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PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION

The present edition constitutes an attempt to keep pace with the changes that are constantly being made in the social science survey courses. In the selection of new or additional readings, I have been guided by two objectives: first, to place greater emphasis on certain themes, particularly the cultural process, alternative economic systems, recent foreign policy, and group behavior; second, to stress the functioning of the various aspects of society, rather than the structural features.

For their many and helpful suggestions, thanks go to my colleagues—Professors Maurice Boyd, David Chalmers, William Frederick, H. D. Price, O. F. Quackenbush, Allen M. Sievers, and Clifton K. Yearley, Jr.; and particularly to my wife, Irene S. Thompson, who cheerfully performed a host of generally unpleasant tasks connected with the preparation of this volume.

A.W.T.

Gainesville, Florida
June, 1958

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Of the various innovations that have notably affected higher education in the United States during the past several decades, few have been as significant as the general education movement. The widespread development of this program may be ascribed, in large measure, to the reaction against the overspecialization that has characterized American colleges and universities for the past half-century. Informed members of our society have come to recognize that many of our leaders, executives and professional people—though eminently well-qualified in the particular area of their occupation—do not have the sufficiently broad education demanded by a democratic society for the full and effective participation of its citizens. General education, therefore, is designed to offer the student a larger grasp of man's knowledge during his early years of college. Among the areas inevitably included in this basic curriculum are the social sciences.

Given the extensive scope of the social sciences, it was probably inevitable that, in the preparation of a general program in this field, virtually every college would develop its own version of such a course. Most, though with considerable variation, tend to follow one of three or four general patterns. Some emphasize the historical approach by surveying the history of Western civilization; many are concerned with the major problems of contemporary society; others devote their efforts to analyses of vital concepts and issues in the social sciences. This diversity in course offerings need not be viewed with alarm. Rather, it is indicative of the extensive experimentation, the exchange of ideas, and the constant revision that have taken place over the years. Still, even today, few educators would care to admit that they had found the ideal social science survey course.

In the light of this situation, the preparation of a volume of readings for such a course is, at best, a hazardous venture. Therefore, proceeding on the assumption that most of the courses in this field have a common core of topics, readings have been chosen which deal with those themes most commonly covered. The selections have not been arranged to conform to any of the approaches mentioned above, despite the partial categorization of topics by particular social sciences disciplines. Though an attempt has been made to arrange the material in a consistent and logical fashion, flexibility in the use of these readings has been a prime consideration. Each course will necessarily choose its own sequence, giving particular emphasis to certain items and possibly eliminating others.

In the choice of readings, the editor has been guided by a number of objectives: that

the selection be stimulating and readable; that it be an authoritative statement on the subject by an eminent social scientist; and that it be—with a few necessary exceptions—the product of recent research and scholarship. It will be discernable to the reader that opposing views have not been presented on every controversial issue. Though perhaps desirable, it was simply not possible to do so within the scope of the present volume. Taken in their entirety, however, the selections do offer varying interpretations and perspectives—albeit for different essays. Moreover, the editor was especially interested in presenting selections which seemed to him to go to the very heart of an issue, a movement, a concept; essays that attempted to go beyond artificially created and diametrically opposed positions in which the effect has all too often been to obscure rather than to enlighten. Before reading an essay, it would be well for the student to note the date of publication, frequently important in understanding the writer's allusions or viewpoint. With regard to footnotes, those cherished encumbrances have been eliminated except when pertinent or to identify important individuals mentioned by our authors.

In the preparation of a book of readings as broad in its scope as this, it has been necessary to draw upon the special talents of my colleagues in the various social sciences—all of whom have taught at one time or another in the Department of Social Science (C-1) at the University of Florida. For their many helpful suggestions, I wish to thank Professors William G. Carleton, David L. Dowd, Winston W. Ehrmann, Earl Grigsby, Paul L. Hanna, E. Ashby Hammond, John A. Harrison, William Havard, Ross Koen, Lyle N. McAlister, Rembert W. Patrick, William C. Pendleton, Oscar Svarlien, Irving L. Webber, and George E. Wolff. My thanks go also to Tatiana Capretz and Virginia Stewart who were extremely helpful in the typing of the manuscript.

Finally, the editor would be remiss if he failed to acknowledge his debt to several persons in particular: to Lois S. McVoy, for her good-natured, sustained and indispensable aid in collating the selections; and to my father, Henry Golubock, not only for his contribution to this volume, but also for his wisdom and guidance over the years.

A.W.T.

Gainesville, Florida
January, 1955

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Chapter One

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

I.

Broadly speaking, intellectual endeavor is applied to two areas: the physical sciences and the social, or cultural, sciences. The former deal with man's efforts to understand the phenomena of the universe. The social sciences attempt to understand the actions of man himself—to gain insight into the consequences of his activities as an individual and in group life.

The social sciences are not new, many of them having their origins in antiquity. The Greek philosophers invariably concerned themselves with problems of the state and, to a degree, though secondarily, with man's property relations. Political inquiry, then, goes back a long way and has been a persistent theme among many writers for over two thousand years. However, it was not until the sixteenth century, with the emergence of the modern state system and the accompanying growth of mercantilism, that economics started on the road toward its development as an independent and vital discipline. Initially regarded as an adjunct to politics and, in fact, termed "political economy," economics required another two or three centuries to evolve as a special area of study. History, like politics, also had its beginnings in Hellenic civilization. Indeed, Herodotus is usually referred to as the "father of history."

With the development of the science of geology and the more recent beginnings of archeological excavations, during the past two centuries, man gained new perspective about the nature of his existence. Increasing interest in the study of primitive societies led them to the emergence of the new social science of anthropology. During the nineteenth century the application of scientific inquiry to group action and behavior grad ually developed another area of social science—sociology.

There is little need to labor the point that the social sciences, compared to the natural sciences, are still in a relatively primitive stage. This unpleasant reality is often ascribed to the fact that the social sciences are still "young." But, as already indicated, this is hardly the case. What, then, accounts for this discrepancy between two such important aspects of man's knowledge? To begin with, it has been exceedingly difficult to examine social phenomena critically and objectively during the largest part of the past centuries without conflicting with entrenched political, economic, or social interests. A second factor to be considered is that the social sciences, as opposed to the natural sciences, are more familiar to the average individual. Consequently, the problem of overcoming accepted customs and beliefs was, and indeed still is, a formidable one. Today, the social sciences, dealing as

they frequently do with controversial issues, still run the constant risk of public censure as dangerous or subversive.

2.

Man's pursuit of knowledge has always reflected, to a considerable degree, the cultural milieu of the times. It is no accident, therefore, that during the past seventy-five years interest in the social sciences should have experienced a great expansion. The pressing problems of our time have functioned as a stimulus to serious inquiry into the nature and functioning of society. Seemingly insoluble problems demanded solution. The emergence of big business, the growing severity of cyclical fluctuations, the increasing consciousness of social stratification, the cumulative impact of modern revolutionary forces, and the ever-present danger of international war are merely a few of the many powerful forces daily intruding upon man's existence. Moreover, the twentieth-century decline of our eighteenth-century belief in the inviolability of natural law and the inevitability of progress has also provided man with incentives for a more searching analysis of himself and his institutions. Having achieved an incredible degree of mastery over the outer world of nature, man now seeks to extend the power of his conscious direction to include the inner world of human relations.

By the late nineteenth century social scientists were already vigorously debating the nature, scope, and methods of their respective disciplines in an effort to establish some kind of division of intellectual labor and proceed with the task at hand. The scientific method was eagerly applied to the various fields of social investigation. During the following half-century academic specialization increased to such a degree that there was a temporary decline in the unity of the social sciences. Yet, the achievements have been impressive. A formidable amount of spadework has been done and a mass of information accumulated in each of the disciplines. Aiding in the process have been innumerable professional societies, organizations such as the Social Science Research Council, and an impressive array of subsidizing foundations.

Today the accumulation of knowledge about the past and present of man and his works rolls inexorably on. But the social sciences are undergoing constant transformation, just as is the society of which they are a part. There is increasing emphasis on the empirical approach; there is movement toward more cooperative ventures; there is less moralizing and greater attempt at understanding; and, finally, a concerted effort is being made to integrate the social sciences, to the end that man may be better able to cope with the problems of his time. In the social sciences, as indeed in any intellectual endeavor, the degree of success and the ability of man to understand himself and his society will depend in no small measure on the maintenance of freedom of inquiry at all levels of society.

1

*The Social Sciences and History**

GAETANO SALVEMINI

The task of defining the social sciences, as well as their relationship to history, is an extraordinarily difficult one. Gaetano Salvemini, in his famous work, *Historian and Scientist,* offers some answers to this perennial problem.

Let us take as the starting point of our discussion of history and the social sciences the Aristotelian doctrine according to which intellectual activity is either scientific—if it aims at the ascertainment of truth; or aesthetic—if it has as its goal poetical creation; or practical—if it is directed toward action.

Leonardo da Vinci was an artist when he painted the "Last Supper" and a scientist when he drew the anatomy of the human body. A politician who addresses the electorate, recounting his own achievements, is a man of action who aims at the solution of a practical problem, namely, that of getting votes. He therefore falls under Aristotle's third heading, though he may, at times, display the most amazing gifts of poetical imagination and although even the most supercilious scientist is bound to admit that, at times, his statements are quite true.

Thus I shall term "science" all endeavor to ascertain facts and their interrelations.

Coming now to the definition of history, I shall term "history" all endeavor to reconstruct past events with the help of their remnants or of the traces which they have left in human memory.

In common parlance many investigations which aim at the reconstruction of the past do not fall under the heading of history. The astronomer who collects from all periods and all countries data on which to tabulate heavenly phenomena; the geologist who, basing his research on the distribution and stratification of minerals in the earth's crust, tries to deduct therefrom the phases through which the earth has passed before assuming its present aspect; the paleontologist who, with the help of fossil remains, re-creates flora and fauna which became extinct thousands of years ago; the naturalist who investigates the origin of species—all these are called scientists, while the name "historian" is applied only to those scholars who devote themselves to reconstructing the past of the human race. As a matter of fact, there is no essential difference between the problems which confront the scientist in reconstructing the astronomic, geological, or biological past and the problems which confront the historian in reconstructing the human past. In both cases the expert reconstructs the past with the help of the evidence which the past has left behind it. The technique used by the various investigators may differ, inasmuch as they have to devise differ-

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ent expedients to fit the different sources of information at their disposal, but the method of extracting information from sources remains the same, because the human mind in all circumstances works in accordance with the same laws of thought.

In reconstructing the past we can set before ourselves two different aims: we can limit ourselves to ascertaining the facts one by one; or we can ask ourselves whether there exists a connection of cause and effect between preceding and subsequent facts. Disconnected facts have no interest in themselves. They were all born free and equal. Facts begin to acquire significance only when they are grouped in a system of cause and effect. Only then does knowledge contribute to wisdom.

The work which stops short at the ascertainment of isolated facts about the past we call erudition, and we designate as historians those scholars who seek to organize these facts according to the principle of causality. The work of Le Nain de Tillemont, who in the seventeenth century industriously collected all the sources of information then available on the Roman emperors, selected from them the most reliable data, with all the necessary critical precautions, and then compiled the annals of the Roman Empire, is a work of erudition. Gibbon, who, utilizing the erudition of Le Nain de Tillemont, described the causes and the phases of the decline of the Roman Empire, was an historian. Erudition prepares bricks for the historian. The historian is the architect.

From erudition and from history so defined let us now pass to the definition of the social sciences. I say "social sciences" because this is the term adopted by the social scientists themselves to designate their studies. . . .

The division between history and the social sciences is generally regarded as a pure matter of dates. The historian is one who deals with the study of events of which there are no longer living witnesses, whereas the social scientist deals with contemporary events, about which he can make direct personal observation. A book on the French Revolution is classed as history, while one on the Russian Revolution of 1917 is generally regarded as a contribution to the social sciences. One who studies the organization of the family in ancient Rome is an historian; one who studies the organization of the family in a Negro tribe of the present day is regarded as a social scientist.

On closer scrutiny, however, this conception proves not to fit the facts. One who studies contemporary events derives only an infinitesimal part of his information from immediate personal knowledge. The greater part of his material comes to him from the testimony of others. Every witness, whether dead or living, may have made mistakes or may have had the intention of misleading. All testimony must therefore be subjected to a scrutiny both of its accuracy and of its sincerity. This is equally indispensable whether we use the history of Herodotus to reconstruct the Persian Wars, or the memoirs of Trotsky to study events in Russia in 1917. Abundant official statistics are published today, and statistics belong to the realm of the social sciences. But many of these statistics, when subjected to the methods of historical criticism, are useful only as a proof that in our century the sources of poetical imagination have not dried up.

If history is the reconstruction of the past, even events contemporary to ourselves belong to the past. The speech made in Congress yesterday belongs to the past. The notes taken by a journalist during the speech are records of this past. One who uses these notes, be he historian or

social scientist, must make sure whether or not the journalist gave a faithful reproduction of the speech, *i.e.,* whether, at the moment of taking down his notes and editing them for the press, he misunderstood or even intentionally misreported the speaker's address by ascribing to him statements he never made. This critical inquiry is indispensable whether we are dealing with a speech made yesterday at Washington and published today in a daily newspaper, or whether we are studying the Philippics of Demosthenes.

The line of division between history and the social sciences is not one of chronology. It results from the different aims pursued by the historian and the social scientist.

When one investigates family organization in a given country, at a given time, what factors determined that organization and what fresh circumstances transformed it, one is doing a piece of historical research, no matter whether the type of family belongs to the past or to the present. If one uses all the historical information available about different types of family organization in the greatest possible number of countries and periods, in order to determine whether or not there are constant features which may be formulated into laws, then one is working on a problem of social science.

The astronomer, in so far as he collects evidence about heavenly phenomena observed in the past, is doing the work of an historian, but in so far as he determines periodicity, *i.e.,* the laws obtaining among these phenomena, he is doing work analogous to that of the social scientist in the domain of human relations. The study of historical data and the working out of laws are intermingled in astronomy. In the study of human relations there is a division of labor between history, which reconstructs the facts, and the social sciences, which devote themselves to detecting uniformities and deducting laws therefrom. . . .

The interest evinced by the community in the development of the social sciences, then, is based on the hope that sooner or later the laws—if such exist—to which social phenomena conform will be discovered, and that knowledge of those laws will help us to regulate our conduct more intelligently. Only if we succeed in discovering the laws of social life—assuming them to exist—can we save ourselves fruitless efforts and disastrous mistakes. These laws—always assuming they exist—cannot be revealed to us either by transcendental authority or by any metaphysics, whether ancient or modern, claiming to deduce the solution of all problems from magic formulas expressing the so-called "nature of things." The laws of social life cannot be determined except by the method followed during the past three centuries by the sciences of the physical world—that is, by examining the greatest possible number of facts; coordinating them in accordance with their coexistence in space, their succession in time, and the principle of causality; classifying the various groups of facts according to constant similarities and dissimilarities; and expressing these constant similarities and dissimilarities in synthetic formulas, *i.e.,* laws which enable us to predict that the appearance of a given phenomenon will be the signal for the appearance of other phenomena indissolubly connected with the first.

Chapter Two

ANTHROPOLOGY: THE INSTITUTIONS OF MAN

1.

Simply stated, anthropology is the study of man. It is a unique area of investigation in that it accepts no limitations on its scope except those of man himself. It is restricted neither by time nor by place. It claims interest in man's physical, social, cultural, and linguistic experience, whether ancient or modern, primitive or civilized. Some of its scholars join archeological expeditions to all corners of the earth to discover and explore the nature of prehistoric man. Others embark upon extended visits with primitive tribes still in existence—certain of the Indians of the Southwestern United States, the Bushmen of South Africa, the Dobuans of Eastern New Guinea, and countless others. A growing number of anthropologists have begun to direct their attention to the more advanced peoples. Ruth Benedict's study of Japanese culture, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,* and Margaret Mead's *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority* are recent products of this trend. All, however, are interested in ways of life—the infinitely diverse patterns that man has devised to solve his basic and enduring problems—and in determining the succession of culture stages.

Anthropologists offer their discipline as the general, or coordinating, social science (though in doing so they are not alone). In the effort to effect a greater synthesis of social knowledge, their enduring and probably most significant achievement has been the development of the concept of culture. The application of this concept has contributed mightily to the undermining of racism, to the decline of ethnocentrism, and to the recognition that cultural conditioning weighs most heavily in social attainment. Above all, its value lies in the understanding and attitude of mind it has helped to create by advancing the idea of perceiving a people in terms of their own values rather than ours.

2.

This section of readings makes no pretense at covering even the major areas or problems of concern to anthropology. It is meant rather as an introduction, designed to give the reader a glimpse into the field. It is offered for use as a conceptual framework for the study of man—as a broad canvas of which only a minute part will be subjected later to closer scrutiny.

The basic analyses presented here all revolve around the fundamental social-science tool of the concept of culture. Each of the selections offers something of interest. It is hoped, however, that all of them will help

to clarify some of our confused notions relative to "human nature"; to overcome our false perspective; to indicate the differences in human societies, but also to emphasize their underlying similarities; and finally, to offer some insight into the forces that tend to maintain or disrupt the status quo.

A. The General Concept

2

What Is Anthropology?

CLYDE KLUCKHOHN

Clyde Kluckhohn, one of America's foremost anthropologists, is a Harvard University professor and specialist in the Indians of the Southwest. From his book, *Mirror for Man,* published in 1949, we begin with an introductory view of anthropology.

Anthropology provides a scientific basis for dealing with the crucial dilemma of the world today: how can peoples of different appearance, mutually unintelligible languages, and dissimilar ways of life get along peaceably together? Of course, no branch of knowledge constitutes a cure-all for the ills of mankind. If any statement in this book seems to support such messianic pretensions, put this absurd claim down as a slip of an enthusiast who really knows better. Anthropology is, however, an overlapping study with bridges into the physical, biological, and social sciences and into the humanities.

Because of its breadth, the variety of its methods, and its mediating position, anthropology is sure to play a central role in the integration of the human sciences. A comprehensive science of man, however, must encompass additional skills, interests, and knowledge. Certain aspects of psychology, medicine and human biology, economics, sociology, and human geography must be fused with anthropology in a general science which must likewise embrace the tools of historical and statistical methods and draw data from history and the other humanities.

Present-day anthropology, then, cannot pretend to be the whole study of man, though perhaps it comes closer than any other branch of science. Some of the discoveries that will here be spoken of as anthropological have been made possible only by collaboration with workers in other fields. Yet even the traditional anthropology has a special right to be heard by those who are deeply concerned with the problem of achieving one world. This is because it has been anthropology that has explored the gamut of human variability and can best answer the questions: What common ground is there between human beings of all tribes and nations? What differences exist? What is their source? How deep-going are they?

By the beginning of the twentieth cen-

* Reprinted from *Mirror for Man* by Clyde Kluckhohn. Copyright 1949 by the McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York City. Used by permission of the publishers

tury the scholars who interested themselves in the unusual, dramatic, and puzzling aspects of man's history were known as anthropologists. They were the men who were searching for man's most remote ancestors; for Homer's Troy; for the original home of the American Indian; for the relationship between bright sunlight and skin color; for the origin of the wheel, safety pins, and pottery. They wanted to know "how modern man got this way": why some people are ruled by a king, some by old men, others by warriors, and none by women; why some peoples pass on property in the male line, others in the female, still others equally to heirs of both sexes; why some people fall sick and die when they think they are bewitched, and others laugh at the idea. They sought for the universals in human biology and in human conduct. They proved that men of different continents and regions were physically much more alike than they were different. They discovered many parallels in human customs, some of which could be explained by historical contact. In other words, anthropology had become the science of human similarities and differences. . . .

It was not until the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that scientific anthropology began to develop. The discovery of the relationship between Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, and the Germanic languages gave a great impetus to the comparative point of view. The first systematic anthropologists were gifted amateurs—physicians, natural historians, lawyers, businessmen to whom anthropology was a hobby. They applied common sense, the habits they had learned in their professions, and the fashionable scientific doctrines of their day to growing knowledge about "primitive" peoples.

What did they study? They devoted themselves to oddities, to matters which appeared to be so trivial or so specialized that the fields of study which had been established earlier, failed to bother with them. The forms of human hair, the variations in skull formation, shades of skin color did not seem very important to anatomists or to practicing physicians. The physical remains of cultures other than the Greco-Roman were beneath the notice of classical scholars. Languages unrelated to Greek and Sanskrit had no interest for the comparative linguists of the nineteenth century. Primitive rites interested only a few of the curious until the elegant prose and respectable classical scholarship of Sir James Frazer's *Golden Bough* won a wide audience. Not without justification has anthropology been termed "the science of leftovers." . . .

The beginnings do not sound very promising, either from the point of view of the students who were attracted to the subject or of what they were drawn to study. Nevertheless these very liabilities provided what are the greatest advantages of anthropology as compared with other approaches to the study of human life. Because nineteenth-century anthropologists studied the things they did out of pure interest and not either to earn a living or to reform the world, a tradition of relative objectivity grew up. The philosophers were shackled by the weighty history of their subject and by the vested interests of their profession. Auguste Comte, the founder of sociology, was a philosopher, but he tried to model sociology after the natural sciences. However, many of his followers, who were only slightly disguised philosophers of history, had a bias in favor of reasoning as opposed to observation. Many of the first American sociologists were Christian ministers, more eager to improve the world than to study it with detachment. The field of political science was also tinged with the philosophic

point of view and with reformist zeal. The psychologists became so absorbed in brass instruments and the laboratory that they found little time to study man as one really wants to know him—not in the laboratory but in his daily life. Because anthropology was the science of leftovers and because leftovers were many and varied, it avoided the preoccupation with only one aspect of life that stamped, for instance, economics. . . .

In the American Southwest one of the signs of summer is the arrival of many "-ologists" who disrupt the quiet of the countryside. They dig up ruins with all the enthusiasm of small boys hunting for "Indian curios" or of delayed adolescents seeking buried treasure. They pry into the business of peaceful Indians and make a nuisance of themselves generally with a lot of queer-looking gadgets. The kind who dig into ruins are technically called "archaeologists," those who dig into the minds of Indians, "ethnologists" or "social anthropologists," those who measure heads, "physical anthropologists," but all are varieties of the more inclusive breed term "anthropologists."

Now what are they really up to? Is it just sheer curiosity about "ye beastly devices of ye heathen" or do the diggings, questionings, and measurings really have something to do with the world today? Do anthropologists merely produce exotic and amusing facts which have nothing to do with the problems of here and now? . . .

. . . nothing is more certain than that men ought to see whether the scientific methods which have given such stupendous results in unlocking the secrets of the physical universe might not help them understand themselves and their neighbors in this rapidly shrinking world. Men build machines that are truly wonderful, only to find themselves next to helpless when it comes to treating the social disorders that often follow the introduction of these machines.

Ways of making a living have changed with such bewildering rapidity that we are all a bit confused most of the time. Our ways of life have altered too—but not symmetrically. Our economic, political, and social institutions have not caught up with our technology. Our religious beliefs and practices and our other idea systems have much in them that is not appropriate to our present way of life and to our scientific knowledge of the physical and biological world. Part of us lives in the "modern" age —another part in medieval or even Greek times.

In the realm of treating social ills we are still living in the age of magic. We often act as if revolutionary and disturbing ideas could be exorcised by a verbal rite—like evil spirits. We hunt for witches to blame for our troubles: Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin. We resist changing our inner selves even when altered conditions make this clearly necessary. We are aggrieved if other peoples misunderstand us or our motives; but if we try to understand them at all, we insist on doing so only in terms of our own assumptions about life which we take to be infallibly correct. We are still looking for the philosopher's stone—some magic formula (perhaps a mechanical scheme for international organization) that will make the world orderly and peaceful without other than external adaptions on our part.

We don't know ourselves very well. We talk about a rather vague thing called "human nature." We vehemently assert that it is "human nature" to do this and not to do that. Yet anybody who has lived in the American Southwest, to cite but one instance, knows from ordinary experience that the laws of this mysterious "human

nature" do not seem to work out exactly the same way for the Spanish-speaking people of New Mexico, for the English-speaking population, and for the various Indian tribes. This is where the anthropologists come in. It is their task to record the variations and the similarities in human physique, in the things people make, in ways of life. Only when we find out just how men who have had different upbringing, who come from different physical stocks, who speak different languages, who live under different physical conditions, meet their problems, can we be sure as to what all human beings have in common. Only then can we claim scientific knowledge of raw human nature. . . .

Though some research . . . appears to leave the "anthropos" (man) off to one side, still the main trends of anthropological thought have been focused on a few questions of broad human interest, such as: what has been the course of human evolution, both biologically and culturally? Are there any general principles or "laws" governing this evolution? What necessary connections, if any, exist between the physical type, the speech, and the customs of the peoples of past and present? What generalizations can be made about human beings in groups? How plastic is man? How much can he be molded by training or by the necessity to adapt to environmental pressures? Why are certain personality types more characteristic of some societies than of others?

To most people, however, anthropology still means measuring skulls, treating little pieces of broken pottery with fantastic care, and reporting the outlandish customs of savage tribes. The anthropologist is the grave robber, the collector of Indian arrowheads, the queer fellow who lives with unwashed cannibals. As Sol Tax remarks, the anthropologist has had a function in society "something between that of an Einstein dealing with the mysterious and that of an entertainer." His specimens, his pictures, or his tales may serve for an hour's diversion but are pretty dull stuff compared to the world of grotesque monsters from distant ages which the paleontologist can recreate, the wonders of modern plant and animal life described by the biologist, the excitement of unimaginably far-off universes and cosmic processes roused by the astronomer. Surely anthropology seems the most useless and impractical of all the "-ologies." In a world of rocket ships and international organizations, what can the study of the obscure and primitive offer to the solution of today's problems?

"The longest way round is often the shortest way home." The preoccupation with insignificant nonliterate peoples that is an outstanding feature of anthropological work is the key to its significance today. Anthropology grew out of experience with primitives and the tools of the trade are unusual because they were forged in this peculiar workshop.

Studying primitives enables us to see ourselves better. Ordinarily we are unaware of the special lens through which we look at life. It would hardly be fish who discovered the existence of water. Students who had not gone beyond the horizon of their own society could not be expected to perceive custom which was the stuff of their own thinking. The scientist of human affairs needs to know as much about the eye that sees as the object seen. *Anthropology holds up a great mirror to man and lets him look at himself in his infinite variety.* This, and not the satisfaction of idle curiosity nor romantic quest, is the meaning of the anthropologist's work in nonliterate societies.

Picture the field worker in a remote island of the South Seas or among a tribe of the Amazon jungle. He is usually alone.

But he is expected to bring back a report on both the physique and the total round of the people's activities. He is forced to see human life as a whole. He must become a Jack-of-all-trades and acquire enough diverse knowledge to describe such varying things as head shape, health practices, motor habits, agriculture, animal husbandry, music, language, and the way baskets are made.

Since there are no published accounts of the tribe, or only spotty or inadequate ones, he depends more on his eyes and his ears than upon books. Compared with the average sociologist, he is almost illiterate. The time that the sociologist spends in the library, the anthropologist spends in the field. Moreover, his seeing and his listening take on a special character. The ways of life he observes are so unfamiliar that it is next to impossible to interpret them through his own values. He cannot analyze in terms of the things he had decided in advance were important, because everything is out of pattern. It is easier for him to view the scene with detachment and relative objectivity just because it is remote and unfamiliar, because he himself is not emotionally involved. Finally, since the language has to be learned or interpreters found, the anthropologist is compelled to pay more attention to deeds than to words. When he cannot understand what is being said, the only thing he can do is devote himself to the humble but very useful task of noting who lives with whom, who works with whom in what activities, who talks loudly and who talks softly, who wears what when.

A perfectly legitimate question at this point would be: "Well, perhaps anthropologists in working in nonliterate societies did happen to pick up some skills that have given good results when applied to studies of our society. But in the name of everything, why, if you anthropologists are really interested in modern life, do you keep on bothering with these inconsequential little tribes?"

The anthropologist's first answer would be that the life ways of these tribes are part of the human record and that it is his job to see that these things get recorded. Indeed anthropologists have felt this responsibility very keenly. They have felt that they had no time to write general books when each year saw the extinction of aboriginal cultures that had not yet been described. The descriptive character of most anthropological literature and the overpowering mass of detail are to be traced to the anthropologist's obsession with getting down the facts before it is too late. . . .

The issue is not: Shall the scientific student of man work in our own society *or* among primitives? It is rather: Does the anthropologist by working in the simpler scene isolate certain crucial factors which can then be investigated more effectively in the complex picture? The right questions to ask and the right techniques for getting the answers to them can best be discovered by work on smaller canvases, that is, in more homogeneous societies that have been by-passed by civilization.

The primitive society is the closest to laboratory conditions the student of man can ever hope to get. Such groups are usually small and can be studied intensively by few people at slight expense. They are ordinarily rather isolated so that the question does not arise as to where one social system begins and another ends. The members of the group have lived their lives within a small area and have been exposed continually to the pressure of the same natural forces. They have had an almost identical education. All of their experiences have much more in common than is the case with members of complex societies.

Their ways of life are comparatively stable. Commonly there is a high degree of biological inbreeding so that any member of the society chosen at random has about the same biological inheritance as any other. In short, many factors can be regarded as more or less constant, and the anthropologist is free to study a few variables in detail with real hope of ferreting out the connections between them. . . .

Nonliterate societies represent the end results of many different experiments carried out by nature. Groups that have largely gone their way without being absorbed in the great civilizations of the West and the East show us the variety of solutions which men have worked out for perennial human problems and the variety of meanings that peoples attach to the same and to different cultural forms. Contemplation of this vast tableau gives us perspective and detachment. By analyzing the results of these experiments, the anthropologist also gives us practical information on what works and what doesn't.

B. The Concept of Culture

3

*The Diversity of Cultures**

RUTH BENEDICT

Ruth Benedict has earned a well-deserved reputation as psychologist and sociologist. But it was through her teaching and writing in the field of anthropology that she became most famous. From her very popular and widely read book, *Patterns of Culture,* we view the concept of culture and the nature of cultural differences.

The course of life and the pressure of environment, not to speak of the fertility of human imagination, provide an incredible number of possible leads, all of which, it appears, may serve a society to live by. There are the schemes of ownership, with the social hierarchy that may be associated with possessions; there are material things and their elaborate technology; there are all the facets of sex life, parenthood and post-parenthood; there are the guilds or cults which may give structure to the society; there is economic exchange; there are the gods and supernatural sanctions. Each one of these and many more may be followed out with a cultural and ceremonial elaboration which monopolizes the cultural energy and leaves small surplus for the building of other traits. Aspects of life that seem to us most important have been passed over with small regard by peoples whose culture, oriented in another direction, has been far from poor. Or the same trait may be so greatly elaborated that we reckon it as fantastic.

It is in cultural life as it is in speech; selection is the prime necessity. The numbers of

* Reprinted from Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934). Used by permission of the publishers.

sounds that can be produced by our vocal cords and our oral and nasal cavities are practically unlimited. The three or four dozen of the English language are a selection which coincides not even with those of such closely related dialects as German and French. The total that are used in different languages of the world no one has ever dared to estimate. But each language must make its selection and abide by it on pain of not being intelligible at all. A language that used even a few hundreds of the possible—and actually recorded—phonetic elements could not be used for communication. On the other hand a great deal of our misunderstanding of languages unrelated to our own has arisen from our attempts to refer alien phonetic systems back to ours as a point of reference. We recognize only one *k*. If other people have five *k* sounds placed in different positions in the throat and mouth, distinctions of vocabulary and of syntax that depend on these differences are impossible to us until we master them. We have a *d* and an *n*. They may have an intermediate sound which, if we fail to identify it, we write now *d* and now *n*, introducing distinctions which do not exist. The elementary prerequisite of linguistic analysis is a consciousness of these incredibly numerous available sounds from which each language makes its own selections.

In culture too we must imagine a great arc on which are ranged the possible interests provided either by the human age-cycle or by the environment or by man's various activities. A culture that capitalized even a considerable proportion of these would be as unintelligible as a language that used all the clicks, all the glottal stops, all the labials, dentals, sibilants, and gutturals from voiceless to voiced and from oral to nasal. Its identity as a culture depends upon the selection of some segments of this arc. Every human society everywhere has made such selection in its cultural institutions. Each from the point of view of another ignores fundamentals and exploits irrelevancies. One culture hardly recognizes monetary values; another has made them fundamental in every field of behavior. In one society technology is unbelievably slighted even in those aspects of life which seem necessary to ensure survival; in another, equally simple, technological achievements are complex and fitted with admirable nicety to the situation. One builds an enormous cultural superstructure upon adolescence, one upon death, one upon after-life.

The case of adolescence is particularly interesting, because it is in the limelight in our own civilization and because we have plentiful information from other cultures. In our own civilization a whole library of psychological studies has emphasized the inevitable unrest of the period of puberty. It is in our tradition a physiological state as definitely characterized by domestic explosions and rebellion as typhoid is marked by fever. There is no question of the facts. They are common in America. The question is rather of their inevitability.

The most casual survey of the ways in which different societies have handled adolescence makes one fact inescapable: even in those cultures which have made most of the trait, the age upon which they focus their attention varies over a great range of years. At the outset, therefore, it is clear that the so-called puberty institutions are a misnomer if we continue to think of biological puberty. The puberty they recognize is social, and the ceremonies are a recognition in some fashion or other of the child's new status of adulthood. This investiture with new occupations and obligations is in consequence as various and as culturally conditioned as the occupations and obliga-

tions themselves. If the sole honourable duty of manhood is conceived to be deeds of war, the investiture of the warrior is later and of a different sort from that in a society where adulthood gives chiefly the privilege of dancing in a representation of masked gods. In order to understand puberty institutions, we do not most need analyses of the necessary nature of *rites de passage;* we need rather to know what is identified in different cultures with the beginning of adulthood and their methods of admitting to the new status. Not biological puberty, but what adulthood means in that culture conditions the puberty ceremony.

Adulthood in central North America means warfare. Honour in it is the great goal of all men. The constantly recurring theme of the youth's coming-of-age, as also of preparation for the warpath at any age, is a magic ritual for success in war. They torture not one another, but themselves: they cut strips of skin from their arms and legs, they strike off their fingers, they drag heavy weights pinned to their chest or leg muscles. Their reward is enhanced prowess in deeds of warfare.

In Australia, on the other hand, adulthood means participation in an exclusively male cult whose fundamental trait is the exclusion of women. Any woman is put to death if she so much as hears the sound of the bull-roarer at the ceremonies, and she must never know of the rites. Puberty ceremonies are elaborate and symbolic repudiations of the bonds with the female sex; the men are symbolically made self-sufficient and the wholly responsible element of the community. To attain this end they use drastic sexual rites and bestow supernatural guaranties.

The clear physiological facts of adolescence, therefore, are first socially interpreted even where they are stressed. But a survey of puberty institutions makes clear a further fact: puberty is physiologically a different matter in the life-cycle of the male and the female. If cultural emphasis followed the physiological emphasis, girls' ceremonies would be more marked than boys'; but it is not so. The ceremonies emphasize a social fact: the adult prerogatives of men are more far-reaching in every culture than women's, and consequently, as in the above instances, it is more common for societies to take note of this period in boys than in girls.

Girls' and boys' puberty, however, may be socially celebrated in the same tribe in identical ways. Where, as in the interior of British Columbia, adolescent rites are a magical training for all occupations, girls are included on the same terms as boys. Boys roll stones down mountains and beat them to the bottom to be swift of foot, or throw gambling-sticks to be lucky in gambling; girls carry water from distant springs, or drop stones down inside their dresses that their children may be born as easily as the pebble drops to the ground.

In such a tribe as the Nandi of the lake region of East Africa, also, girls and boys share an even-handed puberty rite, though, because of the man's dominant role in the culture, his boyhood training period is more stressed than the woman's. Here adolescent rites are an ordeal inflicted by those already admitted to adult status upon those they are now forced to admit. They require of them the most complete stoicism in the face of ingenious tortures associated with circumcision. The rites for the two sexes are separate, but they follow the same pattern. In both the novices wear for the ceremony the clothing of their sweethearts. During the operation their faces are watched for any twinge of pain, and the reward of bravery is given with great rejoicing by the lover, who runs forward to receive back some of his adornments. For both the girl and the

boy the rites mark their *entrée* into a new sex status: the boy is now a warrior and may take a sweetheart, the girl is marriageable. The adolescent tests are for both a premarital ordeal in which the palm is awarded by their lovers.

Puberty rites may also be built upon the facts of girls' puberty and admit of no extension to boys. One of the most naïve of these is the institution of the fatting-house for girls in Central Africa. In the region where feminine beauty is all but identified with obesity, the girl at puberty is segregated, sometimes for years, fed with sweet and fatty foods, allowed no activity, and her body rubbed assiduously with oils. She is taught during this time her future duties, and her seclusion ends with a parade of her corpulence that is followed by her marriage to her proud bridegroom. It is not regarded as necessary for the man to achieve pulchritude before marriage in a similar fashion.

The usual ideas around which girls' puberty institutions are centred, and which are not readily extended to boys', are those concerned with menstruation. The uncleanness of the menstruating woman is a very widespread idea, and in a few regions first menstruation has been made the focus of all the associated attitudes. Puberty rites in these cases are of a thoroughly different character from any of which we have spoken. Among the Carrier Indians of British Columbia, the fear and horror of a girl's puberty was at its height. Her three or four years of seclusion was called 'the burying alive,' and she lived for all that time alone in the wilderness, in a hut of branches far from all beaten trails. She was a threat to any person who might so much as catch a glimpse of her, and her mere footstep defiled a path or a river. She was covered with a great headdress of tanned skin that shrouded her face and breasts and fell to the ground behind. Her arms and legs were loaded with sinew bands to protect her from the evil spirit with which she was filled. She was herself in danger and she was a source of danger to everybody else.

Girls' puberty ceremonies built upon ideas associated with the menses are readily convertible into what is, from the point of view of the individual concerned, exactly opposite behaviour. There are always two possible aspects to the sacred: it may be a source of peril or it may be a source of blessing. In some tribes the first menses of girls are a potent supernatural blessing. Among the Apaches I have seen the priests themselves pass on their knees before the row of solemn little girls to receive from them the blessing of their touch. All the babies and the old people come also of necessity to have illness removed from them. The adolescent girls are not segregated as sources of danger, but court is paid to them as to direct sources of supernatural blessing. Since the ideas that underlie puberty rites for girls, both among the Carrier and among the Apache, are founded on beliefs concerning menstruation, they are not extended to boys, and boys' puberty is marked instead, and lightly, with simple tests and proofs of manhood.

The adolescent behaviour, therefore, even of girls was not dictated by some physiological characteristic of the period itself, but rather by marital or magic requirements socially connected with it. These beliefs made adolescence in one tribe serenely religious and beneficent, and in another so dangerously unclean that the child had to cry out in warning that others might avoid her in the woods. The adolescence of girls may equally, as we have seen, be a theme which a culture does not institutionalize. Even where, as in most of Australia, boys' adolescence is given elaborate treatment, it may be that the rites are an induction into

the status of manhood and male participation in tribal matters, and female adolescence passes without any kind of formal recognition.

These facts, however, still leave the fundamental question unanswered. Do not all cultures have to cope with the natural turbulence of this period, even though it may not be given institutional expression? Dr. Mead * has studied this question in Samoa. There the girl's life passes through well-marked periods. Her first years out of babyhood are passed in small neighbourhood gangs of age mates from which the little boys are strictly excluded. The corner of the village to which she belongs is all-important, and the little boys are traditional enemies. She has one duty, that of baby-tending, but she takes the baby with her rather than stays home to mind it, and her play is not seriously hampered. A couple of years before puberty, when she grows strong enough to have more difficult tasks required of her and old enough to learn more skilled techniques, the little girls' play group in which she grew up ceases to exist. She assumes woman's dress and must contribute to the work of the household. It is an uninteresting period of life to her and quite without turmoil. Puberty brings no change at all.

A few years after she has come of age, she will begin the pleasant years of casual and irresponsible love affairs that she will prolong as far as possible into the period when marriage is already considered fitting. Puberty itself is marked by no social recognition, no change of attitude or of expectancy. Her pre-adolescent shyness is supposed to remain unchanged for a couple of years. The girl's life in Samoa is blocked out by other considerations than those of physiological sex maturity, and puberty falls in a particularly unstressed and peaceful period during which no adolescent conflicts manifest themselves. Adolescence, therefore, may not only be culturally passed over without ceremonial; it may also be without importance in the emotional life of the child and in the attitude of the village toward her.

Warfare is another social theme that may or may not be used in any culture. Where war is made much of, it may be with contrasting objectives, with contrasting organization in relation to the state, and with contrasting sanctions. War may be, as it was among the Aztecs, a way of getting captives for the religious sacrifices. Since the Spaniards fought to kill, according to Aztec standards they broke the rules of the game. The Aztecs fell back in dismay and Cortez walked as victor into the capital.

There are even quainter notions, from our standpoint, associated with warfare in different parts of the world. For our purposes it is sufficient to notice those regions where organized resort to mutual slaughter never occurs between social groups. Only our familiarity with war makes it intelligible that a state of warfare should alternate with a state of peace in one tribe's dealings with another. The idea is quite common over the world, of course. But on the one hand it is impossible for certain peoples to conceive the possibility of a state of peace, which in their notion would be equivalent to admitting enemy tribes to the category of human beings, which by definition they are not even though the excluded tribe may be of their own race and culture.

On the other hand, it may be just as impossible for a people to conceive of the possibility of a state of war. Rasmussen tells of the blankness with which the Eskimo met his exposition of our custom. Eskimos very well understand the act of killing a man. If

* Margaret Mead, contemporary American anthropologist and popular author of many volumes including *Coming of Age in Samoa, Growing Up in New Guinea, and Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies.* [Ed.]

he is in your way, you cast up your estimate of your own strength, and if you are ready to take it upon yourself, you kill him. If you are strong, there is no social retribution. But the idea of an Eskimo village going out against another Eskimo village in battle array or a tribe against tribe, or even of another village being fair game in ambush warfare, is alien to them. All killing comes under one head, and is not separated, as ours is, into categories, the one meritorious, the other a capital offence.

I myself tried to talk of warfare to the Mission Indians of California, but it was impossible. Their misunderstanding of warfare was abysmal. They did not have the basis in their own culture upon which the idea could exist, and their attempts to reason it out reduced the great wars to which we are able to dedicate ourselves with moral fervour to the level of alley brawls. They did not happen to have a cultural pattern that distinguished between them.

War is, we have been forced to admit even in the face of its huge place in our own civilization, an asocial trait. In the chaos following the World War all the wartime arguments that expounded its fostering of courage, of altruism, of spiritual values, gave out a false and offensive ring. War in our own civilization is as good an illustration as one can take of the destructive lengths to which the development of a culturally selected trait may go. If we justify war, it is because all peoples always justify the traits of which they find themselves possessed, not because war will bear an objective examination of its merits.

Warfare is not an isolated case. From every part of the world and from all levels of cultural complexity it is possible to illustrate the overweening and finally often the asocial elaboration of a cultural trait. Those cases are clearest where, as in dietary or mating regulations, for example, traditional usage runs counter to biological drives. Social organization, in anthropology, has a quite specialized meaning owing to the unanimity of all human societies in stressing relationship groups within which marriage is forbidden. No known people regard all women as possible mates. This is not in an effort, as is so often supposed, to prevent inbreeding in our sense, for over great parts of the world it is an own cousin, often the daughter of one's mother's brother, who is the predestined spouse. The relatives to whom the prohibition refers differ utterly among different peoples, but all human societies are alike in placing a restriction. . . .

Such a bird's-eye survey of human cultural forms makes clear several common misconceptions. In the first place, the institutions that human cultures build up upon the hints presented by the environment or by man's physical necessities do not keep as close to the original impulse as we easily imagine. These hints are, in reality, mere rough sketches, a list of bare facts. They are pin-point potentialities, and the elaboration that takes place around them is dictated by many alien considerations. Warfare is not the expression of the instinct of pugnacity. Man's pugnacity is so small a hint in the human equipment that it may not be given any expression in inter-tribal relations. When it is institutionalized, the form it takes follows other grooves of thought than those implied in the original impulse. Pugnacity is no more than the touch to the ball of custom, a touch also that may be withheld.

Such a view of cultural processes calls for a recasting of many of our current arguments upholding our traditional institutions. These arguments are usually based on the impossibility of man's functioning without these particular traditional forms. Even very special traits come in for this kind of

validation, such as the particular form of economic drive that arises under our particular system of property ownership. This is a remarkably special motivation and there are evidences that even in our generation it is being strongly modified. At any rate, we do not have to confuse the issue by discussing it as if it were a matter of biological survival values. Self-support is a motive our civilization has capitalized. If our economic structure changes so that this motive is no longer so potent a drive as it was in the era of the great frontier and expanding industrialism, there are many other motives that would be appropriate to a changed economic organization. Every culture, every era, exploits some few out of a great number of possibilities. Changes may be very disquieting, and involve great losses, but this is due to the difficulty of change itself, not to the fact that our age and country has hit upon the one possible motivation under which human life can be conducted. Change, we must remember, with all its difficulties, is inescapable. Our fears over even very minor shifts in custom are usually quite beside the point. Civilizations might change far more radically than any human authority has ever had the will or the imagination to change them, and still be completely workable. The minor changes that occasion so much denunciation today, such as the increase of divorce, the growing secularization in our cities, the prevalence of the petting party, and many more, could be taken up quite readily into a slightly different pattern of culture. Becoming traditional, they would be given the same richness of content, the same importance and value, that the older patterns had in other generations.

The truth of the matter is rather that the possible human institutions and motives are legion, on every plane of cultural simplicity or complexity, and that wisdom consists in a greatly increased tolerance toward their divergencies. No man can thoroughly participate in any culture unless he has been brought up and has lived according to its forms, but he can grant to other cultures the same significance to their participants which he recognizes in his own.

4

*Similarities in Culture**

GEORGE P. MURDOCK

George P. Murdock, Yale University anthropologist, has worked for many years as head of a monumental project which created the Cross-Cultural Survey. Designed to record a tremendous number of cultural traits in some one hundred and fifty cultures, and containing over a million entries, the Survey offers concrete evidence of the similarities in human cultures.

The plan rests, at bottom, on the conviction that all human cultures, despite their diversity, have fundamentally a great deal in common, and that these common aspects are susceptible to scientific analysis. Its theoretical orientation may be expressed in a series of seven basic assumptions. These are

* George P. Murdock, "The Cross-Cultural Survey," *American Sociological Review*, V (June, 1940). Used by permission of the author and the journal.

not claimed to be original, since many of them are shared by all social scientists, and all of them by many.

1. **Culture Is Learned.** Culture is not instinctive, or innate, or transmitted biologically, but is composed of habits, i.e., learned tendencies to react, acquired by each individual through his own life experience after birth. This assumption, of course, is shared by all anthropologists outside of the totalitarian states, but it has a corollary which is not always so clearly recognized. If culture is learned, it must obey the laws of learning, which the psychologists have by now worked out in considerable detail. The principles of learning are known to be essentially the same, not only for all mankind but also for most mammalian species. Hence, we should expect all cultures, being learned, to reveal certain uniformities reflecting this universal common factor.

2. **Culture Is Inculcated.** All animals are capable of learning, but man alone seems able, in any considerable measure, to pass on his acquired habits to his offspring. We can housebreak a dog, teach him tricks, and implant in him other germs of culture, but he will not transmit them to his puppies. They will receive only the biological inheritance of their species, to which they in turn will add habits on the basis of their own experience. The factor of language presumably accounts for man's preeminence in this respect. At any rate, many of the habits learned by human beings are transmitted from parent to child over successive generations, and, through repeated inculcation, acquire that persistency over time, that relative independence of individual bearers, which justifies classifying them collectively as "culture." This assumption, too, is generally accepted by anthropologists, but again there is an underestimated corollary. If culture is inculcated, then all cultures should show certain common effects of the inculcation process. Inculcation involves not only the imparting of techniques and knowledge but also the disciplining of the child's animal impulses to adjust him to social life. That there are regularities in behavior reflecting the ways in which these impulses are thwarted and redirected during the formative years of life, seems clear from the evidence of psycho-analysis, e.g., the apparent universality of intrafamily incest taboos.

3. **Culture Is Social.** Habits of the cultural order are not only inculcated and thus transmitted over time; they are also social, that is, shared by human beings living in organized aggregates or societies and kept relatively uniform by social pressure. They are, in short, group habits. The habits which the members of a social group share with one another constitute the culture of that group. This assumption is accepted by most anthropologists, but not by all. Lowie,* for example, insists that "a culture is invariably an artificial unit segregated for purposes of expediency. . . . There is only one natural unit for the ethnologist—the culture of all humanity at all periods and in all places. . . ." The author finds it quite impossible to accept this statement. To him, the collective or shared habits of a social group—no matter whether it be a family, a village, a class, or a tribe—constitute, not "an artificial unit" but a natural unit—a culture or subculture. To deny this is, in his opinion, to repudiate the most substantial contribution which sociology has made to anthropology. If culture is social, then the fate of a culture depends on the fate of the society which bears it, and all cultures which have survived to be studied should reveal certain similarities because they have all had to provide for societal

* Robert H. Lowie, American anthropologist, University of California professor, author of *Primitive Society*, and *Primitive Religion* [Ed.]

survival. Among these cultural universals, we can probably list such things as sentiments of group cohesion, mechanisms of social control, organization for defense against hostile neighbors, and provision for the perpetuation of the population.

4. Culture Is Ideational. To a considerable extent, the group habits of which culture consists are conceptualized (or verbalized) as ideal norms or patterns of behavior. There are, of course, exceptions; grammatical rules, for example, though they represent collective linguistic habits and are thus cultural, are only in small part consciously formulated. Nevertheless, as every field ethnographer knows, most people show in marked degree an awareness of their own cultural norms, an ability to differentiate them from purely individual habits, and a facility in conceptualizing and reporting them in detail, including the circumstances where each is considered appropriate and the sanctions to be expected for nonconformity. Within limits, therefore, it is useful to conceive of culture as ideational, and of an element of culture as a traditionally accepted idea, held by the members of a group or subgroup, that a particular kind of behavior (overt, verbal, or implicit) should conform to an established precedent. These ideal norms should not be confused with actual behavior. In any particular instance, an individual behaves in response to the state of his organism (his drives) at the moment, and to his perception of the total situation in which he finds himself. In so doing, he naturally tends to follow his established habits, including his culture, but either his impulses or the nature of the circumstances may lead him to deviate therefrom to a greater or lesser degree. Behavior, therefore, does not automatically follow culture, which is only one of its determinants. There are norms of behavior, of course, as well as of culture, but, unlike the latter, they can be established only by statistical means. Confusion often arises between anthropologists and sociologists on this point. The former, until recently, have been primarily preoccupied with ideal norms or patterns, whereas sociologists, belonging to the same society as both their subjects and their audience, assume general familiarity with the culture and commonly report only the statistical norms of actual behavior. A typical community study like *Middletown* and an ethnographic monograph, though often compared, are thus in reality poles apart. To the extent that culture is ideational, we may conclude, all cultures should reveal certain similarities, flowing from the universal laws governing the symbolic mental processes, e.g., the worldwide parallels in the principles of magic.

5. Culture Is Gratifying. Culture always, and necessarily, satisfies basic biological needs and secondary needs derived therefrom. Its elements are tested habitual techniques for gratifying human impulses in man's interaction with the external world of nature and fellow man. This assumption is an inescapable conclusion from modern stimulus-response psychology. Culture consists of habits, and psychology has demonstrated that habits persist only so long as they bring satisfaction. Gratification reinforces habits, strengthens and perpetuates them, while lack of gratification inevitably results in their extinction or disappearance. Elements of culture, therefore, can continue to exist only when they yield to the individuals of a society a margin of satisfaction, a favorable balance of pleasure over pain. Malinowski * has been insisting on this point for years, but the majority of anthropologists have either rejected the assumption or have paid it but inadequate lip serv-

* Bronislaw Malinowski, Polish-English anthropologist who gained world fame through his studies of the peoples of the Trobriand Islands (New Guinea). [Ed.]

ice. To them, the fact that culture persists has seemed to raise no problem; it has been blithely taken for granted. Psychologists, however, have seen the problem, and have given it a definitive answer, which anthropologists can ignore at their peril. If culture is gratifying, widespread similarities should exist in all cultures, owing to the fact that basic human impulses, which are universally the same, demand similar forms of satisfaction. "The universal culture pattern" propounded by Wissler would seem to rest on this foundation.

6. Culture Is Adaptive. Culture changes; and the process of change appears to be an adaptive one, comparable to evolution in the organic realm but of a different order. Cultures tend, through periods of time, to become adjusted to the geographic environment, as the anthropogeographers have shown, although environmental influences are no longer conceived as determinative of cultural development. Cultures also adapt, through borrowing and organization, to the social environment of neighboring peoples. Finally, cultures unquestionably tend to become adjusted to the biological and psychological demands of the human organism. As life conditions change, traditional forms cease to provide a margin of satisfaction and are eliminated; new needs arise or are perceived, and new cultural adjustments are made to them. The assumption that culture is adaptive by no means commits one to an idea of progress, or to a theory of evolutionary stages of development, or to a rigid determinism of any sort. On the contrary, one can agree with Opler,* who has pointed out on the basis of his Apache material, that different cultural forms may represent adjustments to like problems, and similar cultural forms to different problems. It is probable, nevertheless, that a certain proportion of the parallels in different cultures represent independent adjustments to comparable conditions.

The conception of cultural change as an adaptive process seems to many anthropologists inconsistent with, and contradictory to, the conception of cultural change as an historical process. To the author, there seems nothing inconsistent or antagonistic in the two positions—the "functional" and the "historical," as they are commonly labeled. On the contrary, he believes that both are correct, that they supplement one another, and that the best anthropological work emerges when the two are used in conjunction. Culture history is a succession of unique events, in which later events are conditioned by earlier ones. From the point of view of culture, the events which affect later ones in the same historical sequence are often, if not usually, accidental, since they have their origin outside the continuum of culture. They include natural events, like floods and droughts; biological events, like epidemics and deaths; and psychological events, like emotional outbursts and inventive intuitions. Such changes alter a society's life conditions. They create new needs and render old cultural forms unsatisfactory, stimulating trial and error behavior and cultural innovations. Perhaps the most significant events, however, are historical contacts with peoples of differing cultures, for men tend first to ransack the cultural resources of their neighbors for solutions to their problems of living, and rely only secondarily upon their own inventive ingenuity. Full recognition of the historical character of culture, and especially of the role of diffusion, is thus a prime prerequisite if a search for cross-cultural generalizations is to have any prospect of success. It is necessary to insist, however, that historical events, like geographic factors, exert only a conditioning rather than a determining influence on the course of culture. Man

* Morris E. Opler, anthropologist and author of numerous volumes on the culture of the Apache Indians. [Ed.]

adjusts to them, and draws selectively upon them to solve his problems and satisfy his needs.

7. Culture Is Integrative. As one product of the adaptive process, the elements of a given culture tend to form a consistent and integrated whole. We use the word "tend" advisedly, for we do not accept the position of certain extreme functionalists that cultures actually are integrated systems, with their several parts in perfect equilibrium. We adhere, rather, to the position of Sumner that the folkways are "subject to a strain of consistency with each other," but that actual integration is never achieved for the obvious reason that historical events are constantly exerting a disturbing influence. Integration takes time—there is always what Ogburn * has called a "cultural lag"—and long before one process has been completed, many others have been initiated. In our own culture, for example, the changes wrought in habits of work, recreation, sex, and religion through the introduction of the automobile are probably still incomplete. If culture is integrative, then correspondences or correlations between similar traits should repeatedly occur in unrelated cultures. Lowie, for example, has pointed out a number of such correlations.

If the seven fundamental assumptions outlined above, or even any considerable proportion of them, are valid, then it must necessarily follow that human cultures in general, despite their historical diversity, will exhibit certain regularities or recurrences which are susceptible to scientific analysis, and which, under such analysis, should yield a body of scientific generalizations. A primary objective of the Cross-Cultural Survey is to formulate and test generalizations of this sort.

* William F. Ogburn, author and sociologist, has written extensively on the concept of the cultural lag. [Ed.]

C. Cultural Stability

5

*Folkways and Mores**

WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER

For many years a professor at Yale University, William Graham Sumner was closely associated with the early growth of sociology. Rejecting the term "sociology," he insisted that he was studying the science of society. His most famous work, *Folkways,* published in 1906, gave to the social sciences the important concepts of the folkways and mores.

Definition and Mode of Origin of the Folkways. If we put together all that we have learned from anthropology and ethnography about primitive men and primitive society, we perceive that the first task of life is to live. Men begin with acts, not with thoughts. Every moment brings necessities

* William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1940). Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

which must be satisfied at once. Need was the first experience, and it was followed at once by a blundering effort to satisfy it. It is generally taken for granted that men inherited some guiding instincts from their beast ancestry, and it may be true, although it has never been proved. If there were such inheritances, they controlled and aided the first efforts to satisfy needs. Analogy makes it easy to assume that the ways of beasts had produced channels of habit and predisposition along which dexterities and other psychophysical activities would run easily. Experiments with newborn animals show that in the absence of any experience of the relation of means to ends, efforts to satisfy needs are clumsy and blundering. The method is that of trial and failure, which produces repeated pain, loss and disappointments. Nevertheless, it is a method of rude experiment and selection. The earliest efforts of men were of this kind. Need was the impelling force. Pleasure and pain, on the one side and the other, were the rude constraints which defined the line on which efforts must proceed. The ability to distinguish between pleasure and pain is the only psychical power which is to be assumed. Thus ways of doing things were selected, which were expedient. They answered the purpose better than other ways, or with less toil and pain. Along the course on which efforts were compelled to go, habit, routine, and skill were developed. The struggle to maintain existence was carried on, not individually, but in groups. Each profited by the other's experience; hence there was concurrence towards that which proved to be most expedient. All at last adopted the same way for the same purpose; hence the ways turned into customs and became mass phenomena. Instincts were developed in connection with them. In this way folkways arise. The young learn them by tradition, imitation, and authority. The folkways, at a time, provide for all the needs of life then and there. They are uniform, universal in the group, imperative, and invariable. As time goes on, the folkways become more and more arbitrary, positive, and imperative. If asked why they act in a certain way in certain cases, primitive people always answer that it is because they and their ancestors always have done so. . . .

The Folkways Are a Societal Force. The operation by which folkways are produced consists in the frequent repetition of petty acts, often by great numbers acting in concert or, at least, acting in the same way when face to face with the same need. The immediate motive is interest. It produces habit in the individual and custom in the group. It is, therefore, in the highest degree original and primitive. By habit and custom it exerts a strain on every individual within its range; therefore it rises to a societal force to which great classes of societal phenomena are due. Its earliest stages, its course, and laws may be studied; also its influence on individuals and their reaction on it. It is our present purpose so to study it. We have to recognize it as one of the chief forces by which a society is made to be what it is. Out of the unconscious experiment which every repetition of the ways includes, there issues pleasure or pain, and then, so far as the men are capable of reflection, convictions that the ways are conducive to societal welfare. These two experiences are not the same. The most uncivilized men, both in the food quest and in war, do things which are painful, but which have been found to be expedient. Perhaps these cases teach the sense of social welfare better than those which are pleasurable and favorable to welfare. The former cases call for some intelligent reflection on experience. When this conviction as to the relation to welfare is added to the folkways they are converted into mores, and, by virtue of the philosophical and ethical element added to them, they

win utility and importance and become the source of the science and the art of living.

Folkways Are Made Unconsciously. It is of the first importance to notice that, from the first acts by which men try to satisfy needs, each act stands by itself, and looks no further than the immediate satisfaction. From recurrent needs arise habits for the individual and customs for the group, but these results are consequences which were never conscious, and never foreseen or intended. They are not noticed until they have long existed, and it is still longer before they are appreciated. Another long time must pass, and a higher stage of mental development must be reached, before they can be used as a basis from which to deduce rules for meeting, in the future, problems whose pressure can be foreseen. The folkways, therefore, are not creations of human purpose and wit. They are like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation, or they are like the instinctive ways of animals, which are developed out of experience, which reach a final form of maximum adaptation to an interest, which are handed down by tradition and admit of no exception or variation, yet change to meet new conditions, still within the same limited methods, and without rational reflection or purpose. From this it results that all the life of human beings, in all ages and stages of culture, is primarily controlled by a vast mass of folkways handed down from the earliest existence of the race, having the nature of the ways of other animals, only the topmost layers of which are subject to change and control, and have been somewhat modified by human philosophy, ethics, and religion, or by other acts of intelligent reflection. We are told of savages that "It is difficult to exhaust the customs and small ceremonial usages of a savage people. Custom regulates the whole of a man's actions, —his bathing, washing, cutting his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. In his life there is nothing free, nothing original, nothing spontaneous, no progress towards a higher and better life, and no attempt to improve his condition, mentally, morally, or spiritually." All men act in this way with only a little wider margin of voluntary variation. . . .

The Strain of Improvement and Consistency. The folkways, being ways of satisfying needs, have succeeded more or less well, and therefore have produced more or less pleasure or pain. The quality always consisted in their adaptation to the purpose. If they were imperfectly adapted and unsuccessful, they produced pain, which drove men on to learn better. The folkways are, therefore, (1) subject to a strain of improvement towards better adaptation of means to ends, as long as the adaptation is so imperfect that pain is produced. They are also (2) subject to a strain of consistency with each other, because they all answer their several purposes with less friction and antagonism when they coöperate and support each other. The forms of industry, the forms of the family, the notions of property, the constructions of rights, and the types of religion show the strain of consistency with each other through the whole history of civilization. . . .

Definition of the Mores. When the elements of truth and right are developed into doctrines of welfare, the folkways are raised to another plane. They then become capable of producing inferences, developing into new forms, and extending their constructive influence over men and society. Then we call them the mores. The mores are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethi-

cal generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow. . . .

The Mores Have the Authority of Facts. The mores come down to us from the past. Each individual is born into them as he is born into the atmosphere, and he does not reflect on them, or criticize them any more than a baby analyzes the atmosphere before he begins to breathe it. Each one is subjected to the influence of the mores, and formed by them, before he is capable of reasoning about them. It may be objected that nowadays, at least, we criticize all traditions, and accept none just because they are handed down to us. If we take up cases of things which are still entirely or almost entirely in the mores, we shall see that this is not so. There are sects of free-lovers amongst us who want to discuss pair marriage. They are not simply people of evil life. They invite us to discuss rationally our inherited customs and ideas as to marriage, which, they say, are by no means so excellent and elevated as we believe. They have never won any serious attention. Some others want to argue in favor of polygamy on grounds of expediency. They fail to obtain a hearing. Others want to discuss property. In spite of some literary activity on their part, no discussion of property, bequest, and inheritance has ever been opened. Property and marriage are in the mores. Nothing can ever change them but the unconscious and imperceptible movement of the mores. Religion was originally a matter of the mores. It became a societal institution and a function of the state. It has now to a great extent been put back into the mores. Since laws with penalties to enforce religious creeds or practices have gone out of use any one may think and act as he pleases about religion. Therefore it is not now "good form" to attack religion. Infidel publications are now tabooed by the mores, and are more effectually repressed than ever before. They produce no controversy. Democracy is in our American mores. It is a product of our physical and economic conditions. It is impossible to discuss or criticize it. It is glorified for popularity, and is a subject of dithyrambic rhetoric. No one treats it with complete candor and sincerity. No one dares to analyze it as he would aristocracy or autocracy. He would get no hearing and would only incur abuse. The thing to be noticed in all these cases is that the masses oppose a deaf ear to every argument against the mores. It is only in so far as things have been transferred from the mores into laws and positive institutions that there is discussion about them or rationalizing upon them. The mores contain the norm by which, if we should discuss the mores, we should have to judge the mores. We learn the mores as unconsciously as we learn to walk and eat and breathe. The masses never learn how we walk, and eat, and breathe, and they never know any reason why the mores are what they are. The justification of them is that when we wake to consciousness of life we find them facts which already hold us in the bonds of tradition, custom, and habit. The mores contain embodied in them notions, doctrines, and maxims, but they are facts. They are in the present tense. They have nothing to do with what ought to be, will be, may be, or once was, if it is not now. . . .

The Mores of Subgroups. Each class or group in a society has its own mores. This is true of ranks, professions, industrial classes, religious and philosophical sects, and all other subdivisions of society. Individuals are in two or more of these groups at the same time, so that there is compromise and neutralization. Other mores are common

to the whole society. Mores are also transmitted from one class to another. . . .

The Mores Are Unrecorded. A society is never conscious of its mores until it comes in contact with some other society which has different mores, or until, in higher civilization, it gets information by literature. The latter operation, however, affects only the literary classes, not the masses, and society never consciously sets about the task of making mores. In the early stages mores are elastic and plastic; later they become rigid and fixed. They seem to grow up, gain strength, become corrupt, decline, and die, as if they were organisms. The phases seem to follow each other by an inherent necessity, and as if independent of the reason and will of the men affected, but the changes are always produced by a strain towards better adjustment of the mores to conditions and interests of the society, or of the controlling elements in it. A society does not record its mores in its annals, because they are to it unnoticed and unconscious. When we try to learn the mores of any age or people we have to seek our information in incidental references, allusions, observations of travelers, etc. Generally works of fiction, drama, etc., give us more information about the mores than historical records. It is very difficult to construct from the Old Testament a description of the mores of the Jews before the captivity. It is also very difficult to make a complete and accurate picture of the mores of the English colonies in North America in the seventeenth century. The mores are not recorded for the same reason that meals, going to bed, sunrise, etc., are not recorded, unless the regular course of things is broken.

Inertia and Rigidity of the Mores. We see that we must conceive of the mores as a vast system of usages, covering the whole of life, and serving all its interests; also containing in themselves their own justification by tradition and use and wont, and approved by mystic sanctions until, by rational reflection, they develop their own philosophical and ethical generalizations, which are elevated into "principles" of truth and right. They coerce and restrict the newborn generation. They do not stimulate to thought, but the contrary. The thinking is already done and is embodied in the mores. They never contain any provision for their own amendment. They are not questions, but answers, to the problem of life. They present themselves as final and unchangeable, because they present answers which are offered as "the truth." No world philosophy, until the modern scientific world philosophy, and that only within a generation or two, has ever presented itself as perhaps transitory, certainly incomplete, and liable to be set aside to-morrow by more knowledge. No popular world philosophy or life policy ever can present itself in that light. It would cost too great a mental strain. All the groups whose mores we consider far inferior to our own are quite as well satisfied with theirs as we are with ours. The goodness and badness of mores consists entirely in their adjustment to the life conditions and the interests of the time and place. Therefore, it is a sign of ease and welfare when no thought is given to the mores, but all coöperate in them instinctively. . . .

The Mores and Institutions. Institutions and laws are produced out of mores. An institution consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a structure. The structure is a framework, or apparatus, or perhaps only a number of functionaries set to coöperate in prescribed ways at a certain conjuncture. The structure holds the concept and furnishes instrumentalities for bringing it into the world of facts and action in a way to serve the interests of men in society. Institutions are either crescive or

enacted. They are crescive when they take shape in the mores, growing by the instinctive efforts by which the mores are produced. Then the efforts, through long use, become definite and specific. Property, marriage, and religion are the most primary institutions. They began in folkways. They became customs. They developed into mores by the addition of some philosophy of welfare, however crude. Then they were made more definite and specific as regards the rules, the prescribed acts, and the apparatus to be employed. This produced a structure and the institution was complete. Enacted institutions are products of rational invention and intention. They belong to high civilization. . . . All institutions have come out of mores, although the rational element in them is sometimes so large that their origin in the mores is not to be ascertained except by an historical investigation (legislatures, courts, juries, joint stock companies, the stock exchange). Property, marriage, and religion are still almost entirely in the mores. Amongst nature men any man might capture and hold a woman at any time, if he could. He did it by superior force which was its own supreme justification. But his act brought his group and her group into war, and produced harm to his comrades. They forbade capture, or set conditions for it. Beyond the limits, the individual might still use force, but his comrades were no longer responsible. The glory to him, if he succeeded, might be all the greater. His control over his captive was absolute. Within the prescribed conditions, "capture" became technical and institutional, and rights grew out of it. The woman had a status which was defined by custom, and was very different from the status of a real captive. Marriage was the institutional relation, in the society and under its sanction, of a woman to a man, where the woman had been obtained in the prescribed way. She was then a "wife." What her rights and duties were was defined by the mores, as they are today in all civilized society.

Laws. Acts of legislation come out of the mores. In low civilization all societal regulations are customs and taboos, the origin of which is unknown. Positive laws are impossible until the stage of verification, reflection, and criticism is reached. Until that point is reached there is only customary law, or common law. The customary law may be codified and systematized with respect to some philosophical principles, and yet remain customary. . . . Legislation, however, has to seek standing ground on the existing mores, and it soon becomes apparent that legislation, to be strong, must be consistent with the mores. Things which have been in the mores are put under police regulation and later under positive law. It is sometimes said that "public opinion" must ratify and approve police regulations, but this statement rests on an imperfect analysis. The regulations must conform to the mores, so that the public will not think them too lax or too strict. The mores of our urban and rural populations are not the same; consequently legislation about intoxicants which is made by one of these sections of the population does not succeed when applied to the other. The regulation of drinking places, gambling places, and disorderly houses has passed through the above-mentioned stages. It is always a question of expediency whether to leave a subject under the mores, or to make a police regulation for it, or to put it into the criminal law. Betting, horse racing, dangerous sports, electric cars, and vehicles are cases now of things which seem to be passing under positive enactment and out of the unformulated control of the mores. When an enactment is made there is a sacrifice of the elasticity and automatic self-adaptation

of custom, but an enactment is specific and is provided with sanctions. Enactments come into use when conscious purposes are formed, and it is believed that specific devices can be framed by which to realize such purposes in the society. Then also prohibitions take the place of taboos, and punishments are planned to be deterrent rather than revengeful. The mores of different societies, or of different ages, are characterized by greater or less readiness and confidence in regard to the use of positive enactments for the realization of societal purposes.

6

*Status and Role**

RALPH LINTON

It is now more than fifty years since William Graham Sumner wrote his famous work on *Folkways*. In this time, anthropologists have made many significant advances with the result that, for some, the concepts of folkways and mores are dated. These social scientists, increasingly concerned with functional relationships within a culture pattern, have turned their attention to the problem of "role" and "status." From *The Cultural Background of Personality,* by the late Ralph Linton, we have a lucid analysis of these two factors promotive of cultural stability.

It has been emphasized that societies rather than individuals are the functional units in our species' struggle for existence, and that it is societies as wholes which are the bearers and perpetuators of cultures. It has also been pointed out that no one individual is ever familiar with the total culture of his society, still less required to express all its manifold patterns in his overt behavior. However, the participation of any given individual in the culture of his society is not a matter of chance. It is determined primarily, and almost completely, as far as the overt culture is concerned, by his place in the society and by the training which he has received in anticipation of his occupying this place. It follows that the behavior of the individual must be studied not simply in relation to the total culture of his society but also in relation to the particular cultural demands which his society makes upon him because of his place in it. Thus all societies expect different behavior from men and

* From *The Cultural Background of Personality,* by Ralph Linton. Copyright, 1945, D. Appleton–Century Co., Inc. Reprinted by permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

from women, and one cannot understand the behavior of any particular man or woman without knowing what these expectations are. . . .*

The structure of even the simplest primary society, such as a primitive village, is by no means simple or homogeneous. The individuals who compose such a society are classified and organized in several different ways simultaneously. Each of these systems has its own functions as regards relating the individual to culture, and he occupies a place within each of them. Thus every member of the society has a place in the age-sex system and also in the prestige series. He has a place in the system of specialized occupations, either as a specialist or as a member of the unassigned residue which, in our own society, is designated by such vague terms as *unskilled laborer* or *housewife*. Lastly, he always belongs to some family unit, and to one or more association groups. As long as he has a single living relative within the society, he has position in the family system; and even if all his kindred have been swept away, he can re-enter the system by the road of adoption or marriage. As regards membership in the system based on association, any member of a primary society who is not psychotic can hardly fail to be included in friendship units and work groups. He may be debarred from belonging to clubs or other of the more formal association groupings, but even so he occupies a very definite place in the system of which such groups are a part. He is one of the "outsiders" and it is the presence of this group which provides the "members" with most of their emotional satisfaction. It is inconceivable that a secret society could exist without a large audience of nonmembers to envy the members and speculate about the secrets.

In past attempts to clarify the relation of the individual to these multiple social systems, two terms have proved so useful that it seems justifiable to introduce them here. Systems persist while the individuals who occupy places within them may come and go. The place in a particular system which a certain individual occupies at a particular time will be referred to as his *status* with respect to that system. The term *position* has been used by some other students of social structure in much the same sense, but without clear recognition of the time factor or of the existence of simultaneous systems of organization within the society. *Status* has long been used with reference to the position of an individual in the prestige system of his society. In the present usage this is extended to apply to his position in each of the other systems. The second term, *role,* will be used to designate the sum total of the culture patterns associated with a particular status. It thus includes the attitudes, values and behavior ascribed by the society to any and all persons occupying this status. It can even be extended to include the legitimate expectations of such persons with respect to the behavior toward them of persons in other statuses within the same system. Every status is linked with a particular role, but the two things are by no means the same from the point of view of the individual. His statuses are ascribed to him on the basis of his age and sex, his birth or marriage into a particular family unit, and so forth. His roles are learned on the basis of his statuses, either current or anticipated. In so far as it represents overt behavior, a role is the dynamic aspect of a status: what the individual has to do in order to validate his occupation of the status.

* For a more detailed analysis of these ideas, see reading #54 by Margaret Mead.

A particular status within a social system can be occupied, and its associated role known and exercised, by a number of individuals simultaneously. In fact, this is the normal condition. Thus every society ordinarily includes several persons who occupy the status of adult male and adhere to the adult male role. It similarly includes a number of persons who occupy the status of father in the organizations of the particular family groups to which they belong. Conversely, the same individual can and does occupy simultaneously a series of statuses each of which derives from one of the systems of organization in which he participates. He not only occupies these statuses, but he also knows the roles pertaining to them. However, he can never exercise all these roles simultaneously. Such roles are a constant element in his participation in the covert culture of his society, but function intermittently with respect to his participation in its overt culture. In other words, although he occupies statuses and knows roles at all times, he operates sometimes in terms of one status and its role, sometimes in those of another. The status in terms of which an individual is operating is his *active status* at that particular point in time. His other statuses are, for the time being, *latent statuses*. The roles associated with such latent statuses are temporarily held in abeyance, but they are integral parts of the individual's culture equipment.

This formulation can be made clearer by an example. Let us suppose that a man spends the day working as clerk in a store. While he is behind the counter, his active status is that of a clerk, established by his position in our society's system of specialized occupations. The role associated with this status provides him with patterns for his relations with customers. These patterns will be well known both to him and to the customers and will enable them to transact business with a minimum of delay or misunderstanding. When he retires to the rest room for a smoke and meets other employees there, his clerk status becomes latent and he assumes another active status based upon his position in the association group composed of the store's employees as a whole. In this status his relations with other employees will be governed by a different set of culture patterns from those employed in his relations with customers. Moreover, since he probably knows most of the other employees, his exercise of these culture patterns will be modified by his personal likes and dislikes of certain individuals and by considerations of their and his own relative positions in the prestige series of the store association's members. When closing time comes, he lays aside both his clerk and store association statuses and, while on the way home, operates simply in terms of his status with respect to the society's age-sex system. Thus if he is a young man he will at least feel he ought to get up and give his seat to a lady, while if he is an old one he will be quite comfortable about keeping it. As soon as he arrives at his house, a new set of statuses will be activated. These statuses derive from the kinship ties which relate him to various members of the family group. In pursuance of the roles associated with these family statuses he will try to be cordial to his mother-in-law, affectionate to his wife and a stern disciplinarian to Junior, whose report card marks a new low. If it happens to be lodge night, all his familial statuses will become latent about eight o'clock. As soon as he enters the lodge room and puts on his uniform as Grand Imperial Lizzard, in the Ancient Order of Dinosaurs he as-

sumes a new status, one which has been latent since the last lodge meeting, and performs in terms of its role until it is time for him to take off his uniform and go home.

The fact that the individual's various statuses are activated at different times prevents a head-on collision between the roles associated with them. At most, the overt behavior which is part of the role connected with one status may negate the results of the overt behavior which is part of another role. The behaviors themselves will not conflict because of the time differential. Moreover, the roles associated with the statuses within a single system are usually fairly well adjusted to one another and produce no conflicts as long as the individual is operating within this system. This also holds for statuses within different systems whenever these statuses are of such a sort that they normally converge upon the same individuals. Thus in any society the roles of adult male, of father, of craft specialist, of friend, and so on, will normally be adjusted to one another in spite of the different systems from which they derive. Such adjustments, of course, are not the result of conscious planning. They are developed through the experience of individuals who have occupied such series of statuses simultaneously and have gradually eliminated most of the conflicts through a process of trial and error. Thus if patterns of formal friendship are borrowed from some other society, such patterns will soon be modified in such ways that there will be no conflict between them and the patterns already established by the local system of family organization.

In the rare cases in which, through some accident, statuses whose roles are fundamentally incompatible converge upon the same individual, we have the material of high tragedy. While most societies feel little sympathy for the individual who is trying to escape the performance of certain of his roles, all can sympathize with the dilemma of a person who must choose between statuses and roles which are equally valid. Such dilemmas are a favorite theme in the literature of the more sophisticated or introspective societies. The tragedy of the House of Oedipus and the closing episodes of the Niebelungenlied are classical examples, while at the level of simpler folklore we have the Scottish story of the man who finds himself host to his brother's murderer. In each of these cases the individual upon whom the incompatible roles converge meets the problem by the familiar pattern of operating in terms of different statuses at different times, even though recognizing that the associated roles will, in their performance, negate each other's results. Thus in the Scottish story the brother, as host, conducts the murderer safely beyond clan territory then, as brother to the victim, engages him in combat to the death.

Such conflicts rarely arise in primary societies or even within larger social groupings which have persisted for some time and developed well-integrated cultures. However, they may become fairly frequent under the conditions existing in our current society. Under the necessity of reorganizing our social structure to meet the needs of a new technology and of a spatial mobility unparalleled in human history, our inherited system of statuses and roles is breaking down; while a new system, compatible with the actual conditions of modern life, has not yet emerged. The individual thus finds himself frequently confronted by situations in which he is uncertain both of his own statuses and roles

and of those of others. He is not only compelled to make choices but also can feel no certainty that he has chosen correctly and that the reciprocal behavior of others will be that which he anticipates on the basis of the statuses which he has assumed that they occupy. This results in numerous disappointments and frustrations.

D. Cultural Dynamics

7

*Discovery, Invention, and Diffusion**

RALPH LINTON

Ralph Linton, before his untimely death late in 1953, was an outstanding authority in anthropology. A specialist in archeology and ethnology, his later interests included the influence of culture on personality. From his *Study of Man,* we gain some insight into the forces making for cultural change.

Discovery and Invention. Discovery and invention are the obvious starting points for any study of cultural growth and change, since it is only by these processes that new elements can be added to the total content of man's culture. Although developed cultural traits can be transmitted from one culture to another and most cultures owe the bulk of their content to this process, every culture element can ultimately be traced to a discovery or invention, or to a more or less complex combination of various discoveries and inventions which arose at a particular time and place. . . .

Elements of culture are only referred to as inventions or discoveries during the early period of their history, while they are still novelties. No culture element is classified as an invention or discovery after it has achieved general acceptance and has come to be taken more or less for granted. Thus no one in our own society would refer to soap as an invention except in connection with some research into its early history. Conversely, the new cultural feature of radio is constantly referred to as an invention or, when certain of its principles are under discussion, as a discovery.

The terms *invention* and *discovery* both carry the further implication of being elements which have originated within the bracket of a particular combined society and culture. I think every one would agree that an element which one society has borrowed from another would never be termed an invention or discovery of the receiving group. We recognize French inventions and discoveries and German ones, even though we dispute the priority of some of these over similar ones made in our own society. An invention or discovery is thought of as having a direct genetic relationship to a particular society and culture. It is something which has originated with a member or members of this society

* Ralph Linton: *The Study of Man* (New York: D. Appleton–Century Company, 1936). Used by permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

and which has assumed form and function in constant relation with that society's culture. These factors distinguish such elements from the borrowed ones, which come to a culture with form and functions already developed and which must therefore be modified to integrate them with their new cultural context.

Given these common features for discoveries and inventions, it remains to establish some valid line of demarcation between the two orders of phenomena. The popular distinction, which is based on motivation and makes discoveries a result of accident and inventions a result of intention, is far from satisfactory. Thus although we are accustomed to speak of the discovery of a new chemical element, the process which goes to making this discovery is as deliberate and thoroughly motivated as the invention of improving features for a phonograph. A gap in the atomic series is noted, the probable qualities of the missing member of the family of elements determined by a comparison of those which stand close to the gap, and the techniques which should lead to the isolation of the new element tested and progressively modified. The final discovery comes as a climax of perhaps years of directed endeavor.

Even in discoveries which *are* accidental, the important factor from the cultural point of view is not the mere recognition of a hitherto unknown phenomenon, say that certain kinds of black stones will burn, but the perception of the implications of this observed phenomenon and a realization of its potentialities for use. Unless there is this application of rational processes, the discovery remains an isolated bit of information. Such information may become a part of the total knowledge, i.e., culture, transmitted by a society, but it has no social significance. An example of this in our own culture would be the great number of chemical compounds which are known to exist and which can even be produced at will but for which no uses have been found. The knowledge of these compounds is a latent element in our culture. It will become an active, functional element only if or when some inventor discovers a way of combining this knowledge with other knowledge to produce a socially significant result.

The facts just stated would seem to provide us with a valid basis for distinguishing between discoveries and inventions. We may define a discovery as any addition to knowledge, an invention as a new application of knowledge. To give a concrete example, on an individual rather than a social basis, when a small child pulls a cat's tail and gets scratched, this particular sequence of cause and effect is a discovery as far as the child is concerned. The observed fact that cats will scratch when their tails are pulled is an addition to his store of knowledge. If the child pulls the cat's tail when someone else is holding it, so that that person will get scratched, this is in the nature of an invention. The knowledge is employed in a new way to achieve a particular end. If the child is then spanked, he will have another discovery to his credit.

Since it is the application of knowledge, i.e., invention, which is functionally important to culture, we will refer to all new active elements which are developed within the frame of a particular culture and society as inventions. Although much of the knowledge employed in such inventions may have been accidentally acquired, this fact has no special bearing on our present discussion. . . .

Hitherto we have discussed the inventor and his inventions from the point of view of their own qualities, but the picture would be quite misleading if we stopped there. There is a constant and intimate as-

sociation between the inventor and his products and the cultural setting in which inventions are produced and must function. We have defined an invention as a new application of knowledge, a definition which at once implies that the knowledge must precede the invention. Although the knowledge incorporated into a new invention may derive in part from a fresh discovery, most of it always derives from the culture of the inventor's society. Every inventor, even the one who produces a Basic invention, builds upon this accumulation of previously acquired knowledge, and every new thing must grow directly out of other things which have gone before. Thus no inventor reared in a culture which was ignorant of the wheel principle could conceivably produce even such simple appliances as the potter's wheel or lathe. The wheel would have to be invented first. The content of the culture within which the inventor operates thus imposes constant limitations upon the exercise of his inventive abilities. This applies not merely to mechanical inventions but to invention in all other fields as well. The mathematical genius can only carry on from the point which mathematical knowledge within his culture has already reached. Thus if Einstein had been born into a primitive tribe which was unable to count beyond three, life-long application to mathematics probably would not have carried him beyond the development of a decimal system based on fingers and toes. Again, reformers who attempt to devise new systems for society or new religions can only build with the elements with which their culture has made them familiar. It is ridiculous to try to understand the form and content of such sects as Christianity and Mohammedanism until we know the cultural background from which they sprang.

The culture not only provides the inventor with the tools which he must use in invention but also controls, to a very large extent, the direction of his interest. Series of evaluations are an integral part of all cultures and differ from one culture to another. The things which one society considers important and is interested in may be totally different from those which another society is interested in. . . .

This brings us at once to another of the influences which culture exerts upon invention, that of selection. From the point of view of culture dynamics, the successful invention is simply the one which is accepted by society and incorporated into culture. Other inventions, no matter how adequately they may achieve the purpose which their inventors imagined for them, are in the class of the successful operation under which the patient died. This matter of acceptance seems to be controlled much more by the factor of the society's directed interests than by any factors of practical utility. A society will not accept a new invention simply because it works better than something which they already have if it lies in a field which the society considers unimportant. The actual gains do not seem to them to be sufficient to repay for the annoyance of changing established habits or making the alterations in other elements of culture which the acceptance of any new element always entails. Thus a society which has existed contentedly for generations on a hand-labor basis and fixed its attention on speculations regarding the nature of the universe and man's relation to it will feel no great urge to adopt labor-saving appliances, even those which exhibit a high degree of efficiency. It will feel still less urged to accept them while they are still subject to the frequent breakdowns and uncertain performance which attend the early stages of most inventions. The first failure will end even casual interest,

and one more invention will have been stillborn. . . .

In our own civilization invention itself has become a focus of interest as long as it confines itself to mechanical lines. Social and religious invention is still frowned upon, but this attitude may change as the necessity for advance in these fields becomes increasingly apparent. However, there has never been a time in history when individuals were afforded a better opportunity to add to the material aspects of a culture. In most societies the way of both the inventor and his inventions are hard, and surprisingly few inventions survive to be actually incorporated into culture. For every invention which has been successful in the cultural and social sense there have probably been at least a thousand which have fallen by the wayside. Many of these have been successful in the practical sense, being actually more efficient than the appliances which were used before and continued to be used after. However, society rejected them, and if they have not been completely forgotten they survive simply as antiquarian curiosities. We know that the Alexandrian Greeks had a steam-engine which was effective enough for one to be installed on the Pharos and used to haul up fuel for the beacon. Leonardo da Vinci's note-books provide a perfect mine of inventions, many of which show a surprising similarity to modern ones. Perfectly feasible repeating rifles and machine-guns were developed during the first hundred years that hand firearms were in use. All of these inventions failed to "take."

It seems that any invention which fails of acceptance by society within the first generation after it appears may be set down as a total loss. Even when, as in Europe, there are methods for recording it and preserving it as a latent element within the culture, it is rarely if ever revivified. The examples cited above had nothing to do with the modern inventions which they fore-shadowed. The inventor works from his own knowledge and his own sense of needs and rarely pores over archives. The same things are invented again and again and rejected again and again until changes in the culture continuum have prepared a place for them. The process is slow and, from the point of view of the inventor, most discouraging. In the progressive enrichment of its culture no society has ever employed even a tithe of its members' inventive ability. There are few cultures which can show more than a mere handful of traits which have been invented by members of the societies which bear them. All cultures have grown chiefly by borrowing. . . .

Diffusion.* We have seen . . . how the particular culture within which any inventor works directs and circumscribes his efforts and determines whether his inventions will be socially accepted. Because of this the number of successful inventions originating within the confines of any one linked society and culture is always small. If every human group had been left to climb upward by its own unaided efforts, progress would have been so slow that it is doubtful whether any society by now would have advanced beyond the level of the Old Stone Age. The comparatively rapid growth of human culture as a whole has been due to the ability of all societies to borrow elements from other cultures and to incorporate them into their own. This transfer of culture elements from one society to another is known as *diffusion*. It is a process by which mankind has been able to pool its inventive ability. By diffusion an invention which has been made and socially accepted at one point can be trans-

* Ralph Linton: *The Study of Man*, New York, Copyright 1936, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

mitted to an ever-widening group of cultures until, in the course of centuries, it may spread to practically the whole of mankind.

Diffusion has made a double contribution to the advance of mankind. It has stimulated the growth of culture as a whole and at the same time has enriched the content of individual cultures, bringing the societies which bore them forward and upward. It has helped to accelerate the evolution of culture as a whole by removing the necessity for every society to perfect every step in an inventive series for itself. Thus a basic invention which has been made at one point will ultimately be brought to the attention of a great number of inventors and its potentialities for use and improvement thoroughly explored. As more minds are put to work upon each problem the process of culture advance is accelerated. The rapidity of progress during the past century is certainly due in large part to the development of means for easy and rapid communication plus techniques for ensuring to the inventor the economic rewards of his labors. Patents have made secrecy unnecessary. They impose a temporary tax upon the use of inventions but make the idea available to all. Any invention which is made at the present time is promptly diffused over a wide area and becomes part of the store of knowledge available to hundreds of inventors. Prior to the development of the present conditions it took centuries for any new element of culture to diffuse over the same territory to which it is now extended in a few months or years.

The slow cultural advance of societies which are left to their own abilities is well illustrated by the conditions in isolated human groups. Perhaps the outstanding example is the Tasmanians. These people were cut off from the rest of mankind at least 20,000 years ago. When they reached their island they seem to have had a culture which, in its material development at least, corresponded roughly to that of Europe during the Middle Paleolithic. They were still in this stage when Europeans first visited them during the eighteenth century. During the long period of isolation they had no doubt made some minor advances and improvements, but their lack of outside contacts was reflected in a tremendous culture lag. To cite a much less extreme example, the culture of some of our own isolated mountain communities still corresponds in many respects to that of the pioneers of a century ago. The first settlers of these isolated regions brought this culture with them, and their unaided efforts have contributed little to it. In general, the more opportunities for borrowing any society has the more rapid its cultural advance will be.

The service of diffusion in enriching the content of individual cultures has been of the utmost importance. There is probably no culture extant to-day which owes more than 10 percent of its total elements to inventions made by members of its own society. Because we live in a period of rapid invention we are apt to think of our own culture as largely self-created, but the role which diffusion has played in its growth may be brought home to us if we consider the beginning of the average man's day. The locations listed in the following paragraphs refer only to the origin points of various culture elements, not to regions from which we now obtain materials or objects through trade.

Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America. He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or

wool from sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East. He slips into his moccasins, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes to the bathroom, whose fixtures are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. He takes off his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt.

Returning to the bedroom, he removes his clothes from a chair of southern European type and proceeds to dress. He puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the nomads of the Asiatic steppes, puts on shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean, and ties around his neck a strip of bright-colored cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croatians. Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and takes an umbrella, invented in southeastern Asia. Upon his head he puts a hat made of felt, a material invented in the Asiatic steppes.

On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins, an ancient Lydian invention. At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him. His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. He begins breakfast with an orange, from the eastern Mediterranean, a canteloupe from Persia, or perhaps a piece of African watermelon. With this he has coffee, an Abyssinian plant, with cream and sugar. Both the domestication of cows and the idea of milking them originated in the Near East, while sugar was first made in India. After his fruit and first coffee he goes on to waffles, cakes made by a Scandinavian technique from wheat domesticated in Asia Minor. Over these he pours maple syrup, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands. As a side dish he may have the egg of a species of bird domesticated in Indo-China, or thin strips of the flesh of an animal domesticated in Eastern Asia which have been salted and smoked by a process developed in northern Europe.

When our friend has finished eating he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 percent American.

8

*Conservatism and Change in Culture**

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS

Invention, discovery, and diffusion are powerful, though selective, forces contributing to the history—or transformation—of cultures. For a more complete picture of the nature of cultural change, however, it is necessary to assess some of the other vital factors involved, as well as to balance the multitude of elements tending both to preserve and uproot the status quo. The eminent anthropologist, Melville J. Herskovits, addresses himself to this problem.

We cannot too often emphasize the fact—we might say the axiom—that no living culture is static. Neither smallness in numbers, nor isolation, nor simplicity of technological equipment produces complete stagnation in the life of a people. Rules of conduct may be rigid; the strictest sanctions may be invoked to enforce these rules; acquiescence in them may be unquestioning. Yet the observer of a society where even the greatest degree of conservatism obtains will, over a long enough period of time, find that changes have taken place. They may be minute, but they will be there. . . .

We may say that the process of change in culture is universal; that the significance of change must be faced in any study of the nature of culture; and, moreover, that the analysis of dynamics would patently be impossible without postulating change. This, however, does not imply that cultural change can be studied as an isolated phenomenon. It is only one side of the shield; for change, by and of itself, is meaningless, until it is projected against a baseline, measured in time and intensity and in terms of its extensiveness. Above all, it must be contrasted to the phenomenon that is always opposed to it, the phenomenon of cultural stability—a phenomenon which, in its psychological aspects, is called conservatism.

This proposition is not as simple as it appears. It is not difficult to see that since change is relative, any discussion of cultural change has significance only when approached in terms of cultural stability. The appraisal of either change or stability, however, not only depends on taking both into account, but it is dependent as well on the degree to which the observer achieves detachment from the culture in which he is studying change or evaluating stability. The closer the student is to a culture, the more blurred his perceptions in accurately identifying or isolating the changes that may be taking place in it. He reacts to the culture in a manner not unlike that of the members of the group he is studying. If conservatism is stressed as a prevailing pattern, he tends to gloss over the changes that may be occurring,

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often quite without being conscious of doing this. If the culture stresses change, as is the case in Euroamerican society, there is a tendency to slight the vast body of stabilizing elements that, lying beneath the changes that are actually in process, give continuity to the way of life. . . .

One further point, however, must be raised as we consider the balancing of change against stability. This has to do with the different rates of change that mark one aspect of a given culture as against another. The point poses the question whether we are justified in labelling one culture, *as a whole,* conservative, as against another, *as a whole,* which is held to be receptive to change. . . . The fact is, . . . we never find cultures that move at the same rate over the whole front.

Thus the Australian aborigines, who are held to be prime examples of a conservative people, seem to have been far more conservative in their material culture than in their social organization and religion. The simplicity of their material culture has been often noted; it is apparent that the harshness of their habitat inhibited any drive to develop more effective ways of exploiting its potentialities. On the other hand, we observed the complexity of their system of kinship terminology, and the richness of their mythology and the ceremonial life based on those myths. We can only designate them extremely conservative as a whole if we ignore the receptivity to change that must have existed at some time in their past where ideas having to do with social structures and the supernatural world were involved. Conversely, our own culture, held to be "progressive" and hospitable to change, shows unsuspected resistances in the field of nonmaterial culture, when we view it objectively in terms of its aspects, rather than as a unit. Change thus differs with the time, the culture, and the aspect of the culture. It is a point to be borne constantly in mind in the study of cultural dynamics, no less than when we analyze the structure and forms of culture.

Conservatism and change in culture are the result of the interplay of environmental, historical, and psychological factors. All must be considered when studies of cultural processes are made. The weighting given each of these factors, however, has tended to vary with the position of a given student and the emphasis his experience and training has caused him to lay on one or the other. Actually, generalizations as to the weighting to be given any one factor are as hazardous as are overall evaluations of total cultures. In some instances, habitat will be the predominating reason why resistance or hospitality to change is evidenced. Elsewhere, the circumstance of historic contact will most influence the development of a people. Always the psychological factor will be operative. At times we must seek psychological causes alone in explaining why some apparently advantageous opportunity for change, helpful in meeting the demands of the natural setting of a people, is rejected by them; or where something that, viewed from the outside as perhaps quite harmful, is accepted. . . .

The habitat offers possibilities that may or may not be utilized by those who live in a given region. It sets limits that are elastic in the face of an increasingly effective technology. Thus it is often stated that natural barriers to communication can act as forces militating against the changes that come readily to a people inhabiting an area of easy access. And it does seem to hold that the peoples who inhabit the most remote areas of the world are actually to be counted among the most conservative groups. Yet this does not mean that the

converse is true. The civilizations of the Far East are often pointed to as examples of cultural conservatism, yet they are by no means isolated—that is, they are not isolated except as viewed from the perspective of a developing European culture.

Isolation, of itself, can explain very little. Are the cultures of the isolated peoples at the tip of South America, or in the Arctic, or in the depths of the Ituri forests in the Congo basin stable *because* these peoples are isolated; or because they are small in number, and have simple technological equipment that provides only a narrow base for change? Are the Eskimo conservative because they are isolated, or because a harsh habitat imposes limits that tend to suppress change? And what of the many opportunities for change peoples at the crossroads of the world, such as the Egyptians, have had presented to them, only to reject them?

Pertinent questions such as these are raised not to dispute the claim that geographical situation is to be considered in explaining cultural stability and change, but to assess this claim in perspective. Isolation is, at best, a difficult concept to work with, since it is only a relative term. The vast bulk of the Americas were isolated from the rest of the world for thousands of years. Yet from the point of view of the Americas, continents peopled with numerous Indian tribes who stimulated each other, it could as well be said that it was the Old World which was in isolation, not the new. Substantial proof was given of this after the fifteenth century, in the radical changes the discovery of the Americas by Europeans wrought in such important phases of European culture as food resources and dietary habits. Only after the stimulus of contact with the Americas did the European standard of living begin to rise. . . .

Within the limits set by the natural environment, access to the wide range of possible roads a culture may follow is given by historical circumstance. Here we must take into account two processes: cultural drift and historic accident. Cultural drift is the working out of those sequences which seem logically to follow from the way in which a culture is organized, the interests of those persons who make up the society characterized by it, and the ends they seek in terms of the values and goals sanctioned by their culture. Historic accident is a phrase applied to those sequences of events in the life of a people, unforeseen and, from the inner logic of the culture unpredictable, that give new directions to the changes that mark the course of their history, so that sequences that might otherwise have been expected to occur are altered.

Such stimuli can come from within a group or from outside it. A chance discovery, recognized as useful, may induce change, or it may solidify opposition to change and be the instrument for emphasizing conservatism. A journey taken by an individual member of a society may reveal techniques or ideas that he brings back to his people with similar positive or negative results. Conquest may lead to an interchange of cultural elements; or conqueror and conquered, even when living side by side, may, in large measure, each continue his own way of life. Imposition of the institutions and standards of a dominant group on dependent peoples having different cultures may serve to rally them to forbidden earlier ways, and result in those contra-acculturative movements that often mark the course of foreign rule.

These circumstances of history make the development of every people a tale that is never exactly repeated, either by themselves or any other group. And it is these

ever differing historic streams that at once reflect and shape the attitudes and points of view of societies that, in the final analysis, determine the degree to which each will be hospitable or hostile to innovations. This, then, is the third factor we must take into account in studying the dynamics of culture. It involves the consideration of the many psychological mechanisms that underlie human behavior in general, and as such constitutes a special aspect of the enculturative process we found to be so important in understanding the manner in which human beings are conditioned to the way of life of the society into which they are born, and the very nature of culture itself.

This enculturative process is the means whereby an individual, during his entire lifetime, assimilates the traditions of his group and functions in terms of them. Though basically involving the learning process, enculturation proceeds on two levels, that of early life and that which marks the existence of the mature member of society. During early life, a person is conditioned to the basic patterns of the culture in accordance with which he is to live. He learns to handle the verbal symbols that make up his language, he masters accepted forms of etiquette, is inculcated with the ends of living recognized by his fellows, is adjusted to the established institutions of his culture. In all this, he has but little say; he is the instrument rather than the player.

In later years, however, enculturation involves reconditioning rather than conditioning. The learning process is one wherein choice can operate, wherein what is presented can be accepted or rejected. As was suggested, a change in recognized procedures of a society, a new concept, a reorientation of point of view can only come when people agree on the desirability of change. It is the result of discussion, of consideration by individuals who must alter their individual modes of thought and action if it is accepted, or argue preference for established custom in rejecting it.

Thus the mechanism of enculturation leads us to the heart of this problem of conservatism and change in culture. Its earlier conditioning level is the instrument that gives to every culture its stability; that prevents its running wild even in periods of most rapid change. In its later aspects, where enculturation operates on the conscious level, it opens the gate to change, making for the examination of alternate possibilities, and permitting reconditioning to new modes of thought and conduct.

Chapter Three

THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

1.

In presenting studies of economics, many writers, under the continuing influence of the nineteenth-century Englishman, James Mill, have divided the field into four areas: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. Many have more recently tended to view the economic problem from the vantage point of a series of questions: *What* goods and services will be produced? *How* will these goods and services be produced? and, *who* will receive the goods and services? Still other economists, ignoring for the moment an over-all approach to the subject, move directly into a discussion of some of the fundamental and more immediately pressing issues such as full employment and income distribution. However we may approach the matter, all societies—primitive or civilized—have to cope with a similar core of basic economic problems. That the twentieth-century economy of the United States places such heavy emphasis on machine technology and the acquisitive spirit should not be permitted to obscure this important fact.

Most widely accepted is the view that economics concerns itself with the relations among men in their effort to satisfy material needs. Even so general a statement, however, requires some qualification. Most societies have what may be termed a dual economy, one designed to satisfy material needs and another to quench the thirst for prestige. Among the Kwakiutl Indians of the Pacific Northwest, for example, the potlatch ceremony may witness the burning of hundreds of valuable blankets, the destruction of many canoes, and the seemingly reckless distribution of gifts to establish the prestige of some individual—usually a chief. In the United States, Thorstein Veblen's phrase, "conspicuous consumption," and the even more familiar "keeping up with the Joneses," exemplify our own experience with prestige economy.

The word "economics" comes from the Greek *oikonomike,* more specifically from the management of the household or *oikos.* During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Western European writers, under the influence of prevailing mercantilistic policies, utilized the term "political economy" on the ground that the acquisition of wealth was "common to the state as well as to the family." The individualizing forces of the nineteenth century undoubtedly contributed, in their turn, to the emergence of economics as a distinct term and a separate discipline. Today, nationalistic, democratic, and other forces have revived the power of the state, and once again some social scientists are viewing with favor an all-inclusive concept of political economy.

2.

What concerns us at this point is the history of economic institutions in the evolution of Western civilization. We begin by tracing the outlines of the feudal-manorial way of life in Medieval Europe. This is followed by an analysis of the emerging modern economic order by viewing some of its essential ingredients: the movements commonly referred to as the commercial and industrial revolutions, the factory system, and the industrial way of life. Having, then, looked into the background of modern economic life, we turn to the rise of capitalism, in general, and to its particular development in the United States, tracing its growth through the past few centuries to the present corporate system.

A. The General Concept

9

*What Is Economics?**

ALLEN M. SIEVERS

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Any economy may be viewed as that aspect of society which uses resources to provide goods and services to the people of that society. In the American economy, although there is a small amount of economic activity in which people take care of their own material needs directly, a characteristic fact about it is that *most consumption is divorced from production* and that most people do *not* consume the product of their own labor. The significant exception to this generalization is the housewife who does the housework directly for herself and her family.

This separation between production and consumption is sometimes incorrectly explained simply in terms of the principle of specialization or division of labor. In our society each man does a specialized task, and spends all his working time on this single task, so that if he were able to consume only the commodity he had produced he would have a very hard time staying alive. An automobile worker, for example, would not be able to get food, clothing,

* Allen M. Sievers, *General Economics* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1952). Used with the permission of the author and publisher.

shelter, or any of the other necessities and comforts of modern living. The labor force of the country thus being divided up among thousands of different kinds of jobs (division of labor), each man can get what he needs only by trading what he produces for the many other things he consumes. As a matter of fact, he may consume none of that which he helps to produce, as the auto worker may not own an automobile, so that all his consumption is only indirectly produced by himself.

Yet specialization is not the answer, or at least not the entire answer. In some societies known to anthropologists and historians, a man may be a specialist and still help produce almost all of the things he consumes. There are many different kinds of examples of this. The North American Indian, for example, who hunted while his wife performed most of the other economic tasks, was a specialist at the same time that he consumed his own game. The Trobriand Islanders, who trade their surpluses with neighboring tribes for their surpluses, are consuming almost entirely only what they themselves produce at the same time that they are specializing in producing goods which their neighbors lack. In the days of the domestic system, the specialized industrial worker was also largely self-supporting because he divided his time between working for the factor and raising crops for himself. A very complex system of division of labor may exist in a society in which most people work directly in the production of most of the things which they themselves consume.

It is partly a question of the *degree* of specialization. In present-day society men tend to be so specialized at performing one task that they know little or nothing about how to do jobs other men do. This is often regarded as one of the bad features of the modern age, since a man tends to become narrow as a person if he knows so little about the world he lives in. Yet even if a man *knew* how to do several jobs, the structure of the modern economy would give him little or no opportunity actually to perform more than one job at a time. It is the fact that 100 percent specialization is almost forced upon most people that is the key to the solution of our problem.

The reason that people are forced to specialize is that the rationale of our economy demands it. In a *machine* economy, a substantial percentage of the nation's output must be in the form of *capital goods,* or goods used only for the purpose of producing other goods. Hence any worker in a "capital goods industry" is only indirectly producing a few of the goods which he himself may consume (*consumer goods*). Yet one man might, theoretically, still work *both* in a capital goods and a consumer goods industry. He does not do so in actual practice for two reasons. First, it takes a certain amount of skill to tend even the simplest varieties of modern machinery, and few men have the time to learn or develop two skills.

Secondly, the *market* organization of modern society will not permit him, normally, to have two jobs at once, and certainly not a variety of jobs. A worker does not take home the part of a machine he produces but instead a paycheck which he then uses to buy whatever consumer goods he can get on the market for that much money. The worker makes a contract with an employer to work in return for the paycheck. That is, our economy is so organized that work takes place only after a wage contract has been negotiated on the labor market. The worker is not in a position to get access to consumer goods directly, since he does not own the natural

and technological resources, and could not operate them if he did. The worker must sell his labor for a price, or he does not eat. Thus there is a *wage system* at the basis of our economy, and labor resembles a commodity, sold for a price on the market. Not only is there a labor market, but there is market for everything which the laborer consumes, so that he must enter the market place twice—once as a seller and once as a buyer. Since the main object of the worker's economic activity now becomes that of getting the biggest paycheck so that he can buy the maximum amount of consumer goods, there is no reason for him to spend his working hours on more than one job. Moreover, in order to maximize his profits, the employer wants to run his business as efficiently as possible and so prefers skillful "full-time" workers to unskillful "part-time" workers. Hence we have an economy in which almost everyone does just one job.

Division of labor does not only mean that each human being does just one job, but that the economy is divided up into productive units, each of which does just one job—or at most several related jobs. Each [business] firm belongs to a particular "industry" producing a particular product or set of products. These industries can be grouped into certain large classifications. Thus there are the extractive industries, manufacturing industries, mechanical trades, trade, transportation, communication, service industries, etc. Each of these may be subdivided, as the extractive industries into agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining. Again each of these may be subdivided into particular industries according to the specific commodity produced, as the coal-mining industry. Hence a coal operator is in the coal-mining industry, which is in the mining industries, which in turn is one of the extractive industries.

An economy divided into about 10 million productive units—each of which produces one product or set of products and sells it on the market either to another firm, to government, or to one of the approximately 45 million consumption units —requires a technique for control and integration into a single functioning whole. Money and the market provide the basis for such a system. Precisely because there is a market for everything there is an interlocking system of markets which integrates the economy. Every human being receives an income (unless he is dependent upon someone else's income) by selling some productive service (*factor service*) to business—whether labor, managerial skill, the use of land, the use of money or other —and every consumption unit (household) uses this income to buy back from business the goods which business has produced. . . . Production takes place in business units (or firms) through the aid of the factor services of people who are paid therefor and thus receive an income, and the income is then used to buy the output of business, yielding revenue to business. Thus consumption is possible only at a remote stage from production, and the chain which ties one productive unit to another and all productive units to the consumption units is the sale of commodities and factor services on the market for money. These markets may set their own prices through automatic forces to be explained when we come to economic analysis, or the prices may be set by government or some other discretionary agency; but in any case the vastly multiform and indirect productive process eventually places goods in the hands of consumers through the medium of markets. Because money and not barter must be used in such a complex system of markets, money obviously plays a key role. Technology controls nature,

and money and markets control the technology. Money and markets are themselves controlled either through automatic forces or administrative discretion. Thus our economy functions as a unified system.

