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THE COMMUNIST WORLD AND OURS
- With William O. Scroggs*
THE UNITED STATES IN
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THE UNITED STATES IN
 WORLD AFFAIRS 1932

THE
Communist World
and Ours

by
WALTER LIPPMANN



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To Edward Weeks

Editor's Note

On his return from Russia in November, 1958, Mr. Lippmann published in the daily press a sequence of four articles: the first two described, in as full detail as he could recall, the extended meeting he had with Mr. Khrushchev and the points at issue which they discussed; in the two latter he made a calm, penetrating diagnosis of the Communist objectives as he had seen them emerge from the two-hour talk with Mr. K. and from others he had held with Russian officials and editors. The response, here and from Europe, was insistent that Mr. Lippmann's findings be made available in more permanent form. His account of what Mr. Khrushchev said is reproduced without change; his conclusions have been amplified at the close.

Edward Weeks

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Introduction

DURING the last two weeks of October, 1958 my wife and I were in the Soviet Union, almost all of the time in Moscow. We traveled as tourists although we had discussed our visit with the Soviet Embassy in Washington and it had been agreed in advance that my main purpose would be to understand Soviet foreign policy in relation to the United States. Except for a bit of sightseeing in Leningrad, we did not go anywhere else in the vast expanses of the Soviet Union, and I know nothing at firsthand about the internal condition of the Soviet Union. But from an interview, which lasted for two hours, with Mr. Khrushchev himself, supplemented by talks with Soviet officials and Soviet editors, I think I came to understand better than I had before what are the mainsprings and the controlling ideas of Soviet foreign policy.

I shall begin with an account of the interview with Mr. K. But first, I must set down the circum-

stances. For a week after we arrived, the officials in charge could not make a definite appointment. Mr. K. had been away in the south and when he came to Moscow he was involved in the negotiations with Field Marshal Amer, who, representing President Nasser, negotiated the agreement which deals with the Aswan Dam and no doubt with many other things. Between the departure of the Field Marshal and the scheduled arrival of Mr. Gomulka and the Polish delegation, Mr. K. had, it appears, a free day. An appointment was fixed for that day at eleven in the morning in his office in the Kremlin.

We were told to be ready at our hotel twenty minutes in advance and that an official from the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries would come for us in a car. Tourists cannot drive into the Kremlin precincts, but after our car had been identified, we were led by a police car to the door of a building in one of the inner courts of the Kremlin palace. There we were met by an officer who escorted us to an anteroom next to Mr. K.'s office. There was no one else in sight. Unlike the offices of any other chief of government that I have ever visited, there were no guards, there were no other people waiting, there were no secretaries

carrying papers around, there were of course no newspaper men, and there was none of the hustle and bustle which usually prevails in the outer rooms of busy and important officials.

Somewhere and somehow Mr. K. must do a great deal of work and must see a great many people. But there was no outward sign of it. When we were shown into his office, which was on the dot of 11 A.M., he was quite relaxed, had none of the symptoms of a busy and preoccupied man, and indeed he acted as if he had all the time in the world. In the course of the interview it was evident that he wanted to talk about Soviet-American relations and about nothing else. But on this subject he seemed ready to talk as long as I wanted, provided I kept asking him about the broad issues and did not try to go into the details of any particular negotiation.

His office in the Kremlin is a long, rectangular room with a long, rectangular table for conferences, and at the end what seemed to be a very small desk for the ruler of a vast empire. The desk, moreover, was cluttered with gadgets, rather like President Franklin Roosevelt's desk in the White House, and with a large model of an airplane. At the interview, which took place at one end of the long table,

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there were, besides Mr. K. himself, his interpreter Mr. Troyanowski, the son of the former Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Mr. Yuri Zhukov (no relation of the Marshal), who is the head of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, my wife and myself. There was no stenographer present nor was there any visible recording machine.

But Mr. Zhukov took notes, my wife took notes, Mr. Troyanowski made memoranda for his translations, and I, when I remembered to put my mind on it, took some notes also. I do not, therefore, have an official transcript, and at the end of the interview, while we were drinking the mineral water which his doctor has ordered him to drink, I asked Mr. K. to tell me under what conditions I could use what he had said. He waved aside the question, saying I could do what I liked with what he had said, but that he hoped I would not do any damage to Soviet-American relations!

