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Volume III 1871–1890

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GERMANY
1815–1890

BY

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Volume III 1871–1890
With two Supplementary Chapters

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GENERAL PREFACE

The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern Europe, with that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one or two cases the story commences at an earlier date: in the case of the colonies it generally begins later. The histories of the different countries are described, as a rule, separately; for it is believed that, except in epochs like that of the French Revolution and Napoleon I, the connection of events will thus be better understood and the continuity of historical development more clearly displayed.

The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to understand the nature of existing political conditions. 'The roots of the present lie deep in the past'; and the real significance of contemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes which have led to them are known. The plan adopted makes it possible to treat the history of the last four centuries in considerable detail, and to embody the most important results of modern research. It is hoped therefore that the series will be useful not only to beginners but to students who have already acquired some general knowledge of European History. For those who wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography appended to each volume will act as a guide to original sources of information and works of a more special character.

Considerable attention is paid to political geography; and each volume is furnished with such maps and plans as may be requisite for the illustration of the text.

G. W. PROTHERO.

PREFACE

AS was announced in the Preface to my Second Volume, the plan of this work has been to a certain extent enlarged during its progress. The present volume carries on the narrative to the fall of Bismarck; and in two additional chapters I have attempted, respectively, a summary survey of German intellectual and social life during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and a brief account of the main aspects of German political history during the first two decades, or thereabouts, of the Emperor William II's reign. This account, which does not aim at being, even within its chronological limits, a complete narrative of events and transactions, I have—except in certain passages where, for the sake of clearness, I have ventured to carry it a few years further—with some reluctance broken off at a fixed point. In 1907 and 1908, as it seems to me, but as in self-consistency I must not here attempt to prove, a period in German history begins that must be regarded as preliminary to the present world-war, and as, in more senses than one, preparatory of it. Who would venture to dispute the fact that, of the germs of this awful conflict, some are to be sought within the range of the preceding period treated in this volume? But, in the years with which my concluding chapter deals, the forces making for peace between Germany

and her adversaries of yesterday and to-day had not yet been driven down by those making for war. In justice to a statesmanship now of the past, and to currents of national and international feeling which sustained it, we should disclaim for them the imputation of blindness to what is now too readily assumed to have been an inevitable ending.

In my final chapter, as well as in other parts of this volume, I have freely made use of sources in which experience has led me to place trust—including journalism of the rarer kind that is conscious of the responsibility shared by it in our days with the older, and far too freely decried, agencies of political life. An example of such journalism up to the time of the outbreak of the war (since when my knowledge of German periodical literature has been fitful) was to be found in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, under the editorship of H. Delbrück; and my indebtedness to contributions to it has been considerable. My remarks on German intellectual, and more especially educational and literary, activity in the latter half of the nineteenth century, could not in every case rest on personal acquaintance with the men or works mentioned; but I have been anxious to speak so far as possible from my own knowledge, or at all events after the verification of good counsel from others. In this connexion, I have very specially to thank Professor Breul, Litt.D., for taking the trouble of reading the proofs of my sixth chapter, and for much useful and valuable advice, while I have also laid under contribution the kindness of other friends. Mr J. B. Peace, Fellow of Emmanuel and University Printer, has been good enough to superintend the production of the two maps accompanying this volume. Mr E. J. Dent, formerly Fellow of King's College, has kindly furnished me with

information on some points of musical history. Mr A. T. Bartholomew, of Peterhouse, Assistant-Librarian in the University Library, has given me bibliographical and other assistance throughout the production of the present work.

Finally, I have once more to thank the Editor of this Series for his constant kindness in revising the proofs of this *History*, and suggesting alterations which I have been almost invariably glad to accept. The demands made upon him in his editorial capacity must at times have seemed to him exacting. But, at the close of a long literary life during which we have often worked together, I should like to say that there is no personal relation in its course upon which I look back with more sincere pleasure.

A. W. W.

PETERHOUSE,
June, 1918.

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CHAPTER I

PACIFICATION AND ORGANISATION

Both the Peace of Frankfort and the new German Empire proclaimed at Versailles, being but the work of human hands, could not be other than imperfect creations. The endurance of the Peace was conditional, primarily, on the capacity and will of France to fulfil the terms which she had reluctantly accepted—above all, the payment of an enormous war indemnity on which the liberation of her territory depended, and, furthermore, the permanent submission of more than a million-and-a-half of her population[1] to the German rule imposed upon it. The definitive establishment of the Empire, on the other hand, could only be accomplished, if all the States forming part of it, and all the classes, interests and parties which it contained, joined in finishing and consolidating the national edifice.

That the profound mistrust prevailing on both sides had not been eradicated by the Peace of Frankfort, was a feature far from peculiar to this pacification. Less common was the experience that the policy of one of two belligerent States should be so long and so persistently dominated by the conviction that the other was determined to seize the first opportunity of renewing the conflict. Serious doubts were, in the first instance, entertained at Berlin, whether France would prove equal to the financial effort which she had bound herself to make, and whether, conscious of her inability to pay

[1] Hanotaux, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, vol. I, p. 309, reckons the loss resulting to France from the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine at 1,597,228 souls.

the indemnity, she would not seize some occasion for breaking loose from the agreement. Negotiations were, however, continuously carried on at Frankfort as to matters concerning the annexed territories[1]—the right of option (of nationality) in particular; and a convention supplementary to the Treaty of Peace was concluded on December 11th, 1871. Before this, diplomatic relations had been resumed between the two Governments, Marquis de Gabriac being, so early as June 1871, transferred from Petersburg as *chargé d'affaires* to Berlin, where he held his own against the suspicions professed by Bismarck as to the intentions of France, while Count von Waldersee was accredited in a similar capacity to the French Government. His bearing was conciliatory; and still more notable was the influence of the pacific spirit displayed by General (from 1873 Field-marshal) Edwin von Manteuffel, always trusted by his sovereign, but not on cordial terms with Bismarck. While Manteuffel was in command of the German army of occupation, Comte de Saint-Vallier (*persona grata* at more than one German Court) was sent to him as French commissioner. Thus it proved possible to tide over some untoward incidents—a violation by French soldiery of the military frontier at Raincy (June 1871) and, at a later date, the acquittal by French juries of two Frenchmen charged with the murder of German soldiers (November), which had called forth a dispatch of almost brutal menace from Bismarck.

The French Government, of which during this period Thiers remained the ruling spirit, had, from the outset, persistently addressed itself to the task of 'liquidation before

[1] For a lucid summary of the relations between Germany and France from the Peace of Frankfort up to the final liberation of the French territory (in accordance with the Treaty of March 15th, 1873), see Hanotaux, vol I. A more detailed account will be found in the conscientious, if rather long-winded, record by Vicomte de Gontaut-Biron of his embassy at Berlin, from 1872 to 1877, in the two works noted in the Bibliography, and here cited as vols. I and II respectively.

liberation.' This task was little short of stupendous; for, besides the war indemnity of five milliards, the interest on loans for raising the requisite capital, and the cost of the maintenance of the German army of occupation, the work of restoration and reconstruction brought up the charges on the public purse to a total of more than three times the amount of the indemnity. By a convention signed at Berlin, on October 12th, 1871, after a brief discussion between Pouyer-Quertier and Bismarck and Delbrück, the French Government arranged for the payment in instalments of the first two milliards by May 1st, 1872, and the consequent evacuation of six departments; while, at the same time, the rate of payment was settled for the maintenance of the German troops in France, now numbering 50,000. Probably, Bismarck had been found more ready to grant reasonable terms in consequence of the general success which, in the summer and autumn of 1871, had attended his policy.

In August, the Emperors William and Francis Joseph had met at Ischl, and soon afterwards at Salzburg, while Beust held a conference with Bismarck at Gastein—a very amicable farewell meeting between the antagonists of many years[1]. Bismarck was now virtually certain of the goodwill of Austria-Hungary to the new Empire—the ultimate fruit of his moderation at Nikolsburg; and he was no longer dependent on the goodwill of Russia, though anxious to preserve it, so far as to keep the three empires in line and France

[1] They did not meet again, Beust says, for six years. In October, the Slavophil Hohenwart Ministry in Austria-Hungary, with whose head Beust had been on uneasy terms, came to a fall; but it was Andrássy, and not Beust, who ultimately (November) reaped the benefit of a result which they had jointly prepared. Beust was relieved of the chancellorship and appointed ambassador in London Neither his public career nor his troubles were, therefore, quite over; but it is at this point that, in his *Memoirs*, he humorously announces himself to have chosen for his epitaph the words 'Peace to his ashes and justice to his memory!'

isolated and impotent. The beginnings of a reorganisation of the French army supplied a useful irritant; and the policy of Bismarck was directed towards stopping, or at least retarding, the process of French recovery, without delaying the payment of the successive instalments of the indemnity. But he would not go so far as was desired by Count Harry Arnim (who in August 1871 had been appointed envoy, and afterwards ambassador, at Paris), and countenance Bonapartist designs of bringing about, with Bazaine as principal agent, the overthrow of Thiers and the Republic.

Thus, the new year 1872, as Lord Lyons says, opened gloomily for France. A prudent step had been taken by Thiers in appointing Vicomte de Gontaut-Biron ambassador at Berlin, where he entered on his duties early in January. Legitimist as he was and wholly Catholic in his sympathies[1], he was from the first obnoxious to Bismarck, who, in the end, practically dropped all personal direct intercourse with him; but he was a man of unimpeachable honour and correctness, incapable of intrigues in Count Harry Arnim's style, while his connexion with German families of high rank facilitated his access to the Emperor and Empress, who showed him marked favour[2]. Some time, however, elapsed before the tension between the two Governments decreased. The French Military Law, which established a compulsory military service of five years (though with various kinds of exemptions), was passed on July 27th, 1872. But, ten days earlier, the National Assembly had accepted the not very generous convention signed by Thiers and Arnim on June 29th, according to which, two milliards having already been paid, the third and fourth were to be paid by February 1874,

[1] The incident of the protest of French bishops against Bismarck's ecclesiastical policy belongs to the years 1873–4, and will be noted in the following chapter.

[2] The information obtained by him in 1875 as to the intentions of the German Government was of the greatest service to his own.

the evacuation proceeding at corresponding dates; as to the last milliard, though March 1st, 1875, was to be the date of the final payment, and though the evacuation might be accelerated if solid guarantees could be furnished, financial guarantees were not approved on the German side as acceptable in lieu of territorial, nor was a proportionate diminution of the army of occupation granted as a natural consequence of the evacuation of part of the still occupied territory.

Yet, though there was much disappointment in France, the efforts of Thiers and his Government had not been in vain. They had been carried on in the midst of a political conflict with the Assembly, which threatened to overwhelm the Republic (whether 'Conservative' or other), or, at least, to plunge it deeper than ever into the quicksands of party intrigue. In the same month of July, 1872, a loan of three-and-a-half milliards was approved, and subscribed more than fourteen times over. Bismarck held fast to the conviction that the heart of France was set on a war of revenge; and he continued more intent than ever on drawing closer the bonds which united Germany with Austria, while keeping in touch with Russia. The meeting of the three Emperors at Berlin in September 1872 was in so far not planned by Bismarck, that it seems open to question whether the pressure exercised by Tsar Alexander II and Gortchakoff was entirely in accordance with his intentions; and the Foreign Secretary, H. von Thile (who of late had had to bear the burden of so many negotiations), was sacrificed to the ill-humour of his chief. But the Emperors' meeting was, at all events, a clear sign to Europe, and to France in particular, that the position of Germany was altogether unassailable, and that further pressure might be put on France, which, as the tension between Thiers and the Assembly increased, seemed to be on the eve of a political catastrophe. Neither the death of Napoleon III on January 9th, 1873, though it extinguished a daring scheme of bringing back the worn-out exile, nor

the unpopularity of the Orleans family, nor the immovability of the legitimate pretender, nor even the interest displayed by Thiers in the prisoner of the Vatican, could induce the majority of the Assembly to rally to the Conservative Republic and the rule of 'Adolphe Ier,' as Bismarck, half derisively, half sympathetically, called him[1]. But the veteran statesman, though drawing near to his downfall, still patriotically strove to accomplish the liberation of the territory, which was to constitute his final service to his country. It redounds to Bismarck's honour, that, in the last stage of the settlement between the two nations, he should have shown himself on the whole disposed to promote its completion.

Thus, when, at the beginning of March 1873, he advised that the final evacuation should, in accordance with the French proposal, take place on July 1st, Belfort remaining in German hands till the actual completion of the payment of the fifth and final milliard, this last reservation, which (though not unexpected) gave great umbrage in France, may be concluded to have been due to the insistence of the military authorities. Ultimately, however, Moltke's opposition notwithstanding, Bismarck, inexhaustible in the suggestion of expedients, succeeded in substituting Verdun for Belfort. The final convention was, accordingly, signed on March 15th, 1873—this time at Berlin, by Bismarck and Gontaut-Biron[2]). The anticipation of payments was to be allowed, and evacuations were to run parallel with them. France engaged to pay, before May 10th, 1873, the 500 millions not due till March 1st following; and, as to the final milliard, falling due on March 1st, 1875, it was to be paid in four instalments, on

[1] Hanotaux, vol I, p. 550.

[2] The transfer of the final negotiations from Paris, where they were already approaching to a satisfactory conclusion, was regarded as a personal insult by Arnim, and marked a further stage in the lamentable history of his relations with Bismarck, of which the cruel close will be noted later.

June 5th, July 5th, August 5th and September 5th, 1873. In return, the Germans were, within four months from July 1st, 1873, to evacuate the four departments still occupied, except Verdun and a range of four kilometres round it, which were to be evacuated within ten days afterwards. These arrangements were carried out in due course. On August 5th Manteuffel evacuated Nancy; on September 5th the last instalment was paid and the evacuation completed, with the exception of Verdun, which the Prussian troops quitted on the 13th. On September 17th the *Journal Officiel* announced the complete liberation of the French territory on the previous day. It was after this fashion that France, as the Emperor William generously said, brought to pass the prodigious result of freeing herself from an obligation which she had originally undertaken to fulfil within a period extending over two further years. Thiers, when in May of this year he resigned office, had more than deserved the 'three-quarters' apotheosis' awarded to him by the National Assembly. But without Bismarck's acquiescence at the last the task could not have been accomplished; and, in the earlier stages of the whole transaction, he had shown less goodwill than suspicion. His motives in allowing the procedure to be hastened at the end have been diversely estimated. An American politician and historian friendly to Germany[1] informed a colleague that, in his opinion, Bismarck wished to have his hands free for the opening of the Eastern question which he knew to be imminent. Nor should we forget that, at this time, yet another struggle, of a different kind—the so-called *Kulturkampf*—continued to occupy his chief attention; although the progress of this very conflict was to furnish him with an early opportunity of keeping up the apprehensions of France for the independence of her internal government.

[1] George Bancroft, United States Minister at Berlin. See Gontaut-Biron, vol. I, p. 337.

But before adverting to the ecclesiastical conflict which was for some years to dominate the politics of the new Empire, it is necessary to touch on the early stages of its constitutional development, and, more especially, on the settlement of its newly annexed territory of Alsace-Lorraine.

The first German *Reichstag*[1] was opened by the Emperor William I on March 21st, 1871, with a speech from the throne offering humble thanks to God for Germany's achievement of unity, her organic reconstitution, the security assured to her frontiers, and the establishment of her right to determine her national future. The elections had been numerously attended and had produced a result on the whole much more in harmony with the new order of things than had those to the Customs Parliament in the preceding spring. Throughout southern Germany, there had been an inevitable revulsion of feeling; and in Baden, Grand-ducal Hesse and Saxony solid nationalist majorities had been secured. But it was noticeable that, even in northern Germany, a number of Old-conservatives and Clericals—fractions not largely represented in the North-German *Reichstag*—had been elected; and that, of the latter in particular, not less than 36 had been returned from northern, and 21 from southern, Germany. The significance of this fact, to which it will behove us to return in our next chapter, had been made clear even before the actual assembling of the *Reichstag*.

The task to which the national parliament was primarily called upon to address itself was the adaptation to imperial conditions of the constitution of the North-German Confederation. The position in it of the several federated States, and of Bavaria in particular, would have to be specially considered. The foundations would have to be laid, so far

[1] For a summary of its proceedings, see the lucid chapter (XXXIII) in Klüpfel's *Einheitsbestrebungen*; and cf. H. Oncken's *Bennigsen*, W. Oncken's *Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm*, and Hohenlohe's *Denkwürdigkeiten* (vol II in all three cases).

as possible, of measures for the unification of the Empire in matters judicial and military, commercial and financial. And, together with the distribution of the war indemnity, the relations to the Empire of the territories newly acquired by it, and of their system of government, would have to be settled.

The *Reichstag*, having elected to its presidency the veteran Eduard von Simson, hitherto President of the North-German *Reichstag*, and to its vice-presidency the former chief of the Bavarian Ministry, Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst and the President of the Württemberg Chamber of Deputies (Weber, formerly a Bavarian Councillor of State), proceeded to vote, by 243 against 63, an address, composed by Lasker and moved by Bennigsen. It will be seen that umbrage had been taken by the minority, mainly consisting of Clericals, at a passage in this address, which expressed the hope that the days of interference in the life of any nation by others had passed for ever, and at Bennigsen's frank intimation that the German Empire harboured no design of entering into a course of German-Italian or German-Christian policy[1]. It will also be seen that the activity of the Clericals was far from being arrested by this initial failure, and that their next move was an (abortive) attempt to bring up the old stalking-horse of the religious fundamental rights (*Grundrechte*) defined in the Prussian constitution of January 1850. The German *Grundrechte* as a whole were, in 1871, once more left in abeyance; the Social-democrat Bebel, who had just come forth from prison, proclaiming to the Chamber that, before the close of the century, in one way or another, not only would these rights be established, but all the demands of his party would come to be fulfilled.

[1] The troops of the Italian Government had, on September 20th, 1870, occupied Rome, with the exception of the Vatican; and, on October 9th following, the Papal States had been formally incorporated in the kingdom of Italy.

More immediately pressing was the definitive arrangement of the relations between the Empire and Bavaria. The Bavarian Government had spontaneously renounced certain of the exceptional privileges allowed to it by the Treaty of Versailles[1]; and the Bavarian member of the *Bundesrat* now held out a prospect of the acceptance by his Government of further proposals, designed for bringing about a unification of weights and measures, and of the conditions of military service. A bill embodying these changes was read a third time on April 14th, and speedily became law.

A proposal for the payment of deputies to the *Reichstag* was again mooted, but only to be once more rejected; and, on April 14th, the constitution of the German Empire was approved by an overwhelming majority, only the Poles and a solitary Guelf (Professor Ewald, one of the Göttingen Seven[2]) recording their votes against it and bringing down upon themselves and the clerical protesters the scornful denunciations of the spokesman of the *victrix causa*, Heinrich von Treitschke. The King's sanction, on April 16th, gave to the constitution the force of law.

A general survey of it seems unnecessary here, since it was to so large an extent based on that of the North-German Confederation, which has been already examined at some length[3]. But it may be pointed out that, in the adapted constitution, although its opening words define the new polity as a "perpetual federation," and although certain definite concessions are made to the Princes federated with the Emperor, his sovereignty is a real one, and he is made responsible to no other authority. The Ministerial responsibility established by the constitution appertains not to the several Ministers, but to the Emperor's first officer of

[1] Cf. vol. II, pp. 556 f., *ante*.
[2] Cf. vol. I, p. 284, *note*, *ante*.
[3] Cf. vol. II, pp. 357 f., *ante*.

State, the Chancellor of the Empire. A still more peculiar feature in this constitution is the *Bundesrat*—neither a Council of Princes, nor a House of Lords, but intended at once to safeguard the interests of the several confederated States, and to furnish a conservative balance to the popularly elected *Reichstag*. The *Bundesrat* numbers 58 members (instead of, as formerly, 43), in nominating whom the Governments are not tied down to any considerations of birth or *status*; so that experts may be appointed as well as men of high rank or position. To the *Reichstag*, consisting in its early years of some 380 members, elected by universal and direct suffrage, falls the right of controlling expenditure—that on army and navy being subject to the conditions to be noticed below. Its general function is to give or withhold its assent to laws within the imperial competence; while, at the same time, it has the right of proposing legislation on its own initiative. In its original form, the constitution prescribed that, in any matter not of common concern to the whole Empire, only the votes of those deputies should be taken who had been elected in federated States concerned in the subject at issue. But, although intended as a protection for the interests of particular States, this proviso soon proved a palpably two-edged weapon, and was, accordingly, repealed on February 24th, 1873.

In general, notwithstanding the manifest advantages of this constitution, fault was soon found from different points of view with what seemed its shortcomings. Conservatives, and not Conservatives only, regretted that the possession of a moderate income should not have been required from electors, as an additional safeguard to the non-payment of members of the *Reichstag*, on which Bismarck insisted, but which, though it kept out lesser Government officials and petty advocates (who swarmed in certain other parliaments), could not exclude deputies receiving payment from labour or Church sources. Less contentious was the expediency of a

simplification of the existing system, which left the diets of the particular States standing side by side with the *Reichstag*. The right principle, obviously, was that matters of more general concern should be dealt with by the *Reichstag*, while purely internal business was left to the particular diets, which might absolve it in shorter sessions. This, it was hoped, would be the more easily accomplished, as it came to be recognised that special rights (*Reservatrechte*) were anything but advantageous to the progress of particular States. On the other hand, it was desirable that with the constitutional unification of the whole Empire should be combined an administrative decentralisation, which in Prussia had begun in 1868, and which, if extended to the Empire at large, would offer the surest guarantee of a loyal cooperation of its component parts for the welfare of the whole.

In the interest of both whole and parts, it was, above all, desirable that the Empire should possess a common code of criminal and of civil law, and of judicial procedure, which implied the establishment, so often demanded in the past, of a supreme imperial judicial tribunal. Although, from the first, the new constitution treated criminal law and judicial process as within the imperial sphere of legislation, it was not till May 31st, 1872, that the *Reichstag* accepted the principle that this sphere also comprised the entire body of civil law. The *Bundesrat*, indeed, at first objected, and the motion had to be repeatedly renewed, till it was definitively accepted on December 20th, 1873; it was in these debates that the breadth and acumen of Lasker's legally trained mind asserted themselves with notable effect. A criminal code founded on that already adopted by the States of the North-German Confederation, was speedily adopted for the whole Empire, and soon supplemented by a military penal code; but the completion of a civil code and order of judicial process was necessarily the work of many years, and, though begun in 1874, was not ready for the

imperial sanction till 1896[1]. A principal share in this great work belonged to Bennigsen's lifelong friend the eminent jurist Gottfried Planck, who carried it on long after he had become blind.

In other matters, too, unification was advanced with as little delay as possible. The all-important settlement of the military system of the Empire, which was accomplished in 1874, must be reserved for a subsequent chapter. A postal union, and the introduction of a uniform system of coinage (*marks* and *pfennigs*), were rapidly brought about—Bismarck insisting, with regard to the coins of each State, on the maintenance of the undertaking to allow the image of the particular sovereign (or the arms of the Free city) to appear on the obverse, with the arms of the Empire on the reverse. The establishment of an imperial control over German railways was, in principle, agreed upon from the outset; in matters commercial, on the other hand, differences of economical and financial tenets remained unsolved, and the entrance of Hamburg and Bremen into the customs system of the Empire was not accomplished till 1888, when the history of the *Zollverein* as a distinct system came to an end. Of less importance was the question of the right of separate diplomatic representation left to Bavaria and Württemberg, alike reluctant to follow the example of Baden, which, so early as July 1871, abolished its own Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

But all the discussions concerning the political development of the new Empire, during the years which had followed on its establishment—and there have not been many chapters of parliamentary life in which the needs of debate have been met with more ability and energy—were dominated by

[1] The inevitable protraction of these deliberations did not, of course, prevent legislation in particular branches of the law. Thus, as we shall see in another connexion, civil marriage was legalised throughout the Empire on February 6th, 1875.

the chief political problem of the period: the settlement of the conflict between the German State and the Church of Rome. This conflict, and the new conditions of German political and party life, of which its progress was the main determinant, will therefore occupy us in the next chapter. There was, however, one distinct provision of the Peace to which it behoved the German *Reichstag* to give permanency, though the working of its conditions could not be ascertained at once, or before the other provisions of the treaty had been fully carried out. This concerned the relations to the new German Empire of the annexed territory of Alsace-Lorraine, which involved the political future of those much-coveted lands.

The problem was more difficult to solve in 1871 than it would have been in 1815, had the German Powers then been sufficiently united to join in insisting on the cession by France of at least part of Alsace[1]. Before the outbreak of

[1] There is no necessity for citing here the chief authorities on the history of Alsace from the days of its gradual acquisition by France onwards But it may be worth mentioning that no better account could be found of the successive political and social changes in Alsace from the First French Revolution onwards, than in the interesting *Reminiscences* of Count Ferdinand Eckbrecht Durkheim, a scion of a great Alsatian family, who, after faithfully serving France under both the Republic and Napoleon III, played a prominent part in the reorganisation of his native land in 1871 and the following years. Count Eckbrecht Durkheim was German by education and sentiment (he was the biographer of Goethe's 'Lili' and a family friend of her Alsatian descendants); but his loyalty in both phases of his allegiance was unimpeachable As to the language question in Alsace, see some interesting notes in H. Rocholl's *Zur Geschichte der Annexion des Elsass durch die Krone Frankreich* (Gotha, 1888), based chiefly on a pamphlet as to the preservation of the German language, addressed by L. Cazeaux, Honorary Canon of Strassburg, to his Bishop. A useful summary of the condition of affairs in Alsace-Lorraine in the years immediately following on the

the First French Revolution, although there had been little or no desire in Alsace for reincorporation in the effete Germanic Empire, the country had, to all intents and purposes, remained German both in its outward features and in the general character of its population. The Revolution, which had here perpetrated some of its worst extravagances and violently disturbed the previous state of land-tenure, had already much disintegrated the internal condition of Alsace. But, after 1815, the assimilation of its inhabitants to the French had made rapid progress; and the *régime* of Napoleon III, while in many respects favourable to the material prosperity of Alsace, and marked by a praiseworthy solicitude on the part of the Government for the welfare of the working-class at Mülhausen and elsewhere, was consistently adverse to the use of the German language as a vehicle of popular education and religious teaching. In the struggle between the two languages, which since the time of the Revolution had pervaded the educational history of Alsace, from that of the bipartite University of Strassburg downwards, the Napoleonic Government had systematically used its influence in favour of French. The result had been that, notwithstanding the resistance offered by the Protestant as well as by some of the Catholic clergy, together with not a few Alsatian laymen of note, the country had become bilingual, in the sense that neither the French nor the German tongue was a possession of the entire population. While, in the lower spheres of popular life, religion and morality had suffered in the process, in the higher the number of those who adhered to the traditions of their German forefathers had unmistakably continued to dwindle; and the recovery by Germany of this long-lost fraction of her former

war will be found in vol. II of W. Herbst's *Encyklopädie der neueren Geschichte* (1884). For the period from 1885 to 1894 we have the invaluable diary and correspondence of the Governor of the *Reichsland*, Prince Hohenlohe, in his *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. II, pp. 370–515.

self had become an experiment to which only a strong historic enthusiasm could look forward with confidence, and in which only that small minority of the inhabitants of the ceded lands themselves could be expected to acquiesce who either were influenced by ancient family connexion and literary and other intellectual affinities, or bowed to political necessity.

The appointment, during the war, of Count F. von Bismarck-Bohlen as Governor of Alsace (General von Bonin being, in the first instance, appointed Governor of Lorraine) had been in so far successful that a good impression had been made in the conquered land by his conciliatory as well as straightforward bearing. On transferring the seat of his government from Hagenau to Strassburg after the capture of that city, he had, in a proclamation dated October 8th, 1870, expressed the hope that, with God's help, Alsace and her capital would remain German. But he had not interfered in the elections for the French National Assembly held in Alsace and 'German' Lorraine early in February, the results of which had been throughout in favour of adherence to France. With the exception of the higher civil officials, the personal composition of the administration of the lands was left in the main unchanged. The *arrondissements* became circles (*Kreise*) of rather smaller dimensions; and after Count von Bismarck-Bohlen had added to his previous functions those of Civil Commissioner, an undenominational system of school inspection was established. Meanwhile, a training school for Catholic schoolmasters was established at Strassburg, and another, for Protestant, at Colmar; and, so early as April 1871, German was declared the obligatory language for all school-teaching in Alsace-Lorraine, and obligatory school attendance was introduced.

Meanwhile, the political future of the annexed territory had been discussed on many sides. The idea of assigning parts of it to one or more of the States of south-western

Germany was not quite dead[1]; but the question practically resolved itself into the alternatives of the annexation of the whole to Prussia, and the administration of it, at all events for the present, on behalf of the Empire, as a distinct 'imperial territory' (*Reichsland*). The former course was disapproved by Bismarck, who rightly held that it would neither be satisfactory to the Alsace-Lorrainers themselves, nor lead to a development among them of those tendencies to self-government of which they were by no means devoid[2]. He, therefore (April 1st), proposed the other alternative to the *Bundesrat*; the *provisorium* to continue till January 1st, 1874, from which date onwards the constitution of the German Empire was to be valid in Alsace-Lorraine. Ultimately, the country was to be subject to imperial legislation, even in matters not within its range in other parts of the Empire; and, during the *provisorium*, this legislation was to be committed to the Emperor, with the assent of the *Bundesrat* only, while all other rights of sovereignty were to be exercised by him. A committee on the subject, appointed by the *Bundesrat*, accepted these proposals in substance; but it made no secret of its view (to which, as has been seen, Bismarck was opposed) that annexation to Prussia would have been a preferable course, inasmuch as the constitution of the Empire was not suited to the inclusion in it of a *Reichs-*

[1] The notion seems to have been again mooted in the *Bundesrat* and then finally dropped. It is stated that Bismarck had previously not been unwilling to grant Bavaria possession of the town of Weissenburg, and that the idea was welcomed by Bray.

[2] If we were to credit Gelzer's information, the Jesuits had contrived to insinuate to Bismarck the idea of his becoming himself hereditary ruler of Alsace-Lorraine, but Gelzer, though well-informed, especially about things at Rome, was unfriendly to Bismarck. See Hohenlohe, *Denkwurdigkeiten*, vol. II, pp. 61, 64; and cf. *ib.* p. 477 as to the later scheme of making Hohenlohe hereditary regent, and Bismarck's annoyance thereat. The ideas of partition were revived in 1887, but disapproved by the Emperor, and dropped again.

land, or country under immediate imperial sovereignty. In accepting the proposals, therefore, the *Bundesrat* added a stipulation that the amendments or supplements to the constitution which it would necessitate should be carried out by constitutional process.

In April, 1871, an assembly of delegates and notables was held at Colmar, followed by another of the same kind, consisting of 150 members, at Strassburg, in order that the views of the population of Alsace-Lorraine might be laid before the *Reichstag*[1]. They emphasised the desire that no part of the conquered territory should be severed from the rest by being annexed to any State of south-western Germany.

The discussion in the *Reichstag* followed in May. Bismarck, in a long and powerful speech, expounded the whole history of the relations between Germany and Alsace-Lorraine, and gave utterance to a hope that the population would reconcile itself to the change, finding its recompense in the enjoyment of a larger measure of self-government than had been its lot under French rule. He never sounded a truer note, or one more in accordance with the general principles of his imperial policy; and the method thus indicated, had it been consistently pursued, might, in the long run, have perhaps had a chance of gaining over a population whose local conditions and previous history had given it so marked an individuality of its own. The proposals approved by the *Bundesrat* were referred by the *Reichstag* to a commission of 28; and the law embodying them came on for a third reading on May 25th[2]. Bismarck repeated his main

[1] It is worth while to notice Rocholl's bitter comment upon what he regards as the mistake of attaching so much importance to the views of notables (taken of course mainly from the upper classes) instead of ascertaining those of the general body of the population.

[2] On the previous day (May 24th), the *Reichstag* called upon the Chancellor of the Empire to use his influence for the speedy second foundation of the University of Strassburg, as a purely German university A few weeks later (July 1st) Count von Bismarck-

arguments in another speech, pointing out that during two centuries of French government the Alsatians had, in the good old German way, preserved not a little particularism, and that to strengthen this tendency was as necessary here as it was inexpedient elsewhere (in Hanover, to wit). On June 3rd the law, with certain modifications, was passed by a large majority; and it came into force on June 9th. It fixed January 1st, 1873, as the date on which the *provisorium* was to end; after that date the *Reichsland* was to elect 15 representatives in the *Reichstag*; but, by a later law (June 20th, 1872), the term of the *provisorium* was prolonged to January 1st, 1874.

On June 26th, 1871, a general amnesty was proclaimed in the *Reichsland*, followed, in July, by laws as to changes in

Bohlen pointed out to the Emperor that the French Government was contemplating the establishment at Nancy of a university on the German model, with a view of attracting to it the youth of Alsace, and recommended Freiherr von Roggenbach as director of the reorganisation of Strassburg. No better choice could have been made; for Roggenbach, who had declined the administration of part of the new *Reichsland*, was both one of the most high-minded and, whether on his own account or on that of Baden, one of the least self-seeking, of statesmen. His task was full of difficulty; for the means placed at his disposal by the Imperial Chancery were insufficient to enable him to include many leading academical names in the new Strassburg professoriate. Still, there was a notable element of originality and independence of mind in a list including, to speak of historians and economists only, Hermann Baumgarten, to whom neither Bismarck's political nor Treitschke's historical authority was sacrosanct, H Geffcken, the eminent publicist (afterwards one of the Chancellor's victims), F X. Krauss, von der Holst and Michaelis; Max-Müller, too, paid a six months' visit to the new Kaiser-Wilhelm's University. It was formally opened in May 1872, in surroundings full of gloom, and Roggenbach then resigned his curatorship. The success of his creation continued to be hampered by want of funds, but was furthered to the best of his ability by Moller, and contributed at least something towards reviving Strassburg's ancient German fame. Cf K. Samver, *Zur Erinnerung an F von Roggenbach* (1909), pp. 130 ff.

the judicial administration and as to the introduction of the imperial system of customs duties and taxation (which was fully established here on January 1st, 1872). On August 26th, Count von Bismarck-Bohlen announced that no levy for military service would take place in Alsace-Lorraine during the current year—a judicious concession. Shortly afterwards (September 7th), he resigned the offices which he had administered with conspicuous ability.

No Governor-General was appointed in his place; but, in the first instance, Eduard von Möller took charge of the government of Alsace-Lorraine in the capacity of Chief-president (*Oberpräsident*). He had administered the new province of Hesse-Nassau with considerable success; but the assimilative process which he sought to apply in Alsace, and of which the chief factors were to be education and conscription, found favour there only with a small number of influential inhabitants. Möller was assisted in his government by a board called the Imperial Council of Alsace-Lorraine and seated at Strassburg; while in Berlin a separate division of the Imperial Chancery was instituted for the affairs of the *Reichsland*. Its organisation in 22 circles (*Kreise*) was now fully carried out; but it was not till a year later (January 1873) that subordinate representative bodies for the circles (*Kreistage*) were established. Meanwhile, a convention supplementary to the Peace had been concluded at Frankfort (December 11th, 1871), according to which natives of Alsace-Lorraine or persons found domiciled there on March 2nd, 1871, were proclaimed to be Germans, unless they declared that they preferred to remain Frenchmen and emigrated to France.

Affairs failed to run smoothly in what had been intended to be a period of gradual transition. This was partly due to the friction between the population and its new administration, partly to deeper causes. In March 1872, yet another delegacy of notables visited Berlin, with the design of

smoothing down the difficulties of the situation; and an interesting account is given by one of their number, Count Eckbrecht Dürkheim, of his interviews with Bismarck on this occasion. The Imperial Chancellor still adhered to his reasonable notions as to the best method of reconciling the *Reichsland* to the new order of things; but he felt himself unable to give way to such demands as a prolongation for five years of the exemption of the population from military service. Thus the delegacy obtained no concession of importance, beyond a handsome payment to Strassburg for 'restoration' purposes out of the French indemnity.

Towards the end of September, a large exodus of population to France took place; and it has been said that, in the last fortnight of that month, nearly 200,000 Alsatians and Lorrainers crossed the frontier. The population of Metz had, it is added, fallen to 20,000; while that of Nancy rose by 10,000 in a single week, and in the French department of the Vosges the number of inhabitants was augmented by 45,000. But there is good reason for believing that the total estimate, at all events, is much beyond the mark. Many manufactories were sold in haste; and nearly all the former French magistrates left the country. There was much suffering; a *Société de Protection des Alsaciens-Lorrains* was founded in France; and many of the exiles were settled in Algeria[1]. On October 1st, 1872, the German Government officially announced that all persons born or domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine, who had not opted for France or who, having so opted, still remained in the country, would henceforth be regarded as German subjects.

Meanwhile, the new system of government continued, and the administration in the *Reichsland* was not always at

[1] For a lucid and interesting account of the condition of Alsace about this time, see the *Memoirs*, etc., of Sir Robert Morier (vol. II, pp. 263 ff.), who visited several parts of the *Reichsland*, with which he was already familiar, from Munich.

one with the bureaucracy at Berlin. The elections for the *Reichstag* resulted in the return of ultramontane adversaries of the Empire, who fell into speedy conflict with Bismarck on the subject of the right of declaring a state of siege in the *Reichsland*. In June 1875, however, Möller, whose intentions were excellent, succeeded in bringing to pass the first meeting of a *Landesausschuss* or representative committee, which was for the present to serve the purpose of a provisional diet; and it was in conformity with its wishes that he nearly completed the reorganisation of the political government of Alsace-Lorraine (July 1879). But, as a whole, his administration was unsuccessful, and in September 1879, he resigned, making way for a successor who took office, with the title of Governor-general (*Statthalter*), in the person of Field-marshal Edwin von Manteuffel.

Manteuffel, who (as has been seen[1]) had earned deserved commendation while commanding the German army of occupation in France, was one of the most capable men of his day, and had by the confidence of his sovereign been called upon to render in succession many services of high importance and special difficulty. Great hopes were, therefore, placed on his assumption of the governorship of Alsace-Lorraine. According to the reconstructed system, the Governor-general was to be assisted by under-secretaries of State and Ministerial councillors; and the *Landesausschuss* was to act as a permanent representative body, enjoying freedom of discussion and the right of determining the land-tax; while, by way of supplement, there was to be a senate, with purely consultative functions. But, though the new system of government was complete in itself, and the Governor abounded in goodwill, the party of protest seemed to derive fresh strength from the concessions made to its demands. Manteuffel, who was ageing, no longer possessed the strength of will required for breaking the resistance of the

[1] *Ante*, p. 2.

native officials and the Catholic clergy; and his long speeches, intended to conciliate them, gave small comfort to those elements in the population which were well-disposed towards the union with Germany. In short, the 'Manteuffel era' failed to fulfil its promise. It was much clouded in 1873, at a critical time in the relations between Germany and France; and it came to an end with Manteuffel's death in 1885. The elections for the *Reichstag*, held two years later, showed the country to be all but unanimous in its support of the adversaries of the Empire and the ultramontanes.

In October 1885, Prince Hohenlohe took over the government of Alsace-Lorraine into his skilful and experienced hands, in which it remained for nine years. He addressed himself to his task with his usual conscientiousness, and recognised from the first that the difficulties in the way of success were by no means altogether due to the population, influenced though it was by the Catholic clergy, which no steps had been taken to Germanise from the first by a new system of seminaries. (In his opinion the surest way to estrange Alsace-Lorraine from France would have been a new division of dioceses, Strassburg being limited to its old area, Lower Alsace—with the addition of part of Baden—and Freiburg united with Upper Alsace.) The administrative changes proposed by Hohenlohe failed to satisfy the military party at Berlin, which advocated the concentration of the control of the administration at Berlin and the substitution for the governorship of an ordinary chief-presidency, as in the days of Möller. Bismarck upheld Hohenlohe in his resistance to such a change, but was in favour of an increased rigour of government in the *Reichsland*; and there seemed no diminution in the grievances of the population—the persecution of members of the League of Patriots, domiciliary visits, expulsions and the like, and above all, the petty worry of the withholding of shooting-licences (*Jagdkarten*) from inhabitants suspected of French sympathies, and the

so-called *Passzwang* (enforcement of passports), which last was not till 1891, after a deputation to the Emperor William, restricted to persons now or formerly in the military service of a foreign Power, and to emigrants. In April 1887, there was added to these complaints the incidental trouble of the Schnäbele case[1]. The purpose of Bismarck, Hohenlohe feared, was to goad the Alsatians into revolt and bring about a state of siege (which would have removed the military control out of his hands); and, in any event, there was no course open to himself but to carry out the policy of repression as little rigorously as he could. On the other hand, he was able to take the right course in doing what he could towards furthering public works—such as the great reservoir in the Sewen valley and the Ludwigshafen canal—and thus conciliating the goodwill of great industrial centres like Mülhausen. The accession of William II brought no change, though he twice visited the *Reichsland* in Hohenlohe's time; and no alteration was effected in the exceptional treatment of the country either before Bismarck's dismissal, or under Caprivi, who, with his leading Ministers, Miquel and Eulenburg, held that any such experiment would be unsafe, in view of the alleged continued French attempts to tamper with the submission of the population to its existing Government. Thus the conditions remained essentially the same under which Möller, Manteuffel and Hohenlohe had failed in turn; nor was it likely that their successors would be more fortunate, even with time on their side.

It seemed preferable to carry this brief notice of the fortunes of Germany's great territorial acquisition in the Peace of 1871, and of the earlier disillusionments which it brought with it, up to the close of the period more fully treated in the present volume. Returning once more to the date of that Peace, we recall its further condition of

[1] Cf. chap. IV, *post*.

the war indemnity to be paid by France. With the appropriation of this sum the *Reichstag* of 1871 was immediately called upon to busy itself. Liberal provision was made in the way of compensations and other allowances; and it was characteristic of the imperfect sense of security derived from the pacification that large amounts (equivalent to over 54 and 18 millions sterling respectively) were devoted to construction of new fortresses and barracks, and to the storing of material of war at Spandau. Further applications of the indemnity money were made immediately after the reassembling of the *Reichstag* in October. A sum of more than two millions sterling was repaid to the subscribers to the North-German Confederation loan of July 1870; and a reserve of six millions was deposited as an imperial war-treasure. The proposal of this last item met with strong remonstrances, but was carried by a large majority after a powerful speech from Bismarck, in which he ascribed Germany's economic salvation in 1870 to the war-treasure of four-and-a-half millions then in her hands, and the financial difficulties of France to her lack of such a resource.

Earlier in the year, the *Reichstag* had been asked to spend a sum equivalent to £600,000 in dotations to generals and others, who had rendered conspicuous services in connexion with the war. The number of recipients had not been precisely fixed, though a dozen or fifteen seem to have been contemplated; and there was some opposition. Public opinion, however, was on the whole favourable to the proposal, which was supported by Bismarck (who had no personal interest in the matter) and carried by 175 votes to 51. The distribution was not fixed till the following year, after, on the report of a commission of generals, the number of recipients had been largely increased.

Bismarck's special dotation was the gift of his sovereign, who assigned to him the splendid estate of the Sachsenwald in Lauenburg, detached from the other State property of

the duchy as a ducal domain[1]. On March 31st, he had been created Chancellor of the Empire and a hereditary Prince. Moltke and Roon had alike been made Field-marshals and Counts.

On June 15th the *Reichstag* adjourned for the entry of the troops into Berlin on the next day—followed, in the course of the same months, by similar proceedings at Stuttgart, Dresden and Munich (the Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt troops still formed part of the army of occupation in France). The work had been done, and the gathering-in of its fruits was well in hand. But already another conflict was in progress—not, this time, one of blood and iron, but one which concerned interests and issues deeply affecting the national life now, as they had done for centuries past.

[1] Soon afterwards he acquired the *château* of Friedrichsruh on the border of the Sachsenwald. Varzin in Pomerania he had purchased with the dotation of 1866.

CHAPTER II

THE CONFLICT WITH ROME

The roots of the conflict carried on by the new German Empire, and by the Prussian State in particular, against the Church of Rome, to which it pleased the combatants on the former side to arrogate the name of the *Kulturkampf*, lay deep in the medieval past of Europe. Nor was the quarrel settled for all time by the compromise which terminated the phase of it now under review. But, though such was the case and though, under its parliamentary aspect, the historical episode which we have to narrate briefly in the present chapter exercised a lasting influence on the conditions of German political life, it had a definite beginning and a definite ending; and, after a few introductory remarks summarising the course of events in part already incidentally noted, it is to these limits that we must confine our outline of the story[1].

[1] The most serviceable survey of the materials for a history of the struggle will be found in L. Hahn's *Geschichte des 'Kulturkampfs' in Preussen* (1881), with which may be compared, as representing the ultramontane point of view, the elaborate account entitled *Die Culturkampfbewegung in Deutschland* (from 1871) by Dr Heinrich Brück, Bishop of Mainz (2 vols., 1900–1905; vol. II edited and continued by J. B. Kissling), and the briefer, but more trenchant, *Geschichte des 'Kulturkampfes' in Preussen-Deutschland* by the redoubtable Paul Majunke, a priest who took a prominent part in the struggle, both as editor of the ultramontane *Germania* and as deputy, and whose imprisonment for *lèse-majesté* in December 1874 led to a parliamentary vote which will call for notice in the text. English readers are referred to the luminous outline of the origin and earlier

Centuries had gone by since the long-protracted contest between Emperor and Pope had been waged—nominally for the rule of the Christian world, of which each claimed to be the head, really for the annihilation of the Papal power in Germany or the imperial in Italy—and since German patriotism had first identified itself with resistance to the pretensions of Rome. The Reformation had brought to Germany her greatest, but only half-used, opportunity; and, based on the incomplete Religious Peace of 1555, the Peace of Westphalia had, nearly a century later, put an end for ever to the principle of the religious indivisibility of the Empire. Though the Pope would have none of that settlement, the clergy of the Church of Rome, on the whole, kept

course of the conflict contributed, in four sections, by Sir Robert Morier to *Macmillan's Magazine*, vols. XXX and XXXI (September, October and November 1874, and January 1875), of which free use has been made in the earlier part of the present summary The most recent and most lucid German account of the whole episode is contained in F. Rachfahl's essay 'Windthorst und der Kulturkampf,' in *Preussische Jahrbucher*, vols. CXXXV and CXXXVI (February, March and April 1909) Lamprecht's admirable survey of the whole history of the *Kulturkampf* will be found in vol XI, part II, of his *Deutsche Geschichte* (Berlin, 1909), where it is accompanied by a kind of *envoi* of a later date, and in his later manner. See also Bk IX (vol II) of W Oncken's *Zeitalter Wilhelms I.* For the concluding part of the story, cf the article on Gustav von Gossler in vol VII of *Biogr Jahrb u. Deutscher Nekrolog*, vol VII (1905) See also, on the Roman Catholic side, L Pastor, *August Reichensperger*, 2 vols , 1899 For the chief authorities on the history of the Vatican Council see Bibliography The standard history of the Old-Catholic movement is that of its most indefatigable representative, J F. Schulte, likewise cited there.

It may be worth noting in this place that the designation '*Kulturkampf*' (which Falk himself thought unsatisfactory) is stated to have been first applied to the conflict with the Church of Rome in an election address issued by the *Fortschritt* party in March 1873, of which the authorship was attributed to Virchow. (Cf. Hahn, p. 118, and article 'Falk' in *Biogr Jahrb. u. Deutscher Nekrolog* for 1903.)

up a very good understanding with the German Catholic Governments (the Austrian monarchy remaining free from the obligation to tolerate Protestants). Thus, before the Josephine days, only a section of the Lutheran Protestant Princes showed any inclination to interfere, by virtue of their 'episcopal' authority, with the right claimed by the Churches to manage their internal affairs. In general, the Catholic Church, as well as the established Protestant Churches, not only kept in their hands the control of marriages and the registration of the beginnings and endings of personal life, but maintained a fair *modus vivendi* with the necessary requirements of the State, and a friendly and active cooperation even in matters of so great importance as education. As to the Catholics, the medieval conception of the Papal authority, as declared in Boniface VIII's famous bull *Unam sanctam*, was not binding upon their individual consciences; as to the Protestants, the disuse by their territorial sovereigns of the *jus reformandi* seemed to them, what indeed it was, part of the natural order of things.

