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PEACE ... ?

A SYMPOSIUM

ISAAC DON LEVINE

H. G. ROGERS

H. W. HENDERSON

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THE FRUITS OF TEHERAN

by

ISAAC DON LEVINE*

THE year that began under the promising sign of Teheran left behind it a crop of evil and bitter fruit. What did we think had been planted in that garden? The three gardeners said: "We leave here friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose." And what was the harvest like?

Teheran was to establish a second front and to co-ordinate military operations in the East and in the West against the common enemy in such ways as to finish the war in Europe before the end of the year. But the end of the war has been made to wait.

Teheran was to cement indestructibly the unity of the United Nations. But that cement was soon pulverized and the discord in the Allied camp was the chief source of strength for the enemy.

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Teheran was to lay the foundations of a lasting peace. But the spectre of an approaching civil war waged by forces trained in the underground and led by men sworn to the cause of Communist revolution is haunting Europe from Greece to Holland and from Finland to Sicily.

Finally, Teheran was to confirm the promise of Secretary of State Cordell Hull upon his return from Moscow that "there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power." To-day the entire eastern half of Western Europe, roughly marked by a line running from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, an area comprising a pre-war population of 90,000,000, has been staked out by Moscow for Soviet domination or complete sovietization.

BEGINNING OF THE GREEK TRAGEDY

The whirlwind of events has soon ripped the veil off Teheran and exposed the fatal character of the main decisions taken there. These decisions were primarily concerned with the question of the second front or fronts. It was on the surface a military question, but we saw that it went to the roots of the fate of Europe.

The British had long favoured the opening of a front in the Balkans, not only to safeguard their Mediterranean lifeline from traditional Russian encroachments but also to keep the south-eastern flank of Europe, from becoming a base for Soviet domination of Germany. To Stalin, a balkanized area of Europe, centring around the dismembered Austro-Hungarian Empire, offered the most fertile field for the extension of the new Soviet order with the aid of Slavic "national liberation" movements. Since 1939, when Britain and Germany bid for the Soviet hand, which then was won

by Hitler, the grandiose aims entertained by Stalin in the strategic zone stretching from the Black Sea to the Adriatic had been no secret to Churchill.

The rivalry between Churchill and Stalin had developed long before Teheran. To both leaders it was obvious that there could be no permanent vacuum in the centre of Europe once Germany had been crushed, and that he who dominated Germany would eventually dominate the Continent. The question of the second front thus became identified with the question: What kind of Europe shall it be?

CHURCHILL'S COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Eight months before Teheran, in his world broadcast of March 21, 1943, Churchill projected his answer to that cardinal question. He suggested the setting up of a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia in harmony with the "high permanent interests of Britain, the United States and Russia." The Council of Europe was to be a "really effective League" of Western European unity as distinct from the Soviet Union, although the Council "must eventually embrace the whole of Europe."

Elaborating upon his proposed basis for world organization, Churchill declared in his address at Harvard University on September 6, 1943, that "nothing will work soundly or for long without the united effort of the British and American peoples. If we are together nothing is impossible. If we are divided all will fail."

To Stalin, these were ominous trends. Anglo-American unity spelled an inferior global position for the Soviet Union. Western European unity spelled a barrier against Communist infiltration. British hegemony over Germany

spelled a mighty dyke against "proletarian dictatorships." A healthy and restored continent brought about by a system under which, in the words of Churchill, "the glory of Europe will rise again," spelled the ultimate decline of Communist revolutionary doctrine and power.

THE HAND OF STALIN

Stalin began early to checkmate Churchill. He broke diplomatic relations with the Polish government with which he had recently concluded a solemn alliance, and set up an embryonic puppet regime for Poland. *This was a warning that the Kremlin would build its own bridge to Germany across a vassal Polish state.* He set up a Free Germany Committee as another counter-balance to Churchill's scheme of Western European unity. He wooed the government of Czechoslovakia, headed by Benes, away from the arms of London, and after a tug of war which lasted many months won over Czechoslovakia to the Soviet side and made Czechoslovakia the spearhead of a successful drive against any federation in Eastern or South eastern Europe. Stalin remembered Bismarck's warning that to control Prague and Warsaw is to dominate the gateway to Europe.

At Teheran, the head-on collision between Churchill and Stalin came on the issue of the opening of another front in the Balkans. Stalin's strenuous objections to the proposed Allied invasion of the Balkans was altogether political and ideological in character, since the British had already proved their readiness to make territorial concessions to Soviet Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

THE PRESIDENT PERSUADED

But Stalin was able to convince President Roosevelt, by citing the formal dissolution of the Communist International

and the introduction of reforms permitting religious worship in Russia, that the Soviet policy had long since abandoned international Communism and world revolution. Stalin went out of the way to "prove" to the President that the purge of 1936-37 had been conducted by him against the Trotskyite internationalists. Ideologically, Mr. Roosevelt came already conditioned to accept Stalin's assurances at their face value. The Soviet experiment in the eyes of the President had been assuming more and more the aspect of a Russian home-made New Deal. Hence, it seemed to him that Churchill's fears were in reality grounded in British suspiciousness solely, as they were fears for a lifeline which was in no wise threatened by Stalin, whose concern was national reconstruction above all.

Mr. Roosevelt joined Stalin against the idea of a Balkan front. That moment was Churchill's diplomatic Waterloo. Right there and then Stalin achieved the isolation of the United States from her British ally. Churchill and the permanent policy makers in the Foreign Office realized that the Red Army would reach the Balkans first, enabling Stalin to build his own dominion between the Mediterranean and the southern frontiers of Germany. Churchill had to scrap his ideas of a Council of Europe and to yield to that British imperial school of thought which ever since the rise of Hitler had played with the grand scheme of a division of Europe into two spheres of influence.

The British Foreign Office had never accepted Churchill's scheme for European Federations, which was essentially a democratic solution. The permanent policy makers prided themselves upon their realism. They who had favoured a deal with Hitler for the partitioning of Europe before the war, now favoured a similar deal with Stalin for the same

reasons. France was knocked out. Germany would be out for a long time. The two remaining great powers on the frontiers of Europe must of necessity get together and divide the Old World into their respective spheres.

ORIENTAL TRADING

Teheran now deteriorated into an East European trading post. Stalin had the advantage of Mr. Roosevelt's break with Churchill. Stalin also had the advantage of geographic proximity which had enabled him to sink an anchorage in Czechoslovakia for his great design and to ride roughshod over Poland to achieve the ultimate encirclement of Germany. Churchill tried to save as much as he could for the direct protection of the British defences in the Mediterranean, and was almost compelled in his haggling with Stalin to make sacrifices at the expense of Poland and in other zones in return for British retention of vital positions along the sea routes of the Empire.

Here then were seeds of Teheran. Mr. Roosevelt appeased Stalin ideologically and Churchill appeased him with a division of spoils. Stalin emerged from Teheran enormously strengthened both in the field of Russian expansion and in that of world Communism.

The fruits of Teheran began to ripen in the late summer, after Eisenhower's armies had broken through France and Belgium, and seemed to be racing to Berlin. From the Kremlin's point of view an early rendezvous of the Soviet forces with Anglo-American forces in Germany was most undesirable. For Stalin to meet Roosevelt and Churchill in Berlin, at a moment when the entire south-eastern basin of Europe still remained outside of Soviet control, would have meant a showdown on the paramount question of Germany

and would have forced Moscow to follow the lead of the United States and Great Britain on the organization of Europe.

PLAYING FOR TIME

The Big Three had an agreement for a tripartite occupation of Germany and for joint control of Berlin. But if the Red Army met the Anglo-American armies in the vicinity of the capital of the Reich, Stalin would face a European settlement drafted in the shadow of triumphant Western arms and be obliged to assist in laying the foundations of a Western European peace not at all in harmony with his designs. Stalin plainly needed time to exploit the gains of Teheran.

An early termination of the war in Europe would have redounded to the glory of the Western Allies and to their diplomatic prestige, checking the Soviet diplomatic offensive in its initial stages. Stalin's political strategy called, first, for Soviet control of the balkanized areas of Europe, and, second, for the balkanization of Germany as a base for the future sovietization of Western Europe. Both operations required time. Both were in danger of being defeated by a lightning-like conquest of Germany.

Just when Anglo-American forces were pounding at the demoralized western defences of Germany and it looked as if a race for Berlin was on from the West and the East, Stalin withdrew his armies from the Eastern side. The plans of Teheran had provided for just such a nutcracker squeeze of Hitler's fortress. It was the height of summer when the Soviet forces reached the suburbs of Warsaw; the rivers were at their lowest and the dry plains of Poland marked the shortest route to Berlin on all the military maps.

Stalin's army rested on the Vistula, in the centre of the eastern front, and then streamed in an unexpected direction, southward, striking, towards Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria.

THE TEN FATEFUL EVENTS

There followed a succession of events which in the course of a little more than three months at first baffled and confused the Allied world and then well-nigh splintered the camp of the United Nations.

FIRST

Late in August came the capitulation of Rumania in the form of an armistice agreement signed by Soviet Marshal Malinovsky, to which the United States and Great Britain gave their belated assent, and which embodied a permanent territorial settlement. The crucial point in this settlement, which figured as a somewhat muddled issue in the Presidential campaign, was the Soviet unilateral transfer of Transylvania from Hungary to Rumania. Although the United States did make that transfer subject to "confirmation" at the general peace conference, Great Britain appended no such reservations, for the reason that she had secretly recognized Rumania, as within the Soviet sphere of influence. What did Transylvania represent in Stalin's post-war design? London knew it only too well. Transylvania is the strategic northern pillar of that great South-eastern European domain which Stalin had carved out for himself. The other pillar was Bohemia, which Stalin had secured after Teheran through a treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia. He now had in the heart of Europe the two key bastions of his projected great dominion.

SECOND

The Bulgarian armistice provided the next major shock. The United States and Great Britain had been at war with Bulgaria. Soviet Russia had all along been at peace with Bulgaria. The Bulgars had sent emissaries to Cairo to negotiate an armistice. The Western Allies were playing here in reverse the role Russia had performed in the negotiations with Finland, which had remained at peace with America. The Western Allies drafted the terms of a Bulgarian armistice to which the Soviet Government was to become a consignor. Then something happened. The Soviet Government suddenly declared war on Bulgaria. The Kremlin had notified the British and American ambassadors in Moscow of this move—two hours before it was made public. The Cairo negotiations exploded. Stalin took over the sponsorship of the armistice. He dictated new terms which made Bulgaria formally an ally, but actually a ward, of the Soviet Union.

THIRD

The Churchill-Roosevelt meeting at Quebec last September was a hurried attempt on the part of London to check the Soviet flood towards the Mediterranean. With Bulgaria in Soviet hands, the great port of Salonika lay within the grasp of the Red Army. And Salonika dominated the Aegean Sea and the European defences of Turkey, an ally and protegee of Great Britain. Moreover, Yugoslavia and Greece were exposed to occupation by Stalin's forces. Indeed the Partisan leader Tito, who had been coddled by the British in the naive belief that he could be wooed away from Moscow's arms, suddenly began to display an "independence" which was downright shocking. He treated his chief of state, the

Premier of Yugoslavia, Ivan Subasich, with unconcealed disdain. Tito even hinted at setting up a Balkan federation allied to Soviet Russia and extending it to the Dardanelles in the East and Trieste in the West. Churchill rushed to Quebec to enlist Roosevelt's support and to arrange another meeting of the Big Three. He also endeavoured to bring about, with American aid, an early settlement of the Polish crisis so as to be in a stronger bargaining position in Balkan affairs when dealing with Stalin. In the end, Churchill proceeded to Moscow on his own, bringing the Polish Premier Mikolajczyk as the sacrificial goat to the altar of Stalin.

FOURTH

At the Moscow conference held in the middle of last October, Churchill was forced to gamble away the sovereignty of Poland in return for what looked at the moment like a modus vivendi on the Balkan issue. Greece was to remain in the British sphere of influence. Yugoslavia was to be administered under a joint policy of the two powers providing for a union of the Tito leadership with that of the Royal Yugoslav Government. Churchill purchased these concessions by his unqualified support of Stalin's designs upon Poland. These included not only the cession of the areas lying east of the famous Curzon Line and of the Galician areas, comprising the great city of Lwow and the only Polish oil fields, but, also the annexation by Soviet Russia of the industrial triangle of East Prussia centring around Koenigsberg. Poland was to receive as compensation Prussian zones stretching almost to Berlin, *a gift which the Poles did not seek and did not wish to accept*. The Poland thus projected by Stalin was to be headed by Premier Mikolajczyk, who was to include twelve ministers drawn from

the Lublin puppet regime in a cabinet of sixteen, making it a Soviet vassal. *Churchill is known to have stormed and raged at Premier Mikolajczyk in Moscow when the latter declared himself without authority to sign such a capitulation.* Nevertheless, Churchill left Moscow in the belief that he and Anthony Eden would be able to deliver Poland to Stalin from London.

FIFTH

When the Polish government-in-exile with the full backing of its underground leaders in the homeland, decided rather to be slaughtered in the open than to commit suicide in the dark, and defied Churchill, strange things began to happen in the Balkans. Marshal Tito took a plane to Soviet headquarters to plead for the fraternal aid of the Red Army. True, there had been an agreement between Stalin and Churchill for joint control of Yugoslavia. But how could the Kremlin turn a deaf ear to the pleas of the southern Slavs for help? The Red Army marched into Yugoslavia. Portraits of Stalin appeared everywhere in the liberated countries. In neighbouring Macedonia and Greece and Albania the resistance forces suddenly emerged wearing badges of the hammer and sickle. In Trieste there were reported "popular" demonstrations for union with Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito had now undergone a complete metamorphosis and was speaking the brusque language of a Soviet commissar to his former protectors. A storm was brewing for Britain in the Mediterranean.

SIXTH

At the same time a new area of Soviet pressure developed in October on the other side of Britain's ally, Turkey, Moscow demanded from the Iran government of Saed the

immediate granting of oil concessions in North Iran which has been under complete Soviet occupation since 1942. Although the Teheran declaration officially described Iran as an ally, Moscow caused the downfall of Saed's government when it had refused the demand for oil grants. The attempt of the United States to intervene in a friendly capacity on behalf of Iran led to Moscow's sharp denunciation of America's presence in Iran without consent, although its presence had been dictated by the need to help the Soviet war effort with millions of tons of vital supplies. Simultaneously there developed a "spontaneous" movement in adjoining Turkish Armenia for fusion with the Soviet Union, another warning to Turkey as well as to Britain of things to come.

SEVENTH

The Red Army continued to penetrate South-eastern Europe while the Allied armies in the West were preparing for another direct assault upon Germany. The Warsaw front remained inactive. The main Soviet thrusts were directed at Hungary and later at Austria. Behind Stalin's victorious armies there appeared Free Hungary and Free Austria committees, precursors of Soviet puppet regimes. Halted at the gates of Budapest, the Red forces swung on towards Vienna, extending the new Soviet dominion in Central Europe.

EIGHTH

To stem the spreading Soviet tide, the British decided to land troops in Greece, Salonika and on the Dalmatian coast of Yugoslavia. Did not London have an accord with Moscow for a joint policy in Yugoslavia and had not the Soviet Government broken its pledge by sending troops there with-

out consulting its partner? The landing of the British detachments on the Dalmatian shores was announced to the world in November as designed to help the partisans clear their county of the enemy. But Tito's men gave the advance British landing party a most unexpected reception. The British troops were disarmed and threatened with internment. Confronted with the problem of fighting his way into the country, the British commander asked London for instructions and received orders to withdraw. The disarmed British units were allowed to re-embark and sail a way with the rest of the expedition from the shores of the land which they had helped to "liberate".