As this left me with my conscience as my guide, I felt that the right thing to do was to report the story of the interview with explanations but without editorial argument. Because I have no written record, I have refrained from attempting to quote

Mr. K. directly, except for certain phrases which I wrote down at the time in my notes. On the other hand, I have set down as true an account as I can of what I understood him to say and of what I believe he meant.

C H A P T E R I

A Talk with Mr. K.

AFTER the preliminary courtesies Mr. K. waved his hand at me and said he was ready to answer my questions. I began by saying that relations between our two countries had deteriorated since the summit meeting at Geneva in 1955, and would the Chairman comment on this.

Relations, he said, have not become worse. They were bad in 1955. They are bad now, and they have not become any better. The question, he added, is whether our relations are to be frozen where they are now or are to become better or worse.

I reminded him that at the time of the Geneva meeting there had been hopes of much better relations.

Yes, he said, but in the West these hopes were based on a false premise. Dulles and Churchill — or as he put it “that old wolf Churchill” — had hoped that after Stalin’s death there would be a change in the internal policy of the U.S.S.R., and

that the country would turn away from the strengthening of its "socialist achievements." When they saw that the successors of Stalin were not going to liquidate the Communist system but that these successors did want to relax the tension on the basis of the status quo, the West reverted to the tactics of the Cold War. They had hoped to win us over but we shall never be diverted from the path of socialism. Never!

At the next interval I seized the chance to ask Mr. K. to tell me what he understood by "the status quo." The answer to this crucial question, it soon appeared, is in his mind a complex one, and the bulk of the interview which followed was a gradual unfolding of what the phrase means in his mind. It will, I think, help the reader if at this point I interrupt the narrative and summarize what, as I reflected on the whole interview afterwards, seemed to me to be the main elements in his conception of "the status quo."

The simpler part of his conception is that there should be no change of frontiers by military force. He illustrated this by saying that in the cases of China and of Vietnam the issues between the two parts of the country were internal and "civilian", —

and, therefore, were not to be treated as international questions. In the case of the two Germanys and the two Koreas, changes of frontier — presumably by the union of the two parts — were to take place only by “mutual consent.”

I shall come back to the German question later on. But first, I must set down what is the more important part of his conception of the status quo. In his mind, the social and economic revolution now in progress in Russia, China, and elsewhere in Asia and Africa *is* the status quo, and he wants us to recognize it as such. In his mind, opposition to this revolution is an attempt to change the status quo. Whereas we think of the status quo as the situation as it exists at the moment, he thinks of it as the process of revolutionary change which is in progress. He wants us to recognize the revolution not only as it is but as it is going to be.

There is another very important component in his conception of the status quo. This has to do with the balance of military power.

Judging by what he said, and by what was implied in what he said, I would describe his view of the existing military balance of power as follows. It rests, I feel reasonably certain, on his confidence

that the Soviet Union has mastered the intermediate and short range missiles to a point where it can dominate with them Germany and western Europe, Turkey and Iran. I do not know, of course, whether his confidence in these missiles is justified. But there is no doubt that he assumes their existence in his thinking, and that they have now become, as the saying goes, a principal instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

On the other hand, nothing that he said implied that he thinks the U.S.S.R. has long range missiles which have broken, or are about to break, the existing military stalemate with the United States. His conception of his military position in relation to the United States is that neither country can defeat the other in a direct conflict, but that the American forward positions, particularly in Germany and Turkey, can, because of the development of the rocket, no longer be defended. He feels, therefore, that American policy rests on an obsolete estimate of the existing balance of power.

2

I am now resuming the story of the interview itself. After he had talked about the status quo, and about no changes of frontiers by force, and about the need of mutual consent in the German question, I asked him whether he would agree to free negotiations between the two Germanys and whether, as one of the four occupying powers, he would accept an agreement negotiated by the two Germanys themselves. To this he replied quickly — too quickly as it developed — that he would agree to this, and that it would be best if the troops of the occupying powers were withdrawn before the negotiations were concluded. This would bring about “a more normal condition.”