The World Market. The marvelous, almost mysterious, integration of the elements of the American economy into a system which functions as a unit producing a steady flow of automobiles, wheat, and a vast catalogue of goods and services is itself a part of a greater wonder—*the world-wide economy.* Each nation tends, on one hand, to resemble a little world-in-itself, a *microcosm* which carries on its social and economic life wholly within its own borders; but, on the other hand, each nation, like each individual, is related to the total society of mankind. In other eras the relationships among the different peoples of the world were sometimes very tenuous, but today, as we are all aware, at least in the political area, all nations are interdependent. Whether a modern nation-state is at war, or enters into treaty relationships, or joins a League of Nations or United Nations, it cannot ignore the existence of other nations. The political interrelationship of nations may constitute a harmonious system (as do the states, provinces, and cantons of the United States, Canada, and Switzerland respectively), or it may at the other extreme, be chaotic anarchy (like a country in time of civil war); but in any case there is an all-embracing political *macrocosm* of which each nation is a part. It goes without saying that the society of mankind as a whole is well off to the extent that this macrocosm is more harmonious and peaceful and less warlike and disorganized. In the same way, the entire society of mankind constitutes an *economic macrocosm,* which may be more or less organized or disorganized, harmonious or warlike. . . . All the world is one *market* for the output of each nation's productive system.

The Money-Market Economy. The world market is in itself an outgrowth of something even more fundamental, which we might call *the primacy of the market* within the economy of each nation. It was because each nation was organized to buy and sell that it was easy, natural, and even necessary to buy and sell to foreigners. This remains true even today, although the role of the market has shifted.

Each nation's economy is centered around buying and selling—or, in a manner of speaking, the market place. Markets can be based upon the barter system; *i.e.,* trading can consist of direct "swapping" or exchanging of chairs for shoes, bread for medicine, etc. But as a matter of fact the complicated markets of today are built upon the use of money in place of barter. That is, chairs are bought and sold for dollars—as are shoes, bread, medicine, and every other good and service produced in the economy. Thus modern markets are markets employing money and not barter; so we can speak of a *money-market economy.*

The Machine. Once more, however, we must admit that money-market economies are older than the nineteenth century; specifically, that mercantilism was also a money-market economy. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have added an additional ingredient which is of crucial importance in making the world a very different kind of place than it had been throughout all the rest of human history —the power-driven machine. The economy of every major nation today is based upon the machine—and a nation may almost be said to be "major" to the extent that it does have the machine. The opprobrious appellation "backward" really

means no more than that a people does not employ the machine as extensively as "progressive" nations. But even "backward" nations which lag behind the Western nations in the use of the machine are tied into the system which uses the machine. For the "backward" colonial and semicolonial peoples of the world supply the raw materials and constitute the markets for the machine output of the industrial nations. Industrialism cannot exist unless world-wide supplies and world-wide outlets are available to the machine industries. Hence willy-nilly the nonindustrial countries have been integrated in a vast international network which the industrial nations have woven for their own interest. This is what we mean when we say that the present-day economy is world-wide in an *integrated* sense, and that it is a *money-market-machine economy.*

The world community is mutually interdependent economically and politically, and though its traditions and ideologies are perhaps even more varied than those of such a nation as the United States, a certain common tradition or ideology has permeated the world as a consequence of the system itself: all the world now thinks in terms of industrialization, "progress," economic efficiency, high standard of living, and similar economic ideals. However proud China, India, or the Arab world, say, may be of their great cultural achievements in the past, and however much they may think the Western world lacks the benefit even now of these cultural traditions, nevertheless, for the most part, these less industrialized peoples see their future in terms of "catching up with" the West industrially. The tragedy of the twentieth century has been the breakdown of the world-wide community before it had developed into a truly integrated One World. To build such a unified world-wide society which at the same time retains the boon of the industrialized economy is the great problem facing modern man, which if he does not solve may mean complete disruption of the world community and perhaps even the annihilation of mankind itself.

We should now be able to make some general statements about economics and social science in general. Every human society has certain identical characteristics. Thus we can make generalizations simply about society, rather than specific societies. Society has an organization and a function. Its function may be said to so organize its members that they can most successfully live as human beings. This organization is achieved by institutions and institutional configurations, but above all by institutional patterns which permit coercion to operate upon the individuals to induce them to perform socially necessary missions. In other words, society achieves its coherence by means of law. Thus society may be thought of as a system of intercommunication, interdependence and cooperation, integrated by a common technology, a structure of institutions, and a system of law.

It is not surprising that inasmuch as society has these universal characteristics the studying human mind should eventually seek to understand the nature of society in general and the character of its uniform properties. This is the function of social science.

Economics was the first of the social sciences, probably for the simple reason that economic problems first attracted the attention of the thinkers of early modern times, since economic phenomena were so characteristic of the transition to modern times. But economics is just one of the branches of social science; and though it historically has been generally limited to an interest in the nature of capitalism, it

can potentially analyze the economic aspects of all human societies. Economics [then] is a branch of social science, but every other social science (and also mathematics, science, and technology) must contribute some knowledge before economics can fully interpret the economy.

Economic analysis is one way of understanding and interpreting our very complex economy. Although it is not the only way, and perhaps not even the chief way, it is certainly an indispensable approach to achieve a thorough comprehension of a system which functions mechanically as ours does even today. Yet it must be observed that to understand economic analysis itself, it is necessary to understand some of the institutional facts about our society.

The economic analyst is ostensibly concerned only about the how, rather than the why or wherefore, of the operation of the market. If we may make an analogy between the market mechanism and the automobile, the theorist is concerned about explaining the principles of the internal combustion engine, and not where the automobile is or should be going, or whether the driver is sober and skillful.

Economic analysis is concerned, for one thing, with the cause-and-effect interactions among individuals and economic institutions which produce market prices. Inasmuch as there is a market price, under a self-regulating market system, for every commodity and every factor of production —in short, for every transaction in which any individual participates in the economy —a truly tremendous enterprise is implied by this single objective. And yet this is just one of the objectives. For the mechanism of price determination is not only of interest in itself, but as a means or instrument in the synchronizing and integrating the entire economic mechanism. In an economy in which the production of the automobile, for example, implies the flow of goods from every country in the world and every state in the union, in just the right quantities at just the right times, some organizing principle must be at work. The process of price determination, which applies at every stage in the flow of all the raw materials to the final assembled automobile is part of the bigger process of regulating the direction and size of the flow.

The language of economic analysis calls this the process of *allocation*. If one wishes to think of it that way, every society must make allocation decisions some way or another—must decide how much of what products to produce. This really involves a particular kind of choice—the choice which involves going without one thing in order to have another. This kind of choice is not limited to economics, although it is particularly appropriate to economics, particularly in a self-regulating market economy. For example, a general must decide whether to use his troops in one place or another, on one mission or another. Similarly the society must somehow "decide" (although in many societies the decision may be quite unconscious and determined largely by tradition and happen-chance) whether to use all the available labor-power of the community to produce yams, to fish, to fashion canoes, or to produce some other single commodity—or to divide up the labor force and produce a variety of products. But since the amount of anything that can be produced by any given labor force in any given time is limited, the decision to spend more time producing some one good means that more of that good will be produced but at the expense of some other good. In short, allocation implies substitution: to choose what to produce means

to substitute productive power in one direction rather than another.

A self-regulating market economy is one in which countless numbers of allocation decisions must be made in order that the complex exchange of goods will synchronize smoothly. Each of the many producers of each raw material that enters into each automobile part, for example, must decide to produce that raw material and not something else and to sell the amount he does sell, if the given number of parts are to be made. At the same time, each parts manufacturer must decide to buy the quantity of each raw material which the owner of the raw material decides to sell. This agreement, incidentally, is reached through the price of the raw material. The parts manufacturer is then in the same relation to the subassembly manufacturer as the raw material producer is to the parts manufacturer—and he has to make the same kinds of decisions. Likewise, the final automobile manufacturer is in the same relation to the subassembly manufacturers as the subassembly manufacturer is to the parts manufacturer. And this chain is even longer than we have indicated, as it also includes, for example, the transporters, processors, handlers, and middlemen. All the way along the chain, allocation decisions have to be made; or at least allocations have to be made, with or without deliberate decisions. The pricing system operates to effect these allocations in a self-regulating market economy. The analytical economist must not only explain the mechanism of price determination but must show how the pricing system functions to effect a systematic and orderly allocation through the economy. Not only must raw material and intermediate goods be allocated among different firms and industries, but consumer goods (as the automobile) must be allocated among buyers, and labor and capital must be allocated among all the different producers. It has been said that there are five functions of any economy, and these are automatically performed in our economy through the pricing system. First, it must be decided what goods are to be produced. This is the determination of the ultimate ends of the economic process. Secondly, the resources must be allocated to the production of these goods. Third, the goods produced must be *distributed,* or allocated among the consumers. This is essentially the same process as the allocation among the owners of the factors of production. Fourth, goods "on the shelves" of stores must be allocated among customers until new goods are produced, and this is the problem of rationing. Fifth, provision must be made for the future, which involves saving or the allocation of some present production to the making of capital goods which will be of service in producing consumption goods at some later date. All five of these basic functions are essentially allocation decisions, and they are all performed automatically in a self-regulating market economy through the pricing mechanism. The object of economic analysis is to demonstrate both the pricing mechanism and the allocation mechanism, and thus to explain the integration of the system.

B. Modern Economic Development

10

*The Economy of Medieval Europe**

FREDERICK L. NUSSBAUM

Before turning to the economic institutions of the modern world, a glimpse of the medieval European economy is indispensable. Professor Frederick L. Nussbaum, of the University of Wyoming, offers a general picture of manorial life which takes some cognizance of the existence of local variations for the period and area under discussion.

In the centuries in which the organization which we know as European civilization was beginning to take form, economic life, like other forms of social life, was very simple. After centuries of decline, the Roman economic system, like the Roman law, Roman learning, Roman art and architecture, had become merely a memory—a glorious memory, which men for centuries tried in vain to recapture. Whatever may have been the reasons for its disappearance, the great system of production and distribution which the Roman roads from England to the Euphrates and the Roman sea routes along and across the Mediterranean had served was gone from the West.

In the eastern part of the empire, the old economic organization had shown itself much stronger and not only maintained itself at a high level for centuries (say, roughly, down to the Crusades), but even evolved in new and significant directions. The great cities, Constantinople, Antioch, Smyrna, were active commercial and industrial centers, while under the Arabs, Bagdad, Damascus, and Alexandria even surpassed the Greek centers. The story of the Byzantine-Arab economy, fascinating as it is, lies outside of the field of this book. It is mentioned here merely to remind the student that while the Europe that now dominates the world was reduced to a condition of primitive simplicity, the eastern Mediterranean lands were relatively and absolutely prosperous and strong. . . .

When the time was ripe, the Westerners were to learn much of the ways of industry and trade from the great Byzantine and Arab centers. For centuries, however, the West was only a rather poor source of raw materials. Its surplus production was so slight that it offered only very minor attraction to Eastern merchants as a market. It is an error, however, to attribute to the influence of the East that revival of economic energy which becomes apparent in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The "influence" was available in even greater degree while economic life in the West was declining and disintegrating. It was only when new life

* Frederick L. Nussbaum, *A History of the Economic Institutions of Modern Europe* (New York, F. S. Crofts and Company, 1937). Used by permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

and productive vigor developed in the West, when it had begun to discover new ideas and invent new institutions for itself, that it began to appropriate the ideas and institutions of the East. During these centuries, life in the West had become almost purely agricultural. . . .

The Village Economy

Under these circumstances, the forms of economic life were, of course, comparatively simple and primitive. Agricultural production was organized in what we have come to call "village economy." The forms of settlement on the land varied considerably among the different peoples who formed the settlements. Slavs had round villages and consolidated holdings. Celts and Normans had homesteads on the undivided holdings. The Germans had irregular villages and scattered holdings in common fields. Roman colonies still existed with stone houses built wall to wall and rectangular fields. Among these diverse external forms, however, we find a common economic idea: production in common for sustenance rather than for profit. The European peoples showed many characteristics of a transition from (or back to) nomadism and pastoral institutions. Their agricultural technique was very low, their groups were still bound together by the idea of blood relationship, and the land was distributed roughly in proportion to the need and the power of each family. The sustenance idea seems to be a mark of this same transition. Just as the pastoral tribe depends upon its flocks and herds for food, clothes, and shelter, so the medieval villager depended upon his primitive agriculture for all his needs. Even the preparation of his raw products for use—industrial production, building, the production of clothes, of tools, of food was an affair of his own household. If a large establishment were needed, his community provided it, as in the case of water mills and smithies. In Domesday Book, Maitland * points out, "sometimes the ownership of a mill is so divided that we are tempted to think that this mill has been erected at the cost of the vill." In Bavaria, the mills and the smithies, like the churches and the palaces of the dukes, were protected against disorder and violence by specially severe penalties provided in the law. These public workshops were community property and could be used by each inhabitant in turn as need arose. Very early the smith and the wheelwright appeared in the villages as specialized workers, not, however, as independent craftsmen, but rather as functionaries of the community who performed the necessary smithing and wheelwrighting for their share of the community's agricultural production.

Somewhat more is known of the working of one of these types of village economy than of the others; namely, of the Germanic open-field system, common in western Germany, northern France, and eastern England. It is therefore possible and profitable to examine it somewhat more particularly, but we should keep in mind that this system is not by any means general or even predominant in Europe. What a summary examination of its external features can offer is a notion of the practical working of the sustenance idea, how people in a medieval village were bound together in such a way as was possible only for people who had strong community feeling and a strong sense of mutual inter-dependence.

The open-field village began to be called by that name very late in its history in order to contrast it with the fenced fields which

* Frederic W. Maitland, nineteenth-century English historian and author of *Domesday Book and Beyond* (1897). The Domesday Book, an invaluable historical source, was the fruit of a major survey of England made at the request of William I in 1086. [Ed.]

in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries at last displaced it. The typical open-field village was a little group of houses, homes of the tillers of the soil, in the midst of, say, fifteen hundred acres of land of various sorts, meadow, marsh, woodland, and, of course, in every case, arable or plowland. Such a village might have thirty families. Each of these thirty families (not each individual) had a set of rights in these fifteen hundred acres, not defined by boundaries as in the case of an American farm, but by dozens, not to say hundreds, of arbitrary prescriptions arising out of the experience of the group of which the family was a part. Only in one part of the fifteen hundred acres could the head of a family stand and say, this is our land up to that line; beyond, it is some other family's land. That was in the arable. This part of the tract was divided into three great fields (in some places, two) cultivated in a set rotation, each field lying fallow once in three years. In each of these three fields, our peasant family would have perhaps ten oblong strips, called acres in England, typically four rods wide and a furlong (furrow-long) in length. Actually it varied greatly in size and shape. The acres of our peasant family were not next to one another but scattered over the whole of the three fields; but it has been noticed that the same families were likely to be neighbors in each part of their holdings. These strips, or acres, were separated from each other only by balks, little ridges of earth. If you fly over England you can still see in some parts the gridiron pattern they make on the countryside. Naturally, such a system was practicable only if every one in the village plowed, sowed, and reaped at the same times and planted the same crop. No one had to puzzle over agricultural college bulletins to decide what crop to plant the next year. It was decided for him by the authority of tradition and custom. The rotation of wheat, oats, and fallow was as fixed as the laws of the Medes and the Persians.

In the other parts of the fifteen hundred acres, our peasant family's rights were even more involved with those of others. In the meadow, after the grass was cut and divided for winter storage, it might pasture so many cows, so many pigs, as it had done for generations. In the woodland, it might cut a certain amount of wood for fuel or for timber for a new hut. All these various rights are different from individual property. They are rights of participating in a common life. If in the other village forms, the external aspect of the organization does not so clearly manifest it, nevertheless the same community feeling existed.

The low technique of agricultural production meant, of course, that the whole community had to devote itself to the raising of food and fibers. For a number of centuries our barbarous ancestors were quite unable to produce a surplus of goods that would have enabled them by way of exchange to participate in the brilliant civilization of Byzantium to the east or of Arab Spain to the south.

It was natural that such a community should be a close and controlled community. Not until comparatively late did the stranger, the "immigrant," have a place in it. This system continued in full vigor for many centuries and only gradually changed as affinity in blood was displaced by propinquity and as inequality in holdings developed an agricultural class that might almost be called an agricultural proletariat, the cotters (crofters, cotsetle) of the English sources. Even after such changes, the mode of agriculture and its spirit persisted over wide areas down to the nineteenth century —a full thousand years from the time of Charlemagne.

The Feudal Economy

The surprising uniformity in this widespread agricultural economic system was also reflected in another set of relations, partly political, partly economic, that we call feudalism. We are not here concerned with the political and constitutional aspects of feudalism, but only with its economic aspect as a form of landlordship. We shall disregard questions like the social status of the agricultural producers—which varied through all possible shades from Roman slavery to the full personal freedom of the English sokeman and the French alodiary—and the forms of tenure, which were even more confused. The economic features of feudalism are separate from these considerations. Whatever his personal status, the agricultural producer had to give a certain part of his product to his lord, he had to serve a certain number of days in the year on the land of his lord; he remained attached to the soil, and his children after him because there was no other place to go. These features of feudalism do not differ substantially from one end of our limited Europe of that day to the other. The common Roman origins of feudal practices, the common racial traditions of the Germanic invaders, the pervasive influence of the church, especially of the monasteries, with their interchange of persons and practices, combined to give the landlord economy throughout the Western European lands an essentially uniform character.

The feudal landlord economy in all lands was a system by which a class of powerful people attained the end of having their need for goods satisfied by the labor of other people in their own establishments. These powerful people were of various sorts: monks, church dignitaries, kings, princes, warriors, and their officers. Their common economic characteristic was leisure. Not even the poorest of them—and some were very poor—would do other than "honorable service," fighting or praying. Indeed, it may be said that his leisure was the economic objective of the feudal landlord. The acquisition of wealth in the modern sense was not the primary objective, certainly not the acknowledged one. The greater lords, whose supply of goods from a county or a duchy far exceeded the needs of a single family, the great abbots and bishops, whose incomes far exceeded the needs of their monks and clergy, used their surpluses to build up courts, to increase their following of knights, to ornament their churches to the greater glory of God, to enrich their own lives with material and spiritual enjoyments, rather than to build an estate as modern men do. Something of the feudal attitude toward wealth remains in modern feeling. A "gentleman" (which is itself a feudal concept) must be rather indifferent to wealth, especially in the form of money. A "debt of honor" is not money owed to the grocer for the necessities of life, but a debt incurred in noneconomic ways. A gentleman, a lord, "lived of his own" and did not have accounts with outside providers. Even in the landlord economy, the need-satisfying principle of the sustenance economy was basic. . . .

The landlord's exploitation of the labor at his command was in general thoroughly involved with the village organization. In part, he took a share of the producing farmer's own product, which was collected for him by the bailiff (*meier, villicus*), who was often one of the farmers, or by subordinate landlords, or, in the case of some great lords, officials who had large subdivisions of his lands in charge. The landlord had also his demesne (inland, *salland, terra dominica*), which he exploited by means of labor due him from his service-bound

tenants in amounts roughly corresponding to the peasant's degree of unfreedom. This land in general was not a separate holding, but was just as thoroughly involved in the village economy as the land of the peasant. In the three-field system the lord's demesne, like the peasant's holding, was scattered in strips over the common fields.

Industrial production on the manor was carried on essentially in the same spirit: the landlord's needs were met by the labor supplied by his tenants or by servants in his household. In England, even bread was commonly delivered by peasants, but on the Continent the landlord commonly had his own bakery and brewery, and from a very early date his own mill, or, in some cases, the right of having a certain amount of grain ground or rolled in the village mill as an owed service. Clothes were sometimes delivered "ready to wear," especially in the manors of which monasteries were the landlords (e.g., Prüm, Fulda). More frequently, however, the peasant delivered the cloth, and the sewing was done by the women and maidservants of the households. Occasionally the whole process was carried out in the landlord's household. Fulling and dyeing were generally performed by his own servants. Leather tanning and shoemaking seem also to have been done usually in the household of the landlord. Building involved a whole complex of materials and services. Raw materials came from the lord's own woods, quarries, and fields. Unskilled labor was furnished by the lord's domestics, of whom some were also trained masons or carpenters. The rest of the labor and raw materials was furnished as services owed by the tenants. Naturally such a system was adequate only for the very primitive building of the early Middle Ages. As standards developed, skilled labor had to be secured on special terms. Thus, in the ninth century, the bishop of Salzburg collected master masons, smiths, and carpenters, to build churches. Other skilled labor services were secured as dues for holdings. The wheelwright of South Brent in England had to make a plow and harrow, and to help the peasants keep their wagons in order. The smith of Wermouth in Domesday Book "holds twelve acres for making plowshares." Sometimes the smith and the wheelwright were members of the lord's household.

This simple and personal system of production lasted, with only unessential changes, down to the twelfth or thirteenth century and, in a sense, even down to our own day. Alongside it there developed in the villages the seeds of an independent industrial life, which will be further discussed in connection with the revival of town life. . . .

This economic organization, so widespread over the Europe of the Germanic peoples, so different in all its external aspects from the organization with which we are familiar, was the external expression of a widely different set of economic notions from those that dominate the mind of modern man. None of us could view a medieval village without wishing at once to reorganize it upon a more profitable basis—redistribute the land in the interest of efficiency, lessen the burdensomeness of the system for the working farmer on the one hand (although we would propose that the number of farmers on a given area should be reduced), and increase the revenue in goods and especially in money for the lord on the other. Such proposals would have been met with a complete lack of understanding on both sides. . . .

The object of medieval economic life . . . was not profits but men. In the Middle Ages, this purpose was expressed in an economy the object of which was the nourishment and sustenance of all the individuals in the group. Nourishment and sus-

tenance, it is true, varied from person to person, according to his station in life. If he were a lord, he must have a castle, horses, and above all leisure. If he were a peasant, he toiled as a part of his community and counted upon the community to insure him shelter of a rude kind and food still ruder. After the customary semireligious routine of the crude village agriculture was finished, he never thought of utilizing his wide margin of leisure to improve his economic income. He had worked sufficiently to live according to his station in life. It is not necessary to believe that every peasant or every lord thought or felt in this fashion: the exceptions provided the materials for the fables about the extraordinarily rich and the misers. . . . Even more familiar are the men who deliberately sought to make themselves rich by finding treasure or making gold by alchemic processes: it is hardly necessary to point out that they sought wealth outside the economic nexus.

The standards at which the economic man, that is to say, the generality of men, aimed and the means by which he tried to attain them were empirical, traditional, not rational. "According to his station in life" was the familiar, the customary, the traditional standard. The processes were the familiar, the customary, the traditional village system of agriculture, exploited in equally customary fashion by the lord of the land.

11

The Commercial Revolution

LAURENCE B. PACKARD

Dr. Laurence B. Packard, late professor of history at Amherst College, is the author of several volumes on European history and an editor of the Berkshire Studies in the same field. From *The Commercial Revolution,* we survey the momentous changes initiated by that significant movement.

From 1400 to 1700 is a period commonly called the Renaissance. Historically speaking, this word Renaissance is used to indicate the general change from the civilization which we call medieval to that in which we live, and which we think of as modern. A great many aspects of civilization were altering; ideas and customs which had existed for centuries were dying out and were being replaced by new. Feudalism, for example, was giving way to the strong central government of kings; the Christian church of the West, for centuries united in obedience to the bishop of Rome, began to split up into independent sections; new methods of warfare appeared, in which gunpowder and standing armies were important; new kinds of architecture succeeded Gothic types of building; new

* Laurence B. Packard, *The Commercial Revolution* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1927). Used with permission of the publishers.

forms of painting, sculpture, music and literary expression became common. Knowledge was expanding; people were learning more about many things, from their own bodies to the stars, about anatomy, disease, the earth, the atmosphere, the movements of the heavenly bodies. What we call the *spirit* of the Renaissance was active; its aspects were eagerness to learn, curiosity, criticism, and enthusiasm for adventure and invention.

It is the economic changes of this period 1400 to 1700 which are described by the term Commercial Revolution. Changes are always going on, of course, in commerce as well as in social and political affairs; revolutions are perhaps as frequent in one as in another. But between 1400 and 1700 changes in methods of conducting business, in trading centers, in shipping, in the financial aspects of commerce and in the theories underlying practice were so numerous, so pronounced and so rapid that the total effect seems to have been revolutionary. Undoubtedly the changes which were transpiring in government, religion and culture helped to accelerate and make more thoroughgoing those in commerce. Commerce, like most other phases of civilization, passed, between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, from medieval to modern form and manner. . . .

With the coming of the crusades about 1100, a new freedom of movement appeared which exercised far reaching influence upon European life. Horizons were broadened; people traveled; new commodities were brought from the East to the West. Beginnings were later made in the use of credit for the help of crusaders and pilgrims: the Templars, with their many stations throughout Europe, developed a sort of international banking service. Trade felt the impulse of these activities and began to expand. It is noteworthy that fairs became of capital importance in the twelfth century. For two centuries these picturesque forms of medieval commerce, with their special protection for merchants and their social appeal, mark the gradual development of wider and wider trading activities.

Towns began to grow, also; the movement of trade and the markets of the fairs created demands for more commodities, and people in the towns began to see that they could find a sale for their surplus products. These industrial beginnings were small, and grew slowly; the gild which grew up for each branch of trade and each industry reveals, in the character of its rules and regulations, how comparatively limited such activities were. Every town, like every manor, became a little world within itself. The traders in their merchant gilds and the artisans in their craft gilds endeavored to control the amount, quality, price and marketing of all goods produced and distributed. The government of the towns, in fact, usually fell almost entirely into the hands of these gilds which exercised their power in a very paternalistic fashion. Protection for merchant and craftsman, reduction of "foreign" competition (every one not a citizen of the town was a foreigner) and a *just,* or fair, price were among the principal aims of the gilds. . . .

It was through Mediterranean trade, indeed, that influences developed which eventually had much to do with ending the limitations of medieval trade and preparing the way for the Commercial Revolution. The crusades caused much travel across the Mediterranean, much carrying of men and supplies; they greatly stimulated trade. The most immediate recipients of these influences were the cities of Italy. Not only did they profit by the building of ships and by engaging in the rapidly increasing transportation, but they also de-

veloped valuable trade in the cities of the Levant—Antioch, Constantinople and Alexandria. To participate in the advantages of this commercial activity, industries sprang up in the Italian cities. In Venice, Florence, Genoa and Pisa, especially, there were important developments of textile, leather, glass and other forms of manufacturing. How extensive and profitable these activities were is reflected clearly in the growing strength of these Italian cities and in their wealth and their prosperity. Money began to be more plentiful than it had been in medieval times; the cities began to issue coins which were of good value and which were maintained at a high standard. The Venetian ducat, from about 1284 on, became famous throughout Europe. It was widely used as a standard. Similarly the florin, coined at Florence, became one of the most widely employed coins. The British government still mints a two-shilling piece called a florin.

A *money economy* was obviously beginning, and it naturally produced bankers and banking. In northern Italy, particularly, there appeared families whose chief activity was banking; the name Lombard Street, in London, still perpetuates the memory of the period when the Lombards were the pioneer bankers. The famous Medici family of Florence were among these bankers. Many banking terms owe their origin to Italian usage.

Not long after the Italian cities began to flourish so vigorously with this rise in commerce, other cities developed extensive trading activities. In southern France, in northern France, in Flanders and in northern Germany groups of towns became important. During the 13th and 14th centuries their trade was steadily growing; in the north some of these cities founded the *Hanse* or society, known as the Hanseatic League. Bruges, Lübeck, Hamburg and Danzig were among the leading centers of the league; their trade was mainly in the North Sea and the Baltic, although they had contacts with the Mediterranean cities, particularly with Venice, whose ships, the Flanders galleys, made annual voyages to Bruges.

It was in the 15th century, however, that the developments came about which were to furnish the most powerful elements in the Commercial Revolution. The growth of trade which we have just observed was an important preliminary. Most far-reaching changes are preceded by long, slow change; few revolutions are really sudden. So in the case of the great changes in commerce the rise of the cities and their trade prepared the way. It was the political evolution of Europe, however, during the 15th century which altered the conditions under which commerce was to be "revolutionized." In Britain, France, Spain and the Low Countries feudalism was giving way before the growing power of kings and princes. Strong central governments were replacing weak feudal control; larger areas of territory were being brought under a single, unified political system. In England the strong Tudor dynasty established itself in 1485; in France, the wily Louis XI (1461–1483) restored the royal power after the ravages of the Hundred Years' War; in Spain the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile laid the foundation for a strong monarchy; the Netherlands came under the sway of the great Hapsburg family; among the various German peoples, dynastic states began to emerge. These political events signified that, generally speaking, law and order would henceforth be enforced over areas wider than those of feudalism; security of movement would be greater; trade would find a more powerful protector in the central government. Wider markets would be

available; tolls might be somewhat reduced; roads and bridges might be safer and maintained in better repair. The *king's justice* would supplant that of the feudal lord and be surer, on the whole, for the merchant; the *king's highway* would replace the private way of the feudal estate, and be safer and longer.

Added to these highly important changes came the remarkable explorations by sea which have named this period the Age of Discovery. Vasco da Gama reached the coast of India via the Cape of Good Hope in 1498, and was followed by Albuquerque, who carried the flag of Portugal to the Spice Islands in the heart of the East Indies; Columbus brought to Europe the knowledge of a New World, and Magellan's fleet circumnavigated the earth. It is hardly necessary to mention the host of other explorers who expanded European knowledge of the world—the Cabots, the De Sotos, the Verrazanos, the Cartiers and many more. Not only were new continents made known and new routes to the riches of the East revealed but vast changes in the nature of commerce were made possible and, indeed, necessary. Henceforth the center of commercial activity by sea was to be not the landlocked Mediterranean or the Baltic Sea but the broad Atlantic Ocean. From now on ships were to be built larger and more seaworthy and were to be rigged for sailing rather than for rowing. The type of trade which Hanseatic merchants had hitherto conducted was now to be extended and increased. Hereafter, long distance voyages, big scale trading and wider markets were to be sought. Thus we can see the Commercial Revolution in process.

Leadership in trade began to pass from the cities of the Mediterranean—Venice, Genoa, Florence, Pisa, to those peoples whose harbors on the seacoast gave them easier access to the wide expanse of the Atlantic; to the Spaniards, Portuguese, French, Flemish, Dutch and English in their cities of Cadiz, Lisbon, La Rochelle, Nantes, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Bristol and London. . . .

In a very important way these growing cities differed in their conduct of trade and industry from the Mediterranean cities and those of the Baltic and the North Sea. They were not essentially independent, self-governing cities, making wars and making treaties; they did not have the freedom of regulating trade almost entirely in the interest of their own gilds of merchants and craftsmen. They were the "good cities" of kings. They were governed more and more as parts of the states of these kings. Trade rules and customs tariffs were hereafter to be made for states and not merely for single cities. Many of these state regulations were, it is true, an outgrowth or expansion of those previously made by the medieval cities, or by the gilds in the cities. But they were now applied on a much larger scale and began to differ in various ways. State policy succeeded town policy. . . .

As lands were acquired overseas, in North America, South America, Africa and Asia, they were organized, generally, into colonies. These colonies were accompanied by important changes in trade and in ideas about commerce. How should trade be carried on with, and in, these new colonies? What should be the relation of traders in the colonies to those of the mother country? How far should the royal or state government control and regulate this trade? These problems, and the attempts to solve them, affected very deeply, it may clearly be seen, both the manner in which trade was carried on and the ideas or theories about trade. The effect was, in fact, revolutionary.

Trading companies were perhaps the most tangible evidence of this revolution. The new, large-scale, ocean-going trade of which we have spoken, plus the wider opportunities available in the new lands, produced these companies. In the Middle Ages, trade had been carried on by individuals; there was almost none of what we should now call "wholesale" dealing. . . . In the later Middle Ages, partnerships began to be formed, but they were on a small scale and mostly for very limited undertakings.

Now, however, enormous opportunities had appeared; these opportunities needed larger quantities of goods, more expensive equipment for carrying them and, in general, far more money or capital than the average individual possessed. Big ships, wholesale dealings, long voyages and adventurous exploitation of strange lands demanded big sums of money. Hence, merchants began to combine their resources; thus companies originated. . . .

It remained for the formation of the *Joint-Stock Company* to produce a most significant innovation. This company was so called because it was a genuine joint or sharing undertaking; a company was formed into which each of the members put some money and received in return a proportionate *share* of the stock of the company; each member shared the risks, the losses and the gains. The company was ordinarily organized to last indefinitely and to undertake, sometimes, a variety of kinds of trade in one or many localities. Such an association might obviously be very powerful, depending on the amount of money contributed by the joint owners of the stock; at any rate the resources represented by a joint-stock company could be used for business on a much greater scale than was possible in medieval times. It is from the organization of such companies, indeed, that the development began which led more or less directly to the great business associations of our own day.

12

*The Industrial Revolution**

HERBERT HEATON

Over the years Herbert Heaton has taught economic history in England, Canada, and, since 1927, in the United States. He is the author of an *Economic History of Europe* and, until recently, was professor at the University of Minnesota. In response to an editor's request, the author discusses the "industrial revolution" in the light of recent scholarship.

The Editor's letter asked for an article on the industrial revolution, "with the view of bringing teachers up to date on newer scholarship and interpretations." So I spent the morning of Thanksgiving Day examining several recent high school or university history or social science texts to see how they handled economic developments. I soon found I had a new reason for being

* Herbert Heaton, "The Industrial Revolution," *Social Education*, II (March, 1938). Used by permission of the author and the journal.

thankful. One *History of Europe* gives 102 pages out of 845 to economic conditions and trends, and another gives 136 pages out of 1024. This is a mighty advance since the 'eighties, when Fyffe wrote over a thousand pages and never mentioned a machine or a railroad. It is even better than conditions were thirty years ago, when the *Cambridge Modern History* included only three economic chapters in its fourteen volumes. The "Manor," the "Commercial Revolution," "Mercantilism," and the "Industrial Revolution" have definitely been admitted to the texts. . . .

This flush of gratitude for the many crumbs that are now falling from the general historian's table is, however, tempered a little by the staleness of some of the crumbs. Even the best of the university texts have provoked me to make several query marks in the margin; and some of the high school books ought to have whole paragraphs or even pages torn out. A teacher who said that the Roman Empire fell in 476, that the renaissance began when a Greek scholar migrated from Constantinople to Florence in 1397, that the American Constitution was a popular document, or that Germany was solely responsible for the World War would be accused of being old fashioned. Yet that is what often happens when general surveyors or writers of historical introductions to social science deal with economic history. This is inevitable, for the subject is being overhauled by higher criticism of the contents and the ideas of the founding fathers. Those men began their serious study only about sixty years ago and did a grand job with the limited data at their disposal. The second generation, working with a vastly enlarged mass of material, has revised or scrapped some of the pioneers' conclusions, and the third generation is now knocking at the door, or rather knocking some doors down. Almost every issue of the special periodicals forces us to change an opinion or an emphasis; the subject is as living, as exciting, as contemporary physics. But the task of keeping up with the bright young people on the research front line is hard on the heart and lungs of those of us who are over forty. It is even more strenuous for those who wish to be well informed academic general practitioners.

Such higher criticism has been devastating in two fields well known to history teachers. These are the "Manor" and the "Industrial Revolution." Of the "Manor" there is room here only to say that anyone who thinks he has done justice to the medieval countryside when he has described the manorial system is almost as wrong as he would be if he passed off a picture of a slave plantation as an adequate account of the American countryside. Of the "Industrial Revolution," the sharp lines and strong colors—chiefly rose and black—of the old picture have become so blurred that some of us now put the title in quotation marks or avoid using it.

That old picture, painted about 1880 by Arnold Toynbee,* is a triptych, or a melodrama in three acts. First there is "The Eve," still, placid, quiet, at the end of a long day that reaches back to the Normans, Nero, or even Noah. The methods of agriculture, industry, and transportation have changed little in a thousand years. Production is carried on by small manufacturers or farmers. The former, like the latter, live in the country, combine industry and agriculture, and supplement the family labor supply by training an apprentice and perhaps employing a journeyman or two. The

* Arnold Toynbee, English economic historian and reformer, delivered a series of lectures to workingmen later published as *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England* (1884). [Ed.]

wage earner usually works, aided by his family, in his own home on materials put out to him by his employer; but he may work under his master's roof. Between master and man is a "warm attachment"; they call each other by their Christian nicknames. The class of capitalist employers is still "in its infancy"; some merchant-employers put out material to be processed in the homes of their employees or of small masters, and a few factories or central workshops exist. But in general the family firm and the family farm prevail. Division of class and of labor is slight. The worker can express his personality in his work, though what happens if it is crooked is not clear. Production is for local markets or for the producer's larder and wardrobe, since defective means of transportation and mercantilistic policies shut off distant consumers. No one earns great rewards, but the domestic system insures on the whole a sound and healthy life under conditions favorable to the development of mind, body, and personal dignity. Contentment spins at the cottage door; there is plenty of honeysuckle, ivy, and good ale in this "quiet world" of "scarcely perceptible movement." A comprehensive code of state regulation of production and trade combines with technical inertia to prevent anything from changing.

Then, with a rapidity known in the tropics, "The Night" falls, a night full of noise and action. Seven men—four Lancashire men (Kay, Hargreaves, Arkwright, and Crompton), two Scots (Adam Smith and James Watt), and one Episcopalian parson (Cartwright)—invent some textile machines, improve the steam engine, or write *The Wealth of Nations*. Meanwhile other men revolutionize agriculture and redraw the village map, while others improve roads and rivers or cut canals. But it is the seven men who get their names on the record, for their actions or thoughts "destroyed the old world and built a new one." And what they did was crowded into a brief night that lasted from about 1760 to 1780.

Act Three is "The Murky Dawn," in which the effects become visible. It is a period of "economic revolution and anarchy," as machinery and steam overrun industry, and Smith's plea for laissez faire sweeps the statute book clear of the mercantilistic devil. Population is "torn up by the roots" and dragged "from cottages in distant valleys into factories and cities"; independent farmers, expelled from their lands and impoverished by the extension of sheep raising and the inclosure movement, join the small manufacturing master or journeymen in this rural exodus. In the towns a landless propertyless proletariat is the victim of the seven deadly sins of unrestrained inhuman industrial capitalists. The sins are the factory system, long hours, child labor, the exploitation of women, low wages, periodical or chronic unemployment, and slums. If the victims dislike the contrast between their deplorable lot and the fortunes made by fat factory owners; if they object, riot, join labor unions, or become chartists or socialists, they are shot down, put in jail, or sent to Botany Bay. Their economic masters become their political lords by displacing the landowners in the seats of government, and then legislate—or refuse to do so—with one eye on the cashbox and the other on some page of Smith, Ricardo, or Malthus. A dreary, tragic, selfish, sort of dawn! But by lunch time the weather is improving. The exploited grow class-conscious and organized, some employers grow softhearted, laws are passed to permit unions, to regulate child labor, or to provide a better water supply. Mass production makes goods cheaper, the corn laws are repealed, Victoria becomes queen, Albert the Good builds the Crystal Palace, and by the time it is opened

in 1851 the grim tragedy is promising to turn into whatever the urban counterpart of a pastoral should be called.

This story has got into the general books, and the title for it has become so widely accepted that some wit has said all college courses now begin with the amoeba, Aristotle, or the industrial revolution. That is —all courses except those given by the economic historian, for he is getting more and more suspicious of the name and of the crisp dramatic conception. In the great university schools of economic history, Manchester admits that the name was useful when first adopted but thinks it has now served its turn and can scarcely be applied aptly to a movement which was in preparation for two centuries and then occupied at least one more. Oxford finds there is "no hiatus in economic development, but always a constant tide of progress and change, in which the old is blended almost imperceptibly with the new." Edinburgh chimes in with the remark that "sudden catastrophic change is inconsistent with the slow gradual process of human evolution." Harvard insists that the technological changes of the eighteenth century were "only the completion of tendencies which had been significantly evident since Leonardo da Vinci." Birmingham reinforces this by asserting that the developments between 1760 and 1830 "did but carry further, though on a far greater scale and with far greater rapidity, changes which had been proceeding long before." Cambridge finds the period presents a study in slow motion, and in London they tell the pass students there was an industrial revolution, but tell the honor students there never was any such thing.

These quotations give a composite picture of the revised view of the industrial revolution. Let me put it in three generalizations. (1) Steam and the textile machines did not break in on an almost unchanging world of smallscale slightly capitalistic enterprise. (2) The rate of technical change was *lento* rather than *allegro* for a long time; it took decades or even generations to transform old industries and build up new ones. (3) The social and economic "evils" were not new; they were not as black or as widespread as is usually asserted; their causes were often due to special or non-economic factors; and they were in no small measure offset by a substantial improvement in the real wages and living standards of a large part of the wage-earning population. Sentimental unhistorical hysteria is not a good approach to a problem, whether present or past, but it dominated much of the discussion a hundred years ago and the description of a hundred years ago.

Let me elaborate these three contentions. In Toynbee's day little was known of sixteenth-century economic life, and little of any eighteenth-century industry except textiles. Now we know that during this period there were important changes in methods of production, and a quickening spirit of scientific inquiry and of inventive curiosity. New methods of extracting and refining metals were discovered; the preparation of silk yarn, the knitting of hose, the weaving of ribbons, the making of clocks, the finishing of cloth, all obtained new or improved equipment, as did shipbuilding, brewing, mining, sugar refining, and the manufacture of chemicals. The harnessing of wind, water, and animal power was made more efficient, and coal was used in increasing quantities by industries which needed heat. Professor Nef * has shown that England had an industrial revolution

* John U. Nef, American economic historian and author of *The Rise of the British Coal Industry* (1932) and *Industry and Government in France and England, 1540–1640* (1940). [Ed.]

between 1540 and 1640, and that the rate of technical change was possibly as striking during the age of Shakespeare as during that of Wordsworth or Byron. Holland, Sweden, France, and England alike contributed to technical progress, and by 1700 scientists, especially physicists, had learned enough to be able to answer some questions asked by industrialists. True, some industries or processes stood still, and spinning and weaving did not change much; but many were on the march.

At the same time the organization of production was changing. Small craftsmen did not have the capital necessary for some of the new equipment, or for bridging the long gap between buying raw material and getting paid for the finished article by a dilatory or distant customer. Hence where materials were costly or came from afar, where equipment was expensive, where the market was large or distant, the initiative had to be taken by merchants or large producers. Some of them bought the raw materials and put them out to be processed by small masters or by wage earners. Sometimes they supplied the equipment as well and paid the master only for his labor, just as he in turn might pay wages to his journeymen. Some of them gathered workers in, because the material could not be put out. You could not put out coal mining, smelting, sugar refining, building, cloth finishing, shipbuilding, calico printing, or the making of glass, bricks, paper, leather, or gunpowder. As these industries grew, so did the number of persons working for wages in their employer's plant; and the combined expansion of putting out and gathering in had created a large propertyless proletariat long before 1760. It may be true that in 1640 the great majority of industrial workers "laboured in their homes, in town cellars or garrets, or in village cottages. But that majority was by no means so overwhelming as has been supposed" (Nef) and was declining rapidly before a flying shuttle flew or a spinning jenny was devised, even in Lancashire cotton production. Wherever men worked, many of them were wage earners.

If they were, their wages tended to be low; but so were all returns in an age of low productivity. Their hours were long—twelve or more a day—but so were those of their employers and of independent workers, since the rate of production was so slow. Their children and their wives had to work, for every scrap of labor was needed; but so did all children and wives, except those of the rich. Unemployment was frequent and severe, industrial diseases and accidents were common, living and working conditions were often dank, unhealthy, and malodorous, whether in town or village. Labor unions were formed, class conflicts occurred, and the state usually took the employers' side.

This sketch of the period before 1760 takes much of the melodrama out of the next seventy years. Some of the remainder disappears, when we examine the pace at which the textile machines and the improved steam engines were adopted. The cotton industry, which was the scene of the famous inventions, has been used as a sample case. But it was not typical; various factors, such as the newness of the industry, the suitability of the cotton fiber for mechanical treatment, and the great market existing for cheap cotton cloth, prevent the story of cotton from being typical of the changes in industry at large. The transfer from domestic hand spinning of cotton to factory machine spinning was rapid—a matter of about twenty years. By 1815 "the power loom was entering into effective rivalry with the hand loom in the cotton industry, though another generation was to elapse before the battle was finally decided."

But cotton was a lonely hare in an industrial world of tortoises. It loomed far less large in that world than it has done in the textbooks, for even in the 1830's the number of its employees was only two-thirds that of the number of female domestic servants.

When we get our eyes off this exception, we find the pace of change in the rest of industry much more sedate. Wool spinning, on hand jennies instead of on wheels, was still being done in Yorkshire homes in 1850. Power looms had not seriously threatened the woolen hand weaver at that date; the transfer from hand to power weaving came quietly during the next twenty-five years, but even in 1877 I find one manufacturer contending that the old method was as cheap as the new. As for steam power, Watt had only 320 of his engines at work in England in 1800, and in 1830 a quarter of the power used by cotton mills was still drawn from waterwheels. Mining had no great technical change, but a series of little ones. Building remained a manual industry until the concrete mixer came. The pottery industry relied less on machinery than on other factors. Clothes making, glass blowing, and printing were late in getting mechanical equipment, while mechanical engineering only slowly developed the tools it needed for shaping metal parts cheaply and accurately. In 1850 everything was not over except the shouting. Cheap steel, cheap lubricants, industrial chemistry, and cheap electricity were still to come. The railroad had won its battle, but the steamship was still fighting its sailing rival, even on the North Atlantic. Away from Lancashire and the railroad tracks, technical change between 1760 and 1850 had been gradual, slow, and unspectacular.

What then of the social and economic consequences and of the seven deadly sins? In the first place, if we leave out one or two exceptional industries or areas, people were not torn loose from a rural life of pleasant and virtually independent enterprise and plunged almost overnight into the horrible existence of an urban factory slum-dwelling proletariat. Many of them were already proletarian; many of them already lived in industrial towns which now grew large or in villages which grew into towns; and some of them already worked under the employer's roof. For them there was not much shift of habitat or of economic class. There was little mass migration, and little long distance movement, except by the Irish, who swarmed into England before they swarmed into North America, and who made many labor and urban problems much more acute than they would otherwise have been.

In the second place, before we beat our anger to white heat in describing the slums, the foul streets, the smoke-laden atmosphere, the lack of water or sanitation, the ravages of disease, etc., let us remember three controlling considerations. (a) Technical. Cheap bricks, cheap sewer or water pipes, and cheap house fixtures were not available till at least 1840, and knowedge concerning public health was still scanty. Compare conditions in the industrial towns with those of non-industrial communities or with rural housing facilities; then it is evident that the housing and sanitary shortcomings of the manufacturing districts were not wholly due to the new machinery and the factory system. (b) Constitutional. Until 1835 no town government had adequate powers to cope with the new urban problems. (c) Economic. The provision of houses was never, until recent years, regarded as a public duty. It was left to private enterprise and the stimulus of investment or speculation. The potential builder considered whether his capital would yield

a better return in houses than in the many other fields that were thirsty for capital; and the amount he put into a dwelling was limited by what the tenant could afford to pay. In one English town 76 percent of the houses were rented at a dollar a week or less in 1839; the total capital outlay for one house could not be more than six hundred dollars. In view of the western world's housing impasse since 1914, we must speak more kindly of the builder who a century ago put a roof over the head of the poor, without the aid of mass-produced materials, machinery, or government subsidies.

In the third place, few of the factory working conditions were new. Not even the discipline of fixed hours of work was new to industries which had been conducted in central workshops. Night work may have been new, but long and late hours were not. The cruel treatment of some children by foremen was a personal matter; parents had not been free from it in the domestic workshop, and it was part of that streak of cruelty common in prisons, the army and navy, schools, and homes. The thing that was new and revolutionary was not the "evils," but the discovery that they were evils. For that we have to thank those employers who were heartless. We have to thank the factory for making noticeable in the mass what had been ignored in scattered small instances. We can thank onlookers, whether lay or ecclesiastic, and even Tory politicians who saw in factory conditions a new whip with which to flog their Whig industrial opponents. Finally, much credit must go to those employers—and they were many—who treated their workers decently. These men belonged to that growing army of humanitarians who cleaned up slavery, made the penal code less fierce, welcomed the attack on excessive drinking, pushed the cause of education, built hospitals, dispensaries, and charitable institutions, organized the relief of the unemployed in depressed days, established good working conditions, and fought for better factory laws and better town government.

One final comment may help us to understand better the years between 1760 and 1830. Twenty-six of those years (1789–1815) were dominated by the emotions and strain of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic war, and sixteen of them (1815–1830) were filled with the task of readjustment after a generation of war. . . .

How does all this affect the teacher's presentation of economic aspects of modern Europe? It takes out some of the heroics—and the villainics, if I can coin a word—it cuts down the pace, and leaves the tale that of a trend rather than of a tumult. But there is enough left, and space has been made available for more that is of first class importance. Any survey of the making of modern Europe should have something to say about the gradual industrialization of parts of the continent, including the effect of hydro-electricity, industrial chemistry, and post-Bessemer metallurgical developments; the emergence of intensive agriculture; the effect of good roads, canals, railroads, steamships, and refrigeration; the end of serfdom in other countries than Russia and the evolution of an efficient peasant proprietor economy; the growing need for more capital and better banking; the unprecedented growth of population and the mass migration of 50,000,000 Europeans to other continents in a century; the steady advance of voluntary association and the influence of the social conscience in producing the social service state; the instability of a complex capitalistic system in a world economy; the twentyfold increase in the value of world trade; the impact of the new world on the old; and the ability of Europe to

raise greatly the standard of living of an expanding population, thanks to better technique, better organization, and freedom for a hundred years from Armageddon. And if textbooks must have illustrations, I would dispense with pictures of the spinning jenny, Louis Blanc, and even Karl Marx, if thereby I had room for two graphs, one of the movement of general prices and one of the business cycle. These two would explain a lot of social, political, and even diplomatic history.

13

*The Factory System**

JOHN L. HAMMOND

A vital phase of industrialization has been the development of the factory system. Among those well-qualified to discuss this basic feature of our economy is the English historian John L. Hammond. Author of many volumes on the early industrial development of England, he wrote this essay for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*—a storehouse of information for the interested student.

Most persons would describe the factory system as a modern form of production which developed in western Europe in the eighteenth century and has since spread over the world. This description is true of the factory system, but it is not true of the factory. Little is known of the organization of textile production in ancient Egypt, Assyria and Phoenicia, but it is clear that in those early civilizations textile production was not merely a domestic industry. The term factory is applied to three different kinds of establishment which existed before the eighteenth century. Princes and rich men at different times and in different places set up great establishments in order to provide for their own needs and those of their courts and households. . . .

Thus there were factories before the factory system. What is more, there were factories using water power to economize and supplement human labor. In the fourteenth century there were spinning mills in Bologna and paper mills in Nuremberg driven by water power. If capital had been more plentiful and markets larger and easier of access, a factory system in the modern sense might have grown up at that time. But these conditions were not fulfilled until after the discovery of the Atlantic routes. That discovery brought fresh markets within the reach of Europe; it led to a great increase of wealth; it stimulated invention and organization. Hence it created the conditions under which the factory ceased to be a rare and interesting example of human ingenuity and became a normal feature of social life. The factory in the modern sense was the response of industry to the new demands made by commerce. It was the organization of effort on a plan which applied the principle of the division

* The selection from John L. Hammond, "Factory System" in the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences;* copyright 1931 by The Macmillan Company and used with the publisher's permission.

of labor in such a way as to make the fullest use of the resources of science.

The new opportunities of industry and the general spirit of the time had given invention a great stimulus, and it was natural that the early observers of the factory system should regard the use of machinery as its distinguishing feature. . . .

Although factories which were essentially assembling plants using little machinery were not uncommon at one stage, the history of factory development is largely the history of progressive economies rendered possible by the development of machine production.

The earliest English factory in the modern sense is believed to have been a silk mill set up in Derbyshire about 1718 by a merchant named Lombe who had secured employment in a mill in Italy and brought back its secrets. But the significant history of factory development begins with the inventions that revolutionized the cotton industry half a century later. When Arkwright patented a water frame in 1769, the decisive step in making the spinning of cotton a factory process was taken. In 1785 Watt's steam engine was used for the first time in a cotton mill, and as steam power gradually replaced water power all the spinning processes passed into the mill. The change in weaving was slower. But although these first steps were all taken in England, the first factory in which all the processes involved in the manufacture of goods were carried on by power in one establishment was set up in the United States. This was the factory at Waltham, Massachusetts, built in 1814.

The story of the spread of the factory system throughout Europe and the East belongs to the history of the industrial revolution. With the introduction of railways the factory system developed on the continent of Europe. Toward the end of the nineteenth century it spread to the East, and the World War gave a great stimulus to its expansion in Japan, China, India and the countries of South America. The construction on a large scale of factories grouped in federations occupies an important place in the economic plans of the Soviet Union.

The factory system spread not only from country to country, but from industry to industry. During most of the nineteenth century the textiles, especially cotton, were the characteristic factory products. Gradually leather goods, metal goods, machinery, furniture, food and most of the other products of modern society have been drawn within the orbit of the factory system. Moreover, methods of work and principles of organization and management developed in the factory are being widely adapted to the extractive industries and even to agriculture.

Concurrently there have been changes in the nature of the factory itself. Thus the improvement of the early factories led first to a great increase in their size. Between 1860 and 1890, for instance, the number of cotton factories in the United States declined from 1091 to 905, but the value of their products increased by 179 percent and the number of spindles per mill by 227 percent. Such growth depended, however, on local conditions. Thus in Germany, where the domestic worker held his ground much longer than in Great Britain, as late as 1882 only 38 percent of the factory workers were in factories employing more than 50 persons and 42 percent of all textile workers were in establishments employing less than five persons. In general the trend has been toward increasing size of plants especially in industries using heavy machinery, but smaller units have persisted in many types of operation. Concentration has gone furthest in the United States, where in 1923 one half of the wage earners in the country

were employed by less than 4 percent of all the industrial establishments.

What is perhaps the most characteristic feature of modern factory production also had its beginning and has had its greatest development in the United States. In 1851 visitors to the great exhibition in London were struck by the exhibits from the United States, and two years later a report on American factory methods was drawn up for the British government by commissioners who made a tour of the industrial districts. The commissioners noted as a novelty the production in large numbers of standardized articles on a basis of repetition in factories characterized by ample workshop room and admirable system. Mass production of standardized articles, so conspicuous a feature of modern industry, had already begun. The World War stimulated the development of new methods of factory organization both in the United States and elsewhere. The introduction of automatic machinery had already made possible the elimination of many processes and many workers. War demands encouraged the further development of the production of standardized articles or parts. This was accompanied by a widespread development of the principles of scientific management, a new attention to the importance of cost accounting systems and further study of the technical efficiency of the factory set up.

In earlier days there was a movement toward concentration of all processes under one roof, but in many industries today it is found to be more economical to separate processes and to employ different factories for the production of different parts. Thus the factory tends more and more to be a unit in vast organizations, the unit representing all that science and method can accomplish toward making one particular process as efficient and economical as it can be made.

The early British factories using water power were built beside streams in country places. These country factories, like the collieries and ironworks of the time, were the center of the social life of the district. The capitalist often housed his workpeople, kept shops for their needs and provided apprentice houses for the pauper children who worked in his mill. The extreme example of this type of community in the modern world is the mill village in the southern states of America, where the mill owner owns the village, the dry goods store and the cinema and pays not only the parson, the doctor and the school teacher, but the policeman. Many of the factories in China, Japan and India, especially those owned by foreign capital, have been and are the center of similar mill villages. Such a system provides opportunities both for oppression and benevolence.

C. Capitalism and the Economy of the United States

14

*The Rise of Capitalism**

LOUIS M. HACKER

There is a rather common tendency to confuse the relationship between the factory system and capitalism. Insofar as the economic development of western civilization is concerned, the factory system is a method of manufacturing goods which first developed on a significant scale in eighteenth-century England. It was, of course, preceded by other techniques—usufacture (production in, by, and for the household), the guild system, the domestic, or "putting out," system, and the central workshop. The factory, then, is a stage in the industrial development of the west. Professor Louis M. Hacker, economist, historian, formerly dean of Columbia University's School of General Studies, is the author of many stimulating articles and books. In his penetrating analysis, *The Triumph of American Capitalism,* Mr. Hacker discusses the nature and the various stages of development of modern capitalism.

Fundamentally, capitalism is an economic order based on the profit motive: therefore its leading characteristics are the private ownership of the means of production, their operation for pecuniary gain, their control by private enterprisers, and the use of credit and the wage system. This is capitalism in the pure form and it expresses the aspirations and program of a relatively brief era in its history. In other words, the capitalist system, as a program, held sway largely during the periods of the dominance of what we may call Industrial Capitalism and Finance Capitalism. Put chronologically, this era lay between the middle of the eighteenth century and the end of the 1920's in the histories of western European countries and the United States. Preceding the triumph of Industrial Capitalism and its development into Finance Capitalism, there was an antecedent stage, which we may call Mercantile Capitalism, and a subsequent stage, which we may call State Capitalism, in both of which the character of capitalism did not partake of the pure forms above described. That was due to the fact that the state, or public authority, played a part (not necessarily guided by the profit motive) in the determination of policies affecting production and trade. Nevertheless, whether the stage of capitalist development was mixed or pure, it may be said that production for profit set the tone, or represented the prevailing spirit, of producers and enterprisers over the epoch certainly from the sixteenth century to the present day. In the case of peripheral regions, as we shall see later, this capitalist spirit appeared even earlier.

* Louis M. Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947). Used by permission of the publisher.

Other manifestations of this capitalist order, or spirit, may now be detailed. It stands for the accumulation of money capital, over and above the satisfaction of the needs for current consumer goods, in order to convert these accumulations into more producer goods. It stands for the creation of a free working class divorced from ownership of the instruments of production—the land, the workshops, the machines; this working class, therefore, is compelled to sell its only commodity, its labor power, in the market. It stands for the establishment of large workshops, or factories, into which the working class is gathered for the purpose of producing goods; that is to say, labor is socialized and its functioning is continuous and under discipline. It stands for the creation of an ever-widening market which can absorb both the producer and consumer goods created in this fashion. And it is intimately linked with a commercial agriculture that is capable of feeding and clothing an industrial and urban population no longer self-sufficient. Finally, it requires a state, or public authority, to protect private property rights which articulates and encourages social and intellectual rationalization and explanation of the accumulative process. It may be said, therefore, that capitalism, operating on the basis of accumulation (the reverse of which is borrowed money) and utilizing a working class separated from the means of production and paid wages, produces goods for a market to enrich the private owners of the means of production. It is protected by the institutionalism of the state and by a large number of agencies for the dissemination of intelligence.

Subsidiary characteristics of the capitalist order may also be mentioned. It has rational organization. That is to say, its operations have been based on long-term and calculable planning. It has erected plants that may be expected to have a normal life and in the process of operation pay for themselves. It has produced goods as a rule in excess of current needs because of the existence of a widening market. It has been in a position to promise employment, at any rate with some degree of regularity, thus making possible the gathering of workers in large urban areas. And it has utilized a scientific system of accounts. It is not strange that double-entry bookkeeping, as we know it today, first appeared in the Italian cities in the thirteenth century, for it was exactly in the Italian peninsula that the original evidences of modern capitalism showed themselves. As Werner Sombart, the great German economic historian, has said: "Capitalism without double-entry bookkeeping is simply inconceivable."

Again, capitalism has perfected a financial mechanism as one of its most important tools. It utilizes bills of exchange. It employs negotiable securities. It has created banks for both savings and investment purposes. All this assures the universal recognition of counters, or symbols of capital, and permits a steady flow of savings into business enterprise for both long-term and short-term needs. As early as the end of the twelfth century bills of exchange were in common use in the commercial centers of Europe. Originating in Florence, in connection with its textile industries, bills on merchants in Germany, the Low Countries, and France were honored everywhere. Thus, even in the late Middle Ages, despite the chaos of languages and boundaries, capitalism had already learned to talk in a universal tongue.

Also, capitalism, in its modern sense, is based on machine production. It has applied the great lessons of physics, chemistry, and biology to the creation of technology; and technology has made possible mass

production. With such methods, capitalism, holding out the promise of the achievement of a life of abundance, has populated, urbanized, and standardized the world. Indeed the application of technology to the production and exchange of goods has been capitalism's greatest functional achievement.

These attributes of capitalism, naturally, are not all unique to this particular system of production. Some were to be found under the slave economy of antiquity and the feudal economy of the Middle Ages; some exist today in the Soviet Union. However, if we were to seek a single distinguishing hallmark of the capitalist system, that one which could be truly denominated as setting it off from the others that came before it, and that separates it from socialism, it would be the wage system. Under feudalism, the principle of the "just price" prevailed, and this was entirely an ethical concept. Under the plans for socialism, compensation is to be on the basis of need and not production, another ethical concept. But not so in the case of capitalism: for under its dispensation the free worker sells not the product of his labor but only his labor power; and he receives not the whole social value of the goods or services he creates but enough to sustain him and his family in terms of the prevailing standards of living. This is a market concept, divorced from ethics obviously, and based upon the automatic operations of supply and demand and the price system. Its rigors have been tempered a little bit, of course, over the past one hundred years, to prevent out-and-out distress; and today we are moving in the direction of social security. Nevertheless, for the working population, the wage system prevails.

I have said that there have been stages in capitalism's development, accounting for a movement from a mixed form to a pure form and again to a mixed form. This does not mean that our capitalist society has turned full circle and is, at the present day, back to the point from which it started as early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The discussion of the epochs in capitalism's history will illuminate what I have in mind.

1. The Stage of Mercantile Capitalism. There are really two characteristics of this stage, the one economic and the other political; and they do not necessarily exist side by side. Economically, the hallmark of mercantile capitalism is the association of the capitalist or enterpriser with trade and banking rather than with industrial production. This stage started right within the Middle Ages and continued until the triumph of automatic production. Therefore, the *typical* capitalist (obviously there were always exceptions) in thirteenth-century Venice and Genoa, in fourteenth-century Barcelona and Bruges, in sixteenth-century London and Paris, in seventeenth-century Bristol and Liverpool, in eighteenth-century Boston, New York and Philadelphia, indeed in mid-nineteenth-century New York, was a merchant capitalist rather than an industrial capitalist. He owned ships and warehouses, he operated in a countinghouse or bank, he had agents and correspondents in different ports; and he did his business in the buying and selling of goods at wholesale and the lending out of money at interest. When he established links with production, it was again as a merchant and banker rather than as an owner and operator of a workshop or mine.

In America, the first capitalists were such merchants who, creating the original urban communities of Boston, Philadelphia, New York, Newport, and Charleston, sent

the produce of the New World to Europe and the West Indies and brought back the finished ware of textiles, iron goods, and notions. Indeed, mercantile capitalism continued to typify the activity of capitalists in America long after its leadership had been wrested away in England by industrial capitalism. In fact, we may say that in America the characteristic capitalist was a merchant or banker up to the middle 1840's; whereas in England the characteristic capitalist had become an industrial enterpriser by the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

The other side of this shield, that is, the political, was the doctrine of mercantilism. We shall have more to say later of this idea as a public policy; it is enough for our present purposes to indicate that the mercantilist conception of the state was very much like present-day totalitarianism. All the energies of the nation, and indeed of the empire, were to be bent toward the enrichment of the community as a whole: to make it more wealthy in this world's goods naturally but, even more important, perhaps, to make it more powerful. If the feudal economy was striving toward the achievement of plenty (which the Middle Ages never attained because of primitive organization and methods of production), the mercantile economy was striving toward the achievement of power (and for brief intervals met with success: witness the empires of Charles V and Louis XIV).

The significant thing about the mercantilist age was that economic power and political power were not necessarily conjoined. The merchant capitalists engaged in buying and selling and the lending of money capital; the control of the state, on the other hand, was in the grip of the royal dynasties. Hence, private fortunes did not have a long life, for at any moment the royal authority, which was absolute, by decree could snuff out a fortune or help in laying the basis for a new one. This was so, certainly, in Spain from the fifteenth right into the nineteenth century; it was also so in France up to the French Revolution. In England, as a result of the Puritan Revolution of the seventeenth century, state power fell increasingly into the hands of the merchant capitalists themselves. Nevertheless, the spheres of free economic activity continued circumscribed, by law at any rate, until the nineteenth century.

Mercantilism, in the interests of state power, therefore, stood for virtually complete control by public authority of economic activity. It was in such an environment that the American colonies were established and continued to grow during the first one hundred and fifty years of their history. The American Revolution cut the connection with English mercantilism once and for all, and by 1800, in the United States, the state was no longer an aggressive agency. The road was open for the development of industrial capitalism.

2. The Stage of Industrial Capitalism. In this period, again, we are to note unique economic and political aspects. Under the dispensation of laissez-faire principles and the doctrines of utilitarianism, the enterpriser was encouraged to pursue his self-interest: and he had an extraordinary sphere of operations in industrial production. Capitalist activity now became associated largely with the ownership and management of factories, where, thanks to automatic devices, it was possible to turn out vast quantities of producer and consumer goods on a mass basis. The release of a rural peasantry from the land and its induction into urbanized communities were characteristics of this stage; as were also the widening of the market through railroad building and the opening up of backward economic regions of the world for the production of basic raw materials

and the absorption of primary consumer goods.

Towering fortunes were built up in cotton textiles, ironware, steel, oil refining; and they were safe from the depredatory hands of the state because, politically, the state became a passive one. Side by side with the triumph of industrial capitalism went the dismantling of state power. Political authority was to be concerned only with the protection of the so-called natural rights of the individual—life, liberty, and property. So distrustful of the state was the average industrial capitalist (certainly this was so in England) that he was even willing to give up his claims to a protected national market. Laissez-faire, pushed to its obvious limits, meant also an international division of labor: an economic world, in short, based entirely upon the free exchange of goods and services without interference by any political authority.

This was an ideal, or the wishful thought, of English industrial capitalists; and for a short time, they, at any rate, were able to implement it. From the middle of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the World War English capitalism lived in the uninhibited atmosphere of a free-trade economy. The United States threw up protecting tariff walls during the Civil War; France and Germany followed in the 1880's. But English capitalism, operating a rationalized plant and supported by great accumulations, was still prepared to sell its cheap goods in the world market in competition with all comers; and buy its basic raw materials wherever it could find them because it was ever ready to finance the primary producers.

3. The Stage of Finance Capitalism. Even after controls over industrial enterprise began increasingly to fall under the sway of banking capital—as a result of the building up of giant integrations and the creation of combinations to check competition—capitalism was still free in the sense that it was not compelled to submit to political dictates. In the late 1870's in England, in the 1880's and 1890's in Germany, in the 1900's in the United States, the political program's emphasis increasingly was upon imperialist expansion. To find exploitable raw materials, to develop markets for finished goods, to open up areas into which capital accumulations could be moved, the state's assistance was necessary. This was the period when Europe advanced into and pacified the whole African continent as well as near, middle and eastern Asia. This was the epoch of the conquest of backward peoples and establishment of colonies and protectorates.

Finance capital, piling up huge profits from monopoly and near-monopoly controls over industrial production at home, poured its savings into every economically backward region: to build railroads, establish plantations, work mines, construct and operate public utilities. The state's support was necessary to defend property rights in Africa, Syria, Persia, India, China; and it was freely given, but again under the rules of laissez-faire capitalism. In colonies and protectorates under imperialism foreign capital was not weighed down with disabilities or altogether banned. Indeed, the state made no effort to limit fields of capitalist enterprise so that in India and China quite often English and native capital was permitted to erect steel and textile works in competition with those in the United Kingdom.

4. The Stage of State Capitalism. The pendulum swung back once more, particularly after the World War. As a result of Europe's experience in that conflict, first in Italy and Germany, then in England, France, and the United States—with the over-building of plant, the opening up of

new raw material resources, and the threat of social upheaval—capitalism was compelled to call upon the state for protection. The pressure of competition everywhere necessitated the erection of defenses for the safe-guarding of the home market. And all over Europe, and in the United States, too, as a result, tariff walls were pushed up, quotas were imposed upon foreign producers, foreign exchange was regulated: to keep out the foreign trespasser. State power was being rehabilitated.

The onset of depression in 1930 further accelerated the process. The United States was not alone in experimenting with state capitalism, as a result of which the state not only became the defender of property rights but even began to initiate enterprise. For the danger of wholesale bankruptcy for producers of raw materials and fabricators of finished ware and the existence of vast numbers of persons without employment was more than a challenge: it was a threat to social stability. State intervention was necessary.

The political aspects of modern-day state capitalism more and more take on the features of mercantile capitalism. The hand of the state is to be found everywhere. It closely regulates industrial relations, of course; it limits production; it creates work. Indeed, in the totalitarian countries of Italy and Germany it moves toward the extinguishment of private-property rights and the supplanting of state capitalism by state socialism. In Russia, this step has already been achieved. Whatever the special condition, an outstanding attribute of state capitalism or state socialism, as was true under mercantilism, is the building up of a powerful bureaucracy whose members are the chief beneficiaries of the new dispensation.

This is the stage in which we now live.

15

*Capitalist Development in America**

LOUIS M. HACKER

Having surveyed the general background of modern capitalism, we turn once again to Professor Hacker, this time for his analysis of capitalist development in the United States down to the post-Civil War era. The following selection is also from his *Triumph of American Capitalism.*

It has seemed to me that a good deal of our history can be revealed in a more understanding light if we are prepared to recognize the relevancy of at least these three propositions. First, American institutionalism has been shaped, virtually from the beginning, in a capitalist climate. Second, the state itself, as an agency of authority, has been shorn of its powers much more quickly in the United States than in European countries. And third, the belief in the existence of opportunities to achieve economic equality has had a longer and more vital tradition in American history than has been the case anywhere else.

* Louis M. Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947). Used by permission of the publisher.

1. *Our climate has always been capitalist.* The thinking and processes of capitalism operate over most of the surface of the earth at the present time so pervasively that it comes with something of a shock to most of us to realize that capitalist institutions are relatively new. Of course, the beginnings of modern capitalism in Europe can be traced as far back as the eleventh century at least. But we must not forget that only peripheral regions were thus affected: parts of the eastern and western Mediterranean littorals and parts of the lands lying around the North and Baltic Seas. And these were only small islands in the vast, dead sea of feudalism where noncapitalist relations of production existed. It took western Europe a long time —in some areas half a millennium—to shake off the grip of feudalism completely. . . .

Thus, at the time when Europeans, whether they were Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, or Swiss, were moving across the Atlantic to take up their homes in the New World, and, as happened in the case of great numbers, were setting themselves up as free, independent farmers, they were leaving behind them relatives and friends in the Old World who were still functioning in terms of the village agricultural system. Strip cultivation, rights in the commons, and village organization were feudal vestigial traces that lingered on in Europe well into the nineteenth century; but they never struck deep roots in America. In short, the American farmer started out as a capitalist farmer from the very beginning.

And the same was likewise true of industrial production. Even after craftsmen began to fabricate goods with an eye to making profits rather than furnishing local ware and services, the monopolist authority of guild regulations prevailed. In fact, in the European countries, after national monarchies were estabished as we understand them today, beginning with the fifteenth century, the craft guilds continued to have the encouragement and support of the state. They controlled production, set wages, fixed the status of apprentices and journeymen. . . . The influences of the guilds in England did not begin to diminish in significance until the eighteenth century, although the state did not revoke the Statute of Laborers until the second decade of the nineteenth century.

In France, the French Revolution put an end to the guilds; while in Germany, in many remote regions, they lingered on well into the second half of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the European emigrants to America left the guilds behind them. Industrial production here, at any rate as far as guild regulations were concerned, was free from the very beginning. Again, as in agriculture, the industrial producer operated as a capitalist without need for giving hostages to an ancient feudal hang-over.

2. *The state in America was not nearly the potent agency of regulation and oppression that it was in Europe.* The American colonists had come over from countries which were dominated by the theory and policies of mercantilism, that is to say, by a conception of state power which was not unlike the present-day theory of totalitarianism. The political and economic well-being of the state was the touchstone to individual and social activity, and not contrariwise as it became under the dispensation of nineteenth-century liberalism. Many of the early settlers had fled in protest against authority, of course, whether it was in the religious or economic realms; and their allegiance to the concept of mercantilism was already weakened.

But the American Revolution cut the tie

with a single sharp blow. The American Revolution was largely a protest against the limitations and penalties imposed upon the American economy under the imperial-colonial relations of English mercantilism. It was only natural that Americans, emerging from that struggle with the mother country, should regard the state with suspicion and seek to curb its powers.

Using the instruments of the new and leveling state constitutions written during the period of the American Revolution itself, the Bill of Rights of the federal Constitution, and the doctrines and tactics of what we have named Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism, the battle was waged successfully. Out of our own experiences and without too much intellectual rationalization—for we have been a pragmatic people from the start—we worked out a utilitarian program fully fifty years before the English middle class got around to implementing the ideas of Jeremy Bentham.

If we look at the histories of England and France (in Germany the incubus of state authority was never really shaken off) by comparison, we can obtain a proper perspective. It was not until the end of the 1840's that the props of English mercantilism—the Acts of Trade and Navigation and the Corn Laws—were finally removed. In fact, legal recognition of trade-unions did not come until the 1870's. And as for the French, despite the extraordinary achievements of the French Revolution, the French middle class was compelled to struggle against a long line of usurpers, seeking to re-establish the principle of absolute monarchy (or state power), right through even the first decade of the Third Republic. It was not until the 1880's that the French state was made responsive to the needs and demands of the individual. When it comes to an unbroken history of the respect by the state for the individual's natural rights, ours is the longest; and this despite the lateness with which we entered the company of nations.

3. *America is the land pre-eminently where the ideal of equality of economic opportunity has flourished.* We are, in other words, a petty-bourgeois people, believing solidly and consistently that by the cultivation of the virtues of hard work and thrift we can in time achieve economic independence, whether it is in the capacity of farmer, small merchant, or manufacturer, white-collar worker or skilled laborer. There can be no question that originally, at any rate for sizable portions of the population, such opportunities to achieve measurable independences flourished; nor can there be further question, whether they exist currently in actuality, that the hope of their achievement still remains a vital part of the American psychology. If not for ourselves any longer, then for our children. . . .

What, then, shall we say about the actualities of opportunities of economic equality in America? They were real, certainly up to the end of the nineteenth century. In addition to the Turner explanation, as it applies to free farmers alone, the following other factors may be adduced in support of the assumption that America was the land where the petty bourgeoisie flourished.

First, it should be noted that thanks to the mercantilist system imposed by England upon the American colonies, opportunities for industrial production, except in limited fields, were closed to Americans during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the other hand, in England, industrial production had the direct support of the state—by bounties, tax remissions, the grants of monopolies, and crown subscriptions to joint-stock companies. The result was, as early as the sixteenth century,

and certainly on a sizable scale by the seventeenth century, large-scale industrial enterprise was already flourishing in mining and in the manufacture of ironware, chemicals, glass, textiles, soap, foodstuffs, and the like. Production was still by hand, of course, and not by machinery; but the organization of production was already at many points on an industrial capitalist level, using workshops, division of labor, the wage system, and sizable capital funds collected by subscriptions to joint-stock companies.

This does not mean that all the industrial production in England, or indeed most of the production, was thus organized before the advent of automatic machinery. But it does mean that when mechanization came to supplant manufacture (in the literal sense) beginning with the third quarter of the eighteenth century, there already existed in England an enterpriser class which, while small, was schooled in the techniques of large-scale industry.

This class, as well, had already amassed a measurable capital fund. With its managerial skills and its capital, therefore, it was able to move easily into the widening field of industrial capitalism whose expansive opportunities became extraordinary as a result of the invention of the automatic spindle, the power loom, and the steam engine. Further, the capital accumulations from trade in England, because the mercantilist system was designed in the interests of English mercantile capitalism and her merchants had the whole world in which to range, and the capital wrested from the colonial possessions in the West Indies, Africa, and India made transfer into large-scale industrial production possible almost from the very start. In the early decades of the nineteenth century there already existed a powerful industrial capitalist class in England. The opportunities for the upward climb from humble beginnings were not nearly so frequent as is commonly assumed.

But this was not the case in America. After the American Revolution, all the industrial capitalists virtually started from scratch: for the advances onward and upward were not checked by the existence of privileged and already entrenched interests.

Second, in another great region for economic opportunities in America, that is to say in the exploitation of mineral lands, the doors were not closed to the little men. Thanks to the existence of a vast public domain sparsely settled by Indians and a generous land policy, it was possible for a fortunate prospector and a small capitalist to make a lucky strike and hit and work coal, iron, lead, copper, or oil deposits. Many early mining fortunes, in no way connected with special advantage, grew up in the pre-Civil War West out of modest beginnings in lead, iron, and copper. Notably in England and Germany exactly the reverse was the case; for the land had already been pre-empted by landlordism, and in England monopoly in coal production had been flourishing long before industrialism matured. Mining in Europe had always been a favored area of privilege; in the United States it was one of the regions in which free enterprise was able to flourish for a considerable length of time.

Third, Europe was not prepared to pour its accumulated capital into the United States to build up our industrial production (as it did later in Russia, Japan, and India, for example). Obviously it required its savings for capitalist construction at home. But a more important reason was that it could not obtain, and America would not give, the needed political guarantees that

loans would be serviced and paid back.

European capital had helped in the original financing of public improvements (including railroads) in the United States before the panic of 1837 set in; but this was due to the fact that many of the securities launched in the English and Amsterdam money markets were state, or public, issues. But, as a result of his experiences with the depression of 1837–43, the European investor learned an important lesson; for many American states defaulted in interest payments and some repudiated their obligations altogether, leaving the foreign *rentier* without legal recourse. When the long depression terminated, European capital was coy. . . .

I have said that foreign funds poured into the United States to help lay down our railroad net. But, what was even more significant than foreign capital assistance was the aid rendered by public authority. With huge land grants made from the public domain, with loans of funds by federal and state bodies, with stock subscriptions, terminal sites, and special privileges made and freely offered by local jurisdictions, our great trunk systems were really made possible. Placing only a nominal value on the land grants and adding in only the actual bond issues floated and stock equities purchased, before the 1870's were over public authority had advanced railroad promoters in the United States in excess of one billion dollars. This situation explains clearly why the first great post-Civil War fortunes in America were in railroading.

But in industrial production—because of the absence of foreign capital and direct public assistance—opportunities existed for the small enterpriser. And if he were diligent, abstemious, and shrewd (of course, knowing the right people often helped), he could run up a small stake into a respectable and frequently immense fortune. The annals of American enterprise, particularly in connection with industrial and smelting fortunes, have been filled with the amazing histories of the Carnegies, Fricks, Dodges, Rockefellers, Pratts, Gateses, and Reids, who, starting obscurely—without links with either mercantile capitalism or landlordism—made money, plowed profits back into capital plant or bought out competitors, and ended by becoming modern Croesuses. . . .

Fourth, there was a constantly recurrent petty-bourgeois strain in our political life that gave aid and comfort to egalitarian aspirations. The leveling tendencies in America had their origins in England; and of course there continued to exist English counterparts. But while leveling doctrine became quickly submerged in the mother country, in America political leveling notions were constantly blooming. And they were effective, too. There is no country in modern times which can come near matching the successes achieved in the United States by the petty-bourgeois political ideas and leadership of Jeffersonianism, Jacksonianism, a part of original Radical Republicanism, Populism, and La Follette Progressivism. . . .

Thus, at any rate, into the greater part of the second half of the nineteenth century. And then, with the appearance of large-scale integrations in industry and with the growing significance of finance capital—as early as the end of the 1880's but more particularly during the years 1897–1904—the tradition of equal opportunity for men of small means became less and less an active and vital force and more and more a dream. We had come to the end of an epoch.

16

The Corporate System*

A. A. BERLE and G. C. MEANS

Adolph A. Berle, Jr., professor of corporation law at Columbia Law School since 1927, has been a municipal official, Assistant Secretary of State, and ambassador to Brazil. Gardiner C. Means, for many years an analyst and advisor for various government agencies, is a well-known economist and author. In 1932, Berle and Means produced their brilliant study, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. In what has since become a classic, these two gentlemen assess the impact of the corporation on the economic structure of our society and on traditional property relationships.

Corporations have ceased to be merely legal devices through which the private business transactions of individuals may be carried on. Though still much used for this purpose, the corporate form has acquired a larger significance. The corporation has, in fact, become both a method of property tenure and a means of organizing economic life. Grown to tremendous proportions, there may be said to have evolved a "corporate system"—as there was once a feudal system—which has attracted to itself a combination of attributes and powers, and has attained a degree of prominence entitling it to be dealt with as a major social institution.

We are examining this institution probably before it has attained its zenith. Spectacular as its rise has been, every indication seems to be that the system will move forward to proportions which would stagger imagination today; just as the corporate system of today was beyond the imagination of most statesmen and business men at the opening of the present century. Only by remembering that men still living can recall a time when the present situation was hardly dreamed of, can we enforce the conclusion that the new order may easily become completely dominant during the lifetime of our children. For that reason, if for no other, it is desirable to examine this system, bearing in mind that its impact on the life of the country and of every individual is certain to be great; it may even determine a large part of the behavior of most men living under it.

Organization of property has played a constant part in the balance of powers which go to make up the life of any era. We need not resolve the controversy as to whether property interests are invariably controlling. The cynical view of many historians insists that property interests have at all times, visible or invisible, been dominant. Following this grim analysis, one commentator on the rise of corporations observed that they had become the "master instruments of civilization." Another expressed his depression at the fact that the system had at length reached a point definitely committing civilization to the rule

* The selection from A. A. Berle, Jr. and G. C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property;* copyright 1932 by The Macmillan Company and used with the publisher's permission.

of a plutocracy. Still others have seen in the system a transition phase towards ultimate socialism or communism. Acceptance of any of these beliefs may be delayed; but the underlying thought expressed in them all is that the corporate system has become the principal factor in economic organization through its mobilization of property interests.

In its new aspect the corporation is a means whereby the wealth of innumerable individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates and whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified direction. The power attendant upon such concentration has brought forth princes of industry, whose position in the community is yet to be defined. The surrender of control over their wealth by investors has effectively broken the old property relationships and has raised the problem of defining these relationships anew. The direction of industry by persons other than those who have ventured their wealth has raised the question of the motive force back of such direction and the effective distribution of the returns from business enterprise.

These corporations have arisen in field after field as the myriad independent and competing units of private business have given way to the few large groupings of the modern quasi-public corporation. The typical business unit of the 19th century was owned by individuals or small groups; was managed by them or their appointees; and was, in the main, limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals in control. These units have been supplanted in ever greater measure by great aggregations in which tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers and property worth hundreds of millions of dollars, belonging to tens or even hundreds of thousands of individuals, are combined through the corporate mechanism into a single producing organization under unified control and management. Such a unit is the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, perhaps the most advanced development of the corporate system. With assets of almost five billions of dollars, with 454,000 employees, and stockholders to the number of 567,694, this company may indeed be called an economic empire—an empire bounded by no geographical limits, but held together by centralized control. One hundred companies of this size would control the whole of American wealth; would employ all of the gainfully employed; and if there were no duplication of stockholders, would be owned by practically every family in the country.

Such an organization of economic activity rests upon two developments, each of which has made possible an extension of the area under unified control. The factory system, the basis of the industrial revolution, brought an increasingly large number of workers directly under a single management. Then, the modern corporation, equally revolutionary in its effect, placed the wealth of innumerable individuals under the same central control. By each of these changes the power of those in control was immensely enlarged and the status of those involved, worker or property owner, was radically changed. The independent worker who entered the factory became a wage laborer surrendering the direction of his labor to his industrial master. The property owner who invests in a modern corporation so far surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has exchanged the position of independent owner for one in which he may become merely recipient of the wages of capital.

In and of itself, the corporate device does not necessarily bring about this change. It has long been possible for an individual

to incorporate his business even though it still represents his own investment, his own activities, and his own business transactions; he has in fact merely created a legal *alter ego* by setting up a corporation as the nominal vehicle. If the corporate form had done nothing more than this, we should have only an interesting custom according to which business would be carried on by individuals adopting for that purpose certain legal clothing. It would involve no radical shift in property tenure or in the organization of economic activity; it would inaugurate no "system" comparable to the institutions of feudalism.

The corporate system appears only when this type of private or "close" corporation has given way to an essentially different form, the quasi-public corporation: a corporation in which a large measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the multiplication of owners.

Such separation may exist in varying degrees. Where the men ultimately responsible for running a corporation own a majority of the voting stock while the remainder is widely diffused, control and part ownership are in their hands. Only for the remaining owners is there separation from control. Frequently, however, ownership is so widely scattered that working control can be maintained with but a minority interest. The Rockefeller family, for example, is reported to have retained direct or indirect minority interests in many of the Standard Oil Companies; and in the case of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, this interest, amounting to only 14.5 percent combined with the strategic position of its holders, has proved sufficient for the control of the corporation. In such a case the greater bulk of ownership is virtually without control. Separation of ownership and control becomes almost complete when not even a substantial minority interest exists, as in the American Telephone and Telegraph Company whose largest holder is reported to own less than one percent of the company's stock. Under such conditions control may be held by the directors or titular managers who can employ the proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body, even though as a group they own but a small fraction of the stock outstanding. In each of these types, majority control, minority control, and management control, the separation of ownership from control has become effective—a large body of security holders has been created who exercise virtually no control over the wealth which they or their predecessors in interest have contributed to the enterprise. In the case of management control, the ownership interest held by the controlling group amounts to but a very small fraction of the total ownership. Corporations where this separation has become an important factor may be classed as quasi-public in character in contradistinction to the private, or closely held corporation in which no important separation of ownership and control has taken place. . . .

Outwardly the change is simple enough. Men are less likely to own the physical instruments of production. They are more likely to own pieces of paper, loosely known as stocks, bonds, and other securities, which have become mobile through the machinery of the public markets. Beneath this, however, lies a more fundamental shift. Physical control over the instruments of production has been surrendered in ever growing degree to centralized groups who manage property in bulk, supposedly, but by no means necessarily, for the benefit of the security holders. Power over industrial property has been cut off from the beneficial ownership of this property—or, in less technical language, from the legal right to enjoy

its fruits. Control of physical assets has passed from the individual owner to those who direct the quasi-public institutions, while the owner retains an interest in their product and increase. We see, in fact, the surrender and regrouping of the incidence of ownership, which formerly bracketed full power of manual disposition with complete right to enjoy the use, the fruits, and the proceeds of physical assets. There has resulted the dissolution of the old atom of ownership into its component parts, control and beneficial ownership.

This dissolution of the atom of property destroys the very foundation on which the economic order of the past three centuries has rested. Private enterprise, which has molded economic life since the close of the middle ages, has been rooted in the institution of private property. Under the feudal system, its predecessor, economic organization grew out of mutual obligations and privileges derived by various individuals from their relation to property which no one of them owned. Private enterprise, on the other hand, has assumed an owner of the instruments of production with complete property rights over those instruments. Whereas the organization of feudal economic life rested upon an elaborate system of binding customs, the organization under the system of private enterprise has rested upon the self-interest of the property-owner—a self-interest held in check only by competition and the conditions of supply and demand. Such self-interest has long been regarded as the best guarantee of economic efficiency. It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right both to use his own property as he sees fit and to receive the full fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be relied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property he may possess.

In the quasi-public corporation, such an assumption no longer holds. As we have seen, it is no longer the individual himself who uses his wealth. Those in control of that wealth, and therefore in a position to secure industrial efficiency and produce profits, are no longer, as owners, entitled to the bulk of such profits. Those who control the destinies of the typical modern corporation own so insignificant a fraction of the company's stock that the returns from running the corporation profitably accrue to them in only a very minor degree. The stockholders, on the other hand, to whom the profits of the corporation go, cannot be motivated by those profits to a more efficient use of the property, since they have surrendered all disposition of it to those in control of the enterpise. The explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption that the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective use. It consequently challenges the fundamental economic principle of individual initiative in industrial enterprise. It raises for re-examination the question of the motive force back of industry, and the ends for which the modern corporation can be or will be run.

The corporate system further commands attention because its development is progressive, as its features become more marked and as new areas come one by one under its sway. Economic power, in terms of control over physical assets, is apparently responding to a centripetal force, tending more and more to concentrate in the hands of a few corporate managements. At the same time, beneficial ownership is centrifugal, tending to divide and subdivide, to split into ever smaller units and to pass freely from hand to hand. In other words, ownership continually becomes more dispersed; the power formerly joined to it becomes increasingly concentrated; and the

corporate system is thereby more securely established.

This system bids fair to be as all-embracing as was the feudal system in its time. It demands that we examine both its conditions and its trends, for an understanding of the structure upon which will rest the economic order of the future. . . .

We must conclude, then, that parallel with the growth in the size of the industrial unit has come a dispersion in its ownership such that an important part of the wealth of individuals consists of interests in great enterprises of which no individual owns a major part. A rapidly increasing proportion of wealth appears to be taking this form and there is much to indicate that the increase will continue. More and more, our thinking must be in terms of this type of wealth. Here again the change is such as to require a re-examination of basic concepts.

(1) Most fundamental of all, the position of ownership has changed from that of an active to that of a passive agent. In place of actual physical properties over which the owner could exercise direction and for which he was responsible, the owner now holds a piece of paper representing a set of rights and expectations with respect to an enterprise. But over the enterprise and over the physical property—the instruments of production—in which he has an interest, the owner has little control. At the same time he bears no responsibility with respect to the enterprise or its physical property. It has often been said that the owner of a horse is responsible. If the horse lives he must feed it. If the horse dies he must bury it. No such responsibility attaches to a share of stock. The owner is practically powerless through his own efforts to affect the underlying property.

(2) The spiritual values that formerly went with ownership have been separated from it. Physical property capable of being shaped by its owner could bring to him direct satisfaction apart from the income it yielded in more concrete form. It represented an extension of his own personality. With the corporate revolution, this quality has been lost to the property owner much as it has been lost to the worker through the industrial revolution.

(3) The value of an individual's wealth is coming to depend on forces entirely outside himself and his own efforts. Instead, its value is determined on the one hand by the actions of the individuals in command of the enterprise—individuals over whom the typical owner has no control, and on the other hand, by the actions of others in a sensitive and often capricious market. The value is thus subject to the vagaries and manipulations characteristic of the market place. It is further subject to the great swings in society's appraisal of its own immediate future as reflected in the general level of values in the organized markets.

(4) The value of the individual's wealth not only fluctuates constantly—the same may be said of most wealth—but it is subject to a constant appraisal. The individual can see the change in the appraised value of his estate from moment to moment, a fact which may markedly affect both the expenditure of his income and his enjoyment of that income.

(5) Individual wealth has become extremely liquid through the organized markets. The individual owner can convert it into other forms of wealth at a moment's notice and, provided the market machinery is in working order, he may do so without serious loss due to forced sale.

(6) Wealth is less and less in a form which can be employed directly by its owner. When wealth is in the form of land, for instance, it is capable of being used by

the owner even though the value of land in the market is negligible. The physical quality of such wealth makes possible a subjective value to the owner quite apart from any market value it may have. The newer form of wealth is quite incapable of this direct use. Only through sale in the market can the owner obtain its direct use. He is thus tied to the market as never before.

(7) Finally, in the corporate system, the "owner" of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control. . . .

Most fundamental to the new picture of economic life must be a new concept of business enterprise as concentrated in the corporate organization. In some measure a concept is already emerging. Over a decade ago, Walter Rathenau * wrote concerning the German counterpart of our great corporation:

"No one is a permanent owner. The composition of the thousandfold complex which functions as lord of the undertaking is in a state of flux. . . . This condition of things signifies that ownership has been depersonalized. . . . The depersonalization of ownership simultaneously implies the objectification of the thing owned. The claims to ownership are subdivided in such a fashion, and are so mobile, that the enterprise assumes an independent life, as if it belonged to no one; it takes an objective existence, such as in earlier days was embodied only in state and church, in a municipal corporation, in the life of a guild or a religious order. . . . The depersonalization of ownership, the objectification of enterprise, the detachment of property from the possessor, leads to a point where the enterprise becomes transformed into an institution which resembles the state in character."

The institution here envisaged calls for analysis, not in terms of business enterprise but in terms of social organization. On the one hand, it involves a concentration of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of religious power in the mediaeval church or of political power in the national state. On the other hand, it involves the interrelation of a wide diversity of economic interests,—those of the "owners" who supply capital, those of the workers who "create," those of the consumers who give value to the products of enterprise, and above all those of the control who wield power.

Such a great concentration of power and such a diversity of interest raise the long-fought issue of power and its regulation—of interest and its protection. A constant warfare has existed between the individuals wielding power, in whatever form, and the subjects of that power. Just as there is a continuous desire for power, so also there is a continuous desire to make that power the servant of the bulk of the individuals it affects. The long struggles for the reform of the Catholic Church and for the development of constitutional law in the states are phases of this phenomenon. Absolute power is useful in building the organization. More slow, but equally sure is the development of social pressure demanding that the power shall be used for the benefit of all concerned. This pressure, constant in ecclesiastical and political history, is already making its appearance in many guises in the economic field.

Observable throughout the world, and in

* Walter Rathenau, German industrialist and social theorist; controlled distribution of raw materials during World War I and post-war minister; author of *In Days to Come* (1921) and *The New Society* (1921). [Ed.]

varying degrees of intensity, is this insistence that power in economic organization shall be subjected to the same tests of public benefit which have been applied in their turn to power otherwise located. In its most extreme aspect this is exhibited in the communist movement, which in its purest form is an insistence that *all* of the powers and privileges of property, shall be used only in the common interest. In less extreme forms of socialist dogma, transfer of economic powers to the state for public service is demanded. In the strictly capitalist countries, and particularly in time of depression, demands are constantly put forward that the men controlling the great economic organisms be made to accept responsibility for the well-being of those who are subject to the organization, whether workers, investors, or consumers. In a sense the difference in all of these demands lies only in degree. In proportion as an economic organism grows in strength and its power is concentrated in a few hands, the possessor of power is more easily located, and the demand for responsible power becomes increasingly direct.

How will this demand be made effective? To answer this question would be to foresee the history of the next century. We can here only consider and appraise certain of the more important lines of possible development.

By tradition, a corporation "belongs" to its shareholders, or, in a wider sense, to its security holders, and theirs is the only interest to be recognized as the object of corporate activity. Following this tradition, and without regard for the changed character of ownership, it would be possible to apply in the interests of the *passive* property owner the doctrine of strict property rights. . . . By the application of this doctrine, the group in control of a corporation would be placed in a position of trusteeship in which it would be called on to operate or arrange for the operation of the corporation for the *sole* benefit of the security owners despite the fact that the latter have ceased to have power over or to accept responsibility for the *active* property in which they have an interest. Were this course followed, the bulk of American industry might soon be operated by trustees for the sole benefit of inactive and irresponsible security owners.

In direct opposition to the above doctrine of strict property rights is the view, apparently held by the great corporation lawyers and by certain students of the field, that corporate development has created a new set of relationships, giving to the groups in control powers which are absolute and not limited by any implied obligation with respect to their use. This logic leads to drastic conclusions. For instance, if, by reason of these new relationships, the men in control of a corporation can operate it in their own interests, and can divert a portion of the asset fund of income stream to their own uses, such is their privilege. Under this view, since the new powers have been acquired on a quasi-contractual basis, the security holders have agreed in advance to any losses which they may suffer by reason of such use. The result is, briefly, that the existence of the legal and economic relationships giving rise to these powers must be frankly recognized as a modification of the principle of private property.

If these were the only alternatives, the former would appear to be the lesser of two evils. Changed corporate relationships have unquestionably involved an essential alteration in the character of property. But such modifications have hitherto been brought about largely on the principle that might makes right. Choice between strengthening the rights of passive property owners, or leaving a set of uncurbed powers in the hands of control therefore

resolves itself into a purely realistic evaluation of different results. We might elect the relative certainty and safety of a trust relationship in favor of a particular group within the corporation, accompanied by a possible diminution of enterprise. Or we may grant the controlling group free rein, with the corresponding danger of a corporate oligarchy coupled with the probability of an era of corporate plundering.

A third possibility exists, however. On the one hand, the owners of passive property, by surrendering control and responsibility over the active property, have surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest,—they have released the community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights. At the same time, the controlling groups, by means of the extension of corporate powers, have in their own interest broken the bars of tradition which require that the corporation be operated solely for the benefit of the owners of passive property. Eliminating the sole interest of the passive owner, however, does not necessarily lay a basis for the alternative claim that the new powers should be used in the interest of the controlling groups. The latter have not presented, in acts or words any acceptable defense of the proposition that these powers should be so used. No tradition supports that proposition. The control groups have, rather, cleared the way for the claims of a group far wider than either the owners or the control. They have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all society.

This third alternative offers a wholly new concept of corporate activity. Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount interests of the community. The present claims of both contending parties now in the field have been weakened by the developments described in this book. It remains only for the claims of the community to be put forward with clarity and force. Rigid enforcement of property rights as a temporary protection against plundering by control would not stand in the way of the modification of these rights in the interest of other groups. When a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today must yield before the larger interests of society. Should the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a program comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of the profits from the owners of passive property, and should the community generally accept such a scheme as a logical and human solution of industrial difficulties, the interests of passive property owners would have to give way. Courts would almost of necessity be forced to recognize the result, justifying it by whatever of the many legal theories they might choose. It is conceivable,—indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive,—that the "control" of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.

* * * * * * *

In still larger view, the modern corporation may be regarded not simply as one form of social organization but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant institution of the modern world. In every age, the major concentration of power has been

based upon the dominant interest of that age. The strong man has, in his time, striven to be cardinal or pope, prince or cabinet minister, bank president or partner in the House of Morgan. During the Middle Ages, the Church, exercising spiritual power, dominated Europe and gave to it a unity at a time when both political and economic power were diffused. With the rise of the modern state, political power, concentrated into a few large units, challenged the spiritual interest as the strongest bond of human society. Out of the long struggle between church and state which followed, the state emerged victorious; nationalist politics superseded religion as the basis of the major unifying organization of the Western world. Economic power still remained diffused.

The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern state—economic power versus political power, each strong in its own field. The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation, while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, makes every effort to avoid such regulation. Where its own interests are concerned, it even attempts to dominate the state. The future may see the economic organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the dominant form of social organization. The law of corporations, accordingly, might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new economic state, while business practice is increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship.

17

*Mass Production and World Industrialism**

PETER F. DRUCKER

If the modern corporation has produced a vast, impersonal organization in which the individual is increasingly subjected to forces beyond his control, so too has the triumph of mass production, mechanization, and standardization. Moreover, not only has this been a pervasive force within our own culture, but it has also spread with startling rapidity throughout the modern world. Peter F. Drucker, author of *The End of Economic Man, The Future of Industrial Man,* and *The Concept of the Corporation,* analyzes this impact of mass production on contemporary culture.

The world revolution of our time is "made in U.S.A." It is not Communism, Fascism, the new nationalism of the non-Western peoples, or any of the other "isms" that appear in the headlines. They are reactions to the basic disturbance, secondary rather than primary. The true revolutionary principle is the idea of mass-production. Nothing ever before recorded in the history of man equals, in speed, universal-

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ity and impact, the transformation this principle has wrought in the foundations of society in the forty short years since Henry Ford turned out the first "Model T."

Though "made in Detroit," the impact of the new principle is not confined to the United States or to the old industrial territory of the West. Indeed, the impact is greatest on the raw-material-producing, pre-industrial civilizations. The sweep of mass-production technology is undermining and exploding societies and civilizations which have no resistance to the new forces, no background or habit-pattern of industrial life to cushion the shock. In China the mass-production principle, swept into the hinterland from the coastal cities by the forced migration of industries during the Japanese invasion, is destroying the world's oldest and hitherto its stablest institution: the Chinese family. In India, industrialization has begun to corrode the Hindu caste system: ritual restrictions on proximity and intercourse between castes simply cannot be maintained under factory conditions. Russia uses the new mass-production principle to try again where Byzantium failed: to mate Europa and the Bull, the technological fruits of Western thought with Oriental despotism, to produce a new world order which claims to be the legitimate heir to both East and West. In our own country the Old South, hitherto least touched by industry and still living in the ruins of its ante-bellum rural order, is speedily being "tractored off." Indeed, conversion of the Southern farm into a rural assembly line seems on the verge of "solving" the Southern race problem in a manner never dreamed of by either Southern Liberal or Southern Reactionary: by pushing the Negro off the land into the industrial cities.

At the time of World War I, only one generation ago, industry was, by and large, still confined to a narrow belt on either side of the North Atlantic. The only exception, the only successful transplantation of the machine to new soil, was in Japan. The representative unit of industry, even in the most heavily industrialized countries, was the family-owned or family-managed medium-size factory employing fewer than five hundred workers and differing from the workshop of pre-industrial days mainly in its use of mechanical power.

Today the situation is reversed. The areas not undergoing rapid industrialization are few and isolated; the representative, the decisive, industrial unit anywhere is the large, mass-production plant, managed by professionals without a stake in ownership, employing thousands of people, and altogether organized on entirely different technological, social, and economic principles. The change has been so great that, in retrospect, the typical factory of 1910 seems to have been closer to its great-grandfather, the artisan's workshop of pre-steam-engine days, than to its own son: the modern mass-production plant. The new industrial territories, only yesterday rural and largely innocent of machine and factory, are jumping directly into the mass-production age without going through the first "Industrial Revolution."

The geographic spread of the mass-production principle, its sweep of width, is accompanied by a sweep in depth: the penetration of the traditional pre-industrial and nonindustrial occupations. This aspect of the industrial world revolution is fully as important as the industrialization of the raw-material-producing countries.

The great bulk of productive work a generation ago was done in forms antedating industry by hundreds, if not thou-

sands, of years. Even in the most highly industrialized country, it was completely non-industrial in character. Only a minority of the people, though in some countries an important minority, lived and worked in an industrial world. Even in the most highly industrialized country, the mass-production principle was still regarded generally as a mere technique, such as the assembly line, and largely confined to the automobile industry.

Two World Wars showed that the principle which underlay Henry Ford's first plant forty years ago is completely independent of specific tools or techniques, and that it is a basic principle for the organization of all manufacturing activities. Today it has become abundantly clear that the mass-production principle is not even confined to manufacturing, but is a *general principle for organizing people to work together.*

The Russian collective farm was the first application of the principle to agriculture. Its labor organization which uses the individual as a highly specialized tool performing essentially one simple job repetitiously, its control through the state-owned tractor station, its system of compensation—all are applications of mass-production technology. Yet the Russian collective farm is already technologically as obsolete as an automobile plant of forty years ago. The fully mechanized cotton plantation in the Mississippi Delta, or the vegetable cooperative on the irrigated land of California's Central Valley, have gone much further in breaking with the pre-industrial traditions of agriculture. And in their grandiose scheme for raising peanuts in tropical Africa, the British proposed to reorganize a whole colonial empire on the mass-production basis. Yet agriculture has traditionally been regarded as opposite to, and incompatible with, industrialization, if not as the very symbol of the pre-industrial tradition.

Without assembly line or conveyor belt, clerical operations in large-scale business enterprises are today increasingly organized the same way in which Henry Ford organized the production of the Model T. The typists' pool of a large insurance company, check-sorting and check-clearing operations in a big bank, the sorting and filling of orders in a mail-order house, and thousands of other operations in business and government offices do not differ in substance from the automobile assembly line, however much they may differ in appearance.

Similarly, scientific research has been organized on mass-production lines. This has been true for many years in the engineering and chemical research carried on by American industry. The mass-production method is now being carried into medical and biological research. In the new Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research in New York—significantly founded by two of the pioneers of the automobile industry—concepts and methods of work are those of the assembly line. During the War the application of this mass-production principle to scientific research resulted in the atomic bomb, which could not have been produced by any other method. Even pure research, unconcerned with application, has been organized on the mass-production pattern in some of our most productive laboratories such as those of the Bell Telephone System or of the General Electric Company.

The principle has even been applied successfully to work that has always been considered to be essentially personal in character. The efficiency and effectiveness of the Mayo Clinic, for instance, rests largely on its organizing diagnosis and examination into a production line. Henry Luce's

"group journalism," by means of which *Time, Life* and *Fortune* are being produced, is largely assembly-line work.

Most startling, however, is the application of the principle to military organization. Of all pre-industrial types of organization, the army was the most highly formalized and apparently the most rigid. But the great Allied invasions of World War II were prepared and carried out as mass-production processes, with each officer doing only one highly specialized and largely mechanical task. He was seldom shifted from operation to operation, nor did he usually know where his piece fitted into the total. This application of the mass-production principle to the conduct of war was one of the most important contributions this country made to victory. It represented a greater change in the organization of warfare than anything that had been developed since Spain's *"Gran Capitan"* first created the concept of the modern army almost five hundred years ago.

"Industry" once meant any organization for human work. It was only during the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, the era of the first "Industrial Revolution," that the term was narrowed to mean "manufacturing." With the second industrial revolution, the revolution of mass production, "industry" again reverts to its earlier meaning. The industrial principle of today, the mass-production principle, promises to put all major organizations for group work, no matter where or of what kind, on the same basis, and to organize them according to the same concept. It is not only the most revolutionary principle of production man has ever found but also the most general.

The mass-production principle is not a mechanical principle. If it were, it could never have been applied beyond manufacturing, and independently of assembly line, conveyor belt and interchangeable parts. It is a *social* principle—a principle of *human* organization. What was new in Ford's plant was not the organization of mechanical forces, but the organization of human beings performing a common task. And this explains the shattering impact of the new principle on traditional cultures, on the relationship between man and society, and on the family.

Of these impacts, *the divorce of the worker from the product and the means of production* is the most visible.

This separation has long been recognized. In the past it has always been blamed on the legal or economic "superstructure." It has been considered an accident, rather than an essential, of the industrial system. That was, for instance, Marx's premise and on it rest almost all his major conclusions. It was the premise of Marx's enemies, the Guild Socialists and the Syndicalists. It was shared by all other critical students of the effects of the first Industrial Revolution. It underlies the two famous Papal Encyclicals on the industrial order, *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*. There was a general belief that the worker would have control of production if only he were given legal control over the means of production.

In the mass-production system, this belief can no longer be maintained. The divorce of the worker from product and means of production is essential and absolute. It has nothing to do with legal control or political institutions. The worker by himself cannot produce. He must have access to that highly complex organization of men, machines and tools we call a plant. As we shall see, even the collective

of the workers, such as a co-operative, a union or a syndicate cannot control this organization—except in a purely formal and entirely fictitious sense—let alone the individual worker.

In fact, the worker no longer produces, even in the plant; he works. But the product is not being turned out by any one worker or any one group of workers. It is being turned out by the plant. It is a *collective* product. The individual worker usually is not even capable of defining his own contribution to the productive organization and to the product. Often he cannot even point to a part or a process and say: this is *my* work.