In Prussia, the conjunction of tendencies in the system of government was peculiar. As time went on, the idea of a State strong in itself came more and more to dominate the growth of the monarchy. Nevertheless, toleration was one of the most enduring, as it was one of the noblest and the most beneficent, traditions of the Hohenzollern dynasty, from the days when, in the face of many trials, the Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg, after himself adopting the Reformed in place of the Lutheran faith, issued his memorable toleration edict together with his *confessio*. He was, indeed, forced to renounce for himself that *jus reformandi* on which, in Germany as elsewhere, severance from Rome had been based; but he and his successors remained, nevertheless, the heads of the established Lutheran Church in their dominions, and the ineradicable German conviction of the responsibility of the State for the education of its youth—a direct

inheritance of the academical beginnings of the Reformation—worked in harmony with the political consolidation of the Brandenburg-Prussian monarchy. Frederick the Great, though paying scant reverence to particular forms of religious belief, asserted education to be an exclusive concern of the State, and, in all ecclesiastical affairs, upheld the right of appeal from the spiritual to the civil tribunals. The view which he and the generation that assisted him in moulding the policy of Prussia took of the relations between Church and State is fully apparent in the General Prussian Code (*Allgemeines Landrecht*) promulgated eight years after his death. This production, which Frederick II had entrusted to his Grand-chancellor, Count Carmer, exhibits the enlightened and tolerant spirit of the age to which it belongs; but it is, at the same time, specially significant of the principles of State-government already fully established in the Prussian monarchy of Frederick the Great. The code explicitly declares that no bull, brief or provision may be published without the approval (*placet*) of the Crown, and that no foreign bishop or other ecclesiastic has legislative powers with regard to Church matters in the kingdom of Prussia[1].

Yet, notwithstanding these uncompromising declarations, Church and State still carried on an amicable coexistence in Prussia, and this for the most obvious of reasons. Within a few years of the date of the publication of the Prussian code, the Church of Rome underwent one of her most arduous seasons of trials; and the situation in which she was left was nowhere more precarious than in Germany. The dissolution of the Empire (1806) implied the definitive loss by the Church of Rome of all her temporalities (with the passing exception of the new metropolitan see of Ratisbon),

[1] Thus, there is ground for Treitschke's contention (in his paper on *Die Maigesetze u ihre Folgen*, reprinted in *Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe*, p. 429), that the separation between Church and State (the 'American ideal') was in Prussia a baseless theory.

a doubtful promise only being given that the limits of the old dioceses should be maintained and their pecuniary requirements met by the States in which they had been incorporated. In the Catholic parts of Prussia and among their populations, insecurity and confusion prevailed, and a most serious task awaited the reconstituted monarchy, which, after all its vicissitudes, issued forth from the Napoleonic wars as the foremost Protestant Power on the continent of Europe, with as many Catholic subjects as were to be found in all the rest of non-Austrian Germany.

The reorganisation of the Catholic dioceses in Prussia, of course, required the cooperation of the Roman *Curia*, while the permanent endowment of the bishops and their clergy depended on the goodwill of the Prussian State. Fortunately for both sides, and more especially for the Church of Rome, by whom the *zelanti* or 'thorough' party would have liked to see their theocratic ideals supported after a different fashion, the requisite negotiations were conducted to a satisfactory result by Cardinal Consalvi, who had weathered worse difficulties, and by Niebuhr, whose greatness as a historian should not be allowed to obscure his ability as a statesman. Thereupon, for a time, with the exception of the continuance of the perennial grievances of Prussian Poland, all was peace, the new Catholic bishops, while necessarily contenting themselves with their modest endowments, also restricting their activity to purely ecclesiastical affairs, and even remaining well within the range of these. In the inflammable region of the Rhine the relations between Church and State remained amicable during the conciliatory *régime* of Archbishop Count Spiegel zum Desenberg at Cologne (1824–1835)[1], who began his archiepiscopate by prohibiting direct correspondence on the part of his clergy with Papal officials or nuncios. The religious difficulties of King Frederick William III seemed likely to be confined to the relations between the United

[1] He had been Bishop of Münster from 1813 to 1824.

Prussian Church, which he had called into life, and the recalcitrant Old-Lutherans[1]. But, after the death, in 1835, of Archbishop Spiegel, who had been decorated with the Order of the Black Eagle after nearly bringing to a completion an agreement with the State on the highly contentious subject of mixed marriages, the long-adjourned strife broke out once more. It has already been related how the appointment, as Archbishop Spiegel's successor, of Freiherr Clement Augustus Droste zu Vischering led to a series of conflicts with the Government, which terminated in 1837 with the imprisonment of the Archbishop at Minden, whence he was not allowed to take his departure till 1839. The Cologne controversy and the Archbishop's catastrophe excited a spirit of vehement hostility against the Prussian Government in the Rhinelands, where it had at no time been loved. While, as has been seen, Görres, now the prophet of ultramontanism, in this year published his *Athanasius*, a militant defiance of heretical Prussia, much the same sort of flame was lit in the younger generation of Rhenish Catholics—in the brothers Reichensperger, for instance, afterwards leading members of the Centre party.

The Prussian Government, which in the question of mixed marriages, had virtually given way to the demands of the Catholic episcopate[2], was encouraged in its pacific tendencies by the advent to the throne, in 1840, of King Frederick William IV, who abhorred any conflict with ecclesiastical authority, while the romanticism of his own ideals might be said to have culminated in dreams of a union of supreme spiritual and temporal authority in the sovereign on the throne. After his accession, the Cologne dispute was patched up, and Archbishop Droste-Vischering accepted Bishop Geissel (transferred from Speyer) as his coadjutor and actual administrator of the see of Cologne[3]; but the

[1] Cf. vol. I, pp. 295 ff., *ante*.

[2] Cf. *ib.* pp. 297 ff.

[3] See vol. I, p. 301, *ante*; cf. *ib.* pp. 326–7.

signal had been given, and, before the old Archbishop's death (1845), the episode of the Holy Coat at Treves indicated the nature of the popular enthusiasm on which ultramontanism might, in the last resort, rely. But the Liberal movement within the Catholic world of Germany inclined the authorities of the Church of Rome to show prudence. The Archbishop of Freiburg (Hermann Vicari), who was soon to figure as the ultramontane protagonist, still exhibited the conciliatory demeanour to which his Jesuit training had accustomed him, though, so early as 1846, he took up his stand against allowing mixed marriages of which the offspring were not to be brought up as Catholics, and steadily opposed the synodal movement, which revived earlier aspirations for a national German Church.

The revolution of 1848 intervened, and decisively ranged the Catholic prelacy on the side of order. Archbishop Geissel of Cologne became a member of the Prussian Constituent Assembly, and proved a firm supporter of the throne. Diepenbrock, Prince-bishop of Breslau, effectively admonished the Catholic population of his easily agitated diocese against obeying the vote for the refusal of taxes passed by the Assembly. The Church of Rome in Prussia, and elsewhere in Germany, well knew what ends she was pursuing. The State's necessity was her opportunity; and cautiously, but not the less surely, both in the revolutionary days, and in the long period of reaction which ensued, she regained part of the long-lost ground.

In Prussia, no administrative change could have been more advantageous to the policy of the Church of Rome than the institution, or partitioning-off, of a Catholic section in the Ministry of Public Worship and Education at Berlin. This change had been one of the earliest Governmental concessions under Frederick William IV, and had originally, no doubt, been intended to facilitate the management of business affecting Catholics by securing for the service of the Ministry

expert knowledge, more especially as to the requirements of canon law. But the tendency of the section to develop into a separate Catholic department could not fail to grow upon it, especially with the direct advantages derived from the constitution of 1850. Instead of a single councillor for the elucidation of Catholic difficulties, there came into existence a Catholic board with a Catholic chairman, into whose hands flowed every sort of business connected with their Church, including its educational interests, whether in the universities or in the humblest public schools; till, in the days of its last and most active head, Krätzig, the section could be described by Bismarck as a Government department in the Papal service.

It was an earlier director of the Catholic division, Aulicke, who, as the mouthpiece of Archbishop Geissel, induced the Catholic Waldeck, one of the leaders of the *Fortschritt*, to insert in his draft of the proposed new Prussian constitution an article, which, revised to the satisfaction of the ecclesiastical authorities, was more or less analogous to one of the *Grundrechte* adopted by the German National Assembly at Frankfort. These, and certain cognate provisions, were, again through Geissel's influence, introduced into the *octroyée* Prussian constitution of December 5th, 1848, whence they finally found their way into the constitution of January 31st, 1850. What Rome really wanted was, as has been said with some malice, a free Church in an unfree State[1]; what she actually obtained was the insertion in the Prussian constitution, as one of its fundamental principles, of a provision that the Roman Catholic Church, like every

[1] It will be remembered that 1850 was the year in which de Falloux, Montalembert and Thiers earned the thanks of the Pope and the Jesuits by their efforts for the French 'great education law,' and in which the anti-clerical Siccardi laws advocated by Cavour brought upon the Sardinian Government a threat of excommunication.

other religious association recognised by the State, was entitled to the independent ordering and administration of its own affairs, to the control of its property, to the supervision of its discipline, and to the management of the institutions required by it for purposes of worship, education and charity. As to appointments to clerical offices, the right of presentation, election and confirmation, in so far as it had hitherto appertained to the State (as distinct from private patronage) was taken away from it, except in the case of benefices under its direct patronage. Thus, in practice, the Church had acquired what she had long desired In theory, of course, the prerogative of supreme supervision (*jus summae inspectionis*) could not be taken away from the State, as in the last resort responsible for the wellbeing of all its members; while, equally of course, the State had to continue to pay all clerical stipends and to place its administrative and police machinery at the service of the Church. Yet it is noticeable that, all these benefits notwithstanding, Archbishop Geissel declared that, as 'appointed guardian and defender of the rights of the Catholic Church,' he could not take the oath to this constitution except with a reservation of those rights (*salvis ecclesiae juribus*); and he had his way[1].

On the whole, however, the price paid by the Prussian Government for the goodwill of the Church of Rome, whose conservative instincts were, in the present condition of things, in harmony with its own, can hardly be regarded as excessive; while the moderation shown by that Church, considering the weakness at this time of Prussia in Europe, and even in Germany, quite sufficiently explains itself. The Papacy had not yet been deprived of the Temporal Power; in other words, the time had not yet come, or the necessity arisen, for it to resort to the extreme policy of seeking to erect on the ruins of that Power the edifice of a hitherto

[1] In October 1848, he was one of the Catholic prelates who met at Wurzburg to agree upon the demands of the Church.

unclaimed supremacy. Meanwhile, the *Curia*, having regulated its relations to Prussia in a satisfactory way[1], concluded a concordat, favourable to its claim, with Austria (1855), and after many difficulties, arrived at an agreement with Württemberg[2]. In Baden, the conflict between episcopal and State rights carried on under the now resolute direction of Archbishop Vicari was intensified by his disdainful action on the death of Grand-duke Leopold[3] (April 1852). With the ready aid of the gifted and combative Bishop of Mainz, Freiherr Emanuel von Ketteler, the ecclesiastical dispute spread after the most violent fashion through Germany, and indeed beyond its borders. The Austrian Government sought to allay the strife; but the Baden Ministry was encouraged by Bismarck to resist the episcopal demands, and troubles followed, in the course of which the Archbishop was for a week interned in his palace. After this, negotiations were opened, and, in 1859, a concordat was actually concluded. But it was denounced by eighteen Freiburg professors as oppressive, and declared unconstitutional by the Second Chamber at Carlsruhe; nor was it till 1860–1 that a legislative compromise, by no means altogether satisfactory, was brought about.

In Prussia, the relations between the State and the Church of Rome might, as Bismarck's interference in the Baden ecclesiastical quarrel had indicated, easily tend to become affected by political considerations; nor was it long before this came to pass. In 1850, the two authorities had entered, if not into a league, at least into a definite under-

[1] It is said that an English statesman, who about this time enquired from Cardinal Antonelli in what way he thought the demands of the Irish Catholics might most effectively be met, was assured that nothing better could be desired by them than the existing ecclesiastical legislation of Prussia.

[2] Cf. *ante*, vol. II, pp. 64 and 66, and note.

[3] The Archbishop persistently refused to allow the usual mid-day requiem mass to be said for the deceased sovereign.

standing; but when, under Bismarck's guidance, Prussia allied herself with the kingdom of Italy in order to drive Austria out of the peninsula, one of the bases of this understanding was taken away. There is some force in the remark that, logically, the breach between Prussia and the *Curia* ought to have taken place in 1866 rather than in 1870; but Bismarck's diplomacy reckoned with facts only, and, in some of what may be called its side-issues, his policy cannot be said to have been always long-sighted. The *Protestantenverein* founded by Bluntschli in 1864 had not grown to an importance like that of the *Nationalverein* with which it was contemporary; and the secret conspiracy against Rome said to have been set on foot by Prussia is an ultramontane mare's nest. Contrariwise, Bismarck's continued desire of remaining on friendly terms with Rome was shown by his fruitless attempts, soon after Sadowa, to induce the Pope to send a nuncio to Berlin. Bismarck had not yet broken with the Conservative interest at home, with which the Catholic hierarchy was so closely connected; and, above all, his main preoccupation being at this time to carry through the union with the south-west, he was unwilling to alienate Bavaria and the Catholic element in the adjoining States. Thus, between 1866 and 1870, he was not only desirous of standing well with the Church of Rome; but, more or less wilfully, he continued to shut his eyes to the designs which the Papacy was maturing, and to the dangers which the execution of these designs involved for States with large numbers of Catholic subjects, like Prussia, as well as for the Catholic States, their neighbours. The Encyclical Letter and Syllabus of December 1864 had been left without comment by the Prussian Government; at the great Cathedral festival at Cologne in 1867, Archbishop Melchers and the Crown-prince exchanged expressions of goodwill; and, so late as 1869, King William I sent an autograph letter to Pope Pius IX on the occasion of his fifty years' sacerdotal jubilee.

But, before this, what was to prove the decisive step had been taken and announced on the one side, and had, to all seeming, met with acquiescence on the other. On June 29th, 1868, an Oecumenical Council in the Vatican was summoned for December 8th in the following year[1]. Furthermore, on February 6th, 1869, there appeared in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, the Jesuit organ specially favoured by the Pope, an article, manifestly 'inspired,' announcing that this Council would promulgate in a positive form ('dogmatise') the principles of the Syllabus, and expressing the hope of Catholics that it would proclaim the dogmas of Papal Infallibility and of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin. The meaning of this announcement was unmistakable, and it was brought directly home to the Prussian Government by the circular issued on April 9th by the head of the Bavarian Ministry, Prince Hohenlohe, who at the same time propounded to the Bavarian university faculties of law and Catholic theology certain questions as to the effects of the proposed decrees upon the teaching of religion[2]. His circular, which suggested to the Governments the expediency of protesting through their diplomatic representatives at Rome against any decrees of the Council by which State rights might be affected, failed through the unwillingness of Austria-Hungary to intervene in a matter concerning the liberties of the Catholic Church. Beust's dispatch of

[1] The Pope's open brief calling upon Protestants to recant, and the courteous reply of the Supreme Council of the Evangelical Church at Berlin may be regarded as formalities

[2] Cf *ante*, vol II, pp. 404–5. Hohenlohe was at this time seeking to carry a Liberal school-inspection bill through the Bavarian Chambers, but failed Dollinger's famous *Der Papst und das Concil, von Janus* (of which the preface is dated July 31st, 1869) was an elaboration of an article *The Council and the Civiltà*, which appeared in the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*. The book remains invaluable as a history of the claims and designs of the Papacy, culminating in the plan of the Vatican Council. Dollinger's authorship of Hohenlohe's circular has been already noted.

May 15th, 1869, argued that a monarchy, of whose constitution a leading principle was the freedom within its limits of the several religious confessions[1], could not join in seeking to restrict or prevent such a proceeding as the convocation of a General Council of the Church of Rome; while with dogmas the Governments had no concern, and as to the bearing of conciliar decrees upon the relations between Church and State, there was nothing for it but to wait and see. The position of Prussia was, undoubtedly, not rendered easier by this language. Count Arnim (then still Prussian envoy at Rome), while differing from Hohenlohe as to the necessity of interference with the proclamation of the Infallibility dogma, thought it desirable that the action of the Council as to the relations between Church and State should be watched by envoys (*oratores*, in the old terminology) of the Governments, admitted to its sittings; but Bismarck declined to prefer such a demand. He proposed, however, to Hohenlohe (August) that the Bavarian and other south-western Governments should agree with the Prussian on warnings to be addressed jointly to the *Curia* against any encroachments by the Council upon matters appertaining to the State, adding the noteworthy words that, in northern Germany at all events, an effective weapon against transgressions on the part of the Spiritual Power was at hand in parliamentary legislation. In December, a circular to this effect was sent to the diplomatic agents of Prussia. Much the same line of action was adopted by the French Government, whose foreign affairs were then under the direction of

[1] The Austrian concordat with Rome was formally abolished in the following year (July 30th, 1870), a document 'denouncing' it having been previously drawn up by the distinguished jurist, Freiherr K. von Lemayer He was also the author of the exposition of 'motives' put forth in connexion with the ecclesiastical legislation of 1874, by which the relations of Church and State in Austria-Hungary were regulated on totally new lines, including the duty of announcement to the Government (*Anzeigepflicht*) of clerical appointments.

Count Daru (a convinced Catholic), while among both clergy and laymen the influence of Bishop Dupanloup of Orleans and of Count Montalembert was active against the promulgation of the dogma of Infallibility. Thus (presumably on Antonelli's advice) it was thought well to dissolve the Special Congregation for the formulation of decrees to be proposed to the Council as to the relations between the Church of Rome and temporal Governments, which had been named by the Pope and against which Bismarck had transmitted a protest.

In Germany, too, the tide of opinion had, before the first meeting of the Council, begun to rise, even among Catholics, against the intentions attributed to its conveners. In June 1869, the so-called 'Laymen's Council' of Catholics from the Rhinelands and other parts of Germany met at Berlin, but agreed to delay any protest against the expected dogma of Papal Infallibility till the German bishops should have spoken. When the latter assembled at Fulda in September, they announced that no dogmas would be proclaimed that were not contained in revelation and tradition, and no principles set forth which were out of harmony with the interests of the State. This declaration was hardly of a nature to allay the prevailing apprehensions[1]. The Prussian Minister of Public Worship, Muhler, expressed a hope (October) that the Prussian bishops about to repair to Rome would remember their duty as loyal subjects of the king and resist any disturbance of the existing law; and the Bavarian prelates were admonished in a similar strain by their Government, which referred in terms of gratification to the recent Fulda pastoral. So late as January 5th, 1870, Arnim at Rome was instructed that his Government hoped to see the existing organisation of the Church of Rome left unimpaired, but

[1] The deplorable excesses of the mob at Moabit, a suburb of Berlin, on the occasion of the establishment there, in the summer of 1869, of a settlement of Dominicans, show the belief of the multitude that the land was to be flooded with monastic establishments

that any action to this end must be taken by the German bishops at the Council, not by the Government at home[1].

Meanwhile, the Vatican Council had been opened on the date announced (December 8th, 1869), and no time was lost by those who had brought it about and who directed its deliberations in approaching the end which they had in view. It forms no part of our task to relate the history of the Council, or to discuss the thorny questions which any attempt of the kind would involve: whether the Council was oecumenical in fact and in spirit; whether it was either lawfully or equitably constituted; whether the requirement of unanimity was properly waived and the consideration due to a large minority rightly ignored; whether, more generally, the conditions under which it was held and the order of its proceedings determined were such as admitted of a conclusive expression of constituent episcopal opinion; and whether the decrees which it put forth and the much-vext dogma which it ultimately proclaimed could be regarded as binding on the Catholic Church? As to the Infallibility dogma in particular, the controversy whether the time of its proclamation was opportune or not, by the very fact of that proclamation became a purely historical question; while the more fundamental enquiry, as to whether it had already previously been a dogma or tradition of the Church, sank back into the sphere of scientific research, and the credibility of the decreed article of faith became a matter for individual consciences.

Our present concern with the Vatican Council is twofold

[1] See *Life of Abeken* (E. Tr.), pp 228, 241 ff Abeken, who had been chaplain to the Prussian legation at Rome in Bunsen's time, and chief agent in the negotiations for the foundation of the bishopric of Jerusalem, had since become one of the most active councillors in the Berlin Foreign Office, and was specially charged with business connected with the Vatican Council. Early in March, he communicated the line of conduct determined on by the Prussian Government to Vienna, Munich and London.

only: to note the influence of German thought and opinion at the Council itself, and to estimate the effect of the decrees ultimately adopted by it upon the progress of the relations between the Church of Rome and the State in Germany, and in Prussia more especially. The learning on which the opinions of most of the German bishops attending the Council were based, and the sincerity with which those opinions were advanced and supported, played a great part in the history of the Council; and its effects illustrate much besides the old opposition between German theology and Rome. Roman prejudice persisted in regarding German Catholics at large as semi-Protestants, while Pope Pius set down the German spirit —the spirit of critical enquiry, which was wholly alien to him—as 'the worst of all[1].' Doubtless, the Latin eloquence of none among the German bishops equalled that of the deliverances of the Slavonian Strossmayer on the general needs of the Church and on the dogmatic problem which absorbed the attention of the Council. But the attitude consistently maintained towards the contested dogma by Cardinals Schwarzenberg and Rauscher (although the latter was an upholder of the Austrian concordat and in favour of much of the Syllabus), as well as the less determined opposition of Archbishop Melchers of Cologne and Prince-bishop Förster of Breslau, together with the versatile ability of Bishop Ketteler of Mainz (who, at the last, on his knees besought the Pope to defer the final decision) and the perfect command of the entire subject possessed by Bishop Hefele of Rottenburg, combined to form an episcopal opposition of unparalleled strength. The great learning and organising power of Reinkens (afterwards Bishop of the Old-Catholic community) and the flawless intellectual integrity of Döllinger, the real pivot of the anti-ultramontane movement in Germany, were freely devoted to the cause of the minority

[1] See *Quirinus*, whose impressions on this head, at all events, may be safely trusted.

at the Council; and it may be added that, early in 1870, the distinguished Swiss scholar Heinrich von Gelzer[1], to whom in 1867 Hohenlohe had confided his view of the impending ecclesiastical crisis, was sent by the King of Prussia and Grand-duke Frederick of Baden to Rome, where he watched the course of events on their behalf and was useful as an intermediary after the Prussian legation had been suspended.

At the end of January 1870, in reply to a petition to the Pope in favour of the declaration of his infallibility in matters of faith and morals, all the above-mentioned German prelates signed a representation praying him not to lay the dogma before the Council. A pretext was found for the Pope's refusal to receive this representation; and on March 6th the proposed definition of Papal Infallibility was laid before the Fathers. A French memorandum on the intended decrees followed and was supported by Austria; and on April 23rd the Prussian Government signified its concurrence. In Germany, as Arnim pointed out to Cardinal Antonelli (a circumspect statesman, who rarely urged a point too far), Catholic and Protestant Christians must continue to live side by side; so that, if the views opposed to those of the episcopal minority were to prevail, the Prussian Government might lose the freedom of action hitherto used by it to the advantage of the Catholic Church—in other words, there would have to be fresh legislation. But the Council, with the aid of the changed order of business, pressed on the declaration of the dogma; and another protest, signed by the German bishops of the minority (May 8th)[2], fell to the ground.

[1] He was a friend of Bunsen, and during the years 1852 to 1870 edited the *Protestantische Monatsblätter* as an organ of Liberal religious thought.

[2] It was supported by a lay address to which, among other 'ultramontane' names, were attached those of P Reichensperger, Windthorst and Mallinckrodt. The *Civiltà Cattolica*, about this time, observed that the Pope might as well be expected to listen to Prussian complaints as Prussia might have been to listen to Papal after the

Gradually, all hopes vanished of a prorogation of the Council, or of the discovery of a formula which might avert open discord; and, on July 13th, the Council approved the *Constitutio dogmatica de Ecclesiâ*, which finally formulated the propositions of the Syllabus as to the subordination to the Church of all civil societies, and of which an integral part was the dogma of the Infallibility of the Pope when speaking *ex cathedrâ*, and of the immutability of his decrees as such, and not by virtue of the assent of the Church. 451 Fathers voted *placet*; 61 a conditional *placet*, and 88 *non-placet*. Among the *non-placets* were Schwarzenberg, Rauscher, Förster, Ketteler and Hefele. On the 15th, a deputation to the Pope failed to modify the situation; and, on the 17th, all the minority bishops, after drawing up a declaration to the Pope in which they confirmed their vote but confessed themselves unable to do so formally in his venerated presence, took their departure from Rome. On the following day, the new constitution of the Church and the dogma of Papal Infallibility were solemnly adopted and promulgated by a virtually unanimous vote of the Council. The struggle was over, and recusants had been declared *anathema*. Two days earlier, France had declared war against Prussia; and, on September 20th, the entry of French troops into Rome notified to the world the end of the Temporal Power of the Pope. The Papacy had secured its compensation, and in October the Oecumenical Council adjourned *sine die*.

Now that the decision had fallen, the German bishops as a body were not long in shaping their action in the direction of recovered unanimity. At Fulda, where they assembled in August to indite another pastoral letter designed to undo the effect of its predecessor, and to signify their unreserved assent to the decision as to 'the infallible dogmatic power of the Church,' the manifesto was signed by seven out of nine, and

changes consequent upon Sadowa: the Pope could not, in matters of faith, 'follow followers of Martin Luther.'

ten other names were afterwards added. That of Bishop Hefele was not among them; but he made it known that, without abandoning his judgment of the Infallibility dogma, he was unable to discern an alternative to the decision of the entire German episcopate (November). For some time, however, no step was taken by the German Governments, though in Austria the concordat was abolished so early as August, and a prospect of further action held out by the Ministry.

As a matter of fact, the Papacy had good reason for remaining on friendly terms with the German Government, which had not yet reached the end of the war against France. On October 7th, 1870, Antonelli had enquired from Arnim (then North-German envoy at the Vatican) whether, if driven from Italy by the troops of King Victor Emmanuel, he would find a refuge on Prussian soil, and had received an encouraging reply. In November, Archbishop Ledochowski of Gnesen and Posen, in the company of Cardinal-archbishop Bonnechose of Rouen, presented himself at Versailles with an address from the Chapters of Posen and Culm, urging the Prussian Government to protest against the Italian occupation of Rome; but Bismarck put off the question of a Papal asylum, and the King declined to take the first step towards the restoration of the Temporal Power. Yet the Archbishop was said to have left the Prussian headquarters in good spirits, and there were even rumours of intended courtesies from the Vatican. Bismarck was well aware that the question of the Temporal Power would find open expression in the coming *Reichstag*; and, indeed, before it assembled, an address of deputies elected to it in the Catholic interest, soliciting favourable attention to the subject, was presented to the new Emperor at Versailles (February 18th, 1871). Still, there was no interruption of the friendly relations between the Imperial and Papal Governments; and the Pope's congratulations on the restoration of the old, or beginning of the new Empire (March) were merely accom-

panied by an expression of the hope that this consummation would contribute materially to the safeguarding of the rights and liberties of the Church. Before the virtual termination of the war, the Prussian Government had given few indications of the attitude it proposed to observe towards the new claims of the Papacy and the new policy of the Church of Rome. It was in the universities that, in both Prussia and Bavaria, the trial of strength, if there was to be such a trial, must begin. A word must therefore be said here as to the Old-Catholic movement, which for a time seemed destined to exercise a considerable influence upon the relations of the Prussian and Bavarian Governments with the Vatican.

The Vatican decrees had hardly yet been published, or their execution been taken in hand by demanding assent to them, when (at the end of July 1870) a declaration was signed by the professors of theology at Munich, rejecting the dogma of Infallibility and condemning the methods by which it had been carried. The publication of the dogma by the Archbishop (Scherr) and an attempt to enforce it were answered by Döllinger in a classic letter, in which he declared himself ready to sacrifice everything to his conviction of the truth. In August 1870, Döllinger, whose rapidity of action was not less notable than his intellectual calm, had thought it well to call a conference of theologians at Cologne—including Friedrich, Reusch and Reinkens—which drew up a protest against the Vatican decrees. (This was afterwards reinforced by another, likewise dating from the Rhine, which by December had received 1359 signatures from members of all classes.) In September, Archbishop Melchers proceeded to promulgate the dogma and call for assent to it, which was refused by Reusch and three other members of the faculty of theology at Bonn. They were accordingly suspended from their professorial functions.

The question was now: would the Prussian, and with it

the Bavarian, Government (recently reconstituted under the anti-ultramontane Minister of Justice, von Lutz, though Count Bray, whose sympathies were Roman, held office in it as Foreign Minister till July 1871[1]) support the resistance of which indications had been speedily given in the centres of Catholic theological studies? On the answer to this question largely depended not only the future of the Old-Catholic movement, as it came to be called, but that of the Catholic Church in the German Empire (since from Austria no constructive policy was to be expected). The history of Old-Catholicism, and of what must (humanly speaking) be summed up as its failure, shows the support actually received by it to have been in the end inadequate to the occasion. Yet, on the part of the Prussian Government, there was no initial hesitation. Minister von Muhler, whose enduring popularity should not obscure the courage which he displayed in some at least of the final acts of his career, was the first to take up the glove by assuring the Bonn Senate, which had complained of the unlawful suspension of its professors, that the statutes of the University, which the Prussian Government had itself sanctioned, would be upheld by it. In Bavaria, on the other hand, when, in April 1871, Dollinger and Friedrich (subsequently the historian of the Vatican Council), after being suspended from their chairs, were subjected to major excommunication, all was uncertainty; and Hohenlohe, who had hoped to prevent the Council from encroaching on the domain of politics, despaired of any important result following upon the secession of a few thousands from the remodelled Church of Rome[2].

[1] Count Hegnenberg-Dux became President of the Bavarian Ministry in the following month, and, a year later, von Pfretzschner came into office, in spite of the ultramontanes But Hohenlohe was not again called to the control of affairs in Bavaria

[2] See a noteworthy passage in his *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. II, p. 52.

Informal gatherings having taken place under the guidance of Döllinger, and a warning pastoral having been issued by the German bishops in May 1871, the Old-Catholic movement, hereupon, ran its course. It extended from the first congress of the body at Munich in September 1871 (immediately preceded by a preliminary meeting at Heidelberg) to the second at Cologne in the same month of 1872, and thence to the consecration, nearly a year later, of its first bishop, and to later stages of internal development. The first congress, which was attended by delegates from Germany[1], Austria and Switzerland, together with representatives of the Dutch Jansenist episcopal Church, and by sympathisers from various other Churches and countries, clearly laid down the principles of the body, and resolved upon the formation of regular congregations (though this was at first considered premature by Döllinger, with whom the eminent historian Cornelius concurred). The second agreed on the further step of electing a bishop; and, not long afterwards, Bismarck informed Schulte, who had presided at the congress, that he considered the Old-Catholics to be the only Catholics entitled to possession; but he added, *more suo*, that, in the meantime, he would prefer to deal with the accomplished fact of a bishop actually elected. The Old-Catholics took this advice, and out of a list which had been approved by the German Chancellor chose one of the foremost of their number, Hubert Reinkens, who was consecrated by the Dutch Jansenist Bishop of Deventer on August 11th, 1873.

By the recognition of Bishop Reinkens, the Prussian Government implicitly accepted as Roman Catholics the body which had elected him; and its example was followed by Baden, though not by Bavaria. But the Governments could not take the view logically maintained by the Old-

[1] In the eastern provinces of Prussia the movement found few adherents, except at Breslau

Catholics, that the Vatican decrees, and the dogmatisation of Papal Infallibility in particular, were irreconcilable with the true Catholic faith, of which therefore the Old-Catholic Church, but not the existing Church of Rome together with it, had become the depositary. One of the last enactments of the new Prussian ecclesiastical legislation, on which, as a whole, the Old-Catholics neither exercised nor desired to exercise any influence, formally secured the protection indispensable to them in all matters within the competence of the State, including their due share of Church property or income, inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of the Church of Rome had excluded them from its community[1]. But the continuance and consolidation of their body itself were left to depend upon its own vitality. Its annual endowment from the State was, in 1874, with the approval of the *Landtag*, fixed at not more than 16,000 dollars (£2210). Within the next decade, or thereabouts, notwithstanding the abolition of the rule of celibacy for their clergy (which measure met with strong disapproval within their body), the Old-Catholic congregations increased slightly in Prussia, and notably in Baden, while the total number of Old-Catholics, more or less stationary in the former, nearly doubled in the latter, but sank in much the same proportion in Bavaria. In 1886, there were a little above 15,000 Old-Catholics in Prussia, and only about 400 less in Baden. Lamprecht reckons the total in 1882 at 35,000, as against 52,000 in 1878. The number of their officiating clergy had by 1887 risen from its original 35 to 60.

Such are some of the earlier data of a movement whose intellectual and moral influence is, of course, a quite different question from that of its visible success. Certainly, the movement was by no means confined to the learned or even to the

[1] June 1875, and see Falk's speech in the discussion on the episcopal synodal order in the previous month

better educated classes, and included among its adherents a considerable number of artisans. But it was unable to spread its roots through the ecclesiastical and religious life of the nation as a whole, and made no appeal to the principles and forces of democratic Liberalism. Thus, except in passing, the history of the relations between Church and State, in Prussia in particular, remained unaffected by it.

The actual beginning of the conflict between the Prussian Government and the Church of Rome is to be found elsewhere. It lay in the apprehensions excited among Prussian statesmen, and in Bismarck more especially, by the formation of the new Centre party and by the early manifestations of the policy which it proposed to itself. The idea of a political reorganisation of the Prussian—and then of the German—Catholic interest, on a more solid basis than that on which it had previously stood, first arose in the spring of 1870, and met with much favour in the Rhinelands and in Westphalia. The elections for the Prussian diet which met at the end of November 1870 were, among the Catholics, carried on with a view to this end; and, on December 13th, 48 out of a rather larger number of deputies so chosen definitively established the new and long-lived 'Centre faction' which, in order to attract congenial elements, at first added the bracket '(Constitutional party)' to its main designation. It was immediately joined by six other deputies, including Windthorst, the subsequent leader of the party. The prospects of the new fraction were improved by the elections for the first *Reichstag* of the new Empire. With the Catholics, they turned very largely on the question of the restoration of the Temporal Power of the Pope; but the general unwillingness of a large part of the Catholic population in Bavaria and elsewhere in the south-west to be blended with Prussia and the north, helped to raise the ranks of the Centre party to 70, which the Poles might at any time swell to an Opposi-

tion of 85[1]. Foremost in repute among the earlier combatants of the Centre was Hermann von Mallinckrodt, a Westphalian by descent and a high Government official, first at Erfurt and then at Düsseldorf. Before he assumed the leadership of the Centre, he had stood at the head of the so-called Federal Constitutional Union, out of which the Centre had grown; and he was a thorough Conservative at heart. But his fine and unselfish character, and his great oratorical power, gained for him a popularity which, on his rather sudden death in 1874, called forth a widespread manifestation of grief. With him were associated the brothers August and Peter Reichensperger, Rhinelanders animated by a vehement hatred of Prussia and her Government. The elder had, so far back as 1852, led the Catholic fraction which opposed the anti-Jesuit measure of the 'evangelical' Minister K. O. von Raumer, and which, in 1859 and for some time afterwards, had borne the name of the Centre[2]. These uncompromising partisans, of whom the elder declared himself unable to accept Königgrätz in any light but that of an unfathomable decree of Heaven, were gradually, and not wholly to their satisfaction, overshadowed as leaders of the Centre by a wilier politician. Ludwig Windthorst has already been mentioned as a Hanoverian Minister of moderate Conservative views[3]; and his last services to his

[1] In the election of 1873 the Centre increased to 91. The Conservatives, who were opposed to the ecclesiastical legislation of the Government, diminished; but Poles, Alsace-Lorrainers, Guelfs and Social-democrats increased the adversaries of the Government to 133, against whom Bismarck had to depend on 152 National-Liberals. See Abeken, vol. II, p. 246, and cf chap III, *post.*

[2] The political creed of the brothers was laid down in their publication *Deutschland's nächste Aufgaben* (Germany's nearest tasks), 1860. In 1867 the designation 'Centre' was applied to the Old-Liberals.

[3] Cf. vol. II, p. 222, *ante.* The election of Windthorst to *Landtag* and *Reichstag* was of course significant of the survival of Guelf sympathies. In this very year 1871, his native city of Hanover refused to accord a formal welcome to the Emperor and his army.

former sovereign had been his successful negotiation with the Prussian Government of a settlement (afterwards postponed) of the pecuniary claims of King George V. To great natural acumen and a lively wit, he added a legal training, through which, and his earlier parliamentary experiences, he had acquired a rare dialectical skill. Lofty oratorical flights were not in his way; yet he became not only one of the most effective debaters, but one of the ablest and most successful of parliamentary tacticians, and may be described as the only politician who, in a long and momentous political contest, not only held his own against Bismarck, but had the better of him. If Windthorst's name is not to be remembered among those of great German statesmen, he was, at least, one of the ablest leaders of Opposition known to the history of *Landtag* or *Reichstag*. It may be added that neither he nor the Reichenspergers had been favourable to the promulgation of Papal Infallibility. The general interests of their Church were what they had at heart; and of these, in the domain of parliamentary politics, Windthorst, between whom and his party Bismarck had in vain sought to create a breach, lived to show that he held himself a better judge than the Pope. Among other leaders of the Centre party should be mentioned K. F. von Savigny, Prussian envoy at Frankfort in the critical days of 1866[1].

The attitude taken up by Bismarck towards the new Centre party was not, so far as the evidence seems to show, predetermined. That in the ensuing conflict he was, from the outset, moved by religious animosity is a notion due to prejudice, though he and those associated with him could hardly be expected to abstain from an occasional appeal to anti-Roman sentiment[2]. He sprang from a part of Germany (Pomerania) where, in the days of the Reformation,

[1] Cf. vol II, p. 239, *ante*.

[2] According to Majunke, p. 10, Bismarck was an adherent of the 'sect' of the Bohemo-Lutheran Brethren.

religious zeal had among orthodox Lutherans chiefly taken the form of a bitter hostility to Calvinism, and he belonged to a nobility which had at no time been specially distinguished by its interest in religion. It was only in the earlier half of the nineteenth century, in the days of Bismarck's youth and early manhood, that a kind of religious revival, which combined high Lutheran views with Pietist ideas of morality, took hold of parts of Pomerania and many of the nobility there[1]. With this movement Bismarck was brought into contact by his marriage, and it absorbed many of the intimates of his early political life. There could be no sympathy between their views and ultramontanism; but neither was there anything in them to engender a special hostility against Rome. Bismarck was a believing Christian as he was a convinced monarchist; nor did the 'canker doubt' ever affect his intellectual growth. On the other hand we have his own express statement[2], confirmed by other evidence, that one of the main reasons which determined him to enter into the conflict was the fear of the encroachments, with the aid of the Church and the new Catholic party, of Polish upon German nationality. Towards the efforts of the Poles in State or Church he consistently pursued a policy of repression; he feared their influence at Court (through the Radziwill family) and through the Catholic section of the office of Public Worship and Education (whose chief Krätzig had formerly been in the Radziwill employ), and he dreaded its extension from Posen and West Prussia into Silesia. With the aid of the Catholic party-organisation, it seemed to him likely to develop into an anti-national as well as ecclesiastical propaganda; and he appears to have been confirmed in these impressions by a

[1] As to this revival, and the earlier religious history of Pomerania, see vol. II of Wehrmann's *Geschichte von Pommern* (Gotha, 1906).

[2] *Gedanken u. Erinnerungen*, vol II, pp. 127 ff Cf his statement to Hohenlohe, *Denkwurdigkeiten*, vol. II, p 171.

domiciliary visit paid to a high ecclesiastic at Posen in March 1872. Furthermore, the coincidence with Bismarck's contest against Rome of his desire for an alliance with Italy has been, no doubt correctly, regarded as significant[1].

In his conduct of the struggle with a resolute and self-reliant adversary, though he had not entered into it hastily, he showed, in the long run, a lack of definite determination as to the length to which he was prepared to carry it; and herein, rather than in any excess of zeal, probably lay the chief reason of his, at least partial, failure in his long campaign. His difficulties were many, and were not confined to those created for him by his resolute and astute adversaries. The sympathies of the Conservatives were alienated by the dislike felt by the friends of the Protestant Churches to the ecclesiastical legislation to which he soon had recourse; and the Emperor William was himself much influenced by these feelings and by the desire to remain on friendly terms with the Church of Rome, and naturally shrank from embittering the last years of his life by a probably endless quarrel. The Empress Augusta (whether or not Jesuit advice had found its way to her through her surroundings[2]), as well as the Crown-prince and his consort, were adverse to Bismarck's ecclesiastical policy, and the support given to it by the National-Liberal party was very far from unanimous—members of it so prominent, and yet so different in type, as Biedermann and Miquel looking upon it with disfavour. The *Fortschritt* party was divided in its attitude towards the *Kulturkampf*; Eugen Richter, who was becoming its foremost member, was one of the minority which, on this head also, opposed Bismarck's policy.

The Centre party lost no time in beginning the fight in the *Reichstag*, though it was Bennigsen's speech on the

[1] Cf. Hanotaux, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, vol. I, p. 503.

[2] Hohenlohe, vol. II, p. 61.

address, March 30th, 1871, which furnished them with an opportunity or provocation, in his disclaimer on behalf of the German Empire of any desire to interfere in the affairs of other countries[1]. August Reichensperger, Bishop Ketteler and Windthorst demurred to the assumption; and the last-named made it absolutely clear that the German Catholics wished the Empire to cooperate in the restoration of the Temporal Power. The address was carried against the Centre by the large majority of 243 to 63; but it proved the intention of the party to place difficulties in the way of Bismarck's conduct of foreign affairs, though it was not till rather later that his desire for an Italian alliance became apparent.

The next step was of even greater significance, inasmuch as it bore directly on the affairs of the Empire itself. Under the leadership of P. Reichensperger, the Centre made an attempt to introduce into the imperial constitution now under consideration by the *Reichstag* the clauses as to the freedom of the Church included in the Prussian constitution of 1850[2]. The attempt revealed the whole depth of the designs of the party and their fundamental contravention of the principles of Prussian State-government. Windthorst, though he had demurred to the move, took the opportunity to reprove Treitschke for his avowal of these principles, of which in his academical chair he was to become the most renowned propagator[3]. The attempt failed, because of the feeling against the application of imperial legislation (as distinct from territorial) to matters of religion, which, already in the 1867 debates on the North-German constitution, had with unanimity been relegated to the particular States. The

[1] Cf p. 9, *ante*

[2] See pp 34–5, *ante*.

[3] Treitschke had declared the State to be the source of the law. 'This,' Windthorst retorted, 'the State is not, it is only the guardian of the existing law. State omnipotence logically leads to communism.' See Rachfahl, part I, p. 241.

adoption by the *Reichstag* (December 1871) of a law, moved by the Bavarian Minister von Lutz, penalising the use of the pulpit by a minister of religion for utterances dangerous to the public peace, is regarded by some Catholic authorities as the beginning of the *Kulturkampf*; but, though it proved provocative of much angry speech, it can hardly be held of so signal an importance. It was on the offensive of the Centre that the outbreak of the conflict depended.

Although the first efforts of the Centre brought home to Bismarck the full significance of the new political combination, he seems at first to have essayed to strike the ground from under the party's feet by inducing the Pope himself to disavow its activity. Cardinal Antonelli was (as the history of the Vatican Council exemplifies) clever enough, and at the same time sufficiently able to think for himself without Jesuit dictation, to see the force of Bismarck's hint that the Church of Rome would run a serious danger if the confessional principle obtained the upper hand in German parliamentary life; and he let his doubts become known as to the wisdom of the action of the Centre in the matter of the Temporal Power. His chief motive was, of course, to remain so long as possible on friendly terms with the Prussian Government. But Bismarck's attempt to take advantage of the Cardinal-secretary's expression of opinion only led to an explanation which amounted to a disavowal. The German Chancellor thus stood face to face with his parliamentary opponents; his mind was made up, and, according to his wont, he was now swift in striking.

The occasion which at once offered itself was an incident which must not be passed by, if only because it was in the educational bearing of the present Papal policy that lay its greatest significance for the future of the national life. Dr Wollmann, teacher of religion in the gymnasium at Braunsberg in East Prussia, having refused to signify his assent to the Vatican decrees, was by Bishop Kremenz of Ermeland

excommunicated and deprived of his right of giving instruction in the doctrines of the Catholic faith. On June 29th, Minister von Mühler sent a rescript to the Bishop, demanding that the Catholic pupils of the school should continue to receive religious instruction from Wollmann and, after the Bishop had protested against this (it must be allowed) high-handed act, issued an ordinance stating that, in the eyes of the State, the excommunicated teacher remained a member of the Catholic Church. Hereupon, the Prussian bishops addressed an 'immediate' remonstrance to the sovereign, against the interference of the State in the Church's internal sphere of faith and rights. The Emperor informed the Pope (through the Archbishop of Cologne) that the Prussian Government had acted in strict accordance with the existing law as hitherto approved by him, but that care would, in any event, be taken to leave every creed in possession of the full measure of liberty compatible with the rights of others and with equality before the law; and Mühler added a declaration that the State was under no obligation to treat the adherents of the unchanged Catholic Church as seceders from it. In August, the *Provinzialcorrespondenz*, the organ through which the Government was in the habit of elucidating its views for the benefit of the public, explained that no bishop could be allowed to force teachers subject to State-control to give their assent to a dogma imperilling the relations between the State and the Church of Rome. So far matters had proceeded in the Braunsberg case by the end of November[1].

But, only a few days after the outbreak of this trouble, the Prussian Government had taken an administrative step of great practical moment, which it professed to have had for some time in contemplation, by abolishing the Catholic

[1] The ordinance obliging the pupils of the school, if they desired religious instruction, to receive it from Wollmann was withdrawn within a few months.

section in the Ministry of Public Worship and Education. This section had, as Bismarck afterwards said, come to represent the interests of Rome against those of the State; and he would much rather have seen in its place a Papal nuncio at Berlin.

The rule of Krätzig and his fellow Catholic councillors was at an end; and, by the beginning of the new year, a further change took place by the acceptance of Minister von Mühler's resignation. It may seem difficult to understand this decision; but Mühler is said to have voted at the Council against the School Inspection law which he left it for his successor to carry, and his policy during his last six months of office indicates his hope of basing the action of the State on a recognition of the Old-Catholics—a policy which, after him, was never seriously pursued by the Prussian Government. But the truth is that he was one of the most unpopular of Prussian Ministers; and a vote of want of confidence in him, which was to have been introduced into the School Law debate, would have been supported by Liberals of all sections. An unpopular man could not be entrusted with the guidance of a popular movement[1].

The choice of his successor, who was at once appointed, implied that it was by legislative action that it had now been resolved to carry on the conflict. Dr Adalbert Falk was a jurist who had risen to a high position in the administration of the Law, and who had gained special distinction in the legislative work of both the North-German Confederation

[1] Muhler died not long afterwards (April 1874) He owed the beginning of his connexion with the department over which he presided from 1862 to Eichhorn, whose unpopularity he inherited. Whether he was altogether fairly treated by his censors may be open to question: he certainly lacked neither knowledge nor devotion to duty. But the Liberal apprehension that he would not hold his own against the ultramontane demands after the promulgation of the Vatican decrees was justified by the event, and he seems to have fallen a victim to violent dislike.

and the new Empire. It was on the legal rights of the State that he declared it to be his intention to take his stand (January 30th). On the same occasion, Bismarck turned upon the members of the Centre in his most truculent mood, denouncing them as having mobilised the 'confessional party' against the State, of which their leader Windthorst had only reluctantly become a subject, and of having blended their faction with other elements adverse to Prussia and the Empire. But, though the head of the Government came to the front in the decisive moments of the conflict, and at times asserted his opinion over that of the Minister of Education, he left the management of the legislative campaign to Falk (as he left that of economical matters to Delbrück).

In February 1872, the legislative combat in Prussia opened, which was to be the decisive element in the whole struggle (for, apart from Bavaria, it had already been decided in Baden, while in Württemberg and, strange to say, even in Hesse-Darmstadt (at Mainz), the Catholic bishops kept quiet). The fury in Prussia first turned on the School Inspection bill drafted by Muhler before leaving office. Hitherto, while the time-honoured Prussian principle was left untouched, that among the indisputable rights of the State was the control of education, this principle had been applied after a fashion quite satisfactory to the Churches, whether Protestant or Catholic. The 'inspection' (supervision) of schools had been entrusted to the pastors or priests of the localities; the districts had been 'inspected' by the superintendents or high Catholic ecclesiastics resident there; and the final resort had been to the Protestant or to the Catholic section of the Ministry of Public Worship. Henceforth, all persons, clerical or lay, charged with the inspection, were to be so charged in the name of the State, and the choice of them was not to be restricted by the preferences of the clerical authorities. In other words, the object of the change

was to deprive the clergy of any claim to the supervision of education as a right inherent in their Church—not to withdraw from them everywhere the supervision itself. Indeed, there was no intention of introducing reforms which implied any far-reaching changes in school-management—except in one portion of the monarchy. In the provinces where Polish was spoken—in Posen, West Prussia and Upper Silesia—the Government grievance and that of many of the German inhabitants was the neglect of the German language to which the existing system had led, inasmuch as those schoolmasters who allowed the children under their care to make progress in German incurred the disfavour of the clerical inspectors. For, as Bismarck, who, in the debate, according to his wont, lost no time in coming to the point, boldly declared, Germany was the only country in existence, whether Roman Catholic or other, with an anti-national clergy.

