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THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF ROBERT EZRA PARK

VOLUME III

EDITED BY

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Robert Ezra Park

SOCIETY

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

NEWS AND OPINION

SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIETY

The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois

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PRINTING:

This book was set on the linotype in Janson type and printed on Antique Wove paper supplied by Perkins and Squier Paper Co. Typesetting by Slugs Composition Company. Printing and binding by The Book Production Company.

DESIGN:

By Sidney Solomon

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE

ALL of the more important articles and prefaces written by Robert E. Park are now available in the series of volumes of which this is the third.[1]

Certain phrases that recur in the following pages—human conduct, moral order, social order, moral world, moral career—suggest a possible theme of the essays in this volume. If animal behavior is talked of, it is to distinguish human moral conduct from it. If the quasi-biological, ecological processes are mentioned, it is as underpinning for the more distinctly social processes. The lively, even violent, forms of collective behavior—crowds, sects, revivals, strikes, booms, crazes, fads and fashions—are, in Park's system, the elementary forms of social interaction. News, in its various forms, is part of the communication which allows social interaction on a larger scale; public opinion is both a product of such interaction and the basis for new collective actions. Society, in its various forms, is the on-going, somewhat ordered interaction of men; men who have not merely instincts, but goals to be achieved, self conceptions to be lived up to, status to be fought for.

In the course of talking about society, Park commented on the work of many others who have written about the same subject. The reader will find reference to many authors not commonly cited in the sociology of today. Park had little reverence for established departmental lines. In fact, he comments on the number of important sociological works not written by sociologists; and, in a paper

1. Volume I, Race and Culture (1950). Volume II, Human Communities (1952).

in this volume, he asserts that one of the obstacles to social research has been the attempt to fit social problems into the compartments of the existing social sciences. But let no one conclude that Park was not an enthusiast for the cause of sociology. Much of his writing is devoted to distinguishing the sociological way of looking at human society and conduct from other ways. The papers in the last section of this volume contain a major contribution to the running discussion of the relations of the social sciences to each other. Park puts sociology in the central place among them.

But the aim of those who have got these volumes together is not to comment on Park's work; it is to make it available so that others may read, judge and put his ideas into their proper place. Availability, it should be said, is a relative matter. There are quite a number of people who have available not merely Park's written work, but a store of memories. We perhaps do not read his words as they appear on the page to others, for every word recalls the man, his gestures, the circumstances in which he said this or that, the things which he said but did not write. We think we know what he meant by some phrase or other. For instance, there is a good deal of criticism of Park's tendency to write of processes as occurring in cycles: the race relations cycle, the cycle of change from sect to denomination, from conflict to accommodation. We who spent much time with him know him as one very sensitive to the contingencies which break up fixed sequences.

I myself remember vividly how, in one of the first of Park's classes I attended, he described the table before him, not as a thing, but as a resultant of the interaction of forces. If it stood there, apparently the same thing from one minute to the next, it was not because nothing was happening, but because so many things were happening. Before I knew it, my own thoughts got running on this question: What things must happen in order that the Ohio villages where most of my life had been spent might go on from year to year with the appearance of nothing having happened? I suddenly saw that, not change, but the dynamics of remaining the same, is the miracle which social science must explain. Once I was sensitized to this way of looking at society, it became apparent that any system of things is threatened by innumerable contingencies, from within and from without. Whenever I read Park's work on cycles, all of this comes to mind. I am sure he did not

say just what I have said here; he would say something fresh and contrasting, and better than what I write. Were he alive, he would have pushed much beyond the things he said in the years represented by this book. Park was perpetually unable to leave formulations alone; when he was in his eightieth year he would still go back to matters he had considered before and out of old thoughts create new ones.

This wealth of memory and association in which one's own thought is enmeshed with that of his master cannot be made fully available to succeeding generations of students. The work of a scholar must eventually be judged by people who know only his written words.

There are, however, other contingencies which affect the availability of a man's written words. One of his works, rather than others, is translated in to other languages. Some part of it is commented upon or quoted by those who write textbooks. Every social science, like every country and every institution, tends to get a conventional history with a certain few accepted heroic founders whose contributions are reduced to formulae to be reproduced in Ph.D. examinations. It is only by chance that I have lately learned that Tarde, he of *imitation,* bases his whole sociology on the idea that all society results from acts of faith; for example, one man believes that a word he utters will be understood in a certain way by another man. He acts on his belief. Interaction is thus set going. Tarde even wrote a book, *Psychologie économique*, in which *imitation* appears merely a minor by-product of the interaction of the beliefs, wants and wishes of men.

It may be that what Tarde, or Park, has to say on these subjects has long since been superseded by better statements based on new observations conducted in a more scientific manner. Both of them would certainly have hoped this would be so. Only those who read the works of these men will know whether it is indeed so. Those who do not read will not know; but theirs will be a more innocent lack of knowledge than that of those unfortunates who trust the clichés and stereotypes handed down from notebook to notebook, and perhaps even embalmed in the lecture notes of some professor.

Every student and scholar, no matter how avidly he reads, must choose among the many things written during or before his own time. Once one chooses to read, he should read a man; or at least

enough to get the full flavor of the man's thought. Whether or not, in reading Park, people find a system that suits the present state of social science, they will find the record of one man's stubborn, speculative but observant, wide-ranging attempt to understand human conduct and human society.

Park realized the peculiar humanity of that science which has humanity for its subject matter. Although few men of his time worked more effectively toward the description of social interaction in orderly generalizations tested by particular facts, yet he never allowed himself to fall into the error of conceiving either human society or the mind that studies it as a simply mechanical arrangement. His faith was in the power of the human mind always to gain new insights, to raise new questions with which to understand the world around us and with which to guide research.

The name of my late colleague, Louis Wirth, fittingly appears among those who helped edit these papers for publication. He died shortly after the second volume appeared; he was of about the age at which Park came to the University of Chicago and began the prodigious work reported in these volumes. Robert Redfield and Margaret Park Redfield have sensitively commented on the arrangement and titling of all, but more especially of this volume. Winifred Rauschenbush Rorty, research secretary to Professor Park when he was surveying race relations on the West Coast, has contributed supporting appreciation and understanding. Her husband, James Rorty, took volume two off the horns of a dilemma (The City and Human Ecology) by naming it *Human Communities.* I do not presume to thank any of them. I do, however, thank John D. Reid for his help in getting this volume in order, and for sorting and cataloguing the remaining papers, letters and unpublished notes and manuscripts of Professor Park. The Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago kindly made Mr. Reid's services avvailable. Professor and Mrs. J. Masuoka have been especially devoted partners in this labor of love.

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EVERETT CHERRINGTON HUGHES

June, 1954

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PART ONE: *Collective Behavior*

CHAPTER I

HUMAN NATURE AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR[1]

RECENT attempts to apply to the study of human conduct the methods of investigation first employed in the study of animal behavior have profoundly influenced the point of view not merely of psychology, but of social psychology and of sociology. Psychology, in becoming objective—that is to say, behavioristic—has emphasized what it calls overt response. Incidentally, consciousness either has been dismissed from any consideration whatever or has been relegated to the position of an incident in a cycle of events which begins with the physiological reflexes and terminates in an act; what Thurstone calls "the psychological act."[2]

What the students of animal behavior actually have done in their laboratories is to put animals under test conditions and then incite them to appropriate action. The mouse, in a maze, tries to find its way out. The lowly earthworm, which, as reported in a local newspaper, a Harvard professor sought to educate, was incited by hunger and the proximity of food to find the easiest and the least painful way of getting it. Under these circumstances the animal responded in every case, not to a single stimulus, but to a situation; and the response was not that of a single reflex or instinct, but that of the

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from the *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXII:5 (March, 1927), pp. 695-703.

1. This article appeared in *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, II, Heft 3 (September, 1926), pp. 209-23.

2. L. L. Thurstone, *The Nature of Intelligence* (New York, 1924).

organism as a whole. In other words, the response which the situation called forth was not a reaction, if we may be permitted to make a distinction, but an act. A reaction presupposes the existence of a reflex, habit, conditioned reflex, or pattern, in which the response to a stimulus is predetermined. But an act implies, relatively speaking, new adjustment, co-ordination, and integration of the existing physiological mechanism.

The thing which distinguishes an organism from a mere aggregation of individuals, or of parts, is the capacity for concerted action—the disposition of the parts, under certain conditions, to act as a unit. The structure of an organism, inherited or acquired, serves to facilitate this concerted action. This is as true of a social as of a biological organism. The fundamental differences between organisms, the character which permits us to arrange them in a progressive series, are the different degrees to which the different parts of which they are composed have been integrated and organized for the purpose of corporate action. What constitutes the organism, then, as distinguished from the mere assemblage of its parts, is, according to Child, an action-pattern, which controls and co-ordinates the reaction of the parts so as to give to the behavior of the organism the character which I have described as an act.

> We speak of organisms as individuals, meaning that each organism represents a more or less definite and discrete order and unity; in other words, a pattern, which not only determines its structure and the relations of its parts to each other, but enables it to act as a whole with respect to the world about it. . . . Organismic behavior is, then, the behavior of the organism as a whole as distinguished from the behavior of single parts. . . . On the other hand the integration of behavior is not limited by the individual organism. Organisms may be integrated into social groups of various sorts and orders of magnitude, and in such groups the behavior of the constituent individuals is more or less integrated into the social behavior of the group.[3]

On the whole, the social group behaves like an organism, and the differences between groups may be described in terms of the action-pattern which determines the behavior of each. The fundamental difference between a city and a village, from the point of view of sociology, is not the mere size of the aggregates or the number of individuals of which they are composed, but the degree to

3. Charles M. Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior* (New York, 1924).

which these different aggregates have been integrated and organized for concerted action. This suggests that in a study of the social group, as of the biological organism, the point of departure is, properly, not structure, but activity. The thing that gives a community the character of a society is not its structure, but its capacity for concerted action.

The capacity for corporate action is, to be sure, facilitated by structure, but is not dependent upon it. The crowd becomes a society, not by the mere fact that a group of persons are gathered together at a given moment and in a particular spot, but by the fact that this aggregation of individuals is capable of action. Action may take place in the crowd with a minimum of organization or with no organization at all, except what has been called by Le Bon "psychological organization."

Action is first; but the effect of action is to create an action pattern. This action pattern, as may be observed in the crowd, is frequently extremely fragile and ephemeral, and may exist without any clearly defined organization. Permanence of the action pattern, however, is dependent upon the existence of structure, upon a division of labor, and upon some degree of specialization in the individuals who compose the group. When the rôle of the individuals in the action of the group has become fixed in habit, and particularly when the rôle of different individuals and their special functions have become recognized in custom and tradition, the social organization gains a new stability and permanence which permits it to be transmitted to succeeding generations. In this way the life of the community and of society may be prolonged beyond the lives of the individuals who compose it.

Institutions and social structures of every sort may be regarded as products of collective action. War, famine, revolution, the struggle against an external enemy and against internal disorganization —any of the ordinary exigencies of communal and collective life which call for collective action—may set a social pattern which repetition fixes in habits, and which eventually become institutionalized in customs and traditions.

Looked at from the point of the individual organism or the individual member of a community, this functioning of the social group and this evolution of society and of institutions presents itself as a response, an accommodation, and eventually a biological adaptation of the individual to habitat; a physical environment and

a social milieu. In this habitat the individual becomes, in the course of time, a person, and perhaps a citizen.

The same forces which co-operate to create the characteristic social organization and the accepted moral order of a given society or social group determine at the same time, to a greater or lesser extent, the character of the individuals who compose that society. The individual inherits from his forbears and from a long series of his animal ancestors the potentialities which are realized in specific characters in the course of his association—particularly during childhood and adolescence—with his fellows. The extent to which these potentialities are actually realized and the specific forms which they eventually take is determined, not merely by the general conditions which every society and every social milieu imposes upon its members, but rather more by the extent to which, in any given society, a division of labor has been achieved. It is the division of labor, quite as much as anything else, which determines the degree to which the individual is dependent upon, and incorporated in, the social organization of which he is a member.

Adam Smith long ago recognized that the most striking differences between individuals are due to the division of labor. It is not that these differences were not implicit in the individuals themselves, existing there as potentialities, but it is the division of labor and the discipline imposed by society upon its members that has developed them.

> The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect, of the division of labor. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were perhaps very much alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do,

and there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talent. . . .

As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labor, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. . . . There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be carried on nowhere but in a great town.[4]

It is not, however, a division of labor, but the fact of social control that characterizes human society. It is not, in other words, the unconscious competition and co-operation of individual men and women within the limits of a human habitat that has impressed upon human nature and human society their most distinctive traits. It is rather the conscious participation in a common purpose and a common life, rendered possible by the fact of speech and by the existence of a fund of common symbols and meanings. The lower animals have neither words nor symbols; nothing, for them, has what we may describe as meaning. The lower animals have, in the words of Durkheim, no "collective representations." They do not organize processions and carry banners; they sing, and sometimes, we are told, even dance, but they do not celebrate; they acquire habits which are sometimes transmitted as a kind of social tradition, but they have no customs, and for them nothing is either sacred or lawful. Above all, the animals are natural and naïve, and not concerned, as human beings are, about their reputations and their conduct. They are not tortured by moral scruples. "They do not," as Walt Whitman has put it, "sweat and whine about their condition. They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins." And "over the whole earth there is not one that is respectable or unhappy'.'

But it is just this sort of behavior—which makes Walt Whitman, as he says, "sick," so that he thinks he could turn and live with the animals, "they are so placid and self-contained"—that is most characteristic of human nature and human behavior. For man is a creature such that when he lives at all, he lives in his imagination, and, through his imagination, in the minds of other men, who share with him not merely their possessions, but their hopes and their dreams. By suggestion, by imitation, by expressions of sympathy and antipathy, men invade one another's lives and participate

4. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,* Book I, chap. ii.

one with another in their efforts to direct, control, and give expression to their own conflicting impulses.

In human society every act of every individual tends to become a gesture, since what one does is always an indication of what one intends to do. The consequence is that the individual in society lives a more or less public existence, in which all his acts are anticipated, checked, inhibited, or modified by the gestures and the intentions of his fellows. It is in this social conflict, in which every individual lives more or less in the mind of every other individual, that human nature and the individual may acquire their most characteristic and human traits.

It is probably no mere historical accident, as I have said elsewhere, that the word "person," in its first meaning, is a mask. It is rather a recognition of the fact that everyone is always and everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a rôle. We are parents and children, masters and servants, teachers and students, clients and professional men, Gentiles and Jews. It is in these rôles that we know each other; it is in these rôles that we know ourselves.[5]

One thing that distinguishes man from the lower animals is the fact that he has a conception of himself, and once he has defined his rôle he strives to live up to it. He not only acts, but he dresses the part, assumes quite spontaneously all the manners and attitudes that he conceives as proper to it. Often enough it happens that he is not fitted to the rôle which he chooses to play. In any case, it is an effort for any of us to maintain the attitudes which we assume; all the more difficult when the world refuses to take us at our own estimates of ourselves. Being actors, we are consciously or unconsciously seeking recognition, and failure to win it is, at the very least, a depressing, often a heartbreaking, experience. This is one of the reasons why we all eventually conform to the accepted models and conceive ourselves in some one or other of the conventional patterns.

The consequence of this, however, is that we inevitably lead a dual existence. We have a private and a public life. In seeking to live up to the rôle which we have assumed, and which society has imposed upon us, we find ourselves in a constant conflict with ourselves. Instead of acting simply and naturally, as a child, respond-

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5. Robert E. Park, "Behind Our Masks," *Survey Graphic* (May, 1926), pp. 135-39.

ing to each natural impulse as it arises, we seek to conform to accepted models, and conceive ourselves in some one of the conventional and socially accepted patterns. In our efforts to conform, we restrain our immediate and spontaneous impulses, and act, not as we are impelled to act, but rather as seems appropriate and proper to the occasion.

Under these circumstances our manners, our polite speeches and gestures, our conventional and proper behavior, assume the character of a mask. Our very faces are living masks, which reflect, to be sure, the changing emotions of our inner lives, but which more and more tend to conform to the type we are seeking to impersonate. Not only every race, but every nationality has its characteristic "face," its conventional mask. As Emerson points out in his *English Traits,* "every religious sect has its physiognomy. The Methodists have acquired a face, the Quakers a face, the nuns a face. An Englishman will point out a dissenter by his manner. Trades and professions carve their own lines on faces and forms."

In a sense, and in so far as this mask represents the conception which we have formed of ourselves, the rôle which we are striving to live up to, this mask is our "truer self," the self we should like to be. So, at any rate, our mask becomes at last an integral part of our personality; becomes second nature. We come into the world as individuals, achieve character, and become persons.

Human behavior, so far as it can be distinguished from that of the lower animals, is conscious and conventional; socially controlled, in short. Behavior that is controlled in this way we may call conduct; that is to say, behavior morally sanctioned and subjectively conditioned. This subjectivity, so characteristic of human nature, is at once a condition and a product of collective life. So far as it is subjective it cannot be adequately described as the stricter sect of behaviorists insist it should be, in physiological terms; but so far as it is social it cannot be described in terms of individual behavior, and for this reason psychology, so far as it deals with persons and personality, inevitably becomes social psychology. The motives which compel men to commit suicide, to write poetry, and to go to war are frequently the outcome of long and painful conflict. The acts in which they terminate have, therefore, an antecedent history, and it is necessary to know this history to understand the acts. This is true of most overt acts, as it is of individual opinion, religious creeds, and political doctrines.

Opinions, creeds, and doctrines become intelligible to us only when we know their history; when we know, in other words, the experiences out of which they have sprung. The reason why history and biography exist is not merely to record overt acts, but to make them intelligible.

Not only is it true that we all participate directly or indirectly in making up the minds and determining the overt acts of our fellows, but the craving for this participation in a common life—the desire for sympathy, recognition, understanding, for example—is one of the most fundamental traits of human nature. Just as history is, to a very large extent, the record of the struggles of nations and peoples for prestige and status in an international society, so the humbler, more garrulous, and provincial chronicle of the local newspaper is largely a record of the conflicts of individual men and women in seeking to find a place and a position in some tribe, clan, neighborhood, or household.

It is because human actions must be interpreted in order to make them intelligible that documents—human documents—are more important for the study of human nature than statistics or formal facts. The documents are valuable, therefore, not merely because they describe events, but because they throw light upon motives; that is to say, upon the subjective aspects of events and acts in which human nature manifests itself. Not merely events, but institutions as well become intelligible when we know their histories, and particularly when we know the individual experiences of men and women in which they had their origin and on which they finally rest.

The most significant document, of course, is the one that is most expressive and revealing, and this, on the whole, has been the life-history, using that term in the sense in which Thomas and Znaniecki have defined it in their monumental study, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America.*[6]

If it is not practical or desirable to confine our investigations of human nature to the overt response, as the behaviorists define that term, the attempt to study human nature objectively has, at any rate, done sociology and social psychology a good turn in so far as it has directed attention to the psychological act rather than to the

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6. W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: Monograph of an Immigrant Group.* 5 vols. (Boston, 1918).

physiological reaction as a unit of investigation and analysis. For society, as well as mental life, has come into existence not merely in the efforts of individuals to act, but in their efforts to act collectively.

From this point of view the moral struggles of individual men and women and the political conflicts of nations turn out to be merely incidents in the processes by which society and social groups integrate and organize the individual units of which they are composed and mobilize them for collective action. Furthermore, just as the individual person may in some sense be conceived as the product of individual acts, so social institutions may be regarded as the product of collective actions. Just as custom in the group may be regarded as the objective aspect of habit in the individual, so morality in the individual may be construed as the subjective aspect of organization and morale in the group.

CHAPTER 2

THE SECT AND THE CROWD

SOME fifty-six years ago Charles Nordhoff, who had been in his day a sailor, a newspaper correspondent, and a writer for the magazines, wrote a book entitled, *The Communistic Societies of the United States.* The volume which records the author's personal observations of the societies he visited is written with no apparent preconceptions or doctrinaire notions with regard to the peoples and the institutions it describes, but manifests, rather, the uncommitted and wide-ranging curiosity of a man who had observed the world broadly and who was interested in these somewhat quaint and curious manifestations of human nature and collective life mainly for their own sake.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, while America still regarded itself as a refuge for the persecuted and the oppressed of Europe, the United States became what Russia at an earlier date had been, a haven for queer sects, religious and political. At the time Nordhoff wrote, most of these societies had already passed through the first period of exaltation and had reached the point in their life-cycle where they had settled down to a struggle with the prosaic realities of a free and secular society. Either the experiments had failed and the societies were in the process of dissolution, or they had, at any rate, lost the sense of high enterprise with which they had begun. This probably seemed to Nordhoff an appropriate

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Pauline Young, *The Pilgrims of Russian-Town* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), pp. xi-xx.

time to report upon the actual achievements of these Utopias and to learn from the peoples themselves how far their hopes and anticipations had been realized.

Most, if not all, of the communities Nordhoff visited were sectarian in character, although not all of them were what one could ordinarily describe as "religious." All were founded, at any rate, in order that the societies which supported them might have the security and the isolation necessary to enable them to establish and maintain a life-policy, or "way of life"—to use the language of religious discourse—that was more in accordance with their convictions as to what life should be than they had been able to achieve in the competitive, pecuniary, and individualistic society about them.

Anyone who has read Nordhoff's volume and has found himself interested in the questions which his observations raise, will find Dr. Young's more detailed and systematic study of a single sect interesting and instructive. *The Pilgrims of Russian-Town* may be regarded, in some sense, as a sequel to *The Communistic Societies of the United States.*

The Molokans are, to be sure, not precisely communistic, certainly not professedly so. On the other hand, they are not a competitive society, since life in the community is modeled on the familial pattern and all members regard themselves as brothers and sisters. The main point is, however, that the Molokans have "a way of life," and, as they believe, "a better way of life" than the people about them. This way of life prescribes for every member, in most of the more intimate and personal affairs of life, what each should or should not do. These prescriptions are, furthermore, relatively absolute and inalterable. They are not subject to revision by individual initiative or by any sort of referendum.

The ideal of such a society is unanimity in all things. It is of the nature of sects, not only religious but political, to be this way. It is this which distinguishes them from other forms and types of collective life.

This volume is concerned, first of all, with the Molokans themselves—not with the type of which they are so interesting an example. In substance it is a case history, an account at the same time of the varying fortunes of a primitive religious sect, transplanted from the isolation of a rural community in the Russian Caucasus to the seething and bustling activity of one of America's most rapidly changing cities.

In view of this fact, it seems appropriate to say something by way of introduction of a more general nature in regard to the character of sects, so far as that general character is known. As a matter of fact, very little that may be regarded as characteristic of sects is known. Until Sighele published his little volume on the subject, I do not suppose that sects were supposed to have any characteristics that were general and typical, although Le Bon classified them in his epoch-making volume on *The Crowd* as a type of homogeneous crowd.

Sighele, as his discussion of the subject indicates, was mainly concerned with political, rather than religious, sects and did not refer specifically to the differences between them. He did not, perhaps, regard these differences as particularly significant of fundamentals. A sect, as he described it, is a group of "individuals differing in birth, in education, in profession, in social status; but united and, indeed, voluntarily cemented by an extremely strong bond, a common faith and ideal."

Two things are peculiarly characteristic of sects as here defined: (1) the heterogeneity of its component elements and (2) the solidarity in which these divergent elements are bound together, once they are animated by a common ideal and a common faith. Sighele still thinks of a sect as in some sense a crowd, but "a crowd picked out and permanent. The crowd is a transitory sect which has not chosen its members. The sect is a chronic kind of crowd. The crowd is an acute kind of sect. The crowd is composed of a multitude of grains of sand without cohesion; the sect is a block of marble which resists every effort."[1]

It is a spontaneous and informal character of the sect—at least in its origins—that apparently leads writers in the field of collective psychology to identify it with crowds. The crowd is conceived as the most elementary form in which collective action takes place. Institutions have their origin, more often than is generally realized, in crowd movements.

Any faith, whether it be Islamism, Buddhism, Christianity, patriotism, socialism, anarchy, cannot but pass through this sectarian phase. It is the first step, the point where the human group, in leaving the twilight zone of the anonymous and mobile crowd, raises itself to a

1. Translated from S. Sighele, *Psychologie des sects*, pp. 42-51. Quoted in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 204.

definition and to an integration which may then lead up to the highest and most perfect human group, the nation.[2]

Institutions grow up, as Hughes has pointed out, because social movements never quite accomplish all they undertake to do. There is always "unfinished business"—something still to be done which is eventually turned over to a committee or to a secretariat, and eventually to a corps of permanent functionaries. This, at any rate, is one way in which institutionalization takes place in a secular society.[3]

Le Bon says that all mass movements have a religious character. That would mean that all institutions which grow out of mass movements have a religious origin. Le Bon's definition of religion and of the nature of the religious sentiment needs, perhaps, some qualification. It is, however, interesting and suggestive. He says:

> A person is not religious solely when he worships a divinity, but when he puts all the resources of his mind, the complete submission of his will, and the whole-souled ardour of fanaticism at the service of a cause or an individual who becomes the goal and guide of his thoughts and actions.[4]

With respect to the whole-souled devotion which individuals sometimes exhibit to a political faith which they profess, and with respect to the fanaticism with which they sometimes give themselves to a secular cause, there seems to be no difference between the members of a religious and political sect.

In any case, the distinctions between religious and political sects, though they are not always easy to make in particular instances, are not as fundamental as they seem. The essential difference between the two seems to be that religious sects, in describing their program as "a way of life," almost always project their life-policies and the Utopias they hope to achieve beyond the limits of human experience and control. This makes life in this world merely a preparation for a world that is to come. Political sects, on the other hand, are determined that such heavens as they hope for will be achieved presently, on this earth, and, as far as possible, here and now. In the long run this distinction involves a profound difference. The

2. Sighele, *op. cit.*

3. Everett Cherrington Hughes, *The Growth of an Institution: The Chicago Real Estate Board* (Chicago: published by the Society for Social Research, The University of Chicago, 1931).

4. Le Bon, *The Crowd* (London, 1897), p. 82.

political sects—i.e., the anarchists, socialists, communists, etc.—have a program of action—radical action. The religious groups—like the Quakers, Shakers, Holy Rollers, and others—are just as radical but, as far as political action is concerned, they are passive and resigned.

It is characteristic, at any rate, of those religious societies with which we are most familiar, that they, like Margaret Fuller, "accept the universe." They accept the universe and make no great effort to change existing political and social conditions. They are, however, profoundly conscious of their responsibilities for themselves. They are meticulous in conforming to the sectarian tabus and in maintaining the sectarian ritual. In short, they are concerned about their souls rather more than they are about politics. Political sects, on the other hand, are inclined to accept nothing and are prepared to assume—in a world where nothing is impossible—responsibility for all of us and everything.

The difference between the sects begins at the source, in the types of crowds in which they have their origins. The political crowd is the crowd that acts. It may be a mob. It may take the form of a strike. It is very frequently, at a time and place, an expression of what Bancroft calls "popular justice." This includes such manifestations as lynch law and such summary forms of justice as were administered by the vigilantes on the Pacific Coast. The political crowd is an extraverted group. The religious crowd, as typified in our religious revivals, is an expressive, sometimes an orgiastic crowd. Above all, it is introverted, turned inward, absorbed in its mystical experiences, and eventuates, finally, in what may be described as an introverted society—the religious sect.

The religious sect not only does not act in the sense that this is true of the political sect; rather it is disposed to withdraw from this world in order to preserve its faith in the next. Its energies find expression in ritual, sometimes in holy dances, as in the case of the Shakers and of the early Christians. What it seeks through these exercises and ecstasies is something approaching a collective trance, in which each individual has a sense of personal completeness, of mystic solidarity, and of community with every other individual in the group. It is in this way that the faith of the faithful is continuously renewed and the integrity of the organization and of its heritage is preserved.

Religious sects have in common with political, at least in the early stages of their evolution, a certain intransigency and, as I

have already said, a radicalism. They are both in origin conflict groups, and in both cases this conflict tends to assume a fundamental and revolutionary character.

Every revolution that is at all thoroughgoing—that is, in fact, anything more than a reform of existing abuses—seems likely to have its origin in a sect, ordinarily a political sect. It is in the ferment and fervor of sectarian life that new ideas and new ideals of life take form and make themselves articulate. The sect is radical, just because it seeks to formulate, not a new political program, but a new life-policy; and it is in the light of this new life-policy that every other more transient interest is viewed.

Political parties are characteristically accommodating and compromising, but the sect is intransigent and irreconcilable. Political parties formulate policies and seek to give consistency to their actions by making them conform to party doctrines. However, political doctrines and the practical inferences to be drawn from them are at least discussible. Not so in the case of the sect. Its rules of conduct are absolute. A political society in which but one party is recognized and but one party rules inevitably assumes, in the long run, the form of a theocracy, in which the ruling party is merely the ruling sect.

It is in some such frame of reference and from such a point of view as here indicated that one needs to view the case of the Molokans if that case is to contribute to an understanding of sects in general and of the particular type of sect of which the Molokans are a specific instance.

Any attempt to look at religious sects or any other form and type of collective behavior in the formal, objective, and comparative way here suggested inevitably leaves out of consideration the intense, vivid, and often tumultuous subjective life of the sect—the internal tensions, conflicts, repressions, and sublimations incident to the effort of the sect to maintain the integrity of its collective life and to act consistently in accordance with the prescriptions of its self-enforced discipline.

It is quite probable that if one were permitted, in the first instance, to dig deep enough into the memories and experiences of individual sectarians, he would find somewhere in their histories the record of incidents and accidents which would account for much of their ritual, belief, and sectarian behavior generally that now seems quite unintelligible. Most of the behavior of individuals,

and of societies, that strikes us as eccentric is undoubtedly subjectively, rather than objectively, conditioned. Tabus, ritual, and creeds have certainly arisen at different times in the efforts of societies to act, and, above all, to act consistently, that is to say, in accordance with some program, moral code, or rule of conduct. Most of these codes, rules of conduct, usages, and ceremonies which have now become traditional might be explained, if their whole early history was known, as an expression or organ of some normal or perverted social function.

In any case, the effort to act consistently in accordance with a program involves the necessity of maintaining tension at a high level and over a considerable period of time. The necessity of relaxation after such a period of tension, and of new integration and concentration after a period of relaxation, accounts for a good many of our holy days and a good many of our holidays. There are days when we go into retreat, to gather ourselves together, to redefine our life-purposes and reform our life-programs. There are other days, however, when we relax and permit ourselves all sorts of extravagances and absurdities. Most every historical society will be found to have its periods of revivals and renewal of faith as well as its saturnalia and periods of license. This is just as likely to be true of religious sects as of other societies.

What seems to be peculiar about these introverted societies we classify as "sects" is that either individually or collectively they have at some time or times in their history been balked in their efforts to act. We may express it by saying that they have suffered some sort of psychic trauma, from the consequences of which they have never fully recovered.


In society, inhibitions take the form of socially sanctioned tabus. A mildly compulsive idea may take the form in the sect—or other form of society, for that matter—of ritual. Creeds seem frequently to have their origin in the conflicts of religious societies with other religious societies. Creeds are frequently rationalizations of practices and of rites which may have arisen historically out of conditions to which there are no references in the formulated creeds.

The author of this volume has not attempted anything like a Freudian interpretation of the practices of the Molokan sect. For the purposes of this volume no such interpretation is called for. What the story of *The Pilgrims of Russian-Town* offers the stu-

dent of human nature, and particularly the student of religious sects, is, however, if not a psychoanalytic analysis, at least a sympathetic account of the customs, the attitudes, and, in general, of the *inner life* of the sect at a critical period of its history.

This study, which is the fruit of five years of patient investigation, was made possible in the first instance, not only because the author had the good fortune to possess a fluent reading and speaking knowledge of the Russian language, but also because she was able to penetrate into the inner sanctum of Molokanism. This has enabled her to perform, for the Russian sectarians themselves and for the American public, a task that neither could well perform for themselves. Through her interpretations of their experience, the Molokans have been enabled to achieve a more adequate conception of themselves and of their peculiar problems in America than they would otherwise have done. This study has assisted in orienting the Colony to its social environment. It has served, at the same time, to interpret these interesting folk both to their neighbors and to the American public in a way to make their intercourse in the future less difficult and more fruitful than it has been in the past.

CHAPTER 3



THE STRIKE

THE literature of strikes is extensive, but it is, for the most part, historical rather than sociological. It is concerned, therefore, with events rather than things, with programs and policies rather than with social processes and human nature.

The labor movement has, one may say, had its origin in the strike, and labor organizations have come into existence in order, on the one hand, to make strikes effective; and on the other, to make them unnecessary. This volume, however, is not immediately concerned with the labor movement, with collective bargaining, with class conflict, nor with most of the other matters which have engaged the attention of historical scholars and students of social politics. It deals less with policy than with practice, and seeks to give a naturalistic rather than a philosophical account of the phenomena of the strike, seeking to distinguish its different typical forms, inquiring into its etiology, and dealing with it in general as a describable aspect of human nature and social life.

It will serve to put this study of the strike into its proper perspective if it is regarded as, in some sense, a sequel to an earlier volume in this series, *The Natural History of Revolution*, by Lyford P. Edwards. War, revolution, and the strike are, fundamentally considered, elementary forms of political action. They are, in other words, forms in which issues are raised, forced upon the attention of a sometimes reluctant public, and eventually, in some fashion,

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settled. It may seem at first blush that a proceeding which substitutes action for discussion—seeks to justify itself by force rather than by arbitration—is in no sense to be compared with the more orderly and dignified procedure of the courts where issues are dealt with according to law.

In the presence of the disturbances which the conflicts of employer and employee have occasioned, the public has been, on the whole, in the position of an innocent bystander, uncertain about its own interests and divided in its sentiments. The public has been particularly helpless and unable to act in regard to strikes, mainly because there has been no generally accepted law in accordance with which these disputes could be settled to the satisfaction of all the parties and all the interests involved.

On the other hand, the public has, in the long run, as Professor Hiller has pointed out, made the rules of the game and decided the issues. It has done this without recourse to courts of arbitration or of law. Nevertheless, the public has been, in all these disputes, the final arbiter. In this sense, at least, one may say that the strike is a form of political action. In so far as this is true, the study of the strike may be regarded as a contribution to our knowledge of the political process.

Political action is possible, no doubt, because man is a "political animal." But the ways in which men actually achieve concerted action, build up social organizations, and maintain morale in them constitute some of the most obscure and least understood problems in the whole field of human behavior. Not that the thing is not done, but for some reason not wholly clear almost no attempt has been made to study the method of doing it objectively and disinterestedly. Some years ago when Le Bon first published his book, *The Crowd,* we were led to expect, or to hope, that there would shortly be in existence a body of knowledge, based upon detailed studies, which would go far toward explaining actual politics and collective behavior generally. But these expectations have not been realized. The "psychological crowd," as Le Bon conceived it, is, to be sure, an obvious instance of concerted action, interesting because, in this case, it is achieved without formal organization or leadership. But the crowd dissolves with the occasion that brings it into existence. How the transition is made from this passing, ephemeral and spontaneous organization to a more formal, permanent, and self-conscious one, such as we have in the strike, in revolution, and in

social movements generally, neither Le Bon nor any later writer, with the possible exception of Theodor Geiger, has really attempted to explain.[1] This is a central theme of the present volume.

A social movement, such as the one here reviewed, seems, when looked at casually, to be a mere series of episodes—public meetings, discussions, accompanied by intermittent clashes and minor encounters with the existing order. On the other hand, the strike, as the author of this volume conceives it, is not a series of independent episodes but a cycle of typical events which take place in a more or less regular and predictable way.

No doubt every social movement tends to pass through a series of typical phases. Every political action, including war, revolution, and reform, assumes at the outset the character of a collective gesture. What takes place is expressive merely. Someone is agitated and his very agitation makes him, without any ulterior motive on his part, an agitator. If his sentiments thus expressed find an echo in other minds, this expression assumes the character of "public sentiment." Public sentiment thus aroused expresses itself, perhaps, in a spontaneous and unpremeditated public demonstration. At this point the necessity for some organization and direction makes itself felt. Agitation turns out to be a serious business. What was a gesture assumes the form of a political movement. It becomes important that the movement be directed with foresight in order that it may achieve its end. In attempting to direct such a social movement the leaders develop some sort of technique for maintaining discipline within the ranks and strategy in dealing with the enemy outside.

A study of this technique and of these tactics throws light upon the nature of social movements and collective action generally. Thus there is much in a study of the strike that throws light upon political strategy, public opinion, and upon all the conscious devices and unconscious mechanisms by which morale is maintained in conflict groups.

While a strike may be regarded as a single collective act in which minor clashes and individual cases of violence are incidents, every individual strike may be regarded as a single episode in a larger revolutionary movement, a movement of which the participants are perhaps only dimly conscious.

1. Theodor Geiger, *Die Masse und Ihre Aktion: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Revolutionen,* Berlin, 1926.

One thing, therefore, which lends interest to studies in this field is that they indicate how, and how far, the principles that Le Bon and other writers in collective psychology have used to make concerted action in the crowd intelligible can be carried over and used to interpret those more persistent and more important forms of collective action that we call social movements.

CHAPTER 4

REVOLUTION

IN MAY, 1923, there appeared over the signature of Lyford P. Edwards, and in the *Bulletin* of St. Stephens College at Annandale-on-Hudson, a little paper of some seven pages, entitled "Mechanisms of Revolution." What distinguished this paper from most other literature on this subject was its emphasis—as its title suggests—on what may be called the "phenomenal" and "naturalistic" as contrasted with the "historical" aspects of these catastrophic changes in social life and institutions that we call "revolutions."

This paper, in short, is an attempt to give an outline, not a history, not even—to use a term made familiar by Frederick J. Teggart—"a comparative history," but a natural history, of revolution. Revolutions, it is here assumed, are describable in general and in conceptual terms; they may even turn out to be, like earthquakes, measurably predictable. The "mechanisms" involved, of course, are social and mental.

In substance, the present volume is an expansion of this first brief sketch. Naturally the whole conception of the subject has been enlarged and modified in the process of elaboration and in the attempt to check up, by reference to concrete historical materials, notions that in the outline are described abstractly and formally.

The literature of revolution has already familiarized us with

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the notion that revolutions can be, and in fact have been, systematically provoked and incited. These larger and more inclusive social movements can be carried on and directed in ways and by methods which are, to be sure, different, but at any rate comparable with those employed in labor strikes. Revolution has, in fact, been conceived as a form of strike, a "general strike," so called. As strikes, local in origin, become more widely extended, involving wider areas of the organized and institutional life of the community, they assume the character of revolutions.

All this suggests that perhaps there is already in existence a revolutionary tradition and a body of more or less clearly defined and generally accepted tactics for carrying on revolutionary agitation and conducting revolutionary movements. But if there are recognized tactics for conducting revolutions, and if there is, so to speak, a revolutionary technique, this, of itself, presupposes the existence of something generic and typical in these movements—something that can be described in general terms. It presupposes, in short, the existence of materials for a scientific account of revolution, since science—natural science—in the long run is little more than a description in conceptual terms of the processes by which events take place, together with explanations which permit events to be predicted and controlled. Every attempt to control social change may be regarded as a kind of social experiment. A description and an interpretation of these experiments is precisely the business of the social sciences.

A good deal that has been written concerning revolution has emphasized the difference between social changes which are revolutionary and those which are evolutionary. In such cases discussion is centered about the value and the legitimacy of evolutionary as over against revolutionary change. With this matter of the relative desirability of one form of social change over another, neither this nor any other scientific study is immediately concerned. What a naturalistic account of revolutions seeks is such a description of the revolutionary phenomena as will tell us not what ought to happen, but what very probably will happen; not what we should do, but what we can do, in a given situation. If revolutions can be made, they can at the same time be prevented; and a study of the conditions under which ordinarily and naturally they seem to arise should throw some light on the way they have been and can be dealt with. Furthermore, the contrast between evolutionary and

revolutionary changes, from the point of view of this volume at least, is fictitious and misleading. It is the very first assumption of the natural history of revolutions that these catastrophes are themselves the product of an evolutionary process. A natural history, in fact, is nothing more nor less than an account of an evolutionary process—a process by which not the individual but the type evolves. Revolution is not, it seems to me, adequately characterized as change, either progressive or catastrophic, but rather as a more specific type of what we may describe as "collective action." Like war, revolution is a movement which invariably, in its latter phases at any rate, inflames the imagination and projects itself in advance of action, in the form of an ideal. This is not true, of course, of every form of social change. Revolution, as the author somewhere suggests, is to be compared and contrasted with such other types of collective action as reform and fashion, perhaps also with migration. All these forms of change are dominated and controlled by some kind of collective representation, to use Durkheim's expression. It is the existence of this collective representation which converts change into action.

As a matter of fact, excepting war, religion, and romantic love, nothing in ordinary human experience has so inflamed the imagination of men, encouraged so many romantic illusions, or broken so completely with the ordinary routine of existence, as has been true of revolution. Wars have been more destructive, but wars have been defensive as well as aggressive; they have been carried on to gain territory or to hold it, to achieve political power or to maintain it. It is only when wars have been fought to realize some romantic ideal—freedom, for example—that they have changed profoundly and immediately the traditional aims and tendencies of our common life. It is because, and in so far as, revolutions have been dominated by collective representations, that they set themselves off as special forms of social change. They are a type, as I have already said, of collective action.

On the other hand, revolutions, as Mr. Edwards has pointed out, are invariably the effects of long and silent changes which have been felt but not fairly faced nor fully understood. It is only in the later stages, when these changes have projected themselves into the consciousness of men and proclaimed themselves in banners and slogans and utopian myths, that they have assumed the forms of a revolution, as common sense conceives it.

In their earlier stages revolutions may be compared to industrial and business crises. When industrial and business crises get into the field of politics they assume the character, sometimes, at any rate, of revolutions. Revolutions, in fact, are frequently merely the reverberation in politics of prolonged industrial and economic depressions. It is one of the conclusions of this volume, with which, I might add, I am not at present in perfect and complete agreement, that all revolutions have been and will continue to be economic in their origin. It follows that if we could control the economic and industrial processes, revolution as a social phenomenon would cease to exist.

Like industrial crises, revolutions, when they do occur, tend to describe, in their evolution, a characteristic cycle of change. Every social change that is capable of description in conceptual terms, will have, as in this case, its characteristic cycle. This is one of the presuppositions upon which this study is based. As a matter of scientific method, this description of the cycle seems to be the first step in the analysis and description of social change everywhere. It is, on the whole, all, or nearly all, that the present study has attempted to do. In fact, it is as far, or nearly as far, as any systematic study has attempted to go. At most these studies have described, or sought to describe, the revolutionary cycle. It would seem that what remains to be done is to reduce this revolutionary cycle not merely to a conceptual but to a temporal sequence, one in which the series of changes through which every revolutionary movement tends to pass are so determined and accurately described that they can be measured in temporal units. This involves a much more complete analysis of revolutionary processes than thus far has been anywhere measurably achieved. It is perhaps an impossible task, demanding a precision that is quite beyond the present limits of the social sciences. No such precision is attempted here. This volume should serve, however, as an introduction to a field in which much has been written but in which there has been very little systematic observation. If its conclusions, considering the nature of the problem, seem premature or not wholly justified by all the known facts, nevertheless it has at the very least defined for us the task which remains to be done.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL PLANNING AND HUMAN NATURE

I. HUMAN NATURE

GRAHAM WALLAS in his little treatise on *Human Nature and Politics* makes, by way of introduction, casual reference to a personal experience which suggests the nature of the problem with which his book and this paper are mainly concerned. He says: "In my last election I noticed that two of my canvassers, when talking over the day's work, used independently the phrase, 'It *is* a queer business.' "

On another occasion, he adds, he heard much the same words used by professional political agents "whose efficiency depends on their seeing electoral facts without illusion." Still later, in talking over his experience with members of the Paris Municipal Council, he "seemed to detect in some of them a good humored disillusionment with regard to the workings of a democratic electoral system."

The notion that the task, which a democratic scheme of government imposes, of winning every now and then an election, is a queer and baffling business, is one that is likely to follow a more intimate acquaintance with practical politics anywhere. It is based in part no doubt on a lack of understanding of the political process itself, but is due in part, also, to the natural optimism of mankind that leads one, in the ardor of promoting a political cause,

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to expect too much of human nature and sometimes leave it altogether out of the reckoning.

In order to get the attention of the voter it is necessary to capture his imagination. In order to make him move and march it is necessary to have music and banners, and an immense amount of (what is popularly described as) ballyhoo.

It is probable, also, that the notion that electioneering is a queer business merely reflects a kind of general disenchantment that eventually overtakes the man who starts out to inspire and lead the masses, and discovers that his real task is to follow and try to manage them.

Practical politicians do not often discuss in public the mysteries of their profession. When they do there is often a note of cynicism in what they say, suggesting that their present realism had not been achieved without the loss of certain illusions.

Candid accounts of what actually happens behind the scenes in the conduct of political parties and in the management of labor organizations are likely to be disconcerting and disillusioning to the innocent bystander.

It is notorious that lawyers have a poor opinion of juries and they are likely in private conversation to be most enlivening when they are describing the personal eccentricities of judges on the bench. These anecdotes certainly throw an interesting light upon judicial procedure but one can detect in them that same good humored, not to say irreverent, disillusionment to which Graham Wallis refers.

Other professions, which have to deal with the public as individuals, that is, in succession, or in the mass, are not exempt. Physicians know that, in actual practice, success depends not merely on professional skill but upon a certain amount of tact in dealing with the frailties of human nature.

Doctors have to tolerate a good deal of medical superstition in their patients. They have discovered that black pills are best for white folk and white pills for black; that in provincial communities it is still advisable to wear whiskers; and that in general it is important to take human nature into the reckoning.

In the newspaper profession one has to distinguish between the editorial writer and the reporter. The former, when he takes himself seriously, as he sometimes does, is likely to conceive himself as a minor prophet, or at any rate as a leader and inspirer of

public opinion. The news editor and reporter, on the other hand, think more realistically about the public and the profession. It is their business to get and print the news, and make the public read it. Most newspaper men have a poor opinion of the public.

Arthur Brisbane, one of the most distinguished members of the profession, is reported to have said, in explaining the policy of the Hearst papers, that the public is like a baby in the bath. You have to drum on the bath tub to keep it amused while you labor to improve its condition.

The principle upon which the newspaper actually operates is one that was casually enunciated by my friend Alexander Johnson. Someone asked him how it was he was able to speak to, and interest, all sorts and conditions of people. He said: "Well, the fact is, I was once head of an institution for the feeble minded. I had to speak every Sunday morning. I found that if you can speak to the feeble minded you can speak to anyone."

I am recording these somewhat disquieting observations upon the actual workings of our social institutions, not because they suggest that reform is urgent and necessary—as no doubt it is—but rather because they indicate the kind of problem that arises at the end of the political process rather than at the beginning, the problem, namely—human nature being what it is—of making any social program, no matter how well planned, work.

The thing that makes business, politics, and human intercourse generally, exciting and chancy, is the presence of this more or less incalculable human factor.

The man who makes a discovery; invents some new gadget—anything, idea or artifact—designed to add something to the sum total of existing cultural values discovers that it is not enough to produce something of value. He has to sell it.

One reason that electioneering seems a queer business is probably due to the fact that the candidate attempts to deal with the electorate in accordance with the democratic assumption that every voter is a rational human being, quite capable of acting wisely, independently, and in the public interest, if only he is afforded the temporary protection and seclusion of a voting booth. He discovers, however, that most men are timid, irrational, and sentimental creatures, controlled by all sorts of personal interests and irrational affections and antipathies.

Graham Wallis' statement of the matter is that political think-

ing in the past has assumed a degree of intellectuality in mankind that mankind never really possessed. The human nature with which he is concerned in the volume to which I have referred is that pre-rational and nonrational behavior which complicates the political processes everywhere, and on which the tactics of practical politicians are based.

Other writers, many, perhaps, even in recent times, James Bryce among them, have recognized that political science is based finally on a knowledge of human nature. In his *Modern Democracies* he remarks that in human societies there is one "constant," one element or factor which is practically always the same and the basis of all the so-called societies. This is human nature itself.

This is, as George Catlin who quotes it remarks, a highly ambiguous statement, but it does recognize the fact that has been recently recognized elsewhere that the social sciences, including economics and politics, are fundamentally sciences of human relations.[1]

In emphasizing the human factor in politics, I am attacking the problem of social planning, so to speak, from the rear, i. e., not from the point of its program but from the point of view of its administration. I am emphasizing the fact that social planning is social politics, and that some of the most difficult problems it has to face are not in the field of legislation but of administration.

I might add that I am not unaware of the larger question that lies on the margin of this enquiry: the question, namely, whether there are any limits to the extent and rapidity with which changes —planned or not—can go on within the structure of an existing social and political order without destroying it. The question has been raised whether social planning, on any extensive scale, can go on within the limits of any free and secular society. Free societies, it has been asserted, grow; they are not planned.

II. UTOPIA

Social planning is an ancient art, which has achieved in recent years, a new vogue. It is, in fact, as old as politics and like politics, had its origin in the city, in the *polis*, and in the problems of civilized and sophisticated existence such as the conditions of city life permit and enforce.

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1. Bryce, James, Modern Democracies, Vol. I, p. 14. Catlin, George, The Science and Method of Politics.

Social planning, of some sort, we have always had. The social worker who attempts to formulate for a client a program of social rehabilitation is in some sense engaged in social planning.

Ordinarily the task of the social agency is to meet a present and pressing emergency. But it is the experience of social agencies that a very considerable number of the cases they are called on to deal with are recurrent. This often calls for a more elaborate program, covering a longer period, and concerned with more aspects of the individual's personal and family life, and in the end, perhaps, involving the client's whole career. Frequently what was originally a personal and family problem impinges on local custom and eventually on the structure of society, and can not be adequately dealt with without some modification or reform of the existing social structure. At this point what was originally conceived to be a personal and family emergency turns out to be a social problem. This is, in fact, one of the ways in which movements for reform originate. This is typically the way social planning, on a small scale, begins.

But social problems are not wholly solved by changing the form or structure of society. It is necessary that the new social order should be understood, accepted and eventually incorporated into the habits, traditions and mores of the community. In this way it becomes a part of the routine and of the conventions of an established social order which, because it is customary and unconscious, may be said to enforce itself. Thus the social worker's task of securing the cooperation of the client in the program of his own rehabilitation is typical of the problem which arises everywhere in the effort to make social programs effective.

I might add, in parentheses, that in dealing with this very practical problem professional case workers may get some help from psychiatry but very little from psychology or sociology.

As these studies are now organized they are not designed to profit by what doctors, lawyers, newspaper men, and the police have learned about human nature, not to mention what colonial administrators have learned in their efforts at dealing with primitive and alien peoples.

Science seems to be cut off from all those sources of insight and knowledge on methodological grounds. It appears that the more scientific psychology and the social sciences have become

the more they are restricted to the study of those aspects of human life that are neither characteristically human nor social.

Social planning, on a grand scale, such as has been recently undertaken in Russia and in some other European countries, has come into existence as the result of a revolution. but the task of putting the new social order into effect has involved the new societies in the same kind of problem that the social worker faces: the problem of getting the cooperation of the individual in whose habits and customs the new order, if it is established at all, must eventually take root.

The first social planners, in the grand style, were what we may describe as the Utopians. From Plato to Patrick Geddes, there has always been a Utopian strain in social thinking, which has frequently found expression in projects for the creation, somewhere, of a perfect city and an ideal state.[2]

Where these remained mere projects, and no attempt was made to set them up in a real world, they have at least made men more keenly conscious of the limitations and defects of the world in which they were living, by contrast with the spaciousness and perfection of the world of which they dreamed. In this way they have contributed measurably in creating a public opinion and a political power that has functioned elsewhere in some less romantic social enterprise. Social unrest and discontent with existing conditions, as practical politicians understand, is an important source of political power, provided it does not find—and sometimes when it does—expression in religious movements. Religious movements are ordinarily directed rather toward the reformation of human nature and the moral order than the economical and political structure of society.

On the other hand, when serious attempts have been made to establish these planned societies—and the number of such attempts is larger than most of us imagine—they have usually failed and the movements they inspired have been—to use communist phraseology —liquidated.

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2. With the exception, perhaps, of Aristotle's politics it was not until the publication of Machiavelli's *The Prince* that literature affords an example of a man who thought realistically and in the modern manner in the field of politics and social science, seeking to describe, not the sort of state men should desire, but rather how, human nature being what it is, such political society as existed could hope to survive in the world in which it found itself.

It is, however, worth noting that these Utopian enterprises lasted longer when they rested on a religious than upon economic foundations.

In this connection I might add that the ultimate success of the communist regime in Russia probably depends more upon its ability to propagate and establish a new and essentially religious faith —than upon the merits of its economic program. Meanwhile the actual central authority in this new imperium—the Federation of Soviet Republics—seems to rest in a politico-religious sect—the so-called communist party, which requires repeated and more or less regular purgings, to discipline backsliders and keep the faith pure and undefiled.

To political realists these historic Utopias to which I have referred are mere "flights from reality" which belong to the realm of poetry rather than the world of fact. To dismiss them because they are unreal and impracticable is, however, to overlook the role in collective action of what Sorel calls the "social myth."

In his volume *Reflections on Violence,* Sorel discusses candidly and acutely the function in revolutionary movements of the myth of the General Strike.

"The myth," he says, "must be judged as a means of acting on the present; any attempt to discuss how far it can be taken literally as future history is devoid of sense . . . even supposing the revolutionaries to have been wholly and entirely deluded in setting up this imaginary picture of the general strike, this picture may yet have been, in the course of the preparation for the revolution, a great element of strength, if it has embraced all the aspirations of socialism, and if it has given to the whole body of revolutionary thought a precision and a rigidity which no other method of thought could have given."[3]

The Utopian myth, as he conceives it, is a social symbol rather than a social plan. Its function is, at one and the same time, to mobilize and discipline the masses by giving an "aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action"—not that action is possible, but because, as he says, by this method more easily than by any other "men can reform their desires, passions and mental activity."

"Strikes," he adds a little later, "have engendered in the prole-

3. Sorel, Georges, Reflections on Violence, pp. 133-37.

tariat the noblest, deepest, and most moving sentiments they possess."[4]

III. THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Utopian communities have been described as attempts to solve the problems of a real world by taking refuge in a world that is visionary and unreal. But there is always likely to be a visionary and unreal element in social planning, due to the fact that social programs must be conceived and formulated, finally, in ways that are designed to capture the imagination of the people whose world they seek to improve. Otherwise they are not likely to gain the cooperation they require to be successful.

The difficulty with planned Utopias, as with more modest programs of reform, is that they seek to create a new and ideal society out of the same human elements of which the old society was composed.

Social planners have not always reckoned with human and political aspects of their problem. They have assumed that society is to such an extent an artifact that if the formal structure of existing institutions, and the material conditions on which the social order rests are changed, human nature and the moral order would presently respond.

There seems to be implied in the popular conception of "social lag" the notion that, in the long run, human nature always responds and eventually conforms to material conditions. No doubt it does, but sometimes it responds in ways that are neither expected nor desired.

As a matter of fact human nature and social institutions are not wholly the product of the environment, even if you define human environment as just the things to which human nature does respond. Furthermore society and the existing moral order are ordinarily so well established in tradition, custom and the personal habits of individuals that they cannot be suddenly decreed or legislated out of existence.

Once the significance of this fact is understood it emphasizes the necessity of providing in social planning a sufficiently extended period of enlightenment and education in which to make the accommodation necessarily involved in the transition from an old to a new social order.

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4. *Ibid.*

Not only do such social plans and programs need to be advertised and promoted, in order to gain acceptance, but they need to make them effective, to be administered with some reference to and understanding of local tradition and existing customary order. The Tennessee Valley project will probably furnish, before it is completed, an instructive illustration. The whole theory of local self-government which, in spite of recent changes, still has some validity, is based on a recognition of these local differences of tradition and culture.

Originally, it would seem, local institutions came into existence and grew up quite naturally like the plants, and in that case the distinction between human nature and the existing moral order, to which John Dewey refers so feelingly in the introduction to his volume on Human Nature and Conduct, probably did not exist.[5]

It is notorious that among primitive man there is very little evidence of that intense subjective life of which more civilized and sophisticated people are often so painfully conscious.

Lord Olivier, in speaking of primitive man referred to his life as "a full cup." By this he meant that in savage society the habits of individuals so completely conformed to what was customary and expected that the sense of human nature as something, not only different, but in conflict with the social order, did not present itself to men's minds at all.[6]

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5. Morality is largely concerned with controlling human nature. When we are attempting to control anything we are acutely aware of what resists us. So moralists were led, perhaps, to think of human nature as evil because of its reluctance to yield to control, its rebelliousness under the yoke. But this explanation only raises another question. Why did morality set up rules so foreign to human nature? The ends it insisted upon, the regulations it imposed, were after all outgrowths of human nature. Why then was human nature so averse to them? . . . The fact which is forced upon us when we raise this question is the existence of classes. Control has been vested in an oligarchy. Indifference to regulation has grown in the gap which separates the ruled from the rulers. Parents, priests, chiefs, social censors have supplied aims, aims which were foreign to those upon whom they were imposed, to the young, laymen, ordinary folk; a few have given and administered rule, and the mass have in a passable fashion and with reluctance obeyed.—John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 1 and 2.

6. When a race has established and maintained itself for generations in a consistent environment—a primitive race not reaching as yet a very high degree of civilization—and has staved off the disadvantageous effects of excess of population by means of birth control, infanticide, organized emigration, or moderate chronic war with its neighbors, it will have fitted all its bodily adaptation and the processes of its daily life so fully into the mould of its natural

That was before the era of social planning; before the era of legislation and reform and of the efforts to create social institutions by reflection and by fiat.

It is probably, as Dewey suggests, not until the social engineers began to reconstruct society in accordance with some preconceived plan—not until the days of reform and revolution—that "Man's nature has been regarded with suspicion, with fear, with sour looks, sometimes with enthusiasm for its possibilities but only when these were placed in contrast with its actualities."

It is true in America as elsewhere—but probably less true here than in most other parts of the world—that local institutions have evolved slowly, and become what they are by a process of gradual adaptation. On the whole, however, as our political system had its birth in revolution so most of our social institutions have been—not planned to be sure—but produced by a continuous series of minor eruptions and reforms.

The situation has been further complicated in recent years by the multiplication of so-called pressure groups interested in promoting some single measure of reform. The result has been that innovating social legislation has been initiated through the efforts of amateur politicians, who were out of office; while the task of administering this legislation has fallen to the professionals, who were in.

This may seem a fair division of labor but the effect has been that when we speak of politics in the United States, we do not think of political policies and social programs in the Aristotelian sense, but of some unofficial organization and activity, not always understood or countenanced by the community, that is designed, perhaps, "to get out the vote" or perform some other incidental but necessary function that was not originally provided for in the plans of our democracy when it was young and new.

If these somewhat casual references to actual politics are at all

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surroundings that it will not be conscious of itself as other than a part of nature. Such a race, in the vigor of its maturity, is a full cup; its form is saturated to the skin with the energy that has forced it into the natural mould of its life; it is sensitive at the surface reacting immediately according to its own native impulse, not critical of its motives and instincts, not hesitant between feeling and action, thought and word, not sceptical where it believes. It is very fully aware of the things of its own world; it is not aware of, and does not imagine, things outside of it. The invisible, for that race, abuts entirely upon, and is concerned only with, its own visible world.—Lord Olivier, White Capital and Colored Labor, pp. 33 and 34.

convincing they will serve to suggest, at least, the place and function of social planning in the political process. The political process, as here conceived, may be said to begin at the point where formal programs and planned political action supersedes the evolutionary processes by which, in every stable society, a body of tradition and culture slowly accumulates, under the influence of which succeeding generations of men are gradually disciplined and domesticated.

The political process thus defined necessarily interrupts to some extent the customary social order and disturbs some or all of the vested interests.

Even those insidious, minor and slow-burning revolutions we call social movements—the labor movement, for example—by which old institutions are changed and new ones come into existence, if they move too rapidly and are at any time too numerous are likely to prove profoundly disturbing. For this reason the political process can only proceed in a relatively orderly way in so far as it generates a political power and authority capable of enforcing a certain degree of order and discipline until a new equilibrium has been achieved and the changes which the new programs initiated have been assimilated, digested and incorporated with the folkways of the original and historic society.

I might add that the political process, conceived in these very general terms, will operate everywhere in substantially the same fashion—in Moscow, Berlin, and Chicago—irrespective of the particular form of the government in power. This is true because every government, in order to survive and flourish, must secure eventually the consent and cooperation of the people it seeks to govern.

"It is," as the historian and philosopher Hume once said, "on opinion that government is founded; and that maxim extends to the most despotic and the most military governments as well as the most popular and free."[7]

In writing this passage Hume had in mind, no doubt, not merely that opinion which gets registered in popular elections; not merely those opinions in which men rationalize their changing responses to current events—opinions likely to be swayed by every wind of doctrine. Under opinion he included, in addition

7. Hume's Essays, Chap. IV. The First Principles of Government.

to these transient changes of mood and attitude, that body of non-rational and relatively unchanging attitudes and sentiments which have grown up in the course of the history of every permanent and well established society, and constitute an invisible, and so to speak, underground foundation which supports a superstructure of explicit and formal legislation, like the traffic regulations of which we are all the more keenly aware because we are always butting into them and getting hurt.

With respect to these foundations and this superstructure it probably is fair to say that the relative security of society can be estimated by the number of its unwritten as compared with its formal and written laws, i. e., the greater the number of laws on the statute books the less security the people who live under them are likely to enjoy.

CHAPTER 6

WAR AND POLITICS

BY MAKING warfare more efficient and more terrible, modern technology has made war itself our No. 1 social problem. There is a vast literature on war and peace; but, aside from what has been written about the science and art of warfare, there is little or nothing in the literature that throws light on the nature of war or its role and function in the life and natural history of society. Furthermore, what we have learned about the effects of war, while it has made peace more desirable, has not made war any less inevitable.

Most of what has been written in recent years in regard to the problem of war and of peace may be fairly summed up in the vigorous language of General Sherman's apology for his "march to the sea." "War," said he, "is hell"—that is to say, it is cruel, barbarous, economically disastrous and politically atavistic, and generally unconscionable. This recognizes the problem but contributes nothing to its solution. I might add that problems which can be fairly described only in epithets are notoriously hard to deal with. In so far as this is true in the case of war, it seems to be because we have no adequate working conception of what war is.

The immediate consequences of war are obvious enough, but we do not know the long-run effect of wars and the preparations for wars upon society and human nature. It is inevitable that struggles whcih involve the very existence of peoples have had and will continue to have, as long and as often as they are repeated, a profound effect upon the nature of men, their attitudes and institu-

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tions. "Peace," it has been said, "has been the dream of wise men but war has been the history of nations." When, however, we seek to make war the subject of systematic and scientific investigation, we do not seem to have language in which to describe these influences in general terms. We need to ask ourselves: What is war?

We do not know whether to regard war as a natural phenomenon, like an earthquake or a pestilence, or to classify it as a social phenomenon, like a political contest or an elementary form of judicial procedure, like the ancient trial by battle—an institution which may be said to survive at present in Germany and elsewhere in Continental Europe in the form of the duello. In short, we do not know whether war is to be conceived as a social institution or as a biological and social process.

Trial by combat seems to have been a peculiar custom of certain German tribes and was imported by them into western Europe in the course of the Germanic invasions. It was, according to Gibbon, first made a legal institution in Burgundy by an edict of King Gundobald in A.D. 501 and was later "propagated and established in all the monarchies of Europe from Sicily to the Baltic." The church and the clergy were, for various reasons, opposed to the institution, and it is recorded that the King, in defending his edict against the objections and complaints of one of his bishops, disposed of the matter finally with this appeal to common sense and the consensus of mankind. "Is it not true," he said, "that the event of national wars and private combats is directed by the judgment of God; and that his providence awards the victory to the juster cause?"[1]

The conception of war as a procedure in which issues that cannot otherwise be adjudicated are decided, if not by force of arms, at least by physical combat, has persisted to the present day in several interesting forms—the strike, for example.[2] Taking account of the changes in the modes of thought which have taken place since Gundobald made his defense of trial by battle, it is interesting and, in a sense, reassuring to note that the conception of war upon which warfare is conducted today is not substantially different from what it was fourteen hundred years ago. Treitschke in his

1. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. III, chap. xxxviii, p. 331.

2. E. T. Hiller, *The Strike: A Study in Collective Action* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928).

lectures on politics, in which he set forth fully the Prussian conception of war, defined its function in much the same language as King Gundobald. He says: "Between civilized nations also war is the form of litigation by which states make their claims valid. The arguments brought forward in these terrible law suits of the nations compel as no arguments in civil suits ever can do."

In illustrating and enforcing his conception of war as an instrument of political policy and a method by which states may, if they can, "make their claims valid," Treitschke reminds his students, to whom these lectures are addressed, that "often as we have tried by theory to convince the small states that Prussia alone can be the leader in Germany, we had to produce the final proof upon the battlefields of Bohemia and the Main."

Treitschke's notion that war may be conceived as a form of litigation between states, whether wholly valid or not, helps to make war intelligible in so far as he seems to identify the role of modern war with that of the ancient custom of trial by battle. "It is important," Treitschke adds, "not to look upon war always as a judgment from God. Its consequences are evanescent but the life of a nation is reckoned in centuries, and the final verdict can be pronounced only after a survey of the whole epoch," a sentence which reminds one of Schiller's famous dictum, "*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.*"

When and how far war may be conceived as a judicial procedure remains a question. While the institution of trial by battle seems to have been based, like war, on a purely nonrational procedure, these contests did, nevertheless, have the character of a judicial procedure in so far as they were duly regulated by custom and sanctioned by tradition.

The same may be said, with some qualification, to be sure, of war. Even in the little wars of primitive people intertribal etiquette usually prescribed some formalities for the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace. In the great wars of more civilized peoples there have always been some accepted rules of warfare, though not always rigidly enforced. The so-called "laws of war" were mainly designed to lessen the cruelties and hardships of warfare, particularly for the innocent bystanders, namely, the neutrals and civilian populations.[3]

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3. *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1935), XV, 359.

One of the more important actions taken for the regulation of warfare between European peoples was the Declaration of Paris, adopted in 1856 at the close of the Crimean War. This was followed by the Red Cross Convention of 1864, providing for certain immunities for doctors, nurses, and other persons engaged in caring for the sick and wounded.

Not only civilians, however, but military experts and professional soldiers acknowledging that there are "technical limits at which war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity," have from time to time sought to regulate by international understanding the consequences of unrestricted warfare. In 1868 the Russian czar called an international conference, composed entirely of military officers and experts, to secure an agreement to limit the use of a type of bullet which inflicted needless suffering. The recommendations of this conference were embodied in the Declaration of St. Petersburg, binding the parties to renounce, among other things, the use of "projectiles weighing less than 400 grammes (about 14 ounces) which are explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substance." The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 followed, and, as a result of these and other conferences, an elaborate code for the conduct of war was drawn up and adopted. However, in view of the uncertainties of the interpretation and enforcement of these "laws" under actual conditions of warfare the code was happily supplemented by a proviso in the preamble which provided that, until a more complete system of regulation should be agreed upon, "inhabitants and belligerents should remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience."[4]

Since that time warfare, with the rapid advance in the technology of war, has assumed ever vaster proportions and achieved an ever more terrible efficiency. International politics, meantime, has become more realistic and more cynical. "Total warfare," so called, is limited neither to the heavens above nor to the waters under the earth, and, with the advent of the new "strategy of treachery and terror," war has invaded the realm of the spirit—the last stronghold

4. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

of free souls. Under these circumstances a "peace offensive" may be as effective a means of conquest as physical warfare.