This applies wherever the mass-production principle has been applied. The most striking examples are indeed to be found outside of manufacturing. There are apparently no "means of production" in a clerical organization; but when a bookkeeper, a comptometer operator, a shipping clerk, is cut off from the organization he is completely helpless and unproductive. Similarly, an engineer or an industrial chemist is not productive unless integrated into the organization, no matter how highly trained he may be. Here it is clear that the productive unit, the "means of production," is the organization itself rather than any material tool.

There have always been trades and occupations where access to the organization was necessary if the individual was to be effective and productive. It has been a long time, for instance, since the individual soldier armed with his own equipment could go out and gain a kingdom all by himself as he does in the fairy tales. It is also true that, for his subsistence, the individual in all but a few societies is dependent on an exchange of products with his neighbor—that is, on co-operation of some sort. But while not able to *subsist* independently, the overwhelming majority of the people living in any traditional society has always been able to *produce* independently, commanding not much more than the equipment they were born with or that they could make themselves. This applies not only to the hunter, the husbandman and the farmer, but to the craftsman and to the professional in a traditional society. The tailor, the wheelwright or the baker, the priest, the medicine man and the scribe—they all could function productively as individuals.

In an industrial society the situation is reversed. It is only a very small minority of artists and professional men who can produce at all by themselves. All the others are dependent upon access to an organization to be productive. *It is the organization rather than the individual which is productive in an industrial system.*

This divorce of worker and means of production threatens the status and prestige system of any traditional society, whether of the West or of the East; it dissolves the traditional community and uproots the individual.

It also makes unemployment and the threat of unemployment unbearable—not because of their economic, but because of their social, consequences. This in turn imposes on government the new and unprecedented task of preventing and curing depressions, a job far beyond the ability of any government yet devised by man.

Finally, the divorce of worker and means of production makes the old problem of the concentration of power infinitely more urgent because it makes possible an altogether new total tyranny.

Chapter Four

THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

1.

In probably no other social science is there so much diversity of opinion and lack of clarity among its members concerning the nature of the subject matter as in the field of sociology. This confusion stems, in no small measure, from the way in which the discipline developed. Auguste Comte, the nineteenth-century Frenchman who originated the term "sociology," used it to designate a study of the social sciences in general. Such eminent successors as Herbert Spencer in England and Lester F. Ward in the United States utilized the word in the sense of a social science synthesis.

By the late nineteenth century, a number of forces were operating to give the new study considerable impetus in a more specialized direction. To begin with, the era of social reform in Western society and of the Progressive movement in the United States stimulated the interest of many scholars in specific social problems. In addition, a growing collection of statistical data, accumulated by numerous governmental agencies, offered new sources of information to those interested in the problems of an increasingly complex industrial society. Analyses were made of working conditions, slum areas, recreation; multi-volumed reports were gathered on housing, the immigrant, crime; and numerous publications of community studies appeared.

During the second decade of the twentieth century, sociology in the United States underwent a significant change. Less emphasis was placed on immediate social reform, while objective and scientific studies, coupled with long-term research, became more and more the order of the day. Many sociologists proceeded on the assumption that their discipline continued to offer the best opportunity of achieving a general, or systematized, scheme of human society. Most, however, were willing to ignore temporarily the question of the scope of their field and narrowed their sights to the still considerable area of culture not covered by any of the other social sciences. Their stress has been on social problems of a contemporary nature, as distinguished from the historical. Over the past thirty years, then, there have emerged three broad areas of investigation: population and human ecology, social organization, and social psychology and collective behavior.

2.

Having viewed the evolution of the economic institution in the previous section of this volume, we are now concerned with the impact of our technological and urban culture on a particular phase of social organization—the changing character of so-

cial classes. "Class" is unquestionably a powerful social category. Its definition, however, is elusive and sociologists differ widely in their interpretations of this concept. Among those factors noted in the creation of class differences have been: property relations—the particular regulations of a society under which property is held and disposed of; biological factors—the obviously diverse, inherited characteristics of individuals; division of labor—the increasing specialization of economic activity, resulting in a re-organization of established social groups; and war—the transformation of existing group relationships under the influence of conquest. In all probability some, or all, of these explanations—as well as others—have been valid in varying degree, depending upon the place and time of the culture under discussion.

It is a commonplace that class distinctions are much greater in Europe than in the United States. Yet such distinctions—whatever their degree—do exist here and it becomes imperative that we take some account of them. In doing so, we view first the general scheme of things, and then three basic groups: agriculture, labor, and the middle class. Then, perhaps reflecting the amorphous nature of sociology itself, there follow additional selections on the family and population.

A. The General Concept

18

*What Is Sociology?**

THEODORE ABEL

In the following article, Professor Theodore Abel summarizes the highly complex and controversial topic of the nature and scope of sociology. Dr. Abel is chairman of the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at Hunter College.

In attempting to define the nature and scope of sociology we do not have to grope in the dark, nor expose ourselves to the accusation of arbitrariness. The literature on sociology contains sufficiently definite clues to furnish us with a point of departure, and the logic of science and the existing division among the cultural sciences gives us further ground upon which to base an adequate definition of the field of sociology.

The clues which we derive from an analysis of current sociological literature may be expressed in the form of two propositions.

The first proposition refers to the *direction* of sociological research. We find sociologists engaged in investigations of the city, the family, racial antagonism, immigrations, crime, and similar studies that

* Theodore Abel, "The Nature and Scope of Sociology," *Social Forces*, XI (December, 1932). Used by permission of the author and *Social Forces*.

deal with aspects of inter-human behavior. These studies clearly indicate that regardless of divergent definitions of sociology there exists an implicit agreement among sociologists as to the type of subject matter that is the concern of their science. The traditional interest of sociologists has always centered in the kind of life that human beings lead in association with each other, the forms and processes that this life manifests, and the problems to which it gives rise. That the concern with the phenomena of inter-human behavior expresses the predominant direction of sociological research can, therefore, be accepted as a basic proposition which must be taken into consideration in any attempt to define sociology.

The second proposition refers to the *character* of sociological research. We perceive in the writings of sociologists a prevailing trend towards scientific research, and a growing disdain to discuss, within their field, the meaning and purpose of social life, to evaluate phenomena, and to project schemes of adjustment for the best realization of values. In other words, the dominant tendency is to keep sociology and social philosophy separate, which we may formulate in the proposition that sociology is to be a positive science and not a philosophical discipline.

These two propositions which we find implicit in what is best and most significant in sociological literature give us important directives to follow in our search for a definition of the nature and scope of sociology. A consideration of the postulates of the logic of science furnishes us with additional clues. Accordingly, sociology as a science must have for its primary objective the establishment of a body of knowledge, i.e., an organized system of categories and valid generalizations and laws on a particular class of phenomena. Its task cannot be merely the accumulation of facts, or description, or the manipulation of statistical data. Furthermore, its problems must follow from the requirements of its theory and not from practical considerations. And finally, sociology must be conceived as representing a specific approach to the interpretation of concrete situations and occurrences and not be defined in terms of them, for example, as a study of social conditions or of social problems.

As we proceed to inquire what the specifically sociological approach is, it becomes necessary to define with greater precision the particular class of phenomena with which sociology deals. The clues which we have discussed so far do not suffice, however, for an answer to this question. We must search for further directives in the existing division of the cultural sciences which will help us to decide, first of all, whether sociology is a general or a special science, and following that enable us to ascertain its particular field of study.

We begin by asking the question whether there is any validity in the conception of sociology as a general science.

One way in which sociology as a general science is conceived is expressed in its definition as the science of society. This definition is untenable. Sociology cannot be a positive science and have "society" in the comprehensive sense of the term as the object of investigation. For what we call "society" is a vague and unreal construction into an integrated whole of the totality of forms and occurrences of social life, in which all parts are implied to be structurally and functionally related and to follow universal laws. Actually, we find that social phenomena represent discontinuous, conflicting, non-sequential series of forms and activities without an all-embracing order and purpose, and, therefore, cannot be dealt with as a whole. The only possible ap-

proach to the interpretation of the totality of social life resolves itself into the search for some organizing principle such as Spencer, or Hegel, or Spengler attempted to formulate with the intention of showing that social life as a whole expresses a uniform evolutionary process. This approach carries a definite philosophic-speculative stamp and was long before the advent of sociology appropriated and exploited by the philosophy of history or, as it is now called, the philosophy of culture.

It may be suggested that in order to avoid the inherent inadequacy of the term society in its comprehensive sense, the term can be restricted to designate the social structure of a particular cultural area which can be described as a more or less integrated whole. But should sociology, then, be defined as a study of society in the plural, its task would be identical with that of ethnography which deals with the description and comparative study of cultural areas. We see, therefore, that unless sociology is identified with either the philosophy of culture or the descriptive science of ethnography it cannot be defined as the study of society.

Another way of conceiving sociology as a general science is by defining it as a synthetic science. This definition also is untenable. For if by "synthetic" we mean that sociology synthesizes the results of the various social sciences we project an impossible task. The propositions of the social sciences are derived from the analysis of different aspects of social reality and have no direct bearing upon each other. What, for example, can be the synthetic theory that will comprise the theory of business cycles and the theory of mana?

If on the other hand we mean by "synthetic" the interpretation of social occurrences and situations from a synthetic point of view, thus counteracting the tendency of each social science to give a one-sided interpretation, we are equally unable to justify sociology as a synthetic science. The fact that social phenomena are conditioned by many and divers factors is a common-sense observation, but it cannot constitute the basis upon which the sociologist could establish a science. For on such a basis he could merely be the instigator of a cooperation between the social sciences, unless he should want to assume the flattering but presumptuous position of being master of them all and do all the interpreting himself.

If, finally, sociology were to be synthetic in the sense that it would analyze the findings of the social sciences from the unifying point of view of their bearing upon the realization of values it would be identical with social philosophy.

A third way in which sociology is conceived as a general science is: that it studies what is common to all social phenomena. But what have social phenomena in common? First of all the obvious characteristic of their being social. This means that they presuppose interaction between individuals. Secondly, that they are manifestations of human activities which in turn are expressions of basic psychological processes. A science which purports to give a general theory of human action, which studies the mechanisms of interaction and explains motivations and attitudes already exists. This science is psychology. It analyzes the basic factors and processes which make human behavior what it is. Should, therefore, sociology be defined as the study of that which is common is all social phenomena, i.e., the prerequisite of social behavior, it would then be identical with psychology. Failure to realize this consequence is responsible for the persistence of the definition in sociological theory. . . .

Finally, in defense of sociology as a general science, there is the definition of so-

ciology as the study of relationships given between two or more varieties of different social phenomena, or between the social and non-social phenomena. This claim is maintained by Sorokin.* It is true that the relation and interdependence of social phenomena belonging to different classes are not studied by a particular discipline. But why should this particular discipline be sociology? In fact, why should there be such a discipline at all? He would be a poor economist who would neglect to investigate the effect of political factors upon economic processes, or a poor political scientist who would ignore the economic factors influencing political processes. Not only is the study of the relation of the data of different classes practiced all the time within the province of each social science, but only there can it be adequately treated, thus making a special discipline superfluous. To call, as Sorokin does, the study of *any* relationship between different classes of phenomena a sociological procedure is to ignore the special kind of relationship between sociological factors or processes and other social phenomena, to which the term sociological procedure alone is applicable. The utilization of this procedure involves the sociological interpretation of phenomena to which we refer above as constituting one of the tasks of sociology.

We have discussed briefly the most important conceptions of sociology as a general science and have found that in every case the possible field is already occupied by some other science. There are other conceptions of lesser significance which are either variations of the definitions already discussed, or represent unjustified claims upon tasks that actually fall within the province of the special sciences.

We must conclude, therefore, that sociology cannot be constituted as a general science except it be made identical with ethnography or the philosophy of culture, with psychology or social philosophy, or made to encroach upon the field of the already existing social sciences. Since there is no other alternative left we must frankly take cognizance of the clue that unless sociology is conceived as a special science, it is not possible to justify its existence as a science in its own rights.

In view of this conclusion the question of the validity of sociology as a special science must now occupy our attention. We must be able to demonstrate that the pursuit of sociological research constitutes a special field of inquiry and a special approach to the understanding of social reality.

The numerous studies made by sociologists particularly in recent years, which are neither ethnographical, philosophical, nor psychological and which do not fall within the province of economics, political science, jurisprudence, or any of the other cultural sciences, are a clear indication that such a special field of inquiry exists. It takes only a little reflection to formulate its nature and scope, for the basis on which the field of cultural reality is divided among the social sciences gives us the necessary clues.

Cultural reality consists of human activities and of resultants of these activities. Such resultants, for example, are price and business cycles, language and writing, machines and tools, laws and customs, beliefs and philosophies, government and community organization, social relationships and groups, objects of art and literature, scientific systems and methods. The resultants constitute the totality of human achievements in the process of adjustment and self-

* Pitirim A. Sorokin, brilliant Harvard University professor of sociology and author of many volumes, the most recent of which has been *The Meaning of Our Crisis*. [Ed.]

expression. They are either consequences of the way in which human activities are carried on, or products of the characteristically human effort to create and modify an environment that will ensure adequate release or prevention of tensions.

The study of these resultants is the general object-matter of the social sciences. They investigate the origin of the resultants and the laws which they manifest; the changes which they undergo and the way in which they condition human behavior; the relation in which they stand to each other and the problems which they involve.

Division of labor in the study of cultural reality is inevitable in view of its manifold aspects. The differentiation of fields of inquiry is supported by the fact that resultants can be grouped into classes on the basis of common characteristics. The division of the social sciences follows, necessarily, the discrimination of classes of social phenomena since each class has distinct problems of its own and can be comprehended only by an indigenous theory. Every class thus becomes the object-matter of a special science.

The common characteristics, by means of which we distinguish the classes of social phenomena, we derive from the primary directions and intentions of human activities. For example, where the direction or intention is the production and exchange of goods we have as consequences and products resultants which constitute the class of economic phenomena; where it is the exercise of control and power in community life we have as consequences and products resultants which represent the class of political phenomena. These resultants are abstracted from the context in which they appear together with other phenomena in concrete situations and occurrences of social life and subjected to scientific scrutiny by the sciences of economics and politics respectively. On the same principle the other social sciences are established.

Now among the resultants of human activities there are some that closely correspond to the predominant interest of sociology in inter-human behavior, and that are not specifically dealt with by the other social sciences. These resultants are the consequences and products of activities the direction and intention of which is the adjustment of individuals to each other necessitated by the exigencies of living together. It is Znaniecki's * lasting contribution to have shown that they constitute a special class of social phenomena and, therefore, require investigation by a special science. The known resultants which this class embodies have been discovered and are studied traditionally by sociologists. By right of discovery and tradition, therefore, we can consider them to constitute the object-matter of sociology, and we may define sociology as the science which studies resultants of activities the intention of which is adjustment of individuals to each other.

The primary resultants of these activities we observe to be:

1. Social *positions,* which individuals assume with regard to each other, rationally, traditionally, or emotionally. Positions are implied by instances of social differentiation for example.
2. Social *relationships,* that are forms of adjustment between individuals or groups, such as marriage or an alliance, involving a fixation of behavior-pattern of the members of the relationship in respect to each other, most generally expressed as a mutual recognition of rights and obligations.
3. Groups, that are forms of adjustment

* Florian A. Znaniecki, famous sociologist and co-author, with William I. Thomas, of the pioneering work, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America.* [Ed.]

in which individuals are united by a common bond, and which constitute functional wholes with which individuals as members in part identify themselves. These groups range in complexity from the group-of-two to the community.

Positions, relationships, and groups represent the basic categories of sociology, since it can be shown that all other sociological categories, i.e., those pertaining to adjustment between individuals, such as social status, solidarity, conflict, the social individual, and so forth are aspects, or constituent factors of positions, relationships, and groups. Sociology may, therefore, be defined more concisely as the theory of social positions, relationships, and groups.

The scope of such a theory comprises tasks of a formal, historical, and interpretative nature. Among the tasks of formal analysis we may mention the classification of types of relationships and groups and the analysis of their nature; the determination of the phenomena to which relationships and groups give rise, and analysis of the ways in which they manifest themselves; and finally the study of the typical processes and conditions involved in the origin, the maintenance, change, and dissolution of relationships and groups and of their constituent factors. The tasks of historical analysis comprise among others the study of the evolution of typical relationships and groups, of their role and function in different concrete situations and historical settings, and of the way in which they condition and are conditioned by other aspects of social reality, religious, economic, political, and so forth.

Through formal and historical analyses sociology arrives at type-constructs, generalizations, and laws which constitute its body of knowledge. This body of knowledge serves as the basis for the interpretation of the concrete occurrence of social life which is the third task of sociology. Herein lies the eminently practical importance of sociology. For we find that positions, relationships, and groups create conditions and generate influences which in part determine the events, the situations, and the problems of social life. These must, therefore, be interpreted in terms of and with reference to position-relationship- and group-factors and processes, in order that they may be adequately and completely understood. By furnishing the approach and the means for such an interpretation through its body of knowledge, sociology supplements the contributions of other sciences to the understanding of social life and to the guidance in social actions. We see, for example, how much more our knowledge of crime has advanced since we added the sociological approach to the biological, psychological, and economic approaches to this problem.

In the light of our discussion, the nature and scope of sociology may be expressed in the following propositions:

1. Sociology is not a general science but a special social science. As such, its validity is fully justified by the fact that it has for its object-matter a distinct class of cultural phenomena that is not and cannot be systematically and comprehensively investigated by the other social sciences, and the analysis of which establishes a special and important body of knowledge about social reality.

2. The object-matter of sociology is social positions, relationships, and groups, and its purpose is to arrive at a systematic body of demonstrable propositions about them by means of formal and historical analysis.

3. Sociology cooperates with the other social sciences in the interpretation of past

and present occurrences of social life and in the guidance of social actions.

The specifically sociological interpretation is one in terms of, and with reference to position-relationship and group-factors and processes.

4. Sociology as such is not concerned with the investigation of social conditions and social problems. The objects of research are the relationship- and group-aspects which it abstracts from concrete occurrences and situations and subjects to scientific scrutiny. The results of its analysis, however, furnish means for the interpretation of the descriptive and statistical data which the social investigator has accumulated on any particular problem, insofar as this problem is determined by relationship- or group-factors and processes. The contribution of sociology to understanding will be of greatest importance in cases where the kernel of a problem, such as in divorce or crime, is of a sociological nature.

B. Social Organization

19

*The New Social Stratification**

ROBERT M. MACIVER

Dr. Robert M. MacIver, professor emeritus of political philosophy and sociology at Columbia University, has written numerous books. In this essay taken from a cooperative venture published in 1947, we follow MacIver's analysis of the changing social structure in the modern world and some of the reasons which have contributed to that transformation.

In two lands the dream of a classless society has been dynamic. In both of them it has been expressive of social change in the present and of tendencies toward changes to come. But in neither has the dream been fulfilled in the goal of classlessness. Where the dream has been cherished social stratification has been transformed but not abolished, for, as we shall see, social stratification, though forever changing, is in some sense as inherent in society as society is inherent in man. . . .

In spite of their ardent dreams neither North America nor Soviet Russia attained the classless society. The reason why in both cases the dream was unfulfilled is a simple and ineluctable one. Social stratification is a function of social differentiation. Whatever distinguishes man from man, or rather group from group, carries with it the implication of class. Marx erred if he thought that one particular economic disparity was the sole condition of social class. This economic factor was indeed an important determinant of the particular type of class structure that existed throughout the Western world. But it was not the *sine qua non* of class. Some of the most powerful class systems in the world, such

* Reprinted by permission from *Our Emergent Civilization*, "The New Social Stratification," by Robert M. MacIver, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1947.

as the caste system of India, did not depend upon it. Even where this factor was powerful it was far from being all-powerful. The magic of birth and of inherited status also played a part. The economic factor was important because wealth was also power. But there are other sources of power independent of the possession of wealth. Moreover, if wealth is a source of power, power is also a source of wealth. Wealth in the last resort does not consist in the possession of specific titles to material things but in the ability to control, to exploit or to dispose of these things. He who commands men commands also wealth. He has service where other men serve. He rides where other men walk.

In North America the dream of a classless society weakened the older bonds of class. It was a liberating dream. It was also a trusting dream, for it believed that progress was inevitable. Because it believed too easily it suffered disillusionment. In Soviet Russia also the dream was one of liberation. But here it was a swift and universal liberation to be achieved not through the quiet processes of providentially directed change but through an infallible system of action clearly expounded from the first. This dream was charged with the highest dynamism. It brought one form of liberation in a manner beyond the dreams of any previous age. But it brought also a new form of servitude. Revolution does not abolish social stratification; it only changes it, for better or for worse. What is new in a changing society is primarily the character of the social stratification. What is also new is the changing basis of power. . . .

Since social differentiation is highly variant, the class system is different everywhere, not only as between countries but also as between different areas of the same country. It has a different pattern in a North Dakota village from that exhibited in a Midwestern town. It is quite different in a Vermont community from that characteristic in a community of like size in Virginia. Sometimes, particularly in the smaller towns, the main stratification is a simple dichotomy, often signalized by residence, as between those who live on the opposite sides of the tracks or between those who live on the hill and those who inhabit the valley. Sometimes the main stratification divides the community into three groups, as in a New England small town I have in mind, where there is an elite of the old residents and the upper professional class, a middle group of small traders and craftsmen, and a lower social level of millworkers and so forth. Not infrequently in such towns each class has a particular church associated with it. There are also other organizations that have a class significance. There are clubs exclusive to the elite and there are usually particular organizations representative of the middle groups. It is such facts as these that justify us in applying the term "social stratification." Although there may be a general air of pervading fellowship to the outside view, the more intimate relationships are roughly within the boundaries of each group. Within these boundaries the men plan together and play together and the women pay calls on one another. Within these boundaries, for the most part, they marry and give in marriage.

Over these local differences there is superimposed the broader pattern of national differences. We miss any appreciation of the character of social classes unless we recognize that it is both an intricate and an extremely variable phenomenon. Each country has its own distinctive type. It is idle dogmatism to conceive social stratification as the simple corollary of economic power or economic exploitation, to

imagine that it arose solely out of a particular economic relationship, or that it exists only so long as that relationship endures. Within the great range of what is called capitalistic society there are many marked differences in the character of social classes. It is very different in the United States or in Canada from what it is in England. The English class configuration is very different from the French one. The French is very different from the German. We cannot know the pattern of any one country by studying that of another. Each has its distinctive system. If sometimes they approach fairly closely, often they show most significant divergences.

Beyond these differences, again, there spreads a still broader and perhaps somewhat more elusive pattern. Every civilization, every age, tends to create an appropriate over-all scheme of social stratification. The great secular trends of every age influence the modes of relationship between men and groups. With these trends go changes in the underlying schemes of valuation. As these changes are taken up into the living culture of the people they have their impact on class forms and class relationships. We shall now turn briefly to consider some of these broader changes in the scheme of values and in the conditions of social valuation and shall then proceed to consider how they have been and are at work to create a new social stratification.

If there is a new form of social stratification characteristic of the age in which we live or taking shape within it for the time ahead, it is because our age is itself subjected to social forces and cultural influences that differentiate it from the past. Thus our social valuations have undergone and are undergoing change. The direction of some of the major trends of our society is already clearly indicated, particularly in the economic and technological areas. Others are more obscure and more ambivalent. Some of these processes have already been operative over several generations; others are only slowly unfolding themselves.

Most manifest are certain economic and technological trends. These have a specific impact not only on the nature of wealth, on its organization and distribution, but also on the nature and the distribution of power. It is becoming difficult for us to realize that only a few generations separate us from the time when land was still the most prized and overwhelmingly dominant form of possession. With the growing competition of other forms of wealth went the decay of feudalism. Thus began the dissolution of class rigidities, a process greatly advanced by the later developments of capitalism. When land was the main form of wealth—land, that is, regarded simply as the storehouse of products, matured by nature and merely gathered or harvested by man—the essential division of mankind was that of the landed proprietor and the landless worker. This relationship was a relatively fixed one. Land in a feudal sense was the static, the one permanent good. It was not produced by the will of man. It could not be multiplied. It was inherited as a right or won as the prize of power. Authority went with it, authority as undisputed and as absolute as the right of possession. The landless man could rarely pass the barrier between him and the landowner. The lines of social demarcation were hard and fast.

Against this system the growth of industrial capital—as distinct from mere financial capital—began to assert its power. The new wealth, which unlike the old had the secret of reproduction, came into being through the enterprise and under the con-

trol of the middle classes, not of the landed classes; hence it had no relation to prior status. It was not associated with authority. Being itself a fluctuating and unstable, though mightily extensible thing, it was not inherently such as to command the reverence that went with a title to land. He who owned land owned what God had given. He owned part of the indestructible firmament of things. He had the authority that belongs to the eternal. But though industrial wealth carried no intrinsic authority, though the mode of acquisition was despised by the landowner, it was indubitable wealth and it could buy the landed poor and in the end the landed rich. Thus its status increased and it began to shake the seats of ancient power.

The new industrial wealth did much more than merely compete with and in the end dominate the old wealth in land. There were inherent in the economics and technology of industry forces which in various other ways brought profound changes in the relationships of men. For our purpose here we shall single out one of these. From the beginning of the industrial revolution *function,* in the first instance economic function, began to gain social significance. The function of landowning, being in itself static, was relatively passive, receptive and differentiated. The main office associated with it, that of social and political control, was derivative, not inherent. By contrast the function of industrial production was directly and continuously active. It was forever disposing, changing and establishing the relationships of men and groups. It operated through a network of interdependence. From any one focus it ramified to all the earth. It was not, like the function of the landowner, walled within the bounds of a self-sufficient estate. It created a whole series of contingent and intermediate functions. It made a society vastly more diversified than it was before. Gradually it brought a distinction between the owners of the new apparatus of wealth and those who organized or controlled it. Just as function became more complex, so did power.

There is a trend to consistency in the various changing components of a changing civilization. Each one operates to confirm and to sustain the rest. It would be one-sided to attribute the transformation solely or even mainly to technological and economic processes. These processes were themselves responsive to less overt changes. They fostered the cultural changes that in turn stimulated their own development. Social attitudes, religious doctrines, scientific perceptions, all the modes of thought and of belief, as they radiated from the centers of influence, also were undergoing congenial change. The whole complex of the new scheme of things was conspiring toward a characteristic social stratification. Before the industrial revolution certain profound political changes had already been responsive to new conceptions of authority. With the industrial revolution, or series of revolutions, these new tendencies were greatly enhanced. The middle classes were the bearers of the new order, and they carried through, first in England and then in other lands, an assault on the old establishment of power and therewith on the ancient entrenchments of caste. The nobility ceased to be set off as a race apart from the commoners. The men of means entered the portals once so jealously guarded. The nobleman found it expedient, and profitable, to join hands with the industrialist, and often to marry his daughter. Social mobility was everywhere on the increase. It penetrated line after line. The middle classes in turn found that the forces of which they were the beneficiaries were far from being exhausted at that stage. The

hitherto powerless also learned to organize. Labor unions discovered the secret of modern power, the secret of function.

In our space we can give only a synoptic and simplified picture of the great transformation, so as to dwell rather more upon its effects on the system of class.

It is necessary, however, to stress the cultural concomitance of the new economic order. In the first place, the cultural gulf that had previously existed between social strata was gradually narrowed until the line of demarcation became blurred or wholly obliterated. Under the older oligarchical regime the culture of the gentry and the culture of the folk were far apart, save for such indoctrination of the latter as was congenial to the former. The different classes thought different thoughts and practiced different mores. Each had its own manner of speech just as each had its own garb. Since their life chances were totally different, there was a total difference in their outlook on life. The ruling classes had their own system of education; the lowborn acquired, apart from the localized traditions and customs of the folk, only the relatively unspecialized arts of earning a living. The vast mass of men were illiterate, as hopelessly cut off from knowledge as from power. In the industrialized countries of the world all that has been changed. The greater realm of human culture has been opened to the rank and file. The printing press and universal schooling and a thousand agencies of communication have broken down the barriers. Except where extreme poverty still prohibits it, the acquisition of culture has become selective, open to high and to low alike according to their fitness to receive it.

Under these conditions a sentiment alien to the class spirit and therefore scarcely known to the older world, that of nationality, has grown powerful. Nationality equalizes man. All alike, rich and poor, high and low, possess it in equal measure. It cannot be possessed in degree. Class, on the other hand, is based on inequality and on a sense of superiority which demands a corresponding inferiority on the other side. Class is exclusive, essentially hierarchical. So long as class was dominant nationality could not prevail. As the pretensions of class were challenged, the sentiment of nationality came in to assert the greater solidarity. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that this new sentiment found its opportunity.

All other social values were at the same time in process of transformation, and not least among them the values of religion. In the old order religion was the strong buttress of authority, except in those instances where authority itself dared to challenge religion. Otherwise religion tended to give to mundane authority a supermundane sanction of the most impressive kind. It conferred on authority the aegis of eternity. The foundations of social order were divinely ordained. The religious hierarchy was prone to look on social change as dangerous. Those who rebelled against the social order were presumptuously resisting the dictates of an all-wise providence. On the whole, dogmatic religion tended to freeze the *status quo*. . . .

Even in our world today it is notable that systems of authoritarianism seek to confer a kind of religious sanction on their doctrines, seek to establish the sacrosanctness of their absolute power, although these modern equivalents are not nearly so enduring as the ancient faiths. In broad terms this kind of religion has lost its hold on modern peoples. The character of religion itself has been undergoing a subtle and complex change. What has been most obviously challenged is the projection by the old faiths of a tradition of authority over

the secular destinies of men. It may be that religion as a principle claiming ethical authority, as a guide of personal behavior, has not undergone much obvious change. It is hard in any event to trace, sometimes even to see, the influence of religion on the everyday behavior of men. But certainly the hierarchical principle of religion, as it bears on the stratification of men in society, has suffered eclipse.

Bereft of these cultural supports, the authority of man over man has lost its ancient anchorage. Authority is no longer viewed as predetermined, as given in the eternal order of things. Authority of some kind there must always be, but the new authority must find some other refuge than the ancient sanctity. There were now only two grounds on one or the other of which authority could sustain itself. The alternatives were either to find a new sanctity, no longer transcendental but immanent, in the social objectives proclaimed by government or else to make authority something that does not depend on the ruler at all but only on his relation to the ruled.

The choice between these two alternatives will be decisive and has already become crucial. The first is the way of dictatorship, alike in its reactionary forms and in the Marxist form. If we could afford to look at the choice *sub specie aeternitatis* we might regard this refuge of authority as merely a transitional one. For in the long run, and in the endless clashes between the new myth and the hard experience of reality, any sanctity not confirmed by a supra-social sanction is not likely to endure. But that reflection cannot bring much comfort to those who may have to live through a new age of tyranny and who, besides, cannot possibly predict the manner in which such an age will channel the further processes of society.

The other alternative is the way of democracy. Its future will depend on the degree to which it can make its own new kind of authority secure, as the events of recent history have so amply shown. For it must be admitted that authority was an easier concept under the order of ancient sanctity. Then it was static, providentially assigned, inherited, guarded from above. Now it must be guarded from below. Now it is relative, with a relativity that belongs to our age. But this is another question not here to be considered.

It is not difficult to see how all these forces of change first loosened and then dislodged the magical attributes of class, the assumptions of social superiority and inferiority implicit in the ancient myths and rites of authority. But it is not enough to say that function has been substituted for magic as the new basis for social stratification. We still have to answer the question: What makes one function socially more honorific or more potent than another so that the lines of social intercourse are thus determined? Nor can we answer our question simply by scrutinizing the intrinsic attributes of one function as compared with another. A philosopher from Mars might reason that the functions which demanded the most rare capacities or regulated the more important or the most difficult tasks would be those which conveyed the highest social status. A materialist philosopher might conclude that the functions commanding the highest market value would win the greatest social esteem or power. Both would miss the mark.

Modern civilization involves a vast network of strategic controls over a highly complicated mechanism of interdependent functions. In some societies these strategic controls are unicentered. In other words, they are politically manipulated. The most complete embodiment of the unicentered

principle is exhibited in Soviet Russia, where the political omnicompetence has wholly absorbed the economic function. There are also various approximations to this order in fascist types of states where the economic controls have been largely subordinated to politically conceived ends. In a much simpler fashion another approximation is found in such a country as Mexico, where since the antifeudal revolution the politicos somewhat freely manipulate the economic processes of the country. In these very diverse instances the division of classes becomes wholly or in large measuse the simple one between the ruling class, with its inner clique and its outer cohorts, and the class of the ruled. The traditional social classes, relying on tradition, inheritance, birth, sanctity or other magical properties, have in these countries fought generally a losing battle against the new political hierarchy. They tend to disappear as coherent classes. They are either liquidated or else they somehow merge into the new order of things. It is noteworthy that the new political hierarchy in these countries is not determined by prior status. The Georgian peasant or the Austrian semiskilled worker or the Italian journalist or the Latin-American adventurer, may become the apex of the new pyramid.

A quite different picture is presented by those areas which maintain some kind of socio-capitalist system, including a considerable majority of the greater industrialized countries. Here the restratification of society is much more complex. Here there is some kind of moving adjustment between the still-expanding domain of government and the increasingly centralized systems of corporate enterprise, financial and industrial. Here too the function of control has in great measure severed itself from traditional limitations, from the older determinants of status. The divorce is by no means complete, since a minor type of traditionalism develops within the new order. Wealth to no inconsiderable extent tends to confer higher function, particularly with respect to the economic controls. The executive is increasingly likely to be the son of an executive. But since there are practical tests that must be met to hold the more exacting jobs, there are important limitations to this tendency. As for the political bureaucracy, a different test must here sooner or later be met: the capacity of its heads to make the effective kind of competitive public appeal. Hence the new stratification remains mobile. It cannot harden to anything like the rigidity of the older stratification.

In a broad sense we may perhaps think of this transformation as the "managerial revolution." But we must then include in the category of managers the upper political leaders, the party manipulators, and various other kinds of "social engineers." We must include, for example, the heads of the great labor organizations. The relative domain of one type of leadership or another, or of one group or another, fluctuates. The socio-capitalist order, unlike the socialist or the fascist order, is multicentered. There is much stress and strain between rival controls. The spheres of control are differentiated but by no means separated. While the political control always claims over-all authority, that is only the formal aspect. What the voice of that authority proclaims depends on the changing relations of various economic and politico-economic forces. Moreover, the source of power is often disguised. The great cartel runs a secret imperium of its own. The consortium of finance pursues its particular ends through devices the outsider cannot fathom. The organizations of industry on every level muster power against power, control against competing or opposing con-

trol. The bureaucracy of government is subject to the coalitions and the conflicts of these various interests, while at the same time it struggles to maintain its hold on office against ever-renewed insurgent political movements. Everywhere, however, it is the control function, the larger organizing function, that according to its scale holds or seeks the primacy in modern society, creates the relations of subordination and superordination, and thus presides over the stratification of the modern world.

This statement may somewhat oversimplify the complex and everchanging fact. There are other determinants, but they are subsidiary. The ancient magic of class is not wholly dissipated. There are foci of reaction or resistance. There are also forces inherent in the creative culture which exercise great influence on social standards and convey status on their exponents or interpreters. It is indeed conceivable that with the permeation and diversification of new cultural movements, within a society that produces a sufficiency for the material needs of all and that is moving at the same time toward the abolition of abject poverty and economic insecurity and toward the conferment of new leisure on all the people, there will come a time when the increased ranks of the groups that minister to cultural needs will possess a much higher role than now exists within the social order. Here one important difference between the wholly socialized system and the socio-capitalist system is apparent. In the latter the creative culture is not subject to the direct control of the political function. It can follow its own spontaneity, subject no doubt to various economic pulls but nevertheless inherently free. Since in the last resort the stratification of society expresses the prevailing social valuations, this kind of system is much less restrained from following new paths and seeking new goals.

Before we conclude this brief survey we should point out the main factors that in the socio-capitalist order resist the processes of restratification we have sought to indicate. It may well be that the fate of this order itself, over against the new authoritarian order, will depend on the success with which it is able to overcome these resistances. For the factors to which we refer are not merely unreconciled with the spirit of the new order, the emergent civilization. They generate types of hostility within it which if unchecked may well cause its overthrow. We place first the struggle for dominance between nonfunctional groupings, in particular between the various ethnic groups that compose many of the larger societies. The extreme type is the dominance of group over group in the name of racial superiority. This type of dominance constitutes the most formidable obstacle to the trends of modern civilization. Not only does it assert the primacy of class distinctions that have no intrinsic relation to function but it turns the classes thus distinguished into castes, the ultimate form of dissociation between members of the same community. This, for example, is the bitterly inflexible class structure that comprises the white and the colored groups of the United States. Another form of the assertion of racial supremacy, that which distinguished the Nazi regime, identifies race with nation and in a different way resists the whole trend of modern civilization. In this form it devotes itself to military conquest and to that end superimposes another stratification altogether. The myth of race and that of ethnic superiority combine to create one of the last strongholds of traditionalism, one of the last defenses of the ancient magic. A further limiting factor on the processes of restratification is the existence of great military establishments. Not only do they also claim a functional superiority that is utterly irrelevant

to all the functions characteristic of modern civilization but also, because they divert the energies of peoples toward the preparation for war, they blunt the efficacy of all other social tendencies. In the older times the ruling class was also a warrior class and the fusion confirmed the social distance between this class and the rest of the people. When modern civilization has not been threatened by war it has worked toward the reduction of the status of the military class, since the function of that class is alien to the whole functional scheme of things. Thus the decline of the influence of a warrior class on government has been an important development of modern society. Consequently the measure in which the new stratification will proceed to its complete evolution, whatever that may be, depends to no small extent on the chances that a more peaceful world will emerge out of the convulsion through which the whole world has been passing, perhaps in the last resort as a result of the appalling agency of annihilation that science delivered to the world at its close.

C. Agriculture in an Industrial Economy

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*The Farmer's Changing World**

F. F. ELLIOTT

The annual Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture is invariably a goldmine of information. This was particularly true for the social sciences in the 1940 edition which analyzed the problems of the farmers in a changing world. Dr. Foster F. Elliott, agricultural economist for numerous governmental agencies since 1925, discusses, in one of the volume's essays, the broad questions posed for the farmer in a growing industrialized economy.

We live in a dynamic world—a world in which physical nature, man's habits and reactions, and man-made institutions are all constantly changing. The problem of adjustment to change for the farmer can be easily visualized by assuming that he operates in a static or stationary economy in which no change takes place. How would a world without change differ from the real world in which the farmer actually operates?

Picture an Unchanging World. In the first place, in such a stationary state of affairs, production would remain constant instead of continually fluctuating as it now does. The supply of cotton, wheat, corn, and other feed grains, of fruits and vegetables, and of all livestock and livestock products would be forth-coming in a steady and continuous stream. Each year the amount would be the same. There would be no new

* F. F. Elliott, "The Farmer's Changing World," *The Yearbook of Agriculture*, 1940 (Washington: Government Printing Office).

technological developments introduced to upset existing cost and price relationships. There would be no change in size of farms, no new land brought into cultivation, no changes in fertilizer treatment or in cultural practices, no additional soil losses to offset, and no new diseases, pests, or other production hazards to combat. There would be nothing, in short, to interfere either with the production or the even and continuous flow of products to market.

On the demand side, prices of products and cost of goods also would remain unchanged. There would be no fluctuations in business activity or in employment. No new synthetic products or new processes would be introduced to replace those already in use. There would be no change in export outlets either for agricultural or for industrial commodities. Likewise, there would be no change in birth or mortality rates, no further piling up of old-age groups, and no changes in the geographic distribution of the population. Moreover, standards of living, consumption habits, attitudes, and opinions of both rural and urban people would remain the same. There would be no innovations, no change in styles and fashions. All these things would be completely static or bear a constant relationship to each other.

In such a world the farmer's management problem obviously would be practically nonexistent. What decisions would there be for him to make? How simple his problem would be—and how different from those of the real world in which he operates today! It is only necessary to cite a few specific examples of changes that have occurred over the last decade or so to indicate how striking the contrast really is.

The Changing Scene of Reality

Changes in Markets. Consider first what has happened to the farmer's market, including the prices he has received for his products. In the first place, owing to population growth, he has been confronted with rather significant changes in the size of his total domestic market. He has also been confronted with changes in the composition of that market. This is evidenced by changes in the proportion of people living in cities and on farms, by shifts in the different age groups of the population, and by changes in the dietary habits of the people.

In 1920, for example, the farmer supplied food and fiber for approximately 105 million people, while at the present time he must supply the needs of about 132 million people.

Although the number of people living on farms today is about the same as in 1920, the nonfarm population has increased by about 25 million. As a result of this shift, the farmer's business has become more closely meshed with the nonfarm economy. This has increased the farmer's dependence upon the buying power and habits of the consuming group. At the same time it has subjected him, in an increasing degree, to the sharp ups and downs in business activity and in the general level of employment, which are so characteristic of this sphere of our economy.

Changes in Consumption Habits. In addition to these shifts in the total demand for his products the farmer has had to adjust himself to marked changes in the demand for specific commodities.

This type of change is evidenced by shifts in the per capita consumption of farm products. For example, there has been a decline in per capita consumption of wheat flour from 176 pounds in the period 1920–24 to 154 pounds in 1934–37. The consumption of citrus fruits has risen from 27 to 47 pounds per capita in the same period, and the consumption of canned

fruits has risen from 9 to 15 pounds. On the other hand, the consumption of apples has dropped from 55 to 43 pounds. Excluding potatoes, there has been a sharp rise in the consumption of fresh vegetables from an average of 98 pounds during 1920–24 to 126 pounds in the period 1934–37. The increase in consumption of canned vegetables is particularly marked, having risen from 14 to 22 pounds per capita in the same period. There has also been an upward trend in the consumption of dairy products and a decline in the consumption of potatoes and lean meats. Although most of the changes that have taken place in consumption have not placed an excessive burden of adjustment upon farmers, they have added to the general problem and created special problems of expansion and contraction in specific areas.

Prosperity and Depression. The farmer also has felt the impact of industrial prosperity and depression as reflected through sharp fluctuations in the prices and consequently the income he has received. In 1919, for example, the index of prices received by farmers reached a peak of 221 as compared with 100 in the base period 1910–14. Two years later this index figure had slumped to 124. It got back to 147 in 1929 but collapsed again to 68 in 1932. It has since recovered to a post-depression peak of 121 in 1937.

The farmer's income, of course, was affected by these price changes. The gross farm income in 1919 reached the all-time high of 16.9 billion dollars. But in 1921 the farmer was forced to accept an income of only 8.9 billion dollars, barely half of what it had been 2 years before. By 1929 it was up again to 11.9 billion dollars, only to shrink to the ruinous figure of 5.3 billion dollars in 1932. General recovery, combined with a strenuous collective effort on the part of farmers, brought farm income back to slightly over 10 billion dollars in 1937.

These ups and downs in the farmer's prices and income reflect maladjustments in part in agriculture but primarily in the industrial economy, particularly in the structure of prices and the flow of investment.

Even more violent changes have taken place in the farmer's foreign market, reflecting not only the ups and downs of the business cycle and changes in the volume of American foreign lending but also the rise of nationalistic policies of self-sufficiency throughout the world. As a result there has been a sharp drop in the absolute amounts of specific agricultural commodities taken by foreign countries.

In 1919 the American farmer received nearly 4 billion dollars for exported products that required the use of more than 55 million acres of land for their production. In 1932 he received only 590 million dollars for the products of 34 million acres. Despite the subsequent general business recovery during the 1930's, the value of his exports remained low; in 1936 they had a value of less than three-quarters of a billion dollars, and their production required the use of only 20 million acres. Although there has been some recovery, our foreign outlets remain very low as compared with those around the World War [I] period.

Technology and Mechanization. Apart from these sharp changes in markets and demand, the farmer also has had to adjust himself to the impact of rapid technological changes. Although these developments decreased his costs and increased his efficiency, they created new problems. Outstanding has been the increased use of machinery on farms and the substitution of mechanical power for animal power.

Twenty years ago there were more than 26 million horses and mules on farms; today there are fewer than 16 million. This

change has resulted from a marked increase in the use of tractors, motortrucks, and automobiles. The number of tractors on farms, for example, had increased from 160,000 in 1919 to close to 1,600,000 in 1939. A change of almost equal magnitude has taken place in the use of motortrucks. With these shifts has come a release of nearly 35 million acres of land the production of which was formerly required to support work stock. The crops produced on this large area now must find a market through other channels, a circumstance that has greatly contributed to the farmer's surplus and price problem.

The increased use of mechanical power with its full complement of seeding, cultivating and harvesting equipment has resulted in a rather marked increase in the efficiency with which man labor is used. In the period 1898–1902, for example, it required on an average 86 hours of man labor to produce 100 bushels of wheat, whereas in the period 1928–32 less than 50 hours was necessary. This has inevitably resulted in displacement of man labor in agriculture, giving rise to the difficult problem of readjustment and relocation of farm laborers elsewhere.

This trend toward mechanization, furthermore, has tended to cause regional shifts in agricultural production, to concentrate production in the most productive areas, and to increase the competition for farmers located in the more broken and unproductive lands.

Combined with mechanization have been other technological developments, such as those in the fields of plant breeding, genetics, and chemical fertilizers. The productivity of agriculture relative to its manpower has been tremendously increased by all these improvements. The development and recent wide adoption of hybrid seed corn is a particularly apt illustration of what is going on in this field.

Although these advances in technology have enabled the farmer to meet some of his problems, they have also created new ones, particularly when he has had to throw his increased output onto markets already glutted or lacking buying power.

Changing Standards. In addition to these changes of an economic and technical nature affecting the income and purchasing power of the farmer, there have been changes that have altered his standard of living and way of life. Along with other groups in the population, he has attempted to raise his standard of living by adopting many of the numerous innovations which have come to be accepted as necessary by other elements in the American population. These include such things as automobiles, radios, electric refrigerators and other electrical appliances, modern heating and plumbing, and the like. The farmer also has demanded better highways, better schools, better facilities for public health, and other public services.

This tendency to keep pace with rising living standards has increased his money outlay both for personal expenditures and for taxes. The problem of maintaining this standard of living, therefore, becomes increasingly one of maintaining his money income. Hence his concern with the recurring fluctuations in industrial buying power and their repercussions on his own money returns.

The farmer is confronted with still other changes, such as fluctuating debt burdens, changing freight and interest rates, the growth of internal trade barriers, and the like, which also are powerful forces that influence his final action. But it is not necessary to pile up further instances of

the physical, economic, and social changes impinging upon the farmer to indicate how really difficult is the job of operating a farm.

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*Agricultural Trends**

CARL C. TAYLOR

Having surveyed some of the forces which vitally affect the modern farmer, we turn now to a view of the adjustments made to these changes by the rural elements of our society. Carl C. Taylor, rural sociologist and agricultural economist for the Department of Agriculture, discusses present agrarian trends.

The Direction and Measurement of Change. In seeking to measure change by comparing American rural life today with what it was a century ago, one is confronted with the fact that it was not the same everywhere then and is not the same everywhere today. In a country the size of the United States the diversities are so many that a discussion of major trends must confine itself to those that are operative in all farming areas, even though they may be far more pronounced in some parts of the country than in others. . . .

The Lessening of Rural Isolation. Although there are remote areas of the country where isolation is greater today than it was a century ago near Boston, New York, Philadelphia, or Charleston, isolation in rural areas is in general decreasing. In fact, it is even less than it was a decade ago. And yet, rural isolation has increased in some periods of our national life. For instance, it increased for most farm people during the one hundred years that followed the colonial period. Colonial farms were small and largely self-sufficient, and families generally lived close together, many of them in villages or on plantations. So, even though they had no automobiles, telephones, radios, or newspapers, they were not isolated from one another. When, however, the westward movement got under way on an extensive scale after 1790, individuals and families broke away from these compact colonial settlements and moved into the interior at hundreds and hundreds of points. Isolation increased for those who moved westward, although it of course decreased for those who remained in the older settled areas. Since those who went West were moving into isolation, this trend continued for about a century until 1890 or 1900 when there were no more frontier areas to settle.

For the past fifty years isolation has been decreasing for all farm people, and it will undoubtedly decrease at an accelerated rate in the future. Social isolation is not measured by mere distance but basically by lack of human contacts. Automobiles and good roads, newspapers and rural free delivery, telephones and radios are the instruments that have progressively reduced rural iso-

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lation. New inventions such as television and airplanes, plus other means of transportation and communication, will undoubtedly maintain this process of change that has been so pronounced during the last few decades.

Commercialization of Agriculture. Next in importance to decreasing isolation are changes in the system of farm enterprises. Relatively small, family-owned and family-operated farms were maintained by most, though not all, early American colonists. Not only were the family-owned farms relatively small, but the number of cultivated acres per farm was still smaller, for farming had to be done by hand or at best with ox power. Commercialization and mechanization of farming have tended to enlarge farms both in terms of acres and of size of business enterprise. Change in the size of the farm enterprise has not, however, been as important as changes in techniques and in the people's attitudes and value systems which have been affected by the emergence of commercial farming.

Over the decades and generations, American agriculture has made almost a complete shift from what may be called peasant farming to commercialized farming. Some students of agriculture and rural life think that the United States is the only country that has so far developed without peasant farming; others insist that the trend away from peasant farming has taken place everywhere in the world, including the United States. Neither of these points of view is wholly true, for there are still many farmers in the United States who are peasant-like in many of their characteristics. Their deepest attitudes and loyalties to farming are not those of money-making, which characterizes commercial farming. The basic psychology of the peasant farmer is conditioned by his great attachment to the land itself and his love for living, growing things. Peasant farmers live, so to speak, largely under their own vines and fig trees and feel that they are co-creators with God and nature in the production of the necessities of life. They cherish the ownership of farms and measure their worth in terms of the rural ways of life rather than in terms of monetary values. There are still millions of peasant farmers in the world, and some American farmers still have peasant attitudes. But there can be no doubt that these attitudes have steadily diminished over the decades of American agricultural evolution.

Today, tens of thousands of Americans own land that they do not farm, and hundreds of thousands of others farm land that they do not own. "Factories in the fields" are becoming more and more common; and many farms, if not most, are for sale if the purchase offers are greater than the owners' monetary evaluation of them. Farming as a complete occupation and as a way of life has steadily given way to farming as a business enterprise. There are few, if any, places in the world where this shift has been more universal and so marked as it has been in the United States during the past seventy-five years; and there are few, if any, indications that this trend will change.

From Hoe Farming to Mechanized Farming. There are still some hoe, mattock, sickle, and flail farmers in the United States, while on the other hand, there are great mechanized farming areas outside of the United States. But in no other nation in the world, except possibly for some parts of Canada, Argentina, and Russia, has there been so steady and universal a transition from man power to horsepower to motor power as in the more fertile and more level farming areas of the United States. During the period of the westward expansion, farm work progressed from the

use of hand tools to the use of ox power and then to the use of horsepower implements. These included machines for practically all the major time-and-energy-consuming tasks—plows, planters, cultivators, mowers, binders, threshing machines, and so forth. The rapid shift was stimulated by easy ownership of relatively large farms located on open prairie lands and by the increase in commercialized farming. This production for the market was made feasible by the development of steamships and railroads. Farming everywhere in the United States is more mechanized today than it was a generation ago, and it will undoubtedly be still further mechanized in the future.

The increase in mechanized farming has generally been looked upon as desirable, although it has almost everywhere been accompanied by a decline in the number of farm families. Just now, however, as the mechanization of cotton production is beginning to get under way, some people are greatly concerned about what will happen. They envision farmers being pushed off the land, the closing out of some local schools and churches, and the migration of families to new areas. These are real problems, but one should not overlook the fact that there have been great problems involved in the very lack of mechanization of cotton production. That lack resulted in small farms, low incomes, child labor, poor housing, excessive soil depletion, and inadequate medical care for a great proportion of the lower-income families. . . .

From Folk Beliefs and Practices to the Use of Science. Throughout the history of American agriculture there has been a steady shift from a trust in folk beliefs to the adoption of scientific practices in farming. To be sure, there are still some farmers who plant their crops by the signs of the moon, and there are only a few farmers who do everything by precise scientific formulae. In such countries as Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and Switzerland, a larger percent of the farmers are avowedly more scientific than in the United States. But these facts do not diminish the significance of the increasing adoption of science in American agriculture.

Most farmers make use of science without themselves being scientists. They use seeds and breeds which geneticists have perfected and machines which stimulate—in fact, to some extent force—proper planting and cultivation. However, the farmers' knowledge of the sciences of breeding and feeding, of plant and animal diseases, and of soil conservation is steadily increasing. They usually wait a little while for new things to be tested, but the day is literally past when any large number of American farmers use superstitious beliefs to answer practical questions about farming.

The application of science to American agriculture was greatly stimulated by Jefferson, Washington, and Franklin, and by agricultural societies and fairs that early began to promote better varieties of crops and breeds of animals. During the last seventy-five years, through the establishment of agricultural colleges, experiment stations, the Agricultural Extension Service, and vocational agricultural high schools, there has been developed in the United States the greatest gamut of agricultural scientific and educational institutions and agencies to exist any place in the world. The result is that most of the rest of the world today turns to the United States for leadership in the agricultural sciences, while an increasing majority of American farmers accept science as the trusted method of agricultural improvement. This trend, too, will probably be accelerated in the future.

Shifting of Processes from Farms to Factories. In the sense that farmers no longer practice many of the artisan functions which they used to practice, farming has steadily become more specialized. Less than a hundred years ago tanning, shoe cobbling, wagon making and many tool making functions were carried on by farmers themselves—most often by a few farmers in each area who were specialists in these processes. Moreover, in 1820 two-thirds of the manufacture of clothes was done in homes, and not more than fifty years ago wheat and corn were ground chiefly in country mills, many of which were operated by farmers. It is only recently that slaughtering, the manufacture of dairy products, and considerable canning and baking have shifted from farms into factories and other processing plants.

Because of the shift of practically all major processing functions out of farm homes, the American farm family is nowhere near as self-sufficient as it was in the past. It now specializes primarily in the production of raw food and fiber products, sells these in the market, and purchases most of its finished goods. There has always been considerable protest to this loss of the farm family's self-sufficiency, and today there are strong advocates of returning many of these processes to the farm, or at least to the local rural community. To the extent that small processing machines can perform these functions by motor power or electric power, and to the extent that farmers' cooperatives may operate larger processing plants, there need not be any economic loss through the decentralization of factory processes. But the trend is in the other direction, and it will probably not be turned back easily. . . .

Decreasing Proportion of Population in Rural Areas and on Farms. For at least a hundred and twenty-five years there has been a relative decline in the proportion of people who live in rural areas. In 1820 over nine-tenths of all the people in the United States lived outside of cities and towns of 2,500 population, whereas in 1946 less than two-fifths did so. The proportion of the nation's population living on farms also decreased, although census figures are not available on the farm population for the earlier decades. Still, between 1910 and 1946 the proportion of the nation's population living on farms decreased from over a third to less than one-fifth. In terms of farm production, the United States is still the greatest agricultural nation in the world, but it has become such a great industrial and commercial nation that it is no longer predominantly agricultural.

When about 1890 farm people and public leaders became aware of the movement of population from farms to towns and cities, there was considerable concern about the "depletion of the countryside." There are still those who deplore this movement. It should be apparent, however, that such a population shift is an inevitable result of the increasing mechanization of farming, which decreases the need for man power on farms, and of the increasing employment available in other occupations and professions. Thus, between 1930 and 1940 there was a net loss, through migration from farms, of approximately 1,200,000 farm youth between the ages of 15 and 20 years. . . .

Decline in the Operation of Agricultural Ladder. For many generations it was comparatively easy for a young man to start as an agricultural wage worker and move into farm ownership either directly or by climbing the agricultural ladder from hired man to tenant to owner. Today only a relatively small proportion of those who start their occupational careers as hired farm laborers ever become owners of farms. In fact, data

are available to show that from 1880 to 1935 an increasing number of farmers were stalled on the tenancy rung of this ladder. The majority of others who started as hired men on farms during this period apparently moved out of agriculture altogether.

Data are not available to show how many or what percent of those who a generation ago started in agriculture as hired laborers have shifted out of agriculture, have become tenants or owners, or still remain hired men. Practically all studies of the agricultural ladder show only that a given percent of present owners and tenants were at one time hired farm laborers; they do not show what percent of those who started as farm laborers at any given time or place later became farm owners. Nevertheless, a number of studies indicate that there is a tendency for sons of farm owners to become owners, whereas this is not so for sons of tenants, much less for sons of farm laborers. Because of the absence of precise data on the agricultural ladder, one is probably right in questioning whether that ladder worked as well in the past as is generally believed. Still, it did undoubtedly work much better during the period when agriculture was expanding and lands were relatively cheap than it has in recent decades. . . .

Changing Methods of Obtaining Security. Throughout the history of the world security has probably been more definitely assured to people engaged in agriculture than to those in any other broad occupation. Indeed, in self-sufficient agriculture a degree of economic security is almost automatic, except in cases of drought, floods, and similar catastrophes. This security, however, has quite universally been purchased by the sacrifice of both material and cultural levels of living. But now that agriculture has come quite fully into the commercial world and farm people are stimulated by the same cultural desires as others, they are experiencing insecurities that did not prevail in past generations. We have pointed out that to gain ownership of a farm is more difficult than it was in the past, while to operate a mechanized and commercialized farm is far more expensive and involves a great deal more risk than operating a self-sufficient farm. Furthermore, to these inexorable economic facts must be added an equally unyielding social and psychological fact: the higher standards of living of farm people make them feel insecure if they cannot have health, education, recreation, and welfare services that were not available to previous generations of farmers.

As farm people have moved out of what sociologists call primary group relationships into secondary group relationships, they have begun to seek the methods of security that are common in other business enterprises and other segments of society. These methods consist chiefly of different types of insurance. Because of their relatively heavy financial investments they have for a long while insured their farm buildings, their crops and livestock, and, to some extent, their lives. In some other countries farmers are included in national social security programs. In the United States there is a growing recognition that this is probably their only alternative if they are to have modern social services and modern health services, and to be assured at least to a minimum degree against the unpredictable losses that result from physical catastrophes and financial depressions over which they as individual farmers have no control.

D. The Rise of Labor

22

*Labor and American Institutions**

LOUIS M. HACKER

Early in 1948, the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations of Cornell University sponsored a series of lectures on *The New Industrial Relations*. Professor Louis Hacker of Columbia began the series by providing the necessary historical perspective. In this lecture, Hacker analyzes the rise of labor activity—and its consequences—within the changing framework of American institutions.

I

Ours has been a dynamic society because innovation has had free play. The interloper, rather than being a pariah, is the hero. The arrivists and adventurers—the new, the young, the obscure, the bold and frequently unscrupulous and always hard-hitting intruders—these have challenged prescription. They have compelled change. A dynamic society can maintain its stability if its tradition is a living force through which adjustments to—and compromises with—the institutional pattern can be made. Little Business becomes Big Business; Little Labor Big Labor; the Big State threatens to over-awe all of us. Yet our devotion to our liberties and the concept of welfare remain; indeed, must do so, unless, like Europe and its intellectuals, we yield to despair and settle for security and status.

The changes we have gone through in not much more than one hundred years have been extraordinary. Up to one hundred years ago, the American economy was predominantly mercantile and agricultural; indeed, the American businessman called himself a merchant. Our industrialization is not much more than four generations old. Up to the middle of the 1840's, except for the cotton textile industry in one part of New England, production largely took place in small shops or in the homes of rural dwellers; the great proportion of the American population, in fact, lived in the country and labored as farmers. It was small wonder that the labor movement was weak, confused, and filled with utopian yearnings; local unions, central unions, a one-big-union were formed and disappeared. Karl Marx's reserve army of the unemployed never took shape, for skilled workers opened their own shops while the great throngs of the immigrants of the 1850's went west in their passionate and successful quest for freeholds. The first national unions to survive did not emerge until the 1850's; but they had little effect on the wage scale.

During the life of the next generation—that is to say, from 1860 to 1900—America

* Reprinted from *The New Industrial Relations* by Louis M. Hacker and Associates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948) Used with the permission of the publishers.

became industrialized and urbanized; and instead of exporting foodstuffs and raw materials entirely, by the end of the nineteenth century it was beginning to ship abroad manufactured goods. These were some of the forces responsible for the conversion of the United States from a commercial and agricultural economy into an industrial one.

First, the United States was at peace internally. From 1830 to the end of the Civil War the country had been racked by domestic dissension over the slavery question. With the Civil War over, with businessmen and investors now concentrating singly and whole-heartedly on the development of the country, there were no longer any significant divisions on major questions of policy. The West was to be opened up for settlement; railroads were to be built; infant industries were to be protected; immigrants were to be admitted without restriction; a sound money and banking system was to be maintained. On these decisions, Americans generally agreed; here was what I call a domestic compromise installed and in operation.

Second, there were no sharp cleavages in American society. Radical doctrines, it is true, made their appearance; but because business was not generally organized on a corporate basis, and because monopoly practices had not yet emerged to thwart the aspirations of little men, the radicalism of Socialism and Anarchism made few converts. The organized workers favored cooperation rather than government ownership; their leaders were averse to the use of the strike weapon and saw the function of organized labor almost entirely as a pressure group. Indeed, they got lost in the tangled currency debate of the 1870's and 1880's.

Third, in consequence, European capital flowed into the United States for investment purposes. Europeans bought the stocks and bonds of American railroad companies; they invested in American lands and mines; they helped furnish the capital of many American banks. Europeans were willing to risk their capital because of American political stability, and because its national wealth, national income, and standards of living were constantly rising.

Fourth, the United States was thus a debtor nation and indeed remained so up to 1915. But to continue as a debtor, the country had to have a favorable trade balance. This it did; after 1873 its exports exceeded its imports. And the great flow into the world markets of American surplus agricultural goods and raw materials made possible interest payments on the securities owned by foreigners.

Fifth, the United States threw its doors open to the immigrants of Europe. Land was cheap and easily obtainable. Wages were high. There were no religious or political bars, no military service, no hostility to aliens—except on the part of a few intellectuals. In the decade of the 1870's, total immigration came to almost 3,000,000; in the 1880's, to 5,250,000; in the 1890's to 3,750,000.

During this period of compromise—as the railroads, the steel industry, the petroleum industry, the agricultural-implements industry were built up—the real wages of American workers increased more than 100 percent. After 1886, the labor movement parted company sharply with utopianism and adopted a pure-and-simple job philosophy. It was effective in a few skilled crafts; otherwise its influence was negligible. Real wages rose spectacularly despite the absence of an organized trade unionism.

From 1900 to 1930 another important change occurred. Urbanization expanded at a rapid rate. As agriculture declined in significance, more and more persons moved

through secondary into tertiary production. Small and individually owned business firms gave way before concentrated and integrated corporations. The Carnegie Steel Company was swallowed up in the U. S. Steel Corporation, the McCormick Harvester Company in International Harvester. Business became Big; it was dominated more and more by finance; and the average American producer—except in agriculture—became a wage or salary earner. Productivity increased, but real wages did not; from 1897 to 1914, in fact, they stood still. The organized labor movement, despite numerical gains, from 1905 on was plainly on the defensive, as it found it impossible to unionize the great mass-production industries, absorb the new immigrants, and overcome the hostility of the courts. Now radicalism really emerged—no longer utopian, no longer dominated by the intellectuals. For the Socialism and Syndicalism of 1900–1914 arose out of the American background and spoke with an American tongue. Organized labor, following Gompers' voluntarism, found it impossible to absorb these radical creeds: it lost its opportunity to speak, therefore, for the great mass of the dispossessed. True, Socialism and Syndicalism almost entirely disappeared during the 1920's; and because real wages once more began to advance (although not as rapidly as productivity) organized labor satisfied itself with half a loaf. By 1930, the total number of trade unions was not much more than in 1914. From 1900 to 1930, productivity increased almost 50 percent, the real income per worker only 15 percent.

The New Deal was another great domestic compromise and, in its way, as revolutionary as the Republican compromise of 1860–1900. It sought the redistribution of wealth in the interests of agriculture, labor, the lower middle classes. It sought to establish social security for unemployables and unemployed. It sought to create new opportunities for venture capital. It sought to break down the barriers a new mercantilism was establishing all over the world and once more revitalize the flow of goods and capital across national boundaries. The principle of welfare at home was linked with the achievement of security and welfare—the transformation of backward economies from primary to secondary and tertiary production—everywhere. All this required government intervention on a great scale. Government protection and government funds built Big Agriculture and Big Labor. At the same time, the Big State appeared—the welfare state, the bureaucratic state—and threatened to overwhelm all our free associations because intervention also took the form of initiation. The extraordinary growth of government corporations—to buy and sell, lend and borrow, build and operate—was a sign of the times. . . .

II

A brief examination of the current position of organized labor is now in order. The great growth of trade unionism is a phenomenon we have all been able to watch, for it is a characteristic of our own day. From not much more than 3,000,000 members at the end of the 1920's the ranks of organized labor have swelled to more than 15,000,000. These affect wages and working conditions for more than 25,000,000 workers. What have been the outstanding changes since the era when Gompers left his impress on trade union organization and tactics?

(1) Radicalism has declined; we must not forget that in the 1900's Gompers was confronted by a powerful minority in the AFL which openly supported the Socialist

party. Today, except for a small but vocal group controlling a few unions, and committed not to communism so much as the support of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, the American worker accepts the free-enterprise system. Psychologically, his loyalties are to middle-class ideas; and if his own escape from working-class status is not always possible, he still hopes for such achievement for his children. The extraordinary growth of education in America is proof of this.

(2) Voluntarism has been surrendered after a hard struggle; today unions accept state intervention not only in the field of social security but even in that of wage determination. Also, unions actively have entered into politics and in this sense constitute a powerful pressure group; for through their permanent offices in Washington, their committees for political action, and the creation of independent local parties they influence legislation, compel the choice of candidates friendly to their cause, and hold the balance of political power—as in the case of New York State and City.

(3) Centralization of control has developed, in part as a result of the great financial power of national unions, in part as a result of government policy in recognizing the principle of industry-wide bargaining. As Leo Wolman * has pointed out: "It is a fixed tenet of trade unionism that the goal of collective bargaining is uniform wages throughout industry. Once a union is strong enough to do so it eliminates the regional wage differential. . . ." Calling attention to the fact that the N.L.R.B. put out of business some 1,400 local unions in a period of ten years, Dr. Wolman goes on to say: "They [the unions] have made it appear extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile collective bargaining with the competitive-market economy."

(4) Legal status has been accorded; the immunities granted under the Clayton Act have finally been recognized by the courts, and trade unions are exempt from action under the antitrust laws. Indeed, as the experiences of Thurman Arnold indicated, the courts have gone so far as to deny their jurisdiction even when collusion between unions and manufacturers to drive competitors out of local markets was proved. Today, unions can deport themselves as monopolies—and do—without facing the possibility of recourse in the courts.

(5) The right to unionize is now the law of the land. More, the control of the job—in many subtle ways established by union practice or administrative rule—is one of unionism's great powers. The union shop, if not the closed shop (although it remains to be seen if the closed shop in practice has been eliminated), has been established; the striker's right to his job has been recognized; seniority everywhere is observed in hiring and firing; restrictive practices almost universally limit the entrance of new workers into a particular industry. It is hardly necessary—so familiar are all Americans today with such practices—to describe in detail the nature of restrictive apprenticeship rules, high initiation fees, the use of working permits for so-called temporary workers, inheritance of membership, and ousting of union members for political reasons. The tactics of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century medieval guilds, when they became monopoly bodies, have been imitated and improved upon by many of our modern trade unions.

(6) Unions have had a powerful effect on wages. I know historically it is possible to demonstrate—and it is true—that real wages have climbed in America through-

* Leo Wolman, Columbia University professor of economics and specialist in labor and industrial relations. Quotation from Chamber of Commerce of the United States, *Wage Determination and the Economics of Liberalism* (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 97.

out our history, even at such times when unionism was weak or ineffective. There was an increase in real wages from 1860 to 1900 when unions played no significant role in industrial relations; the same was true of the second half of the 1920's. John T. Dunlop* has indicated that from 1820 to 1945 average hourly money wages in industry increased thirteen times, while cost-of-living prices only doubled. The result has been a six-fold increase in real wages in 125 years. From 1919 to 1945 real wages went up more than 100 percent.

Granted that in our earlier period—in fact, probably as late as 1937—trade unionism had nothing to do with these spectacular rises, nevertheless the impact of labor organization on wages has been great. Organized labor compelled the establishment of a floor on wages. Organized labor, through its pressures, has compelled a periodic reconsideration of wage rates and in this fashion has probably made industry raise wages before it has been ready to do so. It has expanded the amount of supplementary benefits, leading to an increase in costs and giving workers additional income not measured in the money wage. Dr. Dunlop, in this connection, says: "The expansion in the amount and extent of supplementary benefits, frequently called fringe adjustments, has been an important development in the wage structure of American industry during the war. The growth of vacation plans, shift premiums, holidays with pay, sick leave, and health and welfare plans has been pronounced."

(7) Unions have had a great influence in eliminating geographical and job differentials. The important fact here is the contraction in the number of key bargains. Says Dr. Dunlop:

> We have reached the stage where a limited number of key bargains effectively influence the whole wage structure of the American economy. . . . The number of really key bargains may be placed in the neighborhood of 25 to 50. . . . In any such list would be included the negotiations in basic steel, the railroads, bituminous coal mining, the major meat packing companies, the major rubber producers, etc. This phenomenon is even important in industries ordinarily regarded as primarily local in character. For example, the bargain over wages in the New York and Chicago building industries and in the printing trades has a significant influence on the negotiations made in other cities in these same industries.*

(8) Unions, too, have had a real effect on working conditions. Their long agitation for shorter hours has finally produced the results we are familiar with; they have helped bring about the elimination of child labor; by their constant pressures they have called attention to and brought about the ending of dangerous and unhealthy conditions of work. They have forced the establishment of proper grievance machinery so that workers' complaints can be treated with dignity and justice.

(9) Nor are we to overlook the psychic satisfactions derived from the sense of belonging to a group and the feeling of power—for good or ill—that comes with membership in a great organization. Thanks to class fluidity—always present in America—the worker did not inherit a feeling of inferiority. Because doors were open to the daring and wealth was a great leveler—the absence of prescription buttressed by crown, nobility, and church as in Europe was of the first importance—social recognition was based upon success. Today, leveling has gone even further. The worker, socially and psychologically, is indistinguishable from other persons in the community.

* John T. Dunlop, professor of economics at Harvard University and member of the National Labor Relations Board (1948–1952) and Wage Stabilization Board (1950–1952).

* Chamber of Commerce, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

All one has to do is compare the portrayal of him in the contemporary comic strips, soap operas, and movies—those great media of popular taste and values—with similar devices of a generation ago to note how far we have traveled. Undoubtedly the strength of trade unionism has given the individual worker greater dignity, and this has had an influence on our mores.

All this is to the good. Only the complete doctrinaire would seek to cast up a balance sheet and, on the ground that the evils are great, disregard and wipe out the positive contributions. It is easy to make out a case against unionism as such; it is easy to argue that its monopoly power has become so great that our whole system of free enterprise is being threatened as a result. One can demonstrate that the unreasonable interferences with the competitive processes will drive us straight into the arms of a collective society, where, ironically enough, as in the Soviet Union and increasingly in Britain, the unions will be among the first victims, for they will lose their freedom. This analysis is largely true; and yet it is unrealistic because it presupposes that accommodation and compromise are out of the question. We shall know the basis of compromise only, however, when we are ready to face up to the actualities.

The first is restriction of production, which in the interests of the maintenance of job monopoly—the basic fact here, of course, is security—is becoming more and more a general practice. Feather-bedding and slow-downs are the most obvious forms; but resistance to the introduction of new technological devices is also increasingly common.

The second is the fact that the wage agreement itself, particularly when made on an industry-wide basis, is monopolistic. It tends to affect and perhaps even lower the real incomes of the less powerfully organized or the entirely unorganized; it restricts the number of workers an industry can absorb. Says Fritz Machlup * on this latter point:

> The wage rates, fixed between the union and the employers, are in excess of the competitive rates; the attractive wage differential makes workers who are employed elsewhere at competitive wage more than willing to seek employment at the shops paying the better wages; but, alas, all jobs there are filled and applicants are turned away. These underprivileged who are crowding the occupations that are still open, will never know that it is a monopolistic wage bargain which excluded them from the jobs they desired. . . .
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> The number of workers which an industry "needs" depends on the wage rate it has to pay. A monopolistic wage rate determination restricts the number of workers who find work in that industry and excludes a large number of others, who are compelled to seek employment elsewhere at much less satisfactory rates.

The third is the currently limited outlook of the members and the leaders of trade unionism. Eschewing the doctrine of the class struggle, nevertheless the American trade unionism regards industrial relations as a state of war. The fact is, up to recently it was just that, because of the methods used by employers to break strikes and smash unions. This hangover has continued despite the changes we have all observed; so that the workers and their spokesmen still refuse to regard themselves as part of an industry but as hostile to it. That excessive demands, even if profits are high, may lead to inflation, unemployment, and hurt to the whole community is, apparently, outside of the concern of leaders who seem to regard their function and success only

* Fritz Machlup, professor of economics at The Johns Hopkins University, author of *The Basing Point System*, *The Political Economy of Monopoly*, and other volumes. Quotation from Chamber of Commerce, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

in terms of higher wage rates. It may or may not be true, but the report that a labor leader hailed the permanent closing down of a plant, due to a strike, as a sign of the trade union's power is not at all improbable. Many such attitudes still persist.

23

*Cause of Industrial Unrest**

FLORENCE PETERSON

Despite the fact that the American worker has achieved a high standard of living, labor strife continues. As a consequence, we have come in recent years to recognize the importance of human relations in industry. Though not minimizing the economic factor, it is nevertheless imperative that we broaden our view of those forces shaping labor's aspirations. Professor Florence Peterson, who has had extensive private, governmental, and academic experience in this field, discusses some of the social and psychological causes of industrial unrest.

Unrest is defined as "a disturbed state; disquietude sometimes amounting to insurgency." It is also a manifestation of mankind's eternal struggle for improvement. Unrest is an active and not a passive condition; it is antipodal to despair because it is coupled with a hope and expectation that the causes of dissatisfaction can be remedied, or at least alleviated. If the condition of workers is so precarious that they have no hope for betterment, their feelings of utter despair can be, and usually are, ignored by others, since it is a characteristic of any society to maintain the status quo until forced to change by overt expressions of unrest. Because it is dynamic, industrial unrest thrusts itself upon the attention of the community and thereby becomes a "problem." But it is not in itself a destructive force; its final effect depends upon what is done about it.

Strikes are one form of expression of workers' dissatisfactions, and an analysis of the cited reasons for the work stoppages which are taking place would be one way to discuss the causes of industrial unrest. Such overt expressions of discontent, however, seldom arise over specific and immediate issues alone, but have their roots in a subsoil of accumulated dissatisfactions. To understand the underlying causes of workers' unrest it is necessary first to consider their innate needs and desires, and then to find out why and in what way their conditions of work do not satisfy these desires. This article, therefore, will be focused on the question: What are the basic drives in human nature which seek satisfaction through economic endeavor, and how is modern industry failing to satisfy these natural aspirations? Four fundamental human needs have been selected for discussion —the urge for self-expression; the desire for personal achievement and progress; the need for group status; and the longing for security.

* Florence Peterson, "Cause of Industrial Unrest," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March, 1951). Used by permission of the author and journal.

Urge for Self-Expression

Anthropologists and psychologists agree that one of the fundamental characteristics of man is his innate urge for self-expression and creative accomplishment. To satisfy this urge one must have a measure of control over one's work situation and a personal relationship to the end product of one's labor. This basic satisfaction is denied to millions of workers in our mass production industries where machines are becoming more "human" and the workers are becoming more machinelike. Technology has relieved workers of much heavy, arduous drudgery, but it has also reduced or curtailed entirely the opportunity for creative expression.

The significance of the change which came about with the introduction of power machines is reflected in our reference to it as the "industrial revolution." It was intensified in what is sometimes called the "second industrial revolution" which started some fifty years ago with the introduction of assembly line techniques which caused machine operators to become machine tenders. The term "revolution" is not a misnomer, and its impact upon workers' relation to their jobs cannot be minimized. What has taken place is a drastic change in the job environment in which millions of human beings perform their labor. In assembly line production the individual worker has lost control over the way he does his job; muscular dexterity has largely displaced use of judgment, and ability to work at a uniform speed has become paramount to application of skill.

Persons not tied to an assembly line may ask, is this really so different from other kinds of work? Do not all jobs involve a good deal of routine? Is not the quantity of work which most of us do actually imposed upon us by the necessities of our jobs rather than by our own inclinations of the moment? We may not punch the time clock, but are we not obliged to adhere to regular hours of work? What, then, is so different in the situation of the masses of industrial workers which leads one to conclude that the repetitive, standardized nature of their work is a cause of their unrest?

The difference may be only one of degree but it is nevertheless very real in two basic aspects: The assembly line worker or machine tender has little or no control over how he does his work. Regardless of workers' temperamental and physiological differences, assembly line production permits little or no individual variation in either the kinds of motions or the pace of motions each person must perform. Furthermore, the same pace must be maintained for long periods of time, usually the entire work period. Secondly, what each worker does comprises such an infinitesimal part of the whole that he can feel little personal relationship to the finished product. He performs one operation on one part which he can never identify in the assembled whole. . . .

There may not seem to be any connection, even to the workers concerned, between their overt expressions of unrest and their natural longing for control of their job environment and opportunity for creative endeavor. They may give various reasons for opposing time study of their jobs, for instance, but much of their objection to time study is undoubtedly due to their instinctive aversion to a purely "scientific" approach to their jobs which seems to ignore them as human beings and to treat them as abstract labor going through numerous cycles of motions. They may go on strike in protest against what they term "speed-up," when in fact the psychological basis for their discontent is the constant level of performance they must maintain

hour after hour, day after day, rather than the total output assigned them. The mere act of expressing a grievance may be a behavior reaction against the impersonal nature of the work environment; an act stemming from a baffling feeling of inferiority and nonentity as much as from a desire to get a specific matter rectified. "Now we'll make the big boss pay attention to *us*" expresses an emotional element in the milieu of many work stoppages or other forms of overt protest.

Very few of us, including the workers themselves, would be willing to turn the clocks backward and dispense with the material wealth made possible by machines and mass production. Without destroying the good derived from technology, can anything be done to counteract its attendant ills which not only cause unrest for millions of workers but detract from technology's achieving its maximum fulfillment? It has been claimed, with some justification, that industrial efficiency could be increased as much as a third by improvement in the human environment with no further technological changes. Adequate solutions will require much research and experimentation, with psychologists and sociologists taking their place along with the engineers and physical scientists already widely used by industry. Superficial endeavors to establish a "happy family" relationship are not enough. Industry will have to give as much scientific attention to the human factor as it has to the mechanical, and persistently will have to seek to discover means for harmonizing fundamental human needs to the mechanical processes of modern industry.

Desire for Personal Achievement and Betterment

Closely related to the human desire for creative expression and personal identification with one's work is the urge for advancement and progress in one's personal status—the drive for "getting ahead." Concrete evidence of its fulfillment is gradual rise in income, but the satisfactions are psychological as well as monetary. Here again the large majority of industrial workers are disadvantaged both in relation to workers of the past and to contemporary workers in other fields of employment. Compare, for instance, the life situation of a wage earner with that of the average professional or technical person. Characteristically, the latter begins his work career at the age of 22 or 25 and reaches his peak when he is about 50 years of age. During these 25 or 30 years his income advances threefold or fourfold, and during these most active years of his life he is continually striving to gain the next step on the promotional ladder, thereby experiencing the challenge and the rewards of individual progress and achievement.

In contrast, the average industrial worker begins his work life at the age of 16 or 18. Within a matter of weeks or months he has attained the job and wage status which he will probably retain throughout the remaining 40 or 50 years of his life. His job status remains practically stationary with very limited opportunity for individual advancement. In a simpler economy, before fragmentation of skills and large-scale production, a young person spent four or six years learning his trade. During his apprenticeship his wages advanced with his skill attainments, and acquisition of journeyman status brought prestige as well as financial reward. Furthermore, he had reasonable hope of rising still further by becoming an independent artisan.

Generalizations are only partial truths, and the contention can be made that despite the present predominance of large-scale industry, some workers are able to

attain supervisory or self-employed status. However, we are not here concerned with those who are no longer wage earners but with the millions who continue as industrial workers throughout their working lives. Also it can be argued that the craftsmen of former days were a select few and were far outnumbered by the "hewers of wood and drawers of water" whose opportunities were much more limited than today's industrial workers'. It is true that the forces which are reducing the need for all-round craftsmanship are also eliminating much onerous manual labor. There is statistical evidence of a decreasing trend in both skilled and unskilled jobs but an upward trend in semi-skilled labor. So far as job satisfaction and advancement are concerned, the impact of technology falls most heavily on those who in another age would have been skilled craftsmen.

But there have also been other changes which affect the situation. For many years in this country the menial laborers for the most part were peasant immigrants, illiterate or at least non-English speaking, whose aspirations were necessarily centered on their children rather than on themselves. The present generation of industrial workers is predominantly native born, and most of them have had at least some high school education. Their horizons have been extended, but the disparity between aspiration and achievement has been widened. As individuals they find their advance is blocked, and they are bound to dead-level jobs for 50 long years. . . .

Need for Group Status

The motive force which leads workers to join labor organizations is their conviction that their advancement depends upon improving their status *as* workers; that economic well-being and its accompanying social prestige and privileges should not be contingent upon their becoming employers or self-employed businessmen. This consciousness and ambition for wage-earner status is a comparatively new development. Most of the nineteenth century organizations which attracted workers had as their ultimate goal the doing away with the wage system. They were based on the philosophy that workers' salvation lay in self-employment via producers' co-operatives or in socially owned and managed business enterprise. Only within the last 50 or 60 years have the masses of American workers become reconciled to the inevitability of a continuing wage system, and with this has come the urge to gain status and influence while remaining wage earners. This they feel can only be attained through organized effort.

It is difficult for nonwage earners to appreciate this deeply felt need for group solidarity, which seems to be at variance with middle-class notions of rugged individualism and advancement through individual effort. They cannot understand, for instance, why the more able workmen, who could easily get wage increases because of their superior abilities, are willing to share in group efforts for general wage increases. . . .

Labor unions not only are vehicles for the improvement of economic and job conditions, but they also satisfy certain emotional needs of their members. Because of their overwhelming numbers, workers lose importance as individual human beings, both in their own eyes and to the world outside. Only in combination with others of their kind can they gain that self-esteem and worthiness without which no human being is whole. When laborers organize, labor ceases to be a mere commodity or form of productive energy or abstract economic element. As members of unions they

become participating members of the larger society.

This is illustrated by the increasing participation of union representatives in community activities of all kinds, on radio discussion panels, and as government appointees in foreign service, positions which were formerly reserved for leaders of business and professional experts. Rank and file members who do not directly engage in these activities, and may not even be personally interested in them, nevertheless obtain satisfaction from the public recognition given them through their unions. They are therefore willing to contribute toward the support of these activities and pay salaries to their union representatives which measure up to the salaries of leaders in other walks of life. . . .

Longing for Security

The universal human quest for economic security has many facets, and unrest which is basically due to fear of insecurity may find expression in protests against specific matters whose relation to the desire for security is not always obvious. To the individual worker security means protection against loss or reduction of income and against arbitrary actions of employers which affect job tenure. Partial protection against loss of income is provided by unemployment, disability, and old age insurance, both governmental and private. Belatedly, the need for such programs was recognized and adopted as social policy some fifteen years ago, and these insurance programs have alleviated an incalculable amount of unrest. But the strikes which have taken place during the past several years indicate there is still much discontent, for when Congress failed to extend and liberalize the government insurance programs workers demanded supplemental protection from their employers. The principle of social insurance has been won, however, and contentions now focus on adequacy and methods of financing.

At best, insurance programs can offer only partial relief for loss of income when jobs are unavailable or when the individual is unable to work. No insurance program can provide security against loss of jobs, and it is the unrest caused by fear of loss of jobs which presents the really baffling problems. Despite ten years of business prosperity the specter of mass unemployment still haunts the minds of workers, especially those old enough to have gone through the great depression. They are convinced that another depression awaits them when production for national defense and foreign aid ceases, and much of their present interest in political affairs is attributable to their concern in having a government in power which will act promptly and vigorously when the need arises.

E. The Middle Class

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*The Changing Middle Class**

LEWIS COREY

Any discussion of the middle class is complicated by its changing and amorphous character. This is particularly true in the United States where so large a percentage of its population has been, and still is, identified with this group. Lewis Corey, author of *The Crisis of the Middle Class,* supplies a factual study of the changing nature of the American middle classes during the past seventy-five years.

What labor and the farmers decide to do on the specific and over-all problems is important. But just as important is what the middle class decides to do. While the old middle class of small independent enterprisers may not be much of an economic power, because of monopoly domination, it is still an influential, ideological, and political force. And the new middle class of salaried employees, especially the technical-managerial and professional personnel, possesses the technical, administrative and educational skills without which the old society cannot carry on or a new society be built. The middle class will face specific postwar economic problems of its own. Will small enterprise shrink still more or grow again? Will economic expansion be enough to bring full employment for technical-managerial personnel and higher pay for white collar workers? Will rising incomes multiply the demand for professional services, including the services of teachers? Finally, will the technical-scientific and educational talents of the new middle class be used for peace or war? All these specific problems of the middle class tie in with the larger problem of over-all social change.

1. Changes in Class Relations

Class relations have developed differently from the expectations of the early democratic and socialist philosophers. Democrats foresaw the continuation and expansion of a middle-class democracy of small independent producers, in which a majority of the people draw their livelihood from property which they work and own. The early socialists, including Marx, prophesied that middle-class democracy was doomed by the concentration of industry and of property ownership, and the prophecy is largely fulfilled. But the Marxists were wrong, too, for there is no fulfillment of their prophecy of a rapid, inevitable polarization of classes into proletariat and bourgeoisie, with the virtual eclipse of the middle class.

Evidence is overwhelming that the early democrats were wrong. The middle class

* Lewis Corey, "The Middle Class," *The Antioch Review* (Spring, 1945). Copyright, *The Antioch Review, Inc.,* 1945, and used by permission of the publishers.

of small independent enterprisers grew in absolute numbers from 1870 to 1910 but underwent a relative decline; since 1910 the numerical size of the class has remained virtually stationary while it has considerably shrunk as a proportion of all gainfully occupied persons. (Table 1.) Its economic power has shrunk even more than its numerical strength because of increasing monopoly domination.

But while it has declined the old middle class has not disappeared, and it is still a class-political force to reckon with. Moreover, a *new* middle class of salaried employees has come into being that, since 1870, has grown faster than the proletariat.

Let us look at Table 1 again. The working class increased slowly from around 53 percent of all gainfully occupied persons in 1870 to a peak of 57 percent in 1910; then it fell to 55 percent in 1920, was stationary in the 1920's, and rose again to 57 percent

TABLE 1—CLASS DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1870–1940

(In thousands)	1940	1930	1920	1910	1870
I. FARMERS	5,265	6,012	6,387	6,132	3,100
1. Owners	3,227	3,463	3,954	3,864	2,325
2. Tenants	2,038	2,549	2,433	2,268	775
II. WORKING CLASS	29,518	25,813	22,665	19,730	6,035
1. Industrial	16,124	16,198	15,118	12,982	3,225
a) Manufactures	9,250 *	9,150	9,450	7,425	1,812
b) Mining	824	887	982	862	179
c) Transportation	2,950 *	2,961	2,386	2,204	465
d) Construction	3,100 *	3,200	2,300	2,490	768
2. Farm Laborers	2,312	2,606	2,217	2,658	1,500 *
3. Other Workers	11,082	7,456	5,329	4,089	1,310
III. MIDDLE CLASS	16,633	14,884	11,682	8,870	2,289
1. Old—Enterprisers	3,863	3,751	3,350	3,261	1,532 *
a) Business	3,382	3,304	2,943	2,895	1,304
b) Professional	481	446	406	366	128
2. New—Salaried	12,769	11,580	8,332	5,609	756
a) Technical-M'g'rial	2,062	1,966	1,527	999	129
b) Professional	2,660	2,413	1,581	1,179	204
c) Clerical	3,889	3,345	2,719	1,403	68
d) Salespeople	3,347	3,003	1,877	1,595	282
e) Public Service	439	418	290	208	48
IV. UPPER BOURGEOISIE	240	300	200		
Total	51,656	47,457	40,935	34,733	11,424

* Partly estimated.

The final totals are all persons "gainfully occupied" or "the labor force" (new Census terminology) minus unpaid family farm workers. "Labor force" and "gainfully occupied" are not strictly comparable; the 1940 total is "labor force" and would be slightly higher if the older concept had been used.

Under "manufactures" are included some workers not working in factories. "Transportation" includes workers in communication industries. "Farm Laborers" includes only hired wage-workers. The "salaried" total includes "unspecified" salaried employees and telephone and telegraph operators (See Table 7). "Salespeople" includes "clerks" in stores. "Public Service" includes federal, state and local officials, police personnel and probation officers; it excludes doorkeepers, laborers and other wage-workers; and does not include the much larger total in government service.

Source: Compiled, computed and arranged from material in *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940,* published by the U. S. Bureau of the Census (Preliminary table.) *

* All the tables in this essay were drawn by Lewis Corey from the same source as indicated above. [Ed.]

in 1940. But "working class" includes farm laborers and workers in domestic and personal service, while the "proletariat" in the Marxist sense is composed of industrial workers. The industrial proletariat reached its numerical peak in 1920 and has been almost stationary since, but its relative weight has fallen. From around 55 percent of the working class in 1870 the industrial workers rose to a peak of 66 percent in 1910 and 67 percent in 1920, falling, however, to 62 percent in 1930 and 55 percent in 1940. This relative shrinkage in the proletariat appears clearly from another angle: as a proportion of all gainfully occupied persons the industrial workers rose from around 30 percent in 1870 to 37 percent in 1910 and 1920, falling to 34 percent in 1930 and 31 percent in 1940.

Two major factors underlie this shrinkage of the proletariat: the growing trend toward use of automatic machines and automatic plants, which displaces manual workers while it multiplies the number of technical-managerial and clerical employees; and the constant growth of professional and personal services, much of them to serve workers themselves as their living standards and leisure rise.

While the working class multiplied six times from 1870 to 1940, the middle class as a whole multiplied eight times and *the new middle class sixteen times.* The absolute numbers of the industrial proletariat has remained virtually stationary since 1920 while the new middle class scored an increase of 50 percent. From an almost negligible proportion in 1870 the new middle class moved up to become 25 percent of all gainfully occupied persons. Technical-managerial and professional employees alone have multiplied thirteen times since 1870, from 330,000 to 4,772,000.

This tremendous growth of the new middle class is an integral part of basic economic changes in the structural set-up of capitalism:

1. The growing technical-scientific nature of industry, which calls for constantly greater numbers of technical employees.

2. The increasingly complex nature of production and distribution, and the separation of ownership from management in collective enterprise, which calls for constantly greater numbers of managerial employees.

3. The growing amount of planning, regulation, and control within industry, and the consequent need for more administration, which calls for constantly greater numbers of clerical employees.

4. The multiplication of goods and leisure, which calls for more employment in distribution and trade and for more personal and professional services, the performers of which are primarily members of the new middle class. The proportion of people employed in the production of physical goods fell from around 75 percent in 1870 to 50 percent in 1940. If incomes and leisure go up again, as they can, it will mean more employment in the performance of services.

5. The growth in the economic functions of government and of public services, which has brought the grand total of all public employees, federal, state and local, from around 175,000 in 1870 to 3,100,000 in 1930 and 3,200,000 in 1940, exclusive of relief workers. The small increase shown in 1940 over ten years earlier was due to contraction in state and local employment; federal employees rose from 580,000 in 1930 to 1,000,000 in 1940. Around one-third of public employees are workers (including mail carriers); the balance of two-thirds are technical-managerial, professional, and clerical employees.

2. The Old Middle Class

The economic basis of early middle-class democracy was the widespread ownership of small independent property in a society of small producers. But small ownership was disastrously limited by the onsweep of industrialism. In the America of the 1820's around 80 percent of the people owned property from which they worked a livelihood; in the 1940's only 20 percent do so, the great majority being now dependent on income from a wage-or-salary job.

Ownership of farms was the basis of earlier economic democracy. The absolute number of farmers kept on increasing until 1910, although they moved downward in a relative sense. But for twenty years thereafter the number of farmers remained stationary while population grew; and in 1940 there were fewer farmers than in 1910. Farmers today are not much more than 10 percent of the gainfully occupied. The decrease in tenancy, from 42.4 percent in 1930 to 38.7 percent in 1940, did not represent an increase of free farmers but dispossession of tenants from the soil.

Small business enterprisers (Table 2) increased from 1870 to 1910, from 1,404,000 to 2,895,000; there was a small rise to 3,304,000 in 1930 and hardly any change in 1940. The trend for the old middle class as a whole, including professionals, was pretty much the same, with a small increase from 1910 onward but a very large decrease as a percentage of all gainfully occupied persons. It is important to observe, however, the relative and absolute decline in the number of independent *industrial* enterprisers (manufacturers, construction, mining)—from around 425,000 in 1910 to 390,000 in 1930 and 257,000 in 1940. The statistical decline may be a bit more than the actual decline, because the different years do not seem wholly comparable and because some of the 1940 decline may have been a temporary depression result, yet the downward trend is definite. Many independent industrial enterprisers have been wiped out by the war. Whether or not they stage a comeback depends upon postwar economic conditions and what kind of policy the middle class pursues.

Small independent enterprisers have held

Table 2—Enterprisers: 1870–1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Manufactures	145,000 *	207,901	235,618	47,000
Building	100,000 *	167,512	174,422	
Mining	12,000 *	15,511	14,287	500
Trade	1,926,000	1,800,000	1,278,000	440,000
Laundry, etc.	53,694	49,461	30,000	1,000 *
Entertainment	70,844	67,744	34,347	1,185
General Services	535,000	467,000	390,000	110,900
Garages	100,000	95,000	18,000	2,000 *
Professional	481,121	446,738	366,223	128,175
Unclassified	439,590	434,332	720,734	802,014
Total	3,863,249	3,751,199	3,261,631	1,532,774

* Partly estimated.

Under "Laundry" are included laundry, cleaning, dyeing and pressing establishments. "Entertainment" includes theatres and motion picture houses, pleasure resorts, race tracks, etc. "General Services" includes hotels and boarding houses, eating and drinking places, barber and beauty shops, etc. "Garages" includes cab and truck owners, and, for earlier years, livery stables. "Professional" includes self-employed performers of professional services. "Unclassified" includes, especially for the earlier years, independent artisans and artisan shops. . . .

their own in numbers only because of the very large increase in trade and personal services (some of which in 1940 was, however, a hangover of people opening small stores to escape unemployment during the depression of the 1930's).

Independent professionals, interestingly enough, have made little contribution to an increase of small enterprisers (Table 3). They made considerable gains from 1870 to 1910, multiplying nearly four times, but the later gains are small compared with the great gains of salaried professionals. Among professionals, too, employment becomes increasingly institutional. Yet they make up a powerful, strategic group that is influential far beyond its numbers.

3. The New Middle Class

In some of its functions the new middle class of technical-managerial, professional, and clerical employees is not altogether new. There were office workers, public employees, a smattering of technicians and managers in early capitalism, some also in the commercial civilizations of antiquity. But their numbers were small and they were significant mainly in the repressive bureaucracy of the state. The new middle class is new in its numbers, in the variety and significance of its occupations, and in being a typical class product of large-scale collective economic activity.

The slowdown in expansion of the new middle class, as a result of the depression of the 1930's, was temporary unless there arises a new economic crisis. But a new crisis will engulf the working class, too. And the problems of policy created by the new middle class will become acute. Trends in the over-all class development since 1870 may be summed up:

The working class has grown proportionately more than twice as fast as the independent enterprisers.

The middle class as a whole has grown around 50 percent more than the number of workers.

The new middle class has grown more than three times faster than the working class, eight times faster than the number of enterprisers, and two-and-one-half times faster than the middle class as a whole.

These are clear indications of the strength and significance of the new middle class. Its functions arise out of changes that have transformed capitalism and that carry into

Table 3—Independent Professionals: 1870–1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Physicians	165,629	153,803	145,000 *	60,000 *
Dentists	70,601	70,344	39,597	7,988
Other Medical	48,458	48,187	19,755	5,585
Lawyers	180,483	160,605	114,704	39,791 *
Architects	21,976	23,100	17,444	2,039
Photographers	37,641	32,805	31,775	7,652
Artists	62,485	57,253	34,094	4,120
Authors	14,126	12,325	4,324	1,000 *
Total	481,121	446,738	366,223	128,175

* Partly estimated.

Under "Physicians" surgeons are included. "Lawyers" includes judges. "Other medical" includes veterinarians, osteopaths, chiropractors and healers. "Artists" includes sculptors and teachers of art. No attempt is made to classify other and newer professions.

The totals are functional, not arithmetical; they assume that an over-all average of 10 percent of professional persons were salaried employees in 1910 and an average of 20 percent in 1930 and 1940. . . .

the future. They have brought a great increase in the number of technicians (Table 4). This increase is underestimated by the Census, which often classifies technicians as "officials" and sometimes as "clerical." Yet the Census figures show an increase of forty times in the number of technicians, with 700,000 as the probable 1940 total. The greatest expansion has been since 1910 and there was no serious slowdown in 1940 because of the depression.

TABLE 4—TECHNICIANS: 1870–1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Chemists	60,005	48,009	16,598	774
Civil Engineers	105,486	102,086	52,031	7,094
Electrical Engineers	55,667	57,259	15,125	
Mechanical Engineers	85,543	54,356	14,514	
Chemical Engineers	11,600	11,970	6,930	
Mining Engineers	9,773			
Industrial Engineers	9,803	3,261		
Laboratory Technicians	17,246	8,288	4,000	250
Total	355,123	285,229	109,198	8,118

Under "Chemists" are included assayers and metallurgists. "Civil Engineers" includes surveyors. "Laboratory" includes technicians and assistants; 1940 data is not comparable with earlier years. . . .

While the majority of technical engineers (electrical, mechanical, mining, civil) are in industry, 26.5 percent of them were engaged in professional service in 1930, and 12.2 percent in public service. They are active in every field of activity.

Any expansion of industry must necessarily increase the number of technicians and enlarge their strategic importance. Industry becomes more and more dependent on the possessors of technical knowledge and skills while the manual labor force dwindles, with increasingly more skilled workers being transformed into "junior technicians." The technician is master of the mysterious processes of a system of production which is infinitely more complex than production in the early stages of the industrial revolution. And the strategic importance of the technician grows, socially as well as economically, as people become more technology-conscious and are influenced by the technician.

Technicians merge into the managerial group, which has grown fourteen times in number since 1870 (Table 5). Managerial employees are important in every field of activity, including government, although the largest proportion is engaged in manufactures. The slight gain registered in 1940 expresses the depression failure of industry to expand, not any decline in the importance of managerial personnel.

Around two-fifths of managerial employees are in the upper group composed of officials and managers. The top layers of this upper group, the administrative officials, may be called "institutional capitalists" (for whom, however, power is a greater motive than profit, which largely explains why they merged so easily into fascism). They are identified with monopoly capitalism and imperialism and are, by and large, the heart of reaction. But this is not true of the whole managerial group, especially its lower layers which are frequently in conflict with the upper (evident today in the struggle of foremen to unionize against administrative opposition). A progressive potential exists in management alongside reactionary attitudes and practices.

In objective functional aptitudes and in-

TABLE 5—MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES: 1870–1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Agriculture	62,778	70,583	52,811	2,000 *
Upper	37,503			
Lower	25,275			
Manufactures	654,457	651,260	301,691	16,000 *
Upper	312,000 *	312,756	125,694	
Lower	342,457	338,504	175,997	
Mining	48,345	49,671	34,285	7,580
Upper	16,101	15,385	10,947	580
Lower	32,244 *	34,286	23,338	7,000 *
Railroads	111,311	153,996	113,003	25,000 *
Upper	32,242	34,132	19,805	
Lower	79,069	119,864	93,198	
Other Transport	102,826	119,927	82,211	10,000 *
Upper	50,882	63,352	34,490	
Lower	51,944	56,575	47,721	
Communication	40,024	34,182	16,551	300 *
Upper	23,301	18,957	10,089	
Lower	16,723	15,225	6,462	
Construction	99,932	68,818	40,000 *	12,000 *
Upper	25,269	23,492	15,000	
Lower	74,663	45,326	25,000	
Trade	89,124	82,658	45,274	7,500 *
Upper	50,000 *	45,000 *	25,000 *	
Lower	39,124	37,658	20,274	
Motion Picture	2,100	1,923		
Garage	21,250	19,247		
Banking	95,000	93,356	56,059	15,000 *
Insurance	39,735	33,997	9,501	1,000 *
Unclassified	340,694	301,271	142,481	25,000 *
Total	1,707,576	1,680,889	893,867	121,380

* Partly estimated.

"Upper," managerial—managers, officials; "Lower"—foremen, overseers, inspectors.

"Other Transport" includes street railways, bus, taxicab, trucking, and shipping. "Communication" includes telephone and telegraph only. Motion Picture, Garage, Banking, Insurance" include managers and officials only.

terests the technical-managerial personnel is not capitalist. It has an instinct for workmanship, which calls for doing a job of production, and its economic interests in terms of employment and income are promoted by full utilization of productive resources and their expansion. The progressive practitioners of management recognize it can become a liberating force. One writes:

"In the increasing specialization of management, and in the consequent increasing infiltration into managerial personnel of technically trained persons whose prime interest and desire are production rather than profit, one may perhaps see an agency for a new industrial revolution and for a conversion of industry into an agency for social welfare rather than for individual profit." *

Salaried professionals scored an increase

* Oliver Sheldon, "Management," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), p. 79.

of thirty times from 1870 to 1940 (Table 6). They increased much more, and more rapidly, than independent professionals. They include not only groups specified in the table but also salaried physicians, surgeons, architects, lawyers, and others. The largest increases were scored by actors, teachers, and editor-reporters, the smallest by physicians and clergymen. A wholly new group emerged, professional social workers. Many professionals are in the upper layers of management, while accountants are part of the administrative bureaucracy of corporate business. At least 125,000 salaried professionals (including technical-scientific personnel) are in the employ of the federal government, with many more, among them 1,100,000 teachers, employed by states, municipalities, and townships.

Among salaried professionals are the shapers of opinion and ideas: the teachers, editors, and reporters who, along with writers and artists, are the architects of ideology. They are the intellectuals—successors to the priests and medicine men of earlier religious civilizations. All intellectuals, conservative, liberal, and radical, are of the new middle class.

The economic status of salaried professionals is, in general, much inferior to that of the independents. Where the great majority of independent professionals have yearly incomes above $2,500, most salaried professionals earn yearly incomes below $2,500 [1] (comparable with most small independent enterprisers). This condition offers a chance for professional-union organization and a tie-in with larger economic objectives and action.

Many technical-managerial and professional employees are, from the angle of their incomes, nearer to the workers than they are to members of their own class. In fact, millions of skilled union workers earn more than millions of lower-salaried employees. Nevertheless, technical-managerial

TABLE 6—SALARIED PROFESSIONALS: 1870–1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Teachers	1,203,622	1,124,520	614,905	128,265
Designers	111,805	102,730	47,449	1,291
Reporters	63,493	51,844	34,382	5,375
Musicians	161,536	165,128	139,310	16,170
Clergymen	140,077	145,877	118,018	
Religious Workers	35,172	31,290	12,970 *	44,934
Social Workers	75,197	32,241	3,000 *	
Actors	40,000 *	37,993	28,297	2,066
Librarians	38,607	29,613	7,423	. . .
Trained Nurses	371,066	294,189	82,327	1,204
Accountants	190,000 *	191,571	39,239	.
Unclassified	110,000 *	95,239	12,061	5,000 *
Total	2,540,575	2,302,235	1,139,381	204,305
Additional	120,268	111,684	40,470	
Grand Total	2,660,843	2,413,919	1,179,851	204,305

* Partly estimated.

Under "Teachers" college professors and presidents are included. "Designers" includes draftsmen. "Reporters" includes editors. "Unclassified" includes professional apprentices and assistants and "other professional occupations." "Additional" is the sum of the assumptions made in Table 5 regarding the number of independent professionals who are salaried employees. Excluded are laborers and other wage-workers, keepers of billiard rooms and dance halls, and managers and officials which the Census lists under "Professional service." . . .

[1] By 1958, of course, this figure was considerably higher. Nevertheless, *The Statistical Abstract of the United States 1957* indicates that this generalization is still valid. [Ed.]

and professional employees are members of the new middle class. Most of them earn more than the workers; their occupations, their functions, and their potential (if not actual) incomes differentiate them from the workers. A worker who earns around $3,000–$3,500 a year knows that is the limit: he can earn more only by ceasing to be a worker. Technical-managerial and professional employees may earn only $2,000 a year, but they know they can earn more and they need not get out of their class to do so. No more than one can say that a worker who earns $3,000 yearly is a member of the new middle class can one say that technical-managerial and professional employees who earn $2,000 yearly are members of the working class. The appeal for progressive action to technical-managerial and professional employees must be made in terms of their functional interests and class as part of the over-all struggle for reconstruction.

This problem of class appears more sharply in the case of white collar workers, whose numbers jumped from around 375,000 in 1870 to 7,600,000 in 1940, an increase of twenty times (Table 7). Many white collar workers are difficult to classify. Salespeople and clerks in stores might be assigned to the working class, bookkeepers to the class of lower professional employees. Yet objective and psychological considerations that are determining factors should be borne in mind.

One objective distinction can be made: the amount of education and training that is needed to qualify for a particular occupation. The professionals need more education and training than the white collars, and white collars (most of them at least) need more than the workers. An important class-psychological distinction is this: the white collar occupations (most, if not all, of them) were occupations that represented an upward move in the world, an escape from the working class. They were cleaner, with better hours and pay; they provided more security, social prestige, and chance to get ahead. In general the white collars developed within the middle class, as its lower layers, and with the psychological attitudes of that class. Hence their resistance to unionism, which is only slowly breaking down.

The white collars are workers. Even if all white collar people are assigned to the working class there still remains a solid core of 9,000,000 members of the middle class, among them 5,000,000 technical-man-

TABLE 7—WHITE COLLAR WORKERS: 1870–1940

	1940	1930	1910	1870
Bookkeepers, etc.	741,308 *	739,077	447,411	38,776
Clerks	1,973,604	1,795,000	639,000	29,801
Stenographers-Typists	1,174,886	811,190	316,693	154
Clerks (store)	525,591	401,991	387,183	80,000 *
Salespeople (store)	2,200,000 *	1,988,322	877,238	160,000 *
Commercial Travelers	256,000 *	223,732	163,620	7,296
Sales Agents	366,312	389,358	167,578	35,000 *
Operators	250,821	316,638	137,684	8,406
Unclassified	118,000 *	117,397	85,240 *	15,000 *
Total	7,606,522	6,782,705	3,221,647	374,433

* Partly estimated.