The bill was stoutly opposed by the Centre as well as by the Conservatives, but ultimately carried (March 11th), with certain modifications, by a vote of 207 to 155. The Protestant ecclesiastical authorities at Berlin, who had hoped through the Conservative party to bring about the defeat of the bill, submitted to its provisions; and the Catholic bishops, again assembled at Fulda (April 11th), declared that, though the new law violated essential rights of the Church and brought great dangers upon her as well as upon the State, yet she would continue to do her duty by the schools which had been torn from her. The general result proved that in this reluctant acceptance of the law the bishops had not reckoned amiss; as for the Polish-speaking parts of the monarchy, the contention between the rival nationalities there was not one to be ended by indirect legislation as to a single phase of it.

Hardly had the conflict with Rome assumed a legislative form, when it was carried into a different sphere by a curious diplomatic incident. On April 25th, 1872, Cardinal Prince

Gustaf Adolf zu Hohenlohe, the younger brother of the Bavarian statesman, was by the German Emperor nominated his envoy to the Vatican; it being proposed that the Cardinal should repair to Rome (which he had quitted immediately after its occupation by the Italian troops) and there, before presenting his letters of credit, ascertain whether the choice met with the Pope's approval. The Cardinal was a believer in the dogma of Papal Infallibility, but doubted the validity of the Council, during whose session he was said to have housed the Old-Catholic Professor Friedrich as his adviser. But, on enquiry, the German *chargé d'affaires* at the Vatican was informed by Cardinal Antonelli that the Pope was unable to authorise the acceptance of so delicate and important an office by a cardinal of the Church; and the appointment, as a matter of course, fell through. Whether or not this rebuff had been from the first the object of Bismarck's manoeuvre, he certainly made the most of it; and, in a debate on the Papal refusal, replied to a speech opportunely delivered by Bennigsen with the memorable words: 'there is no reason for fear: we shall not go to Canossa, in body or in spirit' (May 14th). He added that the only way in which to meet the claim of certain clerical subjects of the King was legislation; and that the complete supremacy of the law must be established without faltering.

What this meant was speedily shown. After a confidential circular had been despatched, on the same day, to the several European Governments as to the expediency of concerting action with regard to the next Papal election, the *Reichstag* on the morrow entered into a debate on a bill for the expulsion of the Jesuit Order from the Empire, which began with a weighty speech by Hohenlohe. This bill (with which, as applying to the Empire at large, the Prussian Minister of Education had no concern) was finally carried by a majority of 181 to 93, not being rendered more equitable

by the latitude left to the several Governments as to enforcing it in particular cases[1]. On the 29th, the Catholic Chaplain-general of the Prussian army (Bishop Ramszanowski), who had prohibited religious services in the garrison church at Cologne, because the military authorities had allowed the Old-Catholics to share in its use, was suspended, and no successor in his office was appointed[2].

Before the close of the next month (June 24th), Pope Pius IX personally replied to these provocations in violent words, addressed to a German reading-club at Rome. 'Who knows,' he said, after stating that the Minister of a powerful Government had placed himself at the head of the persecutors of the Church, 'whether soon the pebble will not be loosened which, falling from the height, will crush the feet of the colossus?' The offending giant's semi-official organ had its reply ready; and so had his Government. The quarrel with Bishop Kremenz, originating in the Braunsberg school trouble (the later parliamentary history of which must be passed by), had, in the meantime, become more and more acute. The German bishops had barely found time to assemble once more at the grave of St Boniface at Fulda, and (September 20th) to issue thence a memorandum purporting that they had neither collectively nor individually given occasion to the present disturbances between the State and the Catholic Church, when, five days later, the blow descended on the Bishop of Ermeland, who was finally deprived of the temporalities of his see. On December 22nd, a Papal allocution translated personal invective into Curial language; but it was felt on both sides that the war of words was being superseded by action.

[1] The case against the Jesuits as an Order is stated with great force by Hohenlohe (vol II, pp 90 ff) Cf. the much later observations by Bennigsen (*Life*, vol II, p. 601), which are marked by his usual fairness of mind

[2] He remained on half-pay till his death (in 1900); and no further change was made.

With the following year, 1873, the second and critical stage of the so-called *Kulturkampf* begins; for in its course was passed the first series of the Falk or 'May' laws. As it happened, Bismarck, much shaken in health, greatly embittered by the widespread antagonism of the Conservatives to his policy in both Church and State[1], and irritated by his difficulty in carrying the Emperor with him in the execution of that policy, had on January 1st transmitted the presidency of the Prussian Ministry into the loyal hands of Roon, retaining only the department of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellorship of the Empire. Inasmuch as the Falk laws aforesaid were specifically Prussian laws, while to the legislation of the Empire resort had to be made only on such points as had ceased to be within the competence of the Prussian State, it is obvious that this rearrangement of the Ministry[2], while it might to some extent conciliate Conservative feeling, could not be conducive to a vigorous prosecution of the Ministerial legislative campaign. This should be remembered in justice to Falk, the Minister immediately responsible for the conduct of it—not that Bismarck's support was wanting to him on critical occasions.

The 'first May laws,' as they were subsequently called, were initiated in the Prussian Chamber on January 9th, 1873. Briefly summarised, and without distinguishing changes introduced into the original drafts, they were, more especially, concerned with the training and appointment of the clergy of the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, and with the regulation of ecclesiastical discipline. Clerical offices could only be conferred on candidates of German birth, who, after passing the school-leaving examination,

[1] See chapter III, *post*. The beginning of the rupture between Bismarck and the Conservatives may be dated from the *Kreisordnung* of 1872, though it had a complicated origin.

[2] It came to an end with Roon's entire retirement from office in November 1873, when Bismarck resumed the presidency.

had studied theology for three years in a German university, and had received a sound scientific[1] training tested by the State. Certain exceptions notwithstanding, this rule was manifestly aimed at theological seminaries, on whose behalf an outcry at once arose. Still more contentious, though not really novel in principle, was the subjection of the appointment of candidates duly trained to the veto of the State. The severity of the process now established went far to justify the resistance with which it met. The State was, rightly, not to interfere except on definite grounds: but these were to include reason for apprehending opposition to the laws of the State on the part of the person designated. Appointments made without the approval of the State were null and void; and the making of them, or the leaving open of clerical offices beyond the period of a year, was to be punishable by fines. Heavy fines were also to be imposed on priests illegally appointed who should exercise spiritual functions—a provision which had the effect of depriving a parish served by such a priest of the ordinary comforts of religion. Hardly less unfavourable was the reception given to the provisions in these laws as to the disciplinary powers of the Churches. These powers were only to be exercised by competent German authorities; the penalties or disabilities inflicted by them were to be of a purely religious nature; and they were not to apply to any acts required by the State, or to be imposed in order to prevent such acts; nor were they or the names of the persons on whom they were inflicted to be made public—under penalties up to 1000 dollars or two years' imprisonment. The ecclesiastical penalties themselves were limited to small fines and removal to institutions for *demeriti*—which were subjected to the control of the State. And, in disputed cases, resort was to be had to the decision of the royal judicial tribunal for ecclesiastical affairs now

[1] *I e* in philosophy, history and German literature This was one of the legal requirements abrogated in 1882

called into life. This tribunal was to have power to authorise dismissal from office by his ecclesiastical superiors of any clergyman whose continuance in it was proved incompatible with the needs of public order, or to remove him itself if they refused; and it was, in the like case, to call upon any clergyman without a competent ecclesiastical superior in the German Empire—in other words, upon any bishop—to resign his office. The tribunal was to consist of eleven members, of whom not less than six were to be judges of the realm.

The excitement caused by the introduction of these laws is the reverse of astonishing. While, in the initial debate, Roon rose to the oratorical height of asserting that the scirocco had brought back from the south a number of German bishops transformed into Romans, these prelates, in their turn, in an elaborate memorandum addressed to the Emperor, protested that they had been suddenly subjected to laws which the faithful were unable to obey. In the committee appointed by the Chamber to report on the proposed laws, it was agreed, in order to remove any doubt as to their constitutional character, to recommend, in the first instance, certain changes in the constitution itself. As a matter of fact, these changes amounted to patent declarations of that principle of supreme State-control which the framers of the constitution of 1850 had thought it unnecessary (or undesirable) to assert explicitly; and, in any case, Falk's remark could not be contradicted, that the constitution itself rested on legislation[1]. It will be seen that a simpler way was soon found of reconciling the new laws with particular constitutional articles. The proposed changes in the constitution having been carried (in the Chamber of Deputies and the *Herrenhaus* by majorities of 245 to 110, and of 87 to 53, votes respectively), the laws themselves

[1] And, he might have added, in part on legislative amendment Cf. vol. I, p 514, *ante*. The articles of the constitution now amended were those numbered XV and XVIII

underwent a long succession of debates, through which it is impossible here to follow them, and, in the end, after a speech from Bismarck alleging the conviction of the King and the Government that the foundations of the State were in danger, on May 1st passed the *Herrenhaus*, where it had been vainly hoped that Conservative feeling and Protestant Church interest might bring about a last rally, by a large majority. They were promulgated on May 15th; and, though the Supreme Council of the United (Protestant) Church reluctantly enjoined submission, the Catholic bishops at once prepared for resistance, informing the Government (May 26th) that they were unable to cooperate in carrying out these enactments.

Thus, though the close of the diet (May 20th) seemed to mark that of the parliamentary contest, and though Roon expressed the hope that peace had been reached, nothing of the kind had taken place. In June, the Government was encouraged by an address of Silesian Catholics, opponents of ultramontanism, submitted to the Emperor by the Duke of Ratibor (Hohenlohe's brother). A correspondence between Pope and Emperor (August and September), the arguments in which on both sides were fundamental, was followed (November) by a Papal encyclical, which showed signs of personal authorship or inspiration. On the other side, the elect of the Old-Catholics, Dr Reinkens, was recognised as a Catholic bishop in the Prussian dominions (September)[1]; and Archbishop Ledochowski of Posen, who had given the signal of active resistance to the May laws, was deposed from his office by the Prussian Government (December). Already, both the Catholic and the Protestant public outside the borders of the Empire had been stirred by the tidings of the action of the Prussian Government. In November 1873, the bishops of the archiepiscopal province of Bourges, headed by Bishops Freppel of Angers and Plan-

[1] This step appears to have been decided on by Bismarck against the opinion of Falk.

tier of Nîmes, had joined in a protest against it; and Bishop Freppel's most vituperative utterances had been reproduced in the ultramontane *Univers*. Bismarck did not let the occasion slip[1], and, though the French Government issued an ordinance against the bishops, demanded disciplinary measures against them (Bishop Plantier in particular) and even held out the threat of prosecuting them before the French tribunals. The French Government suspended the *Univers* for two months, but declined further action—whereupon the incident terminated rather suddenly, Bismarck preferring not to fall out with France on this particular subject. He probably did not overrate the importance of the expressions of British sympathy with his ecclesiastical policy, for which, about the same time, the Emperor William sent an effusive letter of thanks to Lord Russell.

At home, on the other hand, the year was not to come to an end without a renewal of the parliamentary contest. Bismarck was now again at the head of the Prussian Ministry, and during the next three years the tension between him and the Old-conservatives, who, in the *Landtag* election of November 1873 were almost extinguished in the popular Chamber, and who met with a similar fate in the *Reichstag* elections of January 1874, drew near to the breaking-point[2]. The conflict now extended to a question cognate with those treated in the recent ecclesiastical legislation and intimately affecting the social life of the nation. After, in December, P. Reichensperger's motion for an entire reversal of the recent ecclesiastical legislation had been rejected in the Chamber of Deputies by 288 to 95 votes, Falk, in the following January, brought forward a proposal to make civil marriage obligatory, and to render entirely dependent upon it the validity of any marriage as a civil act. Hitherto,

[1] Cf. *post*, ch IV; and see Gontaut-Biron, vol. II, pp. 5 ff

[2] This is the time when Bismarck's quarrel with Arnim, as to which see *post*, had reached its height

marriages, like the registration of births or deaths, had in Prussia been held to be matters under Church control only; but, apart from general tendencies of opinion, Falk was no doubt correct in stating that his proposal would be widely welcomed, by reason of the difficulties that had arisen of late as to the ministrations of legally ejected or illegally appointed priests. Moreover, in the existing state of ecclesiastical tension, religious marriages between Catholics and Protestants must keep up a continuance of confessional discord. The proposed legislation, however, necessarily aroused strong opposition, more especially among the members of the Protestant Churches, who were likewise subjected to it, though they had done nothing to provoke it; and the strong antipathy to the change was shared by the Emperor. This time, it was not Bismarck, but the Ministry (then still presided over by Roon), which exercised the requisite pressure upon the Emperor by offering its resignation (including, of course, that of Falk); but, in the end, notwithstanding the exertion of strong personal influence on the other side, he yielded, on the advice of Bismarck, who personally held, with Luther, that the marriage-contract is a civil affair[1]. The Civil Marriage and Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Bill, after passing in the Second Chamber by 284 to 95, and in the *Herrenhaus* by 89 to 51 votes, was promulgated on March 7th, 1874, and acquired force of law in the Prussian monarchy from October 1st following. In March 1874, the Bavarian deputy Völk, whose attempt to pass a similar law in the Bavarian Chamber had failed, succeeded in the *Reichstag* in making its principles applicable to the Empire at large; and this extension, having been approved by the *Bundesrat*, became law from February 1875.

In its spring session, the diet resumed the task of ecclesiastical legislation proper, and passed the so-called 'second May laws' (1874), which it is unnecessary to treat in detail

[1] See *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol II, pp. 140–1.

here. They professed to be designed to supplement the May laws of the previous year, which, as Falk stated, the Government had never expected to find completely effective; and it was officially announced that, so soon as the first series should prove capable of serving their purpose, the second would practically fall out of use. Thus, precautions were now added against the unauthorised performance of spiritual functions, with provisions for securing the execution of judicial decisions in matters ecclesiastical. Deposed bishops and dispossessed priests might, in case of their continued exercise of their functions, be expelled from the Empire and deprived of the German citizenship. (This provision had to be afterwards approved by the German *Reichstag*.) In the case of bishoprics vacated by deposition, if the Chapter failed to elect a vicar-general within ten days, the chief-president of the province was to appoint a commissioner to administer the temporalities of the see; in the case of a benefice similarly vacated, if the bishop failed to appoint a properly qualified person, the parishioners (here we have an unexpected presbyterian touch) might elect their priest.

The new laws, which were rapidly passed in both Chambers (in the *Herrenhaus* on May 15th, 1874, by 81 against 46 votes), cannot, as already stated, be described as in themselves more than supplementary, either in design or in effect. To the legislation of which they formed part further measures were added in the course of the next twelve months (or thereabouts), the more important of which may be mentioned at once; and in June 1875, after discussion begun in April, their validity was ensured by a law repealing those articles of the constitution (XV, XVI and XVIII) which, even as recently amended, might be held to contravene these enactments. They consisted of a law, passed in March, for the cessation of all State contributions in support of the Catholic Church in dioceses or parishes where the bishop or priest had not bound himself to observe the laws of the

State—a measure speedily (April) repudiated from Fulda by the bishops, as imposing an obligation to which no Christian conscience could submit. In May, a bill of great importance was carried through its final stage. It provided for the dissolution, within the next six months, of all religious Orders and Congregations in the monarchy—the term to be extended to four years in the case of Orders occupied with teaching; while, in the case of Orders and Congregations exclusively devoted to the care of the sick, the State was to content itself with control[1]. The justification of this bill was declared by the Government to be the propaganda carried on by the Orders and Congregations; but Falk's speech on moving it in the *Herrenhaus* showed that he, too, hoped this might be one of the last, as it certainly was one of the harshest, pieces of ecclesiastical legislation. And the reception of the next, and last important, law in the whole series, already showed that the end was coming into sight. The law concerning the administration of Church property in Catholic parishes was intended to furnish the bases of co-operative action between the State, as entitled to supervision, and the ecclesiastical authorities; and, notwithstanding an initial protest put forth in the name of all the bishops by the Archbishop of Cologne, it seemed as if his brethren would not, in the present case, maintain this attitude of resistance. Even Windthorst, the most politic of the leaders of the Centre, appears to have been prepared to infer, from this sign of pliancy, that a wider conciliation was now in view.

The time, however, was not quite yet. The Government's

[1] These religious associations had increased very largely since the constitution of 1850 had encouraged their growth; but it is somewhat surprising to find the Government stating that in 1872–3 (subsequently, therefore, to the expulsion of the Jesuits) the numbers of their members in the old Prussian provinces did not amount to quite 8000. (Cf. Hahn, p. 183.)

ecclesiastical legislation, as a whole, had created an endless series of opportunities for instituting prosecutions and inflicting fines, or forced sales, with other pains and penalties, in particular that of imprisonment, upon the delinquents within the range of its power; and the Prussian Administration, intent as ever on carrying out with conscientious zeal the most oppressive action imposed upon it, had allowed none of these opportunities to remain unused. As Morier concisely puts it, the Roman *Curia* had desiderated martyrs, and the State had met this wish.

A brief notice of the events connected with the conflict before its active period came to a close in 1877, will suffice to illustrate the last stages of the process, and to indicate its general results. In the summer of 1874, a strange incident had added to its violence. On July 13th, Bismarck's life was attempted by a working cooper named Kullmann, who, before and after the deed, declared the 'Church laws in Germany' to have determined him to undertake and to commit it, and whose excitement as to those laws was traced to angry speeches on the subject delivered by a priest at a Catholic men's club at Salzwedel (in the Old-Mark). Bismarck elected to turn the crime to parliamentary account, and flung at Windthorst the taunt that the assassin clung to the coat-tails of what he called 'his fraction.' Great vigilance was hereupon, not unnaturally, exercised over ultramontane associations and journals; and vigorous police ordinances were issued as to those time-honoured instruments of ecclesiastical agitation, religious processions and pilgrimages. On December 5th, the German legation to the Vatican was withdrawn.

Early in the following year (1875) the deposition of bishops, to which hitherto resort had only been had in the case of the Archbishop of Posen, began on an extended scale. The Bishop of Paderborn, Dr Martin, a consistent Infallibilist, was, after imprisonment, dismissed from his

office by the royal tribunal for ecclesiastical affairs (January), and the cautious Prince-bishop of Breslau (Förster) was similarly deprived (November). The Bishop of Münster (Brinkmann, 1876), the Archbishop of Cologne (July 1876)[1] and the Bishop of Limburg (Blum, June 1877) suffered the same penalty; while imprisonment or internment (it is stated, almost literally within their walls) was also inflicted upon the former two, upon Bishop Eberhard of Treves (who died shortly afterwards) and upon the Bishops of Ermeland, Culm, Hildesheim and Osnabrück, as well as on a vicar-general and several suffragans. And, although, in February 1875, another encyclical denounced this oppression of the 'prefects of the Pope,' as Bismarck called them, the storm raged with unabated violence against their subordinates. The statistics of the depositions of inferior clergy, as well as of the punishments inflicted on clergy or laymen in the shape of arrests, domiciliary visits, expulsions or internments, where they could be ascertained, are, from any point of view, painful reading. In Catholic parts of the monarchy the peasantry refused to attend churches served by priests without episcopal sanction; and, all monasteries being closed except those devoted to nursing, spiritual desolation seemed to be settling upon the faithful.

With the year 1877, as observed, the active continuation of the conflict began to draw to its close. The *Reichstag*

[1] The State-prosecutor of the Prince-bishop of Breslau pointed out that the resistance of this one prelate had led to the infliction of penalties upon 93 of his clergy, 28 of whom had been dismissed from office. As to other penalties inflicted in the first four months of 1875 only, see the statistics cited by Majunke, p. 159, from a trustworthy source. In January 1881, the then Minister of Education (Puttkamer) stated that in Prussia out of 4604 parishes with 8,800,000 souls, 1103 with 2,085,000 souls had, in consequence of the legislation of the State, been left without regular pastoral provision. Of these, he claimed that (by the law of 1880) provision had been made, more or less, for 953 parishes with about 1,900,000 souls.

elections of January 1877, although they diminished the numbers of the Centre, conduced to its further consolidation as a parliamentary body; and Bismarck, who for a time thought of a closer combination with the National-Liberals, before long relinquished this idea as incompatible with the new economic policy which he made up his mind to adopt. The change implied a new attitude on his part towards both Conservatives and Centre; and this actually declared itself in the following year. Thus, political tactics for a time cooperated with the sense of the partial failure of an ecclesiastical legislation which had brought his Government little cordial support or genuine popularity in any quarter. His colleague Falk, though intent on carrying action as well as argument to its logical issue and consistently opposed to surrendering the central object of the conflict, had no wish to push the execution of his laws to an intolerable extreme; and the Conservatives, whose numbers had increased in the *Reichstag*, had, from first to last, found much that was contrary to their traditions, as well as to the interests of the Protestant Churches, in the clipping of the wings of ecclesiastical authority. In 1875, as we have seen, the Catholic bishops had shown willingness, in one direction at all events, to abandon their attitude of intransigency; and in 1876, one of the recognised leaders of the Centre party, P. Reichensperger, put forth a pamphlet indicating at least a desire on the Catholic side for peace In 1877, before the depositions of bishops had come to an end, Falk, in the Chamber, expressed readiness for a revision, though not for the rescinding, of the May laws; and, in the course of the same year, Bismarck took occasion to state that the time had come for the Government to adhere to the defensive and calmly await the result: surely, Popes were not all of the same pattern, and a second Antonelli might be found!

He had not had to look far into the future. The death of Pope Pius IX on February 7th, 1878, was followed by the

election of Pope Leo XIII, who appointed Cardinal Franchi, an ecclesiastic known to hold moderate opinions, his Secretary of State, and lost no time, after an exchange of courteous communications with the Emperor William, in expressing his hope that a return to the former good understanding with the Prussian Government might be brought about by legislative and constitutional changes. In a reply written (June 10th) on his father's behalf, the Crown-prince deprecated the subjection of any Prussian law to a foreign Power[1], but expressed the hope that negotiation, although it could not alter principles, might be conducive to peace.

By this time, communications had, in the first instance through the skilful efforts of the Bavarian Count Holnstein[2], passed between Bismarck and the Papal nuncio at Munich, Cardinal Masella. Unfortunately, Cardinal Franchi, who at Rome was really responsible for these negotiations, died suddenly (August 1st); but, soon afterwards, his successor, Cardinal Nina, was informed by Pope Leo of his wish to conclude not only an armistice, but a solid and enduring pacification. Meanwhile, at Berlin, while Falk still adhered to the view that peace must not be restored by a reversal of legislation, the relations between the Chancellor and the Centre continuously improved. Windthorst entered into personal conference with Bismarck on economical—and no doubt on other—matters, and, in July 1879, as will be seen in our next chapter, the rupture between the Chancellor and the National-Liberals was openly declared. Thus, in the same month, the second stage of the *Kulturkampf* came to a definite close with the withdrawal of Falk; and its long-protracted final stage began.

Falk, whose retention of office, in the face not only of great difficulties but of personal trials, must be placed to his

[1] The Emperor was suffering from the attempt to assassinate him made on June 26th.

[2] Cf. vol. II, pp. 559 f., *ante*.

credit, also acted patriotically in electing not to hinder a settlement to which it was impossible for him to be a party. Without Bismarck's support, he could no longer be responsible for a course of action in which, in spite of occasional partial disclaimers from his chief, they had substantially concurred[1]. The choice of Robert von Puttkamer, a high official of Conservative opinions, to succeed Falk as Minister of Public Worship and Education, was significant of the abandonment of a whole-hearted and thorough-going ecclesiastical policy by the Government. In his first Ministerial speech (February 5th, 1880), while deprecating any concession enabling the Church of Rome to press her claims in the sphere of the State, Puttkamer recommended the Chamber to let principles take care of themselves, and to seek an understanding on the basis of facts. Soon afterwards, the negotiations which had been in progress at Vienna between Prince Reuss, the Prussian ambassador, and Cardinal Jacobini, the Papal nuncio there (Windthorst acting as intermediary with Bismarck, and Onno Klopp as assistant at Vienna), seemed at last to be nearing a conclusion. On February 24th, in a brief address to the deposed Archbishop of Cologne, Pope Leo made a definite offer on one of the essential points at issue, to the effect that announcement (*Anzeige*) to the Government of episcopal nominations of priests to cures of souls before canonical institution might be allowed (*tolerari posse*). The Prussian Government, hereupon, declared itself ready, were this concession carried into practice, to seek to obtain from its legislature powers allowing the Government a free hand in applying the laws complained of by the Catholics. But the Papal concession (of which Windthorst and others disapproved) had been only tentative. The demand

[1] Falk had, probably, intensified the illwill to his legislation on the part of the orthodox Protestant Church by his advocacy of the synodal, as opposed to the consistorial, system of ecclesiastical government.

for a reversal of the ecclesiastical legislation as a whole, which the *Curia* had at heart, the Prussian Government was still unprepared to grant; what it had in view (so Bismarck wrote to Prince Reuss) was a *modus vivendi*, not a disarmament. The Papal concession as to 'announcement' was narrowed down and withdrawn, and not definitively made and accepted till five years later.

The negotiations which had thus fallen to the ground were, hereupon, made public by Bismarck, who now decided to proceed in his own way, probably hoping thus to provoke the desiderated misunderstanding between the Papacy and the Centre party. On May 28th, 1880, the new Minister laid before the Prussian Chamber what may be described as a first instalment of the revision of the *Kulturkampf* legislation. In accordance with the line of action consistently maintained by Bismarck, the bill gave the Government discretionary power, for the term of a year (to January 1st, 1880), to mitigate this legislation in several particulars; but the list of eventual modifications was far from exhaustive in numbers or measure, and was still further reduced in the course of the ensuing debates. The Centre, aware that the proposed changes by no means satisfied the demands of the *Curia*, assumed an attitude unfriendly to the bill (although approving the clause for the restitution of the deposed bishops, which was afterwards rejected by a Liberal majority), and voted against it as a whole. The much-altered measure was, however, thanks to Bennigsen's influence with the Conservatives, carried through the Chamber (June 28th) by a narrow majority (206 to 202), and accepted by the *Herrenhaus*. It enabled the State to dispense with the special oath of allegiance; to resume the payment of contributions to the expenditure of dioceses; to stop the penalising of lawfully appointed priests officiating in other parishes, and to authorise fresh settlements of Orders and Congregations for the nursing of the sick. These (with one or two additional

concessions) could not be regarded as more than an instalment of relief; and, as Puttkamer said, in a speech (January 26th, 1881) in which he endeavoured to show that a great change for the better had taken place in the condition of the Catholic Church in Prussia, it depended on her own authorities whether the improvement could be carried further. As the year went on, vicars-general friendly to conciliation were elected and approved in the dioceses of Paderborn and Osnabrück; a third, elected for Treves, the Government declined to approve. At Breslau, the deposed Prince-bishop Förster having died in this year, a suffragan was appointed vicar-capitular.

In June 1881, Puttkamer was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and his place was taken by his under-secretary Gustav von Gossler The son of a high official and of a daughter of Minister von Mühler, he was so conciliatory in his bearing that he had been chosen to preside over the *Reichstag*, and he had religious sympathies without being a partisan. The choice was a fortunate one in the circumstances, which were rapidly developing in the direction of peace. In the same year, the renewal of diplomatic relations between the German and the Papal Governments was taken in hand, the German Minister at Washington, Kurt von Schlözer, who had already conducted important negotiations with the Vatican, being designated for the purpose. It was on this occasion that Bismarck pronounced the Catholic Church in Germany with its Papal Head to be a native institution of the German Empire and its States—an assertion in truth not far from a negation of the original principle of the *Kulturkampf*[1]. With less impetuosity, Bennigsen in October declared that, since the chief end of the struggle had been gained by maintaining the principle of the old Prussian State, there was no reason any longer for insisting on minor points. In July 1882, the same Liberal and patriotic statesman gave it as his explicit

[1] Cf. Bruck-Kissling, vol. II, pp. 58–9.

opinion that, so soon as the Church of Rome consented to the practice of 'announcement,' peace might be definitively concluded[1]. In 1882 and 1884, further 'laws of peace' were passed, of which the later limited the powers of the tribunal for ecclesiastical affairs and relieved the bishops of the critical obligation of 'announcement' in the case of appointments of assistant-priests. About the same time, the remaining vacant Prussian dioceses were filled up, by restorations or new appointments, with the exception of Cologne and Posen, where soon afterwards (1885–6), on the voluntary retirement of the deposed archbishops, the Pope was found ready to appoint their successors. In 1886, with the tactful assistance of the new Bishop of Fulda (Kopp) who (after being made, with the new Bishop of Ermeland, a member of the Council of State) had been summoned to the *Herrenhaus*, a further 'law of peace' was enacted (May), which conceded a series of important rights formerly enjoyed by the Church of Rome in Prussia, including the direct exercise there of Papal jurisdiction. The immediate effect was that the bishops no longer found any difficulty in carrying out, in appointments of parish-priests, the long-vext system of 'announcement' to the Government before institution.

So far, Bismarck's plan of direct negotiation with Rome had worked smoothly, and the relations between the Pope and the Prussian Court and Government were now most amicable. In December 1883, the Imperial Crown-prince, ever anxious when possible to come forward on the side of peace, paid a visit to the Pope; and, two years afterwards, the latter was requested by Bismarck to arbitrate in a dispute between Germany and Spain (on the subject of the Carolines).

But popular forces are more easily summoned than relegated into silence. The Centre party, which had become a great political force, and its leader Windthorst were not to

[1] See H. Oncken, *R. von Bennigsen*, vol. II, p. 459.

be easily driven along with the ebb; and it was not till after a singular series of incidents that the harmony between the *Curia* and the episcopate on the one side and the parliamentary Opposition on the other, was gradually restored[1].

Not a little remained for the Government to concede, if both Papacy and Centre were to be fully satisfied; but there could be no expectation of these concessions including either a restoration, and extension to the Empire at large, of those articles of the Prussian constitution which had been revoked, or of the reestablishment of a Catholic department in the Ministry of State, with full control over the schools. The former would have amounted to avowed surrender on the part of Bismarck; the latter to the abandonment by Gossler of the resistance maintained by him on the educational side of the problem till he resigned office, about the time of Windthorst's death (1891)[2]. But, in February 1887, the Govern-

[1] The circumstances of this 'crisis' appertain to an important political episode mentioned in the next chapter. In 1886, the Government proposed a seven years' grant for the army in its existing numbers. The Pope, at Bismarck's request, intimated through Jacobini (now Papal Secretary of State) his advice that the Central party should vote in favour of the proposal. The advice was kept secret by Windthorst, except from a few members of the party, and the Centre unanimously voted against the Government. As a matter of course, the secret of the Papal intervention came out before long, but, although the Pope was deeply annoyed, Windthorst was not disavowed at the Vatican. In the *Reichstag* elections which followed, the Centre maintained its strength, but the Government was now in command of a composite majority for its proposal, and the members of the Centre for the most part abstained from taking part in the division. Thus, although Bismarck's manoeuvre had not been wholly unsuccessful, the action of the leader of the Centre had asserted and preserved its independence as a political party.

[2] His attempt in 1890 to develop Falk's legislation in this respect failed. The struggle between Church and State for the control of the schools long continued in Prussian Poland, where nationality and religion were allies, and where Gossler had afterwards to deal with it as *Oberpräsident* of the province of Posen.

ment brought forward in the *Herrenhaus* (where it again depended on the mediatory agency of Bishop Kopp) the 'last law of peace,' the terms of which had in the main been already settled by diplomatic negotiation. It established the principle that the Government should have the right of objecting to appointments only when these were to be permanent and to concern parish-priests, but that, in such cases, the objection might be based on definitely stated civil grounds; it permitted the recall of Orders and Congregations not excluded by laws of the Empire; and it gave absolute freedom to priests, as such, to read mass and dispense the sacraments. Bishop Kopp had thought to extend these concessions by amendments; but an end was put to the criticisms of Windthorst and others, when Pope Leo XIII, this time manifesting his will in a matter purely ecclesiastical, signified his decision, in which the College of Cardinals unanimously concurred, that the bill should be allowed to pass. It became law on April 27th, 1887; and, in a consistory held on May 23rd following, the Pope openly and solemnly declared the long and onerous task which he had undertaken at the beginning of his pontificate accomplished (*transacta*). The conclusion of the Prussian *Kulturkampf* may accordingly be dated from this last Papal allocution concerned with it[1].

If the results of the great struggle proved unequal to the fundamental conditions of the historical problem which underlay it; if, in consequence, these results disappointed those who had waged it by failing to bring about the submission of the Church of Rome to the full claims of the Prussian State—the conflict cannot be said to have ended in

[1] The actual completion of the reaction seems to have been a law, passed after Bismarck's day, in June 1891, returning about £3,000,000 worth of money confiscated by the Prussian Government into ecclesiastical hands. The efforts for a reactionary policy in the matter of school administration (1892), and for the readmission of the Jesuit Order (1896), lie beyond the limits of this narrative.

defeat, or in the scarcely less humiliating result of a drawn battle. Neither had the Church of Rome been, on the one hand, made an organic branch of the general polity, nor, on the other, had she been emancipated as a free Church in a free State; but the supremacy of the State within its own sphere had been upheld in principle and, in certain matters—above all, in popular education—in practice also; while an answer had been given to the pretensions recently dogmatised by the Church of Rome, neither complete nor final, but clear, and, for a time, sufficient[1].

[1] The progress of the conflict, of which the course in Prussia has been sketched above, in other States of the Empire cannot be narrated here, but the following notes, based on vol II of Bruck-Kissling's work, may be of service

In *Bavaria*, the anti ultramontane movement in general, as well as the Old-Catholic in particular, was consistently favoured by Freiherr von Lutz, Minister of Public Worship under Count Bray, Count von Hegnenberg-Dux and von Pfretzschner, and afterwards himself head of the Ministry The law of 1872 for the expulsion of the Jesuits (cf *ante*, p 61) was carried into execution, while the efforts of the 'patriotic' party (which in 1875 gained a slight but enduring majority in the Second Chamber) and the recriminations of the episcopate against the ecclesiastical policy of the Government, and especially as to the use of the royal *placet* in matters appertaining to faith and morals, were alike unsuccessful The death of King Lewis II (1886) seemed to promise a change in favour of ultramontane views, but it was not till 1890 that Lutz, while maintaining the Crown's constitutional right to the *placet*, was induced to assent to the expulsion of the Old-Catholics from the Roman Catholic Church

In *Baden*, where, as has been seen, the Old-Catholic movement had taken some root from the first, and where the example of Prussia was most naturally followed by the Liberal Government presided over by Jolly till 1876, the contention with Rome turned largely on the choice of a successor to Archbishop Vicari at Freiburg, which was not finally settled till 1881. The Old-Catholics were accepted as a Catholic body under its own authorities, and their Bishop (Reinkens) was recognised by the Government. Laws were passed restricting the activity within the grand-duchy of religious Orders and Congregations

(1872), subjecting candidates for clerical office to State examinations (1874) and leading to the closing of theological seminaries (1874), besides imposing a declaration of obedience to the laws of the land on ecclesiastics desirous of augmentation of endowments (1876). In 1876, Jolly's memorable period of office came to an end; and in 1879 a modification of the Baden ecclesiastical legislation set in. It may be added that the execution of Jolly's wholly undenominational school law could only be counteracted by the clergy in detail.

Finally, *Württemberg* remained practically untouched, either in its educational system or otherwise, by the movement; and the *Saxon* ecclesiastical law of 1876, while maintaining the royal *placet*, contained no provisions that could be regarded as oppressive by the Church of the dynasty. Mention should, also, be made of *Hesse-Darmstadt*, not because of its, necessarily small, share in the Old-Catholic movement, but because of the always interesting personality of Bishop Ketteler of Mainz. In 1871, Dalwigk was succeeded as head of the Government by K. Hofmann, hitherto grand-ducal envoy at Berlin, who was supported by a National-Liberal majority, which in 1874 passed an anti-clerical school law. Other legislative proposals modelled on the Prussian examples were brought forward in the same year, and carried against the opposition of Ketteler and others. He died in 1877; and it was not till eleven years later that his bishopric was filled up by the appointment of Dr Haffner, under whom and his successor Dr Brück the religious legislation combated by Bishop Ketteler was subjected to revision

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL POLITICS AND PARTIES

I

From 1871 *to* 1877

In one of the most noteworthy, and also most self-conscious, of his parliamentary deliverances[1], Bismarck, with proud humility, declared that the moral responsibility for the great political and military successes, to which there were now to be added the great achievements in social legislation, of the reign of William I, must, in accordance with the monarchical traditions of Prussia, be borne by the Emperor-King himself. Yet, as has been seen, after the crushing victory of 1866 had assured to non-Austrian Germany that unity under Prussian hegemony which had been the aim of endeavours covering nearly two decades, Bismarck had himself counselled his sovereign to return to the parliamentary system of government sanctioned by the constitution of his kingdom and commending itself to the large majority of his subjects. The passing of the Indemnity Act[2] had declared the close of the conflict between Crown and parliament, and from the cooperation of these two factors of government had resulted the constitution of the North-German Confederation, and that of the new German Empire based upon it. The continuance of this cooperation was, therefore, an indispensable element in the steady and harmonious evolution of the political life of Germany and

[1] His reply to Hänel's censure of the imperial message of January 4th, 1882. For a summary of the speech, see W. Oncken, *Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm*, vol. III, pp. 750 ff.

[2] Cf. vol. II, p. 330, *ante*.

Prussia, under its novel conditions. Important and manifold as must remain the differences between Liberals and Conservatives of various shades, the great national achievements of the past and the great national tasks of the future implied by them formed a bond of union which might be expected to prevail against all elements of disintegration. Moreover the self-assertion of principles and interests primarily concerned with the life of a vast class in the nation rather than with that of the nation as a whole, was only beginning to make itself perceptible. Then, however, even before the great war with the foreign foe was over, there opened that new conflict—new in its actual conditions rather than in its motive causes—which the preceding chapter has attempted to summarise. Like the Reformation itself, it was largely, though not in the deepest significance of the movement, political in character: on the side of the Church of Rome and the Papacy, it aimed at securing something besides an increase of spiritual influence; and the protagonist on the opposite side, Bismarck, entered into it, as he entered into every great enterprise of his career, from mainly political motives. Thus, apart from the fact that, of the populations which had looked with suspicion upon the process of unification with Germany under Prussian hegemony, a large proportion professed the Catholic form of faith, and from the additional fact that in Prussian Poland, where the loyalty of the Catholic clergy towards the State had for some years ceased to be an episcopal tradition honoured in the observance[1], the distinction between Polish nationalism and Roman partisanship was passing rapidly away. 'New' or reorganised Catholicism, together with the interests temporarily or permanently associated with it,

[1] Archbishop (afterwards Cardinal) Ledochowski, who subsequently became a thorough supporter of the national Polish policy, had, in May 1866, rigorously prohibited his clergy from taking any personal part in politics.

became a force of unprecedented importance in the political and, at the outset, in the parliamentary life of the nation. The Centre party, of whose beginnings something was said in the preceding chapter, could not fail to affect the relations of parties in a novel, and at times in an unexpected fashion, all the more so, since the spirit informing it and giving it coherence sometimes allied it with Conservatism and the exercise of Governmental control. On the other hand, so admirable, from the point of view not only of the best tactics but also of the essential principles of party government, was the leadership of the Centre, that no other authority could direct the action of the party—not even the Papacy itself, to which it gave its steady adherence, nor the influences by which any particular Pope might allow his policy to be swayed.

The parliamentary history of the last two decades of Bismarck's public life—of which period the initial stages, turning mainly on the organisation of the new Empire, and the legislative and other transactions concerned with the conflict with Rome, have been already summarised—divides itself broadly into halves. The earlier of these, extending from 1871 to 1877 or 1878, came to a close with the *Reichstag* elections of July 30th, 1878, and more or less coincided with the period of the *Kulturkampf*[1].

[1] The ensuing account of the section of German parliamentary history which has been described as the 'National-Liberal era,' and of the years of hesitation which elapsed before the completion of the political changes due to Bismarck's new economical policy, is primarily based upon the narrative and illustrative letters of vol II of Hermann Oncken's *Rudolf von Bennigsen*, with the same author's luminous essay *Bennigsen and the Epochs of Parliamentary Liberalism* in his *Historische-politische Aufsätze und Reden*, vol. II (1914) Bismarck's new policy, from 1877 onwards, is ably, but from a point of view entirely favourable to it, summarised in Wilhelm Oncken's *Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm I*, vol. II, pp. 658 ff. For the memoir and biographical literature of the years dealt with in this chapter, see Bibliography.

During this period, as indeed ever since ultramontanism had joined with particularism in the effort to prevent, impede or impair the process of national unification, the policy of Bismarck found its natural ally in the National-Liberal party. The fact that Windthorst and his associates, without actually blending the Centre party with the lesser fractions of Poles and Guelfs and other particularists, contrived a practical parliamentary combination with them, had, on the one hand, decided the National-Liberals to lend Bismarck their support in the struggle into which he had thrown himself against the pretensions and policy of Rome; on the other, it inclined him to adapt the internal legislation proposed by him, so far as might be, to the Liberal ideas of a party on whose consistent support he could reckon in matters concerning the strength and unity of the Empire.

In the *Reichstag* of 1871, the Centre party and its adjuncts did not, as has been seen, of themselves form a body of numerical preponderance. Out of a total of 382 members in the Assembly the Centre numbered 70 and the Conservatives proper 55 (or, according to another estimate, 48)[1]. But the Centre could reckon, at least on critical occasions, on the votes of the fifteen Poles in the Assembly as well as on those of a few other separatists—Alsace-Lorrainers, Guelfs and Danes. What was of more importance, the ecclesiastical interests of the Conservatives, to a certain extent, coincided with those of the Catholics, while their views of Bismarck's general home policy had for some time past been far from acquiescent. On the other hand, the National-Liberals, who in the *Reichstag* of 1871 were reckoned at 119 (or, according to another authority, at 115), could count on the support of the so-called Liberal party of the Empire (*Liberale Reichspartei*, the name assumed by the Liberals from the south-western States), and of the party of the

[1] It would serve no purpose here to dwell on these divergences, which have no importance in the present connexion

Empire pure and simple (*Reichspartei*, the name assumed in this *Reichstag* by the politicians who in the Prussian diet called themselves Free-conservatives). Of these two lesser fractions, the former numbered 33 (or 29) and the latter 39 (or 35) in the *Reichstag* of 1871. There remained the members of the *Fortschritt*, whose radicalism, as well as their remembrance of former strenuous struggles, induced them to maintain an attitude of independence, which often took the form of determined resistance to Government measures. The general result was that, in the first *Reichstag* of the new Empire, the Government could only command a sure majority, if to the votes of the National-Liberals and Imperialists of north and south were added those of the Old-conservatives; but that, except against a combination of this last with other fractions, Government measures were, as a rule, assured of a sufficient majority in the *Reichstag*, so long as the National-Liberals and the Imperialists adhered to it[1]. In the *Reichstag* elections of 1874 the parliamentary importance of the National-Liberals, and consequently the necessity to the Government of their support, was much enhanced; for their numbers now rose to 152, the Liberal-imperialists of the south having merged in the National-Liberal party (the *Fortschritt*, however, had, by a slight increase, risen to 49), while the Conservatives had sunk to 25 and the Free-conservatives to 33, and the Free-imperialist party of the south had vanished from the scene. But the Centre had risen to 91, and the separatist groups included 14 Poles, 15 Alsace-Lorrainers and 4 Guelfs, while there was now a Social-democratic fraction of 9 members. It will thus be obvious that the machinery of government, as worked in conjunction with parliamentary institutions, could not,

[1] The Prussian *Landtag* elected in 1870 showed the same results in a more accentuated measure against 131 National-Liberals and 55 Free-conservatives, there were here 116 Conservatives, 59 Ultramontanes and 50 *Fortschritt*.

under existing party conditions, be carried on at all except with the support of the National-Liberal party[1]. The only other way was a complete revulsion, such as Bismarck's later economic policy actually brought to pass, in the relations of the Government with the Centre and the Conservative parties. For, as Treitschke clearly put it in 1874[2], the losses of the Conservatives were more largely due to the ill-will of the Government incurred by them than to the increased influence of the Liberals.

But, if it was with the aid of the National-Liberals that, in these seven or eight years of the *Kulturkampf*, Bismarck carried on his constructive as well as his combative policy, there were difficulties to overcome within that party itself, which could at no time be ignored, and which, indeed, are inseparable from the life of parties formed for temporary purposes even of the most momentous and the most patriotic kind—such as the establishment and consolidation of the Empire. The National-Liberal party embodied the patriotic spirit which had encouraged the Prussian Government to enter upon and carry through the great wars that led to the foundation of the Empire, and which was now at work upon its organisation. The party included in its ranks the flower of the constructive statesmanship of Germany; it had the goodwill of Princes who had risen to the height of the national aspirations, such as Duke Ernest of Coburg and Grand-duke Frederick of Baden, and was regarded by the Crown-prince with unconcealed though necessarily tacit approval, while it was even favoured by public men like

[1] In the Prussian *Landtag* elections of 1873, the numbers of the National-Liberals rose to 178, and those of the *Fortschritt* to 72, while the Free-conservatives were diminished to 38, and the Conservatives to 28 New-conservatives and 4 Old-conservatives The Ultramontanes rose to 86 In the *Landtag* elections of 1876 there were no significant changes

[2] In his article *Das Reichs-Militärgesetz* (1874), in *Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe*, p. 456.

Hohenlohe, obliged to deal gently with particularist tendencies in their particular States. But its ascendancy was not without drawbacks, and its coherence was less firm than that of some other equally extensive groupings of Liberalism have been elsewhere.

To begin with, if we take the lower ground almost naïvely confessed by a member of their body, whose own political views, at any rate, were uninfluenced by motives of self-interest or self-advancement[1], the National-Liberals found it difficult to comport themselves as a Government party, when none of them had been personally admitted into the Government, notwithstanding its acceptance of National-Liberal ideas. Not till 1877 did Bismarck seriously entertain the notion of including in his Government Bennigsen, who was the foremost leader of the party, and whom, so late as September 1878, the Chancellor unwarrantably suspected, or professed to suspect, of a design of superseding him at the head of the Ministry[2]. But, apart from this irritating sense of unreality, to which a long period of Prussian parliamentary life owed much of its virulence, the National-Liberal party was, in these years, by no means so firmly and solidly united in itself as it had been even in the days before the great war with France, more especially since, as was noted above, the Liberal-imperialists of the south-west, with the traditions of their own political Liberalism and economic interests, had merged in the great and mainly north-German party. This lack of inner cohesiveness was natural in a party the very essence of whose existence was the achievement of a definite result, and which, in the prosecution of this purpose, had become more and more closely

[1] Heinrich von Treitschke

[2] See Falk's report *ap.* Oncken, *Bennigsen*, vol. II, p 387. Bismarck had previously offered Bennigsen high administrative office in Hanover. For a general account of the condition of the National-Liberal party in these years of its ascendancy, see *ib* pp 247 ff.

associated with the great statesman whose policy was altogether 'real.' By this very association, the National-Liberal party had, in no derogatory sense of the term, shown itself opportunist, while leaving the *Fortschritt* to figure as the representative of *doctrinaire* Liberalism pure and simple. Thus, though the National-Liberal party, in this period, was neither a coalition nor a compromise, yet it continued to be a combination of which the component elements, and the distinctions between them, were always, more or less, perceptible.

The leadership of the National-Liberals was not committed to a single politician, though the services rendered to the party, from the first, by Bennigsen, and the whole character of both his statesmanship and his personality, entitled him, like no other man, to speak in its name. His was a nature born to command, yet always ready to conciliate, free from all jealousy and merely personal ambition, and always ready to face great responsibilities; but devoid of the genius and the passion which sweep aside all obstacles from the path before them. But, more especially after the transfer, in 1874, of Forckenbeck (whom in 1866 his friend Hoverbeek had described as an admirable president, but rather flat as a politician) from the presidency of the Prussian Chamber to that of the *Reichstag*, the supremacy in the councils of the party was virtually divided with Bennigsen by Lasker, who, since Twesten's death in 1870, had become the foremost member of the left wing of the National-Liberals. Lasker's extraordinary promptitude of speech in a great debate (he usually spoke first on his side, and thus created the impression that his party must follow his lead—which by no means invariably proved to be the case), together with his profound learning and power of dogmatic exposition, gave him a commanding influence over assemblies of which he was a member; and this influence was enhanced by the absolute independence of his political

position, since he was free from any desire of power or pelf, and from any personal ambition besides that of ascendancy in parliament. Bennigsen, who from November 1873 to October 1879 was President of the Prussian *Landtag*, besides being twice elected to the vice-presidency of the *Reichstag*, and long chairman of the Budget Committee, as well as frequently of other parliamentary committees, necessarily held himself in reserve as a speaker, and only mounted the tribune on important occasions. But his influence was all the more constantly exerted in the sphere of parliamentary management, in which he excelled, and, occasionally, behind the scenes, on Bismarck himself. To the Chancellor the argumentative force of the little Posen Jew was more intolerable than Bennigsen's calm self-reliance and reasonableness, though he may have shared his own master's 'instinctive monarchical prejudice' against the Hanoverian statesman's abandonment of his sovereign. Bismarck declared—and the declaration covers much ground—that he had never entertained the idea of resignation unless, in the first instance, because of something said or done by Lasker.