Since propaganda has come to be recognized as one of the weapons of warfare, it has, by means of the radio and other forms of communication, not only broken down the last effective barrier dividing nations but abolished the distinction that once existed between peace and war. William James said thirty years ago in an article that sounds as if it had been written yesterday:

> "Peace" in military mouths today is a synonym for "war expected." The word has become a pure provocative, and no government wishing peace sincerely should allow it ever to be printed in a newspaper. Every up-to-date dictionary should say that "peace" and "war" mean the same thing, now *in posse*, now *in actu*. It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive *preparation* for war by the nations *is the real war*, permanent, unceasing; and that the battles are only a sort of public verification of the mastery gained during the "peace"-internal.[5]

Under these conditions it is difficult to conceive of war as a form of judicial procedure even as elementary as the ancient trial by battle. It is even doubtful whether it can any longer be regarded, as it once was, as an "institution recognized by international law."[6] This is true in spite of the German War Book and other treatises in which the rules of the game have been rigorously defined.[7]

War has, in a summary way, settled international disputes but not always in accordance with any recognized principle of justice or necessity inherent in the international situation. Otherwise, each new war as it occurred would have provided a precedent not merely for defining progressively the rules of warfare but for determining the issues involved in these "terrible lawsuits." As a matter of fact the precedents do exist. They make up a large part of the subject matter of our histories. But no principle seems to have emerged from them that is likely to enable us to deal with the issues of new wars as they arise. More often, so far from adjudicating international disputes in accordance with some general

5. *The Moral Equivalent of War*, a leaflet published in 1910 and circulated by the Association for International Conciliation and republished in part in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, Vol. XXII, No. 25 (October 12, 1940).

6. Herman Lutz, "War Guilt," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, XXIII, 356.

7. See "Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege," translated by J. H. Morgan in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XV, 361.

understanding or tradition, not to say principle, of international law, war has been an innovating and revolutionary force tending to overturn the existing international order and to challenge the tradition and principles upon which that order at any time has rested.

Thus World War II, which began with the assumption that its purpose was to revise the treaties with which World War I was concluded, is now proclaiming itself a world-revolution. It is no longer, as was once announced, a war to enforce the claims of the Have-Nots against the Haves. It is rather an ideological war—a war to establish a new order based upon a new political philosophy and a new philosophy of life.

This, then, is the interesting but anomalous status which war seems to occupy in the international social order. It is an institution—a political institution—in process; an institution whose function has not been defined, whose structure is not yet fixed in custom and in tradition. Such usages governing the conduct of wars as have grown up and been accepted in the past have, indeed, tended to legitimatize wars and give them an institutional character. But legitimacy is a characteristic that attaches to something regarding which we know what to expect. We do not know what to expect of war any more.

Considering the manner in which wars are now waged and the definition of "total war" by General Ludendorff,[8] the modern world, whatever it may do in practice, has accepted, as an intellectual proposition, Professor George Mead's dictum that war "as a policy for adjudicating national differences is utterly discredited." It is discredited because, as Professor Mead concludes, "if logically pursued it leaves nothing to be adjudicated, not even the enemy nations themselves."[9]

The obvious, if not insuperable, difficulties of bringing war

8. "Every individual in the nation is expected to give his entire strength either at the front or at home, and this he can only do when he realizes that it is an immutable and inviolable truth that war is being waged solely for the existence of the nation. A totalitarian policy must put at the disposal of such a war the strength of the nation and preserve it and only a conformity to the fundamental racial and spiritual laws will succeed in welding nation, conduct of war, and politics into that powerful unity which is the basis of national preservation" (General Erich Ludendorff, *The Nation at War* [London, 1936], p. 54).

9. George H. Mead, "National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXIX, No. 4 (July, 1929), 400-404.

within the limitations of an institutional order where its function would be defined and its excesses controlled has led some students of political society to conceive war in biological rather than in sociological terms and to define its function accordingly as biological rather than social. Thus, Spencer Wilkinson, professor of military science at Oxford University, in an article on war in the *Encyclopaedia Brittanica,* introduces the subject with a reference to an observation upon which Malthus based his theory of population and Darwin his theory of the origin of the species—namely, the observation that living organisms multiply more rapidly than the food supply, and for that reason there is "a perpetual competition among all living creatures, including human beings, for the means of subsistence." Among the higher organisms, certainly in the case of man, competition often assumes the form of conflict. As a matter of fact, animals "are usually equipped with organs of attack and of protection or evasion. On the one hand teeth, tusks, paws, claws, electricity; on the other hand shells, hides, scales and devices for camouflage."

Because he is not only a gregarious animal like sheep but a social and rational creature as well, man carries on the "struggle for existence," as Darwin described it, not merely by individual competition but by the conflict of organized groups or societies. Such a conflict between organized groups is war, and the instrument by which wars are carried on are armies.

The author pushes the biological interpretation still further. He conceives the army as itself an organism, "a society within a society." The weapons with which an army fights are—like the claws, paws, and tusks with which the lower animals are equipped—the instruments with which nations and peoples carry on the struggle for existence. So conceived, war becomes a form of natural selection, its function being to determine the survival not so much of individuals as of peoples and of the institutions by means of which nations and peoples carry on their collective life. The conception of war in terms of Darwin's theory of evolution, since it seems to accept war as fatally rooted in the very nature of human relations and of society, has not been accepted by the advocates of international peace. Militarists, on the other hand, even when they make no apologies for it, are likely to regard war as an inevitable incident of international relations, just as conflict has invariably been

an incident and an instrument of political action whenever a political society has existed.

Von Moltke, who led the Prussian army in the three wars which brought about the establishment of the Second German Reich, wrote in a letter that has become famous: "Perpetual peace is a dream and not even a happy dream." From other statements one gathers that Moltke conceived of war, as others have before and since, as one of the instruments of God's mysterious providence designed not to settle international disputes but (1) to purge society of a political regime and a social order which were decadent and doomed to destruction and (2) to supersede these with forms more vigorous and fit to live.[10]

The attempt to put war into a biological category goes astray, it seems to me, not so much from a failure to distinguish between the social and biological aspects of wars as from a failure to distinguish between competition and conflict as different aspects of the "struggle for existence." As a matter of fact, the existing species have not survived merely because they were "superior" to those that perished but rather because they were the "fitter," i. e., they fitted the "niches" in the natural economy in which they occur. Thus the first effect of competition has not been to destroy but to distribute the different organisms and species as they have successively appeared in the evolutionary series. It is as if each individual and each species had been condemned to be forever seeking the particular spot in the biosphere where it could live, and to survive by reproducing its kind. In turn, this distribution has been one of the instruments for the evolution of new species. The dispersion of the species, their diversification and preservation in all their diversity, as described by the older naturalists and their successors, the plant and animal ecologists, is one of the most fascinating chapters in the story of biological evolution.[11]

Dispersion was facilitated by the fact that competition between organisms of the same species, since they make similar demands on

10. See Dr. G. F. Nicolai, *The Biology of War* (New York, 1918), pp. 521-22. Written during World War I and translated from the German by Constance A. Grande and Julian Grande, this volume by a professor of physiology is perhaps the most thoroughgoing criticism of the biological conception of war in the literature of the subject.

11. See Richard Hesse, *Ecological Animal Geography*, translated and edited by W. C. Allee and Karl P. Schmidt (New York, 1937).

the habitat, is more intense than the competition between organisms of different species. Dispersion is an incident of the food quest. A further consequence of this dispersion has been the formation of associations, like that of the vine and the fig tree, of mutually interdependent species. This interdependence, like that of the predacious animal and its prey, does not necessarily result in the extirpation of either species but rather in the preservation of both.

It is by competition in the first instance that the dispersion and diversity of organisms is made possible; but it is by competition, also, that what is called the "balance of life" is maintained and the diversity of the species is preserved. This mutual interdependence of organisms has been described as "the web of life."

Within the limits of a geographical habitat the interdependence of the species inhabiting it tends to become more intimate and more vital. Such a region in which plants and animals maintain a kind of biological economy is described by ecologists as a "community." This is, however, a community, *nota bene*, without institutions. Such a community is, in fact, a kind of society, since it is composed of individual organisms living together; but it is different from the so-called animal societies, like those of the social insects, in this important respect—it is composed of species which, because they do not interbreed, have no "family ties." They have no instincts, as is the case of the social insects, which hold the individual units of the family or of other genetic groups together during the periods of reproduction and of the infancy of the progeny. Animal societies are, after all, merely great families. Communities, as the term is used by ecologists, are associations organized territorially in which the nexus which holds individual organisms of the divergent species together is purely economic. Societies, as the term applies to animals, are associations of individuals genetically related and organized on a familial pattern.

The two fundamental types of association which I have sought to distinguish as they exist among the inferior species—namely, (1) the territorial and ecological or economic and (2) the familial or social—are reproduced, with substantially the same differences, in the interrelations of races and peoples. This is true even though the different races, being of the same species, interbreed freely where the opportunity offers, as organisms of different species do not.

Generally speaking, the type of association that I have called "communal"—using the word in the sense in which that term is

employed in ecology—is identical with that widespread system of relationships which commerce has spun among the peoples of the world, a form of association which is likely to be more intimate and personal among neighbors but more impersonal and less intimate among those who are either wholly unaware of their biotic and economic interdependence or know it only at second hand. This net of economic relationships in which, individually and collectively, races and peoples are ineluctably bound together corresponds in a general way to the "web of life" in which all living creatures are involved.[12]

On the other hand, within this wide-ranging economy, which at the present time extends to the limits of the habitable world, kinship ties and economic relationships are, in human society, further complicated by the existence of institutions—familial, economic, political, and religious—which do not exist in animal societies.

It is quite possible, as some anthropologists have contended, that primitive man—the genuinely primitive man—being a gregarious creature, may have lived for long periods of time wandering about in the forests in flocks or herds, without formal organization or institutions of any sort. There are, at any rate, in remote corners of the world peoples like the Semangs in the tropical forest of the Malay Peninsula, the Veddas of Ceylon, or the blameless Punan of Borneo whose mode of life is said to approach in its simplicity that of the lower animals. In this age of innocence, where there were

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12. We have studied the forms of life, and we have considered the adaptation of these forms to the exigencies of this or that habitat. In every habitat we find that there is a sort of community or society of organisms not only preying upon but depending upon each other and that certain balance, though often a violently swaying balance, is maintained between the various species so that the community *keeps on.* The particular name given to this subject of vital balances and interchanges is "Ecology." "Economics" is used only for human affairs; ecology is really an extension of economics to the whole world of life. Man is always beginning his investigation too close to himself and finding later that he must extend his basis of inquiry. The science of economics—at first it was called political economy—is a whole century older than ecology. It tries to elucidate the relations of producer, dealer, and consumer in the human community and show how the whole system carries on. Ecology broadens out this inquiry into a general study of the give and take—the effort, accumulation, and consumption in every province of life. Economics, therefore, is merely human ecology; it is the narrow and special study of the ecology of the very extraordinary community in which we live. It might have been a better and brighter science if it had begun biologically (H. G. Wells, Julian S. Huxley, G. P. Wells, *The Science of Life* [New York, 1931], III, 961).

no formal social order and no institutions, there were, we are told, no wars.[13] As soon, however, as men came together to carry on any common enterprise, under circumstances where it was necessary to preserve discipline and maintain tension over any considerable length of time, some more efficient sort of organization was needed. It was under these circumstances that institutions seem to have come into existence.

Institutions, generally speaking, have had their origins in some collective action—some common enterprise or social movement that required concert and continuity of action over a considerable period of time. The most elementary form which these movements take is undoubtedly that of mass migration. The connection and correlations between mass migration and war in the historical process have been discussed in a recent volume by Frederick Teggart.[14] Other social movements are those that seek to bring about some sort of reform in the manners or in the economic and political organization of existing society, like the feminist or the prohibition movement. But there are also other movements that aim at more drastic changes, for example the revolutionary and religious movements initiated by political sects—fascism, communism, and socialism.

All these movements entail a more or less consistent collective action over a considerable period of time; but, compared with the changes which are ordinarily described as evolutionary, they are relatively sudden and catastrophic. They are, however, different, not merely in degree but in kind, from those more gradual and evolutionary, sometimes insensible, changes which take place with the slow accumulations of time—changes which are the results of the minor innovations, accommodations, and adaptations of a multi-

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13. The Punan of Borneo are among the most primitive people, culturally speaking, in the world. For untold ages they have lived in the forests of Borneo, well out of the way of the great movements that have swept through the archipelago, carrying culture from India to the East. There is no reason to believe that they had been influenced strongly by any food-producing people until the Kayan and kindred tribes came up into the central watershed on their way toward Sarawak.

In the Punan we have a food-gathering people of good physique and bright intelligence who have remained comparatively undisturbed and therefore present to us typical conditions among really primitive peoples in general. (see G. Elliot Smith, *Human History* [New York, 1929], p. 199).

14. *Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events* (University of California Press, 1939).

tude of individuals who, like these little marine animals (Anthozoa) which build the coral islands, co-operate unconsciously to bring into existence a structure of whose character and dimensions they are hardly conscious.

Such changes as social movements bring about might be characterized as "mutations"—mutations that are planned and promoted. Social changes that are planned, particularly when they are planned on a grand scale, almost always have consequences that can never quite be foreseen. These consequences, therefore, are very largely just what happens rather than what was planned. Society is so far from being a closed system that one cannot deal with it either as an artifact or as a system of mechanical forces.[15]

Of all the common enterprises and of all the collective actions that men have undertaken, war is undoubtedly the most imposing in the amount and quality of the effort men put forth; the most devastating and revolutionary in its consequences. Into war—a great war, a total war—man puts all that he has: his wealth, his science, his indomitable will, and eventually his very existence. It is certain, therefore, that as far as man has sought to control his destiny by his collective planning and collective action, these titanic contests—the death struggles of superorganisms—have had the most tremendous effects, not only upon society and its institutions, but upon man himself, his spirit, his personality, and his terrestrial career. The amount of effort that man puts forth in war, however, as well as the passions and sentiments that these efforts arouse, are due not merely to the fact that man is here competing with other men but that he is conscious of those with whom he is in competition, not only of their acts, but of their purposes and intentions. Under these circumstances competition becomes conflict; a competitor an enemy.

Cooley, who seems to have been the first to undertake to give

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15. Where will you find in history a case of a great purpose rationally adopted by a great society and carried through to the intended result and then followed by the expected consequences in the way of social advantage? You can find no such thing. Men act from immediate and interested motives like these for which they have waged war, and the consequences may be advantageous or disadvantageous to men. The story of these acts and consequences makes up human history (*Essays of William Graham Sumner*, edited, with prefaces, by Albert Galloway Keller and Maurice R. Davie [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934], p. 148).

an account of competition in sociological terms, says its function is "to assign each individual his place in the social system." He adds that "competition is not necessarily a hostile contention nor even something of which the competing individual is always conscious," since "from our infancy onward throughout life judgments are daily forming regarding us of which we are unaware, but go to determine our careers."

Cooley does not, however, distinguish the very different consequences that ensue (1) when competition is not conscious and (2) when it is, i.e., when it is conflict. Competition does not indeed determine our place in the economic system since it assigns us to the job and function we can perform rather than to the one we should choose to perform. But status, whether it is occupational or social—in any of the various senses of that term—gets its peculiar character because it is a result of conscious competition, i.e., emulation, personal conflict, war; because, in short, it is the outcome of a struggle, not merely for a spot in the sun or for a job but for recognition and a place in an existing social order.

Gaetano Mosca in his *Elementi di scienza politica*, recently translated under the title of *The Ruling Class*, referring to the attempts to introduce Darwin's doctrine of evolution of the species into the social sciences, declared that its application to social relations is based upon a fundamental confusion, since it identifies "the struggle for existence" which is characteristic of the lower animals with "the struggle for pre-eminence" which is characteristically human and "a constant phenomenon that arises in all human societies, from the most highly civilized down to such as have barely issued from savagery." Incidentally, Mosca points out that conflict, like competition, is not merely a means of biological selection. On the contrary, like competition, it is the principle of organization. Its function is not to destroy but ultimately to assimilate the vanquished. This involves the imposition upon them of the status of a subject people and, incidentally, the assignment to them of a function in the territorial economy within which the victors are dominant. Mosca's statement is:

> In a struggle between two human societies, the victorious society as a rule fails to annihilate the vanquished society, but subjects it, assimilates it, imposes its own type of civilization upon it. In our day in Europe and America war has no other result than political hegemony

for the nation that proves superior in a military sense, or perhaps the seizure of some bit of territory.[16]

Although the struggle for status or, as Mosca calls it, the struggle for "pre-eminence" is an obvious characteristic of human society, it has by no means diminished or taken the place of the unceasing, if silent, struggle of races and peoples for survival. Comparative studies of vital statistics of different peoples and population groups show that.[17] Rather has the struggle for pre-eminence, as Corrado Gini's demographic investigations indicate, had a profound effect upon biotic competition, "the competition of life," as Sumner calls it. This is a consequence of the fact that every population group tends to die at the top. Pre-eminence as it is achieved by any group or class is accompanied by a declining birth rate in the pre-eminent class. "As a rule," says Gini, "the upper classes are less fertile than the middle, and these, as a rule, are less so than the lower classes."[18] The effect of this is "to provoke a current from the middle classes to the upper, and from the lower to the middle" in order to fill the gaps that have been created by the decline of fertility in the upper classes or the decline in birth rate from whatever causes.

These and other considerations to which recent population studies have called attention indicate that the struggle for existence, i.e., the competition of life and for space—*Lebensraum,* to use the German expression—whether it takes the form of biotic competition or the more obvious form of struggle for pre-eminence, is a more complicated matter than has been assumed by those who have sought to explain war as an incident of natural selection and the struggle for existence.

From this point of view competition, as distinguished from conflict, appears as an individuating, not to say analytic, process. It tends to dissolve the traditional social order into its individual elements in order that it may bring about a greater specialization and wider division of labor in an ever wider circle of those economically interdependent individuals and groups which constitute the eco-

16. Translated by Hannah D. Kahn and edited and revised with Introduction by Arthur Livingston ([New York and London, 1939], p. 29).

17. See S. J. Holmes, *The Negro's Struggle for Survival* (University of California Press, 1937); also Romanzo Adams, *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii: A Study of the Mutually Conditioned Processes of Acculturation and Amalgamation* (New York, 1937).

18. Corrado Gini, Shiroshi Nasu, Oliver E. Baker, and Robert Kuczynski, *Population* ("Lectures on the Harris Foundation" [Chicago, 1929]).

nomic community. The communal order, where it exists, is thus an effect of competition. Conflict, on the other hand, tends to bring about an integration and a superordination and subordination of the conflict groups, whether they be familial and tribal in character, as among the simpler peoples, or national, racial, and religious, as among more sophisticated peoples.

These two terms—community and society—employed in this restricted sense, designate two aspects—biological and cultural—of a single entity which presents itself in one aspect as a biotic community, i.e., a population occupying a territory, settled in a habitat, and in the other as an institutional and cultural unit, a society organized to act collectively and eventually politically.

However one may finally conceive the role which war has played in the long process of history, it is obvious that its function has not been merely that of an adjudicator of intertribal or international disputes. Rather, these disputes and the wars that grew out of them have provided the occasion and the necessity for an organization of society which, as it evolved, has become immeasurably superior, for the purposes of collective action at least, to the gregariousness of the primitive horde or the animal herd.

The effect of hostility upon the organization and solidarity of the groups in conflict has been frequently noted, but no one has stated it in more memorable terms than William Graham Sumner in his *Folkways,* where, discussing the mechanisms of "we-group" and the "others-group" relationships, he says:

> The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war. These exigencies also make government and law in the in-group, in order to prevent quarrels and enforce discipline. Thus war and peace have reacted on each other and developed each other, one within the group, the other in the intergroup relation. The closer the neighbors, and the stronger they are, the intenser is the warfare, and then the intenser is the internal organization and discipline of each.[19]

In insuring peace within as its consequence, war has created (1) in the family and in societies organized on a familial pattern a moral solidarity based on personal loyalties and piety and (2) in the state

19. (New York, 1906), p. 12; see also Sumner's essay "War" in the *Essays of William Graham Sumner,* II, 136-73.

a political institution which has made collective action possible on a scale of which there is no promise in primitive society.[20] The fact that in the division of labor between the sexes man was not only the hunter but the fighter, who now and then brought home a strange woman, is responsible for putting him at the head of the family. It is probably one reason why, in primitive society, the matriarchate has, in most cases, been succeeded by the patriarchate—a change which Sumner believes may have been the greatest and most revolutionary in history.[21]

It was, however, not merely war but the life-long intimacy and dependency of every member of the family on every other, the sense of security in the family circle and the terror of all that was outside of it, which created the moral solidarity so characteristic of familial society including the clan and the tribe. As soon as man achieved a more or less settled existence and began to accumulate property, wars were undertaken for less romantic purposes and for less interesting and more manageable booty. In fact, war became with pastoral peoples not merely an adventure but a vocation. Robbery among many of the Bedouin tribes was considered as legitimate a method of gaining a livelihood as agriculture. Lippert refers to it as "Bedouin livelihood."

It happens occasionally today in North Africa that desert tribes come to terms with a settled population, whom they have long regarded as their legitimate prey, by accepting tribute in lieu of the booty they were accustomed to carry off. In such case it is part of the agreement that the erstwhile marauders become the protectors of their erstwhile victims, holding off other tribesmen who would otherwise plunder them. Sometimes, however, mobile and warlike desert tribes have not been content merely to exact tribute from, but have chosen to make a conquest of, their sedentary neighbors. This, in fact, seems to have been the way in which the state has

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20. When for the first time in the history of the world the group of people who happened to be living in Egypt abandoned the nomadic life and began to till the soil they were accomplishing a vastly greater revolution in the affairs of mankind than the mere invention of the crafts of the farmer and the irrigation engineer. They were committing themselves to the much more formidable task of erecting the complicated edifice of civilization and formulating the fantastic doctrine of the state system which has dominated the world ever since (Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-53).

21. See Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 355-56; see also Maurice R. Davie, "War and Women," in his *The Evolution of War: A Study of Its Role in Early Societies* (Yale University Press, 1929), pp. 96-102.

normally come into existence, i.e., by the conquest of an agricultural by a pastoral and nomadic people. Friedrich Ratzel says:

> The war-like character of the nomads is a great factor in the creation of states. It finds expression in the immense nations of Asia controlled by nomad dynasties and nomad armies, such as Persia, ruled by the Turks; China, conquered and governed by the Mongols and Manchus; and in the Mongol and Radjaputa states of India, as well as in the states on the border of the Soudan.[22]

In any case, sociologists and historians who have investigated the the subject seem to agree that the state not only had its origin in war but that its chief business is still, as Dealey says, "to be ready for war and to wage it whenever national safety or national interest demand it."[23]

As states have come into existence by war, it has seemed to certain writers that they are forever condemned to continue their conquests in order to maintain their existence. Nothing is more demoralizing to an army or to a military state than peace, and nations to survive must act. There must always be some great collective enterprise on the national agenda in which all classes can actively participate. "It is not yesterday, tradition, the past, which is the decisive, the determining force in the nation. . . . Nations are made and go on living by having a program for the future."[24]

War has been and still is the greatest, the most strenuous, if no longer the most glorious, enterprise in which nations can engage; and there seems to be, as George Mead has insisted in his reply to William James, no substitute for war. "The age of discussion" has not yet, as Walter Bagehot believed it should and would, superseded the age of war.[25]

What is probably taking place is that the issues in international controversies are being steadily narrowed by the increase of political knowledge, i.e., a more searching analysis of international situations and a more realistic conception of the processes involved

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22. Quoted by Franz Oppenheimer, *The State: Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically* (Indianapolis, 1914), p. 54.

23. See Davie, *op. cit.*, where (p. 166) James Q. Dealey, *State and Government*, is quoted.

24. José Ortega y Gasset, *Invertebrate Spain*, translation and Foreword by Mildred Adams (New York, 1937), p. 26.

25. Walter Bagehot, "The Age of Discussion," *Physics and Politics* (New York, 1904), chap. v, pp. 156-204.

in the functioning of political societies. Even discussions are more fruitful when they are based on facts. But facts assume the existence of some common assumptions, either implicitly or explicitly accepted by the parties to the discussion. In political controversies they involve the existence of a common body of tradition and of constitutional, that is to say fundamental, understandings, by reference to which what was a datum becomes a fact. In most wars what I have called "constitutional understandings" are involved, as they were, for example, in our war between the states, as they are in the present World War. In such cases neither discussion nor "appeasement" is likely to bring a solution. Where no common interest appears that makes compromise possible, wars seem inevitable. But men like Mead believe there is, or should be, no such instance; no situation that would not eventually yield to an intelligent analysis of the facts.[26]

As states brought into existence a society that was organized on the basis of territory rather than on common race and culture, it was more or less inevitable that they should seek to expand their territories. In carrying on their wars for that purpose, however, they were always seeking a frontier which they could defend; always seeking to find a boundary behind which the state could stabilize society and live in peace. But always the frontiers receded as the armies approached them. A land-hungry population was always moving beyond the established frontiers, and new means of travel and transportation were constantly extending the area over which it was possible and necessary to exercise sovereignty in order to maintain peace.

With the organization of the city-state there began, in contrast with the dispersion of peoples characteristic of primitive life, a movement for the coming-together and integration of races and peoples—a tendency which is characteristic of cities and civilized life. The city, as we must remember, has been not merely the market place and focal center of a constantly expanding trade area or market. It has been at the same time the seat and center of an expanding dominion—a dominion and an authority which was invariably dispersed or relaxed in times of peace but constantly tightened and intensified when the beacons on the hilltops announced the

26. Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-407.

approach of war. For war and peace are, as Sumner suggests, so intimately related that one may say that peace creates the problem that war is required to solve.

While the struggle for possession of the land has provided the occasion for most international wars, there have been other wars, like the Crusades to gain possession by Christians of the Holy Sepulcher or the Islamic wars to win the world for Allah and Mahomet. These so-called holy wars were actually ideological wars, seeking primarily to propagandize a cult. But all wars, imperialistic wars, that seek to expand the territory of the state always turn out, as in the case of the present World War, to have an ideological core. They are wars "to end war" or they are wars to defend the democratic way of life from the invasions of a collectivistic and totalitarian imperialism.

On the other hand, ideological wars turn out, likewise, to be struggles for land and living space. This is because, in order to maintain the different ways of life represented by the parties to these conflicts, political control and sovereignty of a territory in which they can survive is indispensable.

What can one say, finally, in regard to the nature of war and its function? Generally speaking, one may say that war is politics. It is, generally speaking, politics in its original, noninstitutional, and nonrational form—a form in which the belligerent states or parties seek by force of arms (1) to extend the territorial limits of their sovereignty and (2) to establish and impose upon the nations and peoples with whom they are in conflict a political and economic order which is in the interest of the dominant party, race, or nation. This gives a new significance to Freeman's statement that "history is past politics" and "politics is present history."

Historically, the function of war has been (1) to extend the area over which it is possible to maintain peace, (2) to create and organize within that area a political power capable of enforcing it, and, finally, at least in most cases, (3) to establish an ideology which rationalizes, and a cult which idealizes and so gains understanding and acceptance for, the new political and social order which the victor has imported or imposed upon the vanquished. This is the way that war settles issues. It is in this sense that one may say with Schiller: "The world's history is the world's judgment" on the acts of men and of nations.

PART TWO: *News and Opinion*

CHAPTER 7

NEWS AS A FORM OF KNOWLEDGE

I

THERE are, as William James and certain others have observed, two fundamental types of knowledge, namely, (1) "acquaintance with" and (2) "knowledge about." The distinction suggested seems fairly obvious. Nevertheless, in seeking to make it a little more explicit, I am doubtless doing injustice to the sense of the original. In that case, in interpreting the distinction, I am merely making it my own. James's statement is, in part, as follows:

> *There are two kinds of knowledge* broadly and practically distinguishable: we may call them respectively *knowledge of acquaintance* and *knowledge-about*. . . . In minds able to speak at all there is, it is true, *some* knowledge about everything. Things can at least be classed, and the times of their appearance told. But in general, the less we analyze a thing, and the fewer of its relations we perceive, the less we know about it and the more our familiarity with it is of the acquaintance-type. The two kinds of knowledge are, therefore, as the human mind practically exerts them, relative terms. That is, the same thought of a thing may be called knowledge-about it in comparison with a simpler thought, or acquaintance with it in comparison with a thought of it that is more articulate and explicit still.[1]

At any rate, "acquaintance with," as I should like to use the ex-

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from the *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV:5 (March, 1940), pp. 669-86.

1. William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1896), I, 221-22.

pression, is the sort of knowledge one inevitably acquires in the course of one's personal and firsthand encounters with the world about him. It is the knowledge which comes with use and wont rather than through any sort of formal or systematic investigation. Under such circumstances we come finally to know things not merely through the medium of our special senses but through the responses of our whole organism. We know them in the latter case as we know things to which we are accustomed, in a world to which we are adjusted. Such knowledge may, in fact, be conceived as a form of organic adjustment or adaptation, representing an accumulation and, so to speak, a funding of a long series of experiences. It is this sort of personal and individual knowledge which makes each of us at home in the world in which he elects or is condemned to live.

It is notorious that human beings, who are otherwise the most mobile of living creatures, tend nevertheless to become rooted, like plants, in the places and in the associations to which they are accustomed. If this accommodation of the individual to his habitat is to be regarded as knowledge at all, it is probably included in what we call tact or common sense. These are characters which individuals acquire in informal and unconscious ways; but, once acquired, they tend to become private and personal possessions. One might go so far as to describe them as personality traits—something, at any rate, which cannot well be formulated or communicated from one individual to another by formal statements.

Other forms of "acquaintance with" are: (1) clinical knowledge, in so far at least as it is the product of personal experience; (2) skills and technical knowledge; and (3) anything that is learned by the undirected and unconscious experimentation such as the contact with, and handling of, objects involves.

Our knowledge of other persons and of human nature in general seems to be of this sort. We know other minds in much the same ways that we know our own, that is, intuitively. Often we know other minds better than we do our own. For the mind is not the mere stream of consciousness into which each of us looks when, introspectively, he turns his attention to the movements of his own thoughts. Mind is rather the divergent tendencies to act of which each of us is more or less completely unconscious, including the ability to control and direct those tendencies in accordance with some more or less conscious goal. Human beings have an extraor-

dinary ability, by whatever mechanism it operates, to sense these tendencies in others as in themselves. It takes a long time, however, to become thoroughly acquainted with any human being, including ourselves, and the kind of knowledge of which this acquaintance consists is obviously not the sort of knowledge we get of human behavior by experiments in a psychological laboratory. It is rather more like the knowledge that a salesman has of his customers, a politician of his clients, or the knowledge which a psychiatrist gains of his patients in his efforts to understand and cure them. It is even more the sort of knowledge which gets embodied in habit, in custom, and, eventually—by some process of natural selection that we do not fully understand—in instinct; a kind of racial memory or habit. Knowledge of this sort, if one may call it knowledge, becomes, finally, a personal secret of the individual man or the special endowment of the race or stock that possesses it.[2]

One may, perhaps, venture this statement since the type of intuitive or instinctive knowledge here described seems to arise out of processes substantially like the accommodations and adaptations which, by some kind of natural selection, have produced the different racial varieties of mankind as well as the plant and animal species. One may object that what one means by knowledge is just what is not inherited and not heritable. On the other hand, it is certain that some things are learned much more easily than others. What one inherits therefore is, perhaps, not anything that could properly be called knowledge. It is rather the inherited ability to acquire those specific forms of knowledge we call habits. There seems to be a very great difference in individuals, families, and genetic groups as to their ability to learn specific things. Native intelligence is probably not the standardized thing that the intelligence tests might lead one to believe. In so far as this is true studies of intelligence in the future are, I suspect, more likely to be con-

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2. "The biologist ordinarily thinks of development as something very different from such modification of behavior by experience, but from time to time the idea that the basis of heredity and development is fundamentally similar to memory has been advanced. . . . Viewed in this way the whole course of development is a process of physiological learning, beginning with the simple experience of differential exposure to an external factor, and undergoing one modification after another, as new experiences in the life of the organism or of its parts in relation to each other occur" (C. M. Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior*, pp. 248-49; quoted by W. I. Thomas in *Primitive Behavior* [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937], p. 25).

cerned with in the idiosyncrasies of intelligence and the curious individual ways in which individual minds achieve essentially the same results than in measuring and standardizing these achievements.

It is obvious that this "synthetic" (i.e., the knowledge that gets itself embodied in habit and custom, as opposed to analytic and formal knowledge) is not likely to be articulate and communicable. If it gets itself communicated at all, it will be in the form of practical maxims and wise saws rather than in the form of scientific hypotheses. Nevertheless, a wide and intimate acquaintance with men and things is likely to be the bulwark of most sound judgment in practical matters as well as the source of those hunches upon which experts depend in perplexing situations and of those sudden insights which, in the evolution of science, are so frequently the prelude to important discoveries.

In contrast with this is the kind of knowledge that James describes as "knowledge about." Such knowledge is formal, rational, and systematic. It is based on observation and fact but on fact that has been checked, tagged, regimented, and finally ranged in this and that perspective, according to the purpose and point of view of the investigator.

"Knowledge about" is formal knowledge; that is to say, knowledge which has achieved some degree of exactness and precision by the substitution of ideas for concrete reality and of words for things. Not only do ideas constitute the logical framework of all systematic knowledge but they enter into the very nature of the things themselves with which science—natural as distinguished from the historical science—is concerned. As a matter of fact, there seem to be three fundamental types of scientific knowledge: (1) philosophy and logic, which are concerned primarily with ideas; (2) history, which is concerned primarily with events; and (3) the natural or classifying sciences, which are concerned primarily with things.

Concepts and logical artifacts, like the number system, are not involved in the general flux of events and things. For precisely that reason they serve admirably the purpose of tags and counters with which to identify, to describe, and, eventually, to measure things. The ultimate purpose of natural science seems to be to substitute for the flux of events and the changing character of things a logical formula in which the general character of things and the direction of change may be described with logical and mathematical precision.

The advantage of substituting words, concepts, and a logical order for the actual course of events is that the conceptual order makes the actual order intelligible, and, so far as the hypothetic formulations we call laws conform to the actual course of events, it becomes possible to predict from a present a future condition of things. It permits us to speculate with some assurance how, and to what extent, any specific intervention or interference in a present situation may determine the situation that is predestined to succeed it.

On the other hand, there is always a temptation to make a complete divorce between the logical and verbal description of an object or a situation and the empirical reality to which it refers. This seems to have been the cardinal mistake of scholasticism. Scholasticism has invariably tended to substitute logical consistency, which is a relation between ideas, for the relation of cause and effect, which is a relation between things.

An empirical and experimental science avoids a purely logical solution of its problems by checking up its calculation at some point with the actual world. A purely intellectual science is always in danger of becoming so completely out of touch with things that the symbols with which it operates cease to be anything more than mental toys. In that case science becomes a kind of dialectical game. This is a peril which the social sciences, to the extent that they have been disposed to formulate and investigate social problems in the forms in which they have been conventionally defined by some administrative agencies or governmental institution, have not always escaped. Thus investigation has invariably tended to take the form of fact-finding rather than of research. Having found the facts, the agencies were able to supply the interpretations; but they were usually interpretations which were implicit in the policies to which the agencies or institutions were already committed.

These are some of the general characteristics of systematic and scientific knowledge, "knowledge about," as contrasted with the concrete knowledge, common sense and "acquaintance with." What is, however, the unique character of scientific knowledge, as contrasted with other forms of knowledge, is that it is communicable to the extent that common sense or knowledge based on practical and clinical experience is not. It is communicable because its problems and its solutions are stated not merely in logical and in intelligible terms but in such forms that they can be checked

by experiment or by reference to the empirical reality to which these terms refer.

In order to make this possible, it is necessary to describe in detail and in every instance the source and manner in which facts and findings were originally obtained. Knowledge about, so far at least as it is scientific, becomes in this way a part of the social heritage, a body of tested and accredited fact and theory in which new increments, added to the original fund, tend to check up, affirm, or qualify, first of all, in each special science and, finally, in all the related sciences, all that has been contributed by earlier investigators.

On the other hand, acquaintance with, as I have sought to characterize it, so far as it is based on the slow accumulation of experience and the gradual accommodation of the individual to his individual and personal world, becomes, as I have said, more and more completely identical with instinct and intuition.

Knowledge about is not merely accumulated experience but the result of systematic investigation of nature. It is based on the answers given to the definite questions which we address to the world about us. It is knowledge pursued methodically with all the formal and logical apparatus which scientific research has created. I might add, parenthetically, that there is, generally speaking, no scientific method which is wholly independent of the intuition and insight which acquaintance with things and events gives us. Rather is it true that, under ordinary circumstances, the most that formal methods can do for research is to assist the investigator in obtaining facts which will make it possible to check up such insights and hunches as the investigator already had at the outset or has gained later in the course of his researches.

One of the functions of this methodical procedure is to protect the investigator from the perils of an interpretation to which a too ardent pursuit of knowledge is likely to lead him. There is, on the other hand, no methodical procedure that is a substitute for insight.

II

What is here described as "acquaintance with" and "knowledge about" are assumed to be distinct forms of knowledge—forms having different functions in the lives of individuals and of society—rather than knowledge of the same kind but of different degrees of accuracy and validity. They are, nevertheless, not so different in character or function—since they are, after all, relative terms—

that they may not be conceived as constituting together a continuum—a continuum within which all kinds and sorts of knowledge find a place. In such a continuum news has a location of its own. It is obvious that news is not systematic knowledge like that of the physical sciences. It is rather, in so far as it is concerned with events, like history. Events, because they are invariably fixed in time and located in space, are unique and cannot, therefore, be classified as is the case with things. Not only do things move about in space and change with time but, in respect to their internal organization, they are always in a condition of more or less stable equilibrium.

News is not history, however, and its facts are not historical facts. News is not history because, for one thing among others, it deals, on the whole, with isolated events and does not seek to relate them to one another either in the form of causal or in the form of teleological sequences. History not only describes events but seeks to put them in their proper place in the historical succession, and, by doing so, to discover the underlying tendencies and forces which find expression in them. In fact, one would not be far wrong in assuming that history is quite as much concerned with the connections of events—the relation between the incidents that precede and those that follow—as it is with the events themselves. On the other hand, a reporter, as distinguished from a historian, seeks merely to record each single event as it occurs and is concerned with the past and future only in so far as these throw light on which is actual and present.

The relation of an event to the past remains the task of the historian, while its significance as a factor determining the future may perhaps be left to the science of politics—what Freeman calls "comparative politics"[3]—that is to say, to sociology or to some other division of the social sciences, which, by comparative studies, seeks to arrive at statements sufficiently general to support a hypothesis or a prediction.[4]

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3. Edward A. Freeman, *Comparative Politics* (London, 1873).

4. The sociological point of view makes its appearance in historcial investigation as soon as the historian turns from the study of "periods" to the study of institutions. The history of institutions—that is to say, the family, the church, economic institutions, political institutions, etc.—leads inevitably to comparison, classification, the formation of class names or concepts, and eventually to the formulation of law. In the process history becomes natural history, and natural history passes over into natural science. In short, history

News, as a form of knowledge, is not primarily concerned either with the past or with the future but rather with the present—what has been described by psychologists as "the specious present." News may be said to exist only in such a present. What is meant here by the "specious present" is suggested by the fact that news, as the publishers of the commercial press know, is a very perishable commodity. News remains news only until it has reached the persons for whom it has "news interest." Once published and its significance recognized, what was news becomes history.

This transient and ephemeral quality is of the very essence of news and is intimately connected with every other character that it exhibits. Different types of news have a different time span. In its most elementary form a news report is a mere "flash," announcing that an event has happened. If the event proves of real importance, interest in it will lead to further inquiry and to a more complete acquaintance with the attendant circumstances. An event ceases to be news, however, as soon as the tension it aroused has ceased and public attention has been directed to some other aspect of the habitat or to some other incident sufficiently novel, exciting, or important to hold its attention.

The reason that news comes to us, under ordinary circumstances, not in the form of a continued story but as a series of independent incidents becomes clear when one takes account of the fact that we are here concerned with the public mind—or with what is called the public mind. In its most elementary form knowledge reaches the public not, as it does the individual, in the form of a perception but in the form of a communication, that is to say, news. Public attention, however, under normal conditions is wavering, unsteady, and easily distracted. When the public mind wanders, the rapport, grapevine telegraph, or whatever else it is that insures the transmission of news within the limits of the public ceases to function, tension is relaxed, communication broken off, and what was live news becomes cold fact.

A news item, as every newspaperman knows, is read in inverse ratio to its length. The ordinary reader will read a column and a half of two- or three-line items about men and things in the home town before he will read a column article, no matter how advertised in the headlines, unless it turns out to be not merely news

becomes sociology (R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921], p. 16).

but a story, i.e., something that has what is called technically "human interest."

News comes in the form of small, independent communications that can be easily and rapidly comprehended. In fact, news performs somewhat the same functions for the public that perception does for the individual man; that is to say, it does not so much inform as orient the public, giving each and all notice as to what is going on. It does this without any effort of the reporter to interpret the events he reports, except in so far as to make them comprehensible and interesting.

The first typical reaction of an individual to the news is likely to be a desire to repeat it to someone. This makes conversation, arouses further comment, and perhaps starts a discussion. But the singular thing about it is that, once discussion has been started, the event under discussion soon ceases to be news, and, as interpretations of an event differ, discussions turn from the news to the issues it raises. The clash of opinions and sentiments which discussion invariably evokes usually terminates in some sort of consensus or collective opinion—what we call public opinion. It is upon the interpretation of present events, i.e., news, that public opinion rests.

The extent to which news circulates, within a political unit or a political society, determines the extent to which the members of such a society may be said to participate, not in its collective life—which is the more inclusive term—but in its political acts. Political action and political power, as one ordinarily understands these terms, are obviously based not merely on such concert and consensus as may exist in a herd or in a crowd. It rests ultimately, it seems, on the ability of a political society, aside from whatever of military or material resources it possesses, to act not only concertedly but consistently in accordance with some considered purpose and in furtherance of some rational end. The world of politics, it seems, is based, as Schopenhauer has said of the world in general, on the organic relation of will and idea. Other and more material sources of political power are obviously merely instrumental.

Freeman, the historian, has said that history is past politics and politics is present history. This puts a great deal of truth into a few words, even if the statement in practice needs some enlargement and some qualification. News, though intimately related to both, is neither history nor politics. It is, nevertheless, the stuff which makes

political action, as distinguished from other forms of collective behavior, possible.

Among other kinds of collective behavior are the recognized and conventional forms of ceremonial and religious expression—etiquette and religious ritual—which, in so far as they create unanimity and maintain morale, play directly and indirectly an important role in politics and in political action. But religion has no such intimate connection as politics with the news. News is a purely secular phenomenon.

III

There is a proverbial saying to the effect that it is the unexpected that happens. Since what happens makes news, it follows, or seems to, that news is always or mainly concerned with the unusual and the unexpected. Even the most trivial happening, it seems, provided it represents a departure from the customary ritual and routine of daily life, is likely to be reported in the press. This conception of news has been confirmed by those editors who, in the competition for circulation and for advertising, have sought to make their papers smart and interesting, where they could not be invariably either informing or thrilling. In their efforts to instil into the minds of reporters and correspondents the importance of looking everywhere and always for something that would excite, amuse, or shock its readers, news editors have put into circulation some interesting examples of what the Germans, borrowing an expression from Homer, have called *geflügelte Wörter*, "winged words." The epigram describing news which has winged its way over more territory and is repeated more often than any other is this: "Dog bites man"—that is not news. But "Man bites dog"—that is. *Nota bene!* It is not the intrinsic importance of an event that makes it newsworthy. It is rather the fact that the event is so unusual that if published it will either startle, amuse, or otherwise excite the reader so that it will be remembered and repeated. For news is always finally, what Charles A. Dana described it to be, "something that will make people talk," even when it does not make them act.

The fact that news ordinarily circulates spontaneously and without any adventitious aids—as well as freely without inhibitions or censorship—seems to be responsible for another character which attaches to it, distinguishing it from related but less authentic types

of knowledge—namely, rumor and gossip. In order that a report of events current may have the quality of news, it should not merely circulate—possibly in circuitous underground channels—but should be published, if need be by the town crier or the public press. Such publication tends to give news something of the character of a public document. News is more or less authenticated by the fact that it has been exposed to the critical examination of the public to which it is addressed and with whose interests it is concerned.

The public which thus, by common consent or failure to protest, puts the stamp of its approval on a published report does not give to its interpretation the authority of statement that has been subjected to expert historical criticism. Every public has its local prejudices and its own limitations. A more searching examination of the facts would quite possibly reveal to a more critical and enlightened mind the naïve credulity and bias of an unsophisticated public opinion. In fact, the naïveté and credulity thus revealed may become an important historical or sociological datum. This, however, is merely another and further illustration of the fact that every public has its own universe of discourse and that, humanly speaking, a fact is only a fact in some universe of discourse.[5]

An interesting light is thrown on the nature of news by a consideration of the changes which take place in information that gets into circulation without the sanction which publicity gives to it. In such a case a report, emanating from some source not disclosed and traveling to a destination that is unknown, invariably accumulates details from the innocent but mainly illicit contributions of those who assist it on its travel. Under these circumstances what was at first mere rumor tends to assume, in time, the character of a legend, that is, something which everyone repeats but no one believes.

When, on the other hand, reports of current events are published with the names, dates, and places which make it possible for anyone concerned to check them, the atmosphere of legend which

5. A universe of discourse is, as the term is ordinarily used, no more than a special vocabulary which is well understood and appropriate to specific situations. It may, however, in the case of some special science include a body of more precisely defined terms or concepts, which in that case will tend to have a more or less systematic character. History, for example, employs no, or almost no, special concepts. On the other hand, sociology, and every science that attempts to be systematic, does. As concepts assume this systematic character they tend to constitute a "frame of reference."

gathers about and clothes with fantastic detail the news as originally reported is presently dispelled, and what is fact, or what will pass for fact, until corrected by further and later news reports, is reduced to something more prosaic than legend and more authentic than news, i.e., historical fact.

If it is the unexpected that happens, it is the not wholly unexpected that gets into the news. The events that have made news in the past, as in the present, are actually the expected things. They are characteristically simple and commonplace matters, like births and deaths, weddings and funerals, the conditions of the crops and of business, war, politics, and the weather. These are the expected things, but they are at the same time the unpredictable things. They are the incidents and the chances that turn up in the game of life.

The fact is that the thing that makes news is news interest, and that, as every city editor knows, is a variable quantity—one that has to be reckoned with from the time the city editor sits down at his desk in the morning until the night editor locks up the last form at night. The reason for this is that the news value is relative, and an event that comes later may, and often does, diminish the value of an event that turned up earlier. In that case the less important item has to give way to the later and more important.

The anecdotes and "believe it or nots" which turn up in the news are valuable to the editor because they can always be lifted out of the printer's form to make way for something hotter and more urgent. In any case it is, on the whole, the accidents and incidents that the public is prepared for; the victories and defeats on the ball field or on the battlefield; the things that one fears and things that one hopes for—that make the news. It is difficult to understand, nevertheless, considering the number of people who are killed and maimed annually by automobile accidents (the number killed in 1938 was 32,600) that these great losses of life rarely make the front page. The difference seems to be that the automobile has come to be accepted as one of the permanent features of civilized life and war has not.

News, therefore, at least in the strict sense of the term, is not a story or an anecdote. It is something that has for the person who hears or reads it an interest that is pragmatic rather than appreciative. News is characteristically, if not always, limited to events that bring about sudden and decisive changes. It may be an incident like that of the colored family in Philadelphia, Frances and Ben Mason,

who won a fortune in the Irish sweepstakes recently.[6] It may be a tragic incident like the battle off the coast of Uruguay which resulted in the destruction of the German battleship, the "Graf Spee," and the suicide of its captain. These events were not only news—that is, something that brought a sudden decisive change in the previously existing situation—but, as they were related in the newspapers and as we reflected upon them, they tended to assume a new and ideal significance: the one a story of genuine human interest, the other that of tragedy, something, to use Aristotle's phrase, to inspire "pity and terror." Events such as these tend to be remembered. Eventually they may become legends or be recorded in popular ballads. Legends and ballads need no date line or the names of persons or places to authenticate them. They live and survive in our memories and in that of the public because of their human interest. As events they have ceased to exist. They survive as a sort of ghostly symbol of something of universal and perennial interest, an ideal representation of what is true of life and of human nature everywhere.

Thus it seems that news, as a form of knowledge, contributes from its record of events not only to history and to sociology but to folklore and literature; it contributes something not merely to the social sciences but to the humanities.

IV

The sociological horizon has recently taken on new dimensions. Social anthropology, no longer interested in primitive society merely, has begun to study not only the history but the natural history and function of institutions. In doing so it has appropriated more and more the field of sociological interest and research. Psychiatry, likewise, has discovered that neuroses and psychoses are diseases of a personality which is itself a product of a social milieu created by the interaction of personalities. Meanwhile there has grown up in the United States and in Europe a sociology of law which conceives as natural products the norms which the courts are seeking to rationalize, systematize, and apply in specific cases. Finally, there have been some interesting recent attempts to bring the subject of knowledge itself within the limits of a sociological discipline.

Theories of knowledge have existed since the days of Parmen-

6. See *Time*, December 25, 1939, p. 12.

ides. They have, however, been less interested in knowledge which is a datum than in truth or valid knowledge which is an idea and an ideal. The question with which the sociology of knowledge is concerned is not what constitutes the validity of knowledge—of a statement of principle or of fact—but what are the conditions under which different kinds of knowledge arise and what are the functions of each.

Most of the forms of knowledge that have achieved the dignity of a science are, in the long history of mankind, of very recent origin. One of the earliest and most elementary forms of knowledge is news. There was a period, and not so long ago, either, when there was neither philosophy, history, nor rational knowledge of any sort. There was only myth, legend, and magic. What we now describe as the exact sciences did not exist until the Renaissance. The social sciences have, roughly speaking, only come into existence in the last fifty years. At least they have only begun within the last half-century to achieve, with the wider use of statistics, anything like scientific precision.

News, so far as it is to be regarded as knowledge at all, is probably as old as mankind, perhaps older. The lower animals were not without a kind of communication which was not unlike news. The "cluck" of the mother hen is understood by the chicks as signifying either danger or food, and the chicks respond accordingly.

This is not to suggest that every kind of communication in a herd or flock will have the character of news. What is ordinarily communicated is merely a kind of contagious excitement—sometimes merely a sense of well-being and security in the gregarious association of the herd, at others a sense of unrest or malaise, manifested and often intensified in the milling of the herd. It seems likely that this pervasive social excitement, which is essential to the existence of the herd as a social unit, serves, also, to facilitate the communication of news, or what corresponds to it in the herd.

There is in naval parlance an expression, "the fleet in being," which means, apparently, that the ships which constitute a fleet are in communication and sufficiently mobilized, perhaps, to be capable of some sort of concerted action. The same expression might be applied to a community, a society, or a herd. A society is "in being" when the individuals that compose it are to such an extent *en rapport* that, whether capable of united and collective action or not, they may be described as participating in a common

or collective existence. In such a society a diffuse social excitement tends to envelope, like an atmosphere, all participants in the common life and to give a direction and tendency to their interests and attitudes. It is as if the individuals of such a society were dominated by a common mood or state of mind which determined for them the range and character of their interests and their attitudes or tendencies to act. The most obvious illustration of this obscure social tension or state of mind in a community is the persistent and pervasive influence of fashion.

At certain times and under certain conditions this collective excitement, so essential to communication if not to understanding, rises to a higher level of intensity and, as it does so, tends to limit the range of response but to increase the intensity of impulses not so inhibited. The effect of this is the same as in the case of attention in the individual. Exclusive attention to some things inhibits responses to others. This means in the case of a society a limitation of the range and character of the news to which it will either collectively or individually respond.

The rise of social tension may be observed in the most elementary form in the herd when, for some reason, the herd is restless and begins to mill. Tension mounts as restlessness increases. The effect is as if the milling produced in the herd a state of expectancy which, as it increased in intensity, increased also the certainty that presently some incident, a clap of thunder or the crackling of a twig, would plunge the herd into a stampede.

Something similar takes place in a public. As tension arises, the limits of public interest narrows, and the range of events to which the public will respond is limited. The circulation of news is limited; discussion ceases, and the certainty of action of some sort increases. This narrowing of the focus of public attention tends to increase the influence of the dominant person or persons in the community. But the existence of this dominance depends upon the ability of the community, or its leaders, to maintain tension. It is in this way that dictators arise and maintain themselves in power. It is this that explains likewise the necessity to a dictatorship of some sort of censorship.

News circulates, it seems, only in a society where there is a certain degree of rapport and a certain degree of tension. But the effect of news from outside the circle of public interest is to disperse attention and, by so doing, to encourage individuals to act

on their own initiative rather than on that of a dominant party or personality.

Under ordinary circumstances—in a time of peace rather than of war or revolution—news tends to circulate over an ever widening area, as means of communication multiply. Changes in society and its institutions under these circumstances continue to take place, but they take place piecemeal and more or less imperceptibly. Under other conditions—in war or revolution—changes take place violently and visibly but catastrophically.

The permanence of institutions under ordinary conditions is dependent upon their ability, or the ability of the community of which they are a part, to adapt themselves to technological and other less obvious changes. But these changes and their consequences manifest themselves not only directly but rather indirectly in the news. Institutions like the Catholic church or the Japanese state have been able to survive the drastic changes of time because they have been able to respond to changes in the conditions of existence, not merely those physically and obviously imposed upon them but those foreshadowed and reflected in the news.

I have indicated the role which news plays in the world of politics in so far as it provides the basis for the discussions in which public opinion is formed. The news plays quite as important a role in the world of economic relations, since the price of commodities, including money and securities, as registered in the world-market and in every local market dependent upon it, is based on the news.

So sensitive are the exchanges to events in every part of the world that every fluctuation in fashion or the weather is likely to be reflected in the prices on the exchanges. I have said that news is a secular phenomenon. But there come times when changes are so great and so catastrophic that individuals and peoples are no longer interested in worldly affairs. In such case men, frustrated in their ambitions and their hopes, turn away from the world of secular affairs and seek refuge and consolation in a flight from the great world into the security of the little world of the family or of the church. The function of news is to orient man and society in an actual world. In so far as it succeeds it tends to preserve the sanity of the individual and the permanence of society.

Although news is an earlier and more elementary product of communication than science, news has by no means been super-

seded by it. On the contrary, the importance of news has grown consistently with the expansion of the means of communication and with the growth of science.

Improved means of communication have co-operated with the vast accumulations of knowledge, in libraries, in museums, and in learned societies, to make possible a more rapid, accurate, and thoroughgoing interpretation of events as they occur. The result is that persons and places, once remote and legendary, are now familiar to every reader of the daily press.

In fact, the multiplication of the means of communication has brought it about that anyone, even in the most distant part of the world, may now actually participate in events—at least as listener if not as spectator—as they actually take place in some other part of the world. We have recently listened to Mussolini address his fascist followers from a balcony of Rome; we have heard Hitler speaking over the heads of a devout congregation in the Reichstag, in Berlin, not merely to the President, but to the people, of the United States. We have even had an opportunity to hear the terms of the momentous Munich agreement ten seconds after it had been signed by the representatives of four of the leading powers in Europe and the world. The fact that acts so momentous as these can be so quickly and so publicly consummated has suddenly and completely changed the character of international politics, so that one can no longer even guess what the future has in store for Europe and for the world.

In the modern world the role of news has assumed increased rather than diminished importance as compared with some other forms of knowledge, history, for example. The changes in recent years have been so rapid and drastic that the modern world seems to have lost its historical perspective, and we appear to be living from day to day in what I have described earlier as a "specious present." Under the circumstances history seems to be read or written mainly to enable us, by comparison of the present with the past, to understand what is going on about us rather than, as the historians have told us, to know "what actually happened."

Thus Elmer Davis in a recent article in the *Saturday Review* announces as "required reading" for 1939 two volumes: Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (431 B.C.). He recommends the history of the Peloponnesian War be-

cause, as he says, "Thucydides was not only a brilliant analyst of human behavior both individual and collective" but was at the same time "a great reporter."[7]

One notes, also, as characteristic of our times, that since news, as reported in American newspapers, has tended to assume the character of literature, so fiction—after the newspaper the most popular form of literature—has assumed more and more the character of news.[8]

Emile Zola's novels were essentially reports upon contemporary manners in France just as Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath* has been described as an epoch-making report on the share-cropper in the United States.

Ours, it seems, is an age of news, and one of the most important events in American civilization has been the rise of the reporter.

7. "Required Reading," *Saturday Review of Literature,* October 14, 1939.
8. See Helen MacGill Hughes, *News and the Human Interest Story* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940).

CHAPTER 8

NATURAL HISTORY OF THE NEWSPAPER

I. THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE

THE newspaper has a history; but it has, likewise, a natural history. The press, as it exists, is not, as our moralists sometimes seem to assume, the wilful product of any little group of living men. On the contrary, it is the outcome of a historic process in which many individuals participated without foreseeing what the ultimate product of their labors was to be.

The newspaper, like the modern city, is not wholly a rational product. No one sought to make it just what it is. In spite of all the efforts of individual men and generations of men to control it and to make it something after their own heart, it has continued to grow and change in its own incalculable ways.

The type of newspaper that exists is the type that has survived under the conditions of modern life. The men who may be said to have made the modern newspaper—James Gordon Bennett, Charles A. Dana, Joseph Pulitzer, and William Randolph Hearst—are the men who discovered the kind of paper that men and women would read and had the courage to publish it.

The natural history of the press is the history of this surviving species. It is an account of the conditions under which the existing newspaper has grown up and taken form.

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from the *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIX:3 (November, 1923), pp. 80-98; also in Park, Burgess and McKenzie, *The City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), pp. 80-98.

A newspaper is not merely printed. It is circulated and read. Otherwise it is not a newspaper. The struggle for existence, in the case of a newspaper, has been a struggle for circulation. The newspaper that is not read ceases to be an influence in the community. The power of the press may be roughly measured by the number of people who read it.

The growth of great cities has enormously increased the size of the reading public. Reading, which was a luxury in the country, has become a necessity in the city. In the urban environment literacy is almost as much a necessity as speech itself. That is one reason there are so many foreign-language newspapers.

Mark Villchur, editor of the *Russkoye Slovo,* New York City, asked his readers how many of them had read newspapers in the old country. He found that out of 312 correspondents only 16 had regularly read newspapers in Russia; 10 others from time to time read newspapers in the Volast, the village administration center, and 12 were subscribers to weekly magazines. In America all of of them were subscribers or readers of Russian newspapers.

This is interesting because the immigrant has had, first and last, a profound influence on the character of our native newspapers. How to bring the immigrant and his descendants into the circle of newspaper readers has been one of the problems of modern journalism.

The immigrant who has, perhaps, acquired the newspaper habit from reading a foreign-language newspaper is eventually attracted to the native American newspapers. They are for him a window looking out into the larger world outside the narrow circle of the immigrant community in which he has been compelled to live. The newspapers have discovered that even men who can perhaps read no more than the headlines in the daily press will buy a Sunday paper to look at the pictures.

It is said that the most successful of the Hearst papers, the *New York Evening Journal,* gains a new body of subscribers every six years. Apparently it gets its readers mainly from immigrants. They graduate into Mr. Hearst's papers from the foreign-language press, and when the sensationalism of these papers begins to pall, they acquire a taste for some of the soberer journals. At any rate, Mr. Hearst has been a great Americanizer.

In their efforts to make the newspaper readable to the least-instructed reader, to find in the daily news material that would

thrill the crudest intelligence, publishers have made one important discovery. They have found that the difference between the high-brow and the low-brow, which once seemed so profound, is largely a difference in vocabularies. In short, if the press can make itself intelligible to the common man, it will have even less difficulty in being understood by the intellectual. The character of present-day newspapers has been profoundly influenced by this fact.

II. THE FIRST NEWSPAPERS

What is a newspaper? Many answers have been given. It is the tribune of the people; it is the fourth estate; the Palladium of our civil liberties, etc.

On the other hand, this same newspaper has been characterized as the great sophist. What the popular teachers did for Athens in the period of Socrates and Plato the press has done in modern times for the common man.

The modern newspaper has been accused of being a business enterprise. "Yes," say the newspaper men "and the commodity it sells is news." It is the truth shop. (The editor is the philosopher turned merchant.) By making information about our common life accessible to every individual at less than the price of a telephone call we are to regain, it is urged—even in the complicated life of what Graham Wallas calls the "Great Society"—some sort of working democracy.

The advertising manager's notion is again something different. For him the newspaper is a medium for creating advertising values. The business of the editor is to provide the envelope which incloses the space which the advertising man sells. Eventually the newspaper may be conceived as a sort of common carrier, like the railway or the post office.

The newspaper, according to the author of the *Brass Check*, is a crime. The brass check is a symbol of prostitution. "The brass check is found in your pay envelope every week—you who write and print and distribute our newspapers and magazines. The brass check is the price of your shame—you who take the fair body of truth and sell it in the market place, who betray the virgin hopes of mankind into the loathsome brothel of big business."

This is the conception of a moralist and a socialist—Upton Sinclair.

Evidently the newspaper is an institution that is not yet fully

understood. What it is, or seems to be, for any one of us at any time is determined by our differing points of view. As a matter of fact, we do not know much about the newspaper. It has never been studied.

One reason we know so little about the newspaper is that as it exists today it is a very recent manifestation. Besides, in the course of its relatively brief history, it has gone through a remarkable series of transfigurations. The press today is, however, all that it was and something more. To understand it we must see in its historic perspective.

The first newspapers were written or printed letters; newsletters they were called. In the seventeenth century English country gentlemen used to employ correspondents to write them once a week from London the gossip of the court and of the town.

The first newspaper in America, at least the first newspaper that lasted beyond its first issue, was the *Boston News-Letter.* It was published by the postmaster. The village post-office has always been a public forum, where all the affairs of the nation and the community were discussed. It was to be expected that there, in close proximity to the sources of intelligence, if anywhere, a newspaper would spring up. For a long time the position of postmaster and the vocation of editor were regarded as inseparable.

The first newspapers were simply devices for organizing gossip, and that, to a greater or less extent, they have remained. Horace Greeley's advice to a friend who was about to start a country paper is as good today as it was then.

> Begin with a clear conception that the subject of deepest interest to an average human being is himself; next to that, he is most concerned about his neighbors. Asia and the Tongo Islands stand a long way after these in his regard. It does seem to me that most country journals are oblivious as to these vital truths. If you will, so soon as may be, secure a wide awake, judicious correspondent in each village and township of your county, some young lawyer, doctor, clerk in a store, or assistant in a post office who will promptly send you whatever of moment occurs in his vicinity, and will make up at least half your journal of local matter thus collected, nobody in the county can long do without it. Do not let a new church be organized, or new members be added to one already existing, a farm be sold, a new house be raised, a mill be set in motion, a store be opened, nor anything of interest to a dozen families occur, without having the fact duly though briefly chronicled in your columns. If a farmer cuts a big tree, or grows a

mammoth beet, or harvests a bounteous yield of wheat or corn, set forth the fact as concisely and unexceptionally as possible.

What Greeley advises friend Fletcher to do with his country paper the city editor of every newspaper, as far as it humanly is possible, is still trying to do. It is not practicable, in a city of 3,000,000 and more, to mention everybody's name. For that reason attention is focused upon a few prominent figures. In a city where everything happens every day, it is not possible to record every petty incident, every variation from the routine of the city life. It is possible, however, to select certain particularly picturesque or romantic incidents and treat them symbolically, for their human interest rather than their individual and personal significance. In this way news ceases to be wholly personal and assumes the form of art. It ceases to be the record of the doings of individual men and women and becomes an impersonal account of manners and life.

The motive, conscious or unconscious, of the writers and of the press in all this is to reproduce, as far as possible, in the city the conditions of life in the village. In the village everyone knew everyone else. Everyone called everyone by his first name. The village was democratic. We are a nation of villagers. Our institutions are fundamentally village institutions. In the village, gossip and public opinion were the main sources of social control.

"I would rather live," said Thomas Jefferson, "in a country with newspapers and without a government than in a country with a government and without newspapers."

If public opinion is to continue to govern in the future as it has in the past, if we propose to maintain a democracy as Jefferson conceived it, the newspaper must continue to tell us about ourselves. We must somehow learn to know our community and its affairs in the same intimate way in which we knew them in the country villages. The newspaper must continue to be the printed diary of the home community. Marriages and divorce, crime and politics, must continue to make up the main body of our news. Local news is the very stuff that democracy is made of.

But that, according to Walter Lippmann, is just the difficulty. "As social truth is organized today, so he says, "the press is not constituted to furnish from one edition to the next the amount of knowledge which the democratic theory of public opinion de-

mands. . . . When we expect it to supply such a body of truth, we employ a misleading standard of judgment. We misunderstand the limited nature of news, the illimitable complexity of society; we overestimate our own endurance, public spirit, and all-round competence. We suppose an appetite for uninteresting truths which is not discovered by any honest analysis of our own tastes. . . . Unconsciously the theory sets up the single reader as theoretically incompetent, and puts upon the press the burden of accomplishing whatever representative government, industrial organization, and diplomacy have failed to accomplish. Acting upon everybody for thirty minutes in twenty-four hours, the press is asked to create a mystical force called 'public opinion' that will take up the slack in public institutions."[1]

It is evident that a newspaper cannot do for a community of 1,000,000 inhabitants what the village did spontaneously for itself through the medium of gossip and personal contact. Nevertheless the efforts of the newspaper to achieve this impossible result are an interesting chapter in the history of politics as well as of the press.

III. THE PARTY PAPERS

The first newspapers, the news-letters, were not party papers. Political journals began to supersede the news-letters at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The news with which the reading public was most concerned at that time was the reports of the debates in Parliament.

Even before the rise of the party press certain prying and curious individuals had made a business of visiting the Strangers' Gallery during the sessions of the House of Commons in order to write up from memory, or from notes taken down surreptitiously, accounts of the speeches and discussions during an important debate. At this time all the deliberations of Parliament were secret, and it was not until 100 years later that the right of reporters to attend the sessions of the House of Commons and record its proceedings was officially recognized. In the meantime reporters were compelled to resort to all sorts of subterfuges and indirect methods in order to get information. It is upon this information, gathered in this way, that much of our present history of English politics is based.

1. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, pp. 361-62.

One of the most distinguished of these parliamentary reporters was Samuel Johnson. One evening in 1770, it is reported, Johnson, with a number of other celebrities, was taking dinner in London. Conversation turned upon parliamentary oratory. Someone spoke of a famous speech delivered in the House of Commons by the elder Pitt in 1741. Someone else, amid the applause of the company, quoted a passage from this speech as an illustration of an orator who had surpassed in feeling and beauty of language the finest efforts of the orators of antiquity. Then Johnson, who up to that point had taken no part in the discussion, spoke up. "I wrote that speech," he said, "in a garret in Exeter Street."

The guests were struck with amazement. He was asked, "How could it have been written by you, sir?"