Under "Bookkeepers" cashiers are included. "Clerks" excludes shipping clerks, who are listed with wage-workers. "Sales Agents" includes insurance and real estate agents. "Operators" includes telephone and telegraph operators. "Unclassified" includes railway mail clerks, etc. . . .

agerial, professional, and public employees. The total becomes larger as farmers (who are middle class, being proprietors) are added. Nothing is gained, and much is lost, by juggling with distortions of the concept of class, or by stretching the meaning of "working class" and "proletariat" until they become all-inclusive, meaningless concepts. That does not conjure away the numbers or strength of the middle class; nor the important problems of differences in functional occupation and interests, the differences in historical background and psychology.

Yet it must be recognized that salespeople in stores are most akin to workers and that the relative position of white collars in general has seriously deteriorated since 1870. The working class has moved upward, the white collars downward. Division and subdivision of labor among clerical workers make their jobs more routine and uninteresting; a modern office more and more resembles a factory as machines in use multiply (office-machine operators almost doubled in 1930–40, rising from 36,162 to 64,178); opportunities to get ahead are increasingly limited; differentials in pay shrink, and constantly larger numbers of wage-workers are better paid than most white collars. Finally, economic security is crumbling; in the depression of the 1930's, unlike the experience in previous depressions, nearly as many white collars, proportionately, were thrown into unemployment as wage-workers. The general situation is thus summed up in a Census analysis of the white collar worker:

> The average salary is only enough to meet demands of a very moderate standard of living. Little is left for savings. He lives all too frequently—as do many workers—face to face with the hazard of unemployment and with the risk of dependency in his old age. . . . [White collars] are a class between the usually better-educated and better-paid professionals and the less well-educated but better-paid skilled workers. The skilled workers [and increasingly other workers too] often belong to unions, and many of the professional persons belong to the professional societies, but only a small proportion of the clerical workers are organized. As a class they are not yet fully group conscious. Until recent years and in many cases until the present, the relation of clerical workers to their employers has been largely a personal relation. But the clerical class is becoming group conscious, it is beginning to organize. When it becomes thoroughly group conscious and completely organized it can exert a great influence on social and economic questions.*

The failure of socialism to grow among the American people, which always puzzled and irritated Marxists, becomes understandable in part as the changes in class relations are considered. Much of the socialist agitation was based on the argument that "opportunity has come to an end." But the emphasis always was on the opportunity to become independent businessmen. In this connection the socialist argument was largely true after 1910, although up until that year the opportunity, while diminishing, was still there. But a whole new field for "opportunity to rise in the world" was opened up by the astonishing expansion of technical-managerial and professional employment (in which may be included the upper layers of white collar workers). The form was new but it *was*

* The U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States*, 1870 to 1940 (1943), pp. 179–180. A most effective job of union organization has been done by the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, AFL, pioneer in the field of white collar unions. An equally effective job, with larger progressive overtones, is being done by the Retail, Wholesale and Chain Store Food Employees Union, CIO, of which Samuel Wolchak is president. Unionism among office workers trails behind. The war, with its rise in prices, has lowered the real salaries of white collar workers. . . .

opportunity and it offered "careers open to the talents." This, along with other factors—no American feudalism, the measurable completion in the 1820's–30's of the struggle for political democracy, the unparalleled economic expansion which brought to the American people the highest living standards in the world—distinguished this country from Europe and explains the failure of socialism. Its lessons must be learned to understand the present and project the future.

These new functional groups, moreover, were never brought within the Marxist class concept. They were, by and large, identified with the bourgeoisie as "class enemies." The theoretical expression of this was the Marxist analysis of surplus value (meaningful enough if it is broadened to include all useful labor, not only the manual industrial workers), which meant that, since the industrial proletariat alone produces surplus value, the useful functional groups of technical-managerial, professional, and clerical employees, without whom production cannot carry on, are like the capitalist in being exploiters of labor! As the new middle class multiplied, the Marxists, especially the communists, tortured the class concept by insisting that most members of the new class were workers. A class concept was tortured to maintain its schematic purity. No effort was made to study concretely and objectively the new class relations; to modify the class concept, and the consequent social-economic program and action, to meet the new conditions. The new middle class remained, by and large, immune to unionism and socialism.

F. The Domestic Institution

25

*The Family: Genus Americanum**

RUTH BENEDICT

The domestic institution deals with those problems relating to marriage and the family and is probably as old as man himself. Like other aspects of contemporary society, these cultural features have also felt the impact of our complex, urban-industrial-democratic way of life. Ruth Benedict, in assessing the changing character of the American family, affords us the perspective of the anthropologist.

A great many people today speak as if the family were in some special sort of danger in our times. We hear a great deal about "saving the family" and about "preserving the home." Authors and lecturers describe how the family is threatened by divorce, or by mothers who work outside of the home, or by unemployment, or by lack of religious training of children. Each of them, depending on his experience in his own home and on his observations in the fam-

* Reprinted by permission from *The Family: Its Function and Destiny* by Ruth Anshen, Editor, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1949.

ilies he knows, selects something which he thinks should be changed—or should be preserved—and says that, if this or that were done, the family would be "saved."

To an anthropologist such phrasings are dangerously misleading. He has studied the family among naked savages and in contemporary civilizations and he knows that it has survived in all human societies known in the record of mankind. Just as surely he knows that the family takes all kinds of different forms. It is not merely that unlettered primitive nomads have family arrangements different from Western industrial nations; even in Western nations around the Atlantic shores the family differs profoundly. The ethics of marriage, the specific close emotional ties which the family fosters, the disciplines and freedoms for the child, the nature of the dependency of the children upon the parents, even the personnel which makes up the family—all these differ in Western civilized nations. The anthropologist knows that the changes taking place in the home in any decade in any country do not mean that the family is now about to disintegrate under our eyes unless we do something about it. The problem as he states it is quite different: how do legal and customary arrangements in the family tally with the arrangements and premises of the whole way of life which is valued in any tribe or nation? If, for instance, the father has a heavy, authoritarian hand upon his children, the anthropologist asks: Is this in keeping with authoritarianism in the state and in industry? Or is it at odds with a society which values non-authoritarianism and the pursuit of happiness? He asks the same kind of question about a nation's laws of inheritance from father to son, about the divorce laws, about the architectural layout of the house, about the reasons that are given to children when they are told to be good.

Customs enshrined in the family in any tribe or nation are likely to be sensitively adjusted to the values and customs of each particular people. This is no mystic correspondence; the persons who make up the family are the same people who are the citizens of that nation—the businessmen, the farmers, the churchgoers or non-churchgoers, the readers of newspapers, and the listeners to the radio. In all their roles they are molded more or less surely into a people with certain habits, certain hopes, and a certain *esprit de corps*. Americans come to share certain slogans, behavior, and judgments which differ from those of Frenchmen or Czechs. This is inevitable. And in the process the role of the family also becomes different. By the same token, just as economic and political changes occur over a period of time in the United States or in France or in Czechoslovakia, the family also changes. . . .

Instead of viewing the family with such alarm, suppose we look at it as it exists in this decade in this country and see how it is arranged to fulfill its functions in American schemes of life. Let us leave aside for the moment the questions of whether conditions are provided that would keep it from preventable overstrain and of whether as human beings we are able to get all the satisfaction we might out of this institution; let us consider only the arrangements of the family as we know it and how these fit in with our values and with the way we should like to plan our lives.

Suppose we take marriage first. Marriage sets up the new family, and it seems to make a great deal of difference whether a society dictates that the new home shall be begun in tears and heartache or with

rejoicing. Many human societies would not recognize a marriage without a wailing bride and a sullen groom. Often the bride has to be surrounded by her mourning women, who lament her coming lifelong separation from her parents and her brothers and sisters, as well as her future misery as she goes to work for her mother-in-law. Often they cut her long hair and remove her jewelry as a sign that she is now a worker and no longer alluring. The groom's role, too, may be that of an unwilling victim. Often marriages are arranged by the parents without giving the two young people any chance to know each other.

All these circumstances are absent in marriage in the United States. The young people are hardly hampered in their choice of a mate; if occasionally parents deplore their choice, public opinion allows the young couple to outface them and expects the parents to accept the inevitable with as much decency as they can muster. We expect that the bride and groom will be in love or will have chosen each other for reasons known to themselves. Whether they marry for love or for money or to show they can win a sought-after mate from a rival, in any case they are making a personal choice and are not acting on command. Because in every field of life American culture puts such a high value on this kind of freedom and so bitterly resents its curtailment in peace time, the fact that young people do make their own choice of a mate is an important and auspicious arrangement. The arranged marriage which is traditional in France or the careful class restrictions which have been observed in Holland would be difficult to manage in the United States. The wide range of choice of a mate and the fact that the young people make their own selection are conditions which could hardly be made more satisfactory for Americans with their particular habits and demands.

After marriage, too, the new family has a wide range of choices about where to live, how the wife shall occupy herself, when to start a family, and a host of other important matters. Such freedom is extremely unusual in the world. Sometimes the couple must live with the husband's family, sometimes with the wife's. Often in other countries, until one or two children are born, the young man continues to work for his father and has no say about the farm or the flock and no money which he can control. But in the United States a young couple plans the family budget before the wedding and what they earn is theirs to spend.

The way the new family in this country sets up its own separate home makes possible a rare and delightful circumstance: the two of them can have an incomparable privacy. No matter how hard it has been to arrange for privacy before marriage, as soon as the wedding is over everybody expects them to have their own latch key and their own possessions around them. If they cannot manage this, they feel cheated and other people think something is wrong. It is the same if they have to give a home to a parent. In most civilized countries this is a duty to which as a good son and good daughter they are bound, but if it is necessary in the United States their friends and neighbors will regard them as exceptionally burdened. Even the scarcity and high wages of domestic servants give the young family a greater privacy. Considering that they have chosen each other to their own liking, this privacy in the home is made in order to gratify them; the only problem is whether they can use it to their own happiness.

When they cannot, and when they find that their choice of a mate was not foolproof just because they made it on their own, there is in the United States great freedom to get a divorce. Our growing divorce rate is the subject of much viewing-with-alarm; yet in a culture built as ours is on ever expanding personal choice, an important goal of which is the pursuit of happiness, the right to terminate an unhappy marriage is the other side of the coin of which the fair side is the right to choose one's spouse. Weak and stunted individuals will of course abuse both privileges, yet it is difficult to see how divorce could consistently be denied in a culture like ours. Certainly if we accepted it more honestly as a necessary phase of our way of life, however sorrowful, and put honest effort and sympathy into not penalizing the divorced, we should be acting more appropriately and in our own best interests. At any rate, the high divorce rate in the United States is no attack on marriage, for it is precisely the divorced—those who have failed in one or two attempts—who have the highest rate of marriage. Between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five not even the unmarried or the widowed marry at so great a rate as the divorced.

Besides free choice and privacy, the American family has unusual potential leisure because of the labor-saving devices, prepared foods, and ready-made clothes available under modern conditions. The basic laborsaver is running water in the sink, and Americans have little idea how many millions of homes in civilized countries do not have it. Thus we are saved an endless round of drudgery that ties down women—and men also—in countries where homes have no running water, no gas and electricity, no farm tools but those which are driven into the earth by human hands or are swung in human arms, and no use of ready-made soaps and foods and clothes. Americans put high value on lessened drudgery, but they deprecate having free spaces of truly leisure time; the more time they save the more they fill up their days and nights with a round of engagements and complications. They are unwilling to admit that they have leisure, but the schedules of their lives prove clearly how much they have.

Universal schooling in the United States also frees the family of many duties when children have come. It is hard for Americans to imagine the difference which regular school hours makes in a mother's role. For a great part of the working day, American children are the responsibility of the teacher and not of the mother. As nursery schools spread over the country, younger and younger children get trained care outside the home and the mother's labors are correspondingly relieved. As the children grow older the mother's leisure increases, until finally she reaches that idle middle age with its round of card parties and clubs and window shopping and movies which engross and waste the energy of so many millions of American women. Her husband is earning more money now than when he was younger, and her children have flown; she has a plethora of privileges and freedom and leisure. In one sense she has everything.

It is obviously unfair to talk about the incomparable freedom from drudgery which the American home offers without emphasizing that interval of a few years when there is no leisure for the mother in the home—the years when the babies are little. In our great cities where each family is strange to all the others, a mother is likely to have to be baby tender every hour of the day, with no one to relieve her. Along with these duties she must do all her cooking and washing and cleaning.

And, as all our magazines and women's pages reiterate, she must make efforts to keep her husband. She must keep herself looking attractive, must keep up social contacts, and be a companion to him. To European wives this program looks formidable. "I was always told that American women were so free," a Polish woman said to me, "but when I came here and saw how they had to manage with the babies and the house without any older women of the family to help, and then how they had to play around with their husbands in the evening to keep them happy, I decided I wouldn't change places with them for anything. In Poland a woman doesn't have to 'keep' her husband; it's all settled when they're married."

The striking fact about the nursery years in the United States is that in comparison with those in other countries they are so short and that nevertheless we do not really treat them as an interim. Mothers who are going through this period give remarkably little thought to the leisure that will come soon. They are often vocal enough about the turmoil of their present lives, and sometimes bitter, but the fact that the nursery years last so short a time in the United States and could be treated as an interim . . . is all too seldom part of their thinking. No doubt this is due in part to a lag in our culture, since even with our grandparents conditions were different; but in part it is a result of the sentiment which selects this period, no matter how short, as the fulfillment of a woman's chief duty in life. A social engineer looking at the family, however, would certainly put his major effort into better arrangements for the overburdened mother during these years and into thinking about effecting some transition from this period into that next one during which, in the United States, millions of women become idle parasites upon society —and dull and unhappy into the bargain.

Another notable feature of the American family is its peculiarly non-authoritarian character. The old rules that a child should be seen and not heard and the adage, "Spare the rod and spoil the child," are anachronistic in the United States; they are dispensed with even in immigrant groups which honored them in their native country. The rule of the father over the family is still a reality in some European nations, but in the United States the mother is the chief responsible agent in bringing up her children; here the father's opinions are something the children are more likely to play off against the mother's, to their own advantage, rather than a court of last authority from which there is no appeal. Children take the noisy center of the stage at the breakfast table and in the living room in a way that is quite imposible in European countries. The fact that they are expected to know right from wrong in their tenderest years and to act upon it on their own is often commented on by European mothers who have lived here. A Dutch mother once spoke to the author about how hard we are on our children because we expect this of them; she said, "I don't expect it of my children before they are seven; until then, I am there to see that they act correctly." But an American mother expects a child of three or four to be a responsible moral agent, and she gives him great latitude in which to prove that he can manage his little affairs by himself.

All this lack of strong authoritarianism in American families accords well with the values that are chiefly sought after in this country. No strong father image is compatible with our politics or our economics. We seek the opportunity to prove that we are as good as the next person, and we do not find comfort in following an authoritarian voice—in the state or in the home,

from the landowner or the priest—which will issue a command from on high. We learn as children to measure ourselves against Johnny next door, or against Mildred whose mother our mother knows in church, and this prepares us for living in a society with strongly egalitarian ideals. We do not learn the necessity of submitting to unquestioned commands as the children of many countries do. The family in the United States has become democratic.

These free-choice and non-authoritarian aspects of the family, along with its privacy and potential leisure, evidence only a few of the many ways in which it has become consistent with major emphases in our national life. They seem, when one compares them with arrangements in other civilized nations, to be quite well fitted to the role the family must play in a culture like the United States. This does not mean, however, that Americans capitalize to their own advantage upon all these consistently contrived arrangements which are institutionalized in the family as we know it.

G. Population

26

*The Demographic Revolution**

WARREN S. THOMPSON

The problems associated with population growth and movement are an indispensable feature of any study of society. The impact of the phenomenal expansion of population in Western civilization during the past few centuries, together with its present, world-wide extension, has more than ever made us conscious of the vital influence of population changes. Warren S. Thompson, director of the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems at Miami University (Ohio), discusses the demographic revolution, its causes, and some of its implications.

To appreciate what has happened in the growth of the world's population in the past 250 years, we must place the situation in a longer perspective. For purposes of illustration let us consider the 10,000-year period prior to 1700 A.D. The best available estimate is that the population of the world in 1700 was in the neighborhood of 600 million, and we may certainly assume that 10,000 years earlier there were at least one million human beings on earth. On these assumptions, the average rate of increase throughout the 10,000 years would have been only .64 of a person per 1,000 per year. Of course in short time intervals and in local communities there must have been much sharper increases or decreases. But taking the period as a whole, any observer might well have agreed with the general conclusion expressed by the 18th- and 19th-century English economist Thomas

* Warren S. Thompson, "Population," *Scientific American* (February, 1950). Used by permission of the author and *Scientific American*.

Malthus, that over long periods population remained almost stationary, and that the chief reason for this was that the positive checks of hunger, disease and war kept man's death rate on the average at about the same high level as his birth rate.

In the 250 years since 1700, however, the number of human beings has abruptly shot upward with almost explosive force. In a period only a fortieth as long as the 10,000 years preceding 1700, the population of the world probably has almost quadrupled, rising from 600 million to more than two and a quarter billion. Over the past 250 years the average annual increase for the planet as a whole has been 5.5 persons per 1,000. Even this average rate of increase in another 250 years would raise the world's population to over nine billion. In some productive areas of the world the rise has been much greater than the average; for example, in the U.S. between 1790 and 1860 the rate of natural increase, excluding immigration, was nearly 33 per 1,000 per year.

The factor principally responsible for the great increase of the past 250 years is a sharp relative drop in the death rate. As to the reasons for this drop, we can find some clues in an analysis of the fluctuations of particular populations. Consider, for instance, the variations in growth from year to year in Sweden between 1751 and 1850. During that century Sweden's population almost doubled, growing from 1,772,701 to 3,461,914. The rate of increase averages out to 6.7 persons per 1,000 per year. Actually the annual fluctuations departed widely from this average; they varied from a natural increase (excess of births over deaths) of 15.95 per 1,000 in 1825 to a decrease of 26.93 per 1,000 in 1773.

The significant fact for our purposes is that there were only six years during this century in which deaths were more numerous than births, and only eight others when the natural increase was less than three per 1,000. In every one of those 14 years the death rate was abnormally high. And in each case the high death rate was preceded by a period of scarcity of food, generally accompanied by an increase in epidemic disease. Abundance or scarcity of subsistence also had an effect on the birth rate: a good harvest generally was followed by an increase in marriages and, in due course, an increase in births, while scarcity was followed by fewer marriages and a lower birth rate. But during this century death rates in Sweden varied much more than birth rates; thus the yearly variations in the death rate during this period clearly were more important in accounting for the variations in natural increase, although later the variations in the birth rate became about equally important. The same general pattern prevailed in Finland during the century we have been considering. There is also much evidence that even today death rates in the less industrialized nations are still highly variable and are more important than birth rates in determining the variations in population growth from year to year.

Thus it appears that the principal restriction on population growth has been the scarcity of food. To be sure, there have occasionally been devastating epidemics that did not seem to be directly related to such a scarcity, but over long periods it is highly probable that epidemics connected with scarcity have been more important in reducing population growth than those not so connected. There can be no reasonable doubt that the amount of subsistence is still the chief factor in determining the level of the death rate in such countries as China and India.

In the long view, Malthus was fundamentally correct when he said that man's

growth in numbers was largely dependent on the supply of subsistence. He did not live long enough to be certain of any significant decline in the birth rate, except possibly in France. Nor did he witness any significant advance in public health, although he mentioned vaccination as probably a factor in the decline of France's death rate. He remained convinced to the end of his life that the supply of food was and would remain the overriding factor in determining population growth.

Many unexpected things have happened since Malthus made this diagnosis. In the writer's opinion the fundamental factors in bringing about the unprecedented growth of population in the last two and a half centuries have been the development of science, i.e., knowledge, and the application of this knowledge to the practical problems of production and health. Of the first importance, both in time and in its effect on the death rate, is the increase in production which has come to be associated with the Industrial Revolution beginning about the middle of the 18th century. Of course this revolution took some time to make its effects felt even in Western Europe, and many parts of the world have still not been much influenced by it. The essential fact, however, is that prior to about 1750 there was very little difference in the manner of life of all civilized peoples, whereas now there are great differences, affecting their birth rates and their death rates.

I remember walking down a street in Nanking, China, one afternoon nearly 20 years ago with the eminent English economic historian R. H. Tawney, and remarking to him that Chinese cities often reminded me of his description of early 18th-century English economic life. He replied in effect: "I was just thinking that the English workman of that age would have been very much at home in the economy as well as in the living conditions we have just been observing, but so also would the Frenchman from Paris or the Italian from Florence. The farmers would have wondered at some of the crops raised here, but they would have understood the Chinese methods of cultivation and the care given the soil."

In 1700 it took the labor of about four European peasant families to produce enough food and fiber for five families. So it did in Russia until within the last 20 or 30 years and so it does in China and Java today. The yields of most crops per acre were low (in this respect much of China was probably well in advance of Europe in 1800), the methods of cultivation were primitive and the livestock was of extremely poor quality. Production of nonagricultural commodities was of the same low estate. Almost the only power man knew, either for agriculture or industry, was his own muscle power.

Into this situation improved varieties of staple crops, new crops, better farming methods and better-bred livestock were introduced slowly. Compared, however, with the changes during the preceding 2,000 years, the revolution in agricultural practices after about 1700 was indeed rapid. Contrary to the common belief, an Agricultural Revolution got under way before the Industrial Revolution, and it was primarily responsible for launching the huge increase of population that we are considering.

The improvement in crops and livestock in Europe not only made it possible for people to eat better, but was also instrumental in making it possible to accumulate capital faster. Soon industry joined agriculture in the revolution, and each made possible further advances in the other. Farmers could clear and drain land faster, and other-

wise improve the management of soil so that it would produce still better crops. From the latter part of the 17th century to the present, agriculture has undergone changes fully as spectacular, though not as widely realized, as those in industry. Today in the U.S. only about 16 to 18 percent of our workers are engaged directly in agriculture; in other words, one farm family produces enough for six families, and at a vastly superior level of consumption. It is probable that the average American farmer today produces as much as 10 non-farm families consumed in 1700.

The improvements in agriculture not only proved to be good economics; they also had exactly the effect that Malthus had predicted the provision of more ample subsistence would have on population growth. They reduced the death rate, i.e., rendered the positive checks less severe, and population grew more rapidly and more steadily.

When man began to harness water to run his machines, to burn coal to generate steam and to produce an increasing variety of goods of better quality, he was well on the way to the development of a new pattern of production which soon exceeded his wildest dreams of efficiency. For a time it appeared that in the Western world we no longer needed to give serious attention to the ideas of Malthus, that we had learned how to produce at a rate in excess of any possible rate of population growth, and that we could look forward to an easier life no matter how high our birth rate or how low our death rate. This view was further strengthened when the rate of natural increase in population began to fall, due to the fact that the birth rate began to decline faster than the death rate. The result was a further general rise in the standard of living.

Two other factors played an important role in the West. The first was the abundance of new land to which Western Europeans began to migrate on a large scale after 1800. Millions of acres of rich agricultural soil and incalculable mineral wealth were opened up in the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil and Australia. Coupled with the application of power, these riches gave Europeans an opportunity to expand unique in human history, permitting an increase of hundreds of millions in population with a better level of living.

The second factor was the application of science to produce great advances in public health facilities—good medical schools, medical research, sewage disposal systems, water works, hospitals. These health works, by preventing the perennial epidemics of typhoid, dysentery, smallpox, diphtheria, and so on, sharply reduced the death rates in the West. They may also reduce them even more rapidly in those parts of the world where rates are still high. In Japan during the Occupation, for example, the vigorous application of health knowledge has reduced the death rate from an estimated 32 per 1,000 in the last five months of 1945 to 12 per 1,000 in 1948, about a third below the prewar rate. This unprecedented achievement is all the more remarkable because the level of living is far lower in Japan than in Western nations. This experience in Japan gives tangible support to the belief of demographers that the industrially backward areas of the world are likely to grow rapidly in population during the next century as they industrialize.

Yet most Americans and Europeans are much less conscious of this possibility of vast increases in population than they are of the possibility of further large increases in production. Hence it is not surprising that there is a rather widespread feeling in the West that the application of science to agriculture and industry will provide improving standards of living for any popu-

lation the world is likely to have in the foreseeable future. This seems all the more probable to us in the Americas and Australia because of the widespread talk of agricultural surpluses. It is natural, therefore, to find many people asking why anyone should be concerned over the possibility of the world's population growing faster than the world's supply of subsistence. Put in this form, however, the problem is meaningless. To consider the problems of population growth realistically we must examine the different situations that exist among the peoples of the world.


Anyone even moderately familiar with the conditions of population growth will readily recognize several different situations. On the basis of characteristic patterns of birth rates, death rates and conditions that determine these rates, the writer classifies the populations of the world in three groups.

Group A consists of most of the peoples of Western Europe and of the lands, such as the Americas, that they have chiefly settled. This category, comprising about a fifth of the world's population, is characterized by low birth rates, low death rates and low rates of natural increase. In general, except for war there is little reason to be concerned over the ability of these peoples to produce the goods essential to decent living.


Group B consists of the peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Japan, Spain and perhaps two or three South American countries. These peoples, also comprising about a fifth of the world's population, are characterized by moderate death rates and birth rates high enough to yield a rather high rate of natural increase, which seems likely to continue for several decades. They have as yet only a moderate measure of voluntary control over births, and death rates which are decreasing about as fast as, and perhaps faster than, their birth rates. They will almost certainly become an increasing proportion of the world's population during the next half or three quarters of a century.

Group C, making up the remaining three fifths of the world's population, lives chiefly in Asia and its large adjacent islands, in Africa and in those parts of South and Central America not included in the second group. They may be called the Malthusian countries. They have very high birth rates and death rates, but chiefly because of the great variability of their death rates their rates of natural increase are also highly variable. Thus India in the decade from 1931 to 1941 was able to hold her death rate nearly 15 points below her birth rate and grew by about 50 millions. However, in this group the control over death rates, such as it is, is highly precarious, and there is no evidence anywhere of any significant decline in the birth rate. The population seems to grow whenever subsistence increases and to stop or even decline at times of scarcity and great epidemics.

These three categories of peoples also have distinguishing economic characteristics. Group A in general has a highly productive economy in which efficiency is increasing rapidly. Since families are small and population is growing slowly, the level of living is high, and if it had not been for the two world wars, all of these peoples would probably have enjoyed rising levels of living. In Group B the economy is less productive, but machine industry is spreading and agriculture is improving. There is reason to believe that in some of the Group B countries productivity will increase faster than population even in the immediate future. Apparently this was beginning to take place in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia before the war, and it may be now occurring in the U.S.S.R., although demographic data from that country are so



JUMP IN POPULATION of the world during the past 250 years is dramatically shown by chart comparing it with slow growth in preceding 10,000 years.



WORLD'S PEOPLES are divided into three categories based on relation of births to deaths. Countries with high rates in both have three fifths of people.

scanty as to permit of only the most tentative conclusions.

In Group C the low level of productivity is the basic factor in keeping the death rate very high, although it gets an occasional assist from an epidemic not due primarily to scarcity, like the 1918 influenza outbreak in India that killed many millions. Group C now has 10 or more times as many people as the whole of Europe in 1700. It has little machine-powered industry. The yields of rice in many parts of South and East Asia, however, are well above grain yields in most of the West today. So far this relatively high per acre production of rice has only served to increase the density of population, and not to raise the level of living. Here is a population at least twice as large as the population of the entire world in 1700, with birth rates and death rates which are probably higher than those of most countries in Europe at that time.

What are the prospects that the growth in agricultural and industrial production among the peoples of Group C will exceed the growth in population enough to raise levels of living? What will be the consequences to these peoples and the rest of the world if this fails to happen? Even these questions are of too general a character to have much meaning, but they are much more realistic than one which gives the impression that there is but one vital question regarding the relation of population and subsistence, and that it can be phrased in some such simple manner as: Can the world feed a large increase in population? . . .

If I have given the impression that the Malthusian view is the only aspect of population study worth our attention today, I can only disclaim any such intent. There are many other aspects of population growth and change that are of great importance to man's welfare, such as the distribution of population, the qualities of peoples, migrations, changes in age structure, differential birth rates and the control of death rates. But in my opinion they are secondary in the furthering of human welfare to the economic problems which many nations and peoples face. I also believe that these problems have a very direct relation to the maintenance of peace. In a world which is filling up as ours is, and which is one world whether we like it or not, the urgent questions regarding the livelihood of a growing people soon become a matter of concern to all nations. Hence there is a need to begin to plan for such changes in population growth as will contribute best to human welfare. We cannot ignore population changes in India and China and Japan even if we desire to do so.

Chapter Five

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

I.

Aristotle has often been quoted to the effect that man is a social animal. Such being the case, there follows the unfortunate reality that group life of necessity poses innumerable problems, among them the maintenance of a semblance of law and order. Most social scientists have proceeded on the assumption that all peoples have devised some kind of solution to the basic question of controlling and directing the conduct and affairs of the individuals within the group. The variety of political forms adopted by pre-literate and literate man is seemingly infinite. It is generally accepted that political forces usually reflect the demographic, technological, and other features of a particular society. We must not lose sight of the important fact, therefore, that political institutions tend to fit into the general configuration of the culture pattern.

From the time of Plato and Aristotle down to the present day, philosophers have speculated on the nature of state and government. For a long time, too, political science was intimately associated with both history and law. By the nineteenth century, it had gradually achieved an independent status and within the past fifty years there has been a perceptible shift away from its earlier, primarily speculative, character. Like so many of its sister disciplines, and perhaps to an even greater extent than most, political science has felt the impact of scientific inquiry. The quest for an exact science of politics has manifested itself in more and more empirical analyses of political parties, power groups, and the functioning of particular political institutions. Myriad statistical studies of elections and legislative voting records have appeared within the past decade. Some scholars, however, recognizing some of the irrational elements in "political man," have turned to study the psychological forces at work, the intangibles of human activity.

In viewing the immense body of knowledge which constitutes political science, the late Charles A. Beard delineated a number of significant areas: (1) the philosophical literature, in which countless efforts have been made to create the ideal commonwealth; (2) the descriptive studies, composed of scholarly tracts on governmental forms—for example, the rise of representative government in late Medieval England, or the organization of the Congress of the United States; (3) since behavior does not operate in a vacuum, there are those inquiries into the historical circumstances which help to create political action—parties, pressure groups, social and economic arrangements; (4) analyses of the functions of government and their performance as

related to an infinite variety of specific activities such as education, taxation, banking; and (5) the literature dealing with the relations between governments.

2.

From this vast array of available information, a necessarily limited number of essays have been selected for inclusion here. The readings which follow deal with a few of the general problems of political science: the nature of the state, the various forms of government, and the question of representative government—as well as with some of its more detailed aspects in the United States: democracy and political parties.

A. The General Concept

27

*What Is Political Science?**

GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR

It is obvious by now that the social sciences simply do not lend themselves to simple definition. Yet, faced at this point with the inevitable problem, "What is political science?" Professor George B. De Huszar, author and political theorist, offers an introductory answer to a difficult and perplexing question.

The field of political science is the division of the social sciences that is concerned with states and governments and with the economical, social, and psychological factors which underlie political phenomena. The term "politics" has many meanings and diverse connotations. . . . the term is used to refer to the process of formulating decisions or of determining policies.

Political science is primarily concerned with the organization of human beings into the state. Government is the agency through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed, and realized. The state acts through law as promulgated by a government endowed with coercive power. Modern political science does not view the government as an entity apart from other aspects of society, but studies it in relation to social forces.

Many political scientists are concerned with all data in which the element of power (coercion and influence) is present, and concentrate on the problem of attaining, consolidating, and distributing political power. They maintain that all politics is the quest for power, and that political relationships are power relationships. In recent years a great number of studies have been made on political power, from psychological, economic, social, and historical points of view. These studies have provided students of politics with considerable data and interpretation on the nature of power. . . .

* Reprinted from *Introduction to Political Science* by J. Roucek, G. B. De Huszar and Associates, by permission of Thomas Y. Crowell Company. Copyright 1950 by the publisher.

Within the last three hundred years a great many approaches to political phenomena have been elaborated. From the point of view of the history of political science, it is useful to distinguish between two major trends: some political scientists have been concerned with the study of legal and institutional phenomena, while others have been primarily interested in the study of the social-psychological foundations of political institutions and processes. The subsequent sections will discuss these two major orientations in detail.

The Legal and Institutional Approach

With the growing specialization of society and the emergence of a complex state, a definite field of political science came into existence. The growth of constitutional government and the reign of legality in politics led to a tendency toward legalism. The state was separated from its social context and was studied in isolation. Thus political science tended to be limited to the study of the formal organization of the state. The approach was institutional; it concerned itself with law and governmental structures, which are essentially static. The German school of *Allgemeine Staatslehre,* for instance, concerned itself mainly with public law and the general theory of the state.

The center of this type of political science is the state, the government which is the medium through which the state acts, and law which is the agency through which government operates. The method was mainly descriptive and classificatory. The central problems have been formal ones: two-chambered government versus one-chambered government, the relative advantages or disadvantages of the American cabinet system versus the British parliamentary system, technical aspects of the constitution, and so forth.

Assumptions and Limitations. This legal approach to political science has some limitations. Its inadequacy is illustrated in considering democracy, for example. The exponents of a purely legal approach assume that once a nation has a representative form of government it has democracy. This assumption is based on the methods of eighteenth century democracy: constitution, ballot, and parties. But a nation like Germany did not become a democracy after World War I although she had a constitution, parties, and the ballot system. The illusionary nature of the assumption that the mere right to vote automatically extends democracy can be demonstrated by another example. In the latter part of the nineteenth century large numbers of immigrants came to this country and voted in elections. Since many of them were unacquainted with the language and political system of their adopted land, the mere right to vote did not make them full-fledged citizens. As a matter of fact, the inability of some of these immigrants to make good use of the ballot, was exploited by political opportunists who either bought the voters or told them how to vote. Thus, owing to political ignorance and economic necessity, some political demoralization followed the extension of the franchise.

The exponents of the legal approach assume that the state is like a clock in which we can take for granted the hand that winds it up and confine ourselves to the study of the mechanism. . . .

Widened Scope. In the last decades it has been fully realized that in order to understand political life dynamic factors must be considered and the field of politics must be viewed as more than the study of government. The classificatory and descriptive

approach cannot explain the functioning of government. Just as the behavior of a human being cannot be studied in isolation, such functioning cannot be understood without reference to extra-governmental factors. Thus it came to be realized that while it would be an error to underestimate the importance of legal and institutional matters, political science must concern itself with more than is implied by these formal problems. A political science which aims to explain political life must concern itself with the dynamics of the state as well as its structural aspects.

The dynamic factors in politics cannot be understood in terms of purely juristic categories. To understand the functioning of government it is necessary for political science to work outward from the nucleus of the study of government and take into consideration social, psychological, and economic factors. This type of political science views the state not as a discrete but as a related phenomenon. It ceases to be purely legal edifice and is viewed as a social phenomenon which is responsive to changes within society. . . .

The Functional Approach

Recently there has been a reaction to the purely descriptive and legalistic approach in political science. The current tendency is away from the study of the tools and methods of law. Emphasis is on the study of functions and political behavior. The analysis of political behavior now has the prestige formerly assigned by political scientists to formal description and law. Griffith has noted that "political behavior has largely replaced legal structure as the cardinal point of emphasis among political scientists. It would seem then that the social psychologist and the sociologist are challenging the lawyer in thus achieving the center of interest in our political thinkers and researchers." * Present-day political science concerns itself with the functional as well as with the structural aspects of government. It emphasizes the study of the psychology of parties, of leadership, of voting and non-voting, as well as the study of propaganda, pressure groups, and revolution.

Modern political scientists' approach to political phenomena is comprehensive. With this orientation the term "politics" regains the original broad meaning it had among the Greeks. However, in one important respect modern political science differs from earlier comprehensive analyses of political life. It is empirical.

Until recently there was a great deal of speculation about politics, rather than an empirical investigation. Present-day political science strives to develop its postulates in empirical terms and to proceed to its conclusions without the help of philosophical and metaphysical intermediation. The empirical trend has been prevalent since the turn of the century, but in the past few decades it has developed to an unprecedented extent, partly because of the application of field techniques and statistical methods. This trend has performed a valuable service by counteracting the philosophical tendency. A better relationship between the Continental theoretical tradition and the Anglo-Saxon empirical tradition resulted. . . .

Delimitation of Its Scope. A major problem of recent political science is the definition of its scope. The problem of demarcation of the political science field is likely to grow more rather than less difficult, as society becomes more and more complex. Some

* Ernest S. Griffith, "The Frontiers of Political Science," *Research in Political Science*, E. S. Griffith (ed.) (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1948), pp. 224–25.

political scientists believe that a precise delimitation of the field fosters exact research. Since other social scientists sometimes accuse political scientists of being superficial, this belief—that through such delimitation careful study is encouraged—has great appeal. Other political scientists point out that if their field is arbitrarily limited they will be "right" but will not be "right" about much. An arbitrary delimitation fails to give consideration to relationships and therefore is bound to lead to incomplete results. The precise findings of political science would stand up under critical scrutiny, but little knowledge of basic issues of political life would be provided.

If no delimitation of the field is made, political scientists must dispense with their professional discipline; and should they do so, political science as a distinct field would disappear. Moreover, if the various social sciences lose their distinctive features the division of labor would be completely destroyed. On the other hand, there cannot be a strict delimitation of fields within the social sciences. Any attempt to develop discrete categories would be arbitrary. A middle way must be found between a limited and an over-all conception of political science. Most political scientists avoid these two extreme positions and believe that political science must continue to draw on the findings of other social sciences but must not become equivalent to their sum total. They maintain that political science should be mainly concerned with the state and with power and should take into consideration data from other social sciences that are relevant to such analyses. Thus the difference between political science and sociology, for instance, is chiefly that of emphasis. The line of demarcation is not precise and the two fields overlap; nevertheless the primary interests of these two disciples are kept. . . .

Nature of Political Science

Like the rest of the social sciences, political science is not an exact science. It cannot hope to attain the scientific precision which characterizes the physical sciences. Those who accept the Marxian doctrine of the materialistic determination of history believe that an exact science of society is possible. But those who do not subscribe to a materialistic view realize that the social sciences cannot be strictly scientific because these fields deal with human beings and not with forces which can be accurately measured and whose behavior can be accurately predicted.

Political science is dependent on a form of knowledge generally referred to as "common sense" and on knowledge gained from insight. Political science also employs the descriptive and classificatory approaches. But these approaches cannot bring scientific results. If science is defined as not merely systematic study and observation but the establishment of scientific laws, political science must go beyond the descriptive and classificatory approach. As noted above, political science has recently attempted to do this; it has taken into account the interdependence of a variety of factors and has established scientific laws about them.

The Problem of Objectivity. The social sciences can never be as objective as the natural sciences, since the subject matter of the former is man himself. It is obvious that in studying himself man cannot completely divorce himself from his prejudices, biases, and preferences. Even the best social scientist is subject to some bias. The proper conduct for the social scientist is to admit that he is not completely disinterested. Complete objectivity, unbiased interest only in facts, consideration of all sides of controversial issues, and the arriving at truth after

painstaking research, is the ideal of the social sciences. It can be approximated but it cannot be fully attained.

Methods of Political Science. Until the last two or three decades political science employed most frequently, perhaps even exclusively, four traditional methods: historical, legal, descriptive, and comparative. In recent years there has been a reaction to the use of the first three methods. The descriptive method has been subject to much criticism, and a number of political scientists have replaced it by the method of functional comparison. They maintain that instead of the customary juxtaposition of descriptive material, an effective functional comparison must be made.

A significant trend in modern political science is its adoption of new methods developed in the fields of economics, psychology, and sociology. The quantitative or statistical method, often used in economics, has been employed by some political scientists. The qualitative, social-psychological method has resulted in the use of field and interview techniques in political science. In the twentieth century new statistical and questionnaire methods which have made possible the measurement of public opinion have been worked out. The techniques of psychoanalysis and other branches of psychiatry have been applied to the study of leadership and of political personalities. Factor analysis and attitude measurement techniques have been employed to determine the attitudes of political groups.

While different political scientists use various methods in their studies, the recent tendency is to study political phenomena by a number of methods. For example, some political scientists maintain that foreign political institutions cannot be understood in terms of any single technique, that neither the orthodox institutional approach nor the strict behaviorist method can bring adequate results. They maintain that methods must be blended and kept in elastic touch and mutual penetration.

Political Science and Philosophy. Science is concerned with the world as it is and not as it ought to be. Science cannot provide goals for mankind, it can only provide an understanding of the world. It can explain political phenomena but it cannot tell what the aims of the state ought to be and what political values should be pursued. Those who believe in the scientific solution of social problems fail to realize that such problems are to a large extent ethical and volitional, and consequently outside the realm of science. Political science analyzes conditions, while political philosophy justifies preferences and values. In providing proper diagnosis and making the cure possible, political science performs an important service. But this activity must be supplemented by philosophical orientation. At certain panels of the Research Committee of the American Political Science Association, the plea was made that the political scientist should also become a philosopher. Attention was focused on the need for a perception of what is meant by concepts like "value" and "meaning," philosophically and ethically speaking.

There are several possible relations between ethics and politics. One school of thought maintains that every effort must be made to improve the practice of politics so that it will approximate ethical standards. Others separate politics from ethics and maintain that the morality of mankind does not apply to politics. Those who believe completely in the efficacy of science maintain that political problems can be solved scientifically, and therefore consider volitional and ethical factors irrelevant. Those who wholeheartedly accept the practice of power politics ignore political ideals altogether and deal only with the crude

realities of political life. Such an approach equates the ideals with the realities of politics and refuses to acknowledge any standards except those of expediency and success.

Problems of Political Science. Some of the major problems that political scientists are called upon to solve are: (1) Improvement in governmental organization, which involves such issues as the relation between the executive and the legislature, opportunities for independent participation in government, and the improvement of bureaucracy; (2) the dilemmas of democracy, which involve the problems of electoral apathy, and the concentration of power versus decentralization; (3) the world-wide and the domestic struggle between democratic and communist ideologies; (4) the relationship of government to the economic order, which involves the alternatives of governmental planning and free enterprise; (5) the issue of international cooperation and peace, which involves the problem of sovereignty versus international organization.

In order to provide adequate understanding of these issues, political scientists are attempting to improve their methods of study. In addition, they are adopting the basic concepts and methodological tools of other fields and are utilizing the ideas and contributions of other social scientists.

Contemporary Trends. There are four major trends in contemporary social sciences which are vitally affecting the work of political scientists:

1. The empirical trend has been particularly prevalent in recent decades; it has led to a more precise formulation of the problems and conclusions of social science.

2. The trend toward integration and synthesis in the social sciences has also been conspicuous in recent decades. While specialization has gone farthest in the natural sciences, integration has been most notable in that realm. Biophysics, biochemistry, neuropsychiatry, etc. are the results of such integration. The situation in regard to the social sciences is similar. Specialization has often led to the isolation of a particular social science, but the trend toward integration has resulted in fruitful cross-fertilization. The establishment of the Social Science Research Council in 1923 was a conscious realization of the need for such integration.

3. Social scientists have been increasingly concerned with critical questions, a sign of the maturity of a discipline. This critical trend embraces such questions as method, the problem of quantification, the nature of social hypothesis and generalization, the possibility of controlled experiment, and what constitutes reliable data. Such concern with methodology will enable social scientists to determine to what extent their field is a science, to what extent it is common sense, and to what extent it is scholarship. This critical trend reached its culmination in the founding of the Committee of Appraisal of Research of the Social Science Research Council in 1937.

4. Social scientists in recent decades have been particularly concerned with the practical applications of the results of their investigations. This again is a sign of the maturity of the field. It indicates that social science has gone beyond the descriptive approach and is able to provide ways and means of solving social problems. . . .

Branches of Political Science

Political scientists have different ways of dividing their field of study. The division given below is an attempt to establish a common denominator of the field as organized in universities and colleges and

discussed in textbooks or general treatises. These branches of the field are obviously overlapping:

1. **Political Theory.** This branch studies the nature, evolution, and purpose of the state and the principles which underlie its existence. It also considers political ideals and ideas such as liberalism, socialism, communism, fascism, and anarchism.

2. **Law.** This branch is concerned with the nature, interpretation, and enforcement of constitutions and the legal status of citizens. It also considers the nature and function of law, particularly with reference to governmental problems.

3. **The Study of Government.** This branch is concerned with the classification, description, and analysis of national, state, and local governments and of their legislative, judicial, and executive functions. It is also concerned with the comparison of various types of government. Political science has always stressed the study of governmental organization and functioning. With the increasing complexity of government, the study of public administration has been emphasized.

4. **Political Forces.** This branch is concerned with the struggle for political power among those who seek to influence the government. It is particularly concerned with the role of political parties, with techniques of propaganda and other means of influencing public opinion, with the role of ideologies, and with the function of violence.

5. **International Relations.** This branch is concerned with the analysis of such forces of international politics as the great powers, nationalism and imperialism. It is also concerned with the legal principles which nations have agreed to observe, and with the nature and scope of organizations to which nations belong.

B. The State and Society

28

*The Nature of the State**

HAROLD J. LASKI

The name of Harold J. Laski will inevitably arise in any discussion of politics. Laski, world-famous English political scientist, was an extraordinarily popular teacher, a prolific writer, and an active participant in British Labor Party circles. From one of his many books, *Politics,* the late Professor Laski outlines the nature of the state.

Every citizen of the modern world is the subject of a state. He is legally bound to obey its orders, and the contours of his life are set by the norms that it imposes. These norms are the law, and it is in the power to enforce them upon all who live within its boundaries that the essence of the state is to be found. For whereas all other associations are voluntary in character, and can

* From *Politics* by Harold J. Laski (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1931). Used by permission of Mrs. Frida Laski.

bind the individual only as he chooses membership of them, once he is a resident of some given state, legally he has no choice but to obey its commands. These are superior in their legal claim to the demand upon him of any alternative body. The state, so to say, is the crowning-point of the modern social edifice, and it is in its supremacy over all other forms of social grouping that its special nature is to be found.

The state is thus a way of regulating human conduct. Any analysis of its character reveals it as a method of imposing principles of behavior by which men must regulate their lives. The state orders us not to steal; it punishes us for a violation of its order. It lays down a system of imperatives, and uses coercion to secure obedience to them. From its own standpoint, the validity of those imperatives is self-derived. They are legal, not because they are good, or just, or wise, but because they are its imperatives. They are the legal expression of the way in which men should act as laid down by the authority which is alone competent to make final decisions of this kind.

But legal imperatives neither state themselves nor are self-enforced. They have been willed by some man, or some body of men, and by some man or some body of men they must be enforced. When we examine the states of the modern world, we find that they always present the spectacle of a large number of men obeying, within a defined territory, a small number of other men. We find, also, that the rules made by this small number, whether, as in Great Britain, they are omnicompetent (the King in Parliament) or, as in the United States, are limited both as to the subject-matter about which they can command obedience and the methods by which this is achieved, nevertheless possess this quality that, should they be violated, this small number of men can use all the coercion that is necessary to vindicate their authority. Every state, in short, is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, the government being a body of persons within the state who apply the legal imperatives upon which the state rests; and, differently from any other body of persons within the territorial society, they are entitled to use coercion to see that these imperatives are obeyed. . . .

The state is thus a society of individuals submitted, if necessary, by compulsion, to a certain way of life. All conduct in the society must conform to that way. The rules which settle its character are the laws of the state, and, by an obvious logic, they have necessary primacy, are, that is to say, sovereign, over all other rules. In this society, the individuals who make and enforce the rules are termed the government; and that portion of the rules which settles (*a*) how such rules are to be made (*b*) the manner in which they are to be changed (*c*) who are to make them, is called the constitution of the state.

This is, of course, to view the state as a purely legal order. It is simply a description of the way in which social relationships are geared together in a modern community, without regard either to the way in which the present system has developed, the purposes that it serves, or the value and dangers which attach to it as it functions.

Obviously enough, all of these are important. The character of the modern state is the consequence of the history through which it has passed, and it would be unintelligible save in the light of that history. The power of the state is not exerted in a vacuum. It is used to achieve certain ends, and its rules are, in their substance, altered to secure the ends deemed good at some particular time by those in possession of the legal right to operate its power. Our sense, again, of the value and dangers of the state as thus conceived will clearly depend very largely upon our view of the ends it is seek-

ing to serve, and the way in which it seeks to serve them.

With the history of the state I cannot here pretend to deal. It must be sufficient only to emphasize that its character as a sovereign body was the product of a long chain of historical circumstances of which the most important was the need, at the time of the Reformation, to find a plane of organization to which all claims to authority could be referred for ultimate decision. The state secured its primacy over all other associations because, at that period, it offered prospects of ordered peace such as no other body could pretend to secure. The anarchy of religious faiths seemed to promise little save conflict; economic organization was too local and atomistic in character to be capable of making general rules. The state emerged as the one association capable of laying down legal imperatives which the mass of men would respect. It was able to order life because, without its commands, there would have been no order. Its triumph was inherent in its ability to enforce its will upon all men against competitors who strove not less ardently for their allegiance.

Why was it able to enforce its will? At this point, we pass from the nature of the state viewed as a purely legal order, to the state as a subject of philosophic analysis. Here, clearly, we must look at it from two different angles. We have to explain what the purposes of the state seem, in general fact, to be: what, that is, explains the character of the legal imperatives it imposes at any given time. We have, also, to search for criteria which will enable us to determine what, again in general terms, the character of those legal imperatives ought to be. What, in a word, explains the habits of some given state, say those of the France of the *ancien régime?* What causes us to make the judgment that the French state of the *ancien régime* was inadequate, in its operation, to the purposes for which a state should exist?

The authority of a state is a function of its ability to satisfy the effective demands that are made upon it. Its subjects desire, for instance, security for their persons and property. The legal imperatives of a state are then directed to satisfying that desire. Its subjects wish to worship God in their own way, without the imposition of prohibitions upon any particular form of religious belief. If the demand cannot be gainsaid, the state makes religious toleration one of its legal imperatives. The reason for the French Revolution was simply that, under the system of legal imperatives maintained by the *ancien régime,* it was impossible to satisfy the demands made upon the institutions of the state by its members.

Legal imperatives, that is to say, are a function of effective demand. They will correspond to the desires of those who know how to make their wishes felt at the center of political power. The laws of any given state will be an effort to respond to those desires; and their efficacy will depend upon the degree to which that response is successful. From, that is, the vast and competing welter of desires which the state confronts among its members, some, and not others, are selected for translation into legally imperative terms. The principle of selection is not a constant one; either time or place determines its operation. We cannot conceive of a state in Western Civilization which does not tax its members to support a system of national education. Yet, less than a century and a half ago it would have been unthinkable that any state should have compelled its members to contribute to such a purpose. A demand which was then ineffective has become, in the process of time, irresistible.

Why? Clearly, because those who exercise the authority of the state have judged it necessary, or wise, or just, to yield to a

demand for a national system of education. But we have to discover what it is which makes such a demand effective at a given time and place. The answer, obviously, cannot be that the demand was reasonable: the state has often refused effect to reasonable demands, and accepted those which, on their face, reason could never justify. Nor can it be the wisdom of their substance, since statesmen do not always act wisely. Necessity is a more obvious cause; but we then need to know why one demand is, at some given time and place, deemed necessary by the state, and not another.

The motives, doubtless, which lead statesmen to action are far too complicated to permit of simple explanation; no one cause is finally exclusive of others. . . .

Let us put our central problem in another way. The state, I have said, is a way of regulating human conduct. It is a legal order the norms of which bind the behavior of men in one way, rather than other. Its action is ultimately imperative action which none of its citizens is legally entitled to escape. Why does it possess this power? It is difficult to see an explanation in other than functional terms. The power of the state can be justified only in terms of what it seeks to do. Its law must be capable of justification in terms of the demands it seeks to satisfy. The state presides over a vast welter of interests, personal and corporate, competing and cooperating. Its claim to allegiance must obviously be built upon its power to make the response to social demand maximal in character. It must strike such a balance of interests that what emerges as satisfied is greater than can be secured on any alternative programme. How exactly the balance is to be struck we cannot say on any permanent principle, simply because each age will value things differently, and an absolute formula of intrinsic worth will be obsolete as soon as it is made. We can only argue that legal imperatives may be imposed if, in their operation, we satisfy at the least sacrifice as much as we can of human want. We have then to shape the institutions through which the state operates in order that it may best attain this end.

29

*The State as an Association**

ROBERT M. MACIVER

In recent years the traditional and legalistic studies of the state have given way to new interpretations. Attention is now focused on the functioning of this aspect of man's culture and its relationship to other phases of society. As a political scientist and sociologist, Robert M. MacIver, professor emeritus at Columbia University, has been a leader in this kind of analysis.

It may seem curious that so great and obvious a fact as the state should be the object of quite conflicting definitions, yet such is certainly the case. Some writers define the state as essentially a class-structure, "an organization of one class dominating over the other classes;" others regard it as the one organization that transcends class and stands for the whole community. Some interpret it as a power-system, others as a welfare-system, this being the line of cleavage between the two great series of political thinkers who in the modern world trace their descent back respectively to Machiavelli and to Grotius or Althusius. Some view it entirely as a legal construction, either in the old Austinian sense which made it a relationship of governors and governed, or, in the language of modern jurisprudence, as a community "organized for action under legal rules." Some identify it with the nations, others regard nationality as incidental or unnecessary or even as a falsifying element which perverts the nature and function of the state. Some regard it as no more than a mutual insurance society, others as the very texture of all our life. To some it is a necessary evil, and to a very few an evil that is or will some day be unnecessary, while to others it is "the world the spirit has made for itself." Some class the state as one in the order of "corporations," and others think of it as indistinguishable from society itself. . . .

In the first place we must distinguish the state from society. To identify the social with the political is to be guilty of the grossest of all confusions, which completely bars any understanding of either society or the state. It is perfectly obvious, if only we look at the facts of the case, that there are social forms, like the family or the church or the club, which owe neither their origin nor their inspiration to the state; and social forces, like custom or competition, which the state may protect or modify, but certainly does not create; and social motives like friendship or jealousy, which establish relationships too intimate and personal to be controlled by the great engine of the state. The state exists within society, but it is not even the *form* of society. We see it best in what it does. Its achievement is a system of order and control. The state in a word regulates the outstanding external relationships of men in society. It supports or exploits, curbs or liberates, fulfils or even

* Reprinted from Robert M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London: Oxford University Press, 1926) by permission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford.

destroys, the social life over which it is invested with control—but the instrument is not the life. In the earliest phases, among hunters, fishers, root-diggers, and fruit-gatherers there have been social groups which knew nothing or almost nothing of the state. Today there remain simple peoples, such as certain groups of Eskimos, which have no recognizable political organization. And at the other extreme, in the highest civilizations which have been attained, the long struggle against the insatiate claims of power has revealed the great intrinsic aspects of individual and social life, the things that are not Caesar's, and withdrawn them wholly, or in great part, from the competence of the state.

This distinction once established, it remains that the state must either be an institutional system or an association. There is no third alternative. All social forms may be classed as areas of society (as we shall call them, communities); organizations established within society for the achievement of conscious and therefore limited purposes (as we shall call them, associations); and institutions, the recognized modes in accordance with which communities and associations regulate their activities. It must suffice to explain that an association denotes a group of persons or members who are associated and organized into a unity of will for a common end, whereas the term institution does not refer directly to persons at all but to the form of order along which their activities are related and directed. It is the obvious distinction between, say, the family and marriage, the church and communion, the professional association and the code. Institutions may, however, be established by the community as well as by associations, and we may include customs in the former class. There is sometimes an ambiguity because the same term may apply either to the form or the group, the institution or the association. We speak of the party, the family, the church, the department, the hospital and so forth, meaning the system of organization rather than the organized membership. And we often use the term "institution" loosely, in the sense which properly belongs to "association." But the distinction is a clear and necessary one. It is brought out in the following simple conspectus of social forms.

SOCIAL FORMS

Integral unities	COMMUNITIES: Exx. country, city, village, nation, tribe.
Partial unities	ASSOCIATIONS: Exx. family, church, party, class, business firm.
Modes or means	INSTITUTIONS: Exx. inheritance, baptism, the party "machine," class distinctions, the market.

Only a part of one's life is lived within or as a member of an association, but there is a sense in which the whole of one's life falls within a circle, greater or smaller, of community. There was a time when the family seemed to comprehend the whole life, but if so, it was not the family as we know it, but rather a family community which on the ostensible basis of kinship included a whole group of social interests. There were likewise times when the state *claimed* control over every sphere of life, but such claims have never been realized, for under the most absolute state, use and wont, custom and tradition, social authority underived from the state but instead the very ground of political power, were far more effective forces in the organiza-

tion of communal life. Not only must we deny that the state is a community or a form of community, we must definitely declare it to be an association belonging to the same category as the family or the church. Like these it consists essentially of a group of members organized in a definite way and *therefore* for limited ends. The organization of the state is not all social organization; the ends for which the state stands are not all the ends which humanity seeks; and quite obviously, the ways in which the state pursues its objects are only some of the ways in which within society men strive for the objects of their desire.

The state is distinguished from other associations by certain peculiar characteristics of its own—but a like statement is true of the family or the church. One historical peculiarity must here be mentioned, because it helps to explain why the true associational character of the state has even yet scarcely been realized in our political thinking. By its very nature the state must include under its control all persons who live within its territorial bounds, whether they are properly members of the state or not. It seems accordingly, to the superficial glance, not to depend on membership, not on an organization deliberately established or maintained by the common will of men. In respect of origins we might even say that there were state-institutions before there was a state at all. As the state emerged the logic of power extended the institution beyond the association. So we may say that in the extreme case of a country subjected to foreign conquest there are state-institutions but no state. In the modern world the range of state-institutions has grown more nearly coincident with that of the state-association. To complete that transformation is the ideal of democracy, which would thus abolish the distinction between the dominant will that imposes institutions and the common will that creates them.

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*The Impulse to Power**

BERTRAND RUSSELL

The nature of power and its relationship to the state has commanded the increasing attention of recent political scientists. Bertrand Russell, a leading philosopher, mathematician and social analyst, suggests, in his usually provocative manner, the pervasiveness of power in society.

Of the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires for power and glory. These are not identical, though closely allied: the Prime Minister has more power than glory, the King has more glory than power. As a rule, however, the easiest way to obtain glory is to obtain power; this is especially the case as regards the men who are active in relation to public events. The

* Reprinted from Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1938). Used by permission of the publishers.

desire for glory, therefore, prompts, in the main, the same actions as are prompted by the desire for power, and the two motives may, for most practical purposes, be regarded as one.

The orthodox economists, as well as Marx, who in this respect agreed with them, were mistaken in supposing that economic self-interest could be taken as the fundamental motive in the social sciences. The desire for commodities, when separated from power and glory, is finite, and can be fully satisfied by a moderate competence. The really expensive desires are not dictated by a love of material comfort. Such commodities as a legislature rendered subservient by corruption, or a private picture gallery of Old Masters selected by experts, are sought for the sake of power or glory, not as affording comfortable places in which to sit. When a moderate degree of comfort is assured, both individuals and communities will pursue power rather than wealth: they may seek wealth as a means to power, or they may forgo an increase of wealth in order to secure an increase of power, but in the former case as in the latter their fundamental motive is not economic.

This error in orthodox and Marxist economics is not merely theoretical, but is of the greatest practical importance, and has caused some of the principal events of recent times to be misunderstood. It is only by realizing that love of power is the cause of the activities that are important in social affairs that history, whether ancient or modern, can be rightly interpreted. . . .

Like energy, power has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion. No one of these can be regarded as subordinate to any other, and there is no one form from which the others are derivative. The attempt to treat one form of power, say wealth, in isolation, can only be partially successful, just as the study of one form of energy will be defective at certain points, unless other forms are taken into account. Wealth may result from military power or from influence over opinion, just as either of these may result from wealth. The laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power, not in terms of this or that form of power. In former times, military power was isolated, with the consequence that victory or defeat appeared to depend upon the accidental qualities of commanders. In our day, it is common to treat economic power as the source from which all other kinds are derived; this, I shall contend, is just as great an error as that of the purely military historians whom it has caused to seem out of date. Again, there are those who regard propaganda as the fundamental form of power. This is by no means a new opinion; it is embodied in such traditional sayings as "magna est veritas et prevalebit" and "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church." It has about the same measure of truth and falsehood as the military view or the economic view. Propaganda, if it can create an almost unanimous opinion, can generate an irresistible power; but those who have military or economic control can, if they choose, use it for the purpose of propaganda. To revert to the analogy of physics: power, like energy, must be regarded as continually passing from any one of its forms into any other, and it should be the business of social science to seek the laws of such transformations. The attempt to isolate any one form of power, more especially, in our day, the economic form, has been, and still is, a source of errors of great practical importance.

There are many ways in which differ-

ent societies differ in relation to power. They differ, to begin with, in the degree of power possessed by individuals or organizations; it is obvious, for example, that, owing to increase of organization, the State has more power now than in former times. They differ, again, as regards the kind of organization that is most influential: a military despotism, a theocracy, a plutocracy, are very dissimilar types. They differ, thirdly, through diversity in the ways of acquiring power: hereditary kingship produces one kind of eminent man, the qualities required of a great ecclesiastic produce another kind, democracy produces a third kind, and war a fourth.

Where no social institution, such as aristocracy or hereditary monarchy, exists to limit the number of men to whom power is possible, those who most desire power are, broadly speaking, those most likely to acquire it. It follows that, in a social system in which power is open to all, the posts which confer power will, as a rule, be occupied by men who differ from the average in being exceptionally power-loving. Love of power, though one of the strongest of human motives, is very unevenly distributed, and is limited by various other motives, such as love of ease, love of pleasure, and sometimes love of approval. It is disguised, among the more timid, as an impulse of submission to leadership, which increases the scope of the power-impulses of bold men. Those whose love of power is not strong are unlikely to have much influence on the course of events. The men who cause social changes are, as a rule, men who strongly desire to do so. Love of power, therefore, is a characteristic of the men who are causally important. We should, of course, be mistaken if we regarded it as the sole human motive, but this mistake would not lead us so much astray as might be expected in the search for causal laws in social science, since love of power is the chief motive producing the changes which social science has to study.

C. Representative Institutions

The power impulse has two forms: explicit, in leaders; implicit, in their followers. When men willingly follow a leader, they do so with a view to the acquisition of power by the group which he commands, and they feel that his triumphs are theirs. Most men do not feel in themselves the competence required for leading their group to victory, and therefore seek out a captain who appears to possess the courage and sagacity necessary for the achievement of supremacy. Even in religion this impulse appears. Nietzsche accused Christianity of inculcating a slave-morality, but ultimate triumph was always the goal. "Blessed are the meek, *for they shall inherit the earth.*" . . .

If this is a slave-morality, then every soldier of fortune who endures the rigors of a campaign, and every rank-and-file politician who works hard at electioneering, is to be accounted a slave. But in fact, in every genuinely cooperative enterprise, the follower is psychologically no more a slave than the leader.

It is this that makes endurable the inequalities of power which organization makes inevitable, and which tend to increase rather than diminish as society grows more organic.

Inequality in the distribution of power has always existed in human communities, as far back as our knowledge extends. This is due partly to external necessity, partly to causes which are to be found in human nature. Most collective enterprises are only possible if they are directed by some governing body. If a house is to be built, some one must decide on the plans; if trains are to run on a railway, the timetable cannot be left to the caprices of engine-drivers; if a new road is to be constructed, some one must decide where it is to go. Even a democratically elected government is still a government, and therefore, on grounds that have nothing to do with psychology, there must, if collective enterprises are to succeed, be some men who give orders and others who obey them.

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*Representative Government**

JOHN STUART MILL

An eminent nineteenth-century Englishman (1806–73), John Stuart Mill has had a profound influence in economics, politics, and philosophy. He is the author of such famous works as *On Liberty* (1859) and *Utilitarianism* (1863). In his *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), Mill elaborates on why he believes "That the Ideally Best Form of Government is Representative Government."

It has long (perhaps throughout the entire duration of British freedom) been a common form of speech, that if a good despot could be insured, despotic monarchy would be the best form of government. I look upon this as a radical and most pernicious misconception of what good government is, which, until it can be got rid of, will fatally vitiate all our speculations on government.

The supposition is, that absolute power, in the hands of an eminent individual, would insure a virtuous and intelligent performance of all the duties of government. . . . What should we then have? One man of superhuman mental activity managing the entire affairs of a mentally passive people. Their passivity is implied in the very idea of absolute power. The nation as a whole, and every individual composing it, are without any potential voice in their own destiny. They exercise no will in respect to their collective interests. All is decided for them by a will not their own, which it is legally a crime for them to disobey. What sort of human beings can be formed under such a regimen? What development can either their thinking or their active faculties attain under it? On matters of pure theory they might perhaps be allowed to speculate, so long as their speculations either did not approach politics, or had not the remotest connection with its practice. On practical affairs they could at most be only suffered to suggest; and even under the most moderate of despots, none but persons of already admitted or reputed superiority could

* John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, taken from Chapter III.

hope that their suggestions would be known to, much less regarded by, those who had the management of affairs. A person must have a very unusual taste for intellectual exercise in and for itself who will put himself to the trouble of thought when it is to have no outward effect, or qualify himself for functions which he has no chance of being allowed to exercise. The only sufficient incitement to mental exertion, in any but a few minds in a generation, is the prospect of some practical use to be made of its results. It does not follow that the nation will be wholly destitute of intellectual power. The common business of life, which must necessarily be performed by each individual or family for themselves, will call forth some amount of intelligence and practical ability within a certain narrow range of ideas. There may be a select class of *savants* who cultivate science with a view to its physical uses or for the pleasure of the pursuit. There will be a bureaucracy, and persons in training for the bureaucracy, who will be taught at least some empirical maxims of government and public administration. There may be, and often has been, a systematic organization of the best mental power in the country in some special direction (commonly military) to promote the grandeur of the despot. But the public at large remain without information and without interest on all the greater matters of practice; or, if they have any knowledge of them, it is but a *dilettante* knowledge, like that which people have of the mechanical arts who have never handled a tool. Nor is it only in their intelligence that they suffer. Their moral capacities are equally stunted. Wherever the sphere of action of human beings is artificially circumscribed, their sentiments are narrowed and dwarfed in the same proportion. The food of feeling is action; even domestic affection lives upon voluntary good offices. Let a person have nothing to do for his country, and he will not care for it. It has been said of old that in a despotism there is at most but one patriot, the despot himself; and the saying rests on a just appreciation of the effects of absolute subjection even to a good and wise master. Religion remains; and here, at least, it may be thought, is an agency that may be relied on for lifting men's eyes and minds above the dust at their feet. But religion, even supposing it to escape perversion for the purposes of despotism, ceases in these circumstances to be a social concern, and narrows into a personal affair between an individual and his Maker, in which the issue at stake is but his private salvation. Religion in this shape is quite consistent with the most selfish and contracted egoism, and identifies the votary as little in feeling with the rest of his kind as sensuality itself.

A good despotism means a government in which, so far as depends on the despot, there is no positive oppression by officers of state, but in which all the collective interests of the people are managed for them, all the thinking that has relation to collective interests done for them, and in which their minds are formed by, and consenting to, this abdication of their own energies. Leaving things to the government, like leaving them to Providence, is synonymous with caring nothing about them, and accepting their results, when disagreeable, as visitations of Nature. With the exception, therefore, of a few studious men who take an intellectual interest in speculation for its own sake, the intelligence and sentiments of the whole people are given up to the material interests, and when these are provided for, to the amusement and ornamentation of private life. But to say this is to say, if the whole testimony of history is worth any thing, that the era of national

decline has arrived; that is, if the nation had ever attained any thing to decline from.

It is not much to be wondered at if impatient or disappointed reformers, groaning under the impediments opposed to the most salutary public improvements by the ignorance, the indifference, the untractableness, the perverse obstinacy of a people, and the corrupt combinations of selfish private interests, armed with the powerful weapons afforded by free institutions, should at times sigh for a strong hand to bear down all these obstacles, and compel a recalcitrant people to be better governed. But (setting aside the facts that for one despot who now and then reforms an abuse, there are ninety-nine who do nothing but create them) those who look in any such direction for the realization of their hopes leave out of the idea of good government its principal element, the improvement of the people themselves. One of the benefits of freedom is that under it the ruler can not pass by the people's minds, and amend their affairs for them without amending *them*. If it were possible for a people to be well governed in spite of themselves, their good government would last no longer than the freedom of a people usually lasts who have been liberated by foreign arms without their own cooperation. It is true, a despot may educate the people, and to do so really would be the best apology for his despotism. But any education which aims at making human beings other than machines, in the long run makes them claim to have the control of their own actions. . . . Whatever invigorates the faculties, in however small a measure, creates an increased desire for their more unimpeded exercise; and a popular education is a failure if it educates the people for any state but that which it will certainly induce them to desire, and most probably to demand.

I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship. Free nations have, in times of old, conferred such power by their own choice, as a necessary medicine for diseases of the body politic which could not be got rid of by less violent means. But its acceptance, even for a time strictly limited, can only be excused, if, like Solon or Pittacus, the dictator employs the whole power he assumes in removing the obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom. A good despotism is an altogether false ideal, which practically (except as a means to some temporary purpose) becomes the most senseless and dangerous of chimeras. Evil for evil, a good despotism, in a country at all advanced in civilization, is more noxious than a bad one, for it is far more relaxing and enervating to the thoughts, feelings, and energies of the people. The despotism of Augustus prepared the Romans for Tiberius. If the whole tone of their character had not first been prostrated by nearly two generations of that mild slavery, they would probably have had spirit enough left to rebel against the more odious one.

There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general.

To test this proposition, it has to be examined in reference to the two branches into which . . . the inquiry into the goodness of a government conveniently divides itself, namely, how far it promotes the good

management of the affairs of society by means of the existing faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of its various members, and what is its effect in improving or deteriorating those faculties.

The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization, but the one which, in the circumstances in which it is practicable and eligible, is attended with the greatest amount of beneficial consequences, immediate and prospective. A completely popular government is the only polity which can make out any claim to this character. It is pre-eminent in both the departments between which the excellence of a political Constitution is divided. It is both more favorable to present good government, and promotes a better and higher form of national character than any other polity whatsoever.

Its superiority in reference to present well-being rests upon two principles, of as universal truth and applicability as any general propositions which can be laid down respecting human affairs. The first is, that the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed to stand up for them. The second is, that the general prosperity attains a greater height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in promoting it.

Putting these two propositions into a shape more special to their present application—human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of others in proportion as they have the power of being, and are self-*protecting;* and they only achieve a high degree of success in their struggle with Nature in proportion as they are self-*dependent,* relying on what they themselves can do, either separately or in concert, rather than on what others do for them.

The former proposition—that each is the only safe guardian of his own rights and interests—is one of those elementary maxims of prudence which every person capable of conducting his own affairs implicitly acts upon wherever he himself is interested. Many, indeed, have a great dislike to it as a political doctrine, and are fond of holding it up to obloquy as a doctrine of universal selfishness. . . . We need not suppose that when power resides in an exclusive class, that class will knowingly and deliberately sacrifice the other classes to themselves: it suffices that, in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it directly concerns. In this country, for example, what are called the working-classes may be considered as excluded from all direct participation in the government. I do not believe that the classes who do participate in it have in general any intention of sacrificing the working-classes to themselves. They once had that intention; witness the persevering attempts so long made to keep down wages by law. But in the present day, their ordinary disposition is the very opposite: they willingly make considerable sacrifices, especially of their pecuniary interest, for the benefit of the working-classes, and err rather by too lavish and indiscriminating beneficence; nor do I believe that any rulers in history have been actuated by a more sincere desire to do their duty toward the poorer portion of their countrymen. Yet does Parliament, or almost any of the members composing it, ever for an instant look at any question with the eyes of a working man? When a subject arises in which the laborers as such have an interest, is it re-

garded from any point of view but that of the employers of labor? I do not say that the working men's view of these questions is in general nearer to truth than the other, but it is sometimes quite as near; and in any case it ought to be respectfully listened to, instead of being, as it is, not merely turned away from, but ignored.

It is an inherent condition of human affairs that no intention, however sincere, of protecting the interests of others can make it safe or salutary to tie up their own hands. Still more obviously true is it that by their own hands only can any positive and durable improvement of their circumstances in life be worked out. Through the joint influence of these two principles, all free communities have both been more exempt from social injustice and crime, and have attained more brilliant prosperity than any others, or than they themselves after they lost their freedom. Contrast the free states of the world, while their freedom lasted, with the contemporary subjects of monarchical or oligarchical despotism: the Greek cities with the Persian satrapies; the Italian republics, and the free towns of Flanders and Germany, with the feudal monarchies of Europe; Switzerland, Holland, and England with Austria or ante-revolutionary France. Their superior prosperity was too obvious ever to have been gainsayed; while their superiority in good government and social relations is proved by the prosperity, and is manifest besides in every page of history. If we compare, not one age with another, but the different governments which coexisted in the same age, no amount of disorder which exaggeration itself can pretend to have existed amid the publicity of the free states can be compared for a moment with the contemptuous trampling upon the mass of the people which pervaded the whole life of the monarchical countries, or the disgusting individual tyranny which was of more than daily occurrence under the systems of plunder which they called fiscal arrangements, and in the secrecy of their frightful courts of justice.

It must be acknowledged that the benefits of freedom so far as they have hitherto been enjoyed, were obtained by the extension of its privileges to a part only of the community, and that a government in which they are extended impartially to all is a desideratum still unrealized. But, though every approach to this has an independent value, and in many cases more than an approach could not, in the existing state of general improvement, be made, the participation of all in these benefits is the ideally perfect conception of free government. In proportion as any, no matter who, are excluded from it, the interests of the excluded are left without the guaranty accorded to the rest, and they themselves have less scope and encouragement than they might otherwise have to that exertion of their energies for the good of themselves and of the community to which the general prosperity is always proportioned.

Thus stands the case as regards present well-being—the good management of the affairs of the existing generation. If we now pass to the influence of the form of government upon character, we shall find the superiority of popular government over every other to be, if possible, still more decided and indisputable.

This question really depends upon a still more fundamental one, viz., which of two common types of character, for the general good of humanity, it is most desirable should predominate—the active or the passive type; that which struggles against evils, or that which endures them; that which bends to circumstances, or that which endeavors to bend circumstances to itself.

The commonplaces of moralists and the

general sympathies of mankind are in favor of the passive type. Energetic characters may be admired, but the acquiescent and submissive are those which most men personally prefer. The passiveness of our neighbors increases our own sense of security, and plays into the hands of our willfulness. Passive characters, if we do not happen to need their activity, seem an obstruction the less in our own path. A contented character is not a dangerous rival. Yet nothing is more certain than that improvement in human affairs is wholly the work of the uncontented characters; and, moreover, that it is much easier for an active mind to acquire the virtues of patience, than for a passive one to assume those of energy.

From these accumulated considerations, it is evident that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should every where be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of all to share in the sovereign power of the state. But since all can not, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of perfect government must be representative.

D. Democracy

32

*The Democratic Idea in America**

IRWIN EDMAN

The growth of the democratic idea was a gradual process and its realization in the United States, as elsewhere, was the culmination of a long train of events involving the resolution of conflicting political, economic, and social interests. Irwin Edman, with the collaboration of Herbert W. Schneider, traces some of these conflicts and movements contributing to the triumph of American democracy. Dr. Schneider is professor of philosophy at Columbia University and both he and the late Professor Edman are the authors of many excellent volumes.

Americans have many plausible reasons for believing that the democratic idea originated on this continent, though the reading of the preceding pages and a perusal of the extracts contained in this volume should make quite clear how the idea of democracy, even though it has a history in America, bound up with the conditions of life on a new continent and under unprecedented conditions, has a much longer history that has its sources much further

* Irwin Edman, *Fountainheads of Freedom* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941). Used by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

back than the commonwealths founded in America. The very idea of commonwealth has a classical sound, and indeed does, as we have seen, go back to Cicero, to Aristotle, and to Plato. Even those phases of the American democratic idea that seem peculiarly American in character borrowed both their temper and their technique from the ideas of the Revolutionists in England, and from the precursors of the French Revolution. The conception of natural rights, the idea of the inherent dignity of the individual, the vision of a society modeled after the eternal moral pattern of reason and justice, the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, owe much to Locke, to Voltaire, to Rousseau, and to Montesquieu. So do the ideas of the consent of the governed, the sovereignty of the people, the rule of the majority, and the substitution of the voice of the people for the voice of God. None of these things was an American invention. Some of them were brought here by the early Puritan colonists and the Quakers who sought a freer soil for both more freedom and more opportunity and, however intolerant they might become, more toleration. Some of the ideals of American democracy were imported by the classically trained, literate, and rationalistic minds ranging from Paine to Jefferson, who might be living in a country physically primitive and socially new, but whose minds inhabited ancient countries of the mind. The idea of law and the idea of social contract as justifying government were invoked as a rationale for the right of revolution against a government whose tyranny violated its contractual obligation of security to the governed. The restless colonials were bringing to bear against the British government, by the seventeen sixties, ideas familiar enough to Englishmen who had a century earlier insisted on the rights and sovereignty of their delegated representatives in Parliament.

Yet it is not accurate or illuminating simply to point out that ancient, already traditional liberties and ideals were invoked by the early American settlers who brought forth on this continent a new nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. It is not enough to point out that liberty and equality were themes as old as the Greeks, and in their peculiarly constitutional form as old at least as John Locke. America was a new continent, and like other ideas and institutions that had a European heritage, the ideas of liberty and equality had a career in America that was necessarily different from what it would have been in Europe. Circumstances alter not only cases but principles also. Because it was a new world, free or relatively free from many of the established encrustations of the old, the democratic idea in America was to take its own form—and in almost a chemical sense, a purer form. De Tocqueville could study America in the first half of the nineteenth century as the characteristic instance of democracy in the history of the world. Even those defects he saw in the idea and in the practice seemed to him most characteristic in the American example. And, however sentimental and utopian a symbol it has sometimes become for distant foreigners, the Statue of Liberty has signified to the whole world a continent where an unprecedented experiment in a free life is being conducted.

What gave the history of the democratic idea in America its special accent and special direction was at once the presence of a vast unexploited continent and the relative absence of established castes, economic and ecclesiastical. These latter were in the East, in all conscience, in all Puritan conscience, to develop fast enough. But else-

where on the continent, Americans could start fresh. The West remained for a long time a new land in which the individual was not merely a theoretically separate entity in the mind of a philosopher. Citizens were living in a flexible society—especially if they moved to the constantly receding frontier—where individual initiative made a practical difference, and the individual counted and had to count for more than his context in a caste or his fixed niche in a tradition, because here castes were nonexistent, the traditions rudimentary, and the individual all. . . .

There are several familiar explanations offered of the novelties in the American democratic theme. Individualism is, of course, not new, and the romantic cult of it was not current in America alone in the early nineteenth century. But there is all the difference in the world, all the difference between two worlds, in the poetic exaltation of the lyric self and its triumph over the not-self, between the Kantian self and its sense of duty, and the version this essentially identical temper took in the American nation carving out its own life and its own bare living on a continental wilderness. Individualism was not a theory but a practice born out of pioneer circumstances in America. On the frontier and on lonely farms, in remote hamlets, in isolated villages, the individual did count. Faith in individualism was a condition of life; faith in one's self a condition not only of success but of survival. Individualism emerged not as a set of concepts nor, once the Revolution was over, as a set of protests. It was a faith implicit in the cardinal conditions of American action. To believe in one's self was to believe in all men, to believe in the common man where there were no inherited grades, to believe in the future where there was nothing much to speak of in the way of an inherited past. Individualism was a belief in the humanity of each man and in the future of all mankind. The conditions of liberty in America, moreover, seemed to indicate what all mankind, given similar conditions of liberty, might become. . . .

In economic and political terms, of course, individualism meant, as it did in early nineteenth-century England, *laissez faire,* a minimum of government interference. Politically it was to become, as in the idea of Jacksonian democracy, the ideal of the common man and of leaders who were men of the people. It meant at once economic freedom for the entrepreneur and social equality for all. Dickens in his "American Notes" satirizes the rough crass equality of manners, and in "Martin Chuzzlewit" the tendency of Americans to believe that every other man one has met is the greatest man in the country. De Tocqueville, impressed, almost despite himself, by the great experiment, felt that equality might be a dead level of mediocrity, and that a society without a past, that is, without molding traditions and inherited standards of excellence, had nothing but a nondescript future. But to Americans themselves, from 1800 on, democracy meant a faith in one's self, in all men, in the future, and in the free growth of all mankind that the success of the American experiment in liberty might indicate to the whole world. . . .

The peculiar quality that, for better or worse, came in the nineteenth century to seem the distinctive characteristic of American democracy was equality, and equalitarianism began not with the framers of the Constitution, but in the ideas of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy. Thomas Jefferson, a landowning aristocrat in the agrarian South, was the first great spokesman of American equality. He took de-

mocracy literally and seriously. He expressed, better perhaps than it has been expressed since, the essential temper of the American democratic tradition. Andrew Jackson, hardly less an aristocrat, became a legend of the people incarnate, and brought into the conception of democracy the dynamic freedom of the new West. The faith in the equality of all men came from an educated gentleman on a Virginia plantation; the faith in the people came from an aristocrat who became the voice of the classless frontier.

The Constitution had served the interests of the commercial classes. The government had been organized by conservative bankers, merchants, and speculators. The agrarian groups had from the beginning fought the proposed Constitution and kept on fighting the commercial autocracy of the Hamiltonian regime. The idea of democratic equality began as a protest of agrarian against commercial interests. Not the smallest irony of American history is the fact that the conception of democracy in the strict sense began among the plantation owners in the South under the leadership, ultimately, of Thomas Jefferson.

The revolt against Hamiltonian Federalism was largely the protest of a semi-frontier agrarian class against a government designed to further the interests of businessmen in the cities of the North. But the Jeffersonian democratic ideal had another source: the ideas of the French Revolution. Americans who had just recently lived through their own Revolution recognized in the French Revolution a protest against tyranny as their own had been a protest against Britain. The rights of man which became slogans in the French Revolutions were, it appeared, the same rights which the American colonists had been appealing to before the Revolution, and which became embodied in the amendments to the Constitution.

Jefferson—bred, too, on earlier French thought—regarded the farmer as the ideal citizen, the country as the ideal (and only) sound scene for a commonwealth. . . .

Jefferson thought of democracy as a majority rule in societies like that plantation society he knew, where all men were equal. He admired the New England town. Government was local and inconspicuous. Jefferson believed in majority rule, but he believed in it because he believed in natural justice, and in men who were presumably all equal in public virtue. Jefferson, unlike the Hamiltonians, trusted the people, the governed, not the governors. Because the voice of the majority is the indispensable condition of sound government, it is important that public opinion be sound. Jefferson's great concern with freedom of the press on the negative side, and public education on the positive side, both flow from this. Sound government depends on the people, but the people's intelligence must be kept flourishing and healthy. Their opinion can be wholesome and effective only if they are free to be enlightened on public affairs and have the competence to understand them. The great American faith in public education, the great American insistence on a free press, had in Jefferson both one of their most ardent and one of their most philosophical champions. An informed and unfettered public is the only possible ground for a genuinely democratic society. That is why Jefferson could spend his time, as part of his political interest, in framing a system of education for the state of Virginia from the school through to a state university.

Jefferson was thus a democrat in the more conventional sense, for he believed in majority rule, and the constant possibility of revising the fundamental structure

of law when majority opinion changed, and he did not believe that the Constitution was eternal. But Jefferson also had, it must be emphasized, what one may call a face-to-face and homespun picture of democracy. Jefferson, for all his own cultivation and for all his own settled status as a property holder, had the conception of democracy of semifrontiersmen living independent local lives in agrarian communities that had no need for, and indeed mistrusted, vast centralizations and distant authorities. The best government, Jefferson thought, was that which governed least: "a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, and which shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned." (*Jefferson's First Inaugural Address.*)

Jefferson took the small farmer or plantation owner and the small farm or plantation life on almost frontier conditions as the type of American society. Within the limits of that picture he imagined a relatively classless society, but that classless society consisted of a definite social class, Virginia farmers and handicraftsmen. The American Revolution had been a bourgeois revolt against the British; but the bourgeoisie became, from the Jeffersonian point of view, aristocrats. The Revolution had been a revolt against the tradition of feudalism, monarchism, and ecclesiasticism of Europe; but there had come, said John Taylor, the most systematic exponent of the Jeffersonian point of view, "the gradual introduction of the aristocracy of the third age," the bankers and the merchants of the North. The Jeffersonian democrats reacted against the financial and commercial powers in the cities and in the North. It was this agrarian protest, so recurrent in American history, that helps explain Jefferson's faith in the common man, enlightened and free, his insistence on essentially local government, his distrust of the federal government that could not help the Southern farmer, but could, at the behest of finance and privilege, interfere with his independence and his self-sufficiency. The frontier, the farmer, and the French Revolution (with its doctrine of liberty, equality, and fraternity) enter as ingredients into the Jeffersonian ideal. Something remains in it, too, of the vision of the small commonwealth, something at once of the Greek city-state and the Ciceronian ideal of a republic.

Jeffersonian democracy stemmed from a frontier agrarianism, but a relatively static one. Jacksonian democracy came out of the West, from a bustling and developing and geographically expanding society. In the new West classless society really was a fact, in a way unprecedented in the modern world. Background, tradition, caste did not count as much as individual endurance, inventiveness, shrewdness, and courage. This equalitarianism of the West stirred up new democratic forces in the East, too. The rising restlessness of wage laborers and of a new kind of pioneer was upsetting the relatively fixed class lines of the East. Immigration, which was to break up the settled tone of sections of American life again and again, by the eighteen thirties was beginning on a large scale.

The framers of the Constitution had had suspicions of the People. Andrew Jackson came to regard himself and came to be regarded as *their* executive. Jackson in 1829 advocated popular election of the president. In the newer states of the West began the movement toward universal suffrage. The framers of the Constitution had tried to circumvent the release of too much power to the miscellaneous many. The president

was elected by the Electoral College which was not, of course, simply a formal and nominal thing as now. When in the Jacksonian period the party conventions began to be genuinely popular expressions, the president was really to be "the People's choice."

The introduction of the People as a political idea in American democratic thought began, like nearly every other political idea in this, or possibly in any country, as a protest. Jackson was an early example of a political leader claiming to represent the People against special interests—the whole People, presumably a classless People, against the interest of a small financial clique, an oligarchy of wealth, a privileged caste of power. All men were to be equal, and all were to have equal economic opportunity, as they did in the frontier community. Even the famous spoils system and rotation in office introduced by Jackson, for all the corruption and scandals to which it led, had a democratic idea behind it. Where the People rule, *all* should have a chance at office. There should be no limitation in the way of wealth or property, no barriers of education or special training. There should be no entrenched bureaucracy. The People's rule meant rule in turn by everyone, for everyone was equal in privilege and competence. The idea of the People has often been a piece of demagoguery. The idea of the executive as the People's leader, and their bulwark and agent against privilege, has often been used by rascals and self-seekers. But Jacksonian democracy did have the merit of introducing into the American political idiom the notion of a People, having a common interest, and not being merely an aggregate of individuals each with his own property and privilege. John Adams could regard the populace as a mob; in Jacksonian democracy the population became the People —and the People came, as it were, out of the West. By the time of Lincoln and in his words and thought, the People acquired a grand and mystical connotation. The People meant a unified nation, the People constituted a Union, one and indivisible, as well as a nation of citizen-equals. But it was Jacksonian democracy that introduced the notion of the People's interest and solidarity for the first time definitely into the American democratic conception. The Revolution had brought liberty; Jeffersonianism aimed to bring civil equality; Jacksonianism, the will of the People. . . .

The democratic hope had, through the stages of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy and through Jefferson and Whitman, taken a certain form and direction by the time of the Civil War. Meanwhile sectional feeling and economic interests began to cut across, to cut into that idea. But whatever form the idea took, whatever sectional or class feeling grew, by the time of the Civil War and certainly at its close, it was settled that the problems of democracy were to be national problems. The abolition of slavery, it was soon found, did not make the Negroes economically independent, or politically or socially free. Nor did the political forms of freedom nor the slogans of liberty, equality, and fraternity insure that even white men would be free from want or insecurity, or from the tyranny of anarchically unregulated industrial power. After the Civil War, it is true, there was still an economy dominated by the fact of a still remaining frontier and the fact of economic opportunity in an expanding market with the possibility of a reckless exploitation of national resources or of the labor of workers. Unregulated industry and commerce were both expanding and exploiting, not only resources but men also. Concentration of wealth and concentration of industrial power were beginning by

the eighteen seventies to loom large, and poverty, no longer so easily escapable by geographical flight, was growing; labor was emerging as an organized group demanding its democratic rights.

The problems of democracy had, therefore, to take a new turn, and the idea, for all its essentially identical moral character, a new form or accent. How was industry, which, unregulated, seemed to be becoming a monster of irresistible privilege, to be made the instrument of economic equality: How was freedom to be maintained, and liberty of enterprise, while at the same time ordered security was to be instituted for all? As in Europe from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the democratic idea began after the Civil War to imply the vocabulary and the techniques of politico-economics. How was the government of the people to control the industry which was beginning to control the government? How were liberty and equality to be reconciled? How security and freedom? How was the Whitmanesque ideal of fraternity or the less rhetorical cooperation of equals on the frontier to live in a society where government seemed to be on the side of the industrially entrenched few, and where the lines of conflicting class interests were cutting into the dream of brotherhood on a new continent? How was the American ideal of the independent individual to be maintained while regulation was instituted to insure an ordered security for all? America, involved increasingly in a world-wide commerce and affected by the winds of social and economic doctrine that flowed westward across the Atlantic, was to have to resolve this issue along with the rest of the world, and in terms not altogether dissimilar.

Men could not be politically free when they were economically constrained. But economic emancipation could only come when liberty was qualified; equality and liberty came into head-on collision. Both those who wished to keep industry and commerce free for privilege and those who cherished the ancient integrities of the individual began to be exercised by this problem—and have been so ever since. The Declaration of Independence had said that men were entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But minimal conditions of happiness for the masses of citizens depended now on large-scale private ownership of the means of production and hence on the regulation of these. It demanded also, in a democracy no longer a village caucus or a face-to-face town meeting, party machinery and popular education on a large scale. The new conditions of concentrated industry and the vanishing frontier made it less feasible than ever for men to be free in an absolute sense. Not everyone could escape to Walden Pond. The "divinely human individual" was, in an unregulated industrial society, at the beck and call of forces not within his own ego. The city, moreover, was succeeding the country as a dominant type of life; sections were becoming involved with each other by rapid transportation and communication.

The moral ideal of liberty remained, but the Jeffersonian farmer, independent on his plantation, was disappearing. The moral ideal of equity remained, but Americans were being divided—as men everywhere had been acutely divided since the Industrial Revolution—by economic ownership and economic dependence. Specific class interests of laborer and entrepreneur had been rendered acutely inharmonious by the rapid march of the Industrial Revolution. Fraternity remained a vision, but labor and capital, the quarrels of privilege and underprivilege, broke up the moral unity to which Lincoln had given exalted expression to a nation exhausted by a fratricidal

struggle in the Civil War. New techniques for anything like the maintenance of these ideals came, in the minds of the rebels and reformers and to many others, to seem acutely necessary. Bellamy in "Looking Backward" dreamed an economic Utopia. Henry George found a cure in a Single Tax on land. Eventually Wilson, half a century after the Civil War, was to proclaim a New Freedom, and eventually Franklin D. Roosevelt a New Deal. These are only a few out of many possible witnesses; they illustrate the new setting and the new obstacles to the realization of that American "democratic faith" which Whitman, not unaware of these looming difficulties, had sung.

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*The Ideology of Democracy**

CARL L. BECKER

Countless works have been written about democracy, but few have provided us with any real analysis of its basic meaning, its underlying philosophy. Carl L. Becker provides us with his concept of the democratic ideology in one of his essays in *New Liberties for Old*. For many years professor of history at Cornell University and the author of numerous volumes, Becker richly deserves the title: historian of American democracy.

Not so long ago one of my lively-minded colleagues invited me to provide democracy with an ideology. The need for one, he said, was urgent. He maintained that in the conflict between the democratic and the totalitarian states the great advantage of the latter was that they united their subjects by centering their activities on something beyond their personal interests, on a common ideal end which, however fantastic and unreal it might be, they could pursue with profound conviction. I reminded him that democracy already had an ideology, and a very good one. To which he replied: "True enough, it has one, and in the great crusading days it was a good one because men were then willing to sacrifice themselves for it. But it has ceased to be effective because it has ceased to be a living faith. We accept it perfunctorily, and with reservations, which means that we only half believe in it after all. . . ."

We do accept democracy somewhat perfunctorily—less so now that Hitler has brought into strong relief its essential virtues, but still rather from habit than from profound conviction. Long familiarity with democracy as a going concern, by disclosing its glaring defects and discords, has bred in many quarters a half-cynical skepticism which is alternately directed against the democratic reality as something scarcely worth preserving, and against the ideal as something impossible to achieve. The result is that if we go all out for the reality we are in danger of being thought hypocritical, while if we go all out for the ideal we are sure to be thought naïve. We can therefore only accept democracy with reservations,

* Carl Becker, *New Liberties for Old* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942). Reprinted by permission of the Yale University Press.

and it is difficult indeed to go all out for reservations.

This is the normal price paid by all religious and social systems for success and long life. Having conquered the world, they are subdued to it. The ideological faiths that originally gave them intellectual coherence and moral support, being gradually assimilated to the worldly conventions, come to be accepted as a matter of course, without serious reservations perhaps, but at least without the disturbing zeal engendered by deep conviction. If then, under the stress of profound discords in the system, the ideology is subjected to skeptical criticism and analysis, it is likely to fade away into the realm of myth, leaving nothing but inertia or naked force to preserve the system from decay or destruction.

Since primitive times most religious and social systems have attempted to avoid this fate by forbidding free criticism and analysis, either of the established institutions or of the doctrines that sustain them. Democracy is the one system that cannot employ this method of self-preservation, since the cardinal principle of its ideology is that free criticism and analysis by all and sundry is the highest virtue. Democracy, if it be consistent, must welcome the critical examination, not only of its current institutions and policies but even of the fundamental assumptions on which it rests. Democracy is thus a stupendous gamble for the highest stakes. It offers long odds on the capacity of the human mind. It wagers all it has that the freest exercise of the human reason will never disprove the proposition that only by the freest exercise of the human reason can a tolerably just and rational society ever be established.

The play is still going on, the outcome of the wager is still uncertain, but the gamble seems now a more desperate one than it did a century ago. During the last hundred years, the assumptions of the democratic faith have been subjected to the freest possible and the most penetrating critical examination; and the result is to leave us somewhat doubtful, not perhaps of the capacity of the human mind at its best, but certainly of the capacity of the average human mind to perceive that which is true and to cleave to that which is good. Our doubt in this respect arises in part from the fact that our conception of human reason, of its capacity to devise a rational system of law and government, and of the part it plays in shaping the conduct of men, is in certain important respects different from that which inspired the early prophets and protagonists of democracy. . . .

The trend of thought variously known as anti-intellectualism, relativism, activism, assumes its crudest and least defensible form in the dictum of Thrasymachus that "might makes right, justice is the interest of the stronger." For more than half a century this doctrine, in more or less diluted form, has slowly, insidiously, not altogether unashamed, warped itself into the fabric of democratic thought and practice; and now, under pressure of economic collapse and social frustration, it has been exalted to the level of a complete philosophy of life in certain countries which have frankly abandoned democratic institutions. In their theoretical exposition of ultimate aims, both communism and fascism pay tribute to certain ideal values—the welfare and happiness of the community, the progress of mankind—which are assumed to be in some mystical fashion identified with an abstract entity, called in the one case the dialectic of history, in the other, the totalitarian state. Yet both assume that the abstract entity is realized in the activities of an inspired leader to whom the truth has been revealed and the direction of affairs committed; and as they exhibit themselves

in action under the leader both represent a direct attack upon intelligence, an unqualified denial of any obligation to be guided by rational thinking or humane dealing. Both assume that the individual man has no importance except as an instrument to be used, with whatever degree of brutality may be necessary, for the common good as the leader understands it. Both subordinate reason to will, identify law and morality with naked force as an instrument of will, and accord value to the disinterested search for truth only in so far as the leader judges it to be momentarily useful for the attainment of immediate political ends. Herein the anti-intellectual, relativist trend of thought reaches a final, fantastic form: truth and morality turn out to be relative to the purposes of any egocentric somnambulist who can succeed, by a ruthless projection of his personality, in creating the power to impose his unrestrained will upon the world.

Hitler and Stalin represent an exorbitant price for a little wisdom. But they have at least done something to strengthen the cause of democracy. More than anything else in recent years, their incredible sophistries and ruthless brutalities have revealed to us the advantages of democratic institutions and the reality of the rational and humane values that are traditionally associated with them. The Declaration of Independence may now be referred to without apology, and even policemen on the beat are becoming dimly aware that there is such a thing as the Bill of Rights. What associations for the defense of civil liberties could not accomplish, Hitler and Stalin have in some measure accomplished; and they have accomplished it by frankly accepting, ruthlessly applying, and thereby reducing to an absurdity the principle that law and morality are nothing more than the right of the stronger. . . .

To have faith in the dignity and worth of the individual man as an end in himself, to believe that it is better to be governed by persuasion than by coercion, to believe that fraternal good will is more worthy than a selfish and contentious spirit, to believe that in the long run all values are inseparable from the love of truth and the disinterested search for it, to believe that knowledge and the power it confers should be used to promote the welfare and happiness of all men rather than to serve the interests of those individuals and classes whom fortune and intelligence endow with temporary advantage—these are the values which are affirmed by the traditional democratic ideology. But they are older and more universal than democracy and do not depend upon it. They have a life of their own apart from any particular social system or type of civilization. They are the values which, since the time of Buddha and Confucius, Solomon and Zoroaster, Plato and Aristotle, Socrates and Jesus, men have commonly employed to measure the advance or the decline of civilization, the values they have celebrated in the saints and sages whom they have agreed to canonize. They are the values that readily lend themselves to rational justification, yet need no justification. No one ever yet found it necessary to justify a humane and friendly act by saying that it was really a form of brutality and oppression; but the resort to coercion in civil government, in war and revolution, in the exploitation of the poor or the liquidation of the rich, has always to be justified by saying that the apparent evil is an indirect means of achieving the greater or the ultimate good. Even the Hitlers and the Stalins, in order to win the support of their own people, find it necessary to do lip service to the humane values, thus paying the customary tribute of hypocrisy which virtue exacts from vice.

Whatever the limitations of reason may be, it is folly to renounce it, since it is the only guide we have—the only available means of enlarging the realm of scientific knowledge, the only means of discriminating the social value of the various uses to which such knowledge may be put. Whatever the limitations of reason may be, they are not so great that the civilized man cannot recognize the existence and the necessity of naked force and coercion in an imperfect social world, without attributing to them the creation of those humane and rational values which by their very nature affirm that naked force and coercion are at best necessary evils.

The case for democracy is that it accepts the rational and humane values as ends, and proposes as the means of realizing them the minimum of coercion and the maximum of voluntary assent. We may well abandon the cosmological temple in which the democratic ideology originally enshrined these values without renouncing the faith it was designed to celebrate. The essence of that faith is belief in the capacity of man, as a rational and humane creature, to achieve the good life by rational and humane means. Apart from this faith, there is no alternative for the modern man except cynicism or despair—or the resort to naked force, which is itself but masked despair or cynicism disguised. For even more obvious now than in the seventeenth century is the truth of Pascal's famous dictum: "Thought makes the whole dignity of man; therefore, endeavor to think well, that is the only morality." The chief virtue of democracy, and the sole reason for cherishing it, is that with all its faults it still provides the most favorable conditions for the maintenance of that dignity and the practice of that morality.

E. Political Parties

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*American Political Parties**

HENRY STEELE COMMAGER

The history of political parties in the United States is, on the surface at any rate, a history of continuous and violent debate. Yet, the intensity of our party battles has obscured the more important and larger area of common agreement—the general acceptance by the great majority of individuals within both parties of private property, the right of individual opportunity, the importance of competition. Henry Steele Commager, prolific writer, editor, and professor of history at Amherst College and Columbia University, traces the growth of political parties in America and evaluates their functions.

The political party, said Edmund Burke, is "a body of men united for promoting the national interest upon some particular principle upon which they are agreed." However accurate this classical definition of the party may have been for eighteenth-century England—and its accuracy even here may

* Henry Steele Commager, "American Political Parties," *Parliamentary Affairs* (Winter, 1949). Used by permission of the author and *Parliamentary Affairs*.

be questioned—it is wildly inapplicable to the American political party. In so far as any definition is possible, the American political party may be said to be a body of men (and since the Nineteenth Amendment of women) organized to get control of the machinery of government. It is not necessary that they be united upon some principle or even agreed upon some general programme. It would be difficult to find any single important policy upon which either of the major political parties have been consistent for any length of time.

It is not clear just when the modern political party emerged in America. There were groups and factions with some resemblance to later parties even before Independence, and John Adams mentions, in his Diary, a "caulker's club" which gave its name to the caucus of later years. These groups crystallized as "patriots" and "loyalists" at the time of the Revolution. Factions closely approximating parties, but lacking both organization and a nation-wide basis, emerged in the debate over ratification of the Constitution as Federalists and anti-Federalists. Not until Washington's second Administration, however, did modern parties clearly emerge. The division that appeared here was along lines that were to be familiar in the future: a division between those who wanted a strong central government, and wanted to use government to advance national economic interests, and who thought in terms of commerce, manufacturing and banking, and those who distrusted a strong central government, put their faith in the machinery of state governments, and were primarily interested in agriculture. The first called themselves Federalists—a name taken from the title of the series of essays by Hamilton, Madison and Jay advocating the ratification of the Constitution; the second used the name Republican, then Republican-Democratic. The titular leader of the Federalists was Washington himself, the actual leader was Hamilton; the leader of the Republicans was Thomas Jefferson.

As long as Washington remained in the Presidency, party divisions were held in abeyance, for Washington deeply distrusted parties and solemnly warned against them in his Farewell Address; he tried, not without some success, to maintain what would now be called a coalition government. The Presidential campaign of 1796, however, was fought along party lines. The Federalist party—the party of the "wise, the rich, and the well-born"—presented itself as the champion of conservative business interests of the country and the peculiar guardian of the Constitution; the Republican party represented chiefly the small farmers, and championed decentralization of the government. There was, too, even this early, something of a sectional alignment: the strength of the Federalist party was largely in New England and in the tidewater areas of the South; the Republican party found its strength generally in the middle states and the Piedmont South, and along the frontiers.

The election of 1796 was the last that the Federalists were to win. By 1801 Jefferson was in the White House, and thereafter his party—which came gradually to be called the Democratic—dominated the political scene for over half a century; Federalists, though they boasted such great names as Hamilton, John Adams and Marshall, declined sharply in strength. The reasons for that decline, and for the eventual disappearance of the party, are clear enough. First the party was essentially aristocratic, and no aristocratic party could prosper in a society as democratic as the American. Second, the party never built a sound organization, but depended rather upon its talents and leadership. Third, Fed-

eralist advocacy of war with France, with consequent high taxes, plus the enactment of the ill-advised Alien and Sedition Laws, antagonized large elements of the population. The Federalists experienced a brief period of strength at the time of the Jeffersonian Embargo (1807–09) and again during the unpopular war of 1812, but the successful conclusion of that war restored confidence in the Republican-Democratic party, and after 1815 the Federalists quietly disappeared from the political scene.

The Republican-Democratic party was thus left in undisputed control of the political arena. This party—which for convenience we may now call the Democratic—is in many respects the most remarkable political organization in history. It is, today, the oldest and the largest political party in the world. It has controlled the United States government for a longer time than any other party or combination of parties in American history—a total of 86 out of 160 years. It numbers among its leaders such distinguished men as Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Cleveland, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt, to name only the Presidents. Jefferson is still its patron saint, and from Jefferson it derives not only its democratic liberalism, but its practical combination of farmer and labor support. Originally dedicated to States Rights, it early abandoned this philosophy and embraced centralism; originally advocating a narrow construction of the Constitution, it found no difficulty in the later advocacy of a broad construction of that document. In the early years its strength was largely in the farmers of the South and the West—the farmers whom Jefferson thought the peculiar depositories of wisdom and virtue; with the passing years it has come to find its strength largely in the great industrial centers, though the rural South remains, for peculiar reasons, loyal to the Democrats.

The disintegration of the Federalist party was followed by what is known, somewhat humorously, as the "era of good feelings." President Monroe, elected in 1816, was reelected in 1820 without opposition. Not until the Jackson administrations (1829–1837) did opposition elements crystallize into a party; then the Whig party, under the leadership of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, made its somewhat fleeting appearance on the political stage. The Whigs were in many respects the legitimate successors to the Federalists. Whig membership was drawn largely from the more prosperous elements of society, from businessmen, merchants, bankers, well-to-do farmers and planters. In so far as the Whigs had a programme—and American parties rarely have consistent programmes—they stood for the "American system"—that is internal improvements, a National Bank, and aid to manufacturers. Notwithstanding the distinction of its leaders, the party enjoyed little success. The panic of 1837 discredited Van Buren and gave the Whigs the Presidency in 1840, but victory was qualified by the speedy death of President Harrison and the accession of Vice-President Tyler—a former Democrat—to the Presidency. The Whigs won the Presidency again in 1848, once more to have the fruits of success taken from them by the death of their President, Zachary Taylor. That was their last national victory. In the mid-fifties the Whig party disintegrated into its component elements, its place taken, to a large degree, by the new Republican party.

The decade of the 50's played havoc with party lines, and threatened the integrity of the Democratic as well as of the Whig party. For the most part American parties successfully ignore or evade real issues, and achieve unity and success through timely compromises and by offering something to

every one of the disparate elements that compose them. Occasionally, however, issues arise so important that they cannot be ignored or evaded. Such was the slavery issue that forced its way to the front in the 1850's; such was the money question of the 1890's, and the great depression of the 1930's.

Unwilling or unable to take a stand on the slavery issue, the Whig party broke up. It was supplanted, very briefly, by that curious organization known as the Know Nothing, or American party. This party, officially dedicated to ignoring the momentous issue of slavery, lasted only two or three years. More important was the creation, out of the ruins of the Whig party and of secession elements from the Democratic, of the Republican party—the only party which has offered continuous opposition to the Democratic. The Democrats too, had trouble with the slavery issue. Northern Democrats, like Chase of Ohio, refused to follow Southern leadership on this issue. Douglas of Illinois tried to compromise the issue, tried to save the Democrats from becoming the official champion of the slave interests. In this he was unsuccessful. By 1858 the Southern wing had taken control of the party—and proceeded to lead it into secession and war.

Secession, Civil War, and Reconstruction had a profound effect on American party history—an effect still felt after the lapse of almost a century. They put the Republican party in power and enabled that party to hold power for a generation. Because the Republicans came to office in time of war, when Democratic opposition was largely withdrawn, they were able to carry through the whole of their programme without difficulty and, in the process, to attach to themselves the loyalty of business and farmer elements in the North. The war, too, made it possible for the Republicans to claim to be the party of Union and of Constitutionalism, and to tar the Democrats with the stick of secession and disunion.