The directorate of the National-Liberal party, which, in 1874, was exchanged for a central electoral committee, included, together with Bennigsen, Lasker and Forckenbeck, several other politicians of note. To the years 1873–6 belongs the height of the parliamentary influence of Johann Franz von Miquel, an indefatigable worker and a speaker of great power. The most important services to the Empire at large of Bennigsen's former associate in the Hanoverian constitutional conflicts with King George V, and fellow-founder with him of the *Nationalvercin*, were rendered at a later date and in the region of finance; and he held in turn the chief-burgomasterships of Osnabrück and Frankfort. In the course of a long and extraordinarily busy life he completed his political evolution from democratic-communistic ideas to a national patriotism above factions; and, even

before his memorable description of parties as 'ancient lumber' brought him his share of obloquy, he had become a political force on the side of compromise. Politicians of slighter calibre were Karl Braun, generally known as Braun-Wiesbaden, who belonged to the left wing of the party and freely displayed in debate the pointedness and humour characteristic of his well-known *Pictures from the Petty States of Germany*; and Karl Biedermann, whose experiences as a sound Liberal had covered the whole duration of the national struggle for unity, and were recorded by him with the clearness of thorough conviction. Neither should Georg von Bunsen be passed by, to whom, without his father's imaginative genius, had descended his stedfast belief in the sanctity of the cause of freedom, nor, as a prominent convert from the *Fortschritt*, Hans Victor von Unruh, formerly President of the Prussian National Assembly. On the right wing of the party sat Heinrich von Treitschke, then in full exercise of his splendid powers both as an orator and as a publicist, and, on the left, Rudolf von Gneist, the great jurist and historian of self-government, who, after belonging to the Liberal majority in the constitutional struggle with Bismarck, now held out by him in the conflict with Rome (the report of the commission on the Jesuit laws of 1875 was Gneist's work). Here also was to be found Ludwig Bamberger, the unitarian radical who had returned from exile to cooperate in the construction of the national State edifice, till, consistently relying on principle, this versatile scion of a versatile race was once more driven into opposition by the change in Bismarck's economic policy.

Since, of the two chief men among the National-Liberals, Bennigsen was always in touch with the Free-conservatives (who, in the first *Reichstag* called themselves the *Reichspartei* and regarded Hohenlohe as the leader of themselves and their southern brethren), while Lasker was constantly making advances to the *Fortschritt*, Bismarck's tactics were,

of course, to strengthen the right wing of the National-Liberals in opposition to the left. In this endeavour he shrank from no expedient, including the well-worn one of threatening to resign his office. Among the Free-conservatives the Duke of Ujest, Count Bethusy-Huc, the assiduous and lucid Dr Friedenthal (from 1874 Minister of Agriculture), and Moritz von Blanckenburg were prominent. The last-named was Bismarck's lifelong friend and a man of notable intelligence, but indisposed to exchange the position of a sympathetic critic for a responsible share in the conduct of public affairs. The *Fortschritt*, for its part, under the leadership of Freiherr Leopold von Hoverbeek, perhaps the most tenacious and uncompromising of Bismarck's adversaries (who died in the autumn of 1875), had lost some of its old leaders—including the great social organiser and administrator Schulze-Delitzsch, who, however, remained an honoured member of the *Reichstag*, though not of the *Landtag*, till his death in 1883. From other names of original members of the party may be singled out that of Rudolf Virchow, whose political activity had its origin in the medicinal researches which brought him world-wide fame. While in the sphere of public health the nation, and Berlin in particular, owed inestimable benefits to his genius, in his political ideas he remained an incurable optimist, but invariably true to the principles of 1848—the year of his own entry into public life. The most active opponents of the Government in this later period, however, were Eugen Richter and Heinrich Rickert, alike indefatigable in their assaults upon the policy of Bismarck and his supporters, and the former of them probably the sharpest of all the thorns in the side of the great statesman in the closing period of his public career. Other politicians of mark cannot be more than mentioned here—from the ultra-Conservative Hans Hugo von Kleist-Retzow to the Conservative-socialist Hermann Wagener, and from him to the Social-democrats August Bebel and Karl Liebknecht.

The names of eminent Ministers of State—Rudolf Delbrück, Otto von Camphausen, Falk and others—have already found, or will find, a place in the course of our narrative. Enough has been said to illustrate the vigorous life which, in the seventies and the next succeeding years, marked the proceedings of the German *Reichstag* and the Prussian *Landtag*; for the wish to see the general legislative business of the Prussian State, as distinct from that of its particular provinces, merge altogether in that of the *Reichstag*, remained a pious hope. If the Frankfort National Assembly of 1848–9 may contest with the Berlin Assemblies of that period the palm of parliamentary eloquence, and if there were *laudatores temporis acti* who thought that the ardour of the debates before the Franco-German war were not equalled after them, the highest honours for productive and constructive discussion must be awarded to the National-Liberal era. That era was created by the necessities of the mighty task imposed upon the reconstituted nation by its achievements; but it ended so soon as the leader whom Emperor and people had in grateful and hopeful confidence accustomed themselves to follow had determined on a new line of action for the consummation of his national policy.

The legislation of the years 1871–4, apart from the ecclesiastical laws discussed in the preceding chapter, was mainly concerned with those measures which were needed for the completion and consolidation of the unification of the Empire, and which have been already enumerated[1]. In the preparation of these measures the National-Liberal party, as could hardly have been otherwise, cordially cooperated. Of social legislation there was as yet little, with the exception of a well-intentioned but ill-conceived law giving to any workman the right of suing his master for damages in the event of an accident due to negligence on the part of

[1] See p 6, *note, ante.*

the master[1]. On the other hand, an administrative reform of great importance, and largely inspired by the ideas of self-government which owed so much to the teaching of Gneist and its spread through Heinrich Geffcken (afterwards a victim of Bismarck's wrath), was the establishment in the old Prussian provinces of a new system of Circles (*Kreisordnung*). It did away with the old obstructive system of Provincial Estates, and with the hereditary exercise of judicial functions; but it could not be carried through the *Herrenhaus*, except by means of a wholesale nomination of 24 new members. The resentment of the Conservatives at this decisive victory of Liberal principles became so strong that the hope was actually cherished of supplanting Bismarck as head of the Government; and there can be no doubt that the notion—to whatever extent it may have assumed the character of a definite scheme—of bringing about the substitution for him, as Imperial Chancellor, of Count Harry Arnim, the German ambassador at Paris, was the real motive cause of the downfall of that unfortunate diplomatist. Inasmuch as it undoubtedly exercised a reflex action upon the course of events at home, the present seems the most appropriate place for referring to what was perhaps the greatest public scandal of the Bismarckian age, only too prolific as it was of lurid illustrations of the great statesman's method of dealing with those who had offended him, and whom he had in his power[2].

Count Arnim, since in the early part of 1872 he had been moved from Rome to Paris, where he held the post of envoy and then of ambassador, had pursued an anti-republican line of policy, and had even inclined to further the

[1] This law, the so-called *Haftpflichtgesetz*, which put the difficult *onus probandi* upon the workman, was superseded by the legislation begun in 1881. Cf. W Oncken, vol II, pp. 741 ff.

[2] For a list of the principal documents used in the following summary of the history of the Arnim case, see Bibliography

hopes of the Bonapartists, before they came to an end with the death of the Emperor Napoleon (January 9th, 1873). We may, however, hesitate to accept Bismarck's charge against Arnim (in June of the same year), that the fall of Thiers had been largely due to his influence. The main cause of Bismarck's ire lay nearer home. Arnim seems to have made no secret of his own aspiring personal ambition; and the Chancellor confessed to having mistrusted him even before he came to detest him as enjoying the confidence of many Conservatives, besides the favour of the Empress Augusta and her Court, and the opportunities of easy access to the Emperor himself. There is, however, no doubt that neither in the earlier stages of the Roman question nor in French affairs before the fall of Thiers, did Bismarck and Arnim see quite eye to eye; and the Chancellor, it would seem, suspected the ambassador of certain not very creditable transactions in the matter of the French indemnity loan. In any case, Bismarck, in deciding to conclude at Berlin, instead of at Paris, the final convention (of March 15th, 1873) as to the payment of the remainder of the French indemnity, upon which Arnim had agreed with Thiers, took a step interpreted by the ambassador as an intended insult to himself[1].

Thus the relations between the pair had grown less and less endurable In a very literal sense, but in one which with Bismarck implied a great deal, he had Arnim 'on the nerves'; and Arnim's dealings with the Conservative leaders heightened Bismarck's impatience with him, in proportion as the Chancellor's estrangement from their party became more marked. Kleist-Retzow, Blanckenburg and his father-in-law, the patriarchal Pomeranian pietist A. von Thadden-Trieglоff, threw in their lot with the irreconcileables, the Gerlachs and E. Senfft von Pilsach. At the close of the year 1872, a Ministerial crisis ended, as has been seen, after a

[1] Cf. p. 6, *note*, *ante*.

novel fashion, Bismarck resigning, on December 21st, the presidency of the Prussian Ministry and retaining only the department of Foreign Affairs and, in accordance with a gracious letter from the Emperor, the German Chancellorship. Count Roon, faithful among so many Conservative renouncements, consented to succeed him as President of the Prussian Ministry; and it was Roon who, with the Minister of Commerce, Count von Itzenplitz, had to face Lasker's demand for an enquiry into the scandals connected with the concessions for the new railways. Of the speculations which had given rise to this public grievance, the notorious Strousberg had been the organising spirit; but the original cause of the financial ferment and of the financial crash which ensued, in the same year 1873, had been the flooding of the money market with the capital set free by the payments of the French milliards.

Notwithstanding Bismarck's resignation of the presidency of the Prussian Ministry, which, however, he resumed in November 1873, and the illness which kept him in retirement for the first ten months of that year[1], the control of foreign affairs remained as completely in his hands as ever; and his judgment of what he regarded as Arnim's unfitness for his post remained unchanged. It seems to have been about this time that he appointed one of his agents, Rudolf Lindau, commercial *attaché* to the Paris embassy, in order to be furnished with confidential reports about Arnim's proceedings. On April 8th, 1873, the ambassador addressed direct to the Emperor an account of his negotiations with Thiers; but, on the Emperor referring it for report to Varzin, Bismarck, while reserving his report, submitted that as Foreign Minister he was the proper channel through which complaints against him should be brought before the sovereign, adding that he had himself never been able to place

[1] He was again ill in March 1874; his resignation, offered in December of that year, was not accepted by the Emperor.

any trust in Arnim. He further stated that, when the proposal had been made of transferring Arnim to London, it had led to a very downright British protest against being asked to receive so utterly untrustworthy a diplomatist. Although Arnim had not then seen this missive of Bismarck's, he was aware of the precariousness of his position; and, on a visit paid to Berlin in the midst of a long illness, he asked the Emperor in person (September 1st) whether his Majesty desired his recall. Having received a reply in the negative, he called on Bismarck, who accused him of unscrupulous insubordination, of intriguing with the Empress, and so forth[1]. In this predicament, the ambassador returned to Paris, where he continued to give dissatisfaction to his official chief, particularly by his conduct of the negotiations consequent upon the protests of the French bishops[2]; so that Bismarck again resolved upon direct interference. Meanwhile, the attacks upon Arnim in the Prussian press in Government pay continued; and he ventured upon a twofold course of self-defence against his ruthless adversary. He addressed another letter of complaint to the Emperor, and also made an appeal to the public, with the view of showing that in the conflict with Rome he had not lagged behind Bismarck or pursued a policy adverse to his. To this end, he published, in April 1874, through the Vienna *Presse*, a private memorandum on the Vatican Council, addressed by him to the Chancellor in June 1870, together with some other letters on the subject, including one from Döllinger commending the memorandum as a masterpiece of statesmanlike intelligence. It was this publication which, with other 'unnecessary prevarications,' reconciled the Emperor to the treatment administered to Arnim[3]. On May 5th,

[1] The account in *Pro Nihilo*, on which the above statements are based, is emphatically *ex parte*, but its verisimilitude is here irresistible.

[2] Cf. pp. 66 f., *ante*

[3] Hohenlohe, *Denkwurdigkeiten*, vol. II, p. 137.

1874, Bernhard von Bülow, who in the previous autumn had succeeded Thile as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and upon whom devolved the main conduct of the Arnim business, in a censorious letter called upon the ambassador for an explanation of his action. He hastened to Berlin, but was there refused access to the Emperor; whereupon he applied for an 'immediate commission' to enquire into his case. This was declined, Bülow having informed the Emperor that Bismarck would make the matter a cabinet question. On May 15th, a circular denouncing Arnim's conduct was issued from the Foreign Office, and he was placed on the retired list.

But the end of this extraordinary duel was still to come. On both sides, there could not but be considerable uneasiness, now that war had been declared between the pair, about the use which would be made of the documentary evidence left in the German embassy at Paris with regard to their previous relations, as bearing upon the course of public business Arnim took the first step by possessing himself of so much of this evidence as he deemed of primary importance; and Bismarck retorted by placing him under arrest (October 4th, 1874) and instituting a public prosecution against him for the 'intentional removal' (*Beiseiteschaffung*)[1] of public documents. This prosecution was carried through three instances, the original sentence of December 19th, 1874, nine months' imprisonment (less one for detention during the preliminary enquiry), being finally confirmed on October 20th, 1875. Arnim, who had meanwhile found his way to Switzerland, whence he afterwards removed to Florence, early in 1876 brought out, under the title *Pro Nihilo*, with a preface dated October 1875, an anonymous statement of his whole case against Bismarck, which, though in the third person, bore evident signs of

[1] '*Beiseiteschaffung*'—not 'destruction'; indeed, some of the documents seem to have been returned

being the handiwork of the individual chiefly interested. This publication, which contained an abundance of inconvenient revelations, was forthwith used by the Berlin Government as the foundation of a fresh charge against Arnim, viz. that of having, by insulting the Emperor and the Chancellor and the Foreign Office of the Empire, and by intentionally misconducting a transaction with a foreign Power entrusted to him by the Imperial Government, committed the crimes of *lèse-majesté* and of high treason. It was argued that he had made false statements concerning the Emperor and his Government, and had made public, to the detriment of the State, what had been officially confided to him. Arnim, who was of course not present at the trial, was hereupon condemned by the Chief State Tribunal *in contumaciam*, and sentenced to five years' penal servitude (October). But, previously to this, in an open letter to Bismarck dated September 1876, while his case was still in progress before the Court, he had carried it in his own name before the forum of public opinion, and commented to the Emperor on Bismarck's letter of April 14th, which had only now been made public. Although he afterwards interfered as a pamphleteer with the Chancellor's endeavours towards a solution of the *Kulturkampf* by negotiation with the Pope, yet the most dangerous rival whom Bismarck had at any time had to face, not only in the favour of the Conservative party, but also in that of the Emperor himself, was henceforth a political wreck. Bismarck's own comments on the case are painful reading, even for those who hold (with Manteuffel, by no means a very friendly judge) that he could not prevent the first prosecution of Arnim.

The results of the *Reichstag* elections of 1874 still further emphasised the commanding position of the National-Liberals, and at the same time pressed home the problem, whether it was through the aid of the Conservatives or

through that of the *Fortschritt* that they were to command a working majority in the *Reichstag*, with Bennigsen in the former case, and Lasker in the latter, as its directing spirit. The solution was reached, without much delay, when there came to the front a question of vital importance for the future of the Empire, and involving at the same time the fundamental relations between Crown and parliament in the German Empire, as it had, twelve years earlier, those in the Prussian monarchy.

In 1867, in view of the political anxieties which the war of the previous year had left behind it, the North-German *Reichstag* had agreed to a temporary renunciation of its budget-right on the head of military expenditure, granting a lump-sum (*Pauschquantum*) for the period of transition immediately in view, and reserving for a future time the fixing by legislation of the peace strength of the army. In November, 1871, this provisional arrangement had been extended for a further term of three years; though the National-Liberal vote on the proposal had been divided, Bennigsen and Lasker taking opposite sides. Now, it was proposed by the Government that the entire military expenditure should henceforth be charged on the budget; but that the peace strength of the army should, once for all, be fixed by law—at 401,659 men. In other words, the budget-right of the *Reichstag* was to be acknowledged in principle; but, inasmuch as nothing was left to be settled by parliament except the figure of the allowance per head—hardly a point admitting of elucidation in debate—that right would be, to all intents and purposes, rendered illusory. The commission of the *Reichstag*, which, in February, 1874, met under Bennigsen's chairmanship, declined the Government proposal, but agreed upon no alternative course; and, since, soon afterwards, Bismarck was confined to bed for several weeks, the matter had to lie by till Easter. Then, although Bismarck threatened both resignation and dissolution, only a few National-Liberals

(among whom was Treitschke[1]) were found prepared to vote the perpetuity of peace strength demanded; while Lasker and his followers, together with the *Fortschritt*, were of opinion that the *Reichstag* should annually fix the peace total of the army. To ensure the rejection of the Government bill, only a small contingent of National-Liberals was, accordingly, needed in addition to the Centre, the Poles, the Alsatians and the Social-democrats. Bennigsen and Miquel, therefore, taking, on this crucial occasion, the leadership of the National-Liberal party out of the hands of Lasker, resolved on a policy of compromise, and (April 8th) induced a conference of the party to agree to a negotiation with Bismarck for fixing the peace strength of the army for a period of seven years (*i.e.* from January 1st, 1875, to December 31st, 1881). The Chancellor himself, in a series of interviews with Bennigsen, was brought round to the proposal; the Emperor signified his assent; and, Bennigsen's septennate amendment having been carried by 224 against 146, the Military Law, as amended, was adopted by 214 against 123 (April 20th). A small section of the *Fortschritt* had voted for the compromise; but the avoidance of a parliamentary catastrophe, such as would have rejoiced the hearts of Conservatives and Centre, was due to Bennigsen, who, in a memorable speech, declared that the religious conflict rendered a union of the national forces indispensable. On the day after the vote, the Government was to bring forward one of its most contested ecclesiastical measures; so that the action of the Centre and its military leaders in the matter of the Military Law needs no further explanation.

As has been seen, Bismarck's health and strength had been most severely tried since, in November 1873, he had resumed the entire conduct of affairs. His friendly relations

[1] His paper on the subject, already cited, furnishes a clear view of the earlier stages of the struggle, apparently without contemplating the compromise subsequently adopted.

with the National-Liberals continued to excite the anger of the Conservatives, which found expression in the invectives (sometimes not easily distinguishable from calumnies) of the *Kreuzzeitung* and of a more ephemeral journal, the *Reichsglocke*, with which some of Bismarck's critics in Government offices, including Colonel von Caprivi, were connected. In December 1874, he was driven into a state of agitation unusual even with his highly nervous nature. The Centre deputy Majunke, editor of the ultramontane *Germania*, having been arrested on a charge of *lèse-majesté* and of insult to the Minister of State, a motion by Hoverbeek, complaining of the arbitrary imprisonment of a deputy in session-time, was carried in the *Reichstag*. Bismarck, enraged by this vote, on December 18th sent in his resignation to the Emperor, who refused to accept it. Windthorst, for his part, was encouraged by the success of Hoverbeek's motion, which he had supported, to seize the occasion of a debate on foreign affairs for demurring to the usual vote for the Foreign Office secret-service fund[1]. But, with even greater swiftness of parliamentary tactics, Bennigsen contrived to convert the vote opposed by Windthorst into a motion of confidence in the Chancellor, which was adopted by a large majority (199 to 71) and upset the manoeuvre of the Centre leader, Bismarck appearing in the *Reichstag*, as it were to seal the reconciliation.

In 1875, the Falk legislation rose to its height, in the measure for the closing of conventual establishments; and, during the religious strife to which he had as yet no intention of putting an end by a compromise, Bismarck was more than ever dependent upon the support of the National Liberals. The attacks of the extreme Conservatives—the

[1] This fund, which was not peculiar to the German administrative system, must be distinguished from the notorious *Reptilienfonds*, the ex-King of Hanover's money used by Bismarck for subventioning the press in its campaign against the Guelf agitation

'Declarants' as they were called—consequently increased in bitterness, and the *Kreuzzeitung* ventured to denounce the corruption of the era 'Bismarck-Delbrück-Bleichröder[1].' No doubt, his own unscrupulous use of the press had contributed to render such journalistic enormities possible; and the enquiry into railway-concessions already mentioned had whetted the public appetite for financial scandals. They missed their aim, however, in the present instance; and, during the years 1875 and 1876, the Chancellor held out fairly by the National-Liberals, and they among themselves. When, in December 1876, differences arose in connexion with the legislation on the judicial system of the Empire, and the *Bundesrat* put forward a series of not less than eighteen objections to the scheme favoured by the majority of the *Reichstag*, a compromise was effected by the National-Liberal leaders, Bennigsen, Miquel and Lasker. The arrangement, however, brought about a violent disruption of such ties as had continued to exist between the National-Liberals —their left wing in particular—and the *Fortschritt*, who before long, under the leadership of Eugen Richter, assumed a more aggressive attitude than ever against Bismarck and the National-Liberal 'deserters from true Liberalism.'

As will be seen below, the final, though not the immediate, consequence of the elections of 1877 was to put an end to the alliance between Bismarck and the National-Liberals, and thus to modify the conditions under which the new Empire was established, both as to what was achieved and as to what was left aside. Yet the credit for what had been accomplished may fairly be divided between the partners in that alliance, and more especially between the self-restraint of Bismarck and the moderating influence of Bennigsen. The government of the new Empire was essentially, and not only in name, monarchical; there was no Ministerial responsibility to the representatives of the

[1] Bleichröder was the well-known Berlin banker.

people, and they had no present control over the military budget, or through it over the peace strength of the army. On the other hand, very important progress had been made towards the unification of the Empire both in its system of law and in other relations of life and intercourse, as well as towards the limited self-government of its component parts. For the rest, the State stood strong and firm in the face of Europe, and had definitely asserted the supremacy of its control as against certain claims advanced, not without a certain amount of Protestant approval, by the Church of Rome. Bennigsen, in his remarkable speech of April 13th, 1877[1], was not guilty of exaggeration in describing the achievements of the closing decade as unprecedented in the history of any nation, and in that of the German in particular. Bismarck, as later admissions on his part show, was conscious of this, and of the recognition due to the patriotism of the National-Liberal leader. But he reckoned with realities; and the time was at hand when his alliance with Bennigsen and those ready to act with him must either be drawn still closer or abandoned.

II

From 1877 *to* 1888

The elections of 1877 advanced into a new stage the problem as to how the government of the Empire, and with it that of the Prussian monarchy, was to be carried on. In the new *Reichstag*, even if the National-Liberals (127) and the *Fortschritt* (39) agreed to support the Government on a critical occasion, they could not secure a majority for it. Could, then, such a majority be obtained by any other combination, without interfering with the continuation of the ecclesiastical conflict to an at least fairly satisfactory conclusion, or interrupting the development of the internal

[1] See H. Oncken, *Bennigsen*, vol. II, p. 305.

organisation of the Empire? And could these ends be secured, while at the same time the new financial and economic policy, which Bismarck had been for some time meditating, was carried out?

A premonitory sign of his intentions on this head (though he was, at first, desirous of treating it as due to his colleague's state of health), was the resignation, in May 1876, of Rudolf Delbrück. For nearly a quarter of a century, he had not so much been Bismarck's right hand in the conduct of the economic and financial policy of Prussia, as the author of that policy itself, to the success of which other men of high ability, among the rest the economist O. Michaelis, had also contributed. In the years 1851–3, it had definitively secured to Prussia the mercantile hegemony of Germany[1]. Delbrück had, thereupon, been the moving spirit of the first epoch of the commercial history of the reign of William I—the epoch of free-trade and of the great commercial treaties based on its principles, with France (in 1862), Belgium and Italy, together with Austria's modified renewal of her treaty with the *Zollverein*. The same spirit presided over the changes in the *Zollverein* system after 1866, and the inclusion of a 'most favoured nation' clause in the provisions of the Treaty of Frankfort. In 1873, the duties on raw iron were abolished (as from January 1st, 1877), and those on manufactured iron immediately[2]. This policy was accompanied by the removal of the restrictions that had continued to hamper the advance of trade and industry in Prussia and in the other States of the Northern Confederation and the new German Empire. Freedom was gained in the exercise of trades and handicrafts (*Gewerbefreiheit*), in navigation

[1] Cf. vol II, pp 3 ff., *ante*

[2] Cf the summary of the concessional policy of Delbruck, by his kinsman H. Delbruck, in the article *Kaiser Wilhelm in seiner Bedeutung fur Handel und Industrie*, in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. LXXXVIII, 1 (April 1897)

and settlement, and so forth; the reform of the coinage was achieved (1873), and that of the banking-system was completed by the transformation of the Prussian into the Imperial Bank (*Reichsbank*) (1875). But, in June 1876, his Ministerial services came to a close by the acceptance of his resignation of the presidency of the Imperial Chancellor's Office, on which, in consequence of differences with the Chancellor, he had thought it right to insist. Undoubtedly, he had forebodings of the coming overthrow of his commercial policy, in which he was resolved to take no part. His place was taken by Hofmann, hitherto head of the Hesse-Darmstadt Government. The Finance Minister, Otto Camphausen, though, like Delbruck, a declared free-trader, gave in to some of Bismarck's new economic projects—among them that of the conversion of the German railways into imperial lines—but had finally (in March 1878) to follow his colleague's example[1].

At the beginning of the year 1877, Bismarck had not as yet relinquished the plan of maintaining his understanding with Bennigsen, and those who acted with him[2]; and he seems, in the first instance, to have hoped to reconstitute

[1] It was said, in consequence of the efforts of the National-Liberals, who wished to put Stauffenberg in his place But Bismarck declined to oblige them (Cf Hohenlohe, vol II, p 249)

[2] In January, he had obtained a judicial sentence against the editor of the *Reichsglocke*, and later in the year, in June, he was infuriated by the promotion to a high titular distinction (carrying with it the dignity of 'Excellency') of a contributor to that journal, Justus von Gruner, the son of a distinguished father (cf. vol I, pp 126–7, *ante*), and formerly in the Foreign Office The instigator of this offence was supposed to have been Schleinitz, between whom and Bismarck a perennial feud existed. But these were personal quarrels, supplementary to the recently ended Arnim affair Gruner's place at the Foreign Office had been taken by Hermann von Thile, whose subsequent fall from the office of Foreign Secretary of State is not quite sufficiently explained (See the notice of him in *Allg. Deutsche Biographie*, vol. LIV.)

his Ministry on the lines of a combination between the Conservatives and the less advanced of the National-Liberals[1]. Delbrück, whose free-trade policy was an offence to the Conservatives, had gone; Camphausen was to follow; and Bismarck would have sent after them the highly capable head of the Admiralty, General Albrecht von Stosch[1], the intimate of the Crown-prince and princess, and at the same time much connected with the Liberal leader Rickert. Any counter-movement in favour of a German 'Gladstone Government,' of which these Ministers or ex-Ministers might form part, would thus be nipped in the bud. At all events, in March 1877, the Chancellor quarrelled with Stosch, whom he charged with having, when the naval estimate brought forward by him was criticised as excessive by Richter, admitted, on his own account, that it was unnecessarily high. Hereupon, Stosch sent in his resignation, which was, however, not accepted by the Emperor. Bismarck then offered his own; and it was on this occasion that the word 'Never'—one of the classic 'nevers' of recent history—was written by the Emperor across the Chancellor's application. He was, however, allowed a long leave of absence in which to recruit his health. Probably, the imminent outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war was among the considerations in the mind both of the sovereign who refused the resignation, and of the Minister who asked for the leave of absence, during which general affairs were to be under the supervision of Hofmann, and foreign under that of Bulow. But the subject on which he proposed to himself more especially to meditate was the great scheme of economic and social reforms which should place the political life of Germany on a new basis.

[1] Among the services rendered by his administration of the navy, particular mention is made of the great advance under the head of torpedoes, and that of mines On the other hand, the terrible loss, in 1878, of the *Grosse Kurfurst*, was laid at the door of his 'system'

The projects considered by Bismarck during his retirement in the Pomeranian back-woods which, with the exception of a sojourn at Kissingen, lasted from April 1877 to February 1878, were of various import. The first, which had a very direct bearing upon the present relation of parties, was that of a permanent union, in the person of the President of the Imperial Chancellor's Office (the post formerly held by Delbruck), of the headship of both the Imperial and the Prussian Ministry of Finance. This idea, which harmonised with Bismarck's general method of blending the interests of Germany and Prussia, commended itself to Bennigsen, who was himself the personage clearly marked out for the post; but no understanding could be reached on the subject, because Bismarck would not assent to the principle that the new Finance Minister should be responsible to the *Reichstag*, and should thus form the nucleus of a responsible imperial Ministry. But the relations between the Chancellor and the National-Liberal leader became closer; and there seems no doubt that when, in July, Bennigsen visited Bismarck at Varzin (whither he had returned from Kissingen) he offered his visitor the Prussian Ministry of the Interior[1]. Bennigsen, however, from the first insisted that at least one other Liberal, besides himself (Forckenbeck by preference), should be included in the Ministry; and nothing came of the scheme at present, the Emperor, who had a strong prejudice against Bennigsen, refusing to consent to any further advance in a Liberal direction. For a time, matters remained in suspense, Bismarck being

[1] Cf Oncken, *Bennigsen*, vol. II, p 319 Bismarck was, probably, desirous of seeing that post vacated by Count Friedrich zu Eulenburg, an able Minister, but tired of his official duties His most notable achievement had been what Bismarck (in a very interesting passage of his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol. II, pp. 179 f.) describes as the bureaucratisation of the Prussian *Landrat*—formerly a personage corresponding in some respects to an English country-justice, henceforth more nearly resembling a French *préfet*.

still desirous of National-Liberal support for the measures over which he was brooding, while the National-Liberals now pressed the admission into the Ministry of both Forckenbeck and Stauffenberg as a condition of Bennigsen's acceptance of a further offer. Thus, after another interview at Varzin (Christmas 1877), in which both Bismarck's projects and the admission of Bennigsen as Minister of the Interior, or (as he would have preferred) of Finance, were discussed, the negotiations came to a standstill. They ended in consequence of an indignant letter from the Emperor to Bismarck (inspired, as the latter thought, by Eulenburg), followed by an offer of resignation by the Chancellor, which he withdrew on receiving something not unlike an apology from his sovereign. Bennigsen remained in some doubt whether the offer to him would be renewed, till Bismarck made an important declaration of his economic policy, to which the National-Liberal leader was altogether adverse[1].

When, on February 22nd, 1878, this declaration was made, Bismarck, in whose foreign policy Bennigsen had a few days before taken occasion to express full confidence, already had a very different combination in view. On February 20th, Pope Leo XIII had been elected by the Conclave which met after the death of Pius IX on February 7th; and the prospect had now opened of a reconciliation with Rome and, consequently, of an understanding between the Government and the Centre party. On the 22nd, Bismarck, also, caused a letter to be written for perusal by the King of Bavaria, which strongly disclaimed any wish for such an interference with 'the federal principle' as would be involved in the establishment of further imperial Minis-

[1] As to these transactions the account of Bennigsen's biographer should be compared with the remarks in Bismarck's *Reminiscences*. It is clear that Bennigsen behaved throughout with perfect loyalty, and that Bismarck in this instance remained uninfluenced by any motive of suspicion or jealousy

tries: and it became clear to the National-Liberals that no advance could be made at present in the direction of Ministerial responsibility. Thus (in March), a law was passed which simply authorised the appointment of a responsible substitute for the Chancellor (in case of the necessity arising), with the title of Vice-chancellor, and of departmental substitutes for the imperial Ministers already in existence. Moreover, the appointments actually made at the present juncture, whatever their bearing upon Bismarck's continued control of affairs[1], certainly revealed no intention of infusing a National-Liberal element into the Administration. Count Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode (formerly Chief-president of Hanover) became Vice-chancellor, and Count Botho zu Eulenburg succeeded his relative as Minister of the Interior. At the same time, in order to facilitate the Chancellor's (or Vice-chancellor's) control over the several Ministers, an imperial Chancery was, *eo nomine*, established; and Privy Councillor von Tiedemann, who enjoyed Bismarck's special confidence, was appointed head of the new office.

Of a sudden, the entire political aspect underwent a drastic change. On May 11th, 1878, a journeyman-tinman named Hödel made an attempt upon the life of the Emperor. He remained uninjured; but the culprit's own confession and other evidence showed that he was an active anarchist, and had recently been addressing social-democratic meetings. The journals of the same way of thinking declared the present state of society to be responsible for Hodel's attempt; and Bismarck at Varzin immediately made up his mind to 'ignore the barriers set up by the abnormal *doctrinaire* precautions of the Constitution, in the so-called *Grundrechte*, for the protection of individuals and parties[2].' In accordance with his

[1] For Bismarck's suspicions on this head, see *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol. II, pp. 196 ff

[2] Tiedemann, *Sechs Jahre Chef der Reichskanzlei*, cited by Oncken, *Bennigsen*, vol. II, pp. 360–1.

instructions, a bill 'for the prevention of social-democratic excesses' was, in the course of a few days, drafted by the new Minister of the Interior, and laid before the *Reichstag* on May 20th. On the following day, the National-Liberal party, not less promptly, agreed to oppose it; on the second day of debate (May 24th), it was rejected by 241 to 57, all the National-Liberals, with the exception of Treitschke and Gneist, voting in the majority with the Centre and the *Fortschritt*, after a speech from Bennigsen which sounded the full note of genuine Liberalism. The vote was more than justified both by the indefiniteness of this sorry legislative effort, and by the clumsiness of the machinery proposed. Bismarck, who was at the moment intent upon the preparations for the Berlin Congress[1], had taken no further step, when, a week later (June 2nd), just as the capital was distracted by the heartrending news of the loss of the *Grosse Kurfürst*, a second attempt was made upon the Emperor's life, this time by a Dr Nobiling, a well-educated man, who had of late frequented social-democratic gatherings. The public agitation was intense; for, on the present occasion, the venerated sovereign had narrowly escaped with his life, so that the Crown-prince had to take his father's place for some weeks in the performance of his public duties[2]. One of the first measures which he was thus called upon to sanction was the dissolution of the *Reichstag* on which Bismarck had resolved, although—in collusion, as he thought, with 'influential parliamentarians'—objection was taken to it by half his Cabinet. Bismarck—the expression is not to be avoided—had been favoured by fortune; for the words used by him on receiving the news of Nobiling's attempt had been: 'Now I have those fellows—now we will dissolve.' It should, however, be recorded at the same time that, when he saw the wounded Emperor, he vowed to himself that, so

[1] See ch. IV, *post*

[2] Not as regent

far as in him lay, he would never desert his master. The era of resignations was over, and the elections for the new *Reichstag* were fixed for July 30th.

Once more, as was shown by the circular which he carefully prepared for the guidance of Government officials in the elections, he stood face to face with Liberalism; but this time he was confronted by a party not possessed of a parliamentary majority, and more especially by a section of it with which he could no longer enter into any joint action. He, therefore, now summoned to his support what he termed the 'productive' classes, whose interests had been neglected by an unproductive Liberalism. Hereby, he proclaimed the purport of the economic policy over which he had been so long brooding, and which he now proposed to carry into execution. The elections were held in the midst of great excitement; for much was at issue besides the future of the National-Liberal party. If the economic changes intended by Bismarck were defeated or delayed, the credit of his statesmanship would be impaired; and it must not be forgotten that, for a time, the Emperor's recovery seemed doubtful, and the advent of another 'Liberal era' a prospect to be reckoned with.

Notwithstanding the exertions of the Government, although both sections of the National-Liberal party suffered in the elections, so that the party as a whole had decreased from 137 to 106 members, it was still relatively the most numerous in the *Reichstag*. The *Fortschritt* had likewise diminished, while the Conservative fraction had increased; and Bismarck, though full of suspicion against both Conservatives and Liberals, had, if he was to secure a majority, to choose between a combination between the one or the other side with the Centre. In the first instance, however, Bennigsen and the main body of the National-Liberals were found prepared to join with the Conservatives in passing a more moderate (anti-)Socialist law; and, thanks to his

management, a satisfactory majority (221—149) was obtained in favour of this measure, and of the compromise by which it was to have validity for two years and a half (October 19th).

This law, which the Socialist leaders Bebel and Liebknecht denounced as the signal of civil war, was in itself (notwithstanding the name by which it was generally known) directed against anarchical agitation rather than against theories of Socialism, and was ill-defended by such arguments as Treitschke's on behalf of inequality as Heaven's first law[1]. It should, at the same time, be viewed in connexion with the social legislation which was to follow, and which (whatever may be thought of the economic policy accompanying it) was at least a serious attempt to redeem the failure of German political parties—and more especially of the National-Liberals in the period of their ascendancy—to find a remedy for some at least of the grievances of the working-classes[2].

For the measures which followed, and for the conduct of them, Bismarck was himself entirely responsible: he more than once compared his exertions with those of a sportsman without drivers[3]. It was not long before the policy foreshadowed in his election-circular was fully revealed. Its drift, in one direction, had been well understood by the

[1] In his article reprinted in *Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe*.

[2] Cf two interesting articles by K Wasemuth on German and Foreign Social Democracy (in *Preussische Jahrbucher* for January 1911 and May 1912), which dwell on the differences between the aspirations and expectations of the working-classes in Germany and those in France, Great Britain and the United States respectively. Readers of Lord Morley's *Rousseau* will recall a remarkable passage in which he notes the difference in the effects of the new dogma of equality in America and in France.

[3] Camphausen was (in March 1878) superseded by Hobrecht, Chief Burgomaster of Berlin; Albert Maybach became Minister of Commerce.

Centre and Conservative parties in the new *Reichstag*, who with the addition of 25 National-Liberals, so early as October 1878, formed a Protectionist combination numbering 204 members, and thus commanding a majority of the Assembly. In December, Bismarck laid the outlines of his financial scheme before a committee on tariff-reform appointed, at his instance, by the *Bundesrat*. To the end, as he said, of securing an independent revenue to the Empire, his plan included three reforms—of the existing systems of taxation, customs and railway finance. The first of these was to be accomplished by a decrease of direct, and an increase of indirect, taxes (a process which would be specially welcome to the middle classes of the population); the second, by a return to the principle of imposing duties upon all imports; and the third, by ceasing to encourage the importation of foreign goods on German railways by means of differential tariffs, denounced by Bismarck as a usurpation of powers liable to be employed against the interests of the Empire.

The battle began on the project of tariff-reform. The speech from the throne, with which the new session of the *Reichstag* opened in February 1879, explicitly demanded a resumption of the system of reserving the German market for German products. In the debates that followed, Bismarck, whose courage failed him as little when he chose to be inconsistent as when he was resolved to be immovable, held his own, with the unwonted support of the leaders of the Centre, against a powerful array of opponents, including Delbrück, Bamberger, Lasker, Richter and Rickert. The *Reichstag* showed itself decidedly favourable to the Government protectionist scheme; and, by the latter part of May, the essential portions of the proposed new tariff (the duties on iron, corn and timber) were adopted by large majorities. About the same time, the *Reichstag* revealed its general political complexion by electing to its presidency

a Conservative, the Silesian Chief-president von Seydewitz, in the place of Forckenbeck, who had at last retired. The National-Liberals were, about this time, further disheartened by the resignation of three Ministers of Liberal tendencies, one of whom, as already noticed[1], was Falk, the chief agent of the *Kulturkampf*. Bennigsen once more attempted to rally his followers against the reactionary proposal of the Centre deputy Freiherr von Franckenstein—by agreeing to which Bismarck ran counter to the declared purpose of the totality of his reforms—to hand over the surplus from the customs duties and the tobacco tax to the several Governments. But it was adopted (July 9th) by a majority of 211 to 122 and the whole Customs law was then (July 12th) carried by 217 to 117. Treitschke and fifteen other deputies, who had voted for the Government, hereupon announced that they had severed their connexion with the National-Liberal party. The elections for the new Prussian *Landtag*, which were held in October, largely increased the relative strength of the Conservatives; so that, in place of Bennigsen, a Conservative (von Köller) was elected President of the Second Chamber. No doubt was therefore left as to the approval by the Prussian electorate of the new tariff; and the Government was, accordingly, in a position to proceed with the other parts of its programme.

The task of railway reform was, in the first instance, the concern of the Prussian *Landtag*, and was accordingly entrusted to Maybach, the recently appointed Minister of Commerce, who was, to this end, placed at the head of a newly created department of Public Works. His carefully prepared bill for the State purchase of four of the principal Prussian railway lines was opposed by Virchow and Richter, but carried through the *Landtag* in the course of December.

[1] Cf. p. 74, *ante*.

It re-organised, within definite limits[1], the Prussian railway system, after a fashion slowly followed by other States.

Before Bismarck proceeded further, in September 1880, in the development of his plans, the National-Liberal party had reached the crisis in its history. This time, it was the left wing, the more advanced or radical section, whose corporate defection was announced (August 28th). In the preceding February, the question of the renewal of the Military Law of 1874 for another seven years from the end of 1881 had come up for discussion; and the proposed extension, while approved by Bennigsen and the bulk of the National-Liberal party, had been resisted by Lasker, who announced his abandonment of the party. Forckenbeck, Bamberger, and two other members of it voted with him against the law. A similar difference of opinion manifested itself in May on the question of the prolongation of the anti-Socialist law for a further period of two years, as well as in other matters. Finally, on August 28th, 1880, the left wing of the party formally severed itself from the followers of Bennigsen and Miquel. The 'Secessionists,' as they were called, consisted of malcontent free-traders unable to acquiesce in the continuous protectionism of the Government, but still unwilling to amalgamate with the *Fortschritt*. Although neither Bennigsen and Miquel nor those who acted with them were prepared to agree to the extinction of the National-Liberal party as such, its work had been done; and it became a middle party pure and simple, whose cooperation was sometimes sought and sometimes spurned Bennigsen himself was, henceforth, simply a wise counsellor, on whose stedfastness and moderation Bismarck, even in the remaining stages of the ecclesiastical conflict, had good reason to rely, but who was no longer a direct factor in the constructive policy of the Chancellor.

[1] Smaller (local) lines were not intended to be included in the design.

In 1888, he became Chief-president of Hanover. Miquel, on the other hand, so early as 1880 accepted the chief-burgomastership of Frankfort, and in 1890 exchanged this office for the Prussian Ministry of Finance, which he held till a few months before his death in 1901[1].

Unmoved by the disruption of the National-Liberal party, Bismarck went on his way without hesitation. In September 1880, adding to his other duties those of Minister of Commerce, he announced the institution of a Council of Public Economy (*Volkswirtschaftsrat*); but this design is memorable only as illustrating the magnitude of its author's conceptions, and before long it fell through. Meanwhile, the condition of the Prussian finances had become so prosperous that the Government could propose to the *Landtag* to devote the surplus payable to Prussia from imperial sources to the relief of Prussian taxation, and could even adopt Richter's motion for making this relief permanent. In a very remarkable speech (from which the note of defiance was not absent), Bismarck expounded the guiding principle of the social policy which he had now matured. His ambition, he said, was to relieve the working-man of all taxation; so that, with the exception of military service, no burden should be imposed upon him by either State or municipality. He renewed his exertions in the *Herrenhaus* on behalf of the bill, which permanently reduced taxation by 14 million marks (under £700,000); and it became law on March 21st, 1881.

In the same year (May) negotiations were definitively resumed for admitting Hamburg into the *Zollverein*, while leaving it in possession of its free port. The Government

[1] His services in this capacity lie outside our present range. At his grave, his old friend and comrade Bennigsen, notwithstanding Miquel's estrangement from the party which of old they had jointly led, described him as 'the greatest Minister of Finance Prussia had ever known.'

had been moving in this direction since the early part of 1879; and in April 1880 a battle royal had been waged on the subject between Bismarck and his former colleague Delbrück. A treaty was finally approved by the *Reichstag* on January 23rd, 1882; and a similar treaty with Bremen (including the free-port clause) followed on March 3rd. The compensation to be paid to Hamburg was settled at 40, that to Bremen at 12 million marks (under £2,000,000 and £600,000 respectively). The *Zollverein* had at last absorbed the whole of united Germany; and a future of unprecedented mercantile prosperity opened for the great cities of the Hansa, itself no longer anything but a great historic name.

The year 1881 is, however, pre-eminently notable in the domestic history of the new Empire as that in which Bismarck sought to achieve the consummation of his new domestic policy by means of a social reform intended for the contentment of the working-classes. This was to be brought to pass by a new system of insurance—in the first instance, against accidents. Little had hitherto been attempted in this direction, while the old *Haftpflichtgesetz*[1] had proved both inadequate and unworkable. In March, the *Reichstag* was invited to rise to the task of preserving the State by recognising as one of its purposes the promotion of the welfare of all its members, and more especially of the weak and helpless. This task, it was argued, was already recognised by the legislation actually in force for the benefit of the poor, and formed an integral part of the social task incumbent on the modern (in contradiction to the ancient) political community. In reply to the unqualified objections urged by Bamberger and Richter against both the project and the phraseology in which it was couched, Bismarck repudiated any wish to bring the Government into line with those anarchists who called

[1] Cf. p. 95, *note, ante.*

themselves Socialists, and whom Minister von Puttkamer had recently denounced in the *Reichstag*. The object of the proposed legislation he loftily declared to be worthy of another name—that of 'practical Christianity.'

There can be no reason for doubting the perfect sincerity of these declarations; for the strength of Bismarck's imagination was part of his genius, as were the bold flights which it could take from conception to action. The socialism from whose book he had borrowed his present scheme was not the anarchism which he had proved himself anxious to chain down or suppress; and, just as he had listened to Lassalle's advocacy of universal suffrage[1] and ended by adopting his panacea, so now he meant to apply a drastic remedy before the German working-man's belief in it had been superseded by the devices of the new 'social democracy.' In this policy he was, from the same motives, supported by Bennigsen.

In the course of the early session of 1881, the *Reichstag* proceeded so far as to adopt the principle of the Government measure; and, though the elections in October of that year were unsatisfactory in their results, Bismarck resolved to proceed with the whole legislative programme on which he had determined. There was no longer any question of a Conservative-Liberal, and still less of a Liberal, majority; for the only fraction which had materially gained in the elections had been the *doctrinaire* radicals of the *Fortschritt*; and even a Conservative-Centre majority was only possible if the slightly increased Centre were joined by all the petty contingents wont to combine with it. But to this curiously negative result, there corresponded the fact that, in its main issue, Bismarck's social policy appealed to the support of none of the existing parliamentary parties, not being founded on the principles of any one of them.

[1] Cf. vol. II, p 100, *note*.

On November 17th, 1881, then, in the absence of the Emperor from illness, Bismarck read to the *Reichstag* an imperial message announcing two bills, to deal respectively with insurance against accidents, and with the further and wider subject of insurance against sickness or incapacitation for work. A further development of the system—old-age insurance pure and simple—was left over for the present. The message indicated that the means for carrying through these great undertakings must be found in the completion of the financial reforms already taken in hand by the Government, *i.e.* by opening abundant sources of income from indirect imperial taxes, from the increased taxation of liquors in particular, and more especially by securing to the Crown the monopoly of the sale of tobacco. Additional importance was (January 4th, 1882) given to his message by an edict addressed by the Emperor-King to the Prussian Ministry, in which he appealed to the Prussian principle by which the King's prerogative of directing the Government and policy of his monarchy is constitutionally limited, but not abolished. It followed that the acts of his Government must necessarily be regarded as personally ordered by himself, and that the King's policy must accordingly be impressed upon his subjects at election times and on other occasions[1]. The animated debate which ensued in the *Reichstag*, and which redounds to the honour of German Liberalism, must be passed by. The tobacco monopoly was rejected (June 1882) by an overwhelming majority (276 to 43); and it may be at once noted that the brandy monopoly which Bismarck afterwards proposed in lieu of it, and from which he anticipated even larger returns, was thrown out all but unanimously (March 1886). On the other hand, the measures of relief which these proposals were to have facilitated were carried—the Sick Insurance bill in June 1883, and that for

[1] In the previous December, Bennigsen had inveighed against the influence exerted in the late elections by Minister von Puttkamer.

insurance against accidents in July 1884. Bismarck had unrolled a most striking picture of the hardships entailed upon the poorer classes by the existing system of direct taxation (the class-tax with communal additions) and of the consequent emigration to America, the land of Protection. By the Sick Insurance law, the contributions fell upon employed and employers in the proportion of two-thirds to one-third; the Accidents Act charged the insurance in certain industries exclusively on associations of employers, while however allowing the use, if desired, of existing companies. There was much debate on behalf both of private interests and of the working-man, whom some thought insufficiently represented in the new organisation; but perhaps the most important principle established was that the Empire, by guaranteeing the payments, or by direct disbursement, contributed materially to the costs of a reform, the beneficent results of which were speedy and enduring. The provisions for Sick Insurance were combined with those for general Old Age Insurance—the crown, so to speak, of the whole system—in the Law of June 22nd, 1889. It established the rule that for a Sick allowance 5, and for an Old Age pension 32, years of contribution by the person insured were required; the allowance or pension itself varying, in four classes, from 140½ to 415½ (c. £7 to c. £20. 10*s.*), and from 106 to 191 (c. £5. 10*s.* to c. £9. 10*s.*) marks respectively; a fixed sum of 50 marks (c. £2. 9*s.*) being in each case payable by the Imperial exchequer. No contributions to the Old Age fund were to be made during military service[1].