NINTH

Marshal Tito now found his Premier Subasitch so tractable that the latter was soon on the way to Moscow, where he was received openly with great warmth. In Moscow, the Yugoslav Premier kept completely away from the American and British embassies. London recognised that its former protege was now an interloper in Stalin's camp, but it was anxious for some face-saving formula. Churchill sent a personal message to Stalin requesting that any agreement reached in the Kremlin between Tito and Subasitch be withheld from publication until the return of Subasitch to London were it could be released simultaneously with Moscow in accordance with their understanding of joint policy. Two days later Moscow alone announced officially Marshal Stalin's approval of an accord between Tito and Subasitch, making Tito the Premier of a "democratic" Yugoslav federation and Subasitch one of its ministers. At this time Stalin also took occasion to make a startling public declaration to a delegation of communists from Poland. Beholding the framework of the grand edifice he was building with the help of the Slavs scattered from the Vistula to the shores of

Trieste, Stalin proclaimed: " The alliance of the Slav peoples is not the tactics of a great sovereign Pan-Slavonia. It is the union of the various Slav nations. The Soviet Union stands guard over such a union"

TENTH

Now that the lines of the new Soviet empire in middle Europe over which Stalin had declared himself guardian appeared in clear outline, the strategic relationship of Greece to it became self-evident from a glance at the map. The "sphere of influence" which Stalin demands is a wide belt running from the Baltic, between Stettin and Riga southward, and tapering down to the Mediterranean in the form of Greece, which strategically dominates the ingress to both the Aegean and the Adriatic. In this situation, with Stalin's known impatience to secure his war booty before the general peace settlement, it was to be expected that Greece would become the first theatre of open civil war in liberated Europe. Moscow kept officially aloof from the developments in Greece. As far as the world was concerned the Greek resistance movement simply "took matters into its own hands." In his speech before Parliament Churchill suggested "a well-organised plot" on the part of the Communist-led ELAS "to march down to Athens and seize it by armed force." What would prevent a Communist controlled Greece from repeating Tito's experiment for joining hands with the Soviet Union? So far as Churchill could see, there was no choice for Britain but to use force to prevent the rounding out of Stalin's great dominion through an eventual union with Greece in the heart of the Mediterranean.

CHURCHILL'S TERRIFYING VISION

The fruits of Teheran are far from full ripening. But already the blackout of news has engulfed all countries "liberated"

or occupied by the Soviet forces. From Finland and the Baltic nations to Rumania and Hungary, a great part of Europe has already been placed outside the pale of Western civilisation. Already the coming balkanization of Germany as a base for its future "national liberation" by Moscow is indicated for those who can read the handwriting on the wall. Already the lines are formed across Western Europe for a full-scale civil war. And there is no indication that Stalin has forgotten or renounced Lenin's dictum to turn the imperialist war into a civil war. Of this impending cataclysm Churchill imparted a terrifying vision in these words on December 15th: "Another great war, especially an ideological war, fought as it would be not only on frontiers but in the heart of every land with weapons far more destructive than men have yet wielded will spell doom perhaps for many centuries of such civilization as we have been able to erect since history began to be written in Europe."



YALTA 'WONT' DO!

By H. G. ROGERS

The Fifth Partition of Poland, accomplished secretly at Yalta by the "Big Three" and blessed by Parliament, differs from the other yivisections of that nation in the important point that it was done by the Allies of Poland, in the interests of Russia. While this gives it a unique malignity it also guarantees its early failure. In spite of all effect inside and outside Parliament to disguise the true situation, the situation remains unchanged. The appearance of calm, judicious realism which the Prime Minister threw over his defence of Yalta does not alter the fact that Yalta was in the same class of hysteria-politics as Munich, and however readily Parliament said Amen to it, no one has the right to forget that the same Parliament said Amen also to Munich. It is human to grasp at any straw, but it is natural for the straw to sink.

Mr. Churchill may declare his conviction that the Curzon Line is a just division of Poland, and thereby secure his own conscience, but Russian policy is quite independent of Mr. Churchill's internal peace. Russia wants what she wants because she wants it, and for no other reason. Russia is in the same position as Germany, hag-ridden by a philosophy of functional violence, disciplined by fear, directed through a single privileged Party, and ruled by an omni-competent Dictator. Mr. Churchill used to despair of those who did not take *Mein Kampf* seriously; he might well be the despair of those who do take *Problems of Leninism* seriously. Just as Hitler redeemed every word of his handbook, so Stalin

successively reduces **his** manual to action. The Partition of Poland may seem to Mr. Churchill the end of a controversy, but to Stalin it is merely the beginning. He has turned the defences of Europe.

There was a sly humour in Stalin's choice of the Crimea for *Britain's greatest diplomatic defeat in history*. Nationalist pride, which was pumped up for the defence of Russia when the political kommissars were brushed aside, has been given a rare fillip, of which we will hear more yet. Yalta was not magnificent, and it was not peace.

Enough attention has not been drawn to the fact that our betrayal of Poland does not stand alone. We do not require a Pact with an Ally in order to sell him. We are not so punctilious. Those Europeans who seized Mr. Churchill's offer of arms "to kill Huns" are also going to curse "Perfidious Albion," because their dreams of setting up regimes according to their own heart's delight are shattered by the Prime Minister's promise that democratic elections must follow the success of their arms. No one can suppose that these "patriots" — whose leaders are Moscow-trained communists to a man—have been fighting for British polling methods; and no one really expects that they will be guided by British opinion. They are already looking to Stalin for their orders, and if it suits him to disown them as he disowned the unsuccessful Greek "patriots," Mr. Churchill will have been given a few crumbs of prestige; if not, and Stalin sees his opportunity to match the Baltic robbery with a Balkan, Mr. Churchill will have been given another case of conscience to solve. But the Balkan Republics will stretch just the same from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. Stalin cannot wait all the time for democratic consciences.

Mr. Churchill said he was not influenced by force, but by justice, in agreeing to the Fifth Partition of Poland. To say

that Russia **deserves** half of Poland because she has fought Hitler so valiantly, puts the Polish right to aggrandizement very high indeed. If Stalin must be rewarded for being stabbed in the back by Hitler, surely a great deal must go to Poland for being stabbed in the back by Stalin. If Russia must be rewarded out of her Ally's territory, surely we ought to reward Poland out of our own, or better still out of some other Ally's—say, a French colony or two. This, one must presume, is "broad justice" in the new moral order conceived at Yalta.

But Russia not only **deserves** half of Poland for her work in killing Huns, she has a right to it based on Mr. Churchill's historical studies. Following the carefully-directed beam of this masked torch he found great satisfaction in the discovery that two hundred years ago Russia had ravished much more from Poland than she does now. In fact the Fifth Partition is nothing like so greedy a business as the Third. Further, in refraining from repeating the whole of that atrocity of 1795 Stalin shows his magnanimity! If Mr. Churchill was pleased to find this admirable self-restraint in his usually impulsive friend, his pleasure received its ratification in the ecstatic chirrupings of Mr. Harold Nicholson. Mr. Nicholson had fully expected that Stalin would imitate the ferocious bad faith of the Czars—and to do both Stalin and Mr. Nicholson justice there was good reason for this expectation—so that it fairly bowled over the simple fellow to find that Stalin proposed no more than to chew Poland in half. In the new dispensation Mr. Churchill and Mr. Nicholson, like very Good Samaritans, keep their penny in their pocket and rush after the thieves to congratulate them on leaving their victim only half-dead.

But Mr. Churchill was not content with this happy excursion into ancient history. He was not building his defence on

what Russia wants or gets or has a right to. He had a duty to his country in this solemn hour when most of its inhabitants felt that their sense of fairplay had been outraged. The nation had to be reassured that its servants had not betrayed its honour. The man in the street had to stop feeling that he had been led round the corner into Sinister Street. So Mr. Churchill was able to assure him that Britain has never at any time guaranteed any particular Polish frontier. We made a Pact with Poland, of course, guaranteeing her sovereign independence, her liberty, her integrity, and anything else which could possibly have a high moral sound in the ears of foolish idealists, but material, degrading details like frontiers—a thousand times No! Never have we so lowered ourselves as to be tied to filthy little squiggly lines on a map. For us Poland is a beautiful spiritual thing, not a mere geographical term like Italy in the old days, but the sort of mystical reality which an honourable nation like our own can find some real pleasure in dealing with. There will always be a Poland, a free and sovereign Poland, somewhere up in the air, undefined but undefiled; while sordid frontiers go in and out like the sides of a concertina Poland will be the sweet music which refreshes Mr. Churchill's sensitive soul.

Other nations, however, in the future who seek a Pact with Britain had better bring along a map and have that signed too. It will be safer. All nations have histories, and now that Mr. Churchill has joined Mr. De Valera in his fondness for ancient history the habit is likely to grow among British statesmen. On the other hand, British statesmen had also better bring along a map of these islands for signature in case an enemy landing in Scotland forces our own allies to the sorrowful conclusion that their Pacts were with a spiritual entity, above all vulgar considerations of territorial

demarcation, which cannot call on their aid against aggression on any particular slice of coastline. To get out of a tight corner still talking in a high moral tone and leaving an Ally to take the kicks, must remain our own contribution to practical diplomacy. Let our statesmen make very sure that no lower forms of life get the chance to do a Yalta on us.

But now we come to the big moment when Mr. Churchill was able to feel that he had the House of Commons with him so far, and with all the dangerous corners past he could let out his breath in one great gust of genial hope. The Poles have heard the bad news, they have been told how lucky they are to escape worse, they have been scolded for their ingratitude, and now they are to be told—whether they believe it or not—that in reality nothing better could have happened for their future happiness. Mr. Churchill became fatherly in his irritation. It is so difficult to speak harshly to the children for they have had a pretty tough time after all, and even if that is mainly through their own fault, they are—well, children still. So he explained kindly to them that they must learn to think of others; that happiness (as they will learn when they grow up) comes rather from giving than receiving; that everybody likes them, really, and is doing a tremendous amount of hard work to make them happy, and that if they will only **try** to be happy, they will be. Look to the future, he says, don't weep for the crust you have lost, think of the cake that is coming to you in plain vans! Don't be huffy with the big boy next door—he is actually a nicer chap than you think—but you bring out the worst in him whenever you start whining for that confounded crust. And anyhow, look! See what a big slice of Vienna bread we're giving you to make up for it! What's that? You're afraid the other big boy will want it back again? Nonsense! We'll see he does not get it. My

goodness, we're pasting the life out of him already. He is already down, take our word for it, we'll sit on his head and keep him down . . . well, of course, not for ever, but for an awfully long time. And by that time you will be grown up, and everything will be so different, with your Uncle Sam helping to make everybody friends, and everybody **being** friends, and . . . and . . . everything.

Leaving Mr. Churchill to wander on the broad uplands which he has gained only by trampling down the Poles in his hasty exit, let us take a look at the facts as they are. No change in them can be perceived. They are as ugly as ever. To do him justice, Mr. Churchill was impressed by them. The Yalta decisions on Poland, he confessed, are not perfect, they are not the very best, although they are very good for the Poles and very good for the world, and particularly good for the Big Three. He qualified everything he said about them by the phrase "in all the circumstances." The circumstances are the facts which we propose to examine without delay.

The first and decisive fact, which colours the whole Yalta meeting, is that Stalin is not bound by that bourgeois code of morality which we call Christian. Sometimes this fact is hidden under the phrase "diversity of outlook", sometimes, while equally hidden, it is justified in advance in the phrase "a different tradition," but always it is openly avowed by Stalin himself, and openly demonstrated by him in everything he does. There is really no excuse for not knowing it. In Stalin's vocabulary he is faithful to the revolution, in ours he is just faithless to his word. That is the cardinal point which was seized upon at once by the Polish Government when Yalta was broken to them. We want deeds not words, said the Poles, and well they might. In the last five

years Stalin has not honoured one single pledge to Poland, including his pledge to recognise that eastern frontier which Mr. Churchill so gaily throws to him. "Can you trust Russia?" he asked. "That is really what you are discussing. In the course of the war Marshal Stalin has made many promises, public and private, to his Allies, and so far as my knowledge goes every one has been kept in time and in spirit as well. "In July, 1941, the Polish-Soviet Agreement was signed in London declaring in its first clause that "The Government of the U.S.S.R. recognises the Soviet-German Treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity." In plain English, Russia said that as far as she was concerned Poland began and Russia ended on the pre-war frontier. If that is not a guarantee of territorial integrity between Allies, then words have no meaning once they are put on diplomatic paper. Again, Stalin endorsed the Atlantic Charter, by which he engaged to seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other, out of the war. His Yalta demand for half of Poland speaks for itself.

The Prime Minister and several others laboured the point that we must trust Stalin. Their insistence on this necessity betrayed its difficulty. Claptrap from a few extremist die-hards, who seem to talk in their sleep, has no relevance at all to this debate. They try to poison the wells of discussion by accusing Christians of a rooted hatred of Russia on ideological grounds, but it does not require some special Christian gift of malevolent interpretation to see Russian aggression rampant from Finland, through the Baltic States, to Poland. It is possible to demand of Christians a convenient blindness to these mounting attacks on Europe, but it is impossible to say that they have not taken place. The advantages of turning a blind eye to them have never been demonstrated, but here in any case they must be mentioned

as the causes of that hesitation to trust Stalin which so exercises our leaders. To his lasting dishonour Mr. Eden attempted to snuff out inconvenient criticism, even in the House of Commons, by professing to hear Goebbels in those who denounced the Partition of Poland. This extraordinary and malicious attack on the patriotism of Members did not receive the trouncing which it should have had from those Members indicated by Mr. Eden's gesture, nor from those men of honour in any part of the House who may still have a sense of decorum. It was just one of those little indications of the failing strength of manliness which we shall be favoured with increasingly as the moral effects of Yalta take full toll of Parliamentary and public life.

But let us give Mr. Eden, a fair hearing. The bolshie bogey, he said, was the German theme before the war. "How well Hitler used it, how well visitors to Nazi Party rallies at Nuremberg were told of the fear of Russia. I had plenty of it chucked at me in various interviews with Hitler. Can anyone doubt that this theme before the war was an element in making it difficult to establish an understanding with Soviet Russia?" We have not the slightest hesitation in telling Mr. Eden that this bogey had nothing at all to do with the difficulty. For proof, just read his own words again. The nauseating reiteration of anti-Soviet fear which apparently characterised pre-war Germany did not prevent the Russo-German Pact of 1939. That is Mr. Eden's answer. The fear of Russia so openly avowed in Germany seems to have worked so well in making a friend of Stalin that we might be doing a real service to Mr. Eden now by stepping up the very fear which he deprecates. Let us not forget that the Russo-German Pact of 1939 was broken by Hitler, not by Stalin, so that it would have been more correct to say that Marshal Stalin had made many promises to our enemies and to our certain knowledge had kept them in spirit and in time.

Mr. Eden concluded his unworthy attack upon the patriotism of his opponents with the silly remark: "Do not fall victims too easily to suspicion of another ally." This remark takes its peculiar flavour of imbecile simplicity from the words "too easily." One might think a suspicion of Russia in Mr. Eden's eyes ought to be self-evidently and damnably false, if we are to follow himself and Mr. Churchill into blind faith in that country's good intentions. But no, Mr. Eden takes for granted that it is very easy to become suspicious of Russia, and although he is right in that, it was not for him to suggest the thought. Of course he may have intended to suggest that the minds of his opponents were so easily swayed by Goebbel's propaganda that they were incapable of making any examination of its truth, or unwilling to resist its effect. This slander on Member's intelligence or good-faith can always be removed by an apology (when they demand it) but it may be rebutted here and now for the great mass of people who share their views. Goebbel's neither delivered nor printed nor published the speeches contained in that voluminous work *The Problems of Leninism*. But Stalin spoke them, and the official Russian propaganda press made them public. On them we base much of our suspicion of Russia.

In the days when Hitler was a figure of fun to the Left wing (do you remember the jibe, "Little man, you've had a busy day?") the present writer was insistent that the author of *Main Kampf* meant every word he wrote. To-day he is equally convinced that Stalin means what he has taken such infinite repetition to say in *Problems of Leninism*. And Stalin says that Russia must be the basis of world revolution, that this is a bloody revolution, that democracy can be made a stepping-stone to revolution by adroit use of capitalist difficulties and by the multiplication of those difficulties on all

occasions. And what Stalin says Russia must do, Russia is doing at this hour.

How we have berated Lord Baldwin for his 'sealed lips' policy! Yet it is true to say that he never left the House with more important things unsaid than our late Prime Minister did when he laughed his way out after the last vote of confidence. The very same Members who have since sneered and jeered at the name of Baldwin leapt on to the velvet-covered seats of the House to cheer Mr. Churchill, although he had not said one word of the true state of affairs between Poland and Russia, a state of affairs which precludes altogether any hope of a future peace in Europe. All he had designed to say was in praise of his personal hunch that Stalin was honest for once in promising the Poles a square deal. The rest of his speech was in denigration of the only Polish Government that exists of right, with threats against them and their compatriots if they do not surrender unconditionally to Yalta.

