest level of sophistication and functional individualism. Here people of specialized individualistic types have survival value and social usefulness. Here tradition has less sway, rigid customs are less binding; men are more willing to let a man be what he will, as long as he does not interfere too much with others and as long as he proves that his unique activities bring success.

Many a rural youth aspiring to a career in writing, art, or music in earlier days faced only criticism in the toil-hardened atmosphere of the farm neighborhood. He had to go to the city to find a group which did not consider writing a waste of time.

The very diversity of social roles in secondary-group social organization, however, opens the way for strain. Primary groups may frustrate the individual of diversified talents and interests but seldom present enough alternatives to cause him many problems of choice. Secondary groups offer social roles, many of which take one in entirely different directions. Intelligent choice of group associations, and thereby of social roles that will produce status, is a problem for the person living in a socio-cultural situation that offers a variety of roads to achievement.

In secondary-group society some groups are perpetually in conflict. There is no possibility of harmonizing their interests, goals, or ideals. The individual who tries to participate in more than one is bound to find that he cannot harmonize his inner life with the standards of groups which are themselves incompatible. Youth are apt to fail to recognize this point and consequently suffer the pangs of conscience. It is a part of maturity to learn that one cannot be a part of all groups and be at unity within oneself.

Personal Crisis in Relation to the Situation

The problem of personality integration in a complex society is one of the most difficult. Even the reasonably well-integrated person always faces the risk that crisis will cause disturbance. Our society is dynamic with such situations. With many people the single inevitable event of death proves to be the disrupting

factor. One whose life integration is built about the family situation and the mate, may in some cases be so completely disorganized by the death of the mate that death soon follows or escape is found in insanity or suicide. In most cases reorganization of life patterns in response to the loss of pivotal points becomes extremely difficult and may never be completely realized.[5]

Take also the field of occupation. In a society where adult life consists primarily in work, one's occupation is a key point in personality organization. Habit formation is effected by the daily tasks performed; one's attitude conforms to the kind of work he does. To a considerable extent his values and life objectives, the extent and character of his association off the job, and his status in the community are molded by his occupation. His satisfaction is to a considerable extent a reflection of his satisfactions in or discontent with his job and the social relations it makes possible. To be dissatisfied and frustrated in one's work, to feel insecure or uncertain in it, is the next worst thing to being unhappily married. To lose one's job after years of habituation to it may seriously disorganize a man's personality. Many a man in the great depression of the 1930's found his life thrown out of gear by the fact that he lost the job about which his habits of life had been built. In losing his job and source of income, he found to his surprise that he lost his authority over the family and his status in the community. Children and wife lost their respect for him when he was no longer the earning head of the family. In many cases, as a consequence, he lost his self-respect.

Some individuals encounter trouble after trouble and become disorganized by repeated strains or by the piling up of situations which exhaust their capacity to adjust. Ill health, disagreements in the family, social rejection, and a great number of such crises, any one of which coming alone might have been endured, cannot be endured together. When all are piled up together, they bring the person to despair; he cannot rally by his own efforts to the point of achieving a new life organization. It is with this type of person especially, or with persons approaching this state, that the professional social worker has to deal.

This analysis further emphasizes the fact that the internal organization of the personality is vitally affected by external

[5] For an excellent analytical study of the bereavement experience, see THOMAS D. ELIOT, "The Bereaved Family." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 60:184–190, March, 1932.

situations which have in the process of personality development become the key points of life organization. Disturb these anchors and the life organization of the person is disturbed.

In this emphasis on external factors there is no intent to detract from the importance of ill health, glandular unbalance, or other such factors of internal or organic origin. They are important, but are in the realm of pathology rather than of social therapy. Our primary interest here is to interpret and understand personality as it relates to the social structure. The individuals with medical difficulties have unique problems, but even the organically normal suffer personality disturbance in a complex socio-cultural world.

To carry the analysis one step further, the preceding discussion implies that the significance of crisis to the individual may depend a great deal on the character of the group situation in which he lives. The strain of personal crisis is undoubtedly much greater in an individualistic society than in primary groups where the individual is not only more fully submerged in the group situation but also more fully protected by it. In large primary groups, death may be much less of a crisis than in the individualistic family where the mate is the only person with whom the survivor has close ties. Financial loss is much less critical from the standpoint of life organization if one depends on the large family organization for security than if he asks a public agency for help. There are, of course, exceptions. In crisis situations where the individual seeks escape, the secondary group offers better opportunities for a new adjustment by virtue of the fact that one can lose his past in its anonymity. The Hester Prynnes of secondary-group society do not wear the scarlet letter on their bosoms.

Personal Disorganization and Social Disorganization

Throughout this chapter the fact has been stressed that personality is the product of social experience, that self and others are closely identified. Personality reflects the extent of social interaction of the individual with his fellows; it also reflects the culture patterns which form the matrix of group life. At no point has the effect of social experience and the culture pattern on personality of the individual been more graphically illustrated than in studies of personal disorganization.

Many studies have shown that in areas of social disorganization where group definitions lack clarity, or where numerous conflicting moral definitions prevail, where neighborhood and community life lack organization, where the life patterns of the local group lack integration, social pathologies are concentrated. Data to demonstrate the validity of this hypothesis will be presented in later chapters. Suffice it to say here that studies of the American city show that crime, juvenile delinquency, functional insanity, divorce, and suicide are concentrated in areas where community controls have broken down and where the social structure offers man little protection against his own vicious appetites. In these areas children come to maturity trained in habits of delinquency and crime, viewing the world from the standpoint of the disorganized community structure which provided their native environment.

Although social disorganization and personal disorganization are closely related, it is necessary to caution at this point that they are not identical. People with integrated personalities can be found in areas of social disorganization, and persons with disorganized personalities can be found in integrated communities.

The significance of this discussion is that the scientist has long since ceased looking for the source of personality conflict and disorganization within the individual alone. He has rather come to stress the fact that the individual's inner complexities reflect the lack of his ability to harmonize his experience with external surroundings. He is disorganized because (1) he lives in a disorganized culture where controls are ill defined, or (2) he is a marginal man, unable to bridge the two cultural worlds between which he must live, or (3) he embodies within his own personality the patterns of two or more groups with very diverse standards, or finally (4) he is unable to regulate organic impulses and bring them in line with systems of control accepted by his group. Each of these situations will be discussed in its proper place in the chapters which follow.

American society has been noted for personality disorganization as reflected in insanity, crime, suicide, psychoneurotic tendencies, and mental conflicts. In addition to those who experience complete breakdown, a multitude of others flock to psychiatrists, faith healers, and quacks of various sorts. It is likely that the increasing popularity of astrology, phrenology, palmistry, faith cures, and psychological and pseudo-psychologi-

cal literature reflects the mental stress and personality strain of our society.[6] Only as one takes into account the extent to which our life is a conglomeration of many culture patterns and a motley of many groups with diverse standards, can he begin to appreciate the reasons for personality disorganization in the United States. During the last century this has been the melting pot of many peoples with different standards, philosophies of life, and systems of social regulation. In such a world, personality problems are inevitable.

Add to this the disconcerting effect of migration, which in itself tends to undermine the established systems of control more rapidly than society can rebuild them. The shifting to and fro of migratory currents breaks people from their moorings. Old controls which operated effectively in one environment prove to be entirely inadequate in another. The individual, under the influence of new stimuli and encountering new worlds of thought and regulation, finds himself without a rudder to steer his course. Such experiences have never been the lot of men in the primary group societies of the ancient world, or in primitive societies of past or present, for in such societies the individual throughout life is surrounded by well-integrated and uniform culture patterns which he absorbs and which, once he has absorbed them, fully prepare him to live. In the complex urban-industrial cultures of the Western world no individual can be finally adjusted for his lifetime when he absorbs the patterns of his particular group, whether it be his primary group or some other. He must, as he moves from place to place, become re-acculturated and readjusted to new systems of regulation. In the United States even the rural population is highly mobile and susceptible to these influences.

The effect of socio-cultural disorganization as found in the United States, where disorganizing forces occur in their extreme form, on the personality of the individual is well summarized by L. K. Frank in the following statement:[7]

> This cultural conception reveals human conduct, not as whimsical or volitionally controlled, but as the way the individual takes over the ideas, beliefs, and practices of the traditional group life and, under their guidance, carries out his life processes. In a secluded group where, over a long period

[6] See data on page 133.

[7] L. K. Frank, "Society as the Patient." *American Journal of Sociology*, 42: 338–340.

of time, men have worked out a unified culture with appropriate sanctions and beliefs, the individual ordinarily finds the pattern of his life prepared for him and, within the permissions and restrictions it offers, he can achieve his life and fulfil his social responsibility. His culture dictates what he will be aware of, how he will respond to it and explain it, and what he can and must do with his organic needs and functions. In homogeneous cultures, individuals of aberrant temperaments are less likely to find it difficult to conform to the patterns laid down by their culture; when forced to do so, they can adapt themselves with a minimum of strain because their culture does not offer conflicting choices. In some cultures it is the practice even to give specific exemptions to an individual whose temperament makes it difficult for him to conform to the patterns that are recognized as socially normal; such exemption saves the individual deviant from anxiety or guilt.

When we regard Western European culture that has emerged from an almost incredible background of conflict and confusion and mixture of peoples, and see that for centuries it has not been unified either in ideas and beliefs or in socially approved practices, we can begin to understand the etiology of the sickness of our society. Our culture has no unanimity of individual or social aims, no generally accepted sanctions, and no common patterns of ideas or conduct. All our basic ideas, conceptions, and beliefs have been in process of revision for the last three hundred years or more, beginning with the displacement of the older notions of the universe and man's place therein and going on now to the supersedure of the traditional animistic, voluntaristic conceptions of human nature and conduct and man's relation to his society. The American scene, moreover, has been successively invaded by representatives of widely different nationalities, who have accelerated the decay of the early American tradition that our changing industry has made inevitable. The picture is sufficiently familiar and has been adequately described so that no prolonged description is needed here.

If we bear in mind this culture disintegration, then our so-called special problems and the seeming perversity of individuals become intelligible. They are to be viewed as arising from the frantic efforts of individuals, lacking any sure direction and sanctions or guiding conception of life, to find some way of protecting themselves or of merely existing on any terms they can manage in a society being remade by technology. Having no strong loyalties and no consistent values or realizable ideals to cherish, the individual's conduct is

naturally conflicting, confused, neurotic, and antisocial, if that term has any meaning in the absence of an established community purpose and ideal. The more skilful contrive to profit from the social confusion and their own lack of scruples, while others evade or break laws, become mentally disordered or diseased, or otherwise violate the older codes of conduct, damaging themselves and those whose lives they touch. No one is happy, it is apparent; the successful are driven as relentlessly as the failures by their sense of guilt, their compulsions, and their frustrations.

Review

1. Discuss the relation of personality to the culture pattern.
2. What is "personality" and how is it formed?
3. What are "individual differences"?
4. Outline and discuss Plant's fivefold classification of personality patterns.
5. Why is personality integration so desirable for the individual? What are the disastrous effects of disorganization?
6. What part do external experiences play in personality disorganization?
7. What are the four basic wishes described by W. I. Thomas? Explain.
8. What factors enter into the development of an inferiority complex? How may an inferiority complex be related to personality organization or disorganization?
9. Indicate how external influences may affect our inner motivations?
10. Explain why personality conflict is at a minimum in a unified culture. Contrast this with personality conflict in a complex culture.
11. Explain the terms "in-group" and "out-group" and relate them to personality organization.
12. Why is the neurotic personality so common in our culture?
13. Relate personality strain to the variety of social roles that secondary-group participation offers.
14. What is the main problem of the individual who performs many different functions and plays many different roles?
15. Describe two types of individualism. Where is each most commonly found?
16. Why is the personality of the average rural man so inflexible?
17. Relate problems of personality integration to crisis experience.
18. How does the social group and the social situation influence the effect of a crisis on the individual?
19. Cite typical situations which produce personal disorganization.

20. How does migration operate to bring about personality disorganization?

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CHAPTER 7

THE PERSONAL CASUALTY OF SOCIAL COMPLEXITY

IN THIS CHAPTER certain kinds of personal breakdown have been selected as illustrations of the sort of personality disorganization which frequently occurs in a complex society. No attempt has been made here even to name all of the many forms of "variant" and pathological behavior; nor, of course, is the analysis of any particular type of personality disorganization given here complete. Exhaustive treatment is the problem of special works in social pathology which focus attention on the detailed aspects of personality breakdown. It is important, however, that the beginning student of social problems should understand the bearing of the socio-cultural structure and of social experience on the process of personality disorganization and of personality reconstruction. It is intended here to interpret the broader outlines of this problem.

A person may become disorganized, either periodically or permanently, because of his inability to adapt to the socio-cultural structure in which he lives. We may say that he is disorganized, in some measure, when he is isolated from a free and satisfying participation in society. His failure may be brought about by the fact that the socio-cultural organization itself lacks sufficient integration to hold him to it, or it may be due to the fact that he has developed behavior traits which exclude him from participation. Of course, disorganization of personality is sometimes due to hereditary defects, to failure of an organism to develop properly, or to actual physical or mental deterioration resulting from disease or accident. Here we are primarily interested in stressing those kinds of personal disorganization which are of broad social significance rather than those of strictly medical importance.

The sociologist is not competent to deal with problems which are primarily medical — such as glandular difficulties, organic weaknesses, vitamin deficiencies, etc. — and he is under no ob-

ligation to do so. He is, however, very much concerned with medical problems which place the individual in a peculiar position from the standpoint of group response and thereby hinder medical treatment. In certain diseases, group attitudes are a greater social problem than the disease itself. In other words, prevailing folkways sometimes make it difficult for individuals who with proper guidance could reconstruct their personalities ever to find themselves. Our attitudes toward the insane, the drug addict, and the alcoholic are still too much of this character. The mores of shame surrounding venereal disease, also, have hindered public policy and have often made personal action ineffective in producing a cure. In fact, social attitude is the essence of the venereal-disease problem now that the organic diseases themselves can readily be cured by early medical attention. Personal disorganization in which social organization and social attitudes play an important part is the subject of this chapter.

Suicide and the Social Structure

The effect of the socio-cultural structure on the pathological behavior of the individual is well illustrated in suicide. In Oriental society, suicide is an accepted culture pattern. That is, in certain social crises society requires self-inflicted death as a face-saving device. Suicide, in these prescribed cases, is expected; in fact, it is the only course open for retaining one's status in the eyes of his group. The American trader, however, who commits suicide during a stock market crash reflects the values of quite a different culture. Under the two systems of social values, even methods of committing the suicidal act will differ. The practical-minded American businessman will make the end quick and painless with a bullet through the brain; the Japanese will employ the gruesome and lingering method of a sword through the intestines.[1] For his pain the Japanese enjoys the wholesome satisfaction of a socially respected ceremony. In the case of the American, the social group says "the fool." In short, Japanese suicide is institutionalized; American suicide is individualistic.

The prevalence of individualistic suicide varies with the degree of "individuation" developed in the socio-cultural situation.

[1] See NANCY V. AUSTEN, "Suicide à la Mode in Japan." *Current History*, 15:83–85, October, 1927.

In rural primary groups of the United States, which are comparatively integrated and neighborly, the suicide rate is much lower than in urban areas, where a more extreme individualism is characteristic. This has long been true. For example, in 1910 the rural rate in the United States was 12.4 per 100,000, the urban rate, 17.9; in 1920 the rural rate was 8.5, the urban, 12.8; in 1930 the rural rate was 12.7, the urban, 20.3; and in 1940 the rural rate was 12.0 compared with a metropolitan (cities of 100,000 or over) rate of 16.8. Even when discounted for the greater number of adults in urban areas the urban rates are higher than rural rates. Adjusted rates for 1940 are: rural, 12.9; cities of 2500 to 10,000, 14.8; cities of 10,000 to 100,000, 14.9; cities of 100,000 or more, 15.6.

In the Netherlands the rural suicide rate actually exceeds the urban, probably because under the Dutch farming system the aged find themselves a burden and often resort to suicide.[2] Such altruistic suicide is not uncommon under various rural cultural patterns of a nonindividualistic character.

Durkheim,[3] in a classic work on suicide, pointed out that in primitive societies, where collective consciousness is strong, suicide is at a minimum. In Western society, where individualism has flowered, suicide has increased. Where the individual lacks the collective consciousness, that is, a strong sense of identification with his group, he lives less safely than in communities where he feels that he is an essential part of the on-going stream of life and that his continued existence is meaningful to others. In fact, the meaning of life to the individual himself is vitally related to the meaning of his life to others.

Cavan,[4] in a study of suicide, stresses the coincidence of outbreaks of suicide in the Western world with periods of social disorganization. She also relates suicide to the disorganized community.[5] In the disorganized areas of Chicago, for example, suicide rates were found to be extremely high. Near the furnished-room district in Chicago, which has been described by

[2] S. GORGAS, "Suicide in the Netherlands." *American Journal of Sociology*, 37:697–713, March, 1932.

[3] ÉMILE DURKHEIM, *Le Suicide*. Paris, 1887.

[4] RUTH S. CAVAN, *Suicide*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1923.

[5] So also do studies of C. F. SCHMID, *Suicides in Seattle, 1914–1925, An Ecological and Behavioristic Study*. University of Washington Press, Seattle, Wash., 1928; C. F. SCHMID, "Suicide in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1928–1932." *American Journal of Sociology*, 39:30–48, July, 1933; ERNEST R. MOWRER, *Disorganization, Personal and Social*, Chapter 14, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1942.

Zorbaugh,[6] a bridge once crossed a lagoon in Lincoln Park. Victims of extreme isolation in that district so often committed suicide by jumping into the lagoon that the bridge was nicknamed "Suicide Bridge." In fact, it was eventually torn down because of its morbid reputation. The high urban suicide rates may be partly explained by the influx of rural persons to the city, many of whom break under the stress of urban adjustment.[7] Rooming-house districts are filled largely with people who come from rural areas.

The feeling of being alone in the world, of being unnoticed and uncared for by others, in other words, psycho-social isolation, has little relationship to spatial distance.[8] It may be experienced in a dense crowd as readily as on an isolated island, being determined chiefly by the absence of social participation. In fact, a certain amount of spatial separation may add to the meaning of social contacts and increase their depth, thus actually decreasing the sense of social isolation. Social isolation most often occurs in anonymous areas of the large city, where population is dense and where contacts are many but superficial.

> Rural areas . . . have settled ways of living, established moral codes, a narrow range of interests, but fairly adequate ways of caring for the interests they have. There are few newcomers, few transients, only a small degree of mobility, and consequently little disturbance to the rigid social control of the family, neighborhood, and institutions. People do not commit suicide without a cause, and in the rural areas there is less of the disturbance to accustomed ways of living, which constitutes a major cause of personal disorganization in urban centers.[9]

Further evidence of the effect of lack of identification with the group is found in the comparative suicide rates of widowed, divorced, and married persons. The rates for the divorced in the United States are more than three times as high as those for married persons; rates for the widowed are more than twice as

[6] HARVEY W. ZORBAUGH, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, p. 83. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929.

[7] Niles Carpenter discusses this probability. See his *Sociology of City Life*, pp. 334–337. Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1931.

[8] The term "social distance" has been used by certain writers, notably Robert E. Park and Emory S. Bogardus, to distinguish between geographical separation and social-psychological separation, social distance being their term for the social-psychological separation of individuals or groups.

[9] CAVAN, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

high as those for the married.[10] Widowed and divorced persons have severed the most intimate tie which human beings form and have suffered the strain of crisis, in many cases without the sympathetic understanding of any meaningful social group.

As further evidence of the effect upon suicide of the sense of integration with the social group, one may cite the precipitous decline of suicide rates during wartime. It will be observed (see the following table) that during our participation in World War I

SUICIDE RATES IN THE UNITED STATES REGISTRATION AREAS, 1915–1945[11]

Year	*Suicide rate per 100,000 population*	*Year*	*Suicide rate per 100,000 population*
1915	16.2	1931	16.8
1916	13.7	1932	17.4
1917	13.0	1933	15.9
1918	12.3	1934	14.9
1919	11.5	1935	14.3
1920	10.2	1936	14.3
1921	12.4	1937	15.0
1922	11.7	1938	15.3
1923	11.5	1939	14.1
1924	11.9	1940	14.3
1925	12.0	1941	12.9
1926	12.6	1942	12.0
1927	13.2	1943	10.2
1928	13.5	1944	—
1929	13.9	1945	—
1930	15.6		

Observe the marked decline in suicide rates during war periods when the integration of the individual with his group is most complete.

suicide rates dropped to 12.3 for 1918 and 11.5 for 1919. It will also be observed that during World War II a similar decline took place, the rate falling to 10.2 in 1943. We need only recall the social pressures exercised by national propaganda during World War II to realize how completely each individual is made to feel a part of the working group in time of war. Everyone is em-

[10] For data see CAVAN, *op. cit.*, p. 319; SCHMID, *The Saga of Two Cities*, p. 373; and F. C. LENDRUM, "A Thousand Cases of Attempted Suicide." *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 13:481, November, 1933.

[11] *U.S. Summary of Vital Statistics, 1943 and 1940*, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

ployed, and everyone is made to feel responsible for carrying out important activities. In every community, enterprises ranging all the way from salvaging tin cans to preparing for air raids are carried out on a group basis. The old find an active place in the work world from which they have been previously excluded. Even the physically handicapped find their skills and services in demand.

Group cooperation and group unity make a man feel that he is wanted, that he belongs to something, that he is part of a forward movement of life which embraces everyone. This is an attitude which is usually missing in a highly individualistic society. It is always present, however, in primary-group societies, where the individual personality is built into the activities and daily routines of his neighbors and of a large family.

Mental Disease in Relation to the Culture Pattern

The neurotic personality and even the more extreme phases of functional psychoses are increasingly being interpreted in terms of social roles, of the relation of self to others, of the totality of an individual's "self-other" relationships. This is in contrast to explanations in terms of weak heredity, childhood shock, or other factors that have been used during various periods in the history of the study and treatment of mental disease. The complexity of modern life and the uncertainty of the individual in secondary groups is undoubtedly an important factor in personality stress, which in turn may exhaust an individual's capacity to adjust and thus bring him to the point of psychoneurosis or even of complete mental breakdown requiring isolation from the normal group.

Psychiatrists recognize the importance of a shift in social roles and the breaking of social attachments in developing the psychoneurotic personality so common in military operations. Baker [12] says that the first great shock comes when the individual who enters the armed forces is taken from his primary-group society and placed in an entirely new social situation. Not only is he torn from his intimate social group; he is also stripped of all the indices of status and recognition which were part of his civilian role. The process is quick. He soon finds himself in a line of

[12] William Y. Baker's views have been expressed frequently in lectures. Dr. Baker was, during World War II, Chief of the Neuropsychiatric Service, Fort George Wright, Spokane, Washington.

nude males awaiting physical examination; before he knows it, he is in a military uniform. To replace the old group, he now forms close attachment to his "buddy." For the groups to which he formerly gave loyalty is substituted the new army unit with which he becomes identified. The buddy becomes the focus of new primary-group loyalties, and within the army unit he gradually gains a new status in the performance of new social roles. The second series of shocks comes when the service man sees this new intimate group gradually destroyed by combat experience. Members of his unit, in many cases even his own buddy or buddies, are gradually taken from him by injury or violent death. Baker conceives of each of these adjustments as exhausting a part of the individual's capacity to adjust. Eventually he reaches the point where he can endure no longer the shocks to his own world of security, and the neurotic break comes. Childhood experience and, in fact, all previous experience which has determined the extent of the individual's feeling of identity with his group have a relation to the breaking point.

For some individuals the break comes early. They have little capacity to adjust. Other individuals break only after repeated experiences of shock; still others, even in the repeated crises of combat, do not break under the strain at all. Combat experience, however, presents within a short period of time more problems of adjustment in the field of emotional-interactional relationships than would in normal society come in a lifetime, and those who do not actually break in combat have, by the time they return to civilian life, to use Baker's phraseology, "practically exhausted their capacity to adjust."

While the present writer may have given more sociological meaning to this analysis than Baker himself intends, it at least suggests that those working directly with psychoneurotic patients in wartime have recognized the vital importance which the disturbance of a person's intimate group and of his social roles has in producing the psychoneurotic personality. An analysis by Weinberg [13] parallels that of Baker at many points, although it is not identical in language. Depending not only on cases which he has selected for analysis but also on a summary of several other studies of the problem, Weinberg concludes that combat neurosis may appear in persons who have given no signs of

[13] S. KIRSON WEINBERG, "The Combat Neuroses." *American Journal of Sociology*, 51:465–478, March, 1946.




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
Chances are one in twenty you and I will spend a term there. The possibilities of restoration to mental health are greatly diminished in institutions where physical care and psychological treatment are inadequate. Compare conditions on left and right pages.

predisposition to neurosis if experiences are sufficiently critical. He classifies the war neuroses (psychoneuroses) into three types based on typical patterns: (1) anxiety, (2) hysteria, and (3) mixed. He finds that fear, apprehension, and tension are the typical strains that produce the anxiety breakdown. Self-concern replaces the social concern to which, as a part of a combat unit, the service man has been trained. His military habits break down. Weinberg continues:

> The crux of the soldier's conflict is between unit attachment and self-concern, both before and after breakdown. This conflict tends to be momentous and draws upon the soldier's profoundest emotional resources. But it is not merely a deliberative conflict. It is rather a tug of forces between the stresses of the external battle situation and the unit strength and individual purpose which instil determination and courage. When the soldier is repeatedly overcome by catastrophic



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> experiences, the cohesive group may provide him with additional resilience and resolution. Even unit influence, however, is limited . . . any soldier can develop a battle neurosis regardless of his personal stability and morale.[14]

Important studies of the relation of functional mental disease to the socio-cultural situations of the modern city have been made by Dunham[15] and by Faris.[16] They have shown that in areas of social disorganization — that is, in the parts of a modern city where social roles for the individual are not well defined and where social controls do not tend to hold an individual together — dementia praecox (schizophrenia) is much more common than elsewhere. Whether selective migration is responsible or whether the community pattern of disorganization produces dementia praecox among those who would maintain normality in a more habitable environment, is not definitely proved. The results, however, suggest that community disorganization as it is reflected in a person's sense of security is an important factor in mental health. Faris's thesis may be briefly summarized as follows.[17]

The schizophrenic is characterized by eccentric behavior and seclusiveness. "Typically, the isolated person makes a struggle to establish intimate social relations, and feels lonely when he fails. In the beginning of the process the 'seclusiveness' or 'shut-in' trait is not the cause, but the result, of the isolation, the other eccentricities follow from this seclusiveness." To normal people conformity "is so much a part of their habits that they do not sense the social control that has molded them. When there is no longer any necessity or desire to communicate with others, or to appear reasonable to them, there is nothing to preserve the order in the mental life of the person."

"Illogical thought" is another result of isolation. The person is indifferent to logic because he has no need for it. "When there is no desire to be understood or no hope of being understood, there is no need for the use of logic." The schizophrenic's delusions and false beliefs are not abnormal because they are false but because they are unconventional. "If three hundred people

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 474.

[15] H. WARREN DUNHAM, "The Ecology of the Functional Psychoses in Chicago." *American Sociological Review*, 2:467–479, August, 1937.

[16] ROBERT E. L. FARIS, "Cultural Isolation and the Schizophrenic Personality." *American Journal of Sociology*, 40:155–164, September, 1934.

[17] *Ibid.*


at a camp meeting see and hear the devil, they are not called schizophrenic." The person must be alone in his delusion. In the rooming-house areas of the larger cities it may be so difficult for a sensitive person, or one uncertain of his status, to establish contacts that he may become as isolated as a prisoner in solitary confinement and with similar results. In Chicago the high rates for schizophrenia "are sharply concentrated in the hobo, rooming-house, and most deteriorated slum areas."

Faris observed that "among some of the Bantu peoples in central Africa there is no disobedience, no violation of the folkways and mores, no punishment, and the children do not even make mistakes in grammar. The informal social control is so strong that a withered old woman can give orders to the strong young men of the village." Faris failed to find a single case of "shut-in" personality among these people. Among primitives whose social situation favors isolation, however, schizoid types do exist.

Dunham's findings on the distribution of dementia praecox in Chicago are substantiated by evidence. (See the map on page 124.) In summarizing the results of his findings, he states:

> (1) The high rates for total schizophrenia are concentrated in communities of marked social disorganization in Chicago. (2) The distribution of the male and female schizophrenic rates separately shows the same concentration in the disorganized communities of the city. (3) The distribution of rates shows the same pattern and concentration by both local and sub-communities. (4) The high rates for paranoid and hebephrenic schizophrenia are concentrated also in these extremely socially disorganized communities in a similar fashion to the total group. . . . (5) The high rates for catatonic schizophrenia are concentrated mainly in the foreign-born and Negro communities. While this distribution is different from the other types because of the paucity of the catatonics in the rooming-house communities of the city, nevertheless a definite concentration of rates is noted. (6) The rates for the three types of schizophrenic, as well as the rates for the total schizophrenic series, show a skewed frequency distribution, with the bulk of the communities having low rates and a few of the communities at the center of the city having high rates.

In studying the manic-depressive psychosis, which is known to be more definitely related to hereditary and constitutional



DISTRIBUTION OF SCHIZOPHRENIA (dementia praecox) BY AREAS IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO

factors, Dunham finds a random distribution; that is, there is no definite tendency for this type of psychosis to be related to community disorganization as is the case with schizophrenia, a more definitely functional psychosis.

Personal Demoralization

The most extensive forms of personal demoralization are summed up under the term "vice," which refers to types of pathological activities which are destructive primarily to the individual himself rather than to others of the social group. The three main categories of vice in our culture are alcoholism, drug addiction, and prostitution. Students of these forms of pathological behavior are coming to recognize that they often reflect a sense of insecurity, conflict, disorganization, or frustration in the individual rather than of vicious appetites as such. The vicious appetites are the result of habit and may reach a point where they are uncontrolled, but in their origin they are often devices by which an individual seeks anesthesia or escape from conditions frustrating to his personality. Social drinking, for example, may provide the original impetus to pathological drinking. The individual, in normal recreational situations, gets his first experience of the ego-bolstering tonic which later becomes a pathological device for escape or ego satisfaction.

Any one of the forms of behavior mentioned above may serve as a means of escape from the dread and anxiety of life which weigh so heavily upon certain individuals. The sensitive person who suffers intensely from social maladjustments, from social frustrations, or from rebuffs of his group is likely to resort to some sort of pathological behavior for relief. If the culture pattern sanctions a particular form of pathological behavior, he is likely to choose this form. The male, for example, has been much more susceptible than the female to alcoholism just because the culture pattern has been more or less favorable to males' drinking. Women may suffer even greater frustration and strain and neurotic tension, yet they have not in the past resorted to any great extent to drink as an escape. It has been pointed out also [18] that the Jew, because his culture from time immemorial has condemned his use of alcohol to excess, does not use this method of

[18] GUY L. BROWN, *Social Pathology*, Chapter 12. F. S. Crofts and Company, New York, 1942.

escape even though his life in many cultures has been filled with frustration, conflict, anxiety, and persecution.

In the drug addict one finds the same motives for escape — frustration, anxiety, fears, body tensions, pain, and social defeat — that are found in the alcoholic. Some become drug addicts because of their having formed the habit during a period of critical illness, but others find an escape in drugs in times of anxiety and fear, and like all who acquire the habit, find themselves crowded into that secretive, deceitful, hopeless world in which resignation to their fate and acceptance of it characterizes the personality pattern. The forced secretive nature of the affliction, its universal condemnation by the larger group, and the desperate appetite projected against this pattern place the drug addict in a situation beyond control by his own strength.

Less definitely, but to some extent, prostitution, for the patron, is an introverted escape — from sex frustrations, marital conflicts, biological tension.[19] It has been, until the development of the modern companionship family stressing the equal obligation of men and women in marital loyalty, an escape device of men rather than of women. With the development of the single standard of morality, commercial prostitution in America as such has tended to go into eclipse, and the clandestine sex experience has become more socially acceptable for both men and women.

For the male patron prostitution represents disorganization with reference to many aspects of personal and social morality. For the prostitute herself it usually represents a level of disorganization which casts aside particularly the finer sentiments involved in romantic love and monogamous morality. The acceptance of commercialized sex, with all of the competitive non-emotional patterns it involves, may at first be an escape from frustrations, from rebuffs in love or marriage, or from social or educational failure. It later becomes a profession with all the mercenary motives of other forms of salesmanship and business operation.[20]

We are not interested here in the symptoms and personality

[19] GEORGENE H. SEWARD, *Sex in the Social Order*, pp. 203–205. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1946.

[20] It is recognized that organized prostitution in large cities today is much more than a problem of personality disintegration of the prostitute herself. Organized prostitution is for the most part controlled and operated by vice rings. This is not, however, a discussion of vice as a social institution.

patterns of persons who have become the habitual victims of vice, important as such study may be. We are interested rather in stressing the fact that such behavior instead of being primarily the product of inherent weaknesses, of inborn depravity, of uncontrollable appetites, or of other presumed genetic weaknesses, is in considerable part a product of social rejection. The victim is often one who has become the unwilling heir to habits into which he has fallen because of experiences which in certain moods seemed to him unbearable. Vice was used as an escape or as a device for bolstering the ego. He became its victim by habit formation.

The film "March of Time" in the summer of 1946 gave attention to the problem of alcoholism. It defined alcoholism as "America's fourth largest health problem," a disease calling for expert scientific and sympathetic treatment.

The imprisonment of the drug addict, who is as much a sick person as a person afflicted with organic disease, is certainly comparable to the practice, in earlier times, of torturing the insane and treating them as demoniacs. The same can be said of imprisonment of the chronic alcoholic. He needs hospitalization and psychiatric treatment. He should not be thrown into jail and punished as though he were a criminal. Society has been slow to recognize the drug addict and the alcoholic as sick persons, following rather the old folkways which blame any failure of the individual on his own choice.

Quite similar to the escape devices discussed above, but having greater social sanction, is the escape of the person who resorts to feigned sickness or chronic invalidism. This device is more used by women than men, no doubt partly because the culture is more tolerant of sickness and chronic complaints in women than in men. This, too, may come to be a dominant adjustment pattern of an individual and lead to social rejection and complete disorganization.

Biological Deviants and Social Control

Throughout this discussion comparatively little has been said about the individual who seems to be born with such strong appetites and passions that he is not susceptible to the normal restraints of a social order. There are undoubtedly such people. It has been suggested in a previous paragraph that the struggle between

man's organic drives and social regulation is perpetual. Some individuals who find one culture frustrating might find another, which was freer in certain spheres of conduct, more satisfactory. Ruth Benedict in her *Patterns of Culture*[21] has clearly pointed out that human beings are naturally malleable and that they are capable of fitting into any of a great number of culture patterns. On the other hand, Lombroso[22] came near the truth when he said that certain criminal types are possessed of such strong appetites that they cannot, under any normal system of social regulations, find full expression for their passions. He believed that in early primitive society such apelike creatures could have found an outlet for vicious appetites which are no longer tolerated in society.

Whether cultivated or acquired, strong drives or passions create problems of adjustment in culture patterns which frown on their expression. For example, our society condemns homosexuality and certain other deviant sexual behavior so vigorously that such practices are kept as secret as possible and always create a socially difficult situation. Those with strong sex passions of any kind face a handicap in a society which builds up numerous sex stimulations and yet retains fairly rigid sex taboos and condemns prostitution and similar avenues of physical expression. Societies with more tolerant views toward sexual promiscuity would offer no particular problem of social adjustment to these individuals.

These are but examples of the perpetual conflict between man's organic drives and appetites and our system of social control. Some, because they have mild appetites, readily conform. Others, because they have strong appetites, find conformity difficult. These are more likely to break the social regulations and to find themselves subjected to social condemnation, which in turn produces guilt conflicts and anxieties.

While it is necessary to recognize such differences in the organic makeup of man, and while any society must take them into account in dealing with the personal casualty, one can easily exaggerate the importance of exceptional types and excuse too much human delinquency and personal disorganization on this ground. In this discussion we have preferred to lay major emphasis on an individual's integration with the social group as

[21] Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1934.

[22] Cesare Lombroso, *Crime: Its Causes and Remedies;* translated by Henry P. Horton. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1941.

the important factor in holding him in line. Even those with strong passions, if they are identified with social groups and if they participate fully in normal group activities, are much less likely to give way to violent appetites than when they are isolated from the group and feel themselves outside the pressure of its social control devices and lacking the protection which group integration gives a man against himself.

Folkways and Constructive Social Policy

We have already suggested that the greatest hindrance to the development of constructive social policy in dealing not only with functional disorders but also with related organic disorders is that these problems are still in the realm of the folkways rather than of rational scientific analysis. Take venereal disease alone, which is purely organic in origin. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, writing in 1936 [23] called attention to the fact that although syphilis alone was doing one hundred times more damage than infantile paralysis and ranked with cancer, tuberculosis, and pneumonia as one of the four greatest killers, the American public continued to treat it as a taboo subject. He stated positively that the nation could virtually stamp out the disease were it not for the fact that "nice" people do not talk about syphilis or do anything about those who do have syphilis. Up to two years before his writing, he indicated, broadcasting companies did not allow the word "syphilis" to be used on the air. He reported that in high schools of certain states officials had forbade the use of an important educational film on the subject.

The medieval idea that syphilis is a just reward for sin, that those who contract it are receiving their just deserts, is the foundation for these folkways. The folkways persist in face of the fact that one of ten adults contracts syphilis and in face of the fact that, according to Dr. Parran, at least half of the people who have syphilis are entirely innocent of violating sex mores. With a considerable number, syphilis is congenital, having been acquired through the blood stream prior to birth. With another large number it is a result of contacts within the family. In other cases it is due to contagion from drinking cups, cigarettes, nurse-

[23] THOMAS PARRAN, "Why Don't We Stamp Out Syphilis?" *Survey Graphic*, July, 1936. Reproduced in *Reader's Digest*, 29:65–73, July, 1936.

maids, barbers, beauty operators, etc.; in others, to no more serious offenses than kissing. If the old folkways were done away with, an aggressive campaign to discover syphilitic cases, to treat them promptly, and to prevent marriages that are likely to lead to the birth of syphilitic babies would speedily work toward the elimination of the disease.

Similarly one need only survey the history of the treatment of the mentally diseased to see how completely this field has been dominated by the folkways which have required treating them as condemned men rather than as sick men. The *Hospital Survey News Letter* recently called attention to the fact that there has been a remarkable increase in psychiatric units in general hospitals and summarized the long history which led up to this vital but tardy development in social policy. This brief historic summary follows:

> Formerly, people who were mentally deranged were thought to be possessed of devils and were placed in the custody of the clergy who attempted to exorcise them. Sometimes the mentally ill were sold at auction to the lowest bidder; although fees were paid to the successful bidder to provide care, there was no method of supervisory control and exploitation was unlimited. Some of these individuals were treated humanely, but the majority were overworked, starved, and tortured. Frequently, they were locked in cells in attics or basements, or town boards required friends or relatives to build small, strong houses to confine them.
>
> The almshouse and the jail were utilized in cities and towns as refuges for the more dangerous lunatics. Pennsylvania Hospital, chartered in 1751, was the first institution incorporated solely for the care of the physically and mentally ill. Twenty-two years later, the first publicly supported mental hospital was established in Williamsburg, Virginia. However, confinement in any mental hospital prior to 1817 amounted to incarceration accompanied by every form of mechanical restraint, unheated cells, filthy living conditions, and inadequate nourishment. Gradually, the lunatic asylum was combined with the county poorhouse; at the time the system seemed much more humane and without doubt became widespread principally because it was a more economical method of caring for the insane.
>
> During this same period, a number of voluntary institutions for the insane were organized by various groups of charitable citizens. Benjamin Rush in the early days of the nineteenth

century campaigned for reform in their treatment, maintaining that they were sick individuals in need of the finest type of medical care. Philanthropists, influenced by the moral management introduced at the York Retreat in England and by Pinel in France, laid emphasis on devising occupations and diversions, regulating meals and exercise, encouraging work and play, and discarding restraint.

Dorothea Dix, who became interested in the welfare and treatment of Boston's insane persons, investigated Massachusetts jails and almshouses. In 1843, her revelation to the state legislature that persons were "confined in cages, closets, cellars, stalls, pens: chained, naked, beaten with rods and lashed into obedience" brought desired results in enlarged quarters and better care for the insane of the state. Her interest in the problem spread to other states and her efforts were directly responsible for founding or enlarging thirty mental hospitals in the United States.

In spite of the increasing tolerance of which such steps in public policy are indicative, the greatest handicaps the mentally diseased face are still the prevailing folkways of superstition and fear.[24] Weinburg [25] cites considerable evidence that some of the most serious adjustments of the soldier suffering from combat neurosis are in the realm of social attitudes. Within the army and among civilians are many who view the sufferer as a malingerer. The drug addict and alcoholic are placed in a similar category by American folkways. Victims of both are as likely to receive penal treatment as psychiatric or medical treatment. Clearly in many fields of personal pathology greater rationality of public attitudes is the first step in humane treatment.

Constructive Social Measures

Education and scientific enlightenment are the tools for banishing superstition, folklore, and notions of "just deserts" which bolster the present folkways. More basic, however, to the elimination of the personality conflicts and stresses which lead to suicide, functional mental disorder, alcoholism, and other forms of pathological compensation are adjustments in the socio-cultural structure itself.

[24] For a graphic and pictorial account of tragic conditions still persisting in many mental hospitals in the United States read ALBERT Q. MAISEL, "Bedlam 1946: Most United States Mental Hospitals Are a Shame and a Disgrace." *Life*, 20:102–118, May 6, 1946.

[25] WEINBERG, *op. cit.*, pp. 475–478.

Much personality conflict is rooted in unstable or uncongenial circumstances in childhood. While psychoanalysis has probably made too much of the idea of reversion to infantile patterns as central to personality disorganization, it must be recognized that the social situation of the family is the most critical of all formative experiences in the life cycle of the individual. The emphasis of modern child psychology and child training is on the importance of building in the child a sense of being wanted by his parents, a sense of belonging to his group. It is known that such a sense is the most important single factor in giving the individual a secure hold on life and assuring mental integration insofar as mental integration is functional rather than organic.

A sense of security affects all of a person's adjustments to social situations; it is a tremendously important factor in the success of his romantic ventures and in his own marriage. Several studies [26] show that the person with a background of family insecurity is more likely than others to fail in his own marriage. It seems likely that the more functional types of mental diseases, that is, those diseases that are related primarily to emotional-habit patterns rather than to hereditary and glandular defects, are in part a reflection of a person's estimate of his place in his social group.

The nation needs more understanding parents. (See Chapter 15.) But a better childhood is not enough. The school teacher and other leaders of adolescents and youth must be trained to appreciate the fact that a person's social situation, his status in the group, is more vital to him than reading, writing, and arithmetic. They must be trained to recognize and correct deviant behavior in its early stages.

Much of the personal stress in the life of both youth and adult in our complex society points to the need of man for life in an intimate primary group, for social participation which involves his total personality, for the kind of personal experience that makes him feel that he is wanted, for a place of respect that makes him feel useful to others. These things give life its meaning. William McDougall,[27] eminent social psychologist, viewing the American scene, describes the neurotic personality as typical of the American experience, and relates the strain on the individual to his casting aside of traditions and substituting for them intangible

[26] Cited in Chapter 15.

[27] WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, *Outlines of Abnormal Psychology*, pp. 215–217. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926.

ideals which are always beyond his grasp. Problems of crime and personal demoralization, he believes, are a natural result. On March 25, 1946, *Time* reported that the nation's 25,000 practicing astrologers were doing a thriving business, the biggest ever. Some customers paid fees ranging up to $50 for a single interview with these seers. One astrological annual sold at least a million copies at a dollar each. Five leading astrological periodicals had a combined circulation of a million. Here is evidence that a scientific age has not been able to quell insecurity and superstition.

Many have analyzed the fundamental weakness of our social order as it relates to the adjustment of the person, but we have no clear-cut guide as to how to correct the social order to bring about the type of integration which will bind a person so thoroughly to his group that he will be protected from the forces which test him beyond endurance. Primary-group society provided this bulwark of social milieu; not perfectly, of course — there were balked dispositions even in the primary group. But primary-group society provided it to a much greater extent than modern complex society has done. What is the way out?

One of the first essentials in building a social order that will be more suited to the modern individualist is the development of a rational system of ethics, a system rooted in group welfare rather than in traditional mores of which only the odds and ends remain. Unfortunately the study of ethics has almost entirely disappeared from the college curriculum. It is little wonder. Ethics has pursued the deductive method of reasoning. Traditionally it begins with principles drawn primarily from the mores and works from these to problems of conduct. There is a place for modern ethics, that is, a science of morality in modern life. There is, in fact, a great need for it. But the study of ethics will have little place in the thinking of today and little influence on conduct unless it is based on objective considerations and inductive reasoning. It must be related to the social good. In this field the social scientist has an obligation which he has so far ignored. He has been too much concerned with the manipulation of abstract symbols and with mathematical exactness, too little with the evaluation of modern culture and of personal experience in terms of social well-being.

The social scientist has an obligation to protect society against the ravages of extreme individualism. He also has an obligation to help create a kind of social order in which men will be defended

against their own vices and appetites. He needs to stress the necessity of developing, in secondary-group society, a functional individualism, that is, an individualism based on choice of desirable alternatives rather than upon outworn mores. The social regulations of primary groups are inadequate for man in the secondary-group world. It is essential, therefore, that the individual develop a functional morality that will help him to perform rationally in all situations for the social good. This must be a morality that works from within, guided by standards of rationality, not a morality of traditions enforced by constant surveillance of an intimate group. There is no effective substitute for the restraints that man must have within himself. We need a rational morality which recognizes the broader social obligations of rational social behavior.

Review

1. When may a man be said to be disorganized? To what factors is disorganization due?
2. What part do group attitudes toward certain diseases or biological deficiencies play in disorganizing the individual?
3. Contrast the phenomenon of suicide in Japanese and in American culture.
4. Explain differences in motivation in institutionalized and in individualistic suicide.
5. Give possible explanations for the different suicide rates in rural and in urban America.
6. Discuss suicide in relation to group attitudes and social isolation.
7. What effect does the sense of integration with the community and social group, or lack of integration, have on the suicide rate? Explain.
8. Discuss the effect of war on suicide rates in an individualistic society.
9. How do social roles and the comparative complexity of modern life affect the amount of mental disease in a community?
10. What happens psychologically to a man when he enters the army?
11. What is the relation between the individual's capacity to adjust and mental breakdown?
12. Discuss Weinberg's explanation of war neuroses.
13. Why might schizophrenia (dementia praecox) be expected to be more common in areas of community disorganization than in other areas of the city?
14. Summarize Dunham's findings in the city of Chicago concerning

the location of schizophrenic (dementia praecox) types by census tracts.

15. Discuss personal demoralization, or vice, as an escape for the individual. Why does he need an escape adjustment?
16. Show how pathological escape devices are related to the culture pattern.
17. How should the drug addict and the chronic alcoholic be treated?
18. Discuss peculiar problems of individuals with strong hereditary or acquired appetites in our culture.
19. How can association help the individual to control violent appetites?
20. How does folklore hinder the development of sound and constructive social policy in the various fields of pathological behavior?
21. Along what lines must improvements in personal maladjustment come?
22. How do childhood experiences affect the later adjustments of the individual?
23. What part does superstition play in a period of personal insecurity? Cite evidence.
24. Explain how primary-group society integrates the individual more thoroughly than secondary-group society has been able to do.
25. How can we build a more secure and better integrated society in modern culture?
26. What part must the social scientist play in this new well-integrated society which must be built?
27. Discuss the ethical motivation required for an individualistic society.

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CHAPTER 8

THE MARGINAL MAN

IN LARGE CITIES on the border of immigrant colonies are businessmen who speak two languages, that of their own group and that of the adjoining culture. Because of their bilingual achievement they are able to cater to the needs of both, understand the customer, and thus extend their business. The Greek fruit vendor on the border between the Greek and Italian colonies is a marginal man who for business purposes has bridged the culture of his own group and that of the group to which he was once a complete stranger.

By the term "marginal man" the sociologist means simply a person who is facing the experience of bridging two cultures. The term stresses particularly the disorganization of the person with reference to his culture. The experience of marginality may lead to personal disorganization and defeat, or may be only a transitional stage to a new organization of the personality with reference to the culture.

The Marginal Man in an Age of World Contacts

In recent American history we have been concerned with the marginal man who by his migration into America has been faced with the necessity of acquiring our culture, the process popularly called Americanization. From a more general point of view, the contact of the white man today as he moves into the territory of natives has become a more significant problem of marginality. European races are now superimposing their civilization upon primitive peoples, many of whom have lived with the same culture, relatively unchanged, through centuries.

This contact of the white man has been brought about by warfare and by the Christian missionary movement. It has also been advanced in the quest for empire and for raw materials. The effect has been that most of the dark-skinned races of the

world have come under the influence of the white man's culture. The white man calls it the native problem; for the native it often means not merely a problem but also cultural decay and racial extinction.

This problem has been discussed by Pitt-Rivers,[1] who points out various alternatives that result from the contact of powerful culture bearers with peoples of weaker cultures. He indicates that many of these peoples, being incapable of readapting their culture to the stronger one, become discouraged and die out. Their elimination may come by way of blood dilution or because the superior culture has the effect of making the native discouraged with his own. Losing faith in it, he no longer has motivation for living. Moreover he risks borrowing certain traits which, being incompatible with his own culture, bring about the destruction of it.

In view of the world-wide contacts of Western culture during World War II, one wonders what the full effect will be upon natives of the remote Pacific and of other Oriental areas. Can people who have seen flying machines, P-T boats, and great battleships be content with travel by rowboat and on foot? If they discard their primitive artifacts and the folkways that go with them, will they find motivation for living? Will loss of faith in their material culture also bring disintegration in their mores and have the effect of disorganizing their system of life?

No doubt there will be many different effects in different places. Certainly the war left comparatively few peoples untouched by the powerful influences of a machine-produced civilization and in the years ahead, when world travel will become commonplace, even the most remote areas of the globe will have to come to terms with the cultural system of the West. Whether many primitive peoples and their civilizations can stand up under this contact remains to be seen.

Cook,[2] describing the effect that contact in the modern world has on primitives, states the view that primitives, like animals, tend to establish an equilibrium with nature, built primarily around food supply. Contact with the outside peoples and their civilization disturbs this equilibrium. It creates a situation in

[1] G. Pitt-Rivers, "The Effect on Native Races of Contact with European Civilization." *Man*, 27:2–7, 1927.

[2] S. F. Cook, "Demographic Consequences of European Contact with Primitive Peoples." *American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 237:107–111, January, 1945.

which a struggle for re-equilibrium takes place. This process creates the serious problem of marginality with which we are concerned in the present discussion. Furthermore, the problems of re-equilibrium are not all cultural: physical contact introduces new diseases and problems of sex behavior that threaten the mores of the primitives, it invariably brings race mixture, and these facts, though not primarily cultural, often strike at the very roots of cultural organization.

Among the disruptive changes are the effects on trade practices, labor customs, and monetary systems, to say nothing of the weakening of the customs, ceremonies, and traditions in which the religious and ethical principles of the tribe are rooted. Cook believes that the Pacific war went a long way toward disorganizing the life of Melanesian and Polynesian natives. He believes that all primitives are due in the immediate future, because of world-wide establishment of automobile highways and landing strips for aircraft, to be invaded by civilizations of the dominant nations of the earth.

> Within the next century it is quite probable that no primitive tribe on earth will be immune to the social and demographic consequences of wholesale immigration by representatives of the so-called higher civilizations. The ultimate result, in the not too far distant years to come, must inevitably be the leveling off of the human race, with the extinction or hybridization of all existing primitive and semiprimitive peoples.[3]

Before World War II the missionary movement was a vital factor in introducing Western culture to peoples throughout the non-Christian world. One cannot question the high motives of the missionaries nor the importance of many of the moral reforms, agricultural improvements, and health practices they introduced. But they were not able to introduce changes without also creating a certain inevitable dissatisfaction with the native culture and therefore placing the convert in a position of marginality.

The following account of a Chinese concubine illustrates this conflict. Born into a culture which accepts concubinage, she tried to accept the Christian idea of monogamy as presented by the missionaries. It conflicted with the age-long system of concubinage sanctioned by her own native culture and also with all

[3] Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

the associated Oriental ideas concerning woman's social and economic status. The account reads in part:

> But, oh Worthy One, there is a problem daily before me, and what must I do? The Christian Way of Life does not allow a man to have several wives; neither should a Christian woman be a concubine, yet here I am, a lowly sinner, concubine number four. It frightens me and often in prayer my heart falls to pieces. This lowly one knows her fault, but I have gone into a blind alley and do not see a clear way out, neither a path to continue on. I am of one heart with our household and our master looks upon all of us with favor and kindness. Willingly he uses silver high and low for me and the others. Every day the maidservants enter our women's quarters carrying in their hands plates of good meat, dishes of fish fried with sweet-sour sauce, bowls of rice and platters of warm steamed bread. It is not as if I am afraid to eat coarse food, work hard, and wear a coat of common cloth, but from childhood I never was taught to provide for my own living and earn pieces of money.
>
> I am but a feeble woman and my learning is little. I know only what is connected with the duties of a wife and mother. Our ways in China are not the bold ways of Western lands where a woman is taught to stand by herself and, yea, even compete with a man for a living. If I should leave the lord of our household, another man would put forth his hand before the next moon could shine and would place me in his house. Clearly I could not stand out against my father and uncles in such a thing, and they surely would want to put me into another home.
>
> You, Shepherd Teacher, are greatly learned about the way of life, the will of God, and the teaching of Christ, therefore tell this lowly one what to do. I will let it be as you decree, and will then make my bow of farewell and depart. It will be to me as if Heaven sent me the message through your lips.[4]

The Immigrant as a Marginal Man

In the United States marginality has been most typical of the immigrant from foreign lands. This individual, whose personality was rooted in the values, language, and general culture patterns of his childhood society, found himself required to adopt

[4] JAMES P. LEYNSE, "A Chinese Concubine Tells Her Story." *Missionary Review of the World*, pp. 191–192, April, 1937.

the manners, customs, value system, habit patterns, and attitudes of a new and entirely different culture. In other words, he had to bridge the wide gap between two cultures and harmonize them in his own personality. The least he could do was acquire enough of the new culture to be able to live in it and function with some effectiveness.

Marginality puts the personality in a position of stress and strain which many cannot stand. This fact is reflected in the high suicide rate among immigrants. Cavan[5] reports the following suicides per 100,000 population for three metropolitan areas during selected periods.

	Chicago *1919–1921*	*Philadelphia* *1916–1920*	*Boston* *1911–1915*
Native white	9.4	9.3	12.7
Foreign-born white	28.8	20.1	21.3

Since suicide is an adult venture, the fact that the foreign-born groups contain more adults than the native groups might discount the proportions somewhat; but it can hardly explain the marked differences reported.

The stress of the immigrant's marginal position is further illustrated by data compiled by Warden Lewis E. Lawes[6] relating murder to the stage of re-acculturation of immigrant groups in the United States. He has shown that during the years 1850 to 1870, after the great Irish migration, the Irish led in the number committed to Sing Sing for murder. Between 1890 and 1919, the period of the Italian migration, foreign-born Italians took the lead, with the Irish second. Since 1920 the foreign-born Italians have maintained their top ranking, but the Negroes, who migrated to the North in large numbers just after World War I, have come into second place. If murder may be accepted as an index of cultural maladjustment, the above data seem to indicate that the period of re-acculturation when the individual is bridging two cultures is a difficult one.

An illustration of the relation between the marginal experience of a group and the breakdown of their institutions and the consequent weakening of social definitions, may be found in

[5] RUTH S. CAVAN, *Suicide*, p. 34. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1928.

[6] "The Death Penalty at Sing Sing: What the Figures Show." *Survey*, 59:69–70, Oct., 1927.

Thomas and Znaniecki's classic study of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America:*[7]

> The general background of the disorganization of the marriage-group among Polish immigrants is the decay of the large family, the weakness of the Polish-American community, and the novelty of the American legal standards. Marriage as a social institution was a part of the wider family institution. The large families of the husband and of the wife, whatever rivalries and conflicts there might be, were both interested in preserving the conjugal bond which was much more their work than that of the individuals concerned and which had led to a detailed adjustment of the economic and social affairs of each family and could not be broken without undesirable consequences for each of them. Each family, therefore, took care to enforce all the traditional rules of behavior upon its own married member and at the same time was ready to defend this member against any break of these rules committed by the other party. And whenever the large family itself overstepped the principles for which it was meant to stand or was unable to influence the marriage-group, the community exercised its rights of control over both the marriage-group and the large family. The traditional system was sanctioned by the entire social milieu of the married couple, including the church and the state, whose rules in this one respect were in harmony with those recognized by the peasant community.
>
> Now, as we have already seen, in this country the large family is no longer a real social body with concrete common interests — for usually only a few members have immigrated and these are often scattered over a vast territory. The community has also only a small stock of old traditions left and cannot efficiently enforce even these unless the individual chooses to participate actively in common life. Further, in spite of the great vitality which the parish has as a social institution, the authority of the church as a religious institution is much weakened, perhaps for the very reason that the existence of the Polish-American church depends on the free will of the congregation. And the state, even if it tries to uphold the marriage-group, does it in a way which does not harmonize at all with the traditions of the peasant and far from preserving, rather weakens, as we shall see, the institutional meaning of marriage in the eyes of the immigrant. As a result marriage almost ceases to be a social institution, and the old socially

[7] WILLIAM I. THOMAS and FLORIAN ZNANIECKI, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Vol. 5, pp. 221–224. Chapman and Grimes, Boston, 1919.

sanctioned attitudes upon which the strength and permanence of the conjugal bonds were based lose most of their practical influence.

Under these circumstances marriage rests almost exclusively upon temperamental attitudes of the individuals, not upon their obedience to social rules. Sexual desire, maternal instinct, in a much smaller measure paternal feeling, desire for response, and desire for security are practically the only powers which draw and keep the couples together. Our documents will show that none of these attitudes is sufficient to form a permanent basis for the family. And it is much more difficult for immigrant society to substitute new social ideals and norms for the crumbling old institutional foundation of family life than to create substitutes for the traditional economic life-organization. The abstract principle of duty has little if any practical influence unless derived either from concrete social rules or from some form of religion. Love as a cultural product with its idealization of the entire personality and consequent permanent attachment to the exclusion of all other individuals is rare in general and particularly rare among the peasants with their traditional subordination of the individual to the group. Economic ideals, when they exist, contribute, indeed, to the maintenance of family life in general, since the immigrant can seldom imagine an economically perfect life without a family. But this does not guarantee sufficiently the stability of marriage, for in any particular case a man may prefer to establish a new family rather than stay with the old one. Moreover, conjugal trouble reacts unfavorably, as we know, upon economic life. The social progress of the marriage-group, an active and prominent participation in Polish-American life which attracts to it the attention of the community, and the advance of the young generation are indeed positive moral factors insofar as they frequently prevent an open breakdown of the marriage-group; but their action is limited to a minority of the immigrants and is appreciable only when the marriage-group has already begun to achieve a certain social prominence, i.e., when the parents have passed the "stormy period" of youth. Besides, in view of the tacitly accepted principle of Polish-American society not to interfere too much with the private life of socially useful members, a very far-going real demoralization may subsist under the appearances of respectability. The nominal standards of respectability are, of course, still kept up by the leading circles but with the exception of a small number of intellectual immigrants who have brought with them a general and more or

less rationally motivated idealism, and of those members of the younger generation who are in close touch with such American circles as have preserved the traditional family mores intact, these standards seem to be merely a respected survival whose most real, though unavowed function is to impart to the eyes of society a kind of scandalized interest in those cases in which they are openly broken.

The moral status of the average Polish-American individual or marriage-group in matters of conjugal life can be thus briefly characterized as that of a very unstable balance of temperamental attitudes and personal habits, which determines whether the traditional social schematization — now almost reduced to a mere form — will be preserved or not. As long as the natural tendencies and habits of the man and of the woman work more or less in accordance with this schematization, their relation is still defined as of old, since it is easier to accept the ready and usual definition than to work out a new one. But there is no social prestige behind this definition and no higher motive which would induce the individual to accept and maintain it when it disagrees with his temperament and habits. Therefore, any cause producing disharmony between the old social schemes and the individual's natural or habitual tendencies may lead him to reject the traditional definition and either prevent him from establishing a conjugal relation where according to all the social rules it should be established, or make him break a conjugal relation already existing. The cause may be some influence producing in the individual new attitudes incompatible with the elementary conditions of conjugal life in general, or it may be some agency modifying the specific traditional scheme of conjugal life in a way which makes it seem no longer acceptable to him. . . .

The Marginal Position of the Second Generation

The marginal personality is characteristic not only of the first generation of immigrants in America but also of the youth generation. Immigrant parents at best rarely make a complete transfer to the American culture pattern. They retain much of the old culture, acquiring often only enough new traits to get them by in practical situations. But the children and youth have to absorb the new culture fully. They begin doing so in the neighborhood and in the schoolroom. Soon they are Americans in a very vital sense. They find it necessary to ignore the patterns

of the old world culture which the parents taught them and continued to insist upon.

This places the new generation in a marginal position in which they are in conflict with the past. The consequence has been that in American cities juvenile delinquency rates have been highest among children of immigrants.[8] They could not accept the old culture of the parents or the morality of the foreign country, and therefore had to defy their parents and come to terms with the child and youth group of the American culture. In so doing they often made mistakes. Being almost entirely free of parental authority, they found themselves in conflict with the law.

The new generation breaking from the old and the difficulties of the transition are well illustrated in the following account of the position of youth of Oriental ancestry on the west coast and in Hawaii.[9]

> The American-born children of oriental ancestry have made contacts with several types of family life. There has been no standardized oriental pattern to follow. In some homes the oriental pattern has been followed with slight variations, but in most instances there has been considerable disorganization and a certain amount of reorganization to fit the new conditions. The young people have made contacts with the occidental family system. As they have tried to steer their course through this uncharted sea, they have broken with many of the oriental practices.
>
> The young people, who have become imbued with democratic ideas, object to the old-fashioned, autocratic family control. The native-born girls, who observe the freedom of American women, are doing much to break down the idea of male domination. They consider themselves Americans and are unwilling to acquiesce in an arrangement which would reduce them to a perpetual minority. Many oppose their parents and argue against their ideas. Some girls are not even satisfied with a status of equality. They state in no uncertain

[8] This is an established fact with regard to immigrant children in the city. See E. H. SUTHERLAND, *Principles of Criminology*, pp. 115–116. J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1934. Donald R. Taft has indicated that it is not true of the child of the rural immigrant who continues to live in an intimate, well knit primary-group world with its more effective system of social regulation. See his "Nationality and Crime." *American Sociological Review*, p. 725, October, 1936.

[9] WILLIAM C. SMITH, *Americans in Process*, pp. 227–235. By permission of the author. Edwards Bros., Ann Arbor, Mich., 1937.

terms that they desire to be the dominating heads of their households. This is not mere idle talk, for some of the women are carrying their ideas into practice. This is made evident by an immigrant Japanese:

> You know, my wife, she used to help me all the time; bye an' bye she catchum baby, then she not help me so much. Bye an' bye she catchum 'nother baby, then she say to me, "I no help you no more." I say, "Yes, you will." She say, "No, I won't; I American citizen." This afternoon, my wife, she telephone me. "You come home." I say, "I no can come, truck gone, I no can come." She say, "You come home!" I go home. Truck gone, I walk home.

Many boys advocate greater freedom for the women but they are unwilling to go as far as the girls; they are not ready to surrender completely the idea of male superiority.

The girls of oriental ancestry are not willing to submit to a system under which the mother-in-law dominates the young wife; they do not want to live with mothers-in-law or other relatives according to oriental custom. Wherever possible the young people move out of the crowded tenement sections. The rapidity of the movement, however, is determined in considerable measure by the economic situation. While the young people prefer to live under their own roofs, oftentimes the economic circumstances will not permit.

Many of the young people are outspoken against the idea of parentally arranged marriages. Many refuse to accept the arrangements made by their parents. Financial independence, particularly among the Chinese of Hawaii, has been an important causal factor. Many Chinese women feel free and independent now that they are wage-earners. Some go to extremes in order to make the emancipation complete; they marry men distasteful to their parents just to parade their freedom. Some have left their homes to avoid marriage with men selected by their parents. Some have declared that they would do as they pleased — but when the time for marriage arrived, the parents took matters in hand and settled all. The parents may adopt American dress quite readily, but the attitudes relative to family matters are deep-rooted and change less easily.

The young people have seen parentally arranged marriages go on the rocks and this has conditioned them against the system. A young woman related her own story:

> At thirteen years of age my father married me off to a wealthy middle-aged man who seemed like a father to me. Naturally, I was taken from school, which I regretted very much. At every opportunity I read my books and always watched the other children going to and from school with envy. I always felt as though I belonged to them. I did not dare tell this to my parents, not even to my mother, as it is against our religion to entertain even a thought of disobedience to one's husband. This feeling, however, became very intense within me and at last, after three years, I decided to leave him. There was much anger and consternation, but I was determined. I had read of American wives acting in this manner under such circumstances and I still feel it is right. I defied anyone to interfere any further with my actions. Some time later I met a student at the night school which I attended. . . . On further acquaintance we found our view of life very similar and decided to marry.

Many young women set high standards for their future husbands. If such are not found, they will not marry. This is quite revolutionary when we consider that bachelors and spinsters have no place in the oriental scheme of life. A considerable number of young women are not marrying, or, at least, they are postponing marriage. They are not remaining single because of inability to marry. According to one writer, "The American-oriental flapper is the most courted woman in the world, for she is wooed not only by the 'sheiks' of her own age but by the tens of thousands of oriental bachelors on the Coast, who can no longer import wives from their home country."

Although many have broken with the old traditions there is, nevertheless, a marked family solidarity. The familial sentiments of many young people are strong. Because of this many deny themselves rather than disappoint their elders. Many make definite plans to care for their parents in old age. The parents have sacrificed to give them a start in life. In return they bend all their energies toward making their elders happy. Some save in order to build comfortable homes for them. Some, desirous of preparing for professional life, give this up and turn to vocations with a more immediate income. Even where home relationships have not been happy, there are young people who care for their elders and make sacrifices for them.

The young people are setting the occidental family before themselves as an ideal to be followed. Many indicate a decided preference for western practices; some even go to extremes in carrying them out. In the discussion of love affairs, there is a great difference between Orientals and Occidentals. Orientals do not have love affairs; hence they are often shocked by the freedom with which Americans discuss such matters.

Very few of the young people have had sufficient contact with American family life to pattern after it, but they are eager to learn from every available source. Books, magazines, and Dorothy Dix's column in the newspaper are read with avidity. Some have learned by working in American homes. Many of their ideas are acquired in the moving-picture theaters.

Many young people are in a difficult situation. They have not learned the technique of American courtship which differs greatly from the oriental practice where the go-between, or match-maker, plays such an important role. When they try to adopt Western methods they find no adequate guide-posts to direct them, and in this period of transition many suffer heartaches. But even if they had made the occidental mode of courtship their own, they would still encounter difficulties. Most houses of the Orientals are not of such size and character that the daughters could conveniently and with appropriate dignity entertain young men friends. More important, however, are the parental attitudes which are encountered. If a boy calls on a girl, the parents consider it a serious matter and that marriage is almost certain to follow. According to many of the older Chinese in the United States, disaster lurks in the automobile rides of young American couples. The young people hear these ideas expressed in their homes. Since many of them do not fully understand American customs, standards, and ideals, an automobile ride not infrequently leads to a forced marriage.

The Marginal Position of American Youth

We have been dealing with examples of marginal men in an extreme position, but we must also point out that there are different degrees of marginality. Farm youth who move to the city and get into entirely new social situations are, during a period of transition, often in a marginal position. In reality, they also are bridging two cultures that are quite distant. To some extent every youth when he first leaves his primary group and enters secondary groups is in a marginal position in which he feels ill at

ease, senses a degree of personality conflict, and faces the critical issue of harmonizing varied culture patterns within his own personality. Becker[10] uses the term "marginal man" to describe the person experiencing readjustments in such internal migrations. He thinks of him primarily as one transferring from a sacred society, that is, an essentially rural, isolated, primary-group society, to a secular society, that is, one essentially urban-metropolitan in character with numerous contacts of a secondary-group nature. It is in this situation that the concept marginal man has most meaning, especially as it applies to internal migrations. The migration of a rural man to another rural area involves fewer adjustments than the migration of a rural man to a city. The migration of an urban man to an urban area calls for fewer adjustments than the migration of an urban man to a rural area.

The possible results of a transfer from an isolated sacred society (rural primary group) to a secular society (urban secondary group) to the personality of the individual are outlined by Becker, in substance, as follows:


1. Continuance of the state of crisis because a satisfactory adjustment has not been found.
2. Heightened self-consciousness that may lead to aggressive self-assertion or to creative artistic efforts.
3. The development of a marked introversion, building a fantasy world of day dreams, or perhaps eventually becoming a neuropath or psychopath.
4. Becoming a fixated marginal man who is, in brief, as a confirmed outsider to all cultures, a revolutionary reformer advocating change in all existing political and economic regimes, often promoting changes of a violent sort.

Carpenter, discussing the problem of city migration, introduced the term "culture shock," to describe the marginal experience of rural newcomers in the city.[11]

> . . . The migrant from the country to the city encounters such a new and unfamiliar universe of experience that the change is almost bound to visit upon him a distinct shock. . . . Many of the disorganizing effects of the city upon the individual (crime, mental breakdown, etc.) are to be interpreted not so

[10] HOWARD BECKER, "The Process of Secularization." *Sociological Review*, 24:138–154; 226–286, 1932.

[11] NILES CARPENTER, *The Sociology of City Life*, pp. 217–218. Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1931.



FSA. Photograph by Lee

SLUMS, THE FIRST ZONE OF IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT

In bridging the gap between Old World and New World culture immigrants often see the worst of American life.

much as effects of city life as such, but rather as the effects of the *sudden impact of the characteristically urban set of conditioning influences upon a personality that has been accommodated to a characteristically non-urban set of influences.* In short, certain individuals break down as a consequence of their failure to become adequately reconditioned to the city.

One further point may be noted. The shock-effect of the city may be carried into the second or even the third generation of migrants. Many conditioning influences are imbedded in traditional folkways. Others are passed on from one generation to another, by conscious precept or by imitation, particularly when the migrating group is also an immigrant group, as is often the case in the cities of the United States. That is to say, there may be reverberations for two or more generations of the shock-effect attendant upon country-to-city migration.

Almost equally severe is likely to be the experience of the youth whose parentage is of the poorer urban laboring classes or of the sharecropper or farm laborer classes and who by applying intelligence in the schoolroom and in later life quickly rises from a low standard of living into the more successful business and professional classes. By the time he is thirty he may live in a sophisticated environment which is foreign to his upbringing. A great deal of social distance may separate him from his parents, former friends, and neighbors.

One may state it as a basic principle, that the greater the difference in culture of the old and new area, or the old social class and the new in the case of vertical mobility, the greater the seriousness of the marginal position of the one bridging the gap.

In the case of internal migration within the United States, probably the most difficult adjustments have occurred among those transferring from isolated mountain cultures to metropolitan communities. Studies of "hillbilly" migrants from the Appalachian-Ozark mountain regions to metropolitan cultures [12] and also to the far West [13] suggest the serious marginal positions of such persons.

Interregional farm-to-farm migration, where it takes the new-

[12] GRACE F. LEYBOURNE, "Urban Adjustments of Migrants from the Southern Appalachian Plateaus." *Social Forces*, 15:238–246, December, 1937; MORRIS G. CALDWELL, "The Adjustment of Mountain Families in an Urban Environment." *Social Forces*, 16:389–395, March, 1938.

[13] PAUL H. LANDIS, "Internal Migration by Subsidy." *Social Forces*, 22:183–187, December, 1943.

comer into distinctly new cultural situations, may in extreme cases involve the person in the strain of marginality. Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath* gives a realistic picture of an Oklahoma drought-migrant family struggling with the more complex cultural world of California. Studies [14] of drought migrants from the northern plains to the state of Washington show that some newcomers, especially those who settled in or near lumber towns with their rough and ready morality, suffered the adjustment strains of marginal men. Studies [15] of rural Negroes in metropolitan areas show that they have extremely low marriage and birth rates, in part, no doubt, reflecting the strain of their marginal position subsequent to migration. These instances are but typical of situations resulting in the disorganization of the person with reference to his culture in a nation characterized by vertical and horizontal mobility.