Later supplementary enactments cannot be noted here; but it admits of no doubt that this legislation, viewed as a whole, consistently carried out the principle of assisted compulsory insurance as a requirement, and at the same time a duty, of the State, while allowing a large measure

[1] See O. Schulze's pamphlet (1891) mentioned in the Bibliography.

of freedom in the process, and thus rapidly came to advance the national welfare, besides furnishing precedents to the legislative action of other countries.

In the year 1884, the development of German party life on the lines indicated above reached a new stage. In March 1884 (Bennigsen being now no longer a member of the *Reichstag*), Miquel and his south-western friends formulated the new programme of the National-Liberal party agreed upon at Heidelberg on the 23rd of that month. While maintaining their adherence to the Liberal principles of the party, they declared their determination to uphold Bismarck's foreign policy, their readiness to support the maintenance of a strong army, and the prolongation of the validity of the 'anti-Socialist' law, as well as their willingness to adopt, in its main points, the Chancellor's social legislation. A few weeks earlier, on March 3rd, the Secessionists from the old National-Liberal party had amalgamated with the *Fortschritt* under the almost untranslatable designation of the *Deutsch-Freisinnige* (German-Liberal-minded) party[1]. The total result of these metamorphoses was that, while henceforth the National-Liberals stood near to the Free-conservatives—the *Cartel* of the future being thus already in preparation—the new Liberal party entered into a fresh phase of opposition under the nominal leadership of Stauffenberg, but with Richter as its indefatigable, and to Bismarck intolerable, protagonist. In the course of the same year 1884, Bennigsen and Miquel were summoned by Bismarck to the Prussian Council of State (*Staatsrat*), a body of little permanent importance, while, as has been seen, the Economical Council (*Volkswirtschaftsrat*), designed by him to strengthen his hands in carrying through his social legislation, never became a reality.

[1] Much capital was afterwards made out of the expression 'a liberal-minded (*freisinnig*) completion of the edifice of the Empire,' used by the Crown-prince Frederick William in his diary.

The first signal occasion for testing the effects of the new party formation presented itself, not in the transactions concerned with the closing of the *Kulturkampf*, as to which the National-Liberals offered no strong resistance to the conciliatory policy of the Government, but in the military question. In the winter of 1886–7, this question inevitably again came uppermost in the *Reichstag*. It was the time when, in France, Boulanger was carrying his agitation to an extreme pitch[1]; and on December 3rd, 1886, Moltke—now in his eighty-seventh year—in an impressive speech brought forward the twofold demand of the Emperor's Government. Besides proposing the prolongation of the fixed army grant from the end of 1888, for another seven years, the Government asked that its peace strength during this period should be raised from 427,000 to 468,000 men. The Centre and the *Freisinnigen*, however, agreed not to allow a prolongation for more than three years; and, on January 14th, 1887, Stauffenberg's motion to that effect was, notwithstanding two notable speeches from Bismarck in the course of the debate, carried by a vote of 186 to 154[2]. The dissolution of the *Reichstag* was immediately announced. It was with a view to the elections for the new Assembly, fixed for January 21st, 1887, that the celebrated *Cartel* was agreed upon, which pledged the National-Liberal and Conservative fractions to act together in the elections, so far as to postpone all other questions to that of supporting the Government in its army proposals. Bennigsen, who came forward as a candidate, pointed out that no amalgamation of parties, but only a combination for a particular purpose, was in question; and this purpose he shortly afterwards defined to be that of meeting the

[1] In January 1888, he set up a large camp of barracks on the eastern frontier of France

[2] As to the attitude of the Centre on this occasion, cf. p. 79, *note, ante.*

danger—sooner or later unavoidable—of another war with France, this time for Alsace-Lorraine. The result of the elections was to seat a sure majority of *Cartel* deputies, consisting of 100 National-Liberals, 80 Conservatives and 41 Free-conservatives; so that when, on March 9th, the decisive vote was taken on Stauffenberg's reintroduced motion for a three, instead of a seven, years' period, it was rejected by 223 against 48 (88 abstaining), and the septennate was carried by an even rather larger majority.

The later history of the *Cartel* lies beyond the limits of the present chapter; it is sufficient to say here that its support was not wanting to the Government in the further stages of its military, as connected with its foreign, policy. In December 1887, a proposal was laid before the *Reichstag* of which the object was to complete the recent military re-organisation by a reform of the existing system of military service, calculated to raise the army which would take the field on an outbreak of war to a total of 500,000 men. This was to be effected by adding to the war strength of the army a revived second levy of *Landwehr*, military service being thus prolonged to the 39th year of age; while the age of those liable to be called out in the *Landsturm* was at the same time extended from their 42nd to their 45th year. In January 1888, this proposal was supplemented by that of a loan of 278,000,000 marks (£14,000,000) for the administration of the increased army. Bismarck, who on February 3rd had made public the treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, advocated, on the 6th, the re-organisation scheme in a powerful speech, declaring that 'we Germans fear God, and naught else in the world.' The entire *Cartel*, this time with the Centre, agreed to proceed with the loan (by referring it to the Budget Commission); and the new Military Law was carried without a division, the Socialist Bebel alone raising his voice against it.

The power of Bismarck touched its zenith in this vote,

by which a united parliament in the name of a united nation approved his policy of defensive vigilance. This policy was not his alone, but also that of his revered master, who a few weeks later lay on his death-bed, while the heir to his throne was known to be stricken by a mortal malady. In what measure and with what force would the same ideas and aspirations animate the new era which was opening for the Empire, and how long would the same pilotage of the now steadied vessel of State carry it, through the home and foreign perils which it seemed at last fully equipped to meet, into the unknown seas of the future?

CHAPTER IV

FOREIGN POLICY, 1873–1887[1]

The dominating aspect of German foreign policy, during the years which followed on the Peace of Frankfort, is, as a matter of course, to be found in the relations with vanquished France. The first period in these relations came to

[1] Besides the sources of information already used in previous portions of this work, in particular Bismarck's own *Reminiscences*, which internal evidence shows to have been put on paper long after the events and transactions to which they refer occurred, and the *Memoirs* of Hohenlohe, I have made large use in this and the following chapter of Lord Fitzmaurice's luminous and statesmanlike *Life of the Second Earl Granville*, under whom his biographer himself served with so much distinction. Among other English authorities I have again had recourse to the *Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier* and to Lord Newton's *Life of Lord Lyons*, with its invaluable series of letters. (I may incidentally observe that it is impossible to conjecture what may have been the meaning of a correspondent of Prince Hohenlohe (*Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. II, p. 157) in saying that the political point of view of Lord Lyons (whose sister was the Duchess of Norfolk) was that of the Howard family; in any case, the insinuation is absurd.) The recently published *Life of Sir Charles Dilke* furnishes an interesting commentary on much that can here only be summarised; the last two volumes of the *Life of Lord Beaconsfield* had not appeared, when these chapters went to press. Among French writers, I have continued to refer to Vicomte Gontaut-Biron's record of his German embassy (vol. II), and, I need not say, have throughout compared the masterly narration of Hanotaux in vols. II and III of his *La France Contemporaine*, which, however, only reach to 1877. Book III, chapter 3, of Egelhaaf's *Bismarck* deals with the foreign policy of the German Empire from 1871 to 1888. As to the 'Re-insurance' Treaty of 1887, the opening sections of Count E. zu Reventlow's *Deutschland's auswärtige Politik*, 1888–1914 (3rd edition, 1916) should be consulted with the necessary caution.

an end with the Convention of March 15th, 1873, and the liberation of French territory, noted in a previous chapter of this volume.

Between these events the statesman to whom that liberation was mainly due was ousted from power, and his place as President was taken by Marshal MacMahon, Duc de Magenta, the chosen of the Right, whom the message read to the National Assembly in his name on May 26th, by his Prime-Minister, Duc de Broglie, described as a sentinel charged with the maintenance of its sovereign power as a bulwark against the Revolution. Upon the new *régime* thus inaugurated Bismarck looked with entire disfavour. He consistently held the continuance of a republican government in France to be best for Germany, as it would be the most unlikely to find any foreign Power with which to ally itself. At the same time, he regarded the royalists as essentially clerical in their views and purposes, though as a matter of fact there was nothing of the ultramontane in their political leader, Duc de Broglie, the son of a *doctrinaire* and a *doctrinaire* himself. To the Bonapartists, whose party gave open signs of a revival on the occasion of the attainment of his majority by the Prince Imperial (March 1874), and still commanded the sympathies of a large part of the peasantry, he was less antagonistic than to the Legitimists and their half-hearted Orleanist confederates. In general, Bismarck's policy towards France in the earlier years of this period, during which the hopes of the royalists gradually subsided into a determination to maintain the MacMahon *provisorium* in the form of a presidential septennate, was to keep a very tight hand over the French Government, but not to push matters to an extreme point. Thus, so long as, under the prudent guidance of the Duc de Broglie during MacMahon's first Ministry, and during his second under the still more cautious conduct of foreign affairs by the Duc Decazes, the French Government showed every

intention to avoid giving offence to its imperious adversary, though there was scant friendliness, there was, on the other hand, little likelihood of a quarrel between them. Of this condition of things a significant illustration was furnished by the consequences of the French episcopal protest, already mentioned, against the ecclesiastical policy of the Prussian Government[1]. This difficulty had been adjusted before the arrival in Paris, in May 1874, of Prince Hohenlohe as German ambassador, in which capacity this eminent statesman, who combined high moral courage with well-balanced judgment, was unlikely to involve himself in doubtful dealings like his predecessor.

The choice of Hohenlohe for this most important post renders it highly improbable that Bismarck was at this time harbouring the designs against the lesser States of the German Empire, and for the incorporation in it of the German provinces of Austria-Hungary, imputed to him by Lord Odo Russell[2]. A certain colour is lent to the British ambassador's impression by the wish expressed by Grand-duke Frederick of Baden that 'the union should be drawn closer[3]'; but, even if this view was still shared by the Crown-prince, he and his brother-in-law were very far from seeing eye to eye with Bismarck, in this matter in particular, while, according to Hohenlohe[4], King Lewis of Bavaria was, in August 1874, on good terms with the Chancellor, though not without apprehensions of the Crown-prince. Indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Lord Odo Russell, although his intimate knowledge of German affairs and his gift of being an incomparable listener frequently put him

[1] Cf *ante*, pp 66 f This protest, which was in harmony with the strong religious revival fostered at this time by the clergy in France, was followed by similar ultramontane complaints in Belgium, as to the consequences of which see below

[2] See his letter to Lord Lyons, *Life*, p. 317.

[3] *Denkwurdigkeiten*, vol II, p 153. [4] *Ib* p. 132.

in possession of information of great value, and although both Ministers and colleagues accordingly placed exceptional trust in him, at times transmitted Bismarckian sayings not of a kind to be taken literally.

As to the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary, against which Bismarck was likewise supposed to have harboured aggressive designs, they had been wholly amicable since the fall of Beust in November 1871 and the appointment of Count Julius Andrássy, a special favourite at the Court of Berlin, as joint Minister of Foreign Affairs for the dual monarchy. The Liberal Prince A. W. D. Auersperg was placed at the head of the Cis-Leithanian Ministry (the so-called '*bourgeois*' Ministry)[1]. Beyond a doubt, Bismarck's friendly feeling for Austria-Hungary had been strengthened by her adoption of an ecclesiastical policy entirely in harmony with that of the earlier stages of the *Kulturkampf*. The Berlin meeting of the Emperors William and Francis Joseph, at which the Tsar assisted, in September 1872, had been a premonitory signal of the alliance to come, which the accession of Italy, whose alienation from France had steadily progressed since the overthrow of the Temporal Power, was to convert into the Triple Alliance[2], and of which the renewal of the Austro-Hungarian Settlement (*Ausgleich*) in 1878 was to constitute the surest guarantee.

Bismarck's attitude to France in the period following immediately on the German evacuation of her territory, is sufficiently explained, now that the German army no

[1] *Bürgerministerium*

[2] The Emperor Francis Joseph visited King Victor Emmanuel at Venice in April 1875, the Emperor William paid him the same compliment at Milan in October 1875, the German Crown-prince attended the King's obsequies at Rome in January 1878; and King Humbert visited Vienna in October 1881, two years after the Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary in October 1879 The Triple Alliance, as will be seen, came to pass in May 1882

longer held her in its actual grip, by a desire to apprise her of his intention to let no occasion pass of reminding her who was master of the situation. This he demonstrated, even before Arnim's recall, by sending word to Decazes that the German Government would not tolerate the assumption by France of the suzerainty, or even of a protectorate, over Tunis. It seems unproved that, so early as January 1874, German troops were ordered to occupy Nancy, and that the execution of the order was only averted by Russian influence. But it is certain that the Russian Government was already watchful, and Tsar Alexander's visit to London in May, although followed by his meeting with the Emperor William in August, can hardly have been altogether insignificant. A 'spirited foreign policy' of some sort was expected from the new Conservative Government in London; and early in the year Queen Victoria appealed to the Emperor William to preserve the peace. Later in the year, there were uneasy rumours of a new Hohenzollern candidature for the throne of Spain, where the French Government was suspected of favouring the followers of Don Carlos (whose claims were upheld by the French pretender) against Marshal Serrano's Government. But this cloud, with some others, blew over. On the whole, there seems reason to suspect that Bismarck's intentions were, at this time, bellicose, and even the Emperor William had his qualms about them; while the fears of France were fostered by British diplomacy, which, from the days of Clarendon downwards, put no trust in the German statesman. He, it must be remembered, was already intent upon the question of a thorough military re-organisation at home, though many years were to pass before, almost on the eve of his fall, it could be (and even then not in its final form) accomplished.

In 1875, however, the apprehension of war rose to a height unprecedented since the pacification of 1871. Early in the year, Bismarck took occasion to lodge a protest

against the alleged purchase in Germany of 10,000 horses for the French cavalry; but it is more or less doubtful whether the purchase in question ever took place, and the German prohibition of the exportation of horses seems to have been afterwards revoked. It is certain that German military circles were much perturbed by the French military legislation which, on March 13th, resulted in the passing of a law adding a fourth battalion to every regiment and thus prospectively increasing the army by some 144,000 men. Of the truth of another report—that of questionable authenticity—Heinrich Geffcken, a distinguished Hamburg jurist and diplomatist, now professor of Public Law at Strassburg, and long on terms of intimacy with the Crown-prince, was convinced; and he impressed it upon Sir Robert Morier, who had the full confidence of the Crown-prince and his consort. According to this rumour, Bismarck was, at this time, meditating a great stroke, for bringing about the political annihilation, rather than the actual conquest, of Belgium as the centre of militant Catholicism[1]. The ultramontane manifestations there against his ecclesiastical policy had led to a remonstrance from the German Chancery in a published note; and there was unmistakably a concurrence of considerations in favour of choosing the present time for armed intervention, even though the assertion was purely conjectural that the object of the special mission of Radowitz (Councillor of the Berlin Foreign Office) to Petersburg in February 1875 was to gain over the Tsar to the policy of giving Germany a free hand in the West, in return for one to Russia in the East. So comprehensive a design against the peace of the world is out of keeping with the course of events that actually followed.

The first overt sign of the disturbance of the elements was the publication in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, on April 5th, of an article on the increase of French armaments, followed,

[1] See Geffcken's letter to Morier in his *Memoirs*, vol II, pp. 333–4.

on the 8th, by another in the Berlin *Post*, ending with the query: 'Is war in sight?' This was succeeded by a disavowal in the official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine*, so incomplete, that, taken together with the language of other organs, it clearly amounted to an attempt to terrorise France into a reduction of her armaments. On May 1st, Lord Odo Russell informed the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, that Moltke had declared to the anxious Belgian envoy at Berlin, Baron Nothomb, his inability to see how war could be avoided in the course of the year following, unless the Powers put pressure upon France to give way. Furthermore—with what object may be left to conjecture—Nothomb had been advised by him to ask King Leopold to have his army in readiness against the probable contingency of a French invasion.

On May 6th, there appeared in *The Times* a letter from the hand of its well-known Paris correspondent de Blowitz, accompanied by a leading article, both pointing out the danger of an outbreak of war and attributing it to the action of Germany. Public opinion was now ablaze in England. The British Ministry was already awake to the seriousness of the situation and the anxiety of Belgium; and Queen Victoria, possibly at the suggestion of her son-in-law and daughter under the influence of Morier and Geffcken, indited an appeal to the pacific inclinations (for such they seem to have been) of the Emperor William. The eyes of British statesmen turned to Russia, and it was at this very time that the ever pleasant Count Schouvaloff appeared in London on his way from Berlin, whither he had been sent to convey to the Emperor William the strong wish of the Tsar that peace should be preserved. On May 8th, the Tsar himself, with Gortchakoff, started for Berlin; and on the same day Lord Derby, encouraged by Schouvaloff's information, instructed Lord Odo Russell to use his good offices to prevent any misunderstanding between Germany and France. On May 10th, the Tsar arrived in

Berlin, where matters had now been sufficiently prepared for his appearance as the harbinger of peace; and, on the 14th, Gortchakoff, overjoyed by the opportunity of at last overtrumping Bismarck, felt himself able to telegraph to the Russian legations that 'peace was assured.' Bismarck had been reduced to the necessity of declaring that he had never intended war, of assuring the Emperor William that the whole disturbance had been the fault of Moltke, and of dropping all references to a French reduction of armaments, or to a general reduction of which the French should form part. At the same time, the Tsar had the satisfaction of inviting Lord Odo Russell to make a similar communication to his Government, between which and the Russian there had been so complete an understanding on the subject.

The great scare was over; and it remained for British and Russian statesmanship to appropriate so much as possible of the credit of having brought about so satisfactory a result. According to Bismarck's own subsequent account[1], he had replied to Gortchakoff's eager officiousness by almost savage ridicule, while commenting on Queen Victoria's remonstrance with polite irony, and designating as 'academic' Moltke's remarks to Münster on the expediency of attacking France at the right moment. There can accordingly be no doubt that he was conscious of having suffered a severe diplomatic defeat, which left him much annoyed with the conduct of the British Government and more bitterly contemptuous than ever towards Gortchakoff; while towards the two active founders of the counter-movement he nursed a feeling of illwill, which in Morier's case was mutual, and in that of Geffcken was a contributory motive to a dire revenge[2]. Bismarck, however,

[1] *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol II, pp 172 ff

[2] In 1884, Bismarck effectually demurred to the appointment of Morier, as ambassador at Berlin (cf. *Life of Granville*, vol. II, p. 364). As to his treatment of Geffcken, see chap. V, *post*.

insisted on attributing the real origin of the whole disturbance to the Empress Augusta, as having supplied Gontaut-Biron with false information concerning the intentions of the German Government—an incredible charge, though there can be little doubt that the French ambassador had, in conversation with Radowitz, gathered some interesting information as to the bellicose views of the military faction in Berlin. Gontaut-Biron's continuance at the German Court, where Bismarck would hardly hold any converse with him, while constantly suspecting him of influencing the Empress through her French reader Gérard[1], thus became more and more difficult; and, while the ambassador's conduct was throughout perfectly honourable, he ultimately found himself in an entirely false position. But, though Bismarck's suspicions were fastened upon Gontaut-Biron with something of the fierceness of those in which he indulged towards the Empress herself, it was not till December 1877 that he was recalled.

On the question of Bismarck's actual responsibility for the crisis of 1875, it need only be observed that, although he repeatedly denied having in the spring of the year sought to pick a quarrel with France, it would have been extraordinary had the general judgment to the contrary, in which so competent and so cool an observer as Lord Derby shared, been utterly at fault. Bismarck afterwards ventured to pretend that, by drawing attention to the desire for war which existed in some quarters in France, he had done his best to preserve peace. But, in a speech delivered to

[1] Gérard was afterwards in the diplomatic service and was appointed by Gambetta, when head of the French Government, his private secretary, but the Ministry fell before Gérard arrived at Paris from Washington His account of *The Society of Berlin* was long afterwards published under the name of 'Count Paul Vasili' by Mme Adam The later volumes of the series were by Vandam (Cf. *The Life of Sir Charles Dilke*, vol I, pp. 225–6.)

the *Reichstag* in February 1876, he took different ground, pointing out how great a folly it would have been for him in the previous year to have urged a declaration of war. Inasmuch as, though he did not declare it, his agents believed such to be his intention, the obvious conclusion suggests itself that he at least wished to *seem* to intend it. He could hardly have simulated this desire with a view to bringing about a French or a general reduction of armaments, or of imposing such a reduction upon France, by way of an amendment to the Treaty of Frankfort. It is more probable that, intent upon the struggle with Rome, and angered by the 'Duchesne incident' (an insensate Belgian's design against his life), he wished to cut through any combination of which the French royalists might form an active element, and to produce something like a paralysis in French politics. And, again, he may have had in mind the great Austro-Russian dilemma, which the Congress of Berlin was afterwards to settle, and he may have been anxious to ascertain what line France was likely to take with regard to it. In any case, before he had gone too far, he had his answer from the Powers; and, though the words were not breathed, the notion of a Franco-Russian alliance for the first time dawned upon quick-sighted minds like Gortchakoff's.

The more difficult the relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary became about this time, the greater was the statecraft required in the management of the relations between Germany and those two Powers. On the occasion of the meeting of the three Emperors at Berlin in September 1872, they had alike displayed their friendship towards her and their acceptance of her political regeneration. All the more deeply had Bismarck been vexed by Gortchakoff's assumption of the character of the angel of peace. Austria's interest being to keep things quiet in the Near East, while Russia's intentions there were far less decidedly pacific, the Austrian Government was in quest of support for this side of

their policy. But neither Great Britain nor France, on uneasy terms with one another, more especially since the celebrated British purchase of Suez Canal shares (November 1875), was willing or able to come forward in favour of the Porte—Great Britain, partly in consequence of the effect exercised on public opinion by the most famous of all Gladstone's pamphlets; France, because this was the time of her most complete internal distraction, and consequent impotence in the councils of Europe. Thus, Russia was more and more encouraged to action, and the position of Germany between her friends became one of much delicacy. In the end, it proved that they had come to an arrangement between themselves; but the so-called Berlin Memorandum of 1876 failed to settle matters. In the autumn of that year, Bismarck's composure was much disturbed by a question put to him by Tsar Alexander through the German military agent, General von Werder: whether, in the event of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Germany would remain neutral. His reply was that, if the two Powers were actually to take up arms against each other, Germany must restrict herself to seeing that neither was brought by the war to lose her independence and influence as a great Power. Accordingly, Russia and Austria, on January 15th, 1877, concluded, without the knowledge of Germany, a convention by which Austria undertook to remain neutral in the imminent Russo-Turkish war, in return for a Russian engagement to connive at the Austrian acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina[1].

In the same month, as is not wonderful, the Conference at Constantinople, convened to settle the differences between

[1] *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol II, pp. 211 ff It is difficult to see that either these transactions, or Bismarck's account of them, bear out the interpretation put upon them by Naumann, *Central Europe* (Engl. Tr.), pp 18–19, that 'the die was cast then in favour of Mid-Europe'

the Porte and its vassal States in the Balkans, separated without having come to any conclusion; and war between Russia and Turkey became a certainty. In April it broke out; but under conditions involving no danger to Germany. An Austro-French alliance was now quite out of the question; in France, even before the death of Thiers (September) left Gambetta at the head of the Republicans, Decazes had announced the complete abstention of France from any interference in Eastern affairs; while Great Britain was jealously watching the progress of the Russian arms. No conjuncture could have been more favourable to an increase of the influence of Germany, which pretended to take no interest whatever in the future of the Balkan States.

When, early in 1878, after defeating the Turks, the Russians advanced upon Constantinople, and the Sultan was obliged to conclude the humiliating Treaty of San Stefano, the moment had arrived for the German Chancellor to come forward as an 'honest broker' to settle the Anglo-Austro-Russian problem[1]. There can be no doubt that the prevalent opinion in Germany, even among the Liberals, was in favour of the policy of Austria-Hungary, though not indisposed to consider the fair claims of Russia. Thus, when, on June 13th, the Congress of Berlin opened under Bismarck's presidency, he had no real difficulty in making peace between the nations and satisfying German opinions at the same time as German pride. From France and Italy there was no reason to look for any but a pacific attitude; and Great Britain had settled her affairs beforehand with the belligerent Powers[2].

[1] Bismarck's famous phrase was used by him on February 19th, 1878, when replying to a speech by Bennigsen, virtually in support of Austria. See H Oncken, *Bennigsen*, vol II, pp. 351–2

[2] By the secret agreement with Russia, revealed by *The Globe* on June 14th, 1878, with a supplement, which remained secret, and by a secret Anglo-Turkish convention, ultimately made public. A

Thus, although Bismarck's—and Germany's—part at Berlin was, in good truth, only 'brokerage' or mediation, without any reward beyond an increase of *prestige* on the heights of European politics, this at least was amply earned at the Congress, whose Act was signed on July 13th. Bismarck, ably aided by the second German plenipotentiary, Hohenlohe, held the balance with unfaltering self-possession between contending interests; and, though his temper was tried by the tenacity of the British plenipotentiaries, Beaconsfield and Salisbury, and he was indeed at one point inclined to resort to his favourite expedient of threatening resignation, he induced even them to make important concessions[1]. Nevertheless, not only was Russian Panslavism disappointed by the result of the Congress, but Russian statesmanship remained sore at the very limited success it had achieved. More especially was this the feeling of Gortchakoff, who had insisted upon appearing as one of the Tsar's plenipotentiaries, although only as second to Schouvaloff, the real representative of Russian policy on this occasion. Accordingly, in the matters of the delimitation of Serbia and Austria's occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russian Government complained that the German members of the commission appointed to carry into effect the stipulations of the Congress had sided with their Austrian, French and British rather than with their Russian colleagues. The irritation thus caused was vehemently reproduced in the Russian press; and, in August 1879, Tsar Alexander, in an autograph letter to the Emperor William, went so far as to

third secret agreement between Great Britain and Austria, as to the transfer to the latter of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was never published, but the gist of it was well known in 1908. Cf *Life of Sir Charles Dilke*, vol I, p 225

[1] As in the case of Batoum. See the account of the proceedings at the Congress from day to day, in Hohenlohe, vol II, pp 230 ff., one of the most interesting and amusing first-hand records of a great diplomatic transaction ever put on paper.

express doubts as to the continuance, in existing circumstances, of peace between the empires. In the following month, the Emperor, though against Bismarck's wish, paid a visit of conciliation to his nephew at Alexandrowo.

Thus, instead of an offensive and defensive alliance being concluded between Germany and Russia, as Schouvaloff had suggested before the Berlin Congress, the natural evolution of German policy continued. It is true that Bismarck, while carefully abstaining from facing an option between a Russian and an Austrian alliance, persisted in urging the maintenance of friendly relations, if not an actual league, between all three imperial Governments. He still (so he afterwards assured his readers) regarded a league between them as far more likely to preserve monarchical order in Europe than a contention for a preponderant influence over the several Balkan principalities or nationalities. But in this policy he professed to have found himself thwarted by Gortchakoff, who had been eager to secure an assurance of German neutrality in the event of a Russo-Austrian war. Since, therefore, no other alliance could really be in question for Germany—for the dependence of British policy on Parliament, and the weakness of Italy, made it impossible to rely on an alliance with either Power—an alliance with Austria-Hungary was the only choice open. This alliance, indeed, presented many difficulties—historical, ethnological and religious (the perennial and insoluble Polish problem being mixed up with all these); but there was no alternative, and, curiously enough, the decision commended itself, though for different reasons, to all the existing German political parties—except, indeed, the Social-democrats, who objected to any Government policy whatever.

Such, according to his own later statement, were the views with which, shortly before the Alexandrowo interview between his sovereign and the Tsar, Bismarck, in September

1879, entered at Gastein into a conference with Andrássy (who had remained in office for the purpose) on the subject of an Austro-German alliance. Andrássy seems to have looked upon this compact as a counter-move against the project of a Russo-French alliance, which seemed already visible on the horizon, although in France the renewed discussion of it was a consequence rather than a cause of the Gastein agreement, and was even then not seriously carried on by responsible statesmen[1]. Bismarck began with adroitly gaining the assent of King Lewis of Bavaria by an exposition of his policy to that sovereign, as centring in an Austro-German alliance, with two millions of combatants and with the probable support of Great Britain, and thus supplying the best obtainable guarantee of the peace of Europe, without excluding a confirmation of the understanding between the three empires. He then addressed himself to the more difficult task of inducing his own master to approve of his present design. The Emperor William's feeling of loyalty toward his kinsman the Tsar caused him, in the first instance, to resent the proposed agreement strongly, though it had the approval of the Crown-prince; and he was only brought to promise to confirm it by the proffered resignation, this time of the entire Cabinet. The Austro-German Treaty of Alliance of October 7th, 1879, while disclaiming any purpose besides that of preserving the peace of Europe,

[1] See Lyons to Salisbury in *Life of Lord Lyons*, pp. 413, 415, where it is stated that the Russian Grand-dukes, who visited Paris in November 1879, were much disappointed by the lack of cordiality in their reception there. It is curious that, at this critical time, when in January the notion of a Franco-Russian alliance was already causing alarm, Hohenlohe (see vol II, pp 274–5) should have had to be convinced by Bismarck himself of the wisdom, which he had previously doubted, of a separate alliance with Austria-Hungary Bismarck was, at this time, afraid that Austria might be induced by her dread of Russia to enter into an alliance either with her or with France, and that Germany would thus be isolated

pledged each of the two Powers to aid the other with its entire armed strength, in the event of an attack upon it by Russia or by any other Power supported by her. But the treaty did not bind Germany to assist the political action of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans or in the Near East generally; it was therefore, although unmistakably intended to check the actual or possible designs of Russia, essentially defensive, and might, as was the wish of the Emperor William, be communicated to Russia without causing a rupture. It remained defensive after the accession to it, on May 20th, 1882, of Italy for a period of five years, and, after the renewal of the Triple Alliance (as it was now called), in 1887 for a further period of the same duration[1]. The development of the policy which the treaty implied remained a question for the future.

It should be added that, a few days after the signing of this treaty, the Austro-Hungarian Government gave its consent to the 'invalidation' of article V of the Peace of Prague (1866), by which Austria and Prussia had agreed that, if the inhabitants of the northern districts of Schleswig should, by a free vote, signify their desire to be united to Denmark, these districts should be ceded to the Danish Crown accordingly. A more cynical close to an intrinsically hollow diplomatic engagement it would be difficult to imagine. Germany was thus relieved from any but a moral obligation to repair the offence committed in her name against the principle of nationality which had underlain

[1] The inclusion of Italy in the Alliance was never a question of supreme importance to Bismarck, and had been long under discussion, indeed, so early as 1877, Crispi had paid a visit to the German Chancellor on the subject of Italy's claims Amicable relations with Italy were of additional value, as likely to conciliate the goodwill of Great Britain, of whose own accession to the Triple Alliance there could not really be any question Bismarck's attempt, in 1883, to induce Spain to join, may be passed by (Cf *Life of Sir Charles Dilke*, vol 1, p 539)

the whole Schleswig-Holstein question. Apart from this supplement, it cannot be denied that the Austro-German Treaty, with its Italian extension, was a masterpiece of European diplomacy; and as such, if for no other reason, it deserved the approval accorded to it by Lord Salisbury. On the other hand, there could be no pretence that it had done the work of an act of congress by establishing the peace of Europe on a basis satisfactory to the Powers at large. Nor was such a consummation part of Bismarck's ambition as a statesman. During all these years, he had consistently acted on his conviction[1] that 'European interests' were a fiction, and had ignored the idea, which in truth was speedily vanishing into nothingness, of 'the European Concert.'

Accordingly, though the Alliance with Austria-Hungary and the subsequent extension of it to Italy was one of Bismarck's great diplomatic achievements, it was not destined to be the last. Nor, in fact, did he pretend to believe in the permanence of treaties of alliance, and he had not concluded this one in expectation of its enduring validity. His main anxiety was, throughout, to keep Russia and Austria on the best terms possible with one another; if they were to quarrel, and then only, Germany would be in the predicament of having to choose between them[2]. But the task was not easy in either direction. If political cooperation with Germany was likely to continue to find favour with the Magyars, notwithstanding their dislike of the recent increase of the Slav element in the monarchy, it was odious to the most self-assertive of the Slav nationalities there, the Čechs of Bohemia; nor could Germany at any time count with certainty on the effect of clerical influences upon the policy of the *Hofburg*. But, for the present, Bismarck maintained

[1] *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol. II, p. 302

[2] See his instructions to Hohenlohe, when sending him as ambassador to Paris in 1864 (*Denkwurdigkeiten*, vol. II, p 119).

the friendliest relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government and its Foreign Minister, Baron Haymerle, and shared his resentment of Gladstone's Midlothian invective against the Emperor Francis Joseph and his policy (March 1880). An apology was brought about, and the relations of Germany and Great Britain remained friendly, as did those with France. On the other hand, an open breach with Russia was, already, in the summer of 1880, in military circles at Berlin, being discussed as likely; while in Russia the Panslavist agitation was beginning to spread. Nor could Germany any longer regard the peril of a Franco-Russian alliance as wholly imaginary. More especially was this the case, after Alexander II (assassinated in March 1881) had been succeeded on the Russian throne by his son Alexander III, who was said to be ill-disposed towards Germany. Yet the Emperor William persisted in cherishing goodwill towards Russia, and in favouring the old Prussian policy of the maintenance of a close union of the three empires against the perennial menace of the Revolution.

Thus, in the midst of the complications of the next years, while encouraging France to occupy herself with the project of acquiring Tunis and with other over-sea enterprises, and showing goodwill to the establishment by Great Britain of a separate instead of a dual control over Egypt—the Schleswig-Holstein, as he called it, of the Western Powers[1]—Bismarck kept the main ends of his European policy steadily in view. In 1884, by a series of steps of which the sequence should be carefully observed, he proceeded, with extraordinary skill and boldness, to renew the relations of

[1] At this time, Bismarck, whose son, Count Herbert, acted as *chargé d'affaires* in London in Munster's absence in 1882, still continued to show friendliness to Great Britain, both before and after the bombardment of Alexandria. With France he was on good terms both during and after Gambetta's short Ministry.

intimacy between Germany and Austria on the one side and Russia on the other.

On March 31st of this year, Bismarck concluded with the Austro-Hungarian and Russian plenipotentiaries, Count von Szechenyi and A. Suburoff, a secret treaty for three years, binding any two of these Powers to the maintenance of a benevolent neutrality, should the third of them be subjected to attack by another Power or Powers. In May, the ground was further prepared by Prince William (the present Emperor William II) being charged, on the occasion of the coming of age of the Tsarevitch Nicholas, with a special message, in his grandfather's name, to the new Tsar, which had an excellent effect. A difficulty raised by the Hungarian interest was overcome; and, on September 15th, the three Emperors, accompanied by their Ministers de Giers (for Gortchakoff's active service had ended in 1882, and his successor was not, like him, an adversary of German policy), Count Kalnoky and Bismarck, met at Skierniewice. There they confirmed the principle of a close cohesion between them, apparently on this occasion identifying the spectre of the Revolution with Gladstone and Chamberlain rather than with any politicians whose action involved a menace to any one of themselves. Towards Great Britain it now suited Bismarck to assume a far from friendly attitude—he was beginning to countenance the aggressive colonial policy to be noted in our next chapter, and showed a general disposition to pick a diplomatic quarrel[1].

In March of this year, Great Britain came near to the verge of war with Russia on the Indian frontier question,

[1] As to his wrath about the alleged suppression of his dispatch, stating that Germany could not maintain a friendly attitude towards Great Britain in Egyptian affairs, so long as the colonial tension was not removed, see *Life of Granville*, vol II, pp 428–9 Neither Granville nor Gladstone could recollect the receipt of any such message.

without any interference on the part of Germany; but gradually Bismarck's attitude towards Great Britain grew more friendly, owing to the imperturbable temper of Lord Granville[1], and perhaps also to the Berlin visit of Lord Rosebery (April), even before in June Lord Salisbury assumed the control of British foreign policy, which, with a few months' interval, remained in his hands till 1892. On the other hand, Germany could remain without apprehension during the anxious period of French politics in 1886–7, when the republican *régime* had fallen on evil days. Some of the leaders left to the republican party had been discredited; and advantage was taken of the symptoms of political collapse by the adventurer General Boulanger to play his audacious game. But Bismarck was resolved to bide his time, and so late as April 1887 refused to make use of the 'Schnabele incident' in order to bring about a collision with France. (A French commissioner of this name, an Alsatian born, had been lured across the frontier by a German colleague, and afterwards arrested as a spy by a German tribunal; but the German Government ultimately allowed the affair to be hushed up by the surrender of the offender.) He had graver issues in view, having, as has been seen, at this very time secured the establishment of an enlarged German army on an enduring footing[2]; nor was he a statesman who ignored the expediency of additional guarantees, or neglected opportunities of making assurance doubly sure.

The feeling of alienation from Germany had sunk deep into many British minds since the Berlin Conference; it outlasted Bismarck's fall, and the best way of removing it

[1] He could not however go so far as to countenance, in December 1884, Bismarck's notion of wintering in Egypt for the sake of his health, for he had recently ceased to support the Egyptian policy of Great Britain.

[2] See as to the renewal of the septennate in March 1887, pp. 125 f., *ante*

was a problem which occupied his mind after that event[1]. There seems, accordingly, no sufficient reason for seeking the 'salient point' of the whole transaction which we are about to mention, instead of in the simple wish to create a good understanding between Germany and Russia, in the intention to cover the latter Power by the benevolent neutrality of Germany against the quarter in which lay her chief danger —Great Britain[2]. Such an interpretation seems as improbable as it is far-fetched.

On November 18th, 1887, Bismarck seized the opportunity of a brief sojourn of Tsar Alexander III at Berlin, to allay the suspicion entertained at Petersburg that the German Government had, in opposition to the Tsar's wishes, recently encouraged Prince Ferdinand of Coburg-Cohary to accept the Bulgarian throne. Bismarck had been charged with a double-faced policy on this head; and the accusation, supported by forged dispatches, had been violently reiterated in the Russian press. His demonstration to the contrary was so successful that the Tsar not only gave orders for the issue of a diplomatic circular deprecating further intemperate journalistic discussion of this question on either side, but consented to a renewal of the Skierniewice agreement, so far as Russia and Germany were concerned. The new treaty was immediately executed by Bismarck and Schouvaloff, upon whom the Emperor conferred the Order of the Black Eagle.

The fact that Austria-Hungary (and, of course Italy) remained outside this treaty, which, notwithstanding a later statement in Bismarck's then (1896) favourite organ[3],

[1] Cf Bennigsen's account (*ap* H Oncken, vol II, pp 570 ff) of his long conversations with Bismarck, at Carlsbad in 1892, on the Russian question and, in the first instance, on the expediency of establishing satisfactory economic relations between the two empires.

[2] See Reventlow, *Deutschland's auswärtige Politik*, pp. 20 ff.

[3] The *Hamburger Nachrichten*.

seems to have been kept secret from her and not to have been renewed when Caprivi succeeded Bismarck in 1890, not unnaturally gave rise to the interpretation of it as a 're-insurance[1].' In other words, in the event of an attack by Russia upon Austria, the old obligation of the 1879 Treaty to assist Austria would rest upon Germany; and if Austria attacked Russia, the latter Power would be assured of Germany's benevolent neutrality. Against this interpretation, literally exact though it is, the not altogether convincing argument has been urged that an attack by Austria upon Russia was at this time unthinkable. Notwithstanding later Ministerial explanations, the circumstances connected with the duration and publication of the treaty still remain more or less obscure; and its significance cannot yet be said to be free from doubt[2].

Generally, it may be added that the inviolability of treaties, when coming into collision with national interests, was not an article of Bismarck's political creed. But, so far as his foresight could carry, the security now established for Germany was complete; and no fears of a coalition against her, such as had haunted him in recent crises of her political history—in 1866, in 1871, and again, though in a less degree, in 1875—remained to interfere with his confidence that he had guided her aright, now that the time was drawing near for him to relinquish the helm.

[1] When an insurance company with whom an insurance has been effected deems it excessive, the risk is limited by means of a further part-insurance with another company, which is termed a 're-insurance.' The German word *Rückversicherung* (back-insurance) is perhaps more correct.

[2] See Egelhaaf, *Bismarck*, pp. 266 ff. and cf. Reventlow, *loc. cit.*

CHAPTER V

THE FALL OF BISMARCK

The Emperor William I died in his palace at Berlin, on March 9th, 1888, surrounded, almost literally, by a mourning people. Neither the judicious praises of patriotic biographers nor the ungrudging tributes of intelligent adversaries are needed in order to adjust the estimate of his services to Prussia and to Germany. His personal character, the chief element in the commanding influence exercised by this simple-hearted and single-minded Prince over his servants and over his subjects at large, has been drawn with extraordinary incisiveness, but not untenderly, by the foremost of them all. On Bismarck, after in a memorable hour[1] constituting him his chief counsellor, the Emperor William bestowed his full confidence in both good times and evil; and without that confidence the Minister could not have achieved any of the great things which have identified the names of both his sovereign and himself with the fame of Germany's national triumph[2]. Bismarck rightly speaks of the Emperor William as, first and foremost, a soldier in heart and mind not less than by training; conscientiously responsive to the call of duty and untiring in the performance of the work it imposed upon him; devoid of personal vanity, but pervaded by a high sense both of what became a monarch, and what was a monarch's due; always true to

[1] Cf. vol. II, pp. 84–5, *ante*.

[2] See *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol. II, ch. XXXIII: *Kaiser Wilhelm I*

those who served him and, in consequence served by them with passionate loyalty; willing to be led as well as advised by those whom he completely trusted, yet never without a consciousness that the supreme, the sovereign, authority rested with himself. Personally, the relation between him and Bismarck was, as I put it earlier in this work, a perfect realisation of the poet's conception of 'the royal king and loyal servant'; at Königgrätz, so Abeken relates, when none of the generals ventured to take the King out of gunshot range, Bismarck forced him to withdraw. Now, in his ninety-first year, he passed away, having done much more than add to the honour in which his dynasty was held; for he had strengthened, as not even the greatest of the Hohenzollerns had before him, both the monarchical and the military spirit of the nation[1].

The death of the Emperor William had been long preceded by that of the faithful friend and correspondent of his earlier days, the highminded and scholarly King John, who in 1873 had been succeeded on the Saxon throne by his son Albert. King Albert's notable services as a commander in the Franco-German war had materially helped to bind the diminished kingdom to the destinies of the North-German Confederation and the new Empire. In 1878, the troubled life of King George V of Hanover—a long series of illusions and disappointments—had closed; but the prosperous duchy of Brunswick remained under the prudent rule of the veteran Duke William till his death in 1884

[1] The best biography of William I is probably that of Erich Marcks (4th ed. 1900), whose memorial speech summarising the Emperor's life and character I have already cited. Among the French estimates of his influence on affairs may be cited Benedetti's in *Essais diplomatiques* (1895); nor should the notices of him in Gontaut-Biron's records of his mission be overlooked; for the ambassador's sentiments towards the Emperor were sympathetic in many respects, though these did not include his sturdy Protestantism.

The reserve of his character had not prevented him from attaining to a sort of popularity as the last of the elder line of Guelf; his will, though naming as his heir the head of the younger line, Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, cautiously bequeathed a large part of his private property to his cousin King Albert of Saxony. The negotiations as to the future government of the duchy had, in 1879, ended in the passing of a law which was duly carried out after Duke William's death. The administration, hereupon, remained for a year in the hands of the territorial diet, and then passed into those of the regent elected by it, Prince Albrecht of Prussia, nephew of the Emperor William. Duke William of Brunswick's namesake, King William I of Württemberg, who had likewise ruled over his dominions for nearly half a century, was succeeded in 1864 by King Charles, who died in 1891. Finally, on June 13th, 1886, the perturbed life of King Lewis II of Bavaria had come to a tragic close. The strange vagaries of his secluded existence, which had some time since reached the stage of insanity, together with his reckless expenditure on architectural and other fancies, which had begun to affect seriously the finances of the kingdom, had determined his Ministers to bring about his deposition and the appointment of a regency. But the commission of State which, hereupon, attempted to visit him at Hohenschwangau had to turn back in consequence of a proclamation issued by him from that retreat on June 9th, adjuring his loyal subjects to uphold his rights against his uncle Prince Luitpold, who had been proclaimed regent. The King was, however, kidnapped at Neuschwanstein, and taken to Berg, another castle of his, on the lake of Starnberg. Here, on the 13th, he was found drowned, together with Dr Gudden, the specialist in attendance upon him. This is not the place in which to offer conjectures on the probable sequence of the final events in this terrible catastrophe. King Lewis's brother and successor, King

Otto, had been for some years a lunatic; hence the nomination by the Ministry, approved by the diet, of Prince Luitpold as regent. King Lewis II, too, had played his part in the foundation of the Empire; but the pathetic loyalty of his people towards his person was due to their consistent faithfulness to his historic dynasty.

The shadow that fell on the very last days of the Emperor William I was one coming close home to himself. On February 22nd, 1888, he lost a beloved grandson, Prince Lewis William of Baden; and, a few days earlier (February 8th), a crisis was reached in the condition of the Crown-prince Frederick William. An operation for cancer in the throat undergone by him on that day left him weak and, to all intents and purposes, voiceless for what could not be other than the brief remainder of his life. The relations between him and Bismarck had varied in the great political crises of William I's reign, and had undoubtedly at times been strained; but, except as a military commander, he had been kept at a distance from public affairs by his father, who herein followed the example of all the Hohenzollern kings, with the exception of Frederick William I[1]. Of late, however, there had been no lack of mutual confidence between him and Bismarck, who had promised the old Emperor on his deathbed to serve his successors—for of the shortness of the next reign there could be no doubt—with the same fidelity as that with which he had served their father and grandfather.

So far as the Emperor Frederick III's few months of rule, which ended on June 15th, 1888, were concerned, no serious occasion of difference arose between him and his chief Minister. The Emperor, who would gladly have marked the occasion of his accession by some more extensive recognition of Liberalism, in the way of honours, than Bis-

[1] See Treitschke, *Zwei Kaiser*, p 14

marck thought judicious, and who desired to dismiss from office the orthodox and intolerant Court-preacher Adolf Stöcker, the leading spirit of the Berlin 'Anti-Semite' movement[1], gave way on both heads. Furthermore, in April, he consented to disapprove the projected marriage of his daughter Princess Victoria to Prince Alexander of Battenberg, who had recently resigned the Bulgarian throne, and was a personage highly obnoxious to Tsar Alexander III and the Russian interest. Queen Victoria, then on a visit to her daughter at Berlin, who like her had favoured the match, had previously agreed to abandon it.

In home affairs, the Chancellor's now avowedly Conservative policy likewise prevailed over the inclinations of Frederick III and his consort; and the Emperor-King's assent was given to the lengthening from three to five years of the period for which Prussian diets were elected. On the other hand, in the more personal question of the dismissal from office as Minister of the Interior of the capable Robert von Puttkamer, who had permitted himself too palpable an interference with the conduct of the recent elections, the Emperor had his way. No other mark was left on the political life of Prussia or of the Empire by a Prince whose birth and personality had given him the foremost place among the paladins of its founder, and whose large-hearted openness to the Liberal ideas of his own generation, encouraged by the bright intelligence of his British consort, might in other circumstances have secured for ordered

[1] Treitschke perceived a sign of the Emperor Frederick's inability to remain in touch with the mighty advance of the age and its new ideas in his scorn for the Anti-Semite movement. On the other hand, Mommsen, in a pamphlet against Treitschke, strongly protested against this movement as retarding the accomplishment of German unity and as a 'dehumanising' attempt to foster a new barbarism. (Cf. the notice of Mommsen in *Biogr. Jahrbuch*, vol. IX (1904). pp. 495 f.)

freedom a greater share in the moulding of the national future[1].