I was not convinced that he had meant what he had said, perhaps because he had not fully understood what a Westerner would mean when he talks about free negotiations between the two Germanys. So I asked him whether he really meant that the occupying powers should accept *unconditionally* the result of negotiations between the two German governments. To this he replied that the occupying powers would, “of course,” abide by the Potsdam

Agreement, which states, he said, that Germany should never again be in a position to disturb the peace. He left me with the reasonable certainty that if the Western powers proposed a free negotiation by the two Germanys, the Soviet Government would not be willing to accept it.

His mention of the Potsdam Agreement brought him quickly to his complaint that the United States is violating that Agreement by contributing to the remilitarization of Germany. This carried with it the implication that there could be no reunification of the two Germanys as long as West Germany was to be once again a military power.

This led deeper into the German question. He discussed it at length and with more passion than he showed on any other subject. Out of it came what was for me a very interesting disclosure of how his mind works on the German question. We must read what he said in the context of his military assumption that the Soviet Union has now mastered the intermediate range missile.

Americans, he began, seem not to realize the danger which their present policy of rearming Germany may well bring down upon them. What

is this danger? I asked. It is, he said, that if a new war is unleashed, — we shall come later to his conception of how a new war could be unleashed — Germany might once again, as in 1939, make an arrangement with the East and turn against the West. Why? Because if Western Germany engaged in a war against the East, the U.S.S.R. — with its missiles — could quickly destroy Western Germany. But if the Soviet Union encouraged Germany to turn against the West, the Germans alone would be much stronger than England, France and Spain combined.

This led him on to say that the situation was much like that on the eve of World War II. How? Much is said in the West about Munich. But the Western peoples do not understand Munich. They think that Czechoslovakia was sacrificed at Munich in order to appease Hitler and keep him from going to war. But in fact, said Mr. K. with passionate conviction, Munich was arranged by British and French conservatives who wanted Hitler to attack Russia. To induce Hitler to do that, they gave him Czechoslovakia, which is “an arrow aimed at the heart of Russia.” The Soviet Union, he said, had been ready in 1938 to join in the defense of Czecho-

slovakia against Hitler, and had actually alerted its army.

After Munich, said Mr. K., Stalin realized the danger to the U.S.S.R. as a result of the Western action at Munich. Hitler, too, saw how Munich must alarm the Russians and, believing that he could finish off Britain and France if the Soviet Union were induced to remain neutral, Hitler offered to make a deal with Stalin. Hitler intended, of course, to attack Russia when he had finished with the West. But Stalin, for his part, saw a chance to weaken Hitler before the coming attack on Russia, so he encouraged Hitler to make war in the West.

The point of Mr. K.'s historical explanation, which he volunteered without being asked any questions about it, was that another German-Soviet pact, like that between Hitler and Stalin, was at least as possible today as it was in 1939. Indeed, he insisted, it is more probable since a German attack on the Soviet Union has now become "suicidal."

CHAPTER II

A Talk with Mr. K. (*continued*)

THE reader who has followed the story to this point will surely be asking himself, as I did ask myself during the interview, whether Mr. K. seriously believes that the United States is contemplating a war against the Soviet Union. For while his attitude towards West Germany and towards Turkey was threatening, it was also clear that he was not thinking of starting a war by attacking them with his military forces.

This was clear to me because I could detect no doubt in his mind that the United States would intervene, and no doubt at all that he regards the United States as a military power to be treated with the utmost respect. His talk about what he could do to Germany and Turkey, and indeed to England, France and Spain as well, was meant, to put it in military terms, as the threat of an offensive-defensive in case the Soviet Union was attacked by

the NATO powers, and principally by the United States.

What, then, makes him think that the NATO powers might attack the Soviet Union? His answer, if I may put it in my own words, is that if the United States finds that it is going to lose the Cold War, it is likely to resort to a hot war.

That is not what he said, but I came to think that it was what he meant after an interesting passage in which he talked about the American fear and hatred of Communism.

Communism, he said, is indeed a great danger to you as an ideology and as a doctrine, but it is not a danger to you as a military policy of the Soviet Government. The Communists do not want to shed their blood or the blood of others to extend their frontiers. And each country should defend itself against Communism within its borders, if it sees fit to do so. (This I took to be an echo of the talks he had had in the preceding days with the Egyptian Field Marshal about Nasser's treatment of his local Communists.) But, nevertheless, after these quieting statements he said rather solemnly that "we" — the Communists — will cause you, the Americans, more "trouble" each year.