Advantages of Marginality

The marginal man is not altogether a problem man. Many individuals who bridge two cultures come to see both objectively and in so doing become greater masters of themselves and of situations than others who always remain submerged within one culture and therefore never have to analyze it or adjust themselves consciously to it. Some of our greatest men are those who have bridged the culture of the old world and have applied their knowledge to the new, and have mastered it also.

These individuals are unusually dynamic and creative, in part because they are marginal men and have the advantage of having been civilized twice — once in childhood as they grew up into their native culture, the other time in youth or early adulthood when they learned the new civilization. One can cite many notable examples: in our own generation, Mayor La Guardia of New York City; in an earlier generation, Edward Bok, the Dutch lad who became editor of the *Ladies' Home Journal*, the first journal to obtain a million circulation; Jacob Riis, another

[14] RICHARD WAKEFIELD and PAUL H. LANDIS, "The Drought Farmers Adjust to the West." *Washington Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 378*. Pullman, Wash., 1939.

[15] LOUIS V. KENNEDY, *The Negro Peasant Turns Cityward*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1930; CLYDE V. KISER, *Sea Island to City*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1932; FRANK W. NOTESTEIN, "Differential Fertility in the East North Central States." *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 16:184–185, April, 1938.

famous immigrant, who succeeded in creating a great place for himself in the culture of his adopted land.

One might make the same comparison with many rural youth who struggle, perhaps intensely, with making the adjustment to secondary-group culture and social experience but who, having done so, achieve distinction in it. Men transplanted into new cultures often achieve greatness by the very fact that they are made to analyze their culture and view it objectively. Many of our most famous anthropologists, for instance, are Jews. The Jew, because he has lived in conflict with the out-group culture, must analyze not only the Gentile culture but his own as well. This experience of culture conflict, of marginality if you will, makes him a keen analyst of the culture of many peoples as an anthropologist must be. Clearly, then, personality conflict growing out of marginal experience may be creative as well as disruptive. Some individuals make the transfer successfully and profit by having done so; others find the strain too great and break during the transition.

The most successful people are not necessarily those who are the most happy or best adjusted in life. In many cases extremely high achievement characterizes maladjusted individuals who, because they cannot fit naturally into social or cultural situations in which they are placed, pour abnormal energy into efforts which will bring recognition. By so gaining a feeling of superiority they cover a sense of social inadequacy which otherwise would be unbearably painful.

Review

1. What do we mean by the term "marginal man"?
2. Why is the native problem so important today to both white and colored peoples?
3. What effects has the culture of the industrialized white man upon native peoples with backward civilizations?
4. What are some of the problems involved in the field of maintaining an "equilibrium" after culture contact?
5. How did World War II in its Pacific Theater influence the Melanesian and Polynesian peoples?
6. Illustrate conflicts introduced into the cultures of natives by the missionary movement.
7. Show how the experience of marginality affected the immigrant in our society.

8. Discuss changes in the marriage-family system of the Polish immigrant in America.
9. How does the marginal situation of parents affect the offspring of immigrants? What conflicts does it foster?
10. Describe some of the conflicts which face second-generation Orientals in Western civilization. How do these conflicts come about?
11. What internal migrations within our culture place youth in a marginal position? Discuss.
12. Discuss possible results of the transfer from a sacred to a secular society.
13. What does Carpenter mean when he uses the term "culture shock"?
14. Why is the adjustment shock of vertical mobility likely to be especially severe?
15. Are there ever adjustment strains suffered by rural to rural migrants? Why?
16. What are some of the advantages of marginality?
17. Criticise or comment on the last paragraph of the chapter. If necessary refer to one of Alfred Adler's books where he discusses inferiority complex and compensation.

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CHAPTER 9

THE YOUTHFUL DELINQUENT

Attaining Moral Maturity in Modern Society

YOUTH WHO COME to maturity in a setting of cultural disorganization have great difficulty in finding clear-cut norms for behavior which can be accepted as a basis for personality integration. On them fall problems of choice concerning moral issues for which young people in more integrated cultures are given ready-made patterns.

The child is free from many restrictions which are imposed on adults; it is at adolescence that he is harnessed with these obligations. In childhood the parent is the symbol of authority, and he remains so until the standards of the family and of larger groups have been implanted in the habit and value systems of the child. For the adolescent the realm of personal accountability enlarges, and he becomes the man of honor, the loyal citizen, or failing this, the lawbreaker.

In the present generation adolescents and youth have been given too great responsibility for moral decision in home, church, and school without having first received the necessary standards to guide them. The adults, in turn, have blamed the young for losing their way.

They have expected youth to decide for themselves things which the adult generation has failed to decide for itself, or once having decided has failed to practice. In our culture adolescence and youth must have the right of moral decision. This is necessary in an individualistic society, where changing technology creates new moral situations. But so much greater becomes the obligation of parents, religious leaders, and teachers, first, to recognize clearly the great moral principles which form the basis of respect for authority, of reverence, of obligation to others, and of responsibility for one's own physical well being, and second, to teach these principles by precept and example. Thus only

can adolescents and youths be expected to find their way unerringly to moral adulthood.

Margaret Mead[1] has contrasted the comparative difficulties of attaining moral maturity in primitive and in modern society. She points out that the Manus girl and the Samoan girl grow up in a coherent society, whereas the American girl does not. The world of these primitive girls is one of unified standards, that of the American girl one of "conflicting standards, contrasting philosophies, angry propaganda." The American girl cannot learn within the sheltered walls of her own home how to play her future part in society. Her home can provide only a fraction of the standards and patterns of her complex society. Her home may even fail woefully to prepare her for life.

In primitive society it does not matter how fantastic the cultural solutions may be, the young accept them because no alternatives are presented. But in our society choices centering about religion, vocation, and love face a girl from the time she begins to think. "She can choose not only whom she will love but whether she will love in or out of wedlock, one or many."[2] In marriage she may choose whether she will have children. In whatever choice she makes, she sets the pattern for weaker comrades who follow her example. Such are the problems of decision thrust upon "ill-educated and inexperienced children" in American society where life is so complex and difficult for the adolescent.

In the preceding chapters stress has been laid upon the interrelation of the social structure and personal behavior. Suffice it to say here that the lack of clear-cut definition for behavior, in either the total culture or a particular community, is serious indeed for adolescents and youth who are on the threshold of life, selecting the patterns by which they are to be guided. Adults, who have already chosen their life patterns, tend to persist in them, resisting newer patterns to which they may be introduced. Not so with youth. They are at the time of life when sampling the range of experience is characteristic. They are at the critical transition stage when the codes and definitions of childhood are no longer adequate and when they must, therefore, broaden their experience and their definitions to include the broader territory of adult behavior.

[1] MARGARET MEAD, "Adolescence in Primitive and Modern Society," in V. F. CALVERTON and SAMUEL D. SCHMALHAUSEN, *The New Generation*, pp. 183–184. The Macaulay Company, New York, 1930. [2] *Ibid.*

Delinquency and the Social Structure

We have already seen, in our discussion of the marginal position of the second-generation immigrant, that the exclusion of the individual from complete identity with the socio-cultural structure places him in a position of peculiar strain and stress and that this often results in delinquency. The effect of lack of community integration and of clarity of definitions in the local community is demonstrated further in the classic study made by Clifford R. Shaw and his colleagues.[3] This study of 9243 male delinquents in the city of Chicago shows that near the business district, in the center of the city, where family life is disorganized and the community has few effective devices of social control, as many as 37 per cent of the children of juvenile age (ten to sixteen years) were brought before the court during a year. (See the figure on page 160.) In blocks of the city more distant from the center, where community life was more stable, juvenile delinquency rates were low. On the outer fringe of the city, where community life was stable and social controls were effective, delinquency was practically nonexistent.


Similarly Thrasher,[4] in his study of 1313 Chicago gangs, shows that in parts of the city where adolescents lack direction, the ordinary juvenile gang graduates into the criminal gang. In the more socially integrated areas of the city, juvenile gangs participate in few nonsocial activities during the period of adolescent ganghood and the members graduate normally into conventional adult patterns at the age of marriage. In the less desirable areas of the city, on the other hand, a prerequisite to initiation into a gang may be a previous encounter with the police or the experience of having been called before the juvenile court.

The associational experiences and the learning processes that affect the development of the delinquent boy, especially in disorganized areas of the metropolitan community, are well described in the following summary by Shaw and McKay from their Report for the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement:[5]

[3] CLIFFORD R. SHAW, *Delinquency Areas*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929.

[4] FREDERIC THRASHER, *The Gang*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1927.

[5] CLIFFORD R. SHAW and HENRY D. MCKAY, *Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency*, Report on the Causes of Crime, Volume II, pp. 390, 391, 393. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1931.



Adapted from Shaw, op. cit., University of Chicago Press
Drawn by McGraw-Hill for Landis, "Adolescence and Youth."

DELINQUENCY RATES IN REPRESENTATIVE MILE SQUARE AREAS IN CHICAGO

Data show per cent of all males 10 to 16 brought before the courts during a year period. In one area near the Loop 37 per cent of all boys were involved. At the outer fringe of the city few were apprehended for delinquency. Shaw and his colleagues conclude that rates are high near the center of the city because population is mobile, community life is disorganized, social controls are few and ineffective and patterns of adult crime and family disorganization center there.

A study of the play groups and gangs of delinquent boys shows that these groups serve as an agency for the transmission of the traditions of delinquency in the high rate areas of the city. Through his participation in the activities of the delinquent groups the boy acquires the knowledge and techniques that are essential in delinquent practices. It appears that the pat-

terns of delinquent behavior, especially the various forms of stealing, are acquired through group contacts just as any cultural form is disseminated and transmitted through social groups.

The delinquent group tends to develop standards of conduct by which it seeks to control and regulate the behavior of its members. The traditions and codes of the delinquent groups emphasize as desirable qualities in their members ability in delinquency and a record in one of the correctional institutions. The "big shot" is respected; the traitor is stigmatized as a "rat" or "stool pigeon"; and the petty thief is regarded as inferior. These characteristic attitudes are built up in the course of the boys' personal contacts with delinquent groups in the neighborhood and with older offenders in correctional institutions.

In the deteriorated and disorganized areas of the city, where the facilities for training and supervision of the boy are meagre, the possibilities for the satisfaction of the boy's desires for recognition, stimulation, companionship, and security are limited largely to the spontaneous and undirected play groups, whose standards and activities are often delinquent in character. In many cases it is by means of his delinquency that the boy is enabled to achieve the recognition and esteem of his fellows, or to defend his status and honor in the group. It may serve also as a source of thrill, adventure, and stimulation. Presumably in the outlying neighborhoods these same desires find their expression through the supervised and controlled groups, whose activities and standards are more in keeping with the norms of conventional society. While the standards and values in the two situations may be widely divergent, or even reversed, the human motives and desires underlying the boy's participation in the activities of his groups are perhaps identical in the two neighborhood situations.

. . . criminal patterns of behavior develop as a product of a long process of interaction between the individual and the successive social situations in which he lives. This process in which criminal habits and attitudes are formed usually involves a continuity of experiences, extending over a long period of time. From this standpoint, a delinquent or criminal act is a part of a dynamic life process and should be considered as such in the analysis and treatment of cases.

The Delinquent Child and the Home

The delinquent child is for the most part one who has not been integrated into the primary-group structure of his own

family and neighborhood, or else one who has been integrated into the primary-group structure of a group which is predatory rather than law-abiding. It has long been known that there is a close relationship between broken homes and delinquency. The rate of delinquency of children from homes broken by divorce and desertion is higher than that among children from complete families or even from families broken by death. Some data suggest that delinquency rates are highest in homes where separation rather than divorce has broken the home.[6]

The White House Conference Report[7] shows that one-half to two-thirds of all homes where delinquency is present have been broken by the death of one or both parents or by separation or divorce. Of all the adolescents studied for the report, rural and urban, 21 per cent came from broken homes. Bell's[8] study of over 13,500 youth of sixteen to twenty-four years of age in Maryland, an older group than that studied by the White House Conference, showed that 32.3 per cent of those studied had experienced breaks in their families. The father was twice as likely to be missing from the family as the mother. Shaw and McKay[9] found as early as 1931 that 25.3 to 38.9 per cent of 7278 delinquent boys in Chicago public schools were from broken homes.

While the broken home is significant in the lives of delinquent children, certain studies indicate that the psychological climate of the home is in reality the critical factor. In fact, Shaw and McKay came to the conclusion that there is only slight relationship between the broken home and delinquency as such — probably because their data dealt primarily with boys — but that family relations within the home are vital. Commenting on the lack of consistent correlation between delinquency and broken homes in various Chicago areas studied, they say:[10]

[6] James S. Plant, reporting clinical experience, finds the delinquency rate ten times as high for children of separated as for children of divorced parents. His data are not extensive enough to be statistically significant but are significant. See a more complete statement on pp. 362 ff. or refer to Plant's article "The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents." *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 10:807–818, Summer, 1944.

[7] White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, *The Adolescent in the Family*. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1934.

[8] HOWARD M. BELL, *Youth Tell Their Story*, pp. 19–20. American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1938.

[9] SHAW and MCKAY, *op. cit.*, pp. 266–267.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 393.

> . . . Apparently the emotional attitudes and personal relationships, which after all constitute the essence of family life, are more significant and formative in the development of the attitudes and behavior patterns of the child than the formal and external aspects of the home or any formal break in the relations between its members.

The White House Conference Report [11] also gives greater weight to the relationships between parents and children than to the broken home as such, even though the cases studied show a large proportion of delinquents coming from broken homes. The report makes it clear that the home can be broken psychologically by tensions and conflicts that are quite as serious as the physical absence of one parent and sometimes more so.

Weeks [12] finds a positive relationship between delinquency and the broken home. In addition he points out that girls from broken homes have a much higher delinquency rate than boys. In seeking an explanation he finds that the nature of the delinquency of boys and girls is probably the important factor. Boys in some 75 per cent of cases are committed because of property offenses, traffic violations, and misdemeanors, whereas only 9.5 per cent of girls are committed for these reasons. Girls are committed primarily for "ungovernability," "running away," "immorality," and "other reasons." Clearly, such offenses as ungovernability and running away are likely to be related more directly to home situations than are such offenses as those for which boys are committed. Weeks' data relating specific offenses to the broken home show that the hypothesis which he advances in the above analysis is probably correct.

While death or even divorce may draw the remaining members of a family closer together, it removes supervision of one parent. This is always critical in adolescence and youth, when a young person is making his transition to adulthood. Worse still is the situation in cases of desertion or separation. Here the child has usually already endured a long series of conflicts in the home. Such conflicts in themselves are disastrous to a child's confidence in adults in general and to his own self-confidence and sense of personal security. Too often parents who are in conflict use the

[11] White House Conference Report on Child Health and Protection, *The Adolescent in the Family*, pp. 212–235. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1934.

[12] H. Ashley Weeks, "Male and Female Broken Home Rates by Types of Delinquency." *American Sociological Review*, 5:601–609, August, 1940.


child as a pawn in an attempt to justify themselves for the attitude they are assuming. They draw the child into the fracas in humiliating and embarrassing ways, one parent even exposing the other's disloyálties to the child in order to enlist the child on his side. As a result, the child is likely to develop a questioning attitude toward all standards. One young woman who grew up in a family where conflict prevailed and where divorce eventually took place has told how she herself was used in the situation:

> If I was on my father's side, my mother would get me in a corner and tell me of his disloyalties to her, the way he beat her when I wasn't around, how he stayed out nights with other women and spent his money gambling and drinking. He was just like all men; none of them were any good as far as my mother was concerned. All this was in an effort to bring me around to her side of the argument and turn me against my father. It was hard for me to believe all of these things because I knew my father was a good man and he had provided well for his family. But since my mother told me about them, they had to be true and I believed. My father never defended himself against these accusations and was always good to me whether I was on his side or mother's. I loved my father too much to grow to hate him because of what my mother had told me. Eventually I discovered for myself that all my mother's claims against my father were false.

Still other stresses and strains may make the home a background for delinquency. The home of the immigrant places the child in a position of marginality in which he must bridge the parental patterns of old-world origin and the play-group patterns of his school and neighborhood. This explains in large part the fact that in urban America juvenile delinquency rates have been higher among children of immigrants than among children of any other group. In rural areas, where the transition from old-world patterns to new-world patterns is less sudden, this has not been true.

The clash of culture patterns in the immigrant home which leads to a clash of authority patterns and a breakdown of parental control is strikingly illustrated by the following paragraphs, in which the parent-child relationships of Polish immigrants in a rural mill town of about 3000 population in Massachusetts is described.[13]

[13] ARNOLD W. GREEN, "The Middle Class Male Child and Neurosis." *American Sociological Review*, 11:31–41, February, 1946.



R. L. Nesmith and Associates

DECADENT AREAS WARP YOUTH INTO PATTERNS OF DELINQUENCY

There are no bad boys by birth, but there are bad communities where the way of life is crime.

An outstanding feature of peasant family life, in contradistinction to that of modern middle-class family organization, is the stress placed upon rules and work-functions rather than personal sentiment; and parental authority is excessive by the standards of any comparable segment of the American population. These rules of conduct and this parental authority are out of place in the American industrial slum. Second-generation Poles participate in a social world outside the home which their parents, because of language difficulties and previous conditioning, are incapable of sharing or even of understanding. As bewildered parents attempt to enforce old-world standards they are met with the anger and ridicule of their children. In answer to this, the parents have final recourse to a kind of authority which was unsanctioned in Poland: a vengeful, personal, irrational authority, which no longer finds support in the future hopes and ambitions of the children; and this new authority is no longer controlled by both parents' families and a cohesive community. But this personal authority will not suffice to curb their wayward progeny, who have little respect for their parents as persons, and who soon come to learn that their "American" playmates are not subjected to anything like it in their homes.

It is through this tragically antagonistic, mutually distrustful clash of wills that the relations of parents and children tend to be lacking in "love" (which is alien to the peasant *mores* anyway). At the same time, there is plenty of "irrational authority." In exasperation and fear of losing all control over their Americanized youngsters, parents apply the fist and whip rather indiscriminately. The sounds of blows, screams, howls, vexatious wails of torment and hatred are so commonplace along the rows of dilapidated mill-houses that the passerby pays them scant attention.

The School's Responsibility in Delinquency

It is a startling fact that most delinquent children come directly from the American schoolroom, where they have presumably had an opportunity to absorb the standards of a law-abiding society. The White House Conference [14] estimated that at all times approximately half a million children in the public schools of the United States have serious behavior problems, judged by the

[14] White House Conference Report on Child Health and Protection, *The Home and the Child*, p. 293. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1931.


probabilities of their attaining moral maturity. For the most part these behavior problems go unrecognized by the average teacher.

It has been said by some criminologists that the future criminal is now being made in the first and second grades of school. Whether it is there or in the eighth or ninth grades, or even in the twelfth grade, does not matter. The point is that nearly every child in America, with exception of the few who are incapable of doing so, goes through the public school system. Deviations from normal behavior could and should be observed by the teachers, and the school system should place about the child corrective influences which would guide him into normal social participation.

An interesting study of children's behavior as viewed by mental hygienists and teachers is presented in the pair of charts on pages 168 and 169. It will be observed that those traits which mark isolation from the group, a sense of aloneness, a lack of identity of self with others — traits which are considered by the mental hygienist as most dangerous from the standpoint of behavior problems — are generally not recognized as serious by the teacher. The teacher tends to attach greatest importance to traits which cause her the greatest immediate disciplinary problems. If the mental hygienists are right, every school system should have someone close enough to the average child in the schoolroom to detect these antisocial traits. In other words, there should be visiting teachers, family-life specialists, counselors trained in mental hygiene, and guidance experts who are able to lead a child from introverted aloneness into normal social participations, to reinstate him in his family group, his play group, or other groups, and to build a sense of security and assurance in group situations.

The first indication of dangerous maladjustment in a child is often truancy from school.[15] Truancy brings into the open attitudes which have in some cases been developing in the child over long periods, attitudes of antipathy toward his social group, family, play, or school, because it has been unfriendly to him. The antipathy may be the result of parental rejection in the home or of neglect or mistreatment by the play group. The latter, in


[15] For a more extensive discussion of this problem than that presented here see WALTER C. RECKLESS and MAPHEUS SMITH, *Juvenile Delinquency*. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1932.



Wickman, "Children's Behavior and Teachers' Attitudes"

Teachers' Ratings on the Relative Seriousness of 50 Common Behavior Problems of Children

Teachers list traits that are serious from a disciplinary standpoint and from the standpoint of moral taboos. Compare their ratings with those of mental hygienists on the opposite page.



Wickman, "Children's Behavior and Teachers' Attitudes"

Mental Hygienists' Ratings on the Relative Seriousness of 50 Common Behavior Problems of Children

Mental hygienists consider traits important in terms of the long-time effect on personality development. The list of traits is the same as in the preceding chart; note how differently they rate traits.

turn, may be due to peculiarity of looks, peculiarity of temperament, a foreign accent, difference of race, or any of a number of temperamental, physical, or social traits. More directly, truant behavior may be the result of the incompatibility of child and the teacher, of the child's inability to achieve a reasonable degree of status in the school, or any series of experiences which makes him despise the school situation.

Truancy, then, is symptomatic, and hence is highly significant as a danger signal in the life of the child. It requires the immediate investigation of the home situation, of the pupil-teacher relationship, and of the relationship of the child with his play group. Investigation will usually show that the child should not be handled by the police methods of the traditional truant officer. Such methods will only develop further attitudes of conflict, defiance, and deception. Often the child has no alternative but to miss school if he wants to avoid situations that are most unpleasant to him. The problem becomes one of helping to correct the situations so that he will feel that he "belongs" in the school. This frequently requires a long series of reconstructive measures aimed at restoring him to a position of being wanted in the family, of being accepted in some play group, and of being given recognition at school. Healy believes that if we could do away with truancy we should go a long way toward solving the whole problem of delinquency, for he points out that truancy is commonly associated with stealing, staying out at night, and sexual misbehavior.[16]

The regimenting of nonconformist children by principals or truant officers who wield a big stick is wrong. The school must learn to exhaust every other device before so-called problem children or pre-delinquents are handled by police methods or housed in corrective institutions.[17] Trained personnel with adequate salaries is cheaper than corrective institutions, which in fact rarely correct or cure. The school must work with behavior clinics, and it must develop special curricula and vocational training programs which will cater to the interests and needs of children not now interested in the school program.

[16] WILLIAM HEALY, AUGUSTA F. BRONNER, EDITH M. H. BAYLOR, and J. PRENTICE MURPHY, *Reconstructing Behavior in Youth*, p. 37. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1929.

[17] For a good discussion of this problem see HARRY E. BARNES and N. K. TEETERS, *New Horizons in Criminology*, Chapters 27–28. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1944.

The Legal Approach to Correction

The Juvenile Court. Legal devices have in the main been punitive. Historically it was assumed that punishment is the just desert of willful creatures who deliberately decide of their own free will to do wrong. This philosophy of punishment as opposed to correction was applied to children and juveniles until the "juvenile court" developed procedures aimed at protecting the apprehended child from the publicity of the usual court action, and substituted for punitive measures the devices of study, analysis, understanding, and correction.

Barnes and Teeters,[18] who are very pessimistic regarding the possibility of our society's taking steps to eliminate the evils of its penal system, see hope in the more intelligent attitude which society is willing to take toward children. They find this attitude expressed in progressive school programs, in juvenile court procedures, and in some of the better types of juvenile corrective institutions. But even so, they point out that too many well-meaning judges and juvenile administrators are obsessed by the idea that strict measures with juveniles accomplish more than scientific diagnosis and scientific treatment. Traditional methods springing from the folkways still appear far too often in the handling of juvenile cases.

Child Guidance Clinics. A development as significant perhaps as the juvenile court itself has been the appearance of child guidance clinics, often connected with juvenile courts. The child guidance clinic is designed to give professional service in the form of diagnosis and treatment of children's problems. Hundreds of such clinics now function in various cities in the nation. An outline of the work of the average clinic is presented in the following quotation from Louis Wirth.[19]

> (a) The case comes to the clinic with a statement of the problems presented as seen by the referring agency or person; (b) which is followed by the collection of data by the investigators of the clinic; (c) there follows discussion among the specialists for the purpose of arriving at the facts; (d) which are then analyzed with a view of agreeing on a diagnosis; (e) to be followed by the formulation of a program of treatment; (f) whereupon attempts are made to carry out the program;

[18] HARRY E. BARNES and N. K. TEETERS, *op. cit.*, p. 897.

[19] "Clinical Sociology." *American Journal of Sociology*, 27:51ff., July, 1931.

(g) accompanied by re-examination and evaluations of the program adopted, and the diagnosis upon which it was based; (h) with the further effort of arriving at valid generalizations of principles and an improvement of techniques.

The Adolescent Court. More recent than the juvenile court is the "adolescent court," which handles young people up to adulthood. Its ideal is to separate youthful criminals from adult criminals. It attempts, so far as possible, to settle cases without court action and to apply corrective and guidance techniques to problems of young people from sixteen to twenty-one years of age.

The American Youth Commission, in connection with the problem of youthful crime, has expressed the following significant views:

> A youth who finds himself in difficulty with the law should not be proceeded against as a public enemy; he should be taken in hand and re-educated as a public asset, the state supplying the parental care and discipline which has been lacking.[20]

The commission agrees with recommendations made by the American Law Institute, which similarly stresses the importance of special legal procedures for the handling of youthful criminals. The institute recommends that a "youth correction authority" should handle cases of young people beyond juvenile court age. The authority would hire psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and family relations experts to study the backgrounds of youthful criminals and their capacities of rehabilitation.

It is clear from these various programs, some of them embryonic and few of them generally accessible to youth in trouble, that the law may be transformed from a punitive to a socially constructive instrument. Such a transformation requires an enlightened social policy based on an understanding of human nature and of the existing social order. The effective functioning of an ideal program would depend on an enlightened and understanding legal personnel who would care more about sociology, psychology, and psychiatry than about the legal tradition or the precedent-establishing decisions in which the legal profession is now immersed. Unfortunately the requisite training is not yet in

[20] American Council on Education, *Youth and the Future*, p. 200. American Youth Commission, Washington, D.C., 1942.

prospect for the legal profession. The goal of the profession is still the administration of "justice" rather than the salvaging of persons wrecked by impersonal forces of the social order. At present, "justice" is often no more humane than the biological doctrine of "the survival of the fittest." Fortunately, however, juvenile problems have driven a significant wedge into legal tradition. In the long run, reform of the entire process of legal administration must result.

The Clash of Folkways and Constructive Social Policy

In handling delinquency, as in handling criminal behavior, the tendency has been to cling to the age-old method of attempting to cure symptoms rather than remove the allergy which produces the affliction. The symptoms have too often been mistaken for the disease. The treatment of juveniles has not gone beyond a stage corresponding to that of medical science several generations ago when physicians bled a patient to cure him of a malady. Society has been too ready to cast juvenile offenders into detention homes or even into prison, too little inclined to apply the devices of education and correction, of guidance and reconstruction, of sympathetic understanding and intelligent reform.

Survey Graphic in April, 1945, described the success of New York's P.S. 37. In this unique public school children who are maladjusted to the point of presenting severe behavior problems in ordinary school situations become normal social participants in an aggressive, lively school atmosphere. They are successfully guided by a woman who knows how to reach the mainsprings of children's actions and make them feel at home as participants in school life.

This is but an example of many excellent social experiments that have been tried here and there locally by wise leaders. Their success has been demonstrated so clearly that it is amazing that society complacently sits back and watches each new generation produce its large crop of juvenile delinquents, many of whom graduate into the profession of crime. In the average community the delinquent still causes the good citizen to throw up his hands in horror and to say, "There's no hope for him; it's bad blood," or "With that kind of parent, what kind of chance is there for the kid — he'll end up a criminal."

The process by which the childish prankster too often becomes

the evil person in the eyes of the community is well described by Tannenbaum in the following words:[21]

> In the conflict between the young delinquent and the community there develop two opposing definitions of the situation. In the beginning the definition of the situation by the young delinquent may be in the form of play, adventure, excitement, interest, mischief, fun. Breaking windows, annoying people, running around porches, climbing over roofs, stealing from pushcarts, playing truant — all are items of play, adventure, excitement. To the community, however, these activities may and often do take on the form of a nuisance, evil, delinquency, with the demand for control, admonition, chastisement, punishment, police court, truant school. This conflict over the situation is one that arises out of a divergence of values. As the problem develops, the situation gradually becomes redefined. The attitude of the community hardens definitely into a demand for suppression. There is a gradual shift from the definition of the specific acts as evil to a definition of the individual as evil, so that all his acts come to be looked upon with suspicion. In the process of identification, his companions, hang-outs, play, speech, income, all his conduct, the personality itself, become subject to scrutiny and question. From the community's point of view, the individual who used to do bad and mischievous things has now become a bad and unredeemable human being. From the individual's point of view there has taken place a similar change. He has gone slowly from a sense of grievance and injustice, of being unduly mistreated and punished, to a recognition that the definition of him as a human being is different from that of other boys in his neighborhood, his school, street, community. This recognition on his part becomes a process of self-identification and integration with the group which shares his activities. It becomes, in part, a process of rationalization; in part, a simple response to a specialized type of stimulus. The young delinquent becomes bad because he is defined as bad and because he is not believed if he is good. There is a persistent demand for consistency in character. The community cannot deal with people whom it cannot define. Reputation is this sort of public definition. Once it is established, then unconsciously all agencies combine to maintain this definition even when they apparently and consciously attempt to deny their own implicit judgment.

[21] FRANK TANNENBAUM, *Crime and the Community*, p. 17. Ginn and Company, Boston, 1938.

Fortunately, corrective measures have multiplied. The average citizen now knows that playgrounds are good antidotes for delinquency, and that it is cheaper to provide playgrounds in slum areas than to hire larger police forces and build jails and reformatories. But even well-known constructive measures have failed to keep pace with the growing stress of modern life, which forces an increasing number of children to the margin of social acceptance. This was clearly proved during World War II. Many children were then denied full acceptance by parents who were too anxious to earn high wages. Also, the community failed to give protection to those who were inevitably denied the supervision of one parent by the fact that the other was drawn into the armed forces. The result was that in a time of extensive mobility, of a general let-down of morals, and of anxiety and strain, many children, adolescents, and youth who might easily have been saved lost their way. Proper constructive measures would not have taken half the community co-ordination and activity that were spent in providing buckets of sand for fire protection, air-raid drills, first aid drills, etc., for which there was never more than a highly speculative need. A fraction of this effort directed toward providing social activities, personal counsel, and directed recreation, and toward the training and employment of personnel skilled in dealing with children, would have saved us from the greater menace of juvenile delinquency and the training of a group of amateurs in crime who will eventually become professionals.

ADOLESCENTS AND YOUTH RECEIVED FROM COURT IN FEDERAL AND STATE PRISONS FOR FELONY IN 1939 AND 1943 [22]

Commitments by Age

	1939		1943	
Age	*Number*	*Per Cent* [23]	*Number*	*Per Cent*
15 to 17 years	2,573	4.1	2,397	6.0
18 years	2,998	4.8	2,377	5.9
19 years	3,557	5.7	2,567	6.4
20 years	3,310	5.3	2,159	5.4
21 to 24 years	12,286	19.8	7,666	19.0

As early as 1943 the prisons were beginning to receive the war-time crop of youthful offenders. Observe the increased proportion entering prisons at the earlier ages.

[22] No data for Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, 1939; none for Georgia, Mississippi, and Michigan, 1943. From *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories, 1943*, p. 16, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1946.

[23] Percentages are based on total commitments of all age groups.

The war has thus brought into focus a situation which is always present. Our nation works wisely, energetically, and efficiently where technological progress is at stake. At the same time its attempts at social protection and at reconstruction of behavior are a mixture of folklore and fear. This myth-mindedness regarding human adjustments is out of place in an engineer's world. Enough is already known for us to do better. The crying need for more practical and more understanding education of parents and teachers must be reiterated. This is the key to enduring progress in personality building and social adjustment in a changing society. Many parents will fail; the teacher must then try to bridge the gap in helping the child. Where both fail the community must take over. If the community cannot afford both police and guidance experts, then it would do better to choose guidance experts.

One of the most hopeful movements of recent years in this field has been the adding of family-relations specialists to the staffs of progressive public school systems. This specialist is able to work with child and parent through the school in achieving adjustments which make it possible for the unaccepted child to find a place of emotional security and to develop self-confidence and a sense of identity with a group. The guidance and personal counseling movement is based on the sound principle of understanding the background, motives, and capacities of the individual with a view to directing him constructively, purposefully, and intelligently toward legitimate social and economic goals. Greater emphasis by society, and greater expenditure of funds and influence, in these directions would reduce appreciably the tremendous burden of apprehending, supervising, institutionalizing, and trying to rehabilitate a great army of criminals. With the decline of family loyalty and the increase of desertion and divorce which inevitably follow periods of crisis like that of World War II, the nation has to choose between rescuing delinquent youth or expanding houses for correction in a tardy but largely futile effort to cope with an increasing group of adults.

The greatest need in all phases of social administration is for skilled workers conscientiously interested in the problems of children and youth, and at the same time highly trained in sociology, psychiatry, and psychology. The average teacher is inadequately prepared for the task. She knows much about educational methods, not enough about the subject with whom she works. The

fault is not that of the teacher, who is usually conscientious and hard-working; it is rather that of the teacher-training system and of the low value which society places on education. Teachers' salaries are too low to expect the profession to be highly selected or broadly enough trained. Yet upon the teacher, the playground supervisor, and local community leaders of adolescents and youth falls much of the responsibility for society's failure in helping young people achieve moral maturity.

If society could actually employ even a fraction of the social measures which are known to be effective in restoring the wayward child to a normal place in his social group, delinquency could immediately be greatly reduced. Social action lags far behind social knowledge. As a consequence many will become enemies of society who could otherwise be a normal part of it; many will spend their lives as inmates of prisons who might contribute their normal share to the work of mankind and to the building of social institutions.

In the delinquency areas of our cities much more is needed than an individual approach. Community reconstruction on a major scale is required. This may necessitate public housing, slum clearance, and other measures which would modify the character of community life. It requires the vigorous action of citizens' committees to eliminate rackets, political graft, and other forms of organized crime which set the pattern of life which youth in these areas emulate and adopt. This is a challenging task which few cities have undertaken wholeheartedly. Even reform political administrations are in the end blocked in their efforts by the fact that illegitimate forms of business tie in closely at many points with sanctioned forms of political administration and business practice. It is doubtful whether, in areas where wholesale delinquency is the established pattern for adolescents and where crime is a major activity of adults, marked improvement will come about until city government becomes more of a science than it is at present and until its officials are trained and chosen as civil servants rather than as tools of political machines.

Review

1. Describe briefly the process by which moral maturity is achieved. How is it related to the culture pattern?
2. Contrast the process in primitive and in modern individualistic societies.

3. What is meant by the term "social definitions"?
4. How does the choice of definitions presented by our culture often serve to confuse and frustrate youth?
5. What basic principles did Shaw and his co-workers discover in their study of delinquency in relation to specific areas in the city of Chicago?
6. Discuss Thrasher's findings.
7. What part do group associations play in the delinquency of the individual?
8. Discuss the broken home as a factor in delinquency.
9. Distinguish between the broken home and the psychologically broken home. Why is the distinction important?
10. Show the importance of relating the broken home to the offenses for which delinquents are charged, as was done by Weeks.
11. Why is the child of the immigrant family so often a delinquent? Illustrate.
12. Why is the school probably the best place to recognize and remedy delinquent behavior?
13. How do mental hygienists and teachers compare in their evaluation of what constitutes a serious behavior problem? What is the significance of this finding?
14. Why should truancy be taken as a danger signal?
15. Is the truant officer the person to handle truancy? Discuss a constructive approach to truancy.
16. Compare punitive measures and corrective measures in the field of juvenile delinquency.
17. How does the average child-guidance clinic function?
18. What part does the adolescent court play in correcting juvenile delinquency?
19. How have folkways in the field of juvenile correction hindered constructive social policy? Explain.
20. Why is it necessary to educate the average citizen to recognize the values of corrective social programs for delinquent children?
21. What effect did the war have on delinquency in the nation?
22. What programs and services are now being maintained in many school systems to cope with problems of maladjusted behavior in children?
23. How must the teacher-training system be remodeled to enable teachers to cope better with problem behavior?
24. What must be done in the way of community reconstruction for the elimination of delinquency?

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CHAPTER 10

THE CRIMINAL

Crime in a Complex Society

IN SIMPLE CULTURES the paths to maturity are few but those which do exist are clearly marked. The one who varies from the accepted pattern is quickly corrected. He finds the going difficult because the censure of intimate primary groups and the uniform opinion of the elders impress upon him the error of his way. The Hebrew prophet, reflecting the background of a rural culture, spoke wisely when he said, "The way of the transgressor is hard."

In a complex society of secondary groups with varying standards, patterns of behavior are many, roads to maturity are varied, shades of difference between the acceptable and the unacceptable are indistinct. The effort to master complex social patterns places the individual in many quandaries and often leaves him undecided as to which group to follow or which standard to accept.

In the field of law alone the difference between a complex society and a simple agrarian culture is immense. The laws of a modern state or even a modern city run into the thousands. Each marks a potential area of delinquency and crime, a new source of strain and frustration for the individual. These, not biological forces, are what make the habitual delinquent and the professional criminal. As Sutherland aptly says,

> There is no evidence that there can be such a thing as a born criminal. No one has such a heredity that he must inevitably be a criminal regardless of the situations in which he is placed or the influences which play upon him. A phlegmatic temperament, which we might assume is inherited, may keep a person from becoming a criminal in one environment, and make him a criminal in another environment. In one environment the individual with an average intelligence becomes a criminal,



State of Indiana, Department of Public Welfare

WHICH IS THE GREATER, SOCIETY'S CRIMES, OR HIS?

There is no reformation in idleness, no contribution to society, no building for the future, only a vengeful brooding over the past.

> and in another the individual with a dull intelligence. Both the individual trait and the situation must be included in the statement of the causation; neither one works alone to produce crime. Every person is a "potential criminal," but it requires contacts and direction of tendencies to make either a criminal or a law-abiding person.[1]

The social processes through which the criminal is made are for the most part the same as those through which the juvenile delinquent is made. While the majority of adult first offenders have had no previous experience with the law and the courts, many of those who become professional criminals first encounter them in the late teens and early twenties when legal definitions shift them from the custody of the juvenile court and juvenile detention institutions to the criminal court and to jails and prisons.[2] The peak load of offenders year after year comes in the young adult group. The rate of general offenses is about five times as great for persons from twenty to twenty-four years of

[1] E. H. SUTHERLAND, *Principles of Criminology* (3rd ed. rev.), p. 90. J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1939. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 95–99.

age as for those over fifty, and the rate of serious crimes is about fifteen times as great.[3] This is, in part, because crime is an energetic and hazardous occupation.

Heterogeneity of patterns of life, the diverse origins of population, and the multiplicity of standards explain many phases of American crime. The only difference between the average citizen and the criminal, according to Tannenbaum,[4] with regard to law observance, is that the former evades the law, whereas the latter deliberately breaks it in order to gain the admiration of a group which considers law-breaking in harmony with its codes. The criminal code accepts and encourages conflict with society. A professional criminal understands very well that his liberty, in fact his very life, depends upon loyalty to his own group and observance of its codes.[5] Crime to him is a business proposition, a way of making money and of acquiring status and distinction. It is not always the easiest way, but it is a way. In a community where criminal patterns are predominant, if one chances to become identified as a criminal, crime offers practically the only way of achieving distinction, social status, wealth, recognition, publicity, and the other things that make life sweet and worth living.

As to the specific causes of crime, one might almost as well try to classify the causes of human behavior; for the causes of crime are as numerous as the causes of any other kind of behavior. The roots of crime are in the social system. Crime itself is a variation from established, accepted procedures. Often the variation is slight.

Even the question of what makes a criminal is one which cannot be answered in simple categorical terms. Criminals are made by exactly the same social processes as are good citizens. A good citizen is the product of a series of influences working toward the building of a personality which leads to social acceptance. The behavior of the criminal is built along lines that work toward social rejection. A man engaged in financial crime is motivated by the desire for wealth, recognition, social status, and achievement, exactly as is the businessman. The one operates within the framework of legal definitions; the other, using many of the same techniques, operates outside legal definitions. In the

[3] E. H. SUTHERLAND, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[4] FRANK TANNENBAUM, *Crime and the Community*, p. 22. Ginn and Company, Boston, 1938.

[5] *Ibid.*, Chapter 3.

field of personal crimes of violence, such as sex assault and rape, the motives and satisfactions sought by the criminal are the same as those that influence the normal man but they are outside the accepted social definitions. Crime involves the violation of the rights and dignities of the other person in order to gratify desire. The person violated may be a minor or an adult. A person who sexually exploits a juvenile commits a criminal offense even though the consent of the juvenile is given; in case the member of the opposite sex is an adult, consent removes the criminal aspect in most instances.

The point is that criminals are not a different kind of people. In much of the history of criminology this view, which is universally accepted today, was not held. There was every attempt to find in the criminal some peculiar biological characteristics which would explain his difference. The most notable of these efforts were those of Cesare Lombroso, who sought to prove that criminals are a distinct anthropological type. We now recognize that criminality is a difference in the behavior patterns, not in the animal; a difference in habits and philosophies of life, a difference in responses to the prevailing system of social control, a different reaction of the individual or group of individuals to the mores and legal control devices prevalent in the society at a given time.

Delinquents and criminals are made by experience with and training in the techniques and patterns of delinquency. The professional criminal learns the art and philosophy of crime in the same way that the banker or the merchant learns the techniques and philosophies of his kind of business.

> Education for crime must be looked upon as habituation to a way of life. As such it partakes of the nature of all education. It is a gradual adaptation to, and a gradual absorption of, certain elements in the environment. As an educational process it depends upon instruction, stimulus, approval, companionship, conversation, idealization. It has its elements of curiosity, wonder, knowledge, adventure. Like all true education it has its beginnings in play, it starts in more or less random movements, and builds up toward techniques, insights, judgments, attitudes. It gradually takes on constructive skills. It depends upon companionship and approving judgment. Like all education it utilizes the material and ideal elements in the environment; it could not come to pass otherwise. It

uses what there is to be found in the neighborhood. These may be such humble things as junk heaps, alley ways, abandoned houses, pushcarts, railroad tracks, coal cars. It begins with the easy things that can be picked up, pilfered, carried off, eaten, disposed of. It requires companionship and encouragement. It is a social process, like all education for life. Friends, companions, brothers, gangs, participate, encourage, amuse, tease, praise, blame, compensate. It is a part of the adventure of living in a certain way in a certain environment. But both the environment and the way of using it must already be there. Both the material and the social environment are prerequisite. For the career of the criminal to develop there must not only be the friends in the gang, the habits of the older companions already prepared to make certain adjustments through previous instruction, but there must also be the support of the older generation. . . .[6]

Crime Patterns in the Contemporary Social Structure

In many ways crime exhibits the characteristics of organized business. Business has long tended toward monopoly and to guarantee profits by crowding out competition. In the same way organized gangs in the city have controlled certain enterprises, legitimate or illegitimate. While big business operates under law, the racket operates outside the law. It compels patronage by physical force, threats of violence, destruction of property, and other illegal devices. It may deal in beer or in milk, in prostitution or in organized charity.

Today when credit transactions represent most wealth, major financial crimes involve manipulation of credit instruments, fraudulent stocks and bonds, forged checks, and other illicit methods of getting easy and quick money. In many of these ventures the line between the operations of a legitimate business and of a criminally motivated enterprise is very thin indeed. It is this kind of situation probably that provoked Bernard Shaw to say that for stealing a loaf of bread we send a man to jail; for stealing a railroad, we send him to Parliament. There was much in the history of America's rugged industrial individualism that according to present standards approached the criminal. Only the fact that these manipulations were condoned, kept them outside the bounds of criminal behavior.

[6] TANNENBAUM, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

Professional and Nonprofessional Criminals

There are those who casually break the law by accident, sudden passion, or other temporary lapses, and who are accordingly guilty of misdemeanors or even crimes; but they are not in a real sense criminal and have little criminal intent. There are others who have made crime a profession. It is their philosophy of life, their method of obtaining a living. They recognize the hazards of their profession and accept them. The prison sentence is one of the risks they knowingly take and which they are willing to take because of the great stakes involved. They are as cold, calculating, and deliberate in planning their criminal activities as the banker or merchant in planning his business. Crime with them involves no scruples. Often they operate in social units of large or smaller size. They have developed their own code of ethics, frequently referred to by the public as "honor among thieves," their own standards of efficiency, their own tools and techniques, and their own trade secrets. They employ a lawyer to their advantage where they can. They make terms with law-enforcement officials who can be bought or bribed. They bargain for political influence. Where they cannot make use of the law, they evade it or deliberately violate it. They are not feeble-minded folk in any sense. They are often among the most intelligent members of society, wise in the ways of their own unique and often highly specialized profession.

While the average citizen often thinks of the man behind prison bars as one who would be interested in going straight if he had the right opportunities and influences placed about him, the facts are that the majority of the professional group have no such interest. Their time in prison is spent not in repentance but in exchanging ideas with other prisoners so that they can improve their skills and techniques and in planning more successful ventures for the days when the sentence ends.

Sutherland,[7] in his description of white-collar criminality, outlines two educational roads to crime. The one, that of traditionally defined criminality, is followed by maladjusted individuals who for the most part have learned criminal behavior in a disadvantaged community where they have been subjected to the associations and influences which teach the techniques

[7] EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, "White-Collar Criminality." *American Sociological Review*, 5:1–12, February, 1940.

FELONY PRISONERS RECEIVED FROM COURTS BY STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, 1944 [8]

Offense	*Number*	*Per cent*
All offenses	41,058	100.0
Murder	1,310	3.2
Manslaughter	1,052	2.6
Robbery	3,058	7.4
Aggravated assault	2,198	5.4
Burglary	6,393	15.6
Larceny, except auto theft	6,988	17.0
Auto theft	2,744	6.7
Embezzlement and fraud	1,187	2.9
Stolen property	453	1.1
Forgery	2,363	5.8
Rape	1,583	3.9
Commercialized vice	301	0.7
Other sex offenses	1,247	3.0
Other offenses	10,181	24.7
Violating drug laws	1,255	3.1
Carrying and possessing weapons	164	0.4
Nonsupport or neglect	595	1.4
Violating liquor laws	2,027	4.9
Violating traffic laws	76	0.2
Violating National Defense laws	3,860	9.4
All other offenses	2,204	5.4

and practices of crime. The other, that of white-collar criminality, often begins in good neighborhoods and good homes and leads through a college or university. This kind of criminal operates through established business and industrial organizations and usually within the accepted folkways of the business or profession but in evasion or circumvention of the law. The inventive geniuses in the field of general criminality are the professionals who make of crime a lifelong study and practice. The inventive geniuses of white-collar criminality in American society are, for the most part, lawyers.

When one first encounters this view, he is perhaps shocked at the classification of white-collar criminality along with other criminality. Yet Sutherland gives convincing evidence that from

[8] No data for state institutions in Michigan, Georgia, and Mississippi. From *Population*, Series PN, No. 5, March 15, 1946. Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of the Census.

the standpoint of financial loss to society and from the standpoint of the loss of confidence of people in each other it is of tremendous social significance. Among the numerous examples of it which he cites are fee-splitting by specialists with doctors who refer patients to them; betrayal of trust, as for example when the director of a corporation, acting on inside information, purchases a piece of land and then turns around and sells it at a fantastic profit to the corporation of which he is director; shortages in weights and measures; embezzlement, political graft, bribery, swindling, and fraud.

The crimes of the slums are crimes of violence, physical action, and overt aggression, which are recognized and condemned by all. The crimes of the business and professional worlds are committed by those of high status and influence, many of them unknown outside the in-group and, because of the high status of the group, immune to prosecution.

Enough has been said to demonstrate that criminals are not a unique kind of human animal born with predatory tendencies. Crime exists at all levels of social development and of social status. Motives for crime are acquired in the same way as those for other forms of behavior. Much that is really crime in the legal sense, and more that is wrong in a moral sense and that should be made wrong in a legal sense, goes unrecognized; and much recognized crime goes unpunished.

The difference between those who are reputed to be law-abiding and those who are considered criminals is at best one of degree. In many cases it is only a difference in the kind of laws broken or in the way of breaking them. It is as illegal — and more socially disastrous — for a banker to violate regulations with regard to investing deposited funds as for a hobo to attempt to rob the cash drawer of a grocery store. Rarely is a banker punished when such policies lead to bank failure and huge losses of the savings of thousands. The hobo rarely goes unpunished even though his attempt may have cost no one a cent.

So complex is the pattern of crime in the United States and so poorly drawn are the lines between criminal and acceptable behavior that one is compelled to admit that the folkways of respectability probably have as much to do with defining crime as does the law itself. These same folkways determine that one apprehended for crime shall be punished according to his status rather than according to the social damage caused by his act.

This is reasonable ground for challenging the philosophy of punitive justice, and for a critical review of the aims, motives and results of procedures that have evolved as folkways for dealing with the criminal as a person. To that problem the remainder of this chapter is devoted.

Penal Treatment

The early records of the treatment accorded persons who transgressed the laws of the group constitute a black section of history. Earliest prisons were underground dungeons, where criminals were punished by a living death. The Hebrews stoned their lawbreakers to death. We have read of Ben Hur or Jean Valjean, who as criminals were sent to the galleys and unbearable toil. Even during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe thousands of heretics were burned in great bonfires. A few hundred years ago a traveler through England might have seen on an occasional hilltop a criminal dangling from a gallows where he had been left as an example to would-be offenders. A common practice of many western European nations was to banish their criminals to one of their colonies. Parts of our continent were settled by convicts from England. Later England used Australia as a dumping ground. Portugal sent her criminals and women of ill repute to Brazil. Russia used Siberia as a place of banishment and sent her convicts there to die as laborers in the poisonous lead mines. Italy made a practice of transporting criminals to islands off her coast. Today French Guiana is used by France as a penal colony for her worst criminals. About eight hundred are landed there annually. Of these three hundred and fifty die during the first year in the tropical climate, and only two live to see their homeland.

A long view of society's attempts to tame the criminal shows a tendency toward decreased severity of punishments, accompanied by the gradually developing idea that treatment should aim at reformation rather than at making an example of the guilty or at taking vengeance upon him for the wrong he has done to society. Emphasis has been placed more and more on education, recreation, and constructive activity rather than on punishment and retribution. Even self-government has been tried under wise administration with some success. Unfortunately, however, in many local jails kangaroo courts are allowed to

operate under the guise of prisoners' self-government. The "court" is nothing more than a system of regulations imposed by the prisoners upon each other. Often the most vicious inmate dominates and uses the regulations for exploitation and even torture.[9]

In handling criminals both in court and in penal institutions, our society has been blindly unmindful of the difference between the professional and the amateur. Treating them alike tends to force the amateur into the philosophy and attitudes of the professional. Incarcerating them together in prison places the amateur under the influence of the professionals. It creates an atmosphere in which the big crimes, the big successes in the criminal world, are respected, in which the most thrilling topics of conversation are vivid rehearsals of crimes committed, in which planning for the future is likely to center about further criminal exploits. Some of these considerations make revolutionary thinkers in the field of criminology like Harry Elmer Barnes, Negley K. Teeters, and Frank Tannenbaum, look upon modern penal philosophy, modern prison treatment, and even modern prisons themselves as archaic survivals which have little if any place in a civilized society.

The desirability of certain revolutionary changes in these fields is obvious from studies of the effects of modern penal institutions upon the behavior of the individual. Society's aim of reform and correction is seldom realized; institutions for juvenile detention and for criminals are really schools of crime. Even the professional who should be permanently removed from society is little restrained by our prison system because we fail to set him apart from the casual or accidental criminal and return him to society again and again to carry on his depredations instead of retaining him in some type of institution which meets the standard of humane yet effective penology.

Barnes and Teeters,[10] while recognizing that the new prison is superior to the old, believe that it still does not meet proper standards for handling criminals. No matter how attractive it is made, it is still a prison, and as such frustrates and defeats men rather than making for their reconstruction. It is the graveyard

[9] For an excellent account see VERNA CONNOLLY's "Those Vicious Kangaroo Courts." *Reader's Digest*, November, 1945 (condensed from *Collier's*).

[10] HARRY ELMER BARNES and NEGLEY K. TEETERS, *New Horizons in Criminology*, Parts VI and VII. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1944.

of ideals, they believe, not an institution which creates ideals. Its philosophy is based on fallacies, its officials are confused, its inmates are socially distorted. While a man is in its confines, he worries about his family and his former social relationships and the family also suffers from the stigma of having a member behind prison walls. When he leaves it, he is still an ex-convict with all the humiliation this label involves.

The new prison like the old is a source of contamination where the adverse effect of one prisoner on another is almost certain to exist. Like the old, it is characterized by "prison psychoses." Psychopathic or neurotic behavior is prevalent among an increasing number of inmates, many of whom should be in hospitals for the mentally ill.

Barnes and Teeters also condemn the new prison for the prevalence of sex perversion in it. They see no hope that this can be eliminated in such an unwholesome environment, where persons with normal sex interests are thrown in with perverts and the whole regime from the standpoint of normal sex behavior is cruel. The inmate-guard complex is also present in the new prisons and the old: a degree of social distance must be maintained and a degree of social authority, and the guard stands for this authority.

Although these two authors see no hope of their recommendations immediately being put into effect, they believe that the old-fashioned prison should be eliminated. They recommend that states build no more prisons of the present type. They believe society should shift emphasis in the direction of treating prisoners as sick persons to be placed in custodial care. This calls for the cottage system of houses, or industrial farms, and for the increased use of psychiatrists, psychologists, and physicians. It requires diagnostic techniques for classifying offenders, for housing under separate circumstances those with different degrees of criminal development, and for the permanent segregation, at least until the natural progress of aging eliminates the risk to society, of those who have proved themselves beyond reform.

Treatment of Criminals Outside of Prison

Knowing that prison is seldom a success as measured by reformation, the modern court has increasingly resorted to probation as a substitute for the prison sentence. Probation consists in per-

mitting the individual to serve out his sentence under supervision of a parole officer outside the prison. The officer presumably acts as a big brother supervising and correcting the individual during the period of his parole. The requirements of probation are established by the court. The offender must report to the officer regularly and give an account of his doings. The assumption behind this system is that it is much better for society to give a man this opportunity to adapt himself to normal living than to place upon him the stigma of prison experience and the more difficult problem of adjusting to society after he has returned a numbered man.

The system of parole is another form of out-of-prison treatment. It is used with the incomplete or the indeterminate sentence, the individual being placed out under the supervision of a parole officer before completing his time in prison. The assumption is that the individual, as he returns to society from the experience of prison, needs guidance and supervision, since on the outside he is likely to face attitudes of hostility and suspicion. It is assumed that the officer, acting as the sympathetic counselor, can help the convict obtain a job and reinstate himself in society. It has long been known that the readjustment of the person who comes out of prison into society is one of the most difficult of all social adjustments, so difficult that many lapse back into crime even in spite of supervision.

Parole, of course, differs from pardon in that the pardoned man has his entire sentence commuted. He is no longer responsible for it. The parolee actually is responsible for finishing the prison term under the supervision of the parole officer outside. If he violates parole, he may be immediately returned to prison without court procedure.

The extent to which probation is used for the first offender varies greatly from area to area. Barnes and Teeters have compiled data illustrating these marked variations. Some judges will immediately sentence to prison an immature defendant who should be on probation and at the same time release a hardened prisoner who makes a good impression on the court, or a woman with a very unfavorable record simply because she is a woman.

We should look forward to the speedy coming of the time when the probationary system will be preceded by diagnosis of the individual, his background, experiences, attitudes, associations,

group acceptance, and many other factors. It should be administered with the same dignity, carefulness, and wisdom as the hospital system and with the same aim; that is, to restore the pathological person to society well and ready to function in life situations.

USE OF PROBATION BY DIFFERENT FEDERAL COURTS [11]

Federal Court	*Percentage placed on probation*
Middle Pennsylvania	75.0
Massachusetts	70.5
Kansas	68.1
Eastern Wisconsin	65.5
Western Wisconsin	64.5
Eastern Tennessee	34.1
Northern West Virginia	16.5
Idaho	11.4
Northern Mississippi	10.8
Western Texas	8.6
Western Tennessee	5.8

The effectiveness of parole depends upon the intelligence and interests of the parole officers and the tolerance and understanding of family, employer, and community. It takes a wise and far-seeing man indeed to help the prisoner make the almost superhuman adjustment he faces in re-establishing relationships with his family, friends, neighborhood, and community and in rebuilding his connection with the work world as he again assumes a free man's responsibilities.

The indeterminate sentence, or indefinite sentence as it is more properly called, has been used increasingly and seems to be the best approach to the problem of early parole. This leaves it to the discretion of those who supervise the prison term to determine the length of prison experience necessary before the man seems ready for release under custody.

Scientific measurement offers opportunity for vast improvement in our parole system. Studies by Burgess,[12] Vold,[13] and

[11] BARNES and TEETERS, *op. cit.*, p. 385. Data adapted from *Federal Offenders*, 1941, pp. 32–33.

[12] *Parole and the Indeterminate Sentence*, Illinois State Board of Parole, 1928.

[13] GEORGE B. VOLD, *Prediction Methods and Parole*. Sociological Press, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1931.

others [14] indicate that various tests which take into account a man's background, the nature of his crime, the nature of his prison behavior, and other such factors, can provide a statistical basis on which chances for success or failure on parole can be more accurately determined. Although serious criticisms have been leveled at such tests on the ground of statistical difficulties, lack of exactness in predicting the behavior of any individual, and the difficulty of presuming that the future behavior of an individual will be a reflection of his past, the fact remains that development in this direction seems to hold greater promise than can be realized on the basis of a parole board's hunches.

Barnes and Teeters [15] predict that we shall gradually be obliged to work out a progressive system of penology outside the prison framework. We shall have to learn to deal with the delinquent and the criminal, not with crime. Those who cannot be corrected must be imprisoned but not punished. They must be permitted to live in humane quarters, made self-supporting and comfortable. Individualized study, training for correction, and the application of medicine, psychiatry, education, vocational guidance, recreation, and religious instruction, they believe are the road to reformation and rehabilitation; not punishment, isolation, social stigma, and humiliation. As long as the prison exists, they believe, the use of parole must continue and increase. In fact, they stress the idea that the prison program, from the day the convicted person enters, should be pointed toward his parole and prepare him for that experience.

In conclusion, for most successful control, crime must be attacked at its sources. At best, remaking criminals who are already in the throes of the law is a difficult and a somewhat discouraging process. Much more promising are those measures which destroy the breeding grounds of crime and that work constructively with those in the first stages of a criminal career. Even under the best designed system of social control and guidance, some will fail; but there is little doubt that greater attention to forces which create crime would be more suitable than the present emphasis on the criminal rather than on the social conditions and social processes which produce him.

[14] CLARK TIBBITS, "Success and Failure on Parole Can Be Predicted." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, May, 1931; ROBERT M. ALLEN, "A Review of Parole Prediction Literature." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, pp. 548–554, January–February, 1942.

[15] BARNES and TEETERS, *op. cit.*, p. 953 ff.

Much more important than the substitution of a corrective justice for a punitive justice are a new regard for law and the development of a socially oriented, rational, ethical system. The view has been stressed that the differences in attitudes of the law-abiding, so-called, and the criminal are minor indeed, that many of the most serious violations of law and of public trust are winked at because of the prestige and status of the guilty. A rational ethical system would begin by redefining criminal codes in terms of a more rational scheme of social values. It would reach its full development in an ethical education which would build in the citizen a regard for the rights and welfare of others.

Review

1. Contrast the relation of the culture pattern and the social structure to crime.
2. Are there any "born" criminals? What makes a person a criminal?
3. How do you explain the preponderance of youthful criminals?
4. How does Tannenbaum differentiate between the average citizen and the criminal?
5. How do the social processes which make the criminal compare to the social processes which make the good citizen?
6. Why is Cesare Lombroso's theory wrong as viewed in the light of present-day knowledge? Explain.
7. Compare organized crime and organized business. How are they alike and how do they differ?
8. What part does the character of the economic structure play in determining crime?
9. Differentiate between the professional and the non-professional criminal.
10. Refute the statement, "All criminals are feeble-minded."
11. What do professional criminals do once they are caught and sent to prison? How does this compare to the average man's idea that prison brings about repentance of the criminal?
12. What are the two educational roads to crime, as presented by Sutherland? Compare the two.
13. What are some of the white-collar crimes which are carried on in our society? Why are they important?
14. How do the folkways influence the prosecution of criminals?
15. Discuss the effect of status and prestige on likelihood of prosecution for law violation.
16. Why is it socially disastrous to treat the amateur and the professional criminal alike in our penal institutions?

17. Why is the view that "Institutions for juvenile detention and for criminals are schools of crime" justified?
18. In the physical sense modern prisons are better than the old institutions; in a social sense they are not. Explain.
19. What type of institutions do Barnes and Teeters recommend for replacement of prisons?
20. Do you feel that criminals should be handled as ill persons rather than as persons deserving punishment? Discuss.
21. What is the basic philosophy of both probation and parole?
22. Distinguish between probation, parole, and pardon.
23. What reforms are necessary in the present probationary system? How is it being abused today?
24. What relation has the indeterminate sentence to parole? How should the present parole methods be modified?
25. Discuss constructive measures in the field of crime control.

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CHAPTER 11

THE MAN OF DARK SKIN

THE SOCIAL STATUS of the man of dark skin who lives within the culture and social organization of the white man, is always in question. The essence of his problem is that his status is determined primarily by pigmentation rather than by personal worth; his acceptance is in terms of stereotypes into which his race is classified by the dominant white group. He has the alternative of accepting the low-caste status, confining his activities to the defined position of the inferior, and accepting the injustices of it as a matter of course, or of trying to fight against his defined place and work his way out of it to a position of personal acceptance within limited spheres of the white society. He may occupy positions anywhere between these two extremes. He can never be fully accepted in the white man's society no matter what his personal qualifications or achievements. Yet if he is intelligent and is sensitive to the white man's values, he can never be content to remain hedged in by the limitations of the society to which the stratification of the white man's world would confine him.

The eternal separation that a Negro feels in a white man's world and his ways of reacting to it are vividly described by the Negro writer Du Bois:[1]

> Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicville; or, do these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the

[1] W. E. B. DU BOIS, *The Souls of Black Folk*, pp. 1–3. A. C. McClurg and Company, Chicago, 1903.

real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word.

And yet, being a problem is a strange experience — peculiar even for one who has never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe. It is in the early days of rollicking boyhood that the revelation first bursts upon one, all in a day, as it were. I remember well when the shadow swept across me. I was a little thing, away up in the hills of New England, where the dark Housatonic winds between Housac and Taghkanic to the sea. In a wee wooden school-house, something put it into the boys' and girls' heads to buy gorgeous visiting-cards — ten cents a package — and exchange. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card — refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil. I had thereafter no desire to tear down that veil, to creep through; I held all beyond it in common contempt, and lived above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows. The sky was bluest when I could beat my mates at examination time, or beat them at a foot-race, or even beat their stringy heads. Alas, with the years all this fine contempt began to fade; for the worlds I longed for, and all their dazzling opportunities, were theirs, not mine. But they should not keep these prizes, I said; some, all, I would wrest from them. Just how I would do it, I could never decide; by reading law, by healing the sick, by telling the wonderful tales that swam in my head — some way. With other black boys, the strife was not so fiercely sunny: their youth shrank into tasteless sycophancy, or into silent hatred of the pale world about them and mocking distrust of everything white; or wasted itself in a bitter cry, Why did God make me an outcast and a stranger in mine own house? The shades of the prison-house closed round about us all: walls strait and stubborn to the whitest, but relentlessly narrow, tall, and unscalable to sons of night who must plod darkly on in resignation, or beat unavailing palms against the stone, or steadily, half hopelessly, watch the streak of blue above.

In a society of mixed races with a dominant one in control, it is almost inevitable that there will be either a universally accepted caste system which rigidly defines the obligations, privileges, attitudes, and behavior patterns of the so-called inferior races, or else there will be a constant attempt on the part of the race holding the inferior status to acquire the privileges, status,

and recognitions of the superior group. In America we have for a period of about two generations experienced both situations in regard to the Negro. Increasingly, however, his position has been that of struggling to achieve status in a white man's world rather than accepting the recognized systems of stratification and accommodation which prevailed in the deep South both before and after the Civil War.

Accommodation to Revolt

Often where races occupy the same territory, a system of accommodation is worked out which entirely eliminates conflict or threat of conflict and provides customary definitions concerning the way in which each race will be accepted by the other.

The Negro in the United States, being at the outset a slave, was easily relegated to a position of inferior status. He was a man with limited privileges and many obligations to the race in the superior position. In the relationship between the two, there easily grew up a system of accommodation which was quite as acceptable to the one as to the other. The master-slave status involved for the white many of the attitudes of ownership and property. It also involved on the part of the Negro an expectation of servitude which led to attitudes of deference toward the white and to the development of social amenities which defined all relationships between the two groups.

There was, therefore, in the days prior to the Civil War, no conflict between the races and little frustration on the part of individuals of the group with inferior status. A man bound to his place and trained for it, generally speaking accepts it. It is true that through Northern influence and the underground railroad before the war a few were encouraged to seek freedom. It is also true that some slave-owners were vicious in their treatment of their workers in much the same way as some farmers are inclined to mistreat livestock; but generally the system of accommodation was accepted and proved reasonably satisfactory to both groups.

After the Civil War the necessity for a new system of accommodation arose. The Negro had a new civil status, but the South immediately insisted on the restoration of most of the mores of the prewar period. The Negro remained inferior to the superior race. The relation between the two, the terms on which they

could meet, the attitudes they should maintain toward each other were rigidly defined. These definitions became so well established that in the old South today the Negro knows as well as the white man what is expected of him. The Negro as much expects to call his employer "boss" as the white man expects to be called

POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES: BY NATIVITY AND RACE
1940 AND 1930

A minus sign (−) denotes decrease

Race	1940		1930		Increase 1930 to 1940	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Amount	Per cent
All Classes	131,669,275	100.00	122,775,046	100.00	8,894,229	7.2
White	118,214,870	89.8	110,286,740	89.8	7,928,130	7.2
Native	106,795,732	81.1	96,303,335	78.4	10,492,397	10.9
Foreign-born	11,419,138	8.7	13,983,405	11.4	− 2,564,267	−18.3
Negro	12,865,518	9.8	11,891,143	9.7	974,375	8.2
Other races	588,887	0.44	597,163	0.48	−8,276	−1.4
Indian	333,969	0.25	332,397	0.27	1,572	0.5
Chinese	77,504	0.06	74,954	0.06	2,550	3.4
Japanese	126,947	0.09	138,834	0.11	−11,887	−8.6
Filipino	45,563	0.03	45,208	0.03	355	0.8
All other	4,904	0.01	5,770	0.01	−866	−15.0

In 1940 over 118 million of the total population of the United States was white, less than 14 million nonwhite. The Negro made up 9.8 per cent of the total population. Other nonwhite groups composed less than one per cent. During the 1930–1940 decade the Negro increased 8.2 per cent. The Indians, Chinese, and Filipinos increased somewhat, while other nonwhite peoples showed a slight decrease.

In 1940 only 11,500,000 persons were foreign-born whites, as compared with almost 14,000,000 a decade earlier. The foreign-born constituted 8.7 per cent of the white population in 1940, whereas they constituted 11.4 per cent a decade earlier.

boss. The Southern Negro, uninfluenced by Northern attitudes or by attitudes of the revolving members of his race, expects his boss to act like a boss. He expects the white man to maintain his superior social position just as much as the white man expects to retain it. In other words, in the deep South the system of accommodation which developed just after the Civil War is still in effect in large measure. There are few problems of race relations and few frustrations on the part of the typical Negro.

That such a set of relationships between human beings seems abnormal to Northerners and to those who live in other phases

NEGRO POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790–1940

Year	Number	Per cent of total population	Number of negroes per 1000 whites
1790	757,208	19.3	239
1800	1,002,037	18.9	233
1810	1,377,808	19.0	235
1820	1,771,656	18.4	225
1830	2,328,642	18.1	221
1840	2,873,648	16.8	202
1850	3,638,808	15.7	186
1860	4,441,830	14.1	165
1870	4,880,000	13.5	157
1880	6,580,793	13.1	152
1890	7,448,676	12.3	142
1900	8,833,994	11.6	132
1910	9,827,763	10.7	120
1920	10,463,131	9.9	111
1930	11,891,143	9.7	108
1940	12,865,518	9.8	109

The Negro population in the United States has increased from approximately 750,000 in 1790 to almost 13,000,000 in 1940. But the ratio of Negroes to whites has dropped from 239 per 1000 in 1790 to 109 per 1000 in 1940.

of American culture is quite beside the point. The fact remains that a workable system of accommodation is in effect, whatever one's views concerning its moral implications or its justice may be. It is virtually a caste system.

To understand the Negro problem in the United States today one must project against this background of accommodation the situation of an increasing proportion of the race who, because of their experience in the North and their reading of protest literature by both whites and Negroes, challenge the system. There is a growing leadership within the race, and there has always been among the whites in the North a large number who view the Negro as biologically equal. They believe that dark skin does not justify economic and social discrimination, that all barriers between the races should be removed, that a Negro should be accorded status on the basis of his character and his personal achievement and not on the basis of his pigmentation. They are not content to strive for those objectives within the North, where the Negro has been given access to certain privileges and a limited

NEGRO POPULATION BY STATES, AND PERCENTAGE OF STATE POPULATION THAT WAS NEGRO IN 1940

State	Negro population	Per cent of total state population	State	Negro population	Per cent of state total population
Southeast			Delaware	35,876	13.5
Virginia	661,449	24.7	Maryland	301,931	16.6
North Carolina	981,298	27.5	West Virginia	117,754	6.2
South Carolina	814,164	42.9	Middle States		
Georgia	1,084,927	34.7	Ohio	339,461	4.9
Florida	514,198	27.1	Indiana	121,916	3.6
Kentucky	214,031	7.5	Illinois	387,446	4.9
Tennessee	508,736	17.4	Michigan	208,345	4.0
Alabama	983,290	34.7	Wisconsin	12,158	0.4
Mississippi	1,074,578	49.2	Minnesota	9,928	0.4
Arkansas	482,578	24.8	Iowa	16,694	0.7
Louisiana	849,303	35.9	Missouri	244,386	6.5
Southwest			Northwest		
Texas	924,391	14.4	North Dakota	201	...
Oklahoma	168,849	7.2	South Dakota	474	0.1
New Mexico	4,672	0.9	Nebraska	14,171	1.1
Arizona	14,993	3.0	Kansas	65,138	3.6
Northeast			Montana	1,120	0.2
Maine	1,304	0.2	Idaho	595	0.1
New Hampshire	414	0.1	Wyoming	956	0.4
Vermont	384	0.1	Colorado	12,176	1.1
Massachusetts	55,391	1.3	Utah	1,235	0.2
Rhode Island	11,024	1.5	Far West		
Connecticut	32,992	1.9	Washington	7,424	0.4
New York	571,221	4.2	Oregon	2,565	0.2
New Jersey	226,973	5.5	Nevada	664	0.6
Pennsylvania	470,172	4.7	California	124,306	1.8

In Mississippi almost half (49.2 per cent) of the population is Negro, in South Carolina 42.9 per cent, in Alabama 34.7 per cent.

status, but they wish to project this pattern on the South also. As a consequence some Southern Negroes resent the existing system and Southern whites, on the other hand, resent outside pressures exerted to modify the prevailing pattern.

The Negro as a race, and many Negroes as individuals, in the North find themselves in No Man's Land for which no social definitions have yet been developed. He has found a place in the white man's industries and occupations, sometimes on a basis of equality but more often to do the inferior tasks at an inferior wage. He has penetrated the Northern cities but usually at the

cost of high rents, poor quarters, and a low level of living. He is accepted on a basis of equality in many Northern schools and universities; but when he has finished his education, he faces the inevitable alternative of serving the white race and having practically no patrons or of serving his own race and having no income. In his struggle for a new status, he finds himself frustrated at almost every point. He is a man who cannot accept the old status but who cannot be sure of a new one. And yet there is much evidence that this kind of struggle, which has gone on now for two generations, is actually bringing to the Negro an increasing number of privileges, a new level of living, and new opportunities to participate in some better elements of the white man's culture.