How we have laughed at poor old Ramsay Macdonald, the master of verbose platitude! Yet it is true to say that he spoke more ordinary common sense at Geneva in 1924 than Mr. Churchill, the master of telling speech, spoke in Parliament on Poland. What the woolly headed Macdonald said to the League of Nations Assembly on a proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance was this: "If we are going to have obligations, if we say we are going to carry them out, we want to know exactly what they are. An obligation that is based on psychology, an obligation that is based upon fear of other people, an obligation that we may have to meet not because a nation has been faced by enemies sent to beset it by the devil, **but because a nation may be beset by enemies on account of its own policy**—that sort of obli-

gation we cannot undertake, because if we did undertake it I want to tell you perfectly honestly that we should find when we tried to carry it out that public opinion would make it impossible for us to do so." There is no nation in the world to-day but Russia to which the fatal objection of its own policy adheres, unacknowledged by our statesmen. Not only has Mr. Churchill committed us to an obligation of the kind so rightly scouted by Macdonald, but he has the unexampled impudence to speak of Russia's right to expect a friendly Poland on its borders, when all the information in his possession (and fortunately in the possession of the public) reveals a continued Russian record of brutality and bad faith towards the first fighting Ally of Britain whom he is scolding. Not even he can accuse the Poles of breaking their word to Stalin on **any** occasion, but he can make use of their difficulties to throw doubt on the obvious fact that the Polish Government residing in London formed according to the Polish Constitution is the real representative Government of Poland, while at the same time holding his tongue about the notoriously immoral conduct of Stalin which made those difficulties, and created just the situation which he himself ascribes to political intransigence in the Poles. Cynicism could go no further.

Or could it? Yes, indeed, it has. "The Poles," said the Prime Minister, "will have their future in their own hands, with the single limitation that they must honestly follow in harmony with their Allies a policy friendly to Russia." This, mark you, to Poland, whose formidable patience has been taxed to the uttermost human limits already by Russian atrocities; this Poland of matchless fidelity and purest honour has to add this crowning insult to the bloody injuries endured in the cause of decency, that her honesty is placed in the balance with Russia's, and by tradesman's swindling fin-

ger is shown wanting! The burden of keeping peace with honesty is laid on her with some doubt of her willingness, when *every act of hers in this war has demonstrated her fantastic magnanimity* in face of Russia's endless and odious treachery.

"I decline absolutely to embark here," said Mr. Churchill, "upon a discussion about Russian good faith." As he had gambled upon its existence at Yalta he would have stultified himself by showing any doubt of it in Westminster, but the utter unreality of such a mystical state of mind could have had some value only if Stalin were not being allowed to keep the fruits of his bad faith, and only if the Prime Minister refrained from placing the blame of the whole imbroglio on the innocent. If Mr. Churchill had been fighting a virile House of Commons that was determined on justice for Poland, and if he had been able to come down to the House with a promise from Stalin that the Polish eastern frontier question would be postponed to the Peace Conference, and that in the meantime he repudiated all intention of breaking the letter or the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, then, and only then, would it have been right to foreclose on any discussion of Russian good faith. The Poles would still be justified in looking for deeds, not words, the House would still be entitled to an account of the measure proposed by Mr. Churchill and accepted by Stalin for the re-establishment of elementary liberty in Russian-occupied Poland, and this country would still be in need of categorical assurance from the Government that they were not bound by any secret engagement to the detriment of Poland, but Mr. Churchill would have been able to say frankly that he trusted Stalin because of this fidelity to the Atlantic Charter, and because of that reasonable transference of frontier disputes to the Peace Conference. But with our connivance Stalin is to

keep his loot, the Atlantic Charter is to be a dead letter, the Peace Conference is to accept a *fait accompli*, and the legend of Polish unwise obstinacy is to cover the truth of Britain's shame. Truly, this is not our finest hour.

No one will be so crazed as to impute unworthy motives to Mr. Churchill, nor so ungenerous as to refuse him sympathy in the peculiarly tormenting course of his recent transactions. It is out of the question to doubt the courage of the "Father of Resistance." But we are free to doubt his wisdom. We are free (in spite of Mr. Eden and his colleagues), to express our sense of impending calamity, and to ascribe it to the proceedings of our Government, and now we are free to point out that the unity of the Three has been bought at too high a price. A few intelligent and courageous Members of Parliament said so, and their names will go down to honourable renown when Mr. Eden's "purring" will be a wry jesting footnote to tragedy. Remember Belinda!

At every step Stalin has imitated Hitler's technique of aggression. By radio-attack, by diplomatic bullying, by the manufacture of "incidents," by direct military aggression, by the formation and imposition of a puppet 'government,' by the arrest, deportation and death of those who form public opinion, by the ruthless employment of a Secret Police, by the confiscation of wireless-sets, by the exclusion of foreign press-men and international relief officials **by the final infamy of crushing the patriotic Underground Army and of branding its heroic leaders as fascists**, Stalin has built up a reputation of such an unequivocal sort that Mr. Churchill is compelled to say, "I know of no Government which stands to its obligations *even in their own despite*, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government." By the

standard of its behaviour to our Ally Poland, there was one such Government more faithful than Stalin's and that is Hitler's. How Mr. Churchill must despise our intelligence!

How he must despise the lack of grit in his Parliamentary opponents! He reminded "those honourable members who undertake the honourable task of being careful that our affairs in Poland are regulated in accordance with the honour and dignity of this country" that he had no quarrel with them. "We ought to make known all the facts which, I hope, will clear away any difference that there is between us." We ought, indeed, but in fact we did not. We turned at once to slap the face of the men who were down, the Polish Government, **whose untarnished honour was stinging us like iodine on an open wound.** "There would have been no Lublin Committee or Lublin provisional Government if the Polish Government in London had accepted our faithful counsel of a year ago." And what was that "faithful counsel?" To go beyond their powers as an elected Government of all Poland and bow to Stalin's accomplished rape of their land, to buy Stalin's capricious favour by a surrender dishonourable in itself and forbidden by every party in the Polish State. That was grand counsel to issue from the "Father of Resistance!" And what a fact to make known in order to clear away differences between Mr. Churchill and his opponents! Was there nobody in the House with the gumption to point out at once that "there would have been no Lublin Committee or Lublin Provisional Government if . . ." Stalin had not formed it, nourished it, guided it and launched it against his Ally, our Ally? Was there no one to protest at the indecency of the reference to Mr. Mikolajczyk who "could have entered Poland with Marshal Stalin's friendship and become Prime Minister of a more broadly constructed Government?" Stalin's friendship was

a myth, the vengeful guns or betrayed patriots would have sent Mikolajczyk to his reward, and the phantom Government proposed would have been so "broad" that, as in Mr. Churchill's 'justice,' the adjective would have destroyed the noun. The known facts were wisely withheld by Mr. Churchill. Had he made them known, his opponents would have been resoundingly justified in their refusal to appease Stalin, and he himself would have stood revealed as the type of wishful thinker who is such by necessity, not by choice, a stumbling beginner who puts more 'oomph' into the job than is needed, dreaming up one world too quickly and defending it too hardily because the reality is utterly unthinkable.

And here we must pause to join the Prime Minister in unaffected agreement. **"Sombre indeed would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western Democracies and the Russian people, if all future world organization were rent asunder."** The thought of it is appalling. It was the dread of it that haunted Mr. Churchill at Yalta, the hope of avoiding it that compelled him to accept the Russian terms, the necessity for disposing of its very possibility that forced him to abandon Poland. No one has the right to come into this debate with frivolity, or with the desire of scoring points. The monstrous accumulation of arms at the disposal of the three major powers would be in itself a grave danger to humanity, but the terrifying cruelty of the war, its ideological character, and its world-wide sweep, have all worked profound changes in men's minds- (The atomic bomb was not yet revealed when this was written.) Fear and suffering have been the lot of millions upon whose unbalanced spirits victory and defeat will operate incalculably. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that the moral and physical rehabilitation

of such vast numbers over such great tracts of the world will demand, first, the concentration of swift executive power in a few hands, and secondly, the exercise of that power over a huge impartial distributing net-work. To make the work of restoration possible at all it will have to be done in a total manner, production being ordered according to priorities imposed locally from a central authority, distribution being equally outside the consumers' control. Not only will this mean the encouragement of a sense of their quasi-divinity in functionaries, but also the encouragement of the corresponding sense of dependence in the recipients of this universal providence. The many will look up, the few will look down.

That is not the spirit of the democratic peoples, or of their Governments although our own is taking means to change gradually to it. But it is precisely the spirit of the people of Russia and Germany. It is the spirit which Stalin is encouraging in the Baltic States and anywhere else he can extend his influence. It would take a long time to make a democrat out of a Nazi or a Fascist, but five minutes would suffice to make him a Communist. He would merely change masters. The process is largely completed in Italy already. All the conditions of a continental swing towards Communism and away therefore from Democracy, are already present or coming into being in Europe. No one in this country, and least of all Mr. Churchill, can take pleasure in that thought, except for a few paranoics, a few social misfits and a few sentimental ineducables. The rest of us would know that the war had been fought in vain if the liberty-loving peoples of Europe elected to renounce their traditional ways of life for a mess of pottage at the international feeding-centre. But we would know that the war had

to be fought all over again if those same peoples were under the necessity of repelling in one country after another either the secret or the overt use of relief organizations to undermine their Governments in favour of Soviet Russia. And how much more desperate would be a war in which we had to combat the sudden rise of Europe against us, a Europe armed supported and led by a Soviet Russia free from all commitments to ourselves or U. S. A.

That is the vision which Mr. Churchill hopes he has dispelled for ever. That would be the result of the "awful schism," and in contemplating its horror one can find the only justification for his call to the Polish Government and people to suffer the loss of half their territory lest they lose all, lest the whole world lose its only hopes of peace.* For after all he does not dream that Great Britain and the U. S. A. have such outstanding differences that **they** must cling together, at any cost to principle! It is Russia and Russia alone that causes anxiety amounting to agony. But he refuses to say plainly that the price of avoiding this "awful schism" is the delivery of half Poland now, although that fact is implicit in everything that he and Mr. Eden say in defence of Yalta. Yalta pays Stalin his price for peace, for co-operation in the future, and it provides no guarantees for his good behaviour. It is completely one-sided. Our Ally Poland is placed at the mercy of Russia, in her sphere of influence, and immediately after the debate in which he had such comforting words for Russian ears Mr. Eden is sent into a flurry of embarrassment by some nasty person who asked him whether it would be possible **now** for a British visitor or official to get a look at what was happening in Poland. 'I'll have to ask m'dad,' sums up his answer.

*Poland has lost, all for whole country is under the Russian police rule
(the Editor)

The complete contempt which Stalin has shown for our British sense of fairplay, his refusal to allow word out of the countries which he has taken, his stubborn defiance of world opinion, have all borne their calculated fruit. "Slap an Englishman on the back," said Hitler, "and he'll fall on his face." Stalin just kicks him on the pants and gets the same result. For Stalin does not worry about any "awful schisms." His dialectic accommodates them very cosily. If it suits him to-day to soothe the democracies with the promise to take all he wants himself for the present, and ask for the rest at the Peace Conference, it will just as easily suit him later on to raise his price. One thing only may have given him pause. One thing only may have made him look seriously at us for the first time. Not by kind words or hard words is the great realist moved, but he must indeed be blind and beyond the reach of warning if he does not see his own shape and shadow moving behind the massive detachment of those who have betrayed their Ally.

That is one side of it, the fact that we have in our democratic way matched his own brutality. In other words, evil communications have corrupted good manners. We have only Mr. Churchill's private hunch that some of our lost virtue has entered into Stalin as compensation. Earlier on we said that the Yalta decision on Poland was the best possible, "in the circumstances" according to Mr. Churchill, and we said that one of those circumstances was that Stalin was not bound by the Christian code of morals. That is abundantly clear. We promised to discuss other circumstances, and although our space is almost exhausted we will make an effort to do so in compendious fashion. The first fact was Stalin's lack of morals; the second was Mr. Churchill's sense of honour. Yalta was a struggle between Stalin who sought the destruction of Poland, and Mr. Chur-

chill who demanded that the half-chewed carcass should be passed through the bars to him. That is not how he would describe the meeting, but that is how it was, and that is why he is irritated by the thankless Poles. They want to have the rest of their body out too, but Stalin will not give it up. Mr. Churchill, whose adventurous nature challenges him to ride on the tiger regardless of precedents, cannot forego this opportunity to guide the animal into better ways. By an overwhelming majority Parliament backed up Mr. Churchill, and under a strong sense that he had saved mankind from a third world war they repeated the distressing performance of the Munichers, and in making themselves Yalta Yesmen pledged themselves to go forward in a course of extremely high idealism after inconveniently leaving most of their ideals behind them.

O frankly fickle, and ficklely true.

Do you know what the days will do to you ?

With manly simplicity Mr. Greenwood said, "It is foreign to the principles of British justice for the fate of a nation to be decided in its absence and behind its back." Major Lloyd said, "I think we represent an enormous number of ordinary folk who are deeply disquieted at the references to Poland in the Yalta agreement. That agreement means downright annexation of Polish territory without the consent of either her Government or her people. History will say we are right." And because British justice has been flouted and the innate sense of the British people has been disturbed, Yalta won't do. Mr. Thorneycroft said it was a test-case for Russia. Mr. Eden thought it was a test-case for Poland. But in fact it is a test-case for the British people. And in their own good time they will give their answer. History will dictate that answer to them, and Russia will ~~make~~ make that history.

SAN FRANCISCO

By : COLM BROGAN

IN March of this year, President Roosevelt addressed Congress on the Yalta Agreement, just concluded. He admitted that it was not perfect, but made his appeal, in substance, on the necessity for finding *some* agreement which Stalin would consent to sign. It was hardly the note that one would expect to hear struck by the chief of the nation which holds the military, material and moral leadership of the world; but there can be no doubt that the President was deeply sincere. "There will soon be presented to the United States and to the American people," he said, "a great decision which will determine the fate of the United States—and of the world—for generations to come. There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict."

Some observers were not sure that he was altogether happy about the terms of collaboration that had been arranged at Yalta. He, himself, admitted that he was not satisfied with the Polish decision, but some thought that he was more dissatisfied than he cared to say. They thought that he sounded uncertain at times, and that he looked worn.

Not so Mr. Walter Lippmann. That eagerly instructive gentleman had decided that Yalta was more than the pessimists could have hoped for, and he thought it had done the President a world of good. He informed his readers that, before Yalta, the President had been worried, aloof and

irritable, aware that his foreign policy was drifting towards failure, but yet unwilling to take the great risk of grappling boldly and decisively with his difficulties. But he had grasped the nettle at Yalta, and the results had greatly cheered him. He had been "relieved of a deep anxiety about the course of events." The bad old days of doubt and hesitation were past. "There is no tonic like doing the right thing and finding it succeeds."

The Tonic

The President is dead. His sudden end struck the free world with grief and something like awe. Is it too much to hope that it may have shaken Mr. Walter Lippmann in his faith in the tonic value of Yalta? What killed the President was the noble devotion to duty of the great chief of the greatest of nations. For more than twelve years he had borne the burden of cruel difficulties and emergencies, first at home, then abroad. It is certain that he died for his country, and for a wider cause, like any of his soldiers on the battlefield; but it is equally certain that the greatest among the anxieties that clouded his last days was the growing proof of the failure of Yalta.

It is failure by the standard of Yalta's defenders, not merely by the standard of its critics. The real defence of Yalta was one that no responsible public man could make aloud. It was this—Stalin had shown himself so unwilling to co-operate on any matter, large or small, so determined to settle all problems by the shameless use of his own naked force, that it was a triumph even to persuade him to attend a meeting. Having got him to attend, it was worth any price to persuade him to collaborate. The whole of that price is not known, for there has been a very ugly air of secrecy both about Yalta and about Teheran; but it was cer-

tainly ignominious. Indeed, Mr. Churchill is almost the only one of Yalta's defenders who had the—pugnacity to pretend that it was just. It was defended by others on the plea that to secure a great right we must suffer a little wrong. At least, said the President, Yalta would end the possibility of unilateral action by any of the Allies. The framework of future peace and security had been put together, and any sacrifice to achieve that end was justified.

This argument would have been more comely if the sacrifice had been made by the signatories to the agreement but, in fact, two of the signatories sacrificed their most faithful Ally to the demands of the third. If it had been suggested that either Britain or the United States should make one-twentieth of the sacrifice decided for Poland (without Polish consent), the government suggesting it would not have lasted an hour. Yet Mr. Churchill was very evidently annoyed that the Poles did not at once agree to his arrangements and put their confiding trust in the bare word of Stalin. He found it in his heart to say that both he and Stalin wanted a strong, independent and integral Poland, and then explained that an integral Poland would be formed by lopping off almost half of the Polish territory and adding, by way of compensation, German territory, from which it would be necessary to expel every living inhabitant before the Poles could move in. **Solitudinem faciunt, Poloniam apelant.** Mr. Churchill is credited with a deep interest in words, but how he could justify "integral," as applied to these doings is a mystery. However, the man who could justify Yalta in Mr. Churchill's terms could justify anything.