"Sir," said Johnson, "I wrote it in Exeter Street. I never was in the gallery of the House of Commons but once. Cave had interest with the doorkeepers; he and the persons employed under him got admittance; they brought away the subjects of discussion, the names of the speakers, the side they took, and the order in which they rose, together with notes of the various arguments adduced in the course of the debate. The whole was afterward communicated to me, and I composed the speeches in the form they now have in the "Parliamentary Debates," for the speeches of that period are all printed from Cave's magazine."[2]

Someone undertook to praise Johnson's impartiality, saying that in his reports he seems to have dealt out reason and eloquence with an equal hand to both political parties. "That is not quite true," was Johnson's reply. "I saved appearances tolerably well; but I took care that the Whig dogs should not have the best of it."

This speech of William Pitt, composed by Johnson in Exeter Street, has long held a place in school books and collections of oratory. It is the famous speech in which Pitt answered the accusation of the "atrocious crime of being a young man."

Perhaps Pitt thought he delivered that speech. At any rate there is no evidence that he repudiated it. I might add that Pitt, if he was the first, was not the last statesman who is indebted to the reporters for his reputation as an orator.

The significant thing about this incident is that it illustrates the manner in which, under the influence of the parliamentary

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2. Michael MacDonagh, *The Reporter's Gallery*. Pp. 139-40.

reporters, something like a constitutional change was effected in the character of parliamentary government. As soon as the parliamentary orators discovered that they were addressing not only their fellow-members but, indirectly, through the medium of the press, the people of England, the whole character of parliamentary proceedings changed. Through the newspapers the whole country was enabled to participate in the discussions by which issues were framed and legislation was enacted.

Meanwhile, the newspapers themselves, under the influence of the very discussions which they themselves instigated, had become party organs. Whereupon the party press ceased to be a mere chronicle of small gossip and came to be what we know as a "journal of opinion." The editor, meanwhile, no longer a mere newsmonger and humble recorder of events, found himself the mouthpiece of a political party, playing a rôle in politics.

During the long struggle for freedom of thought and speech in the seventeenth century, popular discontent had found literary expression in the pamphlet and broadside. The most notable of these pamphleteers was John Milton, and the most famous of these pamphlets was Milton's *Areopagitica: A Defence of the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing*, published in 1646; "the noblest piece of English prose" it has been called by Henry Morley.

When the newspaper became, in the early part of the eighteenth century, a journal of opinion, it took over the function of the political pamphlet. The opinion that had formerly found expression in a broadside was now expressed in the form of editorial leading articles. The editorial writer, who had inherited the mantle of the pamphleteer, now assumed the rôle of a tribune of the people.

It was in this rôle, as the protagonist of the popular cause, that the newspaper captured the imagination of our intelligentsia.

When we read in the political literature of a generation ago references to "the power of the press," it is the editor and the editorial, rather than the reporter and the news, of which these writers are thinking. Even now when we speak of the liberty of the press it is the liberty to express an opinion, rather than the liberty to investigate and publish the facts, which is meant. The activities of the reporter, upon which any opinion that is relevant to existing conditions is likely to be based, are more often regarded as an infringement of our personal rights than an exercise of our political liberties.

The liberty of the press for which Milton wrote the *Areopagitica* was the liberty to express an opinion. "Give me the liberty," he said, "to know, to alter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."

Carlyle was thinking of the editorial writer and not of the reporter when he wrote: "Great is journalism! Is not every able editor a ruler of the world, being a persuader of it?"

The United States inherited its parliamentary government, its party system, and its newspapers from England. The rôle which the political journals played in English politics was re-enacted in America. The American newspapers were a power with which the British government had to reckon in the struggle of the colonies for independence. After the British took possession of New York City, Ambrose Serle, who had undertaken to publish the *New York Gazette* in the interest of the invaders, wrote as follows to Lord Dartmouth in regard to the patriot-party press.

> Among other engines which have raised the present commotion, next to the indecent harangues of the preachers, none has had a more extensive or stronger influence than the newspapers of the respective colonies. One is astonished to see with what avidity they are sought after, and how implicitly they are believed by the great bulk of the people.[3]

It was nearly a century later, in the person of Horace Greeley, editor of the *New York Tribune* during the anti-slavery struggle, that the journal of opinion reached its highest expression in America. America has had better newspaper men than Horace Greeley, although none, perhaps, whose opinions exercised so wide an influence. "The *New York Tribune*," says Charles Francis Adams, "during those years was the greatest educational factor, economically and morally, this country has ever known."

IV. THE INDEPENDENT PRESS

The power of the press, as represented by the older type of newspaper, rested in the final analysis upon the ability of its editors to create a party and lead it. The journal of opinion is, by its very nature, predestined to become the organ of a party, or at any rater the mouthpiece of a school.

So long as political activities were organized on the basis of

3. George Henry Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States*, p. 120.

village life, the party system worked. In the village community, where life was and still is relatively fixed and settled, custom and tradition provided for most of the exigencies of daily life. In such a community, where every deviation from the ordinary routine of life was a matter of observation and comment and all the facts were known, the political process was, at any rate, a comparatively simple matter. Under these circumstances the work of the newspaper, as a gatherer and interpreter of the news, was but an extension of the function which was otherwise performed spontaneously by the community itself through the medium of personal contact and gossip.

But as our cities expanded and life grew more complicated, it turned out that political parties, in order to survive, must have a permanent organization. Eventually party morale became a greater value than the issues for the determination of which the parties are supposed to exist. The effect upon the party press was to reduce it to the position of a sort of house organ of the party organization. It no longer knew from day to day just what its opinions were. The editor was no longer a free agent. It was of this subjugated *Tribune* that Walt Whitman was thinking when he coined the phrase, "the kept editor."

When, finally, the exigencies of party politics, under conditions of life in great cities, developed the political machine, some of the more independent newspapers revolted. This was the origin of the independent press. It was one of the independent papers, the *New York Times* of that day, that first assailed and eventually overthrew, with the aid of a cartoonist, Thomas Nast, the Tweed Ring, the first and most outrageous of the political machines that party politics in this country has so far produced. Presently there was a general breaking away, particularly by the metropolitan, as distinguished from the country, papers, from the domination of the parties. Party loyalty ceased to be a virtue.

Meanwhile a new political power had arisen and found expression in the press. This power was embodied, not in the editorial and the editorial writer, however, but in the news and the reporter. In spite of the fact that the prestige of the press, up to this time, had rested on its rôle of champion of popular causes, the older newspapers were not read by the masses of the people.

The ordinary man is more interested in news than he is in political doctrines or abstract ideas. H. L. Mencken has called

attention to the fact that the average man does not understand more than two-thirds of what "comes from the lips of the average political orator or clergyman."

The ordinary man, as the *Saturday Evening Post* has discovered, thinks in concrete images, anecdotes, pictures, and parables. He finds it difficult and tiresome to read a long article unless it is dramatized and takes the form of what newspapers call a "story." "News story" and "fiction story" are two forms of modern literature that are now so like one another that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them.

The *Saturday Evening Post,* for example, writes the news in the form of fiction, while the daily press frequently writes fiction in the form of news. When it is not possible to present ideas in the concrete, dramatic form of a story, the ordinary reader likes them stated in a short paragraph.

It is said that James E. Scripps, founder of the *Detroit News,* which specializes in afternoon papers in secondary cities, built up his whole string of papers upon the basis of the very simple psychological principle that the ordinary man will read newspaper items in the inverse ratio to their length. His method of measuring the efficiency of his newspapers, therefore, was to count the number of items they contained. The paper that had the largest number of items was the best paper. This is just the reverse of Mr. Hearst's methods; his papers have fewer items than other papers.

The old-time journalist was inclined to have a contempt for news. News was for him simply material upon which to base an editorial. If God let things happen that were not in accordance with his conception of the fitness of things, he simply suppressed them. He refused to take the responsibility of letting his readers learn about things that he knew ought not to have happened.

Manton Marble, who was editor of the *New York World* before Joseph Pulitzer took it and made it yellow, used to say there were not 18,000 people in New York City to whom a well-conducted newspaper could offer to address itself. If the circulation of the paper went above that figure he thought there must be something wrong with the paper. Before Mr. Pulitzer took it over, the circulation had actually sunk to 10,000. The old *New York World* preserved the type of the old conservative high-brow paper down to the eighties. By that time in the larger cities the political independent newspapers had become the accepted type of journal.

Long before the rise of what was later to be called the independent press, there had appeared in New York two journals that were the forerunners of the present-day newspapers. In 1883 Benjamin Day, with a few associates, started a paper for "mechanics and the masses generally." The price of this paper was one cent, but the publishers expected to make up by larger circulation and by advertising the loss sustained by the lower price. At that time most of the other New York papers were selling for six cents.

It was, however, the enterprise of James Gordon Bennett, the founder of the *New York Herald,* who set the pace in the new form of journalism. In fact, as Will Irwin says in the only adequate account that has ever been written of the American newspaper, "James Gordon Bennett invented news as we know it." Bennett, like some others who have contributed most to modern journalism, was a disillusioned man, and for that very reason, perhaps, a ruthless and cynical one. "I renounce all so-called principles," he said in his announcement of the new enterprise. By principles he meant, perhaps, editorial policies. His salutatory was at the same time a valedictory. In announcing the purposes of the new journalism he bade adieu to the aims and aspirations of the old. Henceforth the editors were to be news gatherers and the newspaper staked its future on its ability to gather, print, and circulate news.

What is news? There have been many answers. I think it was Charles A. Dana who said, "News is anything that will make people talk." This definition suggests at any rate the aims of the new journalism. Its purpose was to print anything that would make people talk and think, for most people do not think until they begin to talk. Thought is after all a sort of internal conversation.

A later version of the same definition is this: "News is anything that makes the reader say, 'Gee Whiz!' " This is the definition of Arthur McEwen, one of the men who helped make the Hearst papers. It is at the same time the definition of the latest and most successful type of journal, the yellow press. Not all successful journals are, to be sure, yellow. The *New York Times,* for example, is not. But the *New York Times* is not yet a type.

V. THE YELLOW PRESS

There seem to be, as Walter Lippmann has observed, two types of newspaper readers. "Those who find their own lives interesting"

and "those who find their own lives dull, and wish to live a more thrilling existence." There are, correspondingly, two types of newspapers: papers edited on the principle that readers are mainly interested in reading about themselves, and papers edited upon the principle that their readers, seeking some escape from the dull routine of their own lives, are interested in anything which offers them what the psychoanalyists call "a flight from reality."

The provincial newspaper with its record of weddings, funerals, lodge meetings, oyster suppers, and all the small patter of the small town represents the first type. The metropolitan press, with its persistent search in the drab episodes of city life for the romantic and the picturesque, its dramatic accounts of vice and crime, and its unflagging interest in the movements of personages of a more or less mythical high society represents the latter type.

Up to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, that is to say, up to about 1880, most newspapers, even in our large cities, were conducted on the theory that the best news a paper can print is a death notice or marriage announcement.

Up to that time the newspapers had not yet begun to break into the tenements, and most people who supported a newspaper lived in homes rather than in apartments. The telephone had not yet come into popular use; the automobile was unheard of; the city was still a mosaic of little neighborhoods, like our foreign-language communities of the present day, in which the city dweller still maintained something of the provincialism of the small town.

Great changes, however, were impending. The independent press was already driving some of the old-time newspapers to the wall. There were more newspapers than either the public or the advertisers were willing to support. It was at this time and under these circumstances that newspaper men discovered that circulation could be greatly increased by making literature out of the news. Charles A. Dana had already done this in the *Sun*, but there still was a large section of the population for whom the clever writing of Mr. Dana's young men was caviar.

The yellow press grew up in an attempt to capture for the newspaper a public whose only literature was the family story paper or the cheap novel. The problem was to write the news in such a way that it would appeal to the fundamental passions. The formula was: love and romance for the women; sport and politics for the men.

The effect of the application of this formula was enormously to increase the circulation of the newspapers, not only in the great cities, but all over the country. These changes were brought about mainly under the leadership of two men, Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst.

Pulitzer had discovered, while he was editor of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, that the way to fight popular causes was not to advocate them on the editorial page but to advertise them—write them up—in the news columns. It was Pulitzer who invented muckraking. It was this kind of journalism which enabled Pulitzer, within a period of six years, to convert the old *New York World*, which was dying of inanition when he took it, into the most talked about, if not the most widely circulated, paper in New York City.

Meanwhile, out in San Francisco Mr. Hearst had succeeded in galvanizing the old moribund *Examiner* into new life, making it the most widely read newspaper on the Pacific Coast.

It was under Mr. Hearst that the "sob sister" came into vogue. This is her story, as Will Irwin told it in *Collier's*, February 18, 1911:

> Chamberlain (managing editor of the *Examiner*) conceived the idea that the city hospital was badly managed. He picked a little slip of a girl from among his cub reporters and assigned her to the investigation. She invented her own method; she "fainted" on the street, and was carried to the hospital for treatment. She turned out a story "with a sob for the unfortunate in every line." That was the professional beginning of "Annie Laurie" or Winifred Black, and of a departure in newspaper writing. For she came to have many imitators, but none other could ever so well stir up the primitive emotions of sympathy and pity; she was a "sob squad" all by serself. Indeed, in the discovery of this sympathetic "woman writing," Hearst broke through the crust into the thing he was after.

With the experience that he had gained on the *Examiner* in San Francisco and with a large fortune that he had inherited from his father, Hearst invaded New York in 1896. It was not until he reached New York and started out to make the *New York Journal* the most widely read paper in the United States that yellow journalism reached the limit.

Pulitzer's principal contribution to yellow journalism was muckraking, Hearst's was mainly "jazz." The newspaper had been conducted up to this time upon the theory that its business was to instruct. Hearst rejected that conception. His appeal was frankly

not to the intellect but to the heart. The newspaper was for him first and last a form of entertainment.

It was about the time the yellow press was engaged in extending the newspaper habit to the masses of people, including women and immigrants—who up to this time did not read newspapers—that the department store was beginning to attract attention.

The department store is, in a sense, a creation of the Sunday newspaper. At any rate, without the advertising that the Sunday newspaper was able to give it, the department store would hardly have gained the vogue it has today. It is important in this connection that women read the Sunday paper before they did the dailies. The women are buyers.

It was in the Sunday newspaper that the methods of yellow journalism were first completely worked out. The men who are chiefly responsible for them are Morrill Goddard and Arthur Brisbane. It was Goddard's ambition to make a paper that a man would buy even if he could not read it. He went in for pictures, first in black and white and then in colors. It was in the *Sunday World* that the first seven-column cut was printed. Then followed the comic section and all the other devices with which we are familiar for compelling a dull-minded and reluctant public to read.

After these methods had been worked out in the Sunday paper, they were introduced into the daily. The final triumph of the yellow journal was Brisbane's "Heart-to-Heart Editorials"—a column of predigested platitudes and moralizing, with half-page diagrams and illustrations to re-enforce the text. Nowhere has Herbert Spencer's maxim that the art of writing is economy of attention been so completely realized.

Walter Lippmann, in his recent study of public opinion, calls attention to the fact that no sociologist has ever written a book on news gathering. It strikes him as very strange that an institution like the press, from which we expect so much and get so little of what we expected, should not have been the subject of a more disinterested study.

It is true that we have not studied the newspaper as the biologists have studied, for example, the potato bug. But the same may be said of every political institution, and the newspaper is a political institution quite as much as Tammany Hall or the board of aldermen are political institutions. We have grumbled about our political *institutions,* sometimes we have sought by certain magical

legislative devices to exercise and expel the evil spirits that possessed them. On the whole we have been inclined to regard them as sacred and to treat any fundamental criticism of them as a sort of blasphemy. If things went wrong, it was not the institutions, but the persons we elected to conduct them, and an incorrigible human nature, who were at fault.

When then is the remedy for the existing condition of the newspapers? There is no remedy. Humanly speaking, the present newspapers are about as good as they can be. If the newspapers are to be improved, it will come through the education of the people and the organization of political information and intelligence. As Mr. Lippmann well says, "the number of social phenomena which are now recorded is small, the instruments of analysis are very crude, and the concepts often vague and uncriticized." We must improve our records and that is a serious task. But first of all we must learn to look at political and social life objectively and cease to think of it wholly in moral terms! In that case we shall have less news, but better newspapers.

The real reason that the ordinary newspaper accounts of the incidents of ordinary life are so sensational is because we know so little of human life that we are not able to interpret the events of life when we read them. It is safe to say that when anything shocks us, we do not understand it.

CHAPTER 9

NEWS AND THE HUMAN INTEREST STORY

MODERN science has measurably succeeded in bringing within the limits of rational explanation and rational control more and more of those imponderable forces, personal and political, of which we have always been aware but had not previously been able to weigh. Thus we have achieved relatively effective techniques for carrying on such various activities as measuring public opinion, maintaining discipline in factories, organizing strikes, and fomenting revolutions. We have, at the same time, brought into existence something like a science of advertising and propaganda that has achieved prodigious results in the world of business and in the world of politics.

In these and other studies in this field public opinion has been the subject of much interested inquiry, although there has been, with the exception of Lippmann's *Liberty and the News*,[1] almost no attempt to investigate the nature as well as the political and social function of news. This is all the more notable in view of the fact that it is, generally speaking, only in a discussion of news and of those events that tend to break the routine of daily life that public opinion arises.

1. Walter Lippmann, *Liberty and the News* (1920).

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Helen MacGill Hughes, *News and the Human Interest Story* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940), pp. xi-xxiii.

Now it is characteristic of science that one of the first and last questions which it is certain to ask is this: What is this thing with which this particular science and this particular inquiry are mainly concerned?

This volume is, among other things, an attempt to answer, in a rather fundamental way, the question: What is news? It might be described as an exploratory survey to discover what has been said and what is generally known in regard to news—its different types and its uses. In any case, what is needed for the purposes of systematic investigation in this field is a working concept in which news is clearly distinguished from other forms, in which information in regard to current events gets into general circulation—rumor and gossip, for example, and propaganda.

Interest in this study, however, is focused about the difference between two fundamental types, or perhaps one might say, two fundamental aspects of the news. For that reason it has seemed appropriate to set down something, by way of introduction, in regard to news in general, as well as with reference to some of the contingent and related subjects with which any discussion of human interest and news interest, as they find expression in the newspaper, is inevitably involved. This seems the more important since any inquiry which begins with what is concrete and matter of fact, with the expectation of achieving a conception that is relatively abstract, must at the same time be concerned with gaining some definition of the general field in which the thing investigated actually lies.

It is a curious fact—one of those facts about human nature that philosophers were wont to observe and record before the study of human nature became systematic and scientific—that the things which most of us would like to publish are not the things most of us want to read. We may be eager to get into print what is, or seems to be, edifying, but we want to read what is interesting. That is the reason—at least that is one reason—why the *Congressional Record* and the *Nation* have so little circulation as compared with *Time*, the *New York News*, and the commercial press generally. In fact, the reason we have newspapers at all, in the modern sense of the term, is because about one hundred years ago, in 1835 to be exact, a few newspaper publishers in New York City and in London discovered (1) that most human beings, if they could read at all, found it easier to read news than editorial opinion and

(2) that the common man would rather be entertained than edified. This, in its day, had the character and importance of a real discovery. It was like the discovery, made later in Hollywood, that gentlemen prefer blonds. At any rate, it is to the consistent application of the principle involved that the modern newspaper owes not merely its present character but its survival as a species. This was certainly true as long as survival involved an active competition for circulation. However, since the existing press has in so many places gained a monopoly both of news and of circulation, this situation no longer exists and, so far as this is true, the struggle for existence in the newspaper world has assumed a different character.

It has been said that newspapermen, like poets, are born, not made. This is a saying that, unlike most other examples of popular wisdom, is probably less than 50 per cent true. No doubt some men have a quicker news sense than others. However, what is known in the newsroom as a "nose for news" is not an original trait of human nature. On the contrary, it is usually a hard-won acquisition and one which is more likely to be learned on the job than in the classroom, even of a school of journalism.

What the reporter learns, finally, in the course of his newspaper experience, is the art of looking at events as evidences of things in progress, the full significance of which he does not seek to assess. Doubtless the whole truth in regard to any event includes a final and definite statement as to what ought to be done about it. Such a statement assumes, however, that we are in possession of all the pertinent facts. Besides, it seems to be in the very nature of a news report that it is not final and that the news announces events rather than interprets them. It is the function of the editorial writer, the historian, and the public to interpret the news. Once these authorities have spoken, even if they have merely given them the once-over, events cease to be news and become history.

A reporter, moreover, as he acquires a "nose for news," learns to look at events in a more or less impersonal way, seeing them as they are likely to look to his public and not as they would appear if interpreted from his own naïve point of view or that of any other normally egocentric individual.

Furthermore, there is not, as is sometimes assumed, one public, but many. In fact, every department of a newspaper, from the society column to the sporting page, has its own public, each with

its own concept of what is news and its own definition of what is fact. It is interesting, also, that the publics that read the departmental news are invariably better informed and more critical in regard to what they read than the public which reads the first page. In any case, and that is the point I was coming to, every newspaperman has to know his public and be able to present the facts without color and without comment, except such as is necessary to make them intelligible and readable to the public to which they are addressed.

Some of the first and the most difficult things that the cub reporter has to learn are that he must cut out the sob stuff and let the reader supply the moral to his story. It is the art of writing to tell a story in such a way as will permit the reader rather than the writer to have the appropriate emotions. It is the art of reporting to state the facts so that both parties to an issue will accept them as facts, though they may disagree as to the interpretation to be put upon them.

If, as frequently happens, different individuals draw different and even contradictory morals from the same story—well, that is what news is: something, as Charles A. Dana said, that makes people talk. It is certainly not something that leaves them purring.

The fact that a news story provoked violent approval and violent disapproval from different members of the same public at the same time is at least an evidence that the events were reported objectively. From the newspaper point of view objectivity can go no farther. Facts are, after all, only facts in a universe of discourse and, as I have suggested, every public has its own. This is, however, no more than an application of the general principle of relativity to mundane affairs and to the commonplace but no less important aspects of personal life.

I might, perhaps, add here as an aside that even the newspaper has its canons of objectivity. For example, newspapers require that every news item have a date and a location; they require also that persons mentioned appear under their true names. The reason for this is the same as the one which requires that the report of a scientific inquiry, in order to have scientific validity, must describe in detail the operations by which its findings were obtained. This is so in order that the facts may be checked up. True stories and life-histories, published anonymously or under assumed names, may be human documents but they are not news.

Not everything, of course, that is published in a newspaper is news. Some of it is advertising, some of it is editorial, and much of it is just reading matter, "next to advertising." The principal difficulty that students of the press have had in their occasional efforts to assess and compare the contents of newspapers has been the difficulty of achieving a clear distinction and description of the different types of materials which find their way into the pages of newspapers. As a matter of fact the commercial press has become, in the course of time, a purely secular affair—a kind of common carrier in fact—prepared to circulate anything—fiction, pictures, comic strips—that it pays to publish.

Obviously, the function of the editorial page and the news columns are very different. They are so different in fact that there is rarely anything like a complete understanding between the editorial offices and the newsroom. From the point of view of the editorial office news is interesting when it suggests a few bright remarks on things in general or serves as the theme for a leading editorial in support of the paper's policy or program—if it has one. From the point of view of the reporter and the newsroom every item is, or should be, reported on its individual merits in accordance with the degree of interest it is likely to awaken in the largest circle of readers, and without any reference to anybody's policy or to its ulterior consequences, either to individuals or the public.

The only policy the reporter is disposed to recognize is one which will compel every public man, if not every private citizen —as if every day were judgment day—to live and work in the light of a searching and pitiless publicity.

Once the reporter learns the game and likes it he hunts news with the same passionate and impersonal interest that a hound hunts a rabbit. The newspaper for him is not a profession. It imposes no responsibilities and offers no permanent or adequate rewards for the enterprise and devotion that it requires. It is, like art to the artist, less a career than a form of excitement and a way of life.

The thing that gives the task of the reporter the character of a game is the necessity of getting the facts—getting them quickly and completely. Time and place are the essence of news and this is precisely the difference—to use the language of the newsroom—between a news story and a fiction story.

Another way of stating the matter is this: news has to do with

events in a real world and gets whatever importance it has from that fact. Fiction and art, generally, are symbolic in character and concerned with incidents in an ideal world beyond time and space. For that reason fiction and art have no importance in the sense in which that term applies to the news.

It is this notion of importance which seems, finally, to be the distinctive and the determining specification in the conception of news. Events, if they are to have for the reader the character of news, must be not merely interesting but important. Importance seems, however, to be a quality like hot and cold; that is, relative to time and space. In an empirical world there is nothing like absolute or timeless importance. What is news at one time is not news at another, because the events recorded have ceased to be interesting. History is often quite as interesting as news. But the events history records have ceased to be important because there is nothing one can do about them. On the other hand, when there is nothing to be done about the events recorded in the newspaper they have ceased to be news.

The reason newspapermen know news when they see it is that they know, by a kind of instinct, what is important at a given time and place in their world and to their public. To do this it is necessary that they be thoroughly oriented in the world whose affairs they report, but not to such an extent involved that they are not able to view events with the detachment of an intelligent spectator. As a matter of fact, newspapermen with no expert or professional interest in the matters they report acquire an extraordinary knowledge of what is or will be—once it is published—regarded as news for the general or special public for which they write. On the other hand, it is notorious that the laymen—professional men, businessmen, reformers, or even politicians—have very little notion of what the repercussions of newspaper items are likely to be after they have reached the general public.

It is because newspapermen have this special knowledge that there has grown up in the United States in the last seventy-five years a new profession—a profession which seems to have had its origin with P. T. Barnum and the "Greatest Show on Earth"—that, namely, of press agent or, as it has come to be called, public relations counsel. Every public man and every public institution, including the great universities, the departments of government, and the President of the United States, have their press agents: men who make

a profession of knowing when and how to make statements to the public; of knowing also, how these statements will be received after they have been published. In the United States the press, the press agents, and the so-called pressure groups, operating largely through the press, have more or less superseded Congress in the forming of public opinion and, indirectly, in the making of laws.

Most of these experts in public relations are former newspapermen who have given up their careers as reporters of contemporary life and have become the privy counselors to the administrators and directors of our institutions, public and private. They are the wizards whose function it is to decipher, for the Belshazzars of our day, the portentous writings on our walls; that is to say, the stories of the day's events as recorded in the daily press.

Belshazzar's interest in the news of his day seems to have been wholly pragmatic. However, the day's doings, as recorded in the press, frequently have for the philosophical reader and for anyone who succeeds for the moment in freeing himself from pressing personal and practical concerns a wholly different sort of interest. One may, in an idle moment, read the newspaper with the same interest that one looks out the window at the moving throng in a crowded street. One may read the newspaper without reference to the importance of the news. Best examples of this sort of news are the quaint items which *Time* culls from the newspapers over the country and prints from time to time under the title "Miscellany." Following is an item from the issue of August 22, 1938:

UNDERFOOT

A 16-ft. statue of Washington carved by the late Sculptor Lorado Taft, which for 29 years had ignominiously squatted "in the mud" in Seattle, Wash., was upped to a 27-ft. pedestal near University of Washington's Henry Art Gallery. Found near Washington's feet were three undignified objects: a whiskey bottle cap, a punctured balloon, and a bemired note to "Dear Harry." The note: "Hiya, egg. . . . What have you been doing lately? Do you still go on those long walks like we used to? 'Bye, you snow bat.[2] Can you read this? If I thought you could I would call you a lot of names. Hisses to you. MICKEY."

This is an example of what may be called the "believe it or not" type of news. These items, which may have had a news interest for the readers of the papers in which they were originally printed,

2. Cocaine addict.

have no importance whatever in the context in which they appear in *Time*. They are matters of fact and are presumably part of the news. But one reads them merely because they are quaint or comic or because they reflect aspects of life that are relatively universal and timeless in the interest they have for us. They would be just as interesting if they were read in Aroostook, Maine, or in Walla Walla, Washington. Items like these are interesting not because there is anything to be done about them; not anything that is urgent enough at any rate to require a revision of one's plans or one's attitudes. On the contrary, they are merely suggestive and seem to project us out of the world of temporal and local affairs into the timeless world of ideas and fancies. They are interesting, but in somewhat the same way in which *Alice in Wonderland* or Walt Disney's screen fancies are interesting.

Other things turn up in the news, however, that cannot be classed either as anecdotes or as believe-it-or-not stories, but which, nevertheless, because of something that makes them significant and gives them a more or less universal and symbolic character, are destined to be remembered, repeated, and widely circulated irrespective of the time and place in which they occurred. Eventually they may find a place in the general body of ideas that survive outside their context in local history. They may turn up in that case in the form of folk tales, or after further transfiguration reappear as the themes of formal literature and art.

Sometimes writers like Ben Hecht, in his *1001 Afternoons in Chicago*, and Theodore Dreiser, in his *American Tragedy*, have known how to translate the sordid incidents of a police-court tragedy, without the intervention of time and distance, into the language and idiom of a self-conscious and sophisticated literature. Generally, however, the reports of these incidents have—like the popular ballads which preceded them—remained a kind of popular literature for the entertainment and instruction of the proletarian public of cities.

In the vernacular of the newspaper office these tragic episodes, like the anecdotes which are read merely for their own intrinsic interest and with relatively slight reference to the actual world of people and events in which they occurred, are "human interest stories." The lowest form of human interest story and the most popular is undoubtedly the believe-it-or-not story already referred to.

Every newspaperman knows what a human interest story is, though he may have some difficulty in defining it. It is what gives the news the character of a story that will be read for its own sake, even when the reader is not at all concerned with it as news. Human interest is the universal element in the news. It is what gives the news story its symbolic character. It is the ability to discover and interpret the human interest in the news that gives the reporter the character of a literary artist and the news story the character of literature. It is in the human interest story that the distinction between the news story and the fiction story tends to disappear.

The most notable instance of the tendency of a news story to assume the fictional form and of fiction to assume the character of a news report is, perhaps, Steinbeck's recent novel, *The Grapes of Wrath*, which someone has characterized as a "story that was likely to become the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of the Share Cropper."

It is the practice of writing up and dramatizing the news which came into existence with the so-called Yellow Press that has transformed the newspaper in the United States and, to a less extent, in other countries, including Japan, from a more or less sober record of events into a form of popular literature. The transformation has taken place, to be sure, in different degrees in different newspapers. Publishers like the late Adolph Ochs of the *New York Times* have attempted to make their papers a chronicle of events so that they have something of the character of a historical record of our times. Other publishers, like William Randolph Hearst, have sought to make the newspaper a mere form of literature, using the news as a theme of romantic stories; stories like those recorded in the popular ballads; stories of love and of death.

These papers, each in accordance with its distinctive policy, have sought to document the news. The *New York Times* has, where it was possible, sought to print in full the speches and formal documents that a historian of politics might some day wish to refer to. Mr. Hearst, on the other hand, has gone out for human documents and, in doing so, has apparently been responsible for the new vogue of the so-called "true story" magazines. Thus, as the *Times* has sought to preserve data for history, Mr. Hearst's contributions have been in the field of literature and sociology.

The most recent use of the life-history or human document for the understanding and interpretation of human nature and society

is a volume, *These Are Our Lives*, published under the auspices of the University of North Carolina.[3]

It is the human interest story or, better, perhaps, the human interest aspect of the news with which this study is mainly concerned. The importance of such an investigation for the student of society and of human nature is that it seems to open up to empirical investigation the whole matter of the role and influence, not merely of the newspaper, but of popular literature, in contemporary life. Hitherto it has been assumed that the influences of the press were merely in the field of public opinion and politics; but with the coming of the cinema and the popularity of true stories in newspapers and elsewhere, students have come to realize the more subtle and the more pervasive effects of popular literature and of popular art upon institutions and human relations generally.

3. *These Are Our Lives: As Told by the People and Written by Members of the Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration in North Carolina, Tennessee and Georgia* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1939).

CHAPTER 10

NEWS AND THE POWER OF THE PRESS

THE power of the press is the influence that newspapers exercise in the formation of public opinion and in mobilizing the community for political action. It is obvious that the press has been everywhere an important instrument in the formulation of political policy and in various ways and at various stages has played an important role in the political process.

The political process, as here conceived, is the process by which a political society acts as in the case of war with an external enemy, but it includes, also, those internal and organic processes—legislative, administrative, and judicial—and the ferment and discussion that accompanies them by which new policies, new laws, and eventually new institutions come into existence. The political process may thus be said to begin with the rise of some sort of agitation or social unrest and to end finally with some modification of the mores after new laws have been enacted, interpreted, and enforced over considerable periods of time. It is in the form of the mores that new norms and new rights are incorporated into the ethos of the society to which they appertain.[1]

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from the *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (July, 1941), pp. 1-11.

1. "The Greeks applied the term "ethos" to the sum of the characteristic usages, ideas, standards, and codes by which a group was differentiated and individualized in character from other groups. "Ethics" were things which pertained to the ethos, and, therefore, the things which were the standard of right. The Romans used "mores" for customs in the broadest and richest

It is in this context and as an incident of the political process that public opinion functions. The opinion with which we are here concerned is not merely that which gets recorded on editorial pages, however. It is rather the opinion that emerges from the discussions of individuals attempting to formulate and rationalize their individual interpretations of the news, with or without the help of the editorial commentator. Public opinion, in this limited sense, is political opinion—the opinion that emerges when, in the presence of some emergency, some political action is in progress. It is rather opinion in process of making, before it has been capitalized and, so to speak, funded in the form of dogma, doctrine, or law. Public opinion, once it has been thus fixed and codified, is a stabilizing and conservative rather than an innovating force.

The role of the press in this situation is obviously not merely to orient the public in regard to the issues involved but to bring into existence a collective will and a political power which, as it mobilizes the community to act, tends to terminate discussion. It is this that constitutes the power of the press.

If now we inquire as to the ultimate sources of this power, they are obviously many and varied; but they may be reduced to the following:

1. *Grievances.*—Politicians have invariably known how to capitalize upon the recognized grievances, public and private, of the communities they serve. A public grievance is, in fact, from the point of view of practical politics, a political asset. I have known politicians to create a public scandal over the question whether candidate A or B was entitled to exploit, in his contest for office, a particularly promising public grievance. I might add that the obvious and outstanding case of a politician exploiting a grievance

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sense of the word, including the notion that customs served welfare and had traditional and mystic sanction, so that they were properly authoritative and sacred. It is a very surprising fact that modern nations should have lost these words and the significant suggestions which inhere in them. The English language has no derivative noun from "mores" and no equivalent for it. The French *mœurs* is trivial compared with "mores." The German *Sitte* renders "mores" but very imperfectly. The modern peoples have made morals and morality a separate domain, by the side of religion, philosophy, and politics. In that sense morals is an impossible and unreal category. It has no existence and can have none. The word "moral" means what belongs or appertains to the mores. Therefore the category of morals can never be defined without reference to something outside of itself." William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (New York: Ginn & Co., 1907), pp. 36-37.

to create political power is that of Herr Hitler and the German people. The grievances of the German people after World War I were undoubtedly intensified and embitterd by the failure of the famous "Fourteen Points" and the good intentions of an idealistic American president to achieve what these points seemed to promise. This disillusionment of the German people has contributed, directly and indirectly, to create in Germany a political solidarity and a political power such as the world has never before known. The sources of political power are relatively obvious, but the workings of the collective mind are still obscure.

2. *News.*—A news editor and staff that are keenly alive to the nature and source of existing grievances, since grievances make news, and news makes opinion.

3. *Editorial policy.*—An editorial policy and an editorial writer who is able to rationalize grievances and give them finally the character of a cause. The Negro in the United States is a case in point. The Negro is united by a long-standing grievance, and, as the political, if not also the cultural, life of the Negro people has come to be organized about this grievance, it has assumed the form of a cause. It is an important event in the life of a racial or national minority when it is able to identify its claims with a cause. In doing so it makes itself the protagonist of all other minorities who trace their grievances to the same source or are seeking on the basis of the same principle redress for the injuries they suffer or think they suffer.

Other minorities, such as the French Canadians, have made their grievance the source of a relatively stable political party, but these grievances have not assumed as yet the character of a cause on the basis of which French Canadians can or are disposed to appeal to the world outside the Dominion.

4. *Circulation.*—A newspaper, to make itself a source of political power, must circulate. In a stable and well-organized society, where political opinion is supported by parties that are disciplined and respond to leadership, a paper may exercise a considerable influence even when its circulation is limited to a political élite. But in a democracy where everyone reads, and particularly in a period of rapid change and revolution when political opinion and political power are in the making, it is news rather than the editorial that makes opinion.

This, in brief, is my thesis. What I shall have to say later is in-

tended merely to elucidate and make explicit what is implicit in what has been said.

In the first place it is obvious now, after all that has been written about it in recent years, that public opinion is a more complicated thing than the analysts who have attempted to dissect and measure it have assumed. There is, for example, always an element of novelty and of news in all public opinion. Someone is attempting to do something about something, and the possibility that something may be done, even though it is generally recognized that something should be done, is disturbing to some sections of the social aggregate. There are always in every society and every situation vested interests which are likely to view with alarm any change of any sort. Something must be done, but what? The news which announces changes or merely indicates that changes are impending inevitably starts conversation, raises issues, making news and, incidentally, politics.

Another element in public opinion is public sentiment. Opinion may be merely academic, that is, it may be concerned mainly with the form or the accuracy of a statement rather than with its effects. But public opinion is never merely academic. It is always practical, always political, always relative to some specific action, and action that is immediate and pending. Thus public opinion is always more or less charged with sentiment. It is this fact that led President Lowell[2] of Harvard, in his treatise on *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, to call attention to the fact that public opinion has more than one dimension. It has not merely territorial extensity, but, like a thunderstorm or a mere change in the weather, it has direction and intensity.

This means, for one thing, that a minority or an individual that is convinced is likely to be more effective in determing political action than a majority which is merely interested or moved to

2. "One man who holds his belief tenaciously counts for as much as several men who hold their weakly, because he is more aggressive and thereby compels and overawes others into apparent agreement with him, or at least into silence and inaction. This is perhaps especially true of moral questions. It is not improbable that a large part of the accepted moral code is maintained by the earnestness of a minority, while more than half of the community is indifferent or unconvinced. In short, public opinion is not strictly the opinion of the numerical majority, and no form of its expression measures the mere majority, for individual views are always to some extent weighed as well as counted." A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (Longmans, Green & Co., 1913).

action by some passing incident or some moving orator; that is, aroused but not convinced. This is the reason political sects and so-called pressure groups have been able, particularly in times when party discipline has broken down and public opinion has been more or less apathetic, to exercise very great influence on legislation. On the other hand, when great constitutional issues have arisen—issues that have threatened the existence of the established social order or, as in the case of the Civil War, of the nation—the influence of the political sects and pressure groups, with their insistence upon local and minor issues, has declined. It is, generally speaking, when the public is preoccupied and public opinion is at a low ebb that reform legislation has been written on the statute-books. It is notorious that pressure groups seek to keep the measures they are promoting, as they sometimes put it, "out of politics" and even out of the news.

On the other hand, the power of the press, as here defined, has invariably reached the acme of its influence on political affairs in times of crisis, as in that of the Revolution in 1776 or in the Civil War. It was at such times that the great editors, men like Greeley, of the *New York Tribune*, and Raymond, of the *New York Times*, who knew how to interpret events in the light of the great issues involved, exercised a dominant influence on public opinion and public policy.

It has long been recognized, even if it were not obvious from the conditions under which it arises, that there can be no public opinion in which the masses of the people participate except in a free society. There can be no public opinion in regard to any political action unless the people who constitute the public know, in a general way at least, what is actually going on. There are, of course, always ways in which the people can, even under the strictest censorship, know indirectly what is happening, but, if that knowledge gets into circulation only in indirect ways or takes form only in legends and myths which spring up and gain wide circulation in the absence of more direct and more accurate knowledge, then there can be nothing that corresponds to public opinion as we know it. For public opinion, as it functions ordinarily in a free society, is the product of discussion. In turn, discussion arises from the differing interpretations which different individuals, different political parties and groups give to events. But this again assumes the existence in any public of a general understanding and

a community of interest among all parties sufficient to make discussion possible.

Whenever in any political society the diversity of interests and points of view from which the news is interpreted becomes so great that discussion is no longer possible, then there is no longer any public opinion, at least no effective public opinion. In that case nothing but force, in some form or other, is capable of maintaining sufficient order to permit, if not the normal, at least the necessary, social processes to go on. Under such circumstances it is vain to speak of freedom of speech or of the role of public opinion. In our modern world, where public opinion plays, or seems to play, so large a role in the settlement of disputes and controversies not otherwise justifiable, we have nowhere, it seems, achieved a rule of reason. Everywhere we must compromise or fight, and such government and law as we have are always backed finally by force. In fact one must recognize, it seems to me, that the most elementary form of political action is war, and discussion, when it takes place, is merely a substitute or surrogate for war. In fact, the elections by which in modern democratic states the sovereign power is transferred from one class or one party to another are merely a more or less complete substitute for civil war. That is the reason elections and transfers of political power are so frequently accompanied by civil war or by revolution, as, for example, in Mexico and some of the other less politically mature states in South America and elsewhere.

It is the reason why in a free society like our own we tolerate strikes and other limited forms of violence for the settlement of disputes in which the government and the general public do not want to intervene—except as arbitrators. It is in this sense that we must interpret Walter Bagehot's conception of an "Age of Discussion" which was to supersede, as it has in fact in most European states, civil and dynastic wars as a means not only of determining the succession in the governing body but of settling disputes of every sort. An age of discussion is an age of parliamentary government—a form of government which is at present, it is true, somewhat in abeyance in many parts of the world.

It is in this sense that Sumner's statement about rights—the right of free speech, for example, and other rights essential to a democracy such as ours—should be understood. After discussing what he calls the "dogma of rights," rights which are everywhere

regarded as the opposite of force, Sumner says: "Might has made all the right which ever has existed or exists now," and he adds finally: "If we recognize the great extent to which force now enters into all which happens in society, we shall cease to be shocked to learn the extent to which it has been active in the entire history of civilization."[3] This is not, as it may seem, a statement that might everywhere makes right but rather a statement that rights exist only in a political society, that is, a society that is capable of enforcing them.[4]

It may seem a far cry from public opinion to the "rights of man." As conceived here, however, both are products of the same political process or processes. Public opinion is the form which the collective will takes when it is in process of formation. Rights are public opinion in one of its ultimate forms, after it has been incorporated into the mores.

If observations of this sort do not seem to throw much light on the power of the press, they do suggest the context in which one must look for light on public opinion and the press, as far as either of them can be profitably investigated, within the framework of a systematic science.

I have already indicated that the role of the editorial page in the political process, though intimately related to that of the news, is not identical with it. The editorial and the news are related not merely by the fact that they are published in the same paper, because sometimes they are not, but because the editorials are designed to supplement the news.

As a matter of fact, the editorial and the news have had historically different origins and, except where both were written by the same hands, they have always remained more or less independent of one another. The newspaper originated in the so-called newsletters, not unlike those letters some of us are now receiving from England—letters written by correspondents in the old country to friends or relatives in this country, giving them intimate and

3. *Op. cit.*, pp. 65-66.

4. "Strictly speaking, in a society organized on a familial basis, no one has rights, but all have duties. In such a society every member has certain recognized claims on every other, but these claims are enforced by custom rather than by force or formal law. In China, for example, human relations are regulated less by law, in the occidental sense, than by the principle of *li*." Leonard S. Shu, *The Political Philosophy of Confucius* (London: Routledge, 1932).

firsthand accounts of what has been going on at the centers where history is being made. Such was the origin of the newspaper. It was, first of all, merely a letter circulated to the members of a family or to a wider circle of friends. Later on those who could afford it, and particularly those engaged in foreign trade, hired correspondents to write to them regularly.

The editorial, on the other hand, had its origin in the letters to the editor, in which men interested in political matters sought to express their opinion in regard to debatable measures proposed or undertaken by the government. Usually the writers were in opposition. The publisher, in such cases, was usually an impecunious printer, like John Peter Zenker, whose prosecution and acquittal in 1735 or thereabouts for publishing one such letter established in this country the principle that the truth of a published statement is a sufficient defense in a suit for libel. In spite of all the agitation for free speech in that country, that principle is not yet recognized, I believe, in England.

The function of the editorial writer and of the editorial page is obviously to interpret the news, to tell us what it means, and what we should do about it. We never know what events mean until we know how to act in response to them, and, if we are to act effectively, we must act consistently. The extent to which the editorial page contributes to consistent political action is related to the editor's ability to interpret events in accordance with some rational principle. It is only in this way that events become intelligible in any but the most elementary sense of that term. In the turmoil of political democracy, where government is carried on amidst the confusion of many conflicting voices, it is often difficult to steer a straight course. Success in doing so, however, is the difference between drift and mastery.

There is a rule of law which declares that it is more important that the law should be consistent than that it should be just. The same may be true of an editorial policy in some sense and in some degree. From time to time, however, courts and editors reverse themselves. When the editors flop, it is likely to be disconcerting to the paper's readers and sometimes disastrous to the publisher. As long, however, as the editorial page and the editorial policy are able to maintain contact with events as recorded in the news, the editor can exercise a very considerable influence on the movement of public opinion.

On the other hand, as soon as the editorial interpretation of the news assumes, as it always tends to, a doctrinaire character, so that we know that whatever happens the editorial page, like a cuckoo clock, will merely repeat the familiar note, the influence of the editorial page declines. It does not, of course, cease, but its influence is merely that of an oft-repeated political dogma and not the sort of influence we attribute to mobile public opinion, changing in response to events in an actual world.

In contrast with editorial writers, the news editor and his reporters are in a very different case. They are under no necessity of making one day's news consistent with that of the preceding day. For the news editor and his reporters every morning brings a new day, and the best that can happen is something that one did not yesterday expect.

At an earlier period in the history of the newspaper, when the news columns were subordinate to the editorial page, if something occurred that was not in accord with the policy of the paper, the editor might, as a matter of public policy, suppress it. In the modern newspaper, however, when the news covers almost every aspect of life and the news columns quite overshadow the editorial in importance, the news editor and the reporter have achieved an independence they never before enjoyed, and newspapers, as Charles S. Dana, puts it, print almost anything that God will let happen.

It is not that the news editor, as distinguished from the editorial writer, has no policy. On the contrary, he has. It is a policy, however, that is not determined by political considerations but rather by what in his estimation is news. The answer to that question may be different for every one of the different departments of the paper, including the first page, which is not a department at all, since it is addressed to the widest possible circle and the least-sophisticated.

One consequence of the expansion of the newspaper's conception of news has been to increase greatly the number of persons who read newspapers or read anything. But of this larger circle of readers, relatively few now read the editorial page.

The editorial column exists obviously for the intellectuals. The news, however, is for the great mass of mankind, and the public opinion formed on the basis of the news represents the interpretation of events which each individual makes for himself in accordance with his individual interests, prejudices, and predilec-

tions, qualified by the interpretation which other individuals with whom he has discussed the matter have made of the same events.

It is obvious that news, as it is interpreted differently by different individuals, tends to disperse attention and take discussion out of the realm of abstract and general ideas and bring it within the limits of the comprehension and the universe of discourse of the common man.

So far as this is true at all, the effect of news on public opinion is just the opposite of that of the editorial, which seeks to focus attention on a principle or program for political action. As a matter of fact, news tends to disintegrate political principles, doctrines, and dogmas that have been necessarily formulated out of the experience of an earlier time. In a society that is organized in such a way that every locality, every community, every profession, and every craft have their intellectual leaders, the opinions of editors will be mediated and eventually will be felt. But in times like the present, when great and rapid changes are taking place, it is difficult for editorial programs and political policies to keep pace with events. In such periods it is the interpretation which the great mass of the readers finally agrees to put upon events that makes public opinion. In fact it seems to me that I have noticed a good deal of distress among the newspaper columnists, particularly in recent months, in their efforts to be consistent and at the same time keep up with the news.

It is this public opinion that emerges from the responses of the great mass of newspaper readers that the Gallup and other polls of public opinion seek to measure. It is this moving and fluctuating public opinion of which Lippmann was thinking when he published his notable essay on *Liberty and the News*. The point of that essay was that only as far as the sources of news are not fouled by propaganda is it possible for a people to preserve the liberties guaranteed them by the existence of a democratic society. Lippmann states it in more impressive language than I am capable of. He says:

> Just as the most poisonous form of disorder is the mob incited from high places, the most immoral act the immorality of a government, so the most destructive form of untruth is sophistry and propaganda by those whose profession it is to report the news. The news columns are common carriers. When those who control them arrogate to themselves the right to determine by their own consciences what shall be reported and for what purpose, democracy is unworkable. Public opin-

ion is blockaded. For when a people can no longer confidently repair "to the best fountains for their information," then, anyone's guess and anyone's rumor, each man's hope and each man's whim becomes the basis of government.[5]

This impresses me not merely as an accurate statement of the function of the news but likewise as a just statement of its importance in what I have described as the political process. It is, however, just as true that there is and there can be no such thing as news, in so far as concerns politics, except in a community in which there is a body of tradition and common understanding in terms of which events are ordinarily interpreted. This, however, involves considerations which Mr. Lippmann, in all that he has written about public opinion, has not yet adequately discussed. He seems nearer to it, perhaps, in his volume, *A Preface to Morals*, than in anything else he has written.

5. Walter Lippmann, *Liberty and the News* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920), pp. 10-11.

CHAPTER II

MORALE AND THE NEWS

I. PROPAGANDA

SINCE war has invaded the realm of the spirit, morale has assumed a new importance in both war and peace. Total war is now an enterprise so colossal that belligerent nations find it necessary not only to mobilize all their resources, material and moral, but to make present peace little more than a preparation for future war. Under these conditions so-called psychic warfare, which can be carried on in the between states of actual belligerency, has assumed an importance and achieved a technical efficiency which, if it has not changed the essential nature of war, has profoundly altered the character of peace, making it much harder to bear.

The object of attack in psychic warfare is morale, and less that of the men in arms than of the civil population back of the lines. For the "strategy of terror" is directed rather more at noncombatants and against those who must wait and endure than against those who have some way of striking back.[1] Incidentally, this is one way in which total warfare, in so far as it is a war of nerves, fails to achieve its ends. It fails because it gives everyone something to do; something also which, since it involves participation, if only

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from the *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII:3 (November, 1941), pp. 360-77.

1. Edmond Taylor, *Strategy of Terror* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940).

symbolically, in a great collective enterprise, is at once a source of inspiration and release. It tends thus finally to increase the solidarity and improve the morale not only of the civil population but of the army as well. It seems at any rate to have done this and more in England, where it has, apparently, created a national spirit and a national solidarity such as has not existed there since the date of the Spanish Armada.

The will to join with others in collective action is one of the elementary motives that move mankind. The consciousness and the excitement of participation in great events constitutes one of the most exhilarating and satisfying of human experiences. In the reverberation which such participation invariably arouses in other minds the action of every individual participant acquires a new dignity and a new glory as well as an added moral support.

It is in and through these vast collective enterprises—wars, revolutions or social movements, like the labor movement—that new institutions come into existence and old ones are sometimes rejuvenated. No one seems to have understood this better than José Ortega y Gasset, the author of *Invertebrate Spain.* No one, at the time that this volume was published in 1937, had more reason to understand it, for these essays are devoted to an analysis of the processes by which the integration and the disintegration of the Spanish empire and the Spanish national unity came about. What he says about Spain is peculiarly pertinent today to conditions in the rest of the world and to the subject of this paper. The first of these essays is entitled "How To Make and Break a Nation."

"It is not yesterday, tradition, the past," he says, "which is the decisive, the determining force in a nation. Nations are made and go on living by having a program for the future." It is neither important nor necessary to unity and solidarity, he adds, "that the component parts of a society coincide in their ideas and their desires; the important, the essential thing is that each should know and to a certain extent incorporate into his own life the ideas and the desires of the others."[2]

There is probably no other social process, no form of interaction, by which the individual components of a society are so effectively or so completely integrated, if not fused, as they are

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2. José Ortega y Gasset, *Invertebrate Spain* (New York: Norton, 1937), pp. 19-45.

by participation in some form of collective action. In fact, as it is conceived by some writers, society exists and is "in being," to use a nautical term, only when it is capable of concerted and consistent action.[3]

The so-called "we" group is typically the group that acts. Particularly is this true if one includes under this term every form of society in which ethnocentrism or group self-consciousness ordinarily manifests itself. It is true that a crowd or a mob does not think of itself as "we"; not at least until it comes in contact and in conflict with some other crowd or mob. In the latter case it presently assumes the character of a gang, gives itself a name, and perhaps assumes some vague sort of exclusive possession over the territory which is its peculiar habitat. This is characteristic of some of the lower animals—birds in particular. If I venture to mention this very lowly type of society in this connection, it is to emphasize the fact that not only armies and nations have need of some sort of morale but every other type of social group as well which must act effectively in order to survive in conflict with other societies.

The arts and devices by which a morale of a people can be raised and a national spirit revived if not created, as well as the methods by which national solidarity of an enemy people can be undermined and eventually destroyed, have been convincingly demonstrated in the recent history of Europe and are abundantly illustrated in the current news. There is, in the firsthand reports of observers and participants of the present conflict in Europe, material for a more realistic political science, such as has been historically attributed to Machiavelli but has been more recently and more systematically exemplified in the writings of the Italian sociologist, Pareto. For such a realistic political science, firsthand accounts of political events like William Shirer's *Berlin Diary* are a kind of source book. His account of one of the earlier Nuremberg "pep-meetings" of the Nazi party is a contribution not merely to history but to sociology. "Pep-meeting" is not the right word for the Nuremberg ceremonies. Something less secular and more suggestive of a religious revival would better describe it. Here is an excerpt from that diary under the date of Nuremberg, September 5, 1934.

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3. J. A. Thomson, "Animal Sociology," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th ed.), I, 971.

I'm beginning to comprehend, I think, some of the reasons for Hitler's astounding success. Borrowing a chapter from the Roman church, he is restoring pageantry and colour and mysticism to the drab lives of twentieth-century Germans. This morning's opening meeting in the Luitpold Hall on the outskirts of Nuremberg was more than a gorgeous show; it also had something of the mysticism and religious fervour of an Easter or Christmas Mass in a great Gothic cathedral. The hall was a sea of brightly coloured flags. Even Hitler's arrival was made dramatic. The band stopped playing. There was a hush over the thirty thousand people packed in the hall. Then the band struck up the *Badenweiler March,* a very catchy tune, and used only, I'm told, when Hitler makes his big entries. Hitler appeared in the back of the auditorium, and followed by his aides, Goring, Goebbels, Hess, Himmler, and the others, he strode slowly down the long centre aisle while thirty thousand hands were raised in salute. It is a ritual, the old-timers say, which is always followed. Then an immense symphony orchestra played Beethoven's *Egmont Overture.* Great Klieg lights played on the stage, where Hitler sat surrounded by a hundred party officials and officers of the army and navy. Behind them the "blood flag," the one carried down the streets of Munich in the ill-fated Putsch. Behind this, four or five hundred S.A. standards. When the music was over, Rudolf Hess, Hitler's closest confidant, rose and slowly read the names of the Nazi "martyrs"—brown-shirts who had been killed in the struggle for power—a roll-call of the dead, and the thirty thousand seemed very moved.

In such an atmosphere no wonder, then, that every word dropped by Hitler seemed like an inspired Word from on high. Man's—or at least the German's—critical faculty is swept away at such moments, and every lie pronounced is accepted as high truth itself.

The arts and devices of spiritual warfare are many and various and more subtle no doubt than any analysis has thus far disclosed. But one of the weapons of psychic warfare, both of offense and of defense, is propaganda.[4] Harold Lasswell, who has made propaganda the subject of an extended investigation and who writes more shrewdly about the subject than most others with whose writings I am familiar, has sought to distinguish between education and propaganda. His distinction is based on the difference between two elements or two aspects of culture which he describes as "technique" and "value." He says: "The inculcation of traditional value attitudes is generally called education, while the term propaganda is

4. See Kimball Young and R. D. Lawrence, *Bibliography on Censorship and Propaganda* ("University of Oregon Journalism Series," No. 1 [Eugene, Ore.: University of Oregon, 1928]).

reserved for the spreading of the subversive, debatable or merely novel attitudes."[5]

The distinction is substantially that between news and propaganda or, better still, between news and editorial. The editorial page seeks to inculcate not merely attitudes but opinions; and editorial opinions may be either "subversive, debatable, or merely novel," and are, for most newspaper readers in the United States, since they do not read them, neither one nor the other.

The difference between news and editorial is one thing that every newspaperman knows, when he needs to, even if he is not always able to formulate a definition that makes the distinction clear for all cases. The essence, or intrinsic quality, of news is hard to come at, but news is not propaganda, and it is not editorial. In a general way one may say that news states the fact, editorial, the truth. The facts may call for reflection, for deliberation, and sometimes for more facts. The truth, however, has the character of finality. Having it, i.e., having the whole truth, one stops investigation, ceases to reflect, and is either silent like a plant or acts like a human being. Propaganda is likely to be a little more imperative than the ordinary editorial. Since it seeks action, it aims to dispel doubt and it pretends sometimes to the finality of truth even if it is only a half-truth or a downright lie.

News may be and often is, when the facts are such as to serve the purpose of the propagandist, the best kind of propaganda, but news and facts are always capable of more than one interpretation, and that would be fatal—reflection is always fatal—to propaganda.

It is because events are capable of more than one interpretation that we discuss them. It is out of these discussions that public opinion emerges. Discussions not only make public opinion, they sometimes make war. But as far as my observation goes, they rarely ever make peace. That does not seem to be their function. When discussion is carried on in the orderly, academic fashion, which Socrates first introduced and philosophers have kept up ever since, it is called dialectic. The function of dialectic, if it also can be regarded as a social process, seems to be to test opinion. One tests opinions by finding out if they are consistent in their different expressions. The outcome of discussion is usually to lay bare the submerged hypothe-

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5. Harold D. Lasswell, "Propaganda," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (New York, 1934), 522.

ses, not to say submerged complexes, on which divergent opinions are based. This sometimes leads to an agreement, but it sometimes reveals differences so profound and so charged with emotion and sentiment that further discussion appears unprofitable, if not impossible. When that happens to individuals there seems to be no way of carrying on the controversy except by fighting. When it happens to nations, as it has happened recently in the case of England and Germany, it leads to war.

From this point of view war, whether physical or psychic, presents itself as an instance of the dialectic process. When a discussion ceases to be academic, when it takes finally the form of an armed conflict, it does not cease, to use the language of a recent writer, to be a "battle of minds where ideas, ideologies, propaganda, and emotions clash in ordered ranks, disciplined like soldiers."[6] In this battle of minds and wills, in which the purpose of each belligerent is to maintain, and if possible enhance, its own morale and at the same time undermine and weaken that of the enemy, propaganda, whether it seeks merely to interpret events or to indoctrinate and defend the assumptions and the ideology in accordance with which events are interpreted, is a principal weapon of offense and defense.

II. MORALE

There seems to be some uncertainty as to just what morale is and where it is located. Is it in the individual or in the group or in both? Whether its locus is in the group or in the individual, there is no doubt of its importance. It counts much in the battle but how much? No one knows precisely. It is one of those imponderables with which one must reckon but which one cannot weigh.

Morale in an army is a "will to fight"; in the civil population it is the ability to endure hardships at home and bad news from the front. This will to fight and to endure seems to be a compound of several other imponderable components: courage, confidence, and the Christian virtues faith, hope, and charity, provided by "charity" one means understanding—the kind of understanding one expects to find in small fighting units or in a well-organized family. It is the understanding that is the basis of *esprit de corps*. The charity which notoriously begins at home does not include the enemy, and charity in the abstract is not a qualification of a fighting man.

6. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

Morale, though it is dependent upon the qualities we call virtues, is not to be identified with morals or with mores. Morals are habits, and, like conscience, are rooted in tradition. When they encounter new conditions they are likely to be confused and involved in conflict, compromise, and casuistry. This is the case of the conscientious objector. Morale, on the other hand, is prospective; it rests on such discipline and solidarity as anywhere exists, but its outlook is forward. It is will, the tendencies of the organism to act, organized about a faith in the future rather than about an interest in or a pious concern for the past. Morale, whether in war or in peace, is will; the will to act and to persevere in a course of acting until the hopes which inspired it have been realized. While we ordinarily limit the term "morale" to action, we also apply it to situations in which activity is routine and does not seem to be either controlled or directed.

When President Roosevelt addressed the American people on March 12, 1933, most of the banks in the United States were closed, and most of the people in the United States were in a state of panic. In the course of his remarks he said: "After all, there is an element in the readjustment of our financial system more important than currency, more important than gold, and that is the confidence of the people." The effect of this address has been described as magical. Bronislaw Malinowski, whose studies among the Trobriand Islanders has made him an authority on the subject of magic, would say, I suspect, that the President's speech was magic. The effects brought about by words and symbols, as I understand him, are the essence of magic.[7] One of the functions of the magician in primitive society, he tells us, is to restore morale when fear in the presence of some unforeseen or unprecedented event, like the recent invasion from Mars as reported by Orson Welles, has shaken it.[8]

This seems to demonstrate again, what has often been demonstrated before, that words and symbols which create and maintain the morale of an army are equally necessary to maintain the morale of a civil society. It seems, therefore, that we must recognize morale as a factor in all our collective enterprises. It is a factor in the operation of the stock exchange, quite as much as it is in the activities of the Communist party.

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7. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, 1932).

8. See Hadley Cantril, *The Invasion from Mars* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1940).

It is interesting to note that upon the same date that President Roosevelt made his historic radio address to the people of the United States the press announced the triumph of the Nazi party, or perhaps one might better say of the Nazi sect, in the elections in Prussia. Commenting on this election, the *New York Times* correspondent said: "Through the election history of the National Socialists and the Nationalists, Germany for the first time since the days of the Old Empire, has been unified." Incidentally, some two hundred persons were killed in the course of the campaign, but the New York correspondent believed at this time that "violence was spent."[9]

Morale has not only its spiritual but its physical, more specifically its physiological, aspect. From the point of view of physiology, and perhaps of sociology, morale seems to be the ability of an individual or of a society to maintain tension over a period of time; to carry on an action or an enterprise to completion. The action, with interruptions, may continue, it seems, indefinitely as is the case of one who acts consistently to achieve a career or to carry out a project to which he has devoted a lifetime. What tension, in its most elementary phase, involves, one may gather from watching a cat waiting for a mouse, or any predatory animal stalking its prey.

Early in the present century sociological speculation and research were given a new orientation mainly by the writings of two men: Scipio Sighele in Italy and Gustav le Bon in France. Le Bon, whose little treatise on *The Crowd* (*La Foule*) has done much to popularize the new point of view, discovered that, under certain specific conditions, a casual gathering of individuals, drawn together by no common purpose and having apparently no common interests, could, and if the necessary conditions were present would, in response to what he called "the mental unity of crowds" be suddenly, not to say miraculously, transformed, becoming, as he expressed it, no longer an agglomeration of individuals but "a single being."

All this, as he states it, sounds portentous. What he is describing, however, is a familiar experience. It is the fact that a crowd, when excited, becomes a mob and becomes, what a mere agglomeration could not, a very effective agency for carrying on very elementary

9. F. T. Birchell, *New York Times,* March 12, 1933.

forms of collective action—a lynching, for example. One may observe much the same phenomenon in a herd of cattle or a flock of sheep. Mary Austin, in her little volume entitled *The Flock*, has described the way in which, under the influence of some distress or sudden terror, a flock of sheep will sometimes mill about in an ever narrowing circle "until they perish by suffocation."[10]

What happens under such circumstances is what happens in a crowd when the attention of every individual is, by chance, focussed upon some more than usually exciting object or incident. By a psychological process, not unlike the milling of the flock or herd, the interest and the excitement of every individual is intensified by the response each unconsciously makes to the manifest interest of every other individual. The crowd assumes under these circumstances the character of a closed circuit, each individual responding to his own excitement as he sees it reflected in the attitudes and emotions of his neighbor. The effect of this circular reaction is to produce steady reinstatement of the original stimulus as well as a corresponding increase in the suggestibility, excitement, and tension in every individual until the crowd is a collective unit, psychologically integrated and completely mobilized for whatever action is expected or by chance suggests itself. In any case the impending action, if it takes place at all, will be sudden, impetuous, and, unless manipulated by some outsider, quite unpremeditated and unplanned.

Since its actions are unpremeditated, unplanned, and without perspective, one would probably not, in the sense in which that term is usually used, speak of morale in the crowd. When, however, an action as projected and planned requires not merely readiness to act but the will to act consistently amid all the accidents, incidents, and changes of fortunes of a long campaign, morale acquires the meaning we give it when we speak, as we do so frequently nowadays, of morale in the army and morale in the civilian population. Nevertheless, in the broader sense in which that term is sometimes employed, as when one refers to the prevailing state of mind in France before and since the German conquest, one may, it seems, speak of the morale of any society or of any group in which some sort of concert is maintained by some sort of communication. In such a society there will be changes in tension in response to changes in

10. Mary Austin, *The Flock*, quoted in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (2d ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 881-82.

life-conditions; changes in orientation in response to events as they occur. In human society there are always fashions. As fashions come in and go out, social tensions rise and fall, and society, which inevitably faces in the direction from which the news comes, alters its attitude to its world in response to these changes reported in the press.

One of the most pervasive forms in which tension and will manifest themselves in individuals and in society is in moods. Every occasion, be it a funeral or a wedding, has its characteristic atmosphere. Every gathering, even if it is no more than a crowd on the street, is dominated by some sentiment. One is more likely to notice this mood, perhaps, when one cannot share it. In that case, whether it be a sad or a happy occasion, one is repelled and inevitably seeks more congenial company.

I was constantly impressed, in reading William Shirer's *Berlin Diary*, with the fact that he seemed to note every change in the spiritual weather in a world that was for him every day a little less congenial than the day before. This moral atmosphere seems to be a very faithful index as well as a condition of morale in a civil community—even in a smaller community like that of the diplomatic circle in a foreign country. At any rate it has been a constant concern of Hitler and of his propaganda bureau to preserve in Germany an atmosphere in the civilian population that would support the morale of the army in the field and the program of the government at home. It is this that gives significance to the Nuremberg ceremonies that Shirer describes. It is obviously the purpose of all the ceremony and the ritual associated with the Nazi movement to create an atmosphere, a tension, and an expectancy which, in focusing attention upon the things hoped for, will effectively inhibit any consideration that runs counter to those hopes.

To maintain this atmosphere and protect the German population from the "poison," as Goebbels called it, of foreign propaganda has been the purpose of the censorship. To interpret and mediate the effect of such reports of events as reached them are the functions of the propaganda bureau.

It is obvious that the impulse, the will to act, expresses itself in characteristically different ways in different types of societies; different, that is to say, in the crowd, in the gang, in the political party, and in the sect. In fact, it may express itself in all these

different ways in the successive phases of the evolution of a collective action. This collective impulse assumes in the course of its evolution most of the characteristics of a mind—that is, of a collective mind. Thus, Mary Austin speaks of the "flock mind," Le Bon describes the idiosyncrasies of the "crowd mind." We are familiar with the phrase "public mind." The question as to where this so-called mind or will is located, whether it is a phase or an aspect, like class consciousness, of the individual consciousness or has some sort of independent existence, seems to lose most of its importance if we mean by "collective mind" no more than the unity and intimate interdependence which makes it possible for individuals to act concertedly and consistently. The capacity to act collectively is apparently created by that interpenetration of mind involved in communication.