How? The trouble for the West will come from the continual "multiplication of benefits" received by the people of the Soviet states. At present, he said, the United States is the richest and most productive country in the world. But it is living "the last years of its greatness." Why? Because, shortly, the U.S.S.R. will surpass the United States in productivity per capita. He was referring, it was evident, to the coming Seven Year Plan, which had not at that time been published. When that Plan is achieved, the people (of the poor countries) will "be convinced by their stomachs." That is your danger, he asserted, not our hydrogen bombs.

Here lies the answer to the question of why he thinks we might make war against him. It is an article of his faith, which descends from Lenin, that if the Soviet Union forges ahead in technology and productivity, attracting into its orbit the old colonial territories of the European empires, the West will attack rather than lose the contest for world leadership by default. Against this type of preventive war by the West, Mr. K. believes that he has found the solution with the intermediate range missile. As for Turkey, for example, he asserted that in case of a general war, the NATO

forces would arrive in Turkey too late for the funeral. He added in passing that our action in Lebanon was "playing at war" and that the Soviet Union would not concern itself with "fleas" like Lebanon.

2

His central thesis, then, is that the Soviet economy will in the near future surpass ours in productivity per capita, and that this achievement will cause the poor countries of the world to turn to the Soviet Union as an example and for material help. I asked Mr. K. whether he believed that the Soviet system could be made to work in truly backward countries since the system calls for a high degree of technological competence and also of administrative efficiency.

He replied that forty years ago Russia was a very backward country, and look what Communism had already achieved. I said, yes, much had been achieved, but there had been great Russian scientists before the Revolution and Russia was not a backward country compared with many in Africa and with some in Asia.

I did not feel that he was willing to face this somewhat speculative question, and he put an end to the discussion by insisting that Indonesia would do much better if it adopted the Soviet system. He went on to say that India could easily feed itself without limiting its population if it had the kind of government and the kind of economy which was capable of enterprises like converting the vast jungles of India into arable land. He was quite evidently thinking of his own grandiose plan to grow wheat in the virgin lands of Asiatic Russia and to use the fertile lands of the Ukraine for dairying and vegetables and more diversified crops. But he never came to grips with the question of whether such grandiose plans could be carried out in countries with a feudal or a tribal order.

3

This led me on to China, about which I had heard from others in Moscow comments which varied between awe and anxiety at the rapid progress of the Chinese Communists. Several times before I saw Mr. K., I had been told by Soviet citi

zens that the Chinese rate of advance towards Communism was more rapid than the Soviet's. I asked Mr. K. whether with the long Soviet-Chinese frontier, with the expanding population of China and the comparative emptiness of Siberia, he was not concerned about the future of Soviet-Chinese relations. He indicated that he had heard that question before and he dismissed it with some impatience. Those who took this view did not understand, he said, the nature of a socialist society. I had heard that answer before from others in Moscow. But when I asked the others to explain what they meant, they usually answered dogmatically that socialist states will not and do not go to war.

Mr. K. had a different line of argument. It is that in a socialist society there is no economic limit on productivity — as there is in the case of our farm surpluses, which amused him considerably. China, he said, had only begun to explore and to exploit its natural resources. There were in the north of China vast reserves of virgin land which could support a very much larger population.

Be that as it may, Mr. K. was in no mood to admit that within the Communist world there were any of the conflicts that have haunted the rest

of the human race since the beginning of history. Mr. K. has for the most part a pragmatic and earthy temperament, and he is not much given to utopian speculation. But he has in him also the basic revolutionary faith that a new history has begun, and that a Communist man is a new kind of man. Along with this, he has an infinite faith that technology and applied science can solve all human problems.

4

Finally, I must tell about what Mr. K. had to say on the subject of disarmament. He came to it before some of the passages which I have already reported, but it has seemed to me less confusing to the reader if I left it to the end. Mr. K. had been talking about Turkey and asserting that our military policy in the Middle East was based on ignorance of the real military situation, especially upon the idea, which he attributed specifically to General Norstad, that NATO would go to the aid of Turkey in the sense of landing forces there in time of war. Once again, he was referring, of course, to the

command of the short range missiles, and this led him on to say that all talk about international inspection and control of missiles was "ridiculous."