It is a mistake to suppose that Republican supremacy in the period of war and reconstruction meant a submergence of the Democratic party. The Democratic party remained strong, and with nation-wide support. Though the Republicans controlled the Presidency for all but eight years between 1861 and 1901, the Democrats actually polled a plurality of the popular vote in 1876, 1884, 1888 and 1892: only the peculiar workings of the Electoral College deprived the Democrats of the Presidency on two of these occasions. Not only this, but the two parties were pretty evenly balanced in Congress. In the period from 1876 to 1900, for example, the Democrats controlled the lower House fourteen out of twenty four years.

In the 1890's, as in the 1850's, a vital issue cut across conventional party lines. Free silver was a symbol of larger economic and social issues—of the contest between the agrarian and the business elements in American economy. This issue divided the Democrats sharply: one element of the party followed Grover Cleveland in support of the gold standard; the other, and larger, followed William Jennings Bryan. The Republicans, too, were divided by the money question, though not so sharply: there was a Silver Republican as well as a Gold Democratic party in the field in the '96 election.

Bryan, a neglected and even despised figure, made the strongest impression on the Democrats of any leader between Jackson and Franklin Roosevelt. He rescued it from the doldrums in 1896, won its nomination to the Presidency three times; and largely dictated the nomination of Wilson in 1912. He was the last representative of the agrar-

ian wing of the party—of those elements in the South and West that looked upon big business as wicked and upon Wall Street as a den of iniquity. The shift of American economy from agriculture to manufactures, the change from debtor to creditor nation, the growth of international economic interests, all condemned this old fashioned agrarianism to inevitable defeat.

What Bryan was to the Democrats, Theodore Roosevelt was to the Republican party. Economically conservative, he was politically radical. He tried to revive true conservatism—the kind of conservatism that was associated, in America, with Hamilton and Webster, that is associated in Britain with Disraeli and Winston Churchill. He labored, with only temporary success, to make his party truly national, to base conservative policy on a strict regulation of the malpractices of business, and to make the power of the United States felt in world affairs.

Roosevelt's magnetic personality won him the Presidency twice, and temporary success in his programme, but he was repudiated, in 1912, by his own party. The result was a party split, the creation of the short-lived Progressive (Bull Moose) party, and the inevitable triumph of Wilson at the polls. Though Wilson was neither a strict constructionist nor an advocate of States Rights, his soaring idealism, his intelligent progressivism, and his broad internationalism returned the Democratic party to the traditions of Jefferson. With Republican repudiation of Roosevelt's liberal programme and Wilson's advocacy of the New Freedom—in many respects the precedent for the New Deal—the two parties came close to dividing on logical lines of liberalism and conservatism. Under Wilson the United States began to catch up on its lag in social legislation. Wilson's progressive programme, however, ended with American entry into World War I; thereafter the Republicans took over and reaction set in.

The Republican party of the 1920's was dedicated to "Normalcy" and isolationism. Never before in its history had it been more reactionary, more frankly the instrument of big business; not since the days of Grant had its leadership been as feeble. An era of unprecedented prosperity—at least for the business community—appeared to justify its policies, but the panic of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed were rooted largely in these policies. For the depression the Republicans had no solution, except the traditional one of trying to restore prosperity to business and hoping that somehow some of it would percolate down to the rest of society. Despairing of the Grand Old Party, the country turned in 1930 to the Democrats. The Democratic Congress of 1931, however, could make little headway against Hoover. Not until the election of 1932 swept Franklin D. Roosevelt into the White House did the Government grapple with the depression in a realistic fashion.

Franklin Roosevelt combined, as had no other statesman in American history, an understanding of the world situation, an enlightened liberalism, a shrewd political acumen, boldness, imagination, and personal magnetism. His own extraordinary abilities, plus the achievements of his party in combating the depression and enacting a "New Deal," assured the Democrats of long-continued tenure. Re-elected to the Presidency in 1936, Roosevelt decided, in 1940, to stand for a third term. Washington had refused a third term, and his example had been followed by every one of his successors, until the "third term tradition" was regarded as part of the unwritten Constitution. Roosevelt broke that tradition, as he had broken so many others. His third term drew to a close when the war against the

Axis was still being waged throughout the globe, and a people who regarded him as the chief architect of victory elected him, by a substantial margin, to a fourth term.

Roosevelt's death, early in 1945, and the successful conclusion of the war, was followed by a reaction which seemed to be serious, but proved merely temporary. The Republicans won the lower House, in 1946 —for the first time in sixteen years—and looked forward with confidence to a repetition of the pattern of the 1920's. The election of 1948 however returned Harry Truman to the Presidency, and it began to look as if the nation were permanently Democratic. Not since before the Civil War had the Democrats enjoyed as prolonged a tenure as they have sustained since 1932.

If we look to the functions rather than to the chronological history of the American political party, we can see that the party has been, with the possible exception of the Constitution itself, the basic American political institution. It has administered the government; broken down the artificial barriers of the federal system and the separation of powers; strengthened national feeling; ameliorated sectional and class conflict; and advanced democracy. Each of these functions deserves some elaboration.

The first job of the American political party has been to run the government. The Fathers of the Constitution drew up an admirable blueprint of government—and went off and left it. They made no practical provision for the day by day business of politics or administration. They neither anticipated nor recognized political parties. Parties are not only unknown to the Constitution, they were unknown to law until as late as 1907. But the Constitution was neither a self-starting nor a self-operating mechanism. Political parties came along and ran the government and—with the assistance of a growing permanent civil service —they have been doing it ever since. They have selected men for office, conducted campaigns, managed elections, formulated policies and issues, taken responsibility for legislative programmes. On the whole they have done these things well. As yet no alternative method of running the business of politics and government has been perfected.

Among the most important of the historical functions of the party has been the harmonizing of American political machinery. The Fathers of the Constitution, children of the Age of Reason, fabricated what we may call a Newtonian scheme of government, static rather than dynamic. Not only that, but since experience had taught them that all government was to be feared, they exhausted their ingenuity in devising methods of checking governmental tyranny. They manufactured, to this end, a complicated system of checks and balances—the federal system, the tripartite division of powers, the bicameral legislature, judicial review, and so forth.

Such a system, if adhered to rigorously, would result very speedily in governmental paralysis. For example, if members of the Electoral College really followed their own independent judgment in voting for a President—as the Framers supposed they would—the elective system would break down completely. Parties came along and took charge of the whole business of electing a President—with the result that only three times has the election gone from the Electoral College to the House of Representatives.

Parties implemented the federal system, a system otherwise perfectly designed to produce deadlock. If states actually followed local interests, the American constitutional fabric would be torn asunder—as it was in 1860. It is the party, again, that harmonizes state and national interests.

Parties made possible, too, the effective workings of a tripartite government. Theoretically, executive, legislative and judiciary departments are independent and equal. If the Executive and the Legislature actually maintained their independence, government could not function. Parties normally harmonize these two political branches of the American government. When, as occasionally happens, one party controls the executive branch and another the legislative branch, there is usually a deadlock. Fortunately this happens but seldom, and when it does the good sense of American politicians finds a way out.

The third major function of the party has been—and still is—to strengthen national feeling and ameliorate the otherwise dangerous sectional and class divisions. It should never be forgotten that the United States is comparable to a continent rather than to the average nation, and that it contains within its spacious borders as many geographical, climatic, and economic divisions as are found in Europe or South America. Normally these divisions —roughly sectional in nature—would be disintegrating in effect. Fortunately a variety of forces—historical, political, and economic—have countered the natural particularism of the American scene. Of these forces the three most important have been the Constitution, the frontier, and the political party, and the party is not the least of the three. Occasionally, to be sure, parties have come to represent local or sectional interests, and whenever they have done this they have made for trouble—or disappeared. The Federalists became a purely sectional party—and went under. When, in 1860, the Democratic party split along sectional lines and the Republican party emerged as a strictly Northern party, the Union itself split. The re-creation of the Democratic party as a national institution was perhaps the most effective instrument for the restoration of real Union. It is, in short, the party more than any other political institution that persuades Americans to think nationally rather than locally.

In the same way the party has served to moderate class antagonisms and to reconcile class interests. The party is the great common denominator of American society and economy. This fact is often alleged as a heavy criticism of the American party—especially abroad. Parties do not, it is charged, represent real interests, real groups. They do not adequately represent farmers, labor, business, the middle classes. Nor, it might be added, do they represent whites as such or Negroes as such, Catholics or Protestants or Jews, Baptist or Methodists. They even avoid issues which might give fair expression to the interests of these groups.

The instinct of Americans has always been hostile to the alignment of classes in political parties. For nothing, it is clear, could be more dangerous than such an alignment, and nothing gives greater security than the fact that the two major parties represent all classes and interests of American society.

This does not mean that a particular social or economic interest cannot make itself felt politically. Particular interests, whether economic or political, have two outlets. The first is within the major parties themselves. Thus anyone familiar with the work of platform committees or of conventions, with the compromises and concessions and arrangements that go into the making of party tickets, knows that within the party various interests are represented and can—by eloquence or by political blackmail—get attention to their demands. The second outlet for particular groups or interests is the third or minor party.

The American party system is definitely

a two party system. There has never been a successful third party, and minor parties have rarely polled more than a very small percentage of the popular vote. Yet there have been almost innumerable minor parties—Free Soil, Liberty, "Know Nothing," Greenback, Populist, Farmer-Labor, Progressive, Dixiecrat, Socialist, Prohibition, and many others.

The function of the two major parties is to be all things to all men; the function of the minor parties to be something specific to a particular group of men. The business of the major parties is to capture control of the government and run it. The business of the minor parties is not to capture the government—for that is clearly impossible—but to develop so great a nuisance value that one of the major parties will take over their programmes.

Finally it may be said that the American party has been an effective instrument for democracy. This is a result not of any inherent quality in the party itself, but rather of the dynamics of American politics. Thus each of the major parties has been forced to look for broad popular support, which means that parties inevitably are advocates of an extension of the suffrage. No party has ever taken the risk of openly opposing such an extension: the consequences to it when the extension of suffrage came—as it always did—would have been disastrous. Thus, too, each of the major parties, not being committed in advance to fundamental principles, has ever been on the lookout for popular issues. Whatever issues appear to have wide popular support, these will inevitably be espoused by one or both major parties. Parties know, by experience, that the rewards of election go to the party that has satisfied most popular needs. This does not always mean an aggressive legislative programme, for sometimes the public is weary of legislation and wants quiet. But on the whole the natural pressure of American politics is for an aggressive legislative programme—such a programme as Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson or Franklin Roosevelt espoused—and on the whole, therefore, parties tend to champion popular issues.

Nor should it be overlooked, in any analysis of the democratic features of the American party, that the internal structure and organization of the party is, predominantly, democratic. There are exceptions here, to be sure—in the South for example. But those who come to the fore in party politics are the workers, not the aristocrats or the intelligentsia. Almost every political "boss" has worked his way up from ward-leader or county-leader, and the rewards—spoils or recognition—go to the workers. Not riches or even a great name, but hard work and faithfulness, get results. . . .

Prophecy is notoriously dangerous, yet it is reasonably safe to make some broad generalizations about American parties in the foreseeable future. The United States will continue to maintain a two party system. There will continue to be third or splinter parties: as long as the Electoral College functions as it does now, these minor parties will have only local appeal. The two major parties will continue to have a broad national basis, or will attempt to maintain such a basis. They will differ relatively little on programmes and not at all on principles. Unless some major crisis arises, both parties will continue along moderately conservative lines. Both will seek as candidates "available" men. It is probable that clashes over particular features of domestic policy will be sharp but that in the field of foreign relations the two parties will work together with reasonable amity.

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*Ideology and Political Parties**

WILLIAM G. CARLETON

The fundamental unity of our political tradition has gradually declined in recent decades. We have been moving toward a more corporate and centralized existence. With it have come the enlarged functions of international leadership and domestic regulation. What should be the functions of our parties now? Is there a need for a more clear-cut ideological difference between them? William G. Carleton, professor of political and social science at the University of Florida and author of scores of essays and articles in this field, discusses the question of ideology and political parties in the United States and the problem of a more responsible party system.

I.

American politics have always been nonideological. The American two-party system has consistently defied clear-cut and logical divisions. Both major parties are broad and inclusive. Since factions within the parties commonly are tantamount to several separate parties, at any given time there are in fact not two but five or six separate parties in the state legislatures and in Congress. This has been true all through American history, not just since 1938, although the Dixiecrat-Republican alliance since that date has made this situation better known.

The history of the legislation of any session of Congress is the story of how the factions within the parties align, realign, interweave, and crisscross. All sorts of bipartisan combinations are made to pass and to obstruct legislation. In times of crisis and change, the bipartisan combinations to pass legislation are more numerous, as in the early years of Wilson's New Freedom and of Roosevelt's New Deal. In times of conservative reaction to change, the bipartisan combinations to stop legislation are more numerous, as during the closing years of the Wilson Administration and during the Roosevelt Administration after 1938. As Samuel Lubell has suggested recently, the decisive power conflicts of any given era are largely determined by the conflicts and compromises of the factions *inside* the normally majority party of that era. . . .

Politicians and publicists who think more ideologically than our parties are irritated at the blurred nature of our party system. President Truman ruefully revealed his own irritation at the lack of clear-cut demarcation between the parties when in September he remarked that the Republicans should have nominated Taft, that Taft's nomination would have sharpened the issues for the American voter. President Truman spoke in hurt tones, as though the Republicans, in turning down Taft, had performed a disservice to the proper functioning of American democracy by moderating rather than accentuating the differences between the parties. Truman, like

* William G. Carleton, "A More Responsible Party System?" *Yale Review*, XLII (Spring, 1953). Used by permission of the author and the *Yale Review*, copyright Yale University Press.

Taft, was grieved at the "me too-ism" of the American party system.

The election's reaffirmation of the traditional American system of nonideological politics is all the more significant because of recent tendencies towards a realignment of our two major parties on more sharply drawn lines. There has been a tendency for American politics to become less sectional, less decentralized, less amorphous. This, in part, was the theme of Samuel Lubell's *The Future of American Politics* and of Alexander Heard's *A Two-Party South?*

Now, of course, American politics have never been wholly local and sectional. Had they been so the American nation would never have developed and the two major national parties would never have grown. When Alexander Hamilton and the groups he represented in New York and New England felt that they had more in common politically with the Pinckneys of South Carolina and the groups they represented than they had with George Clinton of New York and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and the groups they represented, and when Thomas Jefferson and the groups he represented in Virginia and the South thought that they had more in common politically with George Clinton of New York and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and the groups they represented than they had with George Washington or John Marshall in Virginia, then America's national party system was on its way. American parties grew out of groups and classes in various states and sections making alliances with similar groups in other states and sections and against dissimilar groups in their own states and sections. National parties represented the triumph of group interest over territorial interest.

Nevertheless, the group that was a majority in one section often was the minority in another section, and this gave to American politics a sectional base. Events leading to the Civil War, the war itself, and the war's aftermath strengthened the sectional character of American politics. The South developed as a one-party Democratic section, and the corn and wheat states of the American prairies developed as a virtually one-party Republican section.

The Populist Party, the various "progressive" parties of the twentieth century, the American Socialist Party, the farm organizations, and the labor unions have brought to America a somewhat larger element of ideological politics. The New Deal did much to sharpen class differences in politics, to cause voting patterns to coincide more consistently and more closely with economic income and status. The Democratic Party tended to become more distinctly liberal, the Republican Party more distinctly conservative. More wage earners became Democrats, more businessmen became Republicans. Farm-belt progressives tended to go into the Democratic Party in greater numbers; the Democrats began placing tickets in more and more of the counties of such states as Minnesota, Iowa, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; the corn and wheat states tended more and more to become two-party states. On the other hand, Southern conservatives were increasingly attracted to the Republican Party. In general, Southerners voted the Republican ticket for President in greater numbers; and the Dixiecrat movement of 1948 was a roundabout way for Southern conservative Democrats to help the Republicans in the electoral college, a movement somewhat parallel, though less direct, to the alliance of conservative Southern Democrats and Republicans in Congress. On the other hand, Southern Democrats who remained loyal to the Democratic national administration saw more clearly than ever before the economic reasons that kept them

loyal. Republican strength developed most in the towns and small cities where local chambers of commerce and civic clubs are influential. Republicans made little headway in the poor rural areas, the mill towns, and the big city labor wards.

In short, a two-party system has been developing in the corn and wheat states and in the South, although in the South this development has been more gradual and less direct. Before the election all of this seemed to indicate that our parties were on the way to becoming more clearly differentiated, more class and group conscious, more national, more centralized. . . .

II.

America's dominant tradition of essential political consensus has been rationalized and defended many times in our history. In the present generation Walter Lippmann, Pendleton Herring, Herbert Agar, John Fischer, and Robert Bendiner are among those who have emphasized and defended the decentralized, inclusive, and nonideological nature of our parties.

These writers have seen in our system much positive merit: moderation, an absence of intransigence and fanaticism, easy means of compromise. In America, differences are adjusted within the parties and between the parties; in Europe's multiple-party system extreme groups rise to prominence and power more easily, exercise greater influence, are not held in leash by intraparty balancing. There the significant adjustments have to be made among the parties and not within them. The differences are too clearly perceived; the way to compromise is rendered difficult. In America, in time of great change, both parties contribute to the change; when change is slowed down, both parties unite to slow it down. Moreover, the concrete policy pursued by any administration anywhere consists of an aggregate of somewhat inconsistent parts; ideological parties can enjoy the luxury of intellectually consistent doctrines but actual administrations cannot. Is it not better to demand that the voter deal with some of the ambiguities inherent in all broad domestic and foreign policies than for a national legislature (like the French) to have the whole burden of coping with them? True, American parties are even more ambiguous than the policies evolved by an administration, but these very ambiguities often allow for a certain amount of play for leadership which ideological parties do not.

However, in recent years, critics have arisen to challenge America's traditional party system and to emphasize its shortcomings and dangers. For the most part they have been admirers of the centralized British parties, or they have been people tending to left-wing views, concerned with getting party machinery that will respond more rapidly to changing conditions. They have pointed out that in a democratic society parties must present issues in a clear-cut way in order to get accurate popular verdicts, that parties must be united and centralized in order to be effectively responsive to popular verdicts. They say that events move more rapidly than in the past, that parties which are not prepared to make positive decisions with dispatch are likely to be powerless in the face of great crisis. If popular verdicts repeatedly miscarry, if confusion and frustration continue, if parties are inadequate to face crises, then, these critics say, we may be confronted with one or several of the following developments: an unhealthy overtaxing of the Presidential office, even dictatorship; the movement of the American people towards the extreme right or the extreme left; even abject national failure in an hour of supreme testing.

In short, a party system which in less

rapidly moving and less perilous days was noted for its moderation may in the crisis years of the mid-twentieth century actually be productive of extremism, actually may destroy the democratic process itself. Contemporary democratic institutions must be rendered flexible, responsible, and capable of making rapid adjustments to change, or die, it is argued.

Harold Laski cogently argued some such view. Max Lerner has often taken such a position. Professor E. E. Schattschneider has analyzed the need in the United States for more national, centralized, and clearly differentiated parties. Under his chairmanship the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association in 1950 made an important report which came out boldly for structural changes in our political and governmental system designed to nationalize, centralize, and differentiate more clearly the two major parties.

The report is a careful and elaborate attempt to draw up a table of organization for more responsible and better disciplined parties. It calls for smaller, more representative, and more vigorous national conventions, though it looks to a time when a direct primary may be a feasible and desirable means of nominating Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates. The report also calls for a national council and a party cabinet in each party. It conscientiously specifies what each of these groups should do and who their members should be, with the general objective of providing an organization that can formulate a consistent policy and implement it by some control over legislative programs, the distribution of party funds, and—in time, perhaps—the choice of candidates.

The report would also replace the present leadership committees in Congress (Rules Committee, Steering Committee, Committee on Committees, etc.) with *party* leadership committees. Congressional committee chairmanships would not be awarded solely on a seniority basis; convinced party loyalty and personal competence would also be considerations for selection. The majority party would have representation on the Congressional committees well above the party's radio in the House or Senate itself, for the present method of having about as many committee positions for the minority as for the majority gives individual members of the majority party the balance of power and invites chaos, according to the report. The report also recommends that the present cloture rule of the Senate be discarded for a majority cloture on all matters before that body.

Without mentioning it by name, the report endorses the principle of the proposed Lodge constitutional amendment, which would divide the electoral vote on the basis of the popular vote in each state, on the ground that such procedure would reduce the one-party areas in the United States, give all sections a real voice in electing a President, and increase party responsibility. The report *insists* that Congressional districts approximately equal in population be drawn.

This report is remarkable in several respects. For one thing it contains no adequate acknowledgment that the whole tenor of the committee's recommendations runs counter to America's dominant political tradition of decentralized parties. Not even lip service is paid to the achievements of the conventional American party system to date. Therefore, the stupendous difficulties in the way of these innovations are drastically minimized.

For another thing, the report ignores the actual realignments taking place in the corn and wheat states and in the South. The report confines itself to structural and mechanical changes in party procedures;

the economic and social forces at work to produce changes in the substantive nature of our parties are passed over. And yet if these great structural changes in America's party system are to take place they are more likely to come after the substantive realignments, not before them. In short, the forces described by Lubell's book are left out of account entirely.

Some of the recommendations of the report might in practice actually lead to a strengthening of the traditional system rather than to the development of a more centralized system, that is, unless the substantive realignment of parties preceded the structural changes. For instance, placing large numbers of the conventional type of national committeemen, state chairmen, and Congressional leaders in such strategic places as a more powerful national convention, party council, and party cabinet might check the one centralizing agency we now have, the Presidency, and make even more influential the local, sectional, and pressure-group interests too often represented by national committeemen, state chairmen, and Congressional leaders.

Again, the instituting of national primaries to nominate the President and Vice-President, a proposal which has already caught the popular fancy, without at the same time redrawing Congressional districts of approximately equal population, a proposal infinitely difficult to accomplish, probably would further separate the President and Congress and accentuate the stalemate between executive and legislature. For national primaries would produce Presidents even more responsible to national and urban interests, but such Presidents would be confronted by the same rurally-weighted Congress as we have today, unless Congress were made more representative of the cities than it is now. In short, the time lag between accomplishing the various structural reforms might actually make our parties more irresponsible than they are now. . . .

In the coming struggle to save America's heritage of freedom, it is not too much to say that the traditional party system in America, the system which does not divide people along ideological lines and which keeps lovers of freedom in both parties, is America's best bulwark against totalitarianism. Today it is well that both parties have within themselves liberals, middle-of-the-roaders, and conservatives bred in the humane tradition who are willing to fight within their parties to curb the totalitarians in their midst.

Clear-cut party divisions always tend to become ideological divisions, and ideological divisions tend to become extreme and totalitarian. This is true everywhere, particularly today, even in countries long accustomed to ideological parties; and it would be especially true of America, where parties based on ideological cleavage would be new and would emerge for the first time in the current period of mass fear. As long as a crisis psychology exists, it might be well not to push too rapidly the underlying tendencies which are at work to give us, ultimately, more clearly differentiated parties. Attempts to do so today are likely to frighten Americans still more and to encourage the kind of ideological division which even the sponsors of more clearly differentiated parties themselves want to avoid at all cost: a party cleavage with totalitarians in one party and nontotalitarians in the other.

In this age of crisis, America's traditional party system, which blurs and softens the issues and the tensions, may do more than any other single element in American civilization to save America's heritage of freedom.

Chapter Six

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF INSTITUTIONS

Government and the Economic Order

I.

We have surveyed the functioning of some of our major institutions. It is entirely possible, of course, to spend a lifetime in studying almost any aspect of any of the social sciences; indeed, many have done so. But, however we may divide the subject matter of man and focus our attention on particular phases, the fact remains that, ultimately, reality is the *total* picture. We may carefully analyze the bricks of several buildings and find them identical. Yet, depending upon their relationship to one another and to each of the materials used in the construction process, the buildings may be totally different. So it is with culture. Institutions do not stand alone. Rather, there is constant interaction among them and the portrait of a society can emerge only out of a recognition and an understanding of that interdependence.

During most of the nineteenth century in large areas of Western civilization—and particularly in the United States,—this important fact had been lost to view, or perhaps had not yet been discovered. This was, in large measure, an age of individualism which was reflected in the relationships of man's institutions. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century revolt against ecclesiastical authority, absolutist monarchic tyranny, and mercantilist control of the economy resulted not only in the separation of church and state, but also in the separation of government and the economic order. The development of *laissez-faire* and an individualistically oriented culture, then, was no historical accident. But the problem became one of reconciling the opposing forces of the sovereign state and of individual liberty. Through declarations of rights and the establishment of constitutional law, it was hoped that an effective control would be established between an omnipotent and increasingly nationalistic state, on the one hand, and the personal rights of its members, on the other. As a consequence, the state was clothed in a negative philosophy—one largely confined to the protective functions of the military, police, and judiciary bodies.

Within the last seventy-five years, with the rise of democracy, the extension of nationalism, and the growing social consciousness of the churches, we have witnessed a reorientation of the relationship between politics and economics. Aided by experience and the observations of the social sciences, we have come to recognize that laws and the state, like all social phenomena, are subject to change. Political

scientists are less concerned with forms of government than with its functions; economists have come to view politico-economic relationships as an indispensable aspect of their discipline. The question of the day is no longer, how may the political and economic institutions be kept apart, but, for good or ill, what is to be the extent of the relationship between these two institutions.

2.

The readings in this section on government and the economic order are offered as concrete examples of the interdependence of institutions. Logically, the first question must be: What has contributed to the present extension of governmental power? For the United States the rise of centralization poses unique problems because of our federal structure, separation of powers, and system of checks and balances. Going further we must analyze the nature, extent, and direction of this significant transformation in our culture. Finally, it is necessary to observe the readjustment of our governmental process in the light of the fact of centralization.

A. Centralization

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*The Rise of Centralization**

ERNEST L. BOGART

In beginning our analysis of modern centralization, an obvious point of departure is a discussion of those forces which have contributed to its development. Dr. Ernest L. Bogart, for many years professor of economics at the University of Illinois and author of an *Economic History of the American People,* provides us with some of the reasons for the changing functions of modern government.

Man is a social animal and, since the beginning of recorded human history, has always shown a capacity for organizing systems of control over divergent interests and for adjusting common relationships. Such were the institutions of monogamy and the family, religious organizations, and shifting social groups. As life became more settled and civilization advanced, political organization developed with definite legal systems to enforce and direct the increasingly complex institutional life. But government could develop only within the framework of accepted social mores and customs, and could not, if it would maintain itself, contravene prevailing standards of right human relationships. Government is society organized for certain desirable purposes, but these purposes have varied from time to time. . . .

Three fairly well-marked stages may be noted since the beginning of our present

* Ernest L. Bogart, "The Changing Economic Functions of Government," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (November, 1939). Used by permission of the author and journal.

capitalistic industrial system. At the beginning of the industrial revolution, all the governments of Europe administered systems of extensive and minute control of industry, commerce, and other forms of activity. The reaction from this oppressive mercantilistic policy gave birth to the theory of individualism and free enterprise, which reached its height about the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Nowhere, however, except perhaps in the United States, did this theory find full expression, for, from the beginning, restraints were everywhere imposed upon competition. The factory acts in England were a notable instance of state interference in private industry when unsatisfactory conditions developed. The prevailing theory held, however, that such interference was admissible only under exceptional circumstances, and that the general rule should be laissez faire. That government was best which governed least.

The principle of individualism never took such deep root on the continent of Europe as it did in England and the United States, and government never abdicated the industrial sphere so completely. In certain fields, as transportation, forestry, and municipal public works, the government shared with private capital the task of development, and in others it exercised powers of control. But even in the two countries where liberalism and individualism progressed farthest, the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a change in the direction of increased governmental interference. Legislation in England was tinged with social objectives and, under the influence of Fabian socialism and other liberal forces, undertook broadening programs of human betterment. Even in the United States, with the disappearance of the frontier and the narrowing of the opportunities for the common man, legislation was enacted and administrative commissions were established to correct abuses and exercise control. There was an enlargement everywhere of governmental powers and an extension of governmental activities. . . .

Reasons for Increased Functions

There were many reasons for the assumption of new functions and the enlargement of old ones by governments, but only the most outstanding need be mentioned.

In the first place, technical improvements had broadened the markets, brought about keener international competition in those markets, and led to larger undertakings and groupings. In no field had technological changes been more revolutionary than in the leading heavy industry, iron and steel. These had tended to reduce the differential advantages enjoyed by the citizens of one country or another in the manufacture of particular products, and had brought them all into the world markets under conditions of intense competition. The textile industries—the most important producers of consumers' goods—presented another outstanding example of keen international competition, owing to the rapid rise of the cotton industry in the Far East, especially in Japan, and to the growing efforts of other countries to supply their own needs. As a result of the strong pressure exerted by these forces, a great increase in industrial combinations was taking place and industries were consolidating in larger and more effective groupings, national in scope. The independent individual or small company became an anachronism. The great combinations were government-aided by loans, by discriminating railroad rates, by import quotas and protective duties, and by for-

eign exchange manipulation, and were at the same time made to serve state policy by strict methods of control and even by partial ownership.

The World War had shown the possibility of government participation in industry on a new scale for the purpose of achieving definite ends. The war brought about compulsory organization under government control in every country, rationing raw materials, labor, transportation, and credit with a view to their most effective utilization in winning the war. A free economic system is impossible during a war, and the more in fear of war a nation is, the more will it expand powers of government at the expense of the rights of individuals. Modern warfare, which involves the utilization of all the material and human resources of a nation, inevitably means the most extreme extension of the functions of government into every domain of activity—economic, political, social, intellectual, and even religious. After the World War, in spite of the removal of controls at the insistence of industry, a larger measure of governmental authority remained than had ever existed before.

Finally, the war bred a feeling of insecurity, which led each of the twenty-six states into which Europe was now divided, into a policy of exaggerated nationalism. In no sphere was this more rampant than in the economic. Barriers were set up against the free movement of goods, of capital, and of labor. Higher tariffs, import quotas, and currency juggling kept out competing goods. Each little state set up its own textile mills, its locomotive works, its factories of various sorts. Economic self-sufficiency was thought to be essential to the achievement of political nationalism, and autarchy became the goal of countries sadly deficient in national resources and capital.

World-Wide Expansion of Government

Upon the basis thus laid it became possible for new authoritarian groups to seize the power of the state and to expand this to a point just short of socialism, establishing systems of organization which are a negation of political democracy and of freedom of initiative and enterprise. The political liberalism of the nineteenth century, which allowed small scope for government functions, and the concomitant philosophy of laissez faire with its freedom from political control, both yielded to the new forces of nationalism and authoritarianism, which stretched the powers of the state to the extreme limit. Democratic forms of organization and control were thought to be too clumsy, slow, and uncertain to fit the needs of these new states, and the internationalism of free enterprise was equally inconsistent with their economic aims. In some countries these liberal institutions have been practically destroyed, and even in those countries where the form has been preserved they have been greatly modified.

Although war and threats of war have served in recent years to enlarge the functions and powers of government, the tendency in this direction had been proceeding steadily for the previous half-century. When Professor Henry C. Adams, in a report to the American Economic Association on *The Relation of Modern Municipalities to Quasi-Public Works,* defended the right of the government to control private business, he was regarded as a somewhat dangerous radical. Since that time, however, the Federal and state governments in this country have not only set up many regulating commissions, but have also greatly expanded government enterprises and have entered many fields previ-

ously occupied exclusively by private industry. Although over one-third of the railroad mileage of the world is publicly owned, the governments of the United States have left this field to private enterprise, except for a short line in Alaska; but the Federal Government owns a barge line on the Mississippi River, and at one time owned and operated a considerable merchant marine. It has entered the express, banking, and public utility fields directly, and indirectly a great many others. State and local governments operate practically all sewage disposal systems, most of the water plants, and many other municipal utilities, such as lighting and electricity.

So gradually has the extension of government participation in these varied activities proceeded that it has not met serious opposition. Down to the period of the World War, most of this extension occurred in municipal ownership. Since that event, the Federal Government in the United States and the central governments in other countries have greatly expanded their functions. It is a world-wide trend, in which we on the whole have lagged behind. Regulation rather than ownership has been employed in this country, although the net has steadily been tightened about private enterprise.

Adaptation to Change

A historical survey of the changes that have taken place in both our philosophy and our practice supports certain tentative conclusions. In the first place, we must realize that economic and political institutions are not immutable. As they now exist, they are the product of a long historical evolution under changing environmental conditions, and are themselves subject to further change. The institutions of political liberalism, of private property, of freedom of economic enterprise, of freedom of choice of occupation, and of freedom of mobility of persons are all comparatively new, and rest solely upon broad principles of expediency. If they are now undergoing processes of further change or modification, we need not therefore conclude that the basis of our traditional economic and political world is threatened.

In the next place, there is need for adaptation to changing social environment in the case of political and economic institutions, just as there is in the biological world. Certain institutions of great value in a certain stage of social evolution, as was feudalism or the Canonist doctrine of usury, become outgrown and serve then only to hinder progress. It is often difficult if not impossible to determine, in the midst of a period of change and resulting conflicts between the forces of radicalism and conservatism, to just what extent the status quo should be preserved; but certainly all who urge change or reform are not therefore destroyers of society.

And finally, we must realize that the aim of organized society is the promotion of the common welfare. Government is a most important and powerful agency in achieving this result, and has positive and beneficent contributions to make. The pendulum has swung far from an unrestrained regime of laissez faire in the direction of increasing powers of control and operation. To conclude, however, that it will reach equilibrium only when complete socialism has been attained is to misread the lesson of history. Equilibrium is the result of the movement of opposing forces. Human institutions resist change, and usually yield only because of inherent weakness. If political democracy and economic liberalism are to survive, it will be because they can prove their capacity to meet the problems of today. Government must be admitted as a partner if it is not to be master.

B. Centralization and American Federalism

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*The Obsolescence of Federalism**

HAROLD J. LASKI

Because of our federal structure, the rise of centralization has posed something of a problem for Americans. Dealing with this dilemma, Harold J. Laski—long an advocate of government planning—presents some penetrating observations in support of his thesis that federalism is obsolete and unable to cope effectively with the major problems of the day.

No one can travel the length and breadth of the United States without the conviction of its inexpugnable variety. East and West, South and North, its regions are real and different, and each has problems real and different too. The temptation is profound to insist that here, if ever, is the classic place for a federal experiment. Union without unity—except in the Soviet Union and China, has variety ever so fully invited the implications of the famous definition? Geography, climate, culture, all of them seem to have joined their forces to insist that, wherever centralization is appropriate, here, at least, it has no meaning. Tradition demands its absence; history has prohibited its coming. The large unit, as in Lamennais' phrase, would result in apoplexy at the center and anemia at the extremities. Imposed solutions from a distant Washington, blind, as it must be blind, to the subtle minutiæ of local realities, cannot solve the ultimate problems that are in dispute. A creative America must be a federal America. The wider the powers exercised from Washington, the more ineffective will be the capacity for creative administration. Regional wisdom is the clue to the American future. The power to govern must go where that regional wisdom resides. So restrained, men learn by the exercise of responsibility the art of progress. They convince themselves by experiment from below. To fasten a uniformity that is not in nature upon an America destined to variety is to destroy the prospect of an ultimate salvation.

This kind of argument is familiar in a hundred forms. I believe that, more than any other philosophic pattern, it is responsible for the malaise of American democracy. My plea here is for the recognition that the federal form of state is unsuitable to the stage of economic and social development that America has reached. I infer from this postulate two conclusions: first, that the present division of powers, however liberal be the Supreme Court in its technique of interpretation, is inadequate to the needs America confronts; and, second, that any revision of those powers is one which must place in Washington, and Washington only, the power to amend that revision as circumstances change. I infer, in a word, that the epoch of federalism is

* Reprinted from Harold J. Laski, "The Obsolescence of Federalism," *The New Republic* (May 3, 1938). Used by permission of the publishers.

over, and that only a centralized system can effectively confront the problems of a new time.

To continue with the old pattern, in the age of giant capitalism, is to strike into impotence that volume of governmental power which is necessary to deal with the issues giant capitalism has raised. Federalism, I suggest, is the appropriate governmental technique for an expanding capitalism, in which the price of local habit—which means, also, local delay—admits of compensation in the total outcome. But a contracting capitalism cannot afford the luxury of federalism. It is insufficiently positive in character; it does not provide for sufficient rapidity of action; it inhibits the emergence of necessary standards of uniformity; it relies upon compacts and compromises which take insufficient account of the urgent category of time; it leaves the backward areas a restraint, at once parasitic and poisonous, on those which seek to move forward; not least, its psychological results, especially in an age of crisis, are depressing to a democracy that needs the drama of positive achievement to retain its faith. . . .

Giant capitalism has, in effect, concentrated the control of economic power in a small proportion of the American people. It has built a growing contrast between the distribution of that economic power and the capacity of the political democracy effectively to control the results of its exercise. It has transcended the political boundaries of the units in the American federation so as to make them largely ineffective as areas of independent government. Whether we take the conditions of labor, the level of taxation, the standards of education, public health, or the supply of amenities like housing and recreation, it has become clear that the true source of decision is no longer at the circumference, but at the center, of the state. For forty-eight separate units to seek to compete with the integrated power of giant capitalism is to invite defeat in every element of social life where approximate uniformity of condition is the test of the good life.

The poor state is parasitic on the body politic. It offers privileges to giant capitalism to obtain its taxable capacity, offers escape from the impositions of rich states, in order to wrest from the wealthy some poor meed of compensation for its backwardness. It dare not risk offending the great industrial empires—cotton, coal, iron and steel, tobacco—lest it lose the benefits of their patronage. Their vested interests thus begin to define the limits within which the units of the federation may venture to move. And since the division of powers limits, in its turn, the authority of the federal government to intervene—the latter being a government of limited powers—it follows that the great industrial empires can, in fact, prevent the legislation necessary to implement the purposes of a democratic society. The situation may, briefly, be summarized by saying that the Constitution inhibits the federal government from exercising the authority inherent in the idea of a democracy; while the risk to a state government of attack upon the conditions exacted by those industrial empires for their patronage is too great to permit the states to jeopardize what they have by issuing challenge. Whether, therefore, it be the hours of labor, the standards of health and housing, the effective organization of the trade unions, at every point the formal powers of the states are rarely commensurate with the actual authority they may venture to exercise. And it is the common citizen of the United States who pays the price of that margin between formal and effective power.

Political systems live by the results they

can obtain for the great mass of their citizens. A democracy is not likely to survive on formal grounds merely; it will survive as it is able to convince its citizens that it adequately protects their powers to satisfy the expectations they deem their experience to warrant. In the present phase of American capitalist democracy, the central government largely lacks the power to implement the ends it is essential it should serve if its democratic context is to be maintained. It cannot obtain adequate standards of government in many of the major fields it seeks to enter. It is hamstrung, partly by the division of powers from which it derives its authority; partly because the Constitution has not enabled it to develop the instrumentalities essential to the purposes it must seek to fulfill. Its effort to obtain the proper recognition of collective bargaining may be stricken into impotence by a state law against picketing. Its effort to produce proper control of public utilities may be rendered vain by local franchises granted in a period when the recognition of the need for uniformity in this field had not dawned upon the public consciousness. So, also, with conservation; with the provision of adequate educational opportunity; with the effective prohibition (a commonplace of any well ordered state) of child labor; with the coördination of relief for unemployment; with public works, especially in the utilization of the possible sources of electric power; with public-health legislation, not least in the field of maternity and child hygiene; with a proper policy of public roads—witness the breakdown of federal-state coöperation in Arkansas in 1923, in Kansas in 1926 and Maine in 1929; with a proper policy in housing. I take examples only. The central point of my argument is the simple one that in every major field of social regulation, the authority of which the federal government can dispose is utterly inadequate to the issues it is expected to solve.

I do not think this argument is invalidated by the rise of coöperation between the federal government and the states, or between groups of states. . . . My argument is the very different one: that (a) there are certain objects of administrative control now left to the states for which they are no longer suitable units of regulation. Economic centralization makes necessary at least minimum standards of uniform performance in these objects, e.g., health, education, unemployment relief; and in others, e.g., labor conditions, railroad rates, electric power, complete federal control without interference by the states; and (b) that the proper objects of federal supervision cannot any longer be dependent upon state consent. Where this dependency exists, state consent will be, in its turn, largely controlled by giant capitalism. . . .

The view here urged, of course, looks toward a fundamental reconstruction of traditional American institutions. It is not impressed by the view, associated with the great name of Mr. Justice Brandeis,* that the "curse of bigness" will descend upon any serious departure from the historic contours of federalism. The small unit of government is impotent against the big unit of giant capitalism. It may be that the very power of giant capitalism is no longer of itself compatible with the maintenance of a democratic political structure in society; there is much evidence to support this view. What, at least, is certain is this: that a government the powers of which are not commensurate with its problems will not be able to cope with them. Either,

* Louis D. Brandeis, famous attorney and United States Supreme Court justice (1916–39), was an ardent supporter of Woodrow Wilson's antitrust policies and the author of a collection of essays, *The Curse of Bigness*, published in 1934. [Ed.]

therefore, it must obtain those powers, or it must yield to a form of state more able to satisfy the demands that it encounters. That is the supreme issue before the United States today; and the more closely it is scrutinized the more obviously does its resolution seem to be bound up with the obsolescence of the federal system.

For that system presents the spectacle of forty-nine governments seeking to deal with issues for many of which they are inappropriate as instrumentalities whether in the area they cover or in the authority they may invoke. They are checked and balanced upon a theory of the state completely outmoded in the traditional ends upon which its postulates are based. Giant industry requires a positive state; federalism, in its American form, is geared to vital negations which contradict the implications of positivism. Giant industry requires uniformities in the field of its major influence; American federalism is the inherent foe, both in time and space, of those necessary uniformities. Giant industry, not least, requires the opposition of a unified public will to counteract its tendency to undemocratic procedure through the abuse of power; a federal system of the American kind dissipates the unity of public opinion in those fields where it is most urgently required. And, above all, it is urgent to note that giant industry, in an age of economic contraction, is able to exploit the diversities of a federal scheme, through the delays they permit in the attainment of uniformity, to reactionary ends. Thereby, they discredit the democratic process at a time when it is least able to afford that discredit. For, thereby, the confidence of the citizen body in its power to work out democratic solutions of its problems is gravely undermined.

Men who are deprived of faith by inability to attain results they greatly desire do not long remain content with the institutions under which they live. The price of democracy is the power to satisfy living demands. American federalism, in its traditional form, cannot keep pace with the tempo of the life giant capitalism has evolved. To judge it in terms of its historic success is to misconceive the criteria by which it becomes valid for the present and the future. No political system has the privilege of immortality; and there is no moment so fitting for the consideration of its remaking as that which permits of reconstruction with the prospect of a new era of creative achievement.

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*The Brief for Decentralization**

GEORGE C. S. BENSON

Despite Professor Laski's compelling arguments, there remains the very real problem of adjusting the new centralization to the American experience. Dr. George C. S. Benson, professor of political science and president of Claremont College, presents the brief for decentralization in the light of our own traditions.

It must be remembered that the "decentralization" which this essay attempts to evaluate is a somewhat protean word. It can mean political decentralization or it can mean administrative decentralization. The latter is pre-eminently a question of management policy. It may exist—and often has done so—in countries highly centralized politically. When Madison said during the constitutional controversy in 1787–88, "It would not be difficult to show that if [the states] were abolished, the general government would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction," he was by no means pacifying his opponents. Every ardent Antifederalist realized too clearly the difference between political and administrative decentralization to accept, as a substitute for the former, a system based on the expediency of breaking down a large area into more workable units of control.

This difference must be constantly in mind in any consideration of the pros and cons of decentralization. When in the course of this study the word "decentralization" is used alone, the political meaning is implied. . . .

Bulwark against Usurpation. In this era of fascist dictatorships it is often felt that one of the greatest advantages of the decentralized system is its latent capacity for resisting dictatorial regimentation. If—to be fanciful—a president wished to become dictator, he would be forced to negotiate forty-nine coups rather than one. Certainly a respectable number of governors—all of the opposition party and undoubtedly many others—would rise up with rugged individualism to resist coercion from Washington on matters of internal concern, and in the event of military pressure would undoubtedly call out the National Guard before turning over their state houses to *staathalters* (men placed in charge of the German states by the Hitler regime). Moreover, it is undoubtedly true that the average American citizen is probably less "national minded" as a result of a century and a half of federalism than are the inhabitants of many other countries. That is not, of course, to say that it is impossible to influence the American population on a national scale. But there does exist sufficient confusion of loyalties between state and national governments that one

* George C. S. Benson, *The New Centralization* (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1941). Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

or more governors raising the banner against "fascism" could achieve a considerable amount of counterpropaganda.

Insulation. Justice Holmes coined the happy phrase "the insulated chambers" of the several states. He was referring to their utility for purposes of governmental experimentation, but the phrase is equally descriptive of their capacity for localizing some of the more undesirable manifestations of public intolerance and wrongheadedness. The sovereignty of the states which undoubtedly does give rise to many vexing problems of interlevel adjustment, works in both directions to check "oppression of minorities." . . . Bryce stated this value of federalism: "If social discord or an economic crisis has produced disorders or foolish legislation in one member of the federal body, the mischief may stop at the state frontier instead of spreading through and tainting the nation at large." And to return to the second point hinted above, the fact that the disease is isolated may in itself tend to promote the cure. Montesquieu, praising the values of federalism, pointed out: "Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound." It is striking how quickly Louisiana has returned to the main current of American governmental ideology after the Long regime. It may well be that the localization of the prejudice against the Negroes has been an important factor in the considerable improvement in Southern attitude and in the decrease in annual lynchings during the past fifty years from 231 to 3. No state desires for too long to play the role of solitary or even minority villain.

Separation of Issues. Potentially, at least, the federal system makes possible the very salutary separation of state and local from national issues. One of the great difficulties even now for the thoughtful voter is the number of judgments registered by a single X on the November ballot. The choice between presidential candidate *A* whose foreign policy we approve and whose domestic policy we abhor and candidate *B* whose domestic policy we should like to support but whose foreign policy we consider disastrous, is sufficiently painful, but if—as under a unitary system—that same X covered decisions on state sales taxes, county relief administration, and municipal sewage disposal plans, we should in effect be abrogating our right to decide on nine-tenths of the issues involved. It is true that the full value of this aspect of federalism is far from being achieved. The form of ballot which encourages block party voting and the human tendency, especially in presidential election years, to subordinate our judgments on state and local candidates to those on national affairs both tend to counteract the advantage. But the fact remains that these mechanical or psychological factors are not fundamental. The nature of the federal system permits us to register our conviction that the program of one party is nationally advantageous, that the state program of another party is superior within the state and that perhaps a "nonpartisan" local administration may promise the best results.

Administrative Efficiency. Even while granting that most of the states are inferior to Washington in administrative efficiency, many students of government are convinced that a government adequate to a large country necessarily becomes unwieldy when its administration is too highly centralized. Economists tell us that it is possible for corporations to reach a size at which the economies of large-scale operation are more than counter-balanced by the inefficiency of a top-heavy overhead management. It is, of course, difficult to

say just where this point of diminishing returns occurs. Some people feel that it has already been reached in the federal government—that a million civil employees is an unmanageable staff; that scores of relatively independent federal agencies must inevitably fail to coordinate their activities; that the machinery is so bewilderingly complex that not even the well-intentioned and persevering can find and root out waste and duplication and inefficiency and that the inertia of large-scale organization is difficult to overcome. . . .

Political Laboratories. Mr. Justice Holmes was not the only one who believed in the "experimental" value of the federal system. Bryce said: "Federalism enables a people to try experiments in legislation and administration which could not be safely tried in a large centralized country. A comparatively small commonwealth like an American state easily makes and unmakes its laws; mistakes are not serious, for they are soon corrected; other states profit by the experience of a law or a method which has worked well or ill in the state that has tried it." And another English writer remarked that "the western states have been the Scandinavia and Switzerland of the New World—laboratories for innumerable experiments in direct democracy." * While the objection that the scientific aspects of this experimentation have too often been negligible is not without foundation . . . , it is true that many policies and techniques later adopted by other states or by the federal government have been tried out on state testing grounds. . . .

There has been an unusual amount of state experimentation in so-called "direct democracy." Popular referenda on certain issues, popular recall of public officials, direct primary elections to nominate party candidates, popular initiative of laws or constitutional amendments—all have been tried out by the states. Although some of these devices have worked badly and students of government are not agreed definitely on which ones can be fitted harmoniously into the total system, it is nevertheless encouraging that the states are eager and able to carry out these experiments. . . .

Adaptation to Local Needs. The impossibility of adjusting blanket policies and techniques to all the diversified local problems and conditions in so extensive a country as this has long been a chief argument for decentralization. Social legislation adapted to Northern states, it was claimed, was neither feasible nor desirable in certain Southern areas. Laws suitable in a thickly populated, largely urbanized and highly industrial state would ill fit the situation in Nebraska or Nevada.

Certainly it is possible to cite instances both of uniform legislation and of uniform administrative policies which have failed simply because they did not respect these essential differences. For example, prior to 1919, several states had adopted state-wide prohibition laws. Many of these laws had been in effect for years and apparently were proving relatively satisfactory. Prohibition was consonant to the wishes of a substantial majority of the local citizens in each case and enforcement proved more or less possible, though somewhat handicapped by interstate evasion. But the total failure of the attempt to impose a national prohibition law is notorious. Popular reaction was prompt and vigorous. . . .

Conclusions. It is apparent that the traditional American decentralization possesses many advantages—advantages not to be lightly discarded in a sudden "reform

* K. Smellie, *The American Federal System* (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1928) 46.

movement" toward centralization. A system of relatively autonomous units is valuable as a safeguard against possible *coups d'état,* as a quarantine against sociological diseases, as a device for separating political issues which need separation. It permits administration on a more workable scale, adaptation to local needs, and training in self-government. However, the very fact that there exists a definite trend toward centralization proves that decentralization has either failed to achieve its inherent advantages or that other advantages not inherent to it seem increasingly significant.

C. The Nature of Centralization

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*Government and Economic Life: The American Experience**

L. S. LYON and V. ABRAMSON

The Brookings Institution, established in 1927 in Washington, D.C., is devoted to advanced research and training in the social sciences and is particularly noted for its brilliant studies in economics and public policy. Just prior to World War II, the center's Institute of Economics published a two-volume work on *Government and Economic Life.* Authored by Leverett S. Lyon, Myron W. Watkins, Victor Abramson, and seven associates, these volumes constitute one of the best historical and contemporary analyses of centralization. From the final chapter of volume two, Lyon and Abramson discuss the role of government in the American economic experience.

From the beginning of our national history there has existed [a] dual relationship of government to economic life. . . . At the very outset, the federal government undertook to organize directly our relationships with foreign nations, and to provide for the national defense; and its activities in the protection of person and property constituted an important implementation of private enterprise. The singling out of areas of private enterprise for special treatment by government began with the tariff act passed by the first Congress in 1789, which declared as one of its purposes "the encouragement and protection of manufactures." The obligations which the common law (taken over from England in the majority of the state jurisdictions) imposed upon "common carriers" and "common callings" to serve all comers at nondiscriminatory rates, further provided special treatment for the transportation and public utility industries.

Early emphasis on implementation and promotion. During the course of the next

* L. S. Lyon and V. Abramson, *Government and Economic Life,* II (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1940). Copyright by The Brookings Institution and used with their permission.

century, the activities of the federal government in relation to economic life were concerned primarily with the implementation and promotion of private enterprise. In addition, however, during this period the tariff became more highly developed as an instrument for bestowing private favors, the postal system was developed, and several wars were waged, each of which required temporarily an extension of direct government production and special regulations of private enterprise.

The elementary structure of implementation was established when the "principles" of property and contract of the common law of England were in large part taken over and enforced by the state governments of the United States. These principles provided the basis for the formation of both individual proprietorships and partnerships for the conduct of business enterprise. By the third decade of the nineteenth century, however, a great advance in the implementation of private enterprise was under way in the adaptation of the corporate device to business enterprises. This organizational form, growing in response to the expanding opportunities for large-scale production, conferred upon those using it the possibility of greatly increased power through extended capitalization. On the other hand, it tended when applied to vast enterprises to divorce ownership from control and thus raised problems concerning the solicitude of management for the interests of the stockholders.

Closely related to the provision of organizational forms for business enterprise was the development of the law of bankruptcy and reorganization. The laws in this field were designed primarily to liberalize and to define more clearly the responsibilities involved in financial failure, and thus to stimulate the use of credit and encourage a maximum of enterprise. . . .

A further important implementation of private enterprise provided by the federal government during the early period of American history was our system of patent rights, designed to provide an incentive and reward for invention. The first patent act was enacted in 1790, and during the next century the system underwent progressive liberalization in favor of the patentee.

The provision of a monetary mechanism to facilitate the conduct of private enterprise also occupied the attention of the federal government in the early years. One of the first tasks undertaken was the direct provision of money through the minting of coins and protection against counterfeiting. This was followed shortly, but only temporarily, by the provision of a paper currency through the First and Second Banks of the United States. Prior to the Civil War, the primary source of paper currency was private bank notes, and the regulation of their issue and value by the state governments was one of the earliest forms of governmental regulation of private enterprise. The establishment of the National Banking System in 1863 marked the permanent entry of the federal government into the regulation of note issue by private banks, as well as of the relations of these banks with their depositors. The greenbacks issued during the Civil War, moreover, constituted a direct provision of paper currency by the federal government. Full recognition of bank credit as a medium of exchange, and its regulation, did not come until the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Under the Federal Reserve System, the regulation of commercial banks has developed from controls designed primarily to protect depositors and note holders from bank insolvency and to stimulate the currency of these notes and deposits, into controls de-

signed to influence the level of interest rates and the availability of credit with a view to mitigating the severity of the business cycle.

In many ways most spectacular among the early activities of our governments in relation to economic life were their promotional activities in connection with internal improvements and education. In an effort to promote the settlement and development of the West, grants of free land and other financial assistance were provided for highway, canal, and railway projects, and there were a few instances of direct government production of each of these forms of transportation. To assure proper educational facilities for newly settled regions, grants of land were made for school purposes; in some instances these grants were made specifically to finance instruction and research in "agriculture and mechanic arts." A considerable development of this character took place also at the local level of government.

The elaborate standardization and research activities of our federal government in the interest of producers, consumers, laborers, and investors, with which we are now familiar, are largely the product of the twentieth century.

The development of regulation. In the last decade and a half of the nineteenth century the emphasis in federal relationships to economic life shifted to the imposition of controls over private enterprise, designed to guide it into socially more desirable channels and to prohibit certain practices which had been widely condemned. The common law rules against "restraint of trade" and "conspiracy to monopolize," and against fraud and deception, as well as much of our tort and criminal law, provided governmental regulation of this character from the beginning of our national history. The increasing industrialism and greater urbanization of the post-Civil War period, however, gave rise to demands for added controls in this direction.

The earliest objects of widespread public demands for additional regulation were the railways. As the railways grew to importance in the seventies and eighties, the discriminatory practices of the monopolized lines, and the poor service they often provided, lead to considerable dissatisfaction, particularly among farmers, who were their main customers in the West. These demands brought forth, first, a program of state regulation, and eventually a series of federal controls, beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. The object of these early regulations was to enforce competition in the industry. This was done primarily by prohibiting certain practices leading to and resulting from the monopolistic controls, such as the charging of "extortionate" or "discriminatory" rates, and pooling.

The Sherman Act, passed in 1890, reflects a broader demand for similar efforts to maintain competition in the general fields of trade and industry. The rise of business units operating on a national scale in the period after the Civil War (fostered by our tariff and corporation laws as well as by the settlement of the West and changes in technical conditions of production) increased the dependency of individuals upon employment by others, and was accompanied by a greater urbanization of our population. At the same time the free land of the West was gradually absorbed, restricting opportunities on this frontier. In these circumstances, recessions in business activity during the eighties were frequently attributed to the existence of large units of enterprise, and a movement developed to restrict them by more stringent controls than had been provided under the common law, which relied largely on pri-

vate suits for damage, or under state laws, which could not effectively reach the great interstate combinations. The Sherman Act prohibited contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, and attempts to monopolize—made them public offenses and provided means of dealing with interstate transactions.

As the judges have read the Sherman Act, its purpose was not to condemn mere size or even market control. Only power unreasonably acquired or abused was held to be proscribed; and *intent* to harm competitors or abuse customers and the *existence* of collusive action became the prominent tests of unreasonableness. It proved difficult under court interpretation of this law to attack practices which *tended to lead to* monopoly, prior to evidence that substantial market control had actually been acquired. It was such interpretation, making it impossible to check certain market practices believed to bring about the destruction of competitive forces, which led in 1914 to provisions in an amendment, the Clayton Act, prohibiting such actions as price discrimination, tying contracts, intercorporate stockholding, and interlocking directorates, the effect of which might be substantially to lessen competition. In 1936 price discrimination was further regulated by the Robinson-Patman Act.

The year 1914 also saw the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission with broad powers to stamp out "unfair methods of competition" in commerce. Under this authority, the Commission has attacked a wide range of deceptive and obstructive practices by sellers, and thereby aided in elevating the plane of competition. The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 has recently strengthened the powers of the Commission in this regard.

The common law had earlier provided remedies against deceptive, fraudulent, and obstructive practices, but it relied on private suit for enforcement, and on judicial decisions and precedents to indicate the range of prohibited acts. This was a slow, expensive, and uncertain procedure. Several factors provided an urge to the imposition of more responsive, more direct, and more extensive controls. The advance of manufacturing technique widened the opportunity for the creation of deceptive form; the range and rate of change in the variety of commodities offered on the market increased, so that it became more difficult for consumers to evaluate alternatives on the basis of their own experience; and the growth of advertising, according to some views, widened the possibilities of deception. To meet this situation, the Federal Trade Commission Act made deception of various forms a public offense, and provided for the surveillance of selling practices by a governmental agency armed with what appeared in the beginning to be broad powers to issue cease and desist orders.

The effort to prevent the deception of consumers began, on a more limited scale, even before the Federal Trade Commission Act, and has been extended in many special forms since. Important beginnings were made in 1906 under the Food and Drugs Act, and a year later under the Meat Inspection Act. A number of special acts since that time have provided similar specific regulations for a number of other industries, covering primarily agricultural commodities and supplies for agricultural production. Somewhat different in character, but directed toward a similar objective, has been a considerable body of legislation establishing compulsory requirements of disclosure and minimum standards of composition or quality for a number of different commodities, primarily food and drugs —in which deception of the consumer

would be likely to have the most serious consequences. Moreover, over this same period of time there has been an enormous extension of governmental activities in the grading and standardization of commodities, and in . . . furnishing useful information to buyers and sellers at all stages of the production and distribution process.

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*Government and Economic Life: New Directions**

L. S. LYON, M. W. WATKINS, and V. ABRAMSON

From the summary chapter of volume one of *Government and Economic Life,* the authors evaluate developments and directions in this vital area.

It is appropriate . . . as we conclude our analysis of the general relationships of government to private enterprise, to make certain interpretative observations and to point out certain important new trends and developments. . . .

It was exactly 150 years ago that the people of the thirteen separate commonwealths, having dishearteningly failed in their efforts to construct an effective instrument of national government through the Articles of Confederation, made a new attempt through the adoption of the Constitution. The need for a device with which to deal effectively with national economic affairs was the strongest force behind the creation of the Constitution. With the ratification by the states in 1789, a new relationship between the national government and the economic life of the country was initiated. Through that government there have been formulated and put into effect public policies which have had a profound and pervasive influence on the economic development of the nation.

Certain aspects of public economic policy have shown a marked consistency. For example, the belief that it is desirable to maintain competition among business men in the general fields of manufacture and trade has persisted. It is true . . . that there have been variations in the emphasis placed on maintaining competition, and differences of judgment respecting what could be called a desirable degree of rivalry. Nevertheless, the laws and court decisions which give expression to public policy have, in general, reflected the view that competition, whatever its shortcomings may be, furnishes for a large part of economic life the best available means of regulating productive and distributive processes in the public interest. Similarly, while the scope and method of governmental efforts to implement private enterprise and to establish a proper plane of competition have been modified from time to time in response to changing economic and social condi-

* L. S. Lyon, M. W. Watkins and V. Abramson, *Government and Economic Life,* I (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1939). Copyright by The Brookings Institution and used with their permission.

tions, these efforts have reflected consistently a design to make private enterprise a better device for the organization of economic life.

On the other hand, a number of features of public economic policy have recently undergone profound modification. Analysis of these modifications shows that they have been of two broad types: there have been significant changes in the purposes or objectives toward which government action is directed; and there have been hardly less significant changes in the governmental methods employed. Both have been related either directly or indirectly to changes in criteria of valuation—to changes of opinion regarding relative social values. The forces which have brought about these changes have been numerous. Some are influences which have been developing over many years. Others are primarily depression-born.

Changes in Objectives. One objective of public policy in which a significant change has occurred is the provision of economic security. To make livelihood secure has always been among the objectives of governmental action. But there has been a change of emphasis. The earlier view was that reasonable security could be achieved largely by preserving freedom of economic opportunity, and by implementing and regulating private enterprise to provide a healthy rivalry. Latterly, the belief has grown that these devices are not sufficient. It is now widely agreed that it is desirable in addition to regulate the pace of general business activity and to assure a minimum income to those who cannot provide it for themselves.

Another alteration of objectives is discernible in the extension of the principle of preserving the competitive position of particular industries or groups. This policy found early expression in the enactment of the "protective" tariff. While the industries protected by tariff barriers are among the most significant areas thus favored, the number of industries given some kind of special aid has greatly increased in recent years. Special treatment of this character is now accorded to agriculture, bituminous coal, and, in some degree, to certain transport industries and to petroleum and natural gas.

In addition, there has been a notable movement in the past decade or two to preserve "small," "independent" business units against the competition of their larger or affiliated rivals. The view that small units need to be protected against the large, if competition is to be preserved, goes back to the early period of antitrust agitation, more than half a century ago. But more recently this notion has been supplemented by the contention that small business is desirable for its own sake, and thus deserves protection apart from its competitive qualities. It has been urged that the maintenance of small units in business enterprise affords a wider range of opportunity for self-expression in economic affairs than would otherwise obtain, and that the preservation of opportunity for individual initiative is socially desirable even if a loss in technical efficiency is involved. By others it is contended that when an industry is organized on the basis of small and independent units, there is assured that ease of entry and adaptability to change which are regarded as essential to the best functioning of a private enterprise system. Further, it is sometimes maintained that smaller units would be technically more efficient than the larger ones that now exist, and that governmental agencies, more effectively than competitive forces, can determine what the optimum size should be.

Changes in Methods. In addition to these broad changes relating to the objectives of

public economic policy, there have been changes in the methods of governmental action. Most important has been the development of governmental prescriptions concerning the management policies of private business. The mere implementation of private enterprise, and the proscription of specific forms of competitive behavior, have apparently come to be regarded as less and less adequate to the achievement of social ends. Increasingly and in many fields it has been thought necessary to impose by government requirement definite modes of conduct for private enterprise.

Certain of these management controls are designed to regulate the pace of general business activity. Most notable of these have been monetary controls. While there were early efforts in this direction, as illustrated by central banking policies during the period between the World War and the depression of the thirties, these efforts have been greatly intensified within the past few years. Moreover, there has occurred an important shift in the character of the monetary measures employed, from the regulation of rediscount rates and open market operations, to the federal programs of taxation, spending, and lending. To control in some measure the pace of general business activity through governmental management was also an avowed part of the philosophy of the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Management regulation by public authorities has also been applied to the protection of the competitive position of special groups or industries. The laws just mentioned were directed in part toward such a purpose, as was the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. Perhaps the most important legislation extending the sphere of management regulation in the interest of special groups, however, is that designed to safeguard the competitive position of small-scale enterprise. Illustrative of such legislation in the federal sphere is the Robinson-Patman Act. . . . This act imposes restrictions on brokerage payments, advertising allowances, and selling aids, to prevent alleged price discrimination in favor of chain stores and other large-scale distributors. Even more significant in terms of extension of management responsibilities of government is the provision of the act which empowers the Federal Trade Commission to establish limits to quantity discounts, without regard to differences in costs. Also illustrating governmental management activities designed to protect the smaller business units are the discriminatory taxes levied by a number of states upon chain stores.

While the federal government has not yet utilized its taxing power to penalize the larger or to subsidize the smaller units, considerable pressure was brought upon both the 75th and 76th Congress * to secure the enactment of such legislation.

To facilitate the conduct of these management-control activities by government, statutory enactments administered by the ordinary agents of law enforcement and the courts have been considered inadequate. It has been found expedient to establish special agencies, in the form of administrators, commissions, and authorities. These agencies have usually been implemented with a staff of research workers, and with sub-agencies and a corps of subordinate officials for policing and for the conduct of hearings. In some instances, such as the National Recovery Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, responsibility was delegated to administrative bodies to a degree for which there was little precedent in pre-twentieth century

* January, 1937–January, 1941. [Ed.]

experience. In these instances the extent of the industrial area covered and the number, variety, and dispersion of the productive units regulated necessitated a huge administrative mechanism.

A second important modification of governmental methods is the considerable expansion of direct production by government. . . . direct production of final goods and services by public agencies was until recent years comparatively small. We have now, however, become accustomed to the extensive provision of public education, public recreational facilities, and public health service. During the last decade, moreover, government production has been extended to the supplying of income for many persons, and to the organization of a vast program of insurance against unemployment, incapacity, and old age.

A third important change in methods is governmental sponsorship of the organization of special interest groups, and the encouragement of partisan group participation in governmental functions. Special interest groups have been known since time immemorial, and their efforts to influence legislation and administration have been persistent throughout American history. But not until recently has government sought actively to promote the organization of partisan interests and required their participation on one level or another in the legislative and administrative process. Under the N.R.A. such groups were accorded a position which was novel in American experience. In the years which have followed, the activities of partisan groups have continued, and it appears that they may become a permanent feature in the relationship of government to economic life.

Three partisan groups which have been particularly sponsored by governmental policies are the labor group, the "producer" or employer group, and the consumer group. These policies have been predicated upon the idea that each of these major groups is more or less homogeneous in composition, and has certain jointly held interests distinguishable from and in some degree different from the others. It is assumed that a desirable public policy may result from group compromise growing out of identification and organization of these groups, and clarification and crystallization of their distinct interests. . . .

Changes in Criteria. These new developments and current trends in the relationship of government to economic life in America profoundly affect the organization and conduct of industry, and raise vital issues for democracy itself. Most significant is the evidence they give of changes in criteria or standards of what is sound public policy.

First, in the present trend toward increased governmental management in economic life, and increased direct production by government, there is implicit a diminished confidence in private enterprise as a social instrumentality for the organization of economic life. In the assignment of new tasks to government—whether for the more direct provision of economic security or for the preservation of particular groups or industries—there is a challenge to the capacity of private enterprise to contribute to the provision and maintenance of a tolerable level of national income. In these new activities of government, there is also implicit a diminished valuation of economic freedom as an end in itself.

A second change in criteria is found in the tendency to identify the special interests of particular groups or industries with the national welfare. Many generations of Americans conceived the basic criteria of sound public policy in such terms as "maximum national income," "industrial effi-

ciency," and "individual economic opportunity." The precedence of these tests of social welfare has latterly been qualified if not displaced. The test more and more frequently applied to proposed measures has been their efficacy to promote the economic security of special interest groups. This test is not new in American experience, as is illustrated by the long history of the "protective" tariff. What is new is the growing conviction that whatever serves to afford more security to establish "blocs" of industrial or group interests is socially salutary, and the wider application of this test, as is evidenced in recent legislation affecting small-scale distributors, labor, and the transportation, bituminous coal, and agricultural industries.

As we have pointed out . . . , legislation has often, for administrative reasons or because of peculiar features of the situations involved, been oriented on an industry or group basis. This is ordinarily necessary wherever extensive management regulation is undertaken. The regulation of the so-called public utilities provides an excellent example of this type of control. In the new trend, however, the tendency is to extend special treatment on the basis of the interests of the special group affected, and indeed in some instances to identify the public interest with the interest of the group as the members of the group define it.

Those who believe that in approaching public economic problems from this standpoint there is promise of sounder public policy than when proposals are appraised in terms of the traditional American criteria, base their belief upon the view that the machine technique makes group organization and rigorous discipline unavoidable. This view was well expressed by Justice Holmes more than forty years ago: ". . . it is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of industrial history . . . that the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever increasing might and scope of combination. It seems to me futile to set our faces against this tendency. Whether beneficial on the whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of society, and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be changed."

On the other hand, there are many who are convinced that the use of the machine technique involves no inexorable tendency toward economic integration, group organization, and individual subordination, or in any other definite direction. They maintain that if the community comes to believe that tendencies toward concerted action, concentrations of power, or the favoring of group interests are disadvantageous, these tendencies may be curbed. Many of those who thus oppose a theory of economic determinism urge the preservation of reasonable opportunities for individual self-expression and spontaneous action in economic affairs. It is a vain hope, they contend, to look for a progressive and efficient economy in the organization of powerful partisan groups.

In whatever direction changes are made, nothing is more important than to realize that the increased assumption of management controls by government confronts legislators and administrators with problems which are more complicated, more technical, and socially more significant than those with which they have been traditionally concerned. To the extent that their problems become more complicated and technical it becomes more difficult for officials to be certain of the consequences of the decisions which they must make. Yet the greater social significance of these decisions makes it more important that the consequences be foreseen. In these circum-

stances it may be well to realize that the "curse of bigness," of which Justice Brandeis has written so brilliantly, can blight an industrial empire under governmental control as effectively as it can one under the management of private citizens.

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*Government and Business in a Mixed Economy**

MERLE FAINSOD

Among the alternatives offered as a solution to the problem of centralization, and the one toward which we seem to be moving slowly, is that of a "mixed economy." Merle Fainsod, professor of government at Harvard University and co-author of *Government and the American Economy,* discusses the nature of the "mixed economy" as his contribution to the cooperative volume on *Saving American Capitalism.*

A decade ago, when New Deal hopes still glowed brightly, mixed economy as exemplified by Sweden's "Middle Way" was being saluted as a shining pole-star of America's future. Today, in the full swing of the reaction against war controls, mixed economy is being denounced in influential circles. It is widely heralded as the "road to serfdom." Our efforts to mingle public ownership, government controls, private and cooperative enterprise, we are told, must end in disaster. Either we must choose wholly unrestricted and uncontrolled private enterprise or submit to dictatorial regimentation. There is no middle way.

This "either-or" line of argument has an obvious polemic value. It is intended to make us hesitate before we entrust any additional functions to government. Yet as a matter of practical choice, it is doubtful whether any substantial body of opinion in the United States, Republican or Democratic, would be prepared to recognize the alternatives of laissez faire or dictatorship as very real. We maintain our attachment to civil and political liberties. We retain our faith in private enterprise as a mainspring of economic activity in many important sectors of our economic life. But, particularly since the Great Depression, we have also come to accept a new responsibility on the part of government for the economic well-being of the nation. There are certain basic securities, such as protection against unemployment and provision for the aged and the destitute, which are increasingly recognized as a primary concern of government. We can be certain that if mass unemployment should again be with us, it will be to government that people will turn for action.

Does this mean that we are committed to a future in which government grows more and more powerful? Will we in our drive for security create an all-powerful bureaucratic Frankenstein which ends up by telling us where we shall work, what we shall eat, what we shall produce, how much we

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shall earn, and what we shall think? Or is there middle ground between complete private and complete public enterprise in which we can combine the civil and political liberties which we cherish and the basic economic securities to which we aspire?

The Meaning of "Mixed Economy." The term which we use to describe such middle ground is mixed economy. The phrase "mixed economy" may cover a considerable variety of possible permutations and combinations. In this country, for all of the legacy of New Deal controls, it still refers to an economy in which private enterprise is of major importance. By far the larger part of our heavy and light industries and distributive trades falls within the area of private ownership and control.

A mixed economy of this kind means that responsibility for the economic welfare of the nation is decentralized. Over most of the economy we look to businessmen to make the important decisions determining output, prices, and profits. Their decisions are in turn affected by the demands and bargaining strength of labor, by the prices paid for raw materials which farmers and others produce, and by the public policies which government pursues. The policies of government are particularly important in the area of fiscal policy and over the whole range of publicly owned or regulated industries. But our "mixed economy" does not operate with a centrally directed plan. Business, labor, agriculture, and government all divide and share responsibility for making the important economic choices which, taken together, spell prosperity or depression.

The Dangers of Mixed Economy. Here lie both the great danger and the grand opportunity of mixed economy. The danger consists in the fact that each group may make its own economic decisions with an eye only on what it conceives to be its own short-run interests. That danger is vividly illustrated by inflationary developments since the collapse of the wartime stabilization program. Some businessmen who should have known better have driven for higher prices in order to make excessive profits in a scarcity market, regardless of the impact on the rest of the economy and the long-term consequences of boom and bust. Some farm groups, too, have exploited shortages and have sought to perpetuate them against the day when consumer demand begins to fall off. Certain labor leaders have resorted to monopolistic restrictions and paralyzing strikes to win compensatory advantages for themselves. A mixed economy operated in this fashion becomes very mixed up indeed, particularly when, as part of the reaction against war controls, government abdicates its responsibilities and allows the pulling and hauling of the great economic groups to prepare the way for catastrophe.

These dangers are real. But the opportunities for constructive statesmanship are no less apparent. A business community concerned with its own survival must appreciate that public responsibilities go with leadership, and that these responsibilities extend beyond the short-run profit and loss position of the company. Business needs to recognize that its own health is dependent on the economic health of the other large economic groups in the nation—farmers, workers, and consumers. The relationship by the same token is reciprocal, a fact which the more far-sighted farmer and labor leaders give increasing evidence of understanding.

The Task of Government. Government too has its obligations to meet. Its basic problem is to achieve a fruitful working relationship with the great economic groups so that each can make its contribution to

the national economic well-being. If a mixed economy is to produce maximum employment, production, and purchasing power, government and business dare not fall into the error of regarding each other as hostile antagonists. The legacy of bitterness which we carry over from the thirties does not ease the task of making a mixed economy work. The New Deal expansion of the economic powers of government represented in the main a response to the demands of disadvantaged farm and labor groups, which used the instrumentality of government to improve their positions. Controls, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board, which were imposed on business, inspired resentment. Many business leaders viewed the New Deal as an enemy determined to displace private enterprise by a socialist state. The frictions and cleavages produced had destructive results. Despite unprecedented governmental activity during the New Deal era and very real social gains, substantial portions of our resources of capital and labor remained idle. The full possibilities of synchronizing governmental and business efforts to overcome economic maladjustments were not adequately realized.

Can they be effectively meshed? If we are to operate a mixed economy with any hope of success, we must exercise all our ingenuity and inventiveness to devise a scheme of interrelationships which will avoid locking business and government in sterile combat. We must find ways of inducing both business and government to give their support to public policies which spell high production, full employment, economic stability, and equitable distribution.

The Employment Act of 1946 with its provision for a three man Council of Economic Advisers, whose function it is, among other things, "to recommend to the President national economic policies to foster and promote free competitive enterprise, to avoid economic fluctuations or to diminish the effects thereof, and to maintain employment, production, and purchasing power" is a useful start in this direction. But it is only a start. The analyses and recommendations of the council are essays in persuasion, rather than policies which carry their own implementation.

As we grapple with the economic problems of the post war years there are certain lessons of our past experience with government regulation of business which it is important for us to keep in mind. Typically, the regulatory agency in this country has not been concerned with such issues as maximizing production, or employment, or securing the most efficient utilization of resources. Typically, as in the railroad field, we have embarked on regulation to stamp out specific abuses such as unreasonable or discriminatory rates. It was important that such abuses be eliminated. But a regulatory philosophy which puts major emphasis on a system of negative restraints inevitably generates friction between regulators and regulated. It is difficult in such a climate to develop public policies in which government and business contribute their efforts as collaborative instrumentalities working toward a common goal.

It may well be that there are situations in which direct controls of the traditional type are unavoidable. Short of public ownership, it is difficult to visualize any alternatives in those areas of the economy in which monopoly factors have taken firm root. Moreover, in a full-employment economy threatened by run-away inflation, where fiscal controls have proved inadequate, direct controls over prices, wages, and allocations may have to be invoked as a last resort. But it should be recognized that the imposition of such controls is al-

most certain to accentuate hostility between business and government.

Effective Compromise. Can terms be found by which government and business can join in building a full-employment economy without wasting their energies in useless friction? Some indications that the problem is not insoluble are provided by the public utterances of such business leaders as Mr. Paul G. Hoffman, chairman of the Committee for Economic Development. Mr. Hoffman and those for whom he speaks agree that it will take the collective wisdom of government, business, labor, and agriculture to stabilize our economic system. He has declared himself ready to support a considerable expansion in the coverage of unemployment insurance, the management of the public debt and credit policy to achieve greater economic stability, the timing of the construction of public works so as to provide for expansion when the level of private business activity is low, a vigorous anti-monopoly policy to insure competition, and a tax system recast to stabilize spending and to encourage investment in risk enterprises. It may well be that the conceptions of government's responsibilities shared by Mr. Hoffman and his collaborators fall far short of the views of liberals who are prepared to press for higher minimum wages, for vigorous programs of regional development, for slum clearance, for health insurance, and the guarantee of a basic minimum diet below which no American family should be allowed to fall. But at least there is common ground within which it is possible to work together. With a minimum of recrimination on each side, it may even be possible to widen the area of agreement.

If public policy is to be oriented toward dynamic economic expansion, and, if business leadership is expected to play a significant role in achieving such expansion, we cannot afford to accept the dreary either-or dilemma that there can be no compromise between private and public enterprise and that their essential purposes are always and necessarily hostile. The challenge is rather that of devising the means and inventing the techniques by which both government and business can make a common contribution to the prosperity of the nation. . . .

Regulation by incentive has its dangers. Carried to a *reductio ad absurdum,* its logic trends toward a demand for universal subsidization. But it is a mistake in public policy, as in other areas, to seek to discredit a device on the ground that it can be abused. The more important question is whether there are areas of public policy where it can be effectively used to achieve the goals of economic welfare upon which there is widespread agreement. If incentives can be employed at strategic points in the economy as seed to produce a richer crop of national economic well-being, then their use should not be too difficult to justify. From this point of view there is much to be said for careful experimentation with this technique of regulation, not only in periods of depression when consumption needs to be expanded and new investment encouraged, but also in periods of relative prosperity when resistance to the expansion of the capacity of bottle-neck industries such as steel cannot otherwise be overcome. . . .

New technological developments mean that government will become an increasingly important factor in the economy. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, for example, outlines a program for government control of production, ownership, and use of fissionable material. New vistas are opened up which we can as yet only dimly apprehend. This new source of energy, provided we find ways of holding its destructive potentialities in leash, may have profound consequences on the organization of our

civilian economy. The responsibilities imposed on government controllers are awesome in their magnitude. There have been few periods in our history when the need for an able and responsible public service has been more urgent.

Do these increased governmental responsibilities spell the omnipotent state and the end of individual liberties as we have known them in the past? No one can vouchsafe a certain answer. In a political system such as ours in which organized economic interests find free expression, no single pattern of relationships between government and the great economic groups can be forever ordained as fixed and unalterable. But while the bulk of the American electorate retains a vigorous and lively faith in democratic processes and our economic system provides high employment, production, and just distribution, the danger is not great. The immediate problem which faces us is not the menace of a totalitarian state or the loss of our political liberties. The challenge is rather that of using government creatively, not as a threat to private enterprise, but as a positive guiding force to strengthen the economy and to adjust it to the needs of the basic economic groups—consumers, farmers, laborers, and businessmen—to whom it is directly responsible.

D. Centralization and Governmental Problems

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*The American Administrative System**

LEONARD D. WHITE

The field of public administration deals with those activities of government designed to execute or enforce the policies established by the legally constituted authorities. With centralization there has been an accompanying expansion of these activities which raises, in turn, pertinent questions concerning the present functions, organization and authority of the American administrative system. Professor Leonard D. White, author of the four-volume administrative history of the United States and a leading authority in this area, discusses trends in this field.

1. Trends in Administrative Functions and Organization

It was inevitable that the transformation of the United States from a rural agricultural nation to one predominately urban and industrial should have a profound effect upon its civil institutions. The modest local government idealized by Jefferson, limited in scope and managed by its citizens, was gradually submerged in large parts of the country by the complex, expensive, and powerful administrative machine of today. Rural administration is still important, but the principal administrative

* The selection from Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration;* copyright 1939 by The Macmillan Company and used with the publisher's permission.

problems are found in the management of cities, of states, of regions and of the nation.

In a brief survey of a century's changes in the administrative structure of a nation as great as this, only some of the most significant aspects can be selected for attention. Other choices could well be made but there will perhaps be agreement that among the principal modifications are these: the great expansion of administrative functions, both regulatory and service, and in consequence the rise of organs of general management; the shift from law enforcement by judicial action alone to considerable law enforcement by administrative officials, entailing the growth of administrative discretion; the expansion of national administrative power and influence at the expense of the states, and of the states at the expense of the cities and counties; the early dispersion and eventual integration of internal administrative responsibility, involving a new concept of the office of chief executive; the gradual decline of patronage, accompanied by the increasing employment of specialists, professional men and scientists, and the rise of administrative planning.

a. Expansion of Administrative Functions. It is unnecessary to emphasize the facts of administrative expansion. They are familiar signposts of the changing attitudes toward government. . . . They are condemned, tolerated or praised by persons of different social philosophies, but the tide of expansion still flows strongly onward. It is possible that new administrative tasks will arise in the near future in health insurance and "socialized medicine," in the operation of railroads and various local utilities, and in the management of the radio; if not in these, it is reasonably certain that in other fields the expansionist pressure will result in more public administration rather than less. . . .

The multiplication of functions has involved a corresponding increase in administrative agencies; and in consequence the recent development of organs of overhead management. These are still in a relatively primitive stage, but deserve notice as a probable harbinger of one line of important future evolution.

b. Rise of Administrative Agencies for Law Enforcement. In the previous section reference was made to the original dependence upon the courts for the enforcement of law, at the instance of private parties. As a result of the panic of 1837 came the invention of administrative agencies designed to enforce the law and conserve public interests not by prosecution but by supervision and prevention. The character of the change is illustrated by an early example drawn from the administrative history of Massachusetts.

The regulation of banks in the Bay State had gradually expanded since 1780. In essence the plan of bank regulation was, however, the same in 1830 as it was in 1780. The system comprised specific legislative requirements and prohibitions imposed upon the bank as a corporation, a schedule of penalties upon bank officials for violation thereof, and the customary right of an individual to sue the bank in the courts for damages. No official agency existed to inspect the bank or its transactions, except that the necessary initial capital was actually counted at the moment the charter of incorporation was granted.

The growing demand for credit and bank facilities consequent upon the building of factories, canals and railroads led to the rapid increase in the number of banks, and to cutthroat competition between some of them. The panic of 1837 brought out a scandalous story of deception, misuse of funds, violation of law and betrayal of trust. It became obvious that mere legislative commands and prohibitions, enforced

by suit on the part of injured individuals, were completely inadequate either as a restraint upon unsound banking practice or as a safeguard of the rights of depositors.

In 1837 the General Court consequently established the State Bank Commission, the first administrative agency of its kind in the commonwealth, and one of the earliest in the country. The Commission was designed to see that the law was observed by the banks. To this end it had powers of visitation and inspection, power to require periodic statements, and in case of necessity power to require a bank to close its doors. The Commission thus became an instrument of the state to prevent the occurrence of unsound banking conditions, an alternative to judicial redress which experience had already demonstrated to be tardy and ineffective.

Implicit in this change was the recognition of a *public* interest requiring public protection through positive preventive action, in addition to the private interest for which judicial recourse had been thought adequate. The interest of the community in sound banking procedures, it was discovered, could not be left to the action of private creditors of a defunct bank. The recognition of a public interest, requiring public action, underlies not only the early bank commission, but the insurance commissions, the railroad commissions, the utility commissions, and the whole movement in favor of official supervision of the economic order.

Implicit in the emergence of administrative regulatory and supervisory commissions was an expansion of discretionary power vested in administrative officers. Over the years the quantity of official discretion has enlarged, despite the reluctance of courts and some public opposition to administrative justice. In fact, however, both administrative rule making and administrative adjudication have served to amplify the discretion exercised by administrators. Subject to judicial review varying in extent from court to court and from time to time, it has become a characteristic feature of modern administrative procedure in many fields of governmental action.

c. Shift in Administrative Balance of Power. The center of gravity of the American administrative system at its inception was in the local governments; it has passed beyond the states and is now in the national capital. The march of power, constitutional, political, and administrative, to Washington has been one of the important governmental phenomena of the last fifty years. The results of the Civil War were decisive constitutionally; the arrival of "big business" was decisive politically and administratively. With the exception of the largest cities, there has been a notable centralization of authority within the states, as supervision and control of various sorts have been imposed on counties and municipalities. The commerce power and conditional grants to the states have been the principal means of extending national authority at the expense of the states. New types of authority intermediate between the state and the nation, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Port of New York Authority, suggest still further diminution of the administrative position of the commonwealth.

d. Dispersion and Integration of Administrative Responsibility. The expansion of governmental functions was reflected throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century in new administrative agencies. Distrust of the executive branch and preference for popular election of officials brought to pass the establishment of scores of small, independent, uncorrelated authorities, each designed to perform some specific activity.

City governments had fallen into a chaotic state by 1900; state governments approached the complex and disorderly organization of cities a decade later.

The reform of municipal government, beginning with the commission plan and continuing with the council manager plan, brought order out of this chaos by consolidating these small units into relatively large and well-organized departments. This result was also effected by charter reform in many mayor-council cities. Within the states the trend toward integration commenced about 1915, and by 1935 had swept over the country. Much improvement resulted, but much remains yet to be done.

These and other parallel movements have transformed the character of city and state executives. In their original pattern they were designed as weak political leaders, the center of power remaining in legislative bodies. Since 1910, mayors and managers, school superintendents and governors have acquired much administrative authority. With some exceptions they are recognized now as the real heads of the administrative systems over which they long nominally presided. They retain also their political interests; and one of the unsettled problems of administration is to ascertain whether political leadership and administrative responsibility can be successfully discharged by one and the same person. . . .

2. Some General Qualities of the American Administrative System

As the result of well over a hundred years' uninterrupted development, an administrative structure has been evolved with characteristics peculiar to it. It is different from the Dutch, the Japanese, the Argentinean or the English civil service; it is peculiarly American.

In the first place, the prevailing American system like many others is based on the rule of law. Officials act on the basis of an authority created and limited by law; they are responsible to the courts for the observance of law; they must always act within the four corners of the statute and have no freedom to attack injustice wherever they see it. In the United States there is an emphasis on the right to be heard, an exaggeration of legal correctness, and in consequence an accentuation of the lawyer in administration which pushes the doctrine of the rule of law farther than in most other countries. An administrator must above all be on sound legal ground; he may exceed his budget but he cannot borrow from the courts.

Our system of administration is that of a democratic government. Real control is exercised by the elected representatives of the people; the voters themselves elect directly, indeed, something like 875,000 public officials, many purely administrative figures. There is a strong sense of localism, a sort of fireside democracy, which affects not only cities and states, but the field service of the national government. There is an intimate interlocking of political parties and administrative office, a special type of democratic influence upon the bureaucracy. There are no special classes within the civil service, such as the English administrative class. This is, in short, an example of administration by consent and by participation on a rare scale.

In its more extensive units, public administration has become an example of large-scale management, with many of the characteristic problems of large-scale organization in business. The Department of Agriculture in 1938 directed the efforts of over 80,000 men and women in all parts of the United States in a wide variety of activities; the Postmaster General man-

ages a department employing over a quarter of a million; the mayor of New York heads an official organization of nearly 100,000 employees. The relations of the parts of a far-flung organization each to the other and to the central direction, the avoidance of "absentee" management by a relatively uninformed headquarters staff, the maintenance of adequate freedom and initiative on the periphery, the management of employees through the necessary means of an official hierarchy, these are among the common vexations of all large-scale structures, public and private.

The American civil service is managed generally by subject-matter specialists in preference to the men of "general competence." Engineers, foresters, geologists, agronomists, social workers, accountants, journalists, economists in more recent years, these are the types who stand at the top of the operating departments, directly beneath the political heads. While the preference for the specialist-administrator is still strong, signs multiply that a different type may soon develop on a substantial scale. The early predominance of the engineer-city manager is weakening, especially in the larger cities, a change dramatized by the career of Clarence A. Dykstra, scholar, teacher, publicist, official, city manager, and since 1937, university president. Several important federal bureaus have definitely concluded that the subject-matter specialist cannot fully meet their administrative needs. Such specialists will doubtless continue to play a more important administrative part than in Great Britain, for example; but their monopoly in administration is being challenged.

Finally it may be pointed out that to an exceptional degree the American system of public administration is imbued with a strong sense of the doctrine of perfectibility. Standards have been, and in many instances still are low; but there is plenty of "divine discontent" with these deficiencies. There is a wholesome stirring of the waters among organizations of officials and among groups of employees, whose efforts toward better service and higher standards are very significant. They, in turn, are supported by a public sentiment for improvement which reflects a growing sense of the risks of failure on the administrative front. The expansion of administrative services to farmer and to city dweller alike is increasing the helpful contacts of government and governed. The masses of people are increasingly interested in administration as of practical, concrete concern to them instead of remotely antagonistic as in early years.

If, then, we seek to characterize the quality of the American public service, we may reflect on its attachment to the rule of law, its organization as an instrument of democratic self-government, the grand scale of its operations, its technical leadership by subject-matter specialists, and its strong internal capacity for improvement. These are not, naturally, universal traits; but even gross perversions of administrative integrity, unblushing partisanship, and occasional denial of the public interest do not destroy these essential qualities.

It is obvious that the system of administration found adequate for thirteen states fronting the Atlantic seaboard and backed by a wilderness is far different from the system which is now ministering to the needs of 130,000,000 people stretched solidly across the continent and harassed and perplexed by the civilization which they have created. An unbroken chain of events links the present to the past, and in the operation of the administrative machine of the twentieth century it is easy to discern the hand of the nineteenth, if not traces of the eighteenth. This history has not yet been

told, nor the growth of opinion with reference to government and its administration. It will some day give insight into our administrative past and guides to our administrative future.

It seems clear that public policy will lay heavy loads upon the civil service of the next generation. The management of the economic estate of the country—lands, water, forests, minerals, power—is now under scrutiny from a long-range point of view; and long-range policies and administrative plans seem likely to result. Much more intricate and complex is the management in some measure of the whole economic system. Almost from the beginning of our national history we have attempted some direction, exemplified in tariff policy, internal improvements, and land policy. It is not likely that we shall now withdraw from the effort to guide a delicate but vast structure of production and distribution. The grave social consequences of indifference are balanced by those of clumsy intervention, but our past and present compel the effort at some degree of direction.

These are among the great ends which challenge government of the future, and which compel the radical and rapid improvement of the administrative organs through which policy works itself out. The stakes are beyond price, for if democratic policy and democratic administration fail, an autocratic alternative may await the opportunity to seize power.

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*Executive Leadership**

EDWARD S. CORWIN

The American system of government provides for a separation of powers, with the chief executive as the responsible head of administration. Centralization and the tremendous enlargement of administrative functions—together with the ever-increasing importance of foreign affairs—has given the president new stature. Professor Edward S. Corwin discusses here the important role of the president, as key policy maker, in his relations with Congress, the chief legislative body. Dr. Corwin is one of America's leading authorities on the Constitution and for many years was professor of jurisprudence at Princeton University.

The growth of presidential participation in legislation, and indeed the vast expansion in recent decades of the President's role in all the departments of national power, invites our attention afresh to a question which has been repeatedly raised regarding the Presidency in the past, but never with more insistency than in recent years, nor for more cogent reasons. This is the question whether the Presidency is a potential matrix of dictatorship; and, if it is, whether there is a remedy.

"Dictatorship," I hardly need to point out, is a word with a highly ambiguous

* Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers*, Third Edition (New York: New York University Press, 1948). Reprinted by permission of the publisher and author

connotation, so much so in fact that I propose to dismiss it at the outset in favor of a less colorful word, "domination." "A nation," it has been well said, "does not have to have a genuine dictator in order to suffer some of the evils of too great executive domination." Imagine an historically minded member of the 81st Congress seeking to emulate Henry Dunning's exploit in 1781 in bringing George III's domination of Parliament to an end and with it, ultimately, British resistance to American independence. It would be the part of such a member to move a resolution declaring that "the power of the President has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished," and he would have little difficulty in making out an arresting case.

First off, he would point out that impeachment, the weapon which the Constitution provides against presidential "high crimes and misdemeanors," is, as Jefferson early discovered, a "scarecrow," and that to galvanize this scarecrow into life would be to run the risk of reducing the Presidency to a nullity, as almost happened in 1868. Then, noting the decision in *Mississippi v. Johnson* shortly after the Civil War, he would assert, and quite correctly, that the President has no judicially enforcible responsibility either for nonperformance of his duties or for exceeding his powers. Congress's power of the purse, to be sure, still offers, he would concede, an obstacle to presidential usurpation which only an outright *coup d'etat* could entirely overcome. Nevertheless, as Dr. Wilmerding points out in his volume on *The Spending Power,* not only have Presidents been able repeatedly to break over statutory controls on expenditure, but such controls are usually much abated by Congress itself in times of emergency, exactly when expenditures are heaviest and presidential dominance is at its zenith. Indeed, generalizing from what happened during the Great Depression, the honorable member might urge that congressional largess in such situations, by the hold which it gives the executive branch upon millions of votes, enables the President to tighten his hold also upon Congress, and so creates a vicious circle whereby Congress pays for its own slow enslavement. And, continues our orator, when war activates the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief, the situation is still more disastrous from the point of view of opposing the power of the purse to presidential dominance. The sums which Congress is at such times under every compulsion to vote are colossal. The needs which they are designed to meet are forcefully represented, and are believed by the public, to be most urgent, while itemization is put out of the question by the demands of military secrecy; and unexpected turns in the military situation may aggravate all these difficulties. Moreover, the criticism which overworked congressional committees of varying competence can offer to the demands of the executive branch under such conditions will be haphazard in the extreme—an item of $50,000 may get more consideration, and certainly far better informed consideration, than a presidential demand for billions.

Turning then to the course which constitutional interpretation has taken more and more pronouncedly in consequence of our participation in two world wars and under the stimulation of economic crisis, our fictioned Dunning will sketch a system of constitutional law which attributes to Congress a legislative power of indefinite scope, and the further power to delegate this indefinite power to the President *ad libitum,* and which attributes to the President in his own right an indefinite power to proclaim "emergencies" and thereby appropriate an indefinite "aggregate of powers" in meet-

ing them. At the same time, he will show that the President, not without judicial encouragement, has been able to cut loose from the two most important controls which the Constitution originally imposed upon his direction of foreign policy. With our four greatest wars directly ascribable to presidential policies, the exercise by Congress of its power "to declare war" has become, he will assert, an empty formality; while by means of the executive-agreement device the President has emancipated himself from his constitutional partner in pledging the national faith.

And at this point our hypothetical member will perhaps devote a word or two to the advantages which a President today enjoys in appealing to the multitude. Propaganda, he will point out, once the casual art of a gifted few, has been within recent times converted into a skilled technique, which is supplemented by the most ingenious gadgets of mechanical science. Today the President of the United States can at any time request that the nation's broadcasting channels be cleared so that he may "chat" with the people, and the request will be granted pronto, for are not all the available frequencies allocated to companies on federal licenses which terminate every six months? Besides, every member of his administration is a propagandist and has access to the radio at will, although a first-class radio voice may not be the heaven-sent gift of all.

Finally, our orator will note certain of the consequences of the demise of the anti-third-term tradition.* A third-term—*a fortiori* a fourth-term—President is bound to dominate not only his party, and Congress through it, but the executive agencies, most of whose chief personnel he will have appointed, and even the courts, a large proportion of whose judges will be his appointees. And in proportion as a President displays reluctance to quit office will the strength of the vested interests supporting his continuance in it wax greater.

The picture is unquestionably overdrawn in some of its details. Thus, if it is true that impeachment is no longer to be reckoned with as an effective weapon in the arsenal of liberty, this is partly due to the fact that Presidents have in the past kept pretty clear of courses which might make people think seriously of so extreme a discipline. Again, although there is no court which is entitled to order a President to perform his duties or to enjoin him from exceeding his powers, yet the subordinates through whom he must ordinarily act do not share his immunity in this respect; and his orders are at all times subject to judicial inquiry into their validity when anybody bases on them any claim or justification whatsoever. Also, his subordinates are, ordinarily, liable at any time to be summoned before a congressional investigating committee and put to the question regarding their official conduct.

Nor is it by any means the case that Congress's control of the purse strings is ineffective as a restraint on the executive branch. To the contrary, it is potentially a highly effective restraint, which with improved machinery within the power of Congress to provide could be made actual. Again, our orator did not find it to his purpose to mention that in the "concurrent resolution" a device today exists by which sweeping delegations of power to the President can be recalled by the houses without the necessity of obtaining presidential consent; nor that ordinarily executive agreements, unlike treaties, do not have the force of law unless they have been sanctioned by Congress. And other lesser exaggerations or omissions might be indicated were it worth while.

What is more, that is a seriously con-

* The adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951, limiting the President to two terms or a maximum of ten years, is indicative, among other things, of the durability of the anti-third-term tradition in America. [Ed.]

tracted point of view from which presidential domination appears as solely a *menace* to democratic institutions. Why, in the face of our democratic institutions, has presidential domination attained its present proportions? Indeed, must not this development be considered as a fulfillment in a measure of those institutions, and as an answer to some demand from public opinion, on which by hypothesis they are grounded? Without doubt, such is the case, and especially as regards presidential leadership in legislation; nor is it difficult to identify this demand—it is the demand that government assume an *active* role in matters of general concern, and especially in matters affecting the material welfare of the great masses of the people. This may eventually turn out to have been a demand impracticable of beneficial realization in the long run; but of its existence there can be no present question.

So we are not free to blame presidential leadership as such for those intrusions upon "liberty," as it has sometimes been understood, which present expanded theories of governmental function entail. This at least must be conceded. We are free, on the other hand, to ask whether presidential leadership, as we know it, is as good an instrument of the demand which brought it into existence as conceivably it might be. Presidential leadership sets itself the task of guiding legislation; and the critics are numerous who say that it does the job badly. To make the indictment more specific, it is asserted that presidential leadership is discontinuous, not to say spasmodic; that it is too dependent on the personality of the President rather than on the authority of the office; that it is often insufficiently informed, especially as regards the all-important matter of administrative feasibility; and, finally, that the contact between the President and Congress is most faulty, being, in fact, at the mercy of either's whim. These contentions also have too much obvious validity to make it worth while to attempt to refute them or even to qualify them nicely.

In short, we are confronted, not with a *single* problem, but with *two* problems: first, the problem of bringing presidential power in *all* its reaches under some kind of institutional control; secondly, the problem of relieving presidential leadership in the legislative field of its excessive dependence on the accident of personality and the unevenness of performance which this involves. Is it possible that these two problems admit of a common solution? At least, so far as they do, it is evident what form the solution must take—the *provision, namely, of some kind of improved relationship between President and Congress.*

It is not irrelevant in this connection to recur for a moment to the argument which the President's Committee on Administrative Management advanced a decade ago in support of its recommendation that the independent agencies be brought within the departments whose heads compose the President's Cabinet. It was upon these agencies, the argument ran, that the most novel, most controversial, most interesting activities of the National Government had been lodged in recent decades, with the result that the President had been constrained to look increasingly outside the Cabinet for advice in shaping his legislative program. But let the Committee's recommendation be adopted, the argument continued, and the President would be forced, or at any rate would have incentive, to return to the bosom of his "official family" instead of consorting with this, that, and other anonymous adviser or dispenser of happy ideas. Thus, on the one hand the Cabinet would be revitalized, and on the

other hand the President would become "the spokesman for the 'administration' in the real sense of the word, not merely the interpreter of his own fancies." He would be at all times what he had always been in times of his greatest power, the representative of the public.

The argument overlooked certain facts, one of which is that "Kitchen Cabinets," far from being recent phenomena, on the contrary long antedate the first "independent agency." Nor is the reason far to seek. It is because the Cabinet seraglio has been recruited from an early date on principles which make it fairly certain that an active presidential imagination will frequently stray beyond its decorous precincts. One of these—the one which is of chief importance for the present discussion—is the idea that the heads of the great majority of the departments ought to be administrative experts, or at least capable of quickly becoming such. Unfortunately, an expert in a particular area of governmental activity is not likely to possess the breadth of outlook which is most desirable in a political adviser, or the time or inclination to interest himself in the problems of other departments or of the country at large. And obviously the Committee's proposal to increase his departmental duties was badly calculated to overcome these handicaps, if that was one of the ends in mind. The argument overlooks the fundamental distinction between Politics and Administration, between determining *what* government ought to do and *how* it should do it, and the exigent need of a President for responsible counsel in relation to the former. It overlooks too the considered opinion of competent critics that, even as an agency for the development of a unified *executive* policy among its own membership, the Cabinet has today "become an administrative anachronism."

Two other plans for stabilizing presidential leadership, while also pivoting on the Cabinet, are directed primarily to the problem of creating a permanent link between the President and Congress. The less radical of these would give the Cabinet members the right to attend the houses in order to participate in debate on matters of official interest to them and impose upon them the obligation of doing so in order to impart information desired by the houses. The proposal, far from raising any constitutional difficulties, has the countenance of early practice under the Constitution. . . .

. . . Why then has the suggestion never produced tangible fruit? Chiefly because most of the legislative work of Congress is done by committees, and before such a body a head of department can always obtain a far more satisfactory hearing than would be conceivably possible before either of the houses in open session. Conversely, if it is Congress which is seeking information, it can do so through the investigatory process much more effectively and thoroughly than by the wasteful and pretentious methods of parliamentary interpellation.

We come now to the more radical proposal referred to above. *It is simply that the President shall construct his Cabinet from a joint Legislative Council to be created by the two houses of Congress and to contain its leading members.* Then to this central core of advisers may be added at times such heads of departments and chairmen of independent agencies as the business forward at the moment naturally indicates.

That the creation of a Cabinet with legislative members would not encounter constitutional difficulties was pointed out in an earlier chapter. Nor would it amount to supplanting forthwith the "Presidential

System" with the "Cabinet System." The President would not become a prime minister, bound to resign when outvoted in Congress, although circumstances might arise in which it might be expedient for him to do so, as Mr. Wilson contemplated doing in 1916 in the event of Mr. Hughes's election. Nor yet would he be a figurehead like the King of Great Britain or the President of Italy, for he would still retain all his constitutional powers and prerogatives although, again, he might choose to use them at times less for pushing a program of his own than for the purpose of mediating between the programs of others, as did Washington at the beginning.

The new Cabinet would, in other words, still be a body of *advisers*. But there are advisers *and* advisers. The proposed Cabinet would comprise men whose daily political salt did not come from the presidential table, whose political fortunes were not identical with his, who could bring presidential whim under an independent scrutiny which today is lacking, and yet who, by putting the stamp of their approval upon his proposals, would be able to facilitate their enactment into law. It would be a body both capable of *controlling* the President and of *supporting* him; of guaranteeing that the things needing to be done would be done on time, but that, on the other hand, the judgment that they needed to be done represented a wide consensus, a vastly wider consensus than the President can by himself supply.

But it may be objected that such an arrangement could not long be adhered to, or if it was it must at times cut athwart the two-party system, and so weaken the political responsibility of the President. The objection has reference to the evident possibility of the President's belonging to the party which is a minority in Congress. Actually, the supposed situation has obtained comparatively rarely—only four times since the turn of the century, covering eight years out of forty-eight.* Furthermore, the objection overlooks the fact that the advantage which is supposed to accrue from President and Congress both being of the same party rarely outlasts the first two years of an administration, when indeed it lasts that long, while some of the bitterest feuding between the two branches has often occurred when both were of the same party. Such conspicuously was the case in the latter days of "F.D.R." . . . What kept the two branches cooperating at all was the common compulsion of a great emergency; and at such times, even under present arrangements, cooperation between President and Congress does not stop at the party line. *But why should it require a crisis to bring forth best methods, especially as with best methods operative crisis might often be avoided?* Suppose one takes the position that government is normally a species of *nation-keeping;* then it is clear that much of the fuss and fury of politics is really factitious and a sheer waste to the community; that the chief objective to be sought in political discussion, whether carried on in Cabinet council, on the floors of Congress, or elsewhere, is *consensus*—in what light does the above proposal then appear? . . .

Kept within bounds, the power and prestige of the Presidency comprise the most valuable political asset of the American people; they are, moreover, in a very true sense the creation of the American people. But centering as they do in a single individual who is free to advise, or to refrain from advising, with whomsoever he chooses, this power and this prestige are apt to become unduly *personalized,* thus inviting two dangers: the slowing down of the legislative process to an extent that unfits it for a crisis-ridden world in which time is often of the essence, and—in consequence—autocracy. It is, therefore, an additional merit of the

suggestion advanced above that it is calculated to meet, or at least abate, both these dangers. Effective presidential leadership is essential to the ready availability of the national lawmaking power; this ready availability reduces to a minimum the excuse for autocratic courses.

To sum up: What is sometimes termed the question of "presidential responsibility" is not a single problem, but presents two quite different, even opposed, aspects: (1) that of concern for the *responsiveness* of government, and particularly the legislative branch of it, to public opinion; (2) that of concern for the *accountability* of the executive branch to the existing constitutional structure, which also presumably embodies public opinion. I am here suggesting that these two aspects admit of a common solution.

Practice under the Constitution clearly demonstrates that the legislative process requires presidential guidance. But it shows too that no President can long shape policy in any field without legislative support, *or* —as happened during the Civil War—an obvious breach of constitutional forms. The problem for which a constitutional solution is sought is, therefore, really the problem of equating easily, and without constant jar to society, the political forces which Congress at any time represents with those which the President represents at the same time, and of putting the relationship of the two *on a durable and understood basis*. For this purpose a reconstruction of the Cabinet, which in its present form has proved but an indifferent success for more than a century, is at least a promising expedient, and one to which the Constitution interposes no obstacles.

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*The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Nation**

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN

Strong executives have invariably come in conflict with the Supreme Court and its power of judicial review in their effort to secure a particular legislative program. From Jefferson's day to the present, each clash has renewed the perennial question of the consistency of a judicial veto with democracy. Robert E. Cushman, professor of government at Cornell University, analyzes the role of the Supreme Court in a democratic nation in a lecture which was delivered in 1938, shortly after President Roosevelt proposed his court reorganization.

Back in 1801 Jefferson wrote to a friend: "The Federalists have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold—and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to to be beaten down and erased." Some people today believe that in a democracy no court should have power to invalidate laws passed by the representatives of the people.

* Robert E. Cushman, "The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Nation," Edmund Janes James Lecture at the University of Illinois, March 9, 1938. Reprinted by permission of the University of Illinois and the author.

Many others believe that we need a Supreme Court with power to declare laws unconstitutional; but they also feel that in the use of that authority the Court has dangerously assumed powers which belong to the legislature, powers which in a democratic government ought not to be exercised by a court of law. This is the problem which I wish to explore. What is the rôle of the Supreme Court in our constitutional democracy?

I should like *first* to show the nature and growth of the Supreme Court's power to invalidate laws. *Second,* I wish to show that the Court in reviewing legislation determines not merely the constitutionality of law but the wisdom and desirability of legislative policy. . . .