But even the Negro leader still must fight his way upward without any hope of acquiring the full status of the white man, economically or socially, and without ever realizing fully the psychological security possessed by the white man who knows that his achievements and successes will be honored and rewarded. In a certain sense, the greater the success of the Negro leader, the greater the measure of his frustration, if he measures his satisfaction by the degree of his acceptance in the white man's society.

Situations Which Redefine Race Relations

A system of racial accommodation persists except as it is challenged by revolutionary forces which disorganize the social structure of a given period or place. The first system of accommodation between Negro and white was destroyed by Emancipation; but the new system, of necessity more ruthless but clearly protective of the white man's status, was quickly evolved after the Civil War. We might say that the first system was destroyed by the intrusion of an outside group. The new is threatened from time to time by the same kind of intrusion. For example, various legislative measures have been introduced in the National Congress to try to make the ballot accessible to the Negro and to maintain non-discriminatory employment practices. These efforts are due to the fact that although the Civil War and the Reconstruction amendments (XIII–XV) to the Constitution gave the Negro a civil status, he has never been able to use it in the deep South because of grandfather clauses, poll taxes, the one-

party political system, and other effective devices for excluding him from the ballot.

More important, perhaps, than the attempts of the North to impose its attitudes of race relations upon the South, and to redefine the status of the Negro, has been the continuous migration



PER CENT OF NEGROES IN THE TOTAL POPULATION IN DIFFERENT REGIONS OF THE SOUTHEAST, 1930[1]

The "black belt" centers in the eleven southeastern states where cotton culture is dominant.

[1] From HOWARD W. ODUM, *Southern Regions in the United States.* University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.


of Southern Negroes to Northern cities during the past three decades. The Negro population of New York City increased from 90,000 in 1910 to 478,000 in 1940; in Chicago from about 40,000 to 281,000; in Philadelphia, from 80,000 to 252,000. This migrant group, in acquiring Northern attitudes and Northern privileges, is always a threat to the old system of accommodation. New ideas are acquired and introduced into the Southern culture by visits back home or by correspondence with relatives. By such informal means the attitudes of the mobile group infiltrate into the attitudes of the stable group and make them question their status.

Periods of social crisis, which open new occupational doors to the Negro and also provide new opportunities for mobility, hasten the process of revolt which challenges the system of racial accommodation. In World War I, when there was a shortage of manpower, Northern industry drew millions of Southern Negroes at high wages. In many cases a week's wages equaled a year's income in the South. Even with all the conditions of poverty and slum dwelling and with the threat of tuberculosis and venereal diseases, the Negro stayed in the North because he found life more satisfactory there. The migration northward continued between the World Wars, for once a new group is planted in the community, migration tends to continue from the previous environment as those in the new environment send back glowing accounts of opportunities and privileges.

World War II created the second great opportunity for escape by mass migration and for acquiring a new status and a measure of equality both in industry and in the Army. Nondiscriminatory employment practices were adopted and widely practiced. The cry of many Northern leaders was for complete equality of the races in the armed forces and in civilian life, the argument being that we could not ask a man to die for his country who did not have an equal stake in his nation's future and the privileges it offered the citizen. These attitudes led to further agitation in Congress for removing some of the more obvious handicaps, notably the poll tax, to the Negro as a citizen.

In the armed forces conflicting views prevailed. Odum in his *Rumors of Race* tells of Northern soldiers, sailors, aviators, and marines protesting discrimination against the Negro soldier and the Negro worker and arguing that they had little motive to fight for world freedom as long as America itself denied freedom to its racial minorities. At the same time the Southern soldier, sailor, and marine, imbued with the traditions of the deep South, argued that although he would gladly give his life for democracy, he did not want the precious heritage of the Southern way of life taken away from him during his absence. Negro youth themselves faced the difficult dilemma of either fighting for a democracy in which they had no equal share or else openly revolting against induction unless racial discriminations were outlawed.

In civilian life the war brought about extensive migration between all sections of the country and thus greatly multiplied contacts between the Southern Negro and the Northern white in



National Resources Planning Board[1]

NET MIGRATION, SINCE BIRTH, OF NATIVE NEGRO POPULATION, 1930

The dominant stream of Negro migration has been northward although the westward migration is substantial. The World War II migration to west coast cities was heavy as was also the migration from farms to southern industrial centers expanded by war industry. Migration helps minority groups break the fetters of caste.

[1] From *The Problems of a Changing Population*, p. 84; map copyrighted by C. W. Thornthwaite, in his *Internal Migration in the United States*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934.

the South. Millions of Northern soldiers and their wives and of Northern war workers and their families moved to the South during the period. Shocked and amazed at the relations between the races, which they had never understood and which many could not believe existed, they spoke freely of their attitudes to Southerners of both races. They tended to ignore the existing system and to accept the Negro in relationships contrary to the Southern mores. As a natural consequence of this fact and the vocal encouragement of the Administration in Washington and notably of Mrs. Roosevelt, the Southern Negro began to ignore the accommodative devices he had always regarded in dealing with Southern whites. He readily accepted the Northern white as an equal. This equality included the privileges of mistreating him, exploiting him, and ignoring the caste amenities, which he

dared not ignore in dealing with the Southern white. Northern Negroes stationed in the South, Southern Negro youth returning from army experience or from Northern industry expected to be treated as equals. Their attitude provoked the comment from antagonistic Southern whites, "These Negroes have been up North and come back, and they think they are as good as white."[2]

In many instances Negroes developed an exploitive attitude common to any group placed in a bargaining position. In certain communities, for example, they owned the only lawn mowers and other gardening tools; in many communities they were the only ones who possessed the skills involved in washing and ironing clothes. Thus they were able to demand and get exorbitant prices for services once rendered for a pittance. No doubt in the beginning they learned they could demand these prices by catering to Northern newcomers who were willing to pay well to get the job done, but soon they learned they could demand high prices from both Northerners and Southerners who had to have their services.

No less revolutionary to thinking on the race question than the effect of Northerners stationed in the South was the effect of Southerners being stationed in the North during the period of the war. Many a Southern youth obtained his first picture of a new kind of relationship between the Negro and white when he moved to an army camp or an industry in a Northern city. Here was a situation in which Negro and white worked side by side, participated in similar activities, rode the same trains, and sometimes entered the same eating places, motion picture theaters, and hotels. This was as much of a shock to accepted notions of propriety as was the role played by the Negro in the armed forces. While it is doubtful that many Southern young men and women completely revolutionized their ideas because of these experiences, they at least modified them. Some were even convinced that the Negro, if given an opportunity, is capable of doing many things which the Southern culture never considered him capable of doing.

The point of all these illustrations is that in a period of crisis when manpower is short, tools are scarce, mobility is extensive, and ideas are being exchanged between groups of different attitudes and different cultural backgrounds, established systems of

[2] HOWARD W. ODUM, *Race and Rumors of Race*, p. 91. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1943.

relationships are challenged and new definitions are in the making. After experiences of this character, it is impossible for groups to return completely to the old system of accommodation. There is always the revolting group which prefers the rebuffs, uncertainties, frustrations, hopes, and promises of new situations to the meager security of the old.

The struggle of the future will be for the Negro to maintain the status he acquired during the national crisis of World War II. He has taken many new steps forward. Must he go back, or can he retain them? If he does not retain them, many individuals and groups within the race are going to miss them and strive for them, and they are going to do so with increasing sympathy not only from Northern whites but from many leaders in the South.

It should not be implied from the above discussion that periods of crisis always liberate a minority race from its inferior status. World War II had exactly the opposite effect upon the Japanese-Americans. In their case it redefined race relations but did not improve them, for this group was robbed of the most vital privileges and rights of citizenship.

One hundred twenty thousand Japanese-Americans, most of them native-born citizens, were, under army command, uprooted from their homes and forced to move into barracks and to become wards of the government under strict prison-camp rule. They had to sell their property in haste and under disadvantageous conditions or turn it over to the custody of various branches of the government. They had to drop completely out of work life, lose all the advantages of good will built over a period of years in their business or profession, and be relatively idle during a period of high prices and prosperous industrial and agricultural activity. They had to live under crowded conditions in isolated, barren settings where they were given few opportunities for any kind of creative expression.

To argue that this action was a military necessity on the West Coast seems absurd in view of the fact that similar measures were not taken in Hawaii where the proportion of Japanese-Americans in the population was much higher and where military defenses were much more vulnerable. That race prejudice was a basic factor in the military decision is suggested by General De Witt's recommendation to the Secretary of War:

> In the war in which we are now engaged, racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy

race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become "Americanized," the racial strains are undiluted.[3]

That the Japanese group was any more dangerous than the German and Italian aliens in the country at the same time is doubtful. If the Japanese had not been a dark-skinned race, against whom business competitors on the West Coast harbored a great deal of prejudice, this violation of all the traditions of a democratic society would hardly have been tolerated by public opinion. Certainly never before in our history has a group suffered such discrimination and loss of status in the eyes of the law.

As a consequence of the war experience, the Japanese-Americans have been scattered over the nation. The 50 per cent who have returned to their former communities have in many instances suffered injustices in their efforts to reacquire property. In some localities they have even faced organized pressure-groups which have resisted their returning to their former communities. In the mind of the new generation, there cannot but be some question about their future acceptability and security as citizens of the nation.

The Conflict Fringe in Race Relations

Under a system of accommodation, conflict between the two races does not exist. It is true that the superior group may at times impose its will by force, as in the case of a lynching mob; but then the inferior race has no redress.

Conflict between races normally emerges within that fringe of relationships where the old system has been challenged and where the race in the inferior social position is claiming for itself new privileges which the race in the superior position refuses to give. In America the usual form has been race riots. The most serious came during World War I, when the Negro was first being admitted to urban industry on a large scale. These riots typically were in areas of Negro invasion or in areas where the old accommodations were breaking down. One should not assume, however, that race riots are entirely a phenomenon of wartime. There is always a possibility of them when Negroes invade

[3] EUGENE V. ROSTOW, "Our Worst Wartime Mistake." *Harper's Magazine*, 191:193–201, September, 1945.

a city through extensive migration and begin to take over the property of the whites in new areas, thus threatening the value of property.

At the basis of the race riot is usually a series of rumors which are without foundation. These rumors have one predominant characteristic: they are stories of atrocities committed by the inferior against the superior race. The rumors quickly pass from mouth to mouth on busses and street corners, in stores and factories. There are such rumors as that of a Negro stabbing a white bus driver because the latter would not let him on a crowded car. Others assert that all Negroes are carrying knives, razors, ice picks, or guns and are ready for an attack on the whites. The essence of the rumor is that the Negro is prepared to challenge the position of the white by force.

Johnson[4] has analyzed 111 racial incidents in the South during the year 1943 and listed factors involved in order of importance:

> (1) incidents growing out of new racial contacts in industrial employment; (2) incidents associated with congestion and racial etiquette in various modes of transportation; (3) incidents associated with crimes committed or suspected, and the police handling of these situations; (4) incidents involving conflicts between Negro service men and civilian or military police, or other civilians; (5) incidents involving Negro status, with respect to civil rights, racial etiquette, etc.; (6) other incidents, including attempts of Negroes to vote, migrate, move into a non-Negro area, challenge of white status, and lynching.

A brief statement of factors involved in the Detroit race riot of World War II illustrates the trivial nature of provoking causes and the play of rumor. The trouble probably started at the end of a particularly hot day.[5] Cars were lined up on their way back to town. It was a slow moving line, and many horns honked. Suddenly one driver saw a chance to get ahead, but was cut out by another driver trying to do the same thing. Fenders bumped. The second man happened to be a Negro. A fight ensued, and within a few minutes word went around among the Negroes that a white

[4] CHARLES S. JOHNSON, "Social Changes and Their Effects on Race Relations in the South." *Social Forces*, 23:343–348, March, 1945.

[5] W. N. ROBSON, "Open Letter on Race Hatred" (Radio document on the Detroit Race Riots). *Theatre Arts*, 28:537–540, September, 1944.

man had thrown a Negro woman and her baby over the bridge. The rumor from white sources was that a Negro had attacked a white woman. Soon the whole city was in an uproar. Neither whites nor Negroes were safe on the streets. The Army had to be called in to put down violence. Thus a race riot was started, not on the basis of truth but through a mere incident which caused rumors to circulate. Both Negro and white men's lives were in danger. The stage was set by the fact that Detroit drew her labor from among the poor whites of the South and Southern Negroes. There was constant friction between these groups because the whites had to work side by side with Negroes.

The terror that race rumor strikes to the heart of the whites is easily imagined from the following account of Labor Day rumors in South Carolina: [6]

> In South Carolina, it was rumored all around that Labor Day week end was the big week end for the long suspected race riot. It was reported that all the Negroes had bought all available ice picks, guns, knives, etc., and were armed, waiting for a signal. We were all made to stay home from Saturday afternoon until Tuesday morning — hoping for the best and expecting the worst. We live in the suburbs and had to be extra careful for we didn't have the protection of the city police. Several of our friends came at night to stay with us just in case anything happened. Saturday night we heard that eighteen white men had been killed and three military police wounded. Sunday night, it went around that a bus had been wrecked by a group of Negroes on a lonely highway and all the people had been slashed to bits. All this and more reached our terrified ears. Our loss of sleep was beyond possible imagination. But when Tuesday's dawn appeared and we were all still existing, we sighed deeply, and, after investigating the rumors of the previous days, we discovered none of them was true.

In areas of large Negro population, where accommodation has been maintained by a rigid system of stratification, the falling of barriers which keep the Negro "in his place" is a basis for fear and for hate. The breakdown of segregation in depots and common carriers under the heavy traffic of wartime and the movement of army troops; the entry of Negroes into new occupations and their success in them, with the resulting economic

[6] Reprinted from *Race and Rumors of Race* by HOWARD W. ODUM, by permission of the University of North Carolina Press. Copyright, 1943, by The University of North Carolina Press.

liberation and unionization; the loss of Negro help in subservient positions — domestic labor and sharecropping especially; migration away from the locality — itself often a form of protest and an expression of emancipation; the growing racial solidarity of the Negro, and the numerous expressions of disregard for the old status; the greater interest of the North in the welfare, health, and education of the Negro — all shake the old foundations. These developments would have come slowly through education and the economic progress of the nation as a unit, but under the impact of war they came quickly and unexpectedly. The old situation of accommodation will never be fully reinstated.

COMPARATIVE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NEGROES AND WHITES IN MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 1940[7]

Occupation	*Negro*	*White*
	Male	
Farmers, farm laborers and general laborers	62.2%	28.5%
Professional, managerial, clerical, and sales work	5 %	30 %
Skilled craftsmen	4.4%	15.6%
	Female	
Domestic and personal service occupations	70%	22%
Sales and clerical occupations	1%	33%
Agricultural occupations	16%	2%

Low occupational status is an integral part of racial discrimination. Manpower demands of World War II disturbed the customary occupational and wage arrangements. Negroes entered new occupations and advanced in them. The underpaid Negro domestic disappeared in war industry much to the dismay of the Southern household. Others were freed of domestic employment by the family allowance of the soldier. Negro agricultural workers also left the land where they have been virtually serfs for war industry.

Race Fictions and Race Equality

Our discussion thus far should make it clear that the problems the man of dark skin faces in the white man's world arise not from lack of mental ability or moral sense but from social standards, attitudes, and evaluations. Three decades ago when problems

[7] JULIUS A. THOMAS, "Wartime Changes in the Occupational Status of Negro Workers." *Occupations*, 23:402–405, 1945.

of immigration were consuming a great deal of attention in Congress, the question of the innate ability not only of racial groups but also of various nationality groups was a matter of national significance. At that time numerous tests were made of anthropological traits, intelligence, aptitudes, sensory acuity, and other characteristics of various groups. The conclusions to be deduced from all these investigations[8] are that there are no inferior races as far as inborn physical and mental abilities are concerned; that there is some evidence of racial differences; that neither the Negro nor any other race or nationality is inferior or superior on the score of its hereditary physical traits. From none of the vast series of studies has come any evidence to justify racial discrimination.

Anthropologists and sociologists now explain historical differences in racial achievement not by differences in innate ability but by differences in socio-cultural opportunity, in fact, by the chance accidents of history which place one race at the favorable points of contact and communication and in this way make it the bearer of the dominant civilization of a given time and place.[9]

Constructive Measures

The racial problem has not been handled rationally. If it had been, it would not now exist. Unquestionably it is one of those issues which are, as far as the majority of the population is concerned, still in the realm of the folkways and mores. Social policy has greatest difficulty in penetrating such spheres because they are fortified by emotional attitudes and prejudices passed from parent to child in the atmosphere of the family.

[8] For a sample of this literature see such works as CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK, *Intelligence and Immigration.* The Williams & Wilkins Company, 1926; E. B. REUTER, *The American Race Problem*, Chapter 4. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1927; R. M. BACHE, "Reaction Time with Reference to Race." *Psychological Review*, 2:475–486, 1895; S. J. HOLMES, "Will the Negro Survive in the North." *Science Monthly*, 27:557–561, 1928; R. B. BEAN, "Some Racial Peculiarities of the Negro Brain." *American Journal of Anatomy*, 5:352–433, 1906; F. BOAS, "Human Faculty as Determined by Race." *Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science*, 43:301–327, 1891; R. S. WOODWORTH, "Racial Differences in Mental Traits." *Science*, 31:171–186, 1910; OTTO KLINEBERG, *Race Differences.* Harper and Brothers, 1935.

[9] For samples of this newer approach see FRANK H. HANKINS, *The Racial Basis of Civilization.* Alfred A. Knopf, 1926; ROBERT H. LOWIE, *Culture and Ethnology*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929, and the excellent collection of articles in WILSON D. WALLIS and MALCOLM M. WILLEY, *Readings in Sociology*, Chapter IV (Readings 38 to 45). Alfred A. Knopf, 1930.

Actually, if we were to face the whole matter rationally, we would recognize that segregation is no answer to the problem, for it cannot but give a minority people a sense of being unwanted and thus destroy the sense of personal worth, frustrate ambition, and lead to defiance of social regulations. Indeed, it is amazing that delinquency and crime are not more common among these groups, that they do not more often resort to violence in protesting against job discrimination, name-calling, accusations of immorality, and the like. Any group, regardless of skin color, would find it hard to maintain morale under such circumstances.

It is not, however, merely the views of the dominant group that the Negro has to combat; he must also overcome the unfortunate results of certain experiences in his own past. The first of these was the almost complete destruction of Negro family life as a result of slavery. This matter has been studied by E. F. Frazier, whose monograph [10] covers a long period from ante bellum days to the present. He makes it clear that the family life of the Negro has never been reconstructed adequately since the Civil War. As a result, the family is still essentially matriarchal. The mother-child attachment is strong, but the husband-wife attachment is weak. The father has comparatively little sense of responsibility for either mother or offspring. The proportion of urban Negro wives working is very high. In large cities, the marriage rate among the women is low, the birthrate is lower than that of whites,[11] and childlessness is twice as common as among whites.[12]

A second obstacle that makes it difficult to alter the attitudes and behavior patterns of the Negro lies in the economic sphere: he has rarely had an opportunity to work and be paid on the same basis as the white man. Almost the only time he has had such a chance was during World War II, when there was legislation forbidding employment discrimination in industry on the basis of race, color, or creed. That achievement, however, was temporary. It was quickly lost at the close of the war through the

[10] E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, *The Negro Family in the United States.* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939.

[11] CLYDE V. KISER, "Birth Rates among Rural Migrants in Cities." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 26:369–381, October, 1938; LOUIS V. KENNEDY, *The Negro Peasant Turns Cityward.* Columbia University Press, New York, 1930; CLYDE V. KISER, *Sea Island to City.* Columbia University Press, New York, 1932.

[12] FRANK W. NOTESTEIN, "Differential Fertility in the East North Central States." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 16:184–185, April, 1938.

opposition of certain Southern Senators who were determined to return the Negro to "his place." And yet we must recognize that economic opportunity will play a large part in the solution of the Negro problem: it has much to do with diet, medical care, health, and energy output; it provides for a decent level of living; and it therefore affects status, recognition, and notions of personal worth.

Unfortunately it seems as though the time is far distant when the problem will be settled on the basis of fact rather than of prejudice. Yet we know it can be settled; for history has demonstrated again and again in the contest of races that a minor group, once given a chance, is capable of the same degree of achievement, morality, and self-esteem as the dominant group. The process of reconstruction may be slow, especially when there have been many years of subjugation; but it can be carried through.

In the meantime the great hope of racial minorities, and of all white citizens as well, lies in education. Education is the one device through which social climbing is achieved, through which the individual attains the skills, attitudes, and knowledge necessary for adjustment to privilege. Federal subsidy of education in poorer rural states of the South, which now have large Negro populations, is the most hopeful measure of social policy for providing the Negro a chance to climb. Unfortunately this measure also has been defeated by Southern congressmen, who are unwilling to see federal funds spent for the uplift of the poor whites if the uplift must apply equally to the Negro.

Recognizing that race and nationality conflict resides in attitudes and the system of values, Marcson [13] has developed an outline for an educational approach designed to appeal to other attitudes and values of democratic culture that would tend to counteract and break down ethnic prejudices. Although a few items relate to the war situation current at the time of its writing, and all the suggestions apply to the broader problem of ethnic conflict and not merely to groups with dark skin, the outline presents a sound and useful approach to the problem.

I. Value of Democracy
   (1) Ours is a democratic society with democratic ideals.
   (2) Ethnic conflict and prejudice are in basic disagree-

[13] SIMON MARCSON, "The Control of Ethnic Conflict." *Social Forces*, 24:161–165, December, 1945.

ment with our cultural ideals of freedom and equality which are the essence of our democracy.

II. Value of the Rights of the Individual
   (1) Respect for the other fellow is an inherent tenet of our society.
   (2) We feel shame when we violate the rights of others.
   (3) The dignity and worth of the individual are necessary bases for the development of human personality.
   (4) Ethnic conflict attacks the sacredness of human personality.

III. Value of Security
   (1) There should be shared security for all people.
   (2) Everyone has a right to a decent job.

IV. Value of Progressive Social and Individual Change
   (1) Understanding will bring change in attitudes.
   (2) Understanding the peoples of the United States prepares for understanding world peoples.
   (3) Insight into individual behavior helps each of us in reducing nonrational behavior.
   (4) Ethnic conflict is a curable disease.
   (5) The cure of ethnic conflict rests upon the implementation of the principles in the Declaration of Independence.
   (6) Sharing in common enterprises will reduce ethnic conflict.

V. Value of Cultural Diversity
   (1) There are significant values in diversity.
   (2) Diversity is stimulating; uniformity is dull.
   (3) Ethnic diversity is compatible with national unity.
   (4) There are many types of culture conflict in our society which are not due to ethnic diversity.
   (5) Differences of opinion are looked upon as healthy.

VI. Value of the Deviant Nature of Prejudice
   (1) Prejudice is abnormal, pathological; friction between groups is normal.
   (2) Prejudice is a social disease ever ready to destroy our society.

VII. Value of Common Humanity of all Ethnic Groups
   (1) Fundamentally all Americans are the same and want the same things but express themselves differently.
   (2) There should be recognition of similarity of abilities of all Americans since ethnic groups are to be found in all types of occupations and would be more evenly distributed if it were not for lack of opportunity.

VIII. Value of Deleterious Social Effects of Ethnic Conflict
- (1) Ethnic conflict provides enemy with propaganda weapon.
- (2) Ethnic conflict leads to civil strife and sabotages war effort.
- (3) Ethnic conflict affects the morale of the ethnic group as workers and soldiers.
- (4) Ethnic conflict affects the war front.
- (5) Ethnic conflict affects postwar reconstruction.

IX. Value of Inherent Traits of American Society which Aid in the Reduction of Ethnic Conflict
- (1) Americans are skeptics by nature and do not believe myths and rumors about ethnic groups.
- (2) In a society such as ours there must be cooperation and sympathy between groups.
- (3) American nationalism depends upon solidarity, belonging together, rather than upon homogeneity of descent.

X. Value of Inherent Traits of Ethnic Groups which Aid in the Reduction of Ethnic Conflict
- (1) Ethnic groups are assimilating.
- (2) Ethnic groups are intermarrying.
- (3) Ethnic groups want to assimilate and are not clannish.
- (4) Ethnic groups are one of many symbols singled out for aggression in our type of society, e.g., bankers, Catholics, unions.

That much can be made of an educational appeal which works through the underlying mores of democratic culture is suggested by Johnson in the following statement: [14]

> Much has been made of the fact that the southern cultural pattern is actually a caste system; and with respect to mental attitudes in the region on matters of race and the historical adjustment of the majority of Negroes, it has been substantially that. A true caste system, however, is based on the acceptance by each individual of his place in the system, which is rigid and not subject to change. This pattern is ruled out in the American South by the basic democratic philosophy of the American creed, to which the South as well as the North adheres in principle. This creed has power enough in the South to make it impossible to exclude the Negro altogether from opportunities for education and self-advancement. The inevitable result

[14] JOHNSON, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

has been that Negroes have become, on the one hand, increasingly aware of unfair and discriminatory treatment, and on the other, less well adapted to fit into the traditional "place." The new factors introduced by war conditions have created a situation favorable to and, indeed, requiring change, and a climate of public opinion in which the expression of protest is on the whole less dangerous.

Review

1. State the problem of the dark-skinned man in white society.
2. What is meant by a caste system? How may it be employed in race relations?
3. Define the terms "accommodation" and "conflict" and show how they apply to race relations.
4. Trace the history of race relations in the South, employing the above concepts.
5. Compare race relations in the North and in the South.
6. Summarize the population facts on race in the nation, in the states.
7. Explain the effect of crisis on race relations. Illustrate.
8. Discuss motivations and consequences of the Negro migration. Give facts on the direction and extent of movement.
9. Compare the effect of World War II on the Japanese and on the Negro.
10. Explain typical situations in which racial conflict usually arises.
11. Discuss rumor as a factor in race conflict.
12. Cite symptoms of the breakdown of a system of racial accommodation.
13. Are race differences an established fact? Racial biological inferiority?
14. What effect might racial discrimination be expected to have on personal behavior?
15. Compare a rational approach to the race problem with handling it through folkways and mores.
16. Present a scheme for improving the lot of the Negro in America.
17. Is there evidence of prospective improvement in opportunity for the Negro in the United States?

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
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PART III

THE FAMILY–SOCIAL SYSTEM OF OUR TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY



Treasury Department of the United States

Security Is the Tie that Binds



PART III

THE FAMILY–SOCIAL SYSTEM OF OUR TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY

IT MAY AS WELL be acknowledged at the outset: American life is no longer family-centered. Urban life is built about the individual, not the family unit. Its social life is for the pair, not the family. To find husband, wife, and children at a social gathering one must go to some remote rural area; urban society is stratified by age-groups.

In the long range of man's experience, children have been considered the natural fulfillment of marriage, barrenness a marital tragedy, to have one's quiver full of arrows a blessing. No longer is this true. Some marry with no intent of ever having children; and to have one, two, or three children at most, is the nearly universal upper limit of family aspiration.

In this new civilization which has come about with industrialization, birth control, and congested urban living, new forces impinge upon man, new values possess him. And yet he craves the intimacy, the emotional security, the deep inner satisfactions that come from an enduring marriage and a loyal family. Never was man more anxious to find supreme happiness in marriage and unity in the family group than in our mobile society where the roots of all emotional life have to be so frequently torn loose and transplanted into new soil; never more serious about retaining a trustful pair-relationship through which the fuller physical and spiritual life may issue forth; never more in danger of losing it when it has once been found.

Family and sex behavior have been delegated to custom. Its restrictive taboos have resided in the mores. Its secretive and sacred character has protected it from scientific inquiry and rational analysis until very recently. Even venereal disease, with all its threat of contamination, only lately could be mentioned in respectable literature. The greatest hindrance to its complete elimination has been the taboo of secrecy which has hindered

public education and enlightenment. Sex education is still questioned in a society which trusts every other phase of teaching to formal education.

The family must be subjected to rigorous critical analysis and its trends and weaknesses be understood. Its institutional functions are often found incompatible with individualistic aims of its members. It, therefore, involves in quandaries man and wife, parents and children, adolescents and youth, and even the aged, who once could expect to find security and usefulness in the homes of their children.

CHAPTER 12

INSTITUTIONAL TO COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY

The Historical Transition

THE AMERICAN FAMILY of today has its roots in the father-dominated family of previous generations. In the father-dominated family it was expected that the wife would be subservient to her husband and that the children would honor and obey their parents. The father's discipline was designed to protect his authority and was assumed to be for the good of the child. But the institution came first; the individual was secondary.

The family had as its major objectives (1) the rearing of offspring and the perpetuation of the line of ancestry, and (2) the acquisition of common property. These institutional objectives were held not only by the individual family but by society also, and the biological and economic success of the family unit determined its status in the community. Such criteria, rather than individual happiness, the fulfillment of a romance, and similar transitory values, predominated.

In contrast, the modern family, sometimes called the individualistic family, the democratic family, or more recently the companionship family,[1] has entirely different objectives. There is still evidence that the companionship family has its roots in the earlier institutional family, but the main objective, clearly and frankly, of the companionship family is individual well-being. The traditional institutional objectives are secondary. The family must first and above all produce for the husband and wife happiness and personal satisfaction. The maintenance of authority for authority's sake or for the prestige of the father, no longer has any place in its liberal thought. Children are optional. Many couples frankly feel that they can realize the fulfillment

[1] E. W. BURGESS and HARVEY J. LOCKE, *The Family, from Institution to Companionship*. American Book Company, New York, 1945.

of marriage without parenthood, and they believe that society has no stake in their family behavior. Persons who deliberately choose marriage without parenthood feel no regret in their failure to participate in the future by leaving a line of descendants.

Almost entirely absent from our society are the ideas of early cultures which severely condemned the sterile wife. Similarly, the measurement of a couple's success in marriage by their acquisition of tangible property, real estate, and common economic goods is almost entirely gone. The modern family is not an economic institution in the old sense. Both members may work and may even have their separate bank accounts, but their standard of living is in no sense dependent on the property they own or on the amount of money they have saved, but on ready cash to be used for current expenditures.

In this new family, relationships between members are measured not by the degree to which the father succeeds in expressing his demands or in commanding subservience and obedience, but rather by a harmonious companionship of husband and wife and, where there are children, of parents and children. The ideal is a democratic social unit in which all members will feel free to express themselves and in which all will participate in making decisions that involve the good of the entire unit. It is from these characteristics that the contemporary family, best represented in urban society, has drawn the labels "democratic family" and "companionship family." It is from these characteristics plus the idea that each human being has a right to develop himself fully, regardless of social obligations, that the modern family has obtained the label "individualistic family."

Under this modern philosophy, which denies the older idea of responsibilities to the family institution for its own sake, each individual has a right to realize his fullest possible development in any group. If the marriage relationship can be shown to be frustrating to the individual personality of either husband or wife, this in many states is grounds for divorce. The fact that this is true is an indication that the public, to some extent at least, is tolerant of the view that every individual has a right to the fullest possible self-expression regardless of contractual obligations such as marriage vows.

Even the authority of parents over children, when it is shown that it is destructive of the children's personal interest, is superseded by that of the state. There is a limit to which parental

authority can be exercised. Our society is not primarily interested in protecting it or in guarding the interests of the institutional family, but rather in the welfare of children. It holds that every child has rights that are superior to the authority of parents. If worst comes to worst the state can protect these rights even at the cost of removing parental authority. This is in direct contrast to the situation in earlier societies, in which the father could without social interference put a child to death for gross forms of disobedience. The very foundations of the modern family are, in marked degree, different from those even of the pioneer family of three generations ago. In too much of our discussion we are inclined to overlook these basic facts, paying attention rather to the incidental and more superficial manifestations of marriage problems and family relationships.

The Romantic Courtship

The modern companionship family is prefaced by a kind of social experience that is unique in the field of mate selection. In all historical societies the selection of a mate has been institutionalized and carefully protected. Seldom has choice been left entirely in the hands of the individual. The parents, the maternal uncle, professional matchmakers, or some other designated adult or group of adults who were presumed to have sufficient experience on which to base a reasonable judgment selected a mate for young people and arranged for the ceremony. It was not unusual for couples to meet for the first time on their wedding night.

Societies have often surrounded marriage with a great number of restrictions, and the limits within which the matchmakers worked were correspondingly restricted. Custom might require that marriage be by arrangement within a certain kinship group. In such case, taboos barred anyone outside the prescribed group from being considered as a prospective mate. In the making of a match little if any thought was given to considering whether the young couple would be fascinated by each other. Adults making the arrangements knew that marriage was much more than a romantic venture. They were concerned about economic matters, about the kind of relationships that would exist between the two families involved. In many cases marriages were arranged primarily to establish a close tie between two families, tribes, or groups. Among monarchs marriage served to cement

relationships between kingdoms. Matchmaking often had to consider dowries or other financial aids designed to benefit the parents of the bride or groom, depending upon the customs of the times.

Clearly in none of the above arrangements, which have prevailed through much of history, was the marriage primarily designed for the happiness of the individuals immediately concerned. It apparently never occurred to anyone that the happiness of the couple should be an important consideration. The new couple had a job to do — bearing offspring and taking their place in the community — and they had reached the age when they should shoulder their responsibilities like men or women.

Compared with this philosophy of mate selection, the modern romantic pattern, which has reached its full development in American society, seems unique indeed, for here the wishes of the couple involved is all that matters. The selection of the mate is left entirely to the choice of youth. A courtship is carried on with little or no supervision of elders. The objective of the courtship and of the subsequent marriage is individual happiness.

Courtship begins in "dating," which has come to be considered a pleasant and thrilling pastime by which one gains social status if he dates the right person and through which he seeks enjoyment by association with the opposite sex. The behavior of the dating period is by no means well institutionalized. Behavior during this period may range all the way from carefully restrained association to sexual exploits. It is assumed that through dating a young person will gradually, as maturity increases, become acquainted with someone who so captures his or her romantic fancy that continuous companionship is inevitable. At this stage the desire of each to possess the other becomes so consuming that engagement is the natural consequence.

Engagement, the promise to marry, leads to a further exploration of the couple's interests, ambitions, and life purposes. With this more intimate revelation of each self to the other may come a break in the engagement. The couple may find, and does so in perhaps 50 per cent of the cases, that they cannot stand the prospect of living intimately together, that their previous idea of compatibility was wrong. If, however, this more intimate level of association proves satisfactory, marriage is the natural outcome.

Clearly, a marriage entered into with this kind of background is of a different nature from a marriage planned by adults who

have decided that a couple are suited to marry and should do so in the interest of progeny, family prestige, and economic self-sufficiency.

The Romantic Marriage

Our ideal of marriage is possibly best expressed in a trite but still popular phrase, "They married and lived happily ever after." Rightly or wrongly, the romantic family puts only one test on marriage, the test of the happiness of the two people concerned. There may be children, but this is not enough. The family may acquire property, own land or other real estate, but this is not enough. The family may have the respect of neighbors and have an influential place in the community, but this is not enough. The romantic marriage must bring to the couple involved the satisfaction of supreme happiness. It can have everything else and fail, and conversely it can fall short of all the standards of the institutional family and succeed. It can fail to acquire property, it can live without offspring, it can lack respect for the community; and yet be extremely successful.

"An insane conception of marriage," our ancestors would have said. Many Europeans would say that today. Certainly the average Oriental would pronounce it the height of folly. The fact remains that this is the standard by which the romantic marriage is judged. This is the marriage which we in America idealize and which we depict in fiction, in the motion picture, and on the stage. It is the marriage of which every young woman dreams and which every young man takes for granted. Its ideals are seldom actually realized and yet even those who have failed feel that it nevertheless should and can be realized.

Is it then to be classed with the great illusions of humankind? Probably not. While human happiness is a difficult thing to measure, it is possible that successful American marriages based on this philosophy realize more in the way of personal happiness and individual self-development than marriages based on a philosophy of the family as an institution.

Weaknesses of the Companionship Family

On the other hand we must admit that the companionship family falls short on many counts. It is highly unstable. Divorce rates are appalling. It does not guarantee security to wife, hus-

band, or child, for it is based on the whims and fancies of a person interested primarily in his own emotional satisfaction rather than in meeting the obligations of matrimony or of parenthood.

Never have human beings sought more of marriage than they do in the United States today. Never have so many failed to find anything in it but bitter disappointment, disillusionment, defeat, almost despair. Never have children so much craved emotional security and stable parenthood, the warm comfort of parental loyalty, maternal devotion. Never have so many been thrown entirely out of the family situation and suffered from the fact that parents forget the obligation they have acquired in parenthood because their romantic whims go off in the quest of another mate or because they find the load too burdensome and throw it overboard. Rarely has the sense of parental obligation been so weak.

Divorce after divorce ignores the rights of children, the parent contending by his action that he has the right to seek his own emotional-personal satisfaction regardless of their welfare. Never have so many family conflicts risen to make the child the victim of parents' quarrelings. In numerous cases he is the pawn in the conflict between parents who, in vindicating their own wrongs and injustices, ignore the irreparable injustices they inflict upon their child. Seldom is there a divorce case in which parents are primarily interested in the disposition of the children or in their welfare. They are interested in how their own emotional lives can be satisfied, how their own welfare can be protected.

Psychological Contradictions of the Romantic Marriage

In the college classroom the romantic conception of marriage as practiced in America, as idealized in romantic fiction, and as portrayed so beautifully on the motion picture screen but so poorly in the lives of those who play the parts has long been questioned. It is questioned because students of marriage know that its goals are rarely possible of attainment. They call it the "romantic fallacy" because the cold hard facts are that the rapturous attachment advocated and realized by some during the illusory stage of courtship, cannot survive the prosaic realities of day to day married living.

The important psychological difficulty of the romantic marriage is that it proceeds through a series of steps leading ultimately

to complete emotional involvement which reduces to a subsidiary position all life goals that have been built into the personality organization from birth to maturity. When illusory elements of the involvement evaporate in the close daily contacts of married life and of conjugal love, the long-established personality goals of both husband and wife reassert themselves. If the love relationship prior to marriage has ignored basic differences and incompatibility in life organization and personality goals, they become a threat to emotional involvement itself and, in fact, may readily convert it to antagonism.

In cases where life interests, personality goals, and general cultural and social backgrounds are compatible, the tempered romantic involvement of marriage brings them more into prominence. The couple then through a series of adjustments build marriage about their common goals, enterprises, and interests. The marriage is re-established on an essentially non-romantic foundation, institutionalized and stabilized, with emotional involvement lending an important but perhaps not the most important bond.

The intensities of love which youth have been taught to seek in courtship cannot be made the sole basis for mate selection if marriage is to be successful. Such ethereal bliss has no power to sweep away the prosaic realities of money, temperament, family histories, relatives, social position, interests, cultural backgrounds, ideals, and moral standards which become matters of first importance in adjusting to marriage and in managing a family. It is too much to expect the motion picture producers to discount their most marketable product, romantic love, but perhaps it is not unreasonable to expect them to present the stark realities of divorce which is an inherent part of this conception of marriage.

The romantic marriage, with its primary bond of affection and its ideal goal a supreme happiness in mate and children, so often falls short of reaching its goal that one is compelled to ask why. The main reason is that the highly individualized personalities of husband and wife often make family goals irreconcilable with personal goals. As a consequence the psychological process of ambivalence (a psychological mechanism involving the fluctuating balance between attraction and repulsion, love and hatred) which characterizes many intimate inter-person relations, is prominent in the romantic marriage.

In the traditional family system a woman's life was built about the idea of being a helpmate to her husband. She shielded him from the world, carried the major burden of rearing the child, contributed through her social activities and family management to his social status in the community. Most of her roles were designed to contribute to his feeling of importance. Quite different is the philosophy of the individualistic woman in the companionship marriage. Even in submitting to the role of motherhood, the wife is likely to feel a certain antagonism toward the relative freedom of the husband. In many cases in having a child she is yielding to the husband's desires for a family; in others she may blame him for an unwanted pregnancy. He goes on about his work, developing his own interests, without being confined to the obligatory routine of caring for the young child. At the same time, he has comparatively little sympathy with her frustrated ambitions for career fulfillment, a goal which she, under our educational and economic system, has been conditioned to seek almost as strongly as he. It is inevitable that her identification of the husband with some of these problems of frustration will produce antagonistic attitudes in husband and wife relations. In many cases these attitudes become expressed in overt conflict.

Nevertheless the husband still expects many of the emotional responses, worshipful attitudes, and submissive "clinging vine" reactions from a wife that were characteristic of the traditional family. Paul Popenoe,[2] Director of the Institute of Family Relations in Los Angeles, has pointed out that the husbands of the more educated classes want wives who will bolster their egos. They therefore marry below themselves in education, leaving the highly educated professional women to hope in vain for a mate of equal training. The educated husband wants to find in the home a place of emotional shelter and appreciative security from the storm of a competitive business world. The educated wife, frustrated in her own ambitions, is often incapable of giving these peculiarly feminine responses which men find in courtship but miss in marriage.

Terman's study, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*,[3] shows that the husband's most frequent source of serious complaint is lack of affection on the part of the wife. The husbands studied

[2] PAUL POPENOE, "Where Are the Marriageable Men?" *Social Forces*, 14:257–262, December, 1935.

[3] Terman's data on this point are presented in Chapter 18.

listed this item first among thirty-five grievances. To those who understand the romantic basis of mate selection in our culture, with its emphasis on love as the goal for personal fulfillment in marriage, this certainly would seem a surprising situation. Yet when one analyzes it in the terms of the competing life goals of women stressed by our culture, it seems inevitable.

The romantic marriage philosophy has exacted a severe penalty for many well-educated young people, especially young women, who feel that they cannot marry except for love. They often face two alternatives, marrying someone far below them in social and economic status, life goals, and personality development, or living as spinsters. Neither provides a satisfactory out.[4]

Apparently it is psychologically impossible for many well-educated women to fall in love with anyone their equal in educational development. If they follow the romantic impulse, they are forced to marry someone who represents the simple socio-cultural level of their own childhood. Were it not for our exaggerated concepts of the necessity of romance for success in marriage, undoubtedly many of these intelligent women could marry and would marry someone of equal personality development, interest, and goals. Marriage could be made on a purely rational basis and would undoubtedly, in more than the average number of cases, realize as much romance as marriages entered into because of romantic involvement.

In making intense romantic involvement the only proper road to marriage we have probably done damage to a great number who could find a more satisfactory method by some other route. Such views are heresy in a movie-minded culture pattern which makes romance the only basis for mate selection. Yet we undoubtedly will be driven more and more in the direction of employing rational tools in mate selection which will concern themselves much more with the roots of the personality in terms of previous socio-cultural experience, life organization, life goals, and other such factors, than with romance itself. We will do so not to eliminate romance from marriage but to provide a practical situation in which romance of a realistic and lasting character is made possible. The marriage fitness test, the premarital conference, courses in marriage and family problems, education for parenthood, these and other measures of intelligent direction now

[4] For various aspects of the single woman's problem see RUTH REED, *The Single Woman*. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1942.

being employed, are all designed to discount falling in love (romance) as the sole criterion for mate selection.

The Child in the Companionship Family

This has been called the century of the child. The phrase implies that the welfare of children has occupied a major place in social policy. It has not only been the century of the child, however, but also the century of adolescence and youth. Child study and adolescence study have been among the most popular educational activities in the college curriculum and in adult education. More recently interest has been extended to another group, the youth group, which first was recognized as having rights and interests apart from adults during the depression decade of the 1930's.

This interest in children, adolescents, and youth is more than an academic one. It is society's recognition that the growing human being has a right to be surrounded by conditions of development which will bring him into a physically healthy, socially adjusted, mentally well-equipped adulthood. In part this new emphasis is a recognition that the human being is more than a biological creature, that his social and mental development are major concerns; in part it is an application of our democratic philosophy to the family situation, a progressive interest in extending the rights and liberties of a democratic society to all age groups.

The companionship family has applied its philosophy of individual rights to the handling of the children in the home. The school has applied it to the treatment of the children in the school. The system of jurisprudence and law enforcement has applied it to the handling of juvenile delinquents. The view that delinquency and crime are due to innate factors within the individual and that they are to be eliminated by violent treatment in the form of punishment and torture, has given way to the view that every individual expresses the kind of training and supervision he has been given. In the school the popular adage, "Spare the rod and spoil the child," is no longer accepted, nor is it accepted in the home.

In the companionship family the idea of equality of all age groups is accepted as an ideal, although rarely fully practiced. It is assumed that every individual, to the extent his age, experi-

ence, and wisdom permits, should share in making the decisions of the family, and should, in so far as he is capable, choose his course of conduct. The idea has gained considerable vogue that a person develops character, judgment, initiative, and personal strength only to the extent that he is allowed to make decisions, to carry responsibility, and to select his course of action.

An authoritarian discipline has no place in this family philosophy for it can do no good except to satisfy the person exercising it. A person is not made better by punishment; he is made better only by learning to do the better thing. The entire emphasis of social control in the family has been shifted from the negative "do not" emphasis to the emphasis on the "things we do."

From arbitrary commands, emphasis has shifted to explaining why this or that kind of behavior is better. As children become adolescents and adolescents youth, they are permitted greater freedom of decision and by this means are gradually prepared for the transition to adulthood in a society which leaves many things for the individual to decide for himself.[5]

Women in the Companionship Family

Travelers in foreign lands, especially in the Orient and even in Europe, often comment on America as a "woman's paradise," recognizing that seldom in human experience have women been given such full power of decision, such complete freedom from the obligations of marriage and parenthood, such a range of economic and occupational activity.

A woman need not marry to escape social stigma; she may achieve much greater distinction through a career. When she marries, she need not sacrifice her economic future or even her career unless she chooses to do so. Even when she chooses to do so, she is not completely subservient to the will of her husband or bound by life-long obligation to her children.

It is hard for the average American to realize that the franchise was first given women in this century, that only a generation ago the masses thought that a woman's place was in the home, that not until World War I did women find their way into any number of industries and not until World War II were they recognized

[5] Discipline and other aspects of child training in the companionship family are discussed at length in Chapter 15.

as man's equal in most fields of production. Less than a hundred years ago co-education began. Only recently has the intelligence testing movement ceased trying to prove the inferiority of women.

The economic freedom of women and the romantic conception of marriage give her a liberty almost equal to that of man within marriage itself. It is true that the double standard still prevails to an extent, as far as sex morality is concerned, and probably always will because of the more intimate role that women play in reproduction. It is also true that in many states a double standard prevails in regard to property rights. But generally speaking women have as great freedom in marriage as men.

Actually, almost two-thirds of the divorces are granted to women. This is often because the man is the offender, but the fact is that women do have a sympathetic hearing from the divorce court. After the divorce the woman is more likely to be burdened with children, but she is more likely to have alimony. In case of divorce a man is more likely to have an opportunity to remarry and is less likely to suffer from economic handicaps. In case of the break of the family by death the woman has less likelihood of a chance to remarry favorably because romance in our society places value on youth and also because men are less ready to marry a widow with children than are women to marry a man left with children.

Our society still has not succeeded in freeing the average wife from the almost constant care of the infant. Nurseries and nursery schools have done something in this direction but as yet the subservience of the woman to the helplessness of the young child is a major problem of motherhood and one which the husband does not, in the vital sense, share.

Man's Place in the Companionship Family

Volumes have been written about women's rights. Men's rights are taken for granted and seldom discussed.

The man's role in the companionship family parallels that of the historic family more closely than that of women and children. In the great majority of cases he is still the primary breadwinner. Society in a vague way expects him to be the head of the household and to assume major responsibility. It is true that there is a lot of patriarchal carry-over in this philosophy, but it seems to survive, nonetheless. It is also expected that the

new family will be built more fully about his personality and interest than those of the wife. He, in fact, sets the pace for the new family, and the wife adjusts to it.[6]

The male's loyalty and devotion in the romantic marriage are supposed to be confined to the spouse much more than in the patriarchal family of other days. Concubinage has disappeared from those parts of the world where the individualistic family has developed. Socially sanctioned prostitution has also been outlawed; the male, with his presumed polygamous tendencies must be satisfied with his spouse or else be extremely secretive in his exploitations. The family is built on mutual trust, loyalty, and emotional solidarity; it has no reason for existence when disloyalty occurs. Rationalizations justifying prostitution as a necessary concession to the male's weakness or strength have entirely disappeared. There is no more excusing the husband's disloyalty than the wife's; the ideal is a single standard of morality. Rigid limits are placed upon the traditional liberties and prerogatives of the male.

In the institutionalized family the social order, and especially the family, was made to suit the male. The behavior and activities of women were largely dictated by his desires and interests. The idea of the average woman's being free to pursue her own interests and inclinations in work, sex, and recreation had little place in its philosophy. In certain situations the male still suffers from carry-overs of that day when women were not considered man's equal. His chivalry is readily exploited, with the result that such notions of chivalry as may remain disappear when he faces highly competitive urban situations where the new female type is dominant. Gallantry requires a certain amount of passive reticence on the part of the female; the male loses it quickly if he stands by at the bus and sees women elbow their way in. He soon learns that the gallant man will stand a long time on the street corner.

Even in the matter of courtship, the increasing aggressiveness of the female requires less gallantry on the part of the male. Women do not want men to be gallant. That this has cost the male considerable in terms of prestige and self-satisfaction cannot be questioned. If one analyzes gallantry historically, he will find that man has gotten a great deal in return for it. It is

[6] So E. W. BURGESS and L. S. COTTRELL report in *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, p. 349. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1939.

perhaps for this reason that women are not willing to pay the price. They know they cannot have gallantry and equality. They prefer equality. Yet even in the companionship marriage women seem to cherish a longing for the gallantry of an earlier day. Terman finds selfishness and inconsiderateness first in a list of thirty-five of the most serious grievances married women hold against their husbands.[7]

In conclusion: this chapter has presented a brief perspective of the emerging companionship family based on the romantic marriage which is replacing the institutional family in the United States. The one was rooted in patriarchal tradition and oriented about institutional forms, the other is democratic and oriented about individualistic values. From this discussion it is obvious that conflicting elements of the two systems express themselves in contemporary marriage and family relationships. Only in isolated mountain areas does the typical institutional family persist. Only in apartment areas of the great metropolis where the companionship marriage, entered into without any idea of children, in reality not a family but simply a marriage, does one find the extreme type of husband and wife companionship. The new problems of the American family grow in part out of the clash of the old values with the new, but more particularly out of the fundamental weaknesses of the romantic companionship-family type. In later chapters many of these conflicts and problems as they affect various age groups within the family and as they affect relationships between husbands and wives, parents and children, will be analyzed more fully.

Review

1. What were the major objectives of the institutional family?
2. How do the objectives of the companionship family compare with those of the institutional family?
3. Describe the democratic family in regard to family relationships, economic ties, and ideologies.
4. In the institutionalized form of mate selection, what considerations predominated?
5. What is the basis of mate selection in the companionship family?
6. Describe the steps in courtship which consummate in marriage.
7. What test of success is applied to marriage?

[7] Data are presented in Chapter 18, p. 356.

8. What are some of the predominant weaknesses of the companionship family? What cost does the child bear?
9. Discuss the "romantic fallacy."
10. Point out the basic psychological difficulty of the romantic marriage.
11. What qualities should one seek in a mate for a lasting marriage?
12. Why do so many of our romantic marriages fail, even with ideal goals?
13. How has the role of the woman changed from the traditional institutionalized family to the modern companionship family?
14. Why do men tend to marry below themselves in educational achievement? What problems does a woman of high educational attainment present to a man in marriage?
15. Can you explain the husbands' complaint of lack of affection on the part of the wife?
16. How does the romantic ideal in marriage frustrate many an educated young woman? In what way could this be remedied?
17. Why have we begun to be more interested in the welfare of children and youth groups?
18. What part does the child take in the modern democratic family? How do this role and participation prepare him for adult life?
19. What change has been made in disciplinary action in the modern individualistic family?
20. What new freedoms have been allotted to women in the companionship family?
21. Why are divorces granted to women so much oftener than to men?
22. How have man's roles been affected in the change from institutional to companionship family?
23. What part does emotional loyalty play in the companionship family?
24. What does "equality" mean to man and wife? How has this single standard changed in the attitudes of couples who participate in the companionship family?
25. How has the traditional role of the gallant male been modified? Why?

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CHAPTER 13

THE SMALL FAMILY PATTERN OF THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY

The Low Birth Rate of Western Society

THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY must be evaluated not only in terms of the personal happiness it brings the individual but also in terms of general social well-being. The interests of the individual are not always compatible with those of the larger social group, the state.


The companionship family has come increasingly to stress individual welfare and personal happiness to the neglect of major social objectives. With the rising standard of living there has come about a competition between offspring and desire for status gained through a high standard of living. Throughout the Western world the long-time trend of the birth rate has been downward. Anxiety on the part of the Western nations concerning their future has led to serious concern about this tendency.

The United States has not yet suffered so much from the declining birth rate as have European nations, notably France and Belgium, but it is at the point where there will soon be a stationary population and, in a generation or two, a declining population; this, in spite of the fact that the death rate has fallen to a new low level.

The same nations which have seen a shift to the small-family pattern and the declining birth rate have experienced a striking differential birth rate between the social classes. This has the effect of placing the major part of the new generation in homes least privileged from the standpoint of economic goods, health, medical care, education, and general conditions affecting nurture and self-development. This situation is vital in democratic society, which believes in individualism and stresses the right of every child to be born into conditions which offer him greatest prospects for nurture and development.

The Small Family Pattern and the Trend of the Birth Rate

The size of family through three generations is shown in the accompanying chart, which compares the grandparent, parent, and the child generations. Almost every college student can trace a similar trend in the history of his own family. It is estimated[1]



Based on data in Ruth O. Truex, "The Size of Family in Three Generations," American Sociological Review, 1:581–591 (data from p. 587), August, 1936

CHANGES IN THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN NATIVE-BORN AMERICAN FAMILIES FOR THREE GENERATIONS

The birth rate cannot continue to fall indefinitely without deaths exceeding births.

that the average American mother in Revolutionary War times bore her husband eight or nine children. In the generation which recently completed child bearing, the average wife produced only 2.9 children. Urban wives bore an average of 2.5 children; rural nonfarm wives, an average of 3; and farm wives, an average of 4.[2]

The trend of the national birth rate is a direct reflection of a change in the reproduction behavior of the family. The effect on the nation's birth rate is clearly shown in the next chart, which traces the trend of the birth rate from 1871 to 1945. It will be seen that the birth rate has dropped from 37 per thousand in 1871–1875 to a low point of 16.6 in 1933. It recovered somewhat during the later depression, and with war prosperity and


[1] ALFRED LOTKA, cited in *Problems of a Changing Population*, p. 18. National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D.C., 1938.

[2] "Women Classified by Number of Children Ever Born, 1940." *Population — Special Reports*, Table 3, Series P-44, No. 2, U.S. Census, February 10, 1944.

the psychological pressures of war it boomed to a new high level in 1943 which was equal to that of the early 1920's but lower than that for any prior years. It is expected that the immediate postwar period will see a high rate, after which there will undoubtedly be a gradual decline to prewar levels.

Children Needed to Replace Population

At present death rates to replace the population and maintain it stationary without emigration and immigration requires an average of 2.6 children per family for all marriages and about 3.3 for marriages which have children. Among women who have passed child-bearing age, however, 14.7 per cent have produced no children. Among urban wives the proportion sterile is 16.9; among rural nonfarm wives, 13.9; among rural farm wives, 8.8 per cent.[3] While some of this sterility is voluntary, a certain percentage is involuntary. The present generation must average about three children per family for its marriages that are fertile. Is there any prospect that this level will be realized?




THE TREND OF THE BIRTH RATE, UNITED STATES, 1871–1945

The birth rate has fallen from 37 per 1000 in 1871 to under 20 per 1000 for most years since 1928.

[3] *Ibid.*, Table 2.

This question has been studied considerably, but primarily among the youth generation during the late 1930's. Whether these data are indicative of the war generation is not known. There is little likelihood that there has been a marked change, however. These studies show clearly that the average youth considers two children the ideal size of the family. Comparatively few want more and comparatively few want none. Results for a sample of more than 11,000 youth in the state of Maryland are shown in the accompanying pictographic chart.[4] Apparently the American family will do well to replace population, to say nothing of increasing it to any great extent. How serious any variation from the standards given will be to national population growth can only be approximated.



Bell, "Youth Tell Their Story"

EACH COMPLETE FIGURE REPRESENTS 4% OF EACH SEX GROUP WHO WANTED SPECIFIED NUMBER OF CHILDREN

NUMBER OF CHILDREN 11,707 MARYLAND YOUTH DESIRED

Small families will be in the majority if youth realize their ideal size of family. Few will have three or four children, the required number for replacement. Almost half of both sexes consider two the ideal number of children, and 10 per cent of males and 8 per cent of females want none at all. If one adds all those wanting two or less children, the group totals almost two-thirds of all youth.

[4] Other studies presenting data on this point are W. S. BERNARD, "Student Attitudes on Marriage and the Family." *American Sociological Review*, 3:354–361, June, 1938; and M. M. WILLEY and STUART A. RICE, "College Men and the Birth Rate." *Journal of Heredity*, 17:11–12, 1926.

A simple device for indicating replacement rates now employed by the census staff and other population authorities is the reproduction index (also referred to frequently as the replacement index). It shows the increase or decrease a given group of people would have within a generation if birth and death rates were to continue as of the time when the index was calculated. The accompanying table shows the situation for two census periods for the total population and for urban and rural areas. The calculations for the year 1940 were made after the low depression birth rate had been corrected and before the boom in war births which reached its peak in 1943 and 1944; it may therefore approximate actual conditions as well as they can be approximated on the basis of recent birth and death rate data.

NET REPRODUCTION RATES BY URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1940 AND 1930 [5]

	1940	*1930*
Necessary for Replacement	100	100
Total U.S.	96	111
Urban	74	88
Rural Nonfarm	114	132
Rural Farm	144	159

It will readily be seen that 1940 reproduction rates were four points short of replacement for the nation. The net reproduction rate for urban areas in 1940 (places of 2500 and above) indicates a potential decline of 26 persons per hundred. At the other extreme was the rural farm population (those living on farms), which in 1940 had a net reproduction rate of 144. The rural nonfarm group (those living in places of less than 2500 people and those in the open country not on farms) fell between with a net reproduction rate of 114 in 1940.

Thompson has calculated the replacement index for several cities for 1940. Of this group of cities, he found that San Francisco has an index of only 55, Washington, D.C. of 56, New York of 65, New Orleans of 69. [6]

[5] U.S. Census, *Population*, Series P-5, No. 13, Aug. 23, 1941. (1940 data are estimates based on a preliminary tabulation of a 5 per cent cross section of the 1940 census returns.)

[6] WARREN S. THOMPSON, *Plenty of People*, Fig. 5, p. 34. The Jaques Cattell Press, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1944.

The relatively high birth rate of the war years brought the reproduction index for the nation up to the point of replacement. This rate may be sustained for a short period after the war, as the lag in births due to delayed marriages of members of the armed forces and in delayed births due to the absence of married men from their homes, is corrected. After that population authorities are of the opinion that the long-time downward trend will reassert itself.

Social Position of the Family and the Birth Rate

Some large groups in our population are reproducing so rapidly and others so slowly that the surviving children of a million women in some groups will be twice as numerous as in others. If these differences should run through three or more generations, the descendants of the first group would be 16 times as numerous as those of the second group.[7] An early student of population and eugenics once estimated that in two thousand years one thousand Harvard graduates would have fifty descendants; and one thousand Rumanian immigrants to the United States would have one hundred thousand descendants, if each group continued to reproduce at their current rates.[8]

Human motives are vitally affected by conditions of living, by position in the socio-economic scale, by religion, and by the prevailing system of social values. So far as we know, the trend of the national birth rate is in no way related to a change in the fecundity of man, that is, his biological capacity to reproduce. In comparing the differential fertility (rate of reproduction) of social classes, in the following pages, it is assumed that we are comparing different kinds of behavior patterns, different systems of values, and different life objectives rather than differences in capacities to reproduce offspring.

The average woman today, as in previous generations, is capable of producing ten to fifteen children during her fertile lifetime. In a society where practically no women reach this capacity, in fact, where even the most prolific rarely have more than a half dozen children, differences in fertility are most certainly a reflection of social values rather than of biological fac-

[7] FRANK LORIMER and FREDERICK OSBORN, *Dynamics of Population*, p. 340. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934.

[8] Credited to Sir Francis Galton by Frank Hankins in DAVIS, BARNES, and others, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 716. D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1931.

tors. What, briefly, are the facts with respect to reproduction tendencies for various economic, social, educational, and religious groups?

Economic Status and the Birth Rate

A number of recent studies prove beyond doubt that those with more comfortable economic status fail to reproduce themselves to the extent that less favored economic classes do. There is considerable irony in this situation. Presumably if both had the

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME AND POPULATION REPLACEMENT IN THE URBAN POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Income Classes	*Reproduction Index*
Necessary for Replacement	100
All incomes	70
$3000 and over	42
2000–2999	55
1500–1999	63
1000–1499	75
Under 1000	96

After Karpinos and Kiser, Milbank Memorial Fund

Data show the reproduction index of various income classes as shown by the National Health Survey of 1935. Observe that those in the upper income brackets bear less than half enough children to replace themselves.

same general system of values, those with most economic goods would have most children, whereas those pinched by poverty would limit their offspring to the number they could readily provide for. In a society with a high standard of living, however, exactly the opposite behavior is manifest: those with least capacity to support a large family have the large family.

A series of data comparing the reproduction index of various income levels, is presented above to demonstrate the truth of these assertions for the United States. Similar conditions exist in all Western societies and have for more than half a century, perhaps much longer.[9] It will be seen that those on the higher levels of income have fewest children, those of the lower levels the most children. The index for those with $3000 income or more was


[9] Sir Arthur Newsholme and T. H. C. Stevenson (data by Bertillion), "The Decline in Human Fertility as Shown by Corrected Birth Rates." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 69:66, March, 1906.

42, or 58 points below replacement; that for those with less than $1000 income was 96, or 4 points below replacement. Many series of data show comparable results.[10]

Occupation and Birth Rate

The differential birth rate is clearly reflected in the standards of value and reproductive behavior of different occupational groups. The accompanying chart shows that those in the most highly competitive and most intellectual occupations produce fewest offspring; observe the relatively low birth rate of the professional group. At the other extreme, those classes which represent on the average the lowest rate of intelligence and least selectivity on the basis of ability have the higher birth rates.

That occupation is related to differences in ability in a competitive society, has been demonstrated again and again. Terman's



Adapted from Lorimer and Osborn, "Dynamics of Population," p. 75

ESTIMATED NET REPRODUCTION RATES FOR BROAD OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES

It will be seen that only the laboring and agricultural classes had a reproduction index sufficient for replacement. Professional and business classes fell far below a replacement level.

[10] The Milbank Memorial Fund has analyzed several series of data along the lines of data shown in the chart. Their studies appear in the *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*. Philip M. Hauser used rental value of housing as a basis for comparing birth rates of economic groups in Chicago. Some of his data appear in *The Problems of a Changing Population*, pp. 139–140. National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D.C., 1938. For a summary of several studies see PAUL H. LANDIS, *Population Problems*, Chapter 7. American Book Company, New York, 1943.

famous *Genetic Study of Genius* [11] cites many examples. He found that of 560 children of genius-mentality, professional parents (the most educated group) contributed 1003 per cent of their normal quota; the public-service group (public officials, postmen, military men, etc.), 137 per cent: the commercial group, 128 per cent; but the poorly educated industrial group, only 35 per cent.

Education and the Birth Rate

Education is also directly related to the birth rate. Clyde V. Kiser and P. K. Whelpton,[12] studying Indianapolis wives from forty to forty-four years of age, women whose families were practically complete, counted the number of live births per one hundred wives according to the educational attainment of the wife, with the following significant results:

Education of wives	*Live births per 100 wives*
College (4 or more years)	156
High School (4 years)	165
Eighth grade Education	260
Seventh grade Education	353
Less than Seventh grade Education	430

These figures show that the college-trained averaged only about one and a half live births per couple; the high school trained, only a fraction more. The eighth grade trained averaged more than two and a half live births; the seventh grader, three and a half; and those with less than seven grades of schooling, four and a third babies each.


Is Indianapolis typical? Karpinos and Kiser, who have studied a large sample of American cities, found that couples with some college training had a reproduction index of only 52; an index of 100 is necessary for population replacement. This indicates that couples with college experience — many had not finished the course — were 48 points below the level required for population replacement. The high school group had a reproduction index of only 68, the seventh and eighth grade groups of 86, those with less than a seventh grade education of 97. Other

[11] Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, California, 1926.

[12] "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*," 21:221–280, July, 1943. See also an article on the same topic in the *Quarterly* 22:22–105, January, 1944.

studies of the Milbank Memorial Fund show similar results for large cities. (See pictographic chart below.)

All these studies leave out the rural population, which has for some twenty years provided the population increase of the



EDUCATION LOWERS THE BIRTH RATE [13]

Data are for large American cities. Those with a seventh-grade education come nearest replacing themselves. The college group produces little more than half enough children for replacement. The high-school trained group also produces few children.

nation. Undoubtedly the same situation prevails in the rural areas except that the birth rate of all educational classes is higher.

The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, drawing on census data, has compiled statistics [14] that use as a measure of the relationship between education and the birth rate the number of children under five years of age per thousand wives. In relat-

[13] Chart from Landis, *Adolescence and Youth*, McGraw-Hill Book Company. Based on data from B. D. Karpinos and C. V. Kiser, "The Differential Fertility and Potential Rates of Growth of Various Income and Educational Classes of Urban Populations of the United States." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 17:357–391, October, 1939.

[14] *Statistical Bulletin*. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 26:6–7, November, 1945.

CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OLD PER 1000 WIVES [15] ACCORDING TO EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF HUSBAND AND WIFE; UNITED STATES, 1940, URBAN AND RURAL

Maximum Years of School Completed by Husband	Maximum Years of School Completed by Wife					
	Grade School			High School		College
	Under 5 [16]	5–6	7–8	1–3	4	1 or more
	Total United States					
Grade school: under 5 [16]	720	735	641	535	379	278
5–6	740	645	613	573	478	383
7–8	628	614	544	503	438	357
High School: 1–3	564	548	499	459	386	389
4	428	495	459	421	344	336
College: 1 or more	448	599	431	387	350	309
	Urban					
Grade school: under 5 [16]	586	592	508	464	297	189
5–6	553	535	508	507	407	296
7–8	535	521	468	445	382	279
High school: 1–3	435	462	446	416	344	377
4	366	424	417	384	318	307
College: 1 or more	370	424	376	352	329	292
	Rural Non-Farm					
Grade school: under 5 [16]	724	727	682	556	456	384
5–6	721	662	635	600	499	383
7–8	675	636	577	538	466	358
High school: 1–3	697	603	529	502	432	378
4	504	578	496	469	369	349
College: 1 or more	400	509	553	423	394	336
	Rural Farm					
Grade school: under 5 [16]	820	832	737	634	513	568
5–6	884	737	715	649	589	485
7–8	713	722	649	604	529	453
High school: 1–3	612	637	627	566	483	405
4	657	626	574	544	467	461
College: 1 or more.....	503	1,099	556	550	472	428


Courtesy of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. "Statistical Bulletin," p. 7, November, 1945.

[15] Native white women of ages 15 to 49 married once and living with husband. The rates were standardized for age on the basis of the age distribution of the total female population at ages 15 to 49 in the United States, 1940. Source for basic rates: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Population, Differential Fertility, 1940 and 1910 — Women by Number of Children Under 5 Years Old*, Washington, D.C., 1945, Table 30.

[16] Includes cases where schooling was not reported.

ing educational attainment of husband and wife to the birth rates of all residential groups, they find a striking relationship among rural groups as well as urban groups. The data also show that the wife's education is more significant than the husband's in determining the birth rate. Results for the nation are shown in the table.

It is significant that the rural birth rate for all levels of education is far higher than that of urban areas. The college group in rural areas exceed the births of the high school group in urban areas. In order to bring out the more striking comparisons of this table the chart is also presented to show the various groups for selected levels of educational achievement.



Children Under 5 Years of Age per 1000 Wives 15 to 49 Years of Age by Educational Attainment of Husband and Wife; United States, 1940, by Place of Residence

Education affects the regional birth rate within the nation. In the South, where more than half of the people have less than an eighth grade education and where almost a fourth have spent less than five years in school, the birth rate was high enough in 1940 to give a replacement index of 111. In the West, where the mid-point in schooling is between one and two years of high school and where only 8 per cent of the population has completed less than five years of school, the reproduction index was only 95.

The low birth rate of the better educated is of concern not only from the standpoint of numbers but also from that of quality. Although it is certain that the educated have no monopoly on the hereditary genes that produce genius, there is evidence that they have more than a normal share of them in our competitive society where intelligence is a factor in success.[17]

The relationship between education and the birth rate reflects the essentially different values that the educational classes place on children and reproduction. The educated group is more likely to delay marriage. An early student of population estimated that a marriage at 18 will produce twice as many children as one at 28.[18] Actually the effect of age of marriage on the birth rate depends considerably upon the social class involved. Professional classes marrying young will produce fewer children in the earlier years of marriage than if they marry later, and will have a total of fewer children than women of little education marrying young.

Differences in education also reflect differences in standards of living demanded by various social groups. The more educated person is likely to demand for himself a higher standard of living and therefore to sublimate his desire to have children to his desire for a respectable and even comfortable level of living. In general the more educated sense most keenly the inevitable competition between the level of living and offspring in our society. They realize more than others that a person cannot put a limited income both into his standard of living and into children. They are more likely to sense the competition which exists in our kind of society between privilege and offspring, between fur coats, automobiles, and country club memberships and hospital bills for babies; and to choose the former.

That this is more than a theoretical problem is suggested by

[17] Refer again to the Terman data, *loc. cit.*

[18] Cited by Frank Hankins in DAVIS, BARNES and others, *op. cit.* p. 351.

the following example. Two couples beginning their married lives take two different routes. The one couple immediately begins a family, having a child every year or two. The other puts five hundred dollars in the bank each year for savings. From the outset the latter build up their capital and begin to derive an income from their investment; within five years they will have $2500 in the bank, plus whatever interest may have accumulated. The other couple has three children but no accumulated capital and may be carrying a burden of debt, especially if there have been unexpected doctor bills. All the time the couple without children has enjoyed a higher level of living, a better diet, and a more respectable social status. The uneducated is likely to ignore these basic facts. The educated can hardly overlook them for he recognizes that they are realities of a competitive, urban, industrial economic order.

THE COST OF REARING A CHILD TO 18 YEARS OF AGE AT TWO INCOME LEVELS

	Family of $2500 Income	*Family of $5000 to $10,000 Income*
Cost of Being Born	$ 300	$ 750
Food	2,272	3,628
Clothing	710	1,697
Shelter	2,648	5,774
Education	82	283
Medical Care	297	846
Transportation and Recreation	1,127	2,787
Sundries	327	572
	$7,763	$16,337

Statistical Bulletin, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 25:9, January, 1944

Child rearing is expensive in urban industrial society. But why do those least able to bear the cost have most children? This is a dilemma of western society.

The following account of a young wife's arguments, or rationalizations, as one chooses to label them, have been duplicated by thousands of educated couples.

> I am a young woman twenty-six years of age, . . . and my husband is . . . one year my senior. We have been married for a year and a half. . . . For five years I have been teaching English in a large city high school. My husband teaches science in a private school. My salary is about $3000

a year. Because of longer training and consequently shorter term of service my husband receives approximately $2500. Our combined resources allow us an interesting life in accordance with our tastes. But can we have a baby?

I figure that I must stop teaching — at any rate for a year. Then there can be no certainty of any future plans to return. This will reduce our income from approximately $5500 to the neighborhood of $2500. A luxury we should never consent to relinquish is expert medical attention. My friends who have babies in the style in which I should wish to have mine tell me that the baby proper costs $1000 including specialist, hospital, and nurse for one month, but excluding any subsequent medical attention, the expenses entailed in an even slightly larger establishment, a competent child's nurse provided I return to teaching, and a hundred et ceteras. Do a bit of mental arithmetic and discover why we gasp to think of the idea.[19]

We may call this young woman selfish and shortsighted. We may say she should not have children and argue that it is no concern to society. We may, on the other hand, view the situation as indicative of a social condition which bars those most capable of rearing families from that privilege. Whatever our views or prejudices, the situation is realistic and all too typical of our culture. It is so fundamental to the future of the birth rate and to the quality of the next generation as measured by privilege and nurture than an intelligent society can no longer afford to disregard it. Developments needed to correct this situation are discussed in a later chapter.