In the gang or other intimate group, where association is based on familiar and personal relation, morale takes the form of *esprit de corps*. In a political party which is a conflict or discussion group it is represented by a policy, supported by a formal principle of some sort. In a religious sect morale is supported by the authority of a creed or by dogmas which cannot be questioned. It seems that the Nazi party, in the course of its history, has passed through all the phases represented by the four types of society I have mentioned. Its first appearance was in a *Putsch* or coup d'état that was carried out by a group almost as little organized as a mob. From that point it fought its way up in a kind of gang warfare with the communists. It became later a political party and as such gained a new status when its supporters gained representation in the Reichstag. Meanwhile it had taken on, at least in the case of its leaders, the character of a more or less fanatical political, if not religious, sect. It now includes among its spiritual possessions not only a ritual and a creed but, in the volume *Mein Kampf*, a Bible. Finally, it has in Hitler its prophet, if not its God. As a political sect it has attempted to suppress every form of dissent with all the fervor and fanatical vigor of a newborn religion. Under its direction the German people are now apparently engaged in a holy war to reorganize the social life of the planet in all its fundamental aspects—economic, political, and religious.

If this statement is a little too summary to do justice to the historical facts, it at least suggests what morale can be under a

totalitarian government such as exists today in Germany and what it cannot be in a more secular society like our own.

III. NEWS

The distinction between activity and action, as I conceive it, is that action has perspective, has a beginning and an end, and, in the process of transition from the first impulse in which it has its origin to its final consumation in a final overt act, it is likely to encounter events that sometimes make that consummation precarious. Action, in short, is activity that is controlled and directed. That is the reason, when and if action is prolonged and difficult, it requires, to insure success, "will" in the individual and, in the group, morale. These actions and their perspectives give the dimensions of the world in which, one might say, life actually goes on, as distinguished from the academic world where not life but thought, a preparation for action, goes on.

Each and all of us live in a world of which we are the center, and the dimensions of this world are defined by the direction and the distances from which the news comes to us. For news is not something new merely, it is something important; and it comes to us with an urgency that requires action, even if no more than a change of attitude or the reaffirmation of an opinion.

All this is of no importance except in so far as it suggests the relativity of worlds in which men are actively alive and for whose orderly existence they are in some way personally responsible. What comes to us in the way of a record of events from elsewhere, that is, outside of or on the outer limits of our world, is mainly myth, legend, or literature; something that is perhaps intrinsically interesting but not so immediately important that something needs to be done about it. It is because the world in which we live is like this that we discover it visibly expanding about us as the perspective of our practical interests and actions lengthen.

How profoundly these perspectives have been changed during the process of the present war! Suddenly, after the fall of France, it seemed as if the planet had grown smaller and our world larger. The isolationists among us are those who for various reasons not wholly articulate, I suspect, are unwilling or unable to accept this change. It is in a realm defined by the circulation of news rather than by the world with which we are in immediate contact that

all our great collective enterprises—war, revolution, and national government—are carried on.

The task of organizing, or energizing, and, above all, of animating with a common will and a common purpose vast armies and whole people is an incredibly complicated but, with modern means of communication, not impossible task. At any rate, the German government, with the assistance of the censorship and the propaganda bureau, seems, as far as is humanly possible, to have succeeded, from time to time, in imbuing its armies and, to a less extent, its civil population with something of the unanimity of Le Bon's psychological crowd. This has helped to maintain the morale of the nation in the successive crises through which it has passed.

The German army, one hears, has been greatly democratized in the course of its rejuvenation. There has come into existence a comradeship between the officers and men that did not exist in the Prussian army before the National-Socialist revolution. This has created in the army, and particularly in the navy, an *esprit de corps* that did not exist during the first World War.

German political technicians, with the aid of German scholars in the several social sciences, history, anthropology, and the new German science, *Geopolitik,* have developed, as their contribution to the national morale, a political philosophy which is designed to justify the German people's claim to the position of the dominant race in Europe. They have at the same time formulated a political program which promises, if successful, to make this claim good. Since Europe has held, perhaps still holds, a dominant position in the modern world, German domination of Europe would imply domination of the world.

Finally, Herr Hitler and his associates seem to have inspired the army, if not the people, with an invincible faith in their mission and destiny—a faith such as would ordinarily exist only in a religious sect. Hitler and his junto have sought to support that faith by ritual, by myth, and, above all, by ceremonies that revive from time to time the atmosphere and the mood of exaltation in which it was originally conceived. This faith in their mission and destiny has been transmitted to Germans abroad, living in what one might describe as the Diaspora of this latest of the "Chosen People." From that source other peoples, who, according to Nazi doctrines, can never hope to be identified with the master-race have nevertheless been infected by its doctrine.

Morale and discipline, as Hermann Rauschning, the author of *Revolution of Nihilism,* says, is now a religion in Germany and has achieved in that nation an unprecedented high level of intensity and effectiveness. It has nevertheless been created and sustained by essentially the same means as social solidarity and discipline have been created and maintained wherever men have been associated to form societies and to act collectively.

A nation includes within its wide embrace all ordinary forms of association with which we are familiar, i.e., local, familial, economic, political, religious, and racial. It is the problem of national morale to co-ordinate these groups so that they co-operate rather than clash. In the language of the Nazi party's political technicians, it is the problem of *Gleichschaltung.* It has been achieved by co-ordinating, subordinating, and eventually fusing every local and minor loyalty into a totalitarian loyalty to the national state. Where that has not been actually achieved, as in the case of the Lutherans and Catholics, it has nevertheless been attempted. There is already considerable literature, psychological and pedagogical, which shows what was attempted and what has been achieved in the army, the schools, and the press.[11]

The relation of news to morale is not so obvious as is that of the other page of the newspaper, the editorial. News comes to us and to the newspaper we read from every part of the world in which we and its other readers are interested. It comes ordinarily, provided it is not written up so that our interest in it is symbolic and literary rather than factual, in the form of disconnected items. Newspapermen have discovered that, other things being equal, news items are read in inverse ratio to their length. The national weekly newspapers like *Time* and *Newsweek* have discovered that they can give a new news interest to these items (1) by classifying them and (2) by digging up so-called background materials which enable us to see them in their relation to other events widely dispersed in time and space. To put a news item in a setting of historical or otherwise related facts gives it a character which is sometimes historical and sometimes sociological. Such an item becomes history in so far as it finds a place in the historical sequence. It becomes sociological in so far as, when

11. See *German Psychological Warfare: Survey and Bibliography* (New York: Committee for National Morale, 1940).

classified, it throws light upon social process irrespective of the place or time in which the process takes place.

As here described, news has no influence upon political action or morale. Its tendency is to disperse and distract attention and thus decrease rather than increase tension. The ordinary function of news is to keep individuals and societies oriented and in touch with their world and with reality by minor adjustments. It is not its function ordinarily to initiate secular social movements which, when they move too rapidly, bring about catastrophic consequences. On the other hand, when some important or disturbing event occurs that "makes the front page" and captures the headlines, it may also capture and hold attention for days and weeks, like the story of the abduction of the Lindbergh baby and the subsequent trial and execution of the alleged abductor.

The story of such an event or series of events is not an item, it is a "story"—a continued story, in fact; one that may grow more absorbing as each day and each issue of the press brings forth some new development. In this way it may become so absorbing as to dwarf interest in every other lesser incident in local or current history. As a story it becomes more enthralling just because it is published in instalments which give opportunity for readers to reflect, speculate, or brood over the significance of each successive instalment. Under the circumstances readers of the news interpret these incidents and all the details in terms of memories of their own experiences and of similar tragic episodes with which they are familiar. In this way the news ceases to be mere news and acquires the significance of literature, but of realistic literature like the "true stories" of the popular magazines and of the earlier ballads that preceded them in the history of the newspaper.[12] What fixes and holds the interest of the reader tends to disorient him; tends to possess him.

It is the same with wars in which we seem to see history in the making; wars in which the fate of nations and of civilization is involved. It is when attention is focused on these events which are not items but chapters from the current history that we who are spectators eventually get sympathetically involved. Under these circumstances it is inevitable that we should, in accordance with

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12. Helen Hughes, *The Human Interest Story* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940).

the differences of our personal experiences and our personal prejudices, interpret events and history differently. It is inevitable that we should take sides, since discussion tends to emphasize and bring out differences as well as obscure, temporarily at least, more fundamental points of view upon which we are united. This is unfortunate, perhaps, for national morale requires above everything else that in a crisis we should act as a nation and be united as a people.

Public opinion is therefore not a good index of morale because, being the fruit of discussion, it intensifies differences. Public opinion is on the surface of things and does not reflect the attitudes and points of view on which the community is united. The very existence of public opinion is itself evidence that we are not at the moment as one in regard to what as a nation or a people we should do. However, as things get discussed and drop out of discussion, the direction which public opinion takes in the course of time indicates the direction in which collective will, in the process of formation, is taking. This is what the Gallup polls show.

Public discussion of public policy during periods of crisis, when discussion tends to become embittered, invariably brings to the surface not only divergent points of view but the memories and original experiences upon which these interpretations of events are based. One has but to read the exasperated and often outrageous views expressed in letters to the editor to recognize that these letters are the reflections of personal frustrations and of deep emotional experiences whose sources are often so obscure that it would require the skill of a psychoanalyst to discover them. But in so far as freedom of discussion gets to the source of this emotional violence and so brings it into the open, discussion to that extent contributes something indirectly to the national morale. These controversial letters serve as a purge to the minds of those who wrote them and give comfort to those who would like to have written them if they could.

In a recent copy of the *Detroit Free Press* I ran across a very clever and not ill-natured indictment of Harold Ickes. He was described as the kind of a man who writes exasperating and exasperated letters to the editor. Well, probably Harold Ickes is that kind of a man, but he has been a great comfort to me and I am sure to others. He exaggerates, to be sure, as an exasperated man will; but he says things that someone should say, and I am certain through my own experience that he is improving the morale of the country.

I recall what he has said about Lindbergh, whom I admire. I wish I could hear him on Senator Gerald Nye. I suppose he has at some time landed on the senator from North Dakota, but if so I have missed it.

Getting this stuff off our chest is, as I have suggested, good for the country. It improves morale, and, besides that, one can be certain that no one who comes out with the bitterness that is in him is going to be a fifth columnist. These letters to the press are not public opinion, however. They are merely personal opinions. If they could be accompanied by a confession "sudden, complete, and bitter" which would reveal the context in which they were formed, they would throw a great light on the sources of discontent which make it difficult in a country like ours, composed of people who have come to us from the ends of the earth, to unite wholeheartedly, except in a great national emergency, on an all-out totalitarian policy, such as a great national emergency requires that we should.

I said at the outset of this paper that war tended to assume the character of a dialectical process in which ideas rather than force play the leading role. As events make the issues as originally conceived and stated obsolete, belligerents find it necessary from time to time to redefine their aims and discover more fundamental and more reasonable grounds to justify the course they have chosen to pursue. In the long run, particularly if conflict is prolonged, it becomes necessary not merely to satisfy the questions which reflection has raised at home but to justify the aims and conduct of the war to the public abroad which may not be wholly committed to either side. In this case war ceases to have the character of an international *coup d'état*, aiming by means of a *Blitzkrieg* to present the world with a *fait accompli*, and becomes more and more a war of ideas and ideologies. Such wars inevitably come to have the character of revolutions. They end in that case by bringing about not merely changes in material possessions but in institutions and the fundamental conceptions of life. It is, in fact, why in so far as they do this that war can be said to function in the historical process.

Under these circumstances, morale supported by a principle of reason ceases to be a matter of either hope or fear and becomes a morale force. In the long run it is these morale forces that determine the issues for which wars are carried on.

CHAPTER 12

PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL SERVICE

WE have learned, during the present world war, a great deal about a great many things, and among others, that it pays to advertise. Advertising has made it possible to sell government bonds to the people direct, instead of through the banks as middlemen. But in selling bonds to the people we have, at the same time, to speak in the technical language of the advertising man, "sold" the United States. In advertising the Liberty Loan the government has advertised its purposes in this war. People who subscribe to the United States war bonds subscribe at the same time to the aims of the United States, to the principles upon which these aims are founded, and to the methods of the government in carrying them into effect. In order to sell Liberty bonds to 17,000,000 individuals in the United States it has been necessary to convince the great mass of the people that this is a just war, and to invite their co-operation in carrying it on. The advertising campaign which marketed the Liberty Loan has done as much as any other one thing, perhaps, to make the cause of the United States and its Allies the cause of the American people. It has paid the United States to advertise.

It is a good thing that public institutions have to go directly to the public, now and then, for funds. It is now pretty generally recognized that one of the most effective ways of keeping a public

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institution alive and vigorous is the need of getting and keeping the interest and the co-operation of the people who support it. To do this it must advertise. To use again the language of the advertising man it must sell its services to the public. A campaign for funds in this way becomes not merely a method of raising money, but a means of public education. At its best, advertising is always a form of pedagogy, and the social agency's most effective appeal, as William H. Allen has pointed out, is one that is conceived and carried out as a more or less disinterested form of public education.

There is another consideration. A government or an institution that advertises, and advertises effectively, is likely to be a democratic institution, and a democratic government. Under the new democracy, which is just now emerging from the wreck of our existing party and parliamentary government, a public institution, which is any institution supported by the public, will no longer expect to take money from the community, either in the form of gifts or taxes except upon condition that it can make the people of the community intelligent and responsible participators in its enterprises and its tasks. Under the City Manager plan of municipal government, where each department is expected to justify itself directly to the people, it has seemed to me that success was likely to depend finally upon the use which the government was able to make of the stereopticon and the moving picture.

A few years ago a friend of mine, who himself writes advertising, related an anecdote which has lingered in my memory. It was at the time when the manufacturers of breakfast foods and the southern and western fruit growers were teaching the American people to make their breakfasts of fruits and cereals (a ration appropriate to urban and sedentary people) rather than the traditional ham and eggs of our rural ancestors. A couple of advertising men were working together upon an advertisement of a breakfast cereal. "I wonder," said one of these men to the other, "I wonder if people eat this stuff because they like it, or simply because we make 'em do it."

The inference seems to be that we, who in our daily lives are so constantly exposed to the hypnotic influences of the advertising man, are no longer free agents. My own impression is, however, that just at present we are liable to overestimate the influence of publicity. Writers on the psychology of advertising, social workers and idealists, exaggerate, it seems to me, the extent to which the

public has been and can be manipulated by the press, agitation, and other forms of advertising. Practical advertising men do not have quite so romantic a conception of their profession. They do not conceive of the advertising writer either as a sophist or a wizard. They would, perhaps, admit that clearness of statement, with sufficient emphasis and sufficient repetition, might sell anything once. On the other hand there is a maxim which is older than any special psychology on the subject, to the effect that it does not pay to advertise something that the public does not want.

THE MAGNETIC ATTITUDE

It sometimes seems to me that the social agencies have formulated their publicity policies under the impression that they are trying to sell the public something that the public does not want. In spite of this we speak hopefully of social advertising, on the general principle, perhaps, that advertising can somehow do the impossible. Let me illustrate by a quotation from a recent pamphlet on *Publicity* and the *Financing of Social Agencies:*

> We are called at this time, while war is raging and ravishing, to keep alive and active the finer feelings and vital concern of every man and woman of intelligence and means in our midst toward their lowlier neighbors, who toil sore and yet cannot buy; toward the babes who languish because they need but cannot get doctors, nurses and life-giving sustenance; toward the sick who suffer on beds of pain in our hospitals and sanitaria; toward the friendless girl who is tripping along lightly toward destruction; toward the fatherless and the widows who know not where to lay their heads.

This is not what an advertising man would call a good "selling talk." It is not expansive and cheering. It suggests that the social agencies are on the defensive. It puts too much emphasis on the distressing situation, and not enough upon a program of action. Let me add, by way of parenthesis, that "selling," as the advertising man uses the word, is not necessarily a commercial term. I sell you when I have convinced you, not intellectually and tentatively, but permanently and, so to speak, habitudinally. What the advertising man seeks to establish in the man he sells is not an opinion, nor an idea, but a habit. The appeal which touches the receptive heart but does not lure the active and constructive mind does not "sell" anything; it establishes no habits. In the end we learn to resign ourselves to pain and distress, particularly if the pain is not in us

but in our neighbor. This is but an application to advertising of the school teacher's maxim that we learn by doing.

I do not wish to seem too subtle in my criticisms of social advertising, but it seems to me I notice a disposition among the social agencies to regard the war as an inconvenience rather than an opportunity. It is no doubt a hardship to be compelled to complete for funds with all the suddenly inprovised organizations which are attempting to do war work. It is not good advertising policy, however, to advertise that fact. It stirs subtle, silent conflicts in the public mind and this inhibits the full, free flow of the tide of public sentiment upon which all advertising projects must eventually float, if they succeed. In the last analysis, all our advertising is a matter not, as our psychologists of advertising seem to believe—a matter of the individual, but the public mind.

Besides, war work is everything that contributes to national efficiency and the measure of social efficiency is the extent to which rational methods have been applied to the problems of poverty, crime and disease. At a time when the whole nation is aroused, as it has never been before, to the necessity for wider and wiser control of the common interests of the community; when the whole world has been stirred to a sort of passion for international right and social justice it should be less difficult rather than more to gain recognition and support for the work of the social agencies.

It seems to me social agencies are disposed to direct their appeals too exclusively to the so-called finer and hence feebler instincts. But these finer sentiments are too exclusively the luxury of a leisure class. A wisely directed publicity campaign should seek to take social service more completely out of the ideal and show its intimate connection with the plain, practical interests of our daily life. Social workers understand better than most people how intimately crime, poverty and disease are connected with so practical a thing as unemployment. We are all beginning to understand how easily every other value represented by civilization is destroyed when people lose, as they can most easily do, the slowly acquired habits of persistent labor. One way to interest the public in the work of the social agencies is to state social problems in definite terms of profit and loss to the community.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT VERSUS CO-OPERATION AS BASIS OF APPEAL

The criticisms upon social advertising which are here suggested amount, in general, to this: For purposes of successful publicity, social agencies are still too much inclined to hold to the earlier, individualistic, other worldly, and, if I may use the word in this connection, evangelical tradition. There is too much emphasis upon individual need and not enough on social utility; too much stress is put upon sentiment and not enough on action. Appeals are directed too exclusively to getting financial contribution, rather than intelligent co-operation.

In fact, it seems to me that social science and social practice generally, in spite of the progress of recent years, is too exclusively concerned with effects rather than causes. It is still too concerned in its task to be relief, rather than prevention and cure.

If the social agencies have not always conceived their problems in a way to gain the full co-operation of the community; neither have they stated their case so as to most effectively capture and hold the interest of the public. This is due in part to historical causes. The social agencies came into existence in order to direct and control, under the complex and artificial conditions of urban life, the natural impulses of neighborly and community co-operation; impulses, which, in smaller and more primitive communities, functioned automatically. In doing this, however, they have, as in the case of the organized charities, come between the giver and the need, the individual and his problem.

The social agencies are not alone in this respect. In politics, religion, art and sport, we are represented now by proxies where formerly we participated in person. All the forms of communal and cultural activity in which we all formerly shared have been taken over by professionals and the great mass of men are no longer actors, but spectators. Just as the average man, under the influence of professional politicians, has been relegated to the role of a mere taxpayer, so he has been reduced by the social agencies to the position of a mere contributor.

It is pretty generally accepted that a large part of the restlessness, the thirst for novelty and excitement, so characteristic of modern life, is due in part to the fact that we have been deprived, under the artificial conditions of city life, of most of the natural

outlets for the expression of our interests and our energies. So far as this is true the solution of the problems, not merely of the social agencies, but of the church, the theatre, politics and the saloon—all the agencies that are now competing for our spare time—is some method by which the individual can regain a sense of personal participation in the institutional life about him. To achieve this is to achieve democracy. For in the last analysis we mean by democracy participation, practically and imaginatively, in the common life of the community.

We have learned something during the present war about social advertising. We have also learned something about press bureaus. It is an interesting fact that England started the war with censorship—a censorship so severe that, for a time, it seemed to Englishmen as if almost any one knew more about the movements of the English army than the English people. America, on the other hand, declared war and established forthwith, not a censorship, but a press bureau. The American press bureau is called at present, *The Committee on Public Information.* The Committee on Public Information is, however, performing the functions of a press bureau and George Creel, who is at the head of it, is the press agent of the United States.

The press bureau has become during this war a weapon, quite as important as any other, for both offensive and defensive warfare. The vital part of an army, as of a community, is its morale and morale may be weakened or sustained by a well directed press bureau. It has occurred to me, that the time has arrived when the social agencies should have a press bureau. In fact, they already have one in the *Survey* magazine. But it should be locally as well as nationally, organized, and its activities should be extended.

What could a press bureau do for the social agencies and for the community?

The first thing that a press bureau should do for the social agencies is to mobilize and organize them. It could do this by establishing between them a community of purpose and a morale that does not now exist. Morale means will, and community morale means community will, and this is something more than esprit de corps, or mere formal organization.

The second thing which such a bureau should do is to make news—social news. The world is in a process of reorganization. The

problem of making the world safe for democracy involves making democracy safe for the world. The problems of the twentieth century, both scientific and practical, are predominantly social and political. The social agencies are accumulating in the course of their daily work, the experience and the knowledge which must form the basis for any scientific solution of these problems. The social agencies are every day experimenting with the principles of a slowly growing science of social life. The social agencies, moreover, give us most of our social legislation. To make this legislation effective, it must have the support of the community. One way to educate community is through the press.

REQUIRING AND USING A FUND OF INFORMATION

Hitherto, newspaper publicity, as far as the social agencies are concerned, has consisted largely of hard luck stories. We have approached the public, like the traditional beggar, with a piteous gesture. Novelty and human interest, we have assumed, were the only qualities in a piece of news that captured the public attention and got space in a newspaper.

The fact is, however, that the human interest story, which was the *chef-d'oeuvre* of the *yellow journal*, is losing its standing in the newspaper world. The re-write man, who has been accustomed to give the literary touch to these romantic incidents of daily life, has written himself out. The stories have been told so often that they are now quite conventionalized and cease to interest. The newspapers are going in at present for social service. They are introducing departments that are intended to be educational, like Dr. Evans' articles, widely syndicated, upon health. The *Chicago Tribune* has established under the title of *The Friend of the People*, a bureau of information upon municipal matters. It has become very largely a complaint bureau. It is making itself a substitute for the aldermen who has hitherto functioned locally chiefly as a friend at court in the relation between the individual citizen and the city government. Furthermore, the *Christian Science Monitor* has now demonstrated that there is an increasing number of people who are rather more interested in social welfare and social politics than in those half-fact and half-fiction stories which still so largely fill the columns of the daily newspapers. All this suggests that we may, perhaps, look forward to a time when the work of the social

agencies will occupy as much space in the daily papers as Wall street and the sporting column.

There are two difficulties. The social agencies do not advertise, as perhaps they should do. Departmental news, like that of the churches, of books and of the theatres, gets into the papers most easily when it finds a place next to a special kind of advertising; book notices next to book advertising, theatre notices next to theatre advertising, etc. For it should be remembered that the modern newspaper is a commercial institution, made to get circulation. The second difficulty is that most of the information which the social agencies are able to furnish is likely to be based on case studies and is therefore personal and private, and confidential. Case studies do not ordinarily make news, but local studies will.

There is an increasing number of interesting and important local studies going on in various parts of the country. Some of these have been made by social agencies. Others have been made by universities. Some of the most important have been made by the telephone companies and other commercial bodies. The *Chicago Tribune*, for example, spent something like thirty thousand dollars in constructing a rent map of Chicago, for advertising purposes. If some agency could be established to collect and fund this information it would become a valuable source of social news as rapidly and as often as it could be employed to interpret local events. Such information spread abroad through the press would tend to foster a widespread and intelligent interest in social problems and, incidentally, in the work of social agencies.

One of the values of social surveys, where they have been conducted on a scale broad enough to enlist the interest of the whole community, consists in the fund of news about the local community which they produce. Information of this kind may well find a place in courses in community civics which are now popular in the public schools. In this way the schools will serve to lay the basis for a more intelligent understanding of the facts of community life. The social survey, when it becomes, as it has in Cleveland, a permanent institution, may and does perform the service not merely of a permanent bureau of social research, but of a bureau of publicity, as I have conceived it, for the social agencies.

Since this was written my attention has been called to an interesting fact, namely: while most of the funds which support social welfare enterprises are provided by representatives of the capitalist class, many social workers

are socialists. This, it has been suggested, is one reason why the appeal of the social agency is so frequently based on superficial and sentimental grounds. The social worker and social benefactor cannot get into the same universe of discourse and cannot therefore talk about fundamental problems. On the other hand the "class-conscious" social worker does not always realize that most of the fundamental reforms which his knowledge of conditions compels him to favor can be perfectly justified on intelligible grounds of national efficiency which is, or should be, a common interest of both capitalist and laborer.

CHAPTER 13

IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY AND IMMIGRANT PRESS

SOME years ago an enterprising Chicago newspaper man wrote a series of articles describing the different foreign language communities in Chicago under the title of "Round the World in Forty Blocks." One of the strange, interesting and significant features of American life is its foreign language communities. During a peaceful invasion covering a period of a hundred years nearly every language group in the civilized world has established colonies in this country; little centers of population struggling to maintain, in the midst of an alien culture, traditions and a language of their own. When there are in an American city as many Jews as there are Danes in Denmark, and in that same city more Italians than there are Italians in Rome we have indeed "something new in history."

It happens that for the past five or six years I have been "seeing" this America. I have been seeing it mainly through the contents of the foreign language press. The distribution of this press is significant, since it locates with considerable accuracy the principal immigrant settlements in the United States, and makes it possible to outline "cultural areas" in which the influences of certain immigrant groups have been more pronounced than elsewhere.

Every foreign language group tends to make some one city its racial capital: New York, for instance is the Jewish, as Chicago is

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the Polish capital of America. These two cities contain, the first, the largest Jewish, and the second, the largest Polish, populations. But they are besides the seats of the most important newspapers and other racial institutions. They are cultural centers of the language groups they most largely represent.

The character and contents of the papers published in these areas are an index, likewise, to the characteristic interests, ambitions and social attitudes of the people who read them. In this way it is possible, not merely to define different immigrant areas, but to sketch in a rough way, their moral, psychological and political complexions.

Outside New York and Chicago, where most of the larger immigrant colonies are located, the immigrant populations, as marked by the location of their journals, fall into three or four large groups.

The Middle West group, represented by the Germans and Scandinavians, stretches a German arm down into the Southwest as far as Central Texas, and a Scandinavian arm up into Minnesota and the Northwest. This group includes also the Bohemian farmers of Wisconsin and Iowa, and small groups of Hollanders and such minor population groups as the Belgian-Flemish and the Welsh. If it were possible to characterize this Middle Western group with a word, one might designate them, with reference to their attitude as immigrants, as *settlers*. By the settlers we mean those immigrants who came here to settle on the land and in doing so more completely broke their connection with the home country than do those who came here to earn money to buy land at home as is the case with most later immigrants.

A second group might include the Spanish-Mexicans who have crossed the border from Mexico in the South, and the French-Canadians, who have come down from the Province of Quebec on the North. These people, when they do not represent early settlement made before the United States took over the territory they now occupy (as is the case in New Mexico), came into the country originally as season laborers. Every year, however, the stream of immigration across the border has moved deeper into the country. Every time the tide flowed back it left behind a certain number of permanent settlers, but the population deltas thus formed are still firmly anchored by ties of sentiment and tradition to the home country.

This is partly because there are no natural barriers between the

United States and the mother countries, and partly because the differences in culture are so wide that the immigrants have remained culturally isolated. These peoples, with reference to their attitude toward American life, might be designated as *colonists.*

A third division of immigrant peoples that can be locally defined, is that represented mainly by the Italian and Slavic populations. The full list would include: Bulgarians, Croatians, Finns, Hungarians, Italians, Lithuanians, Poles, Roumanians, Russians, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovanians, Ukrainians. These are the people who compose, or did compose before the War, that great drifting body of laborers, which formerly moved back and forth across the Atlantic in response to the changing demands of American industry. These are the men who do the rough work in the mines and make up a large part of the factory populations in our industrial cities. These people have left their own country, but they have not quite settled in this. We may characterize them as the migrant, as distinguished from the immigrant peoples. They are the *migrant industrials.*

Finally there are the minor nationalities, who live for the most part in the larger cities, and engage either in trade or in the lighter secondary industries. They include those mobile, adventurous and trading peoples who are farthest removed from participation in the political and social life of the country. These are the peoples from the Near East: Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, Persians, Syrians (Arabic), and Turks. With these we may include some of the very recent immigrants, the Albanians and a comparatively small group of Letts, and also the Orientals on the Western Coast: the Chinese, Filipinos, Hindus, and Japanese. All these we may classify as exotics, because for various reasons they are, or seem to be, more completely isolated and removed from contact and participation in American life than any other immigrant peoples.

Some groups do not belong completely to any one of these classifications. The sea-roving Portuguese from the Cape Verde Islands have established small colonies and newspapers on both the Eastern and the Western coasts. The fact that they cling to the coast shows how tentative their occupation is, and from the point of view of participation in American life, they should be classed with the exotics. Yet, industrially, they belong with the migrant industrials.

The Jewish immigrants, who might be classed with any one of

the different categories, can actually be classed with none. The Jew, to be sure, has a predilection for trade and is by tradition a city-dweller. But the Jew, just because he has no native country, in the sense that the Norwegian is native to Norway, when he changes his nationality does so whole heartedly. He brings his family and all his household and tribal gods with him. Nevertheless there are no people, with the exception of the Chinese and Japanese, who bring to this country a more distinctive culture than the Jews, or who have been better able to adapt their culture to America and still preserve it against the disintegrating effects of the American environment. Not that the Jews have actually succeeded in this. Under the first rude impact of American life the old structure of Jewish life, is, to be sure, crumbling. But out of the ruins of the older cultural life a new, richer, freer, cultural life has sprung up.

The Jews are the only immigrant group who have created in this country a literature in a foreign tongue that can be compared with that of the home country. This is to be considered in connection with the fact that the Jew is probably more at home in America than he was or is in any other part of the world. He is more at home in New York than he is in Jerusalem. The fact that Jews have created in New York an art and a literature that is genuinely expressive of Jewish life is the best evidence that this is true.

These outlines of the characteristic types of settlement of immigrants in the United States offer a first rough sketch of America as it would look if we were able to see it from the point of view of the immigrants themselves. If we look a little closer at the inner life of any one of these foreign language settlements the picture becomes still more interesting and informing.

In order to understand the intimate life of one of these little foreign communities we must know just how these settlements came into existence and the motives that sustained them after they were established. The fever of immigration, as has long been recognized, is highly contagious. When it strikes a peasant village, it infects the whole community and continues to rage until all who can have emigrated. In this country a new community is thus established which is virtually a colony of the village and eventually of the province in the old country from which the immigrants originally came.

The United States is chequered with little settlements, each composed almost entirely of people from a single village or prov-

ince abroad. We know more about the German colonies than any others because the histories of their settlements have been written. Immigrants from the Rhine Valley, from Oldenburg, Westphalia, Rhenish, Prussia, and Rhine-Hessen, settled at Bastrop, Texas; Westphalia, Michigan; Roxburg, Middleton and Berry, Wisconsin; and at Little Rock, Arkansas. Wurtemburgers settled at Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Saxons settled at Osnabruck, Mississippi. Germans from Alsace-Lorraine settled in Lorain and Erie counties, Ohio.

Some of these colonies had special interests. Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and Nazareth, Goshen and Canaan, which are just across the border in Ohio, are types of the early religious colonies of the Moravians, Dunkards, and Amish. Montgomery and Gasconade Counties in Mississippi, New Braunfels and Fredericksburg in Texas, and Germania in Wisconsin, mark the three attempts to found a German state in America. The Femme Osage river settlement of Mississippi, and Belleville in Illinois, got their stamp from the number of upper-class and educated people who settled there, among whom were most of the political refugees of 1848. They were known as the "Latin Settlements."

The Jews and Italians have settled in the Lower East and West sides of Manhattan Island, New York City, in precisely the same way that the Scandinavians and Germans settled the rural districts of the Middle West. The Jewish Quarter, below Houston Street is, or was originally, a congeries of little settlements, each represented by a synagogue bearing the name of the foreign village from which its members came. Every Italian immigrant, and this is particularly true of the Southern Italians, comes from a village in Italy to a colony of that village in New York or some other city.

The difference in the situation of the immigrant people who settled mostly in the cities and those who settled in rural communities is that the colonies of the former have been literally crushed together in congested areas; while the latter have been dispersed and isolated in small agricultural communities scattered over two-thirds of the United States.

This accounts for a great many of the differences which students have noted between the earlier and later generations of immigrants. The earlier immigrants were what we have called settlers. They came to stay and for the most part they settled on the land.

This was not true of the Irish. They settled in the cities. The later immigrant have followed the example of the Irish.

Now, the first effect of city life is to destroy the provincialism of the immigrant, and to intensify his sense of racial and national solidarity. This explains why the Jewish people, although they use three distinct foreign languages, German, Yiddish and Ladino, have attained in the United States a degree of solidarity and community organization more efficient than they have attained anywhere else since the Dispersion.

What is true of the Jews is likewise true, though in a less degree, of the other urban peoples. Italian immigrants, from all the provinces, with their historical and dialectic differences, brought together in our great cities, have developed a national feeling and sense of solidarity that did not exist in Italy. The national Italian society, which figures so largely in the Italian press on patriotic occasions, turns out on analysis to be composed of smaller units which every little colony forms among its members as soon as it is established in this country. These societies are in their turn merely formal organizations of the spontaneous neighborliness of the Italian village.

This effect of city life is visible in the urban press, where both news columns and editorials create and maintain an active interest in the politics, national and international, of the home country. The larger metropolitan papers, with their wide circulation, are bound to address themselves neither to Bavarians nor to Westphalians, nor to Saxons, but to Germans; not to Genoese, Neapolitans, Abuzzesi, or Girgentesi, but simply to Italians. In this way, residence in our cities has broken down the local and provincial loyalties, with which the immigrants arrived, and substituted a less intense but wider national loyalty in its place.

The tendency of rural life is naturally in the opposite direction. It emphasizes local differences, preserves the memories of the immigrants and fosters a sentimental interest in the local home community. The German provincial press in America idealizes a German provincial life that no longer exists except in the memories of the editors and readers of these papers.

It is an interesting fact that as a first step in Americanization the immigrant does not become in the least American. He simply ceases to be a provincial foreigner. Wurtemburgers and Westphal-

ians become in America first of all Germans; Sicilians and Neapolitans become Italians and Jews become Zionists. This interesting fact of human nature was very early recognized by the leaders of the patriotic and nationalist movements abroad. In a letter written in 1879 to the Gazeta Polska of Chicago, Agaton Giller, a former member of the Polish national government of 1863, makes this statement:

> Every Polish peasant, from whatever Polish province he comes, even from one of those which, like upper Silesia or East Prussia, have been for a long time separated from the national body, when transferred to a strange soil among foreigners, develops a Polish sentiment and a consciousness of his national character. This phenomenon is incomprehensible for those who saw the peasant at home without a consciousness of national duties. And yet it is quite natural. National consciousness originates in him spontaneously in a foreign country in consequence of the feeling of the striking difference between his speech, his customs, his conceptions, from those of the people who surround him. . . .
>
> If, after the formation of a conception and sentiment of nationality in him, there is some one capable of explaining to him the meaning of this national character and of making him understand the duties resulting from this character, then this plain man, formerly ignorant and passive for the national cause, will become an individual consciously and actively serving the idea which rests upon nationality. . . .
>
> When the mass of Poles in America is morally and nationally raised by the fact of being unified and is economically prosperous—which should be also one of the tasks of the organization—it will render great services to Poland, even by the mere fact of representing the Polish name well in America. These services can gradually become very considerable, when the Poles begin to exercise an influence upon the public life of the United States, when they spread among Americans adequate conceptions about the Polish cause and information about the history, literature, and art of our nation, when finally they become intermediaries between Poland and the powerful Republic so as to foster sympathy with our efforts for liberation and develop it into an enthusiasm which will express itself in action.

The ambition of the immigrant to gain recognition in the American community, "to represent" the national name "well in America," as Agaton Giller says, is one of the first characteristic manifestations of national consciousness and it is because he has been unable to get recognition in America as an individual that he seeks it as a member of a nationality.

One reason immigrants live in a colony is that they cannot get out, and one reason they establish nationalist societies which seek

among other things "to represent the old country well" in this country is that in this way they can participate in American life.

If the immigrant chooses to remain a hyphenated American, it is, frequently, because only through an organization of his own language group can he get status and recognition in the larger American world outside. As a leader in an immigrant community he and the community are enabled to participate in American life in ways which they could not as individuals, unacquainted as they are, with the language and with the customs of the country. The following statement from a paper by Eugene S. Bagger, in regard to Hungarian Intellectuals and Leaders, will illustrate this point:

> The characteristic note of the corporate life of Hungarian-American intellectuals is one of utter hopelessness, born of the consciousness of isolation, both from the main currents of American and of old-country life, and of the realization of the doom hanging over the American-Hungarian community. This is the paradox of the immigrant colony—that it is constantly losing its best element, which manifests its superiority just by being able to detach itself and to merge into the larger American life. . . . There are new "movements" every now and then to "organize" American Hungariandom (*"amerikai magyarsag,"* a collective term like Deutschtum). The conscious or avowed purposes of these movements are mere attempts at organized graft, and undoubtedly there is an element among the "leaders" which is trying to exploit these campaigns for personal gain. Nevertheless, it is plain that there is some moral purpose behind them—factors ranging from personal vanity and craving for prestige to a genuine, though vague, yearning for spiritual achievement. Hungarian-American intellectuals are obsessed by a peculiar megalomania centering about the "mission" and greatness of "Hungarian-Americandom." Nobody ever tried to define what this mission is, but it is constantly spoken of. This megalomania seems to be the converted expression of a manifold inferiority complex—the resultant, perhaps, of the following complexes: (1) The "oppressed race" complex. Magyar chauvinism is just the result of a feeling of inferiority as compared to Austria, of playing the second fiddle within the monarchy, of the fear of being classed by Europeans as a Balkan race. (2) The inferiority complex of the immigrant, the "hunky." (3) The individual inferiority complexes of men who have proved failures at home.[1]

Sometimes the motives of the nationalist leader are less patriotic, nationalistically, than commercial. A Report of the U. S. Immigration Commission on Immigrant banks, referring to the frequent

1. Park and Miller: *Old World Traits Transplanted,* pp. 105-6.

coalition between immigrant bankers and immigrant newspapers cites the following case:

> The most serious charge that is brought against such a coalition of bankers and newspapers is that by constant appeal to the prejudice and patriotism of the immigrant his Americanization is not only retarded, but deliberately combated, in order that he may be held as a source of income to those whom he trusts. An instance in point is the case of a certain Slovak banker, an ex-student of theology, who operates a large, handsomely furnished establishment, with two branch houses. This banker is a national and religious leader among his people, having organized and headed a national Slovak society in this country. He issues a daily, a weekly, a humanistic monthly, a yearly almanac, and from time to time, other publications. Although he has renounced allegiance to Hungary, severed all political ties with that country, and become an American citizen, he does not advise his Slovak countrymen to do the same, but instead preaches in all his publications a militant and enthusiastic "Pan-Slovakism." So long as the Slovaks remain Slovaks and can be filled with Slovak patriotism and enthusiasm by such agitation, just so long will they remain a source of profit to the banker. Prior to the recent industrial depression this man was accustomed to transmit abroad, on behalf of his patrons, from $2,000,000 to $2,500,000 annually and to sell 6,000 steamship tickets per year.

Nationalist societies avowedly aim to "preserve" the immigrant for the mother country. Other immigrant institutions without announcing their purposes, seek to retard the assimilation of the immigrant. But it is doubtful whether even the nationalist societies do not on the whole promote Americanization rather than retard it. The nationalist newspapers do not want their readers to become Americans, but by printing news of what is going on in America, which they must do in order to circulate, they necessarily prepare them to become American citizens.

No racial group has made a more desperate fight to maintain the interest of its immigrants in the home country than the Poles. Nevertheless, according to recent Polish writers:

> In spite of the continual use of patriotic Polish slogans by all local groups, Poland, before the World War, was for the great majority of the Poles, mainly the object of an almost purely aesthetic interest, whose motive power is very small as compared with the immediate social environment. . . . Even before the great war Polish patriotism was not a vital matter with the great mass of American Poles.

We have only to read the account which the leaders give in their own press of the difficulties they are having to maintain in

this country the language and traditions of the homeland, to realize how glacial and, in the long run, wholly irresistible, under conditions of American life, is the trend toward a common language, a common life and a common tradition of all the peoples in this country. Here is a statement of a French Canadian patriot:

> It is a very painful admission, but we cannot fail to recognize that our language has suffered and is suffering constant and lamentable losses. . . . Children born in this country, and consequently American citizens by birth, have produced a third generation of a totally different mentality from the first. . . . It is true some intelligent individuals who had in childhood no opportunity to secure a French education, and little opportunity to speak French, have applied themselves to the study of the French language, forcing themselves to practice it and to show themselves truly patriotic. But these are people of heart and character who appreciate all that is noble in the race from which they are issued and who were unwilling to be simply Americans.

If it is true that the immigrant, who arrives here a provincial, takes his first step in Americanization when he becomes concerned about the reputation of his home country in America, it is equally true that the immigrant who remains a provincial remains at the same time farthest removed from American life.

The Italians apply the term *caffoni*, simpleton, to a class of immigrants who refuse to burn with patriotic sentiment for their own nationality, and is equally unconcerned in regard to the opinions of Americans in regard to himself or his fellow-countrymen.

The *caffoni*, who were in Sicily mostly *villani* (serfs), are looked down upon by their own people and especially by that class of Italians who want to stay here and who feel injured whenever the Italian name is hurt. To this superior class a good name for the Italians is a requisite for their progress. The *caffoni* don't care. All they want is to make money and go back. So we often see the superior class preaching and speaking to the *caffoni* in meetings, in groups and individually, persuading them to uphold the Italian name. The *caffoni* listen, but then they shrug their shoulders and it is all over. "It does not give me any bread whether Italians have a good name in America or not. I am going back soon."

It is not among the socialist, anarchists, and radicals, however loud their denunciations of American capitalism, that one finds, the least understanding and the most positive blind hatred of America. It is rather in these little isolated colonies of provincials, who have not become settlers, like the German religious sects, but who like

the Italians are maintaining a provincial life in the midst of our cities.

These little communities, composed almost entirely of people of the same village, live entirely upon the news and the gossip of the home community. Every letter to any member of the community is news for the whole community. Nothing goes on in the home village that is not known sooner or later in the American colony of that village. Every one reckons upon eventually returning home, if for nothing more than a visit. If any member of the colony in America marries outside the community or announces finally that he does not intend to return he is regarded as lost.

Most of the Cinisari in the Sixty-ninth Street group intend to return to Sicily. The town of Cinisi is forever in their minds; "I wonder if I can get back in time for the next crop?"—"I hope I can get back in time for the festa"—"I hope I can reach Cinisi in time to get a full stomach of Indian figs," etc. They receive mail keeping them informed as to the most minute details, and about all the gossip that goes on in Cinisi in addition; they keep the home town informed as to what is going on here. They write home of people here who have transgressed some custom: "So-and-so married an American girl. The American girls are libertines. The boy is very disobedient." "So-and-so who failed to succeed at college in Palermo, is here. He has married a stranger" —that is, an Italian of another town. In this way, they blacken a man's name in Cinisi, so that a bad reputation awaits him on his return.

The reputation given them in Cinisi by report from here means much to them because they expect to return. Whole families have the date fixed. Those who express openly their intention of remaining here are the young Americanized men.

It is natural under the circumstances that even in the heart of the largest city in America immigrants living thus should gain a very inadequate and a very unfavorable opinion of America. This is more true of the Italians, perhaps, because most of what they learn of this country outside of the gossip of the colony comes to them through the Italian newspapers.

I have seen a large number of articles from Italian newspapers, written by Italian professional men concerning America, which if translated and published, would open the eyes even of the blind. America is described in these articles as a ruthless, rapacious, hypocritical, puritanical country. American men are superficial, weak, ridiculous; American women are vain and prefer to have a good time rather than to be good wives and mothers; churches in America are places of business; social and philanthropic work is established to furnish fat salaries to innumerable office holders; the political life is incurably corrupt; and everything else is termed "Americanate," meaning the quintessence

of foolishness. A sensational divorce case, a scandal at the City Hall, Dowie or Billy Sunday, anything and everything is used as a pretext for a long philippic against America. I have seen Italian newspapers with laudatory articles on America written in English, which no Italian would read, and with an article in Italian in the same issue, that the American would not understand, painting America in the blackest colors.[2]

We do not realize that the Americanization of the immigrant begins long before he reaches America. Every peasant village in Europe has some returned immigrants. The letters from America are filled with stories of strange adventures of relatives and neighbors. Every peasant village has its own tradition about America, but it is not the America we know, it is immigrant America.

A striking feature of the market places in Catania, Sicily, where on a market day the peasants from all the surrounding country gather to trade and chaffer, exchanging their little stocks of produce for the townsman's wares, are the professional story tellers, each surrounded by a group of enthralled peasants. The favorite stories are of America, America and the "Black Hand."

We think of the Black Hand as an importation from Sicily. The Sicilian, however, does not regard the fabulous stories about America as comparable with anything in his experience. The only America of which the Sicilian peasant has any knowledge is just that America which is even more strange and foreign to us than it is to him, namely the Little Italys of our great cities.

It is reasonably clear, then, that if the immigrant lives in a colony of his own people it is because, under ordinary circumstances, that is the only place he can live at all. He learns about America what the experience of those who preceded him can teach him. For a long time the immigrant community is almost the only source of information about American life that is accessible to the newly arrived immigrant. For a long time, as far as he is concerned, the immigrant community is America.

If this community is well organized, if it is directed by leaders of intelligence and understanding, if the average of intelligence and culture in the community is high, as is the case with the Jews and the Japanese, then the difficult, painful, and often heartbreaking process of accommodation to American life will proceed, relatively speaking, rapidly and easily. If the situation is, as frequently

2. E. C. Sartorio, *Social and Religious Life of the Italians in America.*

happens, just the opposite, then Americanization will lag, and the natural animosities or indifferences to American institutions and American life will obstruct, where they do not altogether inhibit, the process of assimilation.

The fact is, however, that the immigrant community, which is itself an accommodation to American life, has been until very recently almost the only institution outside of the public school that has actually helped the immigrant to find his place and make his way in America. Looked at disinterestedly it is, consciously and unconsciously, an institution for Americanization. It is at any rate so necessary and inevitable a part of the life of the immigrant in this country that, rather than destroy it, as has been so frequently proposed, we should seek to cooperate with and use it.

Whatever we would like to do with the immigrant, there is after all only one thing that we can do if we want him to be an efficient, contributing, and loyal member of the community, and that is help him, as my friend William Leiserson has said, "to get on in the country." If he gets on, if he is able to realize here in America some of the fundamental wishes that were denied him in his mother country, he will eventually become an American, in every sense that we desire to give to that title.

CHAPTER 14

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS

THERE are something like forty-three or forty-four languages and dialects spoken by immigrants in the United States. This fact is important because among immigrant people mother-tongue, rather than country of birth, is the basis of association and organization. The world-war has emphasized the fact that old political boundaries of Europe did not include homogeneous peoples. It has revealed the fact that within these political boundaries Europe was organized on the basis of languages, and of the memories and traditions which these languages have preserved. It is significant also that when other bonds broke language and tradition held. The nations, which in the break-up of Europe gained their independence, were all language groups, not nationalities.

In America, as in Europe, it is language and tradition rather than political allegiance that united the immigrant populations. People who speak the same language find it convenient to live together. Our great cities, as we discover upon close examination, are mosaics of little language colonies, cultural enclaves, each maintaining its separate existence within the wider circle of the city's cosmopolitan life. Each of these little communities is certain to have some sort of mutual aid society, very likely a church and a school, possibly a theater, but almost invariably a press.

It seems almost certain that there are more foreign language papers in America in proportion to the foreign population than

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there are in Europe in proportion to the native populations. It is certainly true that a very large proportion of the immigrant population read newspapers in America who did not read them in their home country. An article published in the *Russkeye Slove*, based upon information obtained in response to a questionnaire, indicates that even among those who were able to read only about 3 per cent were habitual readers at home.

Peasants and laborers constitute more than 90 per cent of all the Russian immigrants in the United States. A great majority of them felt no need for periodicals or for theatrical performances in their old country. According to the census of 1910, there are 38.4 per cent illiterates among the Russians above fourteen years of age. But even those who are able to read rarely saw newspapers in Russia, and theaters were out of their reach. The Russian village, from which the majority of immigrants came, had no press and no theater.

Out of the three hundred and twelve correspondents only sixteen have regularly read newspapers in Russia; ten others used from time to time to read newspapers in the "volost," the village administrative center; twelve were subscribers to weekly magazines.

In America all of them are subscribers or readers of Russian newspapers. Two hundred of them are theater-goers, and all are visiting the "movies."

Twenty-five per cent of them also read the American newspapers published in the English language. But some mention the fact that they "understand only one word out of five." Others, buying an American daily, just glance over the headlines. "These are easy to understand and you know all the news," writes one of the correspondents.

Most immigrants have been peasants at home. They are likely to be laborers here, participating more or less in all the turbulent cosmopolitan life of our modern industrial cities. In the little, isolated peasant villages from which they came, life was, and is still, relatively fixed and settled. Under such conditions custom and tradition provided for all the exigencies of daily life. Conduct was based on face to face relationships, that is to say, speech and neighborly gossip. In America, where there are vast distances and no traditions, where the population is mobile and everything is in process, the peasant discards his habits and acquires "ideas." In America, above all, the immigrant organizes. These organizations

are the embodiment of his new needs and his new ideas. He becomes a socialist or a nationalist, or a member of a fraternial organization, and reads a paper, because practically every immigrant organization publishes some sort of a paper.

There are other explanations for the popularity of the foreign language press. One reason why immigrants are eager to read their own language in this country is that they have not been permitted to do so in their own. Sometimes they have not learned to read before they come here; have not been permitted to do so. Sometimes the journals they might have read were not interesting or not intelligible. Frequently these journals did not exist.

In Lithuania, German Poland, Ukrainia, Slovakia, and Hungary the languages of the native peoples were interdicted. There were in these countries schools and a press, but they were conducted in the language of the dominant race, i.e., German, Russian, Hungarian. The result was that the peasant, who got his education in an alien tongue, never got enough to enable him to read. Besides it is very hard to learn to read in an alien tongue unless you have already learned to read your mother-tongue.

Another reason the immigrant did not read at home was that he could not understand the papers even when they were published in his own language. The papers were, in fact, not addressed to the common man.

A recent writer has called attention, however, to the fact that not only does the average American not speak the English of the books, but he probably does not understand more than two-thirds of what comes from the lips of the average political orator or clergyman.

The reason that the ordinary man does not fully understand the "highbrow" when he is discoursing may be due to the fact that the matter under discussion is itself abstruse. In that case it is even possible that the highbrow does not fully understand it himself. In most instances, however, failure to comprehend is due to the fact that the average man and the academic person do not speak the same language, and no one fully comprehends any form of speech that he does not habitually use. What is interesting and significant in this connection is the fact that, however wide the divergence between the written and the spoken language may be in America, these divergences are considerably less in this country than in any other part of the world.

In no other country is so much effort and ingenuity expended in perfecting the art, not merely of printing, but of publication and publicity. Not only is the language of the press simpler, more direct and incisive, closer to the language of the street, but the distinction between the written and the spoken speech is steadily decreasing in spite of the fact that "the typical literary product of the country is still a refined essay in the *Atlantic Monthly*."

The evidence of this is the enormous circulation of such journals as the *Saturday Evening Post*, and the fact that the number of daily newspapers is decreasing at the same time that circulations are steadily increasing.

In countries were the intellectuals constituted, as they did in Russia, a separate caste, the schools, even where they did exist, did not create a reading habit in the masses of the people, because all the journals were addressed to the highbrow. The American newspaper, with its local news, personal gossip, and its human interest anecdotes, is not the foreigner's conception of journalism.

It is the American's interest in local news that justifies, perhaps, the characterization of America as a "nation of villagers." As a people, it seems we are not interested in ideas but in gossip.

That was undoubtedly the meaning of the cautious observation of a member of the Jewish intelligentsia, whom Hutchins Hapgood met in a Ghetto cafe. In *The Spirit of the Ghetto* (p. 282) he writes:

> In Russia a few men, really cultivated and intellectual, give the tone and everybody follows them. In this country the public gives the tone and the playwright and the literary man simply expresses the public.

In America, however, it becomes necessary for the editors to make some concessions to the intelligence of the immigrant.

The peasant is sentimental; the editors print poetry for him in the vernacular. They fill the paper with cheap fiction and write loud-sounding editorials, double leaded, so that they will be easily read. Sometimes they compromise by writing in the literary language on the editorial pages, discussing the conventional themes, while the rest of the paper is made up of hasty translations from the American newspapers written in jargon, made up of words from the vernacular interspersed with American idioms and American words with foreign endings.

Sometimes the publisher is himself an ignorant man, or at least not an intellectual who looks upon his paper, as the American pub-

lisher does, as an advertising medium, which prints news merely to get circulation. It is said that one of the most successful Chinese editors in America cannot read the editorials in his own paper because he does not understand the literary language. Some of the most successful foreign language papers are published by men who do not make any pretensions to education and are regarded by the writers they employ as ignoramuses. These men know their public, however, and insist on printing in the paper what their subscribers are interested in and able to read. When the writers for the press despise both their employers and their public, as they sometimes do, not much can be expected from the newspaper which they succeed in producing.

The effect of this general lowering of the tone of the foreign language papers has been to create a public in this country composed of people who in their home country would have read little or nothing at all. All of the foreign languages have contributed to establish reading habits in the immigrant. It is the socialist press, however, that has taught him to think.

The most interesting of the foreign language papers in America are Yiddish. In the Yiddish press the foreign language newspaper may be said to have achieved form. All the tendencies and all the motives which other divisions of the immigrant press exhibit imperfectly, are here outstanding and manifest. No other press has attained so complete a simplification of the racial language, nor created so large a reading public. No other foreign language press has succeeded in reflecting so much of the intimate life of the people which it represents or reacted so powerfully upon the opinion, thought, and aspiration of the public, for which it exists. This is particularly true of the Yiddish daily newspapers in New York City.

The Jewish socialists were the first among the Jewish immigrants to conceive the idea of a press that would reach and interest the masses of the people. Among the immigrants who sought refuge in America in the early eighties were a number of Jewish students who had participated in the revolutionary agitation that preceded the assassination of Czar Alexander II, in March, 1881. It had been the program of the revolutionists to educate the masses of the people, "to go in among the people" as they termed it, and so prepare them for the international revolution which they, after the manner of millennialists everywhere, believed was impending.

Although there was at this time a popular literature in Yiddish among the Jews in Russia, political discussion was in Russian. There were sermons in Yiddish but no one had ever heard a political speech in the language of the people. The masses of the Jewish immigrants knew nothing of socialism or the labor movement, just as they knew nothing of modern science or modern political thought. All these high matters were the special concern of a few intellectuals who had been permitted to attend a Russian university. William M. Leiserson has said:

On July 27, 1882, occurred the first public meeting of the Russian refugees. For the first time they had an opportunity to enjoy freedom of speech, and on this sweltering day 500 of them jammed to the walls the little Golden Rule Hall on Rivington Street. The speeches were in Russian and German, and many could not understand either of these languages, but they were none the less enthusiastic. Schevitz, editor of the German *Volkszeitung*, Nelke, a German anarchist, and A. Cahan, one of the Russian students addressed the meeting.

It was Cahan at this meeting who first suggested the idea of using the Yiddish jargon to propagate socialism among the Jews. The suggestion was ridiculed. Who was there that could make speeches in Yiddish? Cahan volunteered to do it; and the following week in the anarchists' hall on Sixth Street the first Yiddish speech was delivered. After that many Jewish meetings were held, but for a long time Cahan continued to be the only Yiddish speaker.

The meetings of the "Propaganda Verein" were marked by the greatest enthusiasm. The right of free assemblage was a new experience to most of the Jews; but still more new and strange were the speeches in the mother tongue. *The doctrine of socialism which formerly the educated alone could understand were now to be made comprehensible to the ordinary immigrant.* A cry went up among the students: "In the mother tongue must we agitate among the Jews." And for a few months there was great activity in the "Propaganda Verein."

It was not, as it turned out, an easy matter to carry on a political propaganda in the language of a people who had had no political experience. There were no words in Yiddish in which to express the formulas of Marxian socialism. The scholastic discussions of the Russian students did not hold the interest of the common people, eager as they were for the knowledge which the new doctrines promised them.

P. Wiernik, in his *History of the Jews in America* (p. 303, 1912), writes:

In one respect the Hebrew and the Yiddish writers were struggling

with the same difficulty—that of making themselves understood by the largest possible number of readers. The method prevailing in Russia, of writing as hard or using as high a language as possible so that the highly intelligent reader—the title to which every reader of a newspaper there at that time laid claim—should take pride in being able to understand the contents, would not attract readers here as it does where scarcity of printed matter makes the public accept with eagerness whatever is offered. But the Hebrew writer came here with a style that may be termed aristocratic, and the Yiddish writer, who had to begin everything anew, had hardly any style. It was all easy as far as the work of the agitator was concerned; denunciations and accusations are always easily understood, and this alone is one of the reasons of their popularity. But when it came to the parts where the writer wanted to describe or to explain, especially in the scientific or semi-scientific articles which a public that had no systematic schooling so eagerly devoured, the language of most of the writers was inadequate and easily misunderstood.

It was not until the appearance of the *Forward*, however, and not until Abraham Cahan returned from his five years' apprenticeship upon an American daily paper that the Jewish socialists succeeded in creating a newspaper that the masses of the Jewish people, and even women, would read. The *Forward*, under Abraham Cahan, may be said to be modelled on the *Yellow Journal* of the period. It was, however, less a copy than an application of methods. The Jewish *Forward* is unquestionably American, but it is unquestionably unique. Its immediate and remarkable popularity was an indication that the Jewish daily press had finally arrived.

Forward was born at a Socialist ball fifteen years ago, when Cahan and others passed the hat around to start a Yiddish socialist daily and collected $800. A co-operative publishing company, the Forward Association, was formed almost on the spot. This Association pledged itself to publish the paper and to devote whatever profit accrued to the furthering of socialism and of *Forward*. Today *Forward* and its building bring many thousands of dollars a year profit, not a cent of which goes as dividends to anyone or for any other than these purposes. But as late as ten years ago the *Forward* was not only deep in debt, but also dying.

Its board of managers in despair appealed to Cahan to come and take hold. At that time Cahan was making a name for himself as special writer on the *Sun*, the *Evening Post*, the *Commercial Advertiser*, and other papers. His stories of Jewish life were ap-

pearing in the first-class magazines. His novel of East Side life, *Yeki*, had been acclaimed by William Dean Howells and other critics on both sides of the Atlantic as a masterly bit of realism. His *White Terror and Red* and his *Imported Bridegroom and Other Stories* were bringing him a widening English-reading public. But at the call from his comrades he went back to the East Side and threw himself into the task of reviving the dying Yiddish daily.

He found the circulation was barely six thousand, the columns full of abstract economic controversy, the tone bitter, and an exaggerated air of the "highbrow" even for the East Side, where Tolstoy, Spencer, Darwin, and similar literature can be bought on pushcarts. Worst of all, it was written in a highly intellectualized, Germanized Yiddish, which only the "intelligentsia" can understand fully.

Cahan at once changed its language to the colloquial, Americanized Yiddish spoken in the street, the shops, the factories, and the homes of the people it desired to reach. "And if you want the public to read this paper and to assimilate Socialism," he told his staff, "you've got to write of things of everyday life, in terms of what they see and feel and find all about them."

So he banished the long abstract essays on economic determinism and the class struggle and presented these things in the form of short actual stories and news from the shop, the street, the market, and the home. The East Side began to read about itself in the news columns of *Forward*. It found its homely everyday problems discussed trenchantly yet sympathetically on the editorial page by Cahan, and read advice to the lovelorn in a department conducted by Rose Pastor, who afterward added Stokes to her name.

The *New York Evening Post*, in its issue of July 27, 1912, said:

> Within eight weeks after Cahan had taken hold of *Forward* its circulation trebled. Within two or three years it began to pay a profit; and now (1912) it has a daily circulation of over 130,000 a day.

It is not possible to estimate the changes which the appearance of a genuinely popular press has had upon the life of the Jewish immigrant. Jewish scholars had been sitting for centuries in the synagogues, by the light of sacred candles, poring over the past, brooding over the inner life of the race. Upon this spectacle the

common man looked with awe and reverence. The popular press turned the eyes of the Jews outward upon the world. The press was a window on life. The new press was, to be sure, socialistic, but more interesting to the masses of the people than political philosophy was the information it gave them about life, about the physical universe and the world of human nature about them. There had arisen, at this time, a school of writers who devoted themselves to writing popular science in the language of the people. There were a number of these popular writers. Abraham Cahan was one. J. Rombro, who wrote under the name of Philip Kranz, was another. Rombro, like Cahan, was a Russian fugitive. In London he met Morris Winchefsky, the Yiddish poet and writer. Winchefsky, who was at that time editing *The Polish Jew*, the first socialist Yiddish paper to be published in England, asked him to write a description of the riots against the Jews in Russia. "It was a hard job for me," he wrote to Leo Wiener, "and it took me a long time to do it. I never thought of writing in the Jewish jargon, but fate ordered otherwise, and, contrary to all my aspirations, I am now nothing more than a poor jargon journalist." To which the author of the *History of Yiddish Literature* adds this comment:

From Leo Wiener's *History of Yiddish Literature* (pp. 223-24, 1899), I quote:

> The author's evil plight has, however, been the people's gain, for to his untiring activity is due no small amount of the enlightenment that they have received in the last ten years.

The most picturesque figure among the popular writers in Yiddish is Shaikevitch, the man who popularized the "heften." The "heften" were unsigned novels, popular stories, that had an immense vogue until the daily papers began publishing them serially. The competition of daily papers, which sometimes published as many as five or six stories at a time, destroyed the vogue of the "heften."

Shaikevitch, in an interview with Hutchins Hapgood, said this of his own work:

> My works are partly pictures of the life of the Jews in the Russian villages of fifty years ago, and partly novels about the old history of the Jews. Fifty years ago the Jews were more fanatical than they are now. They did nothing but study the Talmud, pray and fast, wear long beards and wigs and look like monkeys. I satirized all this in my novels. I tried to teach the ignorant Jews that they were ridiculous,

that they ought to take hold of modern, practical life and give up all that was merely formal and absurd in the old customs. I taught them that a pious man might be a hypocrite, and that it is better to do good than to pray. My works had a great effect in modernizing and educating the ignorant Jews. In my stories I pictured how the Jewish boy might go out from his little village into the wide, gentile world, and make something of himself. In the last twenty-five years, the Jews, owing to my books, have lost a great deal of their fanaticism. At that time they had nothing but my books to read, and so my satire had a great effect.[1]

Through the medium of the popular press the learning which had been the privilege of the few became the common possession of the many. The intellectual ferment, which this new contact with modern science produced, was scattered broadcast and under the influence of the new ideas and the unrest which it created, the whole structure of Jewish life crumbled. The younger generation, particularly the more ardent and intellectual among them, went over to socialism, *en masse*. Socialism gave the common man a point of view from which he could, at any rate, think about actual life. It made the sweatshop an intellectual problem.


Under the same influences socialism itself changed. It ceased to be a mere political doctrine and became a criticism of life. The socialist press ceased to be the mere organ of the doctrinaires, and became an instrument of general culture. All the intimate, human, and practical problems of life found a place in its columns. It founded a new literature and a new culture, based on the life of the common man.

A fact in regard to the immigrant, which is not generally understood, is that there exists in certain parts of Europe, as a result of the suppression of the folk languages and because of some rather drastic efforts at naturalization, what has been characterized as an "artificial illiteracy." With the growth of socialism and of nationalism, the two political movements which immigrant peoples are able to understand, there has been an intellectual awakening of the masses of the people. There is in all the back areas of Europe, as a matter of fact, a genuine renaissance, a widespread desire to know and to participate in the conscious life of the world from which they have hitherto been shut out. This new and vivid interest in life—modern life, science, and even literature—has been intensified

1. Hutchins Hapgood, *The Spirit of the Ghetto*, chapter x, "Odd Characters," pp. 274-75.

by the new, strange, confusing but stimulating encounters with the American environment, the organization of the great industries, and the vast and cosmopolitan life of modern cities. It is to this interest that the foreign language press, and particularly the socialistic, communistic, and I.W.W. press, appeals. But after all the worst that can be said in regard to the great majority of the so-called radical immigrant papers is, that while they aim at being edifying, they succeed in being dull. This is not true of the whole radical press, it is not true of the Yiddish papers. It is far from true of the *Forward*, the most successful and important of them all. But the *Forward* has long since ceased to be a purely radical paper and has become, more completely than any other paper in this country, a form of literature and a transcript of life.

CHAPTER 15



AMERICAN NEWSPAPER LITERATURE

THE newspaper has generally been conceived of as a mere extension of the personality of its editor. The printing press has had an independent history, but histories of newspapers are often merely the records of the fortunes of the men that publish them. This is certainly true of the first, and, on the whole, as far as it goes, the best account that has yet been written of the American newspaper: namely, Hudson's *Journalism in the United States* (16). Two more recent histories, one by Payne (32) and the other by Lee (18), fill some gaps in Hudson's story and bring it down to recent times. Payne's history, which is the briefer and more readable book, is valuable mainly for the light it throws upon the rôle of the press in America's struggle for independence. It was during this period that the American newspaper gained the high and secure position in public esteem which, in spite of growing disillusionment in recent times, it has ever since held. Lee's history is a more detailed account of significant changes that have taken place in the organization of the newspaper in recent years. What is needed, however, is not so much a history as the natural history of the press—not a record of the fortunes of individual newspapers, but an account of the evolution of the newspaper as a social institution.

Materials for such a natural history of the press are at hand. They exist in the voluminous current literature on the subject and

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in the fugitive publications in which men who have known the newspaper from the inside have occasionally recorded their experiences.

What is wanted, then, first of all, is an adequate bibliography of the newspaper press. This need is met by the very complete bibliography recently published by the New York Public Library and compiled by Carl Cannon (6). The difficulty with a bibliography extensive enough to cover the whole field is that its classifications are not minute enough to meet the needs of the special student. For this purpose a reference, however, may be made to such books as Bleyer's *Profession of Journalism* (4), Crawford's *Ethics of Journalism* (7), and Payne's *History* (32). The best review, however, of the literature of the press is contained in Lucy Salmon's *The Newspaper and the Historian* (36). Miss Salmon seems to be the person who comes nearest to having read all that is worth reading on the subject of the daily press. Among the most valuable contributions to our knowledge of the newspaper are the monographic studies, like O'Brien's *Story of the "Sun"* (30), of individual newspapers. Other narratives, none of them quite so well done, are Nevins' *The Evening Post* (29), Davis' *History of the "New York Times"* (9), and Hooker's *The Story of an Independent Newspaper* (15).