1. The Nature and Growth of the Supreme Court's Power over Legislation. Let us turn to the first of these . . . topics,—the nature and growth of the Supreme Court's power over legislation. I do not enter here upon any analysis of the theory of judicial review. I do not wish to make any comment upon the old, old dispute as to whether the framers of the Constitution intended to have the Supreme Court invalidate acts of Congress. We may accept judicial review as a going concern without worrying about its lineage. I should like, however, to trace the stages in the development of the power of the Supreme Court to declare laws unconstitutional, from the rather modest beginning in John Marshall's famous decision in the case of Marbury *v.* Madison, to the broad and drastic power which the Court now enjoys. This will make more clear the actual working relations between the Supreme Court and the Congress. There are at least four stages in this evolution of the Court's power, and these I wish to discuss.

First, let us examine briefly the case in which the Supreme Court first declared an act of Congress unconstitutional. This was the case of Marbury *v.* Madison, well known to every college student.

Now there are two facts about Marbury *v.* Madison which should be carefully noted. In the first place, the act of Congress held void was an act in which Congress had, in the Court's opinion, unconstitutionally tampered with the Court's own jurisdiction. It had tried to give to the Court powers which could not validly be given and the Court had protected itself against this legislative assault on its own integrity. Jefferson himself could not logically quarrel with the basic theory of the Court's action. He believed that each of the three departments of the Government must interpret the Constitution in so far as it bears upon its own powers and status, and may properly follow its own interpretation. No department is bound by the constitutional interpretation of any other department. In Marbury *v.* Madison the Court is simply saying to the Congress, "You must keep your hands off from us. You cannot enlarge our jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits." While some of Marshall's language is more generous, the case of Marbury *v.* Madison, viewed on its facts, does not establish the power of the Court to reach over its own fence and pass upon the validity of Congressional or Presidential acts which in no way affect the prerogatives or jurisdiction of the Court itself. Marshall nowhere asserts the superiority of the Court over Congress or the Executive, nor does he lay claim on the Court's behalf to any general power of supervision over the other two departments. In the second place, no other act of Congress was invalidated until the Dred Scott case in 1857. If the Supreme Court, under the doctrine of Marbury *v.* Madison, was supposed to enjoy the broad power to supervise the constitutional correctness with which Congress and the President exercised their own powers, it is rather

surprising that during the fifty years following no attempt was made to seek the Court's decision as to the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, a protective tariff, the acquisition of Louisiana, the annexation of Texas, and numerous other legislative or executive acts which aroused bitter constitutional dispute.

The second stage in the development of the power of judicial review was reached in the Dred Scott case decided in 1857. We cannot go into the fascinating story of this great case. It is enough for our purposes to know that the Court held that a Negro slave could not become a citizen of the United States, and that the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820, which forbade slavery in the federal territories north of 36° 30′, was unconstitutional. In thus forbidding slavery in the territories Congress had exercised a power not granted to it in the Constitution, a power which could not validly be implied from the delegated power to govern the territories. This represents an important enlargement of the scope of judicial review over the doctrine of Marbury *v.* Madison. Marshall's early decision had held that the Court could refuse to enforce laws purporting to change its own jurisdiction when the Court believed those laws to be invalid. In the Dred Scott case Taney and his colleagues go much further. They hold that the judgment of Congress as to the scope of one of its own legislative powers, this time a power in no way concerning the Court, is wrong and that the act so passed is unconstitutional. The Court, in other words, takes on the task of determining whether Congress has exercised powers which the Constitution has not delegated to it. Congress must stay in its own constitutional backyard and the Supreme Court, not Congress, is to determine whether it has done so.

The third stage in the growth of judicial guardianship over legislation came in the late eighties with the emergence of the Court's modern doctrine of due process of law. Here the Court added to its power of deciding whether Congress exercised undelegated power the much more far-reaching power of deciding whether Congress has exercised delegated power in an improper manner. Due process of law is a test, not of the existence of legislative power, but of the method of its exercise. The story back of this can be sketched only in the briefest way. The guarantee of due process of law traces its ancestry back to Magna Charta. After many permutations we find it set forth in the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Bill of Rights. There we read, "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Similar clauses are found in most state constitutions, and in 1868 the Fourteenth Amendment included an identical due process clause which applies to the states. The early history of due process of law was not spectacular. For a hundred years due process was held to be a limitation upon governmental procedure and not upon the substance or content of legislative policy. It required notice and hearing and a fair trial, but it did not forbid the legislature to regulate a social or economic problem. After the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted the Supreme Court, in its first case construing it, held that the due process clause had no relevance to, and could not, therefore, forbid an arbitrary state police regulation setting up a slaughterhouse monopoly in New Orleans. Due process seemed destined to remain the "forgotten clause" of the Constitution. But vast economic changes were taking place. The states began to deal with social and economic problems through more drastic exercises of their police powers, while the regulatory powers of Congress, especially

under the commerce clause, were pushed far beyond previous limits. All this legislative activity was a sharp challenge to our American pioneer philosophy of *laissez faire*. Vested interests felt keenly the need of a constitutional weapon with which to combat the onward march of the new social control, and after a period of some wavering and uncertainty the Supreme Court, abandoning the precedents of a hundred years, converted the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment into judicial yardsticks by which to measure the validity of the substance and content of social legislation. Under the new rule a state or federal law was void as a denial of due process of law if in the opinion of the Court it impinged in an "arbitrary" manner upon the liberty or property rights of the individual. This step, taken without ostentation, constituted the greatest expansion of the Court's power to review legislation which has thus far occurred. Let me give a single illustration of the way in which the new doctrine enlarged judicial power. In 1898 Congress passed the Erdman Act regulating interstate railroads. One section of that act, aimed at the promotion of collective bargaining, forbade any interstate railroad to discharge one of its men because he belonged to a labor union. The Supreme Court held the act void on two grounds. It held first that this provision was not a regulation of interstate commerce because the relations between the railroad and its men had nothing to do with interstate commerce and did not, therefore, fall within the delegated power of Congress to regulate that commerce. It held, secondly, that, even if Congress had exercised its commerce power in passing the act, it had exercised it in so arbitrary and unreasonable a manner as to deprive the railroads of their liberty and property without due process of law. Congress had tried to exercise a power it did not have; but even if it had had the power, it had exercised it in an unconstitutional manner.

There is a fourth step in the development I am tracing. By it the Court has added to its scrutiny of the constitutional propriety of the *method* by which a granted power has been exercised by Congress, the further job of judging the constitutional propriety of the *purpose* for which the power has been used. This new technique was first employed in invalidating the first federal child labor act in 1918 in the case of Hammer *v.* Dagenhart. This act had forbidden the shipment in interstate commerce of the products of mines and factories in which children were employed in violation of standards set up in the act. In a five-to-four decision this was held void on two grounds. First, child labor is not closely enough connected with interstate commerce to make the statute a bona fide exercise of the delegated power to regulate commerce. Secondly, even if the statute were a bona fide exercise of the commerce power, it was an exercise of the commerce power for an unconstitutional *purpose,* namely, the regulation of child labor, a matter lying within the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Three New Deal measures of importance were invalidated on this same ground, that they constituted exercises of valid federal powers for invalid purposes. These acts were the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Municipal Bankruptcy Act, and the Guffey Coal Act. In invalidating the AAA in the Butler case Mr. Justice Roberts did not hold the processing taxes and the paying of crop reduction benefits void on the ground that Congress was not exercising its delegated power to spend money. He held it void because the tax was levied in order to raise money to be spent for financing a scheme for the regulation of agriculture, an object which lies outside

the delegated powers of Congress. The power was there, the method was regular, but the purpose was wrong. The Court has thus extended its supervision to the *motives* which have led Congress to exercise its delegated powers. "Thus," as Mr. Justice Cardozo put it, "the process of psychoanalysis has spread to unaccustomed fields."

To summarize this whole growth of judicial power, we find the Court at the outset protecting itself and its jurisdiction from unconstitutional interference by Congress. It next assumed the power to keep Congress from exercising powers not delegated to it by the Constitution. By a third step, the Court took over the authority to see that Congress and the States do not exercise their admitted powers by methods which seem to the Court to be arbitrary. Finally, the Court has undertaken to scrutinize legislative motives and to invalidate exercises of valid powers, by valid methods, but for wrongful purposes. Thus the judicial camel has got himself pretty completely into the legislative tent.

II. The Legislative and Policy-Determining Character of the Supreme Court's Power to Declare Laws Void. This brings me to the second major part of my discussion—the substitution, through the Court's power of judicial review, of judicial for legislative judgments on major questions of legislative policy. Has this come about in any large measure? If so, how has it come about, and with what practical results? My own view is that the Supreme Court now exercises wide power over the actual content of legislative policy. A very large proportion of the social and economic legislation invalidated in recent years has been held void not because it conflicted clearly and unmistakably with the clauses of the Constitution, but because a majority of the members of the Supreme Court believed the legislation to be economically unsound and objectionable. The Court exercises what I believe to be essentially a legislative veto. It is doing the legislature's job over again.

I am well aware that this charge would be sternly denied by the Supreme Court. As Professor Thomas Reed Powell * has neatly put it, the Court has a very keen appreciation of "the rôle of rigmarole" in the judicial process. Proceeding on the theory "let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth," the Court continues to insist that the invalidating of a statute is an almost mechanical judicial process in which there is no room for personal opinion as to the social or economic merits of the legislation involved. In the very process of holding the Agricultural Adjustment Act void on grounds so strained and loosely reasoned as to reach almost a new low in judicial technique, Mr. Justice Roberts takes time out to restate the old orthodox incantation:

> When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the Courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty —to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged—and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the Court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the question.

All of which sounds as though the justices, with the aid of compasses and slide rules, should reach a perfectly accurate result with which there can be no disagreement.

Now, certain clauses of the Constitution can be interpreted by the Supreme Court in this coldly mechanical manner. If Congress should fix federal income tax rates at a higher level in Illinois than in New York

* Thomas Reed Powell, eminent authority on constitutional law, professor emeritus of Harvard Law School, author of *The Supreme Court and State Police Power*. [Ed.]

there could not be the slightest doubt that such an act violates the requirement of geographical uniformity in accordance with which the Constitution states that such taxes must be levied. It would be impossible for Congress to regulate criminal procedure in the federal courts in such a way as to violate the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights guaranteeing trial by jury, or protection against compulsory self-incrimination. It may be readily agreed that in such cases the Court could put the statute and the constitutional provision side by side and see at a glance that they do not jibe. Cases of this kind are exceedingly rare. They are rare because legislatures are not likely to indulge in self-advertised violations of the Constitution.

But these are not the cases in which the validity of social and economic legislation is involved or in which broad questions of legislative policy are at issue. If we examine the cases in which important legislative measures have been held by the Supreme Court to be valid or to be invalid over the last twenty years, we shall see that the constitutional provisions which these laws are supposed to violate do not have any clear, certain, and established meaning. What, for instance, are the major constitutional issues on which the validity of the principal New Deal measures turned? They are three in number. *First,* has Congress exercised some power not delegated to it? Or, concretely, can you reasonably hang the National Industrial Recovery Act on the constitutional "peg" of the commerce power, which Congress thought it was exercising when it passed the statute? *Second,* has Congress, or have the states, exercised some power in a manner so arbitrary or unreasonable as to amount to a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law? *Third,* has Congress exercised some delegated power, such as the commerce power or the taxing power, for a purpose believed by the Court to be unconstitutional? There are no sharp, clear lines here between the constitutional and the unconstitutional, no categories of black and white, and in settling these issues the Court has come to exercise a type of judgment and discretion which is essentially legislative in character. Let us examine more closely just how the judicial process actually works in dealing with problems of this sort.

Let us turn first to the Minimum Wage Cases. In 1923 the Supreme Court by a five-to-three decision held that the due process clauses of the Constitution guarantee the right to pay women and children starvation wages. The Court clung to this shocking doctrine until last year when it held by a five-to-four vote that its previous decision was wrong and that minimum wage laws for women and minors do not deny due process of law. Now what actually happened here? A minimum wage law is an exercise of what we call the police power. The police power is that vital power of the American states to legislate for the public welfare. More specifically it is the power of the state to restrict individual freedom of action, or the free use of private property, in order to protect the health, morals, good order, convenience, or general welfare. A parking regulation, a quarantine of contagious disease, or an act forbidding gambling is each an exercise of the police power. Each exercise of the police power contains two elements. It restricts individual liberty and it protects or promotes some public social interest. The Court's task when it applies the test of due process of law to a legislative exercise of the police power is to weigh these two conflicting interests one against the other. If, in the opinion of the Court, the restriction upon individual liberty outweighs the social ad-

vantage claimed for the act, then it denies due process of law. Thus a majority of the Court prior to March, 1937, believed that minimum wage laws imposed upon employers and employees a burdensome restriction of their right to make free contracts with each other about wages, and that this restriction was not offset or compensated for by any equivalent social gain. The valued right of women and minors to work for next to nothing was at stake, and there was no substantial advantage to the community in having them paid a living wage. Then suddenly light came to one of the members of the Court and this balance between social advantage and restricted bargaining power was reversed. There were now five justices who believed that starvation wages for women and children were a sufficient social menace to warrant a legislative restriction on the free bargaining power of employers and employees, and as a result minimum wage laws suddenly became constitutional.

Now in reaching these important decisions the words of the Constitution have played no real part. The Constitution does not mention minimum wages and it does not explain what it means by due process of law. The Court therefore must decide whether or not a minimum wage law is valid without any direct help from the Constitution itself. The question is in essence not a legal question at all. It is a question of individual judgment and opinion and the answer which the individual judge makes to it will depend upon his social and economic philosophy, which, in turn, will depend upon his early environment and education and his business or professional associations. This is what Mr. Justice Stone was driving at when he said, "It is difficult to imagine any grounds, other than our own personal economic predilections," for holding a minimum wage law void. And when the Supreme Court invalidates important legislation on the basis of its "own economic predilections" it is doing the work of a legislature and not of a court; it is determining questions of legislative policy and not questions of law. Minimum wage laws were unconstitutional for fourteen years not because the Constitution forbids them but because a majority of the Court believed them unsound and objectionable.

Let us examine next the Schechter case in which the Supreme Court held void the National Industrial Recovery Act. We may pass by that part of the Court's decision holding that the NIRA invalidly delegated legislative power to the President, because the statute could easily have been amended to avoid that constitutional defect. The crucial issue in the case was whether Congress in the exercise of its delegated power to regulate interstate commerce could validly authorize the application of a code of fair competition to a Brooklyn wholesale poultry market and punish violations of that code. The Court, in a unanimous decision, held that it could not. The Government urged that the transactions in the Schechters' poultry market, and other similar establishments covered by the code, vitally affected the stream of interstate commerce in poultry in the metropolitan area. Congress therefore could properly take measures to protect that interstate commerce against the harmful effects of bad labor conditions and unfair competitive practices prevailing in the local markets. In a substantial number of cases the Court had permitted federal power to penetrate into local affairs in order to protect interstate commerce from the effects of local evils or local discrimination. The Supreme Court did not repudiate these earlier decisions. It did not even deny that conditions prevailing in the Schechters' poultry mar-

ket had an influence upon the interstate commerce which Congress might lawfully regulate. It merely held that that influence was "indirect" and not "direct" and therefore the code could not be sustained under the commerce power. Here is an important act of Congress stricken down by the Court because it falls on the wrong side of the line by which the Court separates those transactions and interests which are "directly" connected with interstate commerce from those which are only "indirectly" connected with it. It is perfectly clear that in making such a decision and in drawing such a line the Court translates into a rule of constitutional law its own opinions as to how far the policy of federal centralization under the commerce power should be permitted to go, again a question of policy, a question of expediency, thinly disguised as a question of law.

There is a third type of decision in which the Court even more clearly assumes the role of the lawmaker. These are the cases in which the Court invalidates acts of Congress because delegated powers have been used for what the Court regards as wrongful purposes. Some of the best illustrations have arisen under the federal taxing power. In 1902, Congress, under pressure from the powerful lobby representing the dairy interests of the country, drove colored oleomargarine out of the market by levying on it a prohibitive tax of ten cents per pound. Two years later in the McCray case the Supreme Court upheld the statute against the charge that it was an abuse of the federal taxing power since its purpose was not revenue but destruction. The Court refused to inquire into or worry about the motives which had led Congress to pass the act. Such motives cannot properly be made the subject of judicial scrutiny. The oleomargarine tax is "on its face" a revenue measure. It is, in short, "objectively" constitutional, and whether it is "subjectively" unconstitutional, whether Congress had an ulterior and unconstitutional purpose in levying it, is none of the Court's business. A year ago this doctrine was reaffirmed in a case in which Congress had imposed a special license tax of $200 per year upon those engaged in selling machine-guns, sawed-off shotguns or rifles, and silencers. "On its face," says Mr. Justice Stone, "it is a taxing measure" and "inquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of the Court." The good faith of Congress is evidenced by the fact that twenty-seven people paid the tax in 1934 and twenty-two in 1935, so it must have been a revenue measure. In 1919, however, Congress imposed a tax of ten percent upon the net income of those employing children in violation of the standards set up in the act. It had also passed the Future Trading Act by which a tax of twenty cents a bushel was laid upon all grain sold on future contracts upon grain exchanges which were not registered with the Secretary of Agriculture and subject to his regulations. The Supreme Court held both of these statutes unconstitutional. The taxes levied were not really taxes at all. They were penalties imposed on those who indulge in practices which Congress objects to but may not directly forbid. Speaking of the child labor tax Chief Justice Taft declared, "Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?" How indeed, except by just following the sound and wholesome doctrine of the oleomargarine tax case that the motives leading Congress to exercise a delegated power are not a proper subject for judicial examination. But this the Court was not willing to do. Last year the court

applied the rule of the Child Labor Tax Case to a federal statute imposing an annual license tax of $1000 upon anyone engaging in the business of selling liquor in violation of the laws of a state. This, again, is a fiscal penalty and not a tax and encroaches, therefore, upon state power.

Now the Court in these tax cases has very deftly managed to eat its cake and keep it too. It invalidated the child labor tax without overruling its decision in the oleomargarine tax case. It has, therefore, both rules to play with and can select with a good deal of freedom which prohibitory or regulatory federal taxes it is going to hold valid and which it is going to hold void. Looking at them realistically there is no essential difference in the nature of these taxes or the privileges or interests upon which they fall. Congress taxes the privilege of making colored oleomargarine, the privilege of employing children, the privilege of selling the kinds of weapons with which gangster crimes are usually committed, or the privilege of operating as a bootlegger within a state. Congress could not directly forbid anyone to exercise any of these privileges on which it has laid its tax. In every case the tax is for a nonfiscal purpose and everybody knows it. When the Court approves of the regulatory policy involved in the tax it turns a blind eye to the obvious effect of the tax and applies the test of "objective constitutionality." But with equal ease it can invalidate a similar regulatory tax, by taking into account "what everybody knows" and applying the test of "subjective constitutionality." In deciding which formula to use the Court is able to give effect to its own views as to the expediency of the legislative policy involved, it is able to exercise a policy-determining power.

I have no patience with the pious verbal expressions and legal epigrams by which certain judges and lawyers seek to camouflage or to conceal the essentially legislative power which the Court exercises in the handling of these three groups of cases and many others. In applying these vague and general clauses of the Constitution to concrete cases the Court has the opportunity, and it embraces the opportunity, of giving effect to its hunches, its predilections, and its prejudices. In interpreting due process of law it may read into the Constitution either a progressive social philosophy or a Mid-Victorian theory of "rugged individualism." In setting the limits to the commerce power it may swing the balance toward an aggressive federal centralization or toward an equally vigorous protection of state rights. In my judgment the legislative power which the Supreme Court now wields in the exercise of its power of judicial review of legislation is far greater than can be soundly adjusted to the principles of democratic government. Our constitutional system rests on the principle that the legislative power of the United States is vested in the Congress. It is not vested in the Supreme Court. It seems to me one of the vicious paradoxes of our national democracy that so many vital questions of national policy are determined in the last analysis by the "personal economic predilections" of Supreme Court justices.

Chapter Seven

INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITION

Liberty and Democracy in an Age of Nationalism

1.

It is a well established social-science axiom that no human culture is static. Even the most conservative society rarely remains unchanged over a long period of time. Archeological evidence has clearly established this fact for prehistoric times; the records of history are monumental evidence of it for the ages since. In our own day, the oft-repeated lament of elders that "times are not what they used to be" may be heard in primitive and advanced cultures alike. Change, then, is part of the maturation process, not only of man, but of his institutions as well. Cultural change has obviously been accelerated in the last four or five centuries of Western civilization. Behind this transformation, of course, have been the far-reaching technological innovations with their accompanying effects on economic organization, political ideology, and social relationships, as well as the increasing communication and interdependence within and between culture areas.

In modern society, two forces have risen to particular prominence and undergone constant change—liberty and democracy. We have frequently assumed the identity of these factors, partly because they have been conjoined for a time. Historically this is not the case, and today, under the impact of collective forces, there are evidences of conflict between them.

During ancient and medieval times, liberty was rarely an individual matter. Usually, it was achieved for the protection of the special interests of some particular group against the dominant power. The extension of certain liberties to the early commercial classes, or to a few dissenting religious sects, are cases in point. The long-range influence of the Reformation and the activities of the early entrepreneurs, associated with the rise of capitalism, were notable forces in emphasizing the primacy of the individual. The general collapse of a corporate existence, because of these and other early modern movements, provided the need and the impetus for the rise of religious, political, and economic liberty. By the eighteenth century, acceptance of the idea of natural and inalienable rights of the individual, beyond the encroachment of existing authority, was widespread. Yet today we have come to recognize, unhappily perhaps, that liberty is not inalienable; and since it must conform to the laws of society, neither is it absolute. Moreover, we have seen that the meaning of liberty itself has changed with time.

Democracy, like liberty, admits of no

single definition. For some, it is a way of life; others view it as a form of government, a political process, or, simply, majority rule. If democracy has an essence, it is equality—the effort to reduce differences among men. The medieval contribution to the rise of democracy was the development of systems of representation. The feudal idea of contract, under which the lord was obligated to fulfill certain functions, eventuated in the view that political power must be exercised in the interests of the governed. During the nineteenth century, western Europe and the United States witnessed the extension of suffrage and, ultimately, the establishment of political democracy. It was achieved by a gradual process, developing in England more or less along class lines, through the passage of various reform bills, and in the United States more along geographic lines during the Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and post-Civil War eras.

2.

We begin the readings under each of the sections for this topic with essays on the nature and development of liberty and democracy. Then, in each instance, we observe how the rising nationalistic forces of our time, heavily reinforced by the problems of an industrial-urban way of life, have resulted in a serious threat to liberty and a challenge to democracy in contemporary life.

A. Liberty in the Modern World

45

*On Liberty**

JOHN STUART MILL

Since its publication in 1859, John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* has become a classic. What is significant about Mill's ideal of liberty is that it is not merely negative; it is not solely an end in itself. He is fully aware of the existence of the state and the need to reconcile individual rights and authority. But he is interested, also, in the preservation of liberty as the best means of achieving intelligent direction in society.

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not

* John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, taken from Chapters I and II.

a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the "liberty of the press" as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. . . .

Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.

First: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that *their* certainty is the same thing as *absolute* certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.

Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far

from carrying the weight in their practical judgment which is always allowed to it in theory; for while every one well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion, of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable.

Let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed. However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that, however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.

There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. Where their influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on convictions are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however, this possibility—assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument—this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidently clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.

It still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make diversity of opinion advantageous, and will continue to do so until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems at an incalculable distance. We have hitherto considered only two possibilities: that the received opinion may be false, and some other opinion, consequently, true; or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth. But there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part. Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjointed from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited. Heretical opinions, on the other hand, are generally some of these suppressed and neglected truths, bursting the bonds which kept them down, and either seeking reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion, or fronting it as enemies, and setting themselves up, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole truth. The latter case is hitherto the most frequent, as, in the

human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception. Hence, even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to super-add, for the most part only substitutes, one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than that which it displaces. Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when resting on a true foundation, every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see. Rather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided assertors too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole.

I do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of religious or philosophical sectarianism. Every truth which men of narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and in many ways even acted on, as if no other truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first. I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated thereby; the truth which ought to have been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil; there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. And since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates but is so advocated as to be listened to.

We have now recognised the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we will now briefly recapitulate.

First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.

Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the prevailing or general opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.

Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless

it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.

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*Free Speech Today**

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.

Among the liberties which have been subjected to severe limitation in recent decades has been freedom of speech. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., former Harvard Law School professor, discusses this problem in the following selection from his *Free Speech in the United States,* a classic of our time.

Speech should be fruitful as well as free. Our experience introduces this qualification into the classical argument of Milton and John Stuart Mill, that only through open discussion is truth discovered and spread. In their simpler times, they thought it enough to remove legal obstacles like the censorship and sedition prosecutions. Mill assumed that if men were only left alone, their reasoning powers would eventually impel them to choose the best ideas and the wisest course of action. To us this policy is too exclusively negative. For example, what is the use of telling an unpopular speaker that he will incur no criminal penalties by his proposed address, so long as every hall owner in the city declines to rent him space for his meeting and there are no vacant lots available? There should be municipal auditoriums, schoolhouses out of school hours, church forums, parks in summer, all open to thresh out every question of public importance, with just as few restrictions as possible; for otherwise the subjects that most need to be discussed will be the very subjects that will be ruled out as unsuitable for discussion.

We must do more than remove the discouragements to open discussion. We must exert ourselves to supply active encouragements.

Physical space and lack of interference alone will not make discussion fruitful. We must take affirmative steps to improve the methods by which discussion is carried on. Of late years the argument of Milton * and Mill has been questioned, because truth does not seem to emerge from a controversy in the automatic way their logic would lead us to expect. For one thing,

* Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941). Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

* John Milton, seventeenth-century English poet whose famous prose work, *Areopagitica* (1644), is a landmark in defense of freedom. [Ed.]

reason is less praised nowadays than a century ago; instead, emotions conscious and unconscious are commonly said to dominate the conduct of men. Is it any longer possible to discover truth amid the clashing blares of advertisements, loud speakers, gigantic billboards, party programs, propaganda of a hundred kinds? To sift the truth from all these half-truths seems to demand a statistical investigation beyond the limits of anybody's time and money. So some modern thinkers despairingly conclude that the great mass of voters cannot be trusted to detect the fallacies in emotional arguments by Communists and so on, and hence must be prevented from hearing them. Even the intellectuals do not seem to do much better in reaching Truth by conflicting arguments. For example, take controversies between professors. They talk and talk, and at the end each sticks to his initial position. On which side does Truth stand? We still do not know. Then, too, the emergencies seem greater and more pressing than of yore. We are less willing to await the outcome of prolonged verbal contests. Perhaps Truth will win in the long run; but in the long run, as Walter Lippmann says, we shall all be dead—and perhaps not peacefully in our beds either. Debating is only fiddling while Rome burns. Away with all this talk; let's have action—now.

Nevertheless, the main argument of Milton and Mill still holds good. All that this disappointment means is that friction is a much bigger drag on the progress of Truth than they supposed. Efforts to lessen that friction are essential to the success of freedom of speech. It is a problem, not for law, but for education in the wide sense that includes more than schools and youngsters. The conflict of oral evidence and arguments can be made increasingly profitable by wise improvements in technique. Anybody who has attended a forum knows how much depends on an able chairman and on sensible rules enforced by him. Journalists and other writers value accuracy of facts far more than formerly—we can expect even more from them in future. None of us can get rid of our emotions, but we can learn to drive them in harness. As for blazing propaganda on both sides, young Americans can be trained to keep alive the gumption which comes down to us from Colonial farmers; this will make them distrust all men who conceal greed or a lust for power behind any flag, whether red or red-white-and-blue.

Reason is more imperfect than we used to believe. Yet it still remains the best guide we have, better than our emotions, better even than patriotism, better than any single human guide, however exalted his position.

A second point deserves renewed emphasis. The effect of suppression extends far beyond the agitators actually put in jail, far beyond the pamphlets physically destroyed. A favorite argument against free speech is that the men who are thus conspicuously silenced had little to say that was worth hearing. Concede for the moment that the public would suffer no serious loss if every communist leaflet were burned or if some prominent pacifist were imprisoned, as perhaps he might be under the loose language of the unprecedented federal sedition law passed last year,* for discouraging drafted men by talk about plowing every fourth boy under. Even so, my contention is that the pertinacious orators and writers who get hauled up are merely extremist spokesmen for a mass of

* Reference is made to the Smith Act, which was part of the June 1940 Alien Registration Law. There is little doubt that the law went beyond any previous wartime security enactment in its severity.

more thoughtful and more retiring men and women, who share in varying degrees the same critical attitude toward prevailing policies and institutions. When you put the hotheads in jail, these cooler people do not get arrested—they just keep quiet. And so we lose things they could tell us, which would be very advantageous for the future course of the nation. Once the prosecutions begin, then the hush-hush begins too. Discussion becomes one-sided and artificial. Questions that need to be threshed out do not get threshed out.

The evils of such a policy of suppression are especially acute during a national emergency like the World War or the present rapid development of national defense. . . .

The Supreme Court, though much more anxious to support liberty of speech than it was twenty years ago, can do nothing to keep discussion open during an emergency. Cases of suppression will get to Washington long after the emergency is over. What counts is what the local United States judges do. Still more important is the attitude of the prosecutors and police, because they can stifle free speech by breaking up meetings by arrests and confiscating pamphlets, and then not bothering to bring many persons to trial. Above all, the maintenance of open discussion depends on all the great body of unofficial citizens. If a community does not respect liberty for unpopular ideas, it can easily drive such ideas underground by persistent discouragement and sneers, by social ostracism, by boycotts of newspapers and magazines, by refusal to rent halls, by objections to the use of municipal auditoriums and schoolhouses, by discharging teachers and professors and journalists, by mobs and threats of lynching. On the other hand, an atmosphere of open and unimpeded controversy may be made as fully a part of the life of a community as any other American tradition. The law plays only a small part in either supression or freedom. In the long run the public gets just as much freedom of speech as it really wants.

This brings me to my final argument for freedom of speech. It creates the happiest kind of country. It is the best way to make men and women love their country. Mill says:

> A State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished.

And Arthur Garfield Hays * tells the story of a liberated slave who met his former master on the street. The master asked, "Are you as well off as before you were free?" The Negro admitted that his clothes were frayed, his house leaked, and his meals were nothing like the food on the old plantation. "Well, wouldn't you rather be a slave again?" "No, massa. There's a sort of a looseness about this here freedom that I likes."

Doubtless it was an inspiring sight to see the Piazza Venezia in Rome full of well-drilled blackshirts in serried ranks cheering Mussolini, or to watch Nurenberg thronged with hundreds of thousands of Nazis raising their arms in perfect unison at the first glimpse of Hitler. In contrast our easy-going crowds seem sloppy and purposeless, going hither and thither about their own tasks and amusements. But we do not have the other side of the picture—when every knock on the door may mean that the father of the family is to be dragged off to a concentration camp from which no word returns; great newspapers reduced to mere echoes of the master's voice; the professorships of universities

* Arthur Garfield Hays, eminent attorney and director of the American Civil Liberties Union. [Ed.]

that once led the world filled as we fill third-class postmasterships; the devoted love of young men and women broken up by racial hatreds; the exiles; the boycotts; and what is perhaps worst of all, those who conform to the will of the men in power in order to avoid financial ruin or worse, and yet, even while holding their jobs, live days and nights in the uneasy fear of calamity and the shamefaced consciousness that they have had to sell out their minds and souls. Once commit ourselves to the ideal of enforced national unanimity, and all this logically and easily follows.

Behind the dozens of sedition bills in Congress last session, behind teachers' oaths and compulsory flag salutes, is a desire to make our citizens loyal to their government. Loyalty is a beautiful idea, but you cannot create it by compulsion and force. A government is at bottom the officials who carry it on: legislators and prosecutors, school superintendents and police. If it is composed of legislators who pass shortsighted sedition laws by overwhelming majorities, of narrow-minded school superintendents who oust thoughtful teachers of American history and eight-year-old children whose rooted religious convictions prevent them from sharing in a brief ceremony—a government of snoopers and spies and secret police—how can you expect love and loyalty? You make men love their government and their country by giving them the kind of government and the kind of country that inspire respect and love: a country that is free and unafraid, that lets the discontented talk in order to learn the causes for their discontent and end those causes, that refuses to impel men to spy on their neighbors, that protects its citizens vigorously from harmful acts while it leaves the remedies for objectionable ideas to counter-argument and time.

Plutarch's Lives were the favorite reading of the men who framed and ratified our Constitution. There they found the story of Timoleon who saved his native city of Syracuse from the Carthaginian tyrants. In later years young hotheads used to get up in the public assembly and abuse Timoleon as an old fossil. His friends urged him just to say the word, and they would soon silence his detractors. But Timoleon insisted on letting the vituperative youngsters have their say. "He had taken all the extreme pains and labor he had done, and had passed so many dangers, in order that every citizen and inhabitant of Syracuse might frankly use the liberty of their laws. He thanked the gods that they had granted him the thing he had so oft requested of them in his prayers, which was, that he might some day see the Syracusans have full power and liberty to say what they pleased." . . .

Let us not in our anxiety to protect ourselves from foreign tyrants imitate some of their worst acts, and sacrifice in the process of national defense the very liberties which we are defending.

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*Freedom and Loyalty**

HENRY STEELE COMMAGER

Modern nationalism has probably been the most significant force contributing to the recent encroachment on our traditional liberties. Undoubtedly accentuated by the present struggle with the Soviet Union and the fear of communism, there has grown up a new concept of loyalty in America. Professor Henry Steele Commager, noted historian, and outspoken defender of civil liberties, is the author of *Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent* from which this excerpt is taken.

I

What is the new loyalty? It is, above all, conformity. It is the uncritical and unquestioning acceptance of America as it is—the political institutions, the social relationships, the economic practices. It rejects inquiry into the race question or socialized medicine, or public housing, or into the wisdom or validity of our foreign policy. It regards as particularly heinous any challenge to what is called "the system of private enterprise," identifying that system with Americanism. It abandons evolution, repudiates the once popular concept of progress, and regards America as a finished product, perfect and complete.

It is, it must be added, easily satisfied. For it wants not intellectual conviction nor spiritual conquests, but mere outward conformity. In matters of loyalty it takes the word for the deed, the gesture for the principle. It is content with the flag salute, and does not pause to consider the warning of our Supreme Court that "a person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn." It is satisfied with membership in respectable organizations and, as it assumes that every member of a liberal organization is a Communist, concludes that every member of a conservative one is a true American. It has not yet learned that not everyone who saith Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of Heaven. It is designed neither to discover real disloyalty nor to foster true loyalty.

II

What is wrong with this new concept of loyalty? What, fundamentally, is wrong with the pusillanimous retreat of the Washington educators, the barbarous antics of Washington legislators, the hysterical outbursts of the D.A.R., the gross and vulgar appeals of business corporations? It is not merely that these things are offensive. It is rather that they are wrong—morally, socially, and politically.

The concept of loyalty as conformity is a false one. It is narrow and restrictive, denies freedom of thought and of conscience, and is irremediably stained by private and

* From *Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent* by Henry Steele Commager. Copyright 1954 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Used by permission of the author and publisher.

selfish considerations. "Enlightened loyalty," wrote Josiah Royce,* who made loyalty the very core of his philosophy,

> *means harm to no man's loyalty. It is at war only with disloyalty, and its warfare, unless necessity constrains, is only a spiritual warfare. It does not foster class hatreds; it knows of nothing reasonable about race prejudices; and it regards all races of men as one in their need of loyalty. It ignores mutual misunderstandings. It loves its own wherever upon earth its own, namely loyalty itself, is to be found.*

Justice, charity, wisdom, spirituality, he added, were all definable in terms of loyalty, and we may properly ask which of these qualities our contemporary champions of loyalty display.

Above all, loyalty must be to something larger than oneself, untainted by private purposes or selfish ends. But what are we to say of the attempts by the NAM and by individual corporations to identify loyalty with the system of private enterprise? Is it not as if office-holders should attempt to identify loyalty with their own party, their own political careers? Do not those corporations which pay for full-page advertisements associating Americanism with the competitive system expect, ultimately, to profit from that association? Do not those organizations that deplore, in the name of patriotism, the extension of government operation of hydro-electric power expect to profit from their campaign?

Certainly it is a gross perversion not only of the concept of loyalty but of the concept of Americanism to identify it with a particular economic system. This precise question, interestingly enough, came before the Supreme Court in the Schneiderman case not so long ago—and it was Wendell Willkie who was counsel for Schneiderman. Said the Court:

> Throughout our history many sincere people whose attachment to the general Constitutional scheme cannot be doubted have, for various and even divergent reasons, urged differing degrees of government ownership and control of natural resources, basic means of production, and banks and the media of exchange, either with or without compensation. And something once regarded as a species of private property was abolished without compensating the owners when the institution of slavery was forbidden. Can it be said that the author of the Emancipation Proclamation and the supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment were not attached to the Constitution?

There is, it should be added, a further danger in the willful identification of Americanism with a particular body of economic practices. Many learned economists predict for the near future an economic crash similar to that of 1929. If Americanism is equated with competitive capitalism, what happens to it if competitive capitalism comes a cropper? If loyalty and private enterprise are inextricably associated, what is to preserve loyalty if private enterprise fails? Those who associate Americanism with a particular program of economic practices have a grave responsibility, for if their program should fail, they expose Americanism itself to disrepute.

The effort to equate loyalty with conformity is misguided because it assumes that there is a fixed content to loyalty and that this can be determined and defined. But loyalty is a principle, and eludes definition except in its own terms. It is devotion to the best interests of the commonwealth, and may require hostility to the particular policies which the government pursues, the particular practices which the economy undertakes, the particular institu-

* Josiah Royce, famous American philosopher (1855–1916) and author of *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908). [Ed.]

tions which society maintains. "If there is any fixed star in our Constitutional constellation," said the Supreme Court in the Barnette case, "it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception they do not now occur to us."

True loyalty may require, in fact, what appears to the naïve to be disloyalty. It may require hostility to certain provisions of the Constitution itself, and historians have not concluded that those who subscribed to the "Higher Law" were lacking in patriotism. We should not forget that our tradition is one of protest and revolt, and it is stultifying to celebrate the rebels of the past—Jefferson and Paine, Emerson and Thoreau—while we silence the rebels of the present. "We are a rebellious nation," said Theodore Parker, known in his day as the Great American Preacher, and went on:

> Our whole history is treason; our blood was attainted before we were born; our creeds are infidelity to the mother church; our constitution, treason to our fatherland. What of that? Though all the governors in the world bid us commit treason against man, and set the example, let us never submit.

Those who would impose upon us a new concept of loyalty not only assume that this is possible, but have the presumption to believe that they are competent to write the definition. We are reminded of Whitman's defiance of the "never-ending audacity of elected persons." Who are those who would set the standards of loyalty? They are Rankins and Bilbos, . . . Hearsts and McCormicks. May we not say of Rankin's harangues on loyalty what Emerson said of Webster at the time of the Seventh of March speech: "The word honor in the mouth of Mr. Webster is like the word love in the mouth of a whore."

What do men know of loyalty who make a mockery of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, whose energies are dedicated to stirring up race and class hatreds, who would straitjacket the American spirit? What indeed do they know of America—the America of Sam Adams and Tom Paine, of Jackson's defiance of the Court and Lincoln's celebration of labor, of Thoreau's essay on Civil Disobedience and Emerson's championship of John Brown, of the America of the Fourierists and the Come-Outers, of cranks and fanatics, of socialists and anarchists? Who among American heroes could meet their tests, who would be cleared by their committees? Not Washington, who was a rebel. Not Jefferson, who wrote that all men are created equal and whose motto was "rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God." Not Garrison, who publicly burned the Constitution; or Wendell Phillips, who spoke for the underprivileged everywhere and counted himself a philosophical anarchist; not Seward of the Higher Law or Sumner of racial equality. Not Lincoln, who admonished us to have malice toward none, charity for all; or Wilson, who warned that our flag was "a flag of liberty of opinion as well as of political liberty"; or Justice Holmes, who said that our Constitution is an experiment and that while that experiment is being made "we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loath and believe to be fraught with death."

III

There are further and more practical objections against the imposition of fixed concepts of loyalty or tests of disloyalty. The

effort is itself a confession of fear, a declaration of insolvency. Those who are sure of themselves do not need reassurance, and those who have confidence in the strength and the virtue of America do not need to fear either criticism or competition. The effort is bound to miscarry. It will not apprehend those who are really disloyal, it will not even frighten them; it will affect only those who can be labeled "radical." It is sobering to recall that though the Japanese relocation program, carried through at such incalculable cost in misery and tragedy, was justified to us on the ground that the Japanese were potentially disloyal, the record does not disclose a single case of Japanese disloyalty or sabotage during the whole war. The warning sounded by the Supreme Court in the Barnette flag-salute case is a timely one:

> Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel obedience is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of pagan unity, the Inquisition as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast-failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.

Nor are we left to idle conjecture in this matter; we have had experience enough. Let us limit ourselves to a single example, one that is wonderfully relevant. Back in 1943 the House Un-American Activities Committee, deeply disturbed by alleged disloyalty among government employees, wrote a definition of subversive activities and proceeded to apply it. The definition was admirable, and no one could challenge its logic or its symmetry:

> Subversive activity derives from conduct intentionally destructive of or inimical to the Government of the United States—that which seeks to undermine its institutions, or to distort its functions, or to impede its projects, or to lessen its efforts, the ultimate end being to overturn it all.

Surely anyone guilty of activities so defined deserved not only dismissal but punishment. But how was the test applied? It was applied to two distinguished scholars, Robert Morss Lovett and Goodwin Watson, and to one able young historian, William E. Dodd, Jr., son of our former Ambassador to Germany. Of almost three million persons employed by the government, these were the three whose subversive activities were deemed the most pernicious, and the House cut them off the payroll. The sequel is familiar. The Senate concurred only to save a wartime appropriation; the President signed the bill under protest for the same reason. The Supreme Court declared the whole business a "bill of attainder" and therefore unconstitutional. Who was it, in the end, who engaged in "subversive activities"—Lovett, Dodd, and Watson, or the Congress which flagrantly violated Article One of the Constitution?

Finally, disloyalty tests are not only futile in application, they are pernicious in their consequences. They distract attention from activities that are really disloyal, and silence criticism inspired by true loyalty. That there are disloyal elements in America will not be denied, but there is no reason to suppose that any of the tests now formulated will ever be applied to them. It is relevant to remember that when Rankin was asked why his Committee did not investigate the Ku Klux Klan he replied that the Klan was not un-American, it was American!

Who are those who are really disloyal? Those who inflame racial hatreds, who sow religious and class dissensions. Those who subvert the Constitution by violating

the freedom of the ballot box. Those who make a mockery of majority rule by the use of the filibuster. Those who impair democracy by denying equal educational facilities. Those who frustrate justice by lynch law or by making a farce of jury trials. Those who deny freedom of speech and of the press and of assembly. Those who press for special favors against the interest of the commonwealth. Those who regard public office as a source of private gain. Those who would exalt the military over the civil. Those who for selfish and private purposes stir up national antagonisms and expose the world to the ruin of war.

Will the House Committee on un-American Activities interfere with the activities of these? Will Mr. Truman's disloyalty proclamation reach these? Will the current campaigns for Americanism convert these? If past experience is any guide, they will not. What they will do, if they are successful, is to silence criticism, stamp out dissent —or drive it underground. But if our democracy is to flourish it must have criticism, if our government is to function it must have dissent. Only totalitarian governments insist upon conformity and they —as we know—do so at their peril. Without criticism abuses will go unrebuked; without dissent our dynamic system will become static. The American people have a stake in the maintenance of the most thorough-going inquisition into American institutions. They have a stake in nonconformity, for they know that the American genius is nonconformist. They have a stake in experimentation of the most radical character, for they know that only those who prove all things can hold fast that which is good.

IV

It is easier to say what loyalty is not than to say what it is. It is not conformity. It is not passive acquiescence in the status quo. It is not preference for everything American over everything foreign. It is not an ostrich-like ignorance of other countries and other institutions. It is not the indulgence in ceremony—a flag salute, an oath of allegiance, a fervid verbal declaration. It is not a particular creed, a particular version of history, a particular body of economic practices, a particular philosophy.

It is a tradition, an ideal, and a principle. It is a willingness to subordinate every private advantage for the larger good. It is an appreciation of the rich and diverse contributions that can come from the most varied sources. It is allegiance to the traditions that have guided our greatest statesmen and inspired our most eloquent poets —the traditions of freedom, equality, democracy, tolerance, the tradition of the higher law, of experimentation, cooperation, and pluralism. It is a realization that America was born of revolt, flourished on dissent, became great through experimentation.

Independence was an act of revolution; republicanism was something new under the sun; the federal system was a vast experimental laboratory. Physically Americans were pioneers; in the realm of social and economic institutions, too, their tradition has been one of pioneering. From the beginning, intellectual and spiritual diversity have been as characteristic of America as racial and linguistic. The most distinctively American philosophies have been transcendentalism—which is the philosophy of the Higher Law—and pragmatism —which is the philosophy of experimentation and pluralism. These two principles are the very core of Americanism: the principle of the Higher Law, or of obedience to the dictates of conscience rather than of statutes, and the principle of pragmatism,

or the rejection of a single good and of the notion of a finished universe. From the beginning Americans have known that there were new worlds to conquer, new truths to be discovered. Every effort to confine Americanism to a single pattern, to constrain it to a single formula, is disloyalty to everything that is valid in Americanism.

B. Democracy and Centralization

That governmental centralization has been a cardinal feature of the twentieth-century West would hardly be denied even by its most violent detractors. Moreover, the impetus given to this trend by the extension of the democratic idea is an acknowledged fact. Yet, if democracy has, in part, been a "cause" of governmental centralization, what, in turn, have been the consequences of this centralization to the democratic process?

There are those who insist that democracy cannot withstand extensive centralization and that the curtailment of economic freedom results in the gradual extension of authoritarianism. Others hold a contrary view, that political freedom and democracy are only effective when economic freedom is curtailed to prevent inequality and insecurity for the mass of society. Here, then, is the central issue, to which the following readings relate.

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*Alternative Economic Systems**

CARL L. BECKER

Unlike most historians, Carl L. Becker emerged from the confining influence of academic life in his later years. In a series of essays and lectures—later incorporated in such volumes as *Progress and Power* (1936), *Modern Democracy* (1940), *New Liberties for Old* (1941), and *How New Will the Better World Be?* (1944)—Becker, drawing on the rich background of his own thought and experience, reflected on the problems of contemporary life. From the last of these efforts, *Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life,* we have an intelligent and succinct summary of alternative economic systems.

To denote [the] general trend away from the theory and practice of laissez faire, two expressions have lately come to be widely used. One of them is "collectivism." The other is "managed economy." In this country the word "collectivism" has a bad odor because most people identify it with the word "communism." The term "managed

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economy" smells almost as bad. I have no great attachment to particular words and am quite willing to use any word, or even the letter *X*, just so an agreed-upon meaning can be attached to whatever word or symbol may be thought best. The important thing is the set of historical facts or events which the word or symbol represents; and whether we use the words "collectivism," "managed economy," "governmental regulation," or the letter *X*, the historical fact is that during the last hundred years there have emerged various forms of collectivism, managed economy, governmental regulation, or *X*, differing partly in respect to the extent of regulation or control they advocate, and partly in respect to the means they propose for effecting such regulation or control. These different forms of *X* we might call Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Pi. Let us, however, call them Socialism, Communism, Fascism, and, for want of a better term, Social Democracy.

The trend towards what I have called Social Democracy appeared first in England, the first country to become industrialized by applying the new technology. In England the abandonment of the old mercantile system is commonly said to have been completed by the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846; but it is significant that more than a decade before the laissez faire theory was thus officially accepted, the evils of the system, as exhibited in the cotton mills, were already so ghastly that it was found necessary to restrict freedom of contract in the employment of children. The first of the so-called "factory acts," passed in 1833, prohibited the employment in factories of children under nine years of age, limited the hours of labor for children between nine and thirteen to forty-eight hours a week, and of children between thirteen and eighteen to sixty-nine hours a week! Since this was an improvement, we can imagine what the original situation must have been.

But the main point is that this was the first of the "factory acts"; and since that time the British Parliament has passed an increasing number of laws placing restraints on private economic enterprise, all designed to provide a greater degree of equality of possessions and of opportunities between the rich and the poor. Similar legislation for a similar purpose has been enacted in all democratic industrialized countries. Such legislation has been commonly called "social legislation," or "social reform"; its purpose has been to achieve social as well as political democracy; and it has been justified, tacitly if not explicitly, on the assumption that it is a proper function of government to regulate private economic enterprise in so far as may be necessary to aid the less fortunate classes of society at the expense of the more fortunate classes.

To this general rule the United States is no exception. I have said that in no country was the theory of laissez faire more commonly accepted or more generally applied in practice than in the United States, and so far as the regulation of particular business enterprises is concerned this is true enough. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the people of the United States have ever really doubted that it is a proper function of government to promote the general welfare. Although Americans have commonly believed that government should never meddle in business, no class of Americans, so far as I know, has ever objected (such is the inconsistency of the human mind) to any amount of governmental meddling if it appeared to benefit that particular class. Since 1815 the Federal Government has regularly enacted tariff laws ostensibly designed to protect infant industries, maintain a high standard of liv-

ing for labor, and sustain the price of agricultural products. The Federal Government has constructed highways, has given public lands to railroads, and subsidies to steamship companies. Millions of acres of public land have been set aside as an endowment for schools and universities, and most states have maintained at public expense free schools mainly for the benefit of the poorer classes. In 1862 the Federal Government passed the Homestead Act, which permitted any head of a family or citizen twenty-one years of age to acquire one hundred and sixty acres of public land virtually free of cost if he would live on that land for five years. Few people notice the little vans that run about the streets collecting mail, but they are parts of one of the largest business enterprises in the country—a business enterprise owned and operated with exceptional efficiency by the Federal Government. No one thinks that the United States Post Office is a menace to private economic enterprise; and if the government had built, owned, and operated railroads and telegraph lines from the beginning no one would now think that it was meddling in business.

All these measures and activities were in contravention of the theory of laissez faire. All were based on the assumption that it is a proper function of government to limit the individual initiative of some people and to assist the initiative of others. All were based on the assumption that it is a proper function of government to do what the Federal Constitution was designed to do—"to promote the general welfare."

Nevertheless, the regulation of particular enterprises, which is what Americans commonly think of as government meddling in business, began in the United States at a comparatively late date. In the third quarter of the nineteenth century farmers complained that the railroads were charging them excessive or discriminatory rates for transporting farm products. In 1873 certain Western states passed laws regulating freight rates, and the courts sustained these laws on the ground that "the State must be permitted to pass such rules and regulations as may be necessary for promoting the general welfare of the people."

This decision may be taken as the official denial, casual as it may have been, of the theory of laissez faire and the doctrine that government must never meddle in business. At all events, from that time to the present many laws have been passed, by the Federal and by the state governments, placing restraints of one sort or another on the activities of business corporations, all designed to protect the people against the evil effects of private economic enterprise. Many people profess to believe that the so-called New Deal of the present administration is something brand new and revolutionary—a complete reversal of our traditional custom, something that denies in theory and tends to destroy in practice the American system of free economic enterprise. In fact it was nothing new, but merely a revival and an extension of measures for social reform that Theodore Roosevelt called the "Square Deal" and Woodrow Wilson called the "New Freedom." Particular measures of the New Deal may have been well or ill designed to effect the end desired; but the New Deal itself was in harmony, both in theory and in practice, with the long-established American tradition that the State "must be permitted to pass such rules and regulations as may be necessary for promoting the general welfare of the people."

It is, then, an obvious historical fact that during the last hundred years there has been, in every democratic industrialized country, including the United States, an increasing amount of governmental regu-

lation of private economic enterprise. The object of such regulation has been to correct the manifest evils of free competition by bringing about a greater degree of equality of possessions and of opportunity for the mass of the people. The method by which it has been effected has been the method of discussion, compromise, and legislation by the democratic procedure. This regulation of economic life by the democratic governments is the form of collectivism or managed economy that I have called Social Democracy. It rests on the assumption that it is desirable to preserve the capitalist system of private enterprise, and that the evils of this system can be sufficiently corrected by the democratic method of procedure.

Nevertheless, during the last hundred years there have been many who have denied this assumption, who have asserted on the contrary that the capitalist system of free enterprise for private profit is itself the chief cause of social injustice, and that accordingly all attempts to correct the evils of the system while preserving the system are bound to fail in the end. Other forms of collectivism or managed economy have therefore been proposed or adopted. These are known as Socialism, Communism, and Fascism.

Socialism and Communism in their modern forms derive from the philosophy of history and economic theory formulated by Karl Marx in the mid-nineteenth century. The Marxian philosophy (which Marx called communism or "scientific socialism," to distinguish it from other forms of socialism) rests on the assumption that the structure and transformation of society are fundamentally determined by impersonal economic forces rather than by the wills and aspirations of men. In the Middle Ages, for example, land was the most important form of wealth, the landowning aristocracy was therefore the ruling class, and the prevailing social and moral customs and ideas were those best suited to maintain the power and prestige of that class. But when in the course of some centuries wealth in the form of capital became more important than land, the bourgeois-capitalist class which controlled this new form of wealth elbowed the feudal landowning aristocracy out of the seats of power and adopted those liberal-democratic institutions (representative government, freedom of speech and religion, freedom of private economic enterprise) which were better suited to promote its interests and maintain its power. This transfer of economic power from the feudal landed aristocracy to the bourgeois-capitalist class was, according to Marx, the essence of what is called the liberal-democratic revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the liberal-democratic ideology was merely, as he might have said, accessory after the fact—a reasoned justification of the forcible usurpation of political control by the class which the shift in economic influence had made the dominant class.

Marx did not deny that the capitalist-democratic revolution was an important and necessary stage in historical progress. It abolished many evils, established many liberties, made possible the rapid advance in scientific knowledge and technology, and thereby resulted in an enormous increase in the production of wealth. But society is not static; and according to the Marxian doctrine the democratic-capitalist system, although a necessary stage in the dialectic of history, was a temporary form, bound, like the feudal system before it, to be transcended by something better. It would be transcended, not by wishing or by argument or by denouncing its evils, but by its own inherent economic "contradictions." Free private economic enter-

prise and ruthless competition would inevitably concentrate wealth in the hands of the few most intelligent and unscrupulous capitalists and gradually reduce the mass of the people (the proletariat) to the level of a bare subsistence. When this inevitable and irreversible process was sufficiently matured, business expansion would slow down because more goods could be produced than the impoverished proletariat could buy, and a series of increasingly severe economic depressions would end in economic and political disintegration. Then the proletariat, made desperate by its miseries, conscious of its rights, and instructed in the Marxian philosophy of social revolution, would establish a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat, confiscate private property in land and industry, liquidate the capitalist classes, and after the revolution was accomplished establish a classless society and a truly democratic government which would organize the production and distribution of wealth for the common good.

In the late nineteenth century this doctrine of inevitable social revolution was widely accepted by the industrial workers in most European countries. While waiting for the coming revolution, which could neither be much advanced nor retarded by anything men could do, the workers formed socialist political parties, elected representatives to the legislative bodies in the various countries, and advocated advanced egalitarian programs of social reform. But ten years after the death of Marx in 1883 many of the prophecies of Marx seemed falsified by events, and the revolution seemed a long time coming. For this and other reasons the socialist political parties split into two groups—the majority and the minority parties. The minority parties still adhered to the orthodox Marxian doctrine of revolution by collapse and violence, but the majority parties accepted a "revised" Marxian doctrine which maintained that the social revolution (the abolition of the capitalist system of private economic enterprise for private profit) could be achieved without violence—by the education of the people, the triumph of the socialist parties at the elections, and the consequent nationalization of land and industry through the constitutional democratic procedure.

During the early years of World War I both parties lost prestige and power; but the Russian Revolution of October 1917 gave a spectacular and world-wide significance to the orthodox Marxian doctrine of revolution by violence. To characterize the form of socialism established in Russia and to distinguish it from the "revisionist" forms advocated by the majority socialist parties in other European countries, Lenin used the word "communism." Since the Russian Revolution, therefore, Communism and Socialism have usually meant quite different things to those who belong to the communist and socialist parties in Europe and America. They agree in believing that the capitalist system of private enterprise for private profit is the major source of social injustice and must be abolished; but whereas the socialists think that this can be done within the framework of democratic government and by peaceful democratic procedure, the communists maintain that it can be done only by violent revolution, dictatorship, and the forcible liquidation of the capitalist classes. The difference, although ostensibly a difference in method only, is a radical one. It is the difference between those who believe that the democratic form of government and the democratic political and intellectual liberties can and should be preserved, and those who believe that, temporarily at least, they can and must be destroyed.

Social Democracy, Socialism, Communism—these are the three forms of collectivism or managed economy that emerged in the nineteenth century. There is a fourth form which goes by the name of Fascism. The roots of the Fascist tree run deep into the nineteenth century, but the tree itself sprang up suddenly and unexpectedly after World War I. According to the Marxian philosophy the social revolution would occur first in the most highly industrialized country (England probably), and then spread rapidly to other industrialized countries. In fact it occurred first in Russia, one of the least highly industrialized countries of Europe, and did not spread to any major industrial country. Revolutions occurred (in Italy, Germany, Spain, and other countries), but so far from being communist they were in part inspired by fear of Russian Communism. For all that, however, there are certain similarities between Italian and German Fascism and Russian Communism. All three systems were established by violent revolution. All three were one-man and one-party dictatorships. All three suppressed the democratic liberties as we understand them; and in all three (although in Italy and Germany land and industry were not as in Russia formally nationalized) the economic life of the community was so completely controlled by the government that private enterprise for private profit as we understand it virtually disappeared. Nevertheless, the differences between Fascism and Communism as exhibited in Germany and Russia are important. Communism rests upon a reasoned philosophy of history and politics that was propagated for fifty years before it was established in Russia. Fascism was scarcely more than an invention of Mussolini and Hitler to serve their personal ambitions, and it is supported by a philosophy, if you can call it that, hastily devised after the event. Taking the two philosophies as standards for judging the two systems, the differences are radical. Communism is democratic—that is, the dictatorship is regarded as temporary, a necessary device for carrying through the revolution, to be replaced ultimately by a government of, by, and for the people: Fascism is antidemocratic—the dictatorship and the suppression of individual liberties are regarded as permanent. Communism is international—it preaches the brotherhood of man and the equality of nations; Fascism is anti-international—it denies the equality of nations as well as the equality of individuals, and preaches the supremacy of the nation or of the master race. Communism is pro-intellectual—it declares that social progress rests on knowledge, and that knowledge can be attained only by the disinterested search for truth; Fascism is anti-intellectual—it regards science and the search for truth as of no importance except in so far as they can be used for the attainment of immediate political ends.

It will be said that in Russia the ideals of Communism are not in fact lived up to. That is true. It is also true that the ideals of democracy are not lived up to in the United States, England, or any other democratic country. The ideal forms that, according to Plato, are laid up in Heaven, rarely correspond with much exactness to their earthly counterparts. But the ideal forms are not to be despised or lost sight of for all that. The political philosophy, the set of values, which any form of government professes and attempts to live up to is of vast importance. The worst thing that can be said about the Americans or the English or the Russians is that they do not live up to their ideal aims. The worst thing that can be said about the German Nazis is that they do live up, or down, to their ideal aims. They suppress the truth and practice bru-

tality, not merely as temporary means for the attainment of ends that cannot for the time being be otherwise attained, but deliberately, systematically, and with malice prepense as permanent means inseparable from ultimate ends and having in themselves the same inherent virtues.

These are the four forms of collectivism or managed economy, that have emerged during the last one hundred years. They are alike in one respect only; they all reflect the trend in all modern industrialized societies towards a greater degree of governmental regulation of the economic life of the community. In other respects they differ more or less radically. What are the essential differences?

We can make the essential differences clear by defining briefly the traditional democratic liberties and then asking what part of these liberties the four forms of collectivism require us to give up. The traditional democratic liberties can be briefly defined under three heads. First, intellectual liberties—freedom of speech and of the press, of religion, of learning and teaching. Second, political liberties—free discussion of public affairs, free election by the people of government officials, and the enactment of such laws as the elected representatives can agree upon and the people will support. Third, economic liberties—the right of private property and of private economic enterprise for private profit. Social Democracy asks us to give up none of these liberties, but only to submit to such governmental regulation of private economic enterprise as may be necessary to correct its evils and secure a reasonable degree of equality of possessions and of opportunities for the mass of the people. Socialism asks us to give up permanently the right of private economic enterprise for private profit, but assures us that none of the other liberties need ever be surrendered. Communism asks us to give up permanently the right of private economic enterprise for private profit and the intellectual and political liberties as well for the time being, but allows us to hope that the one-man and one-party dictatorship will at some uncertain future time find it expedient to restore them to us. Fascism asks us to give up all of our liberties forever and to trust to the one-man and one-party dictatorship to think and to act for us better than we can think and act for ourselves.

Which of these four forms of collectivism or managed economy do we want? No doubt the great majority of the people in the United States would reply: "We do not want any form of collectivism at all." In most cases I think the reply would be instinctive, inspired by aversion to the word "collectivism" more than by the thing itself. But there is really no use in saying we do not want any form of collectivism or managed economy, in the sense that I am using these words—no use, that is, in saying we do not want any sort of governmental regulation of private economic enterprise. We already have a good deal of it; and it is about as certain as anything can be that we shall have more. To say that we do not want any form of governmental regulation of economic life is like saying that we should be better off without Diesel engines, automobiles, airplanes, and broadcasting stations. Maybe we should. But we have these things, we cannot get rid of them by wishing, and while we can adjust our lives to them in one way or another, it is mere folly to suppose that we can refuse to adjust our lives to them in any way whatever. . . .

This problem cannot be solved by letting things ride. It cannot be solved by bombarding each other in the dark with jet-propelled phrases, such as "bureaucracy," "states' rights," "mature economy," "the

American Way of Life," and the like. Nor can it be solved by playing politics—by calling the prewar depression a "Hoover Depression" or a "Roosevelt Depression" and thinking that all will be made right by putting one political party in power rather than another. The problem cannot be solved without a good deal of governmental aid and supervision. But neither can it be solved by a series of uncoordinated measures, each one designed to cure some specific evil without regard to the others. Nor can it be solved by any measures designed primarily to place restraints on productive enterprise—limiting the production of cotton and wheat in order to raise farm prices, spreading out and slowing down the work in order to raise the wages of labor, and then freezing prices and wages in order to prevent inflation. Still less can it be solved by supplanting private economic enterprise by a centralized governmental organization and direction of economic life—an organization that, like an engineer's blueprint, purports to take account of all contingencies and to foresee the finished structure.

I, at least, am one of those who believe that if we cannot preserve a very large measure of individual initiative and private enterprise for private profit, it will be exceedingly difficult to preserve that degree of intellectual and political freedom without which democracy cannot exist. I think, therefore, that the primary aim of all governmental regulation of the economic life of the community should be, not to supplant the system of private economic enterprise, but to make it work.

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*The American Economy: "Controlled Capitalism"**

JOHN K. GALBRAITH

In recent years, the fierce ideological debate between the supporters of capitalism and its various detractors has not only obscured our view of economic realities, but has also diverted our attention from coming to grips with some of the fundamental economic issues of the day. John K. Galbraith, Harvard University professor of economics and author of the stimulating volume, *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power,* discusses some of these developments in his analysis of substance and myth in the American economy.

I

Clearly the conventional doctrine as a faith has had a severe buffeting both from ideas and from events. Until the outbreak of the war one might have concluded that, under the strain, it was losing its hold on its former adherents. The term laissez-faire had become, among conservatives themselves, one of opprobrium. Even the term

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capitalism had acquired overtones which careful semanticists sought to avoid. In the war years, however, the American economy recovered its strength. The prestige of wartime achievements accrued on the whole to business. Much flexibility in relating cause to effect is permissible in American economic and political discussion; accordingly, it was possible to point to the achievements of the economy, under what amounted to comprehensive planning, as general proof of the efficacy of free enterprise. This was accompanied by a resurgent energy in the enunciation of the formal doctrine.

At the same time a new tenet was added: the proposition that non-intervention by the state in the economy is a necessary condition for the preservation of freedom. From today's newspaper, one cites what amounts to a standard formulation: "The free exchange of goods has been the forerunner and prerequisite of all freedom among peoples and nations. Slavery and serfdom are the inevitable results of a controlled economy." The stakes in the war on state power, by this extension of the doctrine, became not alone material values. There was now a threat not only to the body but also to the soul.

The notion of a unique association of freedom with free enterprise was taken up by a hardy band of advocates including, even, some former socialists who brought to their new cause the single-minded ardor of the convert. Like devout Marxians, they reserved their strongest condemnation not for their extreme opponents, the Communists, but for such deviationists as British Socialists abroad and New Dealers at home.

It was the good fortune of this group of revivalists to find a prophet of skill and influence in the scholarly Professor Friedrich Hayek whose *Road to Serfdom,* published in 1944, must be counted one of the influential books of the past decade. Professor Hayek, arguing with skill and a certain unconscious selectivity in evidence, held that once a country began to assume collective responsibility for any of its economic problems, it presently assumed responsibility for all life. The irresistible character of this trend he verified mostly by reference to Germany, a country which some might be disposed to consider a special case, and where still others have attributed the rise of fascism to the incapacity or unwillingness of doctrinaire government to rise to the problems of popular welfare. He passed over the apparent survival of individual freedom, as it is conventionally understood, in face of the collective experiments of Scandinavia, England—and the United States. Nevertheless, Professor Hayek did much to rehabilitate the conventional doctrine. Its reverses at the hands of inhospitable ideas and even more inhospitable circumstances during the years of the Great Depression had vastly weakened its promise of material welfare. Professor Hayek added an impressive moral justification for the exclusion of the State. Few authors have ever attracted a more approving audience. Once again, it is interesting to note, the United States had looked abroad for authority in political economy.

The process of complementing and enlarging on Professor Hayek's ideas in the latter years of the war and in the early postwar years has resulted in one of the most fascinating literary eruptions in the entire history of capitalism. In form, it has ranged from vast and nearly unreadable volumes sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers to succinct treatises designed to instruct in one lesson. Rigorously devoid of either humor or doubt, it is dogmatic rather than persua-

sive, and based firmly on the view that unbelievers are fools, knaves, or weaklings. Given the basic tenet, namely, that government is the implacable enemy of freedom, it obviously must follow that Communists, Socialists, New Dealers, reformers of every variety, should all be marshaled into one great legion of the damned.

The effect of this literature has, no doubt, been to affirm the beliefs of some whose adherence to the official doctrine was largely subjective. As such, it has helped deepen the rift that divides those who hold to the conventional doctrine from those who do not, for it is certain that there have been few converts among the latter. Education, to succeed, must be reasonably compatible with the experience of the individual toward whom it is directed. A resident of a public-housing project is not easily persuaded that he has less liberty than an inhabitant of an adjacent slum; the farmers of the Tennessee Valley are not easily convinced that the T.V.A. has enslaved them; cotton growers have learned that they can remain at war with Washington while accepting government loans. . . .

II

It would be idle to suppose that the uneasiness about American economic institutions will be resolved at any time in the foreseeable future. The ideas that underlie it are not lightly held. Nor are they, more than any other faith, subject to revision because of evidence, experience or persuasion. One system of the political economy will continue to rule at the business conventions and another at the polls. Washington will continue to be the arena of conflict between the two. Everyone will expect the worst.

Happily, the prospect is far less horrible than the protagonists can allow themselves to suppose. For one thing, the conflict takes place in a context in which the most difficult of all problems have been solved. There is no physical barrier to producing a tolerable and even comfortable living for all Americans with, in addition, a considerable margin for serving the whims, social compulsions and neuroses of the well-to-do and something additional for waste. Such a situation is almost, if not quite, a matter of experience. We are the first nation to find ourselves in this happy technological position. No one should underestimate its importance as a solvent of social strains. In other countries the unprivileged must still be helped at the expense of the privileged. In the United States, there is something for both.

We are also aided by the happy circumstance that most of our concerns are in the area of prognosis rather than of experience. The difference is that prognosis can be wrong, and in this instance it probably is. The businessman's insecurity in regard to the state concerns what might happen, not what has—and this attitude needs to be set against the fact that, in the two decades of depression, New Deal, and war, a great deal has happened. The liberal's alarm over the possession by the modern corporation of legislative power that is inconsistent with any available doctrine of government is something he has experienced and survived. If we have begun the descent into serfdom—and no one can deny that government in America is far more comprehensive than it was fifteen years ago—it has not yet inhibited the speech or action of those who voice the fear. One would assume that they would be the first victims.

Only depression is in the realm of experience. And here there has been further experience of escape to new levels of em-

ployment, production and welfare which reduced radical dissent in the United States to defending the proposition that prosperity could not last.

None of this should lead the reader to suppose that this is an exercise in optimism and reassurance. In the United States no economic commentator is taken seriously unless he is a prophet of doom. This essay is meant to be taken seriously. Yet when we turn to the rules by which we live *in fact* rather than in ideas, there is some comfort to be gained. Seven propositions concerning the American economy would seem to be valid. If they do not assure its survival in the future, they appear at least to explain its survival to date.

1. In economic affairs there is far more latitude for variation and even for error than is commonly supposed. A generous endowment in physical resources and a high development of intellectual resources increase this latitude. In both respects the United States is fortunate. We should not flatter ourselves that we have been wise enough to have survived had this not been the case. In few matters are Americans so dogmatic as in their insistence that there is only one path to economic salvation. "Do as I recommend—or face ruin" is our stock argument for a policy. In fact in the usual (though certainly not in every) public decision on economic policy, the choice is between courses that are almost equally good or equally bad. It is the narrowest decisions that are most ardently debated. If the world is lucky enough to enjoy peace, it may even one day make the discovery, to the horror of doctrinaire free-enterprisers and doctrinaire planners alike, that what is called capitalism and what is called socialism are both capable of working quite well.

2. In an industrial community which entrusts half of its production to a mere handful of concerns, competition no longer closely circumscribes private power. The pleasant nineteenth-century image of the manufacturer whose prices, wages, even his investment in new machinery, are controlled by the actions of others unknown to him, can hardly be taken seriously except by those who are determined to do so. So we must concede that the individual businessman is the possessor of power of wide social consequence. The liberal had best begin to reconcile himself to a plain fact of life. The businessman, likewise, must come to expect social judgments on the social responsibility he has assumed. The trade union must expect to be similarly judged—although the fact will not come to most union leaders as a surprise.

3. The liberal may also take comfort from the fact that a much neglected but surprisingly effective process acts to curb power in the modern economy. One of the unfortunate consequences of the old orthodoxy was a myopic concentration on competition as the restraint on private power. As competition atrophied, it was easy to assume that private power was becoming increasingly absolute. The facts have probably been to the contrary. Competition—restraint from the same side of the market—has been replaced by restraint from the opposite side of the market. The spectacular case has been the labor market. No buyer of labor in the United States has power equivalent to that exercised by large corporations a half-century ago. The reason is that the power of the buyer nourished the countervailing power of the trade union. Moreover, this process of checkmate is pervasive. The power of the steel industry as a seller required that the automobile companies be powerful as buyers and accorded advantages to those that were. The power of the canning industry as a buyer is matched by the farm cooperative on the

one hand and by the chain stores on the other. There is nothing fortuitous about the tendency for power to beget countervailing power; it is organic. However it does not work evenly. The buttressing of weak bargaining positions has become, as a result, one of the most important of the functions of government.

4. In this system, the autonomous powers of those who guide the modern American corporation acquire their justification not in principle but in practice. They are defended by the theory of administration, not by the theory of economics. Some way must be found, in an economy that produces as many things for as many tastes as that of the United States, to effect a wide decentralization of the power of *final* decision. Nothing else is so important, and a goodly number of disadvantageous decisions is a modest price to pay for this decentralization. No one can say much in defense of the design (or price) of American motorcars but no one can view with equanimity the problems which would arise were there an appeal from General Motors to higher authority. On decentralization of final decision depends much of the capacity of the economy for accommodation and for change. This is one of the important recent discoveries of the left. Even in avowedly socialist countries, capitalism, though defeated as an idea, survives because of the absence of administratively acceptable alternatives.

5. It would be hard to prove that the American economy selects its business decision-makers by merit, and rewards them in strict accordance with their contribution to the social welfare. But clearly it does recruit diligent men who are rarely accused of failing to take either themselves or their tasks seriously. Many die young. Management in the United States regularly accuses workers of low productivity; American labor, which is not restrained in its criticisms, rarely returns the charge. By contrast, most British and continental tradeunionists have long since ceased to suppose that the boss is useful. The personal earnings of management in the United States, even when adventitiously out of line with accomplishment, are not a subject of much concern mostly because envy, in this land, is almost exclusively confined to the contemplation of others of nearly equal income.

6. Just as the exercise of private economic power is justified on purely pragmatic grounds, so with public authority. There is no controlling principle governing the relation of American government either to the economy or to freedom. Each act of the government can safely be judged on its merits provided only that these are viewed comprehensively. Americans, as each election in recent times has made increasingly clear, do in fact, take a largely pragmatic view of the role of the state. Were others similarly persuaded that the role of government is a practical not a moral issue, they might be happier men.

7. On economic matters there are, in harmony with American capitalism as it is, three ways in which state power must be exercised. There are, first, the task for which the state has superior competence. The provision of education, economic security, a substantial amount of housing, indispensable medical services and, no doubt in the near future, a minimum standard of nutrition are all of this sort.

Second, the state must intervene to align the exercise of private power with the public welfare. This is an exceedingly complex affair and the ancient instinct of liberals, which is that the intervention should be such as to establish a predisposition toward the right decisions rather than to make the decisions, accords with the broad aim of

decentralization of authority. The intervention is, however, far less narrowly confined to reducing the exercise of private power by developing competition than American liberals continue to suppose. It may consist in large measure in helping to establish countervailing power. By far the most durable accomplishments of the government in the last two decades have not been in regulation or in the re-establishment of competition. They have been in supporting trade unions to a point of bargaining equality with employers, in arming farmers with the bargaining alternative of being able to sell to the government, or placing the force of law behind the minimum-wage demands for unorganized workers. These are the measures, not the anti-trust laws, which have most effectively regulated the exercise of private power. It is also clear that they fit a good deal more logically into capitalism as it is.

Finally, and most important of all, it would appear certain that private decision will have to be supplemented by action that will ensure tolerably full use of the resources of the economy.

No one should suppose that this is an easy task—the day when New Dealers could pin their hopes on public works and public spending is past. The income which is subject to control by the government is small compared with the possible changes resulting from exercise of private decision. There are still only the most imperfect and limited designs for expressing the government's effect on income—for supporting consumption, expanding public investment and diminishing the appropriate taxes in the event of a slump. The problem may not be safely solved until some effective way is found of expressing the profound social interest in a high and stable level of private business expenditure, including, in particular, private investment.

The chances are favorable, nonetheless, that we shall find means of keeping the economy functioning at tolerably high levels. There are no physical barriers. We are greatly helped by the fact that there is no single path to salvation that must be found to the exclusion of all others. Nothing in the theory or practice of American government would justify complacency in our ability to select a single right course from among many plausible wrong ones were that the problem. Happily it is not.

The barriers to a solution of the central problem of the American economy are far more in the area of beliefs than in the area of fact. As this essay has sufficiently emphasized, the triumph of practical action over confining doctrine has, in modern America, been a substantial one. It is reasonable to suppose that it will rule in the future. This may not be a solvent for the present uneasiness but it is still a reassuring thought.

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The British Economy: "Democratic Socialism" *

R. H. TAWNEY

The development in Great Britain of what has been called "democratic socialism" gained considerable momentum after 1946 when the Labour Party came to power. R. H. Tawney offers a critical, though sympathetic, account of the social service, planning, and nationalization measures which have been adopted in that country. Tawney, for many years professor at the University of London and the author of such famous works as *The Acquisitive Society* and *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, has been one of the leading economic historians of this century.

A detailed analysis of the policies pursued since July, 1945, cannot here be attempted. Their international background, including the European Recovery Programme and the American loan, in the absence of which British industries would be starved of raw materials, is, of course, of fundamental importance. If that crucial topic be omitted for lack of space, the principal new departures initiated by the Labour Government may conveniently be classified under three main heads. The first has been concerned with the extension and improvement of the various forms of communal provision—education, public health, insurance against sickness and unemployment, old age and widow's pensions, medical care and school-meals for children—which, though widely differing both in their purposes and their effects, are in England illogically grouped together under the un-illuminating name of the Social Services. Mainly under Conservative ministries, they had undergone, in the inter-war period, a development which, when allowance is made for the change in the price-level, had more than doubled the expenditure on them. The necessity both for their further enlargement and for their systematisation had become by 1939 common ground between parties.

The Coalition Government had taken some steps in that direction. It had been responsible in 1944 for a new Education Act, and, in the following year, for a Family Allowance Act. Of the latter something is said below; the former prepared the way for the most far-reaching reconstruction carried out since a public system of education was first brought into existence. It affects every side of that system, from Nursery Schools or classes to the education of adults; but its most significant innovations were, perhaps, four. It substituted a universal system of secondary education for the selective arrangements which had hitherto existed. It fixed fifteen, instead of fourteen, as the minimum age for the cessation of compulsory education, with the addition that, as soon as circumstance allowed, attendance should be legally obligatory to sixteen. It abolished fees, and made

* Reprinted from R. H. Tawney, "Social Democracy in Britain," in William Scarlett (ed.), *The Christian Demand for Social Justice* (1950), a Signet special book, with the permission of Professor R. H. Tawney and Bishop Scarlett.

secondary education free, in all but a small minority of secondary schools. It provided for the creation of a system of compulsory part-time continuation schools to follow full-time education up to the age of eighteen. Henceforward, therefore, all children, and not merely, as hitherto, a minority, will pass, between eleven and twelve, to one type or another of secondary school, and the disastrous gap between the school and industry will be partially bridged by continued education. . . . The present Government's chief contributions to the Social Services have been made, however, in a different field. They consist of its Social Security and Health measures.

A system of pooling risks by unemployment and sickness insurance had been established in England before the first world war. Repeatedly extended in the next quarter of a century, it suffered, when the Labour Government came to power, from the gaps and inconsistencies to be expected after a long series of piecemeal modifications. The details of the new structure are necessarily complicated; but its larger outlines can be simply stated. In the first place, a comprehensive National Insurance Act has consolidated the former Health and Unemployment Insurance schemes; has placed them under a single Ministry of National Insurance; and has established a universal system, with standard contributions and benefits—both, but especially the latter, substantially increased—under which every citizen is insured against sickness and unemployment from the age at which compulsory education ceases to that at which he or she qualifies for a retiring pension, special provision being made for the needs of maternity, in the shape of a grant on confinement and allowances, up to thirteen weeks, in the case of mothers normally in employment, as well as for widows and orphans. In the second place, a further Act provides for the special case of injury or disease incurred by workers in the course of their employment. Henceforward, the injured worker, instead of being required to make good a claim, often stubbornly contested, to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, will receive as a matter of course, subject to periodical medical reports on his condition, industrial injuries benefit up to six months, and subsequently, if he suffers from permanent disablement, a disablement pension graded according to the degree of his incapacity.

The third piece of legislation, the National Health Act, is intended to make the best medical treatment available for the whole population, irrespective of the financial means of different families. It does not, as has been suggested, "nationalise medicine"; and the medical profession, which at first looked askance at the measure as threatening the independence of the private practitioner, decided, after some hesitation, to co-operate in making a success of it. It establishes a service free for all at the time of treatment, the cost of which will be met partly from insurance contributions, partly from local rates and partly from grants from the National Exchequer. Hospitals are transferred from the hands of Local Authorities and voluntary bodies—the latter often short of funds—to the Ministry of Health, under which they will be administered by Regional Boards, composed, to the extent of one-half, of medical practitioners, and, for the other half, of nominees of the Ministry and the Local Health Authorities. Doctors are at liberty to continue their private practices, or to enter the national service, or to combine the two, as they themselves decide. Provision is made for a wide development, as soon as circumstances allow, of Health Centres, equipped and maintained

from public funds, where, when they so choose, they will engage in group practice. Finally, a principle not previously accepted in England has been embodied in an act already mentioned, the credit for which belongs to the Coalition Government. It is common knowledge that the period of maximum strain in a family occurs when several children have been born, and the eldest is not yet of an age to earn. The Family Allowance Act of 1945 is designed to meet that situation. It does so partly by establishing allowances in the shape of a small cash payment for each child after the first up either to the age when compulsory education ceases or to that of 16, whichever is the highest, partly by provision in kind, such as milk, vitamins, and cod-liver oil for expectant mothers and during the first year of a child's life, together with special supplies of the first for children of school age, and meals in public primary and secondary schools. Visitors to England periodically complain that milk is short. In reality, the average consumption per head is considerably higher than at any previous period. It is true, however, that since a larger proportion of the supply than before 1939 goes to those, in particular children, who need it most, there is less for adults—other than invalids—who can contrive, without intolerable hardship, to moderate their appetite for it. It is a question whether that minute concession to Christian ethics can appropriately be regarded as an occasion for tears.

It is possible, by means of a wisely planned system of communal provision, to ensure that the whole population enjoys, as far as environmental influences are concerned, equal opportunities of health and education, and is equally protected against the contingencies of life. Such a system, therefore, is not an excrescence upon Socialist policy, but an essential part of it. It is an investment in the development of human energies, which will, in time, pay handsome dividends; and it was proper that a high place should be given by a Labour Government to the effort to create it. The second and third main departments of that Government's policy are on a different plane. They are concerned, not with sharing more equitably the wealth produced, but with organising more effectively the energies which produce it. They include anti-unemployment measures; the nationalisation of certain important services; and action to eliminate avoidable causes of inefficiency in the case of industries—which will for long remain the great majority—not yet promoted to the dignity of public ownership.

The steps taken under the first head may, at the moment, appear otiose. In order, however, to produce their effect, expedients to avert unemployment must be prepared in advance, at a time when, as to-day, the problem is the shortage, not of jobs, but of workers to fill them. The Labour Party does not share the belief expressed by eminent persons in the United States shortly before the catastrophe of 1929 that the level of productive activity can safely be left to take care of itself, nor does it take the view once fashionable both in that country and Great Britain that decisions based on the self-interest—enlightened or otherwise—of entrepreneurs and investors should be the chief factor determining it. On the contrary, it regards the economic waste and social misery caused by recurrent unemployment as a scandal to our civilisation, and holds that to take every possible step to prevent it is among the first duties of Governments. Thanks, largely, to the work of economic thinkers, such as Keynes and Beveridge, the partial, though doubtless not the complete, suppression of an evil till

recently accepted, like typhus and cholera a century and a half ago, as though it were an Act of God, not the result of human folly and greed, no longer appears to be beyond the wit of man. Naturally, therefore, measures to avert its future recurrence were among the earliest preoccupations of the present British Cabinet.

In this matter the Labour Party makes no pretence to the possession of an infallible formula. It has merely sought the best advice available, and attempted to act on it. Given a planning organisation, to act as an economc general staff, the nucleus of which was created during the war, and which has now, with the necessary modifications, been placed under the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the first necessity was for the Government to be invested with adequate powers of control over the financial system. The principal means employed for that purpose have been three. The Bank of England has at last been added to the not inconsiderable number of Central Banks in public ownership, and its power to issue directions to other banks has been increased. The war-time control of new capital issues by means of a licensing system has been continued, and the Treasury has been empowered to guarantee loans for the reconstruction or development of any industry up to a maximum of £50,000,000, a figure which can, with parliamentary sanction, be increased. A National Investment Council has been established, to "advise and assist the Government in so organising, and, when necessary, stimulating, investment as to promote full employment." Henceforward, therefore, the main levers of short and long term credit will be in public hands, and it will be possible for both to be managed with a single eye to the public interest. Both a blunder, such as that of 1925, when, in deference to City sentiment, the export industries were sacrificed by the return to gold at too high a parity, and the recurrent imbecility of pouring capital into luxury flats, picture-houses and other investments which chance to hit the public fancy, at a time when coal and cotton were starved of the resources required to reconstruct them, are less likely to be repeated. Nor do measures of this order stand alone. Budgetary policy has an obvious bearing on the level of employment; and that favoured by Labour opinion has its contribution to make. Some twenty years have elapsed since it was remarked by a Royal Commission of unimpeachable propriety, presided over by a banker who was a pillar of respectability, that the social services, since they are not subject to sharp fluctuations, are a stabilising factor in the national economy; while it was the most eminent of modern British economists who wrote that "in contemporary conditions, the growth of wealth, so far from being dependent on the abstinence of the rich, is much more likely to be impeded by it." In combining an expansion of communal provision with a steeper graduation of taxation, the Government has complied with these prescriptions. A further, and more important, influence on the side of increased stability is likely to be exercised by a third element in its policy. It is now generally agreed that fluctuations in investment have played a major part in producing alternations of boom and depression, and that those alternations are seen at their sharpest in the producer-goods industries. That public investment, which can be deliberately regulated from year to year, is likely, given a reasonable measure of prevision, to fluctuate less violently than that of private individuals and corporations is equally a truism. The larger, in short, the sector of the national economy in which investment can be made with some ap-

proximation to a settled plan, the greater the State's command of the means to neutralise the grave evils caused by the anarchic oscillations of private industry.

Since 1945, that sector has been in process of expansion. The Housing programme, under which, in the three years following the conclusion of the war, accommodation was provided for not far short of a million and a half persons; the town and country planning policy; the Distribution of Industries Act; and the development areas established under it, are cases in point. The transference, apart from the special case of the Bank of England, of half-a-dozen industries to public ownership, though primarily prompted by other considerations, is, in this connection also, not without its advantages. In considering the reasons for the adoption of a policy which, though not new in principle, is novel on the present scale, certain commonplaces, are, perhaps, in order. The line, in the first place, between the area of economic life resigned to the activities of profit-making entrepreneurs and that administered by public authorities has never possessed the fixity often ignorantly ascribed to it. In reality, as a glance at the history of Europe is sufficient to show, it has been repeatedly re-drawn; and an observer of that impressive Socialist undertaking, the TVA, may be pardoned for feeling some uncertainty whether even the most virtuous of peoples is an exception to that statement. *Prima facie,* there is nothing surprising in the view that, as circumstances change, a re-classification of the spheres of private and public undertakings is periodically required. Whether in any particular instance, it is desirable or not is a question to be decided in the light, not of resounding affirmations of the virtues either of free enterprise or of socialisation, but of the facts of the case. It is an illusion, to suppose, in the second place, that the advocacy of an extension of public ownership is either confined in England to members of one party or advanced by that party as a formula of universal application. Authorities whose political sympathies, if classifiable at all, are not to be grouped under any single heading, have recommended it, on grounds of practical expediency, in the case of monopolies—a large category—agricultural land, transport, coal and power. The Labour Party approaches the problem, in an equally realistic spirit. It is true, of course, that great aggregations of economic power in private hands are open to objection on moral and political grounds, as a menace to democracy and freedom, and that Labour, which is rightly sensitive to their deleterious influence on the quality of civic life, looks to the extension of public ownership as one expedient, though only one, for averting that danger. Practical realities, however, determine that its policy in this field, as in others, shall not be wholesale and indiscriminate, but shall advance step by step, as a case for it is established. The result has been a process of selective nationalisation, undertaken when, on one or more of several different grounds, the balance of advantages favours that course.

In the case of the industries hitherto nationalised, such grounds have not been far to seek. Partly, it is to be presumed, for that reason, opposition to this aspect of the Government's policy has been less vocal than might have been expected. The transfer to public ownership of civil aviation and of long distance communications by cable and wireless passed almost unnoticed. The nationalisation of gas and electricity, if challenged in the House of Commons, stirred outside it only minor ripples. The more formidable task of converting into a unified service the railways, long

distance road haulage, and some sixty canal undertakings, together with subsidiaries such as the docks and harbours owned by bodies of several kinds, naturally aroused more anxiety; but, here again, objections had as their target less the principle of public ownership than specific questions relating to the structure and organisation of the new system. Just under thirty years ago, the recommendation that the mines should be nationalised, which was advanced by the majority of the Coal Commission presided over by the late Lord Sankey, aroused a storm of opposition. When, in 1946, that proposal became at last an Act of Parliament, not a dog barked. It is noticeable that a leading expert, whose strictures on the conduct of the industry by the Coal Board have aroused attention, accompanied them with a statement of his conviction that State ownership had been the correct policy.

The transfer of property in return for compensation, which nationalisation involves, is a means, not an end. Its purpose is to ensure that services, on which the general welfare depends, shall be conducted with a single eye to that objective, under authorities accountable for their proceedings to the public. Its success depends, therefore, not on the mere change of ownership, but on the degree to which advantage is taken of the opportunity offered by it to secure first-class management, to carry through measures of reorganisation which private enterprise was unable or unwilling to undertake, and to enlist the active co-operation of employees in increasing production. It is to be judged by its practical results on consumers, on workers and on the national prosperity; and, though the long decline in output, which went on in the Coal industry under private ownership, has been replaced since nationalisation by a slow upward movement, of results it is, as yet, too early to speak. Even, however, when this part of the programme of the present Parliament has been carried to completion, some four-fifths of the industrial *personnel* of the country will continue to be employed in industries in private hands; and, while some of the latter are not open to serious criticism on the score of inefficiency, there are others whose condition leaves not a little to be desired. Policy here has followed several lines. The first step taken has been to throw on the industries in question the responsibility for preparing such plans for improvement as may be needed, by appointing "working parties" composed of employers and trade unionists, to submit reports on the subject to the Board of Trade. In the second place, the Government has taken powers, under the Industrial Organisation Act of 1947, to set up Development Councils to bring approved schemes of reorganisation into operation, and, in certain cases—for example that of the cotton industry, in which Parliament has empowered it to pay grants up to 25 per cent of the cost of re-equipment—has stimulated modernisation by financial assistance. Third, it has carried a Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act, under which a Commission acting under the Board of Trade will inquire into such practices, and a competent Minister will have power, subject to affirmative resolutions in Parliament, to make orders prohibiting such of them as are found to be contrary to the public interest. Finally, and not least important, it has taken steps to ensure that the reproach of a neglect of the economic applications of science, which, though not generally true, had, in certain old-fashioned industries, too much validity, shall become a thing of the past. It has arranged for the supply of University-trained scientists to be largely increased; has made

funds available to promote research, not only in technology, but in the economic and social sciences; has encouraged the establishment of an Institute of Industrial Management, partly financed from public funds, to conduct investigations into problems of management, and has expanded the activities of the public Production Efficiency Service, whose advice is available for all firms desiring it.

In the immense lottery of war, sacrifices neither are nor can be equally shared. The economic embarrassments inherited by Great Britain from a conflict in which she fought, like her principal antagonist, from the first day to the last, and was not careful, in contributing to the common cause, to consider her own future, have not been a trifle. Of the measures by which she is grappling with these inevitable difficulties, and will in due course overcome them, this is not the place to speak. Nor has the time yet come when the larger policies of her Government can be judged by results. Their tendency is, however, obvious. It will be interrupted by recurrent checks and throw-backs. Since, however, the force behind it is not merely a political party, but the set of British life, it will not be arrested. Like earlier movements in her history, which also wound their way amid shoals and sand-banks, it will produce, in due course, its distinctive social order.

If present indications may be trusted, that order will be found, as it develops, to differ not less from the capitalist plutocracies formerly predominant in Western Europe than from the Eastern dictatorships. Some of its characteristics, if only in embryo, can already be discerned. Parliamentary Government and personal liberty not only continue in England unimpaired, but derive a heightened significance both from the successful employment of the former to effect by consent changes elsewhere imposed by violence, and from the more positive content acquired by the latter as the result of the firmer guarantees for opportunity, economic security and social well-being now added to it. Private interests count for less as a determinant of economic strategy, and public interests for more.

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The Soviet Economy: "Communism" *

BARRINGTON MOORE, JR.

Soviet "communism"—more properly, of course, termed "totalitarian socialism"—has for several decades offered a major economic and ideological challenge to the traditional democratic doctrines of the West. More recently, the Afro-Asian revolts against Western colonialism have served to intensify this challenge. These new nations, with inadequate capital, are seeking to achieve a rapid industrialization which would both raise their standard of living and strengthen their independent status. As a consequence, they have viewed with considerable interest the Soviet techniques of planning. Since a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet economy is impossible here, our attention is focused on the functioning of some of its key aspects, particularly state planning and the decision-making process involved in the various phases of allocation. The following selection is from *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power,* by Professor Barrington Moore, Jr., of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. (For an analysis of the process of allocation in a money-market-machine economy, see reading #9.)

The Problem and the Marxist Answer

It has been pointed out that any industrial economic system has to find ways and means for making four groups of decisions. First, it is necessary to decide what to produce. In the second place, decisions have to be made concerning the most efficient way of combining labor and resources in order to produce the guns, butter, and other myriad products of a modern industrial order. Thirdly, it is necessary to provide some means for deciding how much economic effort should go into the building of new plants and the replacement of equipment that has become worn out or obsolete. Finally, there have to be devices for ensuring the orderly distribution of the products of the economy among the population.

The answer given to these problems by classical economic theory, and to a lesser extent by capitalist economic practice, is that the free play of the acquisitive impulses of the individual in an atomistic and competitive order of society will result in a maximum flow of goods and services. On the producer's side the restless search for profit will supposedly lead him to find out what goods the consumer wants. The pressure from his competitors will supposedly compel him to manufacture these goods with a minimum output of labor and resources. Competition also forces the producer to sell his goods at a price that just covers the cost of production, including a return for his own managerial and entrepreneurial skills. On the consumer's side, it is argued that the restless search for gain will send him into the employment that provides a maximum payment for his

* Reprinted by permission of the publishers from Barrington Moore, *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright 1950 by The President and Fellows of Harvard College.

skills and efforts. Likewise, the acquisitive drives will compel the consumer to spend his earnings in the most efficient manner possible: that is, he will seek to purchase goods and services at the lowest possible price for comparable quality. In this way the consumer controls ultimately the activities of the producer, and the system of theorems is closed.

This system has been under attack ever since its formulation. At least in terms of institutional consequences, Marx and his followers have turned out to be the most important of the attackers. The essence of the Marxist attack lies in the denial of the assumption that the free play of acquisitive impulses among individuals will bring about a maximum of wealth and prosperity for all. Instead, Marx endeavored to show that under the operation of capitalist institutions the free play of such impulses would result in the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming poorer—in the famous "polarization of the classes," culminating in the explosion of the class struggle in the proletarian revolution. This doctrine, too, has been subject to critical onslaught ever since it was first propounded.

In addition, Marx anticipated the viewpoint of some anthropologists in his denial that the "laws" of economics were laws in the same sense as the description of universal relationships observed and calculated by the natural scientists. Instead, according to Marx's argument, each type of social organization—slave economy, feudalism, and capitalism—displays economic and social relationships or laws of its own. With the advent of socialism, according to a famous phrase of Engels', man would make the leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom. Marx coined no such phrase, and asserted more cautiously that in a socialist society man would still be subject to some restrictions and limitations, though these would not be the same as in capitalist society. . . .

Who Decides What to Produce?

The first question raised in the opening paragraph of this chapter may be used as a starting point: How does the Soviet system provide for reaching decisions on whether to produce guns, or butter, machinery or knitting needles?

From the available evidence, it is reasonably certain that the major decisions on the general production goals of the Soviet economy, including the types of products and quantities of each, are now reached by the Politburo and embodied in the various Five Year Plans. This concentration of the decision-making power on matters of national import in the economic field parallels the political concentration of power. The present situation differs markedly from that before Stalin's accession to power. The First Five Year Plan was itself the product of discussions and small-scale trials that lasted from the November Revolution until 1929. . . .

The procedure by which the Five Year Plans are actually drawn up is quite complicated and need not be considered in detail here, especially since this aspect of the Soviet system has received considerable attention from Western writers. It is sufficient to point out that in formulating the details of a Plan the Gosplan authorities must take careful account of existing capacities and resources, an operation which requires an accurate knowledge of such capacities and resources for the USSR as a whole. In the second place, the planners have to make sure that the plans for each industry and area match one another. For example, in expanding the amount of electric power, the Gosplan has to be sure

that there will be available the necessary steel and other equipment for building the new power plants, and that this power in turn will be in a locality where it will be useful to other factories. Thus, it is quite clear that the planners, including not only the technicians but also the political authorities, do not and cannot have a completely free hand in the choices that they make.

The conclusion that the basic decisions concerning what to produce and in what quantities are made in their essentials by the Politburo goes directly counter to the official ideology, according to which the masses participate widely in the planning process and thereby help to control their economic destiny. A recent semipopular Soviet exposition of the planning machinery devotes a whole chapter to the participation of the masses in planning.

An examination of this and other material bearing on this point throws very severe doubts upon the official contention. What happens, apparently, is that, under the stimulus of the Communist Party, the workers, factory directors, and collective farmers produce counterplans, in which they promise to carry out, or often to overfulfill, the official government plans. In 1947 and 1948 these counterplans have taken the form of long letters to Stalin, printed on the front page of the newspapers, in which groups of workers or farmers set themselves specific production goals that they are pledged to fulfill. Other forms of so-called mass participation in planning are the Stakhanovite movement and "socialist competition," in which various groups of workers or factories as well as collective farms vie with one another for prizes awarded to the group with the greatest output. All of these movements are carefully controlled and stimulated by the Party. There is not the slightest evidence that they can in any way affect the fundamental aims of the Plan. They do not affect such basic decisions as whether the economic resources of the country will be directed into heavy industry or light industry, into war goods or peace goods, consumers' goods or producers' goods, which are the essential decisions of the Plan. They are merely additional stimuli to production that, together with the elaborate apparatus of control, help to take the place of the spurs and checks provided by the market in a capitalist economy.

Position and Motivations of the Soviet Manager

Once the decision has been reached concerning what goods are to be produced, there remains a host of decisions to be made concerning the most efficient combination of raw materials, factory equipment, and labor necessary to produce them. Under a capitalist system, the profit motive provides the major stimulus for the maximization of efficient production, and the bankruptcy court the chief negative sanction for inefficiency. The capitalist entrepreneur under textbook conditions is free to obtain his supplies of men and materials where he can find them. Actually, he does a great deal of shopping around for them. Likewise, he makes the decision of whether or not to expand his plant by adding new buildings and machines. In practice, these decisions may be greatly influenced or limited by government authorities. The Soviet manager enjoys only a very limited autonomy in the search for supplies, and on his own initiative can do next to nothing about the major aspects of the size and capacity of the plant entrusted to him by the state. This series of graded distinctions in the power to make important economic decisions, and in the motivations behind these decisions, is more im-

portant in practice at least than differences in property rights in distinguishing between the Soviet manager and his capitalist counterpart.

As a motivating force to interest the manager in the efficiency of his plant, the Soviets make use of the profit motive in a manner that has certain strong resemblances to familiar capitalist arrangements. The utilization of this device, often regarded as a distinctive feature of capitalism, is openly recognized and accepted in current Soviet doctrine. The Five Year Plan adopted in 1946 aims to "increase the importance of the profit motive and economic accounting as an additional stimulus to production." Nevertheless, the operation of the profit motive is hedged in under the Soviet system by limitations on the opportunities to bargain for supplies, the centralization of decisions concerning plant expansion, and taxation policies that return most of the profit to the state. In this manner it is harnessed to the socialist chariot and prevented from becoming a force that might disrupt Soviet institutions.

To understand the operation of the profit motive and the limitations of the manager's power of decision, the Soviet production process at various points may be examined. Beginning at the point of sale, and working back from there, one may note that the products of a plant are sold at prices fixed by the government. Exceeding these prices is punishable by law. But the prices do not represent the money equivalent of the cost of production. The plant is expected to produce its goods at a cost that is less than the price set by the government. A so-called turnover tax and an amount included as the planned profit are added to the anticipated cost of production. Lowering the quality of the goods to increase the margin between cost of production and selling price is punishable by law. If the manager holds costs below the anticipated amount, the profits of the plant are increased. In 1945 the total profit for the Soviet Union as a whole amounted to 21,051,000,000 rubles.

At earlier stages in the production process, the limitations on the manager's power of decision and the operations of the profit incentive are connected with control over the physical equipment of the plant and over supplies of raw materials. The basic assumption of the Soviet system is, of course, that the manager is not free to buy or sell factories, which are regarded as government property entrusted to him to manage. In the process of spelling this principle out in actual legal and institutional forms, the Soviets have for some time drawn a distinction between what they call basic and circulating resources. Very different possibilities are open to the manager for the utilization of each.

The terms "basic resources" and "circulating resources" derive from the differences Marx believed he saw between the *means* of labor—factory buildings, machines, and so forth—and the *objects* of labor—raw materials, semifinished products, and the like. These differences would exist in any form of society, Marx declared. In general, the means of labor are regarded as the basic resources and the objects of labor as the circulating ones. The distinction between the two types of resources does not depend upon the nature of the object itself, but the purpose for which it is intended. Thus a linotype machine that is the product of a factory that makes them is part of the circulating resources of this factory. When this same machine is transferred to a printing establishment, it becomes part of the basic resources of this plant.

In practice, difficulties soon arose in the application of these distinctions. In 1923 it

was decreed that basic resources were those that were not used up or destroyed in a single act of production—buildings, machines, and the like—and that circulating resources were those that could only be used once—fuel, raw materials, and others. In 1936 the definition of circulating resources was broadened to include objects whose useful life was less than a year, independent of their cost, and objects whose cost, independent of their useful life, was less than 200 rubles.

Basic resources cannot be bought or sold again by the individual manager. In other words, the Soviet manager cannot increase or decrease the size and equipment of the plant entrusted to his care through buying and selling operations in the fashion of his capitalist counterpart. However, he does have a voice in the disposal of a small portion of the plant's profits which can be used for expansion. Thus the outlet for the operation of the profit motive is, in this part of the production process, a very small one.

Circulating resources provide the opportunity for the profit motive to serve as a stimulus to production and efficiency. The minimum of supplies necessary for the operation of the plant is determined according to the plan. The flow of supplies to the plant is controlled in different ways for different types of supplies, depending on the scarcity of the commodity concerned. Some of them may be purchased directly from other producers. The production plan for the individual plant includes a certain profit rate, called the planned profit. If the manager makes efficient utilization of his resources, he may exceed the planned rate of profit. Should this take place, the extra profit remains at the disposal of the plant. In 1940, 70 per cent of the cost of production for industry as a whole is reported to have been spent on raw materials, fuel, and other items that come under the definition of circulating resources.

In addition, the manager is permitted to add to his circulating resources through loans from the banks. These loans are supposed to be issued only for strictly defined purposes, though their utilization for purposes other than those defined is deprecated in strong enough terms to suggest that it may occur rather often. Such loans probably increase the leeway available to the manager in the making of production decisions, at the same time providing a further check upon managerial operations in a way that resembles banking control over production decisions in a capitalist society.

The disposition of the profit indicates further its limitations as an incentive. Part of it is taxed and part placed in the Industrial Bank (Prombank) for purposes of capital development within the industry. A third part goes into what is called the Director's Fund, a slightly misleading name, since it does not appear that this fund is a direct reward for the manager.

The Director's Fund is primarily a way of rewarding the workers for energy and efficiency. Since the way the fund is expended is left partly to the discretion of the director, it is safe to assume that it represents a series of tempting prizes that the manager may distribute to those he chooses. In 1940 the amount distributed through the Director's Fund was 2,600,000,000 rubles. In some, presumably exceptional plants, individual workers received cash awards of 500 to 1,000 rubles. Though payments into the Director's Fund were replaced by other rewards during the war years, they were revived again in 1946. Under the postwar legislation only 2 to 10 per cent of the planned profits may be credited to the Director's Fund, the per-

centage varying with different industries. A much larger proportion, between 25 and 50 per cent, of the profits in excess of the plan may be credited to this fund. This arrangement presumably acts as a stimulus toward greater profit on the part of both workers and management. The proceeds of the fund may be spent on improving the housing conditions of the workers and for other amenities, for individual bonuses, trips to rest homes, sanatoria, and the like. While the director has the right to allocate the fund, it does not appear that he may spend any of it upon himself.

On the other hand, salary bonuses for the managers are closely related to profit, though not calculated as a percentage thereof. In coal mining, for each per cent of reduction of real cost of production below planned cost, the manager, assistant manager, chief and assistant engineers obtain a bonus of 15 per cent of their monthly salary. Similar rules prevail in other sectors of heavy industry. On occasion the total bonuses granted to managers and engineers equal or exceed their annual salary.

The Soviets have taken the profit motive of capitalist society and adapted it to the requirements of their own ideology and social system, hedging it in with numerous restrictions so that it may not act as a socially disruptive force. After 1929 they did much the same thing to the capitalist device of competition, which the Webbs described as being, under socialism, the use "of the sporting instinct to augment the wealth of the nation." Socialist competition, as it is known in the USSR, usually takes the form of a race between two or more factories, or shops within factories, to see who can turn out the maximum output. It is thus closely allied to the Stakhanovite movement. The winners receive group publicity in the Soviet press, banners, and other symbols of achievement. During the war there developed, as part of the system of socialist competition, the "200 per cent movement," that is, groups of workers who fulfilled double the requirements of the plan. Whether this type of speed-up leads to an efficient utilization of men and machines is open to doubt, since it often leads to a rapid breakdown of both. It should be noted that socialist competition, directed chiefly toward the quantitative maximization of output, differs sharply from competition in capitalist society, which takes the form of competitive bidding for labor and resources on the side of production, and in competition by price, quality, and services on the side of distribution.

In the light of the foregoing it is safe to conclude, as others have done, that noneconomic incentives and checks play the more important role in producing the desired behavior on the part of the Soviet manager. Chief among these are the possibilities of advancement to positions of greater and greater responsibility and prestige for those who have learned to combine men, machines, and materials in the most efficient manner, and the probabilities of disgrace, or even active physical suffering, for those who fail to measure up to the assigned task. Economic failure is likely to be identified with sabotage, and hence becomes a "sin" in an even stronger sense than is the case in the United States, with severe penalties meted out in this life. . . .

The Collectivization of Thrift

According to classical economic theory, the resources needed for the construction of new plants and the replacement of worn-out machinery come from the sacrifice of present consumption. To a considerable extent they are derived in a capitalist

economy from individual savings that are loaned to industry through the purchase of securities. Interest payments have been widely regarded as a form of reward for the sacrifice of present consumption, thus permitting the construction or replacement of capital equipment.

To some extent individual savings are a source of plant construction and replacement in the Soviet Union. The virtues of thrift are recognized there, too. As early as 1926 Stalin himself spoke out in favor of interest payments as the normal way of "mobilizing" individual savings. But they play a much smaller role in the Soviet Union than they do under capitalist conditions.

When the Soviets in the thirties started the drive for socialist industrialization, they could not, for a variety of reasons, afford to rely upon individual thrift alone, or upon voluntary abstention from consumption as a source of real capital investment. Perhaps the most important of these considerations was that the sacrifices required were too great for reliance on voluntary means. Nor could the regime permit people to save money with the idea that they would invest it wherever there was the greatest opportunity for profit. Both socialist doctrine and the requirements of the day demanded that decisions concerning real capital investment be centralized.