Then he paused to say that the Soviet Union had always believed that it was possible to detect nuclear explosions, and that it was in principle agreed to work out a system of detection. At this point he turned to me and asked, did I have any suggestions as to how Soviet-American relations could be improved? To this I replied that while there could be no solid improvement until and unless solutions were agreed to about Germany, the Middle East and eastern Asia, a success at the coming conference on "surprise attack"¹ would probably do more than anything else that was immediately possible to relax the tension in America. I reminded him that Pearl Harbor had had a profound and lasting effect on the minds and feelings of Americans.

He replied that he understood this. But the psychosis — that was the word used in the translation — is being kept up by American militarists so as to promote the manufacture of new weapons, and thus to make profits. I might say in parentheses

¹ The Conference opened on November 10, 1958.

that in my experience in Moscow the belief is a universal dogma that profits are the compelling motive in American armament. Mr. K. added with a slightly mischievous smile that even soap manufacturers like Mr. McElroy seemed to make profits out of armaments! This American psychosis, he continued, is kept up because Dulles and the militarists would not otherwise get their appropriations from Congress. Like a rabbit before a snake, the American people are so scared that they give the military all the money they want.

Against this background, he returned to the question of inspection and control in relation not to nuclear explosions but to surprise attack and the reduction of armaments. Why, he asked, do you begin with inspection and controls? Why do you not begin by taking seriously our offer of a treaty of friendship and nonaggression? I said we wanted some tangible evidence that an agreement would be carried out.

He replied that the Soviet Union could not agree to inspection and control until confidence, which is now lacking, has been established. You want control first, he said, we want confidence first. Suppose, he argued, that you and another man start to make

friends, and the first thing your new friend says to you is: give me the key to your house. You would think it impudent of him, and when the United States asks for the keys to our house, we say "go to the devil." Here he looked at my wife and apologized for using such language. Your demand for the keys of our house is the way you might talk to a weak and dependent country, not to the Soviet Union. It makes us suspicious that you want the keys of our house before you will sign a treaty of friendship. This, he continued, is "elementary," that a treaty of friendship must come before inspection and control.

I asked him then whether the treaty of friendship should come before a settlement of the German question. His answer was that the treaty is a question of good will and that this never hurts a negotiation of other issues.

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This concludes my report of the interview with Mr. K. I must remind the reader that it is not based on a transcript but on my memory and on the notes

taken by my wife and myself. It covers all the topics discussed in the interview, and I have adhered as strictly as I can to the rules of the journalistic profession which call for a report and interpretation of what Mr. K. said, unadulterated by my own opinions.

C H A P T E R I I I

The Soviet Challenge

HAVING reported as objectively as I can what Mr. K. said, I shall now set down some of my own views on what I learned and observed in the Soviet Union.

In almost all the talks I had in Moscow, not only with Mr. K. but with other officials and with Soviet editors, I was asked what could be done to bring about better relations between our two countries.

The question is a hard one to answer. For the basic issue between us arises from the fact that the Soviet Union, and now alongside it Red China, are well on their way to achieving the leadership of Asia and of Africa. At the root of the profound and abiding suspicion which each of us has for the other lies this bid for leadership and its challenge to the Western position and to Western influence.

There is no reason to think that the suspicion which divides us, and makes even modest and par-

tial solutions difficult, can easily be talked out of existence. Although I am one of those who hope earnestly that the rivalry can be kept below the boiling point, I am, nevertheless, convinced that even this will require a lot more than mutual expressions of good will.

The cause of the bad relations is the suspicion, felt on each side of the Iron Curtain, that the other side intends to commit aggression. The suspicion arises from a belief that in the long run neither side can tolerate the other. The Soviet Union is now entering upon the climactic years — the next seven or ten years — in which it means to surpass the United States, not in the material comforts of ordinary life but in productivity per capita. The Communist leaders are certain that as they achieve this goal, the great mass of the poorer and undeveloped peoples will rally to them. No doubt, wherever they can, they will promote this rally by propaganda and by infiltration and by subversion.