Biographies and autobiographies are not always the best sources of knowledge in regard to the newspaper, for the very reason that by the time a newspaper man has reached the age and position where his story seems worth telling, he has become so much a man of affairs that he has ceased to be a newspaper man. The stories of the reporter, the city editor, the managing editor, and the re-write man are the sources of real knowledge in regard to the modern newspaper. The best of these recent autobiographies is that of Fremont Older (31), who, like many another newspaper writer, began as a reporter and ended as a reformer—a somewhat disillusioned reformer. In contrast with this are the genial reminiscences of "Marse Henry" Watterson (45), which cover the whole field of politics from the Civil War down to recent times but tell us relatively little of the newspaper and its part in the events of that period.

More valuable for the student of the newspaper are Stone's *Fifty Years a Journalist* (42). Melville Stone was the founder of one of the earliest and most successful of afternoon papers, the

Chicago Daily News, and was for many years general manager of the Associated Press. *The Story of the "New York Sun"* is well told in the memoirs of Edward P. Mitchell (28); and Don G. Seitz's two volumes, one on *Joseph Pultizer* and the other on *Horace Greeley*, are undoubtedly the most valuable biographies, from the point of view of one's interest in the press, that have yet been written. William T. Stead, the story of whose life by Whyte (46) has just been published, was an international figure, as well as one of the first and most eminent of our muckrakers. His volume *If Christ Should Come to Chicago* and his later review of the revelations of the Luxow Committee under the title *Satan's Invisible World Displayed*, or *Despairing Democracy, A Study of Greater New York*, were journalistic stunts, although not printed in a newspaper. Stead's career as a journalist in England throws light, in any case, if only by contrast, on several aspects of journalism in America, for Stead was, before everything else, a reporter. Among other writers for the press who were not merely journalists, but newspapermen in the technical sense of the word, are Philip Gibbs (12), Samuel Blythe (5), and Frank Cobb (14). Gibbs and Blythe have told their own stories, but Cobb's record in journalism has been made up from the editorials which he wrote on the *World*.

Interesting, from a different point of view, is the autobiography of Milton McRae (26), of the Scripps-McRae syndicate. McRae was not a news-gatherer, or even, as his autobiography shows, a writer. His story is not merely an autobiography; it is a family history, for McRae is a member, by marriage, of the Scripps family, owners of a chain of afternoon papers extending from Cleveland to the Pacific Coast; and the book that he has written is a curious record of family affairs and newspaper finance. The Scripps were a new type. They were in a sense brokers as well as founders of newspapers—buying and selling and standardizing their publications, and incidentally building up a great fortune; all of which indicates how profound a change has taken place in the field of journalism since running a newspaper became a business instead of a form of sport.

A more recent and more systematic book on the business aspects of the press is Mr. Thayer's *Newspaper Management* (43). Advertising has been quite as positive an influence in determining the character of the American daily press as the enterprise of the

editor in extending circulation. Circulation and advertising are, in fact, the two pillars upon which the whole structure of the modern newspaper rests. Another important volume in this field is Jason Rogers' *Newspaper Building* (35).

Among the very considerable number of critical books concerned with the newspaper are: Villard's *Some Newspapers and Newspaper-Men* (44) and Sinclair's *The Brass Check* (40). They are perhaps more significant than others; not because the writers possess any unusual understanding of the institution which they criticize, but because they reflect and express, more vigorously than other writers have done, the resentment of our intelligentsia toward fundamental changes that are taking place in the American newspaper and in American life. The changing attitude of the public toward the newspaper is an important chapter in the history of the press. Newspapers have ceased to be, to the extent that they formerly were, organs of opinion. They have become great capitalistic enterprises, seeking circulation in order to sell it to advertisers. The reporter has replaced the editor as the dominant figure on the press, and the news the reporter puts into the present-day paper exercises a greater influence on public opinion than the comments of the editor on the editorial page.

The only writers who seem to have any sense for the significance of this change are Will Irwin and Walter Lippmann. Will Irwin's series of articles in *Collier's Weekly* (17) in the spring of 1911 has unfortunately not been published in book form, in spite of the fact that it is the most intelligent account that has thus far been given of the American newspaper. Walter Lippmann has recorded his own changing reflections on the press in three volumes, published at different times: *Liberty and the News* (22), *Public Opinion* (23), and *The Phantom Public* (21). President Lowell's earlier volume, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (24), like Dicey's *Law and Opinion in England* (10), deal with the same subject, but without attempting to define the rôle of the press. The changing character of the newspaper and its relation to public affairs is studied in Scott-James's *Influence of the Press* (37). In this connection, it is proper to mention McDonagh's *The Reporters' Gallery* (25), which tells the story of the long struggle of the English newspaper for the right to publish the parliamentary debates. This volume is as much or more than it pretends to be. It is really the story of a great constitutional change

—a change which profoundly modified not merely the character of the press but the English parliament itself.

George Creel's *How We Advertised America* (8) is likewise something more than an account of the work of our war-time press bureau, the Committee on Public Information. When the government, in order to maintain the national morale, set up a press bureau, it created a new type of political institution. Creel actually performed for the administration of President Wilson the work of a public relations counselor, as a certain class of publicity man is now called. Since Roosevelt, every president has had, under one title or another, a press agent through whom he has been able to speak, more or less directly, to the public. The effect has been to increase enormously the President's prestige and to enable him to maintain an ascendancy over Congress that he formerly never possessed. But the work which Creel did for President Wilson other men have done, and are still doing, for other public men and institutions. To such an extent has this become a feature of modern life that no account of the newspaper in its relation to public affairs would be complete without some reference to the press agent. The most noted of living press agents is Ivy Lee, who has discussed the character of this new profession in a little volume of his own, *Publicity: Some of the Things It Is and Is Not* (18). Other references in this field are Riis and Bonner's *Publicity* (34); and Bernays' *Crystallizing Public Opinion* (3).

Among the sources for the study of the newspaper is the increasing number of books addressed to professional students of journalism. Most of these books are written by men who themselves have had newspaper experience; and, while they are concerned mainly with the art or the ethics of the newspaper, they frequently contain illustrative material which is of real value to the student of politics, of public opinion, and of social institutions. Among some of the more recent treatises in this field are Maulsby's *Getting the News* (27), Harrington's *Feature Writing* (13), and Leech and Carroll's *What's the News?* (20).

Among the numerous textbooks on the technique of journalism, the most instructive—the book that comes nearest to giving its readers the "lowdown" on the press—is, it seems to me, George Bastian's *Editing the Day's News* (2). For one thing, it tells us what a "policy story" is, and why—and this is something. Books of this sort, if they serve no other purpose, at least create for the

reader the atmosphere in which the newspaper man lives and works; and it is within its own milieu that the newspaper must be studied if it is to be understood. There are a number of works of fiction concerned with the newspaper which are written so close to the facts that they may be regarded as authentic descriptions. Among the best of these, perhaps, is *Deadline* (41), by Henry Justin Smith, managing editor of the *Daily News,* and *The Clarion* (1), by Samuel Hopkins Adams.

Two volumes, among others, on the ethics of the newspaper—one by Flint (11) and the other by Crawford (7)—discuss with real understanding the difficulties under which news is gathered and printed; and while they emphasize the faults and failures of the press, they describe at the same time the gradual emergence, under the influence of public criticism, of professional standards and a professional spirit. There is, no doubt, a growing sense on the part of the press of its responsibility to the public, just as there is in an increasing insistence of the public that the newspaper, though privately owned, is none the less a public servant. Under these circumstances the newspaper has ceased to be a mere extension of the person of its editor or an appanage of a political party. It has become, in a very real sense, a public institution.

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PART THREE:

Sociology and Modern Society

SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

I. SOCIOLOGY AND "SCIENTIFIC" HISTORY

SOCIOLOGY first gained recognition as an independent science with the publication, between 1830 and 1842, of August Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive.* Comte did not, to be sure, create sociology. He did give it a name, a program, and a place among the sciences.

Comte's program for the new science proposed an extension to politics and to history of the positive methods of the natural sciences. Its practical aim was to establish government on the secure foundation of an exact science and to give to the predictions of history something of the precision of mathematical formulae.

We have to contemplate social phenomena as susceptible of prevision, like all other classes, within the limits of exactness compatible with their higher complexity. Comprehending the three characteristics of political science which we have been examining, prevision of social phenomena supposes, first, that we have abandoned the region of metaphysical idealities, to assume the ground of observed realities by a systematic subordination of imagination to observation; secondly, that political conceptions have ceased to be absolute, and have become relative to the variable state of civilization, so that theories, following the

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from the *American Journal of Sociology,* XXVI (1920-21), 401-24; XXVII (1921-22), 1-21; 169-83. These three articles appear also as chapter 1 in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), pp. 1-58.

natural course of facts, may admit of our foreseeing them; and, thirdly, that permanent political action is limited by determinate laws, since, if social events were always exposed to disturbance by the accidental intervention of the legislator, human or divine, no scientific prevision of them would be possible. Thus, we may concentrate the conditions of the spirit of positive social philosophy on this one great attribute of scientific prevision.[1]

Comte proposed, in short, to make government a technical science and politics a profession. He looked forward to a time when legislation, based on a scientific study of human nature, would assume the character of natural law. The earlier and more elementary sciences, particularly physics and chemistry, had given man control over external nature; the last science, sociology, was to give man control over himself.

Men were long in learning that Man's power of modifying phenomena can result only from his knowledge of their natural laws; and in the infancy of each science, they believed themselves able to exert an unbounded influence over the phenomena of that science. . . . Social phenomena are, of course, from their extreme complexity, the last to be freed from this pretension: but it is therefore only the more necessary to remember that the pretension existed with regard to all the rest, in their earliest stage, and to anticipate therefore that social science will, in its turn, be emancipated from the delusion. . . . It [the existing social science] represents the social action of Man to be indefinite and arbitrary, as was once thought in regard to biological, chemical, physical, and even astronomical phenomena, in the earlier stages of their respective sciences. . . . The human race finds itself delivered over, without logical protection, to the ill-regulated experimentation of the various political schools, each one of which strives to set up, for all future time, its own immutable type of government. We have seen what are the chaotic results of such a strife; and we shall find that there is no chance of order and agreement but in subjecting social phenomena, like all others, to invariable natural laws, which shall, as a whole, prescribe for each period, with entire certainty, the limits and character of political action: in other words, introducing into the study of social phenomena the same positive spirit which has regenerated every other branch of human speculation.[2]

In the present anarchy of political opinion and parties, changes in the existing social order inevitably assume, he urged, the character, at the best, of a mere groping empiricism; at the worst, of a

1. Harriet Martineau, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, freely translated and condensed (London, 1893), II, 61.
2. Harriet Martineau, *op. cit.*, II, 59-60.

social convulsion like that of the French Revolution. Under the direction of a positive, in place of a speculative or, as Comte would have said, metaphysical science of society, progress must assume the character of an orderly march.

It was to be expected, with the extension of exact methods of investigation to other fields of knowledge, that the study of man and of society would become, or seek to become, scientific in the sense in which that word is used in the natural sciences. It is interesting, in this connection, that Comte's first name for sociology was *social physics*. It was not until he had reached the fourth volume of his *Positive Philosophy* that the word sociological is used for the first time.

Comte, if he was foremost, was not first in the search for a positive science of society, which would give man that control over men that he had over external nature. Montesquieu, in his *Spirit of the Laws*, first published in 1747, had distinguished in the organization of society, between form, "the particular structure," and the forces, "the human passions which set it in motion." In his preface to this first epoch-making essay in what Freeman calls "comparative politics," Montesquieu suggests that the uniformities, which he discovered beneath the wide variety of positive law, were contributions not merely to a science of law, but to a science of mankind.

> I have first of all considered mankind; and the result of my thoughts has been, that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and manners, they are not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy.[3]

Hume, likewise, put politics among the natural sciences.[4] Condorcet wanted to make history positive.[5] But there were, in the period between 1815 and 1840 in France, conditions which made the need of a new science of politics peculiarly urgent. The Revolution had failed and the political philosophy, which had directed and justified it, was bankrupt. France between 1789 and 1815 had adopted, tried, and rejected no less than ten different con-

3. Montesquieu, Baron M. de Secondat, *The Spirit of the Laws*, translated by Thomas Nugent, (Cincinnati, 1873), I, xxxi.

4. David Hume, *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Part II, sec. 7.

5. Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (1795), 292. See Barth *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1897), Part I, pp. 21-23.

stitutions. But during this period, as Saint-Simon noted, society, and the human beings who compose society, had not changed. It was evident that government was not, in any such sense as the philosophers had assumed, a mere artifact and legislative construction. Civilization, as Saint-Simon conceived it, was a part of nature. Social change was part of the whole cosmic process. It proposed, therefore, to make politics a science as positive as physics. The subject-matter of political science, as he conceived it, was not so much political forms as social conditions. History had been literature. It was destined to become a science.[6]

Comte called himself Saint-Simon's pupil. It is perhaps more correct to say Saint-Simon formulated the problem for which Comte, in his *Positive Philosophy*, sought a solution. It was Comte's notion that with the arrival of sociology the distinction which had so long existed, and still exists, between philosophy, in which men define their wishes, and natural science, in which they describe the existing order of nature, would disappear. In that case ideals would be defined in terms of reality, and the tragic difference between what men want and what is possible would be effaced. Comte's error was to mistake a theory of progress for progress itself. It is certainly true that as men learn what is, they will adjust their ideals to what is possible. But knowledge grows slowly.

Man's knowledge of mankind has increased greatly since 1842. Sociology, "the positive science of humanity," has moved steadily forward in the direction that Comte's program indicated, but it has not yet replaced history. Historian's are still looking for methods of investigation which will make history "sciencific."

> No one who has watched the course of history during the last generation can have felt doubt of its tendency. Those of us who read Buckle's first volume when it appeared in 1857, and almost immediately afterwards, in 1859, read the *Origin of Species* and felt the violent impulse which Darwin gave to the study of natural laws, never doubted that historians would follow until they had exhausted every possible hypothesis to create a science of history. Year after year passed, and little progress has been made. Perhaps the mass of students are more skeptical now than they were thirty years ago of the possibility that such a science can be created. Yet almost every successful historian has been busy with it, adding here a new analysis, a new generalization there; a clear and definite connection where before the rupture of idea

6. *Oeuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin* (Paris, 1865-78), XVII, 228. Paul Barth, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 23.

was absolute; and, above all, extending the field of study until it shall include all races, all countries, and all times. Like other branches of science, history is now encumbered and hampered by its own mass, but its tendency is always the same, and cannot be other than what it is. That the effort to make history a science may fail is possible, and perhaps probable; but that it should cease, unless for reasons that would cause all science to cease, is not within the range of experience. Historians will not, and even if they would they can not, abandon the attempt. Science itself would admit its own failure if it admitted that man, the most important of all its subjects, could not be brought within its range.[7]

Since Comte gave the new science of humanity a name and a point of view, the area of historical investigation has vastly widened and a number of new social sciences have come into existence—ethnology, archaeology, folklore, the comparative studies of cultural materials, i.e., language, mythology, religion, and law, and in connection with and closely related with these, folk-psychology, social psychology, and the psychology of crowds, which latter is, perhaps, the forerunner of a wider and more elaborate political psychology. The historians have been very much concerned with these new bodies of materials and with the new points of view which they have introduced into the study of man and of society. Under the influences of these sciences, history itself, as James Harvey Robinson has pointed out, has had a history. But with the innovations which the new history has introduced or attempted to introduce, it does not appear that there have been any fundamental changes in method or ideology in the science itself.

Fifty years have elapsed since Buckle's book appeared, and I know of no historian who would venture to maintain that we had made any considerable advance toward the goal he set for himself. A systematic prosecution of the various branches of social science, especially political economy, sociology, anthropology, and psychology, is succeeding in explaining many things; but history must always remain, from the standpoint of the astronomer, physicist, or chemist, a highly inexact and fragmentary body of knowledge. . . . History can no doubt be pursued in a strictly scientific spirit, but the data we possess in regard to the past of mankind are not of a nature to lend themselves to organization into an exact science, although, as we shall see, they may yield truths of vital importance.[8]

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7. Henry Adams, *The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma* (New York, 1919), p. 126.

8. James Harvey Robinson, *The New History, Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook* (New York, 1912), pp. 54-55.

History has not become, as Comte believed it must, an exact science, and sociology has not taken its place in the social sciences. It is important, however, for understanding the mutations which have taken place in sociology since Comte to remember that it had its origin in an effort to make history exact. This, with, to be sure, considerable modifications, is still, as we shall see, an ambition of the science.

II. HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL FACTS

Sociology, as Comte conceived it, was not, as it has been characterized, "a highly important point of view," but a fundamental science, i.e., a method of investigation and "a body of discoveries about mankind."[9] In the hierarchy of the sciences, sociology, the last in time, was first in importance. The order was as follows: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, including psychology, sociology. This order represented a progression from the more elementary to the more complex. It was because history and politics were concerned with the most complex of natural phenomena that they were the last to achieve what Comte called the positive character. They did this in sociology.

Many attempts have been made before and since Comte to find a satisfactory classification of the sciences. The order and relation of the sciences is still, in fact, one of the cardinal problems of philosophy. In recent years the notion has gained recognition that the difference between history and the natural sciences is not one of degree, but of kind; not of subject-matter merely, but of method. This difference in method is, however, fundamental. It is a difference not merely in the interpretation but in the *logical character* of facts.

Every historical fact, it is pointed out, is concerned with a unique event. History never repeats itself. If nothing else, the mere circumstance that every event has a *date* and *location* would give historical facts an individuality that facts of the abstract science do not possess. Because historical facts always are located and dated, and cannot therefore be repeated, they are not subject to experiment and verification. On the other hand, a fact not subject to verification is not a fact for natural science. History, as distinguished from natural history, deals with individuals, i.e., in-

9. James Harvey Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

dividual events, persons, institutions. Natural science is concerned, not with individuals, but with classes, types, species. All the assertions that are valid for natural science concern classes. An illustration will make this distinction clear.

Sometime in October, 1838, Charles Darwin happened to pick up and read Malthus' book on *Population*. The facts of "the struggle for existence," so strikingly presented in that now celebrated volume, suggested an explanation of a problem which had long interested and puzzled him, namely the origin of species.

This is a statement of a historical fact, and the point is that it is not subject to empirical verification. It cannot be stated, in other words, in the form of a hypothesis, which further observation of other men of the same type will either verify or discredit.

On the other hand, in his *Descent of Man*, Darwin, discussing the rôle of sexual selection in evolution of the species, makes this observation: "Naturalists are much divided with respect to the object of the singing of birds. Few more careful observers ever lived than Montagu, and he maintained that the 'males of song-birds and of many others do not in general search for the female, but, on the contrary, their business in spring is to perch on some conspicuous spot, breathing out their full and amorous notes, which, by instinct, the female knows and repairs to the spot to choose her mate.' "

This is a typical statement of a fact of natural history. It is not, however, the rather vague generality of the statement that makes it scientific. It is its representative character, the character which makes it possible of verification by further observation which makes it a scientific fact.

It is from facts of this kind, collected, compared, and classified, irrespective of time or place, that the more general conclusions are drawn, upon which Darwin based his theory of the "descent of man." This theory, as Darwin conceived it, was not an *interpretation* of the facts but an *explanation.*

The relation between history and sociology, as well as the manner in which the more abstract social sciences have risen out of the more concrète, may be illustrated by a comparison between history and geography. Geography as a science is concerned with the visible world, the earth, its location in space, the distribution of the land masses, and of the plants, animals, and peoples upon its surface. The order, at least the fundamental order, which it

seeks and finds among the objects it investigates is *spatial.* As soon as the geographer begins to compare and classify the plants, the animals, and the peoples with which he comes in contact, geography passes over into the special sciences, i.e., botany, zoölogy, and anthropology.

History, on the other hand, is concerned with a world of events. Not everything that happened, to be sure, is history, but every event that ever was or ever will be significant is history.

Geography attempts to reproduce for us the visible world as it exists in space; history, on the contrary, seeks to re-create for us in the present the significance of the past. As soon as historians seek to take events out of their historical setting, that is to say, out of their time and space relations, in order to compare them and classify them; as soon as historians begin to emphasize the typical and representative rather than the unique character of events, history ceases to be history and becomes sociology.

The differences here indicated between history and sociology are based upon a more fundamental distinction between the historical and the natural sciences first clearly defined by Windelband, the historian of philosophy, in an address to the faculty of the University of Strassburg in 1894.

The distinction between natural science and history begins at the point where we seek to convert facts into knowledge. Here again we observe that the one (natural science) seeks to formulate laws, the other (history) to portray events. In the one case thought proceeds from the description of particulars to the general relations. In the other case it clings to a genial depiction of the individual object or event. For the natural scientist the object of investigation which cannot be repeated never has, as such, scientific value. It serves his purpose only so far as it may be regarded as a type or as a special instance of a class from which the type may be deduced. The natural scientist considers the single case only so far as he can see in it the features which serve to throw light upon a general law. For the historian the problem is to revive and call up into the present, in all its particularity, an event in the past. His aim is to do for an actual event precisely what the artist seeks to do for the object of his imagination. It is just here that we discern the kinship between history and art, between the historian and the writer of literature. It is for this reason that natural science emphasized the abstract; the historian, on the other hand, is interested mainly in the concrete.

The fact that natural science emphasizes the abstract and history the concrete will become clear if we compare the results of the researches of the two sciences. However finespun the conceptions may

be which the historical critic uses in working over his materials, the final goal of such study is always to create out of the mass of events a vivid portrait of the past. And what history offers us is pictures of men and of human life, with all the wealth of their individuality, reproduced in all their characteristic vivacity. Thus do the peoples and languages of the past, their forms and beliefs, their struggles for power and freedom, speak to us through the mouth of history.

How different it is with the world which the natural sciences have created for us! However concrete the materials with which they started, the goal of these sciences is theories, eventually mathematical formulations of laws of change. Treating the individual, sensuous, changing objects as mere unsubstantial appearances (phenomena), scientific investigation becomes a search for the universal laws which rule the timeless changes of events. Out of this colorful world of the senses, science creates a system of abstract concepts, in which the true nature of things is conceived to exist—a world of colorless and soundless atoms, despoiled of all their earthly sensuous qualities. Such is the triumph of thought over perception. Indifferent to change, science casts her anchor in the eternal and unchangeable. Not the change as such but the unchanging form of change is what she seeks.

This raises the question: What is the more valuable for the purposes of knowledge in general, a knowledge of law or a knowledge of events? As far as that is concerned, both scientific procedures may be equally justified. The knowledge of the universal laws has everywhere a practical value in so far as they make possible man's purposeful intervention in the natural processes. That is quite as true of the movements of the inner as of the outer world. In the latter case knowledge of nature's laws has made it possible to create those tools through which the control of mankind over external nature is steadily being extended.

Not less for the purposes of the common life are we dependent upon the results of historical knowledge. Man is, to change the ancient form of the expression, the animal who has a history. His cultural life rests on the transmission from generation to generation of a constantly increasing body of historical memories. Whoever proposes to take an active part in this cultural process must have an understanding of history. Wherever the thread is once broken—as history itself proves—it must be painfully gathered up and knitted again into the historical fabric.

It is, to be sure, true that it is an economy for human understanding to be able to reduce to a formula or a general concept the common characteristics of individuals. But the more man seeks to reduce facts to concepts and laws, the more he is obliged to sacrifice and neglect the individual. Men have, to be sure, sought, in characteristic modern fashion, "to make of history a natural science." This was the case with the so-called philosophy of history of positivism. What has been the net result of the laws of history which it has given us? A few trivial generalities which justify themselves only by most careful consideration of their numerous exceptions.

On the other hand it is certain that all interest and values of life are concerned with what is unique in men and events. Consider how quickly our appreciation is deadened as some object is multiplied or is regarded as one case in a thousand. "She is not the first" is one of the cruel passages in *Faust*. It is in the individuality and the uniqueness of an object that all our sense of value has its roots. It is upon this fact that Spinoza's doctrine of the conquest of the passions by knowledge rests, since for him knowledge is the submergence of the individual in the universal, the "once for all" into the eternal.

The fact that all our livelier appreciations rest upon the unique character of the object is illustrated above all in our relations to persons. Is it not an unendurable thought, that a loved object, an adored person, should have existed at some other time in just the form in which it now exists for us? Is it not horrible and unthinkable that one of us, with just this same individuality, should actually have existed in a second edition?

What is true of the individual man is quite as true of the whole historical process: it has value only when it is unique. This is the principle which the Christian doctrine successfully maintained, as over against Hellenism in the Patristic philosophy. The middle point of their conception of the world was the fall and the salvation of mankind as a unique event. That was the first and great perception of the inalienable metaphysical right of the historian to preserve for the memory of mankind, in all their uniqueness and individuality, the actual events of life.[10]

Like every other species of animal, man has a natural history. Anthropology is the science of man considered as one of the animal species, *Homo sapiens*. History and sociology, on the other hand, are concerned with man as a person, as a "political animal," participating with his fellows in a common fund of social traditions and cultural ideals. Freeman, the English historian, said that history was "past politics" and politics "present history." Freeman uses the word politics in the large and liberal sense in which it was first used by Aristotle. In that broad sense of the word, the political process, by which men are controlled and states governed, and the cultural process, by which man has been domesticated and human

10. Wilhelm Windelband, *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft, Rede zum Antritt des Rectorats der Kaiser-Wilhelms-Universität Strassburg* (Strassburg, 1900). The logical principle outlined by Windelband has been further elaborated by Heinrich Rickert in *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, eine logische Einleitung in die historische Wissenschaft* (Tübingen u. Leipzig, 1902). See also Georg Simmel, *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, ein eerkenntnistheoretische Studie* (2d ed., Leipzig, 1915).

nature formed, are not, as we ordinarily assume, different, but identical, procedures.

All this suggests the intimate relations which exist between history, politics, and sociology. The important thing, however, is not the identities but the distinctions. For, however much the various disciplines may, in practice, overlap, it is necessary for the sake of clear thinking to have their limits defined. As far as sociology and history are concerned the differences may be summed up in a word. Both history and sociology are concerned with the life of man as man. History, however, seeks to reproduce and interpret concrete events as they actually occurred in time and space. Sociology, on the other hand, seeks to arrive at natural laws and generalizations in regard to human nature and society, irrespective of time and of place.

In other words, history seeks to find out what actually happened and how it all came about. Sociology, on the other hand, seeks to explain, on the basis of a study of other instances, the nature of the process involved.

By nature we mean just that aspect and character of things in regard to which it is possible to make general statements and formulate laws. If we say, in explanation of the peculiar behavior of some individual, that it is natural or that it is after all "simply human nature," we are simply saying that this behavior is what we have learned to expect of this individual or of human beings in general. It is, in other words, a law.

Natural law, as the term is used here, is any statement which describes the behavior of a class of objects or the character of a class of acts. For example, the classic illustration of the so-called "universal proposition" familiar to students of formal logic, "all men are mortal," is an assertion in regard to a class of objects we call men. This is, of course, simply a more formal way of saying that "men die." Such general statements and "laws" get meaning only when they are applied to particular cases, or, to speak again the terms of formal logic, when they find a place in a syllogism, thus: "Men are mortal. This is a man." But such syllogisms may always be stated in the form of a hypothesis. If this is a man, he is mortal. If *a* is *b*, *a* is also *c*. This statement, "Human nature is a product of social contact," is a general assertion familiar to students of sociology. This law or, more correctly, hypothesis, applied to an individual case explains the so-called feral man. Wild men, in

the proper sense of the word, are not the so-called savages, but the men who have never been domesticated, of which an individual example is now and then discovered.

To state a law in the form of a hypothesis serves to emphasize the fact that laws—what we have called natural laws at any rate—are subject to verification and restatement. Under these circumstances the exceptional instance, which compels a restatement of the hypothesis, is more important for the purposes of science than other instances which merely confirm it.

Any science which operates with hypotheses and seeks to state facts in such a way that they can be compared and verified by further observation and experiment is, so far as method is concerned, a natural science.

III. HUMAN NATURE AND LAW

One thing that makes the conception of natural history and natural law important to the student of sociology is that in the field of the social sciences the distinction between natural and moral law has from the first been confused. Comte and the social philosophers in France after the Revolution set out with the deliberate purpose of superseding legislative enactments by laws of human nature, laws which were to be positive and "scientific." As a matter of fact, sociology, in becoming positive, so far from effacing, has rather emphasized the distinctions that Comte sought to abolish. Natural law may be distinguished from all other forms of law by the fact that it aims at nothing more than a description of the behavior of certain types or classes of objects. A description of the way in which a class, i.e., men, plants, animals, or physical objects, may be expected under ordinary circumstances to behave, tells us what we may in a general way expect of any individual member of that class. If natural science seeks to predict, it is able to do so simply because it operates with concepts or class names instead, as is the case with history, with concrete facts and, to use a logical phrase, "existential propositions."

That the chief end of science is descriptive formulation has probably been clear to keen analytic minds since the time of Galileo, especially to the great discoverers in astronomy, mechanics, and dynamics. But as a definitely stated conception, corrective of misunderstandings, the view of science as essentially descriptive began to make itself felt about the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and may be associated with the names of Kirchhoff and Mach. It was in

1876 that Kirchhoff defined the task of mechanics as that of "describing completely and in the simplest manner the motions which take place in nature." Widening this a little, we may say that the aim of science is to describe natural phenomena and occurrences as exactly as possible, as simply as possible, as completely as possible, as consistently as possible, and always in terms which are communicable and verifiable. This is a very different rôle from that of solving the riddles of the universe, and it is well expressed in what Newton said in regard to the law of gravitation: "So far I have accounted for the phenomena presented to us by the heavens and the sea by means of the force of gravity, but I have as yet assigned no cause to this gravity. . . . I have not been able to deduce from phenomena the *raison d'etre* of the properties of gravity and I have not set up hypotheses."[11]

"We must confess," said Prof. J. H. Poynting (1900, p. 616), "that physical laws have greatly fallen off in dignity. No long time ago they were quite commonly described as the Fixed Laws of Nature, and were supposed sufficient in themselves to govern the universe. Now we can only assign to them the humble rank of mere descriptions, often erroneous, of similarities which we believe we have observed. . . . A law of nature explains nothing, it has no governing power, it is but a descriptive formula which the careless have sometimes personified." It used to be said that "the laws of Nature are the thoughts of God"; now we say that they are the investigator's formulae summing up regularities of recurrence.[12]

If natural law aims at prediction it tells us what we can do. Moral laws, on the other hand, tell us, not what we can, but what we ought to do. The civil or municipal law, finally, tells us not what we can, nor what we ought, but what we must do. It is very evident that these three types of law may be very intimately related. We do not know what we ought to do until we know what we can do; and we certainly should consider what men can do before we pass laws prescribing what they must do. There is, moreover, no likelihood that these distinctions will ever be completely abolished. As long as the words "can," "ought," and "must" continue to have any meaning for us the distinctions that they represent will persist in science as well as in common sense.

The immense prestige which the methods of the natural sciences have gained, particularly in their application to the phenomena of the physical universe, has undoubtedly led scientific men to over-

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11. Newton, *Philosophia naturalis principia mathematica*, 1687.

12. J. Arthur Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature* (New York, 1920), pp. 8-9. See also Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (2d ed.; London, 1900), chap. iii, The Scientific Law.

estimate the importance of mere conceptual and abstract knowledge. It has led them to assume that history also must eventually become "scientific" in the sense of the natural sciences. In the meantime the vast collections of historical facts which the industry of historical students has accumulated are regarded, sometimes even by historians themselves, as a sort of raw material, the value of which can only be realized after it has been worked over into some sort of historical generalization which has the general character of scientific and, ultimately, mathematical formula.

"History," says Karl Pearson, "can never become science, can never be anything but a catalogue of facts rehearsed in a more or less pleasing language until these facts are seen to fall into sequences which can be briefly resumed in scientific formulae."[13] And Henry Adams, in a letter to the American Historical Association already referred to, confesses that history has thus far been a fruitless quest for "the secret which would transform these odds and ends of philosophy into one self-evident, harmonious, and complete system."

You may be sure that four out of five serious students of history who are living today have, in the course of their work, felt that they stood on the brink of a great generalization that would reduce all history under a law as clear as the laws which govern the material world. As the great writers of our time have touched one by one the separate fragments of admitted law by which society betrays its character as a subject for science, not one of them can have failed to feel an instant's hope that he might find the secret which would transform these odds and ends of philosophy into one self-evident, harmonious, and complete system. He has seemed to have it, as the Spanish say, in his inkstand. Scores of times he must have dropped his pen to think how one short step, one sudden inspiration, would show all human knowledge; how, in these thickset forests of history, one corner turned, one faint trail struck, would bring him on the highroad of science. Every professor who has tried to teach the doubtful facts which we now call history must have felt that sooner or later he or another would put order in the chaos and bring light into darkness. Not so much genius or favor was needed as patience and good luck. The law was certainly there, and as certainly was in places actually visible, to be touched and handled, as though it were a law of chemistry or physics. No teacher with a spark of imagination or with an idea of scientific method can have helped dreaming of the immortality that would be achieved by the man who should successfully apply Darwin's method to the facts of human history.[14]

13. Karl Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 359.
14. Henry Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

The truth is, however, that the concrete facts, in which history and geography have sought to preserve the visible, tangible, and, generally speaking, the experiential aspects of human life and the visible universe, have a value irrespective of any generalization or ideal constructions which may be inferred from or built up out of them. Just as none of the investigations or generalizations of individual psychology are ever likely to take the place of biography and autobiography, so none of the conceptions of an abstract sociology, no scientific descriptions of the social and cultural processes, and no laws of progress are likely, in the near future at any rate, to supersede the more concrete facts of history in which are preserved those records of those unique and never fully comprehended aspects of life which we call *events.*

It has been the dream of philosophers that theoretical and abstract science could and some day perhaps would succeed in putting into formulae and into general terms all that was significant in the concrete facts of life. It has been the tragic mistake of the so-called intellectuals, who have gained their knowledge from textbooks rather than from observation and research, to assume that science had already realized its dream. But there is no indication that science has begun to exhaust the sources or significance of concrete experience. The infinite variety of external nature and the inexhaustible wealth of personal experience have thus far defied, and no doubt will continue to defy, the industry of scientific classification, while, on the other hand, the discoveries of science are constantly making accessible to us new and larger areas of experience.

What has been said simply serves to emphasize the instrumental character of the abstract sciences. History and geography, all of the concrete sciences, can and do measurably enlarge our experience of life. Their very purpose is to arouse new interests and create new sympathies; to give mankind, in short, an environment so vast and varied as will call out and activate all his instincts and capacities.

The more abstract sciences, just to the extent which they are abstract and exact, like mathematics and logic, are merely methods and tools for converting experience into knowledge and applying the knowledge so gained to practical uses.

IV. HISTORY, NATURAL HISTORY, AND SOCIOLOGY

Although it is possible to draw clear distinctions in theory between the purpose and methods of history and sociology, in practice the two forms of knowledge pass over into one another by almost imperceptible gradations.

The sociological point of view makes its appearance in historical investigation as soon as the historian turns from the study of "periods" to the study of institutions. The history of institutions, that is to say, the family, the church, economic institutions, political institutions, etc., leads inevitably to comparison, classification, the formation of class names or concepts, and eventually to the formulation of law. In the process, history becomes natural history, and natural history passes over into natural science. In short, history becomes sociology.

Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* is one of the earliest attempts to write the natural history of a social institution. It is based upon a comparison and classification of marriage customs of widely scattered peoples, living under varied physical and social conditions. What one gets from a survey of this kind is not so much history as a study of human behavior. The history of marriage, as of any other institution, is, in other words, not so much an account of what certain individuals or groups of individuals did at certain times and certain places, as it is a description of the responses of few fundamental human instincts to a variety of social situations. Westermarck calls this kind of history sociology.[15]

It is in the firm conviction that the history of human civilization should be made an object of as scientific a treatment as the history of organic nature that I write this book. Like the phenomena of physical

15. Prof. Robertson Smith (*Nature*, XLIV, 270), criticizing Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage*, complains that the author has confused history with natural history. "The history of an institution," he writes, "which is controlled by public opinion and regulated by law is not natural history. The true history of marriage begins where the natural history of pairing ends. . . . To treat these topics (polyandry, kinship through the female only, infanticide, exogamy) as essentially a part of the natural history of pairing involves a tacit assumption that the laws of society are at bottom mere formulated instincts, and this assumption really underlies all our author's theories. His fundamental position compels him, if he will be consistent with himself, to hold that every institution connected with marriage that has universal validity, or forms an integral part of the main line of development, is rooted in instinct, and that institutions which are not based on instinct are necessarily exceptional and unimportant for scientific history."

and psychical life those of social life should be classified into certain groups and each group investigated with regard to its origin and development. Only when treated in this way can history lay claim to the rank and honour of a science in the highest sense of the term, as forming an important part of Sociology, the youngest of the principal branches of learning.

Descriptive historiography has no higher object than that of offering materials to this science.[16]

Westermarck refers to the facts which he has collected in his history of marriage as phenomena. For the explanation of these phenomena, however, he looks to the more abstract sciences.

The causes on which social phenomena are dependent fall within the domain of different sciences–Biology, Psychology, or Sociology. The reader will find that I put particular stress upon the psychological causes, which have often been deplorably overlooked, or only imperfectly touched upon. And more especially do I believe that the mere instincts have played a very important part in the origin of social institutions and rules.[17]

Westermarck derived most of his materials for the study of marriage from ethnological materials. Ethnologists, students of folklore (German *Völkerkunde*), and archaeology are less certain than the historians of institutions whether their investigations are historical or sociological.

Jane Harrison, although she disclaims the title of sociologist, bases her conception of the origin of Greek religion on a sociological theory, the theory namely that "among primitive peoples religion reflects collective feeling and collective thinking." Dionysius, the god of the Greek mysteries, is according to her interpretation a product of the group consciousness.

The mystery-god arises out of those instincts, emotions, desires which attend and express life; but these emotions, desires, instincts, in so far as they are religious, are at the outset rather of a group than of individual consciousness. . . . It is a necessary and most important corollary to this doctrine, that the form taken by the divinity reflects the social structure of the group to which the divinity belongs. Dionysius is the Son of his Mother because he issues from a matrilinear group.[18]

This whole study is, in fact, merely an application of Durkheim's conception of "collective representations."

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16. Edward Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage* (London, 1901), p. 1.

17. E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

18. Jane Ellen Harrison, *Themis, A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1912), p. ix.

Robert H. Lowie, in his recent volume, *Primitive Society*, refers to "ethnologists and other historians," but at the same time asks: "What kind of an historian shall the ethnologist be?"

He answers the question by saying that, "If there are laws of social evolution, he [the ethnologist] must assuredly discover them," but at any rate, and first of all, "his duty is to ascertain the course civilization has *actually* followed. . . . To strive for the ideals of another branch of knowledge may be positively pernicious, for it can easily lead to that factitious simplification which means falsification."

In other words, ethnology, like history, seeks to tell what actually happened. It is bound to avoid abstraction, "over-simplification," and formulae, and these are the ideals of another kind of scientific procedure. As a matter of fact, however, ethnology, even when it has attempted nothing more than a description of the existing cultures of primitive peoples, their present distribution and the order of their succession, has not freed itself wholly from the influence of abstract considerations. Theoretical problems inevitably arise for the solution of which it is necessary to go to psychology and sociology. One of the questions that has arisen in the study, particularly the comparative study, of cultures is: how far any existing cultural trait is borrowed and how far it is to be regarded as of independent origin.

In the historical reconstruction of culture the phenomena of distribution play, indeed, an extraordinary part. If a trait occurs everywhere, it might veritably be the product of some universally operative social law. If it is found in a restricted number of cases, it may still have evolved through some such instrumentality acting under specific conditions that would then remain to be determined by analysis of the cultures in which the feature is embedded. . . . Finally, the sharers of a cultural trait may be of distinct lineage but through contact and borrowing have come to hold in common a portion of their cultures. . . .

Since, as a matter of fact, cultural resemblances abound between peoples of diverse stock, their interpretation commonly narrows to a choice between two alternatives. Either they are due to like causes, whether these can be determined or not; or they are the result of borrowing. A predilection for one or the other explanation has lain at the bottom of much ethnological discussion in the past; and at present influential schools both in England and in continental Europe clamorously insist that all cultural parallels are due to diffusion from a single center. It is inevitable to envisage this moot-problem at the

start, since uncompromising championship of either alternative has far-reaching practical consequences. For if every parallel is due to borrowing, then sociological laws, which can be inferred only from independently developing likenesses, are barred. Then the history of religion or social life or technology consists exclusively in a statement of the place of origin of beliefs, customs and implements, and a recital of their travels to different parts of the globe. On the other hand, if borrowing covers only part of the observed parallels, an explanation from like causes becomes at least the ideal goal in an investigation of the remainder.[19]

An illustration will exhibit the manner in which problems originally historical become psychological and sociological. Tylor in his *Early History of Mankind* has pointed out that the bellows used by the negro blacksmiths of continental Africa are of a quite different type from those used by natives of Madagascar. The bellows used by the Madagascar blacksmiths, on the other hand, are exactly like those in use by the Malays of Sumatra and in other parts of the Malay Archipelago. This indication that the natives of Madagascar are of Malay origin is in accordance with other anthropological and ethnological data in regard to these peoples, which prove the fact, now well established, that they are not of African origin.

Similarly Boas' study of the Raven cycle of American Indian mythology indicated that these stories originated in the northern part of British Columbia and traveled southward along the coast. One of the evidences of the direction of this progress is the gradual diminution of complexity in the stories as they traveled into regions farther removed from the point of origin.

All this, in so far as it seeks to determine the point of origin, direction, speed, and character of changes that take place in cultural materials in the process of diffusion, is clearly history and ethnology.

Other questions, however, force themselves inevitably upon the attention of the inquiring student. Why is it that certain cultural materials are more widely and more rapidly diffused than others? Under what conditions does this diffusion take place and why does it take place at all? Finally, what is the ultimate source of customs, beliefs, languages, religious practices, and all the varied technical devices which compose the cultures of different peoples? What are the circumstances and what are the processes by which cul-

19. Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, 1920), pp. 7-8.

tural traits are independently created? Under what conditions do cultural fusions take place and what is the nature of this process?

These are all fundamentally problems of human nature, and as human nature itself is now regarded as a product of social intercourse, they are problems of sociology.

The cultural processes by which languages, myth, and religion have come into existence among primitive peoples has given rise in Germany to a special science. Folk-psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*) had its origin in an attempt to answer in psychological terms the problems to which a comparative study of cultural materials has given rise.

> From two different directions ideals of folk-psychology have found their way into modern science. First of all there was a demand from the different social sciences [*Geisteswissenschaften*] for a psychological explanation of the phenomena of social life and history, so far as they were products of social [*geistiger*] interaction. In the second place, psychology itself required, in order to escape the uncertainties and ambiguities of pure introspection, a body of objective materials.
>
> Among the social sciences the need for psychological interpretation first manifested itself in the studies of language and mythology. Both of these had already found outside the circle of the philological studies independent fields of investigation. As soon as they assumed the character of comparative sciences it was inevitable that they should be driven to recognize that in addition to the historical conditions, which everywhere determines the concrete form of these phenomena, there had been certain fundamental psychical forces at work in the development of language and myth.[20]

The aim of folk-psychology has been, on the whole, to explain the genesis and development of certain cultural forms, i.e., language, myth, and religion. The whole matter may, however, be regarded from a quite different point of view. Gabriel Tarde, for example, has sought to explain, not the genesis, but the transmission and diffusion of these same cultural forms. For Tarde, communication (transmission of cultural forms and traits) is the one central and significant fact of social life. "Social" is just what can be transmitted by imitation. Social groups are merely the centers

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20. Wilhelm Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie, eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythus und Sitte.* Erster Band, *Die Sprache,* Erster Theil (Leipzig, 1900), p. 13. The name folk-psychology was first used by Lazarus and Steinthal, *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft,* I, 1860. Wundt's folk-psychology is a continuation of the tradition of these earlier writers.

from which new ideas and inventions are transmitted. Imitation is the social process.

> There is not a word that you say, which is not the reproduction, now unconscious, but formerly conscious and voluntary, of verbal articulations reaching back to the most distant past, with some special accent due to your immediate surroundings. There is not a religious rite that you fulfil, such as praying, kissing the icon, or making the sign of the cross, which does not reproduce certain traditional gestures and expressions, established through imitation of your ancestors. There is not a military or civil requirement that you obey, nor an act that you perform in your business, which has not been taught you, and which you have not copied from some living model. There is not a stroke of the brush that you make, if you are a painter, nor a verse that you write, if you are a poet, which does not conform to the customs or the prosody of your school, and even your very originality itself is made up of accumulated common-places, and aspires to become common-place in its turn.
>
> Thus, the unvarying characteristic of every social fact whatsoever is that it is imitative. And this characteristic belongs exclusively to social facts.[21]

Tarde's theory of transmission by imitation may be regarded, in some sense, as complementary, if not supplementary, to Wundt's theory of origins, since he puts the emphasis on the fact of transmission rather than upon genesis. In a paper, "Tendencies in Comparative Philology," read at the Congress of Arts and Sciences at the St. Louis Exposition in 1904, Professor Hans Oertel, of Yale University, refers to Tarde's theory of imitation as an alternative explanation to that offered by Wundt for "the striking uniformity of sound changes" which students of language have discovered in the course of their investigation of phonetic changes in widely different forms of speech.

> It seems hard to maintain that the change in a syntactical construction or in the meaning of a word owes its universality to a simultaneous and independent primary change in all the members of a speech-community. By adopting the theory of imitative spread, all linguistic changes may be viewed as one homogeneous whole. In the second place, the latter view seems to bring linguistic changes into line with the other social changes, such as modifications in institutions, beliefs, and customs. For is it not an essential characteristic of a social group that its members are not co-operative in the sense that each member actively participates in the production of every single element which

21. G. Tarde, *Social Laws, An Outline of Sociology*, translated from the French by Howard C. Warren (New York, 1899), pp. 40-41.

goes to make up either language, or belief, or customs? Distinguishing thus between *primary* and *secondary* changes and between the *origin* of a change and its *spread,* it behooves us to examine carefully into the causes which make the members of a social unit, either consciously or unconsciously, willing to accept an innovation. What is it that determines acceptance or rejection of a particular change? What limits one change to a small area, while it extends the area of another? Before a final decision can be reached in favor of the second theory of imitative spread it will be necessary to follow out in minute detail the mechanism of this process in a number of concrete instances; in other words to fill out the picture of which Tarde (*Les lois de l'imitation*) sketched the bare outlines. If his assumptions prove true, then we should have here a uniformity resting upon other causes than the physical uniformity that appears in the objects with which the natural sciences deal. It would enable us to establish a second group of uniform phenomena which is psycho-physical in its character and rests upon the basis of social suggestion. The uniformities in speech, belief, and institutions would belong to this second group.[22]

What is true of the comparative study of languages is true in every other field in which a comparative study of cultural materials has been made. As soon as these materials are studied from the point of view of their similarities rather than from the point of view of their historical connections, problems arise which can only be explained by the more abstract sciences of psychology or sociology. Freeman begins his lectures on *Comparative Politics* with the statement that

> the comparative method of study has been the greatest intellectual achievement of our time. It has carried light and order into whole branches of human knowledge which before were shrouded in darkness and confusion. It has brought a line of argument which reaches moral certainty into a region which before was given over to random guess-work. Into matters which are for the most part incapable of strictly external proof it has brought a form of strictly internal proof which is more convincing, more unerring.

Wherever the historian supplements *external* by *internal* proof, he is in a way to substitute a sociological explanation for historical interpretation. It is the very essence of the sociological method to be comparative. When, therefore, Freeman uses, in speaking of comparative politics, the following language he is speaking in sociological rather than historical terms:

22. Hans Oertel, "Some Present Problems and Tendencies in Comparative Philology," Congress of Arts and Sciences, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904 (Boston, 1906), III, 59.

For the purposes then of the study of Comparative Politics, a political constitution is a specimen to be studied, classified, and labelled, as a building or an animal is studied, classified, and labelled by those to whom building or animals are objects of study. We have to note the likenesses, striking and unexpected as those likenesses often are, between the political constitutions of remote times and places; and we have, as far as we can, to classify our specimens according to the probable causes of those likenesses.[23]

Historically sociology has had its origin in history. It owes its existence as a science to the attempt to apply exact methods to the explanation of historical facts. In the attempt to achieve this, however, it has become something quite different from history. It has become like psychology with which it is most intimately related, a natural and relatively abstract science, and auxiliary to the study of history, but not a substitute for it. The whole matter may be summed up in this general statement: history interprets, natural science explains. It is upon the interpretation of the facts of experience that we formulate our creeds and found our faiths. Our explanations of phenomena, on the other hand, are the basis for technique and practical devices for controlling nature and human nature, man and the physical world.

V. THE SOCIAL ORGANISM: HUMANITY OR LEVIATHAN?

After Comte the first great name in the history of sociology is Spencer. It is evident in comparing the writings of these two men that, in crossing the English Channel, sociology has suffered a sea change. In spite of certain similarities in their points of view there are profound and interesting differences. These differences exhibit themselves in the different ways in which they use the term "social organism."

Comte calls society a "collective organism" and insists, as Spencer does upon the difference between an organism like a family, which is made up of independent individuals, and an organism like a plant or an animal, which is a physiological unit in which the different organs are neither free nor conscious. But Spencer, if he points out the differences between the social and the biological organisms, is interested in the analogy. Comte, on the other hand,

23. Edward A. Freeman, *Comparative Politics with the Unity of History* (London, 1873), p. 23.

while he recognizes the analogy, feels it important to emphasize the distinctions.

Society for Comte is not, as Lévy-Bruhl puts it, "a polyp." It has not even the characteristics of an animal colony in which the individuals are physically bound together, though physiologically independent. On the contrary, "this 'immense organism' is especially distinguished from other beings in that it is made up of separable elements of which each one can feel its own co-operation, can will it, or even withhold it, so long as it remains a direct one."[24]

On the other hand, Comte, although he characterized the social *consensus* and solidarity as "collective," nevertheless thought of the relations existing between human beings in society—in the family, for example, which he regards as the unit and model of all social relations—as closer and more intimate than those which exist between the organs of a plant or an animal. The individual, as Comte expressed it, is an abstraction. Man exists as man only by participation in the life of humanity, and "although the individual elements of society appear to be more separable than those of a living being, the social *consensus* is still closer than the vital."[25]

Thus the individual man was, in spite of his freedom and independence, in a very real sense "an organ of the Great Being" and the great being was humanity. Under the title of humanity Comte included not merely all living human beings, i.e., the human race, but he included all that body of tradition, knowledge, custom, cultural ideas and ideals, which make up the social inheritance of the race, an inheritance into which each of us is born, to which we contribute, and which we inevitably hand on through the processes of education and tradition to succeeding generations. This is what Comte meant by the social organism.

If Comte thought of the social organism, the great being, somewhat mystically as itself an individual and a person, Herbert Spencer, on the other hand, thought of it realistically as a great animal, a leviathan, as Hobbes called it, and a very low-order leviathan at that.[26]

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24. L. Lévy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, authorized translation; an Introduction by Frederic Harrison (New York, 1903), p. 337.

25. *Ibid*, p. 234.

26. Hobbes's statement is as follows: "For by art is created that great *Leviathan* called a *Commonwealth*, or *State*, in Latin *Civitas*, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the *sovereignty*

Spencer's manner of looking at the social organism may be illustrated in what he says about growth in "social aggregates."

When we say that growth is common to social aggregates and organic aggregates, we do not thus entirely exclude community with inorganic aggregates. Some of these, as crystals, grow in a visible manner; and all of them on the hypothesis of evolution, have arisen by integration at some time or other. Nevertheless, compared with things we call inanimate, living bodies and societies so conspicuously exhibit augmentation of mass, that we may fairly regard this as characterizing them both. Many organisms grow throughout their lives; and the rest grow throughout considerable parts of their lives. Social growth usually continues either up to times when the societies divide, or up to times when they are overwhelmed.

Here, then, is the first trait by which societies ally themselves with the organic world and substantially distinguish themselves from the inorganic world.[27]

In this same way, comparing the characteristic general features of "social" and "living bodies," noting likeness and differences, particularly with reference to complexity of structure, differentiation of function, division of labor, etc., Spencer gives a perfectly naturalistic account of the characteristic identities and differences between societies and animals, between sociological and biological organizations. It is in respect to the division of labor that the analogy between societies and animals goes farthest and is most significant.

This division of labour, first dwelt upon by political economists as a social phenomenon, and thereupon recognized by biologists as a phenomenon of living bodies, which they called the "physiological division of labour," is that which in the society, as in the animal, makes it a living whole. Scarcely can I emphasize enough the truth that in respect of this fundamental trait, a social organism and an individual organism are entirely alike.[28]

The "social aggregate," although it is "discrete" instead of

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is an artificial *soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the *magistrates*, and other *officers* of judicature, artificial *joints; reward* and *punishment*, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the *nerves*, that do the same in the body natural." Spencer criticizes this conception of Hobbes as representing society as a "factitious" and artificial rather than a "natural" product. Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology* (London, 1893), I, 437, 579-80 See also chap. iii, "Social Growth," pp. 453-58.

27. Herbert Spencer, *op. cit.*, I, 437.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 440.

"concrete"—that is to say, composed of spatially separated units—is nevertheless, because of the mutual dependence of these units upon one another as exhibited in the division of labor, to be regarded as a living whole. It is "a living whole" in which the same way that the plant and animal communities, of which the ecologists are now writing so interestingly, are a living whole; not because of any intrinsic relations between the individuals who compose them, but because each individual member of the community, finds in the community as a whole, a suitable milieu, an environment adapted to his needs and one to which he is able to adapt himself.

Of such a society as this it may indeed be said, that it "exists for the benefit of its members, not its members for the benefit of society. It has ever to be remembered that great as may be the efforts made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the claims of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in so far as they embody the claims of its component individuals."[29]

In other words, the social organism, as Spencer sees it, exists not for itself but for the benefit of the separate organs of which it is composed, whereas, in the case of biological organism the situation is reversed. There the parts manifestly exist for the whole and not the whole for its parts.

Spencer explains this paradoxical conclusion by the reflection that in social organisms sentience is not localized as it is in biological organisms. This is, in fact, the cardinal difference between the two. There is no *social sensorium.*

> In the one (the individual), consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate. In the other (society), it is diffused throughout the aggregate: all the units possess the capacities for happiness and misery, if not in equal degrees, still in degrees that approximate. As then, there is no social sensorium, the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought. The society exists for the benefit of its members; not its members for the benefit of the society.[30]

The point is that society, *as distinct from the individuals* who compose it, has no apparatus for feeling pain or pleasure. There are no *social* sensations. Perceptions and mental imagery are indi-

29. *Ibid.*, p. 450.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 449-50.

vidual and not social phenomena. Society lives, so to speak, only in its separate organs or members, and each of these organs has its own brain and organ of control which gives it, among other things, the power of independent locomotion. This is what is meant when society is described as a collectivity.

VI. SOCIAL CONTROL AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

The fundamental problem which Spencer's paradox raises is that of social control. How does a mere collection of individuals succeed in acting in a corporate and consistent way? How in the case of specific types of social group, for example an animal herd, a boys' gang, or a political party, does the group control its individual members; the whole dominate the parts? What are the specific *sociological* differences between plant and animal communities and human society? What kinds of differences are *sociological differences,* and what do we mean in general by the expression "sociological" anyway?

Since Spencer's essay on the social organism was published in 1860,[31] this problem and these questions, in one form or another, have largely absorbed the theoretical interest of students of society. The attempts to answer them may be said to have created the existing schools into which sociologists are divided.

A certain school of writers, among them Paul Lilienfeld, Albert Schaeffle, and René Worms, have sought to maintain, to extend, or modify the biological analogy first advanced by Spencer. In doing so they have succeeded sometimes in restating the problem but have not solved it. René Worms has been particularly ingenious in discovering identities and carrying out the parallelism between the social and the biological organizations. As a result he has reached the conclusion that, as between a social and a biological organism, there is no difference of kind but only one of degree. Spencer, who could not find a "social sensorium," said that society was conscious only in the individuals who composed it. Worms, on the other hand, declares that we must assume the existence of a social consciousness, even without a sensorium, because we see everywhere the evidence of its existence.

Force manifests itself by its effects. If there are certain phenomena that we can only make intelligible, provided we regard them as the products of collective social consciousness, then we are bound to assume

31. *Westminster Review,* January, 1860.

the existence of such a consciousness. There are many illustrations . . . the attitude for example, of a crowd in the presence of a crime. Here the sentiment of indignation is unanimous. A murderer, if taken in the act, will get summary justice from the ordinary crowd. That method of rendering justice, "lynch law," is deplorable, but it illustrates the intensity of the sentiment which, at the moment, takes possession of the social consciousness.

Thus, always in the presence of great and common danger the collective consciousness of society is awakened; for example France of the Valois after the Treaty of Troyes, or modern France before the invasion of 1791 and before the German invasion in 1870; or Germany, herself, after the victories of Napoleon I. This sentiment of national unity, born of resistance to the stranger, goes so far that a large proportion of the members of society do not hesitate to give their lives for the safety and glory of the state; at such a moment the individual comprehends that he is only a small part of a large whole and that he belongs to the collectivity of which he is a member. The proof that he is entirely penetrated by the social consciousness is the fact that in order to maintain its existence he is willing to sacrifice his own.[32]

There is no question that the facts of crowd excitement, of class, caste, race, and national consciousness, do show the way in which the individual members of a group are, or seem to be, dominated, at certain moments and under certain circumstances, by the group as a whole. Worms gives to this fact, and the phenomena which accompany it, the title "collective consciousness." This gives the problem a name, to be sure, but not a solution. What the purpose of sociology requires is a description and an explanation. Under what conditions, precisely, does this phenomenon of collective consciousness arise? What are the mechanisms—physical, physiological, and social—by which the group imposes its control, or what seems to be control, upon the individual members of the group?

This question had arisen and been answered by political philosophers, in terms of political philosophy, long before sociology attempted to give an objective account of the matter. Two classic phrases, Aristotle's "Man is a political animal" and Hobbes's "War of each against all," *omnes bellum omnium,* measure the range and divergence of the schools upon this topic.

According to Hobbes, the existing moral and political order—that is to say the organization of control—is in any community a

32. René Worms, *Organisme et Société* "Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale" (Paris, 1896), pp. 210-13.

mere artefact, a control resting on consent, supported by a prudent calculation of consequences, and enforced by an external power. Aristotle, on the other hand, taught that man was made for life in society just as the bee is made for life in the hive. The relations between the sexes, as well as those between mother and child, are manifestly predetermined in the physiological organization of the individual man and woman. Furthermore, man is, by his instincts and his inherited dispositions, predestined to a social existence beyond the intimate family circle. Society must be conceived, therefore, as a part of nature, like a beaver's dam or the nests of birds.

As a matter of fact, man and society present themselves in a double aspect. They are at the same time products of nature and of human artifice. Just as a stone hammer in the hand of a savage may be regarded as an artificial extension of the natural man, so tools, machinery, technical and administrative devices, including the formal organization of government and the informal "political machine," may be regarded as more or less artificial extensions of the natural social group.

So far as this is true, the conflict between Hobbes and Aristotle is not absolute. Society is a product both of nature and of design, of instinct and of reason. If, in its formal aspect, society is therefore an artefact, it is one which connects up with and has its roots in nature and in human nature.

This does not explain social control but simplifies the problem of corporate action. It makes clear, at any rate, that as members of society, men act as they do elsewhere from motives they do not fully comprehend, in order to fulfil aims of which they are but dimly or not at all conscious. Men are activated, in short, not merely by interests, in which they are conscious of the end they seek, but also by instincts and sentiments, the source and meaning of which they do not clearly comprehend. Men work for wages, but they will die to preserve their status in society, or commit murder to resent an insult. When men act thus instinctively, or under the influence of the mores, they are usually quite unconscious of the sources of the impulses that animate them or of the ends which are realized through their acts. Under the influence of the mores men act typically, and so representatively, not as individuals but as members of a group.

The simplest type of social group in which we may observe

"social control" is in a herd or a flock. The behavior of a herd of cattle is, to be sure, not so uniform nor so simple a matter as it seems to the casual observer, but it may be very properly taken as an illustration of the sort of follow-the-leader uniformity that is more or less characteristic of all social groups. We call the disposition to live in the herd and to move in masses, gregariousness, and this gregariousness is ordinarily regarded as an instinct and undoubtedly is pretty regally determined in the original nature of gregarious animals.

There is a school of thought which seeks in the so-called gregarious instincts an explanation of all that is characteristically social in the behavior of human beings.

The cardinal quality of the herd is homogeneity. It is clear that the great advantage of the social habit is to enable large numbers to act as one, whereby in the case of the hunting gregarious animal strength in pursuit and attack is at once increased to beyond that of the creatures preyed upon, and in protective socialism the sensitiveness of the new unit to alarms is greatly in excess of that of the individual member of the flock.

To secure these advantages of homogeneity, it is evident that the members of the herd must possess sensitiveness to the behaviour of their fellows. The individual isolated will be of no meaning, the individual as a part of the herd will be capable of transmitting the most potent impulses. Each member of the flock tending to follow its neighbour and in turn to be followed, each is in some sense capable of leadership; but no lead will be followed that departs widely from normal behaviour. A lead will be followed only from its resemblance to the normal. If the leader go so far ahead as definitely to cease to be in the herd, he will necessarily be ignored.

The original in conduct, that is to say, resistiveness to the voice of the herd, will be suppressed by natural selection; the wolf which does not follow the impulses of the herd will be starved; the sheep which does not respond to the flock will be eaten.

Again, not only will the individual be responsive to impulses coming from the herd, but he will treat the herd as his normal environment. The impulse to be in and always to remain with the herd will have the strongest instinctive weight. Anything which tends to separate him from his fellows, as soon as it becomes perceptible as such, will be strongly resisted.[33]

According to sociologists of this school, public opinion, con-

33. W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (New York, 1916), pp. 29-30.

science, and authority in the state rest upon the natural disposition of the animal in the herd to conform to "the decrees of the herd."

> Conscience, then, and the feelings of guilt and of duty are the peculiar possessions of the gregarious animal. A dog and a cat caught in the commission of an offence will both recognize that punishment is coming; but the dog, moreover, knows that he has done *wrong*, and he will come to be punished, unwillingly it is true, and as if dragged along by some power outside him, while the cat's sole impulse is to escape. The rational recognition of the sequence of act and punishment is equally clear to the gregarious and to the solitary animal, but it is the former only who understands that he has committed a *crime*, who has, in fact, the *sense of sin*.[34]

The concept upon which this explanation of society rests is *homogeneity*. If animals or human beings act under all circumstances in the same way, they will act or seem to act, as if they had a common purpose. If everybody follows the crowd, if everyone wears the same clothes, utters the same trite remarks, rallies to the same battle cries and is everywhere dominated, even in his most characteristically individual behavior, by an instinctive and passionate desire to conform to an external model and to the wishes of the herd, then we have an explanation of everything characteristic of society—except the variants, the nonconformists, the idealists, and the rebels. The herd instinct may be an explanation of conformity but it does not explain variation. Variation is an important fact in society as it is in nature generally.

Homogeneity and like-mindedness are, as explanations of the social behavior of men and animals, very closely related concepts. In "like response to like stimulus," we may discern the beginning of "concerted action" and this, it is urged, is the fundamental social fact. This is the "like-mindedness" theory of society which has been given wide popularity in the United States through the writings of Professor Franklin Henry Giddings. He describes it as a "developed form of the instinct theory, dating back to Aristotle's aphorism that man is a political animal."

> Any given stimulus may happen to be felt by more than one organism, at the same or at different times. Two or more organisms may respond to the same given stimulus simultaneously or at different times. They may respond to the same given stimulus in like or in unlike ways; in the same or in different degrees; with like or with unlike

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

promptitude; with equal or with unequal persistence. I have attempted to show that in like response to the same given stimulus we have the beginning, the absolute origin, of all concerted activity—the inception of every conceivable form of co-operation; while in unlike response, and in unequal response, we have the beginning of all those processes of individuation, of differentiation, of competition, which in their endlessly varied relations to combination, to co-operation, bring about the infinite complexity of organized social life.[35]

Closely related, logically if not historically, to Giddings' conception of "like-mindedness" is Gabriel Tarde's conception of "imitation." If for Giddings "like response to like stimulus" is the fundamental social fact, for Tarde "imitation" is the process through which alone society exists. Society, said Tarde, exists in imitation. As a matter of fact, Tarde's doctrine may be regarded as a corollary to Giddings'. Imitation is the process by which that like-mindedness, by which Giddings explains corporate action, is effected. Men are not born like-minded, they are made so by imitation.

This minute inter-agreement of minds and wills, which forms the basis of the social life, even in troublous times—this presence of so many common ideas, ends, and means, in the minds and wills of all members of the same society at any given moment—is not due, I maintain, to organic heredity, which insures the birth of men quite similar to one another, nor to mere identity of geographical environment, which offers very similar resources to talents that are nearly equal; it is rather the effect of that suggestion-imitation process which, starting from one primitive creature possessed of a single idea or act, passed this copy on to one of its neighbors, then to another, and so on. Organic needs and spiritual tendencies exist in us only as potentialities which are realizable under the most diverse forms, in spite of their primitive similarity; and, among all these possible realizations, the indications furnished by some first initiator who is imitated determine which one is actually chosen.[36]

In contrast with these schools, which interpret action in terms of the herd and the flock—i.e., men act together because they act alike—is the theory of Emile Durkheim who insists that the social group has real corporate existence and that, in human societies at least, men act together not because they have like purposes but a *common purpose*. This common purpose imposes itself upon the individual members of a society at the same time as an ideal, a wish

35. Franklin Henry Giddings, *The Concepts and Methods of Sociology*, Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition (St. Louis, 1904), pp. 789-90.

36. G. Tarde, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.

and an obligation. Conscience, the sense of obligation which members of a group feel only when there is conflict between the wishes of the individual and the will of the group, is a manifestation, *in* the individual consciousness, of the collective mind and the group will. The mere fact that in a panic or a stampede, human beings will sometimes, like the Gadarene swine, rush down a steep place into the sea, is a very positive indication of like-mindedness but not an evidence of a common purpose. The difference between an animal herd and a human crowd is that the crowd, what Le Bon calls the "organized crowd," the crowd "in being" to use a nautical term, is dominated by an impulse to achieve a purpose that is common to every member of the group. Men in a state of panic, on the other hand, although equally under the influence of the mass excitement, act not corporately but individually, each individual wildly seeking to save his own skin. Men in a state of panic have like purposes but no common purpose. If the "organized crowd," "the psychological crowd," is a society "in being," the panic and the stampede is a society "in dissolution."

Durkheim does not use these illustrations nor does he express himself in these terms. The conception of the "organized" or "psychological" crowd is not his, but Le Bon's. The fact is that Durkheim does not think of a society as a mere sum of particulars. Neither does he think of the sentiments nor the opinions which dominate the social group as private and subjective. When individuals come together *under certain circumstances,* the opinions and sentiments which they held as individuals are modified and changed under the influence of the new contacts. Out of the fermentation which association breeds, a new something (*autre chose*) is produced, an opinion and sentiment, in other words, that is not the sum of, and not like, the sentiments and opinions of the individuals from which it is derived. This new sentiment and opinion is public, and social, and the evidence of this is the fact that it imposes itself upon the individuals concerned as something more or less external to them. They feel it either as an inspiration, a sense of personal release and expansion, or as an obligation, a pressure and an inhibition. The characteristic social phenomenon is just this control by the group as a whole of the individuals that compose it. This fact of control, then, is the fundamental social fact.