For these reasons, capital investment has been, and is, financed very heavily out of the national budget. . . . The chief source of budget revenue and hence, indirectly, of capital investment is the turnover tax. It constituted 61.1 per cent of government revenues between 1938 and 1940, and 60 per cent in 1946, although the figure dropped to 40.8 per cent in 1945. This tax, with more than 2,500 individual rates, is imposed on almost all consumption goods at the point where they leave the producing plant and enter channels of distribution. It is the major factor in the difference between the cost of production and the selling price of any article. Even plants that fail to operate at a profit must pay this tax. . . .

Distribution

In the Soviet system for the distribution of goods to the population at large, one may observe the same mixture of what are commonly considered socialist and capitalist principles as appear in the other aspects of their economic arrangements. The present arrangements for distribution are the product of a long period of trial and error. By the time of the outbreak of the Second World War, the system devised was to sell the products of socialist industry, as well as most of the products of agriculture, through government and cooperative stores at fixed prices. In addition, there is a free market for certain agricultural products. In this system the turnover tax provides the means for matching prices to available supplies. With certain relatively minor changes this is the principal arrangement in effect today. Under this system, incentives produced by inequalities in income have their full effect. Additional money income means an additional opportunity to purchase the necessities and good things of life. This situation is in accord with the socialist maxim, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work."

However, at various times and under emergency conditions, the Soviet regime, like its capitalist competitors, has found it expedient to resort to other distributive devices. One of these is, of course, rationing, which has existed from time to time, including the period of the Second World War. Wartime rationing was abolished on

December 16, 1947, at the same time that consumer demand was checked by a devaluation of the currency. Special stores, where "members of the intelligentsia and highly skilled workers" could obtain various scarce goods, usually at higher prices than those in the regular distribution channels where the goods were often nonexistent, have been another distributive device. Still another has been the organization of special canteens in the factories. During the war the role of these canteens, which often drew their supplies from the collective farms that made special agreements with a particular factory, increased sharply. Before the war they accounted for only 4 per cent of the retail turnover in the USSR, while in 1942 they accounted for 28 per cent, and in special areas, such as the Urals, for as much as 45 per cent. Despite these variations, the distribution of consumers' goods has by and large been based on the principle of "come and get it if you can afford it."

Even writers sympathetic to the Soviet Union assert that the system of retail distribution is one of the least successful products of the regime, and the Soviets themselves have denounced it perhaps more frequently than any other feature of their society. Service tends to be disinterested and slow. Little or inadequate attention is paid to local needs and tastes, or to seasonal requirements. "Stores are replenished with merchandise irregularly, and the most necessary goods are lacking." Store staffs are "neither accustomed to nor interested in laying in supplies on time or carefully storing perishable commodities." The Webbs' remark, "There have been not a few occasions when village and even city stores have been clamouring in vain for particular supplies, when these have been lying unopened, and even forgotten at some intermediate point." . . .

Summary and Conclusions

In order to make their economic system work, the Soviets have arrived by a trial-and-error process at the stage where they have borrowed a number of the motivations of capitalism: inequality of rewards and incomes, the profit motive, and some of the superficial aspects of competition. These borrowings do not provide a warrant for the viewpoint that regards the Soviet system as closely similar to capitalism. They do provide support for the assertion that a modern industrial society implies certain common problems and even certain common solutions. The extreme claim of universal validity for the principles of classical economics is not warranted according to the Soviet evidence. But neither is the extreme claim of cultural or institutional relativism established according to the same evidence.

The motivations generally lumped under the rubric of personal acquisitiveness, which, as Weber points out, are likely to crop up under widely disparate social situations, do not receive the scope and approbation that they do in the United States. The Soviet economic system is one that keeps them hemmed in at every turn and channeled into what are considered socially useful paths. To take their place other motivations and prestige rewards have been developed. Likewise, other justifications for the Soviet system have received wide dissemination: allegations concerning the greater security of the individual, and the system's claimed freedom from the corrosive effects of crises and unemployment.

In this respect Soviet culture is still a materialist culture. The virtues claimed for the system are material virtues. There is none of the contempt for so-called debilitating material comforts displayed, if not

practiced, by the leaders of Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. The Soviet system of values is much closer to the American system in this respect than it is to Western totalitarian ideologies, or to the ascetic ideologies of the East.

In this system of values the conflict between authoritarian and populist elements finds a reflection in economic institutions. The belief that the masses must be led to their salvation played its role in the programs of forcible industrialization and collectivization. It may also be traced in the creation of a highly centralized system for the making of economic decisions.

Chapter Eight

INSTITUTIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture

Like so many of the social sciences, the study of human behavior can be traced back to the Greek philosophers. On the question of the shaping of the individual personality, the two intellectual giants of Hellenic culture were in distinct disagreement. Aristotle viewed man as a biological animal in which the hereditary factor was of prime importance. Plato, on the other hand, maintained that the individual was molded basically by the nature of the society in which he lived. In many respects, these opposing viewpoints may be regarded as the beginning of the long-standing controversy between "heredity" and "environment." Since then, both positions have had their supporters and detractors.

With the appearance of Darwin's work in the nineteenth century, an evolutionary perspective was introduced into the social sciences. This, in turn, had its effect in the field of human behavior. A number of writers suggested that man's institutions and conduct followed a definite pattern of development. According to one author, religion, for example, is supposed to have evolved from primitive animism, through various stages of polytheism to the present acceptance of monotheism. Probably more influential in the emergence of social psychology have been the crowd behavior studies of several late nineteenth-century French writers, among them G. Tarde and Gustave Le Bon.

In the United States, the extremely popular and pioneering work by William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology,* made its appearance in 1908. Since then, sociologists, anthropologists, as well as psychologists themselves, have done much to undermine McDougall's instinct theory. In attempting to explain man's personality development, social forces have been given a position beside that of his biological inheritance. The relative significance accorded each of these factors in personality formation will, of course, vary according to the individual predilections of the authors involved.

In recent decades, aided by the comparative analysis of psychological behavior in various cultures, as well as the increasingly effective application of experimental techniques, social psychology has made notable advances. Moreover, the scope of the discipline has expanded until, at the present time, it encompasses a considerable number of topics. According to one leading authority, "The major problem areas may be listed as follows: (1) The interpenetration of general psychology and social psychology. (2) The socialization of the child;

culture and personality. (3) Individual and group differences. (4) Attitudes and opinions. (5) Social interaction, group dynamics, sociometry, leadership. (6) Social pathology. (7) Politics, domestic and international." *

The following section of readings, then, brief though it may be, is designed to offer the student an introduction to this very important field of study in the social sciences. In doing so, we turn first to some fundamental observations regarding the nature of social psychology itself; and then to an analysis of the various forces shaping the individual personality. This is followed by additional readings indicating the vital interaction between the over-all culture pattern and its institutions, on the one hand, and the individual personality and group behavior, on the other.

* Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954), p. 17.

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Social Psychology *

OTTO KLINEBERG

Dr. Otto Klineberg, author of numerous studies and professor of psychology at Columbia University, gives us his definition of social psychology as well as some general observations as to the relationships between this and other fields in the social sciences.

Psychology has been defined as the scientific study of the activities of the individual. Social psychology may be defined as the scientific study of the activities of the individual as influenced by other individuals. These "others" may exert their effect singly or in groups; they may act directly through their presence in the immediate environment, or indirectly through the medium of traditional or expected modes of behavior which affect the individual even when he is alone. Whether he moves positively in the direction indicated by a group of which he approves, or negatively in the opposite direction because the group is one which he rejects, his behavior is still socially determined. Even when he reacts not to the actual characteristics or behavior of others, but in terms of an image or stereotype which may be entirely false, he is still being influenced by other individuals as he sees them; this phenomenon is also social-psychological. If he in turn affects those who have affected him—which is usually the case—we may speak of interaction, regarded by a number of recent writers as the essence of social psychology. Since this may not always be the case, however, it seems preferable to adopt the more inclusive definition suggested above.

To speak of a situation as social when the individual is alone may seem at first somewhat paradoxical, but it is not difficult to find confirmation of this view. When an American encounters something which he

* Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954). Used by permission of the publisher.

does not anticipate, he is likely to open his eyes wide in surprise; a Chinese under similar circumstances is much more likely to stick out his tongue. In both cases the reaction is certainly determined by the respective groups to which the individuals belong. Others—parents, teachers, associates—have helped to shape this particular bit of behavior, even though it may occur in an individual unseen by others. To take another example, when someone is faced with a difficult decision, perhaps related to the choice of a new occupation or a new home, though he may have shut himself up alone in his study to consider the alternatives, he is being influenced by others—by those from whom he acquired his standards of value, by his judgment of what the change would do to his wife and children, by his views of the attitudes of his former and future associates, by his estimate of the effect on his social position within the community, etc. Every experiment in psychology in which human beings are used as subjects involves a social component to the extent that the observed behavior is determined by previous social experience.

Conceived so broadly, social psychology is not always easy to separate from neighboring disciplines. Usually it is distinguished on the one hand from general psychology, which deals at least in theory with the activities of the individual as such, and on the other hand from sociology, which is concerned primarily with the group and with social institutions.

Actually both of these distinctions are difficult to maintain. In connection with the former, there is a growing recognition among psychologists of the importance of the group in determining the characteristics of the individual. In particular the discoveries of the ethnologists have revealed the extent to which personality is shaped by the cultural and social environment in which it develops. It would be difficult to point to any substantial amount of psychological description of the individual which does not reveal social influences to some degree. It may not be entirely true that "all psychology is social psychology," but we shall have occasion to see that this statement contains little exaggeration. . . .

It may perhaps be helpful to think of psychological phenomena as representing a continuum extending from a minimum to a maximum of social determination. At one extreme may be found data relating to after-images, dark-adaptation, conditioning of the patellar reflex to electric shock, for example; at the other, a study of the effects of an interracial housing project on the attitudes of the participants, or the extent to which the behavior of an individual is shaped by his status in the community or by the role which he is expected to play. It would be difficult if not impossible to determine the exact point on the continuum at which social factors become important. No sharp break is to be expected, nor can it be discovered. At the same time the phenomena do change in character as we go from one extreme to the other, and different techniques are required for their investigation even though the scientific principles may remain the same. Perhaps the safest conclusion to reach is that the student of social psychology deals with phenomena which are *more* social and the student of general psychology with those which are *less* social.

This absence of any sharp dividing line holds also for the relation between social psychology and sociology. It is true that sociology supposedly deals with groups and institutions, and psychology with individuals, but as groups are obviously made up of individuals, overlapping is inevitable. . . .

If a distinction must be made, it may be helpful to look at the problem in this man-

ner. Suppose, for instance, our interest is in the problem of gangs and gang behavior. The sociologist would presumably be concerned with the social and economic causes of gang life, the relation of the gang to law and order and institutions like the school and the church, the geographical distribution of gangs, their effect on the life of the community. The social psychologist, on the other hand, might be expected to study the nature of the individuals in the gang, their intellectual and personal characteristics, the effect of the gang on the individuals composing it, the life history of individual members, etc. When, however, a sociologist writes a book on "The Gang," he certainly makes no such artificial distinctions, and many of his findings belong properly in the field of social psychology. Similarly, when the Lynds give us a sociological account of "Middletown," they tell us a great deal also about the attitudes and personality of the individuals in that community. . . .

The science of anthropology, particularly cultural anthropology or ethnology, bears a similar relation to social psychology. Wissler regards psychology as concerned with individual performances, and anthropology with group behavior. The anthropologist, according to him, is not especially interested in the function of the individual in the group; if he were, he would be indistinguishable from the psychologist. There can be no doubt, however, that on occasions the individual may be of great importance to the anthropologist. The description of the Ghost Dance, a religious movement among the Plains Indians during the latter part of the last century, is clearly incomplete without some attention to the personality of Wovoka, its founder. The autobiography of Crashing Thunder, a Winnebago Indian, though edited by the anthropologist Paul Radin, is obviously concerned at least as much with the individual as with the group. The growing literature dealing with the life histories of members of many different cultural groups bears ample testimony to the ever-increasing interest of anthropologists in the individual as well as in the culture. . . .

[Ralph] Linton has written as follows: "The individual has been assigned to psychology, society to sociology, and culture to cultural anthropology. . . . It is now becoming apparent that the integration between the individual, society, and culture is so close and their interaction so continuous that the investigator who tries to work with any one of them without reference to the other two soon comes to a dead end . . . the next few years will witness the emergence of a science of human behavior which will synthesize the findings of psychology, sociology, and anthropology."* Although we have not yet achieved this goal, it is precisely the hope of contributing toward such a synthesis which motivated the writing of this book.

* Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality,* New York; copyright 1945. Used by permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

commentators, goes so far as to say: "Scotchmen and Irishmen are more unlike Englishmen, the native of Normandy more unlike the native of Provence, the Pomeranian more unlike the Wurtemberger, the Piedmontese more unlike the Neapolitan, the Basque more unlike the Andalusian, than the American from any part of the country is to the American from any other part." His conclusion is that "it is rather more difficult to take any assemblage of attributes in any of these European countries and call it the national type than it is to do the like in the United States." The preoccupation of American historians with local and sectional diversities has tended to obscure this underlying reality.

But the particular assemblage of attributes recorded by the travelers leaves much to be desired. Not only is the list incomplete, but it fails to distinguish the significant from the trivial. Since the typical European covered as much ground as possible in a limited stay, his attention was caught by externals. Annoying mannerisms assumed undue importance, as dust in the eye of a wayfarer keeps him from perceiving the main features of the landscape. Thus the gospel of work is hardly to be equated with the addiction to spitting. Some visitors actually prided themselves upon learning much from seeing little. More thoughtful ones sought to correlate what they observed with the avowed ideals of the people, such as equality, individualism, and democracy; but except in a few conspicuous instances they lacked sufficient knowledge of the profounder trends in American society to understand either the true inwardness of the ideals or how they manifested themselves in action. Finally, the traveler gave little attention to the crucial problem of why the special combination of traits and attitudes had become endemic within the borders of the United States.

Hence the judgment of these onlookers, though often clear-sighted and frequently valuable as a corrective, leaves ample room for the student of United States history to venture an answer to Crèvecoeur's question. If the native-born historian be suspect as a party in interest, he may at least strive to observe that counsel of objectivity which his professional conscience reveres. What, then, is the American from the historian's point of view—or at least from one historian's point of view? The answer, briefly expressed, is so simple as to be a truism. This "new man" is the product of the interplay of his Old World heritage and New World conditions. Real understanding dawns only when the nature of these two factors is properly assessed.

The Old World heritage consisted merely of that part of European culture which the people who settled America had shared. The great bulk of the colonists, like the immigrants of later times, belonged to the poorer classes. Whether in England or on the Continent, they and their ancestors had been artisans, small tradesmen, farmers, day laborers—the firm foundation upon which rested the superstructure of European cultivation. Shut out from a life of wealth, leisure, and aesthetic enjoyment, they had tended to regard the ways of their social superiors with misgiving, if not resentment, and by the same token, they magnified the virtues of sobriety, diligence, and thrift that characterized their own order. Even when many of them, notably in England, improved their economic position as a result of the great growth of commerce and industry in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they continued to exalt the ancient proprieties. This attitude found its classic spiritual expression in Calvinism.

As Professor Tawney has said, Calvinism was "perhaps the first systematic body of religious teaching which can be said to recognize and applaud the economic virtues." It neatly fitted the glove of divine sanction to the hand of prudential conduct, thus giving a sense of personal rectitude to the business of getting ahead in the world. But whether in Britain or elsewhere, whether in the religious groups directly affected or those more remotely influenced, Calvinism merely intensified a pre-existing bent. It is similarly true that the stringent code of morals often attributed to Calvinism, and more particularly to Puritanism, represented a lower-middle-class mentality long antedating the Geneva teachings.

This, then, was the type of human breed upon which the untamed New World exerted its will. It has often been observed that the plants and animals of foreign lands undergo change when removed to America. These mutations arise from differences in climate and geography. But other influences also affected the transplanted European man. One was the temperament of the settler, the fact that he was more adventurous, or more ambitious, or more rebellious against conditions at home than his fellows who stayed put. It is not necessary to believe with William Stoughton that "God sifted a whole Nation that he might send Choice Grain over into this Wilderness," but undoubtedly the act of quitting a familiar life for a strange and perilous one demanded uncommon qualities of hardihood, self-reliance, and imagination. Once the ocean was crossed, sheer distance and the impact of novel experiences further weakened the bonds of custom, evoked unsuspected capacities, and awakened the settler to possibilities of improvement which his forebears had never known.

The conditions offered by an undeveloped continent fixed the frame within which the new life must be lived, the mold within which the American character took form. Farming was the primary occupation. At first resorted to by the settlers to keep from starvation, it quickly became the mainstay of their existence. The Revolution was fought by a people of whom nineteen out of twenty were farmers. With good soil easily obtainable for over a century more, agriculture continued, though with gradually diminishing effect, to provide the pervasive atmosphere of American life and thought. "The vast majority of the people of this country live by the land, and carry its quality in their manners and opinions," wrote Emerson in 1844. Even when the hosts from Continental Europe began to swell the population in the nineteenth century, the rural temper of the nation continued unaltered, for most of the immigrants also turned to farming. This long apprenticeship to the soil made an indelible impress on the developing American character, with results which the modern age of the city has not wholly effaced. . . .

What qualities of the national character are attributable to this long-persistent agrarian setting? First and foremost is the habit of work. For the colonial farmer ceaseless exertion was the price of survival. Every member of the community must be up and doing. If a contrary spirit showed itself, the authorities, whether Anglican, Puritan, or of a different faith, laid a heavy hand upon the culprit. The Virginia Assembly in 1619 ordered slothful individuals to be bound over to compulsory labor. A few years later the Massachusetts Bay Company instructed Governor John Endecott that "noe idle drone bee permitted to live amongst us . . . ," and the General Court followed this up in 1633 with a decree that "noe prson, howse

houlder or othr, shall spend his time idlely or unproffitably, under paine of such punishmt as the Court shall thinke meete to inflicte. . . ." Such regulations had long existed in England, where it was hoped, vainly, that they might combat the unemployment and vagrancy of a surplus laboring class; in America their purpose was to overcome a labor shortage, that exigent problem of every new country. Of course, the vast bulk of settlers, inured to toil in the homeland, required no official prodding. They were the hardest-working people on earth, their only respite being afforded by strict observance of the Sabbath as required by both church and state. . . .

Probably no legacy from our farmer forebears has entered more deeply into the national psychology. If an American has no purposeful work on hand, the fever in his blood impels him nevertheless to some form of visible activity. When seated he keeps moving in a rocking chair. A European visitor in the 1890's found more fact than fiction in a magazine caricature which pictured a foreigner as saying to his American hostess, "It's a defect in your country, that you have no leisured classes." "But we have them," she replied, "only we call them tramps." The traveler's own comment was: "America is the only country in the world, where one is ashamed of having nothing to do."

This worship of work has rendered it difficult for Americans to learn how to play. As Poor Richard saw it, "Leisure is the Time for doing something useful . . ." The importance attached to useful work had the further effect of helping to render "this new man" indifferent to aesthetic considerations. To the farmer a tree was not a symbol of Nature's unity but an obstacle to be reduced to a stump and then quickly replaced with a patch of corn or vegetables. In the words of an eighteenth-century American, "The Plow-man that raiseth Grain is more serviceable to Mankind, than the Painter who draws only to please the Eye. The Carpenter who builds a good House to defend us from the Wind and Weather, is more serviceable than the curious Carver, who employs his Art to please the Fancy." The cult of beauty, in other words, had nothing to contribute to the stern business of living; it wasn't "practical." The bias thus given to the national mentality lasted well into America's urban age. One result has been the architectural monotony and ugliness which have invariably offended travelers accustomed to the picturesque charm of Old World cities.

On the other hand, the complicated nature of the farmer's job, especially during the first two and a half centuries, provided an unexcelled training in mechanical ingenuity. These ex-Europeans and their descendants became a race of whittlers and tinkers, daily engaged in devising, improving, and repairing tools and other things until, as Emerson said, they had "the power and habit of invention in their brain." . . .

The farmer's success in coping with his multitudinous tasks aroused a pride of accomplishment that made him scorn the specialist or expert. As a Jack-of-all-trades, he was content to be master of none, choosing to do many things well enough rather than anything supremely well. Thus versatility became an outstanding American attribute. In public affairs the common man agreed with President Jackson that any intelligent person could discharge the duties of any governmental office. He had an abiding suspicion of the theorist or the "scholar in politics," preferring to trust his own quick perceptions and to deal from day to day with matters as they arose. In his breadwinning pur-

suits the American flitted freely from job to job in marked contrast to the European custom of following permanent occupations which often descended from father to son. The most casual scrutiny of the *Dictionary of American Biography* discloses countless instances reminiscent of John Marshall and Francis Makemie in colonial times. Thomas Buchannan Read, born on a Pennsylvania farm, was in turn a tailor's apprentice, grocer's assistant, cigar maker, tombstone carver, sign painter, and actor before he became a portrait painter, novelist, poet, and Civil War officer. Another personage is listed as "ornithologist and wholesale druggist"; another as "preacher, railway president, author"; and still another as "physician, merchant, political leader, magazine editor, poet, and critic." The wonder is that, despite such a squandering of energies, they could yet gain sufficient distinction in any phase of their activities to be recalled by posterity.

Even in his principal occupation of growing food, the farmer encountered harsh criticism from foreign visitors because of his practice of wearing out the land, his neglect of livestock, and his destruction of forest resources. But Old World agriculture was based on a ratio of man to land which in the New World was reversed. It was as natural for the American farmer to "mine the soil" and pass on to a virgin tract as it was for the European peasant to husband his few acres in the interest of generations unborn. Not till the opening years of the twentieth century when the pressure of population dramatized the evils of past misuse, did the conservation of physical resources become a deliberate national policy.

Meanwhile the tradition of wasteful living, fostered by an environment of abundance, had fastened itself on the American character, disposing men to condone extravagance in public as well as in private life. Even official corruption could be winked at on the ground that a wealthy country such as the United States could afford it. In their personal lives Americans were improvident of riches that another people would have saved or frugally used. One recent arrival from England in the early nineteenth century wrote that the apples and peaches rotting in Ohio orchards were more "than would sink the British fleet." Another immigrant said of her adopted countrymen that she wished the "poor people in England had the leavings of their tables, that goes to their dogs and hogs." . . .

Toward women the American male early acquired an attitude which sharply distinguished him from his brother in the Old World. As in every new country, women had a high scarcity value, both in the colonies and later in the settling West. They were in demand not only for reasons of affection but also because of their economic importance, for they performed the endless work about the house and helped with the heavy farm labor. "The cry is everywhere for girls; girls, and more girls!" wrote a traveler in 1866. He noted that men outnumbered women in thirty-eight of the forty-five states and territories. In California the ratio was three to one; in Colorado, twenty to one. "Guess my husband's got to look after me, and make himself agreeable to me, if he can," a pretty Western girl remarked—"if he don't, there's plenty will." In the circumstances men paid women a deference and accorded them a status unknown in older societies. European observers attributed the high standard of sex morals largely to this fact, and it is significant that the most rapid strides toward equal

suffrage took place in those commonwealths where the conditions of rural life had lingered longest.

Since the agriculturist regarded his farm only as a temporary abode, an investment rather than a home, he soon contracted the habit of being "permanently transitory." Distances that would have daunted the stoutest-hearted European deterred "this new man" not at all. Many an Atlantic Coast family migrated from place to place across the continent until the second or third generation reached the rim of the Pacific and the next one began the journey back. "In no State of the Union," wrote James Bryce in 1888, "is the bulk of the population so fixed in its residence as everywhere in Europe; in many it is almost nomadic." But for this constant mingling of people and ideas the spirit of sectionalism would have opened far deeper fissures in American society than it did, for the breadth of the land, the regional diversification of economic interests, and the concentration of European immigrants in certain areas were all factors conducive to separatism and disunity. Instead of one great civil war there might have been many. Apart from the crisis of 1860, however, it has always been possible to adjust sectional differences peaceably. The war between North and South might itself have been avoided if the slave-centered plantation system of agriculture had not increasingly stopped the inflow of persons from other parts of the country as well as from Europe. Denied such infusions of new blood, the Southerners lived more and more to themselves, came to value their peculiarities above the traits they shared with their fellow countrymen, and, in the end, resolved to strike for an independent existence. As the country grew older and its institutions assumed a more settled aspect, the locomotive tendencies of the Americans showed no signs of abatement. The wanderlust had entered their blood stream. . . .

Geographic or horizontal mobility was the concomitant of a still more fundamental aspect of American life: social or vertical mobility. The European notion of a graded society in which each class everlastingly performed its allotted function vanished quickly amidst primitive surroundings that invited the humblest persons to move upward as well as outward. Instead of everybody being nobody, they found that everybody might become somebody. In the language of James Russell Lowell, "Here, on the edge of the forest, where civilized man was brought face to face again with nature and taught mainly to rely on himself, mere manhood became a fact of prime importance." This emancipation from hoary custom was "no bantling of theory, no fruit of forethought," but "a gift of the sky and of the forest." In this manner there arose the ingrained belief in equality of opportunity, the right of every man to a free and fair start—a view which in one of its most significant ramifications led to the establishment of free tax-supported schools. This belief was far from being a dogma of enforced equality. The feeling of the American was "I'm as good as you are" rather than "I'm no better than anyone else." To benefit from equality of opportunity a man must be equal to his opportunities. The government existed principally as an umpire to supervise the game with a minimum of rules. The upshot was a conception of democracy rigorously qualified by individualism.

This individualistic bias sometimes assumed forms that defied vested authority. The colonists in their relations with the

mother country evaded unwelcome governmental regulations and, assisted by their theologians and lawyers, made the most of the doctrine that acts of parliament contrary to their "unalienable rights" were void. Within the colonies those who dwelt remote from the centers of law enforcement adopted a similar attitude toward the provincial governments. The Scotch-Irish who squatted on vacant Pennsylvania lands in the early eighteenth century justified their illegal conduct on the score that "it was against the laws of God and nature, that so much land should be idle while so many Christians wanted it to labor on and to raise their bread." The Massachusetts farmers who followed Daniel Shays later in the century were moved by a similar spirit. As a substitute for constituted authority, the settlers oftentimes set up their own unofficial tribunals, which adjudicated land titles and punished offenders against the public peace. In other instances they resorted to the swifter retribution of individual gunplay or of mob action and lynch law. To use a familiar American expression they "took the law in their own hands," thus fostering a habit of violence which survived the circumstances that produced it and has continued to condition the national mentality to the present time.

As a result, Americans tend to act on the principle that men should be equal in breaking the law as well as in making it, that they should enjoy freedom *from* government as well as freedom *under* government. Thoreau, the great philosopher of individualism, knew of no reason why a citizen should "ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator." He declared, "I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward." A similar conviction undoubtedly inspired William H. Seward's flaming declaration to the proslavery senators in 1850 that "there is a higher law than the Constitution . . . ," just as it actuated the thousands of churchgoing Northerners who secretly banded together to defeat the Fugitive Slave Act. But generally it has been self-interest or convenience, rather than conscience, that has provided the incentive to law defiance, as in the case of the businessman chafing against legislative restrictions or of the motorist unwilling to obey the traffic regulations. Sometimes this attitude has paraded under such high-sounding names as states' rights and nullification. This lawless streak in the American character has often been directed to wrong purposes, but it has also served as a check on the abuse of governmental powers and as a safeguard of popular rights.

In still another aspect the individualism of the pioneer farmer accounts for the intense cultivation of the acquisitive spirit. In the absence of hereditary distinctions of birth and rank the accumulation of wealth constituted the most obvious badge of social superiority, and once the process was begun, the inbred urge to keep on working made it difficult to stop. "The poor struggle to be rich, the rich to be richer," remarked an onlooker in the mid-nineteenth century. Thanks to equality of opportunity with plenty for all, the class struggle in America has consisted in this struggle of Americans to climb out of one class into a higher one. The zest of competition frequently led to sharp trading, fraud, and chicanery, but in the public mind guilt attached less to the practices than to the ineptitude of being caught at them. Financial success was popularly accepted as the highest success, and not until the twentieth century did a religious leader venture to advance the un-American doctrine that ill-gotten wealth was

"tainted money" even when devoted to benevolent uses.

It would be a mistake, however, to think of the American as merely a mechanism set in motion by dropping a coin in the slot. When President Coolidge made his famous remark, "The business of America is business," he quite properly added, "The chief ideal of the American people is idealism. I cannot repeat too often that America is a nation of idealists." This dualism puzzled foreign commentators, who found it difficult, for example, to reconcile worship of the Almighty Dollar with the equally universal tendency to spend freely and give money away. In contrast to Europe, America has had practically no misers, and one consequence of the winning of independence was the abolition of primogeniture and entail. Harriet Martineau was among those who concluded that "the eager pursuit of wealth does not necessarily indicate a love of wealth for its own sake." The fact is that, for a people who recalled how hungry and ill-clad their ancestors had been through the centuries in the Old World, the chance to make money was like the sunlight at the end of a tunnel. It was the means of living a life of human dignity. In other words, for the great majority of Americans it was a symbol of idealism rather than materialism. Hence, "this new man" had an instinctive sympathy for the underdog, and even persons of moderate wealth gratefully shared it with the less fortunate, helping to endow charities, schools, hospitals, and art galleries and providing the wherewithal to nourish movements for humanitarian reform which might otherwise have died a-borning.

The energy that entered into many of these movements was heightened by another national attitude: optimism. It was this quality that sustained the European men and women who with heavy hearts quit their ancestral firesides to try their fortunes in a strange and far-off continent. This same trait animated the pioneer farmers confronted by the hardships, loneliness, and terrors of the primeval forest and served also to comfort their successors who, though toiling under less dire conditions, were constantly pitted against both the uncertainties of the weather and the unpredictable demands of the market. When Thomas Jefferson remarked, "I steer my bark with Hope in the head, leaving Fear astern," he spoke for all his compatriots. To doubt the future was to confess oneself a failure since the life history of almost any American documented the opposite view. A belief in progress blossomed spontaneously in such a soil. If it made some men tolerant of present abuses in the confident expectation that time would provide the cure, it fired others with an apostolic zeal to hasten the happy day. As a keen observer in the middle of the last century said of his fellow countrymen, "Americans are sanguine enough to believe that no evil is without a remedy, if they could only find it, and they see no good reason why they should not try to find remedies for all the evils of life." Not even fatalism in religion could long withstand the bracing atmosphere of the New World. This quality of optimism sometimes soared to dizzy heights causing men to strive for earthly perfection in communistic societies or to prepare to greet the return of Christ in ascension robes.

It attained its most blatant expression in the national love of bragging. At bottom, this habit sprang from pride in a country of vast distances and mighty elevations and from an illimitable faith in its possibilities of being great as well as big. The American glorified the future

in much the same spirit that the European glorified the past. Both tended to exalt what they had the most of, and by a simple transition the American also found it easy to speak of expected events as though they had already happened. Oftentimes the motive was to compensate for an inner feeling of inferiority. This frame of mind prompted statesmen to cultivate spread-eagle oratory, a style which a writer in the *North American Review* in 1858 defined as "a compound of exaggeration, effrontery, bombast, and extravagance, mixed metaphors, platitudes, defiant threats thrown at the world, and irreverent appeals flung at the Supreme Being." . . .

This facility for overstatement has given a distinctive quality to American humor. In the United States humor has never been part of a general gaiety of spirit. It has had to break through a crust of life thick with serious purpose. Hence it has had to be boisterous and bold, delighting in exaggeration, incongruities, and farcical effects, and reaching a grand climax in the practical joke. Out of a comic mood so induced arose such folk heroes as Mike Fink, Paul Bunyan, Pecos Bill, and the myth-embroidered Davy Crockett, whose fabulous exploits flourished in oral tradition long before they were reduced to print. In deference to the national sobriety of temperament the most successful professional humorists have been those who preserved a decorous gravity of expression while telling their incredible yarns.

If this analysis of American characteristics is well founded, then certain modifications might be expected as the primacy of rural life yielded to the rise of urbanism. In the latter decades of the nineteenth century a rapidly increasing proportion of the people found themselves dwelling under conditions different from those of earlier times. In 1860 only a sixth of the nation lived in towns of 8,000 or more, but by 1900 a third resided in urban communities, and today well over half do. Moreover, throughout these years, places of 25,000 or more attracted a majority of the city dwellers. Paralleling this urban growth occurred a remarkable development of new means of communication and transport that carried city ideas and ways to "the very fingertips of the whole land": the telephone, rural free delivery, good roads, inter-urban electric transit, the automobile, the movie, the radio. In this changed environment of American society many of the historic national traits flourished; others were tempered or transformed. The period of urban and industrial predominance is short as compared with the long impact of ruralism upon the American mind, but already several reversals of older attitudes are apparent.

One is the importance which Americans have come to attach to cultural achievement. The ancient prejudice against "useless" accomplishments could not long withstand the compelling opportunities offered by the city. In such centers were to be found the best schools, the best newspapers, the best churches, and virtually all the bookstores, libraries, publishing houses, concert halls, art galleries, and theaters. There, too, America made closest contact with the vital thought of Europe. The leveling upward of popular taste insured encouragement and financial support for persons who wanted to cultivate their brains rather than their biceps. Who can ever know how dreadful a toll the two and a half centuries of agricultural existence exacted in terms of possible creative advances of the mind and spirit, how many a "mute inglorious Milton" succumbed to the unending struggle with Nature? For persons like these the

city meant a glad release. It gave them a chance to mature their powers, to commune with kindred spirits, and to enter the lists for fame and fortune. Even in earlier times cultural stirrings had centered in the towns and cities. Now, as the urban influence became uppermost, Americans commenced to make contributions to scholarship, science, literature, and the fine arts that challenged comparison with the best Europe could offer.

As a necessary consequence, some of the old aversion to specialization of talent vanished. In a civilization rapidly growing more complex, men began to learn to place a higher value on thoroughly mastering a skill or conquering a particular branch of knowledge. The business of making a living tended to fall into compartments, with the men best equipped by training or experience reaping the greatest rewards. This trend characterized not only the arts and sciences but also the upper ranges of industry and trade. Even in public life expertness of knowledge steadily played a larger part, notably in the administrative services of city, state, and nation. The derisive references to a "Brain Trust" several years ago came from partisan critics who did not, however, intend to abandon the device if or when they should return to power.

A further result of the changed aspect of American society has been the great impetus given to voluntary associational activity. In an agricultural environment the gregarious instinct was constantly thwarted by the dearth of neighbors. The hunger for companionship could find only an occasional outlet, as at the county fair or in the tumultuous crowd gathered from far and near for a camp meeting. To the rural birthright of liberty and equality the city added the boon of fraternity. In a crowded community like could find like. The reformer, the businessman, the wage earner, the intellectual worker, the sports lover, the ancestor worshiper—all these and many others drifted together into special groups to foster interests held in common, and these local societies seldom failed to expand into nation-wide federations. Soon the population was divided between the organized and those who organized them, until, if the late Will Rogers is to be believed, "Americans will join anything in town but their own family. Why, two Americans can't meet on the street without one banging a gavel and calling the other to order." Thus the passion for associational activity became a sovereign principle of life.

Quite as noteworthy has been another effect of city growth: the renouncing of individualism as the automatic cure of human ills. As the nineteenth century advanced the increasing domination of the national economy by the urban magnates of business and finance caused the farmers to demand that the government intercede to protect their right to a decent livelihood. In the cities the congested living quarters, the growing wretchedness of the poor, and the rise of difficult social problems also created doubts as to the sufficiency of the laissez-faire brand of democracy. Only the rich and the powerful seemed now to profit from the system of unbridled individualism. Though the solid core of ancient habit yielded stubbornly, the average man came gradually to believe that under the altered conditions it was the duty of the government of all to safeguard equal opportunity for all. After the American fashion it was a doctrineless conviction, the product of an adjustment to new times for the sake of preserving the traditional spirit of self-reliance and free competition.

In this modern age the gospel of work

retained its grip upon the American mentality, but the assurance of permanent remunerative work no longer existed, particularly for the army of city toilers. Every sudden jar to the national business structure cast large numbers of them out of employment. The wage earner through no fault of his own was being denied an essential part of his natural heritage. As early as 1893 the American Federation of Labor resolved that "the right to work is the right to life," and declared that "when the private employer cannot or will not give work the municipality, state or nation must." But it was not until the Great Depression of 1929 destroyed the livelihood of people at all levels of society that this novel view became an article of American faith. The New Deal assumed the obligation not merely of saving the destitute from hunger but of creating jobs for the idle and guarding against such hazards in the future by means of unemployment compensation, retirement payments for aged employees, and special provisions for farmers. Thus what had begun as the community's need for everyone to work became transformed into a doctrine of the right to work and then into the responsibility of government to provide the means of work.

The national character, as we at present know it, is thus a mixture of long-persistent traits and newly acquired characteristics. Based upon the solid qualities of those Europeans who dared to start life anew across the Atlantic, it assumed distinctive form under the pressure of adaptation to a radically different environment. "Our ancestors sought a new country," said James Russell Lowell. "What they found was a new condition of mind." The long tutelage to the soil acted as the chief formative influence, removing ancient inhibitions, freeing latent energies, revamping mental attitudes. The rise of the city confirmed or strengthened many of the earlier attributes while altering others. Probably none of the traits is peculiar to the American people; some of them we may regard with more humility than pride; but the sum total represents a way of life unlike that of any other nation.

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The Authoritarian Personality*

SAMUEL H. FLOWERMAN

The triumph of modern nationalism and industrialism has given rise to what has frequently been termed "mass man" and/or "mass culture." Social scientists, analyzing this phenomenon from various perspectives, have pointed out a number of significant manifestations. Among them are a greater tendency toward conformity, a decline of individualism, and a greater response to anti-democratic views. Samuel H. Flowerman, co-editor with Max Horkheimer of the five-volume work, *Studies in Prejudice,* presents a portrait of the authoritarian personality.

Findings of recent scientific investigations reveal that the real menace to democracy is not the brutal dictator but the anonymous man-in-the-crowd on whose support the dictator depends for power. Social scientists have found that this nameless individual is not a creation of the dictator but a ready-made "authoritarian personality"—a person whose family background and social environment have made him peculiarly attuned to antidemocratic beliefs. It requires authoritative personalities to take hold of authoritarian ideas; it takes authoritarian personalities—thousands and even millions of them—to build an authoritarian state.

Concern about authority and the relationship between the ruler and the ruled is not new. It runs through the fabric of recorded history of civilization. Philosophers and poets—from at least as far back as ancient Egypt and Greece to present-day Existentialists—have wrestled with the dilemma of how to attain the highest level of development of the individual within some system of order governing man's relation to man. In the United States a spate of studies about various aspects of personality development has been going forward for several decades. And research workers, most of them trained here, have been conducting studies in post-war Germany in an effort to understand why a people will produce, nuture and follow a dictator. The bulk of these inquiries tend to yield somewhat consistent results: there is something special, something different about the "authoritarian man."

Perhaps the most detailed study of all time in this field was made by a team of social psychologists in California, working for almost five years. They recently completed an investigation of the democratic and anti-democratic ideas and attitudes of the American man-in-the-crowd, seeking keys to their origin. Teams from other parts of the country have added to their findings. The California group—T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Max Horkheimer, Daniel Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford—interviewed and tested

* Reprinted from Samuel H. Flowerman, "Portrait of the Authoritarian Man," *The New York Times Magazine,* April 23, 1950 and used by permission of the *Times* and of the author

more than two thousand persons in the San Francisco Bay area, Los Angeles, Portland, Ore., and Washington, D.C.

Among the groups tested were factory workers, officer candidates in a maritime training school, veterans, members of service clubs (Rotarians and Kiwanis), office workers, male inmates of a prison, members of parent-teacher associations, out-patients in a psychiatric clinic, church groups, and college students.

While the California study is not a statistical study but rather examines various groups psychologically, it was found that authoritarian men did exist in many groups and in many places. Based on the California study and other readings and observations over a number of years, social scientists feel that it can be said that about 10 percent of the population of the United States probably consists of "authoritarian men and women" while as many as another 20 percent have within them the seeds that grow into authoritarianism.

Lest the conclusion be drawn that there are only two kinds of people, authoritarians and anti-authoritarians, it should be said that the social scientists' findings rate persons on a scale from very low to very high, as regards their authoritarian tendencies, with perhaps the bulk of the population clustered around the middle.

From the findings of the California study has emerged this composite psychological portrait of the Authoritarian Man:

He Is a Supreme Conformist. The Authoritarian Man conforms to the nth degree to middle-class ideas and ideals and to authority. But conforming is no voluntary act for him; it is compulsive and irrational. It is an attempt to find security by merging with the herd, by submitting to some higher power or authority. Not only does he feel compelled to submit; he wants others to submit, too. He cannot run the risk of being different and cannot tolerate difference in anyone else.

In a mild form, such compulsive submission to authority may find a Casper Milquetoast chewing each mouthful of food thirty times because some bogus health expert has said he should. In its extreme form it finds people reduced to sheep, herded into marking "yes" on ballots that do not have "no," bleating "Heil!" to the commands of a Hitler, and doing his bidding even when it means oppressing, even killing, other people.

Authoritarians see the world and its inhabitants as menacing and unfriendly. Being so threatened, so anxiety ridden, they must seek security somehow, somewhere. The best security for the authoritarian is to surrender to a powerful authority. He agrees, for example, that "What the world needs is a strong leader"; and "There are two kinds of people, the weak and the strong."

To him, life is a power system into which he must fit. He doesn't have to wield the power himself so long as he can be near power, sharing it vicariously. It is this latter tendency which makes the authoritarian such a good camp-follower.

But the authoritarian is a loyal camp-follower only so long as the leader remains strong. Let the leader falter, let him be defeated; then, "Down with the old, up with the new."

So today in Germany many people agree that Hitler was bad, but only because he was unsuccessful in the long run; their basic way of life is still authoritarian—they simply await a new, stronger, more powerful leader.

He Is Rigid and Shows Limited Imagination. He is a mechanical man, a kind of

robot who reacts to only a limited number of ideas and can't be budged out of the channels in which he has been conditioned to operate. This doesn't mean that the Authoritarian Man is a person of low intelligence; but it does mean that his personality restricts his intelligence and imagination. He is generally incapable of figuring out alternate solutions to problems.

The extent to which this rigidity operates was demonstrated by Dr. Milton Rokeach, a junior member of the California team and now at Michigan State College. Dr. Rokeach worked out a series of simple problems in arithmetic and map reading. He presented these problems to groups of adults and children, whose authoritarianism had already been determined. All the people in the experiment were taught to solve the problems by using a complicated method, but nothing was said about other, easier, solutions; they were simply instructed to get the right answers. As Dr. Rokeach's guinea pigs continued to work down the list of problems they soon reached a series of examples that could be solved either the hard way or very simply. Authoritarians continued to solve the problems the hard way. The non-authoritarians shifted readily to the easy solutions—they were able to use more channels.

He Is Herd-minded. And to be herd-minded—"ethnocentric" is the scientists' term—implies being prejudiced. To the authoritarian, people who are—or seem to be—different are strange, uncanny and threatening, although they may be few in number and unimportant in influence. He tends to exalt his own group and reject members of other groups. (To be sure, there are some exceptions to this praise of one's own group. Sometimes members of minority groups take over the prejudices of the majority groups and engage in what psychologists call "self-hate.")

The person who dislikes one "out-group" generally dislikes many other "out-groups." In this respect he is like the hay-fever victim, who is usually allergic to more than one kind of pollen.

The authoritarian puts neat—and often false—labels on people. In his group he may see individuals; outside his own group he sees only masses or types. So he will frequently say of members of "minority" groups that "that kind" is "lazy," "sex-crazy," "dishonest in business," "money-mad," "smelly," and so on. What is more, he tends to see "them" everywhere.

He Is a Phony Conservative. He waves the flag, he sounds like a patriot, but at heart hates the very traditions and institutions he professes to love. In his most rabid form the phony conservative is the anti-democratic agitator who is more destructively radical than the radicals he claims he is attacking.

The California team distinguishes between the true conservative and the phony conservative. The true conservative may be patriotic, believe in American traditions and institutions, and support their continued existence; he may also believe in a laissez-faire economy. But he is also for giving every individual an equal "break" regardless of his group membership. And it is in regard to this last point that the true conservative can be distinguished from the counterfeit flag-waver.

He Is a Moral Purist. The authoritarian frowns on sensuality, a trait he is ready to find in members of other groups. He regards his own group as morally pure.

Authoritarian men—and women—tend to agree, for example, that no "decent man" would marry an unchaste woman. Even male prisoners jailed for sex crimes support statements condemning sex crimes; and they are also more conforming, more anti-Semitic, more anti-Negro, and more pseudo-conservative than their fellow-prisoners.

It would be a grave mistake to regard the authoritarian as a lunatic or freak, although doubtless there are such extreme cases. If anything, the democratic person may appear outwardly to be less well-adjusted because he "internalizes" his problems to a greater degree and blames himself for many of his difficulties. The authoritarian "externalizes" his problems and blames other people and other forces. On the surface, the authoritarian may seem to be less troubled, but this is often because he has buried his smoldering resentment and hostility within himself.

By contrast with his opposite the extremely democratic personality is a man with a mind of his own; he is a flexible individual, adjusting readily to new situations. He is sensitive to the part he plays in conflicting situations and he is ready to take responsibility for his own behavior.

The model anti-authoritarian tends to like all sorts of people regardless of whether they are members of his group. He is without prejudice against religious or racial minorities. He regards persons as individuals, not types. Nor is he inclined to judge the moral standards of others. It is easy for him to see some good in the world and some hope for its future. Most important, he refuses to surrender his individuality to a "big shot," although he may submit to rational authority by choice when he believes that such authority is based upon equality, superior ability, and co-operation, and that it is subject to dismissal for a job badly done.

The findings of these studies suggest that people are not deliberately and systematically taught the ABC's of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is a term which describes personality; and personality is developed in the crucible of interpersonal relationships, the most important of which is the relationship between parent and child.

As a child the typical authoritarian was usually subjected to harsh discipline and was given little affection in a home in which the father was a tough boss. In such a home children must "knuckle under" and submit. There is little opportunity to act as an individual. Fear rules, and parents and other figures of authority are regarded as menacing, punitive and overpowering. This fear, based on the inability to disagree, is carried over into adult life; when the opportunity to assert one's self occurs, it is seized by way of compensation. The slave of one generation becomes the domineering master of the next generation.

On the other hand, as a child the democratic individual most often grew up in a home where the mother had much to say. Children in these families knew affection and had a feeling that they counted as individuals. They exercised the right to disagree, although often not without conflict and guilt. As adults they regard their parents as flesh-and-blood characters with the traits of real people. In childhood, the democratic person was able to choose equality and independence instead of blind, passive submission. As an adult, the democratic person is not so easily pushed around because he has no compulsive need, based on fear, to submit to the authority of the "big shot."

To be sure, there are reasons for the de-

velopment of authoritarian personalities which are not to be found in the home. There are the major environmental upheavals—depressions and unemployment, inflations, wars, earthquakes, revolutions, floods—which alter ways of living and believing. There are also the chance experiences which an individual encounters in a lifetime. Sometimes the harshness of a child's home may be offset by kindly teachers, decent playmates, and other significant figures who treat the child affectionately as an individual. Sometimes a child grows up in such a way as to be able to throw off the effects of his slavery.

But these rebels are perhaps the exception, whereas the slave personality occurs more often when childhood has been spent in an authoritarian house. Certainly research findings indicate that so far the key to the difference between the authoritarian and democratic personalities lies in the relationship between parents and children. Learning to disagree with one's parents may be the capstone of a democratic personality.

How great is the threat of authoritarian development in this country? There are several deeply ingrained trends in American culture which probably offset to a considerable degree the spread of authoritarianism.

Americans traditionally scoff at authority. An American President reads a State of the Union message before Congress and is heckled, only to answer right back. Prize-fight referees are booed when they award unfair decisions against Negro boxers in favor of white boxers. Players and spectators "razz" baseball umpires. Radio programs and movies make fun of cops, school teachers, and principles, and especially fathers.

American homes are mother-oriented—and if anything—child-dominated. Women control the family purse strings of America, handle immediate problems of discipline, and are favored by over-sentimentality in a Victorian sense.

We have an American creed of fair play, of equality, and of upward mobility among social and economic classes. We are an individualistic, freedom-loving, rational, practical people. Americans are suspicious of flag-waving and of military authority.

Yet there are those who note that our American creed is "honored more in the breach than in the observance." Wide gaps separate what we claim to believe and what we feel and do. Like any national group, we are susceptible to anti-democratic ideologies; we have authoritarian personalities among us.

Chapter Nine

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD INSTITUTIONS

International Relations

1.

Whether or not we view international relations as a phase of political science, it is certainly the newest, and probably least developed, of the social sciences. The increasing contact of peoples and nations in the modern world and the problems that have ensued have obviously led to the emergence of this field as a distinctive area of study. Initially, its emphasis was purely legal and historical. Later, more stress was placed on diplomacy, geography, and current affairs. Today, its scope is broader and its view more dynamic. It is not a synthesis of the social sciences so much as an approach to a particular problem of major significance which draws on all of the social sciences.

We have seen how vital are the interrelationships of institutions within a culture. We have come now to acknowledge the continuous interaction between cultures. In one sense, the history of mankind has been a long period of individual civilizations. This does not discount, of course, the significant fact of cultural diffusion, virtually as old as society itself. In dealing with international relations, we implicitly accept the existence of national states. And clearly, nationalism has been one of the most powerful forces of the modern world. Virtually all of the great ideologies and movements of the past four hundred years, including those ostensibly international in character —capitalism, industrialism, liberalism, socialism, communism, and even certain religions—have foundered on the rocks of nationalism. Yet, with the rise of nationalism, and such simultaneous and interacting movements as democracy and industrialism, we have reached a new peak of cultural exchange and interdependence among peoples. As a consequence, every important force has assumed global significance. The past century and a half has well been termed the age of nationalism. Though seemingly paradoxical, it is also in some respect, the initial period of world history.

2.

A study of the modern state system and the ever-increasing contact among nations raises the question: What are the basic elements of international relations? We turn immediately to an analysis of nationalism

itself and two forces which have been devised to cope with its anarchical consequences—the balance of power and international law and organization. With this as a background, we are inevitably concerned with the development and contemporary character of American foreign policy.

The United States has many notable achievements to its credit. Perhaps most impressive, however, has been its emergence as a dominant power in the world within the relatively brief span of a hundred and fifty years. In general, our external relations have been directed along three different lines. To begin with, the westward movement, which during the nineteenth century assumed continental proportions, received its ultimate extension with our entrance into the affairs of the Pacific and Far East. Secondly, there has been the long-established hegemony of the United States over the Western Hemisphere. And, finally, we have functioned as an intimate part of the Atlantic Community. Beginning with the discovery of the New World, we have been part and parcel of Western civilization, and the constant exchange of ideas, techniques, and peoples has continued ever since. To be sure, we operated for a period under the self-imposed myth that we had been able to maintain a policy of isolation with regard to European affairs. We insisted that our primary interest was in conquering a wilderness, peopling a continent, and building a new nation. That we succeeded in doing both for a time was due far more to the nature of European events than to any wish fulfillment. To a considerable degree, many have been guilty of confusing cause and consequence. But in the twentieth century, two suicidal wars, the phenomenal rise of the Soviet Union, and the new nationalisms of Asia have contributed to the political collapse of Europe. As a result, we have not only had to acknowledge our position in the Atlantic Community, but also to accept the responsibility of leadership thrust upon us by the turn of events.

Following the appraisals of the foreign policy of the United States, it is imperative that we take some cognizance of the emergent international institutions of the contemporary world. In this regard, we view successively the most recent efforts of man to create a new international political order, to sustain an already well-advanced world economy, and to control the cataclysmic weapons of modern science and technology.

A. Elements of International Relations

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*The Idea of Nationalism**

HANS KOHN

Of the many scholars who have enhanced our understanding of nationalism, Hans Kohn must be counted among those few who have contributed the most. Dr. Kohn has taught at Harvard, Yale, California, Colorado, Minnesota, Smith and, at present, is professor of history at The City College in New York. He is the author of some twenty volumes, including *The Idea of Nationalism,* from which the following excerpt is taken.

Nationalism as we understand it is not older than the second half of the eighteenth century. Its first great manifestation was the French Revolution, which gave the new movement an increased dynamic force. Nationalism had become manifest, however, at the end of the eighteenth century almost simultaneously in a number of widely separated European countries. Its time in the evolution of mankind had arrived, and although the French Revolution was one of the most powerful factors in its intensification and spread, this did not mark the date of its birth. Like all historical movements, nationalism has its roots deep in the past. The conditions which made its emergence possible had matured for centuries before they converged at its formation. These political, economic, and intellectual developments took a long time for their growth, and proceeded at a different pace in the various countries. It is impossible to grade them according to their importance or to make one dependent upon another. All are closely interconnected, each reacting upon the others; and although their growth can be traced separately, their effects and consequences cannot be separated otherwise then in the analysis of the scholar; in life, they are indissolubly intertwined.

Nationalism is inconceivable without the ideas of popular sovereignty preceding—without a complete revision of the position of ruler and ruled, of classes and castes. The aspect of the universe and of society had to be secularized with the help of a new natural science and of natural law as understood by Grotius and Locke. The traditionalism of economic life had to be broken by the rise of the third estate, which was to turn the attention away from the royal courts and their civilization to the life, language, and arts of the people. This new class found itself less bound by tradition than the nobility or clergy; it represented a new force striving for new things; it was ready to break with the past, flouting tradition in its opinion even more than it did in reality. In its rise, it claimed to represent not only a new class and its interests, but the whole people. Where the third estate became powerful in the eighteenth century—as in

* The selection from Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism;* copyright 1944 by The Macmillan Company and used with the publisher's permission.

Great Britain, in France, and in the United States—nationalism found its expression predominantly, but never exclusively, in political and economic changes. Where, on the other hand, the third estate was still weak and only in a budding stage at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as in Germany, Italy, and among the Slavonic peoples, nationalism found its expression predominantly in the cultural field. Among these peoples, at the beginning it was not so much the nation-state as the *Volksgeist* and its manifestations in literature and folklore, in the mother tongue, and in history, which became the center of the attention of nationalism. With the growing strength of the third estate, with the political and cultural awakening of the masses, in the course of the nineteenth century, this cultural nationalism soon turned into the desire for the formation of a nation-state.

The growth of nationalism is the process of integration of the masses of the people into a common political form. Nationalism therefore presupposes the existence, in fact or as an ideal, of a centralized form of government over a large and distinct territory. This form was created by the absolute monarchs, who were the pacemakers of modern nationalism; the French Revolution inherited and continued the centralizing tendencies of the kings, but at the same time it filled the central organization with a new spirit and gave it a power of cohesion unknown before. Nationalism is unthinkable before the emergence of the modern state in the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Nationalism accepted this form, but changed it by animating it with a new feeling of life and with a new religious fervor.

For its composite texture, nationalism used in its growth some of the oldest and most primitive feelings of man, found throughout history as important factors in the formation of social groups. There is a natural tendency in man—and by "natural tendency" we mean a tendency which, having been produced by social circumstances from time practically immemorial, appears to us as natural—to love his birthplace or the place of his childhood sojourn, its surroundings, its climate, the contours of hills and valleys, of rivers and trees. We are all subject to the immense power of habitude, and even if in a later stage of development we are attracted by the unknown and by change, we delight to come back and to be at rest in the reassuring sight of the familiar. Man has an easily understandable preference for his own language as the only one which he thoroughly understands and in which he feels at home. He prefers native customs and native food to alien ones, which appear to him unintelligible and indigestible. Should he travel, he will return to his chair and his table with a feeling of relaxation and will be elated by the joy of finding himself again at home, away from the strain of a sojourn in foreign lands and contact with foreign peoples. . . .

These feelings have always existed. They do not form nationalism; they correspond to certain facts—territory, language, common descent—which we also find in nationalism. But here they are entirely transformed, charged with new and different emotions, and embedded in a broader context. They are the natural elements out of which nationalism is formed; but nationalism is not a natural phenomenon, not a product of "eternal" or "natural" laws; it is a product of the growth of social and intellectual factors at a certain stage of history. Some feeling of nationality, it may be said, existed before the birth of modern nationalism—a feeling varying in strength and in frequency from time to time: at some epochs almost completely extinguished, at others more or less clearly dis-

cernible. But it was largely unconscious and inarticulate. It did not influence the thought and actions of men in a deep and all-pervading way. It found a clear expression only occasionally in individuals, and in groups only at times of stress or provocation. It did not determine their aims or actions permanently or in the long run. It was no purposeful will welding together all the individuals into a unity of emotions, thoughts, and actions. . . .

Before nationalism, language was very rarely stressed as a fact on which the prestige and power of a group depended. Alien languages remained until the very recent centuries the languages used by official bodies, in the scholarly world, or among the upper classes. To mention only one fact which stands for a large number, the Breton estates, which were very jealous of their independence, nevertheless spoke French, and in the Act of Union for the Defense of the Liberties of Brittany of 1719 the Breton spokesmen did not mention language grievances. The translations of the Bible in Protestant countries were not undertaken from any motives of nationalism, but purely for the spreading of the true religion. Queen Elizabeth had the Bible and the Prayer Book translated into Welsh, and divine service held in Welsh, to liberate the Welsh from the "ignorance of popery." With the growth of nationalism in the following centuries, still dominated by religion but already harboring the seeds of the new growth, the translations of the Bible certainly were effective in rousing national feeling and in giving a new importance to the national language—which through the spread of popular education and the wider use of the printing press became more and more an element of growing cultural importance. At the same time, the language became uniform, obliterating the vernacular dialects or pushing them into the background, and covering a greater territory as its undisputed domain. . . .

Nationalism is not, as some scholars under the influence of Aristotle suggest, a harmonious natural growth qualitatively identical with the love for family and home. It is frequently assumed that man loves in widening circles—his family, his village, his tribe or clan, the nation, and finally humanity and the supreme good. But love of home and family is a concrete feeling accessible to everyone in daily experience, while nationalism, and in an even higher degree cosmopolitanism, is a highly complex and originally an abstract feeling. It gains the emotional warmth of concreteness only through the effects of an historical development which, by means of education, economic interdependence, and corresponding political and social institutions, brings about the integration of the masses and their identification with a body far too great for any concrete experience. Nationalism—our identification with the life and aspirations of uncounted millions whom we shall never know, with a territory which we shall never visit in its entirety—is qualitatively different from the love of family or of home surroundings. It is qualitatively akin to the love of humanity or of the whole earth. . . .

Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has become more and more common to mankind. The mental life of man is as much dominated by an ego-consciousness as it is by a group-consciousness. Both are complex states of mind at which we arrive through experiences of differentiation and opposition, of the ego and the surrounding world, of the we-group and those outside the group. The collective or group consciousness can center around entirely different groups, of which some have a more permanent character—

the family, the class, the clan, the caste, the village, the sect, the religion, etc.—whereas others are of a more or less passing character—schoolmates, a football team, or passengers on a ship. In each case, varying with its permanence, this group-consciousness will strive towards creating homogeneity within the group, a conformity and like-mindedness which will lead to and facilitate concerted common action. In that sense, we may speak of a group-mind and a group-action. We may speak of a Catholic mind and a Catholic action, of an English mind and an English action; but we may also speak of a rural mind or an urban mind, and of the action of rural or urban groups. All these groups develop their own character. The character of an occupational group, such as peasants, soldiers, civil servants, may be as clearly defined and stable as any character of a national group, or even more so. Each group creates its own symbols and social conventions, is dominated by social traditions, which find their expression in the public opinion of the group.

Group-consciousness is never exclusive. Men find themselves members of different groups at the same time. With the growth of the complexity of civilization, the number of groups of which men find themselves a part generally increases. These groups are not fixed. They have changing limits, and they are of changing importance. Within these pluralistic, and sometimes conflicting, kinds of group-consciousness there is generally one which is recognized by man as the supreme and most important, to which therefore, in the case of conflict of group-loyalties, he owes supreme loyalty. He identifies himself with the group and its existence, frequently not only for the span of his life, but for the continuity of his existence beyond this span. This feeling of solidarity between the individual and the group may go, at certain times, as far as complete submergence of the individual in the group. The whole education of the members of the group is directed to a common mental preparedness for common attitudes and common actions.

In different periods of history, and in different civilizations, we find different groups to which this supreme loyalty is given. The modern period of history, starting with the French Revolution, is characterized by the fact that in this period, and in this period alone, the nation demands the supreme loyalty of man, that all men, not only certain individuals or classes, are drawn into this common loyalty, and that all civilizations (which up to this modern period followed their own, and frequently widely different, ways) are now dominated more and more by this one supreme group-consciousness, nationalism. . . .

Nationalities come into existence only when certain objective bonds delimit a social group. A nationality generally has several of these attributes; very few have all of them. The most usual of them are common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion. A short discussion will suffice to show that none of them is essential to the existence or definition of nationality.

Common descent seemed of great importance to primitive man, for whom birth was as great a mystery as death, and therefore was surrounded by legends and superstitions. Modern nationalities, however, are mixtures of different, and sometimes even very distant, races. The great migratory movements of history and the mobility of modern life have led everywhere to an intermingling, so that few if any nationalities can at present claim anything approaching common descent.

The importance of language for the for-

mation and life of a nationality was stressed by Herder and Fichte. But there are many nationalities who have no language of their own—like the Swiss, who speak four different languages, or the Latin American nationalities, all of whom speak Spanish or Portuguese. The English-speaking nations (also the Spanish-speaking) are partly of similar descent; they speak the same language, and had until quite recently the same historical background, and also traditions and customs very much akin to each other; yet they represent different nationalities with frequently conflicting aspirations. Another example of the comparative irrelevance of objective criteria for the formation and continued existence of separate nationalities is to be found in Norway and Denmark, where the people are of common racial stock and speak almost the same language. Nevertheless, they consider themselves as two nationalities, and the Norwegians set up their own language only as the result of having become a nationality.

Customs and traditions were first stressed in their importance for nationality by Rousseau. Each nation undoubtedly has its customs, traditions, and institutions; but these often vary greatly from locality to locality, and, on the other hand, tend in our times to become standardized all over the world, or at least over large areas. Customs and manners nowadays often change with great rapidity.

Religion was the great dominating force before the rise of nationalism in modern times. This is true in Western as well as Eastern Christianity, in Islam and in India. The dividing lines were not drawn according to nationalities, but according to religious civilizations. Therefore the rise of nationalities and of nationalism was accompanied by transformations in the religious attitude of man, and in many ways the growth of nationalities has been helped or hindered by the influence of religion. Religious differences sometimes divided and weakened nationalities, and even helped to create new nationalities, as in the case of the Catholic Croates and the Orthodox Serbs. On the other hand, national churches have frequently been an important element in helping to arouse nationalism; and when conflicting nationalities were of different religions religion often played a large part in the defense mechanism of the weaker nationality, as Catholicism did in Ireland and in Prussian Poland.

The most important outward factor in the formation of nationalities is a common territory, or rather, the state. Political frontiers tend to establish nationalities. Many new nationalities, like the Canadian, developed entirely because they formed a political and geographic entity. Generally we may say . . . that statehood or nationhood (in the sense of common citizenship under one territorial government) is a constitutive element in the life of a nationality. The condition of statehood need not be present when a nationality originates; but in such a case (as with the Czechs in the late eighteenth century) it is always the memory of a past state and the aspiration toward statehood that characterizes nationalities in the period of nationalism.

Although some of these objective factors are of great importance for the formation of nationalities, the most essential element is a living and active corporate will. Nationality is formed by the decision to form a nationality. Thus the French nationality was born of the enthusiastic manifestation of will in 1789. A French nation, the population of the French kingdom, existed before, as did some of the objective conditions necessary for the foundation of a nationality. But only the newly aroused consciousness and will made these elements active and effective, fused them into a source of

immense centripetal power, and gave them a new importance and meaning. The English and the American nationalities were constituted by "covenants," by free acts of will, and the French Revolution evolved the plebiscite, as a result of which membership in a nationality was determined, not by objective characteristics, but by subjective declaration. The foundation of the Swiss nationality was dramatized by Friedrich Schiller in his *Wilhelm Tell* according to legendary tradition into the famous oath on the Rütli, "Wir wollen sein ein einig Volk von Brüdern." This mythical declaration, "We wish to be one single nation of brothers," was uttered at the birth of every nationality, whether this birth happened, after a long pregnancy, in the enthusiasm of a revolutionary period, or whether the awakening of the masses required many years of ceaseless propaganda. . . .

Nationalities are created out of ethnographic and political elements when nationalism breathes life into the form built by preceding centuries. Thus nationalism and nationality are closely interrelated. Nationalism is a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare. A short discussion of the components of this definition will help to clarify the issues involved.

A state of mind of the large majority of the people: Even before the age of nationalism, we find individuals who profess sentiments akin to nationalism. But these sentiments are confined to individuals; the masses never feel their own life—culturally, politically, or economically—dependent upon the fate of the national group. Periods of oppression or danger from the outside may arouse a feeling of nationalism in the masses, as it happened in Greece during the Persian wars or in France in the Hundred Years' War. But these sentiments pass quickly. As a rule, wars before the French Revolution did not arouse a deep national sentiment. In religious and dynastic wars, Germans fought against Germans, and Italians against Italians, without any realization of the "fratricidal" nature of the act. Soldiers and civilians entered the service of "foreign" rulers and served them often with a loyalty and faithfulness which proved the absence of any national sentiment.

The nation-state as the ideal form of political organization: That political boundaries should coincide with ethnographic or linguistic frontiers is a demand of recent times. Formerly, the city or the fief or a multilingual state held together by dynastic ties was the accepted form of political organization and frequently was regarded as the "natural" or ideal form. At other periods the educated classes as well as the masses believed in the ideal of a universal world-state, although on account of the technical and geographic conditions this ideal never approached realization.

The nationality as the source of cultural life: During most of historical time, religion was regarded as the true source of cultural life. Man was thought to become creative by his profound immersion in religious tradition and by his abandonment in the divine fountainhead of all being. At other times, man's education was steeped in the civilization of a class which spread beyond all national boundaries, like the civilization of knighthood in medieval Europe or of the French court in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During and after the Renaissance, man's education was rooted in the soil of classical civiliza-

tion. Education and learning, the formation of man's mind and character, were not bound by any national limits.

The nationality as a source of economic well-being: This phase of nationalism, as well as the political, was prepared by the period of absolute monarchy, with its mercantilism. But mercantilism never became more than a scheme imposed from above, trying to achieve a national unity which it in reality never approached; continuing in many ways the medieval confusion and disruption of economic life and leaving provinces, cities, and villages as centers of production. The purpose of mercantilism was to strengthen the state and its power in international politics. The system following mercantilism, in the period of *laissez faire,* had as its aim the promotion of individual welfare. Economic nationalism brought about a neo-mercantilism, filling with life, as had been the case with the centralized state, the form erected by the monarchs. It is a much younger development than political or cultural nationalism, and it holds that the well-being of the individual can be achieved and secured only by the economic power of the nation. The close political and cultural identification of the individual with his nationality, which took place at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, extended to the economic field only during the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The supreme loyalty due to the nationality: The Austrian Monarchy was generally accepted as long as man's supreme loyalty was due to the legitimate king; its existence became precarious with the shift of loyalty from the dynasty to the nationality. Only a very few centuries ago, man's loyalty was due to his church or religion; a heretic put himself beyond the pale of society as a "traitor" to his nation does today. The fixation of man's supreme loyalty upon his nationality marks the beginning of the age of nationalism.

Nationalism is a state of mind. The process of history can be analyzed as a succession of changes in communal psychology, in the attitude of man toward all manifestations of individual and social life. Such factors as language, territory, traditions—such sentiments as attachment to the native soil, the *Heimat,* and to one's kin and kind —assume different positions in the scale of values as communal psychology changes. Nationalism is an idea, an idée-force, which fills man's brain and heart with new thoughts and new sentiments, and drives him to translate his consciousness into deeds of organized action. Nationality is therefore not only a group held together and animated by common consciousness; but it is also a group seeking to find its expression in what it regards as the highest form of organized activity, a sovereign state. As long as a nationality is not able to attain this consummation, it satisfies itself with some form of autonomy or pre-state organization, which, however, always tends at a given moment, the moment of "liberation," to develop into a sovereign state. Nationalism demands the nation-state; the creation of the nation-state strengthens nationalism. Here, as elsewhere in history, we find a continuous interdependence and interaction.

"Nationality is a state of mind corresponding to a political fact," or striving to correspond to a political fact. This definition reflects the genesis of nationalism and of modern nationality, which was born in the fusion of a certain state of mind with a given political form. The state of mind, the idea of nationalism, imbued the form with a new content and meaning; the form provided the idea with implements for the organized expression of its manifestations and aspirations. Both the idea and the form

of nationalism were developed before the age of nationalism. The idea goes back to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks, and was revived in Europe at the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation. During the period of the Renaissance, the literati rediscovered Greco-Roman patriotism; but this new attitude never penetrated to the masses, and its secularism was soon swept away by the retheologization of Europe through the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. But the Reformation, especially in its Calvinistic form, revived the nationalism of the Old Testament. Under the favorable circumstances which had developed in England, a new national consciousness of the English as the godly people penetrated the whole nation in the revolution of the seventeenth century. Meanwhile in Western Europe a new political power—that of the absolute kings—had developed a new political form, the modern centralized sovereign state; and this became the political form into which, during the French Revolution, the idea of nationalism was infused, filling it with a consciousness in which all citizens could share, and making possible the political and cultural integration of the masses into the nation. With the advent of nationalism, the masses were no longer in the nation, but of the nation. They identified themselves with the nation, civilization with national civilization, their life and survival with the life and survival of the nationality. Nationalism thenceforward dominated the impulses and attitudes of the masses, and at the same time served as the justification for the authority of the state and the legitimation of its use of force, both against its own citizens and against other states.

Sovereignty has a twofold significance. One aspect deals with the relations of the state to its citizens, the other with the relations between states. Similarly, the sentiment of nationalism is double-faced. Intranationally, it leads to a lively sympathy with all fellow members within the nationality; internationally, it finds its expression in indifference to or distrust and hate of fellow men outside the national orbit. In intranational relations, men are guided not only by supposedly permanent common interests, but also by sentiments of sympathy, devotion, and even self-sacrifice. In international relations, they are guided by the supposed lack of permanent common interests among different states, and by sentiments which vary from complete indifference to the most bitter antipathy, and are subject to swift changes within that range. Nationality, which is nothing but a fragment of humanity, tends to set itself up as the whole. Generally this ultimate conclusion is not drawn, because ideas pre-dating the age of nationalism continue to exercise their influence. These ideas form the essence of Western civilization—of Christianity as well as of enlightened rationalism: the faith in the oneness of humanity and the ultimate value of the individual. Only fascism, the uncompromising enemy of Western civilization, has pushed nationalism to its very limit, to a totalitarian nationalism, in which humanity and the individual disappear and nothing remains but the nationality, which has become the one and the whole.

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*The Balance of Power**

NICHOLAS J. SPYKMAN

The balance of power has been a feature of the nation-state system for about five centuries. Challenged successively by Spain, Austria, France, Germany and, now, the Soviet Union, it has long been a favorite topic for those interested in international relations. Nicholas J. Spykman, at one time Yale professor of international relations and director of its Institute of International Studies, analyzes the nature of the balance of power and its effectiveness in the maintenance of world order.

The reason for such a policy lies in the lessons of history. The number of cases in which a strong dynamic state has stopped expanding because of satiation or has set modest limits to its power aims has been very few indeed. The policy which aims to restrain growing states and is known as the balance of power policy has been part and parcel of the diplomacy of all successful states. Experience has shown that there is more safety in balanced power than in a declaration of good intention. To preserve the balance requires action not only against the neighbor that becomes too powerful but also against distant states. As a matter of fact, the best period for the application of this policy is before continued expansion makes the growing state a neighbor. A hegemony that has access to the sea can become a menace to far distant shores and the ever-increasing bombing range of modern aircraft is making air power almost as effective a threat as sea power against noncontiguous states.

It is obvious that a balance of power policy is in the first place a policy for the Great Powers. The small states, unless they can successfully combine together, can only be weights in a balance used by others. But although they are stakes rather than players, their interest in the outcome of the game is none the less great. A small state is a vacuum in a political high pressure area. It does not live because of its own strength but because nobody wants its territory or because its preservation as a buffer state or as a weight in the balance of power is of interest to a stronger nation. When the balance disappears, the small states usually disappear with it.

Since the Renaissance and the Reformation, the balance of power has been a favorite topic of speculation among the political philosophers of Europe. After Emperor and Pope had lost their function as keystones in the European political order, a search began for a new integrating principle. It was found in the "balance of power," which became the subject of learned discourses. The philosophers pointed out its relation to the law of nature and the harmony of the spheres and indicated that an equilibrium was not only inherently beautiful but full of practical and ethical implications. If all states were held in check, no state could win a war; and, if no state could win a war, then no state would start a war or threaten

* Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942). Used by permission of the publisher.

war. Equilibrium is balanced power, and balanced power is neutralized power. A society in political equilibrium is a society in which force is useless and in which men will, therefore, live happily by the reign of law and devote themselves to the arts and graces.

To the men of learning it seemed obvious that states ought to pursue a balance of power policy; that the law of nature and Christian ethics both demand such a policy. States ought to direct their diplomacy not merely at counterbalancing specific threats to themselves but at establishing a balanced system for the whole of the international society. They ought to pursue a balance of power policy not merely to preserve their own relative power position but to preserve peace.

Statesmen have always been eager to accept from the theologian and the philosopher the correct formulation of the ethical precepts that should guide foreign policy, and since the seventeenth century all power politics has, therefore, been presented not as a crude attempt to survive in a tough world but as a noble endeavor aimed at the establishment of political equilibrium and the preservation of order.

Formulated in those terms the success has not been overwhelming. We might search for an explanation in the fact that the process is not guaranteed and that not all statesmen are good technicians, but it is perhaps safer to explain the result on the theory that they were not really interested in achieving a balance. There are not many instances in history which show great and powerful states creating alliances and organizations to limit their own strength. States are always engaged in curbing the force of some other state. The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger. There is no possibility of action if one's strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can be freely used. Whatever the theory and the rationalization, the practical objective is the constant improvement of the state's own relative power position. The balance desired is the one which neutralizes other states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the deciding voice.

It would seem that this objective does not require quite the accuracy in measuring which the search for a perfect equilibrium would require, but, even so, the task is full of difficulties. It is easy to balance mechanical forces because they can be measured, but there is no measuring stick for political power. Are two states balanced, is their power equal, is the relationship between the two sets of alliances in equilibrium? On that question there is usually profound disagreement. The relative power remains a purely subjective judgment. Each state always feels that the other one needs balancing. In so far as the power concerned is in the last instance a power to wage war, it might be assumed that the military men would know the answer, but theirs is an opinion equally subjective, even if a little more expert. The most learned generals have disagreed as often as the statesmen. The only objective test of relative strength is to fight the war and see who wins, but this is hardly a helpful guide to the state that wants to decide whether to fight or not.

The second difficulty lies in the fact that the elements contributing to strength are not static but dynamic; they do not stay put. A new economic development, a new raw material, a new weapon, a new martial

spirit may produce the most profound inequality between states that only a few years before had been approximately equal. Besides, in a world of states of equal strength, what is there to prevent the combination of two of them against a third?

Another problem which sometimes appears is the discovery that the state selected to be the ally in the opposition to the growing power has already made a deal with the opponent, and the chance for a balance has been missed. Similar unfortunate results may flow from the fact that statesmen occasionally believe in the innocence of other statesmen. This permits some of them to achieve enormous expansion by the accretion of small additions of territory. The state of Lusitania announces that it has only one very limited aim, the incorporation of a little territory of the state of Mauritania after which the true balance will have been established, and it will never aspire to another square foot of land. The demand is so small, the request so modest that it is obviously not worth fighting for. It will, of course, be discovered afterwards that there is still no perfect balance, that there is still need for an additional piece of territory. This even smaller piece is likewise not worth fighting for. It lies perhaps in a region outside the immediate interest of the state which must decide how to act, and so its annexation goes unopposed. It is by this process of gradual conquest that most of the successful hegemonies have been established.

An actual balance of power policy operates along several lines, boundary making, compensation, the creation of alliances, and varying degrees of intervention in wars, grading all the way from slight deviations from neutrality to full participation as an ally. Boundary making is important at the end of a war, and historically the Great Powers have always demanded to be heard at the peace settlement even if they had not participated in the conflict. Under the theory of compensation, states have permitted other states to grow provided they themselves obtained an equal accretion of strength and prestige. It was under this principle of compensation and in the name of the balance of power that the Treaty of Westphalia parceled out the small German principalities among Austria, Bavaria, Brandenburg, and Sweden; that Poland was divided four times; that Africa was carved up; and that plans were laid for the partition of China.

In addition to boundary making and compensation, nations have used systems of alliances to check the growth of a dynamic power. The least expensive and, therefore, the most preferable method would be for a state to encourage an alliance between third parties strong enough to ward off the danger. But this is seldom possible, and the state must be prepared to make its own positive contribution and become part of the alliance. The alliance may stipulate merely a limited contribution in the form of a fixed sum of money, a specific number of ships, or a defined number of soldiers. There is, however, little protection in such limitation. If the survival and continued independence of the ally is really important for the state's own security, its assistance may have to go far beyond the original promises. It will, in fact, have to be increased to whatever is necessary to assure victory and security.

The purpose of the alliance, like the purpose of all power politics, is to achieve the necessary margin of safety in the field of action. But the margin of security for one is the margin of danger for the other, and alliance must, therefore, be met by counter-alliance and armament by counter-armament in an eternal competitive struggle for power. Thus it has been in all periods of

history. One state successfully conquers adjacent territory and makes each new conquest the stepping stone for further expansion, each accretion of power the means for further enlargement. Power tends to grow and diffuse through wider areas, and the states in the vicinity have the choice between collective defense and ultimate absorption.

The weak states of the Tigris-Euphrates valley allied themselves against their stronger rivals and preserved their independence for centuries, until Hammurabi finally established the Babylonian Empire. A new and inconclusive struggle for power then emerged over a much wider area between the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Hittites, and the Persians with the smaller states in the region being used as buffers and weights. The Greek city-states maintained a precarious balance by means of the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues under the leadership of Athens and Sparta, but they failed to combine against the menace of Macedonia. Rome, the victorious, found no league to stem her vast expansion and defeated her enemies one by one. Had they known how to combine, Carthage, Egypt, and Macedonia might have preserved their independence far longer and confined Rome within the boundaries of Europe.

Modern European history begins with the struggle for power among the Italian city-states which was later transferred to the national states over an ever-widening area eventually including the whole world. When the House of Hapsburg under Charles V attained such vast domains that it threatened to become a menace to other states, these states combined to check its ascendancy. Similar was the fate of the hegemonic aspirations of Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II. The fate of Germany's new bid for European domination depends on the outcome of the Second World War.

In this endless story of struggling states, there have been short periods in which an approximation of balanced power prevailed, not because anybody wanted it or tried to achieve it, but because two states or two sets of states were trying to upset it in different directions. Such a situation is inherently unstable because all parties are constantly attempting to destroy it, but while it lasts it brings mankind important benefits as the philosophers had promised. In an international society in which states are intent on preserving their independence, both against world conquest and against world government through federation, balanced power is the only approximation to order. When states are convinced that their strength is inadequate to enforce their will, they become peaceful and reasonable, they discover the benefits of conciliation and arbitration and plead in terms of law and justice instead of demanding in terms of force.

But a political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherently stable condition. It results from the active intervention of man, from the operation of political forces. States cannot afford to wait passively for the happy time when a miraculously achieved balance of power will bring peace and security. If they wish to survive, they must be willing to go to war to preserve a balance against the growing hegemonic power of the period. Balanced power may eventually reduce the prevalence of war, but force remains the most efficient instrument with which to check the expansion of states. Power politics has, therefore, added another reason for going to war to the long list already developed out of the inevitable conflict pattern of international intercourse. States must be ready to fight not only for the defense and

the conquest of territory, for the protection and incorporation of nationals living across borders, for the preservation and acquisition of economic benefits, and for the defense and the propagation of national ideologies, but also for the preservation and improvement of their relative power positions.

It is, therefore, not surprising that international relations are conducted to the constant accompaniment of the drums of battle. There is a tendency to look upon peace as normal and war as abnormal, but this is because of an intellectual confusion resulting from emotional reactions to war. War is unpleasant, but it is an inherent part of state systems composed of sovereign independent units. To forget that reality because wars are unwelcome is to court disaster. War has been a constant phenomenon in international relations in all periods of history. There have been only a few years when the clash of arms could not be heard somewhere in the world. The states of Europe were at war 75 percent of the time in the seventeenth century, 50 percent in the eighteenth century, and 25 percent in the nineteenth century. It seems that the frequency of war is declining, but the effect of a struggle is more and more devastating and involves greater cost in human life and material destruction. The total effect of war on the life of nations has not decreased but increased notwithstanding the lengthening periods of peace.

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*World Community and Law**

OSCAR SVARLIEN

International law and collective security, though different facets of international relations, have increasingly held the attention of man in his efforts to secure a larger measure of world peace. Dr. Oscar Svarlien, professor of political and social science at the University of Florida, combines these two forces in a penetrating review of world community and law.

The applied sciences in our time have profoundly transformed the environment of many nations, and no part of the human race has wholly escaped the cataclysmic effects of the technological revolution. As a consequence, the secular trend has been in the direction of a more complex administrative and legal organization in an effort to meet the needs of a world which is becoming more and more interdependent. The mental and emotional climate of these times, however, is, in many respects, unfavorable to the kind of world organization and law that would effectively guarantee the security of nations.

It has been the hope of the greater part of mankind that the splendid resolutions contained in the Preamble to the Charter

* I am indebted to my colleague Dr. Oscar Svarlien who wrote this essay for inclusion in this volume. Some of the ideas contained in this selection are developed at greater length by the author in *An Introduction to the Law of Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955).

of the United Nations could be translated into reality. But the bitter ideological conflict between the Soviet world and the countries of the West has obscured the luster of this hope by a tarnish of suspicion and fear. Thus, the failure following the Second World War to create the necessary basis for effective collective security on a universal level must be regarded as a notorious fact. But to blame the United Nations organization for the unsuccessful resolution of the "Cold War" is to misunderstand its powers under the Charter. The present organization, like the League of Nations, is nothing more than an association of states, based on the "sovereign equality" of its members. For even though confronted by a common enemy in a war for survival, the United Nations were not willing at San Francisco, nor have they been willing since, to abandon the antiquated principle of "sovereign equality." Yet, an ironic dilemma is presented by the effects of war, which have resulted, on the one hand, in the need for more effective world organization, and on the other hand, in a new and intense nationalism.

Nationalism was a unifying and integrating force at the opening of modern times, when the fragments of medieval Europe were gathering into larger political and territorial units under the aegis of royal absolutism. Thus the political anarchy of the Middle Ages gave way to the modern state system with enlarged territorial sovereignties. By the end of the fifteenth century the principle of nationality was rather well established in England and was rapidly taking form in the Iberian peninsula and in France. These examples, therefore, of the building of the modern state must be regarded as a unifying process when viewed against the background of a continent divided among innumerable feudal states whose princes lived and died by the sword. But the sanguinary wars which attended this unification gave rise to larger and more universal concepts of organization. The Italian poet, Dante, weary of the fraternal strife among princes and cities, advocated in *De Monarchia* a universal law. Thus internationalism, looking to a larger unity may be said to have come into being as a reaction to the constant warfare which accompanied the advent of the modern state.

In all periods of crisis, as in the present age, when impending disaster looms before us through the inadequacy of existing international institutions, the minds of men have often turned in search for security to various projects for "a more perfect union." Ideas and plans for world organization are not new. They did not originate with the United World Federalists or other contemporary groups who advocate "a union now" of the English-speaking world or a federation of the Atlantic nations. Ideas of this kind are exceedingly old, and it is important to appreciate that their embodiment in contemporary institutions is not the result of a sudden inspiration but is the labor of accumulated time.

In this age of thermonuclear weapons, it may well be argued that what is needed most is the federation of the world. At any rate, a stronger and more effective organization than that provided under the Charter of the United Nations. But standing in the way of such a union is an attitude of particularism which modern nationalism has so greatly strengthened. The national states, through their efforts of self-perpetuation, resist amalgamation and instead concentrate on those elements in their make-up which tend to set them apart in categories of uniqueness, both with respect to each other and in their relationships to the whole complex of international organization. There can be no doubt that even

among the countries of the West, the forces which unify are greatly outweighed by the forces which divide their aspirations. But what of a "union now" of the English-speaking peoples? Surely, here is a common basis in culture and language, which many contend is essential to the success of such a project. Yet, the lessons of recent history lead us to the inescapable conclusion that, even here, the popular consensus would at this moment oppose political union. This is not to say that within the British Commonwealth of Nations or, indeed, in the whole of the English-speaking world the basic forces which unify are necessarily on the decline. On the contrary, it is quite apparent that here, at least, there is a conscious realization that continued peace and friendly relations can best promote mutual advantage and secure common interests.

A premature political union may defeat its own purpose by setting in motion forces of centrifugal effect. Modern history is replete with examples of this kind, all of which tend to show that political union, even when given a plausible geographic and cultural basis is, as yet, a precarious enterprise. Indeed, it must be admitted that nations are reluctant to compromise their independence to the slightest degree. But the emergence in our time of integral nationalism with its insistence upon cultural uniformity represents an artificial negativism indicative of a pathological condition which may eventually lead to the destruction of the present state system.

There is little reason to doubt that deeply imbedded in human nature is a strong desire for order and permanence, security and peace. But to achieve these ends, political and legal organization is necessary. With the development of modern nationalism, reinforced by the concept of sovereignty, such organization tended to become coterminous with the national state. With the development of modern means of transportation and communication, and trade and commerce between nations, the need for law and order in a world society became more and more pressing. But in the twentieth century, the unifying and centralizing principle of the state became an element of division and disintegration. It may be said, therefore, that the doctrine of "fundamental rights of states" constitutes in our day a dangerously disruptive force in international relations. For what is needed most is a community of nations, a stronger social bond between them, and rather than an insistence upon rights, a reminder of mutual obligations.

The terms *society* and *community,* as used here, should not be regarded as synonymous. The members of a community are united in spite of their individual existence, while in a society they are isolated even though parties to the association. But the effectiveness of law, whether municipal or international, is dependent upon a conscious presence of community, for it is a social science which derives its validity from the common will. It is not like flying buttresses of external support, but like lines of force emanating from the center of social gravity. These, like their counterparts in the physical world, must fall within the base in order to lend equilibrium to the structure of politics.

To argue that community is the essential prerequisite to effective law is not to deny the intricate nature of the problem, but rather to recognize its immense complexity. For it should be clearly understood that community in itself is one of the most elusive concepts in the whole area of the social sciences. It is the product of multifarious group relationships and is conditioned and influenced not only by the factors of environment but by the inscrutable nature

of man. The forces of external nature have been far easier to subdue and direct than the inner drives of man, which are often motivated by selfish desires for wealth, power, and security. Yet because of a superior intelligence, he, unlike the lower animals, is able to weigh the means against the ends of desire. It is quite possible, therefore, that some day we shall learn at last that the noblest goals presented in life are as elusive as the proverbial pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, and that that which is most important in our earthly existence are the means by which we live.

The increasing complexity of international relations with which this generation is confronted has demonstrated the need for a broader approach in international-legal theory than that which is provided by the extreme positivists of the nineteenth century. It had been the great purpose of the "philosophical radicals" to destroy the juristic rationalism of the eighteenth century and to seek a basis in "reality" for the development of legal norms. Such utilitarian philosophers as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin argued vigorously against the natural law doctrine, which in their day had entered a final period of decadence, and which even in its most creative phases they had really failed to understand.

The nineteenth century saw the triumph of positivism, with the result that international-legal theory became increasingly preoccupied with the rights and duties of states. During this period the monistic conception of the *Rechtstaat* reached new stages of refinement as doctrines of rationalism, which had distinguished the development of international law in the last three hundred years, were gradually obscured by the romantic adulation of the state. But a profound crisis in Western culture, manifested by wars and revolutions has made our century the most turbulent in the entire history of the human race, and a new and frightful despotism has infested the earth. The rights of individuals, once regarded in legal philosophy as sacred and inalienable, are in this age obscured by the shadow of a leviathan state.

The great wars of this century, the resurgence of despotism, and the startling advancements in the industrial arts are all situations which to each other bear a significant relationship, and to all the rest are the main causes of determination. As a result, neither the state nor the individual is likely to escape normative changes in their respective relationships to international law.

What has become the concern of all nations will obviously require certain standards of behavior which the world community itself must prescribe. The collective action which has long been applied by the state against individuals who have disturbed or threatened to disturb its internal peace, is today recognized in the principle of collective security on the international level. Collective action against any nation who would disturb the peace and tranquility of the international community is provided for in Article I of the Charter of the United Nations as follows:

> To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustments or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
>
> To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
>
> To achieve international cooperation in

solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of common ends.

Thus we see in the Charter of the United Nations a recognition of multifarious problems which are the common concern of all peoples. Further evidence of a growing interdependence, which in time may contribute greatly to the creation of a world community, is found in the vast number of international administrative agencies which have come into being in the last fifty years. In practice such an agency may be called a commission, a bureau, a board, a council or by some other name. Some are large such as the International Labor Organization; others, such as the Inter-American Trade-Mark Bureau, are very small. Some, like the International Ice Patrol, are independent; others, like the World Health Organization, are integrated with the United Nations. International administration is concerned with such varied things as science and art, communications and transit, economics and finance, health and morals, law and government. It covers all manner of subjects from astronomy to agriculture, and from wine to women.

Regarding the relationship of law to organization in a society of states, there are two points of view. These turn on the question of which has priority—law or organization. It may well be true, as Professor Brierly suggests, that order must be established before law can take hold and develop. Thus it would appear that international law is effective in proportion to the degree a community is present. Generally, it might be said that the consciousness of community is inversely proportional to the variation in the culture pattern. It makes no difference whether the individual is an American, an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a Russian, his sense of community is likely to be confined to his own nation and his standard of value determined by the vantagepoint of his own culture. But this is the common and narrow view. It is quite possible for enlightened minds to arrive at a consensus of community on the basis of more objective standards, and to delight in such advancement of civilization as can only come from a vigorous interaction of different cultures under the aegis of effective international organization and law. But in the words of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: If such a project remains unrealized, it is not because it is utopian. "It is because men are mad, and to be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness."

Professor Hans Morgenthau speaks of an "iron law" in international politics from which no nation has ever been immune, and contends that legal obligations must yield to national interests. He objects to the evaluation of a particular foreign policy in terms of international law or abstract standards of morality. This, indeed, would seem to deny the existence of a world community and the consequent validity of its law. But even Cicero fancied a *civitas gentium;* and Victoria in his unforgettable lessons at Salamanca in the sixteenth century justified the existence of a law of nations on the ground that "the world as a whole could, in a sense, be considered a single state." In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius, who is yet regarded as the "father of international law," wrote of an *appetitus societatis*—a gregarious propensity of the human race, which he found rooted in the rational qualities of mankind.

In our time a better understanding of

international law both as to its nature and function can be gained when it is realized that its rules and regulations are primarily a result rather than a cause of world community. Thus, in view of the rather meager development of community consciousness on a universal level, it is unlikely that we shall have "One World" soon. Yet, the future for world law and organization is far from hopeless. It is simply a matter of building the edifice, stone upon stone, from firmly laid foundations. If one takes a historic view of the problem, there is, indeed, some cause for optimism. For the story is one of extension of community in ever widening circles. And though the "parliament of man" may yet be far in the future, let it be a challenge rather than a cause for despair, for "all excellent things," said Spinoza, "are as difficult as they are rare."

B. The Foreign Policy of the United States

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*The Shifting Strategy of American Defense and Diplomacy**

SAMUEL F. BEMIS

Unquestionably among the top scholars in the area of American foreign policy, Samuel Flagg Bemis, professor at Yale University, is the author of many volumes in this field. In the following selection, Dr. Bemis surveys admirably the development and broad outlines of our foreign policy.

The effort of this essay is to show that we do have a foreign policy, to recall its primeval principles, to trace its historical shape, and to point out its present-day design. At the outset, one should bear in mind the distinction between general principles and objectives, defining foreign policy, on the one hand, and on the other hand describing the changing circumstances and situations and specific test cases which those principles and objectives continually encounter in the historically shifting strategy of American defense and diplomacy, particularly in relation to the balance of power.

The fundamental bases of the foreign policy of any state are security for the state and what the state stands for in the world. Every state seeks security first; if it cannot have security, if it cannot be its own sovereign master, it cannot stand for much in this world. In the lack of collective security, its foreign policy must then be subordinated to that of another state. At least so it has been until now in history. After security, the foreign policies of states differ according to what they stand for in the world: divine-right monarchy, republicanism, free trade, mercantilism, democracy, the rights

* Samuel F. Bemis, "The Shifting Strategy of American Defense and Diplomacy," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXIV (Summer, 1948). Used by permission of the author and the *Virginia Quarterly Review*.

of man, communism, authoritarianism, imperialism (old-fashioned or new-fashioned), freedom of trade, autarchy, international peace, et cetera.

In terms of security, American foreign policy first meant the winning and preservation of our independence as an Atlantic-Coast Republic in a world of rival colonial empires; afterwards, security to expand through the empty continent of North America to found a transcontinental Republic fronting on the two great oceans; then, security for our established domain and for our republican and democratic institutions in a world of legitimate divine-right monarchy; next, in a new order of world politics and power ushered in by the twentieth century, security for the whole republican New World against the menace of imperialistic colossi arising and joining in the Old World; finally, security for all free peoples against the new imperialism of today.

The foundations of American foreign policy, in terms first of security, and then of principles which we stood for, had been laid in classic form by the year 1823. They were:

(1) Sovereign independence, in order to preserve the rights of English freemen.

(2) Continental expansion.

(3) Abstention from the ordinary vicissitudes and ordinary combinations and collisions of European politics: first expressed in Washington's neutrality proclamation of 1793, then in the Farewell Address of 1796, and finally in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Washington used the qualifying word *ordinary* twice in his Address.

(4) Non-colonization principle—no further European colonization on the American continents.

(5) No-transfer principle: i.e., opposition to the transfer of colonial dominions in North America from one European sovereign to another: after the revolution of Latin America this was extended to the entire New World, including former colonies now independent. They should not be transferred back to any European sovereignty.

(6) Freedom of international trade without discrimination between nationals and foreigners, including freedom of trade with colonial dominions.

(7) Self-determination of peoples—as evidenced by our recognition of the revolted republics of Latin America. We hoped and expected that, despite temporary imperial régimes in Mexico and Brazil, these new states would all be republics, based on the rights of man, modeled on the United States.

(8) Freedom of the seas for neutral ships in time of war, according to certain dicta of neutral rights, and freedom of navigation of international rivers.

(9) The right of expatriation and the wrong of impressment.

(10) Non-intervention—as testified first in the Monroe Doctrine, opposing the intervention of European nations to control the destiny of the free nations of Latin America.

(11) Implicitly, in all this, never quite articulate, was a feeling of anti-imperialism. If one defines imperialism as dominion over alien people, the United States can scarcely be said to have been an imperialistic nation during the nineteenth century. At the cost of a great Civil War it resisted that temptation. The old Manifest Destiny was not imperialism. The new Manifest Destiny and the imperialism of 1898 that went with it have, as we shall see, been liquidated.

Nothing is clearer than that these were the main tenets and objectives of American foreign policy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. No historian disputes their existence, or even their validity. They have remained fairly constant throughout

our history despite the shifting strategy of our defense and diplomacy.

We did not immediately consummate all these principles and objectives, but on the whole we were remarkably successful in making most of them prevail as respected ourselves during the nineteenth century, despite the hazard of a paralyzing Civil War—as successful as any other great nation during that period of history, even more successful, it might be argued.

Before the twentieth century our principles did not reach much beyond the New World in the application of our foreign policy. Today they reach out to all the globe in tests of strength.

Our early diplomatic success was due to taking advantage, for the most part unwittingly, of the wars, rivalries, and distresses of the powers of Europe; to the detached and distant position of the United States; and to the fact that the principles and objectives of its foreign policy, just enumerated, were perfectly compatible with the genius and interests of its people. One other significant factor, the most vital of all, must be emphasized, *the favorable balance of power* behind the British balance in Europe and Asia.

From 1815 during the remainder of the nineteenth century the rival powers of Europe and of Asia were balanced fairly evenly behind the supremacy of British sea power. None of them was able to undertake an adventure in the New World without the assistance of the British Navy, or at least the acquiescence of Great Britain. Thus no non-American power could hurt the United States or even gainsay its will in North America, except Great Britain. During all that century the two seacoasts of the United States, not to mention the entire New World, lay at the mercy of the British Navy. Britain did not choose to collide uncompromisingly with American policy, whether over Florida, Cuba, Texas, Oregon, Mexico, the Isthmus of Central America, or Alaska, if only because of the long, undefended, exposed flank of Empire, presented by Canada.

In a war between the United States and Great Britain, a contingency happily growing more and more unthinkable decade by decade after 1815, Canada must have taken one of three possible positions: (1) loyal participation in the war against the United States—this would have meant the conquest of Canada; (2) neutrality—this would have been tantamount to secession from the British Empire; (3) war against Great Britain. Obviously, none of these choices was agreeable either to Great Britain or to Canada. Thus Canada served, historically, as a hostage for the good conduct of the British Navy toward the United States as we expanded from coast to coast to become a great power. To prevent the growth of such a great power in North America adjacent to Canada, British policy relied on diplomacy rather than force. Great Britain encouraged the independence of Texas and California and tried to prevent their annexation to the United States. The British government, at least, hoped for the success of the Southern Confederacy during the Civil War. If successful, British diplomacy would have South Americanized North America. Texas would have been the Uruguay, California the Chile, the Confederate States the Brazil, the remaining United States the Argentina of North America, none of these nations strong enough to disturb the balance of power behind the British Navy in this continent as elsewhere all over the world. Needless to say, British policy in balancing North America into a constellation of independent states like South America was unsuccessful. The victory of the North during the Civil War put an end to any such policy—fortunately for

the fate of Great Britain; for had Britain balanced North America into a congeries of small nations, whence finally would have come the power from the West to redress the balance in the Old World during the First and Second World Wars of the twentieth century? Is it not a curious commentary on British foreign policy, the policy of the balance of states in all the continents behind an all-powerful British Navy, that British diplomacy strove to prevent the growth of a transcontinental Republic in North America while it did nothing to prevent the rise of the German Empire on the continent of Europe?

One should not leave this interesting poise of Anglo-American relations during the nineteenth century without stressing two things. One is the value to mankind of the British Century, 1815–1914, when world peace rested on a balance of power in Europe, Asia, and South America, behind the all-powerful British Navy. It was the happiest century that modern history has known, with self-government burgeoning out all over the five continents to enthrone the rights of man. As a people, as a nation, the United States was content with the British Century. During it our foreign policy, so clearly defined, was successful.

The other point I wish to make is that the historian could not have regarded Canada in the hands of any other strong imperialistic power as a hostage. In that case there would have been no undefended frontier. Canada in the possession of France, or of Germany after 1815, or of Russia, would have been regarded as a vestibule of invasion of the United States. The increasing affinity and benevolence of Anglo-American relationships in all their broad walks of liberty has to be constantly kept in mind when we think of Canada the Hostage, the magnetic field of American foreign policy during the nineteenth century.

The happy, isolated position of the United States, secure, if only because of Canada, behind the balance of power held by the British Navy, a position in which we grew up uncudgeled to be a transcontinental Republic—I call it the Continental Republic with due respect for the Continental Dominion—in the choicest region on the surface of the globe, with an optimum climate for human welfare and energy, a national estate fronting on the two great oceans; that position began to disintegrate toward the end of the nineteenth century, when an unprecedented phenomenon suddenly took place: the almost simultaneous appearance of three new world powers: the United States, Germany, and Japan.

The advent of one new world power in the international firmament is in itself a spectacle of tremendous significance. It is certain to cause major perturbations in the orbits of the older powers. A triple birth of world powers—that was unknown in history. It unbalanced power in Europe and in Asia.

Two of the new powers confronted the third, the United States, one across either ocean. Each had a formidable army. Each was building a strong navy. Either would soon be in a position to threaten one of our populous seacoasts, if we did not reconstruct the strategy of our defense. Neither had a hostage like Canada alongside the United States to guarantee its benevolence. North America was no longer a safe, isolated landmass. It was becoming an island-continent menaced by new potentials of power. By the same tokens the British Empire was becoming a world-archipelago threatened by hostile continents. The new picture of power and politics caused the United States and Great Britain to look more and more to each other for the security of their own futures. Great Britain was first to feel the significance of the new order of

power and began to look for allies. As the old balance began to tremble under these phenomenal impulses, the American outlook on the world began to change, too.

Ever since the completion of the Continental Republic, American opinion had focused increasingly upon the project of an Isthmian canal. The new frame of power and politics of the twentieth century made such a waterway indispensable for national security. Without a canal two new navies would be necessary, one on each ocean. With a canal one navy might suffice, to be passed back and forth through the Isthmus to protect either coast as circumstances might require. Nobody seems to have dreamed, in the early decades of the present century, that the United States might have to fight simultaneously a two-ocean war. It was Germany who loomed up as the principal disturber of the old balance.

Such was the situation when the United States went to war with Spain over the Cuban Question. Behind the Cuban Question lay the Isthmian Question.

The United States emerged from the Spanish-American War a full-fledged world power, protector of Cuba, mistress of the Caribbean, ready to build, control, and fortify a canal across the Isthmus of Central America. The necessary arrangements, diplomatic and engineering, were quickly completed. Great Britain, eager for firm friendship with the United States against the rising menace of Germany, recognized our paramount interest in the future canal and in Central America and the Caribbean. From 1898 until the Second World War, Panama, not Canada, became the pole of American diplomacy toward which the compass needle came back in every major question despite violent fluctuations east and west.

The diplomatic history of the United States should have taught us by 1914 that there was one danger which ought to disturb the sleep of every American diplomatist—the vision of an undivided Europe agglomerated under one power which could be turned against the United States after overpowering or neutralizing Great Britain; more dreadful still the nightmare of a similar great mass of force united in the Far East which could be allied with Europe against the United States and the New World. As we look back on the First World War it would seem that the real motive for our entrance into that conflict should have been a clearly discerned *raison d'état:* to prevent Germany and her allies from overturning the balance of power against us. It should have been perfectly evident that if the Allies won the war, the United States had nothing to lose by their victory, as proved by the previous British Century and, we can add today looking back, as proved also by the actual event of Allied victory in 1918. It should have been obvious, on the other hand, that the United States had much to fear, much to lose, if Germany should win. Our statesmen did not see this as clearly then as we can see it now.

Woodrow Wilson did not shift the strategy of American diplomacy from Panama to Europe expressly to meet the danger that had now threatened our historic security. He did his best up to the very last moment to keep his country out of the holocaust. We would like to believe that he finally brought the United States into the war on the Allied side in order to prevent Germany from upsetting the balance of power against us. There is no satisfactory evidence that he did. It was rather his *choice* of alternatives of neutral policy between the opposing retaliatory system of the maritime belligerents, rather than his choice of peace or war, which led this peace-loving President into the First World War against his will. Fortunately he took his country into

the conflict on the right side, if belatedly, and thus saved the balance of power for the United States and its associates. Had the United States stayed neutral a few months more until after the Russian collapse, Germany would have won the war, would have become the dominant sea power, and would have been in a position to ally herself with Japan to crush the United States and Canada, to possess herself of Latin America and the Atlantic while Japan took over Asia and the Pacific and perhaps Alaska. Our victory in the First World War saved us from that disaster.

Once in the war Wilson shifted the strategy of American diplomacy in a wholly new and untried direction—world peace through collective security in the form of a League of Nations rather than through the "forever discredited" system of the balance of power. But after the military victory, after restoration of a safe balance in Europe, and the establishment of a new balance in the Pacific and Far East, in short, when everything seemed perfectly secure again in North America and in the New World, the United States turned its back on Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations and his plan of collective security.

After the election of 1920 neither Republican nor Democratic Party dared to stand on a League of Nations platform, not till the closing months of the Second World War.

We may appropriately designate as the "Washington Period" the fifteen years of apparently perfect continental security which followed the Washington Conference of 1922. Never did the Western Hemisphere seem safer, a paradise of peace. Perhaps it would be more accurate to call that period the Fool's Paradise of American history.

During the Washington Period, American foreign policy degenerated into five postulates: isolation, anti-imperialism, disarmament, neutrality, pacifism.

Under the shadow of a new European war, Congress, pressed on by a powerful historiography of revision and disillusion, completely repudiated the policy of Woodrow Wilson during the First World War. One by one the new neutrality laws of 1935–1937 outlawed the issues of neutral rights which had brought the United States into that conflict. They all but renounced the ancient American "birthright" of Freedom of the Seas.

All these legislative precautions, all this new retrograde strategy of American diplomacy, designed to keep the United States out of the next war, only served the purpose of keeping it out of the previous war, so to speak, a war which had already been fought and won. The neutrality legislation said in effect to Germany and to Japan and to the would-be world power, Italy, that the United States would not go to war to preserve the balance of power in the Old World, that it would not even allow the democratic allies of Western Europe to replenish their depleted forces from the potential arsenal of American supplies. Such was American world power on the eve of Munich, when Hitler overthrew the balance in Europe and we looked on still satisfied at peace in our time.

When Germany overran Western Europe, and made the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, it was apparent that the anti-imperialistic, pacifistic United States now faced the greatest peril of its history, the nightmare of its diplomatists, the prospect of a two-ocean war with a one-ocean navy. Only England stood between us and destruction, until Hitler made the mistake of attacking Russia. If Germany defeated Great Britain and seized the British fleet, the new Alexander could then organize the sea power, air power, and man power

of Europe for an irresistible attack on the New World and the United States from the Atlantic, while Japan attacked from the Pacific.

The strategy of American defense and diplomacy shifted again with the change in the balance of power, from Panama as a life-line of hemisphere security to England as a base for a war of defense to be waged in Europe instead of America to restore the balance. American neutrality, already shaken by the initial impact of the war, broke down completely in 1941, notwithstanding the pledges of both major parties and their candidates, in the national election of 1940, to keep the United States out of the war.

It will be Franklin D. Roosevelt's claim to statesmanship as compared with that of Woodrow Wilson, that, whatever his initial vacillations and his campaign deceptions, he came to see the American *raison d'état,* the vital relation of the United States to the balance of power at the advent of the Second World War. He protected that relation at the risk and fact of a double war, rather than permit Japan to destroy the British Empire in the Pacific while the United States was striving to preserve it for our defense in the Atlantic. Despite Pearl Harbor, the greatest humiliation of American history, for which Roosevelt seems as much responsible as anyone, he was right in taking on the double war: with the help of the British Commonwealth we licked Japan left-handed while our right arm was busy together with so many other arms in Europe.

Roosevelt's understanding of the vital interests of the United States in the new shift of the balance of power after the defeat of Germany and Japan was, I suggest, more questionable.

Now, after the Second World War, the geographical basis of American defense and foreign policy is shifting again with the balance of power, shifting back to the north.

Three unexpected political phenomena of victory are: (1) the rise of a new colossus, in the potential supremacy of Russia in the world; (2) the disintegration of the British Empire; (3) the demoralization, at least temporary, of the United States in the Great Let-Down of 1945–1947.