But we delude ourselves if we do not realize that the main power of the Communist states lies not in their clandestine activity but in the force of their example, in the visible demonstration of what the

Soviet Union has achieved in forty years, of what Red China has achieved in about ten years.

The inner moving force of Soviet suspicion is the belief that the United States and the governments of the non-Communist countries will, unless compelled to do so, never allow Russia and China to consummate the revolution which they are leading in Asia and in Africa. In Moscow, and no doubt also in Peiping, they do not believe us when we insist that the rearming of Germany and of Turkey and the maintenance of a ring of air bases are defensive measures against military aggression on their part.

For they are certain in their own minds that they will win the primacy of Asia and of Africa not by going to war, but by avoiding a war that would ruin their economic achievements. They are, like most men, self-centered, and they cannot believe that we really think they will commit military aggression when they themselves are so sure that they must avoid a war. So when we talk about defensive armaments they think we are deceiving them, that our military policy is to surround them in preparation for an attack on them in order to halt their revolutionary rise to world leadership.

I am reasonably sure that this is the way they see the military issue between us. Moreover, this is what the prophet Lenin prophesied, and in the Soviet Union the authority of Lenin, as currently interpreted by the powers that be, is treated as infallible and more than human. Our policy of military containment with its forward positions on their own borders is in their minds conclusive proof that Lenin was right. They suspect us profoundly, and that is why they are stubbornly reluctant to negotiate any concession which would give us even a slight tactical, much less a strategic, advantage in case of war.

In this resistance to agreement with us they are helped by many provocative and bellicose things that have been said at one time or another by the talkative brass in the Pentagon. They are hardened also in their convictions, it must be said, by the propensity of Mr. Dulles, and in lesser degree of the President himself, to treat the conflict, not as one of empires and great states but as a religious war in which the contending positions are absolute. For this confirms their view that we are bracing ourselves for an ideological or religious war, and that

this war will take place unless they make themselves so powerful that it cannot take place.

2

The corresponding suspicion on our side arises, as we know, from the belief that insofar as the Soviet Union and Red China gain in military power, they are certainly bound to use it as an instrument of policy in order to complete their domination of Asia and of Africa. This suspicion is, I have no doubt, well founded, and it is a conclusive reason for making sure that we do not lose the race of armaments.

Our problem here is not whether we can afford to keep up the race. It is absurd to say that we cannot afford it. Nor does the problem arise from any irreparable technological inferiority on our part. For us, the crucial problem of armaments is political and psychological: how to keep the American and the West European democracies ready and willing to support armaments without their becoming so obsessed with weapons that they have neither

the means nor the understanding nor the will to meet the real Soviet challenge in Asia.

The Soviet oligarchy can spend on armaments what it wants, and no questions asked. With us, the necessary appropriations cannot be had, or so our political leaders think, without a great scare campaign. But this scare campaign offends and alienates the pacifists and the neutralists who are the overwhelming majority in the rest of the world.

3

No one can doubt that the Soviet challenge is very formidable indeed. Even to a casual visitor it is evident that the only safe assumption is that the Russians have mastered the modern technology and that their bureaucracy, directed by a powerful government and working on an obedient population, is capable of achieving what they have set themselves to do.

Theirs is a grim and purposeful society in which one who is used to the American air finds it hard to breathe. No doubt the vast machine does not

work perfectly and there is private discontent and some cheating and much fixing and blackmarketing. Nor is the tenure in office of all the individuals who are now at the top of the government fixed and settled for the rest of their lives. None the less, the Soviet system is a going concern, and it would be rash to underestimate its power or to count upon any radical change of direction, much less on a counterrevolution.

I have come home convinced that the most pressing issue is the Russian and Chinese challenge for the leadership of Asia and of Africa. If we are to meet it with reasonable success, we must, I am sure, abandon the notion that the Russian and Chinese revolutions can be reversed or that the spread of Communism in the surrounding countries can be contained by giving armaments to the local military commanders and by establishing our own bases.

What we need is a restrained, unsparing reappraisal of our own habits and reactions. We must learn to keep ourselves armed without working ourselves up into a frenzy of threats and of fear. This is not easy for a democracy to do, but it is necessary. And, once the reason for it is understood by the leaders of American opinion, it can be done.