Religion and the Birth Rate

Ask almost any man on the street and he will tell you that the Catholic birth rate is higher than the Protestant. He bases his opinion either on observation of the reproductive behavior of his neighbors or on the assumption that the Catholic group's disapproval of birth control by artificial means naturally leads to a higher birth rate.

Studies of a large population group by the Milbank Memorial Fund give authoritative information that the birth rate of the Catholic family is highest, that of the Protestant family next, and that of the Jewish family lowest.

[19] JANE SHEPPARD HOLBIN, "Shall We Have a Child?" *Survey Midmonthly*, LVII, No. 5, December 1, 1926.

A study [20] based on data for 6551 native-white married couples in Indianapolis who had passed the childbearing period, showed that 100 Catholic marriages averaged 274 births, 100 Protestant marriages 219, and 100 mixed Catholic-Protestant marriages only 206. Another study [21] of 41,498 native-white couples in the same city compares the fertility of wives in the three religious groups of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. In this case, fertility was not complete but the wives were standardized for age. Data are therefore comparable. The average number of children born to 100 wives of all religious groups in this sample was 149. Where both members of the family were Protestant, the number per 100 wives was 147; where both were Catholic, 173; where the marriage was mixed Catholic-Protestant, 133; and where both were Jewish, 110. As can readily be seen, the Catholic group was the most fertile and the Jewish group the least fertile. It is interesting to note that Protestant-Catholic mixed marriages produced fewer children than either Catholic or Protestant marriages.

Comparisons of Catholic and Protestant birth rates by occupation [22] show that whereas the more successful professional and business groups have small families, the Protestant family of the more favored occupational classes is on the average smaller than the Catholic family of comparable classes. The unskilled laborers have large families among both religious groups, but the Protestant are smaller than the Catholic families.

It is estimated on the basis of the above findings that Catholic couples are 18 per cent more fertile than Protestant couples; that Protestant-Catholic marriages are 10 per cent less fertile than Protestant unions; and that Jewish marriages are 25 per cent less fertile than Protestant marriages.


Taking into account economic factors, if one isolates the lowest income group of Protestants and Catholics, there are practically no differences in birth rate. In the more favored economic classes, however, the Protestant birth rate drops very rapidly.

[20] CLYDE V. KISER and P. K. WHELPTON, "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility." *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 22:22–105, January, 1944. Milbank Memorial Fund, New York.

[21] CLYDE V. KISER and P. K. WHELPTON, "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility." *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 21:221–280, July, 1943. Milbank Memorial Fund, New York.

[22] FRANK W. NOTESTEIN, "Class Differences in Fertility." *The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, 188:32–33, November, 1936.

The Catholic birth rate also drops considerably below that of Catholics with a low income but drops much less than the Protestant rate.



Notestein, op. cit., and Milbank Memorial Fund

THE FERTILITY OF PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS OF SIMILAR BROAD OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES

The Catholic families in all occupational classes have more large families and fewer small families.

This same trend is true when one takes account of the factor of education. Among both Catholics and Protestants, the more education the couple has the lower is their birth rate; but at all educational levels the Protestant falls below the Catholic rate.

It is significant that during recent decades the Catholic birth rate has fallen more rapidly than the Protestant. Stouffer's study [23] of Catholic and non-Catholic groups in urban centers of Wisconsin dealt with more than 40,766 couples married between the years 1919 and 1930. The groups were standardized for age and occupational class, and their fertility rates studied to December 31, 1933. Catholic fertility rates remained considerably higher than the Protestant rates, but during the period of study the Catholic rates declined more rapidly than those of non-Catholics. Applying the same procedures to national census data for large cities, he found that cities with a high percentage of Catholics in the population showed a greater decline in the birth

[23] SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, "Trends in Fertility of Catholics and Non-Catholics." *American Journal of Sociology*, 41:143–166, September, 1935.

rate than did non-Catholic cities. He concludes, therefore, that the trends discovered in Wisconsin cities probably are general, at least throughout northern and western cities of the United States.

Whether this fact points to a time when the two rates will be equalized is not known. It seems likely that they will not be equalized soon since the Catholic position on birth control by contraceptive means is still much more strict than that of most Protestant bodies. So long as the Catholic church continues to emphasize this traditional position and to maintain its principles, which are opposed to the use of artificial means for birth control, it is most probable that the Catholic rate will considerably exceed that of Protestants and Jews.

Perhaps much more significant than the effect of different religious beliefs on the reproductive behavior of families as shown in the preceding paragraph is the general effect of secularization itself on the total birth rate. Although one cannot measure the influence, there is little doubt that the decline in religion has been a factor in the spread of birth control practice, the alarming rise in abortion rates, the weakening of family bonds as exhibited in the divorce rate, the growing selfishness of some couples who find no room for children in their marriage, and other attitudes and practices affecting fertility. Religion to the extent that it stresses duty, self-sacrifice, unselfishness, and other values is favorable to family and offspring. As these values weaken, the change is reflected in family reproductive behavior.

Nation and Family

This chapter has called attention to some basic facts about family behavior as they affect (1) national growth and (2) the growth of particular groups. Common to both is a peculiar set of values inherent in the kind of society we have developed and the kind of family pattern which has become customary.

Presumably man is capable of achieving almost any population goal he sets for himself. Control of numbers of domesticated animals is readily achieved on a nationwide scale by policies and prices. Control of wild life through game management has reached the level of a practical administrative science. But in these spheres one is not dealing with the motives of the breeds that are being manipulated. In the control of human populations one must operate almost entirely in this field.

To bring about an upward trend in the birth rate and a change in the differential birth rate would require radical modification in family and personal values. Whether our society chooses to develop the propaganda devices and social pressures that would make larger families popular is questionable. Dictators tried it prior to World War II and with comparatively little success. It seems more likely that American policy will take the direction of increasing the welfare of children rather than of increasing the birth rate as such. The differential rate will probably be corrected not by the upper classes substantially increasing their birth rate but by the less successful, less educated classes reducing their birth rate. The relatively high rate of the lower classes will fall rapidly. If there is to be an increase in the rate at all, it will have to come among those more privileged groups which have already adopted the small family pattern.

The practice of birth control by artificial devices has now become the general method of limiting size of family. A generation ago it was relatively uncommon. World War I brought the subject to the attention of large groups of people. Within more recent years it has been widely discussed in popular as well as technical periodicals and books but from the legal point of view it properly remains a matter for private medical consultation with the individual's own physician.

It is sometimes assumed that adequate family income would solve all the problems associated with the birth rate. It would solve many, perhaps most, of the problems associated with child nurture and development by assuring medical care, proper nutrition, and educational opportunity —three essentials that should be the birthright of every American child. But adequate family income will not solve the problem of a low birth rate. Throughout the industrialized world, as we have said before, those with more adequate incomes have the lowest birth rates; those with the lowest incomes, the highest birth rate. The dual problems of raising the birth rate and correcting the differential birth rate involve motivations of the family that are as deep seated as the values of civilization itself.

In a later chapter we shall consider attempts of modern governments in this sphere and possible measures our nation may take when family behavior here comes to be considered a threat to national survival as it already has been considered in several nations of western Europe.

Review

1. Discuss the effect of the modern marriage-family philosophy on the trend of the birth rate.
2. Trace the trend in size of family in the United States.
3. How many children per family are needed to replace the present population and maintain a stationary population? Is this goal likely to be realized? Explain.
4. Which group has the higher birth rate, rural or urban?
5. Discuss the net reproduction rate of various residential groups in the population.
6. To what may the falling birth rate be attributed? Does biological capacity have any relation to the lowering birth rate?
7. What relation exists between the standard of living and the birth rate? Why is this socially undesirable?
8. How does occupational status affect the birth rate? Is this differential significant from the eugenic standpoint? Discuss.
9. What influence does the parents' amount of education have on the number of children they will bear? Cite data from various studies.
10. From the standpoint of quality, which group in our population contributes the largest number of the most intelligent children?
11. Compare the net reproduction indexes of regions.
12. What relationship is there between a high standard of living and the number of children a couple decides to have? Present facts to prove your answer.
13. In general, what religious denomination has the highest birth rate? Which has the lowest?
14. Compare Protestant and Catholic birth rates by economic status; by educational attainment.
15. What effect has the secularization of our culture had on the birth rate?
16. How will the differential birth rate in America probably be corrected?

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CHAPTER 14

SEX IN THE ROMANTIC FAMILY SOCIAL SYSTEM

THE ROMANTIC FAMILY frankly recognizes the biological basis for marriage. Sex is treated candidly rather than prudishly. The traditional family system took it for granted as a means for siring the race; the romantic family system speaks much of it as a source of well-being and of romantic fulfillment. On some social levels the traditional system was less concerned about chastity than fecundity. It was not always too serious if a woman demonstrated her fecundity by pregnancy previous to marriage. The romantic philosophy does not regard pregnancy as so supremely desirable.

Until recently in our society sex activity has been surrounded by inhibitions and by notions of uncleanness; it has been considered a concession to the male's vulgar nature. In the romantic marriage, wherein it is sought for its own satisfaction, it has become the center of the cult of beauty, physical attraction, and the other myths that give romance its ethereal quality in the companionship-family social system. Although there is some persistence of the old attitudes, they have lost much of their force and are no longer the source of fear that they once were. At worst they are, not infrequently, the basis of conflict between the older and younger generations.

With the growth of cities and the rapid mobility of the population, society has almost lost control over the relations of men and women. Sex behavior tends to become a matter of personal choice restricted by whatever personal morality the individual himself possesses rather than by fear of social censure. This has tended to lower the level of moral practice, but the morality that exists is of much higher character than that of the primary group which forces people to be good by constant surveillance. The new morality is based on the development of personal ethics, whereas the older was based on social compulsion.

No doubt many people in primary-group situations would be

moral if placed in other situations, but the majority of them have never had to think through the problems of morality or decide moral issues for themselves. Morality has been so clearly defined and so well enforced by the group itself that the individual has felt no occasion to face responsibility for moral decision as he must in secondary-group society.

War and the Sex Problem

War, by isolating the sexes, hinders the normal association of youth in pair situations which satisfy the biological urge of sex through customary channels. The blocking of this means of expression intensifies desire and provides the biological and psychological impulses which cause the sex urge to overflow into non-customary channels when opportunity for temporary association of the sexes is permitted. War is, therefore, always a threat to the moral integrity of a people, and takes its greatest toll among adolescents and youth. The sex psychology of wartime is hard to correct in peace because customs, like personal habits, once broken are hard to reinstate.

But we can blame the war far too much. The sex freedom of the war period only brought to focus a longer trend in American sex customs. Eventually we would have reached this point even had the war not come. It only compelled us to face the problem intelligently a generation or two before we would have done so otherwise.

Sex and the Culture Pattern

Sex in nature is no problem; it is accepted as normal, like birth and death and other purely biological happenings. Sex in society is always a problem because it is related to the family, economic institutions, and religion. Sex customs are always geared to the prevalent marriage and family system.

If one takes a long look at past human experience, he finds that among most peoples, society was much less concerned about virtue than about offspring. Sex experimentation by the young has been condoned and pregnancy before marriage has often been considered an advantage from the standpoint of securing a desirable mate. Even on the American frontier it was not considered too serious provided the young man assumed his responsi-

bilities, married the girl, and took over the economic burden of supporting mother and child.

Historically an interest in offspring has been the predominant motive of adult life and of marriage. In some earlier societies, indeed, the single adult woman had no place. It was expected that women would marry, and marry early. The barren wife was a disgrace to her husband and considered under a curse. The wife or concubine who bore many children was highly favored. In many societies, including the early Hebrew, if a young husband died before his wife bore children or conceived, it was the brother's duty to take her and sire children to perpetuate his brother's name and ancestry. This common practice is known as the levirate.

Sex activity, as such, has been looked upon in most past societies as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Offspring were the primary concern. The race and the family were much more important than the individual's own inclinations and desires. Earlier peoples always felt that they must produce as many children as possible in order to survive. More than half the babies they brought into the world died during infancy. Tuberculosis and other communicable diseases took a heavy toll of adolescents and youth.

When modern man conquered the diseases of childhood and youth and harnessed nature, he multiplied so rapidly that for more than a hundred years he has been afraid he would overstock the world. Malthus, an English clergyman, in 1789 wrote convincingly of how man's numbers were outrunning the food supply; and later prophets have written books with such titles as *Standing Room Only*. In a society dominated by such fears, sex, marriage, and family take on new meaning. "Multiply and replenish the earth," an admonition to earlier societies, has lost its meaning. Now the individual thinks rather of guarding his economic security by limiting his offspring to two or three at most, and society's motto might be said to be "A few well-bred and well-fed are worth a multitude of morons."

What has this to do with sex behavior? Much.

The prevailing philosophy of courtship, marriage, and family has been gradually shifting from the conception that sex is a means to an end to the view that it is an end in itself, a value to be sought in courtship and in marriage. We call it romance or love, and with increasing frequency boldly call it sex or sex appeal.

Dating, courtship, and marriage are primarily for personal pleasure and satisfaction rather than for offspring. It is assumed that fulfillment of marriage is possible without children. It is even assumed by some that children, if they come too early or too often, will interfere with the romantic fulfillment of marriage. In certain sophisticated circles it is assumed that any children at all will make it impossible.

Conditions suddenly forced upon many groups during both the first and the second World Wars seem to have given considerable publicity to this "romantic" point of view. The second World War, even more than the first, involved a very widespread breakdown of normal courtship and marriage customs and a consequently greater loss of traditional standards among young people. This fact, together with the increasingly general acceptance of birth control as a common practice, has re-enforced the tendency to looser sexual morals that has been the concomitant of every prolonged war in modern history.

Chastity in the Mate Selection Process of Youth

The weakening of the mores in the field of chastity places unusual strain on youth in their relatively unrestrained associations in dating and courtship. Once the code of chastity was so well embedded in the mores that it was unquestioned. World War I did a great deal to weaken this code; World War II has done much more. Social definitions are far from clear-cut on the problem today. Although as a society we cling to the ideal of chastity, we do not pursue it without some questioning. This places upon youth the heavy responsibility of deciding for themselves issues which most societies decide for them rather positively one way or the other. As a consequence the youth in his teens today probably makes more moral decisions in the realm of sex behavior than his grandparents made in a lifetime. If he has remained chaste until marriage, he has frequently done so through his own choosing rather than through compulsion.

The sex issue protrudes itself into many dating relationships, into most courtships, and certainly in most engagements. Studies of marriage and sex behavior indicate that it is during the engagement that the code is most often violated. Enforcement of the code is considered the responsibility of the girl in spite of all arguments in favor of a single standard of morality. In the ab-

sence of moral checks the chief restraints are fear of pregnancy, fear of venereal disease, fear of social condemnation if detected, and fear of consequences harmful to later success in marriage. To these, education must add positive motives: it must teach young people to take the long look, to avoid feelings of guilt, and to prepare themselves to enter marriage with confidence and trust.

The following advice seems sensible and practical in an age when the problem of where to draw the line is so often a problem in unsupervised pair relationships:

> We need to learn, specifically, how to let another person know, without being too obvious, that "being with you is heaven"; we need to know how, without being rude, to refuse another's invitation, how to get out of taking a drink, how to avoid having to kiss or be kissed. We need to learn how to do these things graciously, without hurting, humiliating, or belittling the other person, and without feeling that we have lost status in our group because we refuse to do as "the gang does." It is well to remember that individuals who feel secure in their status, who know that they are liked by their contemporaries of both sexes, are less likely to be the ones who feel driven to do that which is "expected" of them.[1]

Sex and the Success of the Romantic Marriage

In direct contrast to the prudery of previous generations which acknowledged sex activity as a male pleasure but often considered it an assault on woman's dignity, the companionship family frankly acknowledges sex as an essential part of romantic fulfillment. This change in point of view has been brought about in the first place by more frank sex education of both sexes. Education has led to a relaxation of taboos and this in turn to an initial advantage in marital adjustment.

Sexual maladjustment a generation or two ago often resulted from prudish sex attitudes which the marriage ceremony failed to remove. Psychological attitudes were once the real obstacles to complete and willing participation in sexual relationships and were therefore a risk in marriage. Proper sex education has placed marriage in the correct emotional light and has thereby contributed to the possibility of success for the romantic family.

[1] ESTHER LLOYD-JONES and RUTH FEDDER, *Coming of Age*, p. 122. Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1941.

The second cause of our changed attitude toward sex activity and the second cause for greater prospects of success for the new type of family, lies in the development of planned parenthood through birth control. In fact, without this, it is doubtful whether the urban companionship family, based on affection and on a great decrease in the number of children, could have developed so rapidly and so extensively as it has in our day. Now for the first time in history woman can feel that she is relieved of the necessity of adding to her household burdens through too frequent childbearing and that she has leisure and energy to devote to other interests which will contribute to her own well being and thus to that of her husband and children.

But even though better education and better devices for birth control undoubtedly provide a solid basis for expectation of success in the romantic marriage, it nevertheless is confronted by difficult problems of its own. One of these arises from the fact that it is based almost exclusively on mutual confidence and trust. Yet the greater frequency of sexual experimentation before marriage opens the way for suspicion and is ground for fear that promiscuous habits once developed will continue after marriage. And this fear is based upon the fact that the majority of young people probably still consider chastity desirable in the person they marry even though they themselves fall short of the standard.

The Abortion Problem Reflects New Attitudes toward Sex

By breaking down the necessary connection between sex experience and offspring, birth control was responsible to some extent, no doubt, for the exaggeration of the value of sex as such in our culture. Birth control, however, in the present stage of its development is not sufficiently effective to assure complete freedom of sex experience. Both within and outside marriage an increasing proportion wish to participate in sex experience without the natural result of offspring and when pregnancy results, they are still unwilling to assume responsibility. As a consequence the abortion problem has become of major importance. During one year in World War II when we had 3,000,000 births in the nation, Dr. Morris Fishbein estimated that there were 1,000,000 abortions, in other words one abortion for each three births. It was estimated that the majority of these abortions were among married women.

On February 4, 1946, *Time* reported the situation in San Francisco where an investigation was pending because of the death of a mother caused by an abortionist. It was estimated that the city had had 18,000 abortions in 1945. Only 16,400 children were born. We seem to be approaching the situation of pre-Hitler Germany when abortions were so common that they were resorted to when they threatened to interfere with a vacation trip or for other equally superficial reasons.

Such a state of affairs is dangerous to the health of women and disastrous to the morality of the nation. The death rate from this cause is more than one in a hundred, a rate two and a half times as high as that of normal birth. Even in Russia, where for a period of some ten years following the revolution abortion was sanctioned by the state and provision made for it in public clinics under skilled supervision, it never became absolutely safe. Prolonged chronic infections and difficult later births were common results, and in 15 to 20 per cent of the cases, the women were made sterile. In the United States, where the abortion must be performed in secret and often by unskilled practitioners, the physical risk is great to say nothing of the psychological cost in guilt and remorse.

The situation is a challenge to education rather than to law. In fact, the law can do comparatively little to regulate the individual and the family in these respects. Education as to the dangers, wholesome sex education, parent education, and other such measures offer the most hopeful corrective possibilities.

Prostitution and the Companionship Family

The companionship family as it has developed around the ideas of romance places an equal responsibility for sex loyalty on male and on female. It makes no provision, as have some earlier societies, for prostitution as an accepted or at least condoned institution. Under these social systems, sex activity, both outside marriage and within marriage, was, as has been suggested, considered a catering to male vulgarity rather than an expression of mutual affection in which both sexes share voluntarily with the motive of enjoyment. Prostitution was then justified or at least rationalized in terms of the polygamous tendencies of the male which required satisfaction outside of monogamous marriage.

The companionship marriage, because of its insistence upon the same sex prerogatives for male and female, believes that the same standards apply to both sexes. The single standard of morality is widely proclaimed. In our period of transition, this not uncommonly means that women claim the same sex privileges as men rather than that men have taken on the purity formerly attributed to women.

The transition has not, of course, led to the elimination of professional prostitution; that is, commercialized sex. It has, however, eliminated it in America as an accepted institution licensed by state or city and thus given civil sanction. In its place has come a new laxity on the part of an increasing proportion of women who give expression to polygamous sexual interests for pleasure rather than for hire. Instead of prostitution has come the practice of dating on casual acquaintance for purposes of illicit sex relations. Under this system of romantic thrill-seeking, sex becomes for women as well as for men a venture for its own sake rather than for money.

In World War II the prostitute plied her trade to some extent but a great deal of illicit sex behavior centered about the pickup girl in beer halls, on trains and highways, on street corners, and in railroad stations, where soldiers made casual dates rather than in brothels and red light districts. World War II also saw the dating of married women in the absence of their husbands on a scale never before tolerated in the American community. In this dating, much of it originally entered into for companionship, sex came to play a part. The consequence has been that marital disloyalty on the part of women is probably little less than on the part of men today where couples are separated for long periods by war or labor migration.

While one must admit that this is the logical outcome of the companionship philosophy of marriage, from a broader social standpoint the single standard of morality achieved by greater laxity on the part of women rather than greater purity on the part of men, is expensive. The rights and welfare of children and society's interests in a stable family institution for the rearing and training of progeny are threatened. There can be no denying that the woman's risk in these relations is greater than the man's, that her responsibility for the rights and welfare of children under our family-social system is greater than that of the male. The consequence is that the increased laxity of women has

profound implications for the stability of the home and the welfare of American childhood.

Sex Education

In a society where the conception of sex we have described has rapidly been developing, many adolescent youngsters accept necking and smooching as legitimate games, engaged in "for the fun of it." [2] Adult concern centers about fears that such indulgence will encourage the biological urge and lead to situations of excitement in which sexual intercourse will result. This is a well-grounded fear, which explains the pressing need for universal, effective sex education among children and youth.

The educational approach must be different from that used in a day when other customs prevailed. It is often not enough to teach that sex is unclean or wrong, even that it displeases God, that it will lead to pregnancy or to venereal disease. The restraints of fear are not enough, for many young persons before they are through high school have lost most of these fears or think they have learned how to avoid the consequences.

If we cannot employ the motive of fear or uncleanness, what is left? All that is needed is left. No effective education in other directions is any longer based on these motives. We have quit trying to make people religious by preaching the doctrines of seventeenth century Puritanism.

Sex education must be rational and honest, complete for the age and period in the life of the child, and given with the same frankness and naturalness as any other phase of education. Studies of youth made over a period of ten to fifteen years show that few of the generation that has recently married had such sex education.[3] Studies of marriage success and happiness show that sex education is conducive to successful marriage.[4]

Never before have young people expected so much of marriage as now. They all want the ideal marriage when they get ready

[2] For evidence that many youth do accept necking read LYND and LYND *Middletown*, pp. 138–140. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1929; and MARJORIE LEDERER, "We're Telling You." *Ladies' Home Journal*, 61:20–21, December, 1944.

[3] See such studies as *The Adolescent in the Family*, White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, pp. 202–209. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1934; HOWARD M. BELL, *Youth Tell Their Story*, p. 90. American Youth Commission, Washington, D.C., 1938.

[4] Both the Terman and the Burgess and Cottrell studies bear on this point.

ATTITUDE TOWARD SEX EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS AMONG 10,898 MARYLAND YOUTHS [5]

Classification of youth	Percentage of youth			To begin in [6]			
	Not to be taught	To be taught	No opinion	Elementary school	High school	College	Level not stated
All youth	19.4	74.8	5.8	28.7	61.9	3.4	6.0
Male	19.5	73.7	6.8	25.5	64.7	4.0	5.8
Female	19.3	76.0	4.7	31.8	59.2	2.9	6.1
White	20.4	74.9	4.7	26.2	65.1	3.8	4.9
Negro	13.9	74.7	11.4	42.2	44.3	1.4	12.1
16-year-olds	22.6	70.9	6.5	23.4	69.0	3.4	4.2
18-year-olds	18.3	77.6	4.1	24.3	67.7	3.7	4.3
20-year-olds	16.9	77.7	5.4	28.3	63.3	3.1	5.3
22-year-olds	20.2	73.3	6.5	29.8	60.0	3.6	6.6
24-year-olds	17.1	76.2	6.7	36.3	51.8	2.6	9.3
Farm	22.4	65.0	12.6	29.6	57.0	2.7	10.7
Village	16.7	76.7	6.6	25.5	64.4	3.6	6.5
Town	15.8	79.3	4.9	27.3	61.0	5.0	6.7
City	20.2	77.5	2.3	30.1	63.0	3.2	3.7
Parents' religion:							
Jewish	15.5	83.9	0.6	32.1	62.3	3.2	2.4
Protestant	17.0	76.6	6.4	29.1	61.4	3.2	6.3
Mixed affiliations	22.5	72.4	5.1	27.1	63.1	3.2	6.6
Catholic	26.3	70.0	3.7	26.8	63.7	4.3	5.2
No affiliation	26.2	62.9	10.9	28.0	59.4	5.6	7.0
Out-of-school youth:							
Less than 6th grade	25.7	53.0	21.3	38.3	39.0	2.8	19.9
8th grade	22.9	70.8	6.3	32.5	60.0	2.5	5.0
12th grade graduate	16.1	81.8	2.1	24.7	67.8	3.2	4.3
1 year [7]	15.2	82.5	2.3	27.1	61.8	4.2	6.9
2 or 3 years [7]	10.7	87.6	1.7	39.0	52.6	4.3	4.1
4 or more years [7]	5.1	94.7	0.2	39.5	50.9	4.8	4.8

to marry. They want to find supreme and lasting happiness in a love mate. Even those who do not want children, want this. Those who want one to three children, as most adolescents and youth think they do when they marry, also want to "live happily ever after." Marriage and family are no longer the practical institutions they once were for joint parenthood and economic life, but their ideals for personal fulfillment and happiness have never been surpassed.

[5] HOWARD M. BELL, *Youth Tell Their Story*, p. 90. American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1938.

[6] Percentages based on youths who favored sex instruction in schools.

[7] Beyond high school graduation.

These are the ideals to which we must appeal in sex education. We must teach the adolescent to take the long look at happiness; show him that it is impossible to realize his hopes for supreme happiness if he establishes habits which will make it psychologically impossible to attain them; show him that he will eventually bring to marriage all his habits and attitudes, good or bad. These, more than the person he marries, will determine his success and happiness in marriage. This sort of reasoning is scientific. It appeals to adolescents and youth. It is not based on the principle of denial and frustrations; it points the way by which those who want most can expect to attain most. It admits frankly that there are cheap and shoddy shortcuts, but that man and our society are so constituted that those who want the supreme prize of life find it by training themselves for it.

The American Youth Commission study shows beyond doubt that most young people feel the need of and want sex education. Most of them think it should begin in high school, although about a third feel it should begin in the elementary school. Certainly in the face of such evidence sex education can no longer be left to chance.

The White House Conference report [8] sets forth three aims of adequate sex education.

1. To impart accurate information about sex as a part of the process of normal living.
2. To establish attitudes which will guide the boy or girl in activities with the opposite sex.
3. To provide for the boy or girl an adult who is ready to counsel him when advice is needed.

The Sex Ratio and the Sex Problem

Until very recently America had a sex ratio in which males were more numerous than females. This tended to increase the bargaining position of women in mate selection and marriage. Beginning in 1944, however, the ratio was equalized. From now on, there will be a slight excess of females, expecially in the marriageable years. This will increase men's bargaining position in marriage, and as a consequence put greater strain on the females' position in dating, courtship, and mate selection. Judging from trends in the European nations which have faced similar situations, it is likely that the result will be a greater relaxation

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 202–209.

of sex mores, and a further breakdown of sex morality among women.


Although this problem is new on a nationwide scale, it is really of long standing in particular areas. Most large cities have always had an excess of women in the marriageable ages. This is brought about by the heavy migration of rural young women to the large cities, a migration which far exceeds that of rural young men. Consequently the rural farm population has a large excess of young men in the marriageable ages, large metropolitan centers an excess of young women in the marriageable ages.

All urban areas combined have had an excess of women in the marriageable ages. These facts for given age groups are presented for 1940 in the chart on page 279. It will be seen that there were only eighty-nine young men from twenty to twenty-four years of age to 100 women in this age group. In the rural farm population there were 126 young men per 100 young women.

Even within the city itself the discrepancy in the sex ratio has varied greatly in different residential sections. For the most part women drawn to the city are interested in white-collar employment, in secretarial and clerical jobs. These young women concentrate in the more desirable apartment house areas. The majority of marriageable young men, on the other hand, are likely to be concentrated in factory areas and areas involving large industrial operations. Being in the overall trades, they do not always appeal to the more sophisticated young woman in a white-collar occupation. The consequence has been that large cities have deterred the marriage rate at least 10 per cent even where the sex ratio favored marriage.[9]

The lack of balance in the sexes in urban areas has had as one of its consequences the greater relaxation of sexual morality in urban areas than in rural areas. This of course is only one factor. In the anonymity of city living, psycho-social isolation often breeds loneliness to the point of despair. Some women are tempted to use sex as a bargaining device for friendship or for marriage. It is likely that this tendency will increase now that sex ratio problems have become somewhat exaggerated by the loss in war of young men of marriageable ages, and by the natural tendency of a stable population no longer receiving immigrant males to have more females than males in the marriageable ages.

[9] W. F. Ogburn, *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, p. 681. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1933.



Landis, "Population Problems"

SEX RATIO (OF MALES TO 100 FEMALES) OF WHITES FOR THE TOTAL, THE URBAN, THE RURAL NONFARM, AND RURAL FARM POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE GROUPS, 1940.

The most significant differences are those in the marriageable child-bearing ages. Observe that the rural farm population has approximately 126 males per 100 females in the ages 20–24, the urban population only 89 males per 100 females in this age group.

Review

1. Have attitudes toward sex altered with the change in the family-social system?
2. Why does war provide a threat to normal sex restraints? Was the war entirely responsible for the sexual freedom of the period? Explain.
3. Illustrate how basic objectives of the family in a given culture affect moral customs in the field of sex behavior.

4. What was the prime concern of early societies? How is the practice of the "levirate" related to these early conceptions of the function of marriage?
5. Why was virtue considered of secondary importance in the past?
6. What effect did the conquering of disease have on motivations for marriage and family life?
7. What is the place of sex in the romantic family pattern? How are children regarded in the romantic family pattern?
8. How has the weakening of the chastity mores affected the modern youth group?
9. Why are mutual confidence and trust so important in the romantic marriage of today?
10. Explain the place of birth control in the companionship marriage.
11. Why have abortions multiplied? Are abortions safe?
12. What common ideas prevailed in the patriarchal family concerning the sex desires of men? Of women?
13. What effect has the companionship family had on prostitution?
14. Discuss the effect of mobility in World War II on the increase in illicit sex relationships.
15. How does the increase in sexual laxity on the part of the women in our culture decrease the chances of secure childhood?
16. Why is sex education so vital today?
17. What is likely to be the result of an unbalanced sex ratio in a population with females more numerous than males?
18. How has the sex ratio in large cities affected sex codes and the marriage rate?

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CHAPTER 15

THE CHILD IN THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY

IN SPITE of vastly improved economic and hygienic conditions, the American child of today confronts more serious psychological risks than the child born in previous generations. His emotional life, his personality integration, his claims to happiness are threatened by the instability of the family and the lack of a primary group into which personality can strike deep roots. Early in life he may reach the point where he will have no place called home, the point where psychologically he will be deprived of the intimate protection of parents permanently united in the interests of home making and child rearing. His position in unstable conditions of this sort gives rise to two of our most serious problems, one involving personal happiness and the other affecting social welfare. Psychoneurotic tendencies often originate in early childhood, and so do behavior problems that later exhibit themselves in delinquency and crime. The unity the individual feels within his own person, his grasp of life, is dependent in large part upon happy relations with his parents, especially the mother, in the home.

Happiness in childhood is so essential to life-long adjustments that it must be sought at all costs. It is now demonstrated that the success of a person's own marriage is related to the happiness of his childhood and the happiness of his parents' marriage.[1] In other words, the emotional tone of the child's early life has deterministic effects on the personality he carries through a lifetime. These effects must be thoroughly explained to all young persons before they undertake the serious responsibility of marriage and childbearing. They must be made to understand that where children are concerned marriage is more than

[1] LEWIS M. TERMAN *et al.*, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*, Chapter 9. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1938.

a romantic adventure. Its tone and character actually determine the future happiness and welfare of the children.

This point of view is quite the opposite of that advocated some two decades ago when, under the influence of the Watsonian philosophy of the conditioned response, it was assumed in child training that casual connections between parent and offspring were desirable. Today child psychologists and students of the family recognize that personality is complete only as it is built into a stable and affectionate family group which makes for sureness and confidence. Lacking this, a child is a lost soul, strained in all his social relationships, anxious and fearful of life.

Our present attitude, furthermore, is the opposite of that found in primary-group societies. There, deep emotional attachments to particular persons were not of prime importance because the individual's emotions were rooted in a large family or neighborhood group. A good illustration of this situation is to be found in Margaret Mead's study of Samoan society.[2] In Samoa, even sex attachments are relatively casual. There is no need for deep attachments of mother and child, for the society is not built on this basis. The sense of "belongingness" so essential to personality is built around the larger primary group and not around the parent.

But our present attitude toward the family and children is far different not only from that of simple, primitive societies but also from that found in the traditional rural family from earliest Hebrew days to the present. In this rural family the father's desire to achieve economic success and ultimate economic security was supplemented by the wife's exertions and by the early work of the son or sons in the family enterprise. Children, in this regime, also guaranteed economic security in old age and assured a sort of immortality by perpetuating the line of ancestry. These ancient values have little place in the world today: the child's time is now absorbed in school, adolescents are excluded from the work world, the child is dissociated from the claims of kinship as he grows to maturity, he migrates from the home neighborhood, he prefers a small family or no children or, in some cases, no marriage at all.

Such patriarchal values, we repeat, simply do not exist in the notions underlying romantic marriage and its goal of erotic satis-

[2] MARGARET MEAD, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, Chapter 13. William Morrow and Company, New York, 1928.

faction as it is usually conceived by young people under the influence of the movies. Indeed, any analysis of those notions emphasizes the risks we mentioned a moment ago. We are driven to the conclusion that many such young people consider children a hindrance to the fulfillment of marriage. They insist, according to various investigations of marriage happiness,[3] that the happiest years are those the couple have to themselves before children are born. Even more significant in this connection is the fact that children are now a threat rather than an aid to the realization of the ambitions and goals of individualistic minded parents. In the average metropolitan community children actually offer the father little help in attaining his own goals; instead, the child is an economic drain on the family. His education extends over a long period and at maturity he becomes an independent individual, able to take his place entirely outside the family, beyond its control and beyond any real sense of attachment to it.

But if children are a hindrance to the father, they are similarly, and perhaps even more seriously, a definite threat to the individualistic roles and ambitions of the wife. In the traditional family the fulfillment of a woman's life was in marriage, childbearing, child rearing, and home management. She was resigned to accept the common values which assured her that "the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world." To the modern woman in romantic marriage, such a distant possibility for personality achievement is comparable to the promise of revivalistic preachers whose message holds out to the culturally dispossessed "a beautiful reward in heaven" or, in the more ironical vernacular of the hobo, "pie in heaven when we die." Frustrated in achieving her own desires because of the child, she must be a strong character indeed if she can find consolation in the promise of ultimate dominance through the cradle by the exercise of her capacity to bear children and of her simple training functions as a mother. She chooses rather to rule the world directly through the realization of her own career and the exercise of her own creative force. Mortgaging her life to the care of young children seems to her a threat to her social status; it isolates her from her roles as an independent woman and is a mark of her inferiority to men. She may even feel that childbearing itself is a humiliating concession to biological forces, which, because of the part she plays in reproduction, automatically limits her chances for realizing social and

[3] TERMAN, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

economic goals which she has been conditioned to desire in our socio-cultural system.

Then again, the goal of emotional security which she seeks in marriage even more desperately than women under the traditional family sought it, is threatened in still other ways. In all previous societies children were an inevitable counterpart of marriage. To fortify woman's role as childbearer a whole series of notions was built up about the concept of duty and obligation to children. Children fitted into this conception of life organization. If there were too many, one accepted them without murmuring as the gift of an all-wise Providence. Nowadays, however, in the romantic marriage the wife can choose whether or not she will have children and this possibility of choice results in an ambivalent attitude toward motherhood and children. The conflict may go so far that she will actually bear and rear children she does not love.

The Problem Parent

Not long ago the term problem child was used; now the term problem parent seems much more appropriate. In the companionship family two kinds of parent offer severe problems from the standpoint of the welfare of children: one, the parent who rejects the child; the other, the overanxious parent. The first resents the coming of the infant, a situation not at all uncommon in our culture where birth control is so widely practiced but where children are nonetheless, in a considerable proportion of cases, not desired.

Resentment of the coming of the child may be based on any one of the economic and social factors that enter into human wishes in a society such as ours which offers so many objects to satisfy human desires but which, in the nature of things, limits the number of things any one person can have. Parents may be hostile toward each other. The mother or the father may feel that the baby has cheated them out of a new car or a new coat or a new home. They may feel that the infant has kept them out of certain social associations or from desirable recreational privileges, or has monopolized too much of the mate's love.

It is not such parents only, however, who fail to welcome the child. Certain evidence seems to indicate that the unwanted child is more frequently found in Catholic and immigrant families

than in others.[4] A possible explanation is that in families where birth control is not accepted the mother may resent the repetition of births to which she is subjected. Weary with caring for the children already born, she may discover in herself a hostile mood regarding the next birth, which seems to her an unkind act of Providence or the result of uncontrollable processes of nature. In earlier societies when neighbors also had children about as fast as nature dictated, such resentment was not so likely to be present as today when those who do not believe in birth control have to compete with neighbors who practice it. In the latter case the mother may pass on to the child an unfortunate sense of being unwanted.

Sometimes, too, unwanted children are the offspring of mothers who themselves were spoiled and never achieved sufficient emotional maturity to place the interests of others, even their own child, above their personal interests. This situation is due in part to inadequate moral training and in part to the failure of families of the previous generation to help the young person achieve emotional maturity and thus be ready for the tremendous responsibilities of parenthood.

In the modern family, however, the husband should not be excluded from blame in failing to welcome children. While the attachment of mother to child is much more vital, actually in many cases the husband's attitude of hostility determines the wife's. Moreover the modern husband is far too often inconsiderate of the wife's position when children are born, and not conscious of the fact that he himself must help share the responsibility in order that the coming of a child may not too completely bind the mother to the home and rob her of the freedom and privileges which the woman without children has in modern society.

It is now believed that the sense of belonging is established early in life, perhaps in the first two or three years, and that if the child fails to acquire it during this period, it is almost impossible to restore it to him at any time during his life. The result of being unwanted is what we used to call the problem child. Psychologists now believe that children with disagreeable behavior problems are for the most part children who are making a desperate effort to wrench from an antagonistic world the satisfactions they missed because of having been denied proper affection in childhood.

The overanxious parent represents the other extreme from the

[4] Evidence is cited in JESSE BERNARD, *American Family Behavior*, p. 161. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1942.

resentful parent. This parent is so solicitous of the child's welfare that he tends to involve himself too completely in its life. This parent quite often is one who, during his own childhood, was denied normal affection, and so in marriage transfers his full emotional energy to the child in an attempt to bind it completely to himself. As the child grows older, it finds itself overshadowed by the parent, usually the mother, who is always there to provide ready-made decisions and shield him from all the bumps of life.

While this situation is probably less disastrous to the future of the child than rejection, it is nonetheless very serious. It is likely that during war, when so many women had their first baby while their husbands were absent on the battlefronts, a great number of young mothers developed these overprotective attitudes. The return of the husband may do something to break abnormal attachments. In many cases, however, the honeymoon with the child may interfere with the normal adjustment of husband and wife and be responsible for breakup of the marriage. Thus the mother's abnormal attachment to the child will be even more intensified.

The modern one-child family takes about sixteen years for parenthood; the three-child family, about twenty-three years; the seven- or eight-child family, thirty years. Twenty years is, then, the average period of relatively full attention to parenthood. This is less than a third, not a large proportion, of the life cycle in our society where length of life has been extended to the middle sixties. It seems likely that education, if properly directed, could change the attitude of young women and lead them to accept the responsibilities of parenthood willingly. If society properly shared the responsibility so that parenthood would not be too confining, it could be made willing and pleasant and thus give young people a chance to fulfill marriage in the deepest sense, to participate in the future by leaving offspring, and to do so without feeling that they are being denied other, more important values.

There is little doubt that intelligent young people for the most part desire parenthood. But our society cannot ignore the fact that many young people, even among the college trained, feel that child rearing is drudgery, that to have a family means to sacrifice a career, opportunities for stimulating work, social privileges, and the like, which are of higher value. Unfortunately it must be admitted that certain of these values really have been

rated higher by our society. It has been assumed that anyone can have a baby and that anyone can rear a child, the more ignorant the parent perhaps the more successfully. A correction in the scale of social values must be made at this point if we are going to improve the psychological attitudes that now determine the lack of favor with which children and child rearing are held in the minds of the average young couple.

It is an established fact that successful marriage without a desire to have children is practically impossible.[5] Data indicate that a childless marriage has had, in recent years, seventy-one chances out of a hundred of ending in divorce, whereas one with children has had only eight chances in a hundred of ending in divorce.[6] These statistics exaggerate the differences somewhat because many divorces take place during the early years of marriage. Had the marriages lasted, children would probably have been born. Nonetheless the importance of children to the complete fulfillment of marriage and to the lifelong partnership of husband and wife is vital.

The Problem of the Only Child and of Sib Position

A few years ago great alarm was expressed concerning the only child, and, in fact, the only child was a serious problem. This situation has been corrected considerably after a generation of child psychology which built up a consciousness on the part of more intelligent parents, who usually have the only child, of the fact that the only child is in a dangerous position. Through superior training and the advantages of a superior home into which the only child is most often born, these risks have been at least partly offset.[7] It is now believed that only children turn out about as well as others. Considering the fact that they have superior advantages, one would expect them to turn out better.

Recent studies of marriage show that the difficulties of the only-child position tend to carry over in marriage. The Burgess and Cottrell[8] data show that only children make poor adjust-

[5] E. W. BURGESS and LEONARD S. COTTRELL, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, p. 260. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1939.

[6] ALFRED COHEN, *Statistical Analysis of American Divorce*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1932.

[7] For a summary of studies see JESSIE BERNARD, *American Family Behavior*, p. 327. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1942.

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

ments in marriage in 40 per cent of the cases as compared to 25 per cent of those from families of two or more children. A very small proportion of only children were found to make good adjustments in marriage.[9] Brill has reported [10] that an abnormally high proportion of only children fail to marry. Some of the evidence would seem to indicate that while the only-child position is not as serious as once thought, still the only child does not have the advantages of normal personality development available to children in families with brothers and sisters.

Not only is the problem of the only child a subject of study today but so also is that of the sib position. By sib position is meant the place of the individual in the age sequence of families having more than one child.

Throughout history cultures have made more or less of the first-born son. The peculiar inheritance rights of primogeniture have been widespread. In the companionship family he has no sanctioned prestige, but it is generally recognized that by the time the second child is born the first feels that he has prior rights and, unless prepared for the event by wise counsel of parents, may resent the intrusion and suffer from his loss of the undivided attention of parents.

In our culture, where the average parent has little or no previous experience with children in his own parental family, such as he had in the large family of yesterday, the oldest child must teach his parents to be parents. The usual pattern is for them to be more strict with the first-born than with those who come later. The youngest child, if we are to accept folklore, is more likely to receive lenient and indulgent treatment and to be "spoiled" in the proverbial sense. The oldest child tends from birth through adolescence to break the way not only in the family but also in the neighborhood and community. The White House Conference Report [11] found the closest emotional attachments between parents and the oldest and youngest children rather than the middle children. Sib position is, however, not the only or necessarily the main factor in such attachments.

It is fairly well established that the oldest child is more often delinquent. Jealousy is also reported to be a peculiar problem

[9] BURGESS and COTTRELL, *op. cit.*, p. 107. See also TERMAN, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 207–212.

[10] A. A. BRILL, *Psychoanalysis: Its Theories and Practical Applications*. W. B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia, 1913.

[11] *The Adolescent in the Family*, White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, pp. 156–157. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1934.

of the oldest child, as would be expected. He monopolizes the family attention for a time only to have it focused later on the baby.

That sib position is of vital importance to personality is suggested in the following statement by Bernard,[12] who also gives one of the best brief summaries of the literature on this problem:

> If, standing on a crowded street corner, we could see all the adults about us in terms of their sib relationships, we would see not the seemingly independent, self-resourceful individuals who pass before us, but rebellious little sisters fighting against parental discrimination, resentful little brothers hating older sisters whose superiority in age and maturity frustrated their male egos, jealous older sisters resenting the attention bestowed on little sisters, sisters of all ages envying the privileges of brothers of all ages. Most of us, on becoming closely acquainted with men and women of apparent maturity, have found that in certain aspects of their personalities they are still much under the influence of brother or sister, still smarting under childhood patterns. It does not matter that they are now successful in their own right; they must still convince brother or sister of their success. One man's whole life is spent in achieving goals which his sister unconsciously set for him years ago; he must prove to her that he can do it. One woman's life is shattered because of her ambivalent attitude of hatred and love for a brother who dominated her childhood.

Parent-Child Relations and the Neurotic Personality

In much psychiatric practice the assumption is made that neurotic difficulties in adolescents, youth, and adults root in unsatisfactory parent-child relations such as those described in the preceding discussion of rejection and overprotection. Within the American culture pattern this is without doubt substantially correct, but it should not be made applicable to children in other cultural patterns and might not be characteristic here with a different family philosophy than that prevailing in the romantic family situation.

Green,[13] in a stimulating comparison of the methods of

[12] JESSIE BERNARD, *American Family Behavior*, p. 312. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1942.

[13] ARNOLD W. GREEN, "The Middle Class Male Child and Neurosis." *American Sociological Review*, 11:31–41, February, 1946.

handling children in the Polish immigrant home and in the middle-class American home, suggests that harsh and even brutal parental authority in the former has no relationship to neurotic tendencies in children, the main reason being that such treatment by parents has no vital connection with the "core of the self" of the child. The Polish peasant, coming from a rural background where affection is not a primary pattern in family relations, does not absorb the personality of the child emotionally as does the middle-class urban American family. The child patterns his behavior as much or more after brothers and sisters and others than after his parents. In general, the child, because he knows more about the adopted culture than the parent does, is from a very early age in rebellion against the parent.

The neurotic counterpart of unsatisfactory parent-child relations of the native-born middle-class family in the United States, he believes, arises from the fact that the parent absorbs the personality of the child and yet, because the child interferes with the attainment of values of both father and mother, holds ambivalent attitudes toward him. These parental conflicts are reflected in attitudes of antagonism that make the child feel insecure. The vicious cycle is somewhat as follows: the child feels a yearning need for parental love because he has been conditioned to expect it; the parent, because the child interferes with the attainment of his own individualistic values, tends to withdraw the love, frequently using this device as a disciplinary measure with the child; the child's fear that love may be withdrawn is a basic factor in neurosis.

Projection in the Companionship Family

One of the dangers of the companionship family, which exists by virtue of its very smallness, is that each member is likely to be too much concerned about directing and managing the lives of other members rather than paying attention to his own affairs. This is one of the most serious sources of conflict in the modern family according to Plant, who has observed the family through a children's clinic.[14]

The tendency of parents to overdirect the lives of children, especially in the vocational field, has been referred to by psycholo-

[14] JAMES S. PLANT, "The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents." *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 10:807–818, Summer, 1944.

gists as *projection.* This term refers to the abnormal interest of some parents in realizing their own ambitions in expressing their own frustrations through the achievements of the child.

Kimball Young, who has discussed this phenomenon in the American family, believes it is especially prominent in the vocational field and that women, because of their vocational frustrations, are most likely to try to work out their own ambitions in the lives of their children.[15] Another type of parent is so completely absorbed and happy in his own vocation that he cannot imagine his children being satisfied in any other. A third type tends to place too high a value on white-collar work and professional employment. Such parents expect a level of high school and college performance that exceeds the capability of the child. They also encourage him to want to enter the white-collar occupations regardless of his ability to function effectively and to be successful in the socially more enviable positions. Too many parents are anxious that their children have an easier life than they have had. This notion is especially prominent among farm people. The average farm mother who has suffered the inconveniences of a lack of running water in the home, lack of bathroom facilities, lack of electricity, and lack of time for social life is often insistent that her daughter prepare herself for a stenographic or a clerical position and find a job in town or city.

It must be recognized that parents in assuming such ambitions are actually reflecting the competitive values of our culture and living up to the ideals of vertical social mobility that are so prominent in the American culture pattern. One cannot criticize them for doing so provided they have a realistic appreciation of the child's capacities and of potential opportunities for him in the direction toward which they are pushing him. Without wisdom and judgment in this regard too many young people are directed toward avenues which are blocked either because they themselves lack ability to function in them or because too many others are being directed to the same channels of activity. The wise parent has to leave a good deal to the judgment of the child, providing him the education and the experience which will make it possible for him to get in touch with the avenues of vertical mobility and understand those types of vocational activities which will match his interests and abilities. Actually, many

[15] KIMBALL YOUNG, "Parent Child Relationship; Projection of Ambition." *The Family,* 8:67–73, 1927.

parents have lived a much more restricted life than their children who have gone to high school and college; they are in a much less advantageous position to make a choice than the youth himself, if he is given freedom and range of experience.

Parental Authority in the Companionship Family

In the institutional family the father's word was law. The patriarch's authority dominated the family situation. In the early Hebrew family the father had the power of life and death over a child in case of disobedience. In the pioneer family the father's authority was unquestioned although such severe disciplinary measures in cases of disobedience did not have social sanction.

Today the authoritative has been replaced by the democratic pattern, which holds that parents and children have equal status in the family. The parent guides and rules only by virtue of his greater experience and judgment, but the child should have a part in decision-making as rapidly as his experience and judgment warrant. The ideal of a democratic family is a council in which all members share in making decisions.

Clearly this ideal is not yet realized in the average family. There is much carry-over of the patriarchal pattern and of the disciplinary notions that characterized the long history of the institutional family. The survival of these, according to much evidence,[16] is greater in the rural than in the urban home. In fact, as has been pointed out repeatedly, the rural home preserves many elements of the institutional family which are already on the way to disappearance in the urban family.

Families which hold a rigid, authoritative, disciplinary pattern as an ideal today run the risk of having their children revolt when they reach the ages of adolescence and youth, leaving home, defying parental authority entirely, and imitating the pattern of freedom they see among youth from democratic families in the same school system.

The democratic family in its extreme form is represented by the home in which there seems to be no discipline at all, in which

[16] Several studies are summarized in PAUL H. LANDIS, *Rural Life in Process*, Chapter 18. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1940. See also *The Adolescent in the Family*, White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, pp. 156–157. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1934.

parents believe in the philosophy of letting the child direct his impulses as he will without restriction. Margaret Mead [17] considers that in these homes the parent overemphasizes the strength of the child, pushes him into independence too early, and puts him into competition with adult authority. She says that the child often has his parents completely bewildered by the time he is two.

Child psychologists believe that discipline, that is, outside direction of the child, is necessary. Discipline in the modern sense means (1) teaching that involves the establishment of standards and guides to conduct so that the child will have a basis on which to choose a course of conduct and (2) reproof and correction in case he fails to follow the standards taught. This is essential to making him a fit member of a society in which all must submit to restraint in the interests of others. Correction need not, and in the ideal democratic family probably will not, take the form of corporal punishment. Disapproval, sympathetic correction, and understanding explanation are more effective in attaining results than physical punishments. The strongest argument against corporal punishment is that it is likely to be indulged in by the parent as a means of venting anger rather than being directed at achieving the ultimate goal of self-discipline in the child. The Child Study Association of America has concluded that in the end "the most fruitful resources for discipline are the sentiments and affections, the spirit of consideration and helpfulness, the readiness for devotion and sacrifice . . ." [18] These virtues are the foundation of the democratic family.

Cavan,[19] in the White House Conference Report, describes two types which clearly point out the contrast between the companionship and the institutional family systems in the field of discipline. The one is based on issuing commands and inflicting punishment for disobedience. Under this system, punishment is often so severe that the child during his early years fears and resents parental authority. There is no attempt on the part of the parent to make the child understand the discipline or the reason for administering it. The parent sets himself above the child and establishes formal dictatorial relations. There is little under-

[17] In an address before the American Sociological Society, December, 1943.

[18] *Parents' Questions*, p. 39. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1936.

[19] *The Adolescent in the Family*, White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, pp. 156–157. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1934.

standing between parent and child. This system of discipline persists until at adolescence there is likely to be an open clash of authority, especially between father and son as the son reaches the point of equal physical strength with the father. It is difficult for parents habituated to this system of discipline to substitute for it any new system of control, or in fact, to relax it. There is often a distinct breach between parent and child, and it is not unusual for young people to run away from home in quest of freedom.

The other system of discipline is based on sympathy and understanding between parent and child. For the most part it is possible for the parent to retain sufficient control to make punishment unnecessary. There is high regard of child for parent in that he is made to understand reasons for correction and for parental expectations. In its ideal form this system makes possible a unified family circle and close confidential relationships between parent and child. This discipline can be gradually relaxed as growing maturity brings greater independence and self-reliance. Under its philosophy the child gradually merges into the greater freedom of adolescence and the adolescent into the maturity of youth.

Students of child psychology now believe that the most wholesome attitude on the part of parents is to be affectionate but not indulgent, firm but reasonable. It is important that they recognize the growing independence of the child but at no time place upon him responsibilities for making decisions which he does not yet have the experience or the maturity to make.

Parent Education

The development of wholesome attitudes on the part of the parent toward children is only one of the many difficulties implicit in the child-parent aspects of the companionship family. Another is the possibility of lifting from the shoulders of the modern parent some of the risks and anxiety of the family, and particularly some of its economic burdens. Relief may call for social measures such as we shall consider in a later chapter in connection with population policy.

A third major problem [20] is that of harmonizing the needs of women for achievement and self-realization with the needs of

[20] J. K. Folsom, *The Family and Democratic Society*, p. 662. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1943.

the young child, who demands almost constant attention and continued care during the years of infancy and childhood. In this sphere our society so far has failed. We stress more and more education for young women, but in all this education we motivate them toward a career rather than toward marriage and a family. Desirable as a career is for women, we must help reinstate in their philosophy attitudes favorable to the family and to child rearing and practical knowledge in homemaking, dietetics, and child rearing, so essential to modern family life.

A still further aspect of this whole matter is the growing need in our society for extensive and thorough parent education. Studies of juvenile delinquency, the rising divorce rate, and other evidences of family instability which are especially disastrous to the child, indicate that we must first of all prepare young people for marriage and give them a realistic understanding of their responsibilities where children are involved. We have gone too far in ignoring the needs of the child in the family-social system. For this, society pays tremendous costs in delinquency, crime, and various forms of social pathology that grow from the breakdown of the person. To this we must add the lifelong misery of maladjusted individuals who have been reared under family associations which warp the personalities of children beyond the possibility of repair.

Review

1. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a child born today in the United States.
2. What was the fallacy in the Watsonian theory of child training?
3. Why is the child so often unwanted in the romantic marriage system?
4. Show how modifications in the culture pattern have converted the child from an asset to a liability in the family.
5. How has the instability of the companionship family served to create maladjustments in the child?
6. What is the effect of childhood on the individual's later emotional life and happiness?
7. Why are childbearing and its accompanying functions so distasteful to women in the modern companionship family? Analyze prevailing ambivalent attitudes.
8. What two types of parents present the most serious threats to the welfare of the child?
9. Why are children apparently more often unwanted in immigrant families than in others?

10. What part does the husband play in the acceptance or rejection of the child?
11. How does the overanxious parent serve to frustrate the child in his later attempts at independence?
12. What corrections in values and attitudes are needed to give children a more welcome place in the average marriage?
13. Give evidence to support the statement, "A successful marriage without the desire to have children is practically impossible."
14. Discuss the only child from the standpoint of the dangers involved in his rearing and consequent adjustments in life.
15. Discuss the importance of sib position in relation to life adjustments and parental attitude.
16. How does the attitude of the parent toward the child increase or decrease his likelihood of developing neurotic tendencies? Compare this danger under two culture patterns.
17. What is meant by "projection" and how does it affect the child?
18. Where is authority vested in the modern democratic family? Can this system go to extremes? Explain.
19. What does discipline in the modern sense mean?
20. Contrast the two types of discipline described by Cavan in the White House Conference Report.
21. What is the middle way in the disciplinary field?
22. What part must education play in the life of young women in our society?
23. Why is "parent education" so necessary today?

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
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CHAPTER 16

THE TRANSITION OF ADOLESCENTS AND YOUTH TO MATURITY IN THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY

ONE OF THE DISTINCTIVE MARKS of the companionship family, as Burgess has pointed out, is its almost complete detachment from the claims of kinship. Young people leave the family nest and in a large proportion of cases travel beyond the scope of direct family supervision. Their lives after marriage are in most cases lived apart from relatives. This situation is the product not only of the highly individualized character of the modern family, but also of the other major social forces discussed in the introductory part of this book — ease and speed of movement; diversity of vocational outlets, which reflects the complexity of culture; and the development of urban industrial society. In other words, young people eventually make a complete break with the family: economically, by becoming self-sufficient; emotionally, in the transition to marriage; and morally, in selecting behavior patterns outside their primary groups. This series of experiences is so important in the lives of modern youth as to constitute the essential elements of the crisis in youth adjustments.

In modern society the adolescent-youth group is made up chronologically of persons from twelve to twenty-four years of age; psychologically, of those terminating a prolonged period of



From Landis, "Adolescence and Youth"

There are two critical periods in the life cycle of man in industrial society — youth, the period of entering the roles of adulthood, is one; old age, the period of retiring from active adult roles, the other.

infancy; sociologically, of those trying to bridge the gap between dependent childhood and self-sufficient adulthood. Childhood is that period when the family assumes full responsibility for conduct, support, and guidance; adulthood, the period when the individual is responsible for his own conduct, support, and choices. The older adolescent has, from a physiological standpoint, reached adulthood: he can produce offspring, make a living, and assume moral responsibility if expected by society to do so.

THE ADOLESCENT-YOUTH GROUP IN THE UNITED STATES BY AGE AND SEX, SHOWING THEIR PLACE IN THE LIFE CYCLE AND THEIR PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, 1940 [1]

Age group	Males		Females		Total	
	Number	Per cent of total population	Number	Per cent of total population	Number	Per cent of total population
Childhood, under 12	**13,065,392**	**19.3**	**12,686,215**	**19.3**	**25,751,607**	**19.6**
Adolescence, 12–15	**4,882,905**	**7.4**	**4,760,088**	**7.2**	**9,642,993**	**7.3**
12	1,234,629	1.9	1,190,771	1.8	2,425,400	1.8
13	1,207,823	1.8	1,181,521	1.8	2,389,344	1.8
14	1,218,116	1.8	1,187,614	1.8	2,405,730	1.8
15	1,222,337	1.8	1,200,182	1.8	2,422,519	1.9
Adolescence and Youth, 16–19	**4,957,816**	**7.5**	**4,953,188**	**7.5**	**9,911,004**	**7.6**
16	1,249,166	1.9	1,239,930	1.9	2,489,096	1.9
17	1,213,277	1.8	1,189,797	1.8	2,403,074	1.8
18	1,281,638	1.9	1,301,010	2.0	2,582,648	2.0
19	1,213,735	1.8	1,222,451	1.9	2,436,186	1.9
Youth, 20–24	**5,603,392**	**8.6**	**5,895,443**	**9.0**	**11,587,835**	**8.8**
20	1,150,663	1.7	1,216,379	1.8	2,367,042	1.8
21	1,178,806	1.8	1,188,855	1.8	2,367,661	1.8
22	1,123,714	1.7	1,168,128	1.8	2,291,842	1.8
23	1,115,609	1.7	1,164,622	1.8	2,280,231	1.7
24	1,123,600	1.7	1,157,459	1.8	2,281,059	1.7
Young adults, 25–34	**10,520,974**	**15.9**	**10,818,052**	**16.4**	**21,339,026**	**16.2**
Middle aged, 35–54	**17,126,813**	**25.9**	**16,718,478**	**25.5**	**33,845,291**	**25.7**
Old, 55–64	**5,409,180**	**8.2**	**5,163,025**	**7.9**	**10,572,205**	**8.0**
Retired, 65 and above	**4,406,120**	**6.7**	**4,613,194**	**7.2**	**9,019,314**	**6.8**
Total	**66,061,592**	**100.0**	**65,607,683**	**100.0**	**131,669,275**	**100.0**

The adolescent group makes up 7.3 per cent of the total population; the group sixteen to nineteen years, 7.6 per cent of the population; and the older youth group, twenty to twenty-four years, 8.8 per cent. Together the group twelve to twenty-four years accounted for 31,141,832 of the 1940 population of 131,669,275 or 23.7 per cent.

[1] Data from United States Census, *Population*, Series P-19, No. 1, January, 1943.

The youth problem is comparatively recent in origin. Three hundred years ago, when the average expectancy of life at birth was less than thirty years as compared with sixty-six years in the United States today, one could hardly have spent the first twenty-five years in preparation for adulthood. In primitive society and even in early American society with its frontier agrarian pattern, childhood merged directly and unconsciously into adulthood; it was essential for those who reached physical maturity to find an active adult role as quickly as possible. Nowadays the conditions are far different. In 1940 the average male adolescent of fifteen could look forward to 51.2 years of life.[2] At twenty he could look forward to 46.8 years; at twenty-five, to 42.4 years. Females could expect two to four years more at these respective ages since women live longer than men. In view of these facts, our society does not, except in wartime, find it practical to accept adolescents into adult social roles.

As a result of this delay, youth today faces special difficulties of social transition in three fields: (1) economic adjustment, (2) moral adjustment, and (3) marital adjustment. Our thesis is that the trend of modern events has made increasingly difficult the transition of the child to maturity in these fields of personality development.

Briefly, what are the problems experienced by youth in making the transition to economic, moral, and marital adulthood; and why have they emerged?

The Transition to Economic Maturity

The essence of the problem of attaining economic adulthood in the companionship family rests in the fact that the work experience of parents no longer provides an apprenticeship for the training of youth. Urban industrial society has largely removed the advantage of the transmission of occupation from parent to child. In rural society there still is, especially on the farm, an apprenticeship advantage, if the youth enters agriculture. However, few youth reared on farms enter agriculture as their life occupation. The others prepare themselves for and enter occupations which have no relation to their childhood and adolescent experience.

[2] *United States Abridged Life Tables, 1930–1939.* U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.

Urban children have little experience with work up to the time they have completed their schooling. They have little chance to acquire either work habits or a work philosophy. They have little experience with chores or with holding a regular job, even during vacation periods, except in times of abundant employment like wartime. Many of them reach adulthood and face its responsibilities without any realistic appreciation of the fact that adult life consists primarily of a daily routine of work.

Isolation from a realistic work world removes the child not only from contact with its skills and habits but also from the attitudes and life-philosophies centering in work that make up so much of the experience of adulthood. As a consequence, when he finishes school somewhere between sixteen and twenty-four years of age, the youth comes up suddenly and sometimes shockingly against the work world, its reality and its modes of thought. The only vocation he knows intimately is that of the school teacher. But the school is rather far removed from the realities of the work-world in activities, motivation, and essential values. Even in urban society the school with its elaborate curriculum is so poorly tied into the world of adult work-activity that it does comparatively little to assure the child that he is ready to make the transition to economic adulthood normally and naturally.

PERCENTAGE OF ALL YOUTH AND OF YOUTH SEEKING EMPLOYMENT (IN THE LABOR MARKET) WHO WERE UNEMPLOYED IN 1937

Age	*Percentage unemployed of all youth*	*Percentage unemployed of those in the labor market*
15	3.5	41.4
16	10.6	50.0
17	17.5	46.5
18	24.1	41.6
19	23.4	34.7
15–19	15.8	41.2
20–24	17.3	24.3

Observe the high rate of unemployment among youth of the nation. Of youth fifteen to nineteen who were seeking work, 41.2 per cent were unemployed; of those twenty to twenty-four years of age, 24.3 per cent. Data are from the national Census of Unemployment of 1937.

More serious still, the trend of American urban-industrial culture has been to exclude youth from the work world. During the 1930's unemployment bore heaviest on the youth group. (See table.) The United States Employment Service reported that it had greatest difficulty placing men under twenty-five years of age.

The extent to which youth of various ages have been crowded from the work world throughout the nation is shown in the following table. The number of those fourteen to fifteen years of age who were gainfully employed dropped from 17.5 per cent in 1920 to 5.2 per cent in 1940. The number of those sixteen and seventeen years of age who were employed in 1940 was less than half that in 1920. The employed group eighteen and nineteen years of age decreased somewhat. The group twenty to twenty-four years of age showed a greater number entering the work world in 1940 than previously. The increase was among girls.

PERCENTAGE OF ADOLESCENTS AND YOUTH, AGES 14 TO 24, WHO WERE GAINFULLY OCCUPIED, UNITED STATES, 1920, 1930, AND 1940 [3]

Age group, years	Census period								
	1920			1930			1940		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
14–15	23.3	11.6	17.5	12.6	5.8	9.2	8.0	2.2	5.2
16–17	58.0	31.6	44.7	41.2	22.1	31.7	29.0	12.9	21.0
18–19	78.3	42.3	60.0	70.7	40.5	55.3	65.6	40.0	52.7
20–24	91.0	38.1	63.9	89.9	42.4	65.7	88.0	45.1	66.2

These data are significant in that they show clearly that young people under twenty were being crowded from the work world before the onset of the depression. This trend, which was well under way during the prosperous decade of the twenties, shows primarily the effects of (1) a long period of agitation against child labor, (2) labor union control of entrance to trades and industrial jobs, (3) a lowered demand for manpower, especially inexperienced manpower, produced by technology, and (4) the decline of self-employment opportunities, which makes it difficult for youth to find a place for themselves outside fields where jobs are dependent on job offers.

[3] *Population*, Vol. 3, Labor Force, Part 1, U.S. Summary, p. 26. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., 1940.

World War II, with its unprecedented manpower shortages, reversed this long-time trend and drew adolescents and youth into the labor market for both part-time and full-time jobs. This was, however, only an episode in our industrial culture. It is likely that the previous trend will now reassert itself.

Not only urban youth but great numbers of farm youth also must find an outlet in industry or be unemployed or underemployed. During the decade from 1940 to 1950, in the rural farm population 1,824,000 men from twenty-five to sixty-nine years of age will die or reach the retirement age of seventy years.[4] To replace them, 3,039,000 young men will reach their twenty-fifth birthday, a ratio of 167 young men to every 100 men who will normally be expected to drop out. This is an excess of sixty-seven young men for every hundred farm operators leaving agriculture. A place can, therefore, be found on the farm for only three out of five young men coming to maturity on farms. The situation varies considerably for states and regions, as is graphically shown in the map on page 306.


Even a greater proportion of young women than of young men must and do leave farming areas for urban employment. They also leave at a younger age, about three years, than young men.[5] The farm boy or girl who must migrate faces all the difficulties of transition to the work world that the urban youth faces, with the added problem of adjusting to secondary-group life and urban living. To offset these handicaps, he may, on the other hand, have the advantage of having acquired work habits and a work philosophy from the close association with the work world inherent in the family-farm enterprise of agriculture.

Choice of a vocation is a difficult problem in an economy which presents many alternatives, but it is only the first one. Finding an opening in the chosen vocation proves at times to be difficult in an age when self-employment is at a minimum. The situation during the depression years of the 1930's was probably atypical, but it may have been little worse than conditions that will reappear. Bell's study[6] of Maryland youth showed wide

[4] CONRAD TAEUBER, *Replacement Rates for Rural-Farm Males Aged 25 to 69 Years, by Counties, 1940–1950* (mimeographed). United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., December, 1944.


[5] C. HORACE HAMILTON, "The Annual Rate of Departure of Rural Youths from Their Parental Homes." *Rural Sociology*, 1:164–179, June, 1936.

[6] HOWARD M. BELL, *Youth Tell Their Story*, p. 132. American Youth Commission, Washington, D.C., 1938.



U. S. Department of Agriculture *Bureau of Agricultural Economics*

discrepancies between the jobs youth wanted and the ones they actually obtained. For example, almost 40 per cent wanted white-collar jobs, but many of them were finally located of necessity in skilled and common labor. Studies elsewhere along similar lines showed similar results.[7]



Bell, "Youth Tell Their Story"

JOBS YOUTH WANT AND JOBS THEY GET

Can any society expect to supply so many white-collar jobs? Where do youth get their desire to enter the white-collar groups?

This situation reflects in part, no doubt, the emphasis of the school on training for white-collar positions, as well as our general cultural values which relate status to work with one's head rather than with one's hands, and which place office jobs above factory or farm work. To the extent that the school fails to correct these spurious values among youth, it sets the stage for frustration. In wartime, however, when overalls and factory were idealized, not only young men but also young women flocked to jobs that entailed

[7] E. L. MORGAN and M. W. SNEED, "The Activities of Rural Young People in Missouri," *Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 269*. Columbia, Missouri, 1937.

dirty clothes and working with one's hands. Economic rewards may have some bearing on this problem, but it seems likely that status is even more important in determining the direction youth's vocational ambitions take in a particular period.

Vocational training, in the sense of training for specific industrial jobs, is probably not the answer to youth's problem of work world transition in industrial society. The American Youth Commission, studying 2216 occupations in 18 industries representative of roughly 70 per cent of American workers, found that few jobs require extensive school training. The Commission also found that on 59 per cent of the jobs normal productivity was reached either without training or within a week or less of training on the job. Of the workers employed, approximately 95 per cent had received their training on the job.[8]

Another study of work world experience corroborates these findings and shows clearly that most training of men now employed on jobs was received on the job rather than in schools or through special training institutions. The data are given in the following table:

SOURCE OF TRAINING OF 3905 WORKERS IN 66 MINNESOTA PLANTS, 1931–32[9]

Source of Training	*Number of workers*	*Per cent*
All sources	3905	100.0
No training	14	0.4
Instruction by foremen	2190	56.0
Instruction by other workers	1504	38.5
Special training institution	12	0.3
Vocational school	2	0.1
Apprenticeship	175	4.5
High school	0	0.0
College	8	0.2

The American Youth Commission, in considering these vocational problems, does not stress the traditional notion of need

[8] HOWARD M. BELL, *Matching Youth and Jobs*, pp. 46–60. American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1940.

[9] V. C. FRYKLUND, *The Selection and Training of Modern Factory Workers*, p. 17. Employment Stabilization Research Institute, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1934.

for more vocational training but rather the importance of vocational education and vocational guidance. It emphasizes the need for giving information about the range of occupations, for teaching the requirements of the work world, for exploring various opportunities, for inculcating the virtues of work, and for providing other training that will assist young people in deciding on a vocation and building attitudes favorable to success in the work world. This kind of training the Commission calls vocational education. Vocational guidance, it explains, is designed to help youth understand their own aptitudes, interests, and abilities as they relate to particular vocational fields or occupational tasks. It involves the use of measurement and testing in the fields of ability and aptitude, and expert counsel so that the young person will find himself in relation to his environment. It should include, and probably will do so in the future, after graduation follow-up to assist youth in finding satisfactory places in the work world.

EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF 2216 OCCUPATIONS IN 18 INDUSTRIES [10]

Educational requirement	*Percentage of jobs*
No education (assumes ability to read, speak, and write English)	47.1
Some elementary education	7.8
Graduation from elementary school	12.1
Some high school education	3.8
High school graduation	20.2
Some college education	2.5
College graduation	6.5

The Commission also recommends a work year for youth.[11] The idea seems sound but is one which would be very difficult of achievement in our society. The essence of the program is that at about sixteen years of age, or at the time the tenth grade is completed, a work year be provided. At this time some youth, the Commission believes, have had all the education that society should give them and should immediately enter the work world to stay. Others should, after a period of six months or so of

[10] HOWARD M. BELL, *Matching Youth and Jobs*, p. 60. American Youth Commission, Washington, D.C., 1940.