The Emperor William II, who, in the thirtieth year of his age, mounted the again vacant imperial throne, had in so far been unfortunate that he had not passed through what has been aptly described as the 'educative period of crown-princeship.' His general education had been conducted with jealous care; of his high spirit and quick intelligence no doubt existed; and there was, at first, every appearance that the sovereign's trust in Bismarck, unbroken during two reigns, would be continued in the third. The speech from the throne, addressed to the *Reichstag* by the new Emperor ten days after his father's death, was Bismarck's composition; and the imperial visit to Petersburg two or three weeks later, followed by visits to Vienna and other Courts, was quite on the lines of the Chancellor's recent foreign policy. Neither the extreme Conservatives, who

[1] There is no necessity for referring here to the harsh censures which in her adopted country were the lot of the Empress Frederick, and which rose to their height in the agonising period immediately preceding her consort's accession to the throne These criticisms, which may occasionally have been provoked by her great vivacity and frankness of temper and speech, ignored the fact of her eager affection for her father's and husband's native land Bismarck, who never hated her as he hated her mother-in-law, acknowledges that, although her influence over her husband culminated in the brief period of his reign, she loyally supported the Chancellor's own continuance in office. One of the most appreciative tributes ever paid to her abilities and character is K Schrader's article on her in vol VII of the *Biogr Jahrbuch* (1902), pp. 451–465 Of the personal character of the Emperor Frederick himself, and the impression left by it upon those immediately around him, perhaps the trustworthiest account will be found in H. Delbruck's 'Reminiscences of him and his House' (1888) reprinted from vol LXII of *Preuss Jahrb* (August 1888). It is there noted how the Emperor long cherished the intention, which he only relinquished when the fatal disease was upon him, of becoming himself, in a series of monumental inscriptions, the historiographer of the Hohenzollern dynasty.

hoped for a complete reaction against Bismarck's friendliness to Liberal ideas in Church and State, nor the Liberals, who would gladly have seen him sacrificed to a more vigorous assertion of the time-honoured principles of their political creed, seemed at first likely to be gratified by the consummation for which they hoped from the new sovereign. And a singularly ill-timed attempt to induce William II to look upon the picture of his father as that of a faithful Liberal and resolute German patriot had an effect quite contrary to that which it was no doubt intended to produce. The unauthorised part publication of the Emperor Frederick's diary, dating from the critical year 1870, resulted in the punishment of Heinrich Geffcken, to whom that publication had been brought home, and the Emperor William II approved of the vindictive course pursued by the Chancellor.

Geffcken, a distinguished Hamburg jurist and diplomatist of senatorial family, and, from 1872 to 1882, professor of public law at Strassburg, had been intimate with the Emperor Frederick III when Crown-prince. Immediately on his death, Geffcken composed a memorial entitled *An Outlook on the Reign of the Emperor William II*, which he desired Roggenbach to ask the Grand-duke of Baden to present to the new ruler; but that statesman thought it more prudent to refrain. Hereupon, in October 1888, Geffcken printed anonymously, in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, portions of what professed to be a copy of the Crown-prince's diary in the year 1870. The published matter contained, together with a passage reflecting on South-German opposition to unification and recommending a vigorous repression of it, the expression of a desire for a constitution of the new Empire on the lines of the *Reichsverfassung* of 1849. Bismarck, hereupon, drew up a direct report (*Immediatbericht*) to the Emperor William II, of which the latter sanctioned, if he did not himself suggest,

the public issue. In this report, Bismarck treated the genuineness of the diary as doubtful—although (as is known from Busch) he was quite sure that the original was the Crown-prince's own, but that in the text, dealing mainly with military matters, political remarks had been interpolated. If, the report argued, the diary in the *Rundschau* was genuine, the publication of State secrets was punishable as such; if it was, wholly or in part, a forgery, it would likewise be punishable as an insult to both the late Emperors William I and Frederick III. The report, therefore, called for a prosecution of Geffcken and the publishers of his article, which contained further indiscretions—among them, apparently, one involving the credit of Sir R. Morier who in 1870 was British Minister at Darmstadt (cf. his *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 355). Geffcken, who at once owned having sent the article to the journal, was arrested and brought to trial before the Imperial tribunal at Leipzig, which on January 4th, 1889, liberated him from imprisonment, on the ground that, though in the interests of the Empire he ought not to have published information contained in the article, as there was sufficient reason for concluding him to have done, yet there was no sufficient reason for holding him to have been conscious of the criminality of his act. Bismarck's opponent and victim had been morally broken on the wheel, without any attempt being made to clear the character of the Emperor Frederick III from whatever obloquy it might have incurred in the process[1]. Furthermore, when the municipal authorities of Berlin resolved on the erection of a statue to the Emperor Frederick, his son took occasion to express his displeasure at the misrepresentations which the democratic press of the city had allowed itself as to his family affairs—*i.e.* at the

[1] As to this case, the last of the celebrated 'affairs' of Bismarck's career, see the notice of F. Heinrich Geffcken, not altogether friendly, in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol LV (1910), by 'D. R.'

contrast which it had drawn between his own and his father's sayings and doings[1].

The adversaries who, as noted, watched the action of the Chancellor with ill-concealed jealousy, during the brief span of power which still remained to him, would gladly have found material to use against him in his foreign policy; and, in its most important aspect, they had the satisfaction of noting a serious difference of view between his sovereign and himself. Bismarck had continuously sought to keep the peace between the three Eastern Powers; and was, therefore, anxious not to allow the Austrian Government to be unnecessarily alarmed, and the Russian irritated, by the communication of reports as to the action of the latter Power which had reached the Emperor, no doubt from his General Staff, now as ever out of touch with the Chancellor. From these reports the Emperor drew the conclusion, which was no doubt in accordance with the belief of the General Staff, that the more or less recent armaments of Russia on the Austrian frontier pointed to warlike intentions on the part of the Tsar. The Chancellor, who believed in the pacific intentions of Alexander III, was slow to respond to the Emperor William's complaints (March 17th) of having been left in the dark concerning a terrible danger, and did nothing to provoke or irritate the neighbour empire, which he had so recently induced to enter into an intimate understanding with Germany[2]. Bismarck's consistent friendliness to Russia, no doubt, enabled him to adopt a more confident tone in the colonial disputes with Great Britain to be mentioned immediately. As for the latter

[1] See the (Bismarckian) pamphlet *Die Vorgänge der inneren Politik bei der Thronbesteigung Kaiser Wilhelms II* (*Incidents of home policy at the time of the accession of the Emperor William II*), Berlin, 1888.

[2] As to the relations between Russia and Germany at this time, see Egelhaaf's *Bismarck*, pp. 387–9.

Power, he had, as he stated in a letter communicated by Lord Ampthill to Lord Granville in September 1882, consciously resisted the antagonism displayed towards it by the German press, and supported so far as he could the policy of Great Britain with regard to Egypt. The friendly relations between Great Britain and Italy could not be unwelcome to German statesmanship; while the eager activity of France beyond seas about this time, in Madagascar and elsewhere—which was by no means agreeable to Great Britain—made the maintenance of good relations with Germany more desirable than ever; and to this end the efforts of Granville, though Bismarck regarded him with no friendly eye, were, with infinite patience directed. It will be remembered that the relations between Great Britain and Russia, in 1884, came near to a rupture on the Afghanistan boundary question, which was not completely, though it was virtually, settled in the following year.

Such was the general political situation when German colonial activity first became an important factor in the conduct of her general policy[1]. Its advance was doubtless largely due to the spirit of self-confidence called forth in the nation by its recent great achievements, and by the desire for the rapid acquisition of wealth which their results had engendered; as well as to the feeling of discontent that Germany should be one of the few European Powers that had made no attempt at forming a colonial dominion. It was, also, consequential upon the over-production of manufactures brought about by existing tariffs, and perhaps owed

[1] The data in the following brief outline are mainly taken from Lord Fitzmaurice's *Life of Lord Granville*, vol. II, *The Life and Letters of Sir Charles Dilke*, vol II, and Egelhaaf's *Bismarck*, pp. 33 ff., as compared with P Rohrbach's *Das deutsche Kolonialwesen* (*German Colonisation*), Leipzig, 1911, and the chapter on 'German Africa' in Sir Harry H. Johnston's *Colonization of Africa* (1899). See, also, the Maps at the close of the present volume

something to the feeling that emigration, though between 1881 and 1885 amounting to only 0·37, and between 1886 and 1890, to 0·2 of the inhabitants of the Empire, wholly cut off from it a not inconsiderable element of population. Bismarck, at first, held back from countenancing the new movement; indeed, in 1873 he declared to his ready British listener that to Germany colonies would be only a source of weakness and that he had no desire for them[1]. Gradually, however, his political instinct led him to favour the growth of German colonisation and of ocean shipping as its indispensable accompaniment, and to use the increasing national interest in these matters as a factor in his general policy. But he had not studied the problem before him, or, at least, was mistaken in believing that the only way of solving it was to follow the example of Great Britain though under quite different conditions, and to establish colonies by means of trading companies.

Among early colonisation schemes which remained unrealised, was the Hamburg project, brought forward in 1880, of promoting a German trading company, guaranteed by the Imperial Government, in the Samoa islands, and thus saving the old-established Hamburg House of Godeffroy from ruin. This project gained the approval of Bismarck; but, during his absence from the *Reichstag*, on account of illness, it was rejected by a small majority, largely through the free-trade influence of Bamberger. The two larger islands Germany definitively acquired in 1899, by an agreement with the United States.

It was, however, to the African continent that, both in pursuit of recent scheming, and in accordance with a much earlier historic effort[2], German colonising activity, of which

[1] This view was held, so late as May 1884, by the German ambassador in London, Count (afterwards Prince) Munster Derneburg (see Oncken, *Bennigsen*, vol. II, pp. 319, 634).

[2] The earliest German settlement in Africa goes back to the reign

Hamburg was the chief *focus*, now above all directed itself. The German African Society was founded in 1872, as a branch of the International African Association; and the explorations of its emissaries were busily carried on in eastern and western Africa, in both of which regions Major H. von Wissmann's travels and labours were specially notable. In 1882, the German Colonial Association was instituted at Frankfort, for furthering the foundation and organisation of German colonies by every kind of propaganda. The most important immediate result of the movement represented by it was the Bremen merchant Lüderitz's acquisition, in 1883, from the Hottentots of south-west Africa, of an extensive territory at Angra Pequena, 280 miles south of Walfisch Bay, to the north-east of which German missionaries had in 1864 hoisted the German flag. The British Government having refused to annex or grant protection, while declaring the Orange River the boundary of Cape Colony, the German Government, in April 1884, granted imperial protection to the Damaraland coast, up to the Portuguese boundary. When the Government of Cape Colony made a belated offer to take possession of the occupied district, Bismarck intimated that he could only deal in the matter with the British Foreign Office, and, in the meantime, protested against any endeavour to set up an exclusive claim to 'spheres of influence' in Africa on the lines of the 'Monroe doctrine.' Count Münster having intimated that Germany's view of the policy of Great Britain in Egypt would depend upon her friendliness in colonial matters, the British Govern-

of the Great Elector, the foundation, in 1682, of the Brandenburg African Trading Company, and the opening of trade operations on the Guinea coast under the protection of the fort of Grossfriedrichsburg. Owing partly to the jealousy of the Dutch, the settlement died out gradually and was quite at an end in 1717, when they purchased the abandoned fort. See *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. VII, pp. 646–7. As to von der Decken's designs on the Zanzibar coast, 1860–1865, see Sir Harry Johnston, *op. cit.* p. 25.

ment gave way, and recognised the German sovereignty at Angra Pequena (June 1884).

In the same year, Germany was allowed by Great Britain to take over the Cameroons district on the Guinea coast, where Dr Nachtigal had hoisted the German flag before the British Government had carried out its intention of proclaiming a protectorate over the whole of the coast between Lagos and the Cameroons; while certain German claims in the Fiji islands, since 1874 under British protection, were handed over to a commission, whose settlement was in their favour. In this way, conflict was avoided; and it is not surprising that, very soon afterwards, Bismarck declined the overtures of the President of the Transvaal Republic (Paul Kruger) for the establishment over it of a German Protectorate. It may, perhaps, be added that, in the course of the negotiations which ended thus favourably for the German interests, Count Münster threw out a 'feeler' as to the cession of Heligoland to Germany, suggesting that the island was the necessary key to the Baltic canal then in contemplation.

The African relations between the European Governments concerned now advanced into a new stage. The British-Portuguese treaty of the year 1884, which had practically proposed the partition of the banks of the Congo between the Portuguese and the British, and to which the German Government, with its eye on the Upper River, had taken exception, had, in pursuance of the policy just described, been abandoned[1]. It was, therefore, now necessary to settle the future of that land of rubber-bearing promise, where Leopold II, King of the Belgians, proposed to call into life a new State attached by personal union (and trade concessions) to his own. Bismarck, assuming the initiative after a fashion highly significant of the point which German colonial ambition had now reached, proposed that a

[1] See the noteworthy article (by Sir Charles Dilke) in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1906, vol. CCIV, p. 48.

conference should assemble at Berlin to settle this business, and at the same time lay down the lines of an enduring partition of the 'Dark Continent' among the European Powers interested in its fortunes.

Towards the close of the year 1884, before this Conference met, the relations between Germany and Great Britain had, in consequence of the friction of interests noticed, and the play allowed by Bismarck to the ambitions of the German colonial party, grown, as was seen, more or less difficult. No event could, therefore, have been more untoward than the death, on August 25th, of Lord Ampthill, who had for thirteen years filled the arduous office of British ambassador at Berlin, and who could least be spared when the policy of 'lying down' under German pressure was being exposed to severe trial. Notwithstanding the assurances of Count Münster, the German flag had been hoisted in Samoa; and now information arrived as to further German designs —of obtaining possession of the bay of St Lucia in Zululand, and of securing control over the coast territory of the sultanate of Zanzibar. The former plan was promptly thwarted by the hoisting of the British flag at St Lucia (December); the execution of the latter was a more elaborate affair.

In November 1884, three German venturers, one of whom was the afterwards notorious Dr Peters, arrived in disguise at Zanzibar, and thence proceeded to the mainland, where they concluded a series of treaties with the native chiefs and hoisted the German flag. About the same time (December), unwelcome information arrived from another part of the world. In the midst of negotiations on the subject, Germany had annexed the northern coast of New Guinea, afterwards called Kaiser-Wilhelm-Land, so far east as Huon Bay, with several of the adjacent islands in what was to be called the Bismarck Archipelago—a step most obnoxious to the Australian colonies, which desired the whole

of New Guinea to be annexed by Great Britain. On his return from East Africa to Berlin, Peters, in February 1885, founded the German East Africa Company[1]; and, since the British Government was now seeking to develop its own territory up to the Mombasa coast, north of Zanzibar, there was every likelihood of renewed friction with Germany, while the Sultan was in a position of the utmost difficulty. Under the additional pressure of the German proceedings in New Guinea and elsewhere, the relations between the British and German Governments actually became very grave; and, in February 1885, Münster expected to be recalled. Though this expectation was not verified, Count Herbert Bismarck, shortly afterwards, arrived in London, and declared himself authorised to state that his father considered Zanzibar to be as independent as Turkey or Russia. On this basis—not easily reconcilable with the fact that, in August 1885, a German squadron anchored off Zanzibar and delivered its Government's demands to the Sultan—negotiations were carried on, which in 1886 led to a definition of the British and German spheres in East Africa. In 1888 the Sultan of Zanzibar granted to the German East Africa Company a long lease of a large extent of territory, which, however, had to be recaptured in 1889, after a general native revolt. It was not till after the resignation of both Granville and Bismarck, that, in 1890, a fresh delimitation of the mainland of this part of Africa was arranged between Great Britain and Germany, and that the latter recognised the British protectorate over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, in consideration of the cession of Heligoland to Germany.

Before this, the German claims in New Guinea had been

[1] It may be added that, in 1885, Bismarck obtained from the *Reichstag* an annual subvention for fifteen years of over five million marks (£250,000) for German steamship lines to East Africa and Australia, and in 1889 a smaller ten years' subvention for a line to the Cameroons and Zanzibar.

amicably settled, and the grievances concerning Samoa had been set at rest. Meanwhile, the Congo Conference, as it was called, had met at Berlin towards the end of 1884, the goodwill of the United States having been secured; and the efforts of King Leopold II had been crowned by the creation of the 'Congo Free State' under his sovereignty[1]. In addition to this main result, the Conference, in accordance with its wider programme, while it recognised Great Britain's sphere of influence as extending over the territory held by the Royal Niger Company, declared trade free on both the Congo and the Niger and slavery abolished in all parts of Africa under European influence, besides prescribing rules for all future processes of occupation by European States. The Conference likewise confirmed the German annexation of the Cameroons and Togoland, both tropical regions, attractive by their productivity in rubber and cocoa. In south-west Africa, the German protectorate, from 1885, extended along a vast and barren coast-line, with good inland pastoral districts, but, in the central part, a difficult native population.

After Bismarck's dismissal, as will be seen, German interest in colonisation was not extinguished, and the German colonial dominions, notwithstanding various trials, on the whole prospered. Meanwhile, though in the British Empire a new solicitude arose as to the bonds uniting the mother-country and her colonies, the tension between the British and German Governments due to their colonial relations gradually relaxed—but not so the national jealousy which it had contributed to excite.

The last colonial annexations of Germany during the continuance of Bismarck in office were those of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific (1885) and of the equatorial Nauru (1888) In 1886, the Carolines (west of the Marshall Islands)

[1] The strange chapter in the history of civilisation which deals with the organisation of the Congo State and its accompaniments does not concern us here.

were suddenly subjected to the process of a German occupation; but a Spanish protest ensued, whereupon Bismarck proposed the reference of the subject of the dispute to arbitration, ingeniously suggesting Pope Leo XIII as arbiter. The result was a decision in favour of the Spanish claim to priority of occupation, while Bismarck was decorated by a papal Order never before conferred upon a Protestant. These islands were, with certain others, purchased from Spain in 1899. The arrangement as to the Samoa group has been already noted.

Thus, colonial as well as foreign affairs were in a condition favourable to German interests at the time when Bismarck's resignation was drawing near. The Triple Alliance had little or nothing to fear from any other Power, Italy having even been assured naval support from Great Britain in the event of troubles in the Mediterranean—which could hardly proceed from any Power but France (or Italy herself). The Balkans were as yet quiet, and the Austrian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina full of promise. The question of the cession of Heligoland to Germany had been, quasi-academically, brought on the carpet, and, with the advent to power of a Minister so friendly to the Triple Alliance as Lord Salisbury, was likely to be advanced into the sphere of actuality. Altogether, the existing situation, of which Bismarck's evident present desire to keep the peace was unmistakably a principal factor, boded well for international tranquillity; and this desire was to be a chief part of his political legacy to Germany and Europe. Bismarck, wrote one of the best-informed and most farsighted of contemporary British politicians, in a letter dated Friedrichsruh, September 13th, 1889—'*Bismarck, c'est la paix*[1].'

[1] See *The Life and Letters of Sir Charles Dilke*, vol. II, p. 308. The chapter on Germany in Dilke's *Present Position of European*

The great Minister's fall was not due to any objection taken by the Emperor William II to his foreign or colonial policy. The subject on which a divergence as to method of action grew into a fatal difference between Bismarck and his sovereign, consumed as the latter was by the ambition of personal rule, was of quite another kind[1]. The duration of the Emperor's first *Reichstag* had not come to an end without a Government defeat, showing that Bismarck's restored good understanding with the Conservatives was not proof against an apparent challenge to prejudices regarded by them in the light of principles. The (anti-) 'Socialist law' of October 1878, originally valid for two years and a half only, but repeatedly renewed, would again expire in September 1890; and the *Reichstag*, whose own period would end in that year, was asked to convert this law from a temporary into a permanent measure. No opposition was offered to this proposal either by the National-Liberals or by the Free-conservatives; but they alike insisted on the omission from the law, in its permanent form, of the clause empowering the police to expel social-democratic agitators from their place of residence—an interference, it was argued, with the 'fundamental' right of every German to free choice or change of residence. Inasmuch as, accordingly, Bismarck would not promise that the Government would resist the omission of this clause, the Conservatives proper

Politics (1887) is chiefly interesting as an exercise in political prophecy, one of the most fascinating (as it is one of the most hazardous) ways of applying political knowledge and insight.

[1] The account of Bismarck's fall which follows rests mainly on the admirable summary of Egelhaaf, *Bismarck*, pp. 377 ff., in which he appears to have incorporated his earlier essay *Bismarck's Sturz* (1909), at present out of my reach. A very important contribution to the solution of the problem is to be found in H. Delbrück's two articles in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, *Die Hohenlohe-Memoiren und Bismarck's Entlassung* (vol. CXXVI, Dec. 3rd, 1906) and *Bismarck's letzte politische Idee* (vol. CXLVII, Jan. 1st, 1912).

cast their vote against the 'truncated' law, which, on January 25th, 1890, was accordingly rejected by 169 to 98 votes. The *Cartel*[1] had thus proved ineffective, on Bismarck's refusal to resist an amendment disapproved by the Conservatives; and the *Reichstag* was dissolved, the question of giving permanency to the anti-Socialist law being left unsettled.

A fortnight before the elections for the new *Reichstag*, fixed for February 20th, 1890, the Emperor William II intervened. For some time past, the idea had found favour in many quarters, of an international conference on labour questions, and on the best remedies for the relief of the working-classes—a subject on which, in 1888, the *Bundesrat* had declined to legislate, as proposed by the *Reichstag*[2]. It had been mentioned as a possible expedient by Bismarck himself; and the project of convoking such a conference at Berne had commended itself to the Swiss Federal Government. The Emperor William II now bethought himself of summoning the conference to Berlin, so that at least the fact of its having been called might impress public opinion in the Empire at this critical season. Two imperial rescripts were, accordingly, issued to this effect (February 4th). They bore no Ministerial counter-signature, but were addressed respectively to Bismarck and to Freiherr Hans von Berlepsch, whose appointment, a few days earlier, to the Ministry of Commerce had relieved the Chancellor of additional departmental duties assumed by him in 1880. In these rescripts, the Emperor ordered the opening of negotiations with the British, French, Belgian and Swiss Governments, for the meeting at Berlin of a congress on the present condition of labour; while at the same time he ordered the results of the proposed assembly to be anticipated by the modification, in the true interests

[1] Cf. pp. 124–5, *ante*.

[2] Bismarck had shown himself particularly cool as to the proposal of increased Sunday rest

of the working-classes, of the present system of regulations affecting German trades and industries (*Gewerbeordnung*).

The Emperor William II, at all events in the earlier years of his reign, without seeking to conceal the extent and significance of his personal intervention, inclined rather to develop, or improve on, the political ideas of others, than to originate new ideas himself; and, in the present instance, he was, as a matter of fact, only hastening the operation of Bismarck's twofold policy with regard to the working-classes. This, as has been seen, consisted of combining the repression of the anarchical tendencies to be found in German Socialism with the application of a remedial process to some of the grievances of labour, which, beyond doubt, were among the causes of the movement. The rescripts, however, to which, according to the Emperor's own statement[1], Bismarck had at first objected but subsequently assented, failed to exercise the conciliatory effect expected from them, so far at least as appeared from the elections to the new *Reichstag*. Not only did the Socialists themselves come forth from the poll with increased strength, having now seated 35 of their party, but, what was of more immediate consequence, the three parties that had in 1887 concluded the *Cartel* had together lost not less than 90 seats, the losses of the National-Liberals alone amounting to 59. In other words, the Opposition, consisting of the Centre, the *Freisinnige* and the smaller fractions, now commanded an overwhelming majority. Bismarck's great political victory was thus undone; and a month had barely elapsed since the date of the elections, when he was out of office.

The constitution of the German Empire had not made the head of the imperial Government responsible to Parliament; and it was therefore not the verdict of the electors, but the will of the Emperor, which determined Bismarck's fall. But what determined the decision of the Emperor?

[1] To Hohenlohe; see *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. II, p. 468.

The question seems to call for some answer, in even the briefest attempt to describe the events which brought to a close one of the greatest Ministerial careers known to history.

Of a complicated problem like this, the simplest, in other words the *a priori*, solution is often the truest; but it would, at the same time, be a mistake to ignore the cooperation of secondary causes. Bismarck fell, because the question of his continuance at the head of the Administration was, after all, in the political jargon which commended itself to him and to his age, a *Machtfrage*, a question of power, in which he must prevail who is the stronger. The difference between Bismarck and the Emperor as to the rescripts had only referred to procedure; but it must have left some soreness behind it on both sides. So soon as a serious conflict had arisen between the master's will and his Minister's, but one result could follow, unless one of the pair made up his mind to yield before the dispute was carried too far. Neither Bismarck's character nor what was known of the Emperor's offered any hope of such a solution.

As a matter of course, influences were at work upon the Emperor not to allow himself to bend before the will which had long led that of his grandfather and had, owing to the force of circumstances, prevailed over that of his immediate predecessor. On these more or less occult influences it is needless to dwell, and, in part, reference has already been made to them. The ultras of the Conservative party, such as Freiherr Hans von Hammerstein, had never forgiven Bismarck's alliance with moderate Liberalism, and were ready to do their utmost to break up the *Cartel*. They were reinforced by the orthodox champions of intolerance and of Anti-Semitism in particular, under the leadership of Stöcker, with whom the Chancellor was known to be out of sympathy. There may have been active hostility on the Liberal side also; for Bismarck had adversaries both where he might, and where he might not, have expected them;

and it has been shown that his views as to the intentions of Russia towards Germany differed from those of the military authorities near the sovereign.

Thus, even before the elections of February 20th, 1890, the Chancellor's position was not altogether so firm as it had been. It was now manifest that the new *Reichstag* would not, like its predecessors, be amenable to Bismarck's controlling authority. On the 25th, he waited on the Emperor to acquaint him with the result of the elections; and we are told that, finding the question of his resignation already present to the Emperor's mind, he declared himself ready to resign so soon as a suitable successor could be appointed. It was, however, settled between the Emperor and himself, that he should, in the first instance, carry through the *Reichstag* the important and indispensable measure for the increase of the numbers of the army[1]. The Emperor seemed to Bismarck to have assented to his remark that this object must be compassed at any cost—even at that of one or even two dissolutions, and if necessary by a meeting of sovereign Princes at Berlin, which should sanction a constitutional alteration of the electoral franchise, or any other changes imperatively required by the political situation. Whether Bismarck's impression as to the Emperor's acceptance of this view was correct or not must remain unknown; but it hardly admits of doubt that, in the weeks immediately ensuing, whatever differences of opinion had previously existed between the pair were rapidly intensified; and it has to be asked on whom the responsibility falls for the conflict which followed and which ended in the Chancellor's dismissal. If we accept the theory of Delbrück, Bismarck, whether or not he foresaw his fall (as he certainly had good reasons for doing), resolved once more to stake on the issue of the crisis something beyond his continuance in office, while, at the same time, worsting the again recalcitrant

[1] As to the final measures on this head, see chap. VII, *post.*

Reichstag and checking the Socialist agitation in its most important sphere of action. The method of procedure was to be a drastic change in the electoral system of the Empire —in other words, the abolition of universal secret suffrage in elections for the *Reichstag*, and the consequent exclusion of the Social-democrats from the first and foremost of all political rights. Now, there can be no doubt whatever that this momentous step was in Bismarck's mind so far back as 1878[1], and that he recurred to his rooted opinion on the subject just before the critical elections of 1887 and in conversation with Hohenlohe late in 1889, as well as, retrospectively, after his fall. It is less certain, however, whether he intended to carry out the idea immediately, or to wait until the Crown should be forced to extremes by the resistance to its military proposals of the present (and, perhaps, of the next) *Reichstag*. And it seems hazardous to assume, with Delbrück, that he had worked out in his mind, and submitted to the Emperor, a complete chain or sequence of action—beginning with the provocation of excesses on the part of the Social-democrats, and proceeding to the proposal of an adequate military law in the *Reichstag*, the dissolution of that assembly after its rejection of the law in question, the issue of a proclamation by the Emperor with the approval of the other German sovereigns, and the substitution of open for secret voting, so as to mark out the Social-democrats and thus make possible the final step of excluding them from the use of the suffrage.

Whatever was the precise nature of Bismarck's final scheme, and the process by which he advised that it should be carried into execution, it was, according to the Emperor's own statement[2], declined by him on the ground that he was not prepared to begin his reign with violence, but would

[1] See his explicit statement of opinion in his letter to Tiedemann, *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol II, p. 190.

[2] To Hohenlohe; see *Denkwurdigkeiten*, vol. II, p. 468.

seek first to satisfy the well-founded grievances of the working-classes. Hence, the rescripts already noticed, put forth in contravention of Bismarck's opinion. The *coup d'état* was thus rejected or, at least, indefinitely adjourned; and a disagreement, in which the will of the sovereign had inevitably prevailed, had declared itself between him and his Minister on a subject of the greatest political gravity. An occasion was sure to arise for widening this disagreement into an open breach between them.

According to a Cabinet order of Frederick William IV, dated September 8th, 1852, the heads of Ministerial departments were not to present direct reports (*Immediatberichte*) to the sovereign without the consent of the President of the Ministry. This prohibition was felt by the Emperor to place a restriction on his autocratic power of acting on the report of a single Minister without consulting the head of the Government—although this restriction was manifestly necessary, if an administrative chaos was to be avoided. On March 4th, the Emperor (as he afterwards asserted, in conformity with Bismarck's advice that he should on occasion consult departmental Ministers—of course a very different thing from a system of 'immediate' reports) directed the President of the Ministry to draft a new Cabinet order abolishing that of 1852. The Ministry, when the matter was referred to them by Bismarck, agreed with him as to the necessity of maintaining the old Cabinet order; and, as a matter of fact, it remained in force after his fall.

But the breach was by this time palpable; and the relations between the Emperor and the Chancellor must have been already near a rupture when, on March 15th, the Emperor, on receiving Bismarck, reproached him with having, three days previously, granted an interview to the leader of the Centre, Windthorst, for the purpose of discussing the parliamentary situation with him. By requesting

that such a proceeding should not be repeated without his permission, the Emperor himself overstepped the line on the further side of which lies distrust—a distrust always pernicious, but unthinkable in the case of a servant of the Crown and State such as Bismarck.

This manifestation of distrust was the end of the story. On the following day, the Emperor sent the Chief of his Military Cabinet, General von Hahnke, with a high civil official, to offer the Chancellor the choice between drawing up the new Cabinet order and sending in his resignation. Bismarck's reply, after on the 17th consulting his colleagues as stated above, was to send in his resignation on the 18th, accompanied by a long document, elaborately explaining his reasons for his action. On the 20th, the Emperor accepted the resignation, in terms of grateful acknowledgment of Bismarck's services, more especially of his wise and vigorous pursuance of a policy of peace, and named him Duke of Lauenburg[1] and General-in-chief of the cavalry. On the 29th, he left Berlin for his seat of Friedrichsruh, a sympathetic multitude witnessing his departure.

The records of the remaining years of Bismarck's life have filled many volumes; and such were the quickness and versatility of his mind, his gifts of pregnant expression and pungent wit, together with his extraordinary power of exposing—as, in his active days, of exploiting—the weaknesses of others, that, wherever those volumes reproduce his own thoughts or sayings, they are never commonplace or dull. But these reminiscences—even his own masterly *Thoughts and Recollections*—are only supplementary to a synthetic narrative of the life's work of one of the most daring and most successful of modern statesmen. The influence exercised by him upon German political life in the period of his retirement, which there is no reason for

[1] Not, it would appear, as a hereditary dignity.

supposing him to have intended to be final, was critical only. At an early date in this period, he had secured the free use of the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, the leading newspaper of the great mercantile city at his door, for his lucubrations[1]. The comments on the transactions of the day in which he indulged, in this and other journals, were, in one way, of a piece with his conduct of business in the times of his public activity—that is to say, those of a man devoid of magnanimity in his dealings, by word or deed, with other men, and especially with those in any sense in rivalry with himself. Least of all did he show generosity towards his successor, Count von Caprivi; and the Emperor William II was within the mark in wondering what Bismarck would have thought of Arnim, had he in his day gone so far in his criticisms. How far this attitude was in harmony with loyalty to the throne, as Bismarck had of old been wont to conceive it, may be left undecided. In 1891, he was elected a member of the *Reichstag* (which had passed his dismissal by without notice); but he attended neither this assembly nor the *Herrenhaus* of the Prussian diet. In 1894 he was invited by the Emperor to Berlin on the occasion of the imperial birthday (January 27th), on the eve of which a personal meeting of a friendly kind took place between them. Prince Hohenlohe, after he had succeeded Caprivi as Chancellor, in October of the same year, took an early opportunity (January 1897) of paying a visit to Friedrichsruh. Bismarck's last interference in public affairs had been in the month of his first successor's resignation, when, in the second of two articles inspired by him, the *Hamburger Nachrichten* reminded—or rather informed—the world of the Russo-German Treaty of 1884, which had secured to Germany the neutrality of Russia in the event of an attack

[1] As to Bismarck's relations with the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, see *Biogr. Jahrbuch und deutscher Nekrolog*, vol. VII (1902), s.v. *Hartmeyer*.

upon the former by France, and which, in 1890, Caprivi had declined to renew. Hohenlohe and his Foreign Secretary, Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, upheld the action of the Government without reflecting on that of Bismarck; and Marschall even supported his defence with the courteous personal argument that, whereas Bismarck, while still in office, might have remained master of the situation created by the 'Re-insurance Treaty,' it was better for his successors to trust to the general advance of the good relations with Russia, which had been largely his work.

Thus far subservient to the political genius of the great Chancellor was the statesmanship of those upon whom his mantle had fallen. That to the German nation at large he should have become the object of an almost idolatrous devotion is not wonderful. In the eighty-fourth year of his age, on August 2nd, 1898—over seven years after the death of Moltke (April 24th, 1891)—he breathed his last.

Bismarck's name and fame are enduringly associated with the great achievement—the foundation of the new German Empire—which formed, at one time, the chosen purpose and then the crowning glory of his political career. He had not yet gone to his rest when a new generation had begun to denounce his shortsightedness and consequent shortcomings, indicating what obvious and necessary parts of the world he had left unconquered, and how, by the institution of universal suffrage and other mistakes, he had earned for himself the title of destroyer as well as that of founder of the Empire[1]. Such paradoxes may, or may not, continue to attract the attention of later generations. From another point of view, and in the true spirit of the historian, one of the foremost among his biographers has pointed out

[1] See O Helffs, *Deutschland's Aufgaben als Gross- und Weltmacht.* (Dresden and Leipzig, 1901.)

the difference between what he accomplished and what he desired to accomplish, and has balanced the great account in a few sentences worthy of them[1]. In the last thirty years of Bismarck's life, the fascination of his personality contributed not a little to render the position secured by him in the national temple of fame unique; and such it will remain, whatever be the destiny of the Empire which he created[2].

Bismarck, to begin with, was not an orator like Pitt and some other statesmen of his calibre; and, though in his parliamentary and other utterances he invariably went straight to the point, there was a certain hesitation, at times almost a stammer, in his speech. But, as is well known, this defect is not always a drawback to impressiveness; and his voice, ordinarily rather high, could at times be very effective in its tones. In debate he was usually invincible, as a dreadnought used to be in the days before submarines, and rarely failed to meet or to crush down the assaults of his adversaries—even, in most cases, the dexterous attacks of Windthorst, the critical thoroughness of Lasker and the

[1] See the conclusion of Max Lenz's essay on *Bismarck* in *Allg. D. Biogr.* vol. XLVI.

[2] For some of the sources whence the ensuing few notes have been drawn, see Bibliographies to the present vol. and vol. II, s. vv. *Bismarck*, *Abeken*, *Busch* and *Sidney Whitman*, besides Egelhaaf, and other generally accessible publications. In the analysis of the personality and influence of 'Ironsides' (Bismarck) which, in his work *The Tragic Comedians*, George Meredith puts into the mouth of 'Alvan' (Lassalle), it is said that his 'ideas are not many. The point to remember is that he is iron on them: he can drive them hard into the density of the globe.' The further remark, that 'he is certainly simple, not really cynical. His apparent cynicism is sheer irritability,' is ingenious, but open to question. Portrait for portrait, and nickname for nickname, there is as much point, and more humour, in the 'Zornebock' of Sir Robert Morier's less friendly *Fragment from Musaeus*, printed as Appendix B in vol. II of his *Memoirs*.

audacious persistence of Eugen Richter. Bismarck's temper, there can be no doubt, was passionate, and he was by nature highly nervous. Yet it may be doubted whether, but for this passionate temper, he could have made his will prevail on critical occasions, and whether his nervousness was not part of that uncontrollable desire to conquer which made it seemingly impossible to withstand him. Except in the presence of his sovereign, he rarely took pains to conceal this desire; and, even in his dealings with the Emperor William I, the moderation and the patience exhibited by him were, by his own confession, among the severest efforts he ever imposed upon himself. On manifold occasions of importance, he, as has been seen, sought refuge in the expedient of tendering his resignation, if he could not have his way; Thiers, who had a sincere admiration for him, in this respect took a leaf out of his book. From others he could not bear contradiction; and his jealous disposition was continually resenting a supposed recalcitrance against his authority, if not a deep-laid intrigue against his continuance in power.

It has been seen how the Empress Augusta's inconvenient habit of pressing, as well as forming, her own opinions, irritated 'the great man' or 'our most gracious Chancellor,' as she, with injudicious irony, called him; if he was similarly suspicious of the Crown-princess (afterwards Empress Victoria) it was not with the same degree of intensity; and, in general, so faithful a colleague of his as Roon regarded his complaints of the feminine influences which thwarted him as a hallucination. With the Crown-prince (Emperor Frederick III) he was on satisfactory terms in the latter part of his public career—the result, though Bismarck had no high opinion of the Prince's capacity as a statesman, of the magnanimous aid extended by him at difficult moments to the Chancellor's policy. How he hunted down Arnim can never be omitted from a

narrative of his public life; and, perhaps on not very different grounds, his feelings were not much more amicable towards Count F. zu Eulenburg. Lesser men who had offended him, such as Geffcken and Gruner, he could not pardon; and he had no toleration for the independence of action assumed, in different ways, by Stosch and Thile. One of the most uncompromising adherents of his policy, Treitschke, wrote of him to Gustav Freytag in 1877: 'Bismarck cannot tolerate independent natures by his side, and I would advise no friend of mine to put his head into the noose.'

In the company of princes and magnates he felt weariness of soul; when his sovereign wished him to confer with a company of the kind at Versailles, he declared that he would gladly have been rid of 'gentry with whom he had to begin by administering a preliminary course of Becker's *Weltgeschichte*.' More serious were the relations, generally uncomfortable and at times much worse, between himself and the General Staff, its illustrious chief and the whole military *clique*. During the Austro-Prussian campaign, he was admitted to the discussions of the Council of War—not so in the Franco-German conflict; and there is abundant evidence that this unsatisfactory state of things continued after the Peace, and that the Chancellor's aversion from *le troupier*, as he called the military element in the State, was anything but transient. This did not have the effect of rendering him attached to the civil bureaucracy: he devotes a chapter of his *Recollections* to his not very harmonious relations with the several Departments of State and his dislike of legislation originating in the Government offices. In the case of H. von Stephan alone, the celebrated organiser of the German Post Office, the ability and energy, perhaps also the congenial arbitrariness, of this great official seem to have exercised their attraction upon the Minister-in-chief.

It cannot be averred that he treated many of his

colleagues with that kind of confidence which adds strength even to the strongest head of a Government; although exceptions would have to be noted in any generalisation on this head in the instance of Roon, and in those of Delbrück and Falk, so long as his policy continued to be in agreement with theirs. When he had fallen, he, as it seems unjustly, suspected K. H. von Bötticher, who in home affairs had been invaluable to him, and F. von Holstein, the depositary of so many secrets of the Foreign Office, of having played him false. Ambassadors of other Powers he did not go out of his way to make welcome individually, in later years generally leaving the secretaries or under-secretaries of State to carry on business with them, and in the signal instance of Gontaut-Biron almost ostentatiously avoiding all personal contact. But to a preference once determined he was staunch; and Lord Ampthill (Odo Russell) received almost as many of his confidences as Keudell or 'Buschlein.' Foreign Ministers of friendly States he in some instances regarded with frank aversion. Gortchakoff in the latter part of his career was detested by him; and, when Lord Derby became Secretary for the Colonies at a critical season, Bismarck showed that he had not forgotten the Lord Stanley of the days of the Luxemburg Treaty. How little, on the other hand, he allowed personal or party ties to influence either his foreign or his home policy has been sufficiently seen; his old intimacy with H. H. von Kleist-Retzow made no difference in his bearing towards the Old-conservatives; his lifelong friendship with the Free-conservative Moritz von Blanckenburg it was easier to keep up.

It was, then, in itself and through himself that Bismarck's influence upon friends, colleagues and followers, and upon his compatriots at large, was so resistless. Not, of course, that his personality was without its genial side. The art of conversation he possessed to perfection; and he was convivial even in his backwoods at Varzin. Nowhere was

he so thoroughly himself as in the intimacy of hearth and home; the devotion of his wife was absolute, and the unselfish affection of his eldest son was true to him in both prosperity and adversity[1]. His vivacity of mind and elasticity of thought were almost as remarkable as were his clearness of purpose and his strength of will. He has, as Abeken, himself a scholar and an author, tells us, been wrongly classed among those who have learnt nothing from books. There must have been periods in his life when he read largely; and his knowledge, especially of legal and political history, was very considerable—not desultory, but systematic and coherent. In *belles-lettres*, he was not specially well read, but even here his good memory served him, and he was certainly apt in quotation. It should be remembered that, before he became envoy at the Frankfort Diet, he had had no diplomatic training whatever, and no official experience except among the Pomeranian dykes.

Bismarck has been credited with the invention of the 'new diplomacy'; and, curiously enough, it was in the year (1862) when he became responsible for the foreign policy of Prussia that Disraeli, after the first personal meeting between them, wrote about him: 'Take care of that man. He means what he says[2].' But, although he always kept in view the end which he proposed to himself, the way he took towards it was, as is allowed by his faithful Abeken, often oblique, and indeed crooked; and, though he was always ready to disclose his ultimate purpose, he was not similarly prepared to reveal the means whereby he intended to accomplish it. His craftiness was on a par with his

[1] Nothing delighted him more than the reception of Count Herbert Bismarck in England, whither he was sent on two confidential missions, and where he fulfilled the primary function of a diplomatist by creating a favourable first impression as 'a chip o' the old block' (Dilke, vol. I, p 432) He was dismissed from office a week after his father.

[2] Buckle's *Life of Lord Beaconsfield*, vol. IV, p. 341.

strength; and the obligations which he acknowledged as incumbent upon himself and his State were those of 'real' necessity, not of word or document. *Ultra posse nemo obligatur* is a principle which, as he asserts[1], no treaty undertaking can invalidate; and German statesmanship has not failed to bear the reservation in mind.

Thus it was that, by putting his destiny and his country's to the touch, and by facing from the outset the ultimate appeal to 'blood and iron,' he accomplished the great work of his life. Towards the close of 1863, the British statesman just cited was of opinion that, in certain circumstances, Prussia might naturally lend itself to partition. Instead of its falling to pieces, Bismarck's policy had before long secured to it that hegemony upon which the foundation of the new German Empire depended; and, within a few years, the Empire itself was established. The constitutional edifice was in so far his work that he directed and watched over its construction with anxious care, providing safeguards against internal jealousy as well as against dangers from without. Yet for constitutional rights and parliamentary liberties he had neither respect nor solicitude[2]; and his success in foreign politics was so much greater than that in domestic, and his conduct of the latter so much more capricious, because in them he had so much more to learn as he proceeded with his task. The sphere of action in which he attained to the fulness of achievement was not unlimited either in width or in height. His attitude towards German colonial enterprise came to be wholly favourable; but the

[1] *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol II, pp 249–50

[2] His unbosomings to Lord Ampthill on this head were not altogether consistent with one another, and he certainly envied the freedom of speech allowed in the British Parliament; but he may be taken to have spoken his innermost mind when he said that he 'disapproved of parliamentary government, Liberal principles and free trade for Germany, and deplored their effects on England' (*Life of Lord Granville*, vol. II, p. 233).

course into which German 'world policy' entered soon after his fall excited in him grave apprehensions. If he had no care for the old-established political systems such as the balance of power, neither was he haunted by any ideas of a common European interest or visions of altering for the better the course of the world. He derided the paradox of his being charged with the duty of making France happy; he was willing, to the last, to let the development of German foreign policy wait upon that of Prussian; and he never relaxed that jealous vigilance towards the designs of the Polish nationality which had been the moving cause of his undertaking the struggle with the pretensions of the Church of Rome, and which a more wide-hearted policy might have inclined him to seek different means of setting at rest[1]. On the other hand, he had no designs of making Germany mistress of central Europe at large; and of universal monarchy for Germany he dreamt as little as of universal peace for the world. Although Germany might alter, the world would remain much what it was, after he had passed away. All pacifications are provisional; the political relations between mutually independent Powers are formed, in an everlasting flux, either by war or by one or the other side shrinking from the renewal of war[2]. Such was the most definite conclusion he drew from the mighty part he had himself played in the history of his nation and of his epoch.

[1] As to his reception at Varzin in 1895 of a deputation representing German interests in Posen and West Prussia which afterwards found expression in the foundation of the Association of the German eastern Marks (*Ostmarkenverein*), see *Biographisches Jahrbuch*, etc. vol. v (1903), p. 250, s.v. *Hansemann, Ferdinand von.*

[2] *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol. II, pp. 135–6.

CHAPTER VI

GERMAN SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE, 1850–1900

It is proposed in the present chapter to note some of the more striking features of German intellectual life during what may be roughly set down as the latter half of the nineteenth century. The chief phenomena of this life were, as a matter of course, largely affected by the political experiences of the nation, and, as these continued to grow in range and effect, came to be, in ever increasing proportions, absorbed by its political, together with its economic and social, interests and activities. None of these, however, could, at least in the period of history now in question, entirely determine the course of Germany's intellectual progress or decline; nor could national character and individual genius fail to assert their claims as cooperating factors in the intellectual results achieved.

No attempt is necessary here to furnish, or discuss, exact and complete statistics of the wonderful growth of the population of Germany (exclusive of Austria), which, in the forty years before 1855, had risen from nearly twenty-five to over thirty-six millions, but, by 1905, increased to over sixty[1]. It must, however, be remembered that a total population

[1] According to Roscher, *Gesch. d. National-Œkonomik in D.* p. 1004, the average population of a (German) square mile in 1871–2 was in Germany 4154 souls, as against 3760 in France, and in Great Britain 5329. In the Rhenish provinces of Prussia it was 7349; in Saxony 9362.

representing the influences of German origin and upbringing, and of the ideas, sentiments and habits of mind implanted by them, must be calculated on a different basis. About the turn of the century, this wider total included, in the first place, besides considerably more than nine millions of Germans in the Cis-Leithanian and two millions in the Trans-Leithanian divisions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the German element in the Baltic Provinces of Russia and (without reckoning the natives of the German Swiss Cantons) the 200,000 Germans, or thereabouts, permanently or temporarily resident in other European countries. And it further included, at a moderate estimate, the twelve millions, or thereabouts, settled as colonists or traders in other continents—a background, so to speak, of kinship not to be ignored in times of peace, and a tremendous asset for the event of a European, and the remoter one of a world-war. Emigration to the United States of America, which had reached its height in 1881–2, had since diminished in volume from something like a quarter of a million to between 30,000 and 40,000 souls annually. A large proportion of these emigrants came from the poorer east of Germany, no longer from the Black Forest and the Rhinelands. But the general outpour, which during the following decade is reckoned as averaging about 130,000 a year, extended over a much wider area (Africa, South America, Australasia and Asia), while a considerable portion of these colonists or traders belonged to the middle classes of the mother-country[1].

[1] The figures given here are mainly taken from H. Lichtenberger, *Germany and its Evolution in Modern Times* (translated from the French by A. M. Ludovici, 1913), to which volume the present chapter is otherwise indebted. For an interesting account of German emigration to North America, and of the history of the German element in the United States, from the latter part of the seventeenth century onwards, see H. Oncken's essay on the subject in vol. I of *Histor.-polit. Aufsatze u. Reden* (1914).

It may be added that a notable moral as well as material influence was exercised by gradual changes in the social condition of the country. Until not long before the middle of the century, Germany had been mainly an agricultural country with home industries; but the continuous industrial and commercial advance, which then began, developed after the war of 1870–1 with extraordinary rapidity. Within the half-century ending in 1900, the proportions between country and town population greatly altered. In 1850, the inhabitants of towns (of 2000 or more inhabitants) were under 30, but in 1900, they exceeded 54, per cent.; and that the inevitable change went no further, was due to the vigilant resistance offered to it, especially through the financial policy ultimately adopted by the Government.

This increase of population, its transfer to larger centres at home, and its spread abroad, very naturally begat a sense of national strength different from the old Prussian patriotism, though not antagonistic to or exclusive of it. In the place of an inherited sentiment, of which the central motive was loyal devotion to the dynasty on the throne, there was now growing up a strong and enduring sense of national unity, finally achieved under the personal leadership of a hereditary monarch, and in adherence to the principle of hereditary monarchy, which no parliamentary institutions could impair. Though Prussia was not 'merged in Germany,' loyalty to the King and then to the Emperor was becoming the symbol of a vast national ambition, which could not but continue to expand and, in course of time, to run into extravagant aspirations. The origins of 'Pangermanism,' afterwards conjoined with further movements for colonial extension and with new tendencies of German foreign policy, may, no doubt, be traced further back than even to the period of Bismarck's sway; but he and those who supported him were strangers to any such ideals, and they will be most appropriately noted later.