Results

Mr. Roosevelt showed a greater modesty and a greater anxiety about Yalta. He admitted that some sacrifice of

the desirable had been made to reach the practicable. What was the worst and the most ignominious part of the sacrifice? It was surely the recognition of the Lublin Committee of traitors as a provisional government of Poland during military operations and as the nucleus round which a more representative government would be formed. That more representative government would be formed by a committee of two ambassadors and Molotov. (Molotov is the man who openly rejoiced in the destruction of the "bastard" Polish State, and signed a treaty with Ribbentrop, offering Russian assistance against Britain and France to ensure that the destruction would be permanent. He declared Britain and France were guilty of the War because they wanted to free Poland from Germany.)

That was the worst of the price of collaboration. In 1938, the Czechs appealed to the world in these terms: "This case is unique in history; our friends and allies have imposed on us such terms as are usually dictated to a defeated enemy." Records don't stand long, nowadays. Whatever injustice the Czechs suffered from was a trifle compared to the desertion of the Poles. The Czechs had not borne, and did not mean to bear, the brunt of German attack. They had not bled, and they have not bled yet, for the cause of freedom. They had not fought, and they have not fought, on the earth, on the sea and in the air, and under the ground and the sea, with unbreakable loyalty to their principles and their friends. But, as Benes now meekly obeys the commands of Stalin' Hacha then meekly obeyed the commands of Hitler. Their case was cruel and unfortunate, but the Poles were in a case that was infinitely worse. They had died for five years, and were still dying, with unexampled devotion and tenacity, when their allies played poker with their country at Yalta—and lost.

Nothing could justify this desertion, even to its supporters, but success. If the concessions made were to be the last, if something solid could be put on the other side, then "realism" might claim a hard but satisfactory bargain. What, in fact, has happened? It cannot be denied that the Committee has been sabotaged by Molotov. Not even the smooth and supple Mr. Eden could pretend to like Lublin Committee, but Molotov has made it clear that the new Government of Poland will be the Lublin Committee, with such meaningless fringes as the Russians, and no one else, will pick and choose. It has been said that, behind the backs of this committee of three, there have been mysterious conversations with genuine Poles of the Underground, brought secretly to Moscow. Britain and America knew nothing of these dealings. They were disturbed, vexed, and anxious, and no wonder. Stalin hoped to reach an understanding with these Poles. If he did, he would have had an agreement signed and slapped it in the faces of the Ambassadors. If he didn't, he would demand that Lublin go to San Francisco. He has behaved exactly like the head of a hostile Power, working secretly and unscrupulously to achieve a diplomatic defeat and humiliation for the countries he regards as enemies. On the very day when Mr. Churchill made his oration on President Roosevelt, it was announced from Moscow that the U. S. S. R. must *insist* on the representation of Lublin at San Francisco. It is no surprise that Mr. Churchill postponed his funeral oration on Yalta.

But collaboration was not the only gain of Yalta. There was written into the agreement a declaration of democratic principles. President Roosevelt is credited with insisting on this and on drawing up the declaration. The meaning of democracy is much disputed, but we know that for any American President it means the right of peoples to choose

their own government by popular vote without coercion or the threat of coercion. What does Stalin mean by it? Poland gives the answer. In that country there are no private wireless sets. There are no independent or foreign newspapers. There is no party that is not an offshoot of the Communist Party of Russia. There is no entrance or exit, except for those chosen by the nominees of Moscow.

Yugoslavia gives the answer. It is notorious that foreign correspondents will not stay there, where they are not able to send a word of news that has not been permitted to appear in the government slave press. **It is not possible either to post a letter to, or to get a letter from, this "liberated" country without strictest censorship.** That is the condition of a prison.

Roumania gives the answer. When Russian force first occupied Roumania, Russian propagandists made much of the fact that there was a scrupulous avoidance of any interference in the internal affairs of the country. But that policy lasted exactly as long as it suited Stalin. Soon the Prime Minister was overthrown by an act of shameless violence, engineered by the Russian Vishinsky, without even a pretence of consulting public opinion. Vishinsky openly defined a democrat as a man who works for the good of the people, i.e., a man who follows Vishinsky. So lawless was the putsch engineered to suit this definition that the Prime Minister had to seek asylum in the British Embassy, and was granted it. But the millions of ordinary Roumanians cannot find shelter there. They are open to the democratic rule of Vishinsky and his quisling nominee.

The signs in Finland all point the same way. A party of the Right, deeply committed to the German cause, has been accepted in a coalition of the Left, simply to give the

Communists a wider hold on Finish politics. Principles never worry Stalin. He will make a deal with any party or person, however Fascist or even anti-Russian. A deal, for Stalin, is a temporary arrangement to suit his own purposes.

Extending Programme.

Turkey and China are next on the list. Turkey holds the Dardanelles. Stalin means that that hold shall be relinquished. Turkey has territory which Stalin may choose to demand. Turkey has a government which Stalin may choose to dismiss. It is Stalin's intention that nobody living within reach of his forces shall survive his disapproving frown. That Stalin means to bring Turkey to heel, which means under his heel, no diplomat would dare to deny.

It is a war aim of the Western Allies that Manchuria shall be totally restored to China. It is a war aim of Stalin that this shall not happen. He is reviving all, and more than all of the old Imperial Russian demands on Manchuria. When and if it is convenient, the Vishinsky formula will be applied to China, and a democratic government will be demanded, i.e., a government which will make a servile offer to Stalin of all that he wants.

Austria, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany open possibilities for the Russian Fuhrer. The new Czech government, like the new Austrian government, was formed in Moscow, where Stalin had a "Free Czech" committee in reserve. Czechoslovakia is now a Russian Protectorate. In Russian-occupied Austria and in Russian-occupied Germany, "power" will go to the parties and peoples who work for the good of the people the good of Stalin. No more proof of this is needed than the fact that Stalin would not have a mixed occupation of these countries. Each of the occupy-

ing countries will have a separate zone, because Stalin will not submit his designs even to the partial control and inspection of powers which take freedom seriously—and because he cannot submit his own forces to the infection of freedom.

The Conference

The San Francisco Conference was opened in an atmosphere of undisguised gloom and anxiety. Prominent men have persisted in talking about a 'last chance for humanity,' and using other phrases of deep apprehension. The reason for this sad and sorry beginning is too obvious to be denied; it is the conduct of Russia.

All the lines of evidence show that Russia is persisting in her policy of isolation, even in military matters, and that she is steadily withdrawing from even the very thin collaboration promised at Yalta. There is nothing solid remaining from Yalta except the concessions made to Russia; the gains have still to be fought for, and it is manifestly Russia's intention that these gains will only be realised, if at all at the price of further concessions.

The Russian technique is childishly simple. It consists in driving a cruelly hard bargain—and then repudiating the bargain. Rather, the terms of the bargain are interpreted by Russia in such a way as to make it meaningless. After the first shock, the Western Allies begin to look for a remedy for a desperate situation, and, of course, that remedy is a compromise—which means that Russia gets still more, and is ready to work the technique again.

The attempt to flout the Ambassadors, and the Yalta decision, by reaching an agreement with the Underground Poles has failed. But the Poles have disap-

peared from human sight. They were arrested and charged of sabotage, taken to a foreign capital, tried according to a foreign code; in spite of the formal invitation by Soviet representatives for a conference on collaboration, in spite of a word of honour assuring their security. The trial was a scandal of forgery a staged performance trying the heros of anti-Nazi 5 years resistance. Among them were men belonging to the London Government, which was still recognised, and in answer to British enquiries, we were told that 'investigations' would be made. Then, to cap one brutal snub with another, Stalin has contacted a twenty years treaty with the Lublin Government, which we are pledged not to recognise. The arrogant contempt of Russian policy is comprehensible, if also evil and unwise, in the treatment of a country so weak as Czechoslovakia, with a Government as servile. But, why the Russians should think it profitable to snub and flout the strongest power in the world, whose aid she desperately needs, is a considerable mystery. It seems to indicate that the great realist is still unable to understand how far it is safe to go when dealing with countries where opinion is free. Sooner or later, there will be an upsurge of anger, and Stalin may then discover that collaboration will be expensive for him.

The main reason why this anger has not yet been formidably felt in Britain is the discreditable shuffling and evasions of the British Press. Whatever reasons of prudence dictated this policy, it has proved very unfortunate. Indeed, the ordinary newspaper reader must be puzzled to understand the anxiety expressed by public men about San Francisco. Why should the creation of a world security organ be an "almost superhuman task?" Why should there be any serious danger of a third and more horrible world war, if Germany is kept impotent? The popular press gives no explanation for the wide spread fears of a collapse of the

alliance. The public has not been told that the only danger lies in the Russian denial of all of the Four Freedoms, and Russian determination to solve all of her own problems in isolation and by naked force. This grim fact, the key to all the forebodings, has been carefully concealed. The evidence of Russian isolationism¹ is mountainous, but it is explained away by humbug phrases about the 'natural mistrust' that Russians feel for the Western democracies. Apparently, the policy of silence and substantial misrepresentation has Government approval, and is to continue, for we are told that returned prisoners of war, rescued from Poland, *are not allowed to speak of their experiences in public*. These men have seen with their own eyes the truth about Poland and Russia, but they are not allowed to inform the public.

So far has the policy of evasion gone that it was possible for a very well-known and reputable paper of a serious kind to say that certain *small* States were tempted to follow a policy of isolation and aggrandisement. There is something wanton in such perversity, and the purpose behind it is hard to discover. But, in spite of the shuffling and the silence, the great and grim facts of the situation are forcing themselves to the light. Discussions over small states have now almost reached the status of a public quarrel, and it is only too likely that a withdrawal by one side or the other will be felt as a national defeat and humiliation.

Dumbarton Oaks

The atmosphere in which the discussions of the world security proposals were conducted can scarcely be said to be cordial. The League of Nations failed at the first hard test which was tragic, but it looks as if the World Security Council may fail before it has really begun.

Certainly, if the Dumbarton Oaks scheme is adopted, we will have nothing short of a machine for global tyranny. By this scheme, the Great Powers have placed themselves above the law. They are not to be subject even to the threat of punitive action or resistance by force. This was done on Russian insistence, and it has been defended on the ground of realism. It will never be possible to coerce a Great Power, so the argument runs, and it is a mere recognition of fact to place them above the law. The argument is bad. In the Middle Ages, it was frequently impossible for a monarch to coerce his more powerful barons, but the monarch did not dream of resigning his claim to obedience. If he could not enforce the law, at least he could uphold its principles. If he had failed to do that, a united state would never have emerged. A lawgiver cannot command respect if he abdicates in the face of force.

After the last War, there was a widespread and profoundly foolish disregard for the reality of force. It is not likely that that mistake will be repeated, but the opposite mistake may very well be. That mistake is to give force a moral standing, to say that a thing must be formally approved because it cannot be prevented. A formal recognition of immunity for the Great Powers reduces the moral conviction behind the purposes of world security. It may be that Stalin believes in force and nothing but force. If that is so, then he is as profoundly unintelligent as Hitler. He is reputed to have dismissed the power of the Papacy by asking, 'How many divisions has the Vatican got?' He would better have asked himself how many divisions did General Gamelin have in 1940, and why did they crumble like dry bread at the first assault? They crumbled because the moral conviction behind the divisions was weak and insufficient.

If the World Security Council is morally tainted, no nation will have the faintest compunction in evading or denying its duties and responsibilities should occasion arise. That is the result of dishonouring the law.

The Small Nations

But there is much worse than that in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The smaller countries will have a representation on the Executive, but their voice will be weak because no smaller Power may be elected for successive periods. The smaller Power will always be a novice on the Executive, with no possibility of initiating and carrying through a long-term policy. The immediate re-election of one Power to the Executive might be a very clear indication of general opinion. That is not possible under the Dumbarton Oaks scheme, and the status of the smaller Power members is thus reduced—deliberately reduced.

The according of separate representation to two of the constituent Republics of the U. S. S. R. is, of course, a mere yielding to a shameless Russian demand. These Republics have no more of an independent power than the States of the American Union, or the Provinces of Canada. For all international purposes, they are merely a legal fiction. It is interesting to note that the triple representation is regarded by Russia merely as a start. There are seventeen Republics in the Soviet Union, so Russian appetite has still a lot to feed on.

Scarcely more real in present circumstances, is the independence of Yugoslavia. It is the Russian intention that all the border States will be her satellites, voting as she votes, protesting as she protests, and acting like a team of well-trained performing dogs. Russian influence in the World Security organisation will certainly not be light.

The Veto

But there is worse, still. By the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, a Great Power is not only safeguarded from any interference with its own doings, but it can veto action against another power, if it chooses. This reduces the whole legal framework to something worse than farce. It has been discussed, in a gingerly way, in the Press, with discreet references to possible action by Power A. affecting Power B.

But there is no need for discreet anonymity. This startling provision was inserted on the insistence of Russia, and it means that Russia can protect any of her satellites in any action, however violent or illegal, which the satellite may undertake with the permission of, or at the instigation of Russia. The performing dogs may bite with impunity if Stalin chooses to allow them.

It may suit Stalin to turn Yugoslavia on to Italy, or Bulgaria on to Greece. By this provision, not only are the border States brought under Stalin's thumb, but so also are the border States of these border States. No State in Middle Europe will venture to raise a voice against Russia, or a neighbour of Russia. It must be remembered that this provision was put in to be used. When Stalin has consolidated his enormous gains, he will have the weapon in his hand to spread his conquests further. Turkey, China, Norway, Iran these countries have good reason to dread the implications of world security.

The Resistance

That is the brutal basis of Dumbarton Oaks. How far will Russia succeed in her plans? How far will she be resisted? What is the strength of Russia's hand? These

are the questions behind Mr. Anthony Eden's talk of a "last chance for humanity." It is a panic phrase, and very ill-judged, for mankind will not fall into irretrievable ruin because of Dumbarton Oaks. On the other hand, the new peace will have the ugliest of possible starts if Russia is accorded the right of conducting her own affairs in rigid isolation and, at the same time, of interfering where and when she likes, all over the world.

Molotov must himself have asked these questions in San Francisco. He and his staff appealed to be living in characteristic seclusion, and to be offending American opinion in a dozen needless ways. Of course, a man with Molotov's mind and training is not likely to be much of a success in answering the pointed and perhaps irreverent questions of American reporters, who take freedom of speech and opinion for granted. But it is much to be hoped that the atmosphere of the next Conferences will be as free as the atmosphere of the Press conferences.

It is to be hoped that Russia will be challenged to implement the four freedoms in the territories she occupies. Freedom of private correspondence with the 'liberated' countries must be demanded, and freedom to visit them. The inhabitants must have freedom to leave, if they want to and they must be allowed the elementary rights of owning wireless sets and being able to buy foreign newspapers. The return of deportees must, of course, be insisted on.

These are only a few of the demands which Molotov may find it impossible to concede, but will find it exceedingly uncomfortable to refuse in public. Molotov is already uncomfortable. With some courage and vigour, he and his tyranny can be exposed and discredited to the whole world.

For the first time, Russia is talking where her censorship does not work. For the first time, she met the criticism of free peoples on free soil. It was embarrassing to the last degree, and it may be made deadly for the prestige of Communism. This prestige is almost lost in all thinking circles, after the appalling grip on the occupied Europe, using all the same methods which the Nazis used, has been revealed,

The Sponsor of Liberty

It is very evident that Russia fears the atmosphere of free discussion as she fears the plague. That is the reason for Russian isolationism. That isolationism springs from weakness, not from strength. It is the weakness of a tyranny which cannot survive effective contact with freedom. But there will be no effective discussion and no effective exposure unless Britain and the United States take a firm and solid stand. Only they have the power to maintain the cause of freedom, unsupported. Smaller nations will not incur the anger of Russia if Britain and the States are weak and temporising. *

There is no reason in the world for democratic weakness. The balance of power has swung finally in our favour, and Stalin's strongest cards are those we play for him. Mr. Attlee plays Stalin's cards for him when he utters his desperate panic warnings of a third world war. You would imagine from the implications of the Attlee mutterings that war or peace was a matter of indifference to Stalin. But in fact, Stalin has far greater reason to fear another war than either Britain or America. It is safe to say that thirty

*It is notable that the three nations which supported Russia in the dispute over Argentina at the Conference are all in danger of Russian aggression.

Russians have died in this war for every Briton, and material loss and destruction have been as great.

It is Russia which has to choose between collaboration and isolation, between the certainty of peace and the danger of war. Collaboration is all to Russia's advantage. There are years of miserable living before the Russian people if Britain and the States do not come to their aid. The want of the Five Year Plans has been followed by the more terrible want of war, and before the people lies that prospect of further want in peace.