[11] American Youth Commission, *Youth and the Future*, pp. 23–27. American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1942.

toughening experience, be permitted to continue their schooling. The Commission thinks this kind of adjustment is necessary because misfits among young people include many with good minds who have by long habit of schooling developed the mental characteristics of a sponge.

Some private groups and some institutions are already making notable progress in facing the realities of youth's problem of work world adjustment. On the college level Antioch College, with its combination of work and schooling, has achieved distinction. On the high school level, Junior Achievement, Incorporated,[12] in 1945 spent a quarter of a million dollars in giving young people fifteen to twenty-one years of age work experience in organizing and running a miniature business or industry, from selling stock to capitalize the activity to marketing the finished product. This movement is reported to be growing.

Success in the work world is so important to personality adjustment, to making the break with parental authority and achieving independent adulthood, to marriage and homemaking, in fact, to achieving the other values and goals of adulthood that industrial society must come to grips with it in a more realistic way than has been done heretofore.

The Transition to Moral Maturity

In discussing the transition to moral maturity, we are defining the term not in any narrow sense but rather in the sense of the child's reaching a point in his development at which he conforms to social regulations and responds to society's control devices as a mature adult individual must do. If he makes this transition from childhood to adulthood, he becomes the responsible adult, the respected, law-abiding citizen; if he fails, he becomes the delinquent, the criminal misfit, the neurotic or rebellious individual, or at best the insecure, unhappy person.

In static societies, with integrated primary-group ties, only one set of moral definitions is held by family, neighborhood, and community. The child absorbs these as a matter of course and has little chance to borrow outside patterns. To a person who knows but one way of life, that way is right. The child in static societies faces few problems of moral choice; for as long as the

[12] National headquarters are at 345 Madison Avenue, New York 17, New York.

elders live, they make the decisions. By the time they die, the youth has children of his own and has, by virtue of unconsciously acquired habits, himself become a conserver of tradition. Morals change little throughout the centuries. Except for an occasional nonconformist who finds the pattern incompatible, problems of achieving moral adulthood do not exist.[13]

Urban society today, and to an extent our mobile rural society, introduces the child to a world of many moral codes. The simple, positive definitions of two or three generations ago ("That's wicked." "This is right." "That is wrong.") no longer exist. Parents and teachers themselves have often made no moral synthesis of experience in a world where activities have become more complex than established social norms and where social demands have outreached traditional moral codes. Some parents tell their sixteen-year-old child, "You'll have to decide that for yourself," when he brings up a perplexing moral issue. They ask him to decide the problem for himself because they have not been able to decide it for themselves.

General observation and the experience of reading more than a thousand autobiographies of college students have convinced the writer that the average youth of today by the time he reaches twenty years of age has made more moral decisions than persons of a generation or two ago made in a lifetime.[14]

Throughout the industrialized world the revolt of youth groups has been characteristic, and youth movements have been common. Most of these are revolts against established standards. In America the high school has created a youth group that includes a majority of youths. In many of their informal contacts, these youths function relatively independently of adult supervision and ideologies. Innovations in standards of conduct are numerous, and old codes are replaced by new ones.

It is freedom to choose, the necessity for choice, which change, social complexity, movement, and independence have brought that make adolescence an age of mental conflict, a time of emotional turmoil. It is the experience of choosing that makes modern youth mature early in the ways both of crime and of civic duty, of social rebellion and of social morality. Youth in static

[13] For a further discussion of this problem, see PAUL H. LANDIS, *Social Control*, Chapters 9–11. J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1939.

[14] This point is developed at length in the writer's article, "Points of Stress in Adolescent Morality." *School and Society*, 51:612–666, May 11, 1940.

societies grow naturally and without effort into an acceptance of the ethics of the tribe. Youth in a dynamic society of complex standards must select from a variety of codes and voluntarily adopt social standards or have none. Because activities have become more complex than social norms, new social demands more pressing than traditional moral standards, the youth of today must build a synthesis of experience or lack personality integration.

Those interested in character development may well give careful study to external situations encountered by the youth of today, for such study will reveal that the youth must in many situations choose for himself rather than depend upon traditional guides. That he be prepared to do so seems to be desirable. Too close supervision in childhood is, therefore, undesirable and too rigid instruction in codes which are out of line with conduct that will be essential as social experience enlarges also seems inappropriate. Too restricted a blueprint for behavior is likely to bring revolt if the individual in the normal course of his development faces contradictory but attractive, and what appear to him to be satisfactory, patterns. Rather than have revolt, which always involves the danger of going too far, it is probably better to teach a broader code or to teach that there are different codes and by such frank recognition prepare the youth to make a more intelligent selection.

Unfortunately in the moral field, as has been suggested, many parents are too confused themselves to act as guides to youth. They know that the traditional morality which they themselves were taught is inadequate in the wider group situations in which youth must function, but they are bewildered as to what to put in its place. The Lynds found this attitude prominent in Middletown, a feeling on the part of parents that "their difficulties outrun their best efforts to cope with them." [15]

Rural parents are more inclined to cling to the remnants of an authoritative family pattern, but they meet with little success. They are often more positive than the urban parent but less wise. The high school, with the relative freedom it offers from parental authority, permits rural youth to break the way to freedom from the restrictive taboos of the local neighborhood but often throws him into a period of cynicism and moral disillusionment by virtue

[15] ROBERT S. LYND and HELEN M. LYND, *Middletown*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1929.

of the contrast between primary- and secondary-group morality. The need for moral training is evident. Many homes are no longer able to cope with it adequately. The school has not yet met the challenge. It must do so.

Even in higher education there is too much tearing apart of the foundations of morality and religion; too little putting them together again on a more rational basis than the traditions of yesterday. Philosophy and ethics have almost disappeared from the curriculum. Like much religious dogma they are founded on deductive reasoning, which proceeds from assumed dogmatic premises to presumed consequences. This kind of logic no longer appeals. The scientifically trained mind of youth must be approached with deductive reasoning which infers conclusions from demonstrated premises.

It would appear that the social scientist, and particularly the sociologist, has a responsibility in constructing a social ethics based on the broadest knowledge of the social consequences of behavior. A rational ethics, rooted in pragmatic tests of social merit, would seem to be a proper approach for our time. We need a moral system for secondary-group experience.

The Transition to Marital Maturity

Marital adjustment in contemporary culture is largely an emotional one. It involves a transfer of deepest emotional ties from the parental family — parents, brothers, and sisters — to a member of the opposite sex of one's own choosing. The transfer is a vital one since under the companionship concept of marriage, love is the true and only foundation for marriage, romance the only guide to mate selection; and within marriage, romance is the road to happiness. The transition therefore is given a tremendous amount of attention in American culture. In fact, de Sales, a Frenchman, viewing our romantic pattern, has suggested that this is the only nation in the world in which love is a national problem.[16]

We have elevated love to a position of importance not only in the companionship family but also in the goals of life itself. No other relationships are put to such a severe test as courtship, love-making, and marriage — the test of supreme happiness. And

[16] RAOUL DE ROUSSY DE SALES, "Love in America." *Atlantic Monthly*, 161:645–651, May, 1938.

in no other sphere has modern society left more to the discretion of immature youth who must, through experimental ventures in romance, seek their own future happiness in marriage with the mate they choose under the unguided stress of biological impulse.

The companionship family, unlike the institutional family, has almost entirely removed from the hands of adults, supervising elders, matchmakers, and others with impartial judgment, the responsibility of helping youth select mates. As a consequence, for more than a generation marriage has been left almost entirely to the discretion of youth. Only within the last few years has alarm been expressed concerning the responsibilities youth have faced, and some thought given to providing them with scientific tests of marriage suitability, advisory staffs in clinics to answer questions and give advice, and other such means to temper romance with a degree of caution and judgment.


Adolescence and youth, as far as marriage preparation is concerned, is likely to be a period of romantic thrill-seeking patterned after motion-picture romance. Dating and later courtship and engagement carry the youth through a series of love-making experiences which are often in the nature of a major pastime rather than motivated by a serious intention to marry. Marriage itself is a consequence of emotional involvement rather than of a desire to have a home and children.

Accumulated evidence shows that inexperience and youthfulness are decided handicaps in mate selection in our culture. The first stages of romance are likely to be too intense to permit realistic considerations of the marriage partnership. A high proportion of marriages resulting from a brief courtship fails to realize happiness. This conclusion is suggested by the accompanying chart on page 315, which relates the length of the courtship period to adjustment in marriage.

In the United States the most popular ages of marriage for young women are seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, and twenty; more marry then than at any other ages. (See pictographic chart on page 316.) More young men marry during the years twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three, and twenty-four than at any other time.[17] By the close of the twentieth year, 36.3 per cent of young women are married; by the close of the twenty-fourth year almost 45 per cent of young men are married.

[17] *Population*, Series P-19, No. 2, July 8, 1943.

While the industrialized part of the world is no doubt delaying the age of marriage beyond that which characterized most primitive peoples, more youth are being married now than in 1890 in the United States. (See table on page 317.) Although data are not available to prove the assertion, it is probable that the marriage rate is considerably higher than in years prior to 1890. Frontier conditions were not conducive to early marriage; on the contrary, rural living in the United States has been and is now conducive to bachelorhood. The frontier is always heavily weighted with males. In the rural farm population of the United States in 1940 there were 127 males per 100 females in the age group 20 to 24 years. These facts reduce the average, outweighing the high proportion of those in rural areas who do marry very early.




Burgess and Cottrell, "Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage," Prentice-Hall, Inc.

PERIOD OF ACQUAINTANCE BEFORE MARRIAGE AND SUCCESS OF ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE

These data suggest that short courtships mean poor marriages in a high proportion of cases. Long acquaintance is an important safeguard.

Increase in sex delinquency, therefore, can scarcely be explained by delay in the age of marriage. It must be explained rather by altered mores, greater freedom, changes in the social structure making for anonymity, the changed setting of courtship, the sex stimulation of many modern forms of art, advertising, and entertainment, and other such factors.

The unmarried person's experience today is characterized by dating and by more or less intimate contact with members of the opposite sex. This situation probably is responsible in a considerable part for the problems of delayed marriage we now have in the United States. There is constant stimulus to perform all the physical functions of marriage, and at the same time an overruling necessity to continue unmarried. This applies



Based on data from "Population," Series P-19, No. 2, July 8, 1943, U.S. Bureau of the Census
Drawn by McGraw-Hill for Landis, "Adolescence and Youth"

PER CENT OF YOUTH OF VARIOUS AGES IN THE UNITED STATES WHO ARE MARRIED

Data are for 1940. More girls marry in all the years than boys. In more than two of three marriages the girl is younger.

especially to the educated group, who are obliged to delay marriage until the late twenties when they have completed college and have made a start in their chosen professions.

PER CENT OF YOUTH MARRIED FOR CENSUS YEARS 1890–1940 [18]

Year	Youth 15–19		Youth 20–24	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
1890	9.5	0.5	46.7	18.9
1900	10.9	1.0	46.5	21.6
1910	11.3	1.1	49.7	24.0
1920	12.5	2.1	52.3	29.3
1930	12.6	1.7	51.6	28.1
1940	11.6	1.7	51.3	27.4

Contrary to popular opinions there has been no appreciable delay in age of marriage. Fewer in the younger ages were married in 1940 than 1930 but the war years undoubtedly increased marriage in the youth group.

Under the romantic pattern of mate selection age, education, and courtship experience have a decided advantage from the standpoint of making a wise decision. Those who marry early find their marriage unsatisfactory much more frequently than those who select a mate later. The data assembled by Burgess and Cottrell [19] as presented in the chart on page 318 are typical of evidence on this point.

Numerous studies attest the fact that education is favorable to wise mate selection.[20] One reason for this fact is that higher education delays marriage until youth in the natural course of maturity develop common-sense values in this field. Moreover college youth, even in the absence of courses on marriage and family, are inclined to discuss the economic, sexual, status, and temperamental aspects of courtship and marriage frankly and to face many such issues realistically. This is still more true on campuses where marriage courses provide factual evidence or controversial views on various aspects of mate selection and marriage.


Baber's study of students' attitudes in a metropolitan university suggests that while college students hold certain romantic

[18] Adapted from census reports of the respective years.

[19] *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage.* Courtesy of Prentice-Hall, Inc.

[20] The above study presents evidence as do most of those listed in the bibliography at the end of the chapter.

values which reflect rather superficial attitudes of our culture pattern, they put mate-seeking to some very substantial tests also. (See table on page 319.)



* Includes a few cases in which the husband was 17 or 18

Burgess and Cottrell, "Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage," Prentice-Hall, Inc.

AGE OF MARRIAGE OF HUSBAND AND WIFE IS RELATED TO SUCCESS IN ADJUSTMENT

Almost half of the wives who married under nineteen years of age made poor adjustments in marriage; few made good adjustments. Husbands who married under twenty-two years of age chanced poor adjustment in marriage.

For example, most young men would not marry a girl who was not decidedly good-looking; yet they would not marry one of unattractive disposition and personality or in poor health. Girls are more concerned about the age, education, and personality of their prospective mate than about his looks. They want a man better educated and older than they themselves. Other evidence shows that educated young women actually succeed in following these standards of mate selection which assure greater economic security. In 65 to 70 per cent of all marriages the man is the older, and in about two out of three cases of educated marriages the man has more education.[21]

[21] See such studies as PAUL POPENOE, "Mate Selection." *American Sociological Review*, 2:735–743, October, 1937; LEWIS M. TERMAN and others, *Psychological Factors*

ATTITUDES OF 642 JUNIOR AND SENIOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS (321 YOUNG MEN AND 321 YOUNG WOMEN) ON MATE SELECTION [22]

Questions	Young men, per cent answering		Young women, per cent answering	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
All other factors being satisfactory would you marry:				
1. A person of lower economic rank than your own? ..	93	7	82	18
2. A person decidedly not good-looking?	32	68	79	21
3. A person of unattractive disposition and personality?	2	98	4	96
4. A person of lower moral standards than your own?	29	71	20	80
5. A person from a family you consider inferior to your own?	78	22	75	25
6. A person of a different religious faith (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish) from your own?	58	42	42	58
If so, would you be willing to adopt his faith?	9	91	5	95
7. A person in decidedly poor health, likely to be of long standing if:				
His health were bad when you first became acquainted?	6	94	4	96
His health became bad after an intimate friendship has formed?	49	51	50	50
8. A person of less intelligence and (or) education than your own?	76	24	18	82
Would you want your mate to have less education than you have, the same education as you have, or more than you have?	Less, 17 Same, 78 More, 5		Less, 0 Same, 36 More, 64	
9. Do you want your mate to be older than yourself, the same age, or younger?	Older, 1 Same, 24 Younger, 75		Older, 94 Same, 6 Younger, 0	
How much older or younger?	3 years		5 years	
What is the limit in age difference beyond which you would not go?	8 years		10 years	

in Marital Happiness. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1938; WILLIAM S. BERNARD, "Student Attitudes on Marriage and the Family." *American Sociological Review*, 3:354–361, June, 1938; RAY E. BABER, *Marriage and the Family*, p. 149. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1939; D. U. MATHER, "The Courtship Ideals of High School Students." *Sociology and Social Research*, 19:169, 1934–1935; PAUL H. LANDIS and KATHERINE H. DAY, "Education as a Factor in Mate Selection." *American Sociological Review*, 10:558–560, August, 1945, and "Educational Selection in Marriage." *Statistical Bulletin*, 26:3–5, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, New York, September, 1945.

[22] RAY E. BABER, *Marriage and the Family*, p. 149. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1939.

The school must give youth assistance in mate selection and arrange for training in the classroom at both the high school and college levels. It is well known that similarity of culture background and ideals, physical fitness, emotional stability, and ruggedness of character are important to marriage success. Youth have a right to know these things in choosing a mate. They need also to be made aware that the relationships they have with each other's families after marriage, their own vocational and recreational interests, their religious inclinations and choice of creeds, their accustomed standard of living, and many other such factors enter into marriage. Romance alone cannot remove barriers to mutual understanding and compatibility on many of these issues.

School training must also stress preparation for marriage, home life, and parenthood. Our present motivation of both boy and girl, but especially of the girl, is too much toward a vocation and not enough toward homemaking and training in attitudes that place family success high in youth's scheme of values. These social objectives can no longer be left to chance. If for no other reason than to avoid the hazards to the personality of the young child, described in the preceding chapter, youth must be guided toward successful marriage.

Review

1. Discuss the almost complete divorcement of youth from the family upon reaching maturity. Is this a unique feature of modern culture?
2. What factors have created the youth group in modern society?
3. Give data showing the extent of the youth group in the United States.
4. What are the three critical transitions of the youth period?
5. What are some of the difficulties which beset youth when they attempt the transition from economic dependence to economic maturity?
6. Contrast the work apprenticeship of rural and of urban youth.
7. What has been the long-term tendency of industrial society with regard to employing youth? Why?
8. How do you account for the wide discrepancy between the jobs which Maryland youth signified they wished to get and the jobs they actually obtained?
9. Do most jobs require extensive school training? Explain.

10. Why has the shift in emphasis been from vocational training to vocational guidance?
11. What program did the American Youth Commission recommend for teaching work and giving experience?
12. Why is it so much more difficult for youth to reach emotional maturity without mishap in an urban society than in a rural society?
13. Why do many parents fail as guides for their children in the field of morality?
14. What is the result of a failure to reach moral maturity?
15. Give examples of types of situations or of experiences which cause youth serious moral conflict.
16. What responsibility must education take in helping youth attain moral maturity?
17. Why is marital adjustment so closely tied in with emotional maturity?
18. What guides have been given youth to help them select their mate? Are these guides necessary in our society? Explain.
19. What are the facts concerning age of marriage? Of what significance are they?
20. Why has sex delinquency increased?
21. Why do the educated group have more moral conflicts in regard to marriage than do those who marry at an earlier age?
22. Why is education favorable to wise mate selection?
23. What part can education play in giving assistance in mate selection?
24. Why is it so desirable to guide youth toward the wise selection of a mate?

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CHAPTER 17

THE AGED IN THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY

Age and Social Roles

FROM A BIOLOGICAL STANDPOINT age is a measure of maturity, a simple index of the duration of the mechanism in time. From the standpoint of organic development age marks roughly the various stages in the maturation of the individual, although physiological development may vary somewhat from the chronological norm. From a sociological standpoint age is significant primarily in that it determines the role the individual will play in a given social group during any cross section of time within a locale of culture. From an economic standpoint age is significant in that it conditions the individual's role as consumer and producer of goods and his place as an independent or dependent member of the group.

The role of children, of youth, of the middle-aged, and of the old varies greatly in different cultures. Always in these roles one encounters social definitions which may spring rather directly from biological characteristics of a given age group in the population but more often spring from customs, some of which have no logical antecedents but rather a chance origin. Children may be petted and pampered until they are twenty years of age or they may be forced to work like slaves at the age of six. Adolescence may be marked by puberty ceremonies which engross the attention of the entire tribe for a season or it may be disregarded. During the early history of our nation youth found a place in the work world at a very tender age because the frontier was short of men. Today the average youth often lives a life of comparative leisure until he is eighteen or twenty years of age, protected from economic responsibilities, not required to do strenuous work, allowed to cultivate his mind and develop his own interests in the artificial world of the school system.

The role of the middle-aged is more likely to be standardized,


in a broad sense, than that of any other age group, this period in life being one that is of necessity in all cultures devoted to certain basic interests — the rearing of families and the production of economic goods.

In some societies age is greatly revered, the best that life has to give coming to the old by virtue of the high regard in which they are held. Such is the case in Chinese society, where honor is accorded in proportion to one's years. In other societies the aged are treated with practical realism, some disposing of them by various means because they are an economic burden which the society does not see fit to carry. In other societies tradition calls for suicide when the old person becomes dependent. Old people may be few in numbers in societies with high mortality rates but nonetheless they may, if custom so dictates, be the most influential group in the entire population. They may be relatively numerous, as in our own population, and yet not hold the reins of social control. Age, like most other population characteristics, takes on significance largely in terms of what the group, because of established custom, makes of it.

The Aged in Modern Society

Interest in this discussion centers about problems of social and economic adjustment of the aged in the companionship family. The general thesis is that in our culture the organic fact of age distribution has a changing significance, not because the various steps of maturation marking the critical points in the life cycle are perceptibly different from what they have always been, but because American culture has been radically modified in the gradual transition from a rural-agricultural to an urban industrial pattern of life, and from the institutional to the companionship family. Numerous changes in the roles that the various ages play, both in their relationship to one another and in their relationship to major activities of the social order, have been effected by this transition.

It is a matter of common knowledge to the social scientist that the proportion of the aged in the nation has increased and will continue to grow rapidly for another four decades. The proportion of aged (those 65 and over) in 1880 was 3.4; in 1900, 4.1; in 1920, 4.7; in 1940, 6.9. By 1960 the percentage will be 10.2 and by 1980, 14.4, according to predictions (See table on page 328).




Camera Guild, Inc.

AT THE SUNSET OF LIFE

For many this period has too little meaning in a society that pushes the elders aside.

Absolute numbers of the aged will multiply from approximately nine million now to twenty-two million in 1980. (See table on page 329.) What is to be the place of this increasing group in American society? This is one of those questions of internal welfare that are assuming considerable importance for our nation.

Long life brings experience and the education which experience contributes. Can these be utilized? Age brings forced leisure. Can an individual after the normally busy years of middle life use it in such a way as to be happy personally and a contributor to the social good? The aged ordinarily have many blood ties. What social advantages or disadvantages accrue? The aged control much property. Can they control it intelligently and for the social good? Much power is vested in them. Should they retain authority and have access to the ballot or should they be expected to retire from all kinds of leadership? What kind of social institutions can be devised to meet the needs of the old of all social classes in a society which seems to have



Thompson, "Plenty of People," p. 153, Jaques Cattell Press

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES BY SELECTED AGE PERIODS, 1870–1970

In one hundred years the ratio of children and youth will decline appreciably, the ratio of the old multiply many times.

done a better job of prolonging life than of giving to those whose life has been prolonged a satisfactory place in the social order?

In American society the aged group is a problem for a great number of reasons. No definite place is made for it in the productive economic scheme and it has only recently been cared for as a subsidized economic group. The aged are given little place in managing the affairs of the world unless they happen to be vigorous enough to have retained an executive position. But the tendency has been increasingly to retire people even in influential positions when they pass sixty-five or seventy years of age, as is done in universities and in certain industries. Although there are no stated retirement provisions in political fields, the public is critical of men running for office after they have reached the upper ages. It is, however, true that in court positions, in legislatures, and in Congress a large number of men who have passed their threescore and five or even their threescore and ten are today in positions of influence and power. It is also true that even though about a third of those sixty-five and over are

PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 65 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, 1880 TO 1940 AND PREDICTED RATIOS TO 1980 [1]

Year	Per cent	Year	Per cent
1880	3.4	1940	6.9
1890	3.9	1950	7.9
1900	4.1	1960	10.2
1910	4.3	1970	11.9
1920	4.7	1980	14.4
1930	5.4		

An increase in the average length of life, and a falling birth rate, decreasing the proportion of children and youth, have the effect of increasing the ratio of old people.

NUMBER OF PEOPLE 65 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1930 AND 1940 AND PREDICTED NUMBER TO 1980 [2]

Year	Number	Year	Number
1930	6,633,805	1960	14,818,000
1940	9,019,314	1970	17,995,000
1950	11,203,000	1980	22,051,000

dependent, control of a considerable share of the world's wealth is in the hands of the aged. If a man has been successful in building an industrial empire or in amassing a fortune during his working years, he ordinarily retains his wealth until death. The psychological implications of political and economic control by the aged are probably of considerable importance, although in the absence of data one can only speculate regarding their significance. Since the old tend to be conservative, one would assume that the power of this group tends to exert a conservative influence in the general practices of governmental and economic institutions.

Finally, and most significantly, the aged are a problem because there is no place for them in the companionship families of their children in urban society.

[1] "Estimated Future Population, by Age and Sex: 1945 to 1980," Series P-3, July 23, 1941, United States Bureau of the Census, and *Population*, Series P-10, Table 4, May 5, 1943.

[2] *Ibid.*

In a society which has only recently begun to consider the aged a major problem group and to develop institutions to meet their needs, it is to be expected that they face numerous problems of psychological, social, and economic adjustment. Their adjustments on these levels to the changing character of society are the crux of this problem.

Difficulties of Adjustment in Old Age

In making any adjustment to life the aged are working under the initial handicap of waning physical and mental energy. The waning of physical powers will be taken for granted, for common observation verifies the fact. The waning of mental powers seems, however, also to characterize age. Evidence indicates that mental ability grows to a certain point, matures, and declines.[3]

The power of making quick decisions deteriorates in late maturity; information tends to increase up to the fifties, but its acquisition becomes more difficult. Older people make high scores on tests in vocabulary and on the knowledge of words but do not do so well on tests in analogy or in situations demanding adaptation. One must allow, as Bird shows,[4] for unequal rates of mental development and decline. Although age exacts penalties, many older men have acute mental power. The important thing is man's ability, not his age. Individual differences often transcend age differences so that even in such things as motor activity, some old people exceed some young people.

There are, of course, many examples of persons of extreme age making notable contributions to society. Madame Schumann-Heink made her debut on the screen when she was seventy-four years old; Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was active until ninety; Tennyson wrote "Crossing the Bar" at eighty-three; Titian was ninety-eight when he painted the "Battle of Lepanto"; Cato the Censor is said to have learned Greek after he was eighty; Verdi produced "Ave Maria" at eighty-five.[5] It is possible that lack of creative activity in the later years in many cases may be as

[3] For a summary of evidence, see CHARLES BIRD's *Social Psychology*, Chapter 12. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1940.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 417.

[5] These examples are summarized from E. WHITTEN, "How Old Is Aged?" *Literary Digest*, 124 (Digest 1):20, August 21, 1937.

much due to lack of motivation as to decreased creative powers.[6] Even poor memory may be due in considerable part to inattention and lack of interest.

Senescence, in many cases, is no doubt in part a state of mind. Ill health, economic insecurity, loss of social prestige, the shock of dropping out of the work world, enforced idleness, and other factors, many of which are of external origin, may be so emotionally disturbing as to cause the individual to give up the struggle to advance or to be self-maintaining.[7] According to Strode,[8] senescence most often comes after some crisis such as loss of position, health, prestige, relatives. Helton[9] suggests that retirement from activity makes old people think they are old. "Unless a man has some source of dominance and pride, he retreats into the past and becomes a child socially." Childishness in the old is often due to fears, insecurities, and a lack of interests.[10]

In contemporary American culture general social forces have produced conditions that contribute to the extensive readjustments required of the old — changes produced by mechanical invention, mobility, and urbanization are among the principal forces calling for readjustment. These forces have, in fact, made of the aged population group a new kind of social problem. Among these are adjustment to change of residence, to changes in social roles, to decreasing respect and prestige, and to reduced authority.

In static societies the family never breaks up, for children rarely leave home in the sense that they do in highly mobile societies of the present time; rather, in the large family setting of familistic cultures the family is a continuous affair, the children either remaining in the family or settling nearby in the neighborhood or community, so that the pain of children leaving home is not experienced. Neither is the isolation that comes with having lost a family characteristic of static cultures.

In direct contrast, in our society the family as a unit for rear-

[6] H. C. LEHMAN suggests this possibility in "Creative Years; Best Books." *Scientific Monthly*, 45:65–75, July, 1937.

[7] For a good statement of the view, see E. KAHN and L. W. SIMMONS, "Problems of Middle Age." *Yale Review*, 29:349–363, December, 1939.

[8] J. STRODE, "County Worker's Job; Old Folks Are Like That." *Survey*, 75:41–43, February, 1939.

[9] R. HELTON, "Old People a Rising National Problem." *Harper's*, 179:449–459, October, 1939.

[10] F. FENTON, "Old Age Is What You Make It." *Independent Woman*, 18:359–360, November, 1939.

ing children is a temporary affair which in many cases terminates abruptly with children moving away from not only the home but from the neighborhood and community. The aging parents are thus suddenly left without the interests in which they have invested the better part of their life's energy and attention during the middle years. It is for this reason, perhaps more than for any other, that intense loneliness so often characterizes the experience of the aged.

Because of the general habits of mobility in American culture, even the old person may find it necessary or desirable to move in the later years. But even if he remains in his rural neighborhood or small town setting, there is an increasing tendency for neighbors and friends to move out, so that the primary-group ties which are so meaningful in age are severed and the aged person finds himself facing the very difficult problem of trying to make new friends at a time in life when making new friends is difficult.

The influences of mobility have been added to the problems of adjustment of old people who, in our culture as in all cultures, must suffer the pain of seeing their friends, relatives, and neighbors parted from them by death. It is, of course, possible that the very fact of extensive mobility has eased this source of pain to the aged, in that separation by distance tends to make people less conscious of loss through death.

Even the institutions in which the old person is rooted often prove to be transitory. He may actually outlive them, as numerous old people have done in open-country areas and hamlets, where the church of their childhood and middle-age has closed its doors with the general shift toward village- and city-oriented church life. The old social organizations that played such a part in the rural community during the horse-and-buggy days have been replaced by the more specialized, individualistic organizations in which the old person may have little place.

But the adjustments required within rural life cannot compare with the radical personality adjustments that are necessitated when an old person transfers from rural to urban culture, as some must do in going to live with children or in entering some public institution.

In a mobile society even adjustments to material objects may be important, for such objects in the person's environment take on value in proportion to the experience he associates with them. To the old many objects that are worthless from a monetary view-

point may be full of meaning because of the numerous experiences these objects revive in memory. Because material objects do have rich meaning it is extremely difficult for the old who have lived in fairly stable environments to adjust to any change that may have to be made in such objects. But most old people do have to give up some of these objects of value. As they become unable to carry on independently, one of their grown children may move into the old place and begin to destroy old articles which to him are cumbersome and worthless. Again, in some cases the old person is compelled to move from his old home, and all that he can take with him of the past is a few of his smaller possessions.

Social Participation of the Old

The old experience a radical transition in institutional participation. Frequently, in the case of the old person who is in ill health or who lacks means of getting about, he must cease his participation in social institutions of which he has been a lifelong member and this at a time when he most needs the institution from the standpoint of passing time and receiving the stimulation of the company of others. Often he must cease attending church. Fortunately in our time he may substitute the radio, if he has access to one, receiving from its programs some of the benefits of his former participation in religious and other activities. But in all social organizations he is likely to play a much less prominent role than he has been accustomed to playing, a change which is difficult to make at any age in life. There is the painful experience of shifting from a situation in which he has exercised authority and in which his word has been respected to a position in which his authority has been relinquished to another and his ideas are considered out-of-date. The decreasing energy of old age may somewhat prepare the individual psychologically for this transition, but to be no longer a leader when one has been a leader carries with it its own problem for many who are forced to drop out of active participation in institutional and organizational leadership before they choose to do so, as, for example, because of retirement provisions of certain institutions.

If he turns to attempts at reformation as a substitute for leadership activities, he often becomes an old fogey, for reforms that are considered desirable are not expected to come from the aged

He belongs to another generation whose society in a dynamic age has passed out of existence. He may, if no longer able to be active because of lack of physical prowess and energy, learn to be content with daydreams of yesterday's achievements. Unable to do those things which bring the admiration of one's fellows, he seeks an audience that will listen sympathetically to the tales of yesterday's exploits. Because the middle-aged are too busy to listen, he must seek the association of those of his own age or better still of children who, if they are not too sophisticated, are ready to listen wide-eyed to his tales.

More serious still is the frequent necessity of old people having to enter institutions with a regimen which is entirely new. Strangely enough, until very recently the special institutions provided for the aged were based on the assumption that the old person who needed institutionalization was a pathological type. Old folks' homes, county poorhouses, and other such institutions which society provided were definitely organized for the pathological individual. If the old person goes to live with relatives there is the problem of learning to adjust to the domination of his own children and of learning to get along with grandchildren. In the modern small family, composed of individualists, this is not easy.

Wisdom of the Aged in a Changing Society

The aged have the wisdom of experience. In many cultures such wisdom is prized highly because it provides the safest guide the group possesses; in all culture it has value in certain realms. Its value decreases in proportion to the degree of development of scientific wisdom and of scientific techniques for control. Its value is greatest in those cultures which have neither a developed scientific complex nor a written language. In such cultures the wisdom of the race must be passed on by word of mouth from generation to generation. The old have had time to absorb the tradition of the group and also to help build tradition; it is they who are most able to pass it on. In such cultures the wisdom of experience is good; in fact, the best kind of wisdom, for it reveals how man has triumphed and how he has been defeated, showing therefore, how he may best pick his way cautiously forward.

In a highly complex modern culture, with written history and with science, age is not a criterion of wisdom. Much of learning is acquired not by direct experience but by education; much of

man's knowledge of how to do things in a technological age comes by way of science and invention and not by absorbing traditional folkways. In such a culture, youth may soon outstrip the surviving old, both in wisdom and in the mastery of the methods and techniques of a mechanical age. True, the aged may have a practical slant on many phases of life that only experience can give, but youth are their masters in the world of action and all too often set aside the superior judgments of the aged, even though that judgment carries the sanction of tradition. In the rapidly changing society there is an inevitable conflict between youth and age. In our culture it seems to be as much moderated by the progressive aged mimicking youth as by youth catering to age.

Within our culture there are vast differences in the extent to which the wisdom of the aged is respected and has utility. The more backward and static the area the greater the likelihood that the aged will be esteemed for their wisdom and hold a place of control in affairs of the community. In geographically isolated, mountainous rural areas where educational standards are low and technology has not advanced beyond the horse-and-plow stage, the old have an important place in society and their wisdom is highly respected. In all rural areas, the authority of the aged is given more deference than in urban areas. Many of the details of planting, harvesting, curing, and storing crops; of breeding, feeding, caring for livestock; of butchering and processing meats and foods; of controlling weed, insect, and other nature pests; of building up soil and retarding erosion; of making fences and maintaining other property are still in the realm of folklore and not of science. They are passed on by word of mouth within the family and neighborhood and are known best by the old.

At the other extreme is the highly developed urban-industrial, technical culture based on recent and ever multiplying scientific inventions. In this culture the wisdom of the aged is the "dead hand," and the "voice of experience" is the raspy voice of yesterday. In this world, whirl is king and only those quick to learn and agile at forgetting can avoid dizziness.

More advanced phases of rural culture mark the big middle zone between the two worlds described. The graduate of the agricultural college puts the wisdom of the aged to shame in spheres where science and technology have affected agriculture. The old have undoubtedly lost some of the satisfactions and

prestige accorded them in an agrarian age when their wisdom was more highly regarded than it is today.

The Changing Place of the Elders in Social Control

A corollary to the preceding discussion is the significant fact that the aged in the companionship family have lost their power of social control in family and kinship groups, with the result that it is difficult for the patterns of behavior of one generation to be stamped on the characters of succeeding generations. In society where kinship organization predominates, the stamp of life of the elders is firmly impressed upon children and youth in the close-knit family and neighborhood group. The elders are always present, and variations from the standard pattern are firmly discouraged. Because the molding process can be so complete, comparatively few formal checks are necessary to achieve effective control. Taboos, mores, accepted rights, standardized practices, the experience of elders, their recognized voice of authority, are sufficient to keep life orderly and consistent.

In such cultures individuation, as we understand it in contemporary society, does not exist. The individual is submerged in the group, and the elder generation in such a situation is not only all-wise but also all-powerful. Duty and obedience are expected of the young. In shocking contrast is the daring challenge of youth to the authority of the elders in our society. The old often have to see their standards violated in a changing society while they submit passively to changes they dislike.

Individuation is the crux of the adjustment problem of the aged. In a familistic culture such as is characteristic in many primitive tribes and in the Orient, and such as still survives in more backward rural areas of the Occident, the old throughout their lifetime hold a vital place in the family. A place is made for the parents when the younger generation takes over the farm and brings up its own families. In most agrarian cultures, the aged have their normal place in the family, entertaining and instructing the grandchildren, helping with the work around the house, watching the baby, mending broken tools; if nothing more, giving their children a greater sense of responsibility in watching over the health of their aged parents, humoring them, tolerating them, even at the expense of conflict with other family members. This is the normal life of the aged as life has ordinarily

been lived throughout the history of the race. To the extent that this pattern of life is accepted as traditional, probably few of the problems we recognize today in an individualistic society existed in the past.

The current problem of the aged seems to spring largely from the fact that we have developed a highly individualistic family in which the rights of marriage partners to enjoy the full development and expression of their personalities unhampered by their parents is generally recognized, and in which the rights of children are given precedence in family philosophy and in social thinking over the rights of the grandparent generation. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of the happiness of the aged in an urban-individualized culture, with its anonymity, its small families, and its cash-to-mouth living, there is little place for the old in the family circle and there is, therefore, great loneliness and isolation.

In this highly individualistic family, it is easy for the child of ten to see that his grandparents are out-of-date, that their ideas are old-fashioned; and since the child is given equal rights, it is often considered quite proper for him to criticize or openly challenge his grandparents' opinions. Under this kind of family pattern, which seems to be increasingly in evidence in American society, the problem of keeping the aged person within the family becomes more difficult and leads to numerous problems of relationships between the members of the three generations.

It must, of course, be recognized that a part of this antagonism between the generations is due to the increasing congestion of modern urban living. The family unit lives in a compressed environment in which personalities must tolerate each other in an intimate way. In such an environment there is no escape from conflict if conflict exists.

Adaptive Institutions for the Aged

Slow-moving social philosophy is gradually becoming aware of the problems of the aged in our culture, and an increasing number of measures of a public character are being introduced in an attempt to ameliorate them. It is now recognized that old people have a right to the essentials for maintaining life, but as yet very little has been done to develop any kind of institution which would aim at assuring old people a minimum of happiness and of

pleasant social relationships. It is significant, however, that in a few urban areas institutions of a voluntary sort are emerging which make a definite contribution to the happiness of the old. Clubs and recreation halls where old people may play games, dance, talk, present concerts and so forth are becoming increasingly popular in many large cities. For example, the Three-Quarter Century Club of St. Petersburg, Florida, has a membership of three hundred ranging from ages seventy-five to one hundred and ten. It was organized by Mrs. Evelyn Barton Rittenhouse of the local Chamber of Commerce to give old people a good time. Ladies quilt, men play ball, and all sing. Open forum meetings are held with three subjects taboo — religion, politics, and the Civil War. A dramatics society was recently added to the club.[11]

Certain new organizations of a voluntary type have indirectly made their contribution to the happiness of the aged. Undoubtedly, the numerous Townsend Clubs and other such groups throughout the country have given the old a new focus of interest; they have united old people in numerous communities in a crusade, stirring their emotions with new visions; giving them a cause for which to work and fight; giving them a sense of unity with their fellows in a world in which they are barred from most forms of normal social participation, a unity with people of their kind such as many old people lack in an age that coddles, protects, and humors the old but does not use and often does not heed them. "Support the Townsend movement and it will support you" is a challenge. It may well be that the Townsend and similar utopian crusades of the depression decade made their greatest contribution to the welfare of the aged by virtue of emotional and social stimulation rather than by the influence which they have undoubtedly had on American politics and American social philosophy.

Predictions are always difficult in connection with a problem so deep-seated and so extensive as that faced by the aged in contemporary American culture. On the other hand, in view of the increasing attention being given to the financial needs of the aged, the increasing awareness of the desirability of providing the aged with types of social activity that are interesting and zest-giving, and the growing realization that most old people would be much happier if they could be making some basic contribution

[11] "Playmates; Three-Quarter Century Club of St. Petersburg, Florida." *American Magazine*, 128:106–107, November, 1939.

to American life, it seems likely that the nation could, and probably will, develop during the current generation much more effective means for increasing the happiness and the social usefulness of the aged.

Unfortunately, we seem now to be in the midpoint of transition from a semi-familistic rural culture, which gave the aged a normal place, to an individualistic urban-industrial society in which it is just beginning to be realized that the aged need to play more definite roles. Many of the institutions and philosophies needed to give them an active place await the making.

Social security programs are so new that it is not yet possible to know all the adjustments that will be required by their initiation. That they will have far-reaching implications to many phases of American social and economic life is not to be doubted.

Salter [12] suggests that old-age pensions and annuities are likely to have a bearing on problems of submarginal land use. He predicts that back-area communities which impose less rigid standards of consumption upon the individual are likely to draw a larger number of pension recipients. In these areas cheap land and cheap living, at least as compared to the cost of living in urban centers, are possible. In addition, there are the attractions of country life. Such areas, he feels, will be especially attractive to the old if they offer good fishing. He admits these suggestions are more or less speculative and yet they seem plausible, and their effects probably will be noted in many rural communities which will be taken over by old people.

Hady and Johnson [13] call attention to a related problem of a group not eligible for social security benefits — farmers sixty-five years of age who are ready to retire. About 800,000, or 12 per cent of farm operators, are now in the group sixty-five years of age or over. Persons in this group find it difficult to retire when they are financially able to do so because it is not easy to liquidate a farm at a reasonable price when one is ready to sell. Moreover, the farmer, if he should sell, does not know how to reinvest his money to advantage. Finally, suitable homes for farmers seeking retirement are often not available. Because these

[12] LEONARD A. SALTER, JR., "Social Security: A New Consideration in Submarginal Land Policy." *Land Policy Review*, 4:45–47, March, 1941.

[13] FRANK T. HADY and SHERMAN E. JOHNSON, "The Farmer at 65." *Land Policy Review*, 4:18–21, March, 1941.

farmers cannot retire, many young men wishing to establish themselves in farming are unable to do so because of a shortage of farms.

The Farm Security Administration is granting loans to young men to help them become farm operators. Hady and Johnson suggest that some quasi-public corporations be given authority to purchase farms from operators who wish to retire, giving in exchange investment bonds of the corporation, these bonds to be secured by the real estate owned and to be guaranteed by the government. Farms could in turn be sold to the young farmers by the corporations on long-term contracts.

Another important supplement to the program suggested by these writers is the development of suitable retirement homes on small tracts of land in rural areas where the person selling his farm could find a satisfactory location for his later years.

A rural community in California called Paradise has catered to the old. The setting is rural but the conveniences of the community are urban.

Here we have a problem recognized and a possible means of solution suggested. The main point of interest is that further attention must be given to the problems of the aged, not only in terms of their needs but also in terms of the needs of the younger generation.

The need for new institutions for the aged is becoming generally recognized. Prolonging life is futile unless the comfort and happiness of the old and infirm are given more consideration. On the other hand, it is just as important to regard realistically some of the difficulties involved in an aging population and a social philosophy that caters to the needs of this group.

The Aged as a Pressure Group

Goals of life change with age. The major cultural values of a society are, therefore, likely to be affected by the proportionate size of the various age groups it contains. Under our culture the aged now seem to want security, entertainment, and a certain amount of luxury. These values are contradictory to the highly competitive values that have characterized the past history of the United States which has been a youthful, overly aggressive, overly energetic nation. To the extent that the goals of the aged come to affect the patterns of American civilization the nation may age

in its ambitions, life goals, and attitudes. On such matters one can only speculate.

The aged require more extensive hospitalization, are a more dependent group, and are less productive than other adult groups. The burden of programs ministering to them is likely to increase as their number increases, and in fact to increase altogether out of proportion to the increase in their numbers. This is likely to be true for several reasons. First, our society has become, as we have seen, increasingly conscious of the needs of the aged and, therefore, more responsive to their cry for assistance. Programs for socialized medicine, for socialized hospital care, for respectable old people's homes, for larger pensions and annuities, are likely to grow in popularity, at least for a time. Second, the old age group is likely to become an increasingly effective pressure group. It represents approximately 11 per cent of the voting population at the present time; it will by 1980 constitute perhaps 17 per cent. Because it is for the most part idle, with more time to read and listen to the radio and to public addresses, it can probably be exploited more easily than any other group by those political and social leaders who present utopias to them in exchange for votes.

The group's influence is even more extensive than its numbers. Schemes which promise gold bricks to the aged will always retain a certain following among their children, who may in some cases hope to share the benefits of a pension to their parents. It seems likely that the aged will become an increasingly effective pressure group and will influence state and national politics more vitally in the future even than they have during recent years. In some states with a large ratio of the old it was difficult even during the 1930's to defeat pension plans, ham-and-egg measures, and other schemes which made impossible promises to the old. It may be difficult, or even impossible, to defeat such measures thirty years from now.

Moreover, rising pension costs have already threatened the welfare of childhood and youth by making such demands on state revenues that educational institutions have suffered. There is danger that child welfare programs may also suffer, because children can never focus the attention of politicians on their interests by pressure tactics nor exchange votes for benefactions. The Committee on Population of the National Resources Planning Board shows that if all the 22 million old people in 1980 were to

receive cash benefits raised by direct taxation, the average tax on each man and woman of the productive age classes would be $24 for each $100 paid to an old person.[14]

The demands of the old are rapidly increasing; their standards of living are rising. They are beginning to expect much more of life because of the expansion of programs designed to give them a more enjoyable old age. These growing desires, coupled with the facts outlined above regarding the likelihood of their becoming an increasingly effective pressure group, are suggestive of problems that will develop. The extent to which all essential needs of the aged can be met without jeopardizing the equally vital interests of children, youth, and of the middle-aged in our society is a matter which needs careful consideration by social scientists as well as by statesmen.

It would not be surprising, if the old continue to function as an organized pressure group, to see movements put on foot during this generation to disfranchise those who reach retirement age, in order to protect the interests of other age groups in the population. Never before in American political life have we had an organized social-political group based on age as such and representing the interests of a biologically differentiated population group within the white population. It brings with it new problems that may be as threatening to the foundations of democratic procedures as other class interests based on racial, social, and economic distinctions have been.

The Hardships of Widowhood in Old Age

In the American family the husband is more often removed by death than the wife. If one takes groups of women and groups of men of equal ages, he will find that the death rate for the latter is higher in each group from birth through old age. Furthermore, over two-thirds of men marry women younger than themselves. For these reasons the woman is much more likely to be left a widow than the man. In the average marriage the wife will spend five to eight years in widowhood. Thus in old age the problem of widowhood is primarily a wife's problem. In 1940 there were in the United States 2,144,000 widowed males sixty-five years of age and above, but 4,700,000 widowed females, more than twice as many. This excess is explained not only by the facts

[14] *The Problems of a Changing Population*, Washington, D.C., 1938, p. 32.

just given, but also by the fact that older men frequently remarry. It is usually possible for an older man who has money to find a woman of his own age or even younger, who will marry him. The aged woman, on the other hand, is much less likely to have an opportunity for remarriage because the day of romance for a woman is considered well past at sixty-five.

Another problem is that of economic responsibility. In many homes the husband has had almost complete charge of business affairs aside from those of buying consumer goods. The wife ordinarily knows little about real estate titles, mortgages, contracts, stocks and bonds, and accounts, and may easily become the victim of fraudulent schemes fostered by unscrupulous people who try to acquire her inherited property or life insurance benefits. Women, as a consequence of outliving their husbands, control a great deal of the inherited wealth of the United States, are beneficiaries of 80 per cent of life insurance policies, and in the majority of cases actually live to collect the life insurance. They inherit the family real estate and have the problem of managing it. They inherit stocks and bonds, and acquire other managerial obligations that add to the normal difficulties of bereavement even though such inheritances do give financial security.

We have stressed the problems of the female widow because she is more numerous and her economic adjustments more difficult. In one respect, however, she is probably considerably better off than the aged widowed male. She is more likely than he to be welcomed into the family of her children and to find a useful place there.[15] She is also more likely to care for the kind of recreation that can be engaged in during old age, such as knitting, crocheting, quilting, and other hobby crafts. The male is often not vigorous enough to carry on his former outdoor hobbies.

Von Hentig,[16] commenting on the social functions of the grandmother in contemporary society, finds that although she lives on the fringe of group activities as long as the family structure is intact, she becomes a key person when the normal structure of the family begins to disintegrate. Her rescue action appears in case of death, divorce, separation, imprisonment, confinement in asylums, migration, or other such factors which break the family,

[15] JUDSON T. LANDIS reported such sex differences among retired farmers in Iowa: "Hobbies and Happiness in Old Age." *Recreation*, 35:60–67, 641, 1942.

[16] VON HENTIG, HANS, "The Sociological Function of the Grandmother." *Social Forces*, 24:389–392, May, 1946.

throwing the child back on the assistance of the grandparent generation. She often plays a key role in the case of illegitimate births.

She has played an important part in family life during recent years when men have been away at war and women have been in industry. In all these crises the grandmother comes to the rescue of the childhood generation, assuming a vital even if temporary role in the family-social system and thus contributing to group survival.

In summary, problems of the aged emerge from the companionship family as it has developed in urban-industrial society where space is small and where personal pleasure of husband and wife, parents and their children is the prevailing value system. The new public institutions are well on the way to taking care of the economic needs of the old, but their psychological and emotional needs are by no means met in this way. The days of the empty nest are lonesome days for aged parents. This problem is intensified by mobility and by the almost inevitable death of one of the pair some years before the other. No adequate substitute has been found for a haven with one's children and grandchildren. But this is no longer available for the masses of parents; and, even if it were, it would not prove to be sufficient because the companionship family specializes in individualism at the cost of institutional responsibilities.

In trying to find a place for the aged in our society we may well keep in mind four broad goals summarized by Simmons [17] after extensive studies of the aged in many societies. These are the objectives the old seek:

1. To live as long as possible, at least until life's satisfactions no longer compensate for its privations, or until the advantages of death seem to outweigh the burdens of life.
2. To remain active participants in personal and group affairs in either operational or supervisory roles — any participation, in fact, being preferable to complete idleness and indifference.
3. To safeguard or even strengthen any prerogatives acquired in a long life, i.e., skills, possessions, rights, authority, prestige, etc.
4. To withdraw from life, when necessity requires it, as honorably as possible, without too much suffering and with maximum prospects for an attractive hereafter.

[17] Leo W. Simmons, "A Prospectus for Field-Research in the Position and Treatment of the Aged in Primitive and Other Societies." Reprinted from *American Anthropologist*, 47:433–438, July–September, 1945.

Review

1. Discuss aging as it affects social roles. How is this relationship affected by the culture pattern?
2. What trend or trends of American culture have made old age a critical point in the life cycle?
3. Cite evidence of aging of the population of the United States.
4. Summarize factors involved in senescence.
5. What socio-cultural factors explain the frequent isolation of the aged in our society?
6. What problems does mobility create for the aged?
7. Discuss the usual changes in institutional participation that come with aging.
8. Comment on the wisdom of the aged and show how its value is affected by the culture pattern.
9. The amount of control exercised by the aged differs with the family system. Explain.
10. Discuss the effect of the emergence of the companionship family on the place of the aged.
11. What movements have recognized problems of the aged in the contemporary family social system?
12. Suggest other possible approaches to the problem.
13. How may the prominence of the aged and their problems threaten the welfare of other groups in the population?
14. Which sex is most often widowed? Explain why.
15. Discuss the comparative adjustment problems of widowhood of men and women.
16. Summarize goals that should be kept in mind in planning for the aged.

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CHAPTER 18


DIVORCE IN THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY

DIVORCE MAY BE PRONOUNCED an evil, and attempts made to eliminate it; or it may be considered a form of social adjustment required in a given family-social system. The first view lends little if anything to an understanding of the basic problem as manifested in contemporary society. Approached from the other standpoint, divorce is looked upon as the end product, a device for mediating an unreconcilable conflict or one that is so viewed by the persons involved, a social solution to a bitter form of personal conflict. Numerical statistics are much less valuable for an understanding of the subject than is a knowledge of the attitudes and relationships which lead a high proportion of couples to seek release from a contract that in most cases was entered into with the best intentions, in fact, with hopes for realizing the greatest happiness of which man and woman are capable. In other words, to appraise the situation justly one must understand the philosophy of modern marriage, its objectives and goals, its hopes for realization, and the standards by which it measures success.

As we have pointed out in preceding chapters, the companionship family holds compatible associations of husband and wife, parents and children, as the criteria of success; it prizes romance and its ethereal happiness above all else; it demands the highest level of conjugal friendship. This is the rigorous test; if the marriage fails to meet it, there is no other reason for continuance, especially if the relationship develops intimate forms of tensions and conflicts which day by day association of incompatible temperaments makes likely.

The companionship family is individual centered. It recognizes no allegiance to the family institution as such; it must either give individuals what they want in marriage or be pronounced a failure. Parent-child ties are not primary factors in holding it together; its stability depends on the hazardous progress of the pattern of romantic happiness between husband and wife

Youth expect in marriage an enduring bliss of which the emotionally charged romantic involvement of courtship was only a foretaste. Little wonder few find it especially when one considers the unprecedented burden the system places upon young people for selecting a mate at an age when they are immature in judgment, lack experience, and often are without any realization of what such a lifetime relationship involves in the way of economic and social responsibility, personal qualities, and character. Mar-



Adapted from Research Division, National Education Association

"UNTIL DEATH DO US PART"

This is the marriage vow, but in our nation the divorce court with increasing frequency (now about one case in five) does the parting.

riage, which requires rigorous adjustments to personal differences, to economic responsibilities and household administration, to the demands of relatives and community, is likely to be an anticlimax.

The companionship family thus represents a loosening of the traditional bonds of the institutional family. This process is still further evident in the fact that youth evade the claims of kinship and escape from the parental family. The sense of continuity between generations is accordingly weakened, and individual happiness is considered the only thing that matters. The removal of the family from the bonds of locality is one more factor in loosening bonds of social responsibility that help cement couples

together. Mobility separates one from familiar scenes and places, severs common ties and mutual friendships, and makes it seem easy to start life over if one tires of his mate. Under such a family-social system petty conflicts and temporary incompatibilities may be exaggerated into major issues, and the way out, through divorce, looks easy. Many a couple, however, who entered into divorce too casually, has found that the loneliness and isolation which freedom cost was much less satisfying than the marriage which they sacrificed for it. It is not unusual for divorcees to remarry their former mate, a confession, it would seem, that many couples entered into divorce too hastily and have found the cost of loneliness too great.

Public Tolerance

The rigorous condemnation of divorce a few generations ago no longer exists. Many states have liberal divorce provisions. One state still clings to the old-fashioned requirement, divorce for adultery only; but in general the public, even including religious bodies, is more tolerant. And it is more tolerant because there is at least a vague understanding of the social forces discussed above, which make the family of today quite a different institution from that of the past. This in turn gives divorce a different meaning from that which it had in our grandparents' generation.

There is general recognition that the bonds of love are the only bonds of the modern family; that the ties of common property, of common work, or a family of children, no longer exist for many couples. There is also general recognition that the day when a woman was safe only in the bosom of her family has passed. She is often more secure economically, and perhaps more at ease emotionally, when freed from an unsatisfactory marriage. And there are cases where she may assure her children a better future alone than within such a marriage. Confession of this fact is made in public policy, in that aid to dependent children under the Social Security Act makes no distinction between widowhood by death and widowhood because of divorce. Even before that Act was passed, many states had mothers' pension laws which similarly made no distinction. The cost of divorce today is not, it would seem, primarily in terms of economic risk or of public censure but in the emotional sphere.

The Specific Causes for Divorce

Divorce is a legal action. Only the law can "put asunder" those whom the Church or the law has joined together. Every divorce, must, therefore, present to the court a legal cause. Yet from a strictly legal standpoint the court proceedings are almost always a farce not only because false reasons are given for the action but because the couple usually agree to the divorce in advance.

There are marked variations between the states regarding legal grounds for divorce. The East and South are conservative, and have low divorce rates. The West has higher rates, partly because Easterners go west to take advantage of easier laws, and partly because Westerners resort to divorce more often than couples in other regions. The West lacks an established, integrated society; community pressures are weaker than in more settled areas where people have lived together for three or four generations. Its people are more mobile; there is less attachment to place. Its people are far removed from the claims of kinship, many having left all relatives behind in moving west. It is less bothered by the traditional attitudes of the institutional family, which persists more tenaciously in the deep South and the rural East.

The grounds on which divorce is most frequently granted are about as follows:[1] cruelty, 47 per cent; desertion, 32 per cent; adultery, 9 per cent; neglect to provide, 7 per cent; drunkenness, 2 per cent; other causes, 3 per cent.

These grounds are obviously general and need to be analyzed if one is to get at the real reasons. Ernest R. Mowrer, sociologist, has conducted investigations in the city of Chicago[2] which make it strikingly clear that a great deal of rationalization enters into the court reason. For example, an examination of 295 cases where divorce was granted on the legal ground of desertion, showed that in 40.2 per cent financial tension was the cause. In 13.2 per cent, one partner left the mate for another. In 10.9 per cent, dissatisfaction with home or married life was the real reason. In 10.5 per cent, infidelity was the real

[1] ALFRED CAHEN, *Statistical Analysis of Divorce.* Columbia University Press, New York, 1932.

[2] ERNEST R. MOWRER, "The Variance between Legal and Natural Causes for Divorce." *Social Forces*, 2:388–392, March, 1924.

cause. In other cases drink, cruelty, and irregular habits were found to be the cause. In the case of 156 divorces granted on legal grounds of cruelty, he found that 45 per cent were in reality brought on by financial tensions; 28.6 per cent by drink; 14.6 per cent by jealousy and infidelity. Divorce for adultery seems to represent the facts most nearly. In 96 cases he found that all but 8 per cent had been involved in illicit intercourse.

Social Disorganization as a Factor in Family Disorganization

The family never exists in a vacuum. Its patterns are parallel in many respects to those of other institutions in the community. Its philosophies of life are much the same as those that dominate the rest of society. In an immobile society where stability of residence and permanence of neighborhood relationships are characteristic, the family tends to be permanent. Rural divorce rates have always been relatively low as compared to urban rates. In a society that suffers from disorganization, in which mobility of population is characteristic, the family also suffers from disorganization. The strands which hold it together become weakened and it often breaks under the strain put on human relationships. For this reason urban industrial society suffers from a high rate of family disorganization and marital shipwreck. Divorce rates are highest in the disorganized areas of cities, where people are transient, neighborhoods do not exist, the conditions of living border on degradation, and children, with only the streets in which to play, have the criminal gang as an object of hero worship.

Mowrer's study[3] of family disorganization in areas of Chicago shows that the character of the community is closely related to the amount of divorce. Of the seventy areas studied, some of the better residential areas had none. At the other extreme were areas which had rates ranging up to 68 per 10,000 people. Areas with the highest rates were rooming house, kitchenette-apartment house, and apartment house areas, which are usually near the heart of the city. Divorces decrease as one reaches the periphery, where living conditions are more normal and life more stable, the total environment more secure and more satisfying. Com-

[3] ERNEST R. MOWRER, *Family Disorganization*, pp. 116–122. University of Chicago Press, 1927. See also BURGESS and COTTRELL, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, p. 252. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1939.

munities with strong neighborhoods that permit the exercise of community pressures, have lower rates than areas that are more mobile and more disorganized.[4] In the latter, it is easier for the family to escape community pressures; in fact, in such areas people seldom feel the sting of social disapproval for any kind of unsocial act. The rates are lowest out in rural areas where the disorganizing forces of modern life have not penetrated so fully.

Within the city, divorce is also related to mobility. A study in the city of Chicago based on changes of address in the telephone directories showed that the groups that moved most frequently had a higher rate than the more stable ones. It was also found that the groups with the highest rates tended to move toward areas of family disorganization when they did move; the more stable groups tended to move away from areas of community disorganization.[5] People living in single dwellings have better marital adjustment than those living in multiple dwellings.[6] Couples who buy their homes have somewhat better adjustment than those who do not. Stability of employment is favorable to marriage, as is ability to hold to a job over a long period of time.


A Social Science Research Committee's map on family disintegration in Chicago for the period 1929–1935 is shown on the opposite page. This map uses nonsupport and divorce as an index.

It will be seen that the rate varies markedly with kind of community. Near the Loop it runs up to 300 for 10,000 married persons; whereas in the better residential areas it drops to as low as 15. It is also extremely high on the Near North Side and in the Ashburn district at the southwest border of the city. The Near North Side area includes the Gold Coast, Bohemia, Hobohemia, and Little Sicily. The Ashburn area has suffered rapid transition from a rural community into an industrial area.

Mowrer,[7] commenting on the facts revealed by this chart, states:

> It is quite clear that the disintegration of the family is closely related to the urbanization of life, since the most urbanized areas are also those which have the greatest family disintegration. Urbanization of life means multiplicity of con-

[4] BURGESS and COTTRELL, *op. cit.*, Chapter 13.
[5] MOWRER, *op. cit.*, pp. 194–206.
[6] BURGESS and COTTRELL, *op. cit.*, p. 252.
[7] E. R. MOWRER, *Disorganization: Personal and Social*, p. 510. J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1942.



Ernest R. Mowrer, op. cit. p. 510

Family disintegration is measured by nonsupport and divorce. Rates are highest near the Loop, in the heterogeneous Near North Side, and in Ashburn, an area recently industrialized. In areas with wholesome community life family disintegration rates are low.

tacts, casual and specialized relations in which only a segment of the personality is involved, freedom of the individual from the control of the primary group exercised through gossip and community status. Under these conditions the family is subjected to a series of stresses and strains, as is every other phase of human relationships, unknown under the simpler conditions of rural life, and its instability is thereby increased.

Extent of Divorce

Of marriages taking place in 1900 only about one in twelve were ultimately terminated by divorce rather than by death; of those taking place in 1922, about one in eight. It is assumed that of current marriages at least one in five will eventually terminate in divorce. The ratio will likely be even higher; for war marriages it may be as many as one in three. Clearly the great ideal of all, "until death do us part," is held in less esteem than the happiness of the marriage partners. When the choice is between living unhappily together and divorce, the second alternative is chosen.

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATIO OF DIVORCES: SPECIFIED COUNTRIES FOR COMPARABLE PERIODS [8]

Countries with the highest rates	Periods	Number of divorces per 10,000 married couples
U.S.S.R. (Ukraine)	1925–1928	98.2
United States	1929–1931	73.2
Austria	1933–1935	47.8
Japan	1924–1927	43.0
Latvia	1933–1936	41.2
Countries with the lowest rates	**Periods**	**Number of divorces per 10,000 married couples**
Portugal	1929–1932	7.6
Turkey	1935	7.4
Scotland	1930–1932	5.8
England and Wales	1930–1932	4.3
Canada	1930–1932	4.3

[8] *International Vital Statistics*, p. 442. U.S. Census, 1940.

To the hazards of divorce today is being added the practice of annulment, which evades many of the embarrassing and difficult processes of divorce. Leander B. Faber of the New York Supreme Court, discussing the annulment evil in the *Woman's Home Companion* of September, 1945, says that not long ago he heard only one annulment to every fifty divorces but that he now hears one annulment for every three divorces. Once the annulments were primarily those of youngsters under legal marriage age; now an increasing number of suits are brought by people who have been married five to ten years and who may even be parents. He reports that many are seeking annulments who would have weak grounds for divorce under the law, or who would avoid divorce because their religion forbids it.

The most common grounds for requesting annulment, he reports, are fraud and duress, usually on the grounds of pressure having been exerted by the girl's family or on grounds of lack of capacity to understand the nature of marriage. In four out of five cases the action is for fraud, the ground being that the husband or the wife had a secret determination never to have children.

This new trend, which opens avenues of escape from marriage for those who, on one pretense or another, have found it unsatisfactory, is another indication of the fundamental weakness of the companionship family. It cannot and will not be held together by legal requirements. Vows are taken lightly by people in a society which has lost much of the power inherent in moral compulsion and religious authority, and in which community pressures can be evaded.


Elements in Domestic Discord

Harriet R. Mowrer[9] rightly distinguishes between domestic discord which arises out of personality disorganization and that which arises out of the marriage situation itself. In the first case the difficulty is usually present in the person before marriage; marriage may aggravate or reduce it. Such difficulties are illustrated by the man who uses drunkenness as an escape device, or the woman who uses sickness. The second kind of discord is more likely to follow forms that reflect the general cultural situation.

The causes of marriage dissatisfaction reported by Terman

[9] *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, p. 149. American Book Company, New York, 1935.

are mainly in the latter category. In his study he asked husbands and wives to list their grievances in order of seriousness. The results are shown in the accompanying chart. Husbands ranked as



Terman, "Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness," McGraw-Hill Book Co. p. 105

THIRTY-FIVE GRIEVANCES OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES LISTED IN ORDER OF SERIOUSNESS

most serious the complaint that their wives are "not affectionate." Wives listed this grievance as fifth. "Selfish and inconsiderate" was listed first by wives and second by husbands; husbands apparently want more of the romance which the companionship family promises than they find in marriage, and wives want more gallantry than husbands show. Husbands ranked "quick tempered" fourth on the list; wives ranked it eighteenth. Husbands listed "conceited" as fifth; wives, as twenty-second. Husbands listed "spoiled children" as eleventh; wives, as twenty-fourth. Husbands considered jealousy less serious than did

wives. Wives, on the other hand, considered "untruthfulness," "argumentativeness," and "not faithful" more serious than did husbands. Wives listed "not faithful" as tenth; husbands, as twenty-seventh. This may reflect a difference in sense of security of husbands and wives rather than greater tolerance of the husband for infidelity. Husbands do not so often fear that their wives will be unfaithful since custom is still less tolerant of the wayward wife than of the wayward husband. A trait not considered in the above comparison, but which husbands mentioned elsewhere as a source of grievance, was "slovenly appearance." [10] This probably reflects a dominant cultural value of urban society wherein the emphasis on ornamental beauty in women is so prominent.

Another study, by Hamilton, showed that the most frequent complaints of two hundred married men were (1) temperamental trouble of mate, (2) wife not romantic enough, (3) lack of personal freedom. Two hundred married women complained of (1) unreasonable romantic demands of the husband, (2) his temperament, (3) domestic slavery and economic trouble.[11]

Who Gets the Divorce.

In approximately three-fourths of the cases in the United States the wife applies for the divorce. One might immediately conclude that women are exercising their rights as individualists to an unwarranted degree. This conclusion is probably not fully justified, although it is undoubtedly true that the modern woman will tolerate less abuse in the family than did her grandmother.

In many cases the couple agree that the wife will apply for the divorce simply because the court is more likely to be sympathetic toward her appeal than that of the husband. A woman can more often apply on grounds of cruelty or even of mental cruelty and receive a sympathetic hearing.

It is likely also that men actually use divorce as a way out of an unsatisfactory marriage less often than women. A woman's life is much more deeply involved in home and marriage. If she finds it unsatisfactory, she has fewer alternatives. The husband,

[10] TERMAN, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

[11] G. V. HAMILTON and KENNETH MACGOWAN, *What Is Wrong with Marriage?* pp. 279–280. Boni, New York, 1929.

if his home life is not fully satisfying, may bury himself in his work, or in recreation, or in other activities outside the home. He is more likely also to try to form a love relationship outside the marriage. He thus becomes the offender against the marriage, and when the wife learns of it she seeks the divorce. In such cases the husband is primarily responsible for the break even though the wife initiates proceedings. Then too, men more often desert the family. In these cases the wife has to seek the divorce even though the husband took the first step.

Most divorces come during the early years of marriage. More come in the third than at any other time although the rate is high all through the first six years. After the tenth year the rate falls rapidly until comparatively few divorces are granted in the later years.

Divorce as a Social Process

Under the companionship family system, divorce is a social process not unlike dating, courtship, and engagement. It is really those processes in reverse. Instead of a series of experiences that build intimacy and involvement until the relationship embraces one's entire personality and climaxes in marriage, it is a series that begins with friction and climaxes in emotional indifference or even violent animosity. Where society permits a legal escape, it is natural that persons trained to romantic values should find no further meaning in marriage.

Tension in the family may arise over any factors that have meaning in the lives of the husband and wife. It may arise over a problem of orderliness, especially if one is meticulous and the other is naturally careless. It frequently arises over money, since that has so much meaning in our culture. It may arise over misunderstandings about sex; or over social relationships, especially if one likes social activity and the other shuns the crowd; or over such a trivial thing as the way the mate spends leisure time. Almost anything in the human relationship, once it becomes a focus of difference, may be exaggerated to a place of major importance and become a primary source of tension.

Waller [12] has traced the various steps through which the couple goes in approaching divorce. The first is a disturbance in the love life; this eventually leads to the point where friction is so

[12] WILLARD WALLER, *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation*, Chapter 12. The Cordon Press, New York, 1938.

intense that the possibility of divorce is mentioned. The next is that in which husband or wife tells some outside person or persons of their difficulty; this immediately puts the marriage on a different basis, since the couple has lost face with other people. Usually this does not end the marriage; it goes on in a matter-of-fact way, with discussions as to the proper course of action. Finally, there comes the stage when the husband and wife definitely decide to make a break. This is followed by a separation, which in turn is followed later by the divorce action itself.

Divorce does not end the relationship, however. There is still the important period of mental conflict, during which both individuals find themselves in the midst of problems of reconstructing their lives to fit the new situation. There is also an emotional readjustment to be made. Waller has stated that in his studies he has yet to find a divorce which was not followed by a serious form of bereavement. In many cases the bereavement following divorce is much more serious than bereavement following death. Death is always classed among the inevitable occurrences of life. The shock of it may be more sudden but it can be charged to Providence, to accident, or to natural causes and one can absolve himself of blame. But in case of divorce there is always the knowledge that it might have been avoided and always the background of expected happiness against which to project it.

Some of the adjustments following divorce are inherent in the situation of separation from the mate; others reflect the larger total social situation. In the first category are sex starvation and the nervous tensions and restlessness that may result from it; the desperate loneliness of a person who has had intimate daily contact with a confidant. In the second category are feelings of wounded pride, fear of public repulsion, a certain amount of shame — attitudes which reflect what the divorcee assumes to be, and what actually are in many circles, the accepted mores of the group toward the divorcee.[13]

Divorce, even with modern tolerance, involves a degree of public shame. It involves a legal process, and most people prefer to avoid the law. It involves emotional wounds for both parties that never leave their personalities the same and, in fact, often leave them shocked almost to the point of disorganization. In cases where husband or wife is interested in a third person, the innocent mate is seriously hurt and must nevertheless make adjust-

[13] WILLARD WALLER, *The Old Love and the New.* Liveright, New York, 1930.

ments with the knowledge that he or she has seriously failed in the most intimate, and what is designed to be the most permanent, relationship in life. At best, divorce is a public confession of failure in a private, highly personal, and highly intimate relationship. Too often it is a way of running from a problem rather than of facing it frankly and trying to work out possible solutions. It does offer a method of breaking a bond which has no further reason for existence. It is a legal means whereby the state can give each party freedom to marry again if he chooses, or freedom to live again as a single person without facing responsibilities which were shouldered in taking the marriage vows.

Divorce does not, however, always free one fully. In about 6 per cent of cases the court grants alimony. In such cases there is always this handicap carrying over from the prior marriage if the husband wishes to marry again.

The most tragic divorces are those in which one member is fully satisfied with the union, deeply in love with the mate and willing to continue to share life with him, and the other is completely unsatisfied, finding nothing right with the relationship and insisting on bringing about its termination. In such cases the wounded party is likely to experience emotional shock which will remain throughout life. The psychological consequences are certainly much more drastic than in cases where both have found the relationship unsatisfactory and agree that the only solution is divorce.

The adjustments to new roles following divorce are likely to be somewhat more difficult for women than for men, entirely aside from the difficulty of emotional adjustment, which probably depends on temperament rather than on sex. The woman must decide whether to resume her maiden name or continually explain when people inquire whether her husband is dead or whether she has been divorced. Where there are children, she is more likely to have custody of them; and although they may give her a great deal of emotional satisfaction, they are likely to hinder her opportunities for a new marriage. Her economic adjustments are also likely to be more severe since she may now be obliged to take up the unfamiliar role of a wage worker.

After observing the adjustments of persons following divorce, one student says that although there are divorced persons who achieve harmony after a second marriage, many more find it

as unsatisfactory as the first.[14] There are various possible explanations of this situation. There is considerable evidence, in the first place, that the divorcee is on the average a biologically inferior type and perhaps not well suited to marriage. Of five hundred cases studied,[15] with an average duration of marriage of over nine years, there was an average of only one child per family; 45 per cent were childless; 77 per cent had only one or no child. Then again, there was a relatively high rate of mental disease, crime, and suicide. Furthermore, it is known that divorcees have a relatively short expectation of life. One can of course overemphasize the hereditary factor; marriage conflict itself might go a long way toward explaining some of these phenomena.