We must learn also to win friends without asking them to be our military allies. This can be done only by encouraging them to follow the neutral course which their instinct tells them to take. The policy of military pacts to contain and push back the Communist revolution is not only incapable of working successfully. Its effect is to antagonize the masses of the people and so to assist the expansion of Communism.

We must also, I have been convinced, reappraise and review the policy of foreign aid. As it is now practiced, it is fair to describe it as a program of subsidies to governments which are threatened with the rise of Communism among their people. Without meaning to say that all or even that some of these subsidies should be discontinued, I submit that we shall not meet the Soviet challenge unless we stop looking at the underdeveloped nations as military bulwarks and bastions and adopt a new and different objective in the uncommitted world.

The Communists are expanding in Asia because they are demonstrating a way, at present the only obviously effective way, of raising quickly the power and the standard of living of a backward people. The only convincing answer to that must be a

demonstration by the non-Communist nations that there is another and more humane way of overcoming the immemorial poverty and weakness of the Asian peoples.

This demonstration can best be made in India, and there is little doubt in my mind that if we and our Western partners could underwrite and assure the success of India's development, it would make a world of difference. It might be decisive in turning the tide. It would put an end to the enervating feeling of fatality and of inevitability, to the sense that Communism is the only wave of the future, that there is only one way of internal salvation, and that the West is impotent and too lazy to do anything but let the future go by default.

There are a number of reasons why I think India is the key country. It is, for one thing, a very big country known to all of Asia as a land of deep poverty. To make a showplace of a small island like Formosa, or for that matter of Puerto Rico, is a good thing to do. But it is not very convincing. For the Communists are proving their case in big countries like Russia and China. We shall have to prove our case, that material progress can be had with civil liberty, in a big country.

For another thing, India has the necessary structure, including a civil service with a good tradition, — something which does not exist in equal measure elsewhere in Asia, except in Japan.

But in my mind the clinching reason for making the demonstration in India is that the Indian spiritual heritage, of which Gandhi was the great teacher, is of all the ideologies of the world the most radically different from that of Leninism. Yet, though it is different, it is, like Communism, addressed to the suffering masses of the people.

I know there is a notion among many Americans that the Indians are more than halfway along the road to being Communists. That notion is based in part on the fact that the Indians mean to become a social democratic state. In the main, the notion that they are half-Communist is based on the fact that on many issues of foreign policy the Indian Government differs from ours and makes great efforts to keep on good terms with the Soviet Union and with its powerful and dangerous neighbor, Red China.

Nevertheless, the Indians who are indoctrinated in the Gandhi tradition are acutely conscious of the gulf between the Soviet system and themselves.

They are not totalitarians. They are not materialistic determinists. That is more than can be said with the same confidence about quite a number of the other peoples who are not yet within the Communist orbit.

If there is any other way of meeting the Communist challenge in Asia, I have not heard of it. The tide is running in favor of Communism almost, one might say, by default. Russia and China are making a demonstration to which the West is offering no alternative. I do not know where else a non-Communist alternative can now be demonstrated, given the fact that only in India, outside of the Communist orbit, could a successful demonstration carry conviction to the great masses of the people who are looking for a better way of life.

CHAPTER IV

A Summing-up

I HAVE been arguing that to make an effective reply to the expansion of Communism in Asia and Africa, it will be necessary to make a demonstration in a large country — preferably in India — that there is another way to overcome mass poverty and national weakness. This is not easy to do. But unless this demonstration can be made, there is every prospect that the masses of Asia will rally to Communism, either of the Soviet or of the Chinese type.

For the old industrial countries of Western Europe and of North America do not provide an example which the great, crowded, submerged masses can imitate. The peoples of Asia might like to be as rich as we are. But they know that this is impossible within their own lifetime, indeed within any foreseeable future. Only in Russia and in China do they find a model of how in backward countries

great masses of people can raise themselves quickly by their own bootstraps.

~~But we must not overdo it. We must not jump~~

versal order of mankind. But looking at the history of the globe, the truth, as I see it, is that there has never been one world, that there has never been a universal state or a universal religion.