Now society also gives the sensation of a perpetual dependence. Since it has a nature which is peculiar to itself and different from our

individual nature, it pursues ends which are likewise special to it; but, as it cannot attain them except through our intermediacy, it imperiously demands our aid. It requires that, forgetful of our own interests, we make ourselves its servitors, and it submits us to every sort of inconvenience, privation and sacrifice, without which social life would be impossible. It is because of this that at every instant we are obliged to submit ourselves to rules of conduct and of thought which we have neither made nor desired, and which are sometimes even contrary to our most fundamental inclinations and instincts.

Even if society were unable to maintain these concessions and sacrifices from us except by a material constraint, it might awaken in us only the idea of a physical force to which we must give way of necessity, instead of that of a moral power such as religions adore. But as a matter of fact, the empire which it holds over consciences is due much less to the physical supremacy of which it has the privilege than to the moral authority with which it is invested. If we yield to its orders, it is not merely because it is strong enough to triumph over our resistance; it is primarily because it is the object of a venerable respect.

Now the ways of action to which society is strongly enough attached to impose them upon its members, are, by that very fact, marked with a distinctive sign provocative of respect. Since they are elaborated in common, the vigour with which they have been thought of by each particular mind is retained in all the other minds, and reciprocally. The representations which express them within each of us have an intensity which no purely private states of consciousness could ever attain; for they have the strength of the innumerable individual representations which have served to form each of them. It is society who speaks through the mouths of those who affirm them in our presence; it is society whom we hear in hearing them; and the voice of all has an accent which that of one alone could never have. The very violence with which society reacts, by way of blame or material suppression, against every attempted dissidence, contributes to strengthening its empire by manifesting the common conviction through this burst of ardour. In a word, when something is the object of such a state of opinion, the representation which each individual has of it gains a power of action from its origins and the conditions in which it was born, which even those feel who do not submit themselves to it. It tends to repel the representations which contradict it, and it keeps them at a distance; on the other hand it commands those acts which will realize it, and it does so, not by a material coercion or by the perspective of something of this sort, but by the simple radiation of the mental energy which it contains.[37]

But the same social forces, which are found organized in public

37. Emile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (New York, 1915), pp. 206-8.

opinion, in religious symbols, in social convention, in fashion, and in science—for "if a people did not have faith in science all the scientific demonstrations in the world would be without any influence whatsoever over their minds"—are constantly re-creating the old order, making new heroes, overthrowing old gods, creating new myths, and imposing new ideals. And this is the nature of the cultural process of which sociology is a description and an explanation.

VII. SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE COLLECTIVE MIND

Durkheim is sometimes referred to, in comparison with other contemporary sociologists, as a realist. This is a reference to the controversy of the medieval philosophers in regard to the nature of concepts. Those who thought a concept a mere class-name applied to a group of objects because of some common characteristics were called nominalists. Those who thought the concept was *real*, and not the name of a mere collection of individuals, were realists. In this sense Tarde and Giddings and all those writers who think of society as a collection of actually or potentially *like-minded* persons would be nominalists, while other writers like Simmel, Ratzenhofer, and Small, who think of society in terms of interaction and social process may be called realists. They are realist, at any rate, in so far as they think of the members of a society as bound together in a system of mutual influences which has sufficient character to be described as a process.

Naturally this process cannot be conceived of in terms of space or physical proximity alone. Social contacts and social forces are of a subtler sort but not less real than physical. We know, for example, that vocations are largely determined by personal competition; that the solidarity of what Sumner calls the "in" or "we" group is largely determined by its conflict with the "out" or "other" groups. We know, also, that the status and social position of any individual inside any social group is determined by his relation to all other members of that group and eventually of all other groups. These are illustrations of what is meant concretely by social interaction and social process and it is considerations of this kind which seem to justify certain writers in thinking of individual persons as "parts" and of society as a "whole" in some other sense than that in which a dust heap is a whole of which the individual particles are parts.

Society not only continues to exist *by* transmission, *by* communication, but it may fairly be said to exist *in* transmission, *in* communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication.[38]

Communication, if not identical with, is at least a form of, what has been referred to here as social interaction. But communication as Dewey has defined the term, is something more and different from what Tarde calls "inter-stimulation." Communication is a process by which we "transmit" an experience from an individual to another but it is also a process by which these same individuals get a common experience.

Try the experiment of communicating, with fullness and accuracy, some experience to another, especially if it be somewhat complicated, and you will find your own attitude toward your experience changing; otherwise you resort to expletives and ejaculations. Except in dealing with common-places and catch phrases one has to assimilate, imaginatively, something of another's experience in order to tell him intelligently of one's own experience. All communication is like art.[39]

Not only does communication involve the creation, out of experiences that are individual and private, of an experience that is common and public but such a common experience becomes the basis for a common and public existence in which every individual, to greater or less extent, participates and is himself a part. Furthermore, as a part of this common life, there grows up a body of custom, convention, tradition, ceremonial, language, social ritual, public opinion, in short all that Sumner includes under the term "mores" and all that ethnologists include under the term "culture."

The thing that characterizes Durkheim and his followers is their insistence upon the fact that all cultural materials, and expressions, including language, science, religion, public opinion, and law, since they are the products of social intercourse and social interaction, are bound to have an objective, public, and social character such as no product of an individual mind either has or can have. Durkheim speaks of these mental products, individual and social, as representations. The characteristic product of the individual mind is the percept, or, as Durkheim describes it, the "individual representation." The percept is, and remains, a private and an individual matter. No one can reproduce, or communicate to another, sub-

38. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, 1916), p. 5.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

jective impressions or the mental imagery in the concrete form in which they come to the individual himself. My neighbor may be able to read my "thoughts" and understand the motives that impel me to action better than I understand myself, but he cannot reproduce the images, with just the fringes of sense and feeling with which they come to my mind.

The characteristic product of a group of individuals, in their efforts to communicate is, on the other hand, something objective and understood, that is, a gesture, a sign, a symbol, a word, or a concept in which an experience or purpose that was private becomes public. This gesture, sign, symbol, concept, or representation in which a common object is not merely indicated, but in a sense created, Durkheim calls a "collective representation."

Dewey's description of what takes place in communication may be taken as a description of the process by which these collective representations come into existence. "To formulate an experience," as Dewey says, "requires getting outside of it, seeing it as another would see it, considering what points of contact it has with the life of another so that it may be gotten into such form that he can appreciate its meaning." The result of such a conscious effort to communicate an experience is to transform it. The experience, after it has been communicated, is not the same for either party to the communication. To publish or to give publicity to an event is to make of that even something other than it was before publication. Furthermore, the event as published is still something different from the event as reflected in the minds of the individuals to whom the publication is addressed.

It will be evident upon reflection that public opinion is not the opinion of all, nor even of a majority of the persons who compose a public. As a matter of fact, what we ordinarily mean by public opinion is never the opinion of anyone in particular. It is composite opinion, representing a general tendency of the public as a whole. On the other hand, we recognize that public opinion exists, even when we do not know of any individual person, among those who compose the public, whose private and personal opinion exactly coincides with that of the public of which he or she is a part.

Nevertheless, the private and personal opinion of an individual who participates in making public opinion is influenced by the opinions of those around him, and by public opinion. In this sense every opinion is public opinion.

Public opinion, in respect to the manner in which it is formed and the manner in which it exists—that is to say relatively independent of the individuals who co-operate to form it—has the characteristics of collective representation in general. Collective representations are objective, in just the sense that public opinion is objective, and they impose themselves upon the individual as public opinion does, as relatively but not wholly external forces—stabilizing, standardizing, conventionalizing, as well as stimulating, extending, and generalizing individual representations, percepts.

> The collective representations are exterior to the individual consciousness because they are not derived from the individuals taken in isolation but from their convergence and union (concours). . . . Doubtless, in the elaboration of the common result, each (individual) bears his due share; but the private sentiments do not become social except by combining under the action of the forces *sui generis* which association develops. As a result of these combinations, and of the mutual alterations which result therefrom, they (the private sentiments) become something else (*autre chose*). A chemical synthesis results, which concentrates, unifies, the elements synthetized, and by that very proccess transforms them. . . . The resultant derived therefrom extends then beyond (*deborde*) the individual mind as the whole is greater than the part. To know really what it is, one must take the aggregate in its totality. It is this that thinks, that feels, that will, although it may not be able to will, feel, or act save by the intermediation of individual consciousness.[40]

This, then, after nearly a century of criticism, is what remains of Comte's conception of the social organism. If society is, as the realists insist, anything more than a collection of like-minded individuals, it is so because of the existence (1) of a social process and (2) of a body of tradition and opinion—the products of this process —which has a relatively objective character and imposes itself upon the individual as a form of control, social control. This process and its product are the social consciousness. The social consciousness, in its double aspect as process and product, is the social organism. The controversy between the realists and the nominalists reduces itself apparently to this question of the objectivity of social tradition and of public opinion. For the present we may let it rest there.

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40. Emile Durkheim, "Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives," *Revue métaphysique*, VI (1898), 295. Quoted and translated by Charles Elmer Gehlke, "Emile Durkheim's Contributions to Sociological Theory." *Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law*, LXIII, 29-30.

Meanwhile the conceptions of the social consciousness and the social mind have been adopted by writers on social topics who are not at all concerned with their philosophical implications or legitimacy. We are just now seeing the first manifestations of two new types of sociology which call themselves, the one rural and the other urban sociology. Writers belonging to these two schools are making studies of what they call the "rural" and the "urban" minds. In using these terms they are not always quite certain whether the mind of which they are thinking is a collective mind, in Durkheim's realistic sense of the word, or whether it is the mind of the typical inhabitant of a rural or an urban community, an instance of "like-mindedness," in the sense of Giddings and the nominalists.

A similar usage of the word "mind," "the American mind," for example, is common in describing characteristic differences in the attitudes of different nations and their "nationals."

> The origin of the phrase, "the American mind," was political. Shortly after the middle of the eighteenth century, there began to be a distinctly American way of regarding the debatable question of British Imperial control. During the period of the Stamp Act agitation our colonial-bred politicians and statesmen made the discovery that there was a mode of thinking and feeling which was native—or had by that time become a second nature—to all the colonists. Jefferson, for example, employs those resonant and useful words "the American mind" to indicate that throughout the American colonies an essential unity of opinion had been developed as regards the chief political question of the day.[41]

Here again, it is not quite clear, whether the American mind is a name for a characteristic uniformity in the minds of individual Americans; whether the phrase refers rather to an "essential unity of opinion," or whether, finally, it is intended to cover both the uniformity and the unity characteristic of American opinion.

Students of labor problems and of the so-called class struggle, on the other hand, use the term "psychology" in much the same way that the students of rural and urban sociology use the term "mind." They speak of the "psychology" of the laboring class, the "psychology" of the capitalistic class, in cases where psychology seems to refer indifferently either to the social attitudes of the members of a class, or to attitude and morale of the class as a whole.

The terms "class-conscious" and "class-consciousness," "na-

41. Bliss Perry, *The American Mind* (Boston, 1912), p. 47.

tional" and "racial" consciousness are now familiar terms to students although they seem to have been used, first of all, by the so-called "intelligentsia," who have been the leaders in the various types of mass movement to which these terms apply. "Consciousness," in the sense in which it is here used, has a similar, though somewhat different, connotation from the word "mind" when applied to a group. It is a name not merely for the attitudes characteristic of certain races or classes, but for these attitudes when they are in the focus of attention of the group, in the "fore-consciousness" to use a Freudian term. In this sense "conscious" suggests not merely the submergence of the individual and the consequent solidarity of the group, but it signifies a mental mobilization and preparedness of the individual and of the group for collective or corporate action. To be class-conscious is to be prepared to act in the sense of that class.

There is implicit in this rather ambiguous popular usage of the terms "social mind" and "social consciousness" a recognition of the dual aspect of society and of social groups. Society may be regarded at the same time from an individualistic and a collectivistic point of view. Looking at it from the point of view of the individual, we regard as social just that character of the individual which has been imparted to, and impressed upon, him as a result of his participation in the life of the group. Social psychology, from Baldwin's first studies of the development of personality in the child to Ellwood's studies of the society in its "psychological aspects" has been mainly concerned with the investigation of the effects upon the individual of his contacts with other individuals.[42]

On the other hand, we have had, in the description of the crowd and the public by Le Bon, Tarde, Sighele, and their successors, the beginnings of a study of collective behavior and "corporate action." In these two points of view we seem to have again the contrast and the opposition, already referred to, between the nominalistic and realistic conceptions of society. Nominalism represented by social psychology emphasizes, or seems to emphasize, the independence of the individual. Realism, represented by collective psychology, emphasizes the control of the group over the individual, of the whole over the part.

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42. James Mark Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (New York and London, 1895); Charles A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* (New York and London, 1912).

While it is true that society has this double aspect, the individual and the collective, it is the assumption of this volume that the touchstone of society, the thing that distinguishes a mere collection of individuals from a society is not like-mindedness, but corporate action. We may apply the term social to any group of individuals which is capable of consistent action, that is to say, action, consciously or unconsciously, directed to a common end. This existence of a common end is perhaps all that can be legitimately included in the conception "organic" as applied to society.

From this point of view social control is the central fact and the central problem of society. Just as psychology may be regarded as an account of the manner in which the individual organism, as a whole, exercises control over its parts or rather of the manner in which the parts co-operate together to carry on the corporate existence of the whole, so sociology, speaking strictly, is a point of view and a method for investigating the processes by which individuals are inducted into and induced to co-operate in some sort of permanent corporate existence which we call society.

To put this emphasis on corporate action is not to overlook the fact that through this corporate action the individual member of society is largely formed, not to say created. It is recognized, however, that if corporate action tends to make of the individual an instrument, as well as an organic part, of the social group, it does not do this by making him "like" merely; it may do so by making him "different." The division of labor, in making possible an ever larger and wider co-operation among men, has indirectly multiplied individual diversities. What like-mindedness must eventually mean, if it is to mean anything, is the existence of so much of a consensus among the individuals of a group as will permit the group to act. This, then, is what is meant here by society, the social organism and the social group.

Sociology, so far as it can be regarded as a fundamental science and not mere congeries of social-welfare programs and practices, may be described as the science of collective behavior. With this definition it is possible to indicate in a general and schematic way its relation to the other social sciences.

Historically, sociology has had its origin in history. History has been and is the great mother science of all the social sciences. Of history it may be said nothing human is foreign to it. Anthropology, ethnology, folklore, and archaeology have grown up

largely, if not wholly, to complete the task which history began and answer the questions which historical investigation first raised. In history and the sciences associated with it, i.e., ethnology, folklore, and archaeology, we have the concrete records of that human nature and experience which sociology has sought to explain. In the same sense that history is the concrete, sociology is the abstract, science of human experience and human nature.

On the other hand, the technical (applied) social sciences, that is, politics, education, social service, and economics—so far as economics may be regarded as the science of business—are related to




FIG. 1

sociology in a different way. They are, to a greater or lesser extent, applications of principles which it is the business of sociology and of psychology to deal with explicitly. In so far as this is true, sociology may be regarded as fundamental to the other social sciences.

VIII. SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH

Among the schools which, since Comte and Spencer, have divided sociological thinking between them the realists have, on the whole, maintained the tradition of Comte; the nominalists, on the other hand, have preserved the style and manner, if not the substance, of Spencer's thought. Later writers, however, realist as well as nominalist, have directed their attention less to society than to societies, i.e., social groups; they have been less interested in social progress than in social process; more concerned with social problems than with social philosophy.

This change marks the transformation of sociology from a

philosophy of history to a science of society. The steps in this transition are periods in the history of the science, that is:

1. The period of Comte and Spencer; sociology, conceived in the grand style, is a philosophy of history, a "science" of progress (evolution).

2. The period of the "schools"; sociological thought, dispersed among the various schools, is absorbed in an effort to define its point of view and to describe the kinds of facts that sociology must look for to answer the questions that sociology asks.

3. The period of investigation and research, the period into which sociology is just now entering.

Sociological research is at present (1921) in about the situation in which psychology was before the introduction of laboratory methods, in which medicine was before Pasteur and the germ theory of disease. A great deal of social information has been collected merely for the purpose of determining what to do in a given case. Facts have not been collected to check social theories. Social problems have been defined in terms of common sense, and facts have been collected, for the most part, to support this or that doctrine, not to test it. In very few instances have investigations been made, disinterestedly, to determine the validity of a hypothesis.

Charles Booth's studies of poverty in London, which extended over eighteen years and were finally embodied in seventeen volumes, is an example of such a disinterested investigation. It is an attempt to put to the test of fact the popular conception of the relation between wages and welfare. He says:

> My object has been to attempt to show the numerical relation which poverty, misery, and depravity bear to regular earnings and comparative comfort, and to describe the general conditions under which each class lives.
>
> If the facts thus stated are of use in helping social reformers to find remedies for the evils which exist, or do anything to prevent the adoption of false remedies, my purpose is answered. It was not my intention to bring forward any suggestions of my own, and if I have ventured here and there, and especially in the concluding chapters, to go beyond my programme, it has been with much hesitation.
>
> With regard to the disadvantages under which the poor labour, and the evils of poverty, there is a great sense of helplessness: the wage earners are helpless to regulate their work and cannot obtain a fair equivalent for the labour they are willing to give; the manufacturer or

dealer can only work within the limits of competition; the rich are helpless to relieve want without stimulating its sources. To relieve this helplessness a better stating of the problems involved is the first step. . . . In this direction must be sought the utility of my attempt to analyze the population of a part of London.[42]

This vast study did, indeed, throw great light, not only upon poverty in London, but upon human nature in general. On the other hand, it raised more questions than it settled and, if it demonstrated anything, it was the necessity, as Booth suggests, for a restatement of the problem.

Sociology seems now, however, in a way to become, in some fashion or other, an experimental science. It will become so as soon as it can state existing problems in such a way that the results in one case will demonstrate what can and should be done in another. Experiments are going on in every field of social life, in industry, in politics, and in religion. In all these fields men are guided by some implicit or explicit theory of the situation, but this theory is not often stated in the form of a hypothesis and subjected to a test of the negative instances. We have, if it is permitted to make a distinction between them, investigation rather than research.

What, then, in the sense in which the expression is here used is social research? A classification of problems will be a sort of first aid in the search for an answer.

1. *Classification of social problems.*—Every society and every social group, *capable of consistent action*, may be regarded as an organization of the wishes of its members. This means that society rests on, and embodies, the appetites and natural desires of the individual man; but it implies, also, that wishes, in becoming *organized*, are necessarily disciplined and controlled in the interest of the group as a whole.

Every such society or social group, even the most ephemeral, will ordinarily have (*a*) some relatively formal method of defining its aim and formulating its policies, making them explicit, and (*b*) some machinery, functionary, or other arrangement for realizing its aim and carrying its policies into effect. Even in the family there is government, and this involves something that corresponds to legislation, adjudication, and administration.

Social groups, however, maintain their organizations, agencies, and all formal methods of behavior on a basis and in a setting of

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43. *Labour and Life of the People* (London, 1889), pp. 6-7.

instinct, of habit, and of tradition which we call human nature. Every social group has, or tends to have, its own culture, what Sumner calls "folkways," and this culture, imposing its patterns upon the natural man, gives him that particular individuality which characterizes the members of groups. Not races merely but nationalities and classes have marks, manners, and patterns of life by which we infallibly recognize and classify them.

Social problems may be conveniently classified with reference to these three aspects of group life, that is to say, problems of (*a*) organization and administration, (*b*) policy and polity (legislation), and (*c*) human nature (culture).

a) Administrative problems are mainly practical and technical. Most problems of government, of business and social welfare, are technical. The investigations, i.e., social surveys, made in different parts of the country by the Bureau of Municipal Research of New York City, are studies of local administration made primarily for the purpose of improving the efficiency of an existing administrative machine and its personnel rather than of changing the policy or purpose of the administration itself.

b) Problems of policy, in the sense in which that term is used here, are political and legislative. Most social investigations in recent years have been made in the interest of some legislative program or for the purpose of creating a more intelligent public opinion in regard to certain local problems. The social surveys conducted by the Sage Foundation, as distinguished from those carried out by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, have been concerned with problems of policy, i.e., with changing the character and policy of social institutions rather than improving their efficiency. This distinction between administration and policy is not always clear, but it is always important. Attempts at reform usually begin with an effort to correct administrative abuses, but eventually it turns out that reforms must go deeper and change the character of the institutions themselves.

c) Problems of human nature are naturally fundamental to all other social problems. Human nature, as we have begun to conceive it in recent years, is largely a product of social intercourse; it is, therefore, quite as much as society itself, a subject for sociological investigation. Until recent years, what we are now calling the human factor has been notoriously neglected in most social experiments. We have been seeking to reform human nature while

at the same time we refused to reckon with it. It has been assumed that we could bring about social changes by merely formulating our wishes, that is, by "arousing" public opinion and formulating legislation. This is the "democratic" method of effecting reforms. The older "autocratic" method merely decreed social changes upon the authority of the monarch or the ruling class. What reconciled men to it was that, like Christian Science, it frequently worked.

The oldest but most persistent form of social technique is that of "ordering-and-forbidding"—that is, meeting a crisis by an arbitrary act of will decreeing the disappearance of the undesirable or the appearance of the desirable phenomena, and the using arbitrary physical action to enforce the decree. This method corresponds exactly to the magical phase of natural technique. In both, the essential means of bringing a determined effect is more or less consciously thought to reside in the act of will itself by which the effect is decreed as desirable and of which the action is merely an indispensable vehicle or instrument; in both, the process by which the cause (act of will and physical action) is supposed to bring its effect to realization remains out of reach of investigation; in both, finally, if the result is not attained, some new act of will with new material accessories is introduced, instead of trying to find and remove the perturbing causes. A good instance of this in the social field is the typical legislative procedure of today.[44]

2. *Types of social group.*—The varied interests, fields of investigation, and practical programs which find at present a place within the limits of the sociological discipline are united in having one common object of reference, namely, *the concept of the social group.* All social problems turn out finally to be problems of group life, although each group and each type of group has its own distinctive problems. Illustrations may be gathered from the most widely separated fields to emphasize the truth of this assertion.[45]

Religious conversion may be interpreted from one point of view as a change from one social group to another. To use the language of religious sentiment, the convert "comes out of a life of sin and enters into a life of grace." To be sure, this change involves

44. Thomas and Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (Boston, 1918), I, 3.

45. Walter B. Bodenhafer, "The Comparative Rôle of the Group Concept in Ward's Dynamic Sociology and Contemporary American Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology,* XXVI (1920-21), 273-314; 425-74; 588-600; 716-43.

profound disturbances of the personality, but permanence of the change in the individual is assured by the breaking up of the old and the establishment of new associations. So the process by which the immigrant makes the transition from the old country to the new involves profound changes in thought and habit. In his case the change is likely to take place slowly, but it is not less radical on that account.

The following paragraph from a recent social survey illustrates, from a quite different point of view, the manner in which the group is involved in changes in community life.

> In short, the greatest problem for the next few years in Stillwater is the development of a *community consciousness*. We must stop thinking in terms of city of Stillwater, and country outside of Stillwater, and think in terms of *Stillwater Community*. We must stop thinking in terms of small groups and think in terms of the entire community, no matter whether it is industry, health, education, recreation or religion. Anything which is good will benefit the entire community. Any weakness will be harmful to all. Community co-operation in all lines indicated in this report will make this, indeed, the Queen of the St. Croix.[46]

In this case the solution of the community problem was the creation of "community consciousness." In the case of the professional criminal the character of the problem is determined, if we accept the description of a writer in the *Atlantic Monthly*, by the existence among professional criminals of a primary group consciousness:

> The professional criminal is peculiar in the sense that he lives a very intense emotional life. He is isolated in the community. He is in it, but not of it. His social life—for all men are social—is narrow; but just because it is narrow, it is extremely tense. He lives a life of warfare and has the psychology of the warrior. He is at war with the whole community. Except his very few friends in crime he trusts no one and fears everyone. Suspicion, fear, hatred, danger, desperation and passion are present in a more tense form in his life than in that of the average individual. He is restless, ill-humored, easily roused and suspicious. He lives on the brink of a deep precipice. This helps to explain his passionate hatred, his brutality, his fear, and gives poignant significance to the adage that dead men tell no tales. He holds on to his few friends with a strength and passion rare among people who live a more normal existence. His friends stand between him and discovery. They are his hold upon life, his basis of security.

46. *Stillwater, the Queen of the St. Croix*, a report of a social survey, published by The Community Service of Stillwater, Minnesota, 1920, p. 71.

Loyalty to one's group is the basic law in the underworld. Disloyalty is treason and punishable by death; for disloyalty may mean the destruction of one's friends; it may mean the hurling of the criminal over the precipice on which his whole life is built.

To the community the criminal is aggressive. To the criminal his life is one of defense primarily. The greater part of his energy, of his hopes, and of his successes, centres around escapes, around successful flight, around proper covering-up of his tracks, and around having good, loyal, and trustworthy friends to participate in his activities, who will tell no tales and keep the rest of the community outside. The criminal is thus, from his own point of view—and I am speaking of professional criminals—living a life of defensive warfare with the community; and the odds are heavy against him. He therefore builds up a defensive psychology against it—a psychology of boldness, bravado, and self-justification. The good criminal—which means the successful one, he who has most successfully carried through a series of depradations against the enemy, the common enemy, the public—is a hero. He is recognized as such, toasted and feasted, trusted and obeyed. But always by a little group. They live in a world of their own, a life of their own, with ideals, habits, outlook, beliefs, and associations which are peculiarly fitted to maintain the morale of the group. Loyalty, fearlessness, generosity, willingness to sacrifice one's self, perseverance in the face of prosecution, hatred of the common enemy—these are the elements that maintain the morale, but all of them are pointed against the community as a whole.[47]

The manner in which the principle of the primary group was applied at Sing Sing in dealing with the criminal within the prison walls is a still more interesting illustration of the fact that social problems are group problems.[48]

Assuming, then, that every social group may be presumed to have its own (*a*) administrative, (*b*) legislative, and (*c*) human-nature problems, these problems may be still further classified with reference to the type of social group. Most social groups fall naturally into one or the other of the following classes:

a) The family.

b) Language (racial) groups.

c) Local and territorial communities: (i) neighborhoods, (ii) rural communities, (iii) urban communities.

d) Conflict groups: (i) nationalities, (ii) parties, (iii) sects, (iv) labor organizations, (v) gangs, etc.

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47. Frank Tannenbaum, "Prison Democracy," *Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1920, pp. 438-39. (Psychology of the criminal group.)

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 443-46.

e) Accommodation groups: (i) classes, (ii) castes, (iii) vocational, (iv) denominational groups.

The foregoing classification is not quite adequate nor wholly logical. The first three classes are more closely related to one another than they are to the last two, i.e., the so-called "accommodation" and "conflict" groups. The distinction is far-reaching, but its general character is indicated by the fact that the family, language, and local groups are, or were originally, what are known as primary groups, that is, groups organized on intimate, face-to-face relations. The conflict and accommodation groups represent divisions which may, to be sure, have arisen within the primary group, but which have usually arisen historically by the imposition of one primary group upon another.

> Every state in history was or is a *state of classes*, a polity of superior and inferior social groups, based upon distinctions either of rank or of property. This phenomenon must, then, be called the "State."[49]

It is the existence at any rate of conflict and accommodation within the limits of a larger group which distinguishes it from groups based on primary relations, and gives it eventually the character described as "secondary."

When a language group becomes militant and self-conscious, it assumes the character of a nationality. It is perhaps true, also, that the family which is large enough and independent enough to be self-conscious, by that fact assumes the character of a clan. Important in this connection is the fact that a group in becoming group-conscious changes its character. External conflict has invariably reacted powerfully upon the internal organization of social groups.

Group self-consciousness seems to be a common characteristic of conflict and accommodation groups and distinguishes them from the more elementary forms of society represented by the family and the local community.

3. *Organization and structure of social groups.*—Having a general scheme for the classification of social groups, it is in order to discover methods of analysis that are applicable to the study of all types of groups, from the family to the sect. Such a scheme of analysis should reveal not only the organization and structure of typical groups, but it should indicate the relation of this organiza-

49. Franz Oppenheimer, *The State* (Indianapolis, 1914), p. 5.

tion and structure to those social problems that are actual and generally recognized. The sort of facts which are now generally recognized as important in the study, not merely of society, but the problems of society are:

a) Statistics: numbers, local distribution, mobility, incidence of births, deaths, disease, and crime.

b) Institutions: local distribution, classification (i.e., (i) industrial, (ii) religious, (iii) political, (iv) educational, (v) welfare and mutual aid), communal organization.

c) Heritages: the customs and traditions transmitted by the group, particularly in relation to religion, recreation and leisure time, and social control (politics).

d) Organization of public opinion: parties, sects, cliques, and the press.

4. *Social process and social progress.*—Social process is the name for all changes which can be regarded as changes in the life of the group. A group may be said to have a life when it has a history. Among social processes we may distinguish (*a*) the historical, (*b*) the cultural, (*c*) the political, and (*d*) the economic.

a) We describe as historical the processes by which the fund of social tradition, which is the heritage of every permanent social group, is accumulated and transmitted from one generation to another.

History plays the rôle in the group of memory in the individual. Without history social groups would, no doubt, rise and decline, but they would neither grow old nor make progress.

Immigrants, crossing the ocean, leave behind them much of their local traditions. The result is that they lose, particularly in the second generation, that control which the family and group tradition formerly exercised over them; but they are, for that very reason, all the more open to the influence of the traditions and customs of their adopted country.

b) If it is the function of the historical process to accumulate and conserve the common fund of social experience, it is the function of the cultural process to shape and define the social forms and the social patterns which each preceding generation imposes upon its successors.

The individual living in society has to fit into a pre-existing social world, to take part in the hedonistic, economic, political, religious, moral, aesthetic, intellectual activities of the group. For these activities,

the group has objective *systems*, more or less complex sets of schemes, organized either by traditional association or with a conscious regard to the greatest possible efficiency of the result, but with only a secondary, or even with no interest in the particular desires, abilities and experiences of the individuals who have to perform these activities.

There is no pre-existing harmony whatever between the individual and the social factors of personal evolution, and the fundamental tendencies of the individual are always in some disaccordance with the fundamental tendencies of social control. Personal evolution is always a struggle between the individual and society—a struggle for self-expression on the part of the individual, for his subjection on the part of society—and it is in the total course of this struggle that the personality—not as a static "essence" but as a dynamic, continually evolving set of activities—manifests and constructs itself.[50]

c) In general, standards of behavior that are in the mores are not the subject of discussion, except so far as discussion is necessary to determine whether this or that act falls under one or the other of the accepted social sanctions. The political as distinguished from the cultural process is concerned with just those matters in regard to which there is division and difference. Politics is concerned with issues.

The Negro, particularly in the southern states, is a constant theme of popular discussion. Every time a Negro finds himself in a new situation, or one in which the white population is unaccustomed to see him, the thing provokes comment in both races. On the other hand, when a southerner asks the question: "Would you want your daughter to marry a Negro?" it is time for discussion to cease. Any questions of relations between the races can always be immediately disposed of as soon as it is seen to come, directly or indirectly, under the intolerable formula. Political questions are matters of compromise and expediency. Miscegenation, on the other hand, is contrary to the mores. As such the rule against it is absolute.

The political process, by which a society or social group formulates its wishes and enforces them, goes on within the limits of the mores and is carried on by public discussion, legislation, and the adjudication of the courts.

d) The economic process, so far as it can be distinguished from the production and distribution of goods, is the process by which prices are made and an exchange of values is effected. Most values,

50. Thomas and Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, III, 34-36.

i.e., my present social status, my hopes of the future, and memory of the past, are personal and not values that can be exchanged. The economic process is concerned with values that can be treated as commodities.

All these processes may, and do, arise within most but not every society or social group. Commerce presupposes the freedom of the individual to pursue his own profit, and commerce can take place only to the extent and degree that this freedom is permitted. Freedom of commerce is, however, limited on the one hand by the mores and on the other by formal law, so that the economic process takes place ordinarily within limitations that are defined by the cultural and the political processes. It is only where there is neither a cultural nor a political order that commerce is absolutely free.

The areas of (1) the cultural, (2) the political, (3) the economic processes and their relations to one another may be represented by concentric circles.

In this representation the area of widest cultural influences is coterminous with the area of commerce, because commerce in its widest extension is invariably carried on under some restraints of custom and customary law. Otherwise it is not commerce at all, but something predacious outside the law. But if the area of the economic process is almost invariably coterminous with the widest areas of cultural influence, it does not extend to the smaller social groups. As a rule trade does not invade the family. Family interests are always personal even when they are carried on under the forms of commerce. Primitive society, within the limits of the village, is usually communistic. All values are personal, and the relations of individuals to one another, economic or otherwise, are preordained by custom and law.

The impersonal values, values for exchange, seem to be in any given society or social group in inverse relation to the personal values.

The attempt to describe in this large way the historical, cultural, political, and economic processes, is justified in so far as it enables us to recognize that the aspects of social life, which are the subject-matter of the special social sciences, i.e., history, political science, and economics, are involved in specific forms of change that can be viewed abstractly, formulated, compared, and related.

The attempt to view them in their interrelations is at the same time an effort to distinguish and to see them as parts of one whole.

In contrast with the types of social change referred to there are other changes which are unilateral and progressive; changes which are described popularly as "movements," mass movements. These are changes which eventuate in new social organizations and institutions.

All more marked forms of social change are associated with certain social manifestations that we call social unrest. Social unrest issues, under ordinary conditions, as an incident of new social contacts, and is an indication of a more lively tempo in the process of communication and interaction.

All social changes are preceded by a certain degree of social and individual disorganization. This will be followed ordinarily under normal conditions by a movement of reorganization. All




FIG. 2

a = area of most extended cultural influences and of commence; *b* = area of formal political control; *c* = area of purely personal relationships, communism.

progress implies a certain amount of disorganization. In studying social changes, therefore, that, if not progressive, are at least unilateral, we are interested in:

(1) Disorganization: accelerated mobility, unrest, disease, and crime as manifestations and measures of social disorganization.

(2) Social movements (reorganization) include: (*a*) crowd movements (i.e., mobs, strikes, etc.); (*b*) cultural revivals, religious and linguistic; (*c*) fashion (changes in dress, convention, and social ritual); (*d*) reform (changes in social policy and administration); (*e*) revolutions (changes in institutions and the mores).

5. *The individual and the person.*—The person is an individual who has status. We come into the world as individuals. We acquire status, and become persons. Status means position in society. The individual inevitably has some status in every social group of which he is a member. In a given group the status of every member is determined by his relation to every other member of that group. Every smaller group, likewise, has a status in some larger group of which it is a part and this is determined by its relation to all the other members of the larger group.

The individual's self-consciousness—his conception of his rôle in society, his "self," in short—while not identical with his personality is an essential element in it. The individual's conception of himself, however, is based on his status in the social group or groups of which he is a member. The individual whose conception of himself does not conform to his status is an isolated individual. The completely isolated individual, whose conception of himself is in no sense an adequate reflection of his status, is probably insane.

It follows from what is said that an individual may have many "selves" according to the groups to which he belongs and the extent to which each of these groups is isolated from the others. It is true, also, that the individual is influenced in differing degrees and in a specific manner, by the different types of group in which he is a member. This indicates the manner in which the personality of the individual may be studied sociologically.

Every individual comes into the world in possession of certain characteristic and relatively fixed behavior patterns which we call instincts. This is his racial inheritance which he shares with all members of the species. He comes into the world, also, endowed with certain undefined capacities for learning other forms of behavior, capacities which vary greatly in different individuals. These individual differences and the instincts are what is called original nature.[51]

Sociology is interested in "original nature" in so far as it supplies the raw materials out of which individual personalities and the social order are created. Both society and the persons who

51. Original nature in its relation to social welfare and human progress has been made the subject-matter of a special science, eugenics. For a criticism of the claims of eugenics as a social science see Leonard T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (Columbia University Press, 1917).

compose society are the products of social processes working in and through the materials which each new generation of men contributes to it.

Charles Cooley, who was the first to make the important distinction between primary and secondary groups, has pointed out that the intimate, face-to-face associations of primary groups, i.e., the family, the neighborhood, and the village community, are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual.[52]

There is, however, an area of life in which the associations are more intimate than those of the primary group as that group is ordinarily conceived. Such are the relations between mother and child, particularly in the period of infancy, and the relations between men and women under the influence of the sexual instinct. These are the associations in which the most lasting affections and the most violent antipathies are formed. We may describe it as the area of touch relationships.

Finally, there is the area of secondary contacts, in which relationships are relatively impersonal, formal, and conventional. It is in this region of social life that the individual gains, at the same time, a personal freedom and an opportunity for distinction that is denied him in the primary group.

As a matter of fact, many, if not most, of our present social problems have their source and origin in the transition of great masses of the population—the immigrants, for example—out of a society based on primary group relationships into the looser, freer, and less controlled existence of life in great cities.

The "moral unrest" so deeply penetrating all western societies, the growing vagueness and indecision of personalities, the almost complete disappearance of the "strong and steady character" of old times, in short, the rapid and general increase of Bohemianism and Bolshevism in all societies, is an effect of the fact that not only the early primary group controlling all interests of its members on the general social basis, not only the occupational group of the medieval type controlling most of the interests of its members on a professional basis, but even the special modern group dividing with many others the task of organizing permanently the attitudes of each of its members, is more and more losing ground. The pace of social evolution has become so rapid that special groups are ceasing to be permanent and stable enough to organize and maintain organized complexes of attitudes of their members which correspond to their common pursuits. In other words,

52. Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization,* p. 28.

society is gradually losing all its old machinery for the determination and stabilization of individual characters.[53]

Every social group tends to create, from the individuals that compose it, its own type of character, and the characters thus formed become component parts of the social structure in which they are incorporated. All the problems of social life are thus problems of the individual; and all problems of the individual are at the same time problems of the group. This point of view is already recognized in preventive medicine, and to some extent in psychiatry. It is not yet adequately recognized in the technique of social case work.

Further advance in the application of social principles to social practice awaits a more thoroughgoing study of the problems, systematic social research, and an experimental social science.

53. Thomas and Znaniecki, *op cit.*, III, 63-64.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER,[1] AND OF WILLIAM I. THOMAS AND FLORIAN ZNANIECKI[2]

I. SUMNER

FOLKWAYS, published in 1906, is undoubtedly Sumner's most important work. It is one of the two or three most important books in the field of sociology by American authors. It is not, however, a systematic treatise. On the contrary, it is a rather loosely organized collection of observations and notes, in which there is much repetition and some inconsistency. The very form in which the matter is presented reveals lack of co-ordination and structure. There is likely to be something about everything in every chapter, and not even the very full Index reveals the wealth of materials and of suggestion which the volume contains on any one of the many topics discussed. In fact, the book, which resembles an en-

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Stewart A. Rice, ed., *Methods in Social Science: A Case Book* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), pp. 154-75.

1. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals* (New York: Ginn & Co., 1906; pp. vii + 692.)

2. W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. First published, Boston: Richard Badger, 1918 (5 vols.); republished, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1927 (2 vols.; pp. xv + vi + 2250). All citations are to the original publication.

cyclopedia in its organization as well as in the multitude of special topics with which it deals, has the character of a traveler's notebook rather than of a systematic treatise, although most of Sumner's travels were made vicariously, through the medium of other writings.

In spite of the unsystematic manner in which its materials are presented, *Folkways* reveals a fundamental point of view and contains implicitly a system of sociological categories or, to use the language of E. W. Hobson, "a frame of reference."[3] It is because points of view and frames of reference are elementary necessities of anything that seeks to call itself scientific, in the strict sense of that term, that Sumner's work is important with regard to method as well as content.

In view of the nature of his interest and of the task that he set himself, it is not easy to describe or define, in formal terms, the methods by which Sumner carried on his researches. They were, on the whole, the methods of an explorer and a naturalist rather than of a technician. Actually, he seems to have undertaken to survey the whole realm of human nature and human behavior, so far as it is crystallized and exhibited objectively in custom and in habit. So far as the *folkways* are concerned custom in the group and habit in the individual are simply two different ways of looking at the same thing. It is important to note that Sumner started his investigations with an interest rather than a problem. It is, however, only after problems have been formulated that we ordinarily speak of method in reference to their investigation. In this sense it might be said that Sumner had no methods at all. He was an ardent and widely read student of history, but his methods and point of view were not historical. He was profoundly impressed by Herbert Spencer and the evolutionary point of view, and he regarded culture, along with physical nature, as one of the incidental products of the cosmic process. But the processes of cultural life and change were not, as he described them, evolutionary processes.

"There is," he says, "no development of the mores along any lines of logical or other sequence. The mores shift in an endless readjustment of the modes of behavior, effort, and thinking, so as

3. E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1926; pp. xvi + 510).

to reach the greatest advantage under the conditions."[4] There is, to be sure, growth and decay, but evolution in the sense of a continuous advance to better and better is an illusion. "Progress," he concludes, "is an object of faith."

Sumner's knowledge of anthropological literature was profound, but he was not concerned with the historical and geographical aspects of culture; it was not the fact that certain customs exist at a time and a place that seemed to him important, but rather that they are not now what they once were; that they change in response to conditions. Manners, customs, usages, and the mores were for him not events to be recorded merely, but they were things; things which grow up and decay, and, in general, behave in ways which can be described and explained. Folkways, as Sumner described them, are cultural traits, viewed from the point of view of action rather than artifact. They are action patterns, artifacts being merely the instruments with which the action is effected. He says:

> The processes and the artifacts which are connected with the food supply offer us the purest and simplest illustration of the development of the folkways.[5] The processes are folkways. The artifacts are tools and weapons which, by their utility modify the folkways.[6]

It is in his conception of the folkways that Sumner most nearly approaches the point of view of anthropology. Folkways are habits and customs, that is to say, forms of human behavior. Tools, artifacts, arts and crafts, language, science, political organization, and institutions are merely extensions of structures and of functions, of which the habits of the individual and the customs of the group are the most elementary expressions. Folkways cover all the ways in which men habitually act. They are the "products of use and wont."

> The operation by which folkways are produced consists in the frequent repetition of petty acts, often by great numbers acting in concert or, at least, acting in the same way when face to face with the same need. The immediate motive is interest. It produces habit in the individual and custom in the group.[7] . . . Every act of each man fixes an atom in a structure. The structure thus built up is not physical, but

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 476.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

societal and institutional, that is to say, it belongs to a category which must be defined and studied by itself.[8]

It is when we look at customs, institutions, and cultural traits as an aspect of action, individual and collective, that the transition from anthropology to sociology and social psychology is effected. Social anthropology becomes sociology as soon as it ceases to be description of something that exists and becomes a description and explanation of the processes by which that something changes and assumes a new and different character.

If in his conception of the folkways Sumner seems to include within his point of view almost all that ordinarily falls within the field of cultural anthropology, in his conception of the mores he trenches on the field of political science and ethics. The mores are those folkways, which, at a given time and place, define and prescribe what is right and proper.

> All notions of propriety, decency, chastity, politeness, order, duty, right, rights, discipline, respect, reverence, co-operation, and fellowship, especially all things in regard to which good and ill depend entirely on the point at which the line is drawn, are in the mores. The mores can make things seem right and good to one group or one age which to another seem antagonistic to every instinct of human nature.[9] . . . The notion of right and ought is the same in regard to all the folkways, but the degree of it varies with the importance of the interest at stake.[10] . . . Out of the unconscious experiment which every repetition of the ways includes, there issues pleasure or pain, and then, so far as men are capable of reflection, convictions that the ways are conducive to societal welfare. . . . When this conviction as to the relation to welfare is added to the folkways, they are converted into mores.[11]

Political philosophy and ethics are implicit in the mores. They are never original and creative, but secondary and derived. Changes in history are due to changes in life-conditions. Then the folkways (mores) change. Then the new philosophies and ethical rules are invented to try to justify the new ways.

All forms of what we call social control, including religious beliefs and political dogma, are in the mores. . . . The folkways dominate the societal life. Then they seem true and right, and

8. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

arise into mores as the norm of welfare. Thence are produced faiths, ideas, doctrines, religions, and philosophies, according to the stage of civilization and the fashions of reflection and generalization."[12]

"The word 'moral' means what belongs or appertains to the mores." It is only when the word is used in this sense that it corresponds to anything real. "The modern peoples have made morals and morality a separate domain, by the side of religion, philosophy, and politics. In that sense, morals is an impossible and unreal category. It has no existence and can have none."[13] Modern peoples have attempted to establish the status of morals on principles of general application, "so that it shall be universal, absolute, and everlasting." But such attempts are "disastrous to a sound study of facts."[14]

Every class or group in society has its own mores. This is true of ranks, professions, industrial classes, religious and philosophical sects, and all other divisions of society. These mores are facts; they are the only morals there are. Principles that have no foundation in the habits of any group are mere abstractions.

This defines the relation of mores to morals, and the relation of sociology to ethics. Sociology treats the moral codes as facts; describes them, but does not seek to criticize or correct them. To criticize and correct morals is a problem, as Thomas and Znaniecki say, for the technician.[15]

The situation is the same with reference to the state and its laws.

> Acts of legislation come out of the mores. In low civilization all societal regulations are customs and taboos, the origin of which is unknown. Positive laws are impossible until the stage of verification, reflection, and criticism is reached. . . . Legislation to be strong must be consistent with the mores.[16]

The mores are a phenomenon of society and not of the state. There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as "administration of the mores." "The state administration fails if it tries to deal with the

12. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Cf. *The Polish Peasant*, I, 67-73, in reference to the task of the social technician.
16. Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

mores, because it goes out of its province." This does not mean "that reform and correction are hopeless." "Observation and consideration of cases which occur affect opinion and form convictions. The statesman and social philosopher can act with such influences, sum up the forces which make them, and greatly help the result." But politics is, like medicine, an art rather than a science. "Intelligent art can be introduced here as elsewhere, but it is necessary to understand the facts of nature with which it will have to deal."[17]

Here again it is important to emphasize the fact that the folkways and the mores, as Sumner understands them, are "not creations of human purpose and wit."

> They are like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation, or they are like the instinctive ways of animals, which are developed out of experience, which reach a final form of maximum adaptation to an interest, which are handed down by tradition, and admit of no exception or variation, yet change to meet new conditions, still within the same limited methods, and without rational reflection or purpose.[18]

It is clear, then, that the sphere of the folkways lies between those inherited capacities and instinctive forms of behavior that E. L. Thorndyke calls "original nature" and those rational constructions of human wit and forethought, erected upon a foundation of custom and habit, that we call "institutions." The distinction between mores, on the one hand, and laws and institutions, on the other, is that laws and institutions are subjects for discussion, and, so far as that is true, they are rational. The mores are not matters for discussion; they are simply facts. "They have nothing to do with what ought to be, will be, may be, or once was, if it is not now."[19]

It is within the limits of the region thus defined that Sumner's investigations and researches lie, so far as they are recorded in *Folkways*. It would be interesting, if it were possible with the information which his biographer has given us, to outline a little more precisely than anyone has yet done the manner in which he arrived at his point of view and deliminated the field of his study. Sumner started life as a clergyman. He became an economist. He

17. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

had, as an officeholder, some political experience. He sought, through his numerous essays and papers, to impress himself and his ideas—but without much success—upon the course of current events. His conviction, reached by a wide survey of manners and customs, convinced him that political doctrine and moral code did not, and could not, have the absolute and universal validity that had ordinarily been attributed to them. He learned, perhaps from his own experience, the futility and the mischievous character of much that passes under the name of idealism and reform. All this led him to seek, in a broad, disinterested, and empirical study of human nature, a sound basis for all practical efforts to direct the course of current events, to control political action, and to improve social life generally.

Sometime early in the nineties economic problems and public questions had begun to lose for him the interest which they formerly held. He began at this time to devote himself more exclusively to the fundamental questions of sociology. As early as 1881, however, he stated:

> It is to the pursuit of sociology and the study of the industrial organization in combination with the other organizations of society that we must look for the more fruitful development of political economy. We are already in such a position with sociology that a person who has gained what we now possess of that science will bring to bear upon economic problems a sounder judgment and a more correct conception of all social relations than a person who may have read a library of the existing treatises on political economy. The essential elements of political economy are only corollaries or special cases of sociological principles.[20]

In 1899 Sumner began to write out a textbook on sociology, based upon materials which he had been selecting and using in his lectures for ten or fifteen years. From the four volumes recently published by A. G. Keller we may see what these materials were like, and what, in all probability, the textbook would have been if it had been completed in the form in which he then conceived it.[21]

The method—if it can be called a method—which he used in collecting this material is described by his biographer in this way:

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20. Sumner, "Sociology," in the volume *War and Other Essays*. Quoted by Harris E. Starr, *William Graham Sumner* (New York: H. Holt & Co., 1925), p. 388.

21. W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (4 vols.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927).

He made and classified thousands of notes containing information derived from an almost incredible number of sources, many of them difficult of access. No task the performance of which promised to make him better fitted for the work seemed too exacting. After he was forty-five years old, on evidence of dates in his dictionaries and grammars, he acquired a good working knowledge of the two Scandinavian tongues, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Russian, and Polish. In 1899, he began to write out the results of all this study in the form of a textbook.[22]

The word *classified* should be especially noted, because it was presumably out of his classifications that the concepts of *Folkways* grew up.

The result of these studies was: (1) a collection of materials illustrating the wide diversities of ways in which human beings customarily act, and the characteristic forms of belief and sentiment that have arisen in the efforts of men to live together; (2) a description, neither complete nor wholly systematic, of the characteristic types and classes of human behavior, which take form in use and wont and are transmitted in the form of tradition; (3) a description—rather inadequate, to be sure—of the way in which custom and the mores when they become objects of reflection and discussion, assume the rational character of social institutions.

One of the most important of Sumner's contributions to social science was the set of categories and concepts which he worked out as an incident of his researches, and as a means of carrying them on. The concepts and the frames of reference with which scientific work, as soon as it becomes systematic, is invariably carried on, are the most important parts of scientific method. But these are usually, as Charles H. Cooley has suggested, the by-products of research and not antecedent to it. This is inevitably so when, as in the case of Sumner, the work is creative and original rather than routine and technical.

In the course of collecting and presenting the materials on which *Folkways* is based, Sumner formulated, as a mere incident of his task, a very large number of concepts. Later, in recording his observations and reflections upon these materials, he employed these concepts as a means of description and interpretation; and he defined them in such general and conceptual terms as to make them useful for other students in this field. Among the most important

22. *William Graham Sumner*, pp. 388-89.

concepts to which Sumner gave an original and more precise definition in addition to those of the folkways and mores, are: (1) social groups, that is, the family, the "we-group" and the "other group," sects, parties, and social classes; (2) ethos, or group character, a term which is comparable to the anthropological concept of the culture complex, but with the emphasis on action and function rather than on form and structure; (3) ethnocentrism, patriotism, chauvinism—characteristics peculiar to nationalist and racial groups; (4) asceticism, a characteristic, primarily, of sects and religious groups, as ethnocentrism is of political and ethnic groups; (5) the masses and the classes, particularly with reference to the rôle that each plays in the formation of custom; (6) taboo, convention, etiquette, and social ritual—the specific forms in which the mores come to be defined and exist in society; (7) fashion, poses, fads, and cant—forms in which the mores change; (8) ceremonial, literature, and the drama—all of them characteristic expressions of the mores; (9) institutions—the forms which language, law, and customs generally assume when they become objects of reflection and subject to revision, correction, and reconstruction, in accordance with rational principles.

This list of terms by no means does justice to the wealth of ideas which are found scattered through the six hundred and fifty pages of *Folkways*. It does suggest, however, that there is implicit in this volume a body of concepts that could have been given a form that would give *Folkways* a systematic character which it does not possess. These concepts are at once Sumner's contribution to the methodology of the social sciences and at the same time the method he actually employed in organizing, classifying, and interpreting the material with which his wide-ranging excursions into the literature of all the languages of Europe had made him acquainted.

There seems to be no reason why Sumner should not have sorted out the fruits of his reading and observations in a more systematic way had he chosen to do so. Perhaps he believed that, in the state of sociological science then existing, his work would be more interesting and give a truer picture of his field of research and investigation if he presented the materials about as he found and recorded them. If so, his faith was justified by the results. *Folkways* is still one of the most useful, stimulating, and widely read books in the whole field of social science. Sumner was an

explorer. His task was to survey the general features of the region in which future studies of sociologists lay. The effect of his researches was to lay a foundation for more realistic, more objective, and more systematic studies in the field of human nature and society than had existed up to that time.

It seems to me futile to attempt to characterize more precisely Sumner's methods of research. There are in *Folkways* what might be described as case studies of institutions, notably his chapters on slavery and marriage. But these have been as well or better done by other writers. What Sumner achieved in the *Folkways* was a point of view. The methodological tools with which he worked were his concepts and his manner of formulating them on the basis of a wide knowledge, not of cases merely, or of individual instances, but of cases in their whole cultural context. This is, it seems to me, an essential step in the progress of a science, which, having been merely descriptive and impressionistic, is seeking to be systematic and explanatory.

One may, perhaps, best define Sumner's position and point of view if one compares his work with such studies as those of Westermarck or Hobhouse—Westermarck, in *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, and Hobhouse, in his volume *Morals in Evolution*. Both Hobhouse and Westermarck were, after all, historians. They were trying to make clear just how the existing moral ideas and conceptions of the modern civilized peoples came into existence. What they achieved was a natural history of morals. Sumner, on the contrary, was trying, by analysis of existing cultures, to describe and classify their different and typical forms in such a way as to make these the objects of systematic investigation and explanation. What he did was to revive an interest in the study of human nature based, not upon instincts, physiology, and the lower animals, but upon the study of man and society.

II. THOMAS AND ZNANIECKI

The only other work of an American sociologist involving research that is comparable to Sumner's *Folkways* in point of view, method, and importance is *The Polish Peasant*, which is the joint product of William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki. The work as originally published consisted of five volumes. These are described in the Preface as follows:

Volumes I and II comprise a study of the organization of the peasant

primary groups (family and community), and of the partial evolution of this system of organization under the influence of the new industrial system and of immigration to America and Germany. Volume III is the autobiography (with critical treatment) of an immigrant of peasant origin but belonging by occupation to the lower city class, and illustrates the tendency to disorganization of the individual under the conditions involved in a rapid transition from one type of social organization to another. Volume IV treats the dissolution of the primary group and the social and political reorganization and unification of peasant communities in Poland on the new ground of rational co-operation. Volume V is based on studies of the Polish immigrant in America and shows the degrees and forms of disorganization associated with a too-rapid and inadequately mediated individualization, with a sketch of the beginnings of reorganization.[23]

Stated in terms of the problems involved, *The Polish Peasant* is concerned with such matters as immigration; racial prejudice; cultural assimilation; the comparative mental and moral worth of races and nationalities; crime, alcoholism, vagabondage, and other forms of anti-social behavior; nationalism and internationalism; democracy and class-hierarchization; efficiency and happiness, particularly as functions of the relation of the individual to the social framework containing his activities; the rate of individualization possible without disorganization; the difference between unreflective social cohesion brought about by tradition, and reflective social co-operation brought about by rational selection of common ends and means; the introduction of new and desirable attitudes and values without recourse to the way of revolution; and, more generally, the determination of the most general and particular laws of social reality, preliminary to the introduction of a social control comparable to that of the material world, resulting from the study of the laws of physical reality.

What one actually finds, upon reviewing these five volumes, is a study of the changes that are taking place in the cultural life of the Polish peasant in Poland and in America. To state it more succinctly, and in the language of Sumner, it is a study of the mores of a peasant community, but of a community which, owing to the breakdown of the historic isolation and to its "contact with the more complex and fluid world," is in process of evolution. It is, one may add, migration which is mainly responsible for the changes here studied; migration to the expanding industrial centers of Po-

23. *The Polish Peasant,* I, viii.

land and Germany, and to the United States. All the specific and practical problems with which these several volumes are concerned are viewed in relation to, and as a consequence of, the breakdown of tradition and custom, and the changes in habit and attitude which this migration has initiated.

It appears, then, that the authors of *The Polish Peasant* and the author of *Folkways* are interested in substantially the same phenomenon, the difference being that they have approached the subject from different points of view and have investigated it by different methods.

Thomas and Znaniecki are not interested, as Sumner is, in a conceptual description of the mores. They do not, as a matter of fact, use the term *mores* at all. They have other concepts—social attitudes and social values—which seem to suit better the purposes of their analysis and better to describe for them the aspects of culture in which they are mainly interested. One may say, in a manner of speaking, that Sumner discovered the mores, and that his task, as he conceived it, was to work out a scheme and a classification on the basis of a wide comparison, for materials which history and ethnology put into his hands. Thomas and Znaniecki, on the other hand, are interested primarily in changes in the mores and folkways; the conditions under which these changes take place, and the character of the processes by which they are effected.

The Polish Peasant is a case study, and the plan, as originally conceived, assumed that other studies of other peasant communities and other peasant cultures would follow, making possible a wider comparison and a more general and accurate deduction. The distinction in point of view from which the authors of *The Polish Peasant* and the author of *Folkways* attack their several problems will appear in a clearer light if we recall Sumner's statement that what is "custom in the group is habit in the individual." The customs of the group impose themselves upon the individual, and his habits are consciously and unconsciously formed in conformity with them. On the other hand, the habits of individuals support group custom. Changes in habits undermine custom, and eventually destroy its influence and authority. It is evident, therefore, that one may study custom, as the ethnologist studies it, descriptively; or one may distinguish and describe general types of culture, as Sumner does, under such general categories as convention, social ritual, fashion, etc. On the other hand, one may study cultural

forms from the point of view of change—change not merely in form but in content. But changes in the content of custom are brought about by changes in the experience of individuals—changes in attitude and in habit.

Things at home look different to the man who has enjoyed a sojourn abroad. Customs that once seemed as much a part of the natural order as the changing seasons look strange and quaint to the returned traveler. Things at home have not actually changed much, perhaps, but the returning traveler sees them in a different light. It is not the old home or its people and their customs but the traveler himself who has changed.

It is when things which have, or should have, the same meaning for everyone concerned turn out to have different meanings for different individuals that the concept of attitude arises. A social attitude is the subjective or individual aspect of a habit which has an accepted and conventional definition by the group of which the individual is a member. This is implied in the more or less familiar statement that a fact is a fact only in a universe of discourse. Every group has, or tends to have, its own universe of discourse; that is to say, its own language as well as its own conventions. The Polish peasant brings to America a body of tradition and custom in which, as Thomas would say, the situation has a definition different from that of the native population. Gradually he accommodates himself to the customs of the country. He acquires new habits and new points of view. In the language of *The Polish Peasant,* he acquires new attitudes and new values.

Society everywhere presents these dual aspects, the individual and the group, habit and custom, attitude and value. In practice, the social problem is, as the authors of *The Polish Peasant* state it: "How shall we produce with the help of the existing social organization and culture the desirable mental and moral characteristics in the individuals constituting the social group?" And, "How shall we produce, with the help of the existing mental and moral characteristics of the individual members of the group, the desirable type of social organization and culture?" The solutions of these problems require two kinds of data, namely, "the objective cultural elements of social life, and the subjective characteristics of the members of the social group."

To these two kinds of data—(1) "objective cultural elements" and (2) "subjective characteristics of the members of the group"

—Thomas and Znaniecki give the names "social values" (or simply "values") and "attitudes." It is evident that these two terms correspond, in a general way, to "custom in the group and habit in the individual," as Sumner uses that expression. I say this in spite of the fact that the authors of *The Polish Peasant* have expressly stated that neither attitudes nor values were "a psychological phenomenon," and that attitude could not be identified with habit.

The distinction is important, but I shall not undertake to make it here. I am mainly concerned in pointing out the differences in the point of view of, and the intimate relation between, *Folkways* and *The Polish Peasant.* Sumner is concerned with the objective, Thomas and Znaniecki with the subjective, aspects of culture. As the fundamental concept of *Folkways* is the mores, so *The Polish Peasant* is mainly concerned with attitudes. *Folkways* is sociology; *The Polish Peasant* is social psychology.

It amounts in substance to this: Social attitudes are the individual and subjective aspects of the mores. The methodological problems with which the authors of *The Polish Peasant* were confronted were: (1) how to obtain a body of documentary materials in which the characteristic attitudes of *The Polish Peasant* were adequately expressed; (2) to find language and concepts in which to describe the attitudes which these materials disclose.

The first problem was solved (1) by the discovery of a large body of intimate family letters which had been exchanged between Polish immigrants in America and members of their families in Poland; and (2) by a collection of life-histories of Polish immigrants, one of which is published in full in Volume III of the series.

Since the publication of *The Polish Peasant,* the life-history, employed as a means for exploration of the attitudes and the cultural backgrounds of immigrants, has proved useful in the study of the behavior of delinquents, and in the investigation of personality types generally. The life-history has been used, also, as a device for exploring the inner life and content of institutions like the family and the church, and in discovering the cultural patterns of local communities. The life-history may have a character varying all the way from a mere record of obvious and external events to that of a confession, depending, finally, upon the extent to which the individual has been able to participate freely and without conflict in the social life about him, and, in doing so, has found a free expression of his attitudes and wishes or has been inhibited and

introverted. It is the introverted individual who ordinarily writes a confession.

There is, as the authors of *The Polish Peasant* say,

> no pre-existing harmony whatever between the individual and the social factors of personal evolution, and the fundamental tendencies of the individual are always in some disaccordance with the fundamental tendencies of social control. Personal evolution is always a struggle between the individual and society—a struggle for self-expression on the part of the individual, for his subjection, on the part of society—and it is in the total course of this struggle that the personality—not as a static "essence" but as a dynamic, continually evolving set of activities—manifests and constructs itself.[24]

As self-consciousness and subjectivity are themselves an effect of this conflict of the individual with the society of which he is a member, so the extent of this subjectivity and the character of the life-history will correspond to the nature and extent of this conflict. If the individual is by temperament and by character a social individual, what we call a "good mixer"; if he is able, in other words, to express himself easily and naturally in every situation he encounters, the story of his life will tend to assume the character of a mere record of events; events in which he participated. If, on the contrary, he is one who finds it difficult to express himself and is habitually frustrated in his efforts to act effectively in the social milieu, his life-history will be a record of his frustrations, of his feelings, of his incompleted acts, of his dreams, of his fantasies. A life-history will then have for him the effect of a catharsis.

In the case of human beings, it is the wide range, of this subjective life, of mental and imaginative behavior, which intervenes between stimulus and response, which makes human behavior fundamentally different from that of the lower animals. It is this, too, which makes human behavior, particularly in the case of certain persons, so problematic and so difficult to understand. It is the purpose of the life-history to get a record of this inner life.

Life-history materials may be said to include any sort of record or document, including the case histories of the social agencies, which tend to throw light on the subjective behavior of individuals or of groups. The fifth volume of the series on the Polish peasant is largely based, for example, upon records of social agencies. Case records of this sort, however, are in themselves quite inadequate

24. *Ibid.*, III, 35-36.

for the understanding of what is problematic in the behavior of the Polish immigrant. But they assume a new value when they are studied in connection with the earlier and more intimate life-history documents in the series.

It is assumed that the behavior and the attitudes reflected in these materials are representative of the Polish community itself and of the different types of personality of which that community is composed. But in order to analyze and describe these different personality types, accurately and conceptually, so that their representative character is manifest, it is necessary for the authors to formulate a conception of personality and to find language in which personality traits can be adequately described. This constituted the second methodological problem which the authors of *The Polish Peasant* were called upon to solve. In the methodological note, published as a sort of Preface to the whole series, and more particularly to the Introduction to Volume III, "The Life Record of an Immigrant," the authors have undertaken to formulate and set forth in rather a systematic way the terms and concepts in which life-history materials, and particularly the autobiography of an anonymous peasant, can be described and interpreted in such a way as to do two things: (1) make that life intelligible by reference to the organization and customs of the Polish community, and (2) throw light upon the nature of personality in general, and particularly upon the relation of personality and culture, and upon the relation of the individual and the group.

These conceptions constitute a frame of reference for the analysis and interpretation of documents and life-history materials in general. More than that, they may be said to constitute, even in the scattered and fragmentary way in which they are presented, a treatise on the fundamental concepts of social psychology.

The most important of these concepts are: (1) temperament, character, life-organization; (2) the three personality types represented by the philistine, the bohemian, and the creative personality; (3) the four fundamental "wishes," so called: curiosity and the desire for new experience, fear and the desire for security, desire for recognition, and the desire for response—that is to say, for love and affection; (4) social organization, including the mores and folkways; (5) the elementary units in which all these dissolve themselves, namely, attitudes.

Attitudes, as the authors conceive them, are of two sorts—temperamental and character attitudes.

We may call temperament the fundamental original group of attitudes of the individual as existing independently of any social influences; we may call character the set of organized and fixed groups of attitudes developed by social influence operating upon the temperamental basis. The temperamental attitudes are essentially instinctive, that is, they express themselves in biological action but not in reflective consciousness; the attitudes of the character are intellectual, that is, they are given by conscious reflection. This does not mean that the temperamental attitude cannot be experienced; it usually is experienced when for some reason the activity is inhibited. But with the temperamental attitude there is no conscious connection between the separate actions in which it expresses itself; every single feeling and satisfaction (e.g. hunger) is for the individual a separate entity; the living being does not generalize these feelings as forming one series, one permanent attitude. On the contrary, every manifestation of a character-attitude is given to the subject as a single expression of a more or less general tendency; a helpful or harmful action is accompanied by a consciousness of sympathy or hate, that is, by a conscious tendency to the repetition (or remembrance) of actions with an analogous meaning; the attitude accompanying the actual production of some piece of work is given as one element of a series that may be willingness or unwillingness to do such work, desire to realize a plan, to earn money, etc. This consciousness need not be always explicit, but it must be implicitly present and become explicit from time to time if the attitude is to be defined as a character-attitude.[25]

Temperament, character, and life-organization are intimately related but not identical. The individual man lives in the world which is limited by his experience. What he finds in nature and makes part of his world depends on what he is interested in, what occupies his attention, and what objects have significance for him. Thus different individuals, even when they live in the same physical surroundings, may be said to live in different worlds because the objects they encounter have for them a different significance. This is what the authors mean when they say that individuals define the situation differently. The way the individual, within the limits of his experience, defines the situation determines his life-organization. This is the way the matter is stated in *The Polish Peasant*:

We must remember, first of all, that the environment by which he

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

[the individual] is influenced and to which he adapts himself, is *his* world, not the objective world of science—is nature and society as he sees them, not as the scientist sees them. The individual subject reacts only to his experience, and his experience is not everything that an absolutely objective observer might find in the portion of the world within the individual's reach, but only what the individual himself finds. And what he finds depends upon his practical attitudes toward his environment, the demands he makes upon it and his control over it, the wishes he seeks to satisfy and the way in which he tries to satisfy them. His world thus widens with the development of his demands and his means of control, and the process of this widening involves two essential phases—the introduction of new complexities of data into the sphere of his experience and the definition of new situations within those complexities.[26]

The authors make a great deal of the distinction between the individual as an example of the human species, a "biological formation," as they call it, and the individual as a member of a society, "a social personality," or what we ordinarily describe as a person.