Meanwhile, the sense of national—or, why not say imperial?—solidarity was further fostered by the system of universal military service, of which the gradual advance has, in its principal steps, been followed in these volumes. Even before the victories gained in the field, and the political results directly attributable to them, had caused national pride to assert itself gradually in a national character of which it had hitherto not been a dominant element, the extension and consolidation of the military system exercised a powerful influence in that direction. On the one hand, this system confirmed the readiness for obedience—the instinct for discipline, if the phrase be preferred—in small things as in great, inbred in the race through its history; and, on the other hand, it fostered that cult of the army and of all things military which, even in the earlier half of the nineteenth century, had been, virtually, confined to certain classes, but which now pervaded all, except a section of the learned world and a large number, though by no means the whole body, of working-men. It would be not less unjust to identify the growth of German national patriotism with the gradual spread of the Prussian army system through non-Austrian Germany, than it would be mistaken to fall in with Gustav Freytag's delusion that universal military service made for peace—as if it had been a system designed, like the Swiss, purely for national defence. Nevertheless, the fact is patent that the consolidation of the German national army was propitious to that of the German nation. After victory had descended upon the German arms in more and more resplendent guise, it became inevitable that, besides acquiring a potent influence over the whole course of the national policy, militarism should, in ever increasing circles, overflow the soil of the national mind, and that other dreams than those of intellectual mastery should haunt the imagination of even the rising generation. True, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as a novelist of genius has noted in

his masterpiece[1], the worship of force, together with that of wealth, usurped the place of loftier ideals in the youth—and not in the youth only—of vanquished France as well as in that of victorious Germany. But it is to the latter that our attention is here confined. In Germany, during the later years of the century, the overwhelming power of force and the all but irresistible contagion of wealth were called into play with an effect not indeed altogether unprecedented, but both severally and in their combination unparalleled, in the earlier history of the nation. The victories of 1864, 1866 and 1870 impressed upon it the conviction that there was but one guarantee of the security of its frontiers, the unity of its States, and the greatness of its Empire—the success of the national arms; and the last of these *anni mirabiles* was the first of the 'promoters' years' (the *Gründerjahre*), during which the milliards flowed in from across the Rhine, and trade and industry were at a loss where to find an outlet for the sudden burst of enterprise and activity. Gradually (after an almost unavoidable crash had been overcome), but at the same time unmistakably, German trade and industry obtained a grip over Europe and the world, of which, notwithstanding the wonder and the jealousy awakened by their progress, neither they nor other nations perhaps had a full conception till the great upheaval of the present war. Taken as a whole, this advance has been well described[2] as due, not even so much to the military victories of 1866 and 1870, and to the subsequent unification of the greater part of Germany, as to the gradual growth in an educated people of capacity for collective action.

But national prosperity, like other kinds of good fortune, is never unattended by its drawbacks. The desire for the good things of the earth, and for material enjoyment in

[1] See Romain Rolland, *Jean-Christophe*, vol x; *La Fin du Voyage* (1912), *ad in*

[2] By Sidney Whitman, *German Memories* (1912), p. 372.

every shape and form, increased with the multiplication of opportunities for satisfying it, and was only kept under where the cost of living advanced at a greater rate than the facility of making a livelihood. The modest frugality which had long been one of the attendant charms of German social relations gave way with astonishing rapidity, as the years went on, to a rather obvious study of domestic 'comfort' (long supposed to be a specifically English notion) and to the flaming demands of luxury; though, where *Gemütlichkeit* went out at the door, refinement and good taste did not necessarily come in through the window. It would be folly to make a whole nation responsible for such inevitable consequences of victory and prosperity; but it would be worse than folly to ignore them, or to deny that militarism and materialism combined in helping to fix the new standards of German social life.

The growth of private expenditure and of self-indulgent ways of life was further advanced by the amassing of large fortunes as the product of financial speculation and commercial and industrial enterprise. Reference has already been made[1] to the earlier effects of the growing ascendancy of Capitalism and of the struggle waged against it by, or on behalf of, Labour; but the continuance of these conditions must not be left out of sight in any survey, however perfunctory, of the social changes in the Germany of the latter half of the nineteenth century. They made themselves perceptible, as will be noted below, in contemporary German literature as well as in politics; and they were by no means confined to the classes on whose support the Socialist movement mainly, though in Germany by no means exclusively, relied. During the last quarter of the century the progress of Socialism was steady, in spite of the special legislation against the excesses with which the movement as a whole had been too hastily identified. The so-called Socialist

[1] Vol. I, pp 337–8, *ante*.

law[1], periodically renewed, remained in force till 1890. But the attempt made, in 1899, to render it permanent having broken down, later proposals to revive it in a different form, as will be seen, proved unsuccessful, and were finally abandoned as unnecessary or unwise. Meanwhile, the antidote of a Christian-Socialist workmen's party, devised in 1878 by the Court-preacher Adolf Stöcker, an able and eloquent fanatic, the sincerity of whose intentions there seems no reason for doubting, in conjunction with a tailor of the name of Grünwald, achieved no striking success; and in 1878, Stöcker joined the Conservatives, his fraction now taking the composite name of the Christian-Conservative-anti-Semite-Petty-citizens' (*Kleinbürger*) party[2].

One link in this queer chain of epithets calls for explanation. An incidental, but very noticeable, accompaniment of that accumulation of capital in a few hands against which Socialism was a standing protest, was the increased importance of the 'Semite' element in the life of the nation. The Jews had been freed—in Prussia by the edict of 1810, in other parts of Germany more gradually through the noble efforts of Gabriel Riesser[3] and others—from most of the legal, and many of the social, restrictions which had long survived as a barbarous inheritance from the Middle Ages. They continued to occupy a prominent place in the economic system of the country, and in the social life of its great towns, although their share in the possession of capital, in this as in earlier periods of

[1] Cf. pp 113-14, *ante*.

[2] I can only refer in a note to the 'Christian-social Junior Movement' out of which Friedrich Naumann and his friends in course of time developed the National-social Association, an interesting endeavour, designed to transform Socialism into a party of national reform. The organ in the press of the whole movement was *Die Hilfe*; but as a political effort it came to an end in 1903, when Naumann and his followers joined the Advanced Liberals (*Freisinn*).

[3] As to Riesser (*ob.* 1863) see A. Stern's essay on him in *Reden, Vorträge*, etc. (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914)

German history, has probably been overestimated[1]. Apart from the special conditions of the Jewish problem in the Polish parts of the Prussian monarchy and on its eastern frontier in general, a process was beginning, both in Germany and elsewhere, by which, especially in the higher classes of society, Judaism came to blend more easily with its surroundings. Thus, so to speak, the bottom was being driven out of the endeavour to repress the Jewish element, till at last its submergence came to be discussed as a more likely issue than the subjugation by it of the remaining population. But this conclusion was not reached without a struggle, and modern Anti-Semitism, which had begun about 1879, reached its height in the last decade of the nineteenth century.

Up to about 1880, the agitation of which Stöcker was the protagonist had directed itself principally against the Jewish 'corruption' of Berlin; then, it was carried into several parts of Hesse, and the eastern provinces of Prussia, where it largely took the form of a defence of the peasantry, while in Saxony it professed to aim at the protection of the

[1] See R. Wassermann's essay, *The Jews and Commercial Life*, in *Preuss Jahrb* vol CXLIX, 2 (August 1912), and F. Rachfahl's criticism, *ib.* vol. CXLVII, 2 (January 1912), of W. Sombart's *The Jews and Modern Capitalism* (Engl Tr, 1913) Rachfahl gives some curious statistics as to the numbers of Jews in Prussia in successive periods of the nineteenth century, and of the numbers, during the last thirty years of it, of Jewish converts to Christianity at Berlin, as compared with Vienna, where Anti-Semitism raged most violently. I find elsewhere that, in 1900, the Jewish population in all Germany amounted to 587,000 as against 568,000 in 1890. There had been a decrease in East Prussia and in most other parts of Germany, and an increase in Berlin, Brandenburg, Saxony and Bremen But in the rate of increase there had been a marked diminution. It may perhaps be noted that the high percentage of Jews in Austria-Hungary is recognised as a possible difficulty in the way of the contemplated 'Central Europe' union by Naumann in his wellknown work (Engl. Tr., pp. 76–7).

middle class. Social reforms, including a Sunday rest of at least thirty-six hours, were demanded; and in 1881 there were Anti-Semite riots at Stettin. The movement had been already deprecated by the Crown-prince Frederick William; it was now also censured by Minister von Puttkamer and by Bismarck. But public excitement was kept up by the Xanten case (a charge of 'ritual' murder of the true medieval type) in 1891; and in the same year an association was formed for the suppression of Anti-Semitism. Its supporters were, however, strong enough to pose in the *Reichstag* as a faction, which in 1893 numbered sixteen members. Their programme included the prohibition of Jewish immigration and the exclusion of Jews from responsible public office Though the agitation continued, and even spread to Bavaria, it gradually waned as a political interlude and in 1898 merged into the so-called Middle-class movement. Even another 'Jewish murder' case, at Konitz in 1901, could not effectively revive militant Anti-Semitism. Meanwhile, the alliance between Stöcker and the Conservative ultras had been for some time dissolved, with the approval of the Emperor William, who had 'always predicted this result.'

To resume. What had really fitted the nation for the great future which blood and iron had at last won for it, and for the assumption and utilisation of the inheritance now in its possession, had not been, only or mainly, the excellence of the model Prussian army or civil administration, systematically disciplined, from Frederick the Great and his father onwards, to obedience, to efficiency and to the use of organisation and forethought. The intellectual advance of the nation as a whole, in default of which the military and general administrative system of the Empire, however elaborately organised, would have been like a tree without sap, was the result of the culture—or (to avoid a term which has come to have an exasperating sound) of the education—

imparted to the nation, in both school and life, by scholarships and learning, by literature, art and science, in every branch of knowledge and research concerned with things human or divine.

The influence of the spread of education in the narrower as well as in the more comprehensive sense of the term—of the organisation and re-organisation of instruction in all its grades and branches, and of the general advancement both of knowledge and of the faculty of using that knowledge which are the products of instruction, whether in or out of school or university—cannot be more than indicated in a brief and necessarily cursory survey. We may, however, claim permission to trace its beginnings further back than the middle of the century. The general rate of progress may be gathered from the example of Prussia, where during the years from 1882 to 1901 the total of school-children had nearly quintupled, while, within sixty years from 1835, the number of secondary (including higher technical) schools had nearly septupled, and, in the half-century from 1850 onwards, the total of university students had more than trebled. The variety of the directions pursued by this educational advance is not less striking than the width of its range; and both reflect themselves, not only in a pedagogic literature of which the quantity would have taken away the breath of Basedow, but in an energy of organisation that would have filled Pestalozzi with wonder. Theories of education must not occupy us here; but it is impossible to ignore the enduring effects upon educational life in Germany, and upon the spirit which pervaded it, of the philosophical, and in particular of the pedagogic writings of Johann Friedrich Herbart (*ob.* 1841), a true humanist in every sense of the term. Though he was interested in politics, he, on principle, took no part in them. (He was a professor at Göttingen in 1837, the year of the 'Seven.') A statue was erected to him at his native place, Oldenburg, so recently as 1876.

As to primary, or elementary, instruction a few words must suffice. Its universal, because compulsory, character was an inheritance of long standing, not a principle introduced by the new Empire. Indeed, this and other branches of education were alike regulated, not by imperial legislation, but by the laws or ordinances of the particular States, which in every case reserved to themselves the supreme control of the system approved by them. About the end of the nineteenth century, elementary education had progressed to such an extent in Germany that the percentage of persons unable to write was not more than 0·05, whereas in Great Britain it was 1 and in France 4 per cent. In Prussia the organisation of the primary schools was perfected by the General Regulations of 1872, which with great precision divided them into schools with several classes under a single master, schools with two classes and two masters and schools with several classes and several masters. In addition to the schools within this elaborate network, a considerable number gradually formed themselves whose teaching went beyond the ordinary range of the *Volksschule*, without reaching that of the secondary school, and which in Prussia came to be called *Mittelschulen* (Middle schools)[1]. In these, as systematised by a special regulation of much more recent date (1910), the learning of a foreign language was made obligatory, while that of a second foreign language in the upper classes was left optional. Apart from these 'middle schools,' boys and girls, on leaving school at the end of the fourteenth year of their age, were encouraged, but not, except in certain States or provinces, compelled, by the law of the State, the municipality or the commune, to attend what in England we should call 'continuation' schools; and it is characteristic that stress was laid, in the interests of

[1] See Dr K. Knabe's useful summary of modern German school-work in the collective publication *Deutschland als Weltmacht*, which appeared at Berlin (n. d) about 1910. From this essay or from Lichtenberger, the statistics in the text are taken.

the State, upon the continued instruction of boys in the interval between the ordinary period of school attendance and the commencement of military service. These continuation schools, partly intended to prolong the course of general education, partly describable as lower technical schools, must be distinguished from the higher technical schools, which were included in the framework of secondary, or even in that of higher, education.

The German secondary school system, like that of other European countries, in the latter half of the nineteenth century passed through a series of phases from which it can hardly be said even now to have emerged as completely settled[1]. During nearly the whole of this period, the principal feature of its history is the contention between the old learning (as it might now, though inaccurately, be called) and the new. In other words, it was to be found in the rivalry between the study of the classical languages and literatures, and that of modern languages, and of mathematical and physical science,—between the study following humanistic ideals and that seeking to meet what might be described as, primarily, realistic demands. The struggle had, of course actually begun at a much earlier date than the middle of the

[1] What follows is essentially based on the standard work of F. Paulsen, *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitaten*, etc., 2nd edition, vol II, pp 439 ff It is difficult to appraise too highly the value of this work for the history of German education or to refuse a tribute of admiration to the power and ardour of the author's ideas as to the future—in whatever measure one may find oneself in agreement with them. (His *obiter dicta* in this volume concerning the condition of the English Universities are, however, singularly incorrect; Paulsen's work contains a very valuable bibliography. See also the same author's *German Education Past and Present* (Eng Tr by T Lorenz, 1908) An interesting sketch of the progress of German education in the nineteenth century, more especially as compared with that of England, was contributed by Vice-Chancellor M. E Sadler to *Germany in the Nineteenth Century*, an admirable collection of Lectures published at Manchester in 1912.

nineteenth century, and in Prussia it had entered on a new stage with the accession of Frederick William IV in 1840. The romanticism which pervaded his educational as well as his religious and political ideas and aims encouraged a reaction, from the expansive tendencies of secondary school instruction, towards concentration; and, since this must necessarily be upon classical studies, classical teaching was fostered more and more eagerly than ever, the Thuringian Schulpforta continuing, with the Saxon 'princely foundations' (of Meissen and Grimma), to be upheld as the luminous exemplar of sound scholastic training. At the same time, its range was more and more conscientiously narrowed. Under the influence of the great textual scholar F. W. Ritschl (of whom a further word below), the training of consummate classical philologers became the essential purpose of classical teaching. Yet it was held far from impossible to blend philological humanistic training with wholesome instruction in Christian dogma. Thus, the characteristic features of the educational system—more especially in its secondary branch—presided over by J. A. F. Eichhorn[1] (1840–1848), as Minister of Public Worship and Education, with G. Eilers as his chief councillor and prophet, united against it the followers of the long dominant Hegelian philosophy and the devotees of the natural sciences, who already looked upon themselves as the heirs of the future, in addition to the scholars who had no stomach for an infusion of Christian precept into their cherished classical studies.

The revolutionary years 1848 and 1849, as a matter of course, interfered with the classical reaction that had formed a main part of the general reaction during Eichhorn's detested *régime*. But an attempt made by his successor, A. von Ladenberg, to give legal force to the reforms now proposed for broadening the basis of secondary education fell through

[1] Cf. vol. I, pp. 206, 314 *et al*, *ante*.

with other efforts of Liberalism[1]. In 1850, K. O. von Raumer became head of the Department of Public Worship and Education, which he administered on much the same lines as Eichhorn, but with a prudent eye to actualities, and a primary attention to political, rather than spiritual, methods and results. His chief councillor, Ludwig Wiese, who filled the same office under his successor H. von Muhler (1862–1872), was thus head of the secondary schools branch of the Prussian Education Office for nearly a quarter of a century —from 1852 to 1875. Wiese, while in sympathy with the purpose of the 'Christian gymnasia' favoured by King Frederick William IV, was adverse to any attempt to insist on the notion (by no means a novel one) of antagonism between humanism and Christianity: the aims of both might well be simultaneously kept in view, while the overthrow of the ascendancy of classical studies would, clearly, not be to the advantage of those conservative principles which centred in positive religious beliefs[2]. Thus, while Prussian educational policy in this period of reaction refrained from the extreme processes adopted by Vilmar in Electoral Hesse[3], it was distinctly anti-revolutionary in design; and in this sense the new Scheme of Instruction (*Lehrplan*) for secondary schools was, in 1856, drawn up and promulgated. In the gymnasia, the attempts at combining simplification with the attainment of at least a *modicum* of efficiency were intended to

[1] Curiously enough, in Austria, the course of whose educational life cannot be pursued here, the changes due to the Revolution had an enduring effect. Secondary education was definitively freed from Jesuit control, and under the enlightened Education Minister, Count Leo Thun (1849–60), with the aid, successively, of Franz Exner and Hermann Bonitz, the secondary school system was renovated on more modern lines. In Bavaria and Wurttemberg, too, there was progress.

[2] Wiese's *Letters on English Education* (Engl. Tr. by L. Schmitz, 1877) were widely read in Germany.

[3] As to Vilmar, the eminent literary historian and ecclesiastical adviser of Hassenpflug, cf. vol. II, p. 3, *ante*, and see p. 232, *post*.

secure the benefits, without the defects, of the old conservative system; but the total result was unsatisfactory. While the old specific drill, intended to produce thorough classical scholarship, had been abandoned, no adequate freer and fuller method of classical training had been substituted; and no attempt had been made to permeate the whole system with the religious spirit on the importance of which so much stress continued to be laid. Moreover, as Wiese himself recognised, a marked shortcoming of the new plan was the failure to allow room for the development of individuality in the pupils. This failure is significant, in view of the increased responsibilities which the expansion of the national life was to impose upon the rising generation; but the blame of it should be laid, less upon particular reforms or reformers than upon the repressive influences inseparable from the still continuing political reaction.

The 'New Era,' which began in 1857 with the regency of the Prince of Prussia, followed by his accession to the throne as King William I, introduced Moritz August von Bethmann-Hollweg as the new Minister of Public Worship and Education, which office he held till 1861. Inasmuch as he was both a true Liberal and devoted to the advancement of Christian effort, great things were expected of him Nothing, however, came of his comprehensive scheme for the re-organisation of the entire system of primary and secondary instruction; but, in the course of his tenure of office, a definite point was reached in the struggle of the classical gymnasia to retain their historic monopoly. Since 1819, when the design of providing secondary teaching for boys not destined for the university had first been taken in hand, a new species of schools, called *Realschulen*, had gradually come into existence. These were not technical schools[1], but schools intended, in

[1] To the lower technical schools reference has already been made. Of the higher, some were special places of learning of much earlier origin *Berg-* and *Forstakademien* (schools of forestry and mining)

coordination with the gymnasia, to furnish an education which would be useful in practical life, without professing to prepare for university study; Latin was, accordingly, not excluded. The fight for their establishment was long, and nowhere was the opposition to them more tenacious than in Prussia; nor was it until 1850 that an ordinance established a regular system of instruction and examinations in *Realschulen* and higher municipal schools (*höhere Bürgerschulen*). This system, being of the nature of a compromise (Latin was included in all classes, French in all but the lowest, English in the three highest, with ample provision for mathematical, historical and geographical, and some for natural science teaching), gave no satisfaction on either side, the classicists objecting to its multiplicity, and the realists to its dissociation from the universities, pupils of such schools not being admitted there till 1870, and then only through a side-door.

In 1862, H. von Mühler became head of the Department of Public Worship and Education, a Minister, as has been already seen, of a far narrower type than Bethmann-Hollweg[1]. He held the office, in the face of a, possibly in part undeserved, unpopularity, till 1872, when, with the appointment of P. L. A. Falk, a new spirit came over Prussian educational

and the like Others were large polytechnic institutions, of which Carlsruhe, which owed its origin to the efforts of List and Nebenius, was the first (1825) and one of the most important Both these species, which also trained teachers in their subjects, were on a university rather than a secondary school level Leaving aside the polytechnic school at Zurich, the higher Carlsruhe standard was soonest reached by the technical schools at Stuttgart (1840), Hanover (1847), Dresden (1851) and Brunswick (1862) For these and further developments, culminating in the full establishment of the Berlin technical high school, which in 1884 migrated to Charlottenburg, see F. Seiler's useful *Geschichte des deutschen Unterrichtwesens* (Goschen series), vol II (1906), pp 90 ff.

[1] As to Muhler, see vol. II, pp 77, 328 and the present volume, pp 40 and 47.

life. Undoubtedly, this change was part of that which, in Germany at large, was due to the growth of national self-confidence after the great victories of 1870–1. It manifested itself in a quickened activity in all spheres of educational life, from the universities to the elementary schools, but in no respect more signally than in the extension of technical teaching, on the basis of a general preparatory training[1]. In Prussia, the most palpable immediate change was that the Ministry presided over by Falk no longer regarded itself as sworn to the dictates of ecclesiastical authority; though personally a man of religious principles, he looked upon religion as the personal concern of every individual[2]. And, whatever judgment may be passed on his policy as to the relations between State and Church or Churches, the effect of his educational administration was certainly not to depress the moral influence of religion. In 1875, Wiese was succeeded at the Education Office by Hermann Bonitz, the creator, in 1849 at Vienna, of the so-called '*unity gymnasium*,' which sought to combine on a footing of equality humanistic and 'real' instruction; and his educational activity at Berlin was directed to substituting for the principle of 'concentration' in secondary schools that of the most comprehensive general culture that could be imparted In 1882, when Gossler[3] was at the head of the Department, the whole system of secondary instruction was re-organised on clear and definite lines. It was henceforth to comprise the gymnasium and the 'real' (or semi-classical) gymnasium—each with a progymnasium of its own—an upper 'real' school in connexion with the higher municipal school, and a 'real' school without Latin teaching. In every part of this sevenfold classification, it was endeavoured to make instruction more thorough; and, while discouraging the merely linguistic study

[1] This is admirably put by Sadler, *loc. cit.* pp. 111 ff.

[2] As to Falk, cf. pp. 58 ff., *ante*.

[3] As to Gossler, cf pp. 77 ff., *ante*.

of the classics, it was sought to secure increased attention for mathematics, natural sciences and modern languages. Yet, even so, the more advanced reformers were not contented, complaining of the insufficiency of the time allowed for the teaching of modern languages, and of the refusal to treat the curriculum of the 'real' gymnasium as directly leading up to university study. In general, the new system was accused of overburdening the learners; and the old 'school war'—the contention between classicists and 'realists'—was not yet at an end.

Thus, yet another change of system, and this, in at least one respect, the most momentous of all, has to be noted in the history of German secondary education in this long period of conflict. In 1890, a school conference met at Berlin, composed after a fashion which seemed to bode ill for moderate progress, inasmuch as the assembly was packed with supporters of the classical gymnasia, to whom were added a few representatives of the Latinless 'real' schools. Upon the conference, stated to have been summoned at the suggestion of the new Emperor William II, that monarch descended in person, with a speech in which he declared that (as known to him from his own experience) the gymnasia of the past lacked a national basis, but that at the same time he took exception to the 'real' gymnasia as a half-and-half concern. Upon the resolutions adopted by the conference, which were regarded by the imperial reformer as amounting to the adoption of his counsels, the Regulations of 1892 were substantially founded. They announced the beginning in Prussian secondary education of a fresh era, which bade a final farewell to the principle of concentration. In the gymnasia proper, the study of German in all its branches—including the national history—now became the most important subject, though not in the actual number of class-hours allotted to it, or claiming, as classics had of old, exclusive possession of the field. The study of classical

literature had become one of mainly historical interest for the learners, whose chief inspiration for life was no longer to be drawn from this source. Religious teaching was to hold its own, and mathematics and natural sciences were liberally provided for; the teaching of French being allotted about as much time as the last-named. The Regulations did not go so far as the Emperor and the conference had suggested, and abolish the 'real' *gymnasium*; but the Latin instruction in it was greatly reduced, and the future of secondary education on this side thus largely committed to the Latinless 'real' *schools*. It may be added that the Conference of June 1900, followed by a royal edict in November of the same year, and by the issue of revised curricula (*Lehrpläne*) early in 1902, marks the furthest advance reached in Prussian secondary education. The three types (gymnasium, 'real' gymnasium and 'upper real' school) were now placed on the same footing, including their relations to the universities (gymnasial training being only required in the case of theologians, archivists and librarians). The Latin course in the gymnasia was strengthened, and the royal edict called special attention to the desirability of fuller teaching of the history of Germany in the nineteenth century. In general, the need of elasticity in settling the details of the curricula was wisely insisted on[1].

Inasmuch as the other States of the Empire followed Prussia, where they had not anticipated her, in the general drift of these changes, they must during the last quarter of a century have exercised an important influence upon German intellectual life, and through it upon the moral and social—to say nothing of the political—life of the nation. The attempt to discover a middle way between classical and

[1] See, on the conferences of 1890 and 1900, A. Matthias, *Erlebtes- und Zukunftsfragen* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 6 ff., and cf. the royal edict in W. Lexis, *Reform d. höheren Schulwesens in Preussen* (Halle, 1902), pp. vii ff.

'real' secondary instruction in the shape of the 'real' gymnasium had more or less broken down. The gymnasia, though reformed as described, maintained an overwhelming predominance; while by their side the Latinless secondary schools were gradually increasing. The chief bond which held secondary education together was now, apart from the element of religious instruction, the national bond; in other words, the established basis of intellectual training in the secondary schools of the German Empire was, with certain exceptions, neither humanistic nor scientific study, but the consciousness of national unity and cohesion.

Nothing has been said above as to female secondary education in modern Germany, a plant of very slow and long uncertain growth, and with no past to fall back upon like that of the classical gymnasia[1]. When, in the nineteenth century, the *sexus potentior* at last turned its thoughts to what even Schleiermacher had, in his later years, regarded as ideals beyond reach, the secondary education of girls still remained in private hands, or was carried on in the 'higher daughters' schools'—a characteristically strait designation which before long came to be changed for that of 'higher girls' schools'—which were, nearly all, under municipal control. In 1848, a conference of teachers in these schools was held at Elberfeld; and, in the same year of change, the Prussian Minister von Ladenberg expressed himself as favourable to their re-organisation under the supervision of the State. But it was not till after the foundation of the Empire that, in 1872, a second conference, held at Weimar, and a third, summoned to Berlin, in 1873, by the Minister Falk, laid down a definite plan which became the basis of girls'

[1] See M. Martin's *Die hohere Madchenschule in Deutschland* (1905), an able survey coloured here and there by the strong feelings of the authoress, and cf. Miss E Davies's *Modern Language Teaching in German Secondary Schools* (1917), where the latest reforms are summarised

secondary education in Germany. Most of the States of the Empire proceeded to give it the force of law. In Prussia, however, the regulations on the subject elaborated under the Ministry of Gossler, in 1886, fell through; but, in 1894, a new code was issued both as to the system of instruction in girls' schools and as to the training and examination of female teachers, whose employment in such schools had long been a theme of jealous contention[1]. The system of instruction now definitely established partook of the nature of a compromise and, of course, proved unsatisfactory to the champions of equality between the sexes in this as in other matters. High schools were required to include in their curriculum two foreign languages. The normal course of complete instruction occupied nine years, as compared with the twelve years of the full course for boys; but girls were allowed an optional tenth year, as preparatory to the teachers' training school (*Seminar*) or for the pursuit of a selected special subject of study. In the plan of studies, German occupied a central position; and, generally, there was a manifest desire to connect linguistic studies with demands of daily life, while laying the foundations of general culture rather than of special virtuosity. The sufficiently exacting regulations for training colleges for female secondary teachers, promulgated in 1894, cannot be detailed here. The requirement of two or three years of university study, as one of the qualifications for the highest secondary teachers' work, formed an important link with the universities, which were before long to open their slowly-moving portals to women students[2]. In 1908, a new Prussian ordinance con-

[1] The Weimar conference of 1872 had been attended by only 54 female, as against 164 male, teachers

[2] Their presence at the jubilee of the University of Berlin was one of its most curious, though not of its universally popular, features See H. Delbruck, *Das Jubilæum der Universität Berlin*, in *Preuss Jahrbucher*, vol CXLII, 2 (November 1910)

cerning High Schools for Girls was promulgated, making provision both for those intending to adopt a definite profession and for others, while establishing a 'lyceum' course subdivided in this sense, and in one of its branches preparing for university study.

The general history of the German universities[1] during this period continued to mirror, as it had of old, that of national ideas and aspirations. But it could no longer do so with the completeness of earlier times—the age of the War of Liberation and the ensuing epoch of the *Burschenschaften*, the exuberant flower of youthful patriotism, or, again, the times of the Revolution, when the German professoriate had been represented more fully than any other body among the chosen of the nation in the Frankfort Assembly. The number of German universities (exclusive of the Austrian) had not increased in the course of the half-century before 1901, except by the reconstitution, in 1872, of the University of Strassburg, and remained at twenty-two, till, shortly after the close of the century, the city of Frankfort-on-the-Main, in conformity with the spirit of the age, raised its academy of advanced studies to the rank of a university—a step which Hamburg was likewise preparing to take, with a view to requirements of its own[2]. The German universities at large

[1] Paulsen's wellknown work, *The German Universities and University study* (see Bibliography), is one of the most suggestive of modern works on academical education and life, and, consequently, an important contribution to pedagogics, but it is not constructed on the historical lines of the same author's larger book previously cited. It contains, however, a valuable short bibliographical list. For other works on the subject, see the Bibliography to this volume, attention should be specially directed, in connexion with what follows, to C. H. Herford's masterly analysis of the intellectual and literary currents in nineteenth century Germany in the volume of Manchester Essays already cited.

[2] In addition to its scientific institute, Hamburg, in 1908, established a colonial institute for the higher instruction of intending

remained too intimately connected with the social life of the nation not to share in the changes that came over it in a season of continuously growing material prosperity and political self-consciousness. They were, of course, well aware of the democratic movement which possessed the soul of the working-classes, and by no means blind to the spread of intelligence and the consequent growth of a desire for knowledge in that social sphere. The 'University Extension movement' was finding its way into the German universities; and, in some of them at least, the social mission of academic youth was coming to be regarded as among its recognised activities. Yet, at the same time, or rather earlier, both teachers and learners had fallen under the influence of very different ideas and notions. The proportion of students drawn from the lower classes diminished, the tendency being, as Paulsen puts it, to 'get rid of the *paupers*' (the medieval term for 'supported' undergraduates); and, in Prussia and Baden at all events, students who were sons of labourers became a vanishing element[1]. In the place of the old *Burschenschaften*, the more or less exclusive *Corps*, and the new *Burschenschaften* modelled upon them, together (more recently) with the *Freie Studentenschaften*—untrammelled by partly antiquated traditions—dominated social student life. In the theological faculty, the Christian Students' Associations began to exercise a direct influence upon the conduct of their members ('Wingolfites') and against the imperfect moral code of the old duelling days. The members of the teaching bodies were partly eager to promote, partly unable to resist, the constant enlargement of their numbers, as the several branches of study, especially on the science side, came to be more and more subdivided; and the professors had to

colonial officers, traders and settlers, which soon had an annual attendance of about 200 students.

[1] See the remarkable statistics for the years 1887–90 and 1869–93 respectively, *ap.* Paulsen, *German Universities*, p 127, *note*.

witness a steady progress, by the grant to 'private' teachers of the *venia docendi*, towards the ideal of complete freedom of lecturing. On the other hand, the professorial incomes in certain of the faculties increased in a comforting, and at times even in a dazzling, ratio, and the professors, also, had an increasing share in the honours and distinctions which make glad the hearts even of the learned. Undoubtedly, these changes, taken together, established easier relations between the professoriate on the one side, and State and Court on the other; and the academical world came to be less of a world by and to itself.

As to the actual work of the universities, there was, speaking generally, a relative decrease of students, of which the reasons are not far to seek, in the theological faculties; while medicine and law had, as usual, to depend mainly on the demand in the professions served by them. In the philosophical faculties, subdivision and specialisation more and more distinctly asserted themselves as inevitable; mental and moral philosophy, in the earlier part of the century the dominant study, now found a successful rival in physical science, which, with the aid of a notable development of the laboratory system, came to form a more and more important part of German higher instruction. The time-honoured study of philology, long one of its chief glories, was, together with advanced mathematical study, more closely restricted to those intended to become in their turn teachers of these subjects, and was carried on with the aid of the highly developed *Seminar* system. The time seemed to have passed by when a general literary or scientific training was sought at the academic centres of Germany for its own sake, or for that of the general intellectual culture which it was trusted to produce.

But the German universities—like all others worthy of their name and of the task implied by it—were not only places of instruction. It is unnecessary to go so far as

Bethmann-Hollweg's draft school-law of 1862[1], which describes them as not being such in the proper sense of the word, but rather designed as institutions for fostering and advancing the several branches of science and learning. But the principle of their existence, as already defined by Wilhelm von Humboldt, was the combination of learning and research with instruction. And, though the primacy achieved by German science (*Wissenschaft*) in many of its branches was largely due to the fostering care of the State—a care which increased, after 1870, with the demands upon the efforts of the one, and with the means at the disposal of the other—this could not, and did not, impair their freedom of movement, of which the final cause was the search after truth. Not so much from this supreme point of view, which would prohibit a perfunctory recital of the achievements of the German universities, and of the academies and other learned bodies cooperating with them in the half-century specially in question, as from that of the manifest influence exercised by their work, in some of its main branches, upon the progress of the national life, a few further words may be allowed here.

In theology, the great gulf between the confessions remained unbridged; their higher teaching was carried on in different universities, or side by side, as at Bonn, Breslau and Tübingen[2]; and no academic arguments sought to render Leibniz's ideal of a religious reunion easier of accomplishment. Among Catholic university teachers in the preceding period none had enjoyed an authority equal to that

[1] Cf the admirable general statement in Delbruck's essay cited above. Probably the most complete accounts of the work of a German university and of an academy of sciences, respectively, will be found in M Lenz's *Geschichte der Konig Friedrich-Wilhelm's Universität zu Berlin*, 4 vols (Halle, 1900), and in Harnack's *Geschichte der Königl. Preussischen Akademie d Wissenschaften* (Berlin, 1901)

[2] Strassburg received a Protestant theological faculty in 1871, to which a Catholic one was added in 1903.

of J. A. Möhler, of Munich, the author of the *Symbolik*; next to his stood that of J. B. Hirscher, of Freiburg, who described moral philosophy as applied dogmatics (he lived till 1865). Meanwhile, Döllinger and his school continued to strive for liberty within the limits of the Church: his celebrated *Church and Churches*, which appeared in 1861, was intended to calm the apprehension caused by his public declaration that he regarded the extinction of the Temporal Power as possible, and even probable. Jacob Frohschammer, also of Munich, who had passed over from theology to philosophy, and whose criticism of Darwin, about the same time, evinced his desire to remain in touch with the conclusions of natural science, was ultimately excommunicated. Inasmuch as, on the other side, the Jesuits continued to carry out the well-planned strategy which was, in the end, to carry the *Curia* the whole way with it, the internal dissensions in German Catholicism that had made themselves felt already in Hirscher's day merged in the great politico-religious conflict of the *Kulturkampf*, to which there is no necessity for returning.

In the far wider field of Protestant theology, it may be convenient to go back for a moment to the time of publication of the first edition of Strauss's *Life of Jesus* (1835)[1]. Not long after that date, signs had appeared of a reaction towards the acceptance of the historical basis of the Christian Church, and at the same time of a propensity to make good the domination of the authority of Scripture by an augmentation of that of the Church itself. Rationalists became aware that the mystical teaching of Schleiermacher

[1] Cf. vol I, p. 305, *ante*. The following paragraphs are largely indebted to book IV, sec. 2 of J. A Dorner's *Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie* (*Gesch. d Wiss in D* vol. V, Munich, 1867), but to this work of the distinguished author it is not always easy to make particular references. See, also, the luminous essay *The History of Theology*, by Prof A. S Peake, in the second series of *Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (Manchester, 1915).

and his followers had not yet become altogether obsolete. In Prussia, the General Synod of 1846 sought to bring about a reconciliation of the differences existing in the United Church, as of old she had gathered into her fold both Lutherans and 'Reformed'; but the revolution of 1848–9 supervened, and the reaction which followed identified itself in matters religious with the views of the Lutheran High Churchmen of Protestant Germany. So long as King Frederick William IV lived, the leading influence in Prussian Church Government was that represented by Stahl. In Hanover, these tendencies led to the troubles caused by the Government's introduction of the 'new' Catechism (1862); and the adverse desire for a free and broad development of the Protestant Church in Germany at large brought about the foundation, on lines in a measure parallel to those of the *Nationalverein*, of the German *Protestantenverein*, in which the great Heidelberg jurist J. C Bluntschli took a leading part.

While these contentions were in progress on the subject of Church Government and its ends, German Protestant theology, more especially at the universities, continued the course which it seemed to have marked out as most necessary and most congenial to itself. The general progress of the multiplicitous studies into which it divided itself is marked by J. J. Herzog's *Real-Encyclopaedia for Protestant Theology and Church*, as well as by the theological portions of Ersch and Gruber's *General Encyclopaedia of Sciences and Arts*. The latter monument of learning began to roll its length along so early as 1818; the first volume of the former was brought out by Herzog at Halle in 1854, and the twenty-second and last at Erlangen in 1863, fourteen years before the editor's death[1]. His migration to Halle had been due to the bitter

[1] In the second edition (1876–84), G. L Plitt, likewise of Erlangen, collaborated with Herzog. The third edition (1896–1913) is by A. Hauck.

ecclesiastical controversies besetting his native Switzerland, and to the friendship of F. A. G. Tholuck, himself the most shining light of the Halle school of divinity, and the eloquent champion of Protestant Christianity, but, in Ritschl's words, 'scientifically incommensurable.' In the wide field covered by these encyclopaedic works, the class of studies which may be designated as biblical more particularly commended itself, in the period under notice, to German research and learning. Undoubtedly, the widespread interest displayed in the results of those studies, when published, like Strauss's celebrated book, without elaborate learned apparatus, contributed to the preference shown for them by theologians. Not that dogmatics were neglected; Möhler's standard work found an adequate Protestant counterpart in the *Manual of Protestant Polemics against the Church of Rome* (1862), by K. A. Hase, the 'supra-natural realist,' afterwards ranked, with Neander and J. K. L. Gieseler (*ob.* 1854), among the leading German ecclesiastical historians[1]. But what in this period theology had, above all else, at heart was enquiry into the very foundations of the faith held and taught by the Church, of whose progress towards width and freedom of development this seemed an all-important condition. What we have (it is difficult to see why) come to call the 'higher' criticism, as applied to the New Testament, and, together with it, to the Old Testament and to the relations between the two, as well as to the documents of early Christianity, now entered in Germany upon an age of unprecedented activity. Schleiermacher's influence on religious thought had not, indeed, come to an end with his death in

[1] K. Ullmann's *Reformers before the Reformation*, published in its complete form in 1842, was regarded as authoritative for nearly a generation afterwards. K. R. Hagenbach's works, more especially his *Church History from Apostolic Times to the Present* (1869–72), which possesses great value for purposes of instruction and is marked by much breadth of view, must be placed to the credit of Swiss theological and historical scholarship.

1834[1]; but it had, in part, depended on his wonderful eloquence, while, again, his insistence on the inseparable connexion between the Christian religion and the historical personality of its Founder had necessarily led to a critical enquiry into the sources of our knowledge of Him and His teaching. The foremost early representatives of those engaged in this research and its ramifications were known as the Tübingen School. Of this, or at least of its older group, the acknowledged chief was Ferdinand Baur, who, on the first appearance of Strauss's famous book, had blamed him for attempting to produce a Gospel history without a criticism of the Gospels[2]. About the fifth decade of the century, Baur had extended his studies from dogmatics to the history of historico-critical theology; of his massive *History of the Christian Church* from the earliest to modern times, the last three volumes were published by his son after his death, which took place in 1860.

The whole period of German Protestant theology to which the Tubingen School belonged produced an extraordinary amount of exegetical work, of which even the most notable examples must be left without notice here. Historical, geographical and linguistic (especially oriental) studies contributed their willing aid, themselves expanding with the growth to which they contributed and with the range of the commentaries which they helped to furnish forth. New Testament criticism was the starting-point, with Christology and the history of the early Christian Church as its natural sequences; but Old Testament criticism was soon in the field, with its more ample use of auxiliary learning. The horizon gradually widened into a

[1] Cf. vol. I, p. 305, *ante*.

[2] Cf. *ib* as to Strauss's *Life of Jesus* (1835) In the new *Life of Jesus for the German People* (1864), Strauss retorted that Baur had given a criticism of the Gospels without a criticism of the Gospel history.

comparative study of other religions—whether or not the whole study of religion, including the 'wild flowers' of its history, was treated as one tending to resolve itself into that of Christianity as its final consummation. Such was the general bearing of the teaching both of Tholuck, who regarded the Old Testament as, in Herder's words, 'one great prophecy,' and of G. F. Oehler, who for the last twenty years of his life (he died in 1872) was professor at Tübingen.

Heinrich Ewald, one of the foremost biblical scholars and orientalists of the century, who had come to Tübingen in 1837 from Göttingen in the days of 'the Seven[1],' returned to the northern university in 1848. His great *History of the People of Israel* had been begun in the previous year. The basis of his later Old Testament historical criticism may, however, be described as more conservative than that of K. H. Graf (*ob* 1869), which finally prevailed, chiefly through J. Wellhausen, whose freedom of judgment seems, in this field, to have been felicitously tempered by his historic sense. Ewald himself (after a second political catastrophe) lived till 1875. The other school of general biblical criticism had already passed its zenith when, in 1856, its lack of cohesion was demonstrated by Albrecht Ritschl, long accounted one of its members, but now professor at Bonn, where he became one of the most widely influential theological thinkers of his time. In his view, Christianity is not (to recur to the figure used above) the finest of all the flowers of religious history, but a distillation from the New Testament of its essence—in other words, a religion wholly based on the life of the Founder of the Kingdom of God. Ritschl was devoid of all sympathy with mysticism; and, though his latest productions included the *History of Pietism*, of which the last volume was published in 1886, three years before his death, his interest in that movement, of long duration in Germany, was very far removed from personal adhesion to it. Pietism

[1] Cf. vol. I, p. 284, *ante*.

continued to be a force of considerable moment in the religious life of Germany—more especially of the north—in the latter half of the nineteenth century, notwithstanding the growth of freedom of religious thought as well as of indifference to religion, on the one side, and, on the other, the onslaught directed against this form of puritanism, from the high conservative point of view, by Stahl and others.

Stahl, who has already been mentioned as an eminent jurist[1], remained, till his death in 1861, the intellectual leader of the reaction in both Church and State, and the promoter of intimate relations between the two. It was, therefore, not wonderful that Bunsen, the fearless champion of religious freedom, more especially in the devout study of the Bible, should have fallen out with his views on 'Christian Toleration,' and provoked an uncompromising reply[2]. The theologian of the conservatives was Professor E. W. Hengstenberg of Berlin, the editor of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, who died in 1869, but much of whose theological work, in which he appears as the defender of the absolute authenticity of the Old Testament Scriptures, dates from the second half of the century. He was, probably, the best-abused theologian of his day[3].

Lutheran orthodoxy was admirably represented by A. von Harless (*ob.* 1879), first in Leipzig (to which he always looked back with affection) and for the last twenty-seven years of his life at Munich, where he was head of the chief consistory of the Evangelical Church in Bavaria. The manliness of his piety contributed to make him an admirable teacher of ethics, a branch of theology in which an un-

[1] See pp 317–18 and note 1, *ante*.

[2] See *Memoirs of Baron Bunsen*, vol. II, pp. 379 ff.

[3] Among the most effective of his adversaries was K. Schwarz (afterwards Court-preacher to Duke Ernest II at Gotha), whose antagonism to modern orthodoxy had been first inspired by the Hegelian theologian P. K. Marheineke, in his highly popular *Contribution to the History of the most recent Theology* (1856).

usually great influence was, also, exercised by Richard Rothe of Heidelberg (*ob.* 1867), an eclectic of a singularly sympathetic, but at the same time independent, mind. On the efforts of this age in what is termed practical theology, in its various branches, it is impossible here to dwell; the union between theory and practice nowhere finds fuller expression than in the *Practical Theology* of K. I. Nitzsch (who died in 1868, as a professor and upper church-councillor at Berlin)—a work begun in 1847 and completed in 1867, and the mirror of a life devoted to both branches of religious activity.

The generous labours of the Inner (Home) Mission, of which J. Wichern, the founder and first manager of the *Rauhe Haus*, the great orphanage at Hamburg, was long the moving spirit, at one time met with much orthodox-Lutheran opposition, but were favoured by the Prussian Government, in whose service he stood from 1857 to the year before his death (1874). The Evangelical-Social movement under the energetic Court-preacher Stöcker[1] was more to the taste of reactionary Conservatism. Finally, the National-Social movement, of which Friedrich Naumann was the prophet, signalised a yet later variety of politico-religious views, to which reference will be made in our concluding chapter.

In face of the negative influences of the philosophy of life which became potent in Germany in the later years of the century, it is not wonderful that a reaction should have manifested itself towards mystical tendencies in religious thought and practice; but this phenomenon, if it be worth noting, lies beyond the range to which these remarks are intended to be confined.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the 'nation of thinkers,' as it had been called in the days of its fathers, was beginning to cease taking pride in the appellation, and to look forward to an era when, both in its own eyes and in

[1] Cf. p. 153, *ante*.

those of neighbouring nations around it, its primary task would be, not the systematisation of thought, but the organisation of action. In other words, though speculative philosophy had by no means been laid to rest either in the German universities or with the educated German reading world, its epoch of ascendancy there was drawing to a close. The Kantian metaphysic went through a long process of neglect, revival and revision, of which it would not be possible to venture on a description here[1]; but the last of the great German mental and moral philosophers died with Hegel (1831). His teaching had entered into the very soul of the nation, and had been granted a quasi-canonical authority by Ministers of the Prussian Crown. When, however, two score years later, the centenary of his birth came round, its celebration had to be postponed on account of the great war with France, and afterwards took place on a modest scale. Of his collected works (1832–1841) only some volumes have reached a second edition[2]. Although his idealisation of the State potently influenced the very latest developments of German morality, yet the metaphysical process by which he sought to reconcile philosophy and religion—thought and faith—no longer, as it stood, satisfied those who, in different groups, represented to the generation after him the Hegelian

[1] It is the main theme of B Bosanquet's essay on *The History of Philosophy* in the second series of *Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (1915).

[2] For an authoritative review of the German philosophy of the age and its influence, see E Zeller, *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz* (*Gesch. d. Wiss in Deutschland*, vol. v, Munich, 1873), sec. v and the preceding sections, and cf Prof Bosanquet's essay cited above, and A D. Lindsay, 'German Philosophy,' in W Paterson's *German Culture*, collected essays by various authors (1915). See also R von Gottschall, *Die deutsche Nationallitteratur des 19 Jahrhunderts*, vol II, p 176, *note*. As to Nietzsche, English readers may like to compare F von Hugel, *The German Soul* (1916), pp. 150 ff., and J N. Figgis, *The Will to Freedom*, Bross Lectures, 1915 (1917).

school. Among these should be specially remembered K. Rosenkranz (who died as professor at Königsberg in 1879), since, widely known as a literary historian, he was specially qualified to interpret to the educated public of his age both Hegel and Hegel's successor at Berlin, though with the latter he was less in sympathy. Schelling had been summoned to the capital by Frederick William IV in the hope (for Schleiermacher had left no philosophical school behind him) that he would provide the German people with a genuine Christian philosophy; but his activity as an academical teacher ceased some years before his death in 1854. Another Hegelian, who adhered, where possible, to the master's doctrine, was J. E. Erdmann (*ob.* 1892), author of the very successful *Outline of the History of Philosophy* (1865), who held a chair at Halle from 1839 to 1892. F. A. Trendelenburg (who died at Berlin in 1872) was long charged with the department of the history of philosophy at the Berlin Academy; and it was in this field that his chief reputation was made.