That misery can be greatly alleviated, and recovery greatly speeded, if Stalin chooses to behave fairly and honestly on the international field. Of course, what he desires is to have all the advantages of collaboration and, at the same time, a perfectly free hand to isolate half a Continent and snub his Allies. But, is there any reason why he should get what he desires? Not if our statesmen show the nerves of men. Not, if they remember that **peace at any price means peace at Stalin's price**. Is it likely that Stalin will be obdurate in the face of what we can give—and withhold? He might be. He might choose to martyr his country again, for the ways of a tyrant are strange. But there is a greater danger—that he will be led on by our seeming weakness till he commits himself too far to go back and, at the same time, finds that he has made collaboration impossible by rousing the anger of the democratic peoples.

Everything depends on the degree of firmness shown by the Allied leaders and the degree of understanding shown by Stalin. There is one thing certain. A diplomatic victory for Stalin will kill world security at birth, for the nations will not and cannot accept the chains he wishes to

rivet on them. On the other hand, it may be a considerable success. That is what we must pray for, but, if success is not to be, then let us have an open and confessed failure. Let it be shown that Russia is irreconcilable. Then we will know what decisions to make, what precautions to take, and our eyes will be opened to the realities of the times which lie ahead.

May 1945

WHAT ARE RUSSIA'S ULTIMATE AIMS ?

By H. W. HENDERSON

What terrible masters would the Russians be if ever they should spread the might of their rule over the Southern countries. A polar despotism, a tyranny such as the world has not yet known, silent as the darkness, keen as ice, unfeeling as bronze, outwardly lovely as snow and as coldly brilliant, a slavery without compensation or relief: this is what they would bring us.

—Henri Frederic Amiel (1821-1881).

The instant the Soviet Union sits on the blue waters of the Adriatic, it occupies an impregnable military position outflanking all that remains of Europe. Europe would then be impossible to hold should the Soviets determine to devour it. Britain itself would be ultimately doomed. The United States would be compelled to re-make its entire view of the Universe.

—William B. Ziff (American authority on international affairs) in "The Gentlemen Talk of Peace."

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Thanks to the policy of boosting to an extravagant degree everything associated with the Soviet Union pursued by large sections of the press, the British public have not the slightest notion of the nature of the forces we are dealing with, and many of them fondly imagine that "Imperialism" is again at work seeking to impose unacceptable regimes upon the countries concerned. Their silence over the policies of Russian Imperialism in Eastern Poland and the Baltic States stands out in striking contrast. Having not the slightest acquaintance with Communist technique, the average man is left with the impression that countries which have formerly had "Fascist" Governments (to the Communist everything is Fascist which is not in harmony with Marxian dogma) are desirous of introducing Democratic regimes and are being prevented from doing so by peaceful methods.

He reads uncomprehendingly of Communist leaders heading the forces of rebellion, refusing to give up the arms with which the Allies have supplied them, and demanding the immediate introduction of "Democracy."

Can he be blamed for failing to understand that Communists do not believe in Democracy but demand it for the purpose of destroying it and establishing the "proletarian dictatorship"?

Is it his fault if he is ignorant of the fact that Communist textbooks provide the reason for the Communist refusal to surrender arms since they teach that force is the only possible method of achieving revolution and sneer at simpletons

who think the transition to Socialism possible by peaceful means?

This pamphlet not only states that it is so, but provides the evidence in indisputable form—that is to say, out of the mouths of the Communists themselves and by a consideration of their actions. It is to be hoped that those who read it, will after doing so, have a better appreciation of the danger that confronts civilisation to-day, and be, mentally and morally, better prepared to combat it.

PART I.

Communism in Theory—(Stalin's "Problems of Leninism.")

The most authoritative book published in Russia to-day is Stalin's "Problems of Leninism." This book has run through many editions, and has been circulated in millions of copies throughout the Soviet Union. It bears the authority of Stalin's name, and like every other publication in the U. S. S. R., it is issued with the sanction of the Soviet Government. "Problems of Leninism" has the same authority in Russia as "Mein Kampf" had in Germany.

Just as Hitler found it expedient on occasions to utter words of peace in his public speeches while acting on fundamental questions in accordance with the warlike plans of "Mein Kampf," so to-day authoritative voices in the Soviet Union are raised in praise of democratic governments, while no departure is made, or intened to be made, in the ultimate plans for world revolution.

That all this is merely a policy of expediency, that the concept of the world revolution, has never been abandoned, that circumstances alone will dictate when and how the revolution is to be brought about, may be seen from Dimitrov's address to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International when he openly admitted that a policy of expediency was being followed.¹

1 "We are sometimes accused of departing from our Communist principles. What stupidity, what blindness! We should not be Marxist and Leninist revolutionaries, nor disciples of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, if we were not capable of completely altering our tactics and our mode of action as circumstances may dictate. But all the deviations, and all the ins and outs of our tactics are directed to a single end—the world revolution." Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Communist International, at the Seventh Congress.

Nothing, therefore, could be of greater importance to our public than the understanding of what this book contains. The authorised English translation published in 1942 by Messrs. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., runs to no less than 667 pages. It is an excellent production by a distinguished publisher, and the author strongly recommends the purchase of a copy to anyone who wishes to grasp the importance of its teachings. Only by reading the work in its entirety is it possible to understand its full significance. But for those who wish an introduction to its teachings, this small pamphlet may serve the purpose of drawing greater attention to the work, and giving a bird's-eye view of Stalinist philosophy. It will help to remove a number of misconceptions from the public mind, chief of these the erroneous impression that while Trotskyism stands for world revolution, Stalinism stands for Communism in one country, and consequently presents no danger to the democratic world.

This is one of those half-truths beloved by cheap-jack journalists who write popular treatises on subjects they are unacquainted with for the edification of the masses.

Stalinism, it is true, does stand for Communism in one country, but only so that this country (the Soviet Union) shall, in the words of Stalin, "form a mighty base for world revolution." When we understand the whole story, it is obvious that Trotskyism and Stalinism stand for the same thing, even though they approach it by different means, and even though the Stalinist variety may be strongly tinged with Russian nationalism.

To realise the danger thus presented to us, is to be prepared for it, and there is no more patriotic duty any one can perform than in giving warning of what, if we are not sufficiently alert, the future holds in store, not merely

for us but for every nation that rejects the Communist philosophy and claims the right to live its life in the way that suits it best.

Democracy a Stepping-Stone to Revolution :

None are louder in demanding democratic Governments in Fascist countries than the Communists.

If such demands were genuine, they would meet with the warmest approval in Great Britain.

We, who are pioneers of democratic government, loathe with every fibre of our being the tyranny, lies and cheating associated with the very name of Fascism. We have set an example to the world with the British Commonwealth of Nations of how democracy may be applied on an international scale, and in our domestic life we have defended and upheld the rule of the majority, even when it has been against our own particular party interests.

The right to freedom of election, freedom of the press, and freedom to express our view on any subject as our conscience may dictate, is as natural and necessary to our way of living as the very air we breathe.

But the Communist demand for democracy is not a genuine one, for democracy with the communist is not an end in itself, but merely a means to an end—and that end is revolution. Nothing is made more clear in Stalin's "Leninism" (as the English translation of his book has been named).

On no less than eight occasions Stalin emphasises that democracy is merely a stepping-stone to revolution, and that the speed with which the democratic form of government is to be transformed into the revolutionary is dependent en-

tirely upon the degree of preparedness in which the "proletariat" finds itself when this first step has been accomplished.

Stalin describes "the idea of the bourgeois revolution passing into the proletarian revolution as "one of the cornerstones of the Leninist theory of revolution."²

"To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese Wall between the first and the second, to separate them by anything else than the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the poorer peasants" (says Lenin, quoted with approval by Stalin), "means monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarise it, to substitute liberalism in its place."

This teaching Stalin repeatedly emphasises.

The democratic revolution must pass at the earliest possible moment into the "proletarian" (that is the Communist) dictatorship. Stalin does not blame the leaders of the Second International for "utilising the parliamentary forms of struggle," but for over-estimating their importance and refusing to employ "extra parliamentary" forms of struggle when the period of open revolution had arrived.

Again and again he makes clear that parliamentary democracy is only a means to an end, a method to be used till revolutionary struggle becomes possible.

He quotes with approval Lenin's teaching on this subject :

2 In Leninist parlance any form of Government is "bourgeois" which has not developed beyond the stage of ordinary democracy. Even when the "exploited" are in arms against the landlords and the monarchy, the revolution, according to Leninist teaching, is merely "bourgeois."

Only when they rise against "Capitalism" in general does the revolution assume a Communist character (the ultimate aim.)

"From the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just in accordance with the measure of our strength . . . begin to pass to the Socialist revolution. We stand for uninterrupted revolution. We shall not stop by the way. . . . With all our might we shall help . . . to make the democratic revolution in order that it may be easier for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on as quickly as possible to the new and higher task—to the Socialist revolution."

This point is repeatedly emphasised and Stalin time and again appeals to Lenin's teaching on the subject as in the following typical passage showing the relationship of the "bourgeois-democratic" to the "proletarian" revolution.

"The first grows into the second. The second in passing solves the problems of the first. The second consolidates the work of the first. Struggle, and struggle alone, decides how far the second shall succeed in out-growing the first."

Never once is it suggested that the revolution will stop at democracy. Democracy is only to be secured in order to be destroyed by the "proletarian" revolution that will follow it. Revolution is the only method of achieving Communism.

On no point is Stalin more emphatic than that revolution alone is capable of achieving Communism.

He reserves his bitterest epithets for those misguided Socialists and Trade Union leaders who imagine that parliamentary transition to the Socialist State is possible.

"The customary methods of the working-class," he tells us, "trade unions, and co-operative organisations, parliamentary parties and the parliamentary struggle—have proved to be totally inadequate. Either place yourself at the mercy of capital, linger in misery as of old and sink lower and lower, or adopt a new weapon—this is the alternative imperialism puts before the vast masses of the proletariat."³

3 It is nothing to the Communist, who regards truth as mere "bourgeois prejudice," that so far from sinking lower and lower under "capitalist democracy," the standard of living of the working-class has continually grown better, so that disillusioned Communists on returning from a sojourn in the Soviet Union have described the standard of the Russian workers as equivalent to the British and American standard on the "dole." (See "I Was a Soviet Worker," by Andrew Smith, and similar works.)

And this revolution he describes as "their only salvation."

Reforms and compromises are only acceptable on the theory that "every little helps" and that they strengthen the revolutionary forces for the coming struggle.

The Revolution Will be a Bloody One :

Whenever it is said that Communism stands for revolution there are well-meaning but ignorant people prepared to come forward and explain that the revolution will be peaceful. Some even talk of a "mental revolution."

Such people are, unknown to themselves, extremely valuable allies of the terrorists. They prepare the way for them.

They throw dust in the eyes of the people by representing the Communists as peaceful citizens anxious only to inaugurate a necessary social change.

Let there be no doubt about this—Communism stands for revolution, for bloody revolution, for the forcible overthrow of all existing institutions, and Stalin words are there to prove it.

Let those who think a peaceful revolution is meant, consider the following passage from Stalin's book;

"Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat? Obviously not. To think that such a revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of bourgeois democracy, which is adopted to the rule of the bourgeoisie, means that one has either gone out of one's mind and lost normal human understanding, or grossly and openly repudiated the proletarian revolution."

Such is Stalin's verdict and he uses Lenin's teaching to support it.

“The liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class.”

“This is emphasized again and again in many passages of which the above are typical. The revolution means war and bloodshed on a gigantic scale.

“The dictatorship of the proletariat,” says Lenin (quoted with approval by Stalin) “is a most determined and most ruthless war; it is persistent struggle . . . against the forces and traditions of the old society.” It is “a war which is a hundred times more difficult, protracted and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between States.”

Russia to be a Mighty Base for World Revolution:

It is the custom of ignorant journalists, as we have already said (men who have never read a line of Stalin's teaching), to inform their readers that the difference between Stalinism and Trotskyism is simple:—Trotsky believed in World Revolution—Stalin believes in building Communism in one country. Therefore, they say, we can all be friends with Stalin, who at least is prepared to mind his own business.

A simple story for simple people.

Trotsky, it is true, stood for World Revolution (in spite of the “phoney” treason trials, now universally ridiculed). But Stalin, as we have already said, also stands for World Revolution—after he has established Communism in one country.

Let us again consult the prophet and learn from his own lips the theory of Leninism which he endorses and supports, and which forms the basis of his power over the Russian people.

Stating that the Russian Revolution, after passing through two stages, "has entered a third stage," Stalin tells us what the "objective" of that third stage is: "To consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries."

Speaking of the possibility of establishing Communism successfully in one country as a start, Stalin quotes with approval Lenin's teaching as to subsequent developments:

"The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised its own Socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and coming out in the event of necessity, even with armed force, against the exploiting classes and their states."

For the "free union of nations in Communism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the Socialist republics against the backward states."

Stalin, himself, is no less emphatic: "The victory of Socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task . . . but . . . a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries . . . It is the beginning of the groundwork for the world revolution."

This lesson he emphasises again and again: "There can also be no doubt that the very development of the world revolution, the very process of the breaking away from imperialism of a number of new countries, will be more rapid and more thorough, the more thoroughly Socialism fortifies itself in the first victorious country, the faster this country is transformed into a base for the further unfolding of the world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of other state."

The Russian Revolution, says Stalin, "constitutes the first stage of the world revolution, and a mighty base for its further development."

And again he asks: "What else is our country . . . if not the base of the world revolution?"

"The Russian Revolution," he emphasises, "is not the private cause of the Russians . . . it is the cause of the working-class of the whole world, the cause of the world proletarian revolution."

For "the Russian revolution was (and remains) the nodal point of the world revolution."

Nothing could be clearer than the fact that Stalin (no less than Trotsky) conceived, and still conceives, the Russian revolution to be a base or starting point for world revolution

Social Democracy to be Destroyed :

No one acquainted with Communist tactics in Germany before the advent to power of Hitler, can fail to be impressed with the fact that unity between the Communist and the Socialist voters could have kept the Nazis out. This however, was rendered impossible by the actions of the Communist Party, acting under instructions from Moscow.

Instead of attacking Hitler they attacked the Social Democrats believing this to pave the way to victory for the proletarian revolution.

Toni Sender in her "Autobiography of a German Rebel," an amazing exposure of Communist duplicity and double dealing, shows how the Social Democrats, realising the growing strength of Nazism, appealed to the Communists for a united front, only to be told the following day: "Our real enemies are the Social Democrats."

This shameful answer was published in the Communist Party organ "Red Flag,"⁴

⁴ "It was not only the rich reactionaries who put Hitler into power it was as much the fault of the Comintern—even though I shall no doubt be branded as a Fascist by my Communist friends for saying this—for it was the Comintern who instructed the German Communist Party to neglect Hitler and to concentrate their fury and efficiency against the Social Democrats, with the result that the one force capable of smashing the evil man before he could gain even the first strings of power, was itself smashed a few weeks later." "Philip Jordon, Russian Glory" (in "Forward," 12-10-42.)

The German Communists however, were merely carrying into practice the philosophy of Stalinism.

For it is a cardinal principle of Stalinist Communism that Social Democracy (represented in Britain by the Labour and Trade Union Movement) must be ruthlessly destroyed.⁵

"The October Revolution," says Stalin, has cut an impossible furrow between Marxism and Social Democratism, between the policy of Leninism and the policy of Social Democratism."

"The October Revolution", he continues, "went further than drawing a line of demarcation between Social Democracy and Marxism; it cast Social Democracy in to the camp of the downright defenders of capitalism against the first proletarian dictatorship in the world . . . Present-day Social Democratism is an ideological prop of capitalism."

Stating that "Lenin was a thousand times right" in describing the Social Democratic politicians as the "real agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalists class," Stalin asserts that "it is impossible to put an end to capitalism without putting an end to Social Democratism in the Labour Movement."

This stupid, bigoted, and self-righteous attitude to the great world of organised labour has brought disaster to the working-classes of Germany, has led to the triumph of Hitlerism, and has brought the Communists back too late with treacherous appeals for Socialist unity.

The hypocritical denunciation of the Labour and Trade Union leaders for declining to admit the Communists as an organised body into the Labour Party, coming as it does

⁵ One cannot but be astonished at the naivete of British labour and Trade Union leaders who remain silent in the face of Communist atrocities that have scarcely any parallel in the history of civilised peoples. The fate of leading Socialists abroad who have fallen into clutches of the Soviet Authorities (such, for example, as Erlich and Alter) should show the fate that awaits them if Communism ever comes to power in other countries.

from men who, a few short months before, were describing them as "lackeys of the bourgeoisie," is well brought out in Stalin's own remarks on factionalism in the Communist Party:—"The existence of factions is incompatible either with the Party's unity or with its iron discipline. It need hardly be proved that the existence of factions leads to the existence of a number of centres, and the existence of a number of centres connotes the absence of one common centre in the Party, the breaking up of the unity of will, the weakening and disintegration of dictatorship." While factionalism (the existence of an independent group within a party) may be all right for members of the Second International (those simple-minded believers in political liberalism) this, says Stalin, is impossible where Communism is concerned.