It is often assumed that most divorces result from the attraction of one of the pair for a third person. Actually, however, this is not true in a considerable percentage of cases. It is estimated that not more than one-third to one-half of divorcees ever remarry. Popenoe places the remarriage of women divorcees at not more than 25 to 30 per cent; the remarriage of men at not more than 40 to 50 per cent.[16]

No one knows the proportion of divorcees who remarry each other, but a certain number do. A study by Popenoe of 200 cases of remarriage to the same person shows that 48 per cent were happy, 15 per cent were doubtful, and 37 per cent were definitely unhappy. Those who were unhappy usually resorted to divorce again very quickly.

Popenoe's explanations as to why remarriage succeeds in so high a proportion of cases are interesting. Some divorces, he finds, are due to emotional immaturity; time and experience following the divorce make the couple better able to succeed. Sometimes the divorce is due to the wife's desire for freedom or a career; as in many cases where the grass looks greener on the other side of the fence, she finds after obtaining her freedom that the world is not waiting for her with opportunity and honor. Middle-aged divorcees sometimes remarry when the divorce is due to the temporary infatuation of one of the pair. Sometimes divorce is due to pressure from the outside; when the pressure

[14] HARRIET R. MOWRER, in HOWARD BECKER, REUBEN HILL, *et al.*, *Marriage and the Family*, p. 361. D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1942.

[15] PAUL POPENOE, "The Fertility of Divorcees." *Journal of Heredity*, 27:166–168, April, 1936.

[16] PAUL POPENOE, "Remarriage of Divorcees to Each Other." *American Sociological Review*, 3:695–699, October, 1938.

is removed, remarriage is possible. In other cases children bring the couple together. In still other cases the couples remarry because they never really wanted the divorce; they encountered difficulties and, not knowing where to go for help, sought a lawyer. This latter fact leads Popenoe to stress the importance of institutes of family relations and other facilities for counseling and conciliation. He believes that the divorce court should be the last resort.

Divorce and the Child

The fact that comparatively few divorces — only about 37 per cent — involve children, indicates that the presence of children in the family acts as a deterrent on divorce. Yet the situation may be due to no special solicitude for their welfare; it may result simply from the father's realization that he will be under the extra expense of separate support for them. But those divorces which are carried through in spite of considerations of this sort are extremely expensive to society in other than financial ways: the children have difficulty in making normal adjustments to life, as all studies of juvenile delinquency demonstrate,[17] and in later years they have trouble with their own marriage.[18] These maladjustments come sharply to the attention of anyone who works with college students, does personal counseling, or reads the autobiographies of college youth; and if all this is true of the college population, matters are probably much worse among youth who do not go to college.

In spite of the heavy costs, however, that many young people of this generation are paying for their parents' failure, competent investigators such as James S. Plant [19] do not recommend that laws be made more rigid or that greater restrictions be placed on divorce. They hold that there is no advantage in continuing marriage, even when children are involved, if a pattern of antagonistic relationships has been established. Divorce is in reality far better than separation; Plant found that ten times as many children were sent to the Essex County Juvenile Clinic from separated parents as from divorced parents. Divorce seems to cause less disturbance; in fact it may come at times

[17] Refer to data in Chapter 9.

[18] E. W. BURGESS and L. S. COTTRELL, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage.* Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1938.

[19] JAMES S. PLANT, "The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents." *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 10:807–818, Summer, 1944.

as a genuine relief to the child or it may appear as a mere incident in a situation of insecurity that has long since done its damage.

As a matter of fact, Plant argues, parents are rarely concerned, when in conflict, with the child's welfare. They either treat the child as a pawn in fighting each other, or use him as an argument for holding the marriage together, or confide in him the bitterness felt against the other parent, pouring into the child's ears all the real or imaginary offenses of the other. A child whose emotional life has been subjected to the catastrophic effects of such experiences is likely to find divorce the best possible solution from his own standpoint.

If Plant is right in his analysis, society should not heap shame on couples with children who resort to divorce; for in doing so it hinders the solution to many family conflicts that really have none other equally good.

The Road Ahead

Every generation has had to contend with forces which challenge the integrity of the family and constitute a risk to successful marriage. Few periods, however, have presented so many challenges as has the twentieth century. Twice in our time the disintegrating influence of war has made its impact on the family. Two succeeding generations have experienced the letdown in moral standards that is part of war and of postwar readjustment. Two war generations, inspired by the heated romance of crisis, have ignored basic personality differences, common traditions, and common interests in mate selection and have paid the price of getting acquainted after marriage.

Those who dream of a more stable family in the immediate future are indulging in wishful thinking. There is little in the current trend of social forces to point to an early solution of the basic problems which produce divorce in so high a proportion of marriages. The companionship family will probably not realize greater stability until some of the present efforts to check romance and guide it by scientific investigation, personality testing, measurements for marriage fitness, pre-marital counseling, and other such scientific devices reach the stage where they can be presented to the public with confidence and be used by a substantial proportion of youth.

It is doubtful whether the American family system is going to expect less of marriage in the future than it does now in the way of happiness and romantic realization. This being the case, a more complete understanding of personality and the effect of background on marriage would seem to be the way forward. Social measures must be devised which will come nearer to insuring that the right people marry and that each marries the right person. In addition to this, further improvement is needed in helping people who are married to understand the frictions and tensions inherent in close daily companionship and to give them greater assistance in meeting these situations with a degree of intelligence. This, rather than crying for the return of the institutional values of the family of yesterday, is the way forward. Youth want more stable marriages and the nation needs them; but no one will pay the price of conflict and dissatisfaction for stability.

Divorce is an integral part of the companionship family system as developed in America. It is as much a part of it as unsupervised courtship and unbridled romance. As long as marriage is put to the supreme test of personal happiness and individualistic satisfaction, we must choose between two alternatives: we should either put mate-selection on a more reasonable and secure foundation and thereby make enduring happiness possible, or else expect the fires of romance to cool quickly in the prosaic associations of daily life as poorly mated individuals discover each other in the cold light of reason after the marriage ceremony rather than before. We must either take the intelligent road or expect an increasing number of marriages to end in annulment or divorce.

There is little hope that individualism will be less emphasized in our society than it is at present. The war has greatly developed the individualistic tendencies of both men and women. Even in its most ideal form, marriage is frustrating to certain of the individualistic interests of both men and women, but especially to those of women. Marriage must actually net the kind of satisfactions which the companionship family claims for itself if it is to be durable, bring children to maturity, and maintain itself as an institution worthy of the lifelong allegiance of an individualistic people.

Review

1. Give two views of the divorce problem.
2. How is the divorce problem related to the family-social system?

3. Discuss factors in the companionship family system that make it vulnerable from the standpoint of stability.
4. How may mobility be a factor in the divorce rate?
5. Explain the greater public tolerance of divorce and show how it may affect the divorce rate.
6. On what legal grounds is divorce usually sought?
7. Cite evidence proving that the legal grounds of divorce are not always the real reasons for seeking divorce.
8. Present evidence demonstrating that social disorganization has a bearing on family disorganization.
9. Trace the divorce trend.
10. Discuss the emerging problem of annulment.
11. Explain Harriet Mowrer's two types of factors producing domestic discord.
12. What are the most common grievances in marriage as found by Terman?
13. Give possible explanations for the fact that women most often get the divorce.
14. Explain the proposition "divorce is a social process."
15. About what factors can tensions arise?
16. Trace the steps in divorce; in readjustment after divorce.
17. Discuss the prospects of successful remarriage after divorce.
18. What proportion of divorces involve children?
19. Should divorce be prohibited where there are children? Defend your position.
20. Discuss the prospects for more stable marriages. Along what lines must improvement be sought?

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
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PART IV

PROBLEMS OF THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM



Robert Yarnall Richie

LINKS IN THE CHAIN OF COMMERCE



PART IV

PROBLEMS OF THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM

SOCIAL PLANNING often falls into disrepute, yet modern society is never without it. It may be called by many names, it may be condemned, but it is the one hope of urban industrial society if that society is to survive. At various points throughout this book we have reiterated that the folkways and mores are inadequate to meet the requirements of life in a complex society. Man clings to the mores as guides to behavior and some of the folkways persist — if not in practice, at least in the memories of the old; but life moves forward on wheels.

The politico-economic system of modern nations has come to have a dominant place in the social structure. It is so far-reaching in its ramifications that it tends to become all inclusive. The extent to which it regulates, directs, and motivates the life of the individual and determines the orientation and philosophies of the family-social system, differs from one nation to another; but no modern industrialized nation has been able to avoid a great deal of centralization of economic and political power.

The realm of politico-economic activities more than any other has been invaded by social policy. Here the major retarding forces are vested interests rather than custom, tradition, folkways, and mores. Government and economic institutions in Western society, where they have had to cope with technology and its products, are more rationalized and objectified than personal and family behavior.

The struggle for control of vested interests, economic and political entwined, is the major problem in this sphere. The development of social policies to replace the surviving folkways is essential.

CHAPTER 19

MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY

The Trend toward a Managed Economy

IN MODERN SOCIETY, politico-economic institutions tend to overshadow all else because in an economy of trade like ours, supervision of the market is more important than the articles in which one deals. Values have come to be in part a product of manipulation by the regulative structures of government rather than a representation of actual worth in terms of barter. When a culture has developed to the point where trade and commerce are the framework of survival, the regulation of economic affairs by the one over-all administrative unit of society, government, is inevitable. The modern world has, therefore, identified political and economic institutions more and more closely; it has used political institutions for manipulating economic institutions and, conversely, used economic devices for the exploitation of political power.

Fascism and communism exemplified this tendency from the beginning, of course, but even democracy has come to recognize that economic conditions are readily converted into social conditions. Full employment or lack of it is not merely a theoretical economic problem; it is also a stern social reality concerned with the individual's welfare and even his survival. So, also, questions of wages are no longer considered theoretical; they are the vital concern of a democratic government which has come to recognize that they have a direct bearing on the worker's level of living and set limits to his participation not only in economic life, but also in social, educational, and other privileges.

It is this realization on the part of democratic society that has made it turn more and more toward government, especially since the major crisis of the early 1930's, for measures designed to protect the individual citizen from the inevitable ruthlessness of an economy based on competition, trade, commerce, and

industry. It is this realization also that has caused a shift away from the philosophy that each individual man by his own efforts, foresight, and enterprise can create his own economic destiny, and toward an acknowledgment of the fact that the great masses of men have little personal control over their economic destiny, that they are in the clutch of economic forces which supersede in importance individual efforts, personal integrity, or other virtues or vices of the individual such as explained economic success or failure in a hand-to-mouth rural economy.

The wealth of the workingman today largely depends upon the policies of the board of directors of the United States Steel Corporation, General Motors, the Ford Motor Company, International Telephone and Telegraph, or any one of the other dozens of large organizations which employ thousands of workers. The actions of these directors are in turn dependent on the economic cycle, which industry itself has been unable to control. In closing a factory they may act to save the industry from collapse and thus protect themselves and the holders of their securities; but at the same time they deprive the majority of their workers of employment. Since economic life is concerned increasingly with forces over which no individual has control, the citizen has put more reliance on government regulation in the hope that governments on a national, or even international scale, can exercise this control.

The competitive capitalistic order has, through experience, found that large-scale industrial operation is most efficient. In fact, no other type of operation is practical or even possible when assembly-line methods are employed. Larger and larger manufacturing organizations have been built, and these have been paralleled by larger and larger financial structures essential to provide the necessary capital and credit. As a result, corporate control over the destiny of the worker is now so complete that it has been necessary to have federal control of the corporation or no control at all. Local and even state government, it seems, cannot cope with the management of the capitalistic structure. This no doubt explains in part the inevitable concentration of power in the central government, not only in this nation but in all capitalistic and industrial countries. Nevertheless the American economy, while certain phases of it border on socialism, still is far from the level of management found in a socialistic state. It is, rather, a mildly managed capitalism. In this respect it dif-

fers from fascism, which is a state-managed capitalism, and socialism, which is a state-owned and -operated industry.

Management of the American economy has been evolutionary and gradual rather than revolutionary. Except during wartime, it has been promoted with the idea of increasing the welfare of the common man rather than of giving power to political leaders, as was the case in pre-war Italy and Germany. In the United States any new assumption of authority by the government is open to challenge by private industry or by the voting public. As long as this is true, democracy has little to fear from social planning and from government management of general phases of the economic system.

Whatever view one may hold concerning government control in modern society, the fact remains that the central government has become the focal point of social policy. Being the only organization with the power to enforce policies on all people, it has come to exercise policy-making functions in the broader aspects of social adjustment. This does not mean that local government has decreased in importance, but simply that the federal government has tended to outgrow it in the field of social policy, especially social planning and social legislation.

In the modern world, economic institutions tend to become international in scope and therefore to evade even centralized national control. Capital, industry, and patents, through cartel arrangements, bridge nations and continents and take with them the protections and vested interests of governments. Although World War II brought cartels into disrepute and defeated the geopolitical ideologies of the Nazis, the fact remains that the tendency of modern economic forces is to expand beyond national boundaries in the quest for resources, customers, outlets for capital investment, and political protection of vested rights.

Although we were the victors in World War II, we did not rank leaders of giant industrial concerns along with military and political leaders in fixing responsibility for war guilt and war crime; we did go so far as to cripple the industrial combines that dominated the industrial sphere in the nations with which we had been at war.

The Managed Economy of the United States

In a time when the majority of people live on wages and when practically all economic activity is based on credit and a monetary


medium of exchange rather than barter, the physical welfare of the nation's people, their happiness, security, and even the expenditure of their energies, is closely identified with the state of the highly complex and diversified economic system. The whole elaborate makeup of economic institutions is such that the management of them in the interest of social well-being has come to be taken for granted. In American democratic society the management of the economy is motivated by a desire to give security and economic comfort to the masses of citizens without at the same time interfering with too many of the traditional rights of individualism inherent in the capitalistic philosophy of the nation.

The idea of a government-managed economy is foreign to the ethics of American business and industry. It was, in earlier decades, foreign to the ethics of the individual citizen. Pioneer individualism, the exploitation of the natural resources for profit, and the amassing of great wealth as a reward for ventures in the field of business and industrial enterprise, have always been part of American economic practice. Even the man who did not succeed respected those who did, and he was ready to gamble by starting some new business venture, seeking new lands on the frontier, joining a gold rush, or buying a lottery ticket.

Gradually, however, through a period of two generations, the idea of the government's taking an increasing part, first in controlling and later in managing certain phases of the economy, has come to be accepted. The major governmental activities in the beginning were in the field of anti-trust legislation, which was designed to limit great industrial monopolies. During the last two decades the government has entered into many new phases of planning and managing the economy, presumably in the interests of the citizen's welfare. This program of controlling, managing, and directing, and in some cases even promoting phases of the national economy, was given great impetus by the election of the New Deal political party in 1932 at a time of national and world crisis in the economic sphere.

Government management of the economy reached its greatest development during the period of World War II when the nation, in order to compete with Fascist governments where the economy was almost entirely government managed, centralized authority in the federal government and rather completely controlled industrial production and the flow of goods through the channels of trade, even to the extent of setting price controls over


AMERICAN BUSINESS



items of consumption affecting the daily living of the citizen. Throughout the war period, more than in any previous period, the federal government took over major responsibility for coordinating the economy by striving for parity of its four phases: wages, profits, price of consumer goods, and price of raw materials, both agricultural and industrial.

Some of these controls may continue to persist in peacetime. For example, it seems likely that unless the struggle between labor and management reaches a more effective level of mediation than is now the case, government will increasingly attempt to regulate this field in the interest of the consumer. This regulation may not be of a strictly legal nature: it may be largely in terms of trying to exert pressure through propaganda to keep labor income on a parity with the cost of living and also to keep agricultural income on a parity with consumer prices and urban income. The view that parity in these fields is equitable and essentially sound economically, seems to have gathered greater acceptance over a period of several years. The federal government is probably nearer the position of a neutral party, with an

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over-all view of the situation, than any other organization could be, and it therefore will probably have to exercise a regulatory function if it is considered essential and desirable.

Control of the Business Cycle

Modern economic activity is carried on through a medium of exchange, the dollar, and numerous credit instruments which are represented by the monetary value. It has been characteristic of industrial society that this medium of exchange has a fluctuating value in the terms of what it will buy. At one period in our history $5000 would buy a new middle-class family dwelling; now an identical new house costs $10,000. The $10,000 house in this instance has no greater value in terms of its livability or of human usefulness. The difference in cost is representative of the fluctuating value of the dollar itself.

In times of great prosperity when the business cycle is on the upward swing, the dollar buys comparatively few goods. Wages are high, the cost of food, clothing, and shelter is also high. In


times of depression dollars are scarce and wages are low. A dollar will then buy much more goods and services, but few people have the necessary money to buy them. The channels of trade are clogged. Surplus goods accumulate; the wheels of the factories stop. The whole national economy is slowed down.

The New Deal during the early 1930's developed the idea that the economic cycle (business cycle) could be modified by efforts of the government to even out the fluctuations. The principal method employed during the decade was for the government to provide employment, purchase structural materials, and in this way start money flowing. The New Deal called the process "priming the economic pump," the assumption being that once money started flowing again and people had jobs, the factories could begin moving, raw materials could flow into the factories from the farms and forests, manufactured goods could flow out of the factories to be purchased by the people who were employed in government and industry. In this way the wheels of economic activity would start again and private industry would gradually take over employment as the demand for manufactured goods increased, trade expanded, and unemployment disappeared. The extent of public priming of the economic system during the depression period, 1932 to 1937, has been graphically portrayed in the chart on page 377.[1] This chart shows the net amount the government put into buying power, much of it in the form of direct relief and wages for work relief. It will be seen that in 1936 the net contribution of the federal government to buying power, above taxes, tariffs, and other incomes, exceeded $4,000,000,000.

When inflationary tendencies and war came, the government again stepped in to manage the economy by setting a definite limit to prices and wages so that the business cycle would be levelled off on the upward swing. The assumption was that if prices were allowed to run uncontrolled, the excess purchasing power of the public would push the price of goods up until dangerous inflation resulted. People then could not purchase, and again factories would have to shut down, farms and forests would be idle, and the nation would be plunged into another greater depression. It is an interesting fact that the period of World War II, primarily perhaps because of government manipulation, did not experience the extreme inflationary price movements

[1] *The Structure of the American Economy, Part I. Basic Characteristics*, p. 95. National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D.C., June, 1939.

NET CONTRIBUTION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO NATIONAL BUYING POWER 1932–1937



National Resources Planning Board

of World War I. The prices of given commodities are arranged in parallel columns in the following table to indicate the price structure during the two wars, the first war with prices uncon-

CHANGES IN CONSUMERS' PRICE INDEX FOR MODERATE INCOME FAMILIES IN LARGE CITIES DURING WORLD WARS I AND II, THE SECOND WITH GOVERNMENT PRICE CONTROLS [2]

	Index (1935–39 = 100)				Per cent increase	
	1914	1919	1939	1944	1914–19	1939–44
All items	71.8	123.8	99.4	125.5	72.4	26.3
Food	81.8	149.8	95.2	136.1	83.1	43.0
Clothing	69.8	168.7	100.5	138.8	141.7	38.1
Rent	92.2	102.7	104.3	108.2	11.4	3.7
Fuel, Electricity and Ice	62.3	91.1	99.0	109.8	46.2	10.9
Housefurnishings	60.7	134.1	101.3	136.4	121.0	34.6
Miscellaneous	51.9	87.6	100.7	121.3	68.8	20.5

In spite of widespread criticism of the Office of Price Administration (OPA) it succeeded in controlling prices to a remarkable degree. The American citizen is inclined to resent government regulation in the economic field even when it works to his advantage.

[2] Data from *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 61, No. 4, October, 1945.


trolled, the second under restrictions and manipulation of the Office of Price Administration (OPA).

The extent to which the government over a long period will succeed in modifying the business cycle and filling the gap of private unemployment with government employment, remains to be seen. The significant fact from the standpoint of this discussion is that government manipulation of this phase of the economic system is coming to be accepted as a reasonable and normal kind of social activity. It involves planning programs for the construction of public works in times of slack employment — local, state, and federal public buildings, hospitals, streets, roads, park and forest improvements, disease control, etc. During the great depression it involved such programs as that of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the National Youth Administration (NYA), the Works Projects Administration (WPA), and other works-employment devices. Public works of an international character were recommended by the National Resources Planning Board prior to its abolition in 1942,[3] as an added public activity in case of another depression. These international public works were to deal with problems of postwar rehabilitation and of international employment. They were to be directed to the rebuilding of destroyed countries, the development of backward countries, and the providing of employment on public-works projects of value to various nations.

Manipulation of the Agricultural Economy

Industry, especially large industry, is to quite an extent centralized under the capitalistic corporation. It is capable of carrying out its own research and sponsoring its own protective devices. Government interest in big business except in wartime has been primarily to regulate it rather than to sponsor it, although the government has in certain instances, notably in utilities, entered the field to compete with big business. The justification has been that of providing a yardstick by which a reasonable cost for electricity can be measured. The largest power projects are government promoted — TVA, Grand Coulee, and Bonneville — and they have established new low rates.

[3] LEWIS L. LORWIN, *International Economic Development, Public Works and Other Problems*, Technical Paper Number 7, National Resources Planning Board. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., October, 1942.



Chicago Board of Trade

CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE

Here is the central market for the nation's agricultural commodities.

Agriculture, on the other hand, is a highly individualized occupation with more than six million families each going its own way. Here the government has not been interested in controlling monopolies but primarily in acting as a coordinator and organizer of the nation's farmers. Agriculture is the one field, for example, in which the government for many years has promoted research through Land Grant colleges and their Agricultural Experiment Stations. It has also promoted a special type of adult education through the federally subsidized Agricultural Extension Service connected with the State colleges. Their service has personnel stationed in most counties of the nation — county agents and home demonstration agents — and carries out statewide youth programs through its 4-H clubs.

In recent years, however, the federal government has taken over responsibility for the management of production and prices in agriculture. These programs, like those having to do with the management of other phases of the economy, were greatly expanded under the New Deal and reached the highest level of regulative supervision during World War II. The depression, as a consequence of unemployment and a reduction in purchasing power of the consumer, who for the most part is the city wage worker, found agriculture loaded with huge surpluses for which there was no market. The New Deal aggressively attacked this problem. The method was to create an artificial scarcity in order to raise prices and create profits, a device long used by American industry. It was believed that if the surplus hogs could be killed off, the surplus cotton plowed under, and wheat acreages reduced, the surpluses would disappear and prices would go up. The logic of carrying out this program at a time when people were starving because they had insufficient money to buy, has always been questioned. The fact remains, however, that it represented the most comprehensive national program ever undertaken for bringing the activities of the farmers under direct control of government. It involved determining the number of acres of certain basic crops that should be planted and the number of livestock that should be raised. That it penalized the consumer, who already had more of a load than he could carry, is a problem in itself.

The program was a failure so far as achieving the goal of decreased production. Data developed by Schultz, and presented in the table below, show that although acreage reductions were

brought about, production was actually not reduced; farmers devoted their better land to the crop of which there was a surplus, and thus made up for the loss of acreage. The program was also a failure from the standpoint of helping the low-income farmer. It did, however, accomplish something for soil conservation.

During the war the emphasis in agricultural adjustment gradually shifted toward increased production, especially of certain crops which were needed to provide essential foods and fibers. These goals were readily achieved by price supports which guaranteed the farmer minimum prices in advance. As a part of the incentive, the government pledged itself to continue the price supports for a two-year period following January 1 after the official declaration of the cessation of hostilities.

PER CENT CHANGE IN ACREAGES AND IN PRODUCTION UNDER AAA POLICIES, 1931–1933 AND 1940–1942 [4]

Crop	Per cent reduction in acreage	Per cent change in production
Corn	20	+ 5
Wheat	13	+21
Cotton	38	−17
Tobacco	18	+ 4
Total	21	

Economists now reviewing the problem of agricultural policy believe that in the future emphasis should be placed upon full production and that prices should reach their own level. Since they recognize that the farmer cannot live under such a regime in a depression period, they recommend measures whereby he can operate through reimbursements from the public treasury. Some recommend that he be reimbursed merely for the difference between the sale price of products and the cost of producing them.[5] Others suggest that he be reimbursed for the difference between the sale price and the pre-depression price of particular products.[6] All believe that full production is desirable since it will provide

[4] THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, *Agriculture in an Unstable Economy*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1945, pp. 171–172.

[5] *Postwar Agricultural Policy*, Report of the Committee on Postwar Agricultural Policy of the Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, October, 1944.

[6] SCHULTZ, *op. cit.*

cheap food for consumers. The approach of the 1930's — limiting production and thereby raising prices — penalizes all classes and threatens the national diet.

Along with full production, agricultural policy-makers stress the importance of measures to stimulate consumption. Subsidized consumption would take the form of free school and factory lunches, food-stamp plans, and other such measures designed to improve the diet of the public and at the same time to increase the use of food products.


There will be a great deal of discussion through the next few years of what is a desirable agricultural policy with regard to production, prices, and incentives to consumption. Of this much, however, we may be certain: there will be policies federally designed and federally administrated, whereby agriculture will receive centralized supervision. This is true because there is no other way by which supervision can be provided, and supervision is necessary.

Agricultural policy to date has for the most part been ineffective in meeting the needs of the lower third of the farming population. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, with its emphasis on compensating farmers for taking certain acreages out of production, did comparatively little to increase the income of small farmers. In most cases it was the large operator who could take his poorer, least profitable acreage out of production and, by concentrating on his better land, raise as large or even larger crops and at the same time receive a large subsidy for acres not farmed. If in the future agriculture takes the road of subsidizing farmers for the cost of production, or of guaranteeing the difference between the price level of depression and the pre-depression period, it will do little to help the great masses of farmers who never produce enough for a decent living. Such groups will have to come under the supervision of welfare policies designed for them and carried out by the Farm Security Administration and welfare organizations.[7]

Government Manipulation of Credit

In an economy where credit instruments are used on an extensive scale and where the use of borrowed money is one of the

[7] Problems of low income groups are discussed in a later chapter dealing with economic security.



Courtesy of Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

Credit channels through such institutions to the nation's network of business and commercial activities.

devices by which security and success are attained, the federal government has increasingly entered the credit field. In recent years its primary attempts have been to establish a low interest rate on borrowings and to grant credit on a long-term basis. Loan policies have also been used as promotive instruments. For example, low-interest loans to home builders have not only served the purpose of making capital available at a low rate and on a long term to persons who want to build, improve, or buy a home, but they have also been an important factor in stimulating home construction and home ownership.

In some instances, notably the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), the government, rather than providing credit directly, has guaranteed loans made by private banks on the condition that the bank write the loan at rates and on a term basis which would conform to government requirements. Through this device the government has promoted home building activities through private capital by acting as an insurance agency underwriting the risk.

In the field of agriculture the tenant-purchase program of the Farm Security Administration encouraged farm ownership by giving the tenant a chance to borrow practically all the money needed for the purchase of a farm at a reasonably low rate of interest and on a contract which requires payment over a forty-year term rather than the usual ten or twelve years required by a bank. These contracts are written so that the annual payment required, rather than being an arbitrary amount each year, is a proportion of the net income from the farm for the particular year. In such instances the government has definitely encouraged a new and more reasonable basis for the use and return of borrowed money.

In the depression and in wartime, government credit was also extended to private business and industry. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was devised in the early depression of 1929 to encourage loans to large business and industrial organizations. So also during World War II it made huge loans to industrial organizations to encourage them to assist in programs of national defense. In other cases during the war, government credit was directly used for construction of great industrial enterprises.

In the field of credit manipulation, the federal government has virtually come to control banking policies. During the banking crisis of the first few days of Franklin D. Roosevelt's adminis-

tration, when all banks had to be closed to avoid failure on a scale exceeding that of the early 1920's and other similar crises, it became apparent that federal protection was necessary. There resulted the bank deposits guarantee provision whereby a person's bank deposits up to $5000 are guaranteed by the federal treasury. The banks have had to pay for this protection by having their lending policies more carefully supervised and regulated.

The extent to which government credit will and should become a factor in the economy is debatable. This question is a highly technical one, the details of which need not concern us here. Our interest at this point is in recognizing that government credit has become something of vital importance in the economic structure.

The Implications of Government-Managed Economy

The management of the economy in American democracy, while it is looked upon by many as dangerous and perhaps really does have dangerous implications, is up to a point necessary in a complex society where the economic weal of the many is at best in the hands of the few. Government restriction and even government promotion of business and economic activity has a democratic flavor. That government control and government ventures in business often lead to awkward and expensive experimentation is equally true.

Few citizens like government regulation of the economy in principle, and yet many interest groups turn to the government for those regulations or controls which will advance their interests. Bureaus expand and government authorities multiply. They are criticized endlessly, but endless new demands are made upon them. There is a great deal of irony and also a profound truth in Senator Byrd's remark, "In depression we need more government to help the needy; in war, to win victory; in peace, to avoid war; and in prosperity, to avoid depression." Washington, D.C., has been a continually growing community. That it ever will cease growing seems to be a matter of doubt. Numerous vested interests seek privileges and therefore spend money and effort in lobbying for legislation that will guarantee them privileges. At the same time, many organizations and individuals decry restrictions and criticize the centralization of government.

It is obvious from time to time that the very ease with which nationwide controls are operated from Washington is a threat to the democratic processes. It is also clear that pressure groups, knowing the efficiency with which federal control can be operated and the relative quickness of the effects on the national economy, are likely to appeal to the government increasingly. To the extent that the Congress responds to particular pressure groups, thereby fostering special interests at the expense of the larger public, centralized control is dangerous.

Favorable Factors in the Trend toward Centralized Government Control

The nation can no longer evaluate federal control strictly from the viewpoint of its older conflict with free enterprise. Free enterprise, in the sense of unrestricted and ruthless exploitation of natural resources and of labor, never was in the public interest; it has no place in the future of democratic society. There must be a balance of power between great industrial corporations and the federal government. The government must always exercise the supervisory, regulative, and controlling functions in order that the public may be protected from the extensive power which economic control places in the hands of small boards of directors which are never democratic.[8]

From the standpoint of public welfare there is a great deal to be said for the centralization of many functions of government. Equalization of privileges such as education, health, and general welfare is possible only if the federal government assumes major responsibility for taxation and for redistributing the proceeds of taxation on the basis of need rather than on the basis of ability to pay. Much of the taxable industrial wealth of the nation is concentrated in a few urban states. The problem of rearing, educating, and providing medical care and welfare services for the

[8] While it is true that the American corporation is operated under a semblance of democratic traditions, control is actually vested in a board of directors. Every stockholder gets a ballot to vote on the election of trustees, accountants, and directors and also is given a chance on this ballot to vote on major policies. The ballot is not, however, a democratic one in the usual sense. The board nominates candidates and formulates the propositions which are to be voted for or against. There is rarely a place on the ballot for nominations and no request that stockholders suggest modifications in policy. Elections are in reality rubber stamp votes confirming directors' previous decisions as to what is desirable.

masses of children and youth of the next generation, is centered in other states afflicted by poverty of resources and a fertile population.

Another field of federal public responsibility emerged during the war. Research in America has always been supported and sponsored in large measure by private and state universities and by industry. In agriculture, however, research has for many years been subsidized by the federal government, working through the state Agricultural Experiment Stations. In the crisis of war, the government for the first time brought together large groups of natural scientists to push forward at as rapid a pace as possible applications of developments in physics and engineering. The amazing success of this group research has made the Congress and the public demand further support of research by government. Because it is recognized that research is basic not only to national defense but also to health and to economic development, there is now under consideration by Congress the founding of a series of national research organizations which will be financed to a large extent by the government. Research is to be carried on in the universities primarily but to some extent also in centralized establishments.

Centralization is also to be justified on the grounds that many economic functions cannot be effectively coordinated on less than a national scale. As has been pointed out in the field of agricultural policy, the Department of Agriculture will have to continue to act as a coordinating agency or agriculture be without effective leadership. Certain highway construction must be on a nation-wide scale. To have a systematic network of transcontinental highways, railways, air ways, radio communication systems, and so on, a certain amount of centralization is essential. Each state must to some extent tie into this broader national plan, at least for a minor portion of its developments in transportation and communication. In matters of protection from crime, also, centralization has become a necessity. The modern criminal does not stop at state lines, where local police officials must stop. These are but examples of the kind of protective or welfare services that have had to become centralized to a considerable degree in the interest of the average citizen.

From this discussion it is clear that centralization is not entirely a liability. There is, in some instances, economy and efficiency in centralization. It is a device by which equalization of wealth

and privilege can be extended throughout a democracy and by which the greatest security can be realized by all.

Criticisms of Centralization

Centralized government is looked upon by many as a disease of the political organism. The average man fears he will lose control of any government that is too far removed from his own daily experience. The average American citizen has always wanted to be governed by his peers. He feels safer when governed by his neighbors and friends, when he can go into his county court house or state capitol and confer with those who make the laws that are vital to him. He fears centralization because he fears power, because he fears that those who are far removed will forget his interests and fail to carry them out in legislation and administration.

At the center of criticism leveled at government control is the bureau and its famed but poorly understood operator, the bureaucrat. Government by departments and bureaus is characteristic of large scale administration. Unfortunately the tendency of the government bureau is to try to perpetuate itself. The average administrator increases his status, his salary, and his departmental appropriation and is able to build a large organization. The consequence is that government bureaus have a tendency to become oriented about selfish objectives rather than public interest. It is these tendencies, in part, that have made Senator Byrd of Virginia a rabid critic of the rapid growth in government personnel to some 3,649,000 in late 1945.[9]

There is another criticism of the bureau: in this form government tends to become arbitrary and may develop activities for which Congress has provided no authority. To the extent that bureaus evade Congressional authority, they evade responsibility to the public, since Congress is the designated authority of the people through which rules governing the administrative bureaus and departments are established. When a bureau or authority too seriously abuses privileges extended to it by Congress, the latter can refuse to appropriate new funds for it and can by this method eliminate it. This is an expedient to which our

[9] For a representative Byrd attack on bureaucracy see *American Magazine*, 139:24–25, April, 1945. For a different view read BEN W. LEWIS, "Lambs in Bureaucrat's Clothing," *Harpers*, 191:247–251, September, 1945.

Congress often resorts. It is not, however, efficient administration since it destroys continuity in the administration of the public service involved.

A recent tendency of government, and one which explains in part the rapid expansion of departments and bureaus, and in turn their large pay rolls, has been the development of the government corporation. The capital in these corporations is furnished from the public treasury rather than through the sale of stocks and bonds. The presumption in most of these enterprises is that (1) private capital would not be willing to assume the risk and (2) that the activity is one which is so much in the public interest that the public assumption of risk is justified.

An Associated Press release of February 9, 1946, describes the threat of the House Appropriations Committee to scrutinize more carefully the expenditures of some forty-one of the biggest government corporations, and lists the corporations. This list is suggestive of the varied corporation activities in operation under federal sponsorship: Commodity Credit corporation, Federal Intermediate Credit banks, Production Credit corporations, Regional Agricultural Credit corporations, Farmers' Home corporation, Federal Crop Insurance corporation, Federal Farm Mortgage corporation, Federal Surplus Commodities corporation, Reconstruction Finance corporation, Defense Plant corporation, Defense Supplies corporation, Metals Reserve company, Rubber Reserve company, War Damage corporation, Federal National Mortgage association, the RFC Mortgage company, Disaster Loan corporation, Inland Waterways corporation, Warrior River Terminal company, the Virgin Islands company, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., United States Spruce Production corporation, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Institute of Inter-American Transportation, Inter-American Educational Foundation, Inc., Inter-American Navigation corporation, Prencinradio, Inc., Cargoes Inc., Export-Import Bank of Washington, Petroleum Reserves corporation, Rubber Development corporation, United States Commercial company, Smaller War Plants corporation, Federal Public Housing authority, Defense Homes corporation, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance corporation, Home Owners' Loan corporation, United States Housing corporation, Panama Railroad company, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Tennessee Valley Associated Cooperatives, Inc.

Such organizations can easily become too numerous and need-

lessly expensive. In times of national hysteria, as in war or depression, there is too little restraint on them and too free use of the public purse to back financial ventures which are not really sound but are at the moment presumed to be. For instance, much of the activity of government corporations in rubber development during the war was foolish, costly, and unnecessary. It is easier to see this in retrospect than it was at the time, but it is doubtful if private capital under similar circumstances would venture such large sums without a more careful appraisal of possible results. Perhaps, then, the most serious indictment of the government corporation is that it does not use public resources with the same degree of judgment and foresight as would be necessary with private funds.

Criticize as we will, however, it seems likely that the American public will demand and receive more rather than less government supervision and management in the economic sphere. Some of it will, as in the past, give the public more for its tax money than could be had by any other form of management, some of it less.

There is a real challenge for men trained in economics, political science, and administration to make of government a profession. Ignorance and inefficiency in positions of high public responsibility always put a needlessly heavy strain on the public treasury.

Review

1. Trace the trend in relationship between political and economic institutions.
2. Is the trend outlined peculiar to any one type of political philosophy? Explain.
3. How has the shift from the idea of individual economic self-sufficiency affected the trend toward a managed economy?
4. Why is centralized government control of the economy essential if there is to be any control at all?
5. What philosophy has motivated the shift toward a managed economy in the United States?
6. Discuss the tendency of economic institutions to extend beyond national political boundaries.
7. Evaluate the idea of a managed economy as it has evolved in the United States.
8. Cite concrete evidence of a business cycle. How does the business cycle affect the value of money? The availability of credit? The availability of jobs?

9. What is meant by "pump priming" as the idea was developed by the New Deal in the great depression of the 1930's?
10. How does government attempt to regulate the business cycle in its two extreme phases, i.e., inflation and depression?
11. In what phase of the business cycle do public works play a part? Explain.
12. Discuss differences in the problem of managing the industrial and the agricultural economy.
13. What devices did the government use during the depression to adjust the agricultural economy? Evaluate them.
14. Compare this philosophy with that of full production.
15. Discuss and illustrate the federal government's activities in the credit field.
16. Discuss evidence for and against centralized control of the American economy.

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CHAPTER 20

BALANCING CLASS INTERESTS

Labor and the Industrial Revolution

ONE OF THE MOST significant aspects of the industrial revolution from the standpoint of the individual was that it removed from his hand tools and other means of production. Under the system of handicraft which prevailed throughout the Middle Ages, the worker owned the simple tools with which to produce goods and he worked in his own shop. Under the factory system, however, no particular person owns the means of production. In most cases they are owned by stockholders, who may number in the thousands. Control and management are in the hands of a few individuals, usually the Board of Directors. Executive responsibility is largely centered in the president, who in many cases is a major stockholder.

With the development of the industrial system, the laborer retained only the job. Since his entire livelihood and round of daily activities depended on his job, the need arose for him to protect it, and to improve its conditions and the returns it brought in the form of wages. The industrial revolution in an indirect but vital way provided the background for the modern labor movement.

Under an industrial system such as has developed in the United States, initiative and risk-taking are the prerogative of the controlling group. It is the executive rather than the laborer who sees possibilities for expansion and profits. The laborer has to be satisfied with what wages he can get as a return from his day-to-day activities on the job. For the most part he does not look for great returns unless he is one of the ambitious few who expect to climb to the top in the industry. But he does want his job, and he wants it made secure. He wants it to pay well, and he wants working conditions which are healthful and pleasant.

In general the labor movement has been built in the direction of realizing these objectives: job security, a favorable working day and working conditions, and an adequate wage.

The Growth of Labor Unions

Trade unions are nothing more than continuing associations of wage earners formed for the purpose of maintaining the job and improving working conditions. In the United States they began as organizations of local groups of craftsmen. These groups gradually built up into national unions which were also built primarily about specific crafts. Most labor-union development on a national scale came after the Civil War. It was not until 1886 that a national federation was developed in the American Federation of Labor.


The American Federation of Labor paid attention to the wages and working conditions of its members and to the organization of skilled workers into unions which could effectively enforce their demands with employers in their respective fields. World War I gave the unions their first great impetus, as will be seen from the trend chart below, because in time of labor scarcity and rising prices labor holds a strategic position. These wartime gains were, however, lost in the 1920's.

It is an interesting fact that prior to 1935 the labor movement embraced few of the total non-agricultural employees of the nation. It is estimated that only 9.9 per cent of the non-agricultural workers were in unions in 1910. By 1920, 19.4 per cent were in unions; but by 1930 the ratio had fallen to 10.2 per cent.[1] The expansion of membership began with the election of the sympathetic New Deal administration in 1932 and the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Wagner Act and the creation of the National Labor Relations Board. These governmental encouragements, however, were not the only factors. The unprecedented hardships borne by the wage worker during the early 1930's because of unemployment and extensive deprivation, provided the background of psychological desperation on which a stronger unity could be built. While the American Federation of Labor had not completely ignored the possibilities of organizing entire industries, its primary emphasis had been on uniting par-

[1] *Structure of the American Economy.* National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D.C., 1939.

ticular crafts. In 1935 the Committee for Industrial Organization was formed as a phase of the traditional labor movement. In 1938 it pulled away from that and, reorganized as the Congress of Industrial Organizations, has led a powerful separate movement. Its primary aim was to organize not crafts but entire industries. This new point of view made it possible to break into the major heavy industries particularly automobile, rubber, and steel, which had been beyond the reach of the American Federation of Labor.

MEMBERSHIP IN AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, 1940–1945



Adapted from Florence Peterson's "American Labor Unions"

During the period of World War II, with its unprecedented shortage of manpower and the continued sympathy of the existing government toward labor, labor organizations had the best opportunity in American industrial history for building a strong group. They not only expanded their membership and their strength in the field of bargaining, but also in the election of 1944, through the Political Action Committee, attempted to wield an influence in national politics. That influence has since been felt in city elections and will undoubtedly be further felt in state, federal, and local elections. Even with all this, however, there is no definite labor party in the nation such as exists in Great Britain. One must still say that American labor's interest is primarily in economic bargaining rather than in political action.

The close of World War II saw labor-union membership at

an all-time high. An estimate made by *The New Republic*[2] summarizes the situation as follows:

AFL	6,800,000
CIO	6,000,000 (est.)
Mine Workers	600,000
Rail Brotherhoods (Ind.)	450,000
Telephone Workers	200,000
Others	500,000
Total	14,550,000

This membership, though exceedingly large, represented but a fourth of the total number of gainful workers, which was estimated on V-J Day to be sixty million.

Methods of Labor Union Operations

Labor works through the trade agreement, which is nothing more than a contract between employer and worker agreed upon through collective bargaining, that is, through negotiations between representatives of employers and of employees concerning wages, hours, tenure, and other conditions of employment. The collective agreement not only protects the worker but it also gives him a chance to exercise some influence in determining policies so far as they affect his own personal welfare.

Labor uses as weapons strikes, picketing (which sometimes takes the form of sit-down strikes), and boycotts, where these are necessary to enforce its demands. Similarly industry has in the past used such devices as lockouts, black lists, labor espionage, and the employment of strikebreakers. Interestingly enough, some of the most vicious conflicts between workers and industry have been over the right of workers to organize and to function as unions. The New Deal legislation, by legalizing unionization and strikes, removed this important cause of friction. Jurisdictional disputes between the two major unions for the control of certain industries now often cause conflict.

The History of the Labor Movement

In England little more than a century ago it was illegal for workers to organize in an attempt to raise wages or change working conditions. The same situation prevailed in America until

[2] December 3, 1945, p. 746.

approximately one hundred years ago. From that point there has been a long struggle to obtain the rights of organization and of collective bargaining. Not until 1932, when the National Labor Relations Act was passed, was the worker protected by law from the risk of being fired for organization activities and for joining the union. Collective bargaining under law has now become a realized fact.

Through union activity workers are able to present a united front in making demands that are considered essential to their livelihood and personal well-being. In considerable part an improved level of living is the result. Largely because of union pressure the hours of work per day have fallen from twelve or fourteen to the present eight. In some industries there has now come a five-day week. Along with this decline in time has come a gradual increase in hourly wage and in total wage.

The average American workman has been able to afford a higher level of living, from the standpoint of goods purchased and also of the leisure he is able to enjoy, than workers in most parts of the world. Industry at the same time, by virtue of increased productivity, better management, and mechanization making for increased output per worker, has been able to produce goods at a lower and lower figure.


The American industrial system under corporate management has proved to be the most efficient industrial system in the world, the most ready to adapt itself to emergency, and the quickest to expand and commercialize new fields of invention and technology. The American worker is one of the best fed, best paid workers in the world. He uses more goods, even luxury goods like automobiles, than other workers anywhere else in the world. (See chart on page 398.)

Psychology of the American Labor Movement

It is generally considered that a man's place in the social and economic scale affects his attitudes and philosophy. Believing this to be true, Karl Marx held that a fundamental conflict exists between labor and capital in a capitalistic society and that it will continue regardless of improved conditions among workers until in a final revolution labor will take over production.

This philosophy, while it has appealed to many intellectuals and reformers and has to some extent been put into practice in

other countries, notably in Russia, has never applied to the American labor movement. Labor and public alike believe in the system of free enterprise. They believe in wealth and in the justice of private gain from the exercise of initiative and the



SYMBOLIC OF AMERICA'S EFFICIENT INDUSTRY

Persons per car in various nations. In spite of its very serious defects the American economic order has brought more people more things that they need than has any other economic order in the world.

spending of capital. They expect businessmen and industrialists to retain control of the means of production and even expect them to amass wealth.[1] Except for a small segment, the American labor movement has never been interested in controlling the means of production. It has been willing to leave industry in the hands of the people who now control it. Its only interest has been to realize the objectives outlined above — a better job at better pay under more ideal working conditions. Strikes and

picketing, even sit-down strikes, have been engaged in to protect the job for the strikers and to force improvement rather than to destroy the industry or to take possession of it.

Social Climbing a Handicap to the Labor Movement

The labor movement in America has never realized complete solidarity or attained a membership embracing any large proportion of the total workers of the nation. Why?

Because of the American tradition of social climbing, the average wage worker has not expected always to remain in the same job or the same industry. Class consciousness has therefore not been strong. Moreover the ranks of labor were constantly filled, until the present generation, with European immigrants who tended to take over the poorer jobs and to push the more experienced workers up to better levels of income and authority, often even to managerial levels. Since the stream of immigrants has been cut off, white and Negro workers from the rural South have played the same role in many northern industries.[3] At best the union card has been for many workers an indication of a temporary bond with his fellows rather than a permanent one.

New Goals for Labor

The American worker is beginning to demand security of employment. There has in recent years been a great deal of agitation for year-round employment and for a guaranteed annual wage. That every worker in modern industry should be guaranteed annual employment would seem reasonable. Many seasonal fluctuations can be ironed out by combining industries with different seasonal cycles for the specific purpose of providing year-round employment. The leveling off of the business cycle will also aid in this problem because the disappearance of depression will save marginal industries from the necessity of closing down from time to time.

The idea of an annual minimum wage also has many advocates. This too would seem reasonable provided it is possible and practical to control fluctuation in the value of the dollar.

[3] E. D. Beynon, "The Southern White Laborer Moves to Michigan." *American Sociological Review*, 3:333–343, June, 1938.

A certain minimum income and regularity of employment in a world where employment for the most part is in the hands of others rather than one's self, is a basic factor in giving a psychological sense of security as well as a certain economic foundation for one's livelihood.

A goal so fundamental should be made a matter of social concern and ways devised for attaining it. That it is tremendously important to individual and family security is suggested by studies of marriage which indicate that amount of income is not correlated with success in marriage, but regularity and certainty of income definitely are.[4]

The Corporate Community[5]

In observing the power and manipulation of labor unions today, the average citizen is likely to lose sight of the fact that American industry is also highly organized and centrally directed. We happen to live in a period when labor is able to make its voice heard effectively, but the fact remains that the American industrial system, on the other hand, is organized into great corporate institutions which control many raw materials, almost entirely dominate the field of processing and manufacturing, and regulate transportation and many phases of retail distribution. Students of business and manufacturing sometimes refer to this system of interlocking organizations as the corporate community.

Through a few key banking institutions which own much of the credit of major industries, and interlocking directorates of many of the various large corporations, centralized control of the industrial mechanism is achieved. The National Resources Planning Board studying two hundred of the largest industrial corporations of the nation in 1935 found that only twenty-five had no directors in common with at least one other. At the other extreme were organizations like the Western Union Telegraph Company, which has interlocking directors with thirty-five others.

The extent to which these directorships overlap is presented in the summary below for two hundred of the largest non-

[4] E. W. BURGESS and LEONARD S. COTTRELL, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, Chapter 9. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1939.

[5] For a more complete discussion of this topic and summary of evidence see *Structure of the American Economy*, Chapter 6, and Appendices 11, 12, 13. National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D.C., 1939.

financial corporations and fifty of the large banking corporations combined. These corporations had total assets in 1935 of $114,914,200,000. It will be observed that one man held nine directorships in corporations which controlled millions of dollars and governed the employment of hundreds of thousands of laborers. Three directors held eight directorships each, or a total of twenty-four. Six held seven directorships each, or forty-two in all. The total of 3544 was held by 2722 directors. In other words, in almost a thousand instances directorships were held by those who were directors of one or more of the other industrial or banking corporations.

NUMBER OF DIRECTORS AND THEIR HOLDINGS OF DIRECTORSHIPS IN 200 LARGEST NON-FINANCIAL AND 50 LARGEST FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1935 [6]

Number of directorships held by a single individual	*Total number of directors*	*Total number of directorships held*
9	1	9
8	3	24
7	6	42
6	6	36
5	19	95
4	48	192
3	102	306
2	303	606
1	2,234	2,234
Total	2,722	3,544

The interlocking directorship is not the only type of coordination between major corporations. Many of the largest financial and industrial interests are organized into interest groups which function with some degree of unity. The Morgan–First National Bank group includes forty-one of the 250 largest corporations ranging all the way from United States Steel to American Telephone and Telegraph. It also holds a controlling interest in eleven major railroad systems which have 26 per cent of the first-class mileage. The Kuhn-Loeb group through its financing

[6] *The Structure of the American Economy, Part I. Basic Characteristics*, p. 158. National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D.C., June, 1939.

combines thirteen major railroad systems, which control 22 per cent of the first-class mileage, the Western Union Telegraph Company, and a bank. There are also the Rockefeller, Mellon, and DuPont groups, to mention only a few other leading combinations.

That this kind of overlapping has a certain advantage from the standpoint of manipulating credit and ensuring coordination of the nation's economic, industrial, and financial machinery, cannot be questioned. That it also represents tremendous political and economic power and has given industry unusual strength in determining the policies and wealth of millions of workers, cannot be doubted.

In addition to corporate organizations, interlocking directorships, group combinations for purposes of financing and management, there are the other combinations of industrial and economic power represented in such groups as the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. These tie in rather closely with the corporate structure of the nation and, through propaganda and other public influences, attempt to voice a united opinion on questions they consider vital to the national welfare as viewed from the standpoint of their own vested interests.

The Public

In the struggle between industry and labor, there is always the group known as the public; this is the group which stands on the sidelines, concerned directly neither with management nor with wage earning in the particular industry involved. The public is nonetheless affected by the outcome of the struggle between the two since policies of industry and labor have a direct bearing on the cost of consumers' goods such as food, clothing, coal, transportation, and automobiles. More important at times than the cost itself is the effect of industrial tie-ups on the availability of goods. Coal shortages are often produced by strikes. So also the supplying of automobiles, refrigerators, and other consumers' goods so greatly needed at the close of World War II, was seriously delayed by the struggle over basic wage policies.

Interestingly enough, one group of laborers is part of the public when another group is striking, so that the public is not the same group in every case. The public is the group that is always concerned as a neutral party in the outcome because it



Keystone View Co.

AN OUTMODED INSTITUTION OR A NECESSITY, WHICH?

Wasted time and energy is costly to labor, management, and the public. Can administrative machinery settle such disputes by less costly means?

affects their own particular interest as consumers. Because of this situation, the nation should certainly look forward to a time when industrial disputes can be settled around a conference table, either with representatives of the government or with some other neutral board sitting as arbitrators or through other peace-making devices that may be made available. Such a move is in the interest of the public, of industry, and of the worker.

As long as collective bargaining is connected with strikes and work shutdowns, so long will the public interest be threatened. That the public does not have adequate legal protection is made clear from time to time. An outstanding instance occurred in February, 1946, when the strike of some two thousand tugboat workers threatened the health and safety of the entire city of New York. Schools and places of entertainment had to be closed to save fuel, millions of dollars were lost to businesses not directly involved, and food supplies dwindled to near the point where the health and life of thousands were jeopardized. It is not


enough to place the blame in this case on the workers, or on the handful of employers who failed to meet their demands, or on both groups. There was a lack of governmental devices to protect the public interest.

It is possible that in the long run that ill-defined group, the public, will have to play a more aggressive role than in the past. This will probably come through consumer groups. Such groups, though now poorly organized, have in certain instances had a vital effect on government policy. They played an important part, for instance, in seeing that OPA and price regulations were continued after World War II until manufactured goods were available in quantities. They can in the future become even more powerful.

The Outlook for Industrial Peace

It seems that industry and labor in America have been coming nearer to the same philosophy. Industry now recognizes that good wages are essential to production, for production ceases when labor and the masses of consumers can no longer purchase goods produced. The problem of industry and labor alike is therefore to seek an optimum balance between reasonable wages and reasonable costs of production.

Realizing a proper balance between the interests of labor, management, and the public is, however, always difficult. On the one hand, labor can make demands which are so unreasonable that the manufacturer is compelled to raise the price of his product, and this penalizes the public including that section of labor that does not obtain the benefit of the wage increase. On the other hand, industry can operate on a basis where it makes an excess profit; and when it does so, it takes advantage of the public by charging too high a price. The interest of all parties demands that industry operate at a profit, carry through times of slack markets, and continue to employ workers; that labor have a wage that makes possible a high standard of living; and that the public have goods at a reasonable cost. In the achievement of this goal, greater cooperation between industry and labor, the greater ability on the part of both to share in the policy-making for both, seems to be a current trend and one which offers the means of improving present relationships. The strike at best is an awkward and primitive gesture for achieving means which should be



Justus in Minneapolis Star-Journal

"FINEST PULLIN' TEAM IN THE WORLD!"

achieved ordinarily at the council table. As in the case of all forms of overt conflict, the strike is wasteful and expensive to all parties concerned.

There is some evidence, however, that union labor at one point is failing to recognize its obligations to the public and to its own long-term welfare. Urban industrial life has tended to stress leisure and luxury rather than the virtues of work and achievement. This is contrary to rural values, which have perhaps overstressed work and taken too much satisfaction from concrete

achievement in work. Where labor does not identify itself with the success of the industry, there is a tendency to make increasing demands for wages but to fail to return to industry and to the public a fair day's work for the wage earned.

This point is made in a statement by Henry Ford II, president of the Ford Motor Company.[7] He said early in 1946 that instead of building a car in 87 hours as the company did in 1941, or in 102 hours as in 1942, it took 128 hours in the months following V-J Day. He also reported that an opinion poll showed that less than 45 per cent of union workers thought they should turn out as much work as they were able while on the job and that 44 per cent thought a man should do about what the average of the groups does; of non-union workers, 60 per cent thought a man should do all he could, and only 33 per cent thought he should produce no more than the average of the group.

Are these views representative of workers generally? We do not know. They may reflect only the temporary let-down of certain groups following war. They may not represent the view of any widespread group. The nature and extent of the poll are not indicated. The results do, however, reflect attitudes which labor unions are, rightly or wrongly, often accused of fostering.

Such attitudes, to the extent that they find expressions in work habits, cannot but raise the price of goods to the public and have the long-run effect of reducing the American standard of living. An increased standard of living is dependent upon full production. Any labor philosophy which holds back full production is in effect sabotaging the nation's interest in a high standard of living.

Labor, Industry, and the Stock Market

The public has another interest in full and efficient production. The capitalistic system in America has given a ready outlet for any capital accumulations, even those of the average man, in the securities market. Stocks and bonds, although often thought of as primarily an outlet for capital of the rich, have also been the outlet for the capital of many people of moderate means.

The market is set up on such a basis that a person with almost any amount of funds, no matter how small, can find an issue for investment. The return on the investment, and its relative se-

[7] "One Solution to Our Problems"; reprint of an address at the Commonwealth Club Luncheon in San Francisco, February 8, 1946.

curity, depend a great deal on the wisdom of the buyer, it is true, and the speculative investor of little experience has more often lost than gained. On the other hand, many people have through such investment of funds realized substantial dividends. The responsibility for managing these funds rests on industry, but the public is vitally interested in profitable management and that in turn results from efficient production on the part of labor.

Labor and the Standard of Living

This discussion of problems of the American economy is concerned with its improvement, not its abolition. Government manipulation and control of the economy have not been aimed at its replacement by state socialism or other systems. The American people have never feared bigness or efficiency as such, either in industrial management or in labor organization. They do fear monopoly, exploitation, waste of resources, and idleness of workers. It is to control some of these abuses that government control of economic forces and regulation of vested interest groups has come about.

Harold J. Laski,[8] the British labor leader and liberal economist, is of the opinion that American industry faces a basic difficulty which has resulted from its own methods of dealing with labor. He thinks that labor has been led to feel that as industry prospers labor will be the recipient of continuous improvement in the standard of living and that industry is capable of unlimited expansion, barring circumstances beyond control, such as international upsets. He believes that labor, as a consequence, has developed an expectation for advances altogether out of proportion to the profitable expansion of production, that actually owners have promised more than they can deliver, and that strife with labor is therefore inevitable. Whether he is right or wrong, certainly the American economic scene is a long way from achieving and retaining any stable balance between production, wages, and prices, which is the essence of labor-management-public relations.

Review

1. How did the Industrial Revolution affect the position of labor?
2. Contrast the philosophy of the laborer and of the manager of an industrial enterprise.

[8] "American Strike Scene." *Personnel Journal*, 24:203–206, December, 1945.

3. What is a trade union?
4. What new principle did the Committee for Industrial Organization introduce into the labor movement not present in traditional trade unionism?
5. Trace the growth of labor union membership and point out factors affecting particular trends up and down.
6. Explain the trade agreement and give examples of conditions it calls for.
7. What weapons does labor have at its disposal?
8. Give some high points in the history of the labor movement.
9. Does the American labor movement psychology conform to the accepted Marxian philosophy? Explain.
10. How has the philosophy of social climbing hindered any trend toward Marxism?
11. What new goals does labor now seek? Evaluate them from the standpoint of a democratic philosophy of opportunity.
12. What is meant by the corporate community?
13. Cite evidence to show that wealth and political power are concentrated in the hands of a relatively small group.
14. Present evidence to prove that the industrial-commercial and credit structures in the economy are closely tied together.
15. What is meant by interlocking directorships? Present evidence to show that they exist.
16. Should our nation attempt to destroy the corporate community? Defend your answer.
17. What is meant by "the public" as used in this chapter?
18. How is the public interest often jeopardized and its welfare threatened in the clashes between management and labor?
19. In what sense is the wage of the worker of vital interest to all groups?
20. Discuss the importance of efficient production by labor.
21. Discuss the public interest in industry as a source of investment for capital.
22. Discuss the possibilities of concerted action by consumer groups.

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CHAPTER 21

PROVIDING ECONOMIC SECURITY

Economic Security in Industrial Society

AMERICAN SOCIETY with its expanding agricultural and industrial frontiers long rated the gambler's chance of quick wealth above security. Better to go broke trying to snatch a million than to plod along in a routine which promised security for life but held no hope of winning big stakes. This philosophy worked fairly well as long as new opportunities opened in sufficient number to guarantee everyone a chance to work if he had the strength and were willing to do so. But before the nation was prepared, the frontier of expanding opportunity was gone and it found itself in 1930 without either the gambler's chance or security.

Self-Employment and Security

In the preceding chapters we have indicated that the industrial revolution took the means of production out of the hands of the workers. The increased shift of population to urban industrial employment, a trend which still is evident in Western society, still further reduces the amount of self-employment because a decreasing number of workers are employed in agriculture. With the growth of industrial society and a world commercial order, even agriculture, which has always been preponderantly an occupation of self-employment and which has therefore offered a great deal of security and individual freedom, no longer gives the average man the security it once did. The farmer now has to orient his activities to the market. His standards of living have been raised to the point where he also lives by cash expenditures rather than directly from the land.

In earlier decades, times of industrial crisis called for escape to the frontier where free land offered an opportunity for labor unable to remain in industrial employment. The safety-valve

theory of Turner, although questioned in some of its details as a realistic description of the actual working of economic forces in early American life, nonetheless explains in part why the management of the economy on a nationwide scale was once unnecessary. The ready accessibility of farm employment, combined with the fact that a considerable proportion of the population was already self-employed, made previous national crises much different from that faced in 1932 when for the first time the nation undertook to manage the economy on a major scale. Free land was gone. Machine agriculture required no further expansion; foods and fibers glutted the market.


Even though in the 1930's millions of industrial workers returned to farms, actually farm employment failed to provide the solution it had been in earlier days. Subsistence farming and subsistence living had largely disappeared during the period of World War I and the following years. Even those who went to farms in the 1930's had to be placed on relief rolls in almost as high a proportion as workers in cities. At the worst period of the depression, relief rolls averaged 15 to 18 millions. By May, 1935, one in eight persons in rural farm areas, as compared to one in six persons in urban areas, was on relief. (See the pictographic chart on page 412.)

In modern society, therefore, economic security won by personal initiative, ambition, and enterprise, is to a considerable extent a myth. The masses of both rural and urban dwellers depend upon the fluctuation of the industrial-commercial order. It was during the great depression that the nation first awoke to the need for national legislation which would underwrite the most common economic risks of the citizen.

The Historical Perspective

Pauperism, delinquency, and crime were all discussed under the same general heading a few decades ago. Pauperism was considered as immoral as crime. Go back two centuries and an honest man was imprisoned for debt — again a symbol of the attitude which once classed financial failure along with crime.

In the large-family system of earlier days, the family was a major factor in the security of the individual. Relatives felt a responsibility for their aged dependents and for their unfortunate members



EACH FIGURE REPRESENTS 2,250,000 PERSONS; WHITE FIGURES ARE THOSE ON RELIEF.

From "On Relief," Works Progress Administration

VICTIMS OF A GREAT DEPRESSION

Rural migration is no longer a safety valve for urban workers in times of depression. It only shifts the burden of relief from urban to rural areas. May, 1935, found one person out of every seven in the United States on relief as a consequence of the nation-wide depression.

of all ages. The neighborhood also was, even in the early American community, a source of security for the socially inadequate.

It was only as urban industrial society reached the point where the secondary group replaced the neighborhood and where secular thinking replaced religious motivation that public welfare on a larger scale came into its own. When the idea of public responsibility for the security of the citizen came to be a recognized philosophy, there was but a step to the removal of public benefits entirely from the realm of charity and the classification of them as rights and duties of the state to its members. As a consequence, with the development of a national social security program, the term "poverty" has tended to pass from the vocabulary and the term "security" to replace it, with an appropriate terminology to cover benefits to the citizen. In place of charity have come pensions and annuities, unemployment compensation, aid to dependent and crippled children, and other such categories

which are not considered charity in the old sense but normal and justifiable benefits to those who qualify. They are in fact benefits built up by the government through collections from payrolls and through taxation.

In a time of self-employment the old concept of poverty had some meaning. The time of day when a man got up, the number of hours he worked, the ambition he exercised in his attack on the natural environment had something to do with whether he starved or fed well during the winter. In that far-off day the identification of pauperism with laziness, vice, or intemperance had some foundation. But now, when six directors of a corporation employing 600,000 workers may decide by their vote whether or not any of these men will work next week or next month or next year, there is little sense in charging poverty to the personal characteristics of the individual. One can, of course, argue that any one of these 600,000 men might have been on the Board of Directors had he had sufficient personal ability and force, or had he been born with the right grandfather, but that is beside the point. Personal characteristics do have some relationship to success, but this is not always so in a society where self-employment is largely a thing of history.

Edward T. Devine[1] as early as 1909 advanced the theory that poverty is primarily economic — the outgrowth of maladjustments which result directly from conditions for which society is responsible. He challenged the prevailing idea that poverty is ordinarily due to shiftlessness, drink, over-reproduction, or other personal faults. He stressed the view that the true causes of poverty should be sought in the social system, not in the personality of the individual. This assumption has come to be the accepted philosophy of our day and poor-relief practices now conform to it.

It is only natural, then, that for religious charity, which emphasized the blessing to the giver for his generous outpouring of himself in tokens to the unfortunate, there have been substituted state-supported social work and state-financed social security. The whole system of charity has been secularized and after the process of transformation is no longer charity. The nation still believes in individual initiative and enterprise in all fields of human endeavor, but at the same time it frankly recognizes that such endeavor is bound to be thwarted in many cases

[1] *Misery and Its Causes*, Chapter 1. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1910.

by impersonal forces of the economy. It has therefore underwritten individual risk by social policy.

Provisions of the Social Security Act and Its Operation

The national Social Security Act, passed in 1935 and since modified and made more inclusive, provides in the first place for a system of old age and survivor's insurance which is based on wages received. Payments are made monthly to retired insured workers, to their dependents, or to their survivors. In order to receive benefits the worker must be sixty-five or older, must be fully insured, and must file a claim for benefits. Supplementary benefits amounting to one-half the worker's are provided for his wife if she is sixty-five or over, or to unmarried dependent children under sixteen, or under eighteen if regularly attending school.

A single man who has been covered by insurance for five years and whose average monthly wage was $50, receives $21.00 per month. If married, he receives $31.50. A single man who has had a monthly wage of $250 over the same period receives $42.00. A married man with an income of $250 or above receives $63.00. If a worker dies before reaching retirement age, his dependents receive monthly survivor-benefits. These also vary with the worker's salary and with the number and age of his dependents.

In addition to these insurance provisions the Social Security Act includes unemployment compensation. Certain standards are set for the states to meet in order to be entitled to Federal grants. The establishment and administration of the systems are wholly within the province of the several states. The money is obtained through a Federal unemployment tax, which requires a deduction of 3 per cent of a worker's wages up to $3000, levied on the payroll by employers with eight or more employees. Benefits vary from state to state.

Federal grants also aid the states in giving financial assistance to the needy aged, to the needy blind, and to dependent children. This all comes under the heading of *public assistance*. The Federal grants are based on the amount the state itself spends. For old-age assistance, to protect those not covered by old-age insurance, the government matches the state's contribution up to a Federal-state total of $40 per person per month. For aid to the blind the government again matches the state funds up to a Federal-state maximum of $40 for each person per month, and also pays half

the cost of administering the state plan. In aiding dependent children the government also matches state funds up to a Federal-state total of $18 for the first child and $12 for each additional one in the family, and pays half the cost of administering the state plan. Aid to dependent children is a direct subsidy by government taxation providing primarily for mothers left with orphaned children. It is in fact for the most part a mother's pension which makes it possible for the mother to care for her children without the necessity of abandoning or neglecting them in order to make a living. These grants, however, are not yet sufficient to give a husband or wife confidence that in case of the death of the wage earner the children will be given reasonable democratic opportunities.

Security for the Family

The most important concern of a democracy is the security and well-being of children. Unfortunately under competitive capitalism and the wage-salary economy, the income of the worker has no relation to family needs. The likelihood is that persons without family responsibility will on the average have a greater income than persons with it. But even if the income is the same, the total must be cut into a larger number of units so that the entire family must live on a lower level. The situation varies somewhat from region to region and with the composition of the family but throughout the United States, and especially in the South, the larger the family the smaller the unit income for each member. Data assembled by the Social Security Board and shown on the chart on page 416 make this strikingly clear.


Each dependent child, for purposes of this analysis, is considered a half family unit. It will be seen that the average family unit-income is under $500. Where there are a man and his wife only, the unit-income is approximately $630. Where there is one child, it is $500; where there are two children, $425; where there are three or more children, $275.[2]

The map on page 417 compares various states of the union with regard to unit-income for non-farm families. The

[2] Data are from T. J. WOOFTER, JR., "Children and Family Income." *Social Security Bulletin*, 8:1–6, Social Security Board, Washington, D.C., January, 1945. Data cover 14,750,000 non-farm families with wage and salary income, a total of 42 per cent of the nation's families.

upper figure shows the total non-farm children by thousands; the lower figure, the average number of children for non-farm families. Shading indicates the family unit-income into which

FAMILY UNIT INCOMES OF WAGE OR SALARY FAMILIES BY TYPE OF FAMILY, URBAN, AND RURAL NON-FARM FAMILIES, U.S. AND SOUTHERN REGION, 1939




Federal Security Agency. Office of the Administrator

each state falls. It will be seen that the dark areas, where income is less than $300, center in the South. Most states in the second classification — $300 to $375 — are strictly agricultural. The states which have high unit-income are those on the West coast, Nevada, Illinois, Michigan, New York, and a group on the north-eastern seaboard. A high income in these urban states does not necessarily represent a high standard of living for a family with more than an average number of children. Many of these urbanized states require a high income to meet the high cost of urban living.

Throughout the nation more families with children have less than a $300 unit-income than have more. (See chart on page 418.) More than 15 per cent of children are in families with a unit-income of under $150. An additional 32 per cent fall in the $150–$200

CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE AND UNIT INCOME OF NONFARM FAMILIES*




*INCOME, 1939; CHILDREN, 1940 U.S. CENSUS

UPPER FIGURE: TOTAL NONFARM CHILDREN IN THOUSANDS
LOWER FIGURE: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER NONFARM FAMILY

Social Security Board

PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES AND CHILDREN IN FAMILIES BY WAGE OR SALARY UNIT INCOME, UNITED STATES, 1939



Federal Security Agency. Office of the Administrator

group. Comparatively few children — 7.5 and 11 per cent respectively — fall in the groups of $600 or more.

Implications of the Unit Wage Income of American Families

The preceding facts are of tremendous social significance. The larger the family, the smaller the pieces into which the pie must be cut. Clearly there is an inequality of privilege that bears most heavily on the child. This situation in the United States is characteristic of industrial society everywhere. In agricultural society, on the other hand, very often the number of workers increases the amount of income. That is true within limits even on the American farm. Generally speaking, the farmer increases his land as his boys reach working ages, and therefore increases his income. Children in a rural economy have always had a certain economic value. In an urban industrial economy since the disappearance of handicrafts with their extensive use of child labor they have never had an economic value.

Throughout the industrialized world the problem of giving the family with children an adequate share of income to guarantee their proper nurture has been a major one. French industry faced it more than a century ago. Some industries initiated the family-wage plan by which a worker received, in addition to a basic wage, an allowance for each child. This system was used by some public employers as early as 1854, became quite general during the first World War, and was made compulsory in a large number of occupations in 1932. In Belgium the system of family allowances was begun as a voluntary measure but was made compulsory with all firms under contract with the government in 1928 and with all firms in 1930. The allowances granted have not fully compensated in either country for the expense of rearing children.

This is one of several possible ways of equalizing the economic load of families with children. In general a cash allowance of this character is looked upon with disfavor by students of sociology on the ground that cash subsidies may not equalize expenditures or even in fact go into expenditures for children. The Swedish[3] government, in the extensive population policies that were being formulated prior to World War II , took the position that so far as

[3] For an excellent summary of Swedish population policy see ALVA MYRDAL, *Nation and Family*. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1941.

possible subsidies should be in the form of goods rather than in the form of cash. Many measures designed to improve housing and nutrition and to decrease mortality have been developed. Loans are made available to those wishing to marry, and about 92 per cent of all mothers are eligible to a special lump sum during periods of confinement. Extensive provisions are made for orphans and for the children of disabled parents, as well as for unmarried mothers and their children. These and other reforms are meant to alleviate the condition of the poor as well as to assist those who wish to have children to do so on a reasonable basis of social and economic security.

American industry has never made a distinction between workers with and those without children. A few public school systems have to a minor degree recognized in salary scales the needs of the man with children. In general, however, Americans have taken no cognizance of a man's responsibility to his family.