Among the Hegelians of the left wing, the free-thinkers proper of their generation, Bruno Bauer (*ob.* 1882) exercised much popular influence in the period before and during the Revolution of 1848-9 as a powerful critic; but the authority enjoyed by him afterwards underwent a long eclipse, from which it can scarcely be said to have emerged when he took it upon himself to pass judgment on the decay already perceptible to him in the Bismarckian era. Ludwig (one of the distinguished sons of the great jurist Anselm) Feuerbach (*ob.* 1872) emancipated himself from Hegelianism, as he had cast off the 'fair, faded flower' of theology; but the works, singularly clear and impressive in style, in which he applied the 'anthropological' criterion to both religion and philosophy, though summarised in his last publication (1866), mainly belong to earlier dates.

The extreme left, so to speak, of the later Hegelians, was

represented by the *Halle*, afterwards *German*, *Jahrbücher* (suppressed by the Saxon Government so early as 1843) and most prominently by one of their editors, Arnold Ruge. After suffering five years' imprisonment as a youthful democrat, he had in 1849 accompanied Karl Blind to England, where he died in 1880 as a pensioner of Bismarck's Government. With him and those who thought with him, the all-including system of the master seemed to call for a method of treatment not stopping short at amendment or supplementation. Such, too, from their point of view, was the opinion of the new school of materialistic philosophers. Among their works, those of Jacob Moleschott, Ludwig Büchner and Carl Vogt, began to exercise a strong popular influence—which, in the case of Büchner and Vogt, was driven home with characteristic ruthlessness—a decade before Darwinism with the cognate teaching of the eminent zoologist E. H. Häckel, of Jena, engrossed the attention of students of natural science.

In the days of Germany's political regeneration no philosopher enjoyed a more acknowledged eminence than Hermann Lotze, successively professor at Leipzig and Göttingen, whence he was called to Berlin, shortly before his death in 1881. Like C. H Weisse, also of Leipzig, who died in 1866, Lotze was perhaps most distinguished in his aesthetical teaching[1]. His best known work, however, is *Mikrokosmus* (1856–64), a work which has been held worthy to rank with Humboldt's *Kosmos* on the one hand, and with Herder's *Ideas* on the other. His aesthetical work and that of Friedrich Vischer (*ob.* 1887), of Tubingen and Stuttgart, who holds an enduring place in German literature as a rarely gifted critical essayist, brought both of these eminent teachers into collision with Eduard von Hartmann, to whom

[1] He is the author of the *History of Aesthetics in Germany* (*Gesch. d. Wiss. in D.* vol. VII, 1868). For a general estimate see Sir H. Jones's *Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze* (1895).

Lotze's general philosophical standpoint appeared to be 'obsolete.' Hartmann's earlier and most celebrated work, *The Philosophy of the Unconscious* (1876), partly directed against the teaching of Schopenhauer, had achieved a success as rapid as it was widespread. Probably this was, in part, due to the congruity between his ideas as to the philosophy of life and the temper of his time; for he abominated 'pacifism' and philosophical 'sentimentality' in general. In more respects than one, above all in its systematised vastness, his philosophy—ethical and aesthetical—resembled that of Hegel himself.

The story, often told, of Arthur Schopenhauer's own slow passage to philosophical fame is a strange one. Absorbed in his own personality not less deeply than he was in his science, he had published his most important philosophical work, *The World as Will and Conception* (*Vorstellung*) in 1819, and had in the same year visited Goethe, by whom he was described as 'a meritorious young man, for the most part misunderstood, but also not easy to understand.' But the initial failure of his book to attract attention, and the success which attended rival publications, caused him, in 1831, to abandon any further attempt at settling down as an academical teacher, and to withdraw, finally, from Berlin to Frankfort-on-Main. His reputation was of very slow growth, and fame came too late in the last year of his life (he died in 1860) to console him for her long-continued coyness. Then, however, his reputation as a philosopher was fanned by a whole generation of admiring commentators. The essence of the world's life, he taught, is the will; and the hindrance offered to the will is the suffering—the evil—inseparable from the world. The self-renunciation of the will is the only way of redemption from this suffering. But the indispensable effort towards redemption the philosopher seems personally unprepared to make; and the result is the hopeless pessimism which was Schopenhauer's message to the generation he left behind him.

Schopenhauer, and Hartmann after him—the latter by literary labours of various kinds—exercised an influence over the national mind attained by none of their successors —with a single exception. This was Friedrich Nietzsche[1], who was born in 1844, and lost his reason some eleven years before his death in 1900. The attractiveness of his writings was—as in many instances of a similar capture of the multitude—largely due to style. He described his own as 'a dance'; and, apart from the fact that *Thus spake Zarathustra* (1883–91) gave a lasting impulse to the symbolist school of lyric poetry, much of the fascination of this work no doubt lay in the charm of its rhythmical prose. But this was not all; nor was the attention commanded by his paradoxical view of humanity and its true ideals merely astonishment at what Lord Morley calls the 'effronteries' of the sermon. Nietzsche's fierce declamations confirmed his generation in its belief that the one thing needful was the 'will to power,' and that above the moral law, and defiant of religious precepts, stands the imperative of the 'superman[1].' This philosopher's political notions were fused in his general conceptions; he was a declared antagonist of the ideas of the first French Revolution and, though he put on record his hatred of the 'idiotic' device of *Deutschland über alles*, and dreaded the extension of the political gains of victory as the supreme danger to culture, he was an advocate of militarism, and made no secret of his predilection for a highly-educated

[1] Words and phrases are the dangers of historians as well as of poets. In Hamerling's widely popular poem, *Ahasver in Rom*, Nero, the votary of pleasure, is cursed as the *Übermensch*—a term twice used (satirically) by Goethe, in the *Erdgeist* scene of *Faust*, Part I (1775), and in the *Zueignung* of his *Poems*. It had been previously employed by Herder, in an unfavourable, and by Jean Paul in a favourable, sense. Nietzsche, as it were, recalled it into existence, with a newly extended meaning. See the elaborate disquisition on the subject of the term in Richard M. Meyer, *Vierhundert Schlagwörter* (Leipzig, 1901), pp. 6 ff.

chivalry (*sans* Christianity) and a hereditary officers' caste. Whether or not views of this sort can be reconciled with one another, the fact remains that an eloquence so subtly mixed as Nietzsche's is capable of intoxicating where it may fail to nourish.

From the dominant academical studies of the Middle Ages, the sciences of theology and philosophy, we pass at once—reserving for the moment a reference to one or two branches of the latter—to the study proper of the Renascence. Emancipated from scholastic tradition, the study of language was now for long established as a principal pursuit of the universities and as the chief discipline of the schools preparing for them[1]. But no transformation could, in its turn, have been more signal than that effected in this study by the second Renascence, which reached its height in the period at present under review. This transformation was due, partly to the new element of original research and criticism introduced into the study of the classics themselves, partly to the extension of linguistic study in general, and more especially that conducted on comparative lines.

The great eighteenth century revival of classical studies in Germany continued in the nineteenth without a break. Of its beginnings Winckelmann and Heyne were in different ways representative, with Lessing as the presiding spirit of the movement, while its most important phase, that of critical enquiry into the great literary documents of ancient Greece and Rome, is associated with the name of F. A. Wolf, the illustrious scholar and archaeologist. Its leading spirits were, in the earlier half of that century (and, in the case of the younger of the pair, for the better part of two decades beyond), Gottfried Hermann and

[1] See C. Bursian, *Gesch. der klass. Philologie im Deutschland*, vol II (*Gesch. d. Wiss in D.* vol. XIX, Munich and Leipzig, 1883); and compare, throughout, Sir J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, vol. III (1908).

August Boeckh, who died in 1848 and 1867 respectively. It is difficult to say which of them held a more conspicuous and a more honoured place in German university life—the former at Leipzig and the latter at Berlin. Hermann was, to the close of his long and vigorous life, the acknowledged chief of the school of grammar and criticism which, following the example of great English and Dutch predecessors, devoted itself to the exact study of the classical languages and literatures, and above all to the formal aspects of Greek and Roman writers. Boeckh, in whom his university and the Prussian capital alike delighted, passed on from 'pure classics' to the leadership of another school—that occupied chiefly with the subject-matter of Greek and Latin writers, more especially, the institutions, the art and the antiquities of Greek and Roman life.

Hermann, like Porson, whose criticism he had in his early days provoked but not resented, was more especially occupied with the Greek classics, the great tragic poets in particular, besides Homer and Pindar. Homer was the favourite study of Wolf's adversary G. W. Nitzsch (*ob.* 1861); Hesiod, of K. W. Göttling (*ob.* 1869); Pindar, of Boeckh, in his earlier days, and of G. L. Dissen (*ob.* 1837). Boeckh, who at the beginning of his half-century's work at Berlin, by his book on *The Public Economy of Athens*, first placed the modern knowledge of Attic life on a solid basis, definitely marked the opening of a new era in the studies of classical history and archaeology by inducing the Berlin Academy to bring out the *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (1828–54), in which he was assisted by Immanuel Bekker and Otfried Müller, and afterwards by J. Franz and Ernst Curtius. This monumental work, followed or accompanied as it was by the labours on Latin inscriptions under the leadership of Theodor Mommsen, vindicated for epigraphy the place which it now holds among the foundations of ancient—indeed, of all—historical studies.

Among Hermann's earlier pupils—for the most brilliant of them all, Otfried Müller, died so early as 1840—F. W. Thiersch, who lived to 1860, long fostered at Munich the love of free humanistic culture which had inspired in him his ardent philhellenism. Of another eminent, but differently remembered, early pupil of Hermann, F. Passow (*ob* 1833), K.W. Göttling, who, after long holding the chief classical chair at Jena, died in 1869, was, in his turn, a pupil. With these should be mentioned A. Meineke, who, after long presiding over one of the gymnasia of Berlin, lived till 1870. But the real protagonists, about the middle of the century, in the grammatical school of classical philology were Karl Lachmann, of whom mention will be made immediately among the great Germanists, and, as already indicated, Friedrich Ritschl of Bonn, who died in 1867. Ritschl, whose insight into the significance of the form and order of words was unparalleled, might in truth have been called the 'master of the texts.' From the Greek drama his illuminating touch passed to the Latin; and his edition of Plautus (1848–54)[1] marked an epoch in the history of textual criticism. His successor at Leipzig was Otto Ribbeck (*ob* 1898), whose literary labours were especially devoted to the history of earlier Roman poetry. The names of many other distinguished scholars are associated with those of various classical authors—thus, that of T. Bergk with the Greek lyric poets, that of Lucian Muller with the Roman poets from Ennius to Horace, R. Merkel's with Ovid, H. Sauppe's with the Attic Orators and those of R. Klotz and, more especially, Karl Halm, with Cicero, whose prerogative claims K. F. A. Nobbe brought home to half a century of *Nikolaischüler* at Leipzig.

Side by side with the grammatical study of the classical languages, though at first treated with scant favour by Hermann and some of the foremost members of his school,

[1] It was followed by his disciple A. Fleckeisen's *Terence* (1857).

the comparative study of language—and more particularly of Sanskrit and the comparison with it of other Indo-Germanic languages—had from an early period of the century asserted itself in Germany. Here, it owed its beginnings and, in a very large measure its final recognition, to Franz Bopp, from 1821 to 1867 professor in the University of Berlin. The value of this study was, as will be seen, most effectively demonstrated by Jacob Grimm's application of the grammatical principles underlying it to the successive stages of German and the other Germanic languages; and its progress was advanced by a goodly company of later scholars. Such were August Schleicher of Jena (*ob.* 1868); the eminent Sanskritist and historian of the whole of this branch of philology in Germany[1], Theodor Benfey of Göttingen (*ob.* 1881); the eminent Leipzig Orientalist, Hermann Brockhaus (*ob.* 1877), long an example of the fine flower of the German professoriate—a specialist (in Sanskrit and Persian) with a vast range of knowledge and incredible powers of work (he edited, at the same time, the *Journal of the German Oriental Association*, and Ersch and Gruber's *Encyclopaedia*), and an outspoken patriotic Liberal; and Georg Curtius of Leipzig (*ob.* 1885), whose indefatigable ardour in establishing the vital connexion between classical (especially Greek) and general comparative philology is attested both by his own works and by an extraordinary number of contributions to his science on the part of his pupils. With grammar, metre became a subject of comparative enquiry; and it was above all in this that Rudolf Westphal (*ob.* 1892) gained high distinction. A special fame was achieved for himself by the illustrious Egyptologist Richard Lepsius, whose monumental labours ended (literally) with

[1] See Th. Benfey, *Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft u. orientalischen Philologie in Deutschland* (*Gesch. der Wiss. in Deutschland*, vol. VIII), 1869.

his death in 1884[1]. English as well as German university history claims a share in the high reputation, as a comparative philologist and historian of language, of F. Max-Müller (a pupil of Brockhaus), who died in 1902.

Among those who carried on the archaeological studies which Boeckh and Otfried Müller had brought to the front, mention should be made of F. G. Welcker, who in his early days had been an inmate of Wilhelm von Humboldt's house at Rome, and whose long life (he died in 1868) was, with intervals of Greek and Italian travel, spent at Bonn. His manifold writings on Greek religion, poetry and art cover a wide field of critical enquiry; and his constructive power is typified by his famous verification of the Aeschylean trilogy. E. Gerhard (*ob.* 1867), whose researches were long carried on in Italy before he became, in 1837, director of the Archaeological Museum at Berlin, had in Rome seconded Bunsen in the foundation of the Institute there of Archaeological Correspondence, in connexion with which many German scholars worked after Bunsen's departure in 1838. Among them, besides Mommsen, was Otto Jahn, who died at Göttingen in 1869, and to whom the study in Germany of classical archaeology in general was greatly indebted. It had gradually achieved a recognised place for itself among classical studies, and led to the production of works such as W. Wachsmuth's *Public Antiquities of Greece* (1820–30), G. F. Schoemann's *Greek* (1855) and L. Lange's *Roman Antiquities* (1856–71), and C. Wachsmuth's (1874–1900) and E. Curtius's (1891) *Histories of the City of Athens*. In breadth and variety of treatment, new progress was marked by L. Friedländer's *History of Roman Civilisation* (*Sittengeschichte Rom's*) *from Augustus to the end of the Antonines* (1862–71); for in this work 'manners' included social life, the arts and religion.

[1] He was born in 1810, on the same day of the same month as Champollion, his senior by twenty years, and his predecessor in the interpretation of hieroglyphics.

Both historic and prehistoric research owed a powerful stimulus to the excavations which became a marked feature of the later years of the century. Conspicuous among these was the exploration of Olympia, carried on (1875–81), under royal patronage, at the instigation of E. Curtius and conducted in the first two years by G. Hirschfeld. Great interest (and much controversy) was, also, excited by the discoveries of H. Schliemann, a self-taught enthusiast, who laid bare a series of marvels to his generation. Whatever might be the right judgment as to the identity of the 'burnt city' in the Troad discovered by him in 1870, whose relics he in 1881 bestowed as a gift upon the German nation, doubt was difficult in face of the lions' gate at Mycenae (excavated in June 1874) or the 'treasury of Minyas' at Orchomenos (June 1880). Of high artistic as well as antiquarian importance, too, were the sculptures excavated by K. Humann (1878–86) in the royal citadel at Pergamon[1], where he was more recently followed by W. Dörpfeld. Greek mythology, as already noted, largely occupied the labours of F. G. Welcker, as it did those of Ludwig Preller, whose *Greek Mythology* (1854) was followed by a *Roman* (1858). His interpretation of myths as records of natural phenomena found great favour, though it was not carried by him so far as it was by the ingenious and enthusiastic P. W. Forchhammer of Kiel (*ob.* 1894). To mythology the comparative method was, with special appropriateness applied by A. Kuhn (*ob.* 1881), and, especially from the ethnological point of view, by J. W. E. Mannhardt (*ob.* 1880).

Finally, the achievements by German scholars in ancient Greek and Roman history may be most conveniently noted here. Though Niebuhr had at last retrieved the long-enduring inferiority of German historical writing to that of

[1] Cf. K. Woermann, *Geschichte der Kunst*, etc. (1911), vol. I, pp 382 ff., as to these sculptures, especially the great frieze now in the Berlin Pergamon Museum.

other Western nations, it seemed, for some time longer, as if the palm which in Roman history he had carried off were in Greek to remain with Englishmen. After Thirlwall had been followed by Grote, German historical scholarship appeared to be primarily intent upon criticising the consistent champion of Athenian democracy, this task being undertaken both by K. F. Hermann in his elaborate work on *Greek Public Antiquities*, and by G. F. Schoemann in a monograph (1854). In 1857, however, Ernst Curtius published the first volume of his *History of Greece*, which occupied new ground, more especially geographical and topographical, and devoted some brilliant pages to art and literature, so that it might be described as supplementing Grote, rather than continuing him. The first volume of Max Duncker's[1] *Ancient History* appeared even earlier (1852); but, while it is notable for comprehensive treatment of its subject, the concluding section, dealing with the history of Greece, reaches no further than 479 B.C. The later period of ancient Greek history was attractively covered by J. G. Droysen's *History of Hellenism* (1877–8).

In Roman history, German research and scholarship long continued to maintain the leadership established by Niebuhr. The main object of the labours of A. Schwegler of Tübingen (where he died in 1857) was to summarise in a critical narrative the progress of the study of Roman history since Niebuhr, whose acknowledgment was not withheld from the endeavour. Schwegler, who has been described[2] as the one German historian of his age 'combining real philosophical talent with the rarest critical faculty,' only lived to complete the earlier stages of his *Roman History* (to the Decemvirate).

[1] Max Duncker, who as a Bonn student had been imprisoned as a political offender, and had then exercised considerable political influence, particularly as adviser of the Crown-prince Frederick William, was in the later years of his life Director-general of the Prussian Archives. He died in 1886.

[2] By Lord Acton.

The more conservative but valuable work of K. Peter (1853–69) and that of W. Ihne (1868–90), intended for a wider public, followed. But the effect exercised by any or all of these was overshadowed by the splendid success of the great scholar Th. Mommsen's popular masterpiece, the *Roman History* (1854–6). Mommsen, who, at all events till the appearance of Treitschke's *German History*, might be described as the Macaulay of German historical literature, treated his work as almost a *πάρεργον*—at least, he showed no compunction in discontinuing it as a narrative from the end of the Roman Republic, having little time to spare from his lifelong labours in Latin epigraphy[1]. It remains, notwithstanding, as a great monument both of learning and of narrative power; while, though the production of a friend of liberty as well as a patriot, its Caesarism may, not unfairly, be accounted one of the influences which helped, in their degree, to mould the national mind of its generation.

Of the literature of Greece, Otfried Muller's work having been left to an English scholar to complete, another history was begun by T. Bergk (1872), while W. S. Teuffel compendiously treated that of Roman literature (1870). In this general connexion may be conveniently mentioned F. Blass's fine historical survey of *Attic Oratory* (1868–80), E. Zeller's earlier *History of Greek Philosophy* (1862–72), K. Prantl's *History of the Study of Logic in the West* (1855–70), the numerous contributions of Jacob Bernays of Bonn (*ob.* 1881) to the history of literature, philosophy and religion; and the equally versatile labours of Emil Hubner (*ob.* 1901), like Bernays well known in England, and author of works on epigraphy, archaeology and literary history, as well as of a comprehensive *History of Classical Philology*.

Great as was the activity devoted, in the German learned

[1] He published, however, a *History of Roman Provincial Administration from Caesar to Diocletian*, which forms vol v of the final edition of his *Roman History*.

world of this period, to the advancement of philological studies in general and of the time-honoured but newly-developed study of the ancient languages and literatures in particular, there was another field of linguistic and literary research of more direct importance for the progress of the national life. This was the study of the German language and literature themselves, more especially in their earlier stages[1]. The demand for it had, far from paradoxically, arisen on the eve of the Wars of Liberation; and it was not long after the national victory—in the days when a beginning was made towards carrying out Stein's idea of a collection of the written historical monuments of Germany—that the brothers Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, whose *Märchen* (1812–15), followed soon afterwards (1816) by their *German Legends* (*Sagen*), were already a household word in the land, betook themselves definitely to those studies with which their names will always be identified[2]. Jacob Grimm's *German Grammar* (1819–37) laid the foundations of the Germanist school. His book on the *Antiquities of German Law* (1828), which treated the form and substance of its legal customs as sources of modern historical knowledge of the German people, coordinate with the remains of early popular poetry and with what is known of early popular speech, was succeeded by his *German Mythology* (1835). This work, to which the labours of F. J. Mone (*ob.* 1871) had been in a measure preparatory, was nearly contemporary with Jacob Grimm's edition of the Middle-High-German *Reinhart Fuchs*

[1] See, for what follows, R. von Raumer, *Gesch. der germanischen Philologie, vorzugsweise in Deutschland* (*Gesch d Wissensch. in Deutschland*, vol IX), 1870, and H. Paul, *Grundriss d german. Philologie* (2nd ed , Strassburg, 1897), vol I, pp 9-158 Compare, *passim*. K. Breul's most useful *Handy Bibliographical Guide to the Study of the German Language and Literature* (1895).

[2] As to the brothers Grimm and the beginnings of the scientific study of German and Germanic philology, see Wilhelm Scherer's admirable *Jacob Grimm* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1885).

(*Reynard the Fox*, 1834), with its valuable supplement of other early treatments of the subject and a signally suggestive introduction on the origin and spread of the beast-epos. Such was the wide range of studies in which he, together with his fraternal *alter ego*, engaged. By the time when, in 1852, they at last took in hand the publication of their long-meditated *German Dictionary*, and carried this work, the crown of their lifelong labours, through the earlier stages of its vast course[1], a considerable number of German scholars had become fellow-workers capable of finishing the great task.

Meanwhile, Karl Lachmann, professor of classical philology in Königsberg, had since 1818 sought to apply to Old- and Middle-High-German the thorough critical method to which he had subjected the texts of Lucretius and of the New Testament. In 1825, he was appointed professor of classical and German philology (the conjunction is significant) at Berlin, where he resided till his tragic death in 1851. As a scholar, whose power of work was comparable to Jacob Grimm's, he is above all remembered for his critical labours on the *Nibelungen* epic, which, stimulated no doubt at first by the example of Wolf's work on Homer, he began in 1815, and carried to completion in 1841. A distinguished friend of his was Moriz Haupt (*ob.* 1874), who, among many masterly editions of Middle-High-German classics, produced, in conjunction with him, the first critical edition of the early Minne-singers (*The Spring of Minne-Song*, 1857). Before becoming Lachmann's successor at Berlin he had taught at Leipzig, and was the original of the Professor in Freytag's *Lost Manuscript*. An eminent follower of Lachmann in the criticism of the German epic, as well as of Jacob Grimm in the general study of German antiquities, and a scholar of original power and judgment, was Karl Müllenhoff, a Ditmarsian like Niebuhr. He held a

[1] Between them, to nearly the end of the letter F.

professorship at Berlin, and died in 1884, before completing his most comprehensive work, the *History of German Antiquities*. G. F. Benecke (*ob.* 1844) was, in part of his labours, associated with Lachmann. Besides Lachmann and the Berlin school of Germanists, several other scholars of distinction devoted themselves to this study. Among them, we must content ourselves with mentioning Eduard Sievers (*ob.* 1894), whose first important work (a critical edition of the Old-High-German 'Tatian') dates from so far back as 1872, Franz Pfeiffer (*ob.* 1868), Karl Bartsch (*ob.* 1888) and Friedrich Zarncke (*ob.* 1891).

With the aid of their annual meetings, which attracted much attention, the 'Germanists,' as they called themselves, rapidly advanced the importance of their line of studies. Among those who lived into the latter half of the century, were—besides J. A. Schmeller (*ob.* 1852), whose investigations covered the whole range of German philology, and even passed beyond it, and F. H. von der Hagen (*ob.* 1856), a scholar of a more conservative type—two German poets of renown. The contributions of Ludwig Uhland to German ballad-poetry breathe the historic national spirit like no other lyrics of the age; and his own life was that of a true patriot and unfaltering witness to the cause of lawful freedom[1]. He died, in 1862, at Tübingen, where, while always responsive to the call of political duties, he had held a professorial chair during the greater part of his life. The other was the celebrated epigrammatist Hoffmann von Fallersleben (*ob.* 1874), whose dismissal from his chair at Breslau has been noted in a previous volume[2], and whose memorable efforts for the preservation of the popular songs of the past formed only part of the general services rendered by him to the study of German (especially Low-German) language and literature. In the same year, 1874, died H. F. Massmann, an original figure in the history of German scholarship, who, after in his

[1] Cf vol. I, pp. 124, 262 *et al*, *ante*. [2] Cf. vol. I, p 333, *ante*.

youth playing the leading part in the audacious burning of the books in the Wartburg[1], became in time director of gymnastic instruction and professor at Berlin, in which latter capacity he edited the *Kaiserchronik* (1849–53) and *Ulfilas* (1857). Mention must not be omitted of H. Paul's indispensable *Outline of German Philology* (1891–3) to which G. Gröber supplied a Romance counterpart (1888).

The chief appeal, however, of the Germanists to a wider circle of readers naturally lay through literary history, in which branch of work great activity was shown by Lachmann's school. The systematic study of earlier German literature is under a great debt to the eminent scholar W. Wackernagel (*ob.* 1868), who chose to give up to Basel what must have been meant for his wider native sphere of Berlin. Mention has already been made of Moriz Haupt, who after being driven from his chair at Leipzig in 1851, for suspected connivance with the Dresden insurrection, was appointed to Lachmann's chair at Berlin. Like his predecessor, he combined an intimate knowledge of classical with the command of German philology: among his services to the latter was the foundation (1841) of the *Journal of German Antiquities* (*Zeitschrift für deutsches Alterthum*). But perhaps the most widely renowned among the members of the school was Karl Simrock of Bonn (*ob.* 1876), who, himself a poet, laboured indefatigably both in the field of poetic literature and in that of mythology. He did much to familiarise the German public by his versions with the great poems of the Middle-High-German period. His version of the *Lay of the Nibelungs* had gone through a score of editions before the War of 1870–1[2].

Among historians of German literature as a whole

[1] Cf. vol. I, p. 157, *ante*.

[2] R. von Liliencron's collection, in 4 vols., of German historic *Volkslieder* from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century (1865–9), should not be left unmentioned.

(Wackernagel's share in the *History* which bears his name reached only into the seventeenth century), mention should be made of A. Koberstein, whose *Outline* (*Grundriss*), not quite reaching 300 pages in the first edition (1847), filled more than ten times that number in the fourth (1866), a rivulet of text being accompanied by a broad current of notes[1]. G. Gervinus, after his expulsion from Göttingen in 1837, returned to Heidelberg, where his influence gradually became of moment in national politics[2]. The grasp which he possessed as a historian gave unity to his *History of German Poetry*, as his most important critical work came to be called in its fourth edition (1853)[3]; but his literary sympathies stopped short with the classical age of the national literature, just as his political antipathies prevented him from taking part in the last phase of the national effort of which he just lived to see the crowning success (he died in 1871). A tribute of recognition cannot be refused to the attractive clearness, in its earlier portions, of the wellknown manual by the reactionary Hessian churchman, A. Vilmar (*ob.* 1868); but a larger view is taken in the voluminous *History* of Heinrich Kurz (1851–72). Among histories of particular literary periods, mention may be made of Hermann Hettner's luminous volume on German (following those on English and French) literature in the eighteenth century; of R. Haym's *Romantic School*

[1] For later editions, see Bibliography. [2] Cf vol I, p 433, *ante*.

[3] The fifth edition, partly revised by K. Bartsch, appeared in 5 vols, Leipzig, 1871–4. Gervinus's *Shakespeare*, in which the treatment is historical and moral rather than, like H Ulrici's (*ob.* 1884), deductive and aesthetic, as a whole remains a work of effective coherency. The dogmatism of German Shakespeare learning met with not unsuccessful censure in the *Shakespeare Studies of a Realist* by Gustav von Rümelin (*ob.* 1889), a true lover both of Shakespeare and of the national classics, and one of the most fairminded politicians as well as enlightened men of letters of his age. J L. Klein's comprehensive *History of the Drama* (13 vols., 1865 to 1876) only reached Marlowe.

(1870)[1]; and of Julian Schmidt's successive instalments (from 1862 onwards) of his incisive critical *History of German Literature from Leibniz to 1814* (1886–90). The personal characterisations in the work of O. Gruppe (1864–70), and the breadth and clearness of W. Scherer's survey to the death of Goethe (1882–5), also call for notice. The number of monographs is endless in the wide field of German literary biography and criticism, as well as in that of research in the domain of German philology, including etymology and metre, in the later years of the nineteenth century. In the former case, the tendency of German academical scholarship to concentrate itself on the elaborate treatment of single writers or works, continued on the increase, while the production of books planned on a wider basis began to fail to keep pace with it. Nor can the fact be ignored, though it is partly accounted for by the enduring inaccessibility of much important material, that to the greatest of all modern German writers no complete literary monument quite worthy of his name and fame was raised in his own country during the century of his death.

The transition seems natural from linguistic and literary to historical studies[2]; and it will be convenient, in connexion with these last, to touch upon certain other subjects of academical learning, without distinguishing the university

[1] 3rd ed., by O. Walzel (1914).

[2] What follows is mainly based upon F. X. von Wegele's *Geschichte der deutschen Historiographie* (vol. XX of *Gesch. der Wiss. in Deutschland*, 1885, bk. v), but I have not failed to compare with this work Lord Acton's brilliant review, *German Schools of History*, in the first number of *The English Historical Review*, 1886. For complete bibliographical information, see the 7th ed. of Dahlmann-Waitz's *Quellenbuch d. deutschen Geschichte*, ed. E. Brandenburg (1906). On the other hand, the *Goethe Jahrbuch*, founded in 1880, and ed. by L. Geiger, abounds in valuable contributions, and has since 1885 been supplemented by the documentary publications of the Goethe Society.

faculties to which they technically belong. Modern German historiography—or, if the expression be preferred, the science of history as evolved in nineteenth century Germany—had its beginnings in the period of the War of Liberation; but its roots lay in the critical method to which, from a rather earlier date onwards, the study of the classics owed its regeneration. Connecting threads, no doubt, existed, though few and faint, with the movement in historical composition caused by the Renascence and the Reformation. Nor, again, can it be denied that what may be called the historical philosophy of Herder had led his generation to reflect on the continuity of *historical life;* and that the brothers Schlegel—Friedrich in especial—and the earlier Romantic School in general (which itself signified a revolt against the rationalist indifference to the past) had infused into literature a vivid interest in the records and remains of earlier ages. Before these impulses were given, Germany had, even in what Acton calls the storage of materials, fallen behind Italy and France, while in historical composition it lagged after France and England. It was historical jurisprudence which led the way, in the person of F. K. von Savigny (who had succeeded Fichte as Rector of the University of Berlin), the author of the *History of Roman Law in the Middle Ages*, of which the first edition of the first volume was published in 1815 and the last in 1831, and which showed the continuous validity of Roman law to be the result, not of chance or arbitrary choice, but of historical development. So early as 1818, K. F. Eichhorn, then of Göttingen, and afterwards of Berlin, had begun the publication of his *History of the German State and Law*, which, when completed in 1823, coherently traced the progress of its theme from the earliest times, relying throughout on the evidence of existing sources. These two legal were followed by one of the most illustrious of political historians of modern times, B. G. Niebuhr, whose great *Roman History* (1811–12, and 1832) in the end became the accepted model of German

historical narrative. Even before his diplomatic experience at Rome, he had enjoyed opportunities of preparing himself by the experience of statesmanship for the historian's task; and, though he was to the end a Conservative, like Savigny and Eichhorn, his mind was too free to allow him to become a political partisan. As a historian, his insight into the past, his courage in rejecting what he recognised as fictitious, and his imaginative power (whatever might be its occasional aberrations) in reconstructing an entire edifice from scanty remains, rendered him peerless on both the critical and the constructive side of his labours. Though his *History* was supplemented by his *Lectures*, which covered a vast expanse of ground, he left the story of ancient Rome only half-told. But his great book had marked an epoch in historical work, and, at the same time, though no other theme could possess the world-wide significance of that which he had proposed to himself to divide with Gibbon, his treatment of his actual share of the subject directed German historians—and not these only—to the production of other works conceived and executed on the same grand lines of national history.

It was in this spirit that Stein resolved to bring about the collection of the materials for a history of the nation which had of old looked upon the Roman Empire as its inheritance. His plan was from 1826 carried out in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, by G. H. Pertz (who in 1849 became Stein's and in 1864 Gneisenau's biographer[1]) (*ob.* 1876). Pertz was assisted by several other historians of mark, including Dahlmann, Lappenberg and G. Waitz, the author of the massive *German Constitutional History from the 9th to the 12th century* (1844–76); and in 1875 the editorship descended to Waitz, aided by W. von Giesebrecht, Philipp Jaffé, the eminent palaeographer, and others. This famous collection of sources proved of the highest importance to modern historical study, not only because of the texts which

[1] The *Life of Gneisenau* was completed by H. Delbrück (1880).

it provided, but also by reason of the criteria of genuineness and of authenticity which it applied to them.

The earlier half of the century witnessed not a few attempts at original treatment of German history after a fashion adequate to the rising demands of the age. The *History of the Teutonic Order* (1827–38) by Johannes Voigt, the author of an unprejudiced monograph on Gregory the Great, is notable as an early example of a thorough use of historic materials—though it was left to a later historian (Treitschke) to reproduce its essence in one of his most admirable essays. A greater temporary success was secured by K. A. Menzel's serviceable *History of the Germans from the Reformation* (1826–48), which, on its first appearance, aroused much interest by its maintenance of the principle of unity, against which it denounced both the Reformation and the halfheartedness of Ferdinand II as offending. H. Luden's *History of the German People* to the Emperor Frederick II (1825–37) disappointed the high expectations due to the author's popularity as an academical teacher and as a politician; while the *History of Germany* (1829 ff.) contributed by K. Pfister, author of a successful *History of Suabia*, to Heeren and Ukert's long-lived series of *Histories of the States of Europe*, of which this was the earliest, was more or less of a failure. The series itself, published by F. A. Perthes of Gotha, with continuations in progress to the present day, is invaluable.

The critical method established by the *Monumenta* soon proved its vitality in new generations of German historical scholars of very various types and tendencies. It pervaded the diplomatic labours of F. J. Böhmer—an original and in some respects delightful personality, though not only Prussia but her great historian Ranke was uncongenial to him—including the *Regesta* of the Emperors (1831 ff.), completed by him up to 1313[1]; and the *History of Württemberg* (1841–

[1] The collection of *Acta Imperii Selecta* left behind by Bohmer was

73) by C. F. von Stälin, one of the best among the earlier publications of the Gotha series, though its 'unpolitical' character was made a charge against it. Similarly impartial was the tone of G. A. H. Stenzel's *History of Prussia* in the same series (1830–7).

More widely read than these works was the *History of the Hohenstaufens and their Times* (1823–5) by Friedrich von Raumer, long one of the best known figures of Berlin society, a man of the world and a traveller. After he had exchanged an official for a literary life, he became both a voluminous and a popular writer; and his tribute to the glory of medieval Germany was composed in a spirit harmonising with the patriotic romanticism of the age. Hence its great success, betokened by Raupach's dramatisation of some of its episodes. Not so successful was his *History of Europe from 1763 to 1783* (1839); but his *Historisches Taschenbuch*, a periodical collection of historical essays continued under the editorship of W. H. Riehl, the celebrated writer on German social history, and then of W. Maurenbrecher, deserved to live, as it did until 1902. Raumer survived till 1873, having previously published his literary 'remains' (*Nachlass*).

A contemporary of Raumer's was J. M. Löbell, who died at Bonn in 1863; but, though he also occupied himself with political and religious problems, his favourite field was literary history. He was a contributor to the celebrated *World-History* of K. F. Becker in its later form, much expanded and changed from its original design (1801–5) of a *Child's History of the World*.

The Gotha collection already mentioned, which, though also dealing with the histories of foreign nations, steadily

edited (1870) by Julius Ficker of Innsbruck, himself a medievalist of note, with whom Sybel, in 1862, had engaged in a memorable controversy as to the relations between the German nation and the Empire. It led to the publication of his politically, as well as historically, notable essay, *Die deutsche Nation und das Kaiserreich* (1862).

maintained its high level, gave rise to many works of lasting value. Among these was the *History of England*, of which the first two volumes (1834–7), reaching to the death of Stephen, were by J. M. Lappenberg (*ob.* 1865). Most of his life was devoted to the service of his native Hamburg; but, though he produced much valuable work on Hanseatic history, he never achieved the task for which he seemed predestined, of superseding Sartorius. His volumes on English history appeared at a season of the highest importance in our national historiography, when, after Sharon Turner had pointed the way on which Kemble and Thorpe followed, Palgrave was beginning to make the use of the national records the basis of a new school of English history. But Lappenberg's devotion to the documents of Hamburg history, and the great fire of 1842 whose devastations did not spare them, forced him to commit the continuation of his English work to other hands. He could have found none so competent as those of Reinhold Pauli, whose share in the work, bringing it down to the death of Henry VII (1853–8), has not lost its value to our own day, though, strangely enough, it still remains untranslated. Pauli's various writings on English history, which range from the England of King Alfred to that of the first Reform Bill, offer an example of international historic sympathy which now cannot be recorded without a sigh.

F. C. Dahlmann, who died three years before Pauli, and who, like him, had suffered for his political courage[1], was a patriot of the sternest stuff. His unfinished *Danish History* (in the same series, 1837–42), which ends with the break-up of the Northern Union, is a model of solidity without dulness, and thoroughness without pedantry; but, more especially as it dealt with the beginnings only of the Schleswig-Holstein question (his declared attitude towards which led to his

[1] He had been one of the Gottingen Seven: cf. vol I, p. 284; and see as to Pauli, vol. II, p. 345.

exchanging Kiel for Göttingen), it did not give him his full opportunity as a political historian. This he found later, in his Bonn lectures on the *English and the French Revolution* (printed in the form of *Histories* in 1844), expressive as they were of the political ideas of which he had become a foremost representative in the public eye. These books, at once concise and ardent, enjoyed a vogue such as very rarely falls to the lot of academical lectures; German historiography, too, was beginning to learn the value, which Greek and English had attested before it, of experience in affairs. Dahlmann died at Bonn in 1860, one of the manliest as well as ablest politicians of his much-decried 'professorial' times.

A very different vein ran through the writings of another wellknown historian of these years, Heinrich Leo, in his youth a participator in the *Burschenschaft* movement, the story of which he lived to tell in his reactionary days. Leo's *History of the Italian States*, contributed by him to the Gotha series (1829–32), contained his most important work on the history of the Middle Ages, which had inspired in him the convictions apparent in all the productions of his maturity and made him, a Hegelian by training, to be accounted a foremost champion of the Papacy (though he never abjured Protestantism). He was an indefatigable worker, and the six volumes of his *Universal History* (1835–44) —described by Acton, notwithstanding its shortcomings, as still[1] the most thoughtful of works bearing that ambitious title—which followed on the *Twelve Books of Netherlands History*, did not exhaust his powers. He died in 1878, as professor at Halle, with a reputation as a historian which his passionate invective had done much to impair.

The same tendencies of opinion showed themselves in the work of A. F. Gfrörer, who died as professor at Freiburg in 1861, and whose *Gustavus Adolphus* (1837), better known than his contributions to medieval history, though suffering

[1] Ranke's was then in course of publication.

from its author's inability to comprehend the greatness of his hero, remains a very acceptable account of the earlier part of the Thirty Years' War. F. W. Barthold, who took it upon himself to complete the narrative of the Great War (1842–3), failed conspicuously in the execution of a task of singular difficulty, above all, through what has been not unfairly styled the 'Ghibelline' tone of his effort. Barthold died in 1858, after his many labours, a disappointed man. F. von Hurter (*ob.* 1865), the opening volume of whose elaborate *History of Innocent III* (1834-72) had revealed the tendency of his opinions, became a convert to Rome and an Austrian official, so that his equally elaborate but even less interesting *History of Ferdinand II and his Parents* (1850–4) might almost rank as a semi-official production. His junior, K. von Höfler (*ob.* 1897), was a pupil of both Görres and Schelling, and a Catholic by birth and training. He afterwards became professor at Prague, where he rendered enduring service to the German interest in Bohemia, and an Austrian councillor of State. His researches in Bohemian history were, partly from this point of view, of considerable importance; and, altogether, he played a memorable part in the history of Austrian intellectual life.

Notwithstanding the labours of these scholars and of their later contemporaries, which accumulated an enormous amount of historical work on the subject of the Thirty Years' War, the great task of narrating it, with its antecedents and results, as a complete and well-proportioned whole, remained unachieved—even by the eminent Bonn historian Moriz Ritter. But his *History of Germany in the period of the Counter-Reformation and Thirty Years' War* (1887 ff.), largely based on the ample diplomatic material edited by himself, notwithstanding that its close is in a sense hurried, deserves recognition as one of the most satisfactory products—in matter and in spirit—of modern German historiography. Other works, on portions of the

immense subject, must be passed by, including, with Ranke's masterly monograph on *Wallenstein* (1869), the gallant effort for the 'rehabilitation' of Tilly by Onno Klopp (1861), the 'Guelf' historian, whose voluminous *Fall of the House of Stuart* (1875 ff.), though exhibiting a partisanship which its author never sought to disavow, forms a valuable contribution to the political history of Europe.

We still have to notice, so far as particular members of them have not already found incidental mention in this necessarily imperfect outline, the two principal schools of German historiography in the century—for as such they may, without invidiousness, be described. But, in view more especially of the origin, indicated above, of the change which in its early years came over the whole spirit and method of the study, it may be well previously to advert to the labours of at least two eminent historical teachers, whose legal training and political experience concentrated their attention upon constitutional life and its foundations.

One of these, G. L. von Maurer, with whom we met in one of the most unlucky passages of his public life[1], was an early member of the Germanist school, and had gained high distinction as a jurist before he became an official of the Bavarian (and temporarily a member of the Greek) Government. Much of his varied public activity was organically connected with the great series of works in which, from 1854 to 1871, he traced the communal life of the German people from the mark system onwards to that of the towns, thus laying foundations on which a great school of historians in England as well as in Germany raised a mighty superstructure. Even closer was the connexion between Savigny's teaching and the work of Rudolf von Gneist, who was assistant-judge as well as professor at Berlin, before the period of constitutional changes began in Prussia and was followed by a reaction towards the old conditions of public life. It was then

[1] See vol. I, p. 360, *ante*.

that a very potent influence was exercised by the results of Gneist's English studies, as laid down in his successive famous historical surveys of English institutions, under the heads of administration, self-government and the conjunction of both in the parliamentary system. The publication of these masterly treatises began in 1857, and culminated in his *English Constitutional History*, which first appeared in 1882. In the midst of these labours, he passed from municipal service into the great political conflicts of the age, in which he took a prominent part, at first as a leading member of the Liberal Opposition, and then as a trusted counsellor to Bismarck, both in questions of administrative reform, especially that of the order of Circles[1] (1869 ff.), and in the great ecclesiastical conflict. With him died, in 1895, a consistent champion of a masculine conception of freedom, and a great comparative teacher of public law and constitutional history.

It seems going back into the previous century, of which he was the historian, and by whose rationalistic spirit he was animated, to introduce at this point the name of F. C. Schlosser, as that of the founder of the Heidelberg school of historians. And, in truth, this latter designation itself is perhaps more convenient than exact, in view of the number of historians who, thanks to her ever open doors, have taken an important part in the teaching of the least territorial of all German universities. Although he lived till 1861, Schlosser had delivered the substance of his celebrated work, as part of a general historical survey, in the years 1826 to 1834, and had completed it for publication in 1848. Other works by him show how he was wont to write large his ideas on historical progress, thus securing wider attention than is usually bestowed on closer scrutinies of historical evidence. K. von Rotteck, of the popularity of whose *Universal History* something has already been said[2], belongs to a rather earlier

[1] Cf. p. 95 *ante*

[2] Cf. vol. I, pp. 129–30, *ante*.

generation. G. G. Gervinus, who after being driven from Göttingen long taught at Heidelberg, whence, especially through the constitutional *Deutsche Zeitung* founded by him in 1847, he exercised a considerable political influence, had some of the qualities of Schlosser, whom he revered as his teacher and master. But, to a forcible though not catholic literary judgment, he united an intense though not always conclusive political insight. Of his literary work something has already been said[1]. His historical *magnum opus*, the *History of the Nineteenth Century* (1856–66), remained uncompleted. Besides containing fine narrative passages, it is like its justly celebrated *Introduction*, full of ideas. Unhappily, it was Gervinus's nature to insist on his most cherished political aspirations being carried out in the way he thought right, and he therefore had to undergo the disappointment of a prophet fated to see his most confident predictions remain unfulfilled.

In effectiveness as teachers neither Schlosser nor Gervinus surpassed Ludwig Häusser, a third eminent Heidelberg professor, and a true son of the Palatinate (whose history he wrote in due course). His *German History from the death of Frederick the Great to the Congress of Vienna* (1854 ff.) struck the note of patriotism proper to a writer who afterwards broke a lance for Frederick the Great with both Macaulay and Onno Klopp; and, though superseded in some respects, it remains a standard work of national history in both matter and form. From a military point of view, but in a popular vein, Häusser's work was supplemented by H. Beitzke's *History of the War of Liberation* (1855) (Häusser died in 1867.)

The foremost figure among the German historians of the nineteenth century—not excepting even men of genius such as Niebuhr, or, *haud longo intervallo*, Mommsen—was Leopold von Ranke. If he, too, is to be regarded as

[1] *Ante*, p. 232

the founder of a school, that school was not restricted to Berlin, 'held like a fortress,' in Acton's words, 'by the garrison of distinguished historians who prepared the Prussian supremacy with their own,' but comprised the full flower of the German historical writers of his age. Born in the Thuringian midlands in 1795, Ranke began his almost unparalleled literary activity at Frankfort in 1824, with the publication of the first volume (for no second appeared) of his *History of the Romance and Germanic Peoples*, a sort of introduction to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the period which was to engage his principal attention as a historian. In 1825, he was appointed professor at Berlin, which, except when on his travels, he never left again[1]. His work on the conflicts between the Turks and the Spanish monarchy (1827), by the use made in it of Venetian and other ambassadorial 'relations,' exemplified his method of using unpublished original documents as a main basis of his narratives; while, at the same time, he applied to research in the field of modern history Niebuhr's great maxim, that secondary sources (*i.e.* historical writers) are of value only insofar as the standpoint of any of them is known to us.

The long series of works which followed proved that he wrote history for its own sake, while addressing himself neither to specialists nor to partisans and always preserving the moderation and self-restraint which are by no means synonymous with indifference. His object was truth—to show how things really happened; and the insight of which he showed himself possessed into the mainsprings of political and religious life, and into the characters of their chief agents, combined with the power of never instructing without interesting, made him one of the most illuminating, though not one of the most inspiring, of historians. His *Roman Popes* (1834–6) at once placed him in the front rank,

[1] At all events from soon after his marriage, he never even changed house.

and founded a reputation steadily maintained, though hardly advanced, by his second great work, *German History in the period of the Reformation* (1839–43). There followed, together with works of lesser volume, *Nine Books of Prussian History*, which disappointed the eagerness of the revolutionary age; then, in quieter times, the *French* and the *English History*, alike *principally in the sixteenth and the seventeenth century*—the former, in the opinion of competent judges, the most perfect example of the master's art; finally, as the gift of his old age (1879–85; he died in 1886), his *Universal History* (*Weltgeschichte*), which he had decided to undertake, in lieu of contemplated memoirs of his own life in connexion with the history of the nineteenth century. No nobler legacy was left by any great writer of that century to itself and to its successors.

Though Ranke entered thoroughly and warmly into the patriotic ideas of Prussian historiography, the chief of the Prussian school of historians, in the more special sense of the epithet, was J. G. Droysen, who had passed from Kiel to Halle and from Halle to Berlin, as he had from the age of Hellenism and the Macedonian supremacy to the centuries in which the Hohenzollerns worked out the policy of the Brandenburg-Prussian State (1855–86), up to the threshhold of the Seven Years' War. His appointment as 'historiographer of the House of Brandenburg' was, therefore, fitly bestowed; nor did he at any point of his voluminous work swerve from the assumption that Prussia's destiny was her supremacy in Germany. He died in 1884, leaving behind him many distinguished pupils, several of whom survive to carry on or supplement his labours.

Among the actual pupils of Ranke (between whom and Droysen there was no intimacy or cooperation) were many of the foremost German historians of the age. One of these was Georg Waitz (*ob.* 1886) of Göttingen, already mentioned as the constitutional historian of the early Empire, and also the

author of works of special national significance, the *History of Schleswig-Holstein*, and the monograph on Wullenwever and the downfall of the Hansa. Another was Wilhelm von Giesebrecht (*ob.* 1889). His *History of the Age of the German Emperors* (1855–8), which, with its continuation[1], reaches to the death of Frederick Barbarossa, clothes in an attractive style the results of strenuous labour on its materials, and is one of those works which, by a deserved good fortune, has become a standard monument of the great past of the national history. Yet another, and worthy to rank beside these great historical scholars, was Heinrich von Sybel, who, in the course of labours in which part was taken by T. von Sickel, 'the prince of critics,' as Acton calls him, had learnt, by