An individual with nothing but his biological formation, or—in social terms—with nothing but his temperamental attitudes, is not yet a social personality, but is able to become one. In the face of the world of social meanings he stands powerless; he is not even conscious of the existence of this reality, and when the latter manifests itself to him in changes of the material reality upon which his instincts bear, he is quite lost and either passively submits to the unexpected, or aimlessly revolts. Such is the position of the animal or the infant in human society; and a similar phenomenon repeats itself on a smaller scale whenever an individual on a low level of civilization gets in touch with a higher civilized environment, a worldling with a body of specialists, a foreigner with an autochthonic society, etc. In fact, human beings for the most part never suspect the existence of innumerable meanings —scientific, artistic, moral, political, economic—and a field of social reality whose meanings the individual does not know, even if he can observe its sensual contents, is as much out of the reach of his practical experience as the other side of the moon.[27]

Just as there is in the mores a rational element, an implicit philosophy, according to Sumner, so in the personality, as Thomas and Znaniecki conceive it, there is something more than character; there is an intellectual element, and it is this intellectual element that is represented specifically in the life-organization. One might perhaps express the notion by saying that the individual has a con-

26. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

ception of himself, and that this conception of himself and his rôle in society is an integral part of his personality. It is, in fact, through this conception of himself that the individual gets and maintains control over his original nature, his impulsive life.

In order to become a social personality in any domain the individual must therefore not only realize the existence of the social meanings which objects possess in this domain, but also learn how to adapt himself to the demands which society puts upon him from the standpoint of these meanings and how to control these meanings for his personal purposes; and since meanings imply conscious thought, he must do this by conscious reflection, not by mere instinctive adaptations of reflexes. In order to satisfy the social demands put upon his personality he must reflectively organize his temperamental attitudes; in order to obtain the satisfaction of his own demands, he must develop intellectual methods for the control of social reality in place of the instinctive ways which are sufficient to control natural reality. And this effective reorganization of temperamental attitudes leads, as we have seen, to character, while the parallel development of intellectual methods of controlling social reality leads to a life-organization, which is nothing but the totality of these methods at work in the individual's social career.[28]

This means that the world in which men live is not merely a physical, but a moral, world; a world defined in terms of the attitudes and wishes of other men; a world which, so far as it has any stability at all, is defined in terms of the mores. It is in this moral world, the world of attitudes and wishes, that the individual with his heritage of instincts becomes a person, i.e., an individual with a status.

As Thomas and Znaniecki conceive personality, it is not something that can be described in static terms. It is not an action pattern or a system of habits merely. Personality is in constant evolution. It evolves, however, not merely under the influences of an environment which exists external to it, but more especially under the influence of an environment which it selects and defines and in a sense creates. In short, a man—and this distinguishes him from the lower animals—may be said to have a career.

A child comes into the world not merely without a character, but without personality. It is at the outset a mere bundle of reflexes. Its instincts, whatever they may be, are, in the language of Thomas and Znaniecki, temperament attitudes. Gradually, by a process that has been described elsewhere as conditioning, the child's impulses

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

are integrated, and instincts are converted into habits. In the natural course, and under the influence of associations with other individuals, the child develops self-consciousness and a conception of himself. At the same time, and in the same natural way, he defines his rôle in a social group; he may define it in several social groups. In so doing, however, he gains a control over himself which he did not possess so long as his life was a mere series of more or less automatic responses to stimuli. In becoming self-conscious the child makes himself not merely an object, but he makes his life, as he projects it ahead of him in imagination, a project. Eventually he formulates principles of action and organizes his life in ways which seem likely to further his life aim. This conception of himself, and the codes and rules by which the individual seeks to maintain this conception and this project in a changing world, is what the authors mean by a life-organization.

With this conception of personality as growing up in response to the changing social situations, the authors have described three different types of personality with reference to their ability to adjust themselves to a changing moral world: the philistine, the bohemian, and the creative personality.

The philistine is the individual who conceives himself in the conventional social pattern; whose life-organization is taken over from, and stabilized in, the patterns which he finds in the society about him. The philistine achieves a consistent life and a stable character, but on such terms as "practically [to] exclude development of any new attitude in the given conditions of life."

Opposed to the philistine is the bohemian, "whose possibilities are not closed simply because his character remains unformed." The philistine is always a conformist, always "accepting social tradition in its most stable elements." The bohemian, on the other hand, is likely to be a radical, responding to every new program or project as it presents itself, but never able to achieve a stable character or make a career. In any case, "Inconsistency is the essential feature of his activity."

In contrast with the philistine and the bohemian is the creative personality. He is one who is able to maintain a consistent life-organization in a changing world; a man who, in order to widen his control over his environment and himself, learns "to adopt his purpose to the continually increasing sphere of social reality."

The Philistine, the Bohemian and the creative man are the three

fundamental forms of personal determination toward which social personalities tend in their evolution. . . . These three general types—limits of personal evolution—include, of course, an indefinite number of variations, depending on the nature of the attitudes by which characters are constituted and on the schemes composing the life-organization of social individuals.[29]

Personalities, in short, may be distinguished with reference to their tendencies to grow. The philistine, with his tendency to develop a stark, fixed character, constitutes the solid structure of society. The more mobile bohemian, disposed as he is to reflect the changing aspects of social life, becomes a medium for communicating them. The creative personality makes the original contribution to culture.

Personalities may be further characterized by the degree to which they are predisposed by temperament or experience to respond to (1) the desire for new experience, (2) the need for security, (3) the desire for recognition, and (4) the desire for response.[30]

In general, it may be assumed that these wishes represent in one form or another the things that men want; these are the values which they will seek and find in society. It may be said, perhaps, that young men want new experience, and that old men want security. That men want fame (recognition), that women want love (response). But individuals will differ in respect to these matters. At any rate, these terms serve in a general way to characterize personality types, and by so doing explain human behavior as we find it.

From what has been said, it is not difficult to foresee that the social organization and the life-organization of the individual are, like custom and habit, different aspects of the same thing. The community imposes its rules, codes, and "definitions of the situation" upon its individual members, and as these are accepted and become established in the habits of individuals, they give support and strength to the social organization of which they are a part. The more firmly the social organization is fixed in tradition, the more completely will the individual's life-organizations be integrated in an existing social order, and the less he will be able, in consequence, to accommodate himself to a new and a looser social order, such, for example, as the Polish peasant finds in America.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
30. See appendix at end of this paper.

It is upon the basis of considerations of this sort that the authors are able to explain much of the demoralization which Polish peasants exhibit in America. The disorganization of the second generation, which is even greater than that of the first, is explained in a somewhat different way, but upon principles which are substantially like those already referred to.

There is much other material in these five volumes of *The Polish Peasant* that is important, to which, however, no reference has been made, since it seemed best to focus attention upon the concepts, and the methodological problems, which are relatively novel and characteristic of this particular study. For example, the authors have written, by way of introduction to Volumes I and II, interesting and important papers upon (1) "The Polish Family," (2) "The System of Polish Society," and (3) "The Religious and Magical Attitudes of the Polish Peasant." As these offer no methodological problems that are in any way peculiar to the type of research characteristic of these volumes, I leave them with this bare reference.

In conclusion, as defining the scientific character of this work, I can do no better than quote this statement from the fifth volume:

> Our work does not pretend to give any definitive and universally valid sociological truths, nor to constitute a permanent model of sociological research; it merely claims to be a monograph, as nearly complete as possible under the circumstances, of a limited social group at a certain period of its evolution, which may suggest studies of other groups, more detailed and more perfect methodically, thus helping the investigation of modern living societies to rise above its present stage of journalistic impressionism, and preparing the ground for the determination of really exact general laws of human behavior. The analogies which we have mentioned are in this respect encouraging, for they allow us to presume that such laws are possible and that their determination will not meet any exceptional difficulties.
>
> On the other hand, our study makes it very clear that a search for similarities in human behavior can lead to valuable and secure results only if it takes fully into account the important differences that exist between various societies, differences due chiefly to the widely varying lines of their past cultural evolution rather than to divergent biological tendencies and unequal natural abilities of their members. . . . The Polish peasant is not and cannot be exactly the same kind of man as the native American, for his character has been moulded by his social milieu, and his social milieu has a set of traditions, an organization, a form and standard of living very different in their concrete

complexity from those which are familiar to the American reader.[31]

The Polish Peasant, like the *Folkways,* must be regarded as a work of pioneers. It was necessary, first, to discover new sorts of materials; and, second, to find language in which to describe them. Quite aside from any practical value which Thomas and Znaniecki's studies have because of the light they throw upon the problem of the immigrant, *The Polish Peasant* is chiefly significant as representing a point of view, a new approach to social problems. Its chief contribution, therefore, is not a body of fact, but a system of concepts.[32]

EXTRACT: THE "FOUR WISHES"

1. The desire for new experience is seen in simple form in the prowling and meddling activities of the child, and the love of adventure and travel in the boy and the man. It ranges in moral quality from the pursuit of game and the pursuit of pleasure to the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of ideals. It is found equally in the vagabond and in the scientific explorer. Novels, theaters, motion pictures, etc., are means of satisfying this desire vicariously, and their popularity is a sign of the elemental force of this desire.

   In its pure form the desire for new experience implies motion, change, danger, instability, social irresponsibility. The individual dominated by it shows a tendency to disregard prevailing standards and group interests. He may be a complete failure, on account of his instability; or a conspicuous success, if he converts his experience into social values—puts them in the form of a poem, makes of them a contribution to science, etc.
2. The desire for security is opposed to the desire for new experience. It implies avoidance of danger and death, caution, conservatism. Incorporation in an organization (family, community, state) provides the greatest security. In certain animal societies (e.g., the ants) the organization and co-operation are very rigid. Similarly, among the peasants of Europe, represented by our immigrant groups, all lines of behavior are predetermined for the individual by tradition. In such a group the individual is secure so long as the group organization is secure, but evidently he shows little originality or creativeness.
3. The desire for recognition expresses itself in devices for securing distinction in the eyes of the public. A list of the different modes of seeking recognition would be very long. It would include courageous behavior, showing off through ornament and dress, the pomp of kings, the display of opinions and knowledge, the possession of spe-

31. *The Polish Peasant,* V, 340-41.

32. [This analysis was first written in December, 1928, and revised by the analyst in March, 1929.—EDITOR.]

cial attainments—in the arts, for example. It is expressed alike in arrogance and in humility, even in martyrdom. Certain modes of seeking recognition we define as "vanity," others as "ambition." The "will to power" belongs here. Perhaps there has been no spur to human activity so keen and no motive so naïvely avowed as the desire for "undying fame," and it would be difficult to estimate the rôle the desire for recognition has played in the creation of social values.

4. The desire for response is a craving, not for the recognition of the public at large, but for the more intimate appreciation of individuals. It is exemplified in mother-love (touch plays an important rôle in this connection), in romantic love, in family affection, and in other personal attachments. Homesickness and loneliness are expressions of it. Many of the devices for securing recognition are used also in securing response.

Apparently these four classes comprehend all the positive wishes. Such attitudes as anger, fear, hate, and prejudice are attitudes toward these objects which may frustrate a wish.[33]

33. See W. I. Thomas, "The Persistence of Primary-Group Norms in Present-Day Society," in Jennings, Watson, Meyer, and Thomas, *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1917).

CHAPTER 18

HUMAN NATURE, ATTITUDES AND MORES

1. HUMAN NATURE

IT IS notorious that some of our more recent and more innovating conceptions of human nature, and of methods for investigating, are almost wholly based on experiments made upon animals of a lower grade than man; i.e., cats, dogs, rats, and even some of the lowlier species. There have been some, but relatively few, investigations by methods so successfully employed in studying animal psychology, of human behavior, but not of behavior that is characteristically and distinctively human rather than animal.

It seems that when we behave most like human beings—fall in love, for example, or get religion—we may at best be celebrated by the historian or the poets, or at the worst, fall into the hands of the psychiatrists, the psychoanalysts, or the "metaphysicians." But we are pretty sure to escape the behaviorists, at least until love and religion come to be habits rather than sentiments.

The observations of the behaviorists upon love and religion, so far, have the rather casual and commonsense character of *obiter dicta,* far removed from the detailed, objective, and quantitative studies that they have made in other fields.[1] So far as this statement is true, it is probably due to the complexities of the phenomena themselves, but it may be due to the fact that the behaviorists'

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Kimball Young, ed., *Social Attitudes* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1931), pp. 17-45.

1. John B. Watson, *Behaviorism,* 1924.

point of view and behavioristic methods of investigation do not lend themselves so readily to the study of man, as they do to the study of animals. This is, however, a detail and not of any especial importance to the purpose of this chapter.

This paper is concerned primarily with a system of relations, and a type of behavior which we call social. It is concerned particularly with the nature of those conceptual units into which such a system, upon analysis, resolves itself. Every science starts with a point of view, and it is this point of view which defines for it, ultimately, the character of its conceptual object. In order to describe and explain this object it is first of all necessary to resolve it into its more elementary components. The logical terminus is first reached with the discovery of what, for the purpose of a particular science, or even a particular investigation, may be regarded as the unit of description and explanation. This unit is likely to be different with every different science, and the same may be said in every case of the methods and procedure employed. They, also, are determined finally by the character of the units of analysis which the different sciences adopt. It thus appears that there is a very intimate relation between point of view, nature of the conceptual object, units of analysis, and methods of procedure.[2]

Since the logic of the behavioristic school has profoundly influenced the methods and the point of view, not merely of psychology, but of the social sciences, it seems worth while to review here briefly the genesis and direction which this point of view has historically taken.

It seems to have been Lloyd Morgan's observations of instinct in animals which gave behaviorism its point of view, suggesting that man might be studied psychologically in the same objective way as the lower animals have been. In fact it may very easily have been Lloyd Morgan's fascinating volume on *Animal Behavior*, published in 1908, which suggested the name given to the new point of view and the new doctrine.

Observations of animals in their natural habitats were followed

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2. A conceptual object, it must be remembered, is like a geometrical figure, an abstraction, not something that is given in nature. Science itself, in so far as it is a method of technique, for investigation and research, is a construct, an artifact, and has no meaning except in reference to the purpose for which it is constructed.

by experiments upon animals in the laboratory. Thorndike's volume, *Animal Intelligence*, published in 1911, seems to have set the pattern for a subsequent investigation and experimentation in this field. Since that time Behaviorism has advanced from the study of cats and rats to experimentation on new-born babes and little children.[3] There is at present an extensive literature on the subject of animal and infantile behavior, which includes a wide range of animal life, extending from that of the lowly earthworm to the almost-human ape.

One result of the experiment upon animals was to confirm a conclusion already reached by Jacques Loeb that "instincts belong to the same class of phenomena as reflexes," and the greater complexity of instinctive behavior compared with that of the simple reflex is due to the fact that instinctive actions are based upon a chain of reflexes in which the first reflex becomes the cause which calls forth the second, the third, and so on.

Loeb illustrated the way in which the reflexes which co-operate to produce a complicated, instinctive reaction may be conceived to operate, by reference to the behavior of the frog in capturing and swallowing a fly. "The motion of the fly," he says, "causes an optical reflex which results in a snapping motion, the contact of the fly with the mucous membrane of the pharynx sets free a second reflex, which brings the fly into the œsophagus" and so completes the instinctive action.[4]

The case of the frog and the fly illustrates, in principle at least, the nature of the mechanism by which, in general, behavior takes place. Every movement and every action can, in theory at least, be resolved into elementary processes or behavior units, each one of which responds in a definite way, to a specific stimulus. The integration and coördination of these units makes it possibles to conceive the simplest as well as the most complex behavior as a response to a specific stimulus.

Physiology and psychology have got on very intimate terms in recent years. Both use the same unit of analysis, namely the physiological reflex, and both employ substantially the same methods of investigation. The difference between the physiologist and

3. See John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, preface 2nd edition, 1924.

4. Jacques Loeb, *Comparative Physiology of the Brain*, 1900, p. 178.

the behaviorist is that one is concerned with the functioning of special organs, and the other is interested only in the behavior of the organism as a whole.

"Our task begins," says Watson, "only when the physiologist puts the separate organs together again, and turns the whole [man] over to us."[5]

We might, without doing violence to the language of common sense, express the difference between the physiologist and the psychologist by saying that physiology is concerned with reaction, while psychology is concerned with action, action being the reaction of the organism as a whole. From the point of view of the organism as a whole the reflex is "a convenient abstraction." It is an abstraction because reflex actions can never take place in isolation."[6]

What remains to complete the logical and theoretical structure of behaviorism is a conceptual account of the process of integration. To a certain extent in man, and to an even greater extent in animals, this integration of the reflexes has already been achieved at birth. But man has much to learn, as compared with the lower animals. He has to supplement his relatively small fund of instincts with a very large number of habits. The habits he acquires are very largely determined by his individual experience. In the traditional psychology, learning by experience was the function of consciousness. Consciousness is, however, a word that is hard to define. Watson says, candidly, that he does not know what it is. Loeb says it is, "a metaphysical term for phenomena which are determined by associated memory" and he describes associated memory as "that mechanism by which a stimulus brings about not only the effects which its nature and the specific structure of the organ call for, but by which it brings about, also, the effect of other stimuli which formerly acted upon the organism simultaneously with the stimulus in question."

The function which consciousness is supposed to perform can be stated as it has been by Bertrand Russell. Though he does not agree with Watson that this principle alone is sufficient to account for all animal and human learning, he admits it is a principle of very great importance. As he puts it, the principle is this:

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5. Watson, *ibid.*, 2nd edition, 1924, p. 20.
6. Watson, *ibid.*, p. 254.

When the body of an animal or human being has been exposed sufficiently often to two roughly simultaneous stimuli, the earlier of them alone tends to call out the response previously called out by the other.

This, says Russell, in conclusion, is the modern form of the "association of ideas" which has played so "great a part in philosophy and particularly British philosophy." The fact that, as here stated, it is movements rather than ideas which are associated, extends this principle of association over a wider field than that covered in the original formulation. This is true because there are more movements than there are ideas, seeing that many movements are involuntary and unconscious. Furthermore, movements are more accessible to observation and verification than ideas.

It thus appears that the function that consciousness was supposed to perform may be made the object of experiment without reference to consciousness. It was, however, the experiments of the Russian, Pavlov, and his students that demonstrated this fact. The most famous of these experiments was made upon dogs. They showed that the salivary glands of a dog, which did not at first respond to a given stimulus, say the sound of a bell, could be made to do so if the bell was sounded at about the same time and a little before the dog was exposed to a stimulus for which the organism was already prepared, namely, food. On the other hand, if the bell was sounded after, rather than before the food was exhibited, the gland refused to respond.

This refusal to respond under the circumstances is interesting because it tends to show that association is dependent upon what the Gestalt psychologists call "organization of the impression." It suggests further that association takes place when the impressions or the movements associated are integral parts of an activity or action.

Pavlov's experiments were impressive in the first instance, because of the elaborate and careful way in which they were planned and carried out. As he was dealing here with an organ which acts reflexively, he called the results obtained after the gland had, so to speak, been educated, the "conditional reflex."[7]

With the formulation of the conception of the "conditioned reflexes" the logical structure of behaviorism was complete. It was now possible to conceive habit, which William James said, includes

7. Ivan P. Pavlov, *Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes.* (Translated from the Russian by W. Horsley Gantt), New York, 1928.

"all our life, so far as it has a definite form" as a structure, built entirely on elementary units, namely, reflexes, by processes of association or conditioning, such as Pavlov's experiments had demonstrated. As experiments indicated that these processes could, in theory at least, be definitely controlled, there remained no sound reason for continuing the rather dubious investigation of the contents of consciousness, upon which the traditional psychology had been founded.

Behaviorism has unquestionably immensely simplified our conception of human behavior and mental life. In breaking down the barriers which seemed formerly to separate the mental and physical aspects of behavior it has made it possible to conceive mental life as one in principle with the processes of physical and physiological growth in the organism.

Every science, however, is inevitably limited by its point of view and by its technique. It is still a question how far psychology can adequately describe behavior that is characteristically human in physiological terms. Up to the present moment the most impressive experiments in habit formation (conditioning) have been made, as I have already said, either upon animals or very little children. For the purpose of discovering the genesis of habit the observations made upon new-born babies seem to be the most promising and important. They are important for the reason that the behavior of children, in the early stages of infancy, is less integrated than that of any other mammals. That means that they have few instincts and no habits.

The new-born baby is so completely lacking in any sort of orientation to the world in which it is presently to find itself, its movements are so completely uncoördinated, that its behavior at the first does not have the character of an action. New-born babies react, but do not act. Psychology, however, is mainly interested in action, that is to say, in the behavior of the organism as a whole, and action only arises in response to a world of objects located in space and time.

The world in which men live is, on the whole, the world in which they have learned to live. Things take form and substance as we learn how to behave towards them. Our habits and our attitudes are the subjective aspect of the world we know. What things mean for us is determined, in the final analysis, by the events in our personal history. The subtleties of the modern mind are re-

flected in the complexities of the modern world. The child at birth knows nothing of space and time, and has, so to speak, no world at all, because it has no habits, no attitudes, and no objects. Its world, as far as it may be said to have one at all, is, as James described it, "a big, buzzing confusion." So, too, the world of the pre-literate peoples is a very simple affair, as compared with that which literature, travel, and science have made accessible to civilized man.

We are bound to assume that there are fundamentally different types and levels of behavior represented in the human organism. Man is the inheritor of all the species that have gone on before him, in the biological series. The result is that the more elaborate forms of human behavior are so completely integrated with the more elementary that it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between them. It is difficult to distinguish between original nature and human nature.

There are, however, certain forms of behavior characteristic of man that are so obviously different from animal behavior that they seem to be differences not merely of degree, but of kind. As an indication of what, in general, these forms of behavior are, I may refer to some rather oblique observations on the human race, recording one of Walt Whitman's earlier and more flagrant examples of free verse, *Song of Myself*. He chants as follows:

I think I could turn and live with animals,
They are so placid and self-contained;
I stand and look at them long and long.
They do not sweat and whine about their condition;
They do not lie awake at night and weep for their sins;
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God;
Not one is dissatisfied—not one is demented with the mania of owning things;
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago:
Not one is responsible, or industrious over the whole earth.

The traits here referred to—man's mania for owning things, his industry, his conscience, causing him to worry about his sins, the loyalties and beliefs that he cherishes in regard to gods and superior beings that he has never seen, the importance to him of status, and of the esteem in which he is held by other persons—all these are not merely fundamentally human traits that could only exist in some form of society such as man has everywhere created and

maintained, but they are the traits, also, upon which the social institutions—economic, political, and religious—seem finally to rest, and from which there is no escape for man, except, as Whitman puts it, he turn and live with the animals.

2. ATTITUDES

There seem to have been, generally speaking, two conditions, one in the original nature of man himself and the other in the situation in which he inevitably finds himself, that have imposed upon mankind those traits and that nature, which, in ordinary parlance, are described as human.

As compared with the lower animals, man may be said to live in a world of three, rather than two, dimensions. He lives, in other words, in a world that has a temporal, as well as spatial perspective. He grows up under the influence of a past that is steadily receding, and of a future that is inevitably impending. He faces each of these divergent aspects of this temporal continuum with a different attitude. The past is that part of his experience which he views as finished and unchangeable; the future, on the other hand, is that part of his prospective experience which is still indeterminate, and which he views with hope and fear. This implies that human beings, in contrast to the lower animals, live to an extraordinary extent in their memories and in their imaginations. Santayana in his *Winds of Doctrine* puts it thus:

> Man is certainly an animal that, when he lives at all, lives for ideals. Something must be found to occupy his imagination, to raise pleasure and pain into love and hatred, and change the prosaic alternative between comfort and discomfort into the tragic one between happiness and sorrow.[8]

The fact that men can look back with regret to their past, and forward with lively expectation to their future, suggests that there is, ordinarily, in the lives of human beings, an amount of tension and sustained suspense which tends to break up established habits and to hold those habits not yet established in solution. During this period of tension and suspense, when overt action and eventual habits are in process, activity is directed less by previous habit than by present attitudes.

It is characteristic of man that he mulls over and broods upon

8. Quoted in my article, "Negro Race Consciousness as Reflected in Race Literature," *American Review*, 1923, Vol. I, pp. 515-16.

his acts before he commits himself to action. As compared with the lower animals man is an introverted and subjective creature. "Between the two terms of a sensory-motor circuit there is," as Köhler puts it, "more *terra incognita* than was on the map of Africa sixty years ago." Somewhere in this *terra incognita* consciousness is located and it is to the existence of this unexplored region that psychology owes its existence. All the turmoil of present-day psychology revolves around this same region and the methods of its exploration.

If we conceive the inception and conclusion of an action, even when that action covers a considerable period of time, as included within the terms of the sensory-motor circuit, we may expect to encounter, in the course of the action, a considerable amount of incidental behavior which is not ordinarily reckoned as either stimulus or response. This behavior, which we may describe as expressive, seems to throw light on the processes which have determined and are determining the course of the action observed. This incidental and expressive behavior is likely to be more manifest in man than in the lower animals, partly because the distance between stimulus and response is ordinarily greater in the case of the former than it is in the latter.

Consider the case of the individual, as Whitman describes him, "sweating" and "whining" about his condition, or the man who lies awake at night to weep over his sins. Here is behavior which reveals something going on that may finally terminate in overt action, but such behavior is not what we ordinarily regard as an act. It is emotional or expressive behavior. It accompanies and, so to speak, advertises the act with which it is associated. Action, as Faris insists, has a configuration and an organization, a "temporal Gestalt." So conceived, action would always involve some preparation and, so to speak, mobilization of the organism for action: some orientation also, of the organism to the situation in which it found itself.

The behavior of a cat, as it slowly approaches and prepares to spring upon a mouse, is an illustration of an act in preparation. A complete account of this action would include a record of the internal, muscular, visceral, and glandular changes involved, as well as of the external and exploratory movements which lead up to the final spring and capture by the animal, of its prey. An even better illustration is, perhaps, the behavior of a rat in a maze. The

purpose of this experiment is: 1, to determine how long it will take a hungry rat to find a piece of cheese at the end of a complicated path, and, 2, to determine how many trials will be necessary until the rat can thread his way through this labyrinth and reach the cheese by the shortest possible route, and without making any false moves. As a condition of this experiment it is necessary that the animal should be hungry. This insures a lively response to the stimulus and sends him scurrying and sniffing about, exploring every blind alley, until he finally hits upon the box in which the food has been placed. Having found it, and satisfied his hunger, the rat loses interest, tension is relaxed, and the action may be regarded as completed. The whole proceeding has the character of a drama; interest is aroused at the outset, is continued and stimulated as the action proceeds, and finally ceases when, at its conclusion, the goal is reached and the problem solved. This is the character of action; it is always more or less a drama.

If one asks what it is that connects the different parts and holds this act together, we may say it is the motive, interest, or sustained tension.[9] "An act," says Faris, "is not merely a series of movements, but rather a series of movements plus some goal of endeavor, some end in view. Movements are integrated into acts by the fact that there is an imagined end and a felt unity."[10]

It is evident that man, because he lives in what I have described as a temporal and spatial perspective, and is thus enabled to survey his movements retrospectively and prospectively, is capable of actions that cover a long period of time and a wide range of objects. These long continued actions, in the course of which every single minor movement is more or less preparatory for and subordinated to the action as a whole, gives to man's life the character of a series of episodes and adventures. These episodes in so far as they are integrated in some general scheme or life program, represent a career. It is characteristic of man that he has a career.

The processes by which actions take place can be stated, and in fact have been stated, in physiological terms by Lawrence K. Frank in a paper discussing the development of personality in children. He says:

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9. Robert S. Woodworth, *Psychology, A Study of Mental Life* (1st edition), 1921, pp. 72-85.

10. Ellsworth Faris, "Attitudes and Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 271-81.

Since the young child reacts to the world of things and people as obstacles to, or sources of, tensional adjustment [change of attitude] which thereby becomes established as the recurrent response to all subsequent appearances of that stimulus or situation.

Consequently, the child necessarily will approach all new situations with the tensional condition [attitude] arising from immediately prior experiences in other situations, or from the already experienced stimuli present in that novel situation in which he learned to respond to a given tensional condition [attitude]. It follows, then, that he will learn from a novel situation, in accordance with his tensional condition [attitude] which means that he will respond selectively to that novel situation, ignoring therein whatever is incongruous with the tensional condition [attitude] he brings to it. So experiences are cumulative, and each tensional change [change of attitude] learned by the child operates to condition his subsequent learning, thus giving the personality that appearance of inevitable direction and trend which is so difficult to interrupt or divert.[11]

One may substitute, as I have indicated, for the expression, "tensional condition," wherever it occurs in the statement quoted, the term *attitude*, and for the term "tensional change" *attitudinal change* without materially altering the sense. The statement then describes with accuracy the rôle which the attitude plays in maintaining the continuity of the act. Sustained tension seems to be the physiological surrogate for attitude. Actions, in the sense we have given to that term, may be said to begin with one attitude and conclude with another. As Faris remarks:

When an act has been consummated, the condition or state of the actor is altered ineluctably. Some deposit remains, not only in the experience but behavior. There results what Pareto calls "a residue." An unpleasant experience may leave a man with a bias or prejudice which he never had before. An unexpected happy experience may completely alter his leaning, or proclivity toward the object of his action. . . . When equilibrium has been disturbed, and a conscious, deliberate act results one effect is the formation in experience, of a new object, and the attitude or *residue* is the correlate of the object.[12]

Changes brought about by an action or an experience of any sort may, of course, be described in physiological terms, as a conditioning of the organism, but the result of an action is, in the first instance, not a habit, but an attitude. What one gains with a new habit is ordinarily a new aptitude, a new facility and skill in

11. Lawrence K. Frank, "The Management of Tensions," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, Vol. XXXIII, p. 718.

12. Ellsworth Faris, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-278.

the performance of a familiar act. The new attitude implies a new object, or a new appreciation of an old one.

Attitude is a psychological as well as a sociological concept. As Thurstone conceives it "an attitude is the sum total of a man's inclination and feelings, prejudices or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any specific topic. Thus a man's attitude means here (i.e., for the purposes of the experiment to be described) all that he thinks about peace and war."[13]

This description of the attitude is more inclusive than precise, but that is, perhaps, because, as the author says, an attitude is, after all, "a subjective and personal affair," and something, therefore, not easily defined. If it is true that attitudes, like intelligence, are more easily measured than defined, it may be the part of wisdom, until we know more about them, to talk about attitudes as Thurstone does, in common sense terms. Other writers, and among them sociologists, have been less discreet, and it is perhaps worth while to see what, from the point of view of observation, rather than experiment, can be said about them.

Thomas, who was the first to popularize the term in sociological literature, describes an attitude as "the state of mind of the individual toward a value" and adds, by way of illustration, "love of money, desire for fame, appreciation for God, hatred of the Jew are attitudes." It follows that money, fame, God and the Jews are values.[14]

The notion that attitudes are relative to values involves a distinction as to the subject matter and conceptual objects of the social and physical sciences which has been very clearly and concisely stated by Znaniecki in a paper entitled, "The Object Matter of Sociology":

> Natural phenomena, as conceived by the sciences of nature, are objects and facts essentially independent of the process of human experience and active thought. It does not matter whether this is their primary character or a secondary construction of practical or theoretic reflection. This is the way the natural scientist always treats them; from his standpoint they are self-existing—"nobody's"—objects and facts. . . . On the contrary, cultural phenomena, as the scientific humanist takes them,

13. L. L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, Vol. XXXIII, p. 531.

14. W. I. Thomas, "The Persistence of Primary-Group Norms in Present-Day Society," in Jennings, Watson, Meyer, and Thomas, *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*, 1917.

are essentially "somebody's" phenomena. They are objects as given to the experience of individuals belonging to our social group, and activities formed by these individuals as appearing to them. . . . The sphere of the humanist's investigation is not a world independent of realities, such as might be known to some ideal subject; it is a world of data, given to concrete historically determined human subjects and of actions which these subjects actually perform upon these objects of their experience. . . .

Without the humanistic coefficient the myth would not exist at all, the painting would be a chaos of colored spots upon a piece of canvas, the word a meaningless sound, the legal scheme a collection of sounds or black spots upon paper; the instrument a mere piece of iron, the social organization a complexity of incoherent movements.[15]

The distinction between nature and culture, as Znaniecki conceives them, seems to rest on the fact that the same perceptual object may have, inevitably does have, different meanings for different individuals, and groups of individuals, depending upon the tradition, experience, and attitudes of the individuals and groups concerned. It is the different meanings and values that objects have for different individuals that makes trade and provokes discussion. It is possible to weigh, measure, and describe a physical commodity to the complete satisfaction of two parties to a trade, though they may be quite unable to get together on the price. As a physical object it is identical for both individuals, even though it has, at the same time, a different value for each, neither of these values will, of course, be identical with the market or trade value.

The social sciences are particularly concerned with those subjective aspects of things we call values, since these are the objects for which men live and strive. They, and they alone, explain why men behave like human beings, this is to say, like Frenchmen and Englishmen, Baptists and Methodists, Democrats and Republicans, rather than like Nordics, Alpines, or other racial varieties of the species.

Thomas' description of attitudes as "a state of mind toward a value" throws no light, however, on the distinction, if indeed such a distinction exists, between attitudes and wishes. Faris describes the wish as "an impulse, together with an image of the object of satisfaction," and distinguishes between attitudes and wishes in respect to the dynamic character of the latter. An attitude is, to

15. Florian Znaniecki, "The Object Matter of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1927, Vol. XXXII, pp. 535-36.

be sure, a "tendency to act"; but, "exists as a tendency, even when latent; a wish is always more or less dynamic or kinetic."

On the other hand, Holt's description of the so-called Freudian wish as "a course of action which some mechanism of the body is set to carry out, whether it actually does so or not" might, without the slightest alteration, be substituted for almost any one of the familiar descriptions of an attitude.[16]

"An attitude," says Bernard, "is essentially an incompleted or potential adjustment behavior process. It is the set of the organism toward the object or situation to which an adjustment is called for.[17]

What Holt says further about the "so-called wish" as a unit of behavior, replacing the sensation of the older psychologists, might be said of the attitude as soon and so far as it has taken the place of the conditioned reflex in the description of human behavior. In both instances there is the substitution of a relatively dynamic for an essentially static conception. If habit is the aspect of behavior in which we are interested, the reflex seems to be the logical unit of analysis and description. As soon, however, as interest in the action-aspect of behavior becomes dominant, the attitude, or the Freudian wish, as Holt describes it, is the more convenient and natural unit of description. Evidently the distinction between wishes and attitudes is a more than purely verbal one. Holt includes the attitude under the wish. My own notion has been that the wish must be conceived as one of the components of the attitude. It is the thing that gives the attitude its kick.

The significant characteristics of attitudes, then, seem to be these:

(a) The attitude, as distinguished from the reflex, or conditioned reflex, implies a certain amount of orientation of the organism to the world of objects about it. It is, as Holt says, the objective reference of the attitude that is significant. "The mere reflex does not refer to anything beyond itself; if it drives an organism in a certain direction it is only as a rocket ignited at random shoots off in a certain direction, depending on how it happened to lie." This is implied in the fact that action, as it has been here defined, represents the reaction of the organism as a whole. Actions are

16. Edwin B. Holt, *The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics*, 1915, pp. 3-4.

17. L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1926, p. 246.

directed behavior, and attitudes indicate and determine the direction in which those actions are tending.

(b) The existence of an attitude, since it is a tendency to act -an incompleted act, in fact—involves a certain amount of tension, even where it is latent. In this respect it probably differs from habit or any other form of behavior so far as it is routine and automatic.

(c) Attitudes which may be described as identical as regards direction or tendency may differ as to intensity. This suggests a certain qualification of Thurstone's procedure for measuring attitudes with reference to an issue in terms of opinion. Two persons, A and B, may hold precisely the same opinions in regard to an issue. This would mean that, in an election in which this issue was involved, they would vote the same ticket. They might, for example, both vote for prohibition, but A might hold his opinion with a certain amount of academic reserve. He might regard prohibition, as President Hoover once expressed it, as a "noble experiment" but still an experiment. On the other hand B might hold the same opinion as an article of faith. On this assumption, one who should regard it as in any sense an experiment would then appear to him as an intolerable and dangerous heretic. Thurstone's experiment seems to measure direction and variation of attitudes, but not intensity.

(d) Attitudes are rooted in experience, but it is this experience in all its concreteness that finally determines the character of an attitude, both as to its direction and its intensity. This is the reason why Thomas and Znaniecki have based their studies of the Polish peasant in America mainly on intimate family documents and life histories.

Attitudes, because they are expressive and an index of the tendency and intention of the organism in a situation, are at the same time communicable and, under certain circumstances—depending upon the suggestibility and responsiveness of the individuals concerned—contagious.

A crowd of people in a high state of excitement frequently attain a state of *rapport* in which communication is so immediate and spontaneous that the whole mass seems to act as a unit. In such a situation it is not so much language or gesture as the subtle suggestive influence of mere physical presence that is the medium of

communication. It is not so much a common purpose as a common mood that seems to dominate the group.

Expressiveness and responsiveness are correlative and fundamental human traits which provide a physiological basis for elementary communication. They are at the same time the terms of a process of interaction by which coöperation and consensus are maintained among individual components of a social group.

Expression and response are involved in the most elementary forms of communication. Children and pre-literate people are apparently more responsive to immediate bodily expression of attitudes than they are to words, and they ordinarily interpret verbal speech from the attitudes with which it is accompanied.

There is probably a great difference in individuals in respect to their responsiveness to different forms of expression. Primitive society and primary groups, in which intimate and face-to-face relations predominate, owe their peculiar character to the elementary form of communication that prevails, and to the immediate and mutual responsiveness of all their members.

We frequently speak of social interaction as inter-stimulation. But in the case of communication the stimulus has the character of a suggestion, a hint, and indication of a purpose or intent which is in this manner communicated. Wherever communication takes place it is the meaning and intention that is expressed or embodied in the attitude that is communicated. Communication often takes place below the level of clear consciousness. We live in an atmosphere of suggestion and counter suggestion, the changes and fluctuations of which influence and control us like a social weather.

Köhler, in a recent volume, *Gestalt Psychology*, has made a very interesting analysis of the nature of communication in its more direct and elementary forms, where one does not so much observe behavior and interpret it, as perceive the mind through the medium of overt acts. Overt actions, because they are instrumental and secondary to the "perception of the attitude" are themselves either perceived but slightly or not at all.[18]

Animals, with whom communication is naturally of a very elementary sort, happen to offer the best illustration of the subtlety and immediacy with which attitudes, expressed in very slight movements, are communicated; that is to say, suggest the purposes or

18. Wolfgang Köhler, *Gestalt Psychology*, 1929, pp. 224-68.

intent of one individual to the mind of another, under circumstances where a gesture, if regarded as something more than a signal for a specific act, would probably be meaningless.

Some years ago there was in Berlin an educated horse called Clever Hans (Kluger Hans) whose performances were so remarkable that they attracted the attention of scientific men. Clever Hans answered questions by tapping his foot on the stage, one tap denoted A, two taps B, three taps C, etc. Where numbers were concerned, one tap signified 1, two taps 2, etc. In this way the animal answered the most complicated questions. He not only multiplied one number by another, indicating the number by tapping, but even extracted the square roots, distinguished ten different colors and was able to recognize the photographs of people. After a thorough investigation, in which every possible source of error was excluded, there seemed to be no explanation of the phenomenon unless one assumed that this horse could think, and calculate independently. And this was, in fact, the conclusion of the committee of scientists who investigated the phenomenon.

The explanation offered by Albert Moll was that someone present unintentionally had given the horse a sign when to stop tapping. He says, "Anyone who has been engaged in training hypnotized subjects knows that these insignificant signs constitute one of the chief sources of error. Signs that are imperceptible to others are nevtherless perceived by a subject trained to do so, no matter whether that subject be a human being or an animal."

This conjecture proved to be correct. When Hans was asked to add numbers the sum of which was known to no one present, he proved as inexpert in mathematics as any other horse. This experiment seems to prove two things; first, that the suggestion and counter suggestion which takes place between individuals who are *en rapport* is very much more subtle than is ordinarily supposed. And, second, that to be a mind reader requires a grade of intelligence not superior to that of an educated horse.[19]

There seems to be a general impression that, with the growth of communication and the expansion of communal life, there has been a corresponding growth in the responsiveness and fellow feeling of men for other men. The impression is probably, with

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19. Albert Moll, *Hypnotism*, 1909, pp. 454-56. Cf. also O. Pfungst, *Clever Hans*, 1911.

some qualifications, correct. Human nature has, however, grown more complex in the meantime, and social relations are more casual and less intimate.

Communication has likewise taken more elaborate and more deliberate forms. It sometimes happens that we can communicate in a letter what would be impossible to state in an interview. Literature has been able to express for us sentiments and attitudes which we would otherwise have been wholly unable to discover or communicate. One of the consequences of all these changes seems to have been to intensify the subjectivity of individual man, and at the same time increase his moral isolation. This aspect of human relations is touched on incidentally in one of the casual papers of William James, entitled, "A Certain Blindness in Human Beings." This essay, and James', "Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion," published in 1901-2, under the title of *Varieties of Religious Experience*, are among the earliest, perhaps the very first attempts, to study attitudes on the basis of personal documents.

The "blindness" to which James calls attention is the "blindness with which we are all afflicted, in regard to the feelings of creatures and people different from ourselves." Few persons have so far discovered, or even sought to investigate, the ultimate sources of joy and sorrow, either in themselves, or in others. The documents cited in his paper throw some light on that obscure subject. They indicate, for one thing, how transient and how slight the connection sometimes is between our actual experiences and the objects in the perceptual world to which we inevitably refer them. They suggest how insensible each of us, viewing the matter from the outside, is likely to be, to use James' language "to all that makes life significant to others."

James' thesis, as it is developed there and elsewhere, is that the significance of objects for individual men and women is, in the final analysis, what gives them the character of reality. For things are not real because they exist, merely, but because they are important. The study of attitudes, as it turns out, is a study of this importance—the importance which objects have for different individuals, and groups of individuals, and the conditions under which this importance is acquired.

3. MORES

If man differs from the lower animals in the fact that he lives

in a temporal and spatial perspective, he differs also in the fact that he lives, to an extent and in a way impossible to the lower animals, in society. The habits of men are, for the most part, merely specifications of custom, and men take over the manners of the community in which they live as naturally and inevitably as they inherit and reproduce an ancestral physical type.

It is true of plants, as well as of animals, that they live in what are called communities, in which there exists some sort of commensalism and some sort of natural economy. But animal society is characteristically symbiotic rather than social. Society, in the strict sense of the term, is based upon consensus, custom, and common understanding. Language, communication, a universe of discourse, and a moral order are prime conditions for the existence of society as we know it.

One consequence of the fact that man is, as so many persons since Aristotle have said, a political animal is that human behavior is fundamentally neither reflexive, instinctive, nor even habitudinal merely, but conventional and rational, that is to say, governed by rules, codes, and institutions; controlled by fashion, etiquette, and public opinion. Thus man turns out to be a sophisticated animal, keenly conscious of himself, knowing good and evil, calculating and casuistic, concerned at once about his reputation and his soul. Behavior of this sort is what we ordinarily call conduct, when that word is given an ethical connotation. Conduct is that form of behavior we expect in man when he is conscious of the comment that other men are making, or are likely to make, upon his actions. Conduct, in short, is behavior that is sophisticated.

Animals and very little children are notoriously innocent of convention and of the complications it introduces into the behavior of adult human beings. They have no reputations to sustain, no status, legal or social, to maintain; and no desire to be respectable or respected. On the other hand, since they are unconscious, or nearly so, of any censorship, either of conscience or public opinion, they have no secrets, privacies, subjectivities. They possess no sense either of inner conflict or inner freedom, and no conception, finally, of themselves.

The conceptions which men form of themselves seem to depend upon their vocations, and in general upon the rôle that they seek to play in the communities and social groups in which they live, as well as upon the recognition and status which society ac-

cords them in these rôles. It is status, i.e., recognition by the community, that confers upon the individual the character of a person, since a person is an individual who has status, not necessarily legal, but social.

The naïveté, so complete in animals and very little children, is under certain circumstances, and at certain times, characteristic of most of us. Some of the most obvious examples of naïveté of which most human creatures are illustrations, are cited by Sumner in *The Folkways*, under the title "Illustrations of Ethnocentrism":

> The Jews divided all mankind into themselves and Gentiles. They were the chosen people. The Greeks and Romans called all outsiders Barbarians. . . . The Arabs regarded themselves as the noblest nation, and all others as more or less barbarous. In 1896, the Chinese Minister of Education and his councilors edited a manual in which this statement occurs: "How grand and glorious is the Empire of China, the Middle Kingdom—she is the largest and richest in the world. The grandest men in all the world have come from the Middle Empire." In all the literature of all the states, equivalent statements occur, although they are not so naïvely expressed.[20]

To be naïve, it seems, is to be unaware of the character of the comment which one's behavior is likely to arouse in others. It is an indication that one does not know what is expected of him, nor what the conventions prescribe. Naïveté and *savior-faire* are, from this point of view, correlative indices of socialization. They show to what an extent an individual is, or is not, "in" the set and "in" the society in which he finds himself. The "greenhorn," the "tenderfoot" and the "foreign devil" are more or less familiar titles for a man who finds himself in a world whose conventions he does not know.

Social conventions, notions of what is right, proper and moral, seem always to conform to what Gilbert Murray calls the "normal expectation of mankind." What one man expects of another in a given society is what custom and tradition has led him to expect. Where there is neither custom nor tradition—where men are living, in other words, in a state of nature—social order does not exist. The expectation of mankind is naturally different for different peoples, and for different times, but whatever it is at a time and place, it constitutes what Sumner calls the mores.

The German word for mores is *Sitten*, and the best definition

20. William G. Sumner, *The Folkways*, 1906, p. 14.

of *Sitten* is one that Sumner quotes from V. Hartmann. It is this:

> The mores [Sitten] are, before any beginning of reflection, the regulators of the political, social and religious behavior of the individual. Conscious reflection is the worst enemy of the mores, because mores begin unconsciously and pursue unconscious purposes, which are recognized by reflection only after long and circuitous processes, and because their expediency often depends on the assumption that they will have general acceptance and currency, uninterrupted by reflection.[21]

Laws, codes, and formal institutions are implicit in the mores and, as Sumner says, "rise out of them" by processes that are familiar, but not conceptually defined.

It is, however, the element of obligation in the mores and in laws that give them their peculiar character and it seems that here, as elsewhere, this sense of obligation has its origin mainly in the expectations which our actions, attitudes, and habits arouse in other persons. Once I permit my dog to look at me with a confident expectation that I am going to throw him a bone, he has established what Thomas calls "a claim" which I may or may not recognize, but which I cannot fail to feel. In the language of a Moroccan tribesman, "he has put the 'ahd on me.' "[22]

The same principle works in various ways. Practices which an individual or a community tolerates over a sufficient period of time create finally a vested interest. For example, it is an old rule of law that anyone who, without formal protest, permits a neighbor to maintain and use a path across his lot establishes in course of time, seven years, I think, that neighbor's right to continue that use.

The sense of obligation as between two individuals is a social psychological phenomenon, and arises immediately out of the situation, and of the relation in which these individuals find themselves. It is based on a fact to which Adam Smith in his *Theory of Moral Sentiment* was among the first to call attention. The fact, namely, that imagination has enabled, and the conditions of social life have compelled, men to live in the lives of other men. The reason ethnocentrism and naïveté may be regarded as indices of

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21. Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

22. Edward Westermarck, *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, London, 1926. Westermarck's two large volumes are a mine of information on how religious customs and moral conceptions arise. His chapter on the "ar" and the "ahd" are especially interesting in this connection.

socialization is that they mark the limits and the degree to which what Comte calls "consensus," and what Adam Smith describes as "fellow feeling," extend.

A certain amount of ethnocentrism in the group and egocentrism in the individual is normal and necessary, because a certain amount of subjectivity is necessary to preserve the inner freedom and *morale* of the group and of the individual. They are necessary in order to maintain in the individual and in the group the normal expectation which the social order demands. Normal expectation rests finally, however, on the established habits of individual men and women, habits to which custom and convention, and eventually law have added their sanction.

The mores, while they tend to become fixed in habits, are not identical with them. They grow up and are maintained under the influence of some sort of general consensus. This is indicated by the fact that it is always possible to detect in the mores of any society a general drift and tendency to which all customs and usages are more or less subject.

> The folkways are, therefore, (1) subject to a strain of improvement towards better adaptations of means to ends as long as the adaptation is so imperfect that pain is produced. They are also (2) subject to a strain of consistency with each other, because they all answer their several purposes with less friction and antagonism when they cooperate and support each other.[23]

The drift and tendency of the mores is affected by fashion. "They [fashions] can make a thing modest or immodest, proper or improper, and if they last long enough they affect the sense and the standards of modesty and propriety." Fashion is more or less dominant in every region of experience. There is fashion in thought as well as in action; fashions in philosophy as well as in clothes. There seems to be no fundamental difference between fashions and the mores, except that fashions change. What fashion demands in speech, dress, and manners is that one shall say, do, and wear the expected thing, but say, wear, and do it in a slightly novel manner.

Fashion is a response to an organic demand for new and stimulating, but not too new and not too stimulating, experience. It is of the essence of fashion that it changes. It is change and novelty

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23. Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

which give to fashion the only character that distinguishes it from the mores. It is not quite true that the mores do not change, but the changes of fashion are more rapid, conspicuous, and widely advertised. As a matter of fact, fashion seems to be one way, and perhaps a characteristic way, in which changes in the mores are brought about. Changes in fashion seem to be even more irrational, and just as little controlled by reflection, as changes in custom. All that one can say in justification of a fashion at any given time is that it is the fashion. Fashion is its own justification. But no matter how fantastic the dominance that it exercises, it is just as real, and sometimes even more insistent than that of custom.

Fashion has a prospective reference, the mores come to us from the past. They are transmitted by tradition. Fashions exist only in the present and are transmitted through space.

Gabriel Tarde distinguished between custom and fashion as the two characteristic forms in which cultural traits are transmitted. He says:

> In periods when custom is in the ascendant men are more infatuated about their country than about their time; for it is the past that is pre-ëminently praised. In ages when fashion rules men are prouder, on the contrary, of their time than of their country.[24]

Periods of revolution and rapid change are dominated by fashion. On the contrary, societies which have achieved a stable equilibrium, are conservative, abhor change, honor custom, and enforce the mores. There was a time in the history of Japan, when social ritual was so strictly enforced that a breach of etiquette was little short of a crime. At that time a rude fellow was defined simply as "an-other-than-expected person," and to act in an unexpected way was an offense that might be punished with death.

As long, and to the degree, that the moral and social order was completely embodied in the mores and man was wholly, or almost wholly, ruled by custom and tradition, no such thing as a political society, in the sense in which we know it today, could well exist. It was not until the sacred order that had been precipitated in the *Sitten*—the expediency of which, as V. Hartmann says, depended upon their unreflective and unquestioned acceptance—had been more or less superseded by a secular society, in which parties had gained some sort of toleration and individual differences of interest

24. Gabriel Tarde, *Laws of Imitation*, 1903, p. 247.

and opinion, some sort of expression, that public opinion and a political order based on it could really be said to exist. Public opinion and political society, and, in fact, the whole individualistic and secular organization of life, have grown up more or less at the expense of the mores.

The political process may be said to begin with the first manifestation of unrest or discontent with an existing régime. Unrest passes over imperceptibly into agitation. Agitation follows unrest, because restless people are themselves agitated, and the agitation still further advertises their discontent. If it turns out that discontent thus advertised is contagious there instantly grows up a sense of common interest among all concerned, which furnishes the basis for some sort of collective action. Systematic agitation may result in strikes, in demonstrations, mass movements; a party usually grows up out of the efforts of leaders to manage and control the masses they have succeeded in rousing.

Mass movements may assume the form of a revolution or of a demand for new policies and new programs. The first effect of the rise and expression of public opinion is likely to be disturbing, merely, destroying the authority of the mores, but bringing about only the most superficial changes in the habits and attitudes of the masses in which the mores are rooted. Even changes in legislation, and the formation of new programs and policies, do not immediately bring about the changes in custom and habit which they seek to enforce. It is through efforts of the courts and the administrative authorities, seeking to enforce the new regulations and to interpret them in some way consistent with the existing mores, that actual changes are eventually achieved.

Public opinion arises as soon as an issue is framed, and public discussion is likely to follow all the proceedings in legislative bodies and in the courts until the meaning and sense of a new law or a new policy is thoroughly clarified, and reduced to some sort of consistency with tradition and fundamental human nature. In the long run the new law and the new institution turn out to be a growth and evolution out of the institutions that preceded them. Finally these new institutions get themselves fixed in the habits of individuals and gain the sanction of custom in the community. What was formerly new and revolutionary is now old stuff, taken for granted, no longer provokes discussion, has become a second nature of the community and is part of the mores.

In this way issues that rise out of the mores are eventually brought back and incorporated into the mores. It is only then that we can properly say that the political process is complete.

Social changes, and particularly changes in the mores, always involve more radical changes in human nature. There is, as Thomas and Znaniecki have pointed out, no preëxisting harmony between the individual and society.[25] The pressure of society on the individual is directed to securing conformity to convention. The resistance of the individual arises in an effort to secure expression of his own interests and purposes.

The struggle which ensues does not always and necessarily take the form of a physical conflict, or even of a political controversy. Much of it, most of it probably, is a struggle that takes place in the mind of the individual himself, or, to speak physiologically and behavioristically, in the individual's insides. It is mostly visceral and glandular behavior. It serves, at any rate, to give man the peculiar human traits for which mankind is notorious—his sophistication and his introversion. It is responsible for the fact that he has a conscience, and a divided self; and for many, if not most of his mental and functional diseases. Mental and not sexual are, it seems, the true social diseases.

Social changes begin with changes in the conditioned attitudes in individuals. Attitudes change first, and thus the changing attitudes of the individuals in any community are a sort of barometer, indicative of changes that will presently take place in social institutions and in the mores. A few years ago, during the agitation of the Oriental Exclusion Law, a question was raised, which played a considerable rôle in the public discussion of the time, as to the relative fecundity of the native and the Japanese people on the Pacific Coast, and as to what was likely to be the relative proportion of the Japanese in the total population in the course of a period of years. Professor S. J. Holmes, author of *The Trend of the Race*, proposed to answer the question, not on the basis of the then existing birthrate, but by finding out what were the attitudes of the Japanese young women of the second generation on the coast towards birth control. This indicates that the trend of the race may sometimes be reflected in those subjective and personal matters that we call attitudes.

25. William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (2nd edition), 1927, Vol. II, pp. 1861-62.

Under the influence of changes which political institutions have introduced into society, along with the coincident expansion of communal life which a rational legal system has helped, at any rate, to make possible, human nature has undergone profound changes. The present-day individualism which is so characteristic of Occidental as contrasted with Oriental civilizations, is undoubtedly connected with the breaking up of the ancient local and tribal loyalties, and the loosening of family ties which still give the tone and patriarchal character to governments outside of Europe and America. In response to changes of a steadily increasing trend toward the secularization of social relations man has lost much of his primitive simplicity. On the other hand, he has achieved a new freedom and a new candor. Human nature today seems to be gradually accommodating itself to a coming cosmopolitanism in which mankind will have become, for better and for worse, completely emancipated and sophisticated.

CHAPTER 19

INDUSTRIAL FATIGUE AND GROUP MORALE

WHATEVER its title—The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization—may suggest to the sophisticated reader, the volume[1] of which this article is a review is not a contribution to contemporary social philosophy. On the contrary, it is a particularly lucid and illuminating account of a series of experiments into the nature of fatigue, and more particularly industrial fatigue, begun in the Fatigue Laboratory at Harvard University and continued in the shops of the Western Electric Company at Cicero, Illinois.

The author, Elton Mayo, is Professor of Industrial Research, of the Graduate School of Business, Harvard University.

The problem of industrial fatigue, as here defined, had its origin in the emergency created by the World War and was first made the subject of systematic investigation in England. As originally conceived, it seemed to be a relatively simple affair. Attempts to measure physiological fatigue by laboratory methods had disclosed that it was associated with the production of various chemical products, certain of which were described as "fatigue toxins." This suggested to certain minds the possibility of discovering a specific drug, an antitoxin, in short, which would banish fatigue and, once and for all, solve a troublesome industrial problem.

It was even suggested that acid sodium phosphate might achieve

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1. Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1933. P. 194.

the result. But "the single discovery, the simple remedy, the one best way," after twelve years and numerous investigations, did not materialize.

These investigations, though they failed to find a remedy for fatigue, did reach one important conclusion, namely, that fatigue "cannot be defined as a single limited entity." That meant, among other things, that fatigue must be conceived less as a disease than as a symptom, or at any rate as a condition that arises in response to a number of interacting factors which, because of the nature of the living organism, cannot be isolated and dealt with singly.

It is this "organic" relation of the factors involved that complicates social as well as biological experiments. If it is not possible, in biological experiments, "to change a factor *a* while keeping factors *b c d . . . n* constant," the same principle seems to apply in social experiments.

If "living organism responds to changes as a totality," the same is probably true of societies and social groups. In any case, the author's "methodological note" on the difficulties of measuring fatigue reflects an insight and announces a principle of very wide application and one which has served to inform and direct the course of the whole series of investigations of which this volume is a record. It is interesting and significant that these investigations, as they have advanced, have brought new and more complicated problems into view. Thus a more thoroughgoing analysis of industrial fatigue suggested that it was connected with, or due to, monotony. An analysis of monotony, however, indicated that it, also, was a response to a variety of factors—factors, however, that might be described as psychological and social rather than physiological. They were psychological in so far as they were based on individual and temperamental differences, or due to changing moods and attitudes in the same individual. They were social in so far as they were determined by personal relations, i.e., the personnel relations of the employees to one another, and to the persons who directed and supervised their work.

Consciousness introduces, in the case of human creatures, factors which do not complicate the operations of robots. For example, employees in the factory become attached to a certain machine, and they are annoyed if they are suddenly transferred to another and different one, particularly if the transfer is accompanied with very little explanation or consideration of their personal wishes.

Furthermore, there is always in the factory or the shop what is described as morale, and this measurably affects turnover and output.

Thus, as the investigation continued, it encountered new and "untouched human problems at depths far below the superficial levels of current industrial organization." It is interesting, also, that an investigation which was undertaken in the first instance in the service of a purely practical purpose, namely, to increase output, was successively forced to face fundamental problems. Thus the attempt to measure fatigue raised a question as to the nature of the thing to be measured; it led next to a similar inquiry in regard to monotony; and led finally to the further and ultimate question: What is morale? more specifically, what is industrial morale?

In the attempt to answer this latter question, which turned out to be the crux of the problem, the inquiry which previously had been conducted under the experimental conditions of the test room took the form of a series of interviews in which each individual was encouraged to make his or her own comments on personnel and conditions in the industry.

What these interviews revealed was not that "deadening effect of the machine" which literary critics commonly suppose to be the chief problem of a mechanical age. What seemed to be the real source of difficulty was a lack of understanding among the workers in regard to the work itself and the manner of its performance; a lack of understanding which, finally, involved the workers and the management in "a degree of discord which no one could understand or control."

It is "the essential nature of the human," as the author puts it, "that, with all the will to co-operate, he finds it difficult to persist in action for an end he can but dimly see." If people are to work together, there must be some sort of consensus between those who direct operations and those who work under this direction. There must, in short, be some sense of participating in a common undertaking such as Sidney Hillman and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers sought to describe in the expression "citizens in industry."

Community of interest, in the ordinary sense of that word, is not enough, particularly if it takes the form merely of a participation in the profits of the industry. What is needed to sustain morale in industry is, in the language of this report, "a non-logical social code, which regulates relations between persons and their attitudes to one another," something that developed naturally in primitive

societies, but seems to be absent in our more sophisticated modern industrial world, namely, a body of industrial folkways.

The trouble with industry is that, under the conditions imposed by modern industrial civilization, the factory is not a society. It is merely a place where a certain number of persons earn their living.

"Insistence upon a merely economic logic of production—especially if the logic is frequently changed—interferes with the development of such a [non-logical] code and consequently gives rise in the group to a sense of human defeat."

This diagnosis of a kind of trouble that "penetrates the whole fabric of one civilization" does not suggest to the author the necessity for any species of political remedy. On the contrary, in spite of the considerable political changes that have taken place since the end of the World War, "the human problems of industrial organization remain identical for Moscow, London, Rome, Paris, and New York." Here, "as ever in human affairs, we are struggling against our own ignorance and not against the machinations of a political adversary."

What emerges as a result of these investigations of industrial fatigue and industrial morale is the insight that both are due to some interference or failure to preserve the organic and the social balance. There remains, however, the further and more general question, namely, How far do conditions in the factory reflect those in the world at large? In the light of previous investigation it was evident that life in a modern industrial center in some unrealized way predisposed workers to "obsessive response." What is here described as "obsessive response" had been recognized in the course of the previous investigations as a symptom, in the individual, of disequilibrium in the group.

In searching for light upon the larger and more general question, the author and his associates were impressed by Clifford Shaw's studies of *Delinquency Areas* in Chicago, and by Ruth Shonle Cavan's investigations of suicide in relation to personal and communal disorganization in the same city. These studies indicated a definite correlation between the rate of crime and of suicide—and the incidence of communal disorganization.

Since both the delinquency and the suicide studies were carried so largely in the central core of a metropolitan region where the demoralization of the population is notoriously widespread, it

seemed advisable to make further investigations in smaller and more stable communities which had been less exposed to the disorganizing effects of industrial civilization.

This task has actually been undertaken by Lloyd Warner, of the department of anthropology at Harvard University. He has just returned from an investigation of a tribe of Australian Blackfellows, and is now, with the assistance of graduate and undergraduate students in anthropology, studying Newburyport, Massachusetts. In assigning this task to an anthropologist, it was assumed that that method, "developed by functional anthropology in the Andaman Islands, the Trobriands and Australia," could be adapted, at least in the beginning, to the purposes of the study of a typical New England town.

Although the "adventure" begun at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company has now moved outside the works and is still incomplete, enough has been learned to make it possible to draw some general inferences.

These investigations of fatigue and morale throw a new and unexpected light, for example, on the doctrines of laissez faire economy which ushered in the present-day industrial régime, as well as upon the policies of political liberalism which has been associated with it.

At the time when, as the author points out, Quesnay was proclaiming the existence of "certain natural principles" capable of regulating human association, and was advising that industry be left free to work out its own destiny, France possessed "a vigorous and highly integrated society much hampered in its industrial development by governmental over-regulation."

When Adam Smith later advocated similar principles in England, the British Empire was also in a position to profit by them. As a result of the rapid changes and the greater complexity of human relations which followed the expansion of industry and trade, government regulation was extended by successive stages to regions of life where control had, up to that time, rested in general upon consensus and the mores, rather than positive law.

The consequence of this extension of political control was that "as other functions of social control diminished or disappeared and the political functions alone survived, political control again emerged as the sole organ in actuality of social organization." This extension of political control took place at a time when in England

and America political philosophy still clung to the maxim that "the government that governs least is the government that governs best."

The result has been that in a period in which society has been undergoing changes which have undermined traditional institutions, political activity and social theory have been multiplying by an ever increasing number of legislative enactments designed to prop up and patch a decaying constitutional structure. The author's comment is: "An unduly abstract political theory has permitted important social changes to pass unnoticed." Things have moved faster than thought. The changes which have undermined the traditional structure of society have been associated with the inevitable migration and movement of people incident to a rapidly expanding industry. This mobility has everywhere broken up the traditional order and has not permitted a new order to establish itself. The automobile is the most obvious symbol of this increased mobility, and of the speed with which these changes have come about. In increasing the mobility of the individual man, it has multiplied the difficulties of maintaining a stable social order. It has at the same time undermined what is in every society the primary source of control, namely, the vigilance of neighbors and the desire of every individual to retain the respect and esteem of his local community. It has made it possible for ubiquitous gangsters and bandits to be classed as public enemies abroad and continue to play the rôle of friend and benefactor among their neighbors, friends, and relatives at home.

These are, however, merely the grosser and more obvious consequences of existing conditions. The ultimate causes and effects are more pervasive and less easy to come upon.

It is true enough, as the author says, that "ills elsewhere in the social organism reflect themselves immediately in political disequilibrium." It is, however, equally true that "ills cannot be understood or alleviated so long as their political symptoms alone are studied."

The stability and health of any society, tribe, nation, or industrial group depend upon its ability to develop a tradition, a body of mores, and a code which represent at once the consensus and common understanding as well as the accumulated wisdom and common sense of the group. If changes are so rapid as to make it impossible to maintain and transmit this tradition, the social equi-

librium and the *esprit de corps* which this tradition has supported will inevitably be dissipated and lost.

"If a specialist group develops scientific knowledge and applies it to technical practice at too high a speed for general social adjustment to the change, one effect is to transform a non-logical social organization into irrational social disorganization."

If so-called "pressure groups" formulate and impose upon the community legislation which cannot be enforced because it is not understood, accepted, and adequately embodied in the mores of the community, the effect is to increase the ills which it was intended to diminish.

The main point is this: The ills from which an industrial civilization is suffering are not fundamentally political; they are cultural —ills that can be cured not by legislation but by concert, collective action and leadership. The most pressing problems of present-day industrial society are: "better methods for the discovery of an administrative élite; better methods of maintaining working morale."

The problems that arise in industry are in the last analysis identical with the problems of industrial civilization generally. "The country that first solves these problems will infallibly outstrip the others in the race for stability, security, and development."

As its title suggests, this volume surveys within the limits of its 194 pages a wide field and arrives at conclusions of very general bearing. It starts, however, from a real problem and remains, on the whole, within the limits of an eminently pragmatic point of view. In his efforts to indicate the implication of the experiments here recorded, the author has displayed an extraordinarily precise knowledge of a wide range of scientific theory, ranging from Lawrence J. Henderson's experiments in biochemistry to Pareto's theory of the rôle of the élite in maintaining social equilibrium. The concept of equilibrium, and particularly social equilibrium, has gained a new, a wider, a more precise significance as a result of the discussion in this volume.

One of the obstacles to social research hitherto has been the difficulty of analyzing concrete social problems in such a way as to fit the categories or compartments of the existing social sciences. This is true, in part, no doubt, because the present organization of social science has largely grown up to meet the necessities of an

orderly exposition of the accepted facts and principles rather than to serve the purposes of research and social experiment.

Actual social problems are complex and invariably arise in conditions that make it difficult if not impossible to isolate and deal with them separately. The attempt to apply social science to actual problems has necessitated an amount of collaboration between men in the different disciplines that has hitherto not been regarded as either practical or possible. One thing that this report demonstrates is that it is possible for investigators representing scientific disciplines as diverse as biochemistry, medical psychology, and anthropology to work together over a long series of diverse but interrelated problems, with the best possible results.

CHAPTER 20

PHYSICS AND SOCIETY

SOME seventy years ago, sixty-eight, to be exact, Walter Bagehot published a notable little volume entitled *Physics and Politics*, described in a subtitle as "Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of 'Natural Selection' and 'Inheritance' to Political Society." Actually the volume sought to sketch in outline a natural history of political society, and to describe the process or processes by which later, more elaborate, and more liberal forms of association have emerged from the dissolution of earlier, simpler, and more rigid, if not oppressive, forms.

Society, or at least political society, as Bagehot conceived it, is a kind of super-organism, having a social structure which is maintained by a social process. This structure is imbedded in and cemented by custom. Man is a custom-making animal. The process in this instance which is not otherwise defined, is what we know elsewhere as "the historical process." Its function is to weave and reweave the web of custom and tradition in which the individuals who are destined to live together and eventually act together as a political unit, are ineluctably bound together.