"Hence Lenin's demand for the complete elimination of all factionalism and the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception, that had been formed on the basis of various platforms, on pain of unconditional and immediate expulsion from the Party."

With Communists what is sauce for the goose is definitely not sauce for the gander. Communists who refuse to admit an independent Labour body into the Communist Party are stalwart defenders of the proletariat, but Socialists who refuse to admit an organised body of Communists into the Labour movement are "political reactionaries" and "enemies of working-class unity!"

No Democracy in Russia:

That there is no democracy in Russia is abundantly clear, not only from the testimony of those who have lived there (no freedom of thought, press or freedom of election), but from the words of Stalin on this very subject:—

"Freedom" "Liberalism" and "Democracy" are sneered at and attacked throughout his book.

"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Stalin, "cannot be 'complete' democracy, democracy for all, for the rich as well as the poor."

He sneers at Kautsky's talk about "universal equality," "pure democracy," "perfect democracy," and other "absurdities," and dismisses it on the ground that equality between the "exploited" and "exploiters" is impossible.

He supports Lenin's arguments against those "who confuse the dictatorship of the proletariat with popular government," and quotes with approval Lenin's assertion that the revolutionary party having taken power, "does not deceive itself or others with talk about 'popular government elected on the basis of universal suffrage sanctified by the whole people.'"

The dominating force is the Communist Party, "which does not and cannot share that leadership with other parties."

And finally Stalin informs us that "there is no ground in the U. S. S. R. for the existence of several parties and consequently for freedom for those parties. In the U. S. S. R. there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. In the U. S. S. R. only one party can exist, the Communist Party. . . ."

So much for the boasted democracy of the "Workers' Fatherland." The Communist demand for democracy is not a genuine one, but as Lenin and Stalin both explain, a manoeuvre do discredit democratic government in the eyes of the masses and (as we have already seen) to bring about the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to which democracy is regarded merely as a stepping-stone.

What this means in practice may be glimpsed from the explanation of Stalin, who tells us that it is the rule "based on force" and "unrestricted by law" of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie.

Force unrestricted by law !

Let the reader ponder on this terrible formula and try to understand its meaning, so well revealed in the blood-stained annals of Communist barbarism.

The Question of Tactics :

Communist tactics vary with circumstances.

This is a fact which cannot be emphasised too frequently. The operation of this principle is seen in every phase of Communist development. No faith should be placed in Communist words alone, but every action should be scrutinised in an attempt to see what lies behind it.

"Tactics," says Stalin, "change according to ebb and flow . . ." "In the period from 1903 to 1905 the Party pursued offensive tactics, for the tide of the revolution was rising, the movement was on the up-grade, and tactics had to proceed from this fact. Accordingly the forms of struggle were revolutionary, corresponding to the requirements of the rising tide of revolution. Local political strikes, political demonstrations, the general political strike, boycott of the Duma, insurrection, revolutionary fighting slogans—such were the successive forms of the struggle during that period.

In the period from 1907 to 1912 the Party was compelled to resort to tactics of retreat; for we then experienced a decline in the revolutionary movement, the ebb of the revolution, and tactics necessarily had to take this form into consideration . . . Instead of the boycott of the Duma, there was participation in the Duma. instead of open, direct, revolutionary action outside the Duma, there were parliamentary speeches and work in the Duma, instead of general political strikes, there were partial economic strikes, or simply a lull in activities . . . During a given stage of the revolution, tactics may change several times, depending on the flow and ebb, the rise and decline of the revolution."

The revolutionary, however, must have patience and wait for the right moment to strike.

"The task of strategic leadership," says Stalin, "is to make proper use of all these reserves for the achievement of the main object of the revolution at the given stage of its development." What does making proper use of reserves mean?

"It means fulfilling certain necessary conditions, of which the following must be regarded as the principal ones: First, the concen-

tration of the main forces of the revolution at the enemy's most vulnerable spot at the decisive moment, when the revolution has already become ripe, when the offensive is going full steam ahead, when insurrection is knocking at the door, and when bringing the reserves to the vanguard is the decisive condition of success."

And when, it may be asked, is the decisive moment to throw off the mask which considerations of policy have demanded, and strike at the hated bourgeoisie who have been lulled into a state of false security by appearances?

Again we have the words of Stalin as our guide:—"The decisive battle, says Lenin, may be deemed to have fully matured when all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads with each other, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength . . ."

So the hostile forces must be put at loggerheads and weaken each other in a struggle that is beyond them?

Then the revolutionary will strike.

To be forewarned is to be forearmed! -

"The revolutionary forces," says Lenin (quoted with approval by Stalin), "must complete their education. . . . Victory is impossible unless they have learned both how to attack and how to retreat properly."

"The object of this strategy" Stalin asserts, "is to gain time, to demoralise the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order, later, to assume the offensive."

He instances the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a case in point. Through it the Bolsheviks gained time to take advantage of the conflicts in the camp of the Imperialists and accumulate fresh forces.

"We take advantage of their mutual anxiety and warfare," says Lenin (quoted with approval by Stalin), "which hamper concerted action on their part against us, and for a certain period have our hands free to consolidate the Socialist revolution."

Stalin is not opposed to reforms, but regards reforms as "instruments for strengthening the revolution . . . for the further development of the revolutionary movement."

Pursuing the question of tactics, Stalin relates how the Bolsheviks in the period of the revolution put forward the slogan, "all power to the Soviets," but as the "counter-revolutionary" cadets gained strength and weakened the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, the Party temporarily dropped this slogan "only to put it forward again in the conditions of a fresh revolutionary upsurge."⁶

Nothing is based on moral principle—it is all a matter of how to gain advantage over your opponent.

Will Communism Bring International Peace?

Stalin, as we have seen, has no faith in those misguided people who believe in a peaceful transition from Capitalism to Socialism. He goes so far as to say that they are either out of their mind or traitors to the revolution.

Will Communism (for it is this that Stalin means when he speaks of "Socialism") bring international peace once it has been established within a single powerful State?

Both Lenin and Stalin, as we have seen, picture the Communistic State as rousing its neighbours to revolution by propaganda and even coming out with its armed forces to assist in putting down "exploiters" (meaning the lawful non-Communist Government of the States concerned). But that is not all.

6. Similarly (though Stalin does not specifically mention it), when the Kornilov rebellion threatened the Kerensky Government, the Bolsheviks withdrew their opposition to Kerensky and assisted him—only to renew the attack when the danger had once more passed.

If we understand Communist teaching aright, all this is but the prelude to a long series of wars between the "Capitalist" and "Communist" worlds. "Most probably", says Stalin, "in the course of development of the world revolution, side by side with the centres of imperialism in individual capitalist countries and the system of these countries throughout the world, centres of Socialism will be created in individual Soviet countries and a system of these centres throughout the world, and the struggle between these two systems will fill the history of the development of the world revolution. 'For,' says Lenin, the free union of nations in Socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged, stubborn struggle by the Socialist republics against the backward states."

Stalin then describes the Russian Revolution in the words already quoted as "the first stage of the world revolution and a mighty base for its further development."

He speaks of "the impossibility of the complete final victory of Socialism in one country without the victory of the revolution in other countries," and quotes with approval the following words of Lenin:—"We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable."

Not a very pleasant prospect, is it?

But that is the teaching of Leninism as expounded by Stalin in the most authoritative book in Soviet Russia.

That is Communism in theory.

It stands for Democracy, as we have seen, in order to use it as a stepping-stone to Revolution.

This Revolution is considered the only method of achieving Socialism.

The Revolution will be a bloody one.

It has already made the Soviet Union into a mighty base for Revolution on a world scale.

It seeks the destruction of Social Democracy (represented in Britain by the Labour Party and the great Trade Unions.)

It has destroyed Democracy in Russia and substituted party dictatorship in place of it.

It shows a greater regard for tactical advantages than for moral principles.

It is incapable of bringing International Peace.

PART II.

Communism in Practice (Soviet Foreign Policy since 1917.)

No word occurs more frequently in Communist literature than "opportunist". The bitterest jibes of Communist writers are reserved for what they are pleased to describe as "opportunist elements" whether they are found in the Labour or any other party.

This has always seemed to me a most peculiar feature of Communist politics, for no political party contains more opportunist elements than the Communist Party. Opportunism is described in "Webster's Collegiate Dictionary" as "a taking advantage, as in politics, of opportunities or circumstances, with little regard for principles or ultimate consequences." And that is Communism to the last syllable!

Neither in domestic nor international relationships has Communism any regard for ethical principle. It is a policy of pure expediency unfettered by any regard for moral scruples.

If you do not believe this, listen to the words of Communist spokesmen. "Law, morality, religion," said Marx, "are to him (the proletarian) so many bourgeois prejudices behind which lurk in ambush so many bourgeois interests."⁷

"We say," said Lenin "that our morality is wholly subordinate to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat . . . That is why we say that a morality taken from outside of human society does not exist for us; it is a fraud. For us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletarian class struggle."⁸

"What coincides with the interests of the proletarian revolution is ethical," says Yaroslavsky.⁹

7 Karl Marx: "Communist Manifesto."

8 V. Lenin "Third All-Russian Congress of Young Communist League" (in Arnold Lunn's "Communism and Socialism")

9 E. Yaroslavsky: "Red Virtue" (in Arnold Lunn's "Communism and Socialism").

In plain language these testimonies mean that a Communist considers himself entitled to lie and cheat to his heart's content if by doing so he can advance his cause.

The Communist policy is one of pure expediency—it adopts whatever measures seem most likely to advance its aims, and backs them up with words intended to deceive.

Thus, in the days preceding the Russian Revolution, Lenin and his associates denounced the war in the manner of true humanitarians, holding up their hands in horror at the bloodshed it involved. They did not explain that Communism stands for war on a still greater scale, and for the mass-murder of all who offer resistance to Communist philosophy, though the most damaging admissions could be found in Communist books, confirming this, and history has shown that they were not mere idle words.

Lenin, as we have seen, admitted in a book published for the instruction of the initiated, that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is a most determined and most ruthless war . . .,” and the results were evident in Russia during and immediately after the Revolution, in a bloodbath without parallel in human history.

Similarly, when Communism was established in Russia, the Bolsheviks, realising their weakness in comparison to other nations at the time, considered it expedient to profess themselves the champions of world peace and concluded non-aggression pacts with every nation that would enter into them. They concluded pacts of peace with, among others, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, France and Italy. They proposed in 1927, “General complete and immediate disarmament” as a means of preventing war, knowing the impracticability of such an arrangement, but realising its propaganda value. By this manoeuvre they

succeeded in getting themselves accepted in the eyes of the world as the champions of international peace surrounded by warlike capitalist powers.

In actual fact they fomented war and revolution in every part of the world, continued to increase their armaments, and in authoritative works like "Problems of Leninism," intended primarily for the initiated, never ceased to advocate the need for bloody revolution and the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Nor did they show the slightest backwardness in seizing territory belonging to other people when it seemed desirable to do so in the interests of Soviet Imperialism.

But the "non-aggression" business paid the biggest dividends and convinced the masses everywhere that Russia stood for peace.¹⁰ Only when she was in a position to reveal her plans with confidence was the mask removed. Then the precious peace and non-aggression pacts were seen for what, in actual fact, they were—gigantic bluffs to give the Soviet Union time to build up armaments ready for "the day." First came her agreement with Hitler, which was actually being negotiated while Russian statesmen were pretending to be discussing an alliance with Britain and France.¹¹

10 Russia's attitude was publicly declared as follows: "We do not covet a single square yard of anyone else's territory, but we shall not yield a single square yard of our own." This statement was quoted in hundreds of Communist publications, but looks rather foolish in view of subsequent developments in Poland and the Baltic States.

11 "I do not attempt to conceal from the House that the announcement came to the Government as a surprise, and a surprise of a very unpleasant character. . . . The British and French missions reached Moscow on April 11th. They were warmly received in friendly fashion, and discussions were actually in progress and had proceeded on a basis of mutual trust when this bombshell was flung down. It, to say the least of it, was highly disturbing to learn that, while these conversations were proceeding on that basis, the Soviet Government were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects of their foreign policy as we had understood it."—Mr. Chamberlain, House of Commons, August 24th, 1939.

Next came the fourth partition of Poland which violated half-a-dozen treaties freely entered into by the Soviet Union and ended with mutual congratulations from the assistants that their pact was "sealed in blood."

Britain and France had now become the "aggressors" and Hitler the man of "peace." The Soviet Union, which had formerly regarded these two nations as "peace-loving democracies" now threatened to take joint action with Hitler against them if they did not stop the war.¹²

After this came the turn of the Baltic States.

In spite of non-aggression pacts, in spite of "pacts of mutual assistance" which were "in no way to interfere" with the social and political system of the States concerned, a few months' time was sufficient to see the swallowing of these tiny, inoffensive and progressive Republics by the Soviet Union.¹³

On 27th June, 1940, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were delivered, under threat, to the Soviet Government (an area of 20,000 square miles with a population of 4,000,000.)

Licking their lips, the peaceful, non-aggression gentlemen looked around for further prey, but a terrible catastrophe was in the offing. Without an ultimatum, without giving them a moment to come to terms, Hitler suddenly struck eastwards, and the sport was at an end. The hunters became the hunted.

Forgetting the injuries done to her, Britain came immediately to Russia's aid. Poland which had suffered more

12. See Press reports Sept. 28, 1939.

13. The whole procedure was condemned in scathing language by Mr. Sumner Welles, U. S. Acting Secretary of State, July 24th 1940

than any other country through Russian treachery, held out to her the hand of comradeship. A Pact of Friendship and Co-operation was signed between the Russian and the Polish Governments.

Russia had but recently proclaimed the end of Poland as a State. But in the pact now entered into she renounced her share of the projected robbery.¹⁴

Expediency! Had it not always worked so well before?

Would it not continue to work in the future?

On invading Poland in 1939 Russia and Germany (as we have already seen) divided that unfortunate country between them. This was the first result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement signed by these two gentlemen on behalf of their respective countries. But, with Russian armies retreating before the German invaders in 1941, and with Russia threatened with destruction, Soviet statesmen were willing to do anything in order to stave off catastrophe and win the goodwill and material support of nations they had but recently denounced as being responsible for the war. By the terms of the Russo-Polish Treaty of Friendship, the Soviet Government renounced, in the clearest possible manner, its former claims to Polish territory. That was Russia in the hour of Peril. "When the devil was ill, the devil a saint would be."

But her tune began to change when, thanks to Allied help and the stubborn valour of her people, the Nazi war machine was halted and finally driven back.

14. "The Government of the U. S. S. R. recognises the Soviet-German Treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity." Article one of the Russo-Polish Treaty of Friendship, Signed in London, July 30th, 1941.

The Eastern provinces of Poland, which she had claimed in 1939 and redounded in 1941, she now laid claim to once again and denounced the Poles as impudent disturbers of the peace when they quite properly protested! "When the devil was well, the devil a saint was he."

Never was the policy of expediency, which Russia has pursued since revolutionary days, made more apparent. Clearly she was prepared to do anything, and promise any thing, in order to get her way.

But should anyone be surprised?

Have not Communist leaders asserted that their policy is determined only by the interests of the "class struggle" and that whatever aids their cause is ethical?

We are not surprised that they have done it; we are only surprised that anyone should have expected them to do otherwise. Consult once more those words of Stalin's book, and link them with the facts of recent history.

Ponder on the words of Dimitrov, showing the need forange adapting oneself to circumstances while never abandoning the idea of world revolution. It is all crystal clear.!

Consider the utterly false charges made against the Government of Finland, (in 1940 the Finns were charged with attacking Russia!); consider the promises made to the Governments of the Baltic States in 1940, when Russia obtained the right to establish bases in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania (they were, as already stated, to remain the property of the Baltic Republics and there was to be no interference with the internal affairs of the states concerned); consider the long denunciation of Hitler's policy from 1933, and the sudden pact with Hitler in 1939, when "the peace-loving democracies" were discovered to be warmongers

and the "Nazi hangmen" were discovered to be men of peace; consider the violation of all the treaties signed with Poland and the shameful attack to which she was unjustly subjected; consider all the non-aggression pacts signed with foreign nations when the U. S. S. R. was weak and her attitude to those same nations now that she is strong; consider her violation of the terms of the Atlantic Charter (to which she has adhered); consider her refusal to allow the states that are nearest to her borders to federate so that they will fall under her dominion, one by one; consider the attempts that have been made to dictate the policy of France, of Italy, of Belgium, and of Greece by force of arms, before a general election could be held, and you have Communist policy in a nutshell.