A Constructive Approach toward Security on the Farm

The Farm Security Administration has in many parts of the country carried on a rural welfare program that has gone to the roots of rural poverty. It took over the job of helping the marginal farmer manage his enterprise in such a way as to realize an income and better subsistence. In many cases this required credit with which to purchase additional workstock or machinery; in others it required milk cows or poultry. Combined with this was the introduction of soil conservation practices. On the living side, it required gardens and taught many who had not previously canned or stored winter foodstuffs, or even for that matter used garden foodstuffs, to plant a garden and use it. By this procedure it not only improved nutrition but taught health. Throughout the South, wherever the Farm Security Administration home economist went, the pressure cooker for canning also went. This was nothing short of a revolution in the old South, where corn and cotton have crowded out the garden. In communities where a group of Farm Security borrowers were concentrated, cooperative principles have been employed for the joint purchase of better animals, notably sires, thus improving the quality of livestock. The borrower has in many communities been protected by prepaid medical plans developed in cooperation with county medical societies. The experience of the FSA demonstrates repeatedly



Farm Security Administration

A GREAT AMERICAN ILLUSION

The agricultural frontier once provided a modest security. It does so no more.

that in many cases the farmer is defeated economically because of heavy medical expenses and that health insurance through cooperative prepayment plans is the only way to protect a loan. It is true that many of these cooperative medical groups did not survive over a long period because the group covered was too small for sound insurance. But some such principles, in the absence of tax supported (socialized) medicine, seem to offer the only adequate means for securing rural medical care.

Finally the FSA through managed credit got at the basis of much maladjustment among marginal economic groups. In the first place credit was granted primarily to those who did not have sufficient assets to secure a bank loan. Enough credit was granted to help a man undertake a farming venture that could reasonably be expected to succeed. It sometimes provided for

purchase of more land and improvement of the house or the farm buildings. Interest rates were low and repayment was based on annual returns from the farm operation, not an arbitrary annual sum regardless of operating conditions as is the case with the usual bank loan. The farmer's and home manager's practices were supervised and directed so that the loan would be protected and, much more important, so that the borrower would learn to improve his methods and raise his standard of living to the point where he would be beyond defeat by the petty risks that overcome so many farmers in the lower third of the income brackets.

It is doubtful if any form of rural relief can point to constructive results equal to those achieved in many parts of the country by the FSA. Unfortunately, in some parts unwise experiments, including cooperative farming on government purchased tracts, have overshadowed the more basic work of the organization. It is an interesting fact that even the cooperative ventures in certain instances proved economically sound but "communistic farming," as it was often called by its critics, did not solve the problem of the individualistic, family-farm psychology of the average family settled on the corporation farms. A man will get out at five in the morning to milk his own cows before going in to the field in the morning, but on the cooperative farm no one wants to milk the cows when there are tractors to be driven.

Land Settlement Is Not Utopia

After World War I this country and many European countries resorted to land settlement as a device for meeting the needs of soldiers. There has been a great deal of talk by the uninformed in favor of such a policy for veterans of World War II. Farm economists, knowing the cost of such activities at the close of the last war and the record of failures, and also knowing the situation that is likely to prevail in agriculture once European agricultures get back into production, strongly condemn any such policy. They do not believe it to be economically sound or in the best interests of human welfare. They know that the settlement of soldiers is likely to be on subsistence-sized tracts and that subsistence farming everywhere in the United States is associated with a low level of living, poor health conditions, lack of social facilities, scant education, and extreme economic hazards. In

a competitive agricultural economy, those without adequate acreage, machine efficiency, and a reasonable orientation to the demands of the market cannot hope to make a decent living.

During the depression many recommended subsistence farms as a relief measure. At that time any venture which took people off relief rolls, even in part, offered some benefit; but as a general welfare measure, especially in times of prosperity, subsistence farming is no satisfactory substitute for employment in industry. We should not encourage any policy which has failed to approach reasonable standards of living.

Unfortunately, back-to-the-land movements always are at the peak during depressions when farms offer less security than at any other time. For example, Baker estimates that about two million back-to-the-land people were still living on farms in January, 1935, when the census of agriculture was taken, and that another two million youths had had to remain on farms because of a lack of industrial opportunity which would permit migration. In 1934, about two million farm operators (almost a third of the nation's farmers) had to "work for pay or income at jobs, business, or professions, not connected with the farm."[4] Land settlement and land development are for the most part stop-gap arrangements.

Future Welfare Aims

The more constructive aspects of security in a democratic society must in the long run be sought not in welfare measures designed to protect the citizen from risks, but in a more farsighted use of natural resources, of labor, of medical science, and of economic goods so that a greater number of people will as a matter of course have a higher level of living and thereby possess greater security. This is the direction in which the nation must build. Such goals can be sought through conservation of natural resources and improvements in farm, forest, and mining management, in providing year-round employment at a high wage for the person hired by others, by socialized medicine or compulsory health insurance, and by population policies which will shift a greater share of the load of child rearing to social institutions outside the family. Part V of this book outlines some policies along

[4] O. E. BAKER, *A Graphic Summary of the Number, Size, and Type of Farm and Value of Products.* United States Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication 266, p. 2, Washington, D.C., 1937.

these lines which are and will increasingly become the goal of democratic society.

Review

1. Discuss the American philosophy of security as it has evolved historically.
2. How has the decline in self-employment affected individual security?
3. Discuss the cultural trends that have undermined the security of agriculture as an occupation.
4. Explain the "safety valve theory." Does the frontier offer an outlet today?
5. Is farm employment a solution for urban depressions? Explain.
6. Discuss the change in philosophy concerning pauperism that has evolved in the Western world.
7. Does the concept of poverty as being a product of laziness or inefficiency seem adequate today? Explain.
8. Can a person with ambition, initiative, and good health fail economically in our socio-economic order?
9. Summarize briefly the provisions of the Social Security Act.
10. Give your views of the merits of the Social Security Act.
11. Does the normal family with children have equality of opportunity with marriages without children? Explain.
12. Compare the unit-family income of families with and without children. Comment on the significance of these facts.
13. Compare states and regions with regard to family-unit income.
14. Classify wage and salary earning families of the nation by groups on the basis of unit income.
15. How might the nation take into account differences in unit income of families with or without children?
16. Discuss constructive measures of the Farm Security Administration.
17. Discuss land settlement in the United States as a welfare measure.
18. Are effective welfare policies to become the primary aims of democratic society? Explain.

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
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PART V

SOCIAL POLICIES IN THE MAKING



Soil Conservation Service

PLANNING A HARVEST FOR THE YEAR 2050



PART V

SOCIAL POLICIES IN THE MAKING

SOCIAL POLICIES are in a certain sense always in the making, for societies which develop them as devices for adjustment hold a tentative view of progress, that is, they believe that greater improvement is always possible even though present achievements in a particular phase of the culture or in a given set of social adjustments, are reasonably satisfactory. They frankly recognize that many fields of social adjustment and cultural development are unsatisfactory at the present level. In these fields they perceive with greater or less clarity goals for early achievement and pursue them. For example, for more than a generation great strides have been made in the direction of conservation. Yet the social policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the great conservationist, merely awakened the nation to a recognition of the fact that with all the achievements in this field conservation has barely begun. For another example, the nation is as yet only vaguely aware of the need for social policy regarding population controls. In the field of immigration, population policies have long been in effect. The birth rate, on the other hand, is still in the realm of the folkways, even though it has a direct bearing on social welfare and on population numbers in the modern world.

For the development of these and many other social policies, complex society has had to depend upon education. The school, of all institutions, should lead in developing social policy that will prepare each generation for the long life which modern science promises. The aims of the school must be constantly revalued in the perspective of its obligations to society. On the school, whether it wished it or not, has fallen the responsibility for the broader aspects of moral training and for the training in social and personal adjustment which is essential to living in the "great society."

CHAPTER 22

THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

The Waste of Natural Resources

THE RESOURCES of a nation are its stake in the future. No generation has a right to destroy, to exhaust, or to neglect natural resources which should be the heritage of all generations. The whole conservation movement has come to mean the management of resources with the interests of future generations in mind. Its motto is "Use Without Waste." Soil, timber, and scenic resources, minerals and oils, water and wild life are so vital to the future of a nation and to the welfare of posterity that state and national policy concerning their use and development is desirable and in fact necessary. America has been a nation of fabulous waste in all these fields. The soil has been wasted by depletion of fertility and by water and wind erosion. Timber and scenic resources have been destroyed to convert forests into farms and to make profits in lumber. Minerals and oils have been wasted through careless and extravagant mining methods. Water resources have been polluted by thousands of towns and cities, have been allowed to run rampant under floods, and have been relatively undeveloped from the standpoint of flood control and power development. Wildlife has been ruthlessly destroyed by sportsmen who practically eliminated animals like the buffalo and antelope, and by the other forms of waste — the destruction of forests, erosion of soil, and pollution of water.


But in a nation which, with all its waste, still has an abundance, conservation practices are difficult to sell. The average man looks upon nature's resources in terms of his own lifetime rather than of the generations to come. In fact many who use land, timber, and water, look upon them not only in terms of their own lifetime but in terms of their own particular tenure on a particular farm or forest area. Their handling of these resources is such as

to yield the largest immediate profits regardless of the risk this may involve for their own future or that of posterity.

Since society has a vital stake in this problem, there has been developed in the United States over a period of years an interest in conserving basic natural resources and in developing social policies and social controls which will make the realization of this ideal possible. The conservation movement began soon after the Civil War when scientifically minded men were responsible for influencing the Congress to establish the Commission on Fish and Fisheries (1871), the United States Forest Bureau (1873), the United States Geological Survey (1879), and the Bureau of Biological Survey (1885).

These, and other bureaus which were added later, devoted their attention primarily to the accumulation of facts regarding waste but were unable to bring about legislation in favor of conservation. It remained for Theodore Roosevelt thirty years later to take the first major steps in this direction. He and other such leaders as Gifford Pinchot became alarmed at the waste of natural resources and were responsible for public action to protect the public domain. Some 234,000,000 acres of public land were withdrawn from settlement and most of it turned into a national forest. This gesture marked the beginning of a practice which, with later additions, created our national forests. Theodore Roosevelt also appointed the American Country Life Commission which concerned itself with problems of rural welfare. From this time forward the movement developed slowly but consistently.

The second Roosevelt era brought the movement to maturity. Franklin D. Roosevelt came to political power in the nation at a time of unprecedented economic crisis. This crisis was related in part to the waste of national resources. Drought and dust storms that plagued great agricultural areas emphasized the need for soil conservation. Unemployment provided a ready excuse for a socially minded administration to turn this idle labor toward the conservation of soil, timber, water, and scenic resources. Public works programs, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and outright government employment of a non-relief character used the energies of millions of workers in damming great watercourses for electric power, irrigation, and flood control; in eliminating stream pollution in the interests of health, sanitation, and recreation; in replanting forest lands, building fire lanes, removing fire



Soil Conservation Service

ONCE A FARM, NOW WASTE LAND

To waste the soil is to sin against future generations. The soil is the nation's most vital material asset.

hazards, and providing recreational areas in national forests; and in improving state and national park areas.

These measures are significant not only for what they have accomplished for conservation in the present and possibly in the future but also for their educational benefit to the nation. Few of the programs of the much criticized "New Deal" administration have met with such universal acclaim from the average man as measures having to do with conservation and the improvement of natural resources. This suggests that such measures will continue regardless of changes in political administrations in Washington.

Soil Conservation

The soil is a resource which man uses perpetually. From it are drawn food, clothing, and shelter for mankind. Even animal life, the other great food product, draws its sustenance from the plant life rooted in the soil.

The number of people the nation or the world can sustain is



Soil Conservation Service

STRIP FARMING SAVES THE SOIL

On rolling land strips of grass or hay are left between cultivated areas to check water run-off and to control erosion.

dependent primarily upon the fertility of the soil. A nation that wastes its soil is mortgaging its future. Good soil, properly cultivated, with proper rotation of crops and proper fertilization, is a permanent resource that will yield a perpetual harvest. Soil depleted of fertility by poor husbandry or eroded because of wrong cultivation or use, means waste land and a poverty-stricken people.

The United States, being a new nation, has had soil in abundance. For centuries vegetation had grown lavishly, filling the ground with organic matter. The frontier, as it was gradually extended across the continent, opened new fertile land. The first generations saw no need for caution. Even if a hilly tract wore out, they could cut a patch of timber and develop a new field, or move on farther west and obtain a free homestead of fertile land. The very wastefulness of nature, the plentifulness of land, provided a psychological background for extravagance. The result was that many areas were wasted to the point where land became almost worthless, in many places so eroded that it was

abandoned and allowed to return to brush and trees. Then nature began the long tedious process of rebuilding through the rooting of vegetable matter which stops erosion and gradually forms a black overlayer.

It remained for the drought-depression of the 1930's which sent clouds of dust fifteen hundred miles from the Great Plains to the eastern seaboard and out onto the Atlantic to awaken the nation to the critical problem of soil conservation. A single dust storm during this period is estimated to have carried away 300,000,000 tons of top soil. The United States Soil Conservation Service expanded greatly during those days when drought in the Great Plains combined with the depression to bring misery to people located on thousands of acres of once fertile land.

ESTIMATE OF THE ANNUAL LOSS IN DOLLARS THROUGH EROSION IN THE UNITED STATES [1]

Soil material (nitrogen, phosphorus, magnesium, calcium)	$3,000,000,000
Reduced farm income and forced abandonment of the land	400,000,000
Damage to irrigation and reservoirs	63,000,000
Damage to highways, railroads, navigable streams	309,000,000
Flood damage to city and farm property	72,000,000
Total	$3,844,000,000

Remarkable progress has been made since then and agriculture in many badly eroded areas has been almost completely revolutionized through the influence of the Soil Conservation Service, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Farm Security Administration, and the Agricultural Extension Service. In the deep South today almost every farm is laid out in contours to stop erosion. Throughout the Great Plains where the light soil has been, in times of drought, driven along until it has piled up along fence rows or against farm buildings or carried away as black clouds of fine dust in the atmosphere, farmers have been using the lister, a disk-like machine which cultivates in ridges so that the rolling action of the soil is stopped. In many areas strip-farming has been practiced to hinder both wind and water erosion on steep hillsides. A strip of grass or alfalfa is planted to stop the

[1] From HUGH HAMMOND BENNETT and WILLIAM CLAYTON PRYOR, *This Land We Defend.* Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1942, pp. 35–36.



Soil Conservation Service


EROSION CONTROL BY LISTING

Deep furrows hold water and catch soil drifted by winds.

course of the water as it goes downward. In other areas, loose trashy fallow has been introduced so that the surface will stop erosion. In all parts of the nation farmers have been made more conscious of the necessity for damming streams, filling in ditches, and preserving the fertility of their land, not only for raising better crops but for retaining fertility as a factor in erosion control. Soil with a great deal of humus in it is much less likely to drift with the wind and water than depleted soil. That the American attitude toward its soil is much different than it was fifteen years ago is suggested by the fact that *Plowman's Folly*,[2] a book suggesting disk cultivation rather than cultivation with the plow, unexpectedly became a best seller after its publication in 1943.

In soil conservation the government has operated not by compulsive legislation but primarily through measures of a persuasive and educational character. The movement is now as nearly ideal a system for joint government and private coopera-

[2] By EDWARD H. FAULKNER. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1943.



U. S. Department of Agriculture
Soil Conservation Service

tion as can be cited. Under the Taylor Grazing Act[3] large areas of the Great Plains are organized to prevent wind erosion, and in numerous other areas soil conservation districts[4] permitted by state law involve joint Federal, state, and private efforts. The regulations governing these districts vary from state to state, but the essence of all of them is that a group of land operators band together and adopt by referendum vote land-use standards applicable to the area. In a few states a two-thirds vote makes the regulations applicable to all land within a district. In most states there is no compulsion. The district provides for local leadership and in this way builds local interest in voluntary practices of conservation. The legal establishment of districts makes it possible for state and Federal agencies to deal with the organization just as it would with any other legal unit such as the town or county. Federal and state agencies are thus able to furnish equipment and seed and lend financial assistance. Without such organization help to the farmer would be limited largely to technical advice and educational services.

The most tragic waste of natural resources is still, in spite of the remarkable achievements outlined, waste of soil. The photograph on page 432 illustrates this fact succinctly. The value of the annual loss is placed at $400,000,000. In the Palouse country of the State of Washington, where wheat farming and the fallow system are practiced, the fall and winter months of 1945–1946 alone, a season of relatively heavy rainfall, saw 19,000,000 tons of fertile top soil washed away in a single county.

The Soil Conservation Service in June, 1945, published a report[5] which lists in detail the work yet to be done by soil class, type of practice, acreage, and man-hours of labor, and outlines some fifty-four standard conservation practices applicable to various kinds of soil problems. In the nation as a whole the Service believes that some 43,234,000 acres of cropland not suitable for further cultivation should be converted to woodland or grazing.

The future of soil conservation is largely a problem of education and of technical assistance in erosion control. There are a few large corporate interests struggling to maintain vested interests as in the field of lumbering. Some six million farmers each

[3] Organized in the Grazing Service, U.S. Department of the Interior.
[4] Organized by the Soil Conservation Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
[5] *Soil and Water Conservation Need Estimates for the United States.*

SOIL CONSERVATION DISTRICTS — AS OF JANUARY 1, 1946

Name of state	Number of districts	Approximate acreage	Operating units	Farms
Alabama	12	32,689,920	207,249	231,746
Arizona	28	409,232	3,291	3,755
Arkansas	46	26,781,700	123,398	154,346
California	43	4,939,411	21,105	24,383
Colorado	57	17,573,348	16,410	19,067
Delaware	3	1,265,920	8,600	8,994
Florida	33	17,314,058	35,667	42,438
Georgia	24	32,055,846	173,760	191,684
Idaho	14	8,324,301	10,862	13,738
Illinois	61	19,318,356	119,487	135,950
Indiana	27	5,074,391	39,849	43,896
Iowa	59	19,753,871	121,239	123,089
Kansas	57	27,719,039	94,964	130,931
Kentucky	59	12,354,604	123,072	126,670
Louisiana	22	25,113,640	97,339	136,058
Maine	8	9,964,900	17,477	19,283
Maryland	20	5,479,040	31,534	36,749
Michigan	28	7,373,197	44,277	54,668
Minnesota	27	7,781,316	43,144	48,296
Mississippi	58	24,413,163	116,883	217,327
Missouri	16	5,616,301	35,169	36,744
Montana	28	23,716,147	14,768	21,368
Montana	21	7,705,322	1,946	6,578
Nebraska	64	26,410,532	91,482	110,227
Nevada	9	13,321,184	921	936
New Jersey	5	3,902,080	21,688	21,973
New Mexico	51	39,892,968	23,818	23,325
New York	28	13,444,480	65,580	85,267
North Carolina	21	27,274,840	241,112	228,709
North Dakota	41	18,412,188	31,404	43,558
Ohio	41	11,404,760	107,067	107,067
Oklahoma	72	38,674,000	145,034	162,218
Oregon	11	2,245,105	1,707	2,140
Pennsylvania	8	2,353,697	10,836	15,459
Rhode Island	3	676,520	1,987	3,014
South Carolina	21	19,580,160	145,948	137,558
South Dakota	37	14,870,909	34,369	41,584
Tennessee	28	7,422,160	71,113	84,789
Texas	120	107,036,872	313,879	338,425
Utah	34	36,276,940	16,358	18,035
Vermont	8	4,213,594	17,382	17,382
Virginia	22	21,061,567	123,028	131,569
Washington	31	12,269,566	26,532	28,799
West Virginia	13	10,910,670	53,499	70,112
Wisconsin	39	19,560,916	125,592	131,992
Wyoming	18	15,906,698	4,725	6,008
United States Total [6]	1455	802,154,107	3,174,605	3,631,326

[6] Does not include 21 grass conservation districts in Montana which cover 1946 operators and 7,705,322 acres.

goes his own way. In no field is the practice of folkways more prominent than in agriculture. Probably no group is more resistant to change than the farm group. Certainly few groups are so independent and so much inclined to question the new and to obstruct compulsory controls.

In spite of these hindrances, progress is being made. As repeated demonstrations prove the economic value of conservation, an increasing number of farmers will adopt improved methods and use their land with sound principles in mind.

Timber and Scenic Resources

The waste of timber began with the first settlement of America. Trees were something to get rid of in order to plant crops. This point of view continued as men moved westward. It is little wonder that a rural population was not at all concerned when lumbermen ruthlessly wasted the best forests in the land by harvesting methods which destroyed the undergrowth and cut off the new growth. Only now, after almost a generation of agitation, the public is beginning to believe in sustained-yield cutting and in government management.


There is in the United States an abundance of forest land, some 630,000,000 acres, or about one-third of the land area of the country. Much of this is covered by non-commercial timber. Another large acreage is non-productive because of ruinous cutting and fire. A still larger acreage is producing only a fraction of its possible yield either because of undesirable practices or because of failure to reseed properly. The total saw-timber has been reduced by almost half since 1909.

The forest industry began on the east coast, moved inland to the Great Lakes, then to the South, then to the far West. Today three-fourths of the forest area is east of the Mississippi, but two-thirds of the saw-timber is in the far West. Behind it in its westward migration, the industry left ghost towns, mutilated cut-over lands, soil erosion, and waste. Little or no provision was made for a future crop. Most land was left to revert to the states because of tax delinquency.

For many years the timber harvest has been much heavier than the timber growth. This is strikingly shown in the pictographic chart on page 440. It will be seen that in 1943 the new growth equalled eleven billion cubic feet; timber destroyed or used

equalled seventeen billion cubic feet. The drain is not only from cutting but from fires, insects, disease, and other such causes.


The movement for conservation has been led by the Federal government and has been shared by state governments and by



TIMBER CUT OR DESTROYED IN 1943 WAS 50 PERCENT MORE THAN TOTAL GROWTH

private industry. The Federal government has been primarily responsible for encouraging a sustained-yield policy. Some of the larger industries looking toward the future have also adopted this practice, and some logging towns, with a farsighted interest in their own preservation, have tried to bring pressure on local operators to adopt it.[7] Sustained yield, briefly, is selective harvesting which will provide a stable forest industry; it includes selective cutting of trees, removing only the mature, slow growing, or diseased trees, burning brush and thus reducing fire and disease hazards, leaving seed trees, and logging by methods which leave young timber unharmed.


A recent law gives the Forest Service greater control of forest still in the hands of private operators. Vast areas were acquired



REDUCED 40 PERCENT IN 30 YEARS

[7] For a unique community effort of this character see *The Elma Survey* (mimeographed). Washington State Planning Council, Olympia, December, 1941.

SAW TIMBER STAND THEN AND NOW



Volume of Saw Timber 1620


Volume of Saw Timber 1938

U. S. Dept. of Agriculture — Forest Service
Washington, D.C. *October 1945*

in the early days by great corporations which still own some of the most valuable timber resources of the nation. Until recently the government could use only methods of persuasion in the management of these areas. Now, however, the Sustained-Yield Law passed by Congress in 1944 permits the Forest Service to make long-time contracts for the harvest of national forest timber by private operators, provided the latter will agree to harvest not only the government's timber but their own on a sustained-yield basis.

Another step in the protection of the forests, and one which has been sponsored primarily by the public, is better fire control. This is the only conservation effort that has had the wholehearted and universal support of private logging operators. The program is one of education so far as fires are caused by man; so far as they are caused by lightning, it is one of forest patrol, more effective firefighting, etc.

A third step, which has a history extending over a period of seventy-five years, is to retain and increase the public-domain lands which are in or adapted to forest cultivation. Such lands



Department of Agriculture

Division of State Cooperation

are managed in the public interest by the Forest Service, which has built up an enviable reputation in government circles. By maintaining a scientifically trained staff relatively free of the rivalries of political parties and devoted to high ideals of public service, it has retained unusual prestige through long vicissitudes of political administration.

A fourth step is to assist owners of private lands in timber, or suitable to timber growth, by providing long-time public credit. The philosophy of this effort is that if such credit is made available private owners will be able to afford to grow a stand of timber to the point of maturity instead of being forced to cut it prematurely to meet financial obligations.

As for the problem of replacing forests already used or destroyed, the Forest Service sets a goal of replanting during the next twenty-five years some 32,000,000 acres. In 1938 some 77,000,000 acres needed planting. Throughout all the years up to 1930 only 3,500,000 acres had been replanted successfully by all private and public agencies engaged in the work.

The Importance of Forest Conservation

Although the development of forest conservation policies is important from the standpoint of timber resources as such, it is equally important for its relation to other far-reaching conservation objectives. In the first place, forests are the natural habitat of much wildlife, fish, and game. During one recent year alone it is estimated that the National Forest provided a take of 193,000 deer, 26,000 elk, and 5700 bear. In these forests there are some 1,500,000 acres of fishing lakes and 100,000 miles of streams, all protected from the pollution which has completely destroyed fish life in the watersheds of many industrial centers. In the second place, forest development offers the recreation facilities that are so necessary in a nation which seeks the outdoors as an escape from congested urban living. Again, it has a direct relation to soil conservation in many areas: to remove the timber is to expose the soil to rapid erosion or even complete destruction. Moreover, it is essential in many watersheds for reducing floods and providing a steady stream-flow through the dry seasons.

All these are public benefits difficult to estimate in terms of human welfare, which is recognized in the philosophy of the present Forest Service administration as the goal of conservation

efforts. Lyle F. Watts, present Chief of the Service, makes this significant comment on the relation between human welfare and forest problems:[8]

> In discussing this question of scarcity versus abundance, I want to make it clear that forestry is something more than boards, ties, cordwood, and other forest products. To me forestry has a human side. It encompasses permanent communities with prosperous industries and a stable tax base. It means good schools, public health, and attractive homes. It means security for the worker to invest in a home and for the butcher, the baker, and beauty-shop keeper to invest in a business. In short, what I am interested in is the extent to which our forest resources may contribute to a better livelihood and greater happiness for all people.

There is no doubt that forest conservation will continue in the future, as it has in the past, to represent a struggle between private industry and public policy. The old folkways of private exploitation still dominate the lumber interests. Into the logging business have gone new ideas, as the younger generation has come into control, but a great deal of its conservation effort is motivated by fear that if it does not change its wasteful practices it will be forced to submit to increasing Federal and state legislation. It is, therefore, inclined to make a greater show of conservation than facts warrant. It tends to overpublicize the importance of its tree farms, to exaggerate its practice of sustained yield, and in other such ways try to convince the public that there is little danger in present forest practices. In contrast to such methods of publicity and propaganda, which often are lavishly artistic, are the constant factual and informational presentations of the Forest Service, which ignores the traditional folkways of the lumber industry and seeks to achieve a more rational and more protective public policy to save forest resources for all future generations.

Wildlife Conservation

In an urban industrial society wildlife serves a vital recreational purpose. The frontiersman hunted for food whether he enjoyed the chase or not. The urban man hunts for pure sport. The outdoors is an area which offers an opportunity for vitalizing

[8] "The Need for the Conservation of Our Forests." Address at a meeting of Friends of the Land, Chicago, Illinois, November 12, 1943.

contact with nature. The chase relieves the monotony of the urban environment. Unfortunately many of the best game animals, such as the bison, were well on the way to extinction when the Federal government and the states recognized that if this priceless heritage were to be preserved, it would be necessary to develop policies under which it could be protected and supervised.

At present, as a consequence of scientific policies, many states now have more game than ever existed before. Under scientific direction a perpetual harvest of game and fish may be made available to the sportsman. In a few instances, notably migratory water fowl, whose movements are interstate in character, the Federal government has taken the lead in conservation. The New Deal during its early days made "Ding" Darling, the famous cartoonist, who has always been interested in game and outdoor life as a hobby, Director of the United States Biological Service, now the Fish and Wildlife Service. Under his able leadership, duck refuges were established in the United States and Canada to protect water fowl at their breeding grounds and in the course of their flight. The principal method of financing his expanding program was the sale of the duck stamp through which the Federal government collects a dollar of revenue from each duck hunter. Many species, almost extinct, soon increased in amazing numbers, and the total duck population increased from some 30,000,000 in 1933 when drought and the depredations of man had shown their worst effects, to an estimated population of 125,000,000 in 1945. Improved natural conditions, reduced hunting seasons, greater protection of game during the open season, and other such factors contributed to this growth. Private organizations such as the Audubon Society and Ducks Unlimited have also helped. As a consequence of the increase, the hunting season has been gradually liberalized and yet the duck population increases.

More attention, however, must be given to the deliberate cultivation of wildlife and its scientific management. At the present time only from 3 to 5 per cent of the workers in this field are scientifically trained biologists. At least 60 per cent of them should have professional training. Clearly there is a challenge to the colleges to provide this so that untrained personnel, many of whom are political appointees, shall gradually be replaced by men qualified to handle the highly technical job which wildlife management has become.

Game management is more than a problem of protecting existing game by warden patrol-service. New species must be introduced, new methods of handling various species developed, new management practices and protective practices adopted. Some species have proved remarkably well adapted to civilized conditions. For example, the prairie chicken cannot survive the plow, but the Chinese ringneck pheasant thrives in cultivated lands in the same area. Again, certain species of wild ducks have declined in importance as civilization has encroached, but in the West the mallard and in the East the black duck have proved remarkably resistant to the depredations of man. So also the white-tailed deer has multiplied in cut-over areas where dense forests once provided a poor habitat for it. Michigan, thanks to this species, now probably has a much larger deer population than in primitive times. In one field at least game conservation policies have a definite relation to the larger problem of soil and water conservation. The beaver, thanks to strict legal protection, is on his way back. As the animal multiplies, an increasing number of small streams are spanned by numerous dams that hold back water and reduce runoff and erosion.

Technically trained men can thus adapt species to the changing landscape and help bring back species nearing extinction or replace them with species that prove more hardy under the new conditions produced by man's activity. In their work, game farms, the artificial hatching of fish for restocking streams, and other such activities to supplement the game and fish crop are now standard practices.

Water

Water is an important resource not only because of its relation to agriculture and to human consumption but also because of the part it plays in the development of electrical energy. The greatest waste of this resource has been through pollution, which has affected wildlife as well as human health and recreation. Recognition of this fact has led to the adoption of scientific methods of sewage disposal and control of industrial waste. As a result many streams have been and many others can be purified and eventually restored to their former value as areas for fishing, hunting, swimming, boating, and other recreational uses.

As a further measure of conservation, the nation has carried on during the last twenty years an aggressive program of dam-


building. The purpose is fourfold: (1) disastrous floods can be avoided and (2) the flow of water can be regulated to improve navigation; some of these dams are sources of (3) domestic water supply and also of (4) electrical energy. No one dam can of course serve all these purposes, but most serve at least two. In addition, the resulting storage reservoirs have created an incidental recreational use which in many communities is a factor of great importance, especially in areas where there is a deficiency of natural lakes and good fishing water. Further development of waterways for irrigation, electricity, flood control, navigation, and recreation is in prospect.

Potential water power in the United States is concentrated in the Pacific Northwest region where great streams with headwaters in high mountain areas reach their peak flow in the summer months. This fact is well illustrated in the map on page 448 prepared by the National Resources Planning Board.

Minerals and Oils

Minerals and oils are deposits made by nature in previous ages, most of them millenniums ago. Once they are exhausted, they will be irreplaceable, at least in the era of contemporary man and in the contemporary geological age. In this sense, the waste of minerals and oils mortgages the future of any civilization that is dependent upon them. Man has, through scientific inventions, learned to short-cut the development of many of the processes by which minerals are made, but even now he would have great difficulty in providing substitutes.

Public policy for avoiding waste in this field has been slow to develop. Industrial operators have therefore carried on without any regard to the future. In the coal fields underground mines have been abandoned without removal of the partitions that support the roof during mining, and when the wooden props have rotted away in the tunnels, the roof has caved in and left the strips of coal in such a condition that they can never be profitably mined again. Many coal fields are nearing exhaustion. About 35 per cent of the coal mined to date in the bituminous fields has been wasted. Natural gas has been wasted in order to get to the oil and then the fields have been abandoned when the most profitable supply has gone. Oil has been taken at a rate far beyond requirements. World War II made an unprecedented




Based on flow available 90 per cent of the time with storage

Special Compilation by the United States Geological Survey

drain on minerals and oil. New resources were discovered during this period, but in some fields the estimated supply promises little to the generations ahead. There is still little useful social policy except as it affects the coal, oil, and gas lands that are in government ownership.

The location of selected minerals and reserves of the nation is shown on the accompanying map.

SELECTED MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES



Prepared in Office of the National Resources Planning Board

In conclusion, the history of the nation's use of resources is one of waste. Abundance of resources was the main factor in the careless use of them; they seemed inexhaustible. Now it is clear that they are exhaustible and must be conserved. The greatness of the nation in the future depends upon our doing so.

Review

1. What is meant by conservation? Why is it important from the standpoint of the individual? The nation?
2. Why have conservation practices been hard to sell to the American public?
3. Give a brief history of the conservation movement.
4. In what sense is soil the key resource of a nation?

5. Discuss the factors entering into an awareness of the need for soil conservation.
6. Estimate the annual financial loss through soil waste in the nation.
7. Outline some steps that have been taken to conserve the soil.
8. What is a soil conservation district and what are its advantages?
9. Cite evidence indicating that there is a big job ahead for soil conservation.
10. Discuss the past use of forest resources.
11. Compare the present use of timber with annual growth.
12. What are two general lines along which public action must function in the field of forest conservation?
13. Discuss "sustained yield."
14. Cite some specific means of forest conservation.
15. Cite data indicating the extent of the job of reforestation.
16. What supplemental benefits do forest lands offer in addition to providing timber?
17. In what way do problems of soil and forest conservation differ with respect to controlling interests to be educated or regulated?
18. Do you think it is wasteful to preserve great national park areas in their natural state even when this often means that ripened timber will go uncut and mineral resources undeveloped? Defend your answer.
19. Discuss the importance of fish and game from the standpoint of recreation.
20. Can wildlife survive the depredations of man? Under what conditions?
21. Present evidence to show that there can be a perpetual harvest of wildlife.
22. Where does the college-trained man come into the wildlife conservation picture?
23. What are the dual purposes achieved by dam construction on major watercourses?
24. Indicate the areas with great undeveloped water power resources.
25. Why is the waste of mineral resources precarious from the standpoint of the future?

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CHAPTER 23

POPULATION IN WORLD RELATIONS

Malthus and the Facts of History

ONE OF THE INTERESTING POINTS about decline of population is that even though the signs may have been clear a generation or more in advance, a nation is seldom aware of it until it is actually in process. The decade of the last depression, for instance, seemed to give people an object lesson with which to bolster their fear of the Malthusian threat of overpopulation and there was talk of an "unwanted" generation. Like other challenging ideologies Malthus' views have gathered weight through the years and continue to be a powerful subconscious force in general thought. But at the very moment when Western nations were preoccupied with this problem, it had really disappeared and a decline in population had already progressed unmistakably far.

Malthus could not foresee the development and spread of birth control among peoples of the Western hemisphere. He could not know that the force which governs increase of population would soon be not famine or pestilence or vice or sudden death but rather the decision of married couples to have or not to have children as they choose. To this force alone must be attributed the pattern of population growth that characterizes the Western world today and that has characterized it for almost two generations past.

Malthus recognized that man might solve the problem through the more economic method of limitation of increase rather than through decimation; but writing in 1789 rather than 1947 he had little faith that man would be able to exercise sufficiently the foresight he recommended — celibacy, delayed marriage, and continence within marriage. If he were living today, he would be the first among us to recognize that Western man is exercising too much foresight in restricting births and is really shortsighted with regard to the destiny of his civilization.

France and Belgium have actually experienced population

decline because deaths exceed births; but all other nations in the sphere of Western urban-industrial civilization are also on the verge of decline. The United States is only a generation behind the older nations of Europe. So population authorities conclude as they study the trends of birth and death rates, and analyze the age composition of populations of Western nations and the proportions of childbearers in them.

As to the unfavorable relation between food supply and population which Malthus viewed with alarm, throughout the Western world where machine agriculture has become characteristic, surpluses of foods and fibers have, except in periods of war, been the rule for several decades. The problem of agricultural markets is the great plague of the entire western hemisphere and of Europe. Agricultural authorities[1] viewing the postwar picture predict the recurrence of food surpluses throughout this area as soon as the critical adjustments of reconstruction are met. Actually agriculture has become so highly efficient that one man with modern implements can provide for a host of urban residents and also for export requirements. As we pointed out earlier,[2] in a different connection, in the United States even before the war, when agriculture was less efficient than now, nineteen farmers provided enough for sixty-six non-farmers, of whom fifty-six lived in the United States and ten abroad.

The picture is far different of course in the Orient, notably in India and China. There vast agricultural areas are subject to constant pressure of population. Malthus' theories seem to be realized and there is no immediate prospect that agriculture as now practiced will keep pace with future needs or in fact even supply the needs of the present. India and China will continue to have famines which take millions of lives in a single season as they have in the past.

Between these two extremes lie other nations partly industrialized but still dependent on a primitive agriculture. In these countries, which are only beginning to bring the birth rate under control, problems are more temporary but nonetheless at present acute.

How can the Western world with its great abundance live side by side with the Orient and its constant hunger? This question

[1] See THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, *Agriculture in an Unstable Economy*. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1945.

[2] See page p. 22.

is difficult to answer; but economic forces and trade practices being such as they are, there seems little hope that the Occident will be able to help in the immediate solution of the population problem of the Orient. The high birth rate of those countries is still deeply embedded in their cultural pattern. Change will gradually come about through contact with the Occident and the borrowing of machine technology and of Western ideas. The threat that propagandists long held before the Western world — that the darker skinned races will outnumber and overrun the less prolific peoples — is logically much nearer realization today than it used to be. The prospect of population decline throughout the Western world is certainly in sharp contrast to the assured population increase of the Orient in the immediate future when the death rate will be brought under more effective control and the birth rate will remain relatively unchecked. On the other hand, one must consider that Oriental peoples have for the most part been peaceful, not interested in conquest, immigration, or colonization. Only Japan, the one nation that has most extensively borrowed Western technology, birth control, and philosophies of conquest and imperialism, has so far offered any threat to the security of the Western world.

Those who see in population pressure the main cause of war, dare not study history too closely. The most warlike nations in recent times have been those which have most effectively brought their birth rate under control and have had least reason from the standpoint of standard of living, adequacy of diet, or other such economic and social considerations to engage in conquest. Population pressure as such is certainly a poor hypothesis on which to explain any war in recent history; in fact, the course of events refutes any such hypothesis. One must rather seek the causes of war in political patterns and national philosophies, not in hunger.

Prospects of World Population Growth

Gunnar Myrdal, the eminent Swedish sociologist and population authority, considered the problem of population from the standpoint of the weal of democratic nations in the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University in 1938. He concluded:

> To my mind no other factor — not even that of peace or war — is so tremendously fatal for the long-time destinies of

democracies as the factor of population. Democracy, not only as a political form but with all its content of civic ideals and human life, must either solve this problem or perish.[3]

Not all social scientists would agree with him, perhaps because they are less farsighted but more likely because American sociologists are not so conscious of the effect of population decline on national life as their Swedish colleagues have been. Sweden has reached the point where not only scientists but also statesmen

ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION OF THE WORLD AND OF THE CONTINENTS, 1650–1938[4]

Continent	Numerical Distribution					
	1650	1750	1800	1850	1900	1938
	millions					
Europe and United Kingdom	100	140	187	266	401	527,900,000[5]
North America[6]	1	1.3	5.7	26	81	141,940,000
Central and South America	12	11.1	18.9	33	63	132,170,000
Oceania	2	2	2	2	6	10,670,000
Africa	100	95	90	95	120	155,500,000
Asia	330	479	602	749	937	1,177,100,000
World Total	545	728	906	1171	1608	2,145,280,000
Continent	Percentage Distribution					
	1650	1750	1800	1850	1900	1938
Europe and United Kingdom	18.3	19.2	20.7	22.7	24.9	24.6
North America[6]	0.2	0.1	0.7	2.3	5.1	6.6
Central and South America	2.2	1.5	2.1	2.8	3.9	6.2
Oceania	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5
Africa	18.3	13.1	9.9	8.1	7.4	7.2
Asia	60.6	65.8	66.4	63.9	58.3	54.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Over half the population of the world is in Asia. The United States has only a few of the world's people, but much of its resources, technical skill and productive capacity. Study the growth of population in various areas of the world.


[3] *Population.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1940.

[4] Data for all years except 1938 are from A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS, *World Population*, p. 42. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936. Carr-Saunders' figures are a revision of W. F. Wilcox's data. Data for 1938 are League of Nations estimates from their *Statistical Year-Book*, Geneva, 1940. Population for Soviet Russia in the League of Nations figures is given separately rather than by continents. In this table three-fourths of the Soviet Union's population is allotted to Europe and one-fourth to Asia, which is the approximate distribution by continents.

[5] The United Kingdom of the British Empire contains approximately 46,213,000.

[6] Exclusive of Central America.

consider action imperative. The two groups have worked together to develop a comprehensive policy for the country — one of the most comprehensive of any nation before the day when Hitler's armies made all Western Europe consider its present strength in men and arms to the neglect of plans for the future of its civilization.



Redrawn from Thompson, "Plenty of People"

PROPORTION OF EUROPEANS, ASIATICS, AND OTHER PEOPLE IN THE WORLD IN 1800 AND 1913

The last century and a half brought the rapid growth of European population. Will the next century? It seems doubtful.

But even in 1938 Gunnar Myrdal sounded a warning to the American nation. In substance he said: We in Western Europe have begun too late to hope to stem the downward trend. We hope by our policies to arrest it as soon as possible. You in America have a generation yet to go before you reach the point where we are now. If you can awaken to the problem now, you have a generation in which to influence the trend and avoid falling into the difficult situation that faces the older nations.

Dr. Warren S. Thompson[7] of the Scripps Foundation for Population Research distinguishes three great areas of population by growth trends: first, Western Europe and the countries settled by its immigrants, where birth and death rates have been falling, the former so much faster that the rate of natural increase is declining; second, Italy, Spain, and the Slavic countries of Central

[7] *Plenty of People*, Chapter 6. Jaques Cattell Press, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1944.

Europe, where birth and death rates are falling, the latter so much faster that the rate of natural increase is being maintained or even increased somewhat; third, Russia, and most of the countries of Asia, Africa, and South America (except among the descendants of white emigrants from Western Europe), where neither birth nor death rates have been brought under effective control. In the more progressive of these countries the death rate is coming under control much more rapidly than the birth rate.

Until such countries gain control of the birth rate, every improvement in medical science that saves life and reduces infant mortality paves the way for huge increases. If the death rate should come under effective control, these countries could multiply by millions in a few decades. During the last decade, for example, when the infant death rate in the United States was 50 per 1000 live births, that of Japan was 110; that of Poland, 140; that of Chile, 230. At the same time the birth rate in the United States was 16.7 per 1000; that of Japan, 29.9; that of Chile, 34.6.


In the natural course of social change the death rate comes under control before the birth rate. Marked increases in population result temporarily. This happened to the white race a little over a century ago; its numbers increased since 1750 from an estimated 175,000,000 to more than 675,000,000. Given medical science to save life, it is only one step to regulating births in the interests of health and of convenience. But during the lag between the two, an immense growth in population will take place in scientifically retarded areas.

Contrast, for example, the projected growth of population in the Soviet Union and in Western Europe for one generation, as calculated by Thompson. The former will increase from 174 million now to 251 million in 1970; the latter will drop from 237 million to 225 million. These calculations take no account of the effect of World War II.[8]

More than fifteen years ago Thompson commented on these facts in no uncertain terms. Thinking of the two great areas in which population is growing, he concluded that it was unlikely that these groups would sit quietly by and starve while peoples in the other group enjoyed "the lion's share of the good things of the earth":[9]

[8] THOMPSON, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[9] "Recent Trends in World Population." *American Journal of Sociology*, 34:959–975, May, 1929.



Redrawn from Thompson, "Plenty of People," p. 88

ESTIMATED POPULATION INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1940–1970

> We must not forget that the lands these thousand millions of people will want are actually being held largely by the British, the French, and the Dutch, and that together these three peoples number only a little over a hundred millions. The redistribution of the lands of the earth is the problem of problems that we must face in the world today as a consequence of the new population movements that are now taking place. Can it be effected peaceably or must it be achieved by war?

The question has been answered. The result was not achieved peaceably. We fought to regain lost territories, taken by prolific people who had learned the tactics of Western warfare. Japan's dreams of empire came late, perhaps too late. As we pointed out in an earlier chapter, by 1930 Europeans had 150,000,000 immigrants and their descendants in other lands; Japan, only 1,756,497.

The Effects of War on the Population Outlook

The loss of population in Europe exclusive of Russia as a result of World War I has been estimated at 22,400,000.[10] This

[10] FRANK W. NOTESTEIN, *et al.*, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*, p. 75. League of Nations, Geneva, 1944.

figure covers deaths in the armed forces, civilian deaths in excess of normal, and a birth deficit of 12,600,000. The loss of births in Soviet Russia alone, from the war and the revolution, is placed at 10,000,000. Although births went up immediately after the war, in countries with large losses the long-time effect on the birth rate was serious. Moreover, the sex ratio was badly unbalanced in the marriageable ages. Nearly three-fourths of the German and over half of the French soldiers lost during the war were men under thirty.[11]

The chart [12] on page 460 shows Thompson's estimates of the total effect of World War I on Germany. The decline in births resulting from sex-ratio factors and from broken marriages is placed at 2,500,000. The loss of births during the war itself is placed at 2,600,000. The loss because fewer children were born during the war to reproduce in the future is placed at 2,900,000.

It is still too early to calculate the full effect of World War II on the future birth rate, but it will undoubtedly be serious. Belligerent countries close to the battle front again experienced sharp declines. France, with 2,000,000 men in captivity partly as a measure for keeping population down, suffered severely. Her birth rate dropped to 13 per 1000 in 1941; between 1939 and the close of the war the population dropped by 1,200,000.[13] The situation in Belgium was even worse.[14]

Military death losses in World War II totaled 9,500,000 to 10,000,000. Those of the United States alone approximated 325,000. Germany's losses, the heaviest of any country, totaled an estimated 3,250,000. Italian losses were from 150,000 to 200,000; Japanese, about 1,500,000. Russia's losses are estimated at approximately 3,000,000 or about two-thirds of the total combat losses suffered by all the Allies. England's are estimated at 375,000 to 400,000. France's totaled some 125,000. Other smaller nations suffered losses.[15] To these must be added great numbers of civilian dead as a result of bombing, torture, disease, starvation, and postwar famine.

Since the preponderant loss in this war as in the last was of

[11] LOUIS I. DUBLIN, "War and the Birth Rate — A Brief Historical Summary." *American Journal of Public Health*, 35:315–320, April, 1945.


[12] THOMPSON, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[13] *Time*, December 17, 1945.

[14] DUBLIN, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

[15] Estimates are by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, 27:6–8, January, 1946.


young men in the early marriageable ages, nations with heavy casualties are left with millions of women in the marriageable ages who can expect to find no mate under a monogamous family system and who, therefore, have no prospect of bearing legitimate children. This loss will decidedly affect the fertility of the present childbearing generation.



Redrawn from Thompson, "Plenty of People," p. 77

Germany's population loss due to World War I totaled an estimated 9,000,000 as distributed. Will not losses of European nations resulting from World War II be greater?

Although the United States has been a belligerent in both wars, it has not suffered effects on population comparable to those of combatant nations near the front. In both wars there was the usual upturn in the birth rate at the beginning and a leveling off toward the end as troops were separated from their families. After World War I the birth rate reached a high peak when servicemen came back to their families. It is likely that a similar upturn will be registered in the years immediately following World War II.



SEX RATIO BY AGE IN THE POPULATION OF FRANCE, ENGLAND AND WALES, AND GERMANY AT THE FIRST CENSUSES AFTER WORLD WAR I, SHOWING DEFICIENCIES IN BIRTHS DURING THE WAR YEARS

At the close of the last war in Germany there was an excess of 2,000,000 women twenty to forty years of age for whom there was no prospect of marriage. One in five women of these ages was doomed to a life of spinsterhood or widowhood. In France there were a million extra women, and in England and Wales another. As a consequence, these four million women had no opportunity to bear children in the postwar period of World War I.

Even the effect on the sex ratio has not been disastrous in the United States, although World War II came at a time when the usually high male sex ratio had disappeared in the normal aging of the population. Beginning in 1943, there was a slight excess of females. Casualties of World War II tended to exaggerate differences in the sex ratio at the most marriageable age period, thus creating for young women a problem from the standpoint of mate selection.

These combined influences cannot but produce a population crisis in nations which before the war were already alarmed at their falling birth rates. The race for demographic armament will be a natural consequence unless the fear of war is removed from the European continent.

Implications of the National Population Trend

At this point we should attempt to allay one fear fostered by the eugenics movement that has been so popular during several decades past, the fear that the mentally defective and the physically unfit may by their greater fertility come to outnumber the well-born. Eugenists stress biological and, secondarily, economic quality. Their ideal is therefore an increase of children for those parents who can assure their offspring the greatest physical and mental health as well as a favorable environment for development. Although such theories seem to leave out of the account many of the emotional values that motivate most human actions, the point of view is probably gaining wider acceptance both in the conscious and in the unconscious practice of the Western world. It gives further impetus to the limitations imposed upon the size of urban families by various economic and social considerations. So far as we can tell, those factors will be even more influential in the postwar world, with a still further extension of the small-family pattern to larger groups of the community and a still greater emphasis upon the theories of eugenics. It is not fanciful, indeed, to predict that within a relatively short time any possible increases in population will have to come from the more privileged groups. Thus the national population trend, so far from leading to a nation of weaklings, seems pointed toward a realization of the standards set up by eugenics.

Whether a falling birth rate and an ultimately declining population are to be dreaded, aside from the military considerations with which history and present experience confront us, is de-

POPULATION, AMOUNT OF INCREASE AND PER CENT OF INCREASE, UNITED STATES, 1650–1946 [17]

Year	Population	Increase	Decennial per cent increase
1650	52,000	.....	....
1660	85,000	33,000	64.0
1670	114,000	30,000	35.0
1680	156,000	41,000	35.9
1690	214,000	58,000	37.2
1700	275,000	62,000	28.8
1710	358,000	82,000	30.0
1720	474,000	117,000	32.7
1730	655,000	181,000	38.1
1740	889,000	234,000	35.7
1750	1,207,000	318,000	35.8
1760	1,610,000	403,000	33.4
1770	2,205,000	595,000	37.0
1780	2,781,000	576,000	26.1
1790	3,929,000	1,148,000	41.3
1800	5,308,000	1,379,000	35.1
1810	7,240,000	1,931,000	36.4
1820	9,638,000	2,399,000	33.1
1830	12,866,000	3,228,000	33.5
1840	17,069,000	4,203,000	32.7
1850	23,260,000	6,191,000	36.3
1860	31,502,000	8,242,000	35.4
1870	39,904,000	8,402,000	26.7
1880	50,262,000	10,358,000	26.0
1890	63,056,000	12,794,000	25.5
1900	76,129,000	13,073,000	20.7
1910	92,267,000	16,138,000	21.2
1920	107,190,000	14,923,000	16.2
1930	123,091,000	15,901,000	14.8
1940	131,949,000	8,858,000	7.2
1946	140,386,509	8,337,509	6.6

The rapid growth of the population of the United States is one of remarkable phenomena of history. For many years the rate of increase has been slowing down. Will the nation be threatened with population decline in a few decades?

[17] Numbers for the years previous to 1940 are from *The Problems of a Changing Population*, p. 21, National Resources Planning Board, 1938. The numbers for all dates after 1850 represent estimates as of July 1 of each census year. The numbers for 1870 and 1920 have been adjusted in accordance with estimates of underenumeration. The 1946 data are as of January 1 and are estimates of the Bureau of the Census and include armed forces overseas. Percentage increase is for a five and a half-year rather than a ten-year interval.


batable. There are arguments, to be sure, in favor of the idea that the nation already has too many people for the standard of living it wishes to maintain. But with our resources, inventiveness, and productivity these arguments are not convincing. The United States is one of the most sparsely populated areas on the globe if one compares its population with the availability of those resources that are essential to a high standard of living. The nation's problem, as we have stated, has always been markets, not goods. Its poverty has reflected not a scarcity of foods and fibers and manufactured goods but a lack of social vision to match this abundance with the means for channeling it into the standard of living of families with children.

All American institutions and enterprises have been scaled to growth and expansion; the American philosophy of unbounded optimism springs from this dream of greater things tomorrow. The nation has not learned how to adjust its economy downward. Expansion historically has been motivated in large part by population growth. Of course our schools, churches, business, agriculture, and industry, our psychology and our philosophy of progress, could be adjusted to a declining population; but it is doubtful whether the idea of progress under an economy of scarcity in numbers of the human stock is going to be popular for many years to come. This amounts to saying that our nation probably will try to avoid population decline simply because it does not want it. Many will wish to see population increase indefinitely. Thompson thinks we might well stabilize at a level of about 160,000,000, which is about the level we shall reach by 1975.[18]

Means of Controlling Population Growth

Man has demonstrated in the case of the lower animals that he is capable of achieving almost any population goal he sets for himself. Control of numbers of domesticated animals has been readily achieved on a nationwide scale through governmental policies and price ceilings. Control of wildlife through game management policies has reached the level of practical administrative science. In these cases the application of controls is relatively easy because there is no need to consider the possible emotional reactions of the lower animals as one must do when human beings are the subjects of control.

[18] THOMPSON, *op. cit.*, p. 232.



Thompson, "Plenty of People," p. 68

FUTURE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES CALCULATED ON ASSUMED FERTILITY AND MORTALITY TRENDS, 1945–2000

The medium estimate shows population leveling off around 1980 and beginning to decline about 10 years later.

These emotional factors immediately become evident as soon as one mentions the simplest expedient of control — emigration and immigration. In this field Western nations have had considerable experience. In 1924 the United States decided for a variety of economic and political reasons that only a small quota would be admitted annually from other nations. This quota has been unfilled, as a matter of fact, first because of depression and then because of war; the probability that we could gain great numbers in the immediate future is suggested by a Paris press release of February 21, 1946. This reported that one-third of France's men and women would like to migrate and start life anew in a foreign country: the working classes favored migration to Russia; the middle classes, to the United States and Canada. But since France is a nation of sharply declining population, the government might well step in at this point and for patriotic reasons place severe restrictions on emigration.

Whether we could attract great numbers in the next few decades if we were to remove restrictions will obviously depend on many factors in our own economic and political life and on conditions prevailing in foreign nations which might wish to export population. We are not likely to liberalize restrictions because public opinion probably would not tolerate such a change. That we should attempt to alter public opinion and develop favorable attitudes toward increased immigration is a debatable question. The arguments may be weighed from a nationalistic and from a world viewpoint with contradictory results.

The second method of population control is control of the death rate and to this is credited in considerable part the unprecedented growth of the white population previously described, an increase of almost four times in less than two hundred years. Further progress in this direction would lead to still greater increases.

What has the United States to hope for from this source? The death rate of eleven or twelve per thousand which has prevailed for two decades in this country can hardly be maintained. It has been possible only because of the favorable age make-up of the population. We received youthful immigrants by the millions during the period prior to World War I, and they in turn produced many children, so that the population has been youthful and middle-aged. According to predictions, based on the present age composition of our population and on projected birth and death rates, we shall have by 1980, not nine million old people, as now, but 22 million.[19] It will take further improvements in the death rate at all ages even to offset the inevitable increase in deaths because of this aging of our people.

Dr. Thompson, commenting on the low death rates that have prevailed in the United States and New Zealand, has shown that if our rate of eleven per thousand were to be retained in a population of normal age-composition, every person would have to live to be 90.9 years old. For a nation with a normal age-composition to retain the record of eight deaths per thousand attained in New Zealand would require an average expectancy of life of 125 years. Admitted that marked increases in the expectation of life have been registered during the century — in the United States it has risen from forty-eight years in 1900 to sixty-six now — the most sanguine predictions give no hope of pro-

[19] For data refer again to pp. 326–329.

jecting it to ninety, to say nothing of 125 in the near future. Dr. Thompson and Dr. Whelpton have placed it at seventy-three years by 1980.

ADMISSIONS AND DEPARTURES OF ALIEN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1910–1945 [20]

Period or fiscal year	Immigrants admitted	Emigrants departed	Excess of immigrants over emigrants (− excess of emigrants)
1910–1914, total	5,174,701	1,442,892	3,731,809
1915–1919, total	1,172,679	618,223	554,456
1920–1924, total	2,774,600	892,984	1,881,616
1925–1929, total	1,520,910	389,746	1,131,164
1930–1934, total	426,953	335,690	91,263
1935–1939, total	272,422	153,248	119,174
1917	295,403	66,277	229,126
1918	110,618	94,585	16,033
1919	141,132	123,522	17,610
1920	430,001	288,315	141,686
1921	805,228	247,718	557,510
1922	309,556	198,712	110,844
1923	522,919	81,450	441,469
1924	706,896	76,789	630,107
1925	294,314	92,728	201,586
1926	304,488	76,992	227,496
1927	335,175	73,366	261,809
1928	307,255	77,457	229,798
1929	279,678	69,203	210,475
1930	241,700	50,661	191,039
1931	97,139	61,882	35,257
1932	35,576	103,295	−67,719
1933	23,068	80,081	−57,013
1934	29,470	39,771	−10,301
1935	34,956	38,834	− 3,878
1936	36,329	35,817	512
1937	50,244	26,736	23,508
1938	67,895	25,210	42,685
1939	82,998	26,651	56,347
1940	70,756	21,461	49,295
1941	51,776	17,115	34,651
1942	28,781	7,362	21,419
1943	23,725	5,107	18,618
1944	28,551	5,669	22,882
1945	38,119	7,442	30,677

[20] Data are from reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Labor.

Little can be expected, therefore, in the way of population increase from the control of the death rate. One method only remains — the control of the birth rate. It can be controlled in a downward direction; but can it be raised? This is the challenging problem to be discussed in our next chapter.

Clearly this analysis of population growth considers the issue largely from the standpoint of national welfare. It is assumed that maintaining numbers is important to our place in world affairs. In a different kind of world, which may actually be in the making, changes could come which could make matters of national strength relatively unimportant. Were the resources of the world divided differently, all nations might maintain a reasonable standard of living and be free of want.

But in the world as now organized politically and economically the industrial nations have a relative abundance of food, the prolific agricultural populations of more backward nations have little. Until these nations borrow Western ideas of family limitation and other aspects of the culture that goes with such a family-social system, there is little likelihood of inequalities in rate of population growth being corrected. The Orient faces overpopulation and, in fact, already experiences it in large areas; the industrialized Western world by contrast faces the prospect of a birth rate falling to the point of marked population decline.

The world now supports around two billion people. It could sustain somewhere between five billion and ten billion people.[21] To do so would require a maximum of free migration between continents and nations and the exertion of all human effort toward producing a maximum food supply. Individualized Western man has, however, reached the point where he is unwilling to devote his full energies to food supply. Vast areas of the world and the majority of the population still live on this level. Future world policy must decide whether all humanity will eventually sink to the level of quest for daily bread, or whether the family-social philosophy and industrial culture that make possible on the one hand a controlled birth rate and on the other an efficient agricultural and industrial economy, will come to prevail. In a world of international contacts it is doubtful whether both kinds of family-social systems and economies will permanently survive.

The Western world under the direction of generous and far-

[21] ROBERT R. KUCZYNSKI, "The World's Future Population"; in CORRADO GINI, *et al.*, *Population*, pp. 283–302. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930.

sighted statesmen could introduce health measures, elements of higher standards of living, and industrial economy into areas where overpopulation is characteristic. This could be done by trade, credits, and exchange of students more effectively than by force of arms. With such interchange would gradually come various modifications in the moral and family systems which would in time tend to equalize the birth and death rates of Oriental and Occidental peoples.

Review

1. Have Malthus' predictions regarding the overpopulation of the world come true? Why?
2. Discuss the relationship between food supply and population in the Western hemisphere. The Eastern hemisphere.
3. Discuss the various factors that determine whether a particular area of the globe is growing rapidly in population or facing the prospect of decline.
4. Weigh the prospect of the Western world being overrun by Oriental peoples.
5. Discuss population pressure as a cause of war.
6. Compared to other nations, how does the United States rank in number of peoples?
7. If one divides the world into three areas of population growth, where does the United States fall?
8. Describe the cycle of population growth as nations come under the influence of modern civilization.
9. Compare the estimated growth of the population of the United States with that of the Soviet Union.
10. Is the loss of manpower at the front the most important population loss of war? Present evidence.
11. Show how the unbalanced sex ratio produced by war may affect two or more generations.
12. Is population increase in the United States at the present time compatible with eugenic ideals? Explain.
13. Is population decline desirable or undesirable aside from military considerations? Discuss.
14. Discuss the factors that determine whether the United States will grow or decline in population.
15. How does the world population situation affect the United States?
16. What responsibilities might the Western world assume for world populations?

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CHAPTER 24

SEEKING GREATER CONTROL OF THE BIRTH RATE

FRANK LORIMER[1] has described the adoption of national population policies as "a new and momentous event." He points out that although certain crude attempts at control were used in ancient societies as a means for achieving political goals, the definite attempt of modern governments to regulate their populations as a phase of the general trend toward organized social control of human affairs is a new development. It is fraught with consequences which we cannot yet foresee.

Prior to World War II the attempts of Germany and Italy to increase their population looked harmless enough; but the Nazi policies, when carried over into war, led to the ruthless destruction of thousands, perhaps millions, of Russian children, to the sterilization of men taken captive in Russia, to vicious attacks on pregnant mothers, and to other acts designed to weaken the conquered peoples in the generation to come. Planned starvation of entire populations hit the child generation hardest. So also the deliberate act of the Nazis in removing some two million French males in the reproductive ages from their homes, thus cutting off the possibility of their siring children during the war, was an act of population policy aimed at permanently crippling a nation already weakened by a low birth rate. Never in modern history has a conquering nation used a deliberate population policy so ruthlessly. In many ancient wars women and girls were taken off as a part of the victor's booty by conquerers, and the population of the enemy country was thus reduced in the next generation; but it is doubtful that any modern nation has so deliberately contrived to cripple its enemies for the generations ahead as did the Nazis.

[1] "Issues of Population Policy." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 237:193–203, January, 1945.

A Review of Population Policies and Their Outcome

In the Western world the problem of population growth has centered around control of the birth rate. Control in the individual family is quite a different matter from control in a nation. As we have shown, Western nations have achieved too great success in the first, too little in the second. Control in the individual family has shown extreme effectiveness over a period of two or more generations. In all the more favored social and economic classes throughout the urban-industrialized world, the birth rate has fallen as information and the use of birth control devices have permeated farther and farther down the social pyramid. The problem in most Western nations, therefore, has become one of trying to bring about a greater number of births in the total population. Closely allied to this problem, but given somewhat less attention, is that of seeing that people of better quality produce their normal share of births.

To put the matter more specifically: can people possessed of birth control information be persuaded to increase the size of their families? In recent decades many a ruler and statesman has wished for an affirmative answer. If they have received it, they have puzzled over the next one: how? Here they have guessed and experimented. All have failed. Perhaps, for all we know, they kept the rate from falling as much as it might have done.

Prior to World War II, many expedients were tried.[2] Germany and Italy imposed penalties upon bachelors and used the funds to support orphanages. Both nations penalized the dissemination of birth control information and voluntary abortion. Germany developed the marriage bonus and subsidized young couples by providing household necessities. Loans were made to more than a million and a half couples. A portion of the loan was cancelled as each child was born, the debt being completely cancelled with the fourth child. Italy put severe restrictions on urbanward immigration of rural families, the family being required to return to rural residence if it did not obtain work soon after arriving in the city. The assumption behind this policy,

[2] For a more extensive review of policies than appears here see G. F. McCLEARY, "Pre-War European Population Policies." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 19:105–120, April, 1941; D. V. GLASS, *The Struggle for Population*. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936; PAUL H. LANDIS, *Population Problems*, Chapter 10. American Book Company, New York, 1943.

that rural families produce more children than urban ones, is borne out by the experience of all urban-industrialized societies. Mussolini also made it a point to honor parents with large families through personal attention and favorable publicity.

Belgium and France have for years used the family wage as a means for encouraging the rearing of children. In both countries leading industries early adopted the scheme, paying a man a bonus for each child. Bonus funds were pooled by industries so there was no tendency for industries to discriminate against the man with a large family when employing a worker. This scheme was used in France as early as 1854 and became general in large numbers of occupations in 1932. All firms in Belgium have used it since 1930.


Sweden had developed a far more elaborate policy prior to the war. Plans were made for a two-price food system, one price for families with children, one for families without children. Universal school lunches, public housing with rents favorable to families with children, marriage loans, vacations during the period of childbirth for women in industry, a public system of nursery schools to assure women with children greater personal freedom and enjoyment, and other programs were designed to take more of the burden of childbearing from the shoulders of the parents and place it on society.[3] Presumably, many of these policies will be revived.

An Associated Press release of July 9, 1944, announced a Russian decree restricting divorce and abortion and granting financial aid to families with three or more children. State aid begins with a grant of $76.00 at the birth of the third child, $247.00 for the fourth child, and a monthly allowance of $15.20 until each child is five years of age. Both birth and dependency allowances increase with the size of family. The eleventh child draws a birth allowance of $950.00 and monthly allowance of $57.00. Mothers with ten or more children are publicly honored. Family taxes are revised downward and financial aid is extended to pregnant mothers.

Can nations accomplish the end desired; that is, produce a large population? Let us review briefly the experience with these programs prior to the war. What was the trend of the birth rate under their operation?

[3] For an excellent work on Swedish policies and their objectives see ALVA MYRDAL, *Nation and Family*. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1941.

There actually was an increase in Germany during the period when these policies were in effect. More careful analysis, however, of the factors involved in this increase leads one to be somewhat skeptical. The marked increase is largely discounted by Dr. Burgdorfer, one of the leading population authorities in Germany.[4] One must take into account the fact that there



PROPORTION OF AMERICAN WOMEN IN THREE AGE GROUPS AND AT THREE PERIODS — PAST (1800), PRESENT (1940), AND FUTURE (2000)

A falling birth rate has marked effects on the structure of the population of a nation. This chart shows the marked change in the ratio of the child generation, the parent generation (those of childbearing ages 20–49), and the grandparent generation that results.

would normally have been a boom after the depression. This happened everywhere. It is doubtful that prewar policies as such in Germany or elsewhere achieved any marked change. It is probable that the nationalist revival in Germany and in Italy created an optimistic tone which was more encouraging to the birth rate than any other combination of factors. This nationalistic revival rather than more rigid legal restrictions may also have been the primary factor in reducing abortions, which had reached the point of one for each birth.

The answer to the question, "Can a nation control its birth rate?" must be somewhat as follows. So far as the evidence goes, no nation has yet achieved marked success. It would still seem possible that a nation could do so, providing that all citizens agreed upon its desirability. The facts, however, seem to be that

[4] Cited by D. V. GLASS, *The Struggle for Population*, Chapter 5. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936.

in a modern nation differences of interests, points of view, and individual motivations have much more to do with the size of the family than any ideals which the state may wish to place before its members. If Germany and Italy, with their complete control of press, radio, and other means of communication and with a unified propaganda emanating from dictators who were masters of minds, men, and arms, could not achieve a marked change in the trend, it is hardly likely that a democracy, which must always leave room for individual choice, can be successful.

Nonetheless it is likely that most Western nations, including our own, will make the attempt. Even though such policies may completely fail or do nothing more than hold the population stationary, they are still of tremendous importance in terms of individual and national welfare alike.

The Effect of Public Welfare Policies on the Birth Rate

While the United States has never experimented with population policies except in the field of immigration, certain other policies have been credited with affecting the birth rate. Relief policies especially have been examined with reference to their probable effect, particularly on the lowest economic level. Abundant evidence has been found to indicate that those on public charity have a higher birth rate than others.

In a competitive economy, perhaps we should expect those with the greatest number of children to be on relief in times of depression. Stouffer[5] in studying a group of families in Milwaukee during the years 1930 to 1933 reported a higher fertility rate among relief families ten months or more after going on relief than among others. This, however, cannot be cited as proof that receipt of relief caused the increase. These families might have continued with a high birth rate even in the absence of relief.

There is some evidence on the other side. Jacobson,[6] studying the trend among persons of different economic levels in New York City for the years 1929–1942, finds that the lowest economic group decreased the rate more than others. Between

[5] SAMUEL STOUFFER, "Fertility of Families on Relief." *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 29:295–300, September, 1934.

[6] PAUL H. JACOBSON, "The Trend of the Birth Rate among Persons on Different Economic Levels, City of New York, 1929–1942." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 23:131–147, April, 1944.

1930 and 1940 the lowest rental group decreased their rate 4.3 per cent; the intermediate group, 3.6 per cent; the high rental group, 1.1 per cent. He concludes that no evidence has been produced to indicate that families supported by public relief increased their fertility after going on relief.

Whether the effect of first relief experience is comparable to that of long-time relief experience is not known. A study of rural families in Wisconsin[7] showed that both the nonrelief and the relief group reduced their rates during the depression, but that the latter reduced less than the former. During a period of five years the nonrelief group produced 677 children per thousand, whereas the relief group produced 1132. The chronic relief group produced 1524 children per thousand; the emergency relief group, 741. In these samples wives were standardized for age.

Furthermore it must be remembered that emergency relief provided mere subsistence, not a basis for raising the standard of living. It seems likely that any type of public welfare program which raised the standard of living of a group would reduce its birth rate. In this respect relief clients would be reacting as all other groups seem to react to economic advantages and social privileges.

To the extent that relief provides for better nurture of children, the survival rates of children in relief families are higher. Such population salvage is justified on humanitarian grounds regardless of whether the innate quality of children born in families on relief is equal to that of families not on relief.

There is something to be said also on another aspect of the relation between relief and fertility. During the depression many social workers undoubtedly gave birth control information to families on relief and in some cases no doubt provided birth control devices. Extensive public provision for welfare in the future might well include the deliberate dispensing of birth control information and providing of birth control devices in families where an increased number of births would seem to threaten the health of the mother or inevitably place children in socially unwise conditions of nurture and development. That welfare policies will necessarily work for an unfavorable differential birth rate by increasing births among the lowest economic class is a questionable

[7] GEORGE W. HILL and R. A. SMITH, "Man in the Cut-Over," pp. 26–28. *Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 139*, Madison, Wisconsin, April, 1941.

fear. It will depend a great deal on the nature of public welfare policies, no doubt, and upon the educational and medical practices that accompany them.

Economic and Educational Factors and the Birth Rate

It is sometimes assumed that adequate family income would solve all the problems associated with the birth rate. Admittedly it would solve many, perhaps most, of the problems of child nurture and development by assuring medical care, proper nutrition, and educational opportunity — three essentials that should be the birthright of every American child; but it will not solve the problem of attaining a balanced birth rate. Financial incentives are more likely to appeal to the unsuccessful than to the successful, to the poorly educated than to the better educated.

This point is borne out by the present situation. The recent spurt in the birth rate is evidently a reflection of the tendency of youth to marry when they have money, as they have had during the war years. A larger proportion of our population is married than at any time in history, and the year 1943 saw the all-time high in number of births — 3,200,000. But at the same time there were an estimated million abortions also, most of them among married women who were presumably in a better financial position to have a child than ever before. Increased income has obviously not influenced all mothers to choose to have children. In other words, choice is based to a large extent upon other than financial considerations.

Any attempt to reach valid conclusions on this whole question must consider it from three points of view: (1) that of economics quite apart from mere increase in immediate income; (2) that of education; and (3) that of social policy.

In the first place, we can hardly urge the advantages of rearing a large family as long as it lacks an unhampered chance to attain a high standard of living and of social privilege. To have children is to divide the pie into smaller slices. Data on the net income of wage earners in American society, developed by the Social Security Board and presented in the charts on p. 251, give a striking demonstration of the fact that families with children carry an unequal burden.

As late as 1939 only some eight of our thirty-six million children under sixteen years of age suffered from the stigma of being

on relief. We continued to blame all the miseries of the poor on their lack of foresight and on their rabbit-hutch philosophy of reproduction instead of recognizing basic inequalities in our wage-salary system of compensation which ignores a man's family responsibilities.

To iron out these inequalities any policy designed to encourage the birth rate at all levels will provide subsidies for raising family standards of living. These subsidies could take many forms and could be sponsored by the government or in part by industry.

The security value of such measures is, of course, easily recognized, but they would have a still deeper significance in our national life. We would then have taken the first tardy steps to right the injustice that any couple which chooses to have children has always suffered in an urban-industrial society dependent upon wage incomes. We would have indicated a change in the scheme of values of our culture, which would work deeper into the motivation of the citizen than economic values themselves.