These three phenomena have perturbed international politics and the prospect of world peace almost as profoundly as the sudden birth of three new world powers at the advent of the twentieth century. None of them offsets the others: on the contrary they all supplement each other in favor of Russia. What does that bode for the balance of power and the traditional principles of American foreign policy?

There is increasing reason to believe that the leaders of Russia for reasons of domestic policy fear the *friendship* of the Western World, particularly of the United States, much more than they do its enmity. In fact, given the phenomena of victory just mentioned, and the perfect security of Russian frontiers brought about by the complete defeat of Germany and Japan, they do not fear our *enmity* at all. It is we who fear *their* enmity and want their friendship.

We have extended an eager hand of friendship to Russia to grasp, for the rights of man, for the principles of nonintervention, democracy, self-determination, and freedom; freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from fear (including the fear of atomic warfare); freedom (hopefully) from want, freedom from the crushing burden of armaments, freedom of trade, freedom of the international rivers and straits; in short, the things we have traditionally stood for in the world and still stand for. We had hoped that Russia would grasp that hand, for on such a sincere handclasp is the only hope for world peace. But these

are not the things that Russia stands for in the world. What she wants rather is the extension of her opposite principles, by revolution if necessary, to the rest of the world: a W.U.S.S.R., that kind of a United Nations.

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*Characteristics of American Foreign Policy**

DEXTER PERKINS

In a discussion of a nation's foreign policy, an awareness of those basic characteristics and persistent tendencies which will tend to shape its current diplomacy is indispensable. Dexter Perkins, professor of American Civilization at Cornell University and the author of numerous books—particularly on the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine—is well qualified to undertake this task.

We have brought the story of American foreign policy down to the present day. But there are certain broad generalizations with regard to it that escape attention in a narrative discussion. They are important for every student of the United States to understand, and should be set down. . . .

First of all, and the point has been made in passing but not with sufficient emphasis, American diplomacy has been frequently bedevilled with partisan politics. This was true in the discussions over the Jay treaty in the administration of General Washington; in the discussions over the acquisition of Louisiana; it was true, to a peculiar degree, in the events leading up to the War of 1812; it was true with regard to the Mexican war, in the debates over the treaty of peace with Spain, and over the Treaty of Versailles. No one wants the voice of opposition to be silent in matters of foreign policy. Blind acceptance of the views of the executive would not be consistent with the principles of democracy. But opposition based on mere partisan antagonism, on calculations of party interest, and not on principle, is certainly not an asset to any state in the conduct of its foreign affairs. Moreover, since the executive is in a far better position than are the members of the legislature to see the picture as a whole, its views are entitled to great respect and to at least a qualified acceptance. And, in days when speed is of the essence of effective action, prolonged debate and obstruction may be very dangerous.

It is, on the whole, therefore, gratifying to observe that the tendency to partisan debate in foreign affairs is declining. For more than a decade our policy with regard to Latin America has been on a basis far removed from domestic political calculation. Since 1945, the same thing has been true with regard to Europe and Asia. We cannot be sure that the new technique is permanent. But the change is significant, and probably lies deeper than the role of any individual. One hopes that it is a sign of national maturity.

Another generalization with regard to American foreign policy is that the struc-

* From *The Evolution of American Foreign Policy*, by Dexter Perkins, copyright 1948 by Oxford University Press, Inc.

ture of our government, and particularly the requirement for the ratification of treaties by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, sometimes makes action difficult. It is certainly not the case, looking at the picture over one hundred and fifty years, that great national interests have been often jeopardized by the two-thirds rule. But, in the controversy over the Treaty of Versailles, the result might well have been different if the constitutional forms had been different; and the same thing applies to the constant efforts, ineffectual until very recently, to provide for American support of a court of international justice. Nor is it right to judge the matter without remembering that fear of senatorial opposition may at times influence the executive against action which it desires to take, or without remembering that on certain occasions, such as the annexation of Texas and the annexation of Hawaii, it was found necessary to outflank the Senate itself. There is an increasing tendency at the present time to move through agencies other than the treaty process. For example, lend lease took the form of an ordinary Congressional enactment; so, too, did the provisions for reciprocal trade treaties; so, too, more recently, has assistance to Greece and Turkey. It is not at all unlikely that this type of procedure will tend to become more common. Another way of avoiding the two-thirds hurdle is by the instrument known as the executive agreement. The famous destroyer-bases deal of the fall of 1940 was of this character; many of our agreements with the states of Latin America have been cast in a form that does not require action by the Senate. Here again, the necessities of a more active and a more decisive and swift-acting diplomacy tend to modify our constitutional forms. After all, the Americans are a practical people; they are not likely to sacrifice to procedural difficulties the genuine interests of the republic.

Nor are they likely—and here is a third point of importance—to think only in terms of interests, as narrowly conceived by a certain type of specialist. No one can study the history of American foreign policy without observing the force of general principles. The Monroe Doctrine, to take the most striking case, is one example of such a principle. It is by no means easy to prove that during the nineteenth and early twentieth century the security interests of the United States were involved in the more remote parts of Latin America; yet the famous message of Monroe was not in general conceived as having a restricted application or as having been renounced with regard to any part of the southern continent. The Open-Door policy with regard to China could be easily challenged, as we have had occasion to observe, by a cynical person; yet it was consistently advanced and widely accepted. In contemporary American action with regard to Europe, loyalty to democratic forms and belief in the fundamental conceptions of the democratic state are certainly not without influence on policy. Under popular government, it is not possible to ignore the power of an appeal to broad generalizations; such generalizations exercise a great influence on the mind of the average man, who, after all, is no student of detail and is unhabituated to searching analysis; and to fail to assess correctly the force of these general conceptions is to misunderstand the motivating forces of American diplomacy. Neither the student nor the statesman can afford not to take them into account.

Because Americans are influenced by broad generalizations, they are—to make a fourth generalization—influenced also by moral appeals. The foreign policy of the American democracy can rarely, if ever, be

baldly cynical. Deviations from reasonable standards of public ethics have again and again been condemned in the United States. Such was the case with the Mexican War; such was the case with the Ostend manifesto; such was the case with the recognition of Panama; such was the case with American abuses of power, as they were by some deemed to be, in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This does not mean that the American record is without flaw; but it does mean that there is, as there ought to be, a corrective in American opinion against the immoderate or unscrupulous use of national power.

Let us not on this matter, however, fall into priggery. The virtuous, or those who believe themselves to be virtuous, have their characteristic forms of error. The moral outlook in politics can easily lead to an egregious oversimplification of the issues; and it can block the road to those concessions which are part of the difficult and dangerous business of statesmanship. A nation that never gives way on an issue because it conceives a principle to be at stake can be a very unpleasant nation to deal with, and can even defeat its own ends; a certain flexibility, a certain readiness to admit the possibility of some other moral outlook than one's own, is indispensable to the conduct of diplomacy. Moreover, overemphasis on moral ideas often leads to a futile kind of wrist-slapping, which increases the tensions of international intercourse without settling anything whatsoever; it can be as dangerous a luxury as losing one's temper can be in personal intercourse; it substitutes self-righteousness for righteousness. It is in the interest of the whole world that the standards of diplomatic action should be penetrated with some conceptions of public morality; but it is not in anybody's interest that there should be that kind of moral feeling that puffs up every question into one of right and wrong, and assumes that there can be no doubt whatsoever of the side on which right lies.

Finally, a fifth generalization needs to be made with regard to the attitude of the Americans in foreign affairs. They are still, on the whole, a naive people, a people who dislike to look the wickedness of the world in the face. It is obvious, for example, that physical power is an element—and an extremely important one—in national policy; but, after each of its two great wars, the American people have been perfectly content to see their physical strength diminish. They still think—all too often—that moral exhortation is a sufficient diplomatic weapon; and they are still oblivious to the fact—and it is a fact—that the ultimate arbiter of a difference of opinion is force. Moreover, they are likely to think of foreign policy in political, rather than in economic, terms; in constitutional, rather than in geophysical, terms. Not many of the supporters of the United Nations, for example, understand that the vitality of that new organization may depend fully as much upon the success of the United States in withstanding another great depression as upon any problem of governmental form; not many of our professional friends of peace are ready to face the fact that the world is really moving towards a conflict of philosophies, and that to prevent this conflict of philosophies from becoming an armed conflict is not merely a question of good-will (it would be wonderful if this were true), but a question of delicate adjustment of the moral and physical instruments upon which diplomacy depends, and upon the wise use of the immense material resources of the United States. To many Americans the problem of peace is simple; to the student it is the most complex, the most continuous, the most exacting, which

can be imagined. No formula, no institution will guarantee its solution; no amount of good-will on the part of a single nation will ensure world tranquillity. Nor, on the other hand, will power in itself be enough. Power can be abused. It is in the wise use of power, the prudent choice of the objectives of power, that hope of the future lies.

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*The Cold War with Russia**

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS

One of the most significant consequences of World War II was the emergence of the Soviet Union as a leading world power. The result, of course, was a basic shift in the international balance of power, with an accompanying, fundamental reorientation in American foreign policy. William A. Williams, professor of history, presents an objective analysis of this "cold war" with Russia in the period since 1946.

Cold War tensions grew out of the coolness, distrust, and antagonism which had existed between the Soviet Union and the Western allies from 1917 to 1942. Their immediate cause was the breakdown of the wartime alliance among Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. These powers could not agree on methods and programs to deal with the problems of reconstruction, maintaining order and security, and guiding the world-wide movement for economic and social change that was unfettered by the Second World War. Wartime collaboration between America and Russia was based on the immediate need to defeat the Axis. There was little discussion of the long-term issues left unsettled by the war. Leaders in each country, lacking the up-to-date specific information which might have been provided by such talks, tended to divide into two groups concerning the proper policy to be followed after the war.

Thus there developed in each country one group which counseled continued efforts to work out some area of agreement with the other nation. These men, Russians and Americans alike, realized that there were divergences in points of view and conflicts of interest between their respective countries, but they insisted that serious efforts should be made to resolve —or at least moderate—these differences. A second set of policy makers in each country argued, however, that the other nation could not be trusted, was a direct and immediate threat to national security, and therefore had to be opposed and checked before it was too late. They maintained that vigorous opposition all along the line was the only safe course of action. Those who advised co-operation and those who agitated for opposition, whether in Russia or America, were alike in one re-

* Reprinted from William Appleman Williams, *The Shaping of American Diplomacy* (Chicago, Rand McNally and Company, 1956). Used by permission of the publishers.

spect. Each group tended to interpret the actions of the other country in the light of its own assumptions and analyses. It was not too surprising, therefore, that those who urged a policy of militant opposition gained primary influence over foreign policy in both countries. For both the United States and Russia undertook actions which could be—and were—interpreted as dangerous to each other.

Such antagonism might well have erupted into World War III upon several occasions during the ten years after the defeat of the Axis. Russia, on its part, retained and exploited its position of power in eastern Europe. It refused to accept American proposals to reunify Germany and continued to extract heavy reparations from its occupation zone of that defeated country. It undertook to strengthen and extend the defenses of its Baku oil fields and its European industrial areas by putting pressure on Iran and Turkey for special privileges in that area. It also gave a measure of support to Mao Tse-tung's Chinese Communists, markedly increasing that support after 1948.

The United States, meanwhile, declined to accept either the idea or the reality of Russian predominance in eastern Europe. It refused to share its temporary technological monopoly in the production of nuclear bombs. Instead, it stepped up its program to stockpile such weapons and increase its ability to deliver them any place in the world. One of the major features of this effort was the establishment of army, naval, and air bases around the borders of the Soviet Union. The United States also seized and maintained exclusive control of the occupation and reconstruction of Japan. It gave economic, military and moral support to Chiang Kai-shek against Mao Tse-tung. And it initiated a broad economic embargo against the Soviet Union and Communist China. All of these actions were tied together in a series of treaties which connected the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of western Europe with nations in the Near and Middle East, Asia, and the Pan-American system in the Western Hemisphere.

These actions and policies reinforced the position of militant leaders in both Russia and the United States. They interpreted such developments as proof of the other nation's evil intentions and used them to justify increased armament expenditures and tighter controls over the political and ideological activities of their own citizenry. The interaction between these Russian and American policies steadily increased the tension between the two nations and tended to divide the world into two antagonistic blocs. It also provoked military and diplomatic incidents (such as the shooting down of planes, expanded espionage activities, and blunt verbal exchanges between diplomats) that had, in other periods, led to declarations of war. But other aspects of this interaction worked in the opposite direction, strengthening the chances of avoiding war.

Perhaps the most important of these antiwar forces, ironically enough, was the militancy of American policy. Leaders of the anti-Russian group in the United States based their policy on the proposition that it was possible to deal with the Russians and so avoid war, only by building up a position of overpowering strength. Only then, they argued, would the Russians give way and accept American proposals for a reasonable and just peace settlement. "Negotiation from Strength" and "Peace through Power" became the central slogans of this dominant group of American policy makers. Atomic

supremacy, anti-Soviet alliances, and an economic embargo were the measures designed to build such overweening strength.

Such a policy might have worked more successfully than it did if America had been dealing with a nation weaker than Russia, or if it had been willing to consider compromising on key issues when it was time to negotiate. But American policy makers viewed negotiations with the Russians in terms of Moscow accepting without modification the most extreme specification of American desires and objectives. This attitude did not weaken Russian resistance. Neither did it improve the position of those Soviet leaders who wanted to reach some *modus vivendi*. Thus American policy reinforced the position of the most dogmatic Marxists and Russian nationalists in the Kremlin, who insisted that the United States was bent upon destroying the Soviet Union. They concentrated all their energy on meeting strength with strength.

Given this attitude, the Russians had two primary objectives: to hold the line internationally, undertaking offensive action only where the dangers involved were clearly minor; and meanwhile, to achieve atomic and industrial parity with the United States. Thus, on the one hand, they antagonized America by their moves in Iran, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Berlin, Korea, and elsewhere. On the other hand, their successes at home did begin, however slowly, to demonstrate to the anti-Russian policy makers in the United States that it would be impossible short of atomic war, to dictate any terms of settlement to the Soviet Union. America's atom diplomacy, which sometimes seemed to be based on the principle of waving the bomb and yelling belligerently, and its attempts to isolate and weaken the Soviet Union economically only served to force the Russians to develop and improve, as well as exploit, their own system as a means of meeting strength with strength. And as Russia grew stronger it became increasingly unrealistic to talk of negotiating *from* strength without adding that one was also negotiating *to* strength. American policy thus forced its own modification.

Another factor which lessened the chances of war was the world-wide reaction against the tensions of the Cold War and the increasing threat of atomic war. This opposition took many forms and existed within both Russia and the United States, among the allies of both powers, and in those nations which were not fully committed to either side. The Russians, for example, found it difficult to promote acceptance of the ideals and the practice of communism in the eastern European countries it had over-run during the war and at the same time drain those countries of their material and intellectual wealth for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet Union. Marshal Tito's declaration of Yugoslavian independence from Moscow was the most dramatic example of this resistance to Russian policy. But other communist leaders in nations like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia also chafed under the Kremlin's firm and extensive controls. These men served as a focus for the dissatisfaction within those countries and also as allies for those Russian leaders who were disturbed about the situation in the Soviet Union.

Soviet leadership was confronted at home with similar problems connected with the theory and practice of achieving a communist society. At great costs, material and otherwise, the Russian people had been driven, pushed, cajoled, persuaded, and inspired by their rulers to build the foundations of a modern in-

dustrial society in less than a generation. Their natural desire was to relax the tempo and controls of this effort and enjoy some of the personal comforts and pleasures of their productivity. But the Nazi invasion demolished much of their labor. Hence they had, in many respects, to start over again after the war. Added to this burden was the demand to produce even more, and again forego immediate rewards, so that Russia could match the military power of the United States as quickly as possible. This not only reinforced the existing sense of weariness, resignation, and apathy, but also raised questions about the system and its policies.

Such uneasiness could not find an outlet in popular elections, but it did reveal itself in debates among Soviet leaders. Thus economists like Eugene Varga argued that the United States could avoid a major economic crisis for twenty-five years by merely continuing the Cold War. Varga did not blurt out the implications of this thesis, but it was clear enough without any histrionics: a relaxation of international tension was the way to hasten both an economic crisis in America and enable the Soviet Union to take the lead in offering a better way of life to the rest of the world. Other spokesmen like Varga called, in line with the ideals of Marxism, for placing more emphasis on an immediate improvement in the standard of living, and for an easing of other restrictions throughout Soviet society.

These spokesmen were answered with the argument that it was impossible to relax until Russia had broken America's monopoly of nuclear weapons. This argument prevailed, and many of those who counseled a more moderate and subtle policy were gagged, demoted, banished, or liquidated. But the debate continued. One of the most revealing examples of the ambivalence in Soviet policy and the existence of restlessness is the manner in which keen-minded critics like Varga were allowed to continue their work in positions from which their voices could still be heard, and from which it would be but a step back to more influence.

War weariness and the reaction against the tensions of the Cold War made themselves felt in different ways in the United States. For one thing, advocates of the peace-through-power argument tended to oversell their program. They provoked as much fear of the horrors of an atomic war as they did enthusiasm for getting ready to fight one if necessary. People became increasingly indifferent to the campaigns for civil defense. A similar attitude developed toward the idea of negotiating from strength. Assured of America's power, but also that Russia was immediately dangerous and that it was not possible to negotiate with communists or that it was not yet time to do so, the public began to grow uneasy and frustrated under the continued tension. Neither taxes nor draft quotas seemed to come down appreciably, and the voters turned to leaders who claimed to have a way out of the dilemma.

Public dissatisfaction was further increased by the growing volume of criticism of American policy coming from friends and allies like Great Britain, France, and Canada, and from other leading nations such as India. Even the most sympathetic friends of the United States in western Europe grew alarmed over the increasing militancy and one-sidedness of American policy. They feared that negotiation and peace were being forgotten in the concentration on strength and power, and worried lest war was becoming probable as well as possible. This, too, was the concern of leaders like Prime Minister

Nehru of India, who spoke for many countries just emerging from colonialism. Such areas resisted the pressures to align themselves with either Russia or the United States. They wanted the opportunity and the time to develop in their own fashion under their own leadership. Nuclear war would deny them that chance, and hence they worked vigorously to moderate the Cold War.

The Communist victory in China was another development which, in a more subtle manner, also helped to prevent an early war between Russia and the United States. Such major changes in the balance of power had led to wars in the past, and China's shift to an alignment with Russia might contribute to conflict in the future, but the immediate effect of Chiang Kai-shek's defeat worked in the opposite direction. Mao Tse-tung's triumph did frighten many American leaders and even provoked some of them to advocate reversing this result by force. But such an effort carried with it the probability of atomic war with Russia, and this forced the interventionists to hesitate and draw back.

Soviet leadership, for its part, could not consider Mao Tse-tung's rise to power as entirely favorable to Russia's interests. Potentially, of course, China appeared to be a powerful addition to the communist bloc. But China needed time to develop its latent strength, and in the meantime Russia was called upon to divert some of its own production—already strained to capacity—to help its new ally. Age-old conflicts of interest between Russia and China in central and northeastern Asia also posed a serious problem. And so, too, did the Russians' adjustment to the new situation of having a major communist ally. Heretofore Moscow had been the only center of communist leadership. Now, in the persons of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Madame Sun Yat-sen and others, and in the traditions and resources of China, the Russian Communists had to deal with intellectual equals who had also carried through a major revolution. All these considerations made it impossible, let alone impolitic, for the Russians to view Mao's victory as the solution to their relations with the United States. Indeed, it may be that the Russians were as worried—if in different ways—about China's next move as were American leaders.

Thus the combination of Russia's success in restoring its devastated industry and its rapid development of nuclear weapons, the growth of a general reaction against the continued tensions of the Cold War, and the influence of events in China all contributed to create a temporary stalemate between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both sides had enough bombs to insure mutual devastation, a situation which led British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan to remark in the summer of 1955 that "There ain't goin' to be no war." The spectacle of a British official publicly and consciously using atrocious English to make his point dramatized the fact that the leaders of the two major powers had been brought up short. War, at least for the time, was no longer a usable instrument of national policy.

Two major alternatives offered themselves for consideration during this breathing space. Russia and the United States could accept the status quo, either in a series of formal agreements or on a *de facto* basis, and proceed to compete with each other on nonmilitary levels. This procedure might lead to greater economic and cultural integration of the world and make it possible for the United Nations organization to strengthen its ability to forestall and settle disputes short of war. The United States and Russia would not

become allies overnight, if ever, but their common interests and concerns could come to exert a stronger influence in the determination of their respective policies.

A second choice also involved acceptance of the current stalemate, but only as an opportunity to develop new weapons and line up new allies. These gains would make it feasible to the extremists on either side to risk confronting the other nation with an ultimatum, however veiled in form, or an intolerable situation in fact. This approach would probably lead to war with nuclear weapons.

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The Problem of Revolutionary Asia

JOHN K. FAIRBANK

Having surveyed the European scene and the cold war with Russia, we turn now to Asia and the new nationalism. Professor John K. Fairbank, head of Harvard's East Asia program, analyzes the revolutionary forces at work on that continent and some of the reasons for their recent successes. One of America's outstanding authorities on the Far East, Dr. Fairbank is the author of a number of books, including *The United States and China.*

I.

Our military resistance to Communist aggression in Korea has been entirely necessary and unavoidable, yet it has brought with it the danger that American policy toward Asia may become preponderantly military and so defeat itself. May we again win a war but lose the peace to follow? Win the conflict in Korea but lose most of Asia?

. . . Our weakness in dealing with the Asian revolution in the past has not been solely military or material. It has also been intellectual, psychological and political.

We need to agree upon an analysis of the sources of Communist strength in China, as well as in Korea. We must then envisage more fully the role which the American people could play in Asia, if they would, in competition with the Russian influence. How can we relate ourselves more constructively to the forces of social change? How can we forestall the Communist capture and use of these forces for the ends of Communist power?

My own conclusion is that the effort to ally ourselves with "nationalism" in Asia and to use it as a bulwark against Communism is a will-o'-the-wisp unless we combine "nationalism" with "reform" in a very specific and sophisticated manner. In the final analysis, "reform" is the more fundamental force. The effort to comprehend the nature of the revolutionary proc-

* From "The Problem of Revolutionary Asia," by John K. Fairbank, *Foreign Affairs,* October, 1950. Used by permission of the author and *Foreign Affairs.*

ess in Asia is the most pressing necessity in our current mobilization.

II. The Social Context

Any analysis of the sources of Communist strength in a country like China must begin with the social context in which the Communists have risen to power. It is hard, if not impossible, for Americans to appreciate this context of social change. The breakdown of the traditional, self-sufficient farm economy, the loosening of the bonds of the old family system, the rise of national consciousness, the emancipation of women and of youth—these are all abstract and general labels which Far Eastern specialists are accustomed to use but which mean little to the American public. Sympathetic insight into the mainsprings of revolution is not easily acquired from a distance. Too few Americans are tenants dependent upon their own hand labor in the fields to understand the bitterness of anti-landlordism. Few non-Negro Americans belong to racial-cultural-geographical minorities that can appreciate the intense feeling of anti-colonialism. "Feudalism" and "imperialism" do not seem our mortal enemies. Ancient glories in our historical heritage do not contrast with an ignominious recent past—no one has been calling us "natives." In short, we have little basis in our own experience for a sympathetic understanding of the motives and feelings which can be used by organizers of revolution in Asia.

The raw ingredients of social revolution, which lie ready at hand in the villages of China, India and the countries in between, must also be distinguished from the process of revolution, by which they are combined and kindled into explosive activity. The backward technology and low productivity in a Chinese village, the stresses and strains in the old kinship structure and the old class structure, the mounting frustrations of a teeming populace gifted with intelligence and infected with hope of a better life—these are not factors making inevitably for Communism, but merely for change. For us the important question is: How did the Chinese Communists unlock the energy of the Chinese village? How did they crack the traditional structure of these atomic elements in Chinese society and control their chain reaction?

III. The Communist Rise to Power

This deserves our closest study. It is noteworthy that Communism made little progress in China until it found the formula of combining agrarian reform with nationalism. At the end of the first decade of Comintern effort in China, the movement was almost a failure, certainly on the defensive. From 1921 to about 1931 the Comintern's main stress had been laid upon the organization of China's weak city proletariat, since by Marxist-Leninist doctrine only it could lead the revolution. The peasant was esteemed less than the urban worker. When Mao Tse-tung eventually broke out of this doctrinaire cul-de-sac by simply organizing peasants, he called them a "landless proletariat" and used other euphemisms to hide his unorthodoxy. By 1932 he was basing Communist power on the countryside, where most of China lives. Chinese Communism rode to power on the backs of an organized peasantry which provided both the manpower for the Communist armies and the food to feed them, both the local espionage network to frustrate the Kuomintang and the coolie corps to support the Eighth Route Army.

How does one organize peasants? The Communist formula has seemed simple and effective: two classes are needed—the

peasant masses of the villages and the intellectual youth recruited from the towns and cities. Once indoctrinated and trained, the latter organize the former and the job is done. But how does one recruit the intellectual and idealistic youth of the nation?

Chinese Communism was at a low ebb in the early 1930's when Mao took over. It remained on the periphery of Chinese politics until Japan struck in 1937. From then on the Chinese Communists became leaders of a patriotic effort in North China, for which Western observers at the time rightly gave them credit. Peasants can never be organized so easily as when foreign invaders are burning and raping in the land: the Japanese army delivered the farming populace of North China into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, which was ready and waiting to receive them. More important, the Communists found that the intellectual youth of China responded to the call of patriotism, in the war of resistance against Japanese invasion, in a way that they never had to the call of anti-landlordism in the hills of Kiangsi.

Until the war of resistance, the intellectual youth of China had been largely cut off from the peasantry by that subtle but pervasive bifurcation of Chinese traditional society which made it impossible for long-gowned students to mingle with illiterate peasants on a common ground. Getting the literati into direct contact with the villages was the first essential. This process had begun at the time of the Nationalist Revolution of the 1920's, but Japan gave it an impetus that it had never had before. Tens of thousands of Chinese students from the middle schools and colleges went to Free China, where the Chinese Communists soon outdid the Kuomintang in enlisting and training cadres for village mobilization. When the Japanese war ended, Chinese Communism had a grip on the two essentials of power—agrarian revolution as the dynamic of the peasantry and national regeneration as the dynamic of the intellectuals.

The Chinese Communist use of these two elements of power is an object lesson in revolutionary technique. The first stage was the creation of a peasant-supported military force in a territorial base area, such as Ho Chi Minh has in Tonkin, such as the Huks are evidently seeking today on Mindanao. Let us repeat: the peasantry supplied both the manpower and the food supply for the guerrilla armies, the intellectuals of the student class provided the cadres of party-workers necessary to organize the peasantry. In a land which consists of innumerable peasant villages, as most of Asia does, the mobilization and control of the agrarian populace is the key to military power. This activation of the peasantry in turn is achievable only through the devoted work of an élite body of evangelists of the revolution—mainly boys and girls drawn from the esteemed scholar class, imbued with the patriotic fervor of wartime, indoctrinated with the Marxist-Leninist view of the world and trained to use the methods of village organization which Chinese Communism has perfected.

As this new power became established in its territorial bases in North China, it proceeded with a second stage, the economic-political-cultural reorganization of the peasant village society. The whole "liberation" movement deserves more careful study by competitors of Communism: its combination of persuasion and coercion, its use of hope and of fear, its remaking of class structure and cultural values, all provide a textbook study in "social engineering." This program unlocked energies which had been for centuries stultified in the old social order, utilized suppressed desires which had long sought expression, and

under the slogan of "Liberation" created a new system of power.

It is a truism that in the peasant-based society of China, the surplus for investment, if it is not to be borrowed from abroad or gained through foreign trade, must come in the main from the peasant economy. Thus the new régime must squeeze the agrarian surplus from the farmer just as inexorably as the landlord class ever did. The all-important difference is that the new government not only collects this surplus more efficiently but uses it for wider social ends.

Substituting the government for the landlords has its precedents in Chinese history, but a great deal more has gone with this change-over than the old Confucian literati ever dreamt of. The Communist order in China has fundamentally new ideas and methods, which we minimize at our peril. Among these is its use of the modern technology of communications: the centralized Leninist party apparatus, the monopolistic propaganda machine, and the open and secret police networks. These are familiar features of Communist states elsewhere. They constitute a totalitarian control system more effective and comprehensive than anything in China's past, even when based upon some of the same sanctions as the old imperial administration, with its network of officials, its orthodox Confucian ideology and its monopoly of police power.

Thus agrarian reform is fitted at last into a new pattern of state power. Similarly the patriotism of the Chinese peasant and party worker is channeled into the service of the nation. Increased production, industrialization for defense—these conceptions focus the national effort. They are valid expressions of nationalism.

Let us note one essential step in this Communist rise to power—the capture of the Chinese "liberals," that stratum of unorganized individuals of literary and artistic abilities who have inherited the tradition of scholarship and the position of literati. The Chinese Communist approach to these individuals was in their terms, speaking the language of liberalism, expressing the disgust of the intellectual for corruption and self-seeking in high places, the despair of the patriot over official incompetence, and the hope of high-minded idealists for a better world. Indeed, if these promises of peace, order and plenty should be fulfilled and China not be prostituted for Russian ends, we in America would have no need to fear the course of developments in Asia. Like Pandit Nehru, we cannot rule this happy prospect out of account in China; but neither can we accept it as probable, in view of the Communist record elsewhere.

The desertion of the intellectuals from the old order was a crucial factor in its collapse. As the Nationalist Government sank deeper in a morass of inflation, disinvestment and incompetence, its police and party organizers sought to suppress the disaffection of the intellectuals, and so pushed them directly into the Communist camp. Equally important, however, was the appeal of the Marxist-Leninist view of the world.

The harness and checkrein of the new order is its dogmatic ideology of revolution, which can be manipulated only from the top. In the setting of peasant Asia, the Marxist-Leninist formulas take on concrete meaning. "Feudalism," that ill-defined word, becomes identified with the old order of landlordism. Capitalism becomes an outmoded phase of inevitable world history in which the United States is still backwardly immersed. Most of all, the shopworn thesis of Lenin that imperialism is the necessary final stage of capitalism is used first to explain the aggression of Japan in China (on the theory that the *Zaibatsu* sought profits

by war abroad) and then to explain the American support of Chiang Kai-shek (as evidence of the classic tie-up between native feudalism and foreign imperialism). "Feudalism" as the landlord and "imperialism" as the foreign invader make good sense to a peasant or a party worker. After all, even Chiang Kai-shek, in "China's Destiny," showed himself, unconsciously like so many others, a believer in Lenin's theory of imperialism.

It is illusory to think that this made-in-Moscow ideology is incompatible with the sentiment of nationalism, particularly in the early stages of Communist revolution. The Chinese patriot who has felt the humiliation of China's "backwardness" and the "unequal treaties" can rejoice in what seems Communist China's new chance to be in the vanguard of progress.

In practice we outside observers are inclined to overlook the fact that Communist movements are in the main carried on by native converts. It is hard to convince a Chinese Communist who feels himself patriotic that he has sold out to Russia. It is as easy for the Chinese Communists nowadays to suggest that a Chinese Christian has accepted an unpatriotic spiritual tutelage to the West. Like any other faith, Communism is accepted as a way to salvation—national salvation quite as much as human salvation in general.

This brief analysis suggests that the Communist system, with its Russian allegiance, can expand to almost any part of Asia that offers conditions similar to those in China, Korea or Indo-China. An insecure peasantry and a frustrated intelligentsia, the hope for economic improvement and national regeneration, are ready at hand to be organized in the Communist pattern. How can the United States compete with this system in its seemingly inexorable advance?

IV. The Use of Nationalism

Military strength is a first essential for any American policy in Asia, as in Europe, since the Russian threat of force can be offset only by a corresponding threat of force. But to concentrate solely on the creation of military force would be a shortcut to disaster. Communism does not rely on arms alone. Neither can we.

To supplement our rearmament, should we seek to ally ourselves in Asia with the forces of "nationalism"? This is an easy slogan to announce. But nationalism is of many kinds. Let us distinguish two varieties—the conservative and the reformist-revolutionary. Conservative patriots in Asia may have no less love of country than their rivals, and yet have little or no comprehension of the social forces making for revolution. Conservatives in power are of course prone to preserve their power at the expense of change. By some, "nationalism" in Asian countries is taken to mean simply "anti-Communism," on the tenable theory that no real Communist can have the good of his country as the ultimate criterion of his effort. The defect in this kind of "nationalism" is the same as that in any and all "anti-Communism" in Asia—given the context of social change, the key to power lies in active programs of change, not in programs of suppression nor even of maintaining stability.

The true nationalist appeal in backward Asia consists not merely in preserving one's country from outside control, as might be sufficient in the West, but of constructing one's country anew, solving its many problems, uplifting its ragged millions, and remaking its society in every respect where it now is inadequate. Thus the higher patriotism of the modern Orient is compounded of love of country and belief in its potentialities, faith in its future rebuilding, and

determination to carry through great social changes. This is the other kind of nationalism—the reformist-revolutionary kind, to be found among most of the Asian leaders who have come to power since the war. Nationalist reformers of this type can lead the Asian revolutionary process, while leaders who identify their own careers with the welfare of their countries and become bent upon holding power lose their following. The nationalism toward which such leaders as Nehru, Soekarno and Thakin Nu appear to be working is compounded of diverse things, many of which are in the realm of the spirit—self-respect and self-confidence, the expression of national culture. We cannot assist this kind of national fulfillment solely by a program of arms and anti-Communism.

The project of stopping Russia by aiding nationalism thus has to be broken down into a more complex series of problems. The peoples of Asia seek to realize their national life in all its many and varied potentialities. Many Chinese today hope to do it under Communist leadership; the Peking Government already claims the usual plethora of achievements, many of which are undoubtedly real. It is the hope of realizing these many potentialities that makes up the real appeal of "nationalism" in Asia—to develop agricultural production, to industrialize for national strength and welfare, to alleviate disease, illiteracy, poverty and ignorance, to build up a genuine "people's democracy" in the proper sense. This expanded nationalism seeks both freedom and welfare, both independence and growth, both political and economic progress—dynamic "reform" in the broadest sense.

V. Leadership in Asia

Since the United States is of all countries the richest in technological and other resources, we have a great opportunity to participate in the remaking of Asia. With a modicum of capital equipment our agricultural specialists can do much to raise Asia's productivity. But this is a political as well as an economic problem. . . . In short, it is plain that American specialists, backed with American technology and some supplies, can help carry through genuine rural reform programs; but they must have the active political backing of the local régime. The Asian government in question must aim at reform, not mere self-defense. It cannot be primarily a landlords' government. This means that agrarian reform, even when helped by us, must depend for its main impetus upon an Asian leadership. Our key problem is, therefore, to find and support those Asian leaders who have the youthful vision and the dynamic idealism to seek a genuine reconstruction of the life of the peasant masses on a non-totalitarian basis. . . .

In Asia . . . it is the governments that must lead in programs of reform and economic development. Many Asians admire nothing in America so much as the T.V.A. Their governmental programs are often called "Socialistic," meaning chiefly that their societies lack the pluralistic institutions which give us our strength. In Asia we must expect to find the state power playing a greater role in the new national life than is the case with us. Private initiative and local capitalist enterprise cannot be expected to do the job in a country like Indonesia or Burma which we expect it to do in our own country. While we may hope that those institutions will have their chance to develop in these new countries, we cannot look to them for immediate results. . . .

It is plain that we can neither revive the old "imperialism" and "colonialism" nor escape the problems left in their wake. The

new problem of creating a partnership between Eastern and Western states which claim equality in international law but are unequal in economic and military power has not been solved by the Communist system. We have it to solve. It is plain that our doctrine of self-determination for all peoples must be redefined to meet the reality of a world where power is concentrated in big states and the complete independence of small states is impossible. To solve this problem we cannot think purely in political terms, and when we broaden the scope of our thinking, we face at once the social and economic problems of the Asian revolution: how can peasant life be recreated, how can the patriotic intelligentsia be recruited to lead movements of reform, how can we inspire and help them to work out alternatives to the Communist system? We will get no answer, nor will we save Asia from Communism, except by a concerted nation-wide effort of study and action. Our success will depend upon the degree and quality of contact that we can establish, in the immediate future, with the peoples of Asia.

C. Contemporary World Affairs

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*International Political Relations**

ERICH HULA

Since its birth at San Francisco in 1945, the United Nations has been a source of inspiration and hope for many, of despair and condemnation by others, but, above all, of constant debate. Dr. Erich Hula, professor of political science at the New School for Social Research, assesses the areas of relative success and failure during the organization's early years of existence.

The United Nations is . . . by no means an entirely novel experiment in building an international political organization of projected universal scope. To be sure, it was part of the propaganda employed in selling, or rather overselling, the new organization to the American public, to present the United Nations as a hitherto untested remedy for the evil of war. Inasmuch as references to the defunct League of Nations could not altogether be avoided, they were made only in order to illustrate the constitutional superiority of the new over the old organization. Actually, the United Nations does differ from its predecessor in some, not wholly irrelevant, respects. These differences, moreover, are not confined to the institutional and functional features of the two organizations, but extend to their moral, ideological, and political settings as well. Nevertheless, the United Nations and the League of Nations are, fundamentally, variants of one and the same organizational type—the confederate system. Both were conceived by their founders as international bodies composed of sovereign member states, yet charged with the task of uphold-

* Reprinted from Erich Hula, "Four Years of the United Nations," *Social Research* (December, 1949). Used by permission of the author and *Social Research*.

ing the authority of the community of nations as a whole. The basic identity of structure and purpose has made for a continuity of issues and problems that is already very striking and is bound to become ever more so. Their fundamental unity of structure, purpose, and problems makes it possible—indeed, even imperative—to analyze and weigh the short record of Lake Success and Flushing Meadow in the light of the somewhat longer record of Geneva.

The limits of experience do not present the greatest stumbling block in the way of assessing the accomplishments and failures of the United Nations. A record short in terms of years is not necessarily deficient in terms of work actually undertaken. The Charter assigned to the United Nations and its specialized agencies tasks of a variety and scope unprecedented in the history of international organization. And even the severest critic of the United Nations could not possibly maintain that it has not been eager to make the fullest use of its powers. The formidable number of items on the agenda of each year's General Assembly and the length of its annual sessions clearly testify to a work load that very definitely puts the activities of the League of Nations in the shade. This quantitative difference is no less impressively indicated by the respective staff figures for the League of Nations Secretariat and that of the United Nations. Whereas the maximum number of staff members employed in the former was approximately 800, there are today some 3,000 staff members employed in the latter, not counting the civil service of the specialized agencies. Thus, instead of being frustrated by lack of material, the student of the United Nations finds himself overwhelmed by its abundance.

It would be impossible to evaluate in any one paper all the activities of the United Nations with anything close to accuracy. This holds true especially for the functions assigned to such organs as the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council. . . .

It is not only necessary, but justifiable as well, to limit the following stocktaking to the record of the United Nations as an agency for maintaining international peace and security. Maintenance of international peace and security is the purpose that stands highest in the hierarchy of aims which the United Nations is designed to fulfill. Its success is therefore primarily determined by its actions and failures to act in the political field proper. In fact, all the other activities of the United Nations being of an essentially auxiliary character, they too must be measured in terms of their respective contribution to peace and security.

By far the greatest expectations aroused in us by the establishment of the United Nations were based on its alleged merits as a security organization. Chapter VII of the Charter was considered to be its very core. The technical features of the collective security system, incorporated in the Chapter, were supposed to assure the effectiveness of the new peace machinery to a much higher degree than the League of Nations Covenant had done. The powerful protection which the system was presumed to offer the smaller members of the organization was to reconcile them to its hierarchical structure and its authoritarian spirit. Actually, however, not even the legal features of the Charter's security system justified such fervent hopes, quite apart from the doubtful validity of its political assumptions.

According to the concept of collective security, the national security of the individual state is a matter of concern to the community of nations as a whole. A threat to the security of one is a threat to the security of all. The other nations are not only

entitled, but obligated, to come to the help of the state threatened. In exchange for receiving protection from the international community, the individual state is expected to give up, or rather accept limitations of, such important attributes of its sovereignty as the right to arm, to form alliances, and to wage war. Collective enforcement of peace and security is to replace individual self-help.

The close interdependence between the obligation of the community and the undertakings of its members is obvious. In fact, it operates as a vicious circle in which any system of collective security is bound to be caught. No nation, including the most peaceable one, can afford or be willing to renounce, without reservation, the paraphernalia of power and the right to employ them, unless it can be virtually certain of effective collective protection. But the confederate structure of the system of collective security precludes the only true guarantee of such efficacy, a supranational authority superior to any and all of the national governments in terms of political, moral, military, and economic strength. The advocates of world government, therefore, are no doubt right in maintaining that the problem of collective security is insoluble within the framework of a confederate system. They are wrong merely in assuming that a world government proper would be attainable or workable.

The short history of the United Nations security system is a melancholy illustration of this vicious circle. It is the more discouraging as it is, *mutatis mutandis,* a repetition of the League of Nations experience, the main difference being the greater rapidity with which the disintegration of the San Francisco system has been consummated. As a matter of fact, it would be more appropriate to say that it has not come into existence.

What are the legal features and political assumptions of that system, and what are the causes and symptoms of its disintegration?

Universal membership is the ultimate goal of the United Nations. But this was never meant to imply that its coercive powers were to be universally applicable. On the contrary, as a security organization proper, the United Nations to all intents and purposes has had from the very beginning an extremely narrow scope. In view of the right of the permanent members of the Security Council to veto any enforcement measure—a right upon which we insist, even today, as strongly as the Russians do—the organization could not, even in purely legal terms, be expected ever to be in a position to institute enforcement proceedings against any of the great powers. Neither can we count on its support against the Russians, nor can the Russians count on it against us. What is worse yet, none of the smaller powers is entitled to regard collective protection as certain or even likely, if and when its security should be threatened by a great power.

At best it could be hoped that the legal security mechanism of the United Nations might operate in cases of conflict between minor powers. But the veto applies in these cases as well, though its subjective aspect is somewhat different. By exercising it, a permanent member of the Security Council would not stave off collective action against itself, but would refuse to participate in such action against another United Nations Member, thus blocking enforcement procedures against the latter. And it is quite likely to do so if its supposed national interests suggest this course.

To emphasize the restrictive character of the veto is not to imply that the political problems involved in collective security could and should be solved by abolishing

the veto in its application to enforcement measures. The veto is a symptom, not the root, of the difficulties that are inherent in the political realities. To remove the legal obstacle which precludes enforcement action against a permanent member of the Security Council would mean to endow the organization with a merely fictitious right, unless it is ready to launch what would be essentially a global war, the very catastrophe which the organization is intended to prevent. Nor would it be any more useful to abolish the veto as a means of blocking collective action against a medium-sized or small Member of the organization. If one of the great powers, and especially if one of the superpowers should consider it, rightly or wrongly, necessary for political reasons to identify itself with the nation against which preventive or repressive collective action is to be taken, such action would again ultimately mean global war. The veto is nothing but the legal form in which a permanent member of the Security Council states what it holds to be the zone of its vital interests on which it is not ready to compromise. Without the veto, it could be legally outvoted, but not actually brought into line. . . .

The very word "veto" has today a derogatory connotation. But the actual and potential abuse of the veto privilege should not make us forget that the veto is the reverse of a positive idea of long standing, adapted to the parliamentary procedures of current international politics. The idea that the maintenance of international peace and security depends, primarily and ultimately, upon the existence of what, in the predemocratic age, was called the concert of the leading powers, has not become any less valid because the stubborn facts of world politics displease our tender liberal hearts. Whether we like it or not, far from being a substitute for the concert of powers, the system of collective security has a reasonable chance to work only within a hegemonic framework. The fathers of the United Nations were therefore wise in recognizing the unanimity of the foremost powers as a basic prerequisite for the new security system.

The chances for successful operation of collective security are slim enough when the interests of great powers that otherwise entertain the most cordial relations with one another do not run parallel with regard to enforcement measures called for by the alleged disturbance of peace by a third minor state. The Indonesian case with its alignment in the Security Council of colonial versus anticolonial powers, instead of the usual alignment of east versus west, was a typical illustration of such a situation. That what the French veto defeated was not an enforcement measure proper only corroborates the problematic value of the collective security system even under comparatively auspicious conditions.

But practically speaking, the system is unworkable if the great powers are divided by a deep and permanent rift. To be sure, even within the context of a cold war there might arise situations in which its protagonists are, for one reason or another, willing and able to pursue common enforcement policies. In the Palestinian case, the Security Council went so far as to base its final cease-fire order explicitly upon Chapter VII of the Charter, and to declare that failure to comply with the order would require its immediate consideration with a view to further action. It is an open question, however, whether the Security Council could have ever agreed on actual enforcement proceedings, if subsequent developments in Palestine had called for them. As the record stands, the case testifies to the value of the United Nations as a

conciliatory agency rather than as an international policeman. . . .

Security has become also an American obsession, ever since we fully realized that the political and technological developments of recent years have deprived us of the benefits of an isolated position. Contrary to the Russians, however, in our quest for safety in a shrunken world, we turned to the idea and the contrivances of collective security. True, we hoped to gain our new security at a cheap price, and some of the most important provisions of the Charter, as well as certain omissions in it, all of them tending to emphasize the powers of the Member states over against the authority of the United Nations Organization as a whole, are due to American initiative taken for the sake of American sovereignty. But we were inclined to attribute to the world confederacy a very high security value, because our long liberal tradition had made us prone to believe in the triad of Wilsonian internationalism: the fundamental harmony of divergent opinions and interests, the potency and justness of public opinion, and the effectiveness of rational procedures in settling disputes.

Admittedly, our basically optimistic philosophy has never induced us to neglect completely our actual and potential instruments of national power. The atomic bomb is, after all, hardly a typical expression of the Wilsonian faith. But the pace of our rearmament began to quicken only with the growing realization of the deficiencies of the United Nations security system. The degree which our disillusionment has reached today is indicated by the fact that our military planning has caught up with Russian policy in completely disregarding the United Nations as a security factor. In this atmosphere of absolute lack of international confidence, proposals for the regulation of conventional and atomic weapons are, on the part of all powers, likely to be propagandistic gestures rather than serious efforts to arrive at agreements.

Another phase and symptom of the disintegration of the world security system has been the formation of political and military alliances. This trend revealed itself first in the east by a vast network of bilateral treaties between Russia and her satellites as well as between the satellites themselves. The western world soon followed suit with multilateral security agreements. The pattern was set by the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. Its counterpart in western Europe is the Treaty of Brussels concluded in 1948. The development finally culminated this year [1949] in the North Atlantic Treaty and its military implementation.

By far the most momentous of those particular political and military understandings is the Atlantic Pact. It also demonstrates more clearly than any other how far, in spite of ourselves, we have moved away in the brief span of four years from the ideas of Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. To be sure, the Pact is based upon and formulated in strict accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, which recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defense. To that extent it can no doubt correctly be called an implementation of a Charter provision. But this does not alter the fact that the Pact is based upon political and legal conceptions that are fundamentally different from those underlying the Charter.

Wilson conceived of the League of Nations as the very negation of the European system of alliances and balance of power, in his opinion one of the main causes of the ever-recurring wars on the Continent. Nor did his heirs who were to build the United Nations hold these devices in any higher esteem. The structure they planned for it

and the stress they laid on the paramountcy of the world organization to any regional arrangements were a clear rejection of the allegedly immoral and outdated notions and techniques. It is all the more indicative, therefore, that American statesmen became the main architects of the Atlantic Pact which is, whatever we choose to call it, an alliance based on the balance of power idea.

It signifies that the nation which believed in the efficacy of collective security with almost religious fervor has reluctantly come to the conclusion that the very objective of the system, to check in advance any potential aggression by assembling at least equal or possibly superior forces against it, will be better achieved by the diplomatic methods of olden times. Indeed, it is not entirely unjustifiable to presume that the very concreteness of the system of alliances may well render it a more effective means of assuring peace than the abstract system of collective security with its "twilight zone," where, to quote Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "one side assumes that collective security exists and the other counts on taking advantage of the fact that it does not."* Therein lies our hope that the disintegration of the United Nations security system does not necessarily mean that the cause of peace is lost as well. . . .

In accordance with the idea of collective security, the Charter stipulates a general prohibition of war as a means of individual self-help. Any lawful use of force is, under the principal terms of the Charter, the monopoly of the United Nations Organization acting through its central agency, the Security Council. Article 51 establishes the exception, the right of the individual Member states to wage defensive war. True, it also defines the only conditions and limits under and within which the exception may lawfully be considered to apply. But by leaving the previous determination whether a state may in a concrete case resort to self-defense to the discretion of the individual state in question, Article 51, to all practical intents and purposes, restores the right to war to the position it held in modern international law prior to the establishment of an organized international society.

In view of the likelihood of a deadlock in the Security Council in case of an international crisis, which would block collective protection by the organization of the victim of an armed attack, Article 51 is undoubtedly a reservation that no Member of the United Nations can reasonably be expected to renounce. But to shift the emphasis in interpreting and applying the Charter from the provisions that constitute the very core of the system of collective security to the provision which envisages its suspension, and to speak at the same time of implementation of the Charter, is a not very profitable attempt to deceive ourselves and others about the bankruptcy of the political and legal system whose establishment was the primary purpose of the Charter.

* Hamilton Fish Armstrong, author, and editor of the magazine, *Foreign Affairs*. [Ed.] Quotation from "Coalition for Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 27 (October, 1948), 13.

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*International Economic Relations**

ALVIN H. HANSEN

In the building of a constructive and peaceful world order, we have come to recognize the importance of eliminating economic conflicts and tensions. In one of his many volumes, Alvin H. Hansen, professor of political economy at Harvard, discusses the role of the United States in the world economy.

Economic Security and World Peace

World security in the interwar period failed no less because the great industrial nations did not understand and were wholly unprepared to face the economic problems of the postwar world. Everywhere there was an effort to revert to prewar policies and to restore the prewar economy. This effort failed. Price fluctuations in all countries, inflation in Germany and France, a persistent core of unemployment in England, increasing disequilibrium in the primary-producing countries, boom and depression in the United States—these were the manifestations of economic unbalance all over the world.

All hopes for the restoration of the prewar economy were dashed in the great depression. International economic cooperation was completely cast aside. Each nation struggled by whatever means it could grasp to stay above water. Economic warfare became the rule. Tariff increases, import quotas, exchange control, competitive exchange depreciation, bilateralism and multiple currencies destroyed multilateral trade and the international price system.

Could we have stopped the great depression dead in its tracks and gone on to high levels of income and employment and rising standards of living throughout the world, we might eventually have rebuilt the structure of world peace on firmer foundations. But the great depression fanned the flames of a new world conflagration. . . .

What, now, are the prospects after World War II? A great new fact emerges from World War II. It will change the face of Europe. It will profoundly dominate the course of world history in the generations that lie before us.

This great new fact is the rise of Russia on one side of the globe and the economic and military power of the United States on the other. A happy geographical accident—two great powers occupying vast continents and controlling vast resources in areas that are noncompetitive—this fact must be set down as a dominating and directing force in the future course of history. We are confronted here with a completely new constellation of forces. Within this framework the role of France, Germany and England of necessity must be something very different from that set by the European patterns of past generations. . . .

We are thus confronted with a new political equilibrium following World War II. But what about the world economic situa-

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tion? Are we better prepared to meet our economic problems than we were after World War I?

Here again, I think, there is solid ground not indeed for optimism but for hope. There can be no question that a profound revolution has occurred in economic thinking throughout the world. We have learned a great deal from the experiences of the last two decades. In the United States we have introduced a number of important reforms which will tend to minimize the distortions of a boom period. And we are not hopelessly at sea, as we were in 1929, with respect to ways and means of heading off a rapidly cumulating depression. For example, the crazy financing of home mortgages prevalent in the twenties created a thoroughly unsound situation which intensified the collapse that followed. This situation has now been remedied through the reforms instituted under the Federal Housing Administration. Reforms relating to the stock market, including the Securities Exchange Commission and margin regulations, tend to prevent such unhealthy speculation as prevailed in the twenties. Important banking reforms have been instituted, including the guarantee of deposits. The social-security program puts a floor under depressions. These and many other measures help to remove artificial distortions and to minimize the danger of unchecked collapse following a boom.

Even more important is the fact that we have definitely abandoned the view that a depression must be allowed to run its course. While it cannot be claimed that we have developed any far-reaching program that assures the mastery of our economic fate, nevertheless marked progress has been made. I do not think that any future administration in the United States would again sit idly by while the national income falls rapidly to half its former level as occurred from 1929 to 1932. We have learned ways and means of stopping such a catastrophic development. We are no longer hampered by the doubts, fears and restraints that prevented us then from taking vigorous action. All this represents a major gain.

Throughout the world, leaders in government and in industry are more and more committed to a program of sustained full employment. This does not mean that anyone believes that perfection can be achieved. We shall fall short of the goal aimed at. There will be fluctuations in employment. But we are determined, through anti-depression measures, to moderate these fluctuations. All modern governments are increasingly committed to expansionist and developmental programs, to the promotion of rising standards of living and to the creation of underlying conditions necessary for the attainment of full employment.

A new attitude, moreover, is prevalent among the leading industrial countries with respect to the primary-producing and economically backward countries. In former times these retarded countries throughout the world were condemned to the position of economic colonies. They were mere appendages to the economies of the great industrial nations. Economic policies were as a matter of course directed toward the continuance of the status of economic colonialism. The industrially backward countries were expected to supply raw materials for the great countries and, in turn, to furnish a market for manufactured products.

There is a new outlook abroad in the world today. Now, everywhere the note is sounded that development, diversification and industrialization must be undertaken in the backward areas. We have come to realize that the future trade of the world cannot continue to run in the simplified terms of exchange of raw materials for finished manufactured products. Rather, it

must run in terms of highly diversified trade between countries with different skills and resources but each developed to the fullest possible extent. Large-scale developmental projects, industrialization to an extent that is economically feasible, and the diversification of agriculture; the development and improvement of human resources through improved health, nutrition and education; the promotion of a higher standard of living, rising productivity, and increased purchasing power—these are the new world economic goals. They promise a more stable economy and better living standards everywhere. . . .

The Economic Basis of Sound International Relations

I have the strong impression that many persons vitally interested in sound international relations are too frequently disposed to assume that a high level of economic prosperity in all countries would be assured if trade barriers were largely removed. It is undoubtedly true that the erection of postwar agricultural tariffs, together with the increasingly protectionist policies of many countries, the reparation payments, and the unsound policies pursued with respect to foreign lending, were important factors intensifying the terrific world depression beginning in 1929. While this may certainly be granted, it would be a great mistake to assume that sounder international economic policies of the character referred to above would themselves insure an avoidance of serious depressions. Indeed, one can go much farther and assert that even in a world that was completely under one political sovereignty the fundamental factor producing depressions would still be present, namely, the fluctuation in the volume of real investment.

In laying plans for a durable peace it would be very dangerous to overlook the threat to the stability of any arrangements that may be made should we experience a recurrence of deep depressions.

I think it is increasingly the view of economists that the depression starting in 1929 is in very large measure responsible for the present plight of the world. There was a very good chance—though no absolute certainty—that in the absence of the great depression a solution might have been found for the central problem of Europe, namely the place of Germany in international relations. Despite the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty, progress was being made toward a solution in the relatively prosperous years of the late twenties, and could this prosperity have been maintained on a fairly high level, it is not unreasonable to assume that, progressively, a solution would have been found and war thereby averted.

The thesis can, therefore, be advanced with a good deal of reason that the really acid test of international economic cooperation runs in terms of deliberate international policy with respect to the control or moderation of depressions.

With respect to the United States, it may be asserted with a good deal of confidence that this country could make no greater contribution toward the solution of the international political as well as economic problems than that of achieving a high degree of internal economic stability at a level of fairly full employment of labor and other resources. It is, I think, a fact that the extraordinary instability of the American economy presents one of the most serious problems confronting Europe and, indeed, the whole world. The great depression itself was, of course, a result of the interplay of a great many factors, partly internal and partly international, but there can be little question that the tremendous investment

boom of the twenties in the United States (and in other countries fostered by American foreign loans), the succeeding high degree of temporary saturation and the ensuing collapse in the output of fixed capital goods, particularly in this country, were the central core of the great world depression and determined in the main its intensity and duration. A bad international setup, of course, magnified the impact upon the outside world, and this impact in turn reflected itself back upon our own country in a cumulative fashion. Thus, as always in a depression period, it is quite impossible to unravel the interplay of cause and effect relationships. But through it all it is important to see the internal situation in the United States which would have created a profound depression regardless of the international setup.

Europe, and the primary-producing countries as well, from whom we import so heavily and whose prosperity or depression is, therefore, in large measure a reflection of our own, have every reason to fear the impact of America upon world affairs if we continue a high degree of economic instability or chronically depressed conditions as in the interwar years.

It is a striking fact that the movements of the Federal Reserve index of industrial production in the last decades bear a close resemblance to the movements in the quantum of world trade. A sharp depression in the United States spreads to the rest of the world through the sudden decline in American imports induced by our depression. A low rate of activity in America inevitably throws the American trade and service payments on international account into disequilibrium. A violently fluctuating American economy is a menace to economic stability in the rest of the world. A chronically depressed America, unless the world can in some manner isolate itself from this depressional influence, tends to infect other countries.

Under these circumstances it is highly probable that unless the United States can do a better job of managing its own economy and can effectively cooperate with other countries on monetary policy, fiscal policy, and on a coordinated international program of expansion and development to combat depression and unemployment, it will become necessary for foreign countries to insulate themselves as far as possible from the American influence. It is by no means improbable that without an adequate internal American policy, combined with international collaboration along the line indicated, the European countries will find it essential to their political and economic stability to collaborate on policies designed to segregate themselves economically from the United States. This would indeed be a world tragedy. . . .

Means of Achieving International Balance

The main means to achieve international equilibrium are (*a*) the promotion of full employment in the industrially mature countries, and especially in the United States, (*b*) the development and industrialization of the backward countries designed to change the structure of their economies, and (*c*) a liberalization of commercial and tariff policies throughout the world, and notably in the United States.

International collaboration to secure full employment in the industrially mature countries promotes international equilibrium in the respect that a full-employment income in these countries tends to spread prosperity throughout the world and in general promotes a high level of world trade. Within the framework of full employment and a high level of world trade, substantial

tariff reductions become feasible, and price adjustments incident to changes in the United States tariffs and exchange rates can be more effective than is possible under conditions of underemployment.

A structural change in the economies of undeveloped countries is equally important. This means diversification of agriculture, better equipment on farms, mechanization of agricultural production, improved transportation facilities, electrification and the spread of industrialization. Industrialization is typically possible along the following lines: (*a*) the first stages in the processing of indigenous raw materials, (*b*) the development of lighter consumer-goods industries, and (*c*) the assembling of complicated industrial products manufactured abroad. Diversification and industrialization, moreover, require the promotion of large-scale development projects, including electric power, port facilities, river-valley development, roads, railroads, airways and other communications. Thus the basic solution runs in terms of the spread of capital equipment and modern techniques throughout the world.

In order to effectuate the necessary programs of adjustment it will be necessary to engage in international economic cooperation on many fronts.

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*International Military Relations**

JACOB VINER

The development of atomic energy for military purposes certainly hastened the end of World War II. The real impact of atomic weapons thus far, however, has come during the postwar diplomatic struggle between the Atlantic Community, led by the United States, and the Soviet Union. Dr. Jacob Viner, professor of economics at Princeton and an outstanding authority on international affairs, discusses "The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations."

In his Message to Congress of October 3, 1945, President Truman stated that: "In international relations as in domestic affairs, the release of atomic energy constitutes a new force too revolutionary to consider in the framework of old ideas." Beyond a few facts and a few surmises about the military effectiveness and the cost of atomic bombs, however, I unfortunately have no materials to work with except a framework of old ideas, some of them centuries old, with respect to the inherent character of international relations. I suspect that practically every non-scientist is in substantially the same predicament, except that many are unfamiliar even with the old ideas about the character of international relations.

. . . I want to disclose the atomic-bomb premises upon which my argument is based. . . .

* Jacob Viner, "The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations," reprinted from *The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 90, No. 1 (1946). Used by permission of the author and publisher.

A single atomic bomb can reduce a city and its population to dust. A single airplane can carry the bomb. A single person can carry the explosive ingredients of the bomb, and it can be deposited at an appropriate spot and detonated at an appropriate time by pressing a button or setting a time-clock. The bomb has a minimum size, and in this size it is, and will remain, too expensive—or too scarce, whether expensive or not—to be used against minor targets. Its targets, therefore, must be primarily cities, and its military effectiveness must reside primarily in its capacity to destroy urban population and productive facilities. Under atomic bomb warfare, the soldier in the army would be safer than his wife and children in their urban home.

Secrecy as to the fundamental scientific principles underlying the atomic bomb is already non-existent. Secrecy as to manufacturing know-how is probably already less than perfect and can at the most delay the manufacture of such bombs for other countries by only a few years. The atomic bomb is susceptible of further improvement. But, even if our superior supply of scientists, of industrial resources, and of industrial technique could be relied upon to keep us always ahead of other countries in the quality of the national brand of bombs, this would probably have little strategic significance. The atomic bomb, unlike battleships, artillery, airplanes, and soldiers, is not an effective weapon against its own kind. A superior bomb cannot neutralize the inferior bomb of an enemy. It does not much matter strategically how much more efficient the atomic bomb can become provided superiority in efficiency affects chiefly the fineness of the dust to which it reduces the city upon which it is dropped.

There are differences between countries in their military vulnerability to atomic-bomb attack. Since the bomb can have destructive effect which will justify its own cost only if directed against major targets, a country is more vulnerable: (*a*) the greater the proportion of its population which lives in large cities; (*b*) the greater the average size and density of these cities; (*c*) the greater the urbanization or other regional concentration of its major industries of military significance; (*d*) the smaller its total and per capita resources of capacity for production (and stockpiling); therefore, other things equal, the smaller the margin of expendable resources which needs to be consumed before the military and civilian economies are brought to their physical or psychological breaking-points. . . .

There seems to be no prospect of an effective specific defense against the atomic bombs. In theory their military effectiveness can be somewhat reduced, however, by planned decentralization of industry and deurbanization of population. Carried on on only a modest scale, this would have negligible military significance unless it was directed primarily at setting up a miniature war-economy and military organization, insulated from the economy as a whole and always ready to act on short notice in pursuit of military objectives even when the economy as a whole was engulfed in a disaster situation. Carried on on a grand scale, it would be painfully expensive; there would always be the risk, moreover, that before mass-decentralization had been carried far some new development of lethal weapons would have made it waste effort. In any case, I leave it to you to judge whether the decentralization of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, can be regarded as physically, economically, politically, practicable. But our military planners, in deciding upon the location of new facilities of military significance, should of course give careful con-

sideration to the bearing of the atomic bomb upon the logic of strategic location. This logic calls for as wide a dispersal of facilities, as complete an avoidance of metropolitan areas as possible and as little dependence as possible of military communications and transportation, military stockpiles, and military staff personnel on urban-centered facilities. . . .

The atomic bomb makes war a prospect horrible to contemplate. Moreover, even without the atomic bomb other new military weapons of unprecedented capacity to destroy life and property already perfected or soon to be perfected threaten us with horrors not much less awesome than those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Every person of sane mind and sound morals is anxious that mankind be protected against these horrors by whatever political means are available. The physical scientists, presumably because they are better aware than we laymen are of the death-dealing potentialities of these new weapons, and because they have had more time to consider what dread fate is in store for us if these potentialities should ever become actualities, have been particularly active in calling for action, and rightly so. I gather, however, that they, like many others, think there *must* be an effective remedy, that such a remedy is in fact known and available, and that it consists in the establishment of "World Government." I gather also that many of them think that all that stands in the way of adoption of this remedy is the stupidity of politicians and ordinary citizens, or their failure to understand how terrible the atomic bomb is or how impossible it is for any country to retain a monopoly of it. I fear that the problem is not so simple; that complacency and ignorance are not the only barriers to world government. . . .

In theory the world can be effectively organized for peace through universal pacifism, through universal monarchy, or through world government, world government in this connection meaning a world state which in military matters at least can give the law to national governments or peoples. We do not know how to get universal pacifism. We do not want universal monarchy, or the rule of the world by a single nation-state; even if we did want it—presumably, for ourselves—we probably would not be willing to pay the price at which it would be obtainable, if at all. World government has been possible in the fairly recent past. It may again be possible in the somewhat distant future if, as a result of the wide distribution of atom bombs, or of other conceivable developments, military power is once more widely distributed. But I do not believe it is possible now or even that it is possible now definitely to begin planning it for the future. . . .

I am forced to the conclusion that the only conceivable ways in which the world even in theory could be effectively organized so as to assure peace are not available now. We may regret this or we may rejoice in it. I for one deeply regret it. But our regret and our joy are equally irrelevant. That does not mean, however, that there is nothing that can be and should be done to make war less probable. On the contrary. Let us consider the possibilities of action in this direction.

The balance-of-power system is discredited today. References to it, even by professional historians and international lawyers, commonly imply either that it was a system for preventing war which repeatedly failed or that it was a system for making war which often succeeded in its purpose. The balance-of-power system had, in fact, neither peace nor war as its primary objective. Its primary objective was the maintenance of the independence of the states in the system by associating states

in alliances too strong to be overwhelmed by any single state or combination of states outside such alliance. The principle of the balance-of-power called for defensive wars and even for preventive wars to stop any power from growing so strong that it could upset the balance. The system often was abused. During the period of its dominance as a European system, say, 1648 to 1918, its record in preventing war was certainly not striking. Indeed, it probably was itself responsible for starting more wars than it prevented. As human institutions go, however, it did have extraordinary success in attaining its primary objective, that of maintaining national independence. To the best of my knowledge, only one major European state, Poland, and only a few minor German states permanently lost their independence through external aggression in the entire period 1648 to 1918, and in even these instances the failure of England to play its customary and, I am willing to avow, its useful role in the balance-of-power system was probably a significant contributory factor. The balance-of-power system also deserves some of the credit for the receptiveness of belligerents during that period, including definitely aggressor nations, to limited warfare when actual hostilities were under way, to early termination of hostilities, and to moderate peace terms.

Whether we like or detest its record, however, the balance-of-power system is probably now only of historical interest. In the first place, the same factors which have created new barriers to world government have probably destroyed the availability of the balance-of-power system. To have any chance of effective operation in maintaining international equilibrium, the system requires that military power be fairly widely distributed so that there are no overwhelmingly strong concentrations of power, even regional ones, in single states, and so that there is always some hope, or fear, that timely negotiations of new alliances will restore a balance temporarily destroyed. Abstracting from the atomic bomb, the world was emerging from World War II as a two-power world, with Britain deprived of the necessary economic base for sustained military effort, with Germany, Japan, and Italy reduced to military ciphers, and with France's underlying weakness finally exposed to view.

The development of the atomic bomb promises to restore some military significance to the weaker countries; it gives a strong weapon to *any* country able to use it. It thus tends to make all countries strong, or to make all countries weak, as you prefer. It seems doubtful, however, whether it goes, or will go, far enough in that direction, whether it will scatter military power widely enough to make it possible to create a single world agency strong enough to exact obedience from any single country. Should it do so, however, then not only an effective balance-of-power system but even world government will again be possible, and to the discovery of the atomic bomb will belong the credit. On the other hand, the atomic bomb removes the physical and administrative restrictions on warfare which helped to make "limited-warfare" attractive even to aggressors and therefore tends to deprive the balance-of-power system of its only merit with respect to the issue of peace or war, namely, that it reduces the damage done by war when war does occur.

This leaves a Concert or League of Great Powers, committed by solemn covenant to the maintenance of peace, as the only immediately available type of political institution for preserving peace. The League of Nations, as it actually operated, was, I believe, essentially a Concert of Great Powers. The United Nations Charter, with its

single-veto privilege for the Great Powers, provides more frankly and honestly for such a Concert. The essence of Concerts of Powers is that they aim to include all the major powers; that they start with good intentions; that they have the means and have agreed or can agree upon the procedures by which to enforce peace upon the small and weak countries; but that they have neither the means nor the serious intention to enforce peace upon each other. They should not be despised as useless or evil. Earlier Concerts of Powers did serve to maintain peace for a time. The League of Nations never had adequate membership and never was given a fair chance. The United Nations Organization will start with at least two advantages over the League of Nations: essentially complete membership and an ambitious program of beneficent economic and social activities which may succeed in fostering a feeling of community between the governments and the peoples of the world strong enough to withstand the strains of the clashes of interest and of emotions which will inevitably arise. But Concerts of Powers are essentially self-denying ordinances, embodiments of good resolutions terminable at will and unilaterally. They cannot have within themselves effective means for *enforcing* their own survival. They may promote peace; they cannot assure it. . . .

There is one more thing, in my opinion by far the most important, that can be done although it is unfortunately not in the least spectacular, revolutionary, soul-stirring, or exciting. That is the conscientious and unrelenting practice by the statesmen of the Great Powers, day after day, year after year, of mutually conciliatory diplomacy. Wilful disturbers of the peace do arise from time to time: Louis XIV, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Bismarck, Hitler. But for the most part wars arise out of mutual fear of peace, out of fear of loss of national independence or of other nationally treasured objectives unless war is resorted to, more than out of love of war or than out of lust for war booty. Countries most often go to war because they fear the consequences of remaining at peace. If rulers act as statesmen, and if their peoples permit—and still better, demand—that they so act, if rulers so behave as not to arouse or sustain fear in other countries, lasting peace will still not be guaranteed, but it will be probable. By making the peace a mutually more satisfactory one, we will further lessen the risk that some day some country may fear continuance of the peace more than it fears war. By adding to the horror of war and therefore to the attractiveness of peace, the discovery of the atomic bomb will aid instead of hinder the diplomacy of peace. In any case, it is on the quality of postwar diplomacy and of postwar diplomats, and on the texts of charters only as they are incidental to, facilitate, and are supported by the exercise of good diplomacy, that we must rest our main hopes for the maintenance of peace.

It would be wonderful if it were possible to *enforce* peace. It would be wonderful if a workable scheme could be devised whereby the atomic bomb itself could either be used as the equivalent for the world of the policeman's baton or could make the baton unnecessary. For the reasons given, however, I believe that this is under existing circumstances not within the realm of the possible and that at the best it can be regarded only as a distant goal. And if it is not, or even probably not, possible in the near future, I believe it is unwise to pretend that it is possible, and thus to divert attention from those things that *are* possible and that are possible *now:* full support of the United Nations Organization so that it may realize its fullest potentiali-

ties for promoting mutual trust and collaboration in good causes; public insistence that diplomats gather with the determination to reach agreement on vital issues rather than with irresponsible readiness to quarrel on secondary issues. In both cases, this means a call to action . . . in our own country as well as elsewhere.

D. The World "Crisis"

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*Present World Conditions in Cultural Perspective**

RALPH LINTON

"The crisis of civilization" has been a phrase frequently used by Americans during the past decade. But *dealing* with a crisis demands an intelligent understanding of its causes and nature, as well as its extent. Dr. Ralph Linton surveys some of the contemporary problems of man and society and, with the broad view of an anthropologist, places them in their proper historical and cultural perspective.

Periods of stress are no new thing in human history. All civilizations have experienced them and every generation which has been confronted by them has felt that its own emergency was the worst. The only unique thing about the present period is the large number of people who believe that such periods are not inevitable and that they can be avoided by intelligent planning for the future. This attitude seems to be something new in human history. It could not arise as long as men regarded themselves as playthings of the gods or pieces moved by blind fate. It reflects our increasing realization that man has made and can make himself. With it there has come an increasing unwillingness to accept the old facile explanations of disaster and a desire to understand the underlying causes. . . .

Although man is beginning to learn to stand on his own feet and to accept responsibility for the working out of his own destiny, this does not diminish his need for immediate reassurance. In the past he has always turned to his gods for the explanation of present calamity and for advice on how to mitigate it. These two are equally necessary to his peace of mind. Discomforts become somehow more bearable if their causes are understood. Today he turns with the same blind faith to the new god, Science, and expects from it everything that the old gods provided. This has made the present a field day for charlatans, especially those who volunteer to foretell the future. However, the true scientists find such faith embarrassing. No one knows the short-comings of a God as well as his own priests and those who devote their lives to a search for scientific truth realize better than anyone else how little they know. The social scientists, in particular,

* Reprinted from Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945). Used by permission of the publishers.

are reluctant to assume the role of the ancient oracles. They realize that they have only begun to understand the behavior of human beings, whether as individuals or in groups. There is a fine irony in the fact that those sciences whose services are most urgently needed in the present crisis are the youngest and least developed of all. Science gave man new weapons in his age-old battle with nature and in the first flush of victory he pushed his advantage against the ancient enemy, ignoring everything else. The application of scientific methods to the study of man and society is barely a century old, and even at the present rate of progress it will require many years to bring the social sciences abreast of the others. . . .

The culture of a society is the way of life of its members; the collection of ideas and habits which they learn, share, and transmit from generation to generation. Culture provides the members of each new generation with effective, ready-made answers to most of the problems with which they are likely to be confronted. These problems, in turn, stem from the needs of individuals living as members of organized groups. Such needs fall into two classes, which we may call practical needs and psychological needs. The former are those which must be met to insure the physical survival of a society's members and the perpetuation of the society as a going concern. The latter are those which must be met to keep these members happy and contented. No society can survive for any length of time unless its culture provides satisfaction for the needs of both orders. . . .

Although the practical and psychological needs together provide the motive power which keeps cultures operating and are also responsible for their growth and change, knowledge of them does not help much in the understanding of the structure of cultures. Most of the patterns of behavior which a society transmits to its members are of such a sort that they contribute to the satisfaction of several needs simultaneously and may be touched off by any one of these. Thus, the practical reason for wearing clothes is to keep warm. At the same time, people in all societies derive a high degree of ego satisfaction from the feeling that they are well dressed, whether this involves a Hattie Carnegie model or a coat of paint. People dress to keep warm but also to make a good impression, and which of these motives is the dominant one depends upon the circumstances. Culture as a whole satisfies the society's needs as a whole, but the interrelations are so complex as to defy analysis. . . .

Cultures are rarely if ever what one might term well rounded. It seems that societies, like individuals, tend to be much more interested in some things than in others. As a result, their cultures grow and expand in the direction of their interests. Some particular activity catches their attention and they proceed to amplify this at the expense of the rest. The process by which this is accomplished is obvious enough. Societies *per se* do not invent or borrow but their members do. Inventions which are along the lines in which the society is primarily interested at the time are the ones which bring the largest rewards. Contrast the rewards which our own society bestows upon a man who invents a new rhyme form with that it gives to the inventor of a new and more effective type of radio receiver. Moreover, inventions which are along the lines of a society's dominant interests have a much better chance of being accepted and incorporated into the culture than those which are not. People feel that even a slight improvement along these lines is worth the trouble of readjusting other parts of the culture. The same things hold for borrowing from other societies, one of the most

important processes of culture growth. People will borrow things that they are interested in while blandly ignoring other things seemingly of much greater obvious advantage.

Since cultures tend to grow irregularly, pushing out in certain directions and lagging in others, it follows that when we study a culture at any one point in time it almost always seems disharmonic. Cultures are like growing children, disproportionately long in the body at one stage of their development, disproportionately long in the legs at another. Anthropologists can cite innumerable examples of this from their studies of primitive cultures but a few will suffice to illustrate the point. The Australian blackfellows have been satisfied with the simplest sort of technological equipment and live happily at what we would regard as a level of extreme discomfort and insecurity. At the same time they have elaborated their social organization and rules governing marriage until these have reached a complexity beyond those of any other known society. The Polynesians of the western islands have developed an amazingly complicated system of rank and etiquette, but display a polite well-bred indifference toward religion. We ourselves have concentrated upon technological development until the average middle-class American home is a mass of mechanical gadgets of questionable utility. At the same time we have, until very recently at least, been blandly indifferent to the social problems which this very development was creating.

Two things limit the distance to which such one-sided developments can be carried. The first of these is the increasing disharmony produced within the culture by extending one aspect farther and farther while failing to use thought and ingenuity in developing other aspects to the point where they will work under the conditions created by the overextension. Our own indifference toward developing techniques of distribution to match rapidly improving techniques of production is a case in point. The second factor, which is in some ways only a special aspect of the first, is that the techniques of production which are known to any society set definite limits to the development of its culture in other directions. The most pressing needs of any society are for food and shelter. The ways in which these needs are met lie at the foundation of every culture. It is through them that the society discovers the realities and inescapable limitations of its natural environment. Such technical processes are potentially no more stable than any other part of culture. In fact much of human history could be written in terms of technological growth and improvement. However, interest in technology is no more a constant feature of human life than is interest in any other special sort of activity. From the point of view of the societies which practice them, all technologies are adequate as long as they provide for the society's material needs. . . .

The term technology is used in a very broad sense to refer to the methods which any society has developed for dealing with its natural environment. The most important of these, from the point of view of cultural limitation, are techniques for producing food and other necessities. All other aspects of a culture must be of a sort which will not interfere with the successful operation of these. It should be pointed out that such technological determinism is not to be confused with the classical theories of economic determinism. The latter fail to distinguish in most cases between the actual techniques of production and a society's regulations covering ownership and distribution. A particular set of productive techniques may be linked with any one of

several systems of ownership and distribution. In the modern world our own system and the Russian one would be a case in point. Both use the same technological equipment and production methods, although the patterns of ownership and distribution differ profoundly. Among primitive peoples we find that essentially the same productive techniques may be linked in different groups with individual ownership or group ownership of resources, with a money economy, a system of gift exchange, or a system in which all surplus is concentrated in the hands of chiefs, who then disburse it downward to the rest of the tribe as needed. Each of these systems appears to work well enough as long as there are sanctions which assure everyone of the necessities of life.

If we use technology in this broad sense, ignoring minor changes and improvements in specific processes, the fundamental changes which have occurred in the course of human history have been surprisingly few. It is a curious and still quite unexplained fact that very much the same fundamental inventions seem to have been made quite independently at different times by societies living in different parts of the world. Thus the development of civilization in the Old and in the New World shows a great number of similarities which certainly were not due to contact. In every case where such fundamental changes in technology have occurred, they have been followed by exceedingly rapid and far-reaching changes in other aspects of the culture. In the evolution of culture such basic technological advances seem to play very much the same role as the fundamental mutations which occur from time to time in the evolution of living forms. They provide a new starting point for development and variation and these result in the production of new forms vastly different from any which have existed before. There seem to have been only three of these fundamental mutations in human history, but each of them had far-reaching and long-enduring consequences.

The first mutation came at a period so remote that we can only conjecture what its immediate results were. It consisted in the development of tools and the use of fire. These gave man a control of his environment which, slight as it may seem to us, was vastly greater than anything which the world had seen before. Many animals make use of natural objects when these are both available and needed. Thus even some species of wasps have been seen to use pebbles to tamp the earth in their burrows. However, the essence of tool using is that objects are made for a specific purpose and kept for repeated use. Man is the only animal which has progressed to this point. That man is the only fire-using animal is too well known to require discussion. Our ancestors tamed and kept this tricky element long before they learned how to make it and it had an enormous influence upon the development of culture. We are accustomed to think of the contribution of fire mainly in terms of light, warmth, and protection from animal enemies. Actually, it had even more important effects in connection with the human food supply. Almost any sort of animal food that can be eaten cooked can also be eaten raw. However, most vegetable foods require cooking. This is universally true of the hard seeds which became the mainstay of man's diet in most regions where game was scarce and which are still his basic food in most parts of the world. We still pray for our daily bread but there can be no bread without fire. . . .

The second basic mutation came with the invention of food raising. This mutation took place independently a number of

times, as the varying domestic plants and animals of various regions attest. The idea that man became first a herdsman and then a farmer has become a part of our mythology. It was first advanced by scientists who were attempting to arrange the history of all cultures in a single evolutionary sequence and was based more upon logic than upon evidence. Actually, the development of food raising did not progress in any such regular fashion. Here and there some tribe of big game hunters may have begun to guard and eventually to tend the herds which they followed, but there are few parts of the world in which this could have happened. Even today most primitive food-gathering groups depend more upon plants than animals. Meat, being a scarce and preferred food, looms larger in their talk than in their diet. In most regions food raising seems to have begun with the domestication of plants. Animals came later, and in many cases their domestication would have been impossible without the at least semisettled life which crops make possible. Thus anyone who has tried to drive pigs knows that they could not have been domesticated by any group who spent most of its time on the move.

Although the ultimate consequences of food raising were almost as far-reaching as those of the use of tools and fire, they took some time to make themselves felt. The earliest agriculture seems to have been little more than a supplement to hunting and wild-food gathering. Even within the historic period there have been many tribes who planted a crop and then wandered off to live on the country, returning to harvest or gather anything which had survived weeds, blight, and insects. With the improvement of agricultural techniques and the greater assurance of a yield, men stayed closer to their fields and spent more time on them, but for many generations they must have relied upon wild foods for certain important elements in their diet. The real shift of human existence from a food-gathering to a food-raising basis came only when food raising had been developed to a point where it could provide a balanced ration; one containing all the elements necessary to life and health. In that part of the Old World from which most of our own civilization is derived, this was accomplished by a combination of plant and animal raising plus the truly revolutionary invention of milking. By milking, herds could be made to yield a steady supply of most of the food elements lacking in the grains which were here the basis of agriculture. The lack of vitamin B in the grain-milk diet was taken care of by making a large portion of the grain into beer, a yeasty home brew much like that with which many of us became acquainted during the dark days of prohibition. In the New World, milking was never invented and the balanced ration was provided by various combinations of crops, notably one consisting of corn, beans and chili peppers.

The ability to raise a balanced ration opened up a whole new range of possibilities for cultural development. Over a large part of the world men could now settle down and live in the same place generation after generation. Nomads have to be jacks-of-all-trades since they can never tell when a particular skill will be needed or be sure that there will be a specialist at hand who knows it. Now specialists of all sorts grew and multiplied, with a corresponding improvement in the various crafts. The stable village lent itself to the development of more rigid forms of social organization, while the farmer's constant worry about crops and weather made him more religious than his predecessors. Temples appeared and the primitive medicine man developed into a priest. In those areas

where the soil was rich enough to support large populations and where adequate techniques of transportation had been developed, a new phenomenon appeared, namely, the city. Here specialized manufacture and trade was centered, while the crowding together of great numbers of people set new problems of rule and organization. City dwelling is so new in human history that our species still has not been able to adapt to it physiological terms. . . .

Recent archeological discoveries have shown the speed with which men adapted themselves to the new conditions provided by successful food raising. While the initial adaptations were going on, there must have been a time of internal confusion and cultural reorganization much like the present, but of this we have little knowledge. One wonders what a food-gathering people thought when they discovered that the land, something previously of no value in itself, now was something possession of which gave a man power over his fellows. The only thing that we know with certainty is that a great number of changes in culture took place in a very short time. In the Near East, from which our own civilization mainly stems, a thousand years witnessed the whole shift from a primitive method of life on a par with that of modern hunting tribes to full-blown civilization. In this brief period men learned to smelt metals, to write, to govern themselves by formal law codes, to deal with banking and credit and in general to live on very much the terms that our own ancestors lived on only two hundred years ago. Much the same thing seems to have happened in the New World, although present indications are that here the speed was even greater. Thus in our own Southwest the establishment of a balanced ration on an agricultural basis resulted in a shift from a very simple wandering pattern of life to the complex culture of the Pueblos in only three hundred years.

Once the limits of cultural development established by the new food-raising basis had been explored and successful adjustments worked out, the various civilizations settled down once more. Further developments became a matter of swings within these limits which left the basic patterns of life largely unaffected. In the Near East these have persisted down to the present time. Here for nearly eight thousand years the peasant with his ox plowing the land and the artisan working in front of his little shop have gone on unchanged while empires rose and fell, and gods were born and died. In Europe civilization was established much later but here also there was the same continuity, once it had been established. . . .

The third mutation is so recent that even the basic changes in technology which are responsible for it have not yet run their course. It springs from two fundamental inventions, that of how to produce power and that of the scientific method. The use of natural power, as in the water wheel, goes back to almost the beginnings of civilization as does the use of animal power. However, both of these were strictly limited in quantity, while water power was only available in a few favored places. The discovery of how to get power from fuel released it from these limitations and made it possible to employ it everywhere and in quantity. This in turn inaugurated the search for new sources of power which is still going on briskly. Our attempts to tap the tremendous resources of solar energy and atomic energy are still in their infancy, but the problems involved may not be insoluble. What the results of success might be we can only conjecture, but one of the first results would certainly be a shifting of the value of various territories. Thus if

we learn how to tap solar energy, our production centers will automatically shift from regions of mineral fuel to those of intense sunlight, leaving Europe stranded under its low-cloud ceiling. Even the further development of the recently announced methods for synthesizing oil products from vegetable matter may result in an ultimate shift of many industries to tropical regions where crops for this purpose can be grown most advantageously.

The invention of the scientific method may prove even more revolutionary in the long run than that of getting power from fuel. It must be emphasized that this was an invention. Man has dealt with the qualities and potentialities of inanimate objects ever since he chipped the first flint and fed the first fire. However, what he learned about them he learned more or less by accident and his knowledge was transmitted unquestioningly. He learned that certain techniques produced certain results but he did not bother to inquire how they produced them or how many of the things included in the technique really contributed to the outcome. Even today techniques which have not been touched by science include a great amount of ritual and unnecessary movement, as may be observed even in the workings or our own kitchens. The essence of the scientific method lies in two things, the repeated experiment and the accurate record of its results measured by methods which are, as far as possible, divorced from the conclusions of the individual observer. These two things are equally important and it was their combination which produced science. The modern scientist does not trust the evidence of his own senses or the workings of his own mind unless these can be checked either by mechanical means or by the observations of others. In this he differs from the Greeks. Their lively and universal curiosity carried them to the point of experiment, but they did not understand the fallibility of the intellect. In fact they regarded it as the court of last resort in all questionable cases. It was not until man became suspicious of his own mind that he could become a true scientist. Ironically enough it was probably the Christian Church, with its insistency on the fallibility of the mind as contrasted with the infallibility of authority, which laid the groundwork for this new attitude. The suspicion which this engendered extended at last to authority also and the awakening intelligence of the Renaissance turned toward measurements, mathematics, and machines in its search for certainty. As these were refined and extended, modern science was born.

We have only begun to explore the potentialities of the scientific method even in the field of technological advance. However, it seems probable that we will eventually be able to create out of other substances anything which is to be found in nature. The possibilities for improvement in technology, and consequently in standards of living, which this opens up are so vast that we can hardly perceive their limits. Even without the development of such synthetics our techniques of mass production have given us, at least in times of peace, an *embarras de riches*. We can produce much more than we can contrive to distribute to the people who still need it. That this should be so stems in large part from the particular fixation of interest which we have already mentioned as characteristic of our current culture. While the scientific method had been applied wholeheartedly to everything which has to do with material advance, it has only been applied haltingly and tentatively to the social and psychological problems which that advance has brought to the fore. Moreover, while even

the most conservative manufacturer is quick to take the advice of the chemist or engineer, the legislator rarely pays any attention to the findings of the social scientist. Someone has said that in this age of wireless and airplanes the legislator typically keeps his ear to the ground.

It is true that the social scientist often does not have too much to offer. He is only beginning to develop the special techniques necessary for the study of the particular order of phenomena with which he deals. However, even the slender guidance which he can provide is of value under present conditions. The forces which the third mutation has unleashed are so vast that they cannot be left to work themselves out without conscious direction. If they are so left the most probable result will be a collapse of the cultures which have experienced their first impact—those of western Europe and America.

In recognizing this fact the social scientist is no more a prophet of doom than is the physician who predicts that there will be an epidemic unless proper steps are taken to avert it. There are two factors involved in the present situation which are distinctly encouraging. One of them is the tremendous productive power of modern industry and scientific agriculture. Some idea of how great this is can be drawn from the fact that the United States has been able to carry on a war of unprecedented magnitude and at the same time feed and clothe its population better than many of them were fed and clothed in peacetime. A society which has such an economic margin can survive a great deal of cultural maladjustment and muddling through without exposing its members to actual physical deprivation. The other encouraging feature of the present situation is that there are a larger number of individuals in all Western societies who recognize the need for conscious planning and direction in the development of a new social order and know that there must be a new social order, planned or otherwise. Although such recognition is by no means general, it is steadily gaining ground and its ultimate effects must be tremendous.

It is an important sign of the times that the last twenty years have witnessed two attempts to reorganize European society and culture, one in Russia, the other in the various Fascist countries. Each of these attempts, while denying religion, has assumed many of the aspects of an organized religion, including swift punishment for all heretics who questioned the creeds on which the movements were based. Each of them has also, in the absence of supernatural sanctions, sought to justify itself in terms of inevitability. They have advertised such new orders as the next predestined stages in the evolution of civilization, stages whose arrival may be delayed but cannot be prevented. If our present knowledge of the principles underlying the growth and organization of culture indicates anything, it indicates that there is no such thing as cultural predestination. The present technological advance, like those of the past, has opened up a wide range of possibilities for social and cultural reorganization and neither Communism nor Fascism has exploited more than a few of these. As has already been pointed out, any successful, in the sense of enduring, culture must provide satisfactions for man's psychological needs as well as his physiological ones. Both the Communist and Fascist systems include numerous features inacceptable to those reared in the Western traditions of individual freedom of thought and action and of tolerance. These traditions are deeply ingrained in most of us and no planned culture which refuses to recognize and provide for them can satisfy our needs.

Even though such a culture may be temporarily advantageous to a small ruling group, it carries within it the seeds of so many discontents and psychological deprivations that it is hard to see how it could survive for long. It seems highly improbable, therefore, that either Fascism or Communism will become permanently established in Western Europe, still less in America. Certain aspects of both may be incorporated into the new civilization which is emerging, but these movements, in their present form, will find their place in history as little more than initial experiments in social planning, the first halting and unsuccessful attempts at a conscious rebuilding of civilization in the face of new conditions.

One last word should be said. Even if the Western peoples remain so entranced with their new mechanical and scientific toys that they fail to make the necessary adjustments in time, this will not mean the end of the world. In spite of airplanes and factories the bulk of the world's population still lives under the relatively stable, integrated cultures which have been erected on the basis of the second mutation. The impact of Western civilization upon these has been disturbing but not, as yet, disintegrating. Most of these "backward" peoples do not share our own fixation on technological improvement for its own sake. If the pressures which the Western nations are now able to exert are removed, it seems highly probable that these people will profit by our errors, take over the new technology at a slower rate and exercise much greater selectivity. Their aim, conscious or otherwise, will be to adapt the machine to man rather than man to the machine. Stable and enduring civilizations can be established on no other basis.

Chapter Ten

HISTORY

Over the centuries, millions of volumes have appeared under the heading of history. Their primary emphasis and interpretation has varied, depending upon when they were written. In the past, religious, legal, military and political themes have dominated historical writing. But we have come a long way from the 1880's, when, for example, an American university inscribed on its walls "History is Past Politics and Politics is Present History."

Beginning with the early twentieth century, increasing emphasis was placed on the economic forces of the past and, more recently, on the social and intellectual. For several decades, a great debate raged among historians as to the proper interpretation of history. But even today, few pretend to have a final answer. For the most part, historians have come to accept the idea that each age will tend to view the past in the light of its own cultural milieu and to stress those aspects of the past which contribute to an explanation of existing problems.

For obviously practical reasons, many historians specialize in a particular area, whether it be political history, economic history, religious history, or social history; most limit the geographic scope of their study as well. In general, though, historians have come to accept the idea that any past experience of man is the proper concern of their discipline. In this respect, the concept of culture, so significant for the other social sciences, has also been of major importance to the historian. As a result, many social scientists have tended to view history as the central or unifying social science, as the new general philosophy. Others, contending that their own discipline serves that function, conceive of history as a particular method applicable to all social studies. In any case, the sweeping interpretation of cultural history, so broad in its scope, is understandably disheartening even to the specialist in the field. It does serve, however, to emphasize the need for an ever-increasing interdependence among the various cultural disciplines in their common effort to achieve a synthesis of the social sciences. Indeed this is a major challenge of our time.

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*History and the Social Sciences**

JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR.

The initial selection in this volume was an essay on the nature of the social sciences. As we moved from discipline to discipline and from topic to topic, considerable emphasis was placed on the developmental, or historical, approach to each problem. Yet, since no section was devoted to history as a separate entity, the question must now be raised: What is the relationship between history and the social sciences? Dr. John Herman Randall, Jr., professor of philosophy at Columbia and author of *The Making of the Modern Mind,* offers some thoughtful answers to this important question.

I remember once long ago asking a friend what he was particularly interested in doing. This was in the morning of life, and we both had our ambitions. "I want to study history," he replied. "The history of what?" I went on to inquire—quite naturally, it seemed to me. To my surprise, my friend was greatly perplexed at this simple question. "Why," he finally managed to come out with, "I'm not interested in the history of anything in particular. What I want to go on and study is just history."

Now what this "just history" may be, that so many men seem anxious to study, I have never been able to understand. It is easy to observe that those devoted to it in the past have rarely been agreed on just what it is; no two of the classic "historians" have understood what "history" is in precisely the same way. And it is hard today to avoid rival schools of "historians" vociferously debating just what kinds of material their "history" should include. We have all been taught, I presume, that "history" is not merely or primarily past politics or past battles, but must comprehend a great deal more than those very minor matters. Many tell us "history" must include primarily facts about the economic institutions under which men have lived. Others bid us study the great ideas that have meant so much to those capable of appreciating their significance, the ideas of science and philosophy. For some, it is the religion that has organized and expressed the life of entire cultures that seems of fundamental "historical" importance. Art and literature, those consummate expressions of what the past has been and has felt, have their devoted followers. Still others insist that the true "history" is of the beliefs and institutionalized habits of men, the beliefs which the masses have actually entertained, and which have determined the course of all men's social relations.

Now I can understand sympathetically a genuine interest in all these things. I can indeed understand and share in an interest in everything that men have done and thought and felt and made during their long sojourn upon the earth. I can even understand what used to be called "natural

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history"—though I find that today what nature has done is not regarded as the province of the "historian," and enters therein, if at all, only if it has done something to his "history"—usually in the first chapter. But I must confess I cannot understand even the meaning of the questions, which of these many different interests should "history" include, and which should it emphasize and make central? Nor, if "history" is to include all of them, and is to be a complete record of everything that man has achieved on this planet, can I see how "history" differs from the entire sum of human knowledge. For everything that is has an historical aspect, and can hence be the appropriate subject-matter of historical investigation. . . .

I am trying rather to emphasize certain fundamental facts about the nature of history. Everything in our world has *a* history, and the man who wants to understand any particular thing or field is well advised to inquire into *its* history. Everything that is, is historical in character, and has an existence that can be measured in time. And this historical aspect which any particular thing has and possesses is an essential part of what it is. But "just history" in general seems to have no meaning, unless it be taken as synonymous with knowledge as a whole. History is not a "thing" at all; it is not a noun, a "substance." It is rather a character, an adjective, a predicate. Or, put in somewhat more formal terms, "history" is not a distinctive subject-matter to be inquired into. It is rather at once a trait of all subject-matters, something to be discovered and understood about each of them; and a distinctive way of inquiring into any subject-matter—though by no means the only way. . . .

On the basis of these facts about the nature of history, we can now proceed to state certain fundamental relations between history and the so-called social "sciences."

(1) For any understanding of the histories that things possess, the social sciences are essential. The processes of change by which anything human has come about are the proper subject-matter of the social sciences, which distinguish those processes, and analyze their structure, and how they cooperate with and interact with other processes as they are found operating in the present. Every history is full of "processes" at work: it exhibits a complex cooperation of processes interacting with each other. A particular history, to be sure, is not itself as a whole a "process." "Process" has meaning only if it exhibits an invariant structure—only if that same process can be repeated in various instances. A process, in other words, is always an instance of a way of acting; and its structure is a way of acting, a "law" or "universal." In contrast, "the history of" anything is always a particular—it is always, as a whole, something unique and unrepeatable, something that is never an instance of any repeated pattern. When we can say justly, "History is repeating itself," we mean we have found a "process" at work—a process whose structure has been exemplified before.

The particular historical changes that have brought about the state of anything whose history we are considering are to be "explained" by drawing on the best available science of human behavior at our disposal—those sciences of cultural change in which certain patterns or constant ways of operating of human behavior have been arrived at through the experimental analysis of observed human behavior. The record of the past of course furnishes materials to these "sciences of cultural change," in the form of instances of the patterns of behavior that can be observed also in the present;

and without this temporal dimension our knowledge of the way human nature functions would be exceedingly thin and provincial. But it remains inescapable that it is in terms of our present sciences of human behavior, such as they are—in terms of our anthropology, our psychology, our political science, our economics, our sociology, and the rest—that we must ultimately understand past human behavior, if we are to understand it at all.

"The history of" anything is always a particular, with a unique set of materials of its own, a unique set of human actors, and a unique pattern or structure of the action brought to bear on those materials. The sciences of the processes at work in histories will clearly not explain the presence of these particular materials in a history—institutions, ideas, and men—which are there in it to interact and change, within the unique limits set by those materials in each case. To explain the presence in a history of these particular materials, we have to turn not to the sciences of cultural change, but to tracing the histories of these materials back to those points where they were worked out and formed in their past.

A particular history is thus understood both in terms of the "origins" of its unique materials—"origins" which are themselves always unique histories—and in terms of the operations of human thought and action upon those materials—operations which are illustrations of the sciences of human operations, the social sciences. A history is understood, that is, in terms both of the "continuities" and of the "changes" it exhibits. . . .

Having made clear how, for any understanding of the histories that things possess, the social sciences are essential, we can now proceed to examine the second fundamental relation between history and the social sciences.

(2) For inquiry in the social sciences, a knowledge of history is essential. This is true because the social sciences are fundamentally historical in character, in at least three basic ways: (*a*) their subject-matter is fundamentally historical; (*b*) many of the institutions they deal with have an essentially temporal and historical structure: they are human ways of acting that become unified only in the light of historically generated problems; (*c*) they necessarily employ methods of historical analysis—though by no means exclusively. I wish now to elucidate these three points.

(*a*) The subject-matter of the social sciences is fundamentally historical in character. That subject-matter is *human culture,* in the widest sense, as the anthropologist views it. The different social scientists select different aspects of human culture—aspects which are cut out from a common matrix. They are all exploring different perspectives on the same institutionalized behavior of men. This is true even of psychology, which is often considered to deal with "human nature." But "human nature" is nothing other than culture individualized and personalized. In reality, all the social sciences are merely different branches of a common "science of culture." The present division of labor among investigators is largely accidental, historically conditioned, and intelligible only in historical terms. . . .

Now human culture, the subject-matter of all the social sciences, is basically historical in character. Not only is it changing in time, and not immutable and eternal like the subject-matters of physics or chemistry, which seem to have remained unchanged during recorded history. Not only is culture historically conditioned, in that it al-

ways requires dating in time and location in place. Fundamentally, human culture is progressive and cumulative—it is a series of reworkings of materials inherited from the past, reworkings effected in the light of historically generated tensions.

This historical character of the subject-matter of the social sciences is the major difference between them and the natural sciences. There are, to be sure, natural sciences that are likewise historical in character—such as historical geology, paleontology, etc. . . . The more abstract natural sciences, like physics and chemistry, can disregard this pervasive historical trait of the world, with its demand for historical knowledge. The social sciences simply cannot so disregard the historical character of all existence.

Now every society or culture displays a number of distinguishable sets of complex social habits, of "structures" or "patterns" of institutionalized organization of habitual human behavior, institutionalized methods or ways of doing things. These sets include: (1) a technological organization—a set of habitual ways of turning natural materials to human use; (2) an economic organization—a set of habitual ways of controlling the technology of that society, and its fruits; (3) a political organization—a set of institutionalized methods for adjusting conflicts; (4) an intellectual organization—a set of habitual ways of believing about various objects of its experience; we commonly call this the folklore of that society, or, when it is systematically organized in terms of recognized standards, that society's science; (5) a religious organization—a set of institutionalized ways of acting, feeling, and even believing, holding that society together and expressing its common experience, by celebrating, consecrating, and clarifying its accepted values.

These sets of institutionalized social habits are channels or limits within which what men do in that society is carried on and human activities take place. They are not "forces"—they themselves *do* nothing. They are rather ways in which things are done. When for any reason men are led to act differently, then these ways of acting change—they are historically conditioned, we say. Like all habits, however, they have a very considerable inertia, and are changed only with great difficulty.

These "organizations" of socially institutionalized habitual behavior are sets of concrete ways of doing things, viewed *functionally*. They are selected from the total culture in terms of various distinguishable social ends. They are different ways of organizing men's habits to perform various kinds of function. Hence the same concrete activities of men will figure in several or even in all such types of organization—going out on strike, for instance, or leaving money to a church. Each such organization is really a perspective on all the activities of that society from the viewpoint of its distinctive social function. In part, each organization selects certain human activities as having a special bearing on that function. In part, it selects certain consequences of all, or nearly all, human activities.

Now, it is these functional organizations of human behavior that are the distinctive subject-matters of the different social sciences. And it is clear that as subject-matters they are all *historical* in character. They are temporally changing. They are historically conditioned. They are progressive and cumulative. They are "relative" and "limited to" a particular historical situation. And they all demand historical analysis. . . .

(*b*) The social sciences are fundamentally historical in character, secondly, because many of the institutions they deal

with have a structure that is itself essentially temporal and historical.

The simplest illustration of an "historical nature," that is, of something whose nature *is identical* with its history, and is definable only in historical terms, is a biological organism, like a seed we plant and watch unfold the pattern of its growth. The seed *is* its career in time; the structure of that career is temporal and cumulative, *time* enters into its very substance. Such a "career" in time can be traced from its very beginning; we can follow the development of what eventuates as a whole, of what emerges at the harvest. Similarly, the life of a man is just such a temporal "career."

Of such "careers" or historical natures we can tell the story. They lend themselves to the art of story-telling, of historical narrative. This art naturally selects its own appropriate materials. And past historians, having been great story-tellers, have chosen such "careers" as their subject-matter—episodes with some degree of dramatic unity, like the biographies of men, dramatic episodes such as wars, political campaigns and struggles, strikes, such dramatic themes as the rise of Rome or the conquest of Peru.

But the social scientist is usually concerned with more complex temporal structures or "historical natures," with societies, cultures, and institutions. These historical natures are likewise fundamentally historical in essence or structure, but they have no "career" as a whole, like the seed, that can be traced from its beginnings; for they are not wholes. A society or a social institution is not an "organism," despite the many attempts so to view them, especially in the heyday of evolutionary biological ideas in the last century. . . .

Likewise, there is no discoverable "career" of medieval culture. For there were no "Middle Ages" until self-conscious "moderns" arose to criticize and fight and escape from them. There is also no career of "feudalism." For "feudalism" did not make its appearance—that is, men's action and thought were not taken as illustrating any unified political institution of "feudalism"—until the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century lawyers began to want to escape from certain features of their institutionalized political behavior, and proceeded to analyze those particular features of their "political organization" whose elimination formed their practical problem.

Nor is there any discoverable "career" of "capitalism"; for "capitalism" did not exist —in the welter of confused and contradictory ways in which men have always acted economically—until men appeared who wanted to escape from certain of those ways, and proceeded to formulate a "capitalistic system" in the light of those features. It is notorious that the term "capitalism" was invented by the Socialists; and it is only in the last twenty-five years that it has been accepted as the name of something to be defended, in conscious reaction against socialistic attacks. . . .

How much and what part of our present economic activities constitute "capitalism"? How much and what part of our present religious activities constitute "Christianity"? These activities are so manifold and confused, they exhibit so much "interpenetration," that no strictly contemporary analysis could avoid being arbitrary. Analysis of such institutions can become objective only by becoming historical. What is "essential" to capitalism or to Christianity is revealed only in the histories of our economic or our religious problems; it is clarified only when we see what has happened to saddle us with those problems.

In these problems, they have become genuine historical unifications, which have histories; and it is precisely these histories which made the unifications objective. No

"earlier stages" are clearly distinguishable until problems have emerged. But those problems and their elements are then understood only in the light of "earlier stages" *of* those elements—stages which are quite objectively relative to the present form. Take "private property," for example. Only an historical analysis can determine what is "private property" today, and why. What private property, for instance, is represented by a share of non-voting common stock in a holding company for a bankrupt railroad mortgaged to the R.F.C.? It took an historian—Charles A. Beard—to find out who "owns" what in our railroads today.

(*c*) This is an illustration of the fact that, since their subject-matter is basically historical, and since many of the institutions they deal with are "historical unifications" created by history, the social sciences necessarily employ methods of historical analysis —though not exclusively so.

There is, in the first place, no such thing as *"the* historical method," or *"the* method of historical analysis." There are rather many different types of historical analysis, appropriate to different kinds of problems in different social sciences. These various types need careful analysis and distinguishing; but this is hardly the place to undertake it. It would require a year's course, or an entire volume, to deal even cursorily with all the problems involved.

Secondly, historical analysis is not of itself sufficient to deal with any problem in the social sciences. It must always be used in connection with other types of analysis —formal or structural analysis, and functional analysis. The latter is primary, and involves the others; though the reasons why are hardly pertinent to the present theme.

Here, I can only illustrate something of the relation between historical and functional analysis in the case of the very difficult problem of evaluation. Tracing the continuous history of a way of acting or believing—that is, of any institution—will disclose the specific function performed by that way or institution in the past. And it will reveal how well that way did its job. Such tracing of a history will not reveal the present functioning of that way, or its adequacy today. But it will illuminate the difference between past and present conditions, in which the institution has functioned and is functioning. And it will illuminate the consequent decline in adequacy of functioning—or even the changes in the very function performed.

This is why history is always relevant to an evaluation in the present, although it can never in itself furnish such an evaluation. . . . For example, a famous remark of the late President Roosevelt ran: "The Constitution was devised for the horse-and-buggy age." This is an undoubted historical fact—though it raises questions in detail as to the history of transportation. Actually, the Constitution is more "old-fashioned" than the buggy, and was invented several generations earlier. This historical fact, however, does not indicate whether or not a "horse-and-buggy" Constitution is adequate for our own streamlined era—though it does suggest the inquiry. Rather, when we today find that the checks and balances of the Constitution, its decentralization, etc., are not wholly adequate to our own political needs, and when we are hence forced to face the practical problems generated, the history of the Constitution makes clear why we are facing those problems. It focuses attention on the changed function we now require of our constitutional instrument. It reveals how well the Constitution performed in the past the functions which a functional analysis of our present situation may well indicate we can no longer afford to let it continue to perform.

The history of an institution is thus not in itself an evaluation. Nothing is good or bad merely because it has been—though familiarity is certainly a positive value. But history can make clear that a fresh evaluation is called for. And history provides many—though not all—of the factors necessary for that evaluation.

What has just been illustrated in connection with judging and evaluating is true of understanding in general. Nothing in the social sciences can be understood in terms of its history alone, though nothing can be understood without reference to that history. In general, we may state the conclusion of this analysis of the relation between history and the social sciences as follows: History cannot do its job without the social sciences, and the social sciences cannot do theirs without history. Each needs the other, but neither is to be confused with the other, or absorbed in or reduced to the other. Here are all the makings of a perfect marriage. What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.

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