The failure to recognize this truth that there are many worlds, not merely one, is, I believe, the deepest source of confusion between us, and the most stubborn obstacle to that mutual toleration which is the very best that is conceivable between our two societies.

The orthodox Leninist, whether he is a true believer or merely a conformist, thinks that he knows the scheme of history. According to this scheme the capitalistic world is bound to fight the Communist revolution unless the Communist parties capture the Western governments. His opposite number on our side is one who thinks also that he knows the true scheme of history. In his philosophy, the line of all human progress is the line that we have taken in the West. The Communist revolution is, therefore, a relapse and a diversion from that true line of progress. It follows that the Russians and the Chinese are bound to return to our line in the course of time.

All of this is, I feel sure, a misreading of the

reality of things. The Communist revolution which began in Russia and has spread to China is not a repetition of the English and the French Revolutions. It is a new historical phenomenon which comes out of a convulsive awakening of the submerged masses demanding a better life for themselves. The dictators who lead this massive uprising rule the people despotically. But he would be a rash man, I think, who would say that such great masses of backward people could be persuaded by democratic methods to accept the discipline and to make the sacrifices which are necessary to the rapid formation of capital in a primitive economy.

3

To a Westerner the character of this revolution of the submerged masses is a terrible thing to contemplate. But the more he sees of it, the more he must feel, so it seemed to me, that while the Communist system is acceptable in the backward countries, it is not likely to spread to the more advanced countries, except insofar as it is imposed by force. The Soviet system does not work, and there is

no reason to think that it will work, in Eastern Europe. I feel sure that the Soviet domination of Eastern Germany, of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary is precarious and impermanent. Moreover, I think that the rulers of Russia know this and that, if they could think, which they have not, of any safe way to disengage, they would eventually accept some such settlement. For they are drawn towards Asia and away from Europe and the general posture of Moscow, as distinct perhaps from Leningrad, is to be turned towards Asia. Moscow is full of delegations of Asian peoples — many from the outlying parts of the Soviet Union itself, a great many from mainland China, many from South Asia and from the Moslem world.

This gives to Moscow the air of being the capital of a new order of things among the emerging peoples of Asia.

4

I conclude with the feeling that, barring a great catastrophe resulting from a war, the Communist system has no serious attraction for the highly de-

veloped Western countries, and that as an experience and an example, it is, in fact, irrelevant to them. Provided we maintain the balance of deterrent power, I feel confident that there is no military threat to the United States, — nor, unless something very stupid or desperate or reckless is done, to our principal allies in Europe.

The Communist revolution will, I think, expand in Asia unless we make an heroic effort of statesmanship to demonstrate that there is an alternative to it, that there is another way to overcome the immemorial poverty and indignity of the life of the Asian masses.

But in Central and Eastern Europe the situation is, I am convinced, radically different. In East Germany, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary, the Communist regimes have been imposed by the military conquest which took place during the war against Nazi Germany. But for this conquest and the resulting military occupation, they would not be satellite states of the Soviet Union. They have not, like China, come to Communism as a result of a native Communist revolution inspired by the example of the achievements of the Soviet Union.

Without wishing to be dogmatic about it, I feel in my bones that the Soviet leaders know that in Eastern Europe they are not followed and admired and imitated. They are accepted because they are there and because they are so powerful. I have long believed that the principle of our European policy should be to bring about gradually and prudently, with all due precautions, the withdrawal of the Red Army behind the frontiers of the Soviet Union. My experience in Moscow has made me think that while there are huge difficulties in the way of inducing a Soviet military withdrawal, the nationalist forces in Europe are mounting and that in the long run the difficulties of the Red Army's remaining will be greater than the difficulties of its withdrawing. I think, therefore, that we are missing the bus as long as we fail to identify ourselves with the idea of bringing to an end, however gradually, the military occupation of the European continent.

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If I am right in this summing-up, what the doctor would order for our people is that they relax

their fears in order to fortify and clarify their purposes. We have to live on the same globe with the Communist powers. But we do not live and we cannot live in the same intellectual and political world. Not now. Not in the foreseeable future. But formidable as the Communists are, they are not ten feet tall, and the less we plunge ourselves into hysterics, the more likely we are to take good care of our affairs.