Always there is a more or less inflexible tradition which imposes upon each new generation the pattern of the inherited social order. But always there are the liberating and individuating influences of other social processes—competition, conflict, and discussion—

Reprinted by permission of the publisher from the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, VI:2 (May, 1940), pp. 135-52; also in C. W. M. Hart, ed., *Essays in Sociology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1940), pp. 1-18.

which represent what Bagehot describes as man's "propensity to variation," or, to use a political rather than a biological term, his propensity for non-conformity, "which," he adds, "is the principle of progress."

Competition, not economic merely but biotic, the kind of competition which, according to Darwin, was responsible for the different organic species, as well as the different races of man, seems to have been the individuating and organizing factor in what Bagehot describes as "the preliminary age," at a time when society, in the human sense of that term, was no more than emergent. The preliminary age in which man lived in a social order, familial and genetic rather than political, but at any rate irresistibly fixed in custom and tradition, was eventually succeeded by the "age of conflict."

War and conquest, even when they involved slavery, seem to have been the first great emancipators of man, since they first effectively destroyed the fixed customary social order in which man had lived until that time as a mental prisoner of his tribal or local culture.[1] It was in conquest that the state, which first brought together in a common *modus vivendi* peoples of different races and cultures, seems to have had its origin.[2] But if the state had its origin in war it nevertheless imposed peace within the territory that it dominated. It is this fact, perhaps, that justifies the statement that "the function of war has been to extend the area within which it has been possible to maintain peace," and with peace, industry, commerce, and a wider division of labour.

With the rise of industry and of commerce, an "age of discussion" gradually superseded, at least in the Western world, the age of conflict. It was, in fact, about the market-place, where men came together to dicker and chaffer, to exchange goods and ideas, that

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1. Slavery, because it is one of the institutions to which, "at a certain stage of growth all nations in all countries cleave to," is described by Bagehot as "a provisional institution." In accordance with this conception "a slave is an unassimilated atom; something which is in the body politic, but yet hardly part of it." *Physics and Politics* (London, 1872), p. 171.

2. The notion that society and intellectual life have advanced as a consequence of events that disturbed a pre-existing social equilibrium and undermined an inherited social order is the catastrophic theory of progress. It is not Bagehot's invention but has been put forward, in one form or another and at one time or another, by a long line of humanists and non-professional students of society and human nature. (See Frederick J. Teggart, *Theory of History* (New Haven, 1925), ch. xv, "The Method of Hume and Turgot.")

political discussion grew up and intellectual life began. It was, as Bagehot remarks, "politics and discussion that finally broke all the bonds of custom" which, up to that time, had strangled men's thinking and held them in bondage to precedent and to the past.

The age of discussion is obviously also the age of reason. Reason is, in fact, the product of dialectic, just as mind, according to Mead, is the product of social interaction. "We must regard mind, then, as arising and developing within the social process, within the empirical matrix of social interactions."[3] In this age of discussion, then, men are no longer trammelled by either tradition or custom, but are free to discuss everything in the heavens or under the seas; evrything, accordingly, sacred or secular, is now, or in a way to be, the subject of rational analysis or scientific inquiry. Thoughts are never dangerous, it seems, as long as discussion is possible.

One should add, perhaps, that although in this new, enlightened world man is no longer hampered by piety toward the past or respect for tradition, the great mass of men and women still bow to the dictates of fashion and never wholly escape the more insidious influences of advertising and propaganda. The substitution of fashion for custom and of propaganda for tradition is no doubt to be interpreted as a more or less inevitable incident of progress and of the cultural emancipation of mankind, just as one expects a flock of quacks to follow the wake of every advance in medical science, or a new outbreak of crime to follow every effort to enforce by police regulation a rule of conduct that is not supported by the mores and the general consensus of society. This, briefly and in substance, is Bagehot's account of political society.

In re-reading, after many years, Bagehot's notable little volume I am impressed again, as I have been before, with the number of instances in which social science has been indebted for some of its more profound and penetrating insights to laymen, rather than to professional students, that is to say, to men whose sources of knowledge are a wide acquaintance with men and affairs, rather than the methodical inquiries of systematic science. Walter Bagehot is an instance, but it would not be difficult to name others. Adam Smith, for example, who wrote not only *The Wealth of Nations,* but *The Moral Sentiments;* William Graham Sumner, whose *Folkways,* one of the most widely read and influential books in the field of

3. George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago, 1934), p. 133.

sociology, is actually a quite unsystematic collection of notes and comments on the author's wide-ranging reading in ethnological and historical literature. Graham Wallas, author of *Human Nature in Politics* and *The Great Society*, is another example of a writer whose knowledge is largely that of a curious observer of men and their ways rather than of systematic investigation of society and human nature. One might even include among the list of these unprofessional students a philosopher and sociologist like Georg Simmel, whose observations on human relations and the "social mind" are often quite as subtle and penetrating as are those of Freud and the psychoanalysts upon the more obscure aspects of the individual psyche.

None of these men, with the possible exception of Simmel, were systematic students of society. They were, however, men whose intellectual interests led them to range widely over the surface of events and to reflect deeply upon the human scene in the various aspects in which it presented itself to them. One might describe them, perhaps, as human naturalists, curious and interested observers of human relations, somewhat as Darwin and the naturalists of the last century were of the interrelations of the lesser organisms. It is worth noting, also, that while these men were not primarily interested, as more systematic students of society are likely to be, in the logical and methodological problems of the social sciences, there were often implicit in their writings, ideas and insights which if carried out into some greater detail might have supplied a logical framework for more systematic and more scientific investigations.

At any rate, Bagehot's attempt to discover what one might describe as "the mechanisms of progress" in order to make intelligible the rise of the modern world, serves admirably to lift into plain view what is sociologically significant in the present world crisis, and to indicate its relation to what is, perhaps, the most fundamental problem with which students of society have everywhere had to deal, the problem, namely, of social change.

There have always been, it seems, a limited number of theoretic problems to which every "system" or frame of reference for the study of society must find an answer, and although different students will conceive and formulate these solutions differently, the problems remain essentially the same. Every society, for example, possesses a structure and every such social structure has presumably

come into existence and is maintained by some sort of process or processes. In analysing and describing social phenomena some writers have emphasized the aspect of process, others structure.

Almost every fundamental problem of society, whether theoretical or practical, revolves finally, it seems, about the necessity of reconciling changes in the social order with the perpetuation of the function for which that order exists; with the necessity, of reconciling freedom with security, and social change with social progress.

In the natural history of human relations there has always been, to use an ecological term, some sort of succession. There has been, for example, the rise and the fall of empires, and with these apparently cyclical changes there has been some sort of discontinuous progress. There has been progress probably because there has always been the possibility of including more territory and more people within the limits of a single economy, which in turn has insured the existence of a greater specialization of function and a wider division of labour. But the modern progress, as the modern man understands it, is an invention of not merely the modern but the occidental world. It was unknown to the ancient Greeks and Romans. "It was not" as Bagehot remarks, "that they rejected the idea; they did not entertain it."

In the modern world, on the other hand, progress is not simply a term describing a particular form of social change, i.e., change characterized by a long-time secular trend. It is rather an ideal and an article of faith. Walter Bagehot seems to have shared this faith, not in a continuous and irreversible, but in an intermittent and ultimate progress. Further and continued progress, however, was likely to be confined to Europe. However, Bagehot's conception of progress and of the historical process was based on his observations of a world that no longer exists. What we see going on about us today seems, in many respects, a reversal of all that his discussion of the evolution of political society might have led us to expect.

Bagehot lived at a time when the people of Europe were enjoying at once a degree of personal freedom and personal security such as they probably never experienced before and may never know again. Europe was just beginning in 1870 to reap the full fruits of the industrial revolution. The age of discovery which began with Columbus was presently to be completed with the rediscovery of Africa by Livingstone and Stanley. Technological inventions had

made Europe the active and dominant centre of a new, world-wide civilization and at the same time, of a political and cultural domination which the steamship and the locomotive were presently destined to extend to the most remote regions of the earth. England had reached, or nearly so, the zenith of its political power and influence in the world. The wide-flung British Empire seemed, at the moment, to hold the whole world in its embrace. The problem of population which had troubled Malthus in the early part of the century and had suggested to Darwin his theory of the origin of the species, seemed to have been solved as a result of the world-wide division of labour, which the expansion of the world market had made possible.

The progress of science and technological inventions have continued at an even more rapid rate since that time, but Europe is no longer the only politically or culturally active centre in an otherwise passive world. Something has happened to reawaken intellectual life in the "arrested civilizations" of the Orient. In all the states of Europe where technological advancement has been greatest, populations are declining. In other parts of the world that were formerly passive, notably Japan, China, and India, population is increasing.

The world, which in 1870 seemed to offer a limitless space for expansion is today overcrowded. Economists are busy inventorying its resources and reckoning the time when they will be exhausted. No longer is Europe expanding. Migration has practically ceased. International trade has declined. European civilization has reached its territorial limits and great powers are engaged in a desperate struggle for living room, *Lebensraum.*

But if the trend which Bagehot plotted has changed, the processes he described continue. Furthermore, with the change in the trend there has been a corresponding change in the ideology and in the unconscious assumptions by which men live. Walter Lippmann says the intellectual climate of western Europe began to change somewhere between 1848 and 1870, and since 1870 liberal philosophy has been on the defensive and liberals have been fighting a losing rear-guard action. Since 1874 there has been a steady trend toward the substitution of the authority and control of the state in the place of the freedom and responsibility of the individual man.[4]

4. After 1870 or thereabouts, men thought instinctively once more in terms

Meanwhile, and as a consequence of changes in life conditions which technological changes have made, there has been general change in the attitude of men of science and the modern world with respect to the relation of science to human welfare. Thus a year ago, in an address before the National Academy of Sciences, Sir William Bragg said: "The effect of science upon social relations and social conditions has become very great, and the gains are obvious. Yet science does not appear to be in all cases beneficient. It has become a matter of anxious consideration whether or no the increase in the knowledge of nature must necessarily bring evil as well as good." This is not the isolated utterance of a single individual. On the contrary, Sir William's words merely reflect the doubts and misgivings of thoughtful men in every avenue of life. Men are now beginning, it seems, to reckon with the cost of progress asking themselves whether, at the moment, the balance is on the credit or the debit side of the ledger.

"Science and its applications are not only transforming the physical and mental environment of men; but are adding greatly" —this is the language of the American Association for the Advancement of Science—"to the complexities of their social, economic and political life."[5] There are obvious reasons, it seems, why at the present, when totalitarian governments have subordinated science, as they have every other social function, to their national policies, men of science should be concerned about the future of science. It explains why the American Association for the Advancement of Science, after proclaiming as a fundamental article of faith that "Science is wholly independent of national boundaries and races and creeds and can flourish permanently only where there is peace and intellectual freedom," decided to make "as one of its objectives an examination of the profound effects of science upon society."[6]

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of organization, authority, and collective power. To enhance their prospects business men looked to tariffs, to concentrated corporate control, to the suppression of competition, to large scale business administration. To relieve the poor and lift up the downtrodden, reformers looked to an organized working class, to electoral majorities, to the capture of the sovereign power and its exploitation in their behalf. Though great corporate capitalists continued to invoke the shibboleths of liberalism when confronted by the collective demands of the workers or the hostile power of popular majorities, yet they were thoroughly imbued with the collectivist spirit through their attachment to protection and to the concentration of control. Walter Lippman, *The Good Society* (Boston, 1937), p. 47.

5. *Science*, vol. XC, Sept. 29, 1939, p. 294.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

But this problem of the relation of physical science and technology to society and social conditions which Sir William Bragg described as "a subject of the first importance of the wole world," is neither as novel nor as recent as one might assume from the interest it has aroused since the rise of the totalitarian governments.

Brooks Adams seems to have predicted the present crisis thirty-seven years ago. At that time, including much else that is pertinent to this discussion, he said: "No established type of mind can adapt itself to changes in environment, even in slow-moving civilizations, as fast as environments change. . . . To us, however, the most distressing aspect of the situation is that the social acceleration is progressive in proportion to the activity of the scientific mind which makes mechanical discoveries, and it is therefore a triumphant science which produces those ever more rapidly recurring changes in environment to which men must adapt themselves at their peril."[7]

The influence of physics and the physical sciences upon society and social life are naturally more obvious in the field of technology than elsewhere. The modern world has passed successfully through the age of iron, steel, and electricity and now it is struggling to adapt itself to an age in which the social structure is largely determined by the automobile, the tractor, and the aeroplane. These mechanical devices have sometimes been devastating in their effects, but at the same time they have been regenerating. In every case, however, they have invariably drawn closer and tighter that steadily expanding web of mutual interdependence we call *society*.

Technological devices have naturally changed men's habits and in doing so they have necessarily modified the structure and functions of society. The general nature of these changes may be described as follows: (1) change in the character of man's relation to the soil and to his natural habitat; (2) changes in his relations to other men.

With the aid of machinery, man has become less and less immediately dependent upon the natural resources of his habitat and more and more dependent upon a complex social organization, through which these resources are collected, manufactured, and distributed. The result is that the food quest in the modern world

7. Brooks Adams, *The Theory of Social Revolution*, quoted by Elton Mayo, in *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1938), p. 175.

has ceased to be what it once was—a search for food—and has become rather a hunt for a job.

It is naturally the great cities that have most completely transformed the human habitat and imposed upon human beings the discipline of a more completely mechanized world. Perhaps that is why social problems in great cities have, in recent years, uniformly assumed a technological character. They have become problems in social engineering. Every function of life, as it becomes rationalized, tends to be carried on, it seems, with the assistance of some sort of expert and with the aid of some sort of machine.

The modern city has long since ceased to be what the peasant village was, an agglomeration of individual habitations. Rather, it is like the civilization of which it is the centre and focus, a vast physical and institutional structure in which men live, like bees in a hive, under conditions such that their activities are considerably more regulated, regimented, and conditioned than is likely to appear to the spectator or be perceived by the habitant.

In order to be specific as to the changes which technology has made in the character of social relations, it will be advantageous if not necessary to say something as to the nature of the thing we call society. Assuming that any association in which individuals carry on a common life is a society, the types of association which we expect to find in a society of human beings are (1) territorial, (2) economic, (3) political, and (4) cultural, corresponding to the different social sciences, i.e., human ecology, economics, politics, and sociology or cultural anthropology.

The territorial order. Geography and the territorial organization of society get their importance from the fact that personal and social relations are determined largely by physical distances, and that social stability is insured when human beings are rooted in the soil. On the other hand, the most drastic changes in society are likely to be those that involve mobility and, particularly, mass migrations of peoples. Thus Frederick Teggart, and others who adhere to the catastrophic theory of progress, believe that most of the great advances in civilization are due, directly or indirectly, to the migration of peoples and the catastrophic changes which have accompanied them.

From this point of view it seems that every technical device, from the wheelbarrow to the aeroplane, in so far as it provided a new and more effective means of locomotion, has, or should have

marked an epoch in history. This is so far true as most other important changes in civilization are likely to be correlated with changes in the means of transportation and communication. It is said likewise that every civilization carries in itself the seeds of its own destruction. Such seeds are likely to be the technical devices that introduce a new social order and usher out an old.

The economic or competitive order. Living creatures not only attract and repel others, as do physical objects, but they also compete with one another. Economic relations, wherever they exist, are the products of competition; but competition eventually brings about some sort of co-operation, which in the case of human beings takes the form of an exchange of goods and services. The economic order is the product of trade. The market, and the area over which exchange takes place, mark the centres and limits of economic society.

It is obvious that technological devices have profoundly affected economic relations. In improving the means of transportation they have progressively extended the limits of the world market and of economic society. They have made mass production and mass distribution possible and are directly responsible for the existence of the capitalistic system as we know it. In so far as they have brought the divers peoples of the earth into a world-wide web of economic relations, technological devices have laid the basis for a world-wide political society and eventually of a moral and cultural order that will include all mankind. Finally, civilization, as distinguished from local and tribal cultures, is the product of commerce and the incidental division of labour which commerce not only permits but ensures.

Elliot Smith, the English anthropologist, in an account of certain of our primitive contemporaries, says:

> They have, of course, no agriculture and no domesticated animals, except the dog in some cases. They do not build permanent houses, and at most make rough shelters. They would seem formerly to have gone about naked, as many of them still do. They are ignorant of pottery-making, and of metal-working. They have no social classes, and usually no organization in clans or other similar social groups. In fact, their condition can truly be defined as being practically devoid of social institutions. Many of them still live in this original way in natural family groups, such, for example, as are found among the gorillas and other anthropoid apes.[8]

8. Elliot Smith, *Human History* (New York, 1929), p. 183.

We have only to compare the material and intellectual wealth of modern civilized peoples with the material and intellectual poverty of primitive peoples to gain some concrete notion of what the physical sciences have contributed to society as we know it and to human welfare as we understand it.

The political order. Disregarding for the moment the fact that human beings have their origins in and owe most of their personal and distinctively human traits to the intimate associations imposed by the family, let us consider the significance of the fact that we are actually living today in the Great Society, whose dimensions and characteristics have been described by Graham Wallas, in his volume of that title. That means that we are living in a world in which, no matter how limited or how intimate our relations with certain individuals, we are nevertheless involved, at the same time, with all other living creatures in what Darwin calls "the web of life." Under these circumstances our most abstract and impersonal relations with other human beings are likely to be territorial and symbiotic rather than social, that is to say each individual will be living in some more or less unconscious dependence upon every other at least in the same habitat. The next, somewhat more limited area of human relationships, is that which includes individuals living in the same economy in which there is some recognized division of labour and some regular exchange of goods and services, all more or less regulated by custom and law. Following this, we are involved in a more limited as well as a more intimate circle of relationship which we call political. We may describe as political that relationship which constitutes society, as organized on a territorial rather than a familial basis.

It is characteristic of a political society that within the limits of its authority, rights and duties of individuals are more or less defined and, if necessary, enforced either by the formal laws, sanction of custom, or power. Obviously the state and the political organization of society is based on a less inclusive and more concrete and intimate circle of relationships than the area of trade and commercial relations in which it exists. It is equally obvious that the circle of relations between individual citizens of a state or the inhabitants of any of its dependencies is necessarily more inclusive, but less intimate than ordinarily exists in the family, the tribe, or any other genetic group.

If we look at the structure of society as a whole, with respect

to the degree of interdependence and intimacy of the relations in which individuals live, we shall see that human relations seem to take the form (1) of a vast cone or, when projected on a flat surface, (2) of a triangle, the base of which—taking into account the present interdependence of every part of the world on every other—may be the whole human species. The individual, on the other hand, with the family of which he is a member, will be located at the apex.

This puts the existing population of the world at the bottom and the individual person at the top and divides society and social relations into the different strata with each of which a special science is concerned. The human-relations' pyramid, if I may so describe it, will serve at the same time as a diagrammatic description of the character of the influences that operate to form the individual personality. In accordance with this diagram we may conceive the socialized person at the apex of the triangle as an ultimate expression of the biological individual after he has been conditioned by association with other individuals on the different levels of association.


He may be conceived as beginning life as a biologic individual at the lowest or biotic level of existence. In the course of his career, however, his elementary and instinctive drives will be modified and redefined and sublimated by his contact with other individuals. Thus in the course of his career, starting as a mere biologic individual, he achieves the character and the status of a person, i.e., a socialized individual.

Returning, after this digression, to the political organization of society, one observes, particularly in so far as it tends to involve personal and moral rather than physical relationships, that it is relatively less dependent upon technology than upon abstract and formal relationships. On the other hand, in so far as politics involves war as a part of its method of settling disputes, it is quite as dependent upon armament as it is upon a form of discipline which tends to convert the individual man into a mere instrument of some other man or group of men.

It is nevertheless true, that the political power which a state or any political institution exercises either within or without the limits of its domain, rests upon the loyalties which the state and its cause inspire in the personal attachments of individuals to the

soil, its association, traditions, and eventually in the personal loyalties which these associations have created and maintained.

Political power rests, as do other social forces, upon transportation, communication, as well as upon discipline and community



of interest, but it rests finally on something less material and less rational, namely, social solidarity and morale. It is these that make it possible for great bodies of men, including those who are organized and those who are not, to act collectively and consistently in such a manner as to preserve the corporate existence of the nation or the empire and its institutions—institutions which have become, by use and wont,—fixed in the habits and the very structure of man.

The cultural order. More intimate and less formal than the political, is the system of relations we call cultural. Culture, so far as it is embodied in folkways rather than artifacts, is, in fact, the "cement" which according to Bagehot first held men together within the bonds of a social order that was customary and traditional rather than instinctive and biological. It is this same culture, embodied in habit and custom, that constituted "the yoke of custom" which man, under the rationalizing and secularizing influence of science, has so successfully and so completely thrown off.

The thing we call society is, of course, something more than a population aggregate having a territorial configuration; something more than "a geographical expression," or even an association for the exchange of goods and service. Society, in the sense in which that term is applied to human beings, is characterized by the fact that it imposes upon the free play of economic and egoistic forces the restraints of a political and a moral order. Yet, custom, conventions, and law, by which society exercises control over the individual and itself, turn out finally to be the products of

communication; and communication is, as Bridgman, the physicist, shrewdly remarks, "a device by which one endeavors as far as possible to anticipate the probable future actions of his fellows and so put himself in a position to make the necessary preparations."[9] But communication is something more than Bridgman's description indicates. It is a social-psychological process by which one individual is enabled to assume, in some sense and to some degree, the attitudes and the point of view of another; it is the process by which a rational and moral order among men is substituted for one that is merely physiological and instinctive. Communication "spins a web of custom and mutual expectation which bind together social entities as diverse as the family group, a labor organization, or the haggling participants in a village market." On the other hand, particularly when it takes the form of dialectical discussion, communication tends to individualize thought and bring out distinctions within the limits of a common understanding and universe of discourse. In this fashion communication tends to assume a rational rather than the intuitive form characteristic of ordinary intercourse.

Communication and competition seem to be the two fundamental processes, or forms of interaction, by which a social order is initiated and maintained among the individuals whose life in common is the life of society. Communication is, on the whole, an integrating and socializing process. It creates the loyalties and understandings that make concerted and consistent collective action possible. It is by communication that the great fund of knowledge, which we call science, is accumulated and transmitted. Science, may, in fact, be regarded as the kind of knowledge that can be communicated, and the kind of knowledge that grows and becomes more abstract and more precise by transmission.

I have gone into some detail in my description of the role and function of communication because it is so obviously fundamental to the social process, and because the extensions and improvements which the physical sciences have made to the means of communication are so vital to the existence of society and particularly of that more rationally organized form of society we call civilization. Having said so much, it is scarcely necessary to point out again the importance of the printing press, telephone, telegraph, phono-

9. P. W. Bridgman, *The Intelligent Individual and Society* (New York, 1938).

graph, radio, and cinema in bringing about the revolutionary changes in political and cultural life that are visibly going on about us. All these instrumentalities, separately and together, have for one thing made possible the most extraordinary concentrations of political power that the world has ever known. The fact becomes all the more significant as we observe the extent to which it has been possible, through means devised by science, to mobilize these vast imponderable social forces—the sentiments of fear and of loyalty—and put them into the hands of single individuals or a group of individuals; for example, the dictators and their privy counselors.

I have attempted to suggest briefly, the extent to which physics and the applications of physical science have entered into the warp and woof of present-day social life. I have sought to make some estimate of the material resources which science and technology have made available for the uses of the modern world. The question which finally poses itself is this: has science, in awakening the vast energies that are resident in the material world, brought into existence forces which science cannot hope to control? This, I take it, was implied in the question as formulated by Sir William Bragg in the address from which I have quoted.

The problem that remains to be solved, therefore, is how to create moral forces that will not merely counter-balance but control the forces which physical science has unleashed, making them the instruments for the re-creation of man and his world rather than their destruction. Stated in this form the problem seems to be —if a problem for science at all—one for the social rather than the physical sciences. This may seem to put it outside the limits of any sort of scientific inquiry, for it is doubtful whether there is, or ever will be, a science of society in the sense in which that term is used of the physical sciences. One of the important, perhaps the most important, contributions which physics and the physical sciences have made to society is one to which I have so far made no reference. We are indebted to the physical sciences for a method of inquiry, perhaps the only method that can properly be called scientific, which, by making knowledge exact has made it at the same time systematic. In a systematic science each new contribution to knowledge serves as a check on all that has gone before. At the same time what has gone before provides a frame of reference for all that follows.

It is in the field of physical nature more than elsewhere that

science has been most successful in reducing things to their elements and of describing the relations between these elements in purely mechanical terms, making them in this way as obvious and intelligible as the relation between the parts of a machine. There is nothing more rational and less mystical than a machine and it is for this reason, perhaps, that in every field of research, psychology, sociology, or politics, science is looking for mechanisms, seeking to describe the relations it discovers in mechanical terms. Thus physiologists and psychologists are looking for mental and physical mechanisms. The experimental "conditioning" of the organism which has played so important a part in the researches of physiologists and psychologists in recent years is a process by which an inherited instinct, or at any rate an established mechanism-habit, is modified and a new mechanism and a new habit are established in its place. As I am writing these lines my eyes have fallen upon a passage in a recent copy of *Science* in which a writer, discussing the physiology of old age—a subject in which I find I have an increasing interest—remarks that something further was needed than is now known "to clarify the mechanism of senescence."[10] Much is needed that we do not know to clarify the mechanisms of social relations and the super-organism.

I am not at all certain what sort of definition one should give to the term mechanism as it is used in the social sciences. It is, at any rate, employed to describe a relation between things rather than between ideas, a relation that may be defined with precision and which in operation insures, to the proper impulse, the expected response. As we speak of mental mechanisms so we may and do, in much the same sense, speak of social mechanisms. We are all of us familiar with situations, particularly in the field of personal relations, where an expression on the part of A seems automatically to call forth a corresponding reaction in B. Thus a harsh word or contemptuous expression upon the part of A will call forth, more or less automatically, a response of resentment and perhaps permanent ill-will in B. These are mental and, at the same time, social mechanisms, and if we recognize them when we see them and understand the complexities of their operation we can predict, with some assurance, what the normally expected response to a specific gesture, attitude, or expression will be.

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10. *Science*, Jan. 5, 1940.

The social sciences have certainly not been unaffected by the method and conceptions of the physical sciences, and this influence has served at any rate to take social studies out of the field of purely dialectical discussion, and direct inquiry to the relation of things rather than ideas. When, however, writers like Wesley Mitchell tell us that in view of the present condition of the world, "the most urgent item of unfinished business is to increase our knowledge of human behavior," and when he adds "preaching righteousness" and "appeals to reason" are not enough, one wonders just what kind of knowledge he is thinking of. It cannot be the sort of systematic and scientific knowledge one gets of human nature from the findings of the psychological laboratories.

The knowledge of human nature that we need most, it seems to me, is of the type I have referred to—using an expression of William James,—as "acquaintance with." By that I mean the sort of knowledge "one inevitably acquires in the course of one's first hand encounters with the world about him." "Human beings have an extraordinary ability, by whatever mechanism that ability operates, to sense these tendencies to action in others as in themselves. It takes a long time, however, to become thoroughly acquainted with any human being, including one's self."[11] Nevertheless, that is the kind of knowledge we need of human beings in order to know them not in any such sense as science demands, but merely to become aware, by observation and exploration, as the psychiatrists have become aware, of the nature of human relations. What we need then, is not merely more facts, but more insight; not less logic but more understanding.

What we need more than anything else—seeing that the old order is manifestly passing—is a conception of society and of human relations that will include within the perspective of a single point of view all the diverse tendencies and forces that are obviously and actively operative in bringing about the changes we are now witnessing in the existing world order. As Europe and the occidental world seem to have completed, or nearly so, a cycle of irreversible change and as we are obviously approaching the end of an era, we need, for the purpose of social and sociological

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11. Robert E. Park, "News as a Form of Knowledge: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge" (*American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XLV, March, 1940, p. 671).

science, a new orientation and, if not a new faith, a renewal of the old.

Machines have done much, as I have already indicated, to change the character of human relations but it still seems doubtful to most of us, that we shall ever be able to devise any mechanism, physical or social, that will satisfactorily solve the ultimate social problem. For society is fundamentally a biological phenomenon and institutions are not enacted, but like trees they grow. Society is something that cannot be taken apart and put together again. It is not an artifact. It has, like the tree, the principle of its existence, as Aristotle would say, within itself rather than outside, as in the case of a machine. Furthermore, the nature of human relations and of society is such that we must think of society as composed of individuals to be sure, but of individuals held together not by rational purposes merely, not wholly by laws, constitution, and contracts, but by sentiments and loyalties, sentiments that have become incorporated by use and wont into the habits of individuals, and in the structure of society. The very existence of customs, law, and a tradition that insure the permanence and the solidarity of the social structure rests finally on the fact that human beings possess an imagination which enables them to enter into other minds and make their thoughts and feelings, in some way and to some extent, their own. The existence of society in which men can live a life of reason is dependent finally on the existence of a body of tradition, sentiments, beliefs, and personal loyalties that can be understood and shared but which are not rational, not at least in the sense that a machine is rational.

Some years ago Elton Mayo, of the Harvard School of Business Administration, published a very interesting volume based on observations and experiments which have been carried on for the past seven years or more in the shops of the Western Electric Company at Hawthorne, Illinois. It was entitled *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization.*[12] The thesis of this volume, though the author did not state it as badly as I shall, was that the trouble with industry in the United States, and, in fact, the cause for the disorder, unrest, and chaos in industrial society generally, is too much "scientific management," too much rational planning, too much machinery, too much regimentation and arbitrary con-

12. New York, 1933.

trol of the natural and free expression of organic life of the individual and society. The rapid advance of technology—and here he repeats what others have said,—has brought about too rapid changes in the conditions of social life. The great body of custom which ordinarily directs life in the older, smaller, and thoroughly integrated forms of society that still exist in many parts of Europe and in some parts of North America, the province of Quebec for instance, has been, like the soil in many parts of our country, eroded and washed out. We have developed progressively a condition of what Durkheim describes as *anomie*, a kind of constitutional disintegration of traditional society.

The present plight of the United States and the world constitutes, it seems, a problem which, fundamentally conceived, is neither economic nor political but cultural. It is therefore, a problem in the field of social anthropology or, perhaps, social psychiatry, if such a thing exists. The attitude of the natural sciences toward social institutions is notoriously opposed to that of social or cultural anthropology. The physical scientist, observing that social institutions and social practices are often crude and inefficient; that popular beliefs and religious practices are frequently based on wishful thinking, mistaken interpretation of fact, and the inherent stupidity of mankind, has been disposed to plow them under as just so much superstition, and substitute for the traditional culture the rational novelties of an ever-expanding natural science. Anthropologists, on the other hand, recognizing that social institutions, however crude or imperfect, perform, nevertheless, in the societies in which they exist, a more or less indispensable function, are disposed to protect and preserve them, even in their more primitive forms, preserve them at least until they have learned to understand their role and importance in the cultures of which they are a part.

There are two specific ways in which the procedure of the anthropologists in dealing with cultural institutions differ from the methods of the more exact and so-called "measuring" sciences. In the first place, physical science deals with things in segments. Anthropology, on the other hand, conceiving society as an organism and culture as a unit, has sought to deal with its separate functions as aspects of an integrated whole. Sociologists, likewise, whose function, as sometimes conceived, has been to reform society, have discovered that reform of one institution is likely to create a problem in another. In the second place, the social anthropologist in-

variably seeks, as I have suggested, to understand the people and the culture that he investigates. He recognizes that personal sentiments and religious beliefs, though not wholly rational, are nevertheless a necessary part of the life of individuals and of society, and that even superstitions have their values.

In China, a few years ago, I made the acquaintance of a young Chinese sociologist who had studied in America and had finished his course by marrying and taking home an American wife. In the course of time they had a little daughter, who, having learned Chinese as the custom is in China from her amah, had become so fluent that she ordinarily spoke in Chinese to her mother. Her mother, on the other hand, insisted on speaking English to her, as it seemed important that she should become, as most Chinese students in fact are, bilingual. One day the American mother said to her Chinese daughter, calling her by her Chinese name,—we will call her Anna,—"Anna, there are some things that you are in the habit of doing that I do not like. I want to talk them over with you and perhaps after that you will not want to do them any more." That seemed fair to Anna and she readily assented. Then her mother had a second thought and she added: "But there may be things that I do which you do not like and if that is so I wish you would tell me about them and I will try to do better." That seemed wholly satisfactory to Anna, who waited patiently until her mother had finished. Then Anna who was, as I remember, about six years old, said: "Well mamma, there are some things I wish you would do. I wish for one thing you would speak more Chinese and then, I wish mamma, you had more superstitions."

Well, there is certainly one thing in which China has the better of the United States, particularly of the middle west, and that is in the number and quality of its superstitions. I suspect it is the superstitions, folklore, and local traditions which Elton Mayo misses in America. These are particularly absent in our great cities and our factory towns. They seem to constitute the soil in which culture and those common understandings which make social life tolerable grow. They make life tolerable even when the technological devices and gadgets of a higher civilization are absent. Where, on the other hand, these customary familiar and folksy things, including the associations that go with them, are absent, it is as if everything that made it difficult to leave home was gone.

In any case, it is important to remember, in considering the

function of superstitions and folklore, as of religious beliefs, that in the life of the community science is, after all, merely secondary and instrumental. Man can live, and has lived without science but not without some sort of philosophy of life, and some sort of religious faith. In fact science would be meaningless without these.

CHAPTER 21

MODERN SOCIETY

MUCH has been written about society before and since Comte and Spencer first described it as an organism. Rather less has been written about societies. When students have wished to say society in the plural, they have said "social group." For most present-day sociology, if not for the other social sciences, society is made up of societies, and societies are social groups.

Comte and Spencer, who sought to make sociology a science, would now be classed as philosophers rather than scientists. At any rate they wrote in the grand manner of philosophers, not about societies, but about society and, as they saw it in the long perspective of history, they were perhaps more interested in society as an idea than as a thing.

Later students, as they turned their attention to the analysis and description of society in its existing concrete forms, have discovered, in a great variety of minor social entities, essentially the same social processes, producing essentially the same social structures as those observed by philosophers of history. This has led them to try the somewhat hazardous experiment of taking societies, so to speak, out of their local and historical settings, in order to view them *sub specie aeternitatis*, that is as individual instances of a class or type. About such classes and types one may venture some general statements. That seems to be, in part at least, the method of the natural as distinguished from the historical sciences. History at any rate

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does not ask what things are. It has no taxonomic problems because it does not ordinarily seek to make general statements. It merely uses them to elucidate its statements of historical fact. If and when historians seek to make their statements general rather than specific, history ceases to be history and becomes, possibly, sociology.

But the things which science classifies change. Crowds under certain circumstances become mobs; religious revivals produce religious sects; social movements are transformed into social institutions. It is these changes and the processes by which they are brought about with which sociology and the social sciences, in so far as they assume the character of natural sciences, are ultimately concerned. Under these circumstances a more abstract term has gained currency to describe the different sociological species. The term, social group, is now generally used to designate any form of society from a family to a ward caucus. In the vocabulary of the social sciences, society is still used in the sense of Spencer and Comte, but only to describe that world-wide mesh of social relations within which in this modern world all peoples and all institutions are obviously held together and in an ever-tightening embrace. It is in this sense that Graham Wallis uses the term The Great Society. The Great Society is modern society.

George Mead, who has made a more penetrating analysis of the relations we describe as social than anyone else I happen to know, has described sociology as a science of institutions. Social institutions, however, seem to be a matter of the special social sciences—economics, politics, and, perhaps, comparative religions—these being the disciplines of which each is concerned with a type of institution, and a type characteristic of one of the different levels, upon which social integration has obviously taken place.

We are thus accustomed to speak of economic society, of political society, and, if not of religious society, at least of religious societies. We speak as if each one of these did not represent merely one aspect or one system of human relations of that more inclusive social aggregate which Comte and Spencer describe as a social organism.

This segmentation of society and the incidental specialization of the social sciences is both logical and possible, because on each of these levels—the economic, political and cultural—special functions have emerged in response to the necessities of a steadily expanding society. That these structures and processes function in

modern society in relative independence of each other is so familiar a fact that we have not always realized its significance. At the present moment, however, when the old social order seems to be breaking up and going down river, like ice in the spring, it is more apparent than ever before that these different levels of social integration are only relatively independent of one another, and that we cannot fully comprehend either the economic, political, or the moral and religious aspects of society, except as we view them, as anthropologists do, as integral parts of a single organism.

Considered in their integrity as social units rather than as congeries of social institutions, societies have been and can be conveniently divided into two types merely on the basis of literacy. There are the literate peoples and the preliterate peoples. Most of our knowledge of modern societies is that of the literate peoples. We don't think of the primitive societies as modern. Modern in the sense in which we ordinarily use that term, is not a temporal category. Most of our present knowledge of modern societies is contained in the findings of the special social sciences. When one has abstracted from what has been contributed to our knowledge by the special sciences, what remains is, to say the least, not impressive.

On the other hand, it is not in the special sciences, nor in the studies of the specific institutional forms which characterize society on its different levels of integration, that we are likely to discover the specific traits which distinguish it from other earlier and simpler forms of association. On the contrary, what is fundamentally unique about modern society, as perhaps of every other, is probably just the relation which these different levels of integration—the economic, political, and moral—bear to one another and to the societal total of which they are parts.

If, then, as it will appear, this paper is mainly concerned with what Graham Wallas and others have called "The Great Society," it is because that term seems to include the whole realm of the social in so far as the ways in which men live together have assumed institutional forms peculiarly characteristic of modern life.

However, the realm of the social includes, in the sense in which some students are using it, not only man's habits but his habitat. At any rate, the realm of the social, as ordinarily conceived, exists in and is dependent upon an economy that is not social in the sense in which that term applies to human beings alone. It is an economy

in which all living creatures participate in so far as they are anywhere bound together in what has been described as "the web of life."[1]

Modern society differs from such primitive and preliterate societies as still exist on the outer margins of our expanding world economy in ways that are so obvious as to well-nigh obscure the fact that, in respect to what is fundamental in human society and human life, they are essentially alike. Modern society differs from earlier and less sophisticated societies in some ways, however, that are less obvious. What are the distinguishing characteristics of modern society? They are many; I shall mention only a few:

(1) *Size.* Within the framework of the existing world economy which European commerce and European industry has imposed upon the rest of the world, there is growing up a body of custom, practices, and artifacts—a civilization, in short—within the circle of whose influence all the peoples of the earth now live. This civilization, which is new and world wide, has inherited the cultural traditions of an earlier and simpler peoples. There is probably no racial minority and no local culture that has not made its contribution to the cultural resources of this cosmopolitan society.

There are in this, as in every civilization, two types of cultural elements: (1) The traits which are indigenous and represent the discoveries and inventions of the peoples who possess them, and (2) the exotic traits, brought to them by the processes of cultural diffusion. These two elements constitute "the fabric of a people's culture or of its civilization." As Roland B. Dixon states it: "The foundation or warp comes from within; the exotic elements or weft come from without. The warp is static in that it is tied in some measure to the environment. The weft is dynamic, mobile, drifting along diffusion lines."[2]

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1. In every habitat we find that there is a sort of community or society of organisms not only preying upon but depending upon each other, and that a certain balance, though often a violently swaying balance, is maintained between the various species so that the community *keeps on.* . . . The particular name given to this subject of vital balances and interchanges is called Ecology. Ecology is a term coined by Haeckel, the celebrated German biologist, in 1878; its root is the Greek *oikos,* a house, which is also the root of the kindred older word economics. Economics is used only for human affairs; ecology is really an extension of economics to the whole world of life.—H. G. Wells, *et al., The Science of Life,* Vol. III, p. 961.

2. Dixon, Roland B., "The Building of Cultures," New York and London, 1928, p. 271.

The warp of the new civilization is represented by those traits which have arisen in the efforts of peoples to live in cities and particularly in the great cities that have grown up in recent years along the ocean highways of the world. The warp, which is European, is a product of the machine age.

The weft, on the other hand, is composed of those elements contributed by the peoples and cultures of the world outside Europe. These exotic traits have, in many cases at least, been to such an extent transformed, overlaid and obscured by later additions and by the processes of acculturation that only professional students, familiar with the methods of cultural analysis, are likely to recognize them in the existing cultural fabric.

Among other things that characterize this new and still expanding civilization is the fact that it has already reached the geographical limits of the human habitat. Since Stanley discovered the source of the Nile in 1877 there has been little or no more world to be discovered. I am not counting the Arctic regions. They are not within the limits of what the Greeks called the *oekonomie*. The significance of this fact is not merely that modern society has achieved a territorial extension never attained by any of its predecessors, but it has reached the geographical limit of the habitable world. All future expansion of The Great Society will, therefore, be in the direction of greater complexity rather than greater extension.

This physical fact puts a limit to a great many things. For one thing, it puts a limit to the capitalistic system which has come into existence with the expansion of European commerce, and has grown up in and upon a steadily expanding market. However, since Europe began exporting its capital to its dependencies, economic and political, the European market, so far from expanding, is now apparently contracting. Besides that, free competition has everywhere, as the result of what seems to be an irreversible tendency, created monopolies, either in the form of international trade agreements or of governmental tariffs.

Modern civilization, merely because of the size of the social unit it has created, has effectively changed the functioning not only of economic, but of every other type of social institution.

One consequence of the size of The Great Society is this: As the web of human relations has become more extensive, mobility has increased and personal relations have therefore become more

casual, promiscuous, and "democratic." Everywhere the diffusion of European culture has been accompanied by an increasing relaxation of the familial and tribal bonds which, in some fashion, formerly held society together and maintained, without the benefit of police or the courts, some sort of discipline.

Everywhere the diffusion of European culture has, for example, tended to plow under the local and traditional religious beliefs and to substitute a secular for a religious social order.

The little religious sects which have sprung up so spontaneously and in such great numbers on the frontiers of European civilization, in the United States, and elsewhere, have in some sense and to some degree performed in the modern world the function of the clan and the tribe in more primitive societies. They represent in most cases the pathetic attempts of lost souls to renew their religious faith. Where they have failed it seems to be because they have been, for the most part, recruited by converts from racially and culturally heterogeneous groups. They are not, or not yet, as is the case of the Jews and other tribal religions, based on a genetic unit. They are like the Mormons, or the Seventh-Day Adventists or the Christian Scientists recruited from peoples of essentially the same class rather than of the same race. The result is the bonds that hold them together are ideological rather than those of race and kinship.

This is necessarily true since these sects are still in the propaganda stage. Genetic societies on the contrary are usually, like castes, closed societies and are maintained by natural growth only.

"Social organization on a large scale is," as Graham Wallis remarks, "not wholly a new thing. . . . As ancient empires became larger they became too distant and too unreal to stimulate the affection or the pride of their subjects. The methods of their agents become more mechanical and inhuman, and the passions which grouped themselves around smaller units, local or racial or religious, produced an ever-increasing strain. . . . The 'cash nexus' has," he adds, "no more than the 'voting nexus' secured that common membership of The Great Society that shall mean a common solidarity."[3]

(2) *Complexity.* Modern society is obviously more complex than society in any previous period in history. Complexities mul-

3. Wallis, Graham. "The Great Society," New York, 1914, p. 10.

tiply with every territorial expansion of the world economy and with every increment of increase in the population of the world community. The territorial unit of a local economy may be a primitive village, a city, or a metropolis. It will include in every case the territory contributary to, and dependent on, a central market. This market serves at the same time as a medium for the exchange of goods, of services, and of news. No matter how small or how great the territorial unit, the economic, and eventually every other aspect of life within the local community, will tend to respond to events and to news from every other.

To say that one part of the world responds to the news from an other means simply that every part of the world responds, not to what happens merely, but to what interests it, in every other. Such is the nature of the mechanism which holds together and coordinates the activities of The Great Society. Society, in the sense in which that term applies to human beings and to some of the higher animals, exists as Dewey has said, "in and through communication."

The complexity of modern society reflects the extraordinary diversity and interdependence of modern industry. Such organization as exists among its widely dispersed units is based on the world wide division of labor which came into existence and is bound up with modern commerce. It is bound up especially with the complexities and the mysteries of international banking and finance. The rise of the world economy has brought about, incidentally, a condition of interdependence of all parts of the world community such that—to cite a comparatively recent instance—the price of crude rubber on the London market has profoundly affected the lives of the natives in Central Africa and in the upper reaches of the Amazon River.[4] For a similar reason a strike on the waterfront in Shanghai, Bombay, or San Francisco may have repercussions along the main highway of the world upon which these cities are located.

The most interesting and significant expression of this international interdependence of peoples in The Great Society is, however, that resulting from the specialization and division of labor among men of science in every part of the civilized world. The civilized world is, perhaps, to be identified with the world that is

4. See "Rubber," *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, vol. 13, p. 460.

literate, but finally with so much of the literate world as is capable of assimilating systematic knowledge. In any case what gives this vast and more or less unconscious cooperation of scholars its real importance is the fact that it is based on a mutual understanding and solidarity which makes communication and collaboration possible, in spite of racial, religious and political differences. And this in turn makes men of science participants in a common enterprise designed to create and preserve a fund of knowledge which is the common heritage of all nations and all peoples.

This increasing complexity of the modern society due to the increasing interdependence of peoples has, as one might expect, greatly increased the difficulties of national and international politics. It has made necessary more complete articulation and *Gleichschaltung*, to use a Nazi term, of national institutions and international relations.

It has made the clock and the time-table—so necessary in order to maintain effective social organization in other aspects of life—an increasingly important factor in the extension and maintenance of that ever-widening concert necessary to corporate action on an ever-widening scale.

It has finally had the effect of transforming economic activities into a kind of political action so that what, under earlier conditions, would have been regarded as a commercial crisis has tended to assume in recent times the character of a political revolution. Under these circumstances international wars have acquired the character of international revolutions.

All this would seem to make, if I may illustrate by a practical application, such an international secretariat as that established by the League of Nations more than ever an international necessity. It is already a necessity since it is only by making instantly available actual and impersonal information on international affairs that one may hope to avoid the necessity of settling international disputes, as they arise, by something less drastic than international wars.

I might add that as international relations become stabilized, it seems likely that international news will more and more take the place of propaganda in international affairs. It seems in fact, under the conditions which modern life imposes, it must, since in cases of international misunderstanding propaganda is now merely a more subtle form of warfare. On the other hand, the knowledge

which serves to make clear a fundamental community of interest among nations and of parties will at least suggest the one secure way in which any party or any nation can advance its individual interests.

At any rate it seems obvious today, as it never did before, that the only way an individual can live is to find a job, and the only way a nation or a society can survive is by finding a place in which it can function in the more inclusive social order of which it is an integral part.[5]

(3) *Speed.* Societies may be, have been, compared with reference to their relative mobility, that is to say, with reference to the amount of movement and migration that characterizes them or the units of which they are composed. Races and peoples, from somewhat the same point of view, have been classified as nomadic and sedentary, and the distinction is one of historic and sociological importance.

Civilization seems to have arisen with the rise of the sedentary peoples. At the same time, as Karl Bücher remarks, "each new advance of culture commences, so to speak, with the new period of migration." Historically the state seems to have had its origin in the conquest and permanent subjugation of a sedentary by a nomadic people.[6]

Mobility has always been regarded as an index, if not a cause, of social change. Furthermore, in so far as forms of change can be reduced to modifications in the relations, spatial or otherwise, of individual persons, or of other social units of which society is composed, the hypothesis seems to be valid. In the efforts of students to find a statistical unit for measuring it, mobility has been

5. It is the existence in the centers of world trade and of world politics like New York, London, and Berlin, to a lesser degree perhaps, in the metropolitan cities located on the main highways of the world, of an increasing fund of information to which experts, newspaper editors, and the general public may have instant access to enable them to interpret and evaluate the news of the world, that will make it increasingly possible for the world to deal effectively with each new world crisis as it arises.

6. Oppenheimer, Franz, *The State: Its History and Development Viewed Sociologically*, Indianapolis, 1914, p. 54. [Aware of R. H. Lowie's view of the state (*The Origin of the State*, New York, 1927) as present in elementary form in even simple and familially organized societies in the form of a territorial element always present and in intra-tribal political institutions, Park wishes here to stress the profound break in the history of the evolution of society occasioned when one ethic group assumed sovereignty over another.—ED.]

at different times identified with migration, with changes of residence or occupation, and of changes of status within the social hierarchy.

What makes facts like these significant is that in so far as migration and mobility involve an interruption of an existing social routine or a break with tradition and custom, they are possibly one of the more important causes of social changes. I might add also that mobility seems to be correlated with social unrest which seems to be the subjective aspect of social change.

This intimate association of mobility and social change, in both their personal and social aspects, is a phenomenon so persistent and so pervasive that some writers have regarded migration, and the interruption of routine incident to it, as the source and origin of progress.[7]

The westward advance of the frontier of the United States illustrates the way in which familial and communal bonds are weakened or severed by migration. In the course of this historic movement the different elements of which the American population is composed have been successively atomized, mixed, and democratized. Much of the same thing is taking place today among the more recent immigrants in American cities, especially in the northern states.

Migration is not identical with mobility, although as in the case of nomadism and seasonal migration, it tends to be. Migration, where it terminates in permanent settlement, is a secular and irreversible movement which disturbs an existing equilbrium but initiates a new one. When migration is seasonal it assumes the form of a cyclical movement, and has, or tends to have, the character of a process of adjustment, that is to say, a process by which an existing equilibrium is not disturbed but maintained.

This transition from a secular to a seasonal type of migration, *i.e.*, from a migration that may be described as a social movement to one that has the character of a social process, is manifest in the changes which have progressively taken place in the character of migration to the United States within the last fifty years. But this is a change which has taken place not only in the United States, but in the world generally in the period previous to the outbreak

7. See Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1904; Frederick J. Teggart, *Theory of History*, New Haven, 1925, ch. xv, The Method of Hume and Turgot."

of the first World War. Perhaps the most remarkable instance of this latter type of migration is that of the seasonal migration of Italian laborers to the Argentine. In this case the tide of migration moves from Italy in the autumn and returns to Italy in the spring, leaving no doubt a deposit of permanent migration every season. By this means migratory laborers are able to enjoy the benefits of summer the year around.

As the difficulties of travel have steadily declined with the improvement of the means of transportation, this cycle of immigration and emigration has steadily taken the place of the migration and settlement of the earlier days. Thus in America the later migration from Europe has assumed the character of a tide which moves no longer in one direction, from the old world to the new, but back and forth seasonally or merely in response to changes in the business cycle.

At the present time migration—except the migration of refugees—has well-nigh ceased in every part of the world. On the other hand the mobility of the world's population is probably greater than ever before. Every improvement in communication and transportation which has made not merely migration but movement easier and less expensive has tended to increase the total amount of mobility in the world and to make it possible to traverse wider spaces in shorter periods of time. In other words it has increased speed—speed of movement and speed of social change.

Speed, which is not merely the rate at which men move but the rate at which social changes take place as a result of that movement, has been increasing at an ever-accelerating pace in recent years. It is apparently greater today, in spite of the cessation of migration, than at any other period in history. It is a curious fact that the very time that the span of human life has been measurably lengthened, the pace at which life moves has been so quickened that one is impressed as never before with the fact that time is pressing and, in the language of Max Lerner, "It is later than one thinks." Time moves swiftly when much is going on; and there is much going on in the world today.

One thing that has been a factor in accelerating the pace of modern society is the well-nigh complete substitution of a money economy for the more primitive form of barter. Nothing, for example, has contributed more than the increasing use of money as a measure of value and a medium of exchange, to mobilize and to

secularize existing society. It has brought this about by the substitution, in all the relations of life of an impersonal and rational, in place of personal and moral, nexus between members of The Great Society.

It is in this sense that Brooks Adams writes when he says: "No established type of mind can adapt itself to changes in environment even in the slow-moving civilizations as fast as environments change. Thus a moment arrives when the minds of any given common type fail to meet the demands made upon them and are superseded by a younger type which is in turn set aside by another still younger, until the limit of the administrative genius of that particular race has been reached. Then disintegration sets in, the social momentum is gradually relaxed, and society sinks back to a level at which it can cohere. To us, however, the most distressing aspect of the situation is that the social acceleration is progressing in proportion to the activity of the scientific mind—which makes mechanical discoveries—and it is therefore a triumphant science which produces those ever more rapidly recurring changes in environment to which men must adapt themselves at their peril.[8]

(4) *Mechanism.* The life of ancient primitive man, as it has recently been reconstructed for us by the observations and speculations of a group of anthropologists who have been peculiarly interested in the subject, is represented as an idyllic existence in which *homo sapiens* lived in a state of innocence like that of the higher apes, that is, without institutions, without tools, and without traditions.[9]

It is possible that no such golden age of mankind ever existed, and the simpler life of primitive man was probably no happier than our own. What seems to be true, nevertheless, is that from the very earliest times to the present day every important advance in civilization, if it has not been caused, has nevertheless been accompanied by the invention of some new tool or of some new technique designed to meet the needs of man's increasingly complicated, if not more desirable, existence.

It is no mere coincidence, therefore, that the modern world where technology has made such unprecedented progress, should

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8. Brooks Adams, *The Theory of Social Revolutions,* Macmillan Co., New York, 1913, pp. 204-205.

9. Eliot Smith, *Human History,* New York, 1929, p. 183.

be characterized as "the machine age," the age of gadgets. Machinery has, as a matter of fact, entered into the very structure of society, and human nature as we know it probably could not exist without the mechanical devices which technology has provided nor without the habits and the discipline which mechanics have imposed. This fact, if not at once obvious, has nevertheless been so often and so eloquently stated that there is no need to dwell upon it here.

Not so obvious are some of its more remote and pervasive effects upon human relations and the pattern of culture in the modern world. One thing, for example, which distinguishes the mentality of the modern from that of the primitive man is the extent to which he has been willing to substitute new and more rational for customary and magical methods in the performance of the ordinary tasks of life; that is, the extent to which he has succeeded in substituting reason, reflection, and technique for instinct, habit and custom. Reason is the one native trait which, by common consent, distinguishes mankind from the lower animals. However, reason matures slowly; babies do not seem to have it, and as a function of individual and social life it is largely an incident and by-product of verbal communication.[10]

Reason has, in the case of civilized man, at any rate, achieved a very high degree of perfection by means of discussion and dialectic. It has also been profoundly influenced by technology.

There is, as I have said elsewhere, nothing so thoroughly rational and nothing so completely intelligible as a machine.[11] Once one understands how to take a machine apart and put it together again, there is no longer any mystery about it. The thing stands there, as it were, completely unveiled, with nothing either obscure in its past or problematic about its future to inspire speculation or encourage mysticism, since its behavior is completely predictable.

This is, in fact, what is meant by making a thing intelligible, and since the task of science seems to be to make things intelligible, it performs this function by treating things as machines, that is, things that can be taken apart and put together. Where, as in the case

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10. George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society, from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, edited and with an introduction by Charles W. Morris, Chicago, 1934, pp. 334-335.

11. Robert E. Park, "Physics and Politics," *Canad. J. Econ. and Polit. Sci.*, vol. 6, no. 2, May, 1940, pp. 147-148.

of living organisms, science has been able to take things apart but has not been wholly successful in putting them together again, living creatures and life itself have remained, from the point of view of science, more or less a mystery.

Technology has flourished mainly in cities, where it has completely transformed the human habitat, but it has had profound effects upon the structure of the more ancient and traditional forms of society, like the family and the village community. The mechanization and rationalization of agriculture, for example, has tended to depopulate the countryside, and by converting the farmstead into a factory and the peasant into a wage earner and proletarian, has so stepped up the tempo of rural life that it has brought society as a whole into such a condition of unstable equilibrium that anything apparently may happen, the best as easily as the worst. By way of making the thing more concrete I cite you John Steinbeck's report on the share-cropper in his novel, "The Grapes of Wrath." This report is no doubt the comment of an angry man, but it is at any rate a vivid statement and takes account of aspects of life that are not adequately covered in the official statistics.

In the city as distinguished from the country, one is, typically, born in a hospital, spends most of his life in a hotel, barracks, or a multiple dwelling of some sort, and dies in an institution, possibly an old people's home. If this is an exaggerated statement of the actual situation, it suggests at least the extent to which, in modern society, life has been institutionalized and the home transformed into a dwelling place for people whose associations are more casual than intimate, because their interests are so diverse.

Technology is not, of course, identical with science, but it is not until science is applied that it achieves its goal of making the object of its researches fully intelligible. Thus every advance in science involves finally the discovery of a new mechanism or a new technique for performing an old task. The successful application of science is the final test of the validity of its findings.

Science, as we have come to know it, is actually physical science, and every advance in scientific knowledge, even in the fields of the biological, psychological, and social sciences implies the discovery of some new "mechanism," psychological, biological, physiological, or political, which presently becomes the basis for some new technique for dealing with the problems of social and personal life. Every habit and every custom is a mechanism, and as

soon as science has discovered under what conditions habits are formed, or can be modified, that discovery is in a way to become the basis for a new technique in education or in politics.

Just now sociologists and psychologists are eagerly analyzing and reporting on new methods of propaganda, advertising, and publicity by which new and surprising results can be, and have been, obtained. Most of us have been astounded, and some of us have been terrified, by what Herr Hitler and his associates have accomplished in recreating, in so short a time, the German army and transforming the disorganized German Empire into the most powerful military and political machine the world has ever known.

These results have been accomplished in part by new applications of physical science, but they likewise have been achieved by new methods of propaganda; new techniques for arousing, activating, and controlling, not merely armies, but the unorganized and more or less helpless masses behind them. At the same time, Germany has been equally successful in its so-called spiritual warfare in undermining the morale of the nations with whom it has come in conflict. This new spiritual warfare has created a new interest among political scientists and others in the realistic politics of Machiavelli, who was, it seems, the first philosopher to suggest that political action would be more successful if based on social mechanisms rather than on moral principles.

Science and technology have profoundly altered our methods of dealing with men in other social relations. They have led to the substitution in politics, in education, and in business, of methods of manipulation rather than of understanding. Everywhere in The Great Society the relation of men, which were intimate and personal, have been more or less completely superseded by relations that are impersonal and formal. The result is that in the modern world, in contrast with earlier and simpler societies, every aspect of life seems to be mechanized and rationalized. This is particularly true in our modern cities which are in consequence so largely inhabited today by lonely men and women.

(5) *Freedom.* It seems to have been and to be a general assumption of the modern world that civilized man has everywhere and always been involved in a struggle to regain his lost freedom. The French Revolution and the modern world were ushered in with Rousseau's paradox, "Man is born free and is everywhere in chains," and Marx's proclamation to the proletarians of the world in which

he told them they had everything to gain and "nothing to lose but their chains" has been the watchword of the most fundamental and subversive social movement of modern times, namely, the struggle of labor to depose capital as the dominant power in industry and in politics.

The fact seems to be, nevertheless, that in what appears to have been the normal condition of life in the past, most people have had so little ambition to be free that they have sometimes seemed to fairly hug their chains. They may have wanted to improve their condition, but they had no desire to be either emancipated or enlightened. Thrifty, orderly, and harmless folk like the Christians of Russia or the inhabitants of what H. L. Mencken refers to rather disparagingly as the "Bible Belt" and above all the people of the little pietistic sects, like the Mennonites, the Moravians and others even less worldly than they, have apparently wished only to be left alone to live and vegetate in an atmosphere of mystical piety, undisturbed by wars and untouched by the winds of doctrine that have so frequently rocked the lives of more sophisticated peoples.

Peasant folk and primitive peoples are notorously conservative, and this is true to such an extent that habit and custom have become, in some cases, it seems, as fixed and inflexible as instincts. Under these circumstances the individual man becomes, so to speak, the prisoner of his habits, and social life tends to be and is controlled by an inflexible routine, in which change and progress is difficult if not impossible—except when, to use Walter Bagehot's terms, "the cake of custom" is broken by war, revolution or, possibly, by mass migration.

Implicit in the concept of "cultural lag" is the notion that the fundamental obstacle to progress is tradition. It is custom which forges the fetters, which so limits freedom that each new generation is compelled to conform to the conventions, not merely of the next but eventually of all preceding generations. There are individuals and peoples who accept with reluctance the changes which progress has forced upon them; people who are not irked by the social order in which they find themselves and do not desire to be emancipated. This is, perhaps, merely another and further evidence indicating how completely they are enslaved.

It seems then that only those are free who are conscious of their slavery. At any rate there are a great many people in the world

today who are conscious of their slavery and are rebellious against it. Modern society is, or seems to be, very largely made up of the emancipated. The 19th century witnessed the emancipation of the slaves in the United States and the serfs in Russia, and the 20th century seems destined to see the more or less complete dissolution of the remaining traditional and institutional forms—marriage among the rest—by which society has held itself together and been able at the same time to enforce some discipline upon its members.

As a matter of fact the casual way in which marriages are contracted and the apparently painless way in which they are dissolved, particularly in the United States, is a conspicuous illustration of the working in actual life of a widely accepted article of faith in modern society, namely, that romantic love is the only sound basis for marriage; the only basis, in fact. This doctrine or dogma is one of what Lippmann calls the "acids of modernity" which are undermining the traditional structure of modern life.

If we ask what then this freedom is, that not all men desire, the answer is this: freedom has several dimensions corresponding, as I find myself repeating again, to the different levels upon which modern society is socially integrated. First and most fundamental is the freedom necessary to the existence of every form of life above the vegetable, the freedom to move about, to explore and to see the world, "for to see and to behold," as Kipling puts it. It is the freedom which has achieved its present dimensions with the extraordinary development in recent years of the means of transportation and communication and has found expression in an amount of vagabondage, hitch-hiking, and general tourism unparalleled in the history of civliization. Today everyone travels. The humbler sort travel in trailers, and live in the lonely promiscuity of trailer camps. But those who can afford it travel in those great sea-going hotels, the modern steamships.

If freedom to move and get about is fundamental, freedom to compete is hardly less so. It involves freedom to compete for an occupation in the communal economy as well as for a place and a status in the social hierarchy. Security and recognition of some sort seem to be minimum demands every individual is bound to make of the society in which he is a part.

What one wants, finally, in modern society, however, is not merely security and recognition, but the right and opportunity of self-expression. As a matter of fact the people in modern society

have that opportunity to an extent unparalleled in history. Not only does everyone travel now-a-days, but almost everyone who travels, it seems, writes an autobiography; an autobiography which turns out to be, in the long run, not so much a description of this mobile world as a personal confession, or perhaps one might better say an inventory of the contents of the mind with which the traveler has looked at the world he describes.

A family consisting of seven children and their parents goes vagabonding around the world and their children write a delightfully naive and revealing account of their adventures. They call it "Around the World in Eleven Years." A young colored woman, without education and without money, travels around the world and writes an autobiographical account of her adventures. She calls it "My Great Big Beautiful World."

One of the most characteristic traits of modern society is the amount of self-expression and self-revelation that it permits and encourages. One has but to dip into the pages of some of the popular literature one encounters on the news stands and in the railway stations and read the anonymous confessions and "true stories" which are ordinarily displayed there to realize to what extent the hitherto inarticulate masses are finding expression in print and pulp, if not in which the intelligensia call literature. This bursting into print and literature of individuals representing every cultural level of the community is one aspect of that "revolt of the masses" of which José Ortega y Gasset has written so interestingly and with so much conviction.[12]

The effect of all this intellectual ferment has been quite as profoundly disturbing to all the inherited forms of society as the more obvious changes in the physical conditions of life. In this modern world, where everything moves and nothing vegetates, all social distinctions are, or seem to be, abolished. Everyone goes to college and, like Kaltenborn, everyone edits the news. Every day the Gallup poll announces the judgment of a widely dispersed public upon the news of yesterday or the day before. In this poll every individual counts, but he does not count much.

Modern society and modern manners are the fruit of a vast enlightenment. With the aid of the movies, everyone, transported on a magic carpet, has become acquainted with the most distant

12. José Ortega & Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 1932.

scenes and familiar with the most intimate aspects of contemporary life. No longer are we hampered by the inhibitions, the modesties and the distances that, at an earlier period, made certain aspects of life a mystery. What the candid camera, and the scenes on the beaches in summer have not disclosed, a realistic literature, and the deliberate indiscretions of the psychoanalysts have revealed.

As a result of all this enlightenment the modern man as Lippmann describes him, "scurrying through the flux of events and the giddiness of his own soul, comes to believe that Aristophanes must have been thinking of him when he declared that Whirl is King, having driven out Zeus."

"For the modern man who has ceased to believe," he continues, "without ceasing to be credulous, hangs, as it were, between heaven and earth, and is at rest nowhere. There is no theory of the meaning and value of events which he is compelled to accept, but he is none the less compelled to accept the events. There is no moral authority to which he must turn, now, but there is coercion in opinions, fashions and fads. There is for him no inevitable purpose in the universe, but there are elaborate necessities, physical, political, economic. He does not feel himself to be an actor in a great and elaborate destiny, but he is subject to the massive powers of our civilization, forced to adopt their pace, bound to their routine, entangled in their conflicts.

"He can believe what he chooses about this civilization. He cannot, however, escape the compulsion of modern events."[13]

It would be pleasant, if it were possible, to conclude this paper with a statement which would put into a phrase all that, if not said, has at any rate been suggested in regard to those characteristics of modern society which distinguish it from earlier and simpler forms of association. I shall, however, content myself with a summary statement which, if it adds nothing, may at least emphasize what has been said. Modern society is complex, vastly more complex than any society which preceded it. It is moving at a high rate of speed. Probably at no time since Socrates and the Sophists of ancient Greece have so many things happened in so short a space of time. Modern society is mechanized. Man is today not merely dominated by the machines he has created, but he seems in a way to be superseded by them. Wherever machines multiply the popu-

13. Walter Lippman, *A Preface to Morals,* Macmillan Co., 1929, p. 9.

lation declines or the rate of its increase declines, so that machines seem to be producing more and more commodities for fewer and fewer people.

Modern society is a free society. We are all children of the great emancipation, which is a by-product of the machine age. Machines have not abolished our ancient superstitions, but they have led us to question, not merely our traditions, but our instincts.

Modern society is an urban and a secular society. Earlier societies were organized on the pattern of the family and the kinship group. Present society grew up around the market place. The great cities which have reared their towers about these market places have been the melting pots of races and cultures, and the centers of intellectual life.

But great cities, where men live together in relations that are symbiotic rather than social, have not yet, it seems, developed a tradition, a body of mores, or a moral solidarity sufficient to insure either the perpetuation of existing social institutions, or the orderly succession of those economic, political and cultural changes which embody the aspirations of this modern world.

The fact that The Great Society has reached the limits of the habitable world suggests that it has attained something like maturity; but the fact that men still make war to insure the perpetuation of a way of life, or to impose upon the world a new social order, suggests that it is not as Spengler suggests, either declining, or finished.[14]

14. The city is intellect. It upsets thrones and limits old rights in the name of reason, and above all in the name of "the People" which henceforward means the people of the city. Democracy is the political form in which the townsman's outlook upon the world is demanded of the peasantry also. . . .

Finally there arises the monstrous symbol and vessel of the completely emancipated intellect, the world-city—the center in which the course of a world history ends by winding itself up. A handful of gigantic places in each Civilization disfranchises and disvalues the entire motherland of its own culture under the contemptuous name of the "provinces." . . .

The stone Colossus "Cosmopolis" stands at the end of the life's course of every great "Culture." The Culture-man whom the land has spiritually formed is seized and possessed by his own creation, the City, and is made into its creature, its executive organ, and finally, its victim. This stony mass is the *absolute city*.—Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, quoted by Edwin Franden Dakin in *Today and Destiny*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940, pp. 213-215.

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