To trust in the word of Communist statesmen would be as mad as to trust in the word of the Nazi gangsters who planned this war while lulling the democracies to sleep with words of peace.

Let us consider the future in the light of the past.

Let us gather our friends and allies around us, and be true to those who have sacrificed their all in defence of human freedom.

Let us demand a press that is not afraid to speak the truth about matters that are vital to our security, and statesmen who do not allow the voice of conscience to be drowned by the noisy tumult of the uninformed.

As we have been forewarned, let us be forearmed !

COOPERATION?

by COLM BROGAN

CHAPTER ONE

The Second World War is just over, but already mens minds are filled with the fear of a third war, more ruinous than the second, and perhaps fatal to civilised life. What is the secret of this fear? You will read the British Press and listen to the British wireless for long enough without catching a hint of it. There, a huge and hollow humbug is kept up that all depends on the relations we keep with a defeated Germany. But everybody knows, the man in the street, the man in the factory and the office, and the humbug merchant in the B. B. C., that all depends on the relation we are able to keep with a victorious Russia.

The victorious powers have nothing in common except victory. The whole conception of social and personal life held in Russia is totally different from the conception held in Britain and a U. S. A. If the two systems fall apart, the third war will be in sight. Can they keep together? The signs are unpromising, partly through Russian ruthlessness, partly through the British policy of truckling appeasement. We see Belgian Communists striving for civil war, to ensure that Belgium will *not* have an alliance with Britain. We see one-half of Poland surrendered by Poland's allies to Poland's ancient enemy. And the second half overpowered and looted by Russia with nobody's consent. We see a convicted deserter from the French Army returning to France to ask why other Frenchmen are not fighting home Fascism well enough and to lead his party in obedience to the orders of Moscow.

These are ugly signs, but they are not yet fatal. We can still overcome the barriers and establish a firm understanding—provided two things. First, if Russia learns that all concessions cannot come from the West, she will either modify her policy or take upon herself the responsibility and appalling risk of dividing the world in two and starting a race of ideologies (and therefore armaments)¹ whose end will be only too clear. Secondly, if we recognise the *fact* that Russian ideology and British ideology are opposite, right down to the roots, we will be able to speak to Russia as plainly as she speaks to us. Plain speaking does not mean international abuse, as the Russians sometimes seem to think, but a statement, clear, moderate and firm, of unalterable conviction. The first step in solving any problem, is to recognise that there is a problem, and what that problem is. We have not made that step written before the failure of Prime Ministers Conference in London. That is the ugliest sign of all.

Instead we have wrapped ourselves in twaddle about “the three Great Democracies of Britain, Russia and U.S.A.” Communists (the inveterate enemies of Britain and, if they only knew it, of Russia) are the leaders of the chorus, but they are strongly backed by the fools and knaves who are their agents, open and disguised. Russia is a democracy, in one meaning of the word, and Britain is a democracy, in a very different meaning of the word. This fact is clearly, and indeed contemptuously recognised in Russia. What we call the real democracy, Stalin calls “bourgeois democracy,” and he boasted openly to his people that he had destroyed and scattered it. The spirit behind our democratic system is usually called “liberalism”, Stalin said that liberalism was “gangrenous.”

When Lenin was dead, his coffin was carried on the first stage of its journey to the tomb by six bearers, two simple

1. written before the appearance of atomic bomb.

workers, two simple fighting men and by Stalin and Zinoviev. That is what the Russians mean by democracy. Afterwards, Zinoviev was liquidated by his fellow mourner Stalin. That is *not* what we mean by democracy, and there is the world of difference between the two systems which are confused, and deliberately confused, by the misuse of a single term.

Russia is a totalitarian State. That is the fact on which we cannot deceive ourselves without courting disaster. If we recognise that fact, we will not make the mistake of imagining that there is any such thing as an effective Russian public opinion, or that Committees of National Liberation in Russian-occupied countries are anything more than the base tools of the Kremlin, incapable of spontaneous life and decision. We will not make the mistake of imagining that the Communist Parties all over the world are any less servile and abject, or any less treacherous to their native land. We ought to despise these Parties, and their members, for the best of reasons; the reason that Russia despises them. They are used and abused by the Russians, without thought for their pride and principles. Time and again the policy which they have furiously advocated has been scrapped without anybody taking the trouble to warn them of the change. They have had to wheel round and scuttle after the procession, jeered at by their enemies and ignored by their masters. They meet the fate which usually befalls toadies. There is something about a toady which sickens all men, good or bad. Bad men will use them, but will be indifferent to the pains of their humiliation and grovelling, if they do not actually enjoy them. It may be that the fawning bewilderment of the British Communist Party rouses sardonic amusement among the genuine Russians of Moscow; it certainly rouses no sympathy.

A recent incident in Greenock illustrates the abject state of the Communist Party, and also the need for emphasising, continually till it is no longer denied, the central and vital fact of Anglo-Soviet relations—the fact that Russia is a totalitarian State. Needless to say, this is a fact which the Communist Party cannot afford to admit. On the other hand, they cannot afford to contradict it and argue the case in public, for the evidence against them is so overwhelming that they can put up no case at all. Their one profitable line is to go on making brazen assertions, to ignore all contradiction, and to run away from all challenge.

The Communists of Greenock made a grave error, not the secondary error of accepting a challenge, but the primary error of issuing one. Father John Boyle of Greenock had made the statement that Russia was a totalitarian State, given to State worship, and the Communists challenged "J. Boyle" or any supporter of his to debate this assertion in public. The challenge was accepted, and I was asked to take on the debate. I agreed at once, but I said that I was sure that the Communists would never face the test of the public platform; they would find some mean, cowardly and ignominious excuse for deserting their cause.

For a time, it seemed that I might be wrong, for two meetings were held between my supporters and the Communists, and a harmonious agreement was reached on most of the small but necessary points of detail. Greenock Town Hall was agreed on, a date and time were fixed, and tickets were ordered. It would seem that shame itself would keep the Communists from drawing back, but shame is something they are not deeply familiar with. They cancelled the debate, on their own, without consulting or informing my supporters. They cancelled it on an excuse so shabby and unconvincing that it showed their imagination to be as feeble

as their sense of shame. They cancelled it by sending an announcement to the Greenock Telegraph, and a curt note to Father Boyle.

It might seem to be a satisfactory conclusion that the Communists have given this public and pitiful proof that they are unable to face the light of free discussion. But it is not satisfactory. Communists are exceedingly close to Nazis in mind, manners and morals, but nowhere so near as in their insolent reiteration of proved and preposterous lies. They cannot face any examination of their case, but they hope that by persistent bawling they will shout their opponents down. Hitler's recipe for lying is shrewd. Make your lie so startling that people will be taken aback and will think that nobody could have the cheek to say this astonishing thing if it wasn't true. That is the Communist recipe, too. It is not to be hoped that they will stop talking about Russian freedom merely because they have exposed themselves to public contempt by their cowardice. The typical Communist has the persistence of an unteachable cur that howls when it is kicked, but comes back again and again for more of the same treatment in the hope that mere weariness of contempt will finally permit it to sink its teeth in. It therefore seems necessary to put in print some of the things which the Communists were afraid to hear and could not afford to have said because they, more than anyone else, knew that they were true.

CHAPTER TWO

Russia is a totalitarian State. A totalitarian State is one in which a single party governs all the lives of men, in which that party *is* the State, and human activities, economic, religious, social, personal, literary and even athletic are bent to the purposes of the State. Men in all their functions are merely pawns in the great State game. Everything is to be used for the State, nothing is to be used against the State, and nothing of serious importance is allowed even to be indifferent to the State. This doctrine of complete slavery had its final and most brutal expression in the words of the famous Communist Litvinov who told the head of American Relief to his starving country that food was a political weapon. Conversely, starvation is a political weapon, as millions have discovered in the past generation. (The Russians have a worthy disciple in Tito, the totalitarian Marshal who has refused some time ago to allow U. N. R. R. A. to bring relief to the starving people of Jugoslavia. U. N. R. R. A. would distribute necessities according to need, not according to politics, and that would never do. Everybody in Jugoslavia must love the People's Marshal. If they don't, they can starve.)

It goes without saying that there is no liberty of thought or speech or conduct in Russia. Free speech does not exist, there is no Press except the Press of the State and the Party, no voice of criticism or even question is ever raised against the inner circle of the Kremlin. The evidence for oppression is overwhelming. What is the evidence for any degree of freedom? Recently, the "Daily Worker" produced a triumphant article to show that a Russian was free to write to his newspaper complaining about the quality of war-time toothbrushes. That is the ringing and independent voice of Russian Democracy; a complaint about tooth-

brushes—when it suits the Kremlin to have toothbrushes complained about.

There has been much talk recently in Britain about the number and the nature of the essential liberties which we cannot give up. Freedom of speech is generally mentioned first, because the discussion is generally carried on by politicians and journalists, and it is a good test. The State which will not permit people to talk will scarcely allow them to act.

The famous Draft Constitution offers a wide measure of freedom of speech. According to the Constitution, you can arrange public demonstrations to advertise your point of view, and you can apply in the appropriate quarters for supplies of paper and printing labour to issue publications espousing your political notions. It is a pleasing fancy to think of some earnest Russian who disapproved of the Soviet Pact with Germany going to the nearest printing works and asking the manager to print a pamphlet for him attacking Stalin's policy in the way that Neville Chamberlain's was attacked here. In fact, not a word of criticism rose in Russia because Constitution or no Constitution, nobody could open his mouth against Stalin without the certainty of immediate death.

If our Communists pretend that there is freedom of speech, let them produce evidence of people speaking freely. Why does not the "Daily Worker" print some letters, even mildly puzzled letters, by Russians writing about the pact with Germany instead of about toothbrushes? The "Daily Worker" prints no such evidence because there is none. Of course, the Worker would like us to believe that Stalin's suddenly-announced decision to collaborate with Nazi Germany had the full confidence and support of all the

hundred and eighty millions who had previously been taught that Nazi Germany was the final enemy, that all the Soviet nations were so overcome by their worship of the State and its wisdom that nobody wanted to raise his voice, even in question, much less in protest. That this fantastic theory is against the witness of common-sense will not worry the Communists, but it is also against the witness of Stalin. Coming to the wireless just after the German fury had broken on his land, Stalin openly answered those who had criticised his policy. The critics were there, although they had not criticised in print or in public speech, but only in secrecy, when they were secure, or thought they were secure, from the secret police.

A recent example of the total absence of any freedom of discussion or protest under Russian rule, and an equally striking example of what may be expected by non-Russians under Russian rule was given by a paragraph in the "Daily Worker," announcing that the people of Warsaw had publicly voted the Warsaw Medal to Stalin for liberating Warsaw. This news item was enough to jolt the teeth even of a Communist, for, up to the date of the paragraph, Warsaw remained in German hands. The touching ceremony took place in the suburb of Praga, and it was the "people" of Praga (who had been earlier accused by the Russians of not fighting the Germans) who made the presentation. Can even a Communist pretend that there was nobody in the suburb who did not want to point across the river and say, "There is Warsaw, there where the German flag flies above the smoking ruins. What is the meaning of this obscenity?" Nobody said so, or, if anybody did, he is now dead. The people of Praga and Warsaw remembered well the 1944 August-October fight, the lack of help and arrests of Polish Home Army men by Russians, they hated them (Editor.)

The publication of this paragraph, and the reception of the "honour" are an interesting indication of the contempt in which Stalin, like Hitler, holds the intelligence of the ordinary man, at home and abroad. Its publication in the "Daily Worker" shows what the Worker thinks of your intelligence. The workers will swallow anything if it is shoved hard enough down their throats; that is the view of the Communist Party of Great Britain. It is the party which boasted of being a section of a great world party, and, a few weeks later, announced as a great liberation and step forward that it was not a section of a world party. It is the party which said that Thorez was quite right to desert from the French Army, and then said it was "a Vichy slander" that he ever had deserted. Lincoln said you can't fool all of the people all of the time, but the Communists think he was wrong; probably they will call him a Fascist.

What is the reality of the guarantees of free speech in the Draft Constitution? The reality is nil. Remember that the same Constitution allows any State of the Soviet Union to leave that Union if it chooses. Who out of Bedlam believes that? It is a right that no State would dare to claim. The right to free speech is in the same category. *You are free to speak if you don't mind being shot.*

At one time there was a degree of free speech within the Party, though none outside of it. That is to say, it was permissible to argue till the Party had reached its decision, and then the "iron discipline" of the Party (the phrase is used both by Lenin and Stalin) was clamped down and discussion had to cease. But Stalin put an end to that. All the men who spoke against his views in the past are dead; Stalin shot them, or they committed suicide, or were murdered in exile, like Trotsky.

The Old Guard Communists who had enjoyed bludgeoning and battering the life out of all opponents did not enjoy the same treatment being applied to them, and they tried to resist, but were soon reduced to a state of servile and fawning subjection and cowardice that disgraced humanity. Zinoviev, for example, backed Trotsky's notions against Stalin's in 1925. As head of the Leningrad Soviet, he felt himself to be in a fairly strong position. But Stalin was Secretary of the Party, and he changed the personnel of the Leningrad Soviet and so cut the ground away from Zinoviev. What was the result? Instead of going to the Party Congress ready to side with Trotsky against Stalin, he supported Stalin up to the hilt and proposed the expulsion of Trotsky from the Party! Sickening toadyism is not confined to British Communists. Zinoviev's was only one case. When Stalin frowned, the doughtiest heroes of the Revolution publicly abased themselves and licked his boots. There was no end to this servility. When then shootings began, Radek howled for the blood of the men on trial, although he must have half-known that he would be next on the list for liquidation—as *he was*.

It was a hard enough struggle to trample out the last members of resistance and questioning within the Party itself. During that struggle most of the great figures of the Revolution were secretly or openly executed, with or without trial. In one phase of the fight, Stalin made the grim comment that to be expelled from the Party was worse than death. That proved to be an exaggeration. Expulsion from the Party was not worse than death. It was simply death. It was not only opponents of Stalin who went like pigs to the abattoir. The zealous toadies who carried out unpopular policies with vicious ruthlessness till groaning anything could stand no more were suddenly rebuked by

the Kremlin for carrying out the Kremlin's orders—and found themselves in the abattoir. The head of the O.G.P.U. himself was liquidated—by the O.G.P.U.

A character in Bernard Shaw explains that there is no need to fear public opinion. Kill all the people who hold a certain opinion, and the opinion will cease to exist. It takes strong nerves to carry out such a policy, but nobody doubted the nerves of the Kremlin. In the great Paris Exhibition, the Russian Pavilion had a huge picture of the great men of the Soviet Union, more than life-size. By the time the picture was hung, several of these great men had been shot by the smiling great man in the centre. That didn't worry Stalin. The most famous men of the Revolution weltering in their blood, or three million peasants of the Ukraine dead of starvation—these things didn't worry the Great Realist. He had a fight to win. He had the iron discipline of the Party to maintain. He had his own position to secure.

It must have been very difficult for any prominent Communist to avoid execution, with the best will in the world, for every aspect of Soviet policy was liable to drastic change overnight, and it was fatal to be too late or too soon in recognising the change. In fact, if you had been too zealous for the old policy, and the old policy had been too unpopular you had no chance to change. You were thrown to the wolves of the public fury, to save the popularity of Stalin.

At last he rested secure. By 1934 the Party, at least was clean. At the end of the Seventeenth Congress, Stalin rose to make his reply to the debate. This is what he said:

“Comrades, the debate at this Congress has revealed complete unity of opinion among our Party leaders on all questions of Party policy, one can say: As you know, no

objections whatever have been raised against the report. Hence, it has been revealed that there is extraordinary ideological, political and organisational solidarity in the ranks of our Party. (Applause.) The question arises: is there any need, after this, for a speech in reply to the debate? I think there is no need for it. Permit me, therefore, to refrain from making a speech in reply." (Ovation. All the delegates rise to their feet. Loud cheers. A chorus of cheers. "Long live Stalin!" The delegates all standing sing the "Internationale," after which the ovation is resumed. Shouts of "Cheers for Stalin!" "Long live Stalin!" "Long live the C. C.!")

He laid them in the aisles, you must say. But not the Bolshevik Old Guard, and hundreds of purged Communists. He had laid them in their graves.

It would be easy to fill a large book with evidence of the total authority of Stalin and his Party, and the total absence of independent political life. The people who say there is political liberty in Russia are the people who say that Stalin has liberated Warsaw, though in fact, none of his soldiers has set his foot in it. But it will be rather difficult even for those to deny Stalin's own words.