Writing as early as 1934, Lorimer and Osborn[8] concluded that no groups with a high standard of living and a knowledge of birth control methods could be expected to be permanently self-replacing except as social conditions are made distinctly favorable to fertility. They expressed the view that change in the birth rate of the upper classes can be brought about only by the gradual building up of attitudes favorable to a reasonably high fertility, that is, a preference for families of three, four, and five or more children, and by providing institutions and ways of living which will assure physical vigor and economic security essential to the support of such families.[9]

This view does not overlook the fact that some elements in our population have exercised their powers of fecundity remarkably freely considering the social and economic privileges they could give their offspring, and perhaps too freely for the eugenic quality of the race of tomorrow. But that problem is well on the way to taking care of itself. World War I gave the middle classes birth control; World War II, as has been suggested, largely reduced conscientious scruples and ignorance of birth control devices among the least privileged strata. The next generation is likely to practice birth control much more generally.

[8] *Dynamics of Population*, p. 326. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 327.

In the second place we must consider what our fundamental problem means in terms of practical educational policy. To change the trend of the birth rate will require that the interests and motives of the young pupil be more family-centered. Family life as a means to personal happiness and well-being must be stressed in our schools. The appeal to individual well-being first and to national welfare only incidentally is more likely to be effective in leading the educationally favored to desire more offspring.


Courses in marriage and family, in child care and training, for high school pupils as well as for all college students, can go a long way, if properly handled, toward motivating the individual to function normally in the home situation and to find satisfaction in childbearing, child care, and child training. The tendency of the school system in the past to ignore almost completely these major functions in every normal person's life has contributed to making young people view family life as something unessential or incidental, whereas they have mastered techniques and developed interests in numerous things that will be of much less importance to the part they will play as adults in society. Public education has scarcely realized that training to be a husband or wife, father or mother, is as essential as training to be a farmer, home economist, teacher, or minister. By ignoring family problems, the school has influenced the philosophy of many urban youth who too often think that children are not necessary to the fulfillment of marriage. The motives of educated youth should, on the contrary, be oriented around a desire for family and offspring rather than on the externals of family behavior.

Finally, as we analyze the question of the birth rate more deeply, we are led to the conclusion that in any attempt to balance the differential birth rate by using more rationally the privilege of birth control, the more favored educational groups need the encouragement of a more farsighted social policy.

Our system of private medical care, under which costs have pyramided during the last two decades, has added a heavy burden and numerous anxieties to the normal load of the family with children. Provision for adequate medical care through group prepayment, national health insurance, tax-supported medicine, or some scheme making medical and hospital care available to all on a prepayment basis will be one of the first measures developed when we seriously consider easing the burden

of families with children. Even in the absence of such a program, medical care during confinement and medical care for infants must be provided somehow.

Second, provision of foods essential to health and nutrition on a more equitable basis to families with children will, through some form of subsidized consumption, also be essential; this might be achieved by some kind of food stamp plan available to all, not



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PARKCHESTER HOUSING PROJECT

A city interested in its future and that of the nation should clear its slums and give attention to public housing for families.

simply to those on relief. Agricultural subsidies motivated primarily by a desire to provide an abundance of "health foods" rather than to support prices of agricultural products we do not need is the kind of reversal in public policy which will come about when we are fully conscious of the needs of the nation's children. Universal free school lunches and in-factory lunches offer other possibilities.

Third, measures for more adequately housing the family with children are essential; these might take the form of public housing programs, tax concessions on real estate occupied by families with children, or other such devices. Some forward-looking metropolis might well take the initial step. A big city should

lead the way, for in the United States the larger the city, the lower its birth rate. Studies of Bernard D. Karpinos and Clyde V. Kiser made in 1935 showed that cities of over 100,000 population had a reproduction index of only 72 (28 points below replacement); cities of 25,000 up to 100,000, of 83; and cities of under 25,000, of 89.[10] Such a move might be extremely farsighted, for the day may come when rural areas, as their level of education increases, will no longer produce sufficient children to sustain the migration into metropolitan areas and to fill the places left vacant by those many near-sterile urbanites who succeed in the mighty struggle for place and position at the sacrifice of family.

Further concessions on the income tax to families with children offer other possibilities for improvement in social policy. Congress referred to the $500 exemption permitted in the 1944 revision of the tax scale as a baby bonus, but it can hardly be considered that. It saves families in the lowest bracket less than a third as much as it costs to provide for a child annually.


Again, the time may come when we will consider making marriage loans to young people of high ability so that they may marry and have children while the young man finishes his education. The fact that Hitler started this system does not necessarily mean that it is without merit. One reason for the low birth rate among educated couples is that marriage is delayed by education, and the first child is further delayed while they are getting on their feet economically after college graduation. The differential birth rate can scarcely be corrected unless society is willing to recognize the economic problem of the youth who finds schooling and early marriage incompatible. In the United States now the usual age of marriage for the wife in the professional class, the most highly educated occupational group, is twenty-three or twenty-four, compared to eighteen or nineteen for the usually poorly educated wife in the laboring classes. In the light of this fact, marriage bonuses to a select group of youth with educational ambitions might prove highly desirable.

A family wage system in industry is another possibility, although social policies designed to place a greater share of the

[10] B. D. KARPINOS and C. V. KISER, "The Differential Fertility and Potential Rates of Growth of Various Income and Educational Classes of the Urban Population in the United States." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 17:367–391, October, 1939.

burden of childrearing on society by furnishing supplemental institutions are considered more sound.

In the next place, greater protection for widows with children is essential. Thompson,[11] in stressing the desirability of economic security for families as a factor of great psychological importance to the birth rate of the middle classes, points out that in 1940 there



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NUMBER OF WOMEN IN VARIOUS AGE GROUPS ENTERING WIDOWHOOD IN THE UNITED STATES ANNUALLY

Data are annual averages for the years 1936–1938. War periods greatly exaggerate numbers entering widowhood in the early childbearing ages.

was one widow for each 58 married women 25–29 years of age; at 30–34 the ratio was one to 32; at 35–39, one to 18; and at 40–44, one to 11.

The accompanying chart shows the number of women entering widowhood annually in the United States for a typical period. It will be seen that in spite of our relatively low death rates the number of women left in widowhood during the years under 50, when they might be expected to be responsible for young children, is appreciable. A wife's chances of being left a widow are considerably greater than those of the husband. This is a natural consequence of two situations previously discussed: (1) in approximately two out of three marriages the husband is older, and (2) at all ages the expectation of life for women is greater than that

[11] THOMPSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–228.

for men. The number of young women entering widowhood during wartime is greater than shown in the chart. The social protection of the widow is, however, greater during war, because of larger amounts of insurance carried by the average man in the armed forces.

Finally, free school books throughout the grades and high school, free tuition in state institutions of higher learning, more public recreational facilities, and other such aids would further help to equalize the burden of families with children.

These are only suggestions of measures whereby educational philosophy might be modified and social policy changed to meet the problem of the low fertility trend in the population. They are not all the measures that will be needed when we become aware that social action is necessary. The important thing is that we become aware. Families will have more children only when society requires fewer denials and personal sacrifices from the individual who performs this social function, and less personal sacrifice will be required only when the community takes over a greater share of the cost and risk. Fortunately the policies suggested are worth seeking from the standpoint of social justice and human welfare even if it were a foregone conclusion that they might fail to increase the birth rate.

Population Quality

Except for immigration policies — which were determined in part by rationalizations concerning the relative capacities of various racial and nationality groups — the nation's efforts to secure quality of population have centered for two generations about efforts to keep known defectives from reproducing offspring. The institutionalization of mental defectives has been the measure most frequently used, especially when the feebleminded were involved.

The most significant further development in this direction has been an increase in legal provisions for sterilization of the unfit since the first law on the subject was passed in Indiana in 1907. Some twenty-nine states now have effective laws, and the United States Supreme Court has declared them constitutional. The sterilizations under such laws are summarized in the table on the opposite page by types of cases.

It may be said that the sterilization, over the years, of only

21,263 out of some 117,000 known feebleminded at any one time, and 20,914 out of some half a million known mentally diseased

STERILIZATIONS OFFICIALLY REPORTED FROM STATES HAVING A STERILIZATION LAW UP TO JANUARY 1, 1945 [12]

State	Insane	Feebleminded	Others	Total
Alabama [13]	.....	224	....	224
Arizona	20	.....	....	20
California	10,707	5,968	724	17,399
Connecticut	410	80	....	490
Delaware	278	382	25	685
Georgia	130	230	....	360
Idaho	12	2	....	14
Indiana	467	893	....	1,360
Iowa	322	250	25	597
Kansas	1,962	779	110	2,851
Maine	20	128	70	218
Michigan	333	2,057	183	2,573
Minnesota	392	1,799	....	2,191
Mississippi	485	56	13	554
Montana	40	173	....	213
Nebraska	143	489	....	632
New Hampshire	204	255	52	511
New York [13]	41	.....	1	42
North Carolina	350	1,051	204	1,605
North Dakota	337	315	32	684
Oklahoma	303	250	....	553
Oregon	679	894	105	1,678
South Carolina	.....	77	....	77
South Dakota	3	633	17	653
Utah	87	308	....	395
Vermont	13	191	28	232
Virginia	2,754	2,026	....	4,780
Washington [13]	403	276	6	685
West Virginia	19	10	19	48
Wisconsin	.....	1,467	....	1,467
Grand Total	20,914	21,263	1,614	43,791

Thirty states in all have carried on a sterilization program although in three states the laws are now ineffective because they have been declared unconstitutional. It will be seen that almost an equal number of sterilizations have been performed on feebleminded and insane. Apparently few have been performed for other reasons, such as criminality and certain hereditary health defects. The White House Conference on Child Health and Protection declared: "There should be no child in America that has not the complete BIRTHRIGHT of a sound mind in a sound body, and that has not been born under proper conditions."

[12] Courtesy of Birthright, Inc., Box 441, Princeton, New Jersey.

[13] Laws declared unconstitutional and therefore no longer in effect, New York, 1918; Alabama, 1934; Washington, 1942.

at any one time, and of few of the many with transmissible and hereditary diseases, represents a small percentage; but the influence of the eugenics movement cannot be evaluated entirely in these terms. Many intelligent couples have been affected to the extent that one member voluntarily and secretly submitted to sterilization for fear of passing on to their children possible hereditary defects. Educated youth have no doubt also been made more conscious of health and hereditary qualities in mate selection than they otherwise would have been.

It is very possible also that propaganda for eugenics by making citizens more conscious of the risk of leaving mentally defective individuals at large has thereby hastened their institutionalization. It has no doubt also helped correct the mores which hold that every man has a right to reproduce regardless of social consequences.

On the unfavorable side, eugenics propaganda has created abnormal fears of hereditary defects among more sensitive educated groups, and may thus have reduced their birth rate appreciably. Moreover, in stressing the desirability of not only sound birth but proper nurture, the eugenist must share the responsibility for the falling birth rate which has so far affected the classes most able socially and economically, and perhaps biologically, to give children privilege. The less educated and lower socio-economic classes have not responded to this propaganda to an equal extent, if at all.

The reduction of the number of the unfit is at best a slow process. There have been only about sixty generations since the beginning of the Christian era. As we understand heredity better and know the physical and mental traits which are passed on, we shall be in a position to practice eugenics more extensively and more confidently. No intelligent effort should be spared to keep the mentally and physically incompetent from being born.

Conclusion

In conclusion two possible explanations may be cited for the falling birth rate: (1) a decrease of the fecundity of the human race, (2) a change in social values. All the evidence is in favor of the latter rather than the former. Man is capable of producing as many children as he ever was. The falling birth rate is due to the fact that other values are placed above childbearing.

We may call these values extremely selfish and personal; or on the other hand we may view them as a shrewd economic sense which more intelligent, more educated classes have developed in the face of reality. They realize that they face the choice between a large family and an adequate standard of living, between many children and the enjoyment of those privileges and luxuries to which they feel themselves entitled and to which they feel their children entitled.

Since such attitudes reflect the current economic and status values of our culture, one should not pronounce small-family couples selfish but simply conclude that the social order has created a situation in which having large families is not wise from the standpoint of the culture pattern. Recognizing this fact, a nation which wishes to increase its birth rate should, before bringing any pressure devices to bear, create the kind of economic and social situation which will make it possible for a couple to have a reasonably large family without paying for it in personal sacrifice, economic loss, and a reduced standard of living.

In nations like the United States, the control of the birth rate is not simply a matter of trying to regulate numbers to achieve desired national population numbers but also a question of regulating the birth rate of the various social classes in such a way that the quality of population from the standpoint of inheritance and nurture will be favorable. It is clear that the problem resolves itself into one of regulating family behavior in such a way that sufficient births will take place to provide adequate numbers, and, on the qualitative side, of seeing that a fair share of these births takes place in those families which are best able, from the standpoint of hereditary endowment and social and educational opportunities, to bear their share of the children.

To realize this goal calls for considerable correction in the birth rate of various socio-economic groups. It calls of course for a marked improvement in the condition of certain social classes, those least favored by education and economic opportunity. This is an objective that, on other grounds as well, will justify itself and be readily accepted by all groups in America regardless of their attitude toward population. But it involves, on the other hand, a problem which is perhaps even more difficult, that of seeing that the middle and upper classes, which have reasonable educational background and sufficient economic privilege to guarantee children proper nurture and development, increase

their birth rate to the point necessary for population replacement or for population increase, whichever the nation may desire.

Correction on this latter point is extremely difficult of realization, and hits at the very roots of our competitive socio-economic structure.

Review

1. Discuss population policy as it has developed in modern nations.
2. About what problems have population policies centered in the Western world during recent decades?
3. What are some of the specific measures employed to influence the birth rate?
4. Have these measures succeeded in raising the birth rate?
5. Summarize the evidence bearing on the effect of public welfare policies on the birth rate in the United States.
6. What relationship exists between economic success and the birth rate?
7. How will economic motivation be employed in efforts to raise the birth rate?
8. How may education be employed to this end?
9. Show that the family with children is at an economic disadvantage in our competitive economic order.
10. Show how programs for medical care could be employed in an effort to encourage a higher birth rate among the middle and upper classes.
11. What other public policies might be employed to lighten the burden of families with children?
12. What is your view of public policies such as those suggested in the interest of public sharing of the cost of rearing children?
13. Discuss the effects of the eugenics movement.
14. Summarize the data on sterilization.

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
CHAPTER 25

THE QUEST FOR LONGEVITY

ONE OF THE UNIVERSAL DESIRES of mankind has been to live long and experience the ripe years of old age. Actually it has been achieved by comparatively few. Throughout most of that part of history for which reasonable estimates can be made and even today in the densely populated areas of the globe the average length of life has been only about thirty years. Fifty to a hundred years ago in the average American community funerals were two or three times as numerous as they are now, and from time to time epidemics sweeping the community multiplied deaths many fold over anything we know at present.[1] These deaths were not among the old but among the young — children and youth who had fallen victim to communicable diseases. Today death is rare in the American community; and when it comes, it falls most often among those who have reached old age or at least the years beyond middle life. Rather than being caused by contagious diseases, it is usually brought about by some disease characteristic of old age and the wearing out of the system.

It is almost impossible for us to realize the tremendous importance of this change for our philosophy of life. One of the reasons we are optimistic and hopeful is that we can look forward to a long future. We can afford to spend twelve to sixteen, in some cases more, years in school, fairly confident that we shall have many years in which to put the training into practice. We have a long life in which to acquire economic goods. The average woman can look forward to long leisure after rearing her family and seeing them leave home to enter life on their own. The race is maintained with a comparatively low birth rate. These are a few of the benefits that long life has brought to mankind in the Western world. Little wonder that our society wishes to pursue

[1] LEWIS I. DUBLIN and ALFRED J. LOTKA, *Length of Life*, p. 85. Ronald Press Company, New York, 1936.



Courtesy Mayo Clinic


MAYO CLINIC, A KEY INSTITUTION IN THE QUEST FOR HEALTH AND LONG LIFE

this goal further and not only increase life but increase health and happiness while men live.

Progress in Extending Life

Our remarkable success in extending life is suggested by the pictographic chart, which covers almost 450 years. In Geneva, Switzerland, in 1500 a child at birth could look forward to only twenty-one years of life. Today, the average child in the United

THE AVERAGE TIME-DISTANCE FROM THE CRADLE TO THE GRAVE DURING 450 YEARS



States can look forward at birth to sixty-six years. The time is not far distant when the goal may be extended to seventy or seventy-one years.

The record in the United States is good, but not the best. For many years it has been excelled by that of New Zealand. Data in the table on page 493 present figures on expectation of life for different countries at approximately the same period of time. It will be seen that the United States ranked third and that the Western world is ahead of the Orient. Note especially the condition of British India, where the average is little more now than it was in Geneva, 450 years ago.

In the United States, women have a longer expectation of life at every age than men. At present the male infant looks for-

EXPECTATION OF LIFE AT BIRTH IN SELECTED COUNTRIES FOR GIVEN YEARS [2]

Nation	*Period*	*Expectation of life at birth*
New Zealand	1931	65.0 years
Netherlands	1931–1935	65.1 "
United States (white)	1940	63.8 "
Norway	1921–1930	61.0 "
Germany	1932–1934	60.0 "
Austria	1930–1933	54.5 "
Bulgaria	1925–1928	46.0 "
Japan	1926–1930	45.0 "
U.S.S.R (Europe)	1926–1927	42.0 "
U.S.S.R. (Siberia)	1926–1927	39.2 "
British India	1921–1930	27.0 "

ward to about sixty-one years, the female to sixty-seven years. Kiblin and Lockgren have indicated in the chart on page 494 the percentage of improvement in the expectation of life at each ten-year interval. It will be seen that marked improvement has taken place since 1901 at every age under forty. Above forty the expectation of life for women has increased more than twice as fast as that for men. The expectation of life for both sexes shows remarkable improvement in the earlier ages but much less in the upper years of life.


This is perhaps what would be expected since the major improvement has come in the fields of diseases that affect children primarily. The situation of those in the upper years, however, presents a standing challenge to the ingenuity of medical science. It seems possible that medical science will be able to increase the length of life by improving health in those years. In fact, certain marked improvements in extending the length of life and retarding the degenerative process of age have recently been recorded.

The Conquest of Diseases

Those who question the idea of social progress and the superiority of the man-made over the natural should study the facts of recent medical history. The table on page 495 compares the death rates for two periods in our history, 1900 to 1904 and

[2] *International Vital Statistics*, pp. 430–432, U.S. Census, 1940.

1942. A drop of more than one third in the death rate from all causes is shown in the first line of figures. Some causes of death that took many lives from 1900 to 1904 were much less important by 1942. The rates of typhoid fever have dropped to 0.6 per cent, and of scarlet fever to 0.3 per cent. Remarkable prog-



IMPROVEMENT IN MORTALITY RATES BY SEX AND AT DIFFERENT AGE PERIODS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1901–1942

Most improvement has come under 40 years of age. The improvement in mortality rates at all ages has been much greater for females than males, in the older ages more than twice as great. Since 1900 the average length of life for white males has increased by about 16 years and for white females by about 18 years, an increase of a third in less than 50 years.

ress is seen for almost every kind of disease except those which are part of the degenerative processes of old age. Diseases of the heart and cancer show marked increase.

This situation would be expected in that a much higher proportion of the population now lives to the age where they easily fall victim to these diseases. It is significant that the greatest improvement has come in the early years of life, thus guaranteeing the average child approximately a full lifetime.

Increasing attention is now being given to the diseases of old

AVERAGE ANNUAL CRUDE DEATH RATES PER 100,000 FOR SELECTED CAUSES — DEATH REGISTRATION STATES OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1900–1904 AND 1942 [3]

Cause of death	*1900–1904*	*1942*
All Causes	1622.3	1035.5
Typhoid fever	26.8	.6
Communicable diseases of childhood	65.3	4.2
Measles	10.0	1.0
Scarlet fever	11.8	.3
Whooping cough	10.7	1.9
Diphtheria	32.8	1.0
Influenza and pneumonia	184.4	55.7
Influenza	22.9	8.1
Pneumonia	161.5	47.5
Tuberculosis, all forms	184.8	43.1
Syphilis, all forms	12.9	12.2
Cancer, all forms	67.6	122.1
Diabetes mellitus	12.2	25.4
Cerebral hemorrhage	106.3	90.2
Diseases of the heart	147.7	295.2
Diarrhea and enteritis	115.6	8.8
Appendictis	9.3	6.3
Nephritis, chronic	84.2	70.2
Accidents, all forms	79.1	71.7
Motor vehicle accidents [3]	.....	21.2
Infant mortality [4]	.....	40.4
Maternal mortality [4]	.....	2.6

age, and no doubt progress will be made. Whether we can expect as much as in the case of those affecting children, is still problematic. Recently reported discoveries, however, indicate the possibility of retarding the aging process itself. If this is done, some of these diseases of old age will possibly decrease in importance.

There is one threat to life that is alarming and for which there is as yet no satisfactory solution — automobile accidents. The rate in 1942 was actually lower than in the immediate prewar years but already we hear reports of an increase in the postwar period. Whether safety measures, better highways, and other

[3] Data assembled by DUBLIN, *op. cit.* from sources: 1900–1939, Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics Rates in U.S.*, 1900–1940, Table 15; 1940–1942, Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics Special Reports*, Vol. 19, No. 3, and Vol. 20, No. 2.

[4] Rates per 1000 live births; data relate to Birth Registration states.

precautions can protect man from its hazards in an age which demands more and more speed and in a population which runs vehicles with increasing power, remains to be seen.

The Low General Standard of American Health


In spite of these remarkable achievements of medical science, there is much evidence that the American health standard is far below that which one might expect. Of some 14,000,000 who were examined by the Selective Service only 2,000,000 were up to reasonable standards; 3,500,000 were hopelessly unfit; 2,250,000 were remedial 4-F's; and 6,500,000 were accepted despite physical defects. One million were discharged for defects which were discovered or which developed after induction.

It has long been known that medical care and health conditions in rural areas are below the general standard of the nation. This showed up in the higher ratio of rejections for rural draftees than for urban draftees. Rural areas, with their superior natural conditions, long enjoyed the advantage of lower death rates but in recent years improvement of sanitation and hygiene and the superior hospital service of urban areas have reversed the situation.

This is one indication of the inadequacy of health care in the United States. Another is the failure to support on an adequate basis the United States Public Health Service, the one nation-wide organization giving primary attention to problems of prevention of disease. Only about 60 per cent of the counties in the United States have full-time public health services. We have been content to spend about one and one-half cents of our health dollar on preventive health care, the other 98.5 cents on curing disease.

The situation with regard to hospital facilities is equally distressing. There is no registered hospital, that is, a hospital recognized by the American Medical Association in 40 per cent of the counties in the United States. In the field of mental disease, there are less than 3000 psychiatrists. The average community does not provide facilities for mental cases. Delay in the development of this field is no doubt a result in part of much questionable medical practice and the natural suspicion which charlatans and quacks in psychology and psychiatry have created in the minds of the public.


SELECTIVE SERVICE FOUND AMERICA'S HEALTHIEST GROUP IN FAR WEST



The far western, mountain, and west north central areas of the United States produced the largest percentage of healthy soldiers and the lowest percentages of 4-F military rejects, according to figures released by the selective service as of June 1, 1944. Idaho had the lowest percentage of 4-Fs, with 10.3 per cent, and South Carolina the highest, with 30.2 per cent. The states in black on the map had less than 15 per cent of their registrants in 4-F, while the southern states, excepting Maryland and Delaware, reported 20 per cent or more of their registrants in 4-F. The average for the United States was 18.5 per cent rejects for physical reasons, or a total of more than 4,000,000 males 18 to 37 years old unfit for military service.

The Failure of Medical Administration

By far the greatest difficulty which America faces in the field of health care lies in the problem of providing the best medical service to the mass of people through medical administration. The improvement of medical science and technology is beyond question. The medical profession, however, has not yet succeeded in providing for the American people a system of administration which will make available on the most reasonable basis all the advantages that medical science has to offer. Many people believe that this cannot be done as long as medical care is



TIME Chart by R. M. Chapin, Jr., Courtesy of TIME, Copyright Time Inc. 1945

FIFTEEN YEARS EXPERIENCE IN COMBATING DISEASE

based to as large an extent as at present on a fee basis. Had education remained on this basis to the same degree, half to three fourths of the American people would be illiterate. Unfortunately, some of those who favor and of those who oppose systems of group medical care, national health insurance, and medical care on a tax-supported basis have failed to consider the problems from an objective point of view.

It seems clear that the majority of our people favor improvements in medical organization. Two forms can be employed for complete coverage: (1) medical care on a strictly tax-supported basis, which is called socialized medicine and is comparable to our system of education; (2) medical care on an insurance basis such as now is recommended by Congress as part of the Social Security Act.

It seems likely that a nationwide system of compulsory health insurance will eventually be put into effect as part of this Act. Such a program might be supported by taxes on pay rolls shared by employer and employee. Those not employed by others, that is, the self-employed like farmers, small businessmen, and professional people, would pay a premium for social security

benefits amounting to a percentage of their income. The aim would be to give everyone access to hospitals and dental care and medical services without additional payments. Premiums collected by the government would be used not only to provide medical care in the traditional sense, but also to expand greatly hospital and health service facilities in urban and rural areas, to subsidize research, to provide for training of medical students, and in general to put the whole system of medical administration on a basis where the best care could be had by all, where doctors would be assured compensation for their work, and where emphasis could be shifted from cure to prevention.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ILLNESS AND INCOME [5]

Ill persons	The number of illnesses for each 1000 persons during 1 year [6]		The number of days in 1 year that each ill person was disabled	
	Acute	Chronic	Acute	Chronic
In families on relief	163	71	4.4	11.9
In families with incomes:				
Below $1,000	119	54	3.1	8.6
$1,000–$2,000	117	38	2.8	4.8
$2,000–$3,000	113	37	2.8	4.3
$3,000 and over	111	38	2.8	3.9
All groups (average)	124	48	3.2	6.6

The average length of life under such a program would probably be greatly extended. America has been slow in the development of a rational program in this field. Certainly the physical well-being of all the people is as important to happiness, national strength, and general welfare, as education.

Improving the Nation's Diet

During the last decade or so we have become conscious of another deficiency in our system of public administration. In a nation that has boasted of an abundance, in fact, that has been troubled perpetually by a great surplus of food products, live many undernourished citizens. The diet of the majority is, in one respect or another, inadequate. Part of this is due to igno-

[5] From *People and Resources*, National Resources Planning Board, p. 32.

[6] Based on a canvass of 2,308,588 persons in 81 cities in 1935–1936 during the national health survey by the U.S. Public Health Service.

rance; part is due to actual need induced by inability to purchase the food required for an adequate diet. This problem first received some attention from the standpoint of social policies during the days of emergency relief. A Surplus Commodities Corporation was set up to make surplus food stocks such as meats, cereals, and later citrus fruits and certain dried fruits, available to people on relief. Toward the end of the depression the program was supplemented by the food-stamp plan whereby relief clients were given stamps with which to purchase additional food without cost.

More recently the nation has become vitamin-conscious and, with the ability to purchase made possible by a high war income, has actually gone a considerable way in correcting nutritional deficiencies through the use of vitamins and through ability to buy health foods in greater quantities.

To cope with the problem of adequately improving the national diet there must be a more aggressive campaign of education to be carried on not only in the school system but also by impartial agencies, probably state and federal, and by representatives of educational institutions who work with adults. Information in this field is still imparted chiefly by competitive pharmaceutical firms sponsoring a particular product. It is obviously desirable that such work should be in the hands of impartial authorities.

Then again the problem must receive greater attention from national policy-makers, especially those concerned with agricultural policies and prices. The depression measures were motivated by a desire to get rid of excess agricultural products; improving diet was a secondary concern. Little attention was really given to the problem of nutrition. That some surplus foods did actually improve nutrition was an accident growing out of the fact that citrus fruits and certain other health foods were periodically declared surplus commodities.

It is significant that during the last three or four years agricultural policy-makers have been stressing increasingly the desirability of subsidized consumption in case of another depression.[7]

[7] THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, *Agriculture in an Unstable Economy*. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1945; *Postwar Agricultural Policy*, Report of the Committee on Postwar Agricultural Policy of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, October 25, 1944. Distributed by Agricultural Experiment Station, State College of Washington, Pullman, Washington, and many other college agricultural experiment stations.

The following measures might be employed: (1) production might be guided in the direction of providing more health foods; (2) farmers might be compensated through taxation for any losses in cost of production; (3) food stamp plans, or other measures for food distribution, might be developed on a basis which would make sure that the elements needed for the health and development of children are provided; (4) agriculture and industry should at all times be encouraged to operate at full production levels, it being left to various measures of social policy to see that production is consumed. Our industrial economy in the past has always operated on opposite principles: when prices became low, production was limited, goods were made scarce in order to increase the price to the producer, and high prices were maintained at the expense of the ordinary family.

Review

1. Discuss length of life among historic peoples.
2. What are some of the advantages of long life?
3. Trace progress in lengthening life in the Western world.
4. Compare length of life in the United States, British India, and New Zealand.
5. Which sex is the weaker from the standpoint of length of life?
6. Cite data showing improvement in length of life for various periods in life? Which group has gained most? Which group least?
7. Discuss progress in the conquest of disease.
8. Contrast the conquest of disease with progress in the general health of the American public.
9. What part of the population now experiences the worst situation with regard to health?
10. Point out striking weaknesses in America's system of medical care.
11. Discuss the situation existing in medical administration.
12. Along what lines may a nationwide system of medical care be provided?
13. Indicate the problems that exist in the field of diet and suggest how they might be solved.
14. How might agricultural policy be used to help achieve an adequate diet?

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CHAPTER 26

IMPROVING EDUCATION AS A MEANS OF ADJUSTMENT


Education and Vertical Social Mobility

EXCEPT FOR SOME immigrant groups which have placed the virtues of work above education, and perhaps some isolated rural groups which still value hard manual labor above white-collar employment, the desire for education and for educational opportunities for children is an almost universal trait in American life. The educated who have succeeded are likely to credit their success to education, and naturally expect their children to have opportunities equal to or superior to their own. Those who have had less education have generally suffered from a sense of inferiority on this account and therefore want their children to have a better education. Those at the lowest level of economic opportunity want their children to have an easier life than they are having and look upon education as the one way to attain this goal.

At every level education has become, for the individual, the main instrument for vertical social mobility, the acknowledged route for social climbing and the achievement of status. By the same token it has become, from the social point of view, the main device for the improvement of social adjustment and efficiency. Education — in its broadest sense — is therefore the most dynamic of the forces operating in modern society to bring about constructive change. Educational opportunity for all is thus an obligation of a democracy.

If justification is needed for this traditional American faith in education, it can readily be found from a consideration of actual conditions. In the depression decade, we must admit, experience showed that education is not foolproof insurance against poverty or unemployment because many educated young people were on the rolls of the unemployed or on relief. But in normal times,

when the usual laws of competition prevail, education is undoubtedly an economic asset and does improve one's competitive position. The following chart shows the conclusions of one among many studies about this point. At the same time this direct



Landis, "The Territorial and Occupational Mobility of Washington Youth"

EDUCATION HELPS IN OCCUPATIONAL ADVANCEMENT

The chart shows the distribution of young men and young women by rates of pay received on first job and present job. The study covered 3,251 youth, most of whom attended schools in the state of Washington. The average period elapsing between the first and present job was five years. The better trained received better pay at the beginning and also advanced to better pay more rapidly with experience.


economic advantage is re-enforced by the less tangible advantages arising from the educated man's enhanced social prestige, his freedom to move about in circles of influence and authority. And of course there are many highly paid positions which are open only to those who have had long technical or professional training.

From the broader social standpoint, too, education gives a good account of itself. It is one of the most important guarantees to democratic equality that our society possesses. The public school does more than any other social institution to break through layers of rank, status, and prestige. It brings together in every community practically all the young people regardless of status. It gives each child — regardless of the economic or social or psychological handicaps he may have to experience in his home — an opportunity to show what he himself can do, a chance to be accepted in the group on the basis of his own achievement. The results are evident to the most superficial observer: the underprivileged often surpass those in more fortunate circumstances and, once given a chance, prove that they have plenty of gray matter. Furthermore, this free association of young people of different social and economic backgrounds has been a strong factor in encouraging marriage across class lines; recognition of personal qualities, special abilities, and mutual interests has prevented the formation of anything resembling the caste system of older countries.

In still another way the American public school system shows its value for the nation. In many multi-racial communities it offers daily a concrete demonstration of racial tolerance. Children and youth in this situation are often extremely democratic and permit various nationality and racial groups to participate freely in all aspects of school life. The school has thus been perhaps the greatest Americanization influence. By bringing diverse nationality backgrounds together, it has quickly blended cultural differences into the American pattern and has made children of foreign parentage full participants in the activities of American society.

Unfortunately, we cannot deny that many school situations are characterized by a certain amount of clannishness and snobbery.[1] It would be too much to expect that any social group could entirely avoid such attitudes; no social institution can achieve complete success in attaining the high goals we as a nation have set. But such attitudes are not a sanctioned part of the school system. In general, its atmosphere and its program

[1] For data indicating that class differences do affect school situations, see the following study of a midwestern town: BERNICE L. NEUGARTEN, "Social Class and Friendship among School Children." *American Journal of Sociology*, 51:305–313, January, 1946.



University of Minnesota News Service

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA CAMPUS

Educational institutions are elevators for vertical social mobility.

encourage the ideal of democratic equality. Education must continue to strive to rise above class prejudices, race prejudices, and discrimination against minority groups.

Beyond the public schools, the American college, for the comparatively few who are privileged to attend it, is the most effective social elevator for the individual and perhaps the most successful of all institutions in opening doors of opportunity to young people regardless of family heritage. In most colleges the young person who works his way is as much respected as the one who has his expenses paid by his parents. The former may be even more highly regarded because he has proved that he has the kind of stuff life is made of. His professors feel confident in backing him since he has already demonstrated his ability to succeed in both practical and educational situations.

Increasing Educational Opportunity

Since education is so great a factor in determinining socio-economic status, every young person should have at least a reasonable opportunity for trying out his capabilities in the school situation. Opportunity differs, however, from state to state, from region to region, and within various groups. The need for greater uniformity over the country will be evident from a study of the two following groups of statistics.

The first of these tables presents data from the 1940 census, which compare the median number of school years completed in various states and regions by persons twenty-five years old and over and also show the percentage of those who have completed less than five years of schooling. In the West 8.3 per cent had less than five years schooling; in the North the figure was 10.1 per cent; and in the South, the proportion went as high as 22.9 per cent. Iowa at the one extreme had only 4.1 per cent of its adults in this classification; Louisiana, at the other, had 35.7 per cent. The situation in the South reflects in part the lack of educational opportunities for the Negro. Converted into figures, these percentages mean that 10,105,000 adults in the nation had completed less than five years of schooling.

The 1940 census also compared the median years of schooling of whites and Negroes. The Negro had a median of 5.7 years; the native white group, 8.8 years. The foreign-born white group fell between these two extremes with 7.3 years.

Throughout all regions of the nation and in fact partly explaining these differences is a marked contrast between the rural and the urban population. The latter is much better educated. For the adult urban group, that is, those twenty-five years of age and over, the 1940 census showed a median of 8.7 years schooling; for the rural nonfarm group the median was 8.4 years; for the rural farm group it was only 7.7 years.

These medians do not reflect the situation at the extreme ranges, however, and therefore are not so significant as certain other data that may be used for comparison. Take, for example, the college-trained group. Of the urban population of twenty-five years and over, 5.7 per cent in 1940 were college graduates; of the rural nonfarm population, 4.2 per cent; but of the rural farm population, only 1.3 per cent.

PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY MEDIAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING COMPLETED, AND BY PER CENT WITH LESS THAN 5 YEARS' SCHOOLING COMPLETED, FOR THE UNITED STATES BY DIVISIONS AND STATES, 1940 [2]

Division and state	Median school years completed	Per cent less than 5 years completed	Division and state	Median school years completed	Per cent less than 5 years completed
United States	8.4	13.5	Maryland	8.0	15.3
Regions:			Dist. of Columbia	10.3	8.2
The North	8.5	10.1	Virginia	7.7	23.2
The South	7.8	22.9	West Virginia	7.8	16.5
The West	9.4	8.3	North Carolina	7.4	26.2
New England:	8.8	10.1	South Carolina	6.7	34.7
Maine	8.9	7.4	Georgia	7.1	30.1
New Hampshire	8.7	8.1	Florida	8.3	18.5
Vermont	8.8	6.1	East South Central:	7.5	24.8
Massachusetts	9.0	10.1	Kentucky	7.7	20.2
Rhode Island	8.3	13.7	Tennessee	7.7	21.7
Connecticut	8.5	11.2	Alabama	7.1	28.9
Middle Atlantic:	8.4	12.2	Mississippi	7.1	30.2
New York	8.4	12.1	West South Central:	8.1	21.5
New Jersey	8.4	12.0	Arkansas	7.5	23.1
Pennsylvania	8.2	12.3	Louisiana	6.6	35.7
East North Central:	8.5	9.1	Oklahoma	8.4	13.5
Ohio	8.6	8.4	Texas	8.5	18.8
Indiana	8.5	7.7	Mountain:	8.9	11.0
Illinois	8.5	9.6	Montana	8.7	7.4
Michigan	8.6	10.2	Idaho	8.9	5.2
Wisconsin	8.3	9.4	Wyoming	9.2	7.1
West North Central:	8.5	7.5	Colorado	8.9	9.0
Minnesota	8.5	7.5	New Mexico	7.9	27.3
Iowa	8.7	4.1	Arizona	8.6	19.4
Missouri	8.3	10.3	Utah	10.2	5.5
North Dakota	8.3	10.8	Nevada	9.6	8.8
South Dakota	8.5	7.2	Pacific:	9.7	7.4
Nebraska	8.8	6.0	Washington	9.1	5.9
Kansas	8.7	6.1	Oregon	9.1	5.2
South Atlantic:	7.8	22.9	California	9.9	8.1
Delaware	8.5	12.9			

In the nation the median years of school completed is 8.4 years or slightly more than an eighth-grade education. The median schooling of 10.3 years in the District of Columbia and 10.2 years in Utah represent the highest level of educational attainment in the nation. Of the broad regions, the West with 9.4 years has the record; of the geographic regions, the Pacific division with 9.7 years. The lowest median schooling is found in Louisiana, 6.6 years. South Carolina is a close second. Of the regions, the South is lowest, 7.8 years, and of the geographic divisions, the East South Central, 7.5 years, with the South Atlantic a close second.

[2] Rearranged from *Population*, Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Series P-10, No. 8, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, April 23, 1942.

Even more significant from the standpoint of the future are he facts shown in our next table, which concerns the generation n school in 1940. It will be seen that the higher the age level, he greater the differential between the proportions of the farm group and the urban group. More than twice as many young

PERCENTAGE OF YOUTH FROM RURAL FARM, RURAL NONFARM, AND URBAN AREAS ATTENDING SCHOOL, BY SINGLE YEARS OF AGE, 1940 [3]

Years	United States total	Rural farm	Rural nonfarm	Urban
12–24	46.6	45.4	46.4	47.2
12	95.5	91.9	95.8	97.4
13	94.8	90.7	95.1	97.1
14	92.5	86.1	92.9	96.0
15	87.6	77.4	87.3	93.4
16	76.2	63.8	75.0	83.6
17	60.9	49.4	59.9	67.5
18	36.4	30.1	35.3	40.0
19	20.9	16.8	19.2	23.3
20	12.5	9.2	10.7	14.5
21	8.5	5.7	6.8	10.3
22	5.5	3.4	4.1	6.7
23	3.5	2.2	2.5	4.4
24	2.5	1.5	1.8	3.1

At 12 years of age 91.9 per cent of rural farm youth are still in school, 95.8 per cent of rural nonfarm youth, and 97.4 per cent of urban youth; at 24 years of age only 1.5 per cent of rural farm youth and 1.8 per cent of rural nonfarm youth, but 3.1 per cent of urban youth are in school.


people twenty-four years of age were in school in urban areas as in rural farm areas. Other data for the 1940 census show that rural farm young people are more often retarded in school than are urban young people.

Bell's study of Maryland youth shows that whereas only one in thirteen youth of fathers in the professional and technical occupations failed to go beyond the eighth grade, one out of two children of farm owners and tenants failed to go on, and seven out of eight children of farm laborers failed to go on. Among urban unskilled workers, the ratio was two out of three. The deterministic effect of occupation, especially of rural occupations,

[3] Data from *Educational Characteristics of the Population of the United States, by Age*, 1940, Series P-19, No. 4, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, December 27, 1943.

on education is clearly portrayed in the accompanying pictographic chart from Bell's study.

It may be said in general that rural states rank low in providing educational opportunities. The usual picture is one of




RELATION OF FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS TO THE AMOUNT OF EDUCATION THEIR CHILDREN RECEIVED

Parental occupation and income tend to determine the educational opportunity of the children. The differences shown here may have been exaggerated somewhat by depression conditions.

low teachers' salaries, poor school facilities, shortness of the school term, lack of a diversified curriculum, and all the other characteristics that represent poverty.

This condition in rural areas can be attributed to (1) a low tax base compared to that of urban industrial states or localities and (2) a relatively high birth rate and a consequently large crop of children to be educated. The concrete data demonstrating these relations are presented in the chart for representative rural and urban states. Urban industrial states with low birth rates have few children in ratio to wealth, whereas agricultural states with relatively low income and high birth rates have a relatively heavy educational burden.

Many people are inclined to consider that any attempt to equalize educational opportunities would be a direct subsidy to rural states which would have to be borne by the more prosperous urban industrial areas. Actually, if one understands the trends



Edwards, "Equal Educational Opportunity for Youth," p. 84

UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN IN RELATION TO INCOME IN SELECTED STATES

States with urban-industrial wealth and low birth rates have great wealth in ratio to children; agricultural states with relatively high birth rates have little wealth compared to their educational burdens.

of internal migration in the United States, such equalization through Federal tax measures would not really be a subsidy at all but rather an investment by urban industrial areas in their future population. We have seen from data presented in previous chapters that the larger metropolitan centers fall far short of replacing themselves and that their future depends upon a continued influx of rural youth. Any educational investment in rural communities would therefore be an investment in a better quality of youth to enter eventually into the economic and social life of the cities. Such education should be not only of the traditional rural sort but should orient the students to opportunities beyond their home communities and prepare them for the transition to secondary-group society.

This migration of youth when they reach the productive years, constitutes a continuous and heavy drain on rural wealth even

at the present low levels of education. O. E. Baker[4] has calculated its dollar value for one decade alone as follows:


> The cost of the contribution which the farming people have made to the productivity and prosperity of the cities, suburbs, and villages is greater than is commonly recognized. If it costs $2000 to $2500 (at pre-depression prices) to rear and educate the average child on American farms to the age of 15, when he may be assumed to be self-supporting — and $150 a year does not seem an excessive estimate of the cost of food, clothing, medical services, education, and all the incidental expenses — then the 6,300,000 net migration from the farms during the decade 1920–1930 represents a contribution of about $14,000,000,000. This contribution is almost equal to the value of the wheat crops plus half that of the cotton crops during these years.
>
> Nor is this all. When the farmer and his wife grow old and die, the estate is divided among the children. During the decade 1920–1930, about one-fifth of the farmers and their wives died, and their estates were distributed among the children. One-third or more of the children had moved to town, and many of those children who remained on the farm had to mortgage it in many cases to pay the brothers and sisters who lived in the cities their share of the estate. A rough estimate indicates that between $3,000,000,000 and $4,000,000,000 was drained from the farms to the cities and villages during the decade 1920–1930 incident to the settlement of estates.

Entirely aside from the marked inequalities of educational opportunity already discussed, we must also consider the fact that the present school system tends to discriminate against the economically underprivileged. In every community a large proportion drop out of school before they have reached the age and development which equip them to function in society up to their highest potential level. Unfortunately, the main reason is economic. The American Youth Commission study in Maryland (see pictographic chart on page 513) presents concrete evidence on this point. Many other studies made during the 1930's show similar results. Anderson and Kerns,[5] in New York, found that

[4] O. E. Baker, "The Outlook for Rural Youth," *U.S. Department of Agriculture Extension Service Circular 229.* Washington, D.C., 1935.

[5] W. A. Anderson and Willis Kerns, "Interests, Activities, and Problems of Rural Young Folk," *Cornell Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 631.* Ithaca, New York, 1937.

going to work was a major reason for dropping out of school. A study by the Works Progress Administration[6] covering more than 30,000 youth during the year 1938 in seven major cities repre-



EACH FIGURE REPRESENTS THE REASONS GIVEN BY 3% OF EACH SEX GROUP

Bell, "Youth Tell Their Story"

WHY DO YOUTH LEAVE SCHOOL?

Economic factors accounted for more than half of those leaving school. The fact that the study was carried on during a great depression no doubt exaggerated the economic factor over what it would have been in normal times. Lack of interest accounted for almost a fourth. Financial reasons are more often given by the boys, probably because the parents more often expect them to be self-supporting. Boys also quit more often because of a desire to earn money. Girls drop out more often for marriage.

sentative of all sections of the country, showed that more than half who left school did so because of lack of money to continue. The New York Regents Inquiry[7] found that economic privilege perpetuates class barriers as far as equalization of educational opportunity is concerned. The economic factor is especially im-

[6] *Urban Youth: Their Characteristics and Economic Problems*, pp. 10–11. Works Progress Administration, Washington, D.C., 1939.

[7] RUTH E. ECKERT and THOMAS O. MARSHALL, *When Youth Leaves School*, p. 45. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1938.

portant on the college level. Thousands of college youth with promising abilities, especially in times of economic crisis, are denied educational opportunities entirely or terminate their college careers prematurely because of economic hardship.[8]

All these studies reflect conditions of the depression decade and therefore exaggerate the economic factor. Nonetheless one can probably assume that this is always important, especially at the high school and college levels. It seems reasonable that society should subsidize young people with unusually promising abilities through college or else develop some kind of loan arrangement whereby they could finish college if they chose to do so.

Adjusting the School Program to the Needs of Adolescence and Youth

One of the most serious indictments of the secondary school program today is stated succinctly by the New York Regents Inquiry[9] in the following paragraph:

> On the average, the less competent a pupil has shown himself to be in meeting school tasks, the more quickly he is released to face adult problems. Those who will be least able to acquire socially useful habits, information, and points of view without formal instruction are those to whom the school has given least attention.

This report goes on to show that, in New York State high schools, for every two pupils who are graduated with a diploma, three leave without one. Most of those who withdraw are entirely without a career motive or else have their minds so definitely made up on only one field that change would involve great difficulties. The less able the student, the less likely he is to have clearly outlined, flexible plans for a life program. And the report adds the further warning that whatever the secondary school fails to do in developing competence for living will for the most part remain undone! Clearly the high school must go much further in providing terminal education for those who cannot or should not complete its program. It should also appeal to a greater number

[8] RAYMOND W. HATCH and PAUL H. LANDIS, "Social Heritage as a Factor in College Achievement," *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, pp. 215–272. Pullman, December, 1942.

[9] ECKERT and MARSHALL, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–68.

of pupils through the provision of a greater range of training possibilities so that those not now challenged will be interested in what it has to offer.

Perhaps the way to meet the present situation is that suggested by the American Youth Commission; namely, that the nation plan for a work year when a young person has reached the age of sixteen or has finished the tenth grade.[10] At that time a young person could, by spending six months or a year or at least a summer period in gainful employment, test himself and his capacities in practical situations. The Commission believes that many young people would at this point find they are ready to enter the work world while others would return to the school system toughened by their experience and given a more realistic appreciation of the roles of adulthood.

Some such diversity must be offered. The school cannot expect to have custody of all adolescents and youth unless it is able to offer a program challenging to all of them. As in any other life situation, frustration or other personal maladjustments are likely to develop in a school system which is incompatible with the personality and interests of the individual. There is no doubt that forced continuance in school under present conditions is for many the circumstance which provokes truancy and delinquency.

The guidance movement offers many possibilities for improvements, especially in the adjustment of the young person to school requirements and to social relationship. Briefly, guidance on the secondary school level, or personnel work on the college level, is designed (1) to help young people understand and make the most of their educational opportunities, (2) to aid them in their adjustments in the educational system and give them while in school an appreciation of the future application of their education, and (3) to prepare them and equip them to make the transition to society.

An effective guidance program applies all the tools of testing and measurement which will reveal to the individual his own capacities, interests, and inclinations. It provides for the person-counselor relationship which will make it possible for a young person who is frustrated or thwarted to express his views with confidence and to receive help in working out a solution. In

[10] *Youth and the Future*, pp. 23–27. American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1942.

time it must provide for a follow-up for young people after they have left school to help them make a satisfactory adjustment to adulthood. The New York Regents Inquiry [11] and other studies [12] make it clear that at the present time the gap between school and life-realities is too great, that the transition to the work world is for many too abrupt and requires adjustments which many are unprepared to make without the advice and help of an expert. Every school system should know where its young people go, and so far as possible develop a program and orient the extracurricular activities towards the goals which the majority of the pupils will eventually seek.

The Increasing Load of the School

One of the major difficulties faced by the educational system is created by the numerous responsibilities thrown upon it. Many of these, as we have implied at various points throughout this book, are a direct consequence of the disorganization of other social institutions. The failure of the family to meet the child's needs in moral training has forced the school to teach the essence of morality. In personality development, the disorganized home has forced the school to help the child find emotional security among his peers, to correct the warped or disorganized personality, and to salvage the individual for the social system. Demands in this field alone have been so great that the school has been unable to meet them and many children graduate into a life of delinquency, crime, or neurotic disorder.

To some extent the school, in attempting to teach moral responsibility and civic righteousness, has had to compensate not only for the failure of family religion but also for the loss of prestige by the church and Sunday School. The school has had to recognize that only a fraction of young people today come in contact with religious influences and it has therefore had to teach many of the ethical concepts which in Christian culture have been rooted in religious thought.

It has also had to take the initiative in teaching good citizenship and law-observance. In this regard, its teachings are often beyond the level of adult example placed before children in daily experience. Since the average adult citizen is not law-respecting

[11] *Op. cit.*

[12] Studies of the American Youth Commission stress this point.

in attitude or practice, he does not stress the importance of a regard for law and legal processes. The school must therefore teach this attitude of mind as well as the more formal aspects of civics.

Furthermore it has had to try to check obvious health difficulties which interfere with the child's progress in school and which in some cases are the basis of social maladjustment. Results of Selective Service health examinations during World War II make it all too clear that the school has been unable to cope to any appreciable extent with this problem. No doubt the situation would have been much worse had not progressive school systems given casual health examinations and referred cases to doctors or public clinics for remedial treatment.

The school has had to compensate for the inadequacies of other social institutions in still other important fields. The urban child, for instance, who has little contact with the work world, must be given an apprenticeship in some cases or at least an understanding of the work world, its opportunities, its obligations, and its requirements. The school must even go into more personal realms such as sex instruction, preparation for marriage, and an understanding of family obligations; the relationships of youth to each other in courtship and in other social activities; the use of more intelligence in mate selection and an understanding of the importance of health, eugenics, and other factors in marriage and family life.

And finally, the school has had to offer all youth an experimental laboratory in which capacities, interests, and talents are tested and developed, in which the ability to get along with others and to participate in normal life situations is tested. A complex society makes so many demands on the individual that much of his learning is vicarious rather than direct.

There is every evidence that the school will have to continue these extended duties. Even at best the romantic family will probably not soon be stabilized, so that the school must for a long time help the great numbers of children who will be the warped product of parental rejection, parental conflict, parental separation, and divorce. There must also be help in meeting the numerous behavior problems with which our society is having to cope.

In the face of these added burdens on the school, society must shoulder the responsibility for better teacher training and selec-

tion. It would seem that this training must stress more understanding of the person. If this cannot be done without lessening the emphasis placed upon methods of teaching, classroom procedures, etc., then less attention must be given to these methods and more to the human element. Good methods are not a satisfactory substitute for understanding. The teacher should be trained in mental hygiene, abnormal psychology, sociology, and as many other techniques as are required to make her able to discern behavior problems and work toward their solution.

Unfortunately public education is not sufficiently well rewarded to attract many of the best qualified young people to the profession. Teachers are too overworked to give much attention to the personal problems of the student. There are too few experts who understand human nature and how to deal with it when it manifests itself in behavior problems. We bemoan the present high costs of education, but we should really spend far more. We annually spend about the same amount for education as for tobacco, confections, ice cream, and soft drinks combined.[13]

More expenditures for education and for improvements in educational practice will do a great deal to reduce the nation's bill for delinquency and crime. It will help immeasurably in reducing the number of inmates of the hospitals for the mentally diseased and save others from personal demoralization and social failure.

Education has not proved to be a cure-all for social ills, but the nation has too often been content with poor education and usually has operated its schools as it has a number of non-technical institutions, with an efficiency far below the best standards. It is time that education be lifted above the folkways and mores and that problems be faced frankly. Here, as in technology, the highest level of competence should be sought. This is the real test of education. This is the real test of democratic society's ability to make rapid progress.

No movements are more important in their promise for education than (1) the employment of family-life specialists in progressive grade and high schools; (2) guidance programs in the grades and secondary schools; and (3) personnel-counseling programs in the colleges. These movements, to the extent that they

[13] So the report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care showed. See *Medical Care for the American People*, Final Report No. 28. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1932.

are manned by personnel with a full knowledge of their responsibility and a breadth of training and experience comparable to the demands of the job, offer an opportunity for corrective work which can curb anti-social tendencies in personality development which, if they are left uncorrected, may eventually lead to psychoneurotic difficulties, delinquency, and crime.

These programs can smooth the adjustment processes of all individuals and be a vital influence in seeing that young people find their proper place in the social and occupational structure of their group. These movements can also help the individual reach a sense of psychological security by assisting him to attain a satisfactory status in meaningful social groups. Such activity is not only in the interest of the best personality development but is the essence of an effective system of social control since it motivates by building internal loyalties to worthwhile groups rather than by simply exerting external prohibitions and imposing external restraints. These movements are so important that their further development offers the cheapest social method of reducing delinquency, crime, neuroses, functional psychoses, and many other problems of person and society.

Education and National Objectives

Rightly or wrongly, American democracy has come to depend on educational institutions to build the attitudes which will help man adjust to the new kind of world he is creating. It is left largely to the Federal government to develop broader outlines of social policy once public opinion is created, but it remains to quite an extent the function of the school to build a generation ahead those ideals and social objectives which eventually crystallize in nationwide social policy.

For this reason, the school is a vital instrument in progressive social change. In the educational philosophy propagated in one generation one finds the roots of national political action in the next. In this sense, the fundamental ideal of American democracy, which based its hopes on an intelligent electorate and therefore created universal free public education, is being realized.

The school is the greatest enemy of tradition, mythology, and cultural inertia. In the modern high school, if not sooner, the average young person begins to think in terms of cause and effect and to understand some of the basic concepts of the scientific


method and the scientific attitude of mind. In reaching the masses of American children with these essential ideas, the school system is entitled to credit far beyond that which is usually given; it has created the American attitude of mind, which is receptive to new inventions and theories and identifies change with progress, in fact, expects change to produce progress.

In the college field especially, and among the college generation, the ideas that lead to new social policy are planted. The social philosophy which will be in practice twenty-five to fifty years from now is being taught in the classroom today. It is the product of the research of yesterday.

The technology of tomorrow, the new industries that will transform man's external life and in turn modify his philosophy of existence, are being worked out in the abstract principles and discoveries of pure science in the laboratories of our universities. Man is pushing back the curtain that marks the unknown, and is peering deeper and deeper into nature's secrets. This apparently useless knowledge becomes the secret of man's conquest of nature.

New philosophies of criminal procedure and of penology that will determine the penal practices of tomorrow are being taught in college classrooms today. These philosophies are now being worked out by scales and measurement, psychological experiments, and sociological investigations by men who are far enough detached from the active scene of human affairs to view it with a degree of objectivity and to measure the effect of actions and policies. These new philosophies find their way first into the thinking of the college generation, later into the thinking of the state and nation. In a real sense, therefore, the school must be considered a key institution in modern society for achieving new adaptations of man to nature and to society, for making possible a new understanding of man himself and of the world in which he moves. The school is the chief custodian of science — not only its custodian, but its sire.

Moreover, the school is the godfather of America's efficient industrial technological system. This fact has been too little realized in the past and is still too little realized by practical-minded businessmen who are inclined to regard their own manipulation of finances and labor as of more importance to human progress than the work of underpaid and little-recognized research men and teachers. These ideas were in part dispelled for



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Education is a key to progress in democratic society.

natural science by the achievements of the physicist in World War II in the field of radar and in the release of atomic energy. The importance of educational institutions in war is well summarized by Compton in the following words:[14]

[14] From Report of President Karl T. Compton, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

> Whereas the Army and Navy constitute our first line of national defense, I venture the statement that our educational institutions rank with our manufacturing industry and transportation system as the principal supporting lines of military power in time of war and of reserve strength in time of peace. In peace, they educate men for every aspect of our national economy in which higher education is important. In war, they are ready-made centers for housing and training officer and specialized personnel; their faculties are the most readily available source of experts for the numerous emergency boards, committees, and expanded technical services; their laboratories and staffs become productive centers for research and development on new instrumentalities of offensive and defensive warfare.
>
> Of this latter aspect I give five of the most significant of some hundreds of illustrations: The most widely used and effective new weapon of this war was radar, which received its principal war development, especially in its microwave version, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the center of development of the devices and methods for rendering the enemies' radar ineffective or its indications misleading was Harvard University; the principal center of development of the important series of rocket weapons was the California Institute of Technology; work on the most important antisubmarine warfare devices was coordinated and organized through contracts with Columbia University; it was scientists from the University of Chicago, the University of California, Columbia University, and other institutions of the United States and Great Britain who developed the atomic bombs which so dramatically delivered the final blow to end the war.

There has been much ridicule in certain periods of American history of the man in the academic gown and mortar board, but the fact remains that the academic specialist has become a guide in government, economics, and national and international policy. His role must be even greater in the future. Many industries which a generation ago made fun of this recluse of the library and laboratory have found him indispensable, not only in the laboratory where new processes are created and patented but in the personnel office where labor management is gradually becoming a highly refined psychological science, and where job training, grading, etc., is being placed on a measurable basis. In the field of salesmanship, the science of public opinion and public persuasion is an indispensable asset to the advertiser.


Sociologists, anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and economists in the college classroom are probably presenting the ideas which will provide a peaceful world more nearly than any system now in practice. The fact that the world has come to appreciate the possibilities of world government, and to demand it, can be attributed in part to generation after generation of college instructors in history, political science, sociology, and anthropology who with a high degree of impartiality and objectivity toward world affairs, have for several generations presented to a selected generation of youth now in political leadership, ideas pointing to a world of order and law.

To their voices today are added others which are equally effective and more widely heard, although probably not so influential in molding the ideas of youth — the radio commentators and newspaper columnists, who use not only the media of indirect communication but also the public lecture platform.

A recent study by *Fortune* [15] of responses to questions in their opinion surveys over a four-year period, classified responses on the basis of education of the informants. The data show conclusively that uninformed people are much more likely to give no answers. Further analysis indicates that the better educated are more likely to give correct answers on specific information questions. This would seem to indicate that the educational system, whatever its weaknesses may be, prepares people to make more definite decisions on socio-political issues and to render a more moderate opinion than those with less education. The chart on page 524 shows the comparative results on information questions for the grade school group and for the college group. It will be seen that the percentage of correct answers given by the college group far exceeds that of the grade school group; in some cases, the former exceeds by a ratio of more than three to one.

In conclusion, a case has been made for the school as an instrument of democracy and a forerunner of intelligent change and progress. It has not, it is true, achieved the ideal or even approached its possibilities. It does not have adequate financial support; it does not always draw the best teaching and research talent; often it does not use the best techniques; it does not contribute as much to personality development as might reasonably be expected; it does not provide equal opportunity for rural

[15] "The Fortune Survey." *Fortune*, pp. 282–286, October, 1945.



ACCURACY OF ANSWERS ON SEVENTEEN INFORMATION QUESTIONS ON *FORTUNE* OPINION POLLS BY EDUCATION OF INFORMANTS

The college group is more often correct. In some cases more than three times as great a proportion of the college as of the grade school group is correct. Other data of the study show that the uninformed are more likely to take extreme positions on public questions or to answer "I don't know."

and urban youth, rich and poor, white- and dark-skinned races; it fails to develop a great deal of American genius. Nevertheless it has, on the positive side, developed many of the devices and philosophies which, with further improvement and more extensive use, point the way to progress.

Review

1. Discuss the educational system as a social elevator.
2. Explain the faith of the average man in education.

3. Discuss education as a form of economic security.
4. Show how the school helps assure democratic opportunity.
5. Summarize data reflecting the educational level of the adult citizen in the nation. Point out regional differences.
6. How do rural and urban adults compare in educational achievement?
7. What special problems do rural areas face in trying to realize parity with urban areas in educational opportunities?
8. Cite evidence to justify the subsidization of education in rural areas and in rural states.
9. Show that economic factors place limits on educational opportunity.
10. Along what lines must the school program be adjusted to meet the needs of adolescents and youth?
11. Summarize the American Youth Commission recommendation for giving work experience to youth.
12. What are the aims of the guidance movement? Comment on its significance.
13. Why has the school had to take on increasing responsibilities?
14. Along what lines must the school system be improved?
15. How does the educational program aid in the realization of national objectives?
16. What debt does technology owe to education? World statesmanship?
17. Present evidence showing that the better educated are more intelligent citizens.

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VISUAL AIDS

MATERIAL supplementing the discussion in many chapters of this book may be found in the following list of films. After each title there is a note on the running time, whether the film is silent (si) or sound (sd), and the producer or distributor. A directory of these producers and distributors is given at the end of the list.

The selection and descriptions are based upon the material in *Educational Film Guide*, Annual Edition, June 1946, compiled by Dorothy E. Cook and Eva Rahbek-Smith; New York, The H. W. Wilson Company, 1946. This volume lists and describes a large number of other films, many of which are suitable for college classes in social problems. Monthly supplements bring the material up to date.

CHAPTER 1 — *CULTURAL CHANGE*

Interdependence (30 min; 16 si; Harvard). Shows dependence of individuals and communities upon one another; relations of cities and country districts.

We Do It Because (7 min; 16 sd; TFC). Alleged explanations of social customs.

CHAPTER 2 — *URBANIZATION*

Growth of Cities (10 min; 16 sd; EBF). Various types of cities and city plans; factors involved in the growth of suburbs.

Arteries of the City (11 min; 16 sd; EBF). Development of a city's transportation facilities.

New York (22 min; 16 sd; ITTCO). Color film; gives an impression of the crowds of New York City; buildings, markets, playgrounds, etc.

New York Parade (10 min; 16 sd; TFC). "Depicts particularly well the relationships of individuals through casual acquaintances in a great metropolis."

CHAPTER 3 — *MOBILITY*

Golden West (9 min; 16 sd; Official). Development of the American West from first mining prospectors to modern mining methods.

Pioneers of the Plains (10 min; 16 sd; EBF). Experiences of a pioneer family in journeying from Illinois to a homestead on the plains.

Of Mice and Men (108 min; 16 sd; Post). John Steinbeck's story of the struggles of migratory farm workers.

CHAPTER 4 — *PRIMARY TO SECONDARY GROUPS*

Maria Chapedelaine (95 min; 16 sd; BraF). Life in a primary group in French Canada.

Home Town, U.S.A. (20 min; 16 sd; Look). A homey, pleasant picture of life in an American small town.

The Town (2 reels; 16 sd; OWI). "A film visit to Madison, Indiana, revealing the many ways in which American customs are related to the rest of the world."

CHAPTER 7 — *THE PERSONAL CASUALTY OF SOCIAL COMPLEXITY*

This Is the Bowery (10 min; 16 sd; TFC). "A story of life along New York's Bowery, a street of despair, peopled by men who have lost their grip."

It's the Brain That Counts (20 min; 16 sd; WCTU). How a few drinks may have caused an accident.

To the People of the United States (24 min; 16 sd; local health dept.). Starring Jean Hersholt; deals with the venereal disease problem.

CHAPTER 8 — *THE MARGINAL MAN*

Grapes of Wrath (12 reels; 16 sd; Fi). The much discussed Steinbeck film based on the book of the same title.

Greenie (10 min; 16 sd; TFC). A little Polish refugee boy becomes part of the American scene.

American Anniversary (15 min; 16 sd; NAM). The rise of an immigrant to a place of significance in his community.

CHAPTER 9 — *THE YOUTHFUL DELINQUENT*

What Can Be Done About Juvenile Delinquency (19 min; 16 sd; color; Chicago). The practical suggestions of recognized authorities on delinquency are condensed in this colorful, action-stimulating film.

Devil Is a Sissy; gang sequence (13 min; 16 sd; NYU). Deals with boys' gangs.

Criminal Is Born (2 reels; 16 sd; TFC). Four boys, whose parents show insufficient interest in them, turn to crime and pay the price.

CHAPTER 10 — *THE CRIMINAL*

Dead End; gangster sequence (9 min; 16 sd; NYU). A gangster risks capture by returning to his old neighborhood to see his mother and his former sweetheart.

Think First (20 min; 16 sd; TFC). Two waitresses in a roadside restaurant join a shoplifting ring.

They're Always Caught (2 reels; 16 sd; TFC). A crime is solved by crime laboratory technique.

CHAPTER 11 — *THE MAN OF DARK SKIN*

The House I Live In (10 min; 16 sd; Young America). Stars Frank Sinatra; develops the theme of understanding religious and racial problems.

Brotherhood of Man (10 min; 16 sd; color; BraF). Portrays that differences between the human races are superficial and that differing skins mean nothing.

Towards Unity (11 min; 16 sd; BraF). A definite plea against racial and national prejudice and for peace.

CHAPTER 12 — *INSTITUTIONAL TO COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY*

Good Neighbor Family (20 min; 16 sd; OIAA). "An excellent story of family life among Latin Americans."

Wife, Doctor, and Nurse (21 min; 16 sd; NYU). Deals with marital relations in general and with jealousy in particular.

CHAPTER 14 — *SEX IN THE ROMANTIC FAMILY SOCIAL SYSTEM*

Wrong Way Out (18 min; 16 sd; TFC). "Commentary points to the fact that most of the tragedies of youth are the result of impatience and false pride."

Animal Kingdom (16 min; 16 sd; NYU). Deals with the problems growing out of a pre-marital experience.

CHAPTER 15 — *THE CHILD IN THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY*

The Boss Didn't Say Good Morning (1 reel; 16 sd; TFC). The psychological effect a boss's failure to say good morning has on an employee; "recommended for use in connection with parent-child relationships."

CHAPTER 16 — *THE TRANSITION OF ADOLESCENTS AND YOUTH TO MATURITY IN THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY*

This Is Robert (80 min; 16 sd; NYU). "Traces the development of an aggressive, 'difficult,' yet thoroughly appealing child from his early nursery school days to his first year in a fine public school."

Educating Father (5 min; 16 sd; NYU). Deals with the choosing of a vocation.

Your Uncle Dudley (4 min; 16 sd; NYU). A mother insists that her daughter practice endlessly to win a singing contest.

CHAPTER 17 — *THE AGED IN THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY*

Make Way for Tomorrow (18 min; 16 sd; NYU). Considers the problem of an older person, the husband's mother in this case, in the home.

CHAPTER 18 — *DIVORCE IN THE COMPANIONSHIP FAMILY*

Wednesday's Child (9 min; 16 sd; NYU). The problems of a child involved in the dissolution of his parents' marriage and the events which lead up to the divorce.

CHAPTER 19 — *MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY*

New Ways in Farming (2 reels; 16 sd; March of Time). "Shows the methods in use today and what modern trends are; a good film for those interested in the welfare and future of the nation's agriculture."

Work of the Stock Exchange (15 min; 16 sd; Coronet). "Shows not only the detailed operation of the Stock Exchange but gives a background of information about the part the Stock Exchange plays in our entire economic structure."

CHAPTER 20 — *BALANCING CLASS INTERESTS*

Labor Front (21 min; 16 sd; BraF). "The overwhelming facts of the decisive contribution of labor and management in the United Nations are carefully analyzed in contrast to the Axis manpower boasts."

Machine: Master or Slave (14 min; 16 sd; NYU). "Considers the problems that management faces in its approach to the human and financial factors involved in technological progress."

Man and His Job (18 min; 16 sd; BraF). The problem of unemployment and the rise and functioning of Unemployment Insurance.

CHAPTER 21 — *PROVIDING ECONOMIC SECURITY*

Social Security (10 min; 16 sd; TFC). "A valuable and factual explanation of Social Security legislation."

Old Age and Family Security (10 min; 16 sd; Social Security Board). A description of federal old-age and survivors insurance and its operation.

Soak the Old (21 min; 16 sd; TFC). A racketeer organizer exploits an old-age pension movement.

CHAPTER 22 — *THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES*

Soil and Life (10 min; 16 sd; Case). Important soil conservation practices.

Conservation of Natural Resources (10 min; 16 sd; EBF). Water power, forests, and farm lands are considered.

Heritage We Guard (30 min; 16 sd; Soil Conservation Service). "A concise, enlightening survey of the wild life of this country and its value to our wellbeing."

Trees and Men (44 min; 16 sd; Weyerhaeuser). "Story of logging and reforestation in the Pacific Northwest, with scenes in various camps and mills and historical sequence of the development of the Westward March from 1850."

CHAPTER 25 — *THE QUEST FOR LONGEVITY*

Defending the City's Health (10 min; 16 sd; EBF). "Brings to life the working activities of the great army of public health workers upon whom so much depends in the matter of living in a city."

Triumph Without Guns (10 min; 16 sd; TFC). The story of Dr. Harvey W. Wiley's struggle for the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Bill.

Balanced Way (28 min; 16 sd; YMCA). Discusses the necessity of a well balanced diet and gives suggestions for planning the right kind of meals.

CHAPTER 26 — *IMPROVING EDUCATION AS AN AGENCY OF ADJUSTMENT*

New Schools for Old (10 min; 16 sd; MMA). Contrasts the little red schoolhouse, its methods and results, with the modern classroom.

Campus Frontiers (28 min; 16 sd; Antioch). Life at Antioch College.

Design for Education (25 min; 16 si; Sarah Lawrence College). Life at Sarah Lawrence College.

Producers and Distributors

Antioch — Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio

BraF — Brandon Films, Inc., 1600 Broadway, New York City 19

Case — J. I. Case Company, Racine, Wis.

Chicago — Chicago Board of Education Film Council, 228 N. LaSalle Street, Chicago 1, Ill.

Coronet — Coronet Productions, Glenview, Ill.

EBF — Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Inc., 20 N. Wacker Drive, Chicago 6, Ill.

Fi — Films, Inc., 330 W. 42nd Street, New York City 18; 64 E. Lake Street, Chicago 1, Ill.; 314 SW Ninth Ave., Portland, Ore.; 1709 West 8th Street, Los Angeles, Calif.

Harvard — Harvard Film Service, Graduate School of Education, Lawrence 4, Cambridge 38, Mass.

ITTCO — International Theatrical & Television Corporation, 25 W. 45th Street, New York City 19

Look — Look Magazine, 511 Fifth Avenue, New York City

March of Time — March of Time, 369 Lexington Avenue, New York City

MMA — Museum of Modern Art Film Library, 11 W. 53d Street, New York City

NAM — National Association of Manufacturers, 14 W. 49th Street, New York City 20

NYU — New York University Film Library, Washington Square, New York City 12

Official — Official Films, Inc., 25 W. 45th Street, New York City 19

OIAA — (Apply to New York University Film Library, and certain others designated in the Educational Film Guide)

OWI — Office of War Information, Bureau of Motion Pictures, Washington, D.C. 25

Post — Post Pictures Corporation, 723 Seventh Avenue, New York City 19

Sarah Lawrence College — Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville 8, N.Y.

Social Security Board — Social Security Board, Washington, D.C.; 11 W. 42nd Street, New York City

Soil Conservation Service — Soil Conservation Service, Upper Darby, Penn.

TFC — Teaching Film Custodians, Inc., 25 W. 43rd Street, New York City 18

WCTU — National Women's Christian Temperance Union, 1730 Chicago Avenue, Evanston, Ill.

Weyerhaeuser — Weyerhaeuser Sales Company, First National Bank Building, St. Paul, Minn.

YMCA — National Council of Young Men's Christian Associations, Motion Picture Bureau, 347 Madison Avenue, New York City 17; 19 S. LaSalle Street, Chicago, Ill.; 351 Turk Street, San Francisco, Calif.; 1700 Patterson Street, Dallas, Texas

Young America — Young America, Film Division, 32 E. 57th Street, New York City 22

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