Stalin said that the essence of Leninism was the dictatorship of the proletariat. He defined the proletariat as the urban and industrial workers, who were, of course, a small minority in Russia. But the directing power and the "iron discipline" was not with even that small minority, but with the Party, which was and *must* be (Stalin's own statement) a minority of that minority. In fact, Stalin candidly admitted that his system cannot be complete democracy. (Foundations of Leninism.) He said, further, that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule—*unrestricted by*

law and based on force—of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie." Lenin said that the dictating proletariat "does not deceive itself or others with talk about 'popular government elected on the basis of universal suffrage, sanctified by the whole people.'" If Lenin did not wish to deceive others, why should the British Communist Party try? So much for "Democracy."

For totalitarianism. Stalin said that Communist Party, a minority of a minority, must give the general direction to "trade unions, co-operative societies, factory and work organisations, the press, cultural and educational organisations, youth leagues, Soviets of deputies." In other words, all activities must be directed by the Party. The independence or neutrality of these organisations "is incompatible with Leninism."

If that is not totalitarianism, the word has no meaning.

CHAPTER THREE

It may well be asked, "Why bring all this up? Russia is our Ally and has fought with an endurance and efficiency that have astonished both friend and foe. We had the common interest as regards Germany, the common interest of keeping the peace. Why say anything that might create bad feeling? We cannot interfere in Russia's internal affairs, and have no wish to. Why not agree to differ?"

It is a tempting argument. We fought the last War with Tsarist Russia, and showed no disposition to hurl denunciations against her internal policy, little though we liked it. Unfortunately the cases are not similar. In the last War, there was no Tsarist Party in Britain conducting a campaign of malignant falsehood, changing their policy with changes in Russia, and *endeavouring to seduce us into imitating the Tsarist system by misrepresenting that system*. If the Communists of Britain would drop their insolent and fraudulent pretences, and we all recognised the enormous differences between the British and the Russian ways of life, then we could let the matter rest. But, so long as the Communists act as the agents of a foreign political system, they must be answered.

That is not the only reason why an answer must be made. We must recognise that the people of Britain are unhappy about the position of Poland and, perhaps to a lesser degree, about the position of the Baltic States. It is therefore important for us to realise what incorporation in the Soviet Union means. *It means the exchange of a free life for a life of mental, moral and physical slavery. It means the forcible abduction of whole classes of people to*

misery, exile and death in Siberia. (Anyone who denies the deportations would do well to remember that Stalin formally admitted them when he signed his treaty with Shikorski.)

There is a third reason of deadly importance. The U.S.S.R. began its career with the full intention of spreading revolutionary Communism all over the world. "Everybody" now says that that idea has been dropped—everybody except Stalin. But Stalin did say, "One country cannot consolidate Socialism. Victory of the Revolution 'in at least several' countries is necessary. Therefore revolution in the victorious country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means of hastening the victory of the revolution in other countries."

That is the strategy laid down in "The Foundations of Leninism," which has the same relation to Stalin's thought and purpose as *Mein Kampf* has to Hitler's. There are people who say that Stalin doesn't mean that any longer. They said the same about Hitler. Rather, and this is a curious thing, the people who said it about Hitler were furiously scoffed at and denounced by the people who now say it about Stalin. As late as 1939, Stalin laid down that the most complete training in and acceptance of Marxist-Leninism for Russian leaders is "nine-tenths" of the job. Does that look as if he had changed his mind.

Of one thing we may be sure. If Stalin has abandoned the intention of spreading Communism abroad, it is not for loss of faith or desire, but merely because he sees the thing is impracticable, not because he thinks it is no longer desirable. Stalin has boasted with justice that though Communism will change its tactics dozens of times, going back on its

course, twisting and doubling, advancing and retreating, it never changes its strategy, its fundamental purpose. Thus, the first attempt at spreading world revolution was abandoned because it was a too obvious failure. That was the early and open cry to the workers of the world to overthrow their masters and join with Russia in Communism. The very attempt showed the inexperience of the new rulers of Russia. It was really ludicrous to expect that highly-developed countries with rich and ancient cultures would meekly follow the lead of the unknown leaders of an unknown nation. Perhaps Stalin himself did not expect it. The total result was blood-shed and the trampling down of the Communist organisation in a number of countries and the deepening of hostility towards Russia.

The second attempt was the organisation of slavish Communist Parties in other countries, to work underground, collaborating with other elements one year and venomously attacking them the following year—or even collaborating and attacking at the same time. Stalin's recipe for Communist Parties in non-Communist countries is not without interest. "The revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as an aid, combining legal work, with illegal work, to intensify, under its cover, the illegal work for the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie." And after that, our Communists complain that they are not trusted!

The result of this policy of infiltration, fraud and false pretences have been very bad for Russia. They deepened exasperation in foreign countries, most particularly in U.S.A. The political immorality of Communists in every country made even Labour men, and perhaps those most of all, reflect with suspicion on the political morality of Russia herself.

Communists laid the way open for Hitler, in fact gave him assistance, did their treasonable best to sabotage the war effort of Britain and fatally weakened the war effort of France. If there was no Second Front in 1941, the person who could take most of the responsibility for that was Thorez leader of the French Communist Party and deserter from the Army.

Patently, the underground method did everything except secure the victory of Communism. But the third method of installing Communism is by forcible occupation of neighbouring lands, and by military and other backing for armed insurrection elsewhere. Let it be admitted that this is a much more promising method. Very much can be done by pushing the formal and actual frontiers of Russia eastwards and westwards.

But, again, the results will be bad for Russia, for the alliance of the victorious nations cannot possibly stand the strain of such tactics. Therefore Stalin must show, by deeds, that this is not his intention. He must be willing, as we are to accept the verdict of the European, and Asiatic peoples, given without fear or force. If he does that, there is no power on earth that would dream of attacking him.

But, if he starts on a policy of political conquest, and we do not immediately make the firmest stand, answering realism with realism, he will break the alliance and enter on a course that will lead as surely to war as Hitler's course did. Therefore, if we are weak and pandering now, we will tempt Stalin to think that we will always be weak and pandering; and that we cannot be. Appeasement is folly and the handmaid of war.

The benefits of co-operation with Russia will be no less great for Russia than for us. The disaster of another war will be no less great for Russia than for us. Let us give all honourable assistance to Russia and join in all honourable dealings. But let us recognise that weak, paltering and dishonourable dealings at the expense of our other allies will ultimately be at our expense and Russia's will lead inevitably to war, death, and ruin for us all.

SOCIALISM AND BOLSHEVISM

By A POLISH SOCIALIST

Few people are apt to think independently, fewer still are really keen on gathering first hand and well established information, as elements on which their free and unbiased judgment can be based; this means very few indeed are those who sincerely care for truth. This human weakness, as well as the cynical but clever saying of Voltaire: "It is enough to repeat a lie thousand times to make people believe it is a truth,"—have been shamelessly exploited by the big propaganda machineries of different vested interests and imperialisms of our times.

A cheap slogan, repeated more than a thousand times in recent years, and accepted as truth only because of this noicy and persistent repetition, is the statement that in the present gigantic world crisis two 'worlds' are in conflict, that from on side we have the 'fresh' wave of 'new' life, of progress and of dynamic socialist ideals and creative practice, represented by their pioneer—Soviet Russia, who must win, for such is the logic of the evolutionary process; whilst on the other side stands all that is outgrown,—capitalism, imperialism, reactionary ideas and retrograde practices, all that is still strong only through inertia, and must be discarded in a natural process as a withered leave in autumn, or violently overthrown, to give way to the new, strong and creative stream of life.

Facts however do not corroborate this definition.

It is well-known to all who have carefully studied the development of socialism in Europe during the last 25 years,

and the relations between socialists and communists on the continent, that there were no greater nor more bitter enemies than these two. This fact had its well founded reason not grasped at first by outside observers, deeply understood by the active workers. For communism, as it is now practiced in Soviet Russia, is the opposite of socialism. To prove it we have only to examine facts.

In all countries of Europe, where the liberty of the individual has not been suppressed, the most progressive and creative elements, the most undaunted fighters against Nazism, are now definitely opposing the communists, not only because—as de Gaulle said—the communists look to a foreign country for instructions, and the object of their loyalty is outside their native land, but because the supremacy of the communist party would mean, for any nation, a step backwards not forwards. The loss of all civil liberties for the individual, an exploitation of the worker and the peasant, in many cases more ruthless under this State-capitalism, than under the system of private capitalism; the cramping of creative art by the imposition of a severe control and a limited range of subjects allowed by the authorities, who guide all State art and literature; one party rule, supported by an all-powerful secret police, ruling as autocratically as the Tsarist bureaucracy in the 18th century, with such 'new' aspects of mediaeval fanaticism as the suppression of all religion and a clever and compulsory anti-religious propaganda.

In France Leon Blum, the socialist leader who was persecuted and arrested by the Nazis, who has many achievements to his credit, and cannot be, by any means, associated with any 'reactionary' activity, is standing definitely against the communists, at whose head is the notorious

Thorez, a deserter from the French army, a man who called the nation to leave the battle-front and not to oppose the Germans, when the latter were in sweet agreement with the Soviets; who left his country when she was in need of service and support, to proceed to Moscow his ideological Mecca, and who now is doing his best to gain control over such departments of French life as would enable Russia to extend her camouflaged protectorate over France also.

It is not socialism that Russia is bringing to the countries overpowered by her, but the same totalitarian ruthless and inhuman regime as the Nazis, with the very slight difference in methods; and the lot of those unfortunate Central-European countries which have been liberated by the Soviet, is in many cases worse and more desperate than it was under the German yoke.

To understand it one must first grasp the difference between communism on the Russian model, and the socialistic ideology, and then know a little about the methods used and the conditions prevailing in those European countries. Let us quote the Polish Socialists views, the view of those who have fought 70 years for the social and political freedom of the masses of Poland, who we are most active in the heroic defence of Warsaw in 1939, and the Rising in 1944, who were in the first ranks of the unflinching fighters opposing Nazism on the Polish soil, and all reactionary tendencies wherever they crept in, among the Poles abroad. Here are excerpts from an article published in the Polish Socialist Party organ, which, [with two other Polish papers, one Catholic, the other a National Democratic Party organ] being denied supply of paper in Britain, sought more liberal and hospitable lands and is now published in France under the modest title "Informa-

tion Bulletin of the Polish Socialist Party." The author says :

"It is important to understand the difference between communism and socialism. Some years ago it was stated that the differences concerned only methods but not aims. This definition is utterly wrong. For all that is introduced in the countries where communists are ruling, has nothing in common with socialism. Private capitalism is replaced by State-capitalism, and this to function properly needs a totalitarian political system as its complementary.

The economic, social and political systems of countries overpowered by the communists, systems of which we hear so many high sounding slogans lead in practice to :

1. the economic exploitation of the workman, peasant and intellectual, (compulsory work under heavy penalties, for "disobedience" withdrawal of ration-cards, which means starvation, or arrest and deportation; very high quotas taken by the government, 75 per cent of all the crops; no right to strike, 10 and 12 hours working day etc.)
2. a social and political structure in which each citizen is subject to constant secret police espionage; in which spying even of one's own family is regarded as a national or party duty, and imposed under penalties upon the people;
3. the treatment of each individual only as an economic unit, totally subordinated to the needs of the State, with a small group of party men deciding what constitutes the "need of the State;" party interests and its dictatorship being identified with nation's interests;

4. the distortion of human minds by fanatical and compulsory acceptance of vulgarised and misrepresented Marxian theories; of cheap slogans imposed on and repeated by the people without any possibility nor permission of questioning, verifying or criticising them;
5. the imposition of a mono-party rule, of bureaucracy and terror, and the development of secret police to an extravagant and unheard of degree.

All these are now imposed on the countries controlled by Russia; they are the opposite of socialist ideas, deeply abhorrent to all true socialists.

Socialism and democracy are bound to be guided by humanitarian principles. Socialism, in the pursuance of its aims, tries to gain its adherents by persuasion, never by compulsion; it wants to awaken human minds and souls, not to distort and crush them. The very foundation of socialist thought and action lies in the profound trust in the inherent strength and goodness of man and society. This faith in the goodness of human nature, in the moral power of the human character, guides the choice means and methods. Where the attitude of man to man is proper, which means based on moral principles, no falsehood, no contempt, no vulgar brutality, even towards our opponents, is admissible.

The profoundly human, moral attitude, equally expressed in private, personal, as well as in public life and State relations, can develop only in a healthy atmosphere. Socialism hates the system of police spying, born out of fear, terror and hypocrisy, so common and inseparable from the communist system. A communist axiom is that

'the aim justifies the means', it is not realised that these feudal and jesuitic theories are the heritage of the most reactionary groups of society, whose direct heirs, in this respect, the communists are. They hold that any means which leads to a proposed aim is acceptable, for it is neither good nor bad in itself, the quality changing according to the utility at a given moment. It is the old amoral utilitarianism of the sophists, retrograde and outgrown in any progressive society. In the communist conception virtues and crimes do not exist, what was good today may be regarded as wrong tomorrow. One day a communist may give a solemn promise, his word of honour, tomorrow he may throw it to the wind, and even liquidate the man who was foolish enough to trust his pledge, and may have become an undesirable witness.

Today a man is a friend, a nation—an ally, tomorrow without any reason or provocation, they become deadly foes, and only persecution or aggression are their lot. There is no mean too brutal, cruel or atrocious which a communist would be reluctant to use, if it should suit his plans or the programme imposed by his authorities; for them nothing is sacred, nothing human, nothing moral.

It would be interesting to know if they realise to how great an extent they are, in this respect, slaves of the most loathsome bourgeois morality, fed by the stinking elements of the desintegrating, perfidious, 'moral' world of yesterday, jackals fed on corpses.

Many examples of this vile principle "the means are justified by the aims" can be now observed in the countries overpowered by the Soviet forces. Foreign agents with hands stained by blood, guilty of the death and torture of

hundreds of thousands of innocent Polish men, women and children, are 'representing' Poland. A Soviet pupil and fanatical follower, who fought in the Red expeditionary batallions in Spain, to bring the world revolution nearer, is a dictator and lord of life and death of the people of Yugoslavia, terrorised, oppressed, dispossessed of all civil liberties and human rights. The peasant leaders, with years of merit in the sincere wholehearted work for the peasant masses of Rumania—Manju and Bratianu—who were persecuted by the Germans, and their satelite Antonescu, are now once more persecuted and their life is seriously threatened.

The 16 leaders of the Polish Underground Parliament, socialists, peasants, workers, *elected* and representatives of the Polish nation, having been guaranteed safe conduct by the word of honour of a high officer of the Red Army, were arrested. We could multiply examples indefinitely.

What we want to show is this : for us, Polish socialists *morality is a real force*; respect for the human individual is a basis of all society and future development of nations and States; the treatment of human beings like inanimate bricks or dung, as they are treated under communist systems, is to our mind, retrogression and not progress.

To solve economic difficulties by sacrificing all personal liberty of human beings. will never lead to a happy world, to peace and prosperity, for the human being is not only an economic unit but a sentient, thinking being, who above all needs freedom for its development.

We know it well enough, we who belong to a nation which has fought for her independence for 120 years, a nation where a peasant, a workman, a young child as well

as an old man, all are equal in their passionate attachment to liberty, which is valued more than any material gains, or even life itself, Humanity must advance towards true democracy, a word which is a sacrilege in communist's lips a thing entirely divorced from them. Humanity must advance towards voluntary, conscious co-operation of nations and States, in well planned federations and unions of great and small of white and brown, and black, of all creeds and all opinions. All that makes this easier, is progress; all that hinders it, be it capitalism or red totalitarianism, is reaction. Russia is not a pioneer of anything new, but on the contrary she, with her methods adopted from the darkest days of feudalism, stands as the successor of direst imperialism. Only the organised lies of propaganda and the weakness of the western democracies, have created this misconception among naive people, who do not care to verify news, nor to gather true information. The state of Europe today should disillusion all who are still lulled by childish beliefs in Russia's 'evolutionary mission'.

It is true there is a tremendous struggle in the world today, a conflict of ideas and means; but the 'new', the creative, the longed for by all humanity is the reign of Law, of Morality, of Justice; and in all these respects only Socialism pure and unadulterated, can give a contribution of real importance; because it is trying to do so, communists and conservatives alike, are equally defeated wherever people are free to think and to express themselves; and socialists are persecuted in Soviet occupied countries more cruelly than remnants of the Nazis who are rather welcome as members of the communist party.

Socialism brings the enlargement of civil liberties, the deepening of the self-respect of individuals, nations, races,

as well as sound economic development, giving a proper share in profits, in education and all other opportunities of development to each individual.

Socialism brings Freedom, Justice, Peace and Brotherhood. This is the progressive, the dynamic ideal for the immediate future of humanity.

A POLISH SOCIALIST.

France November 1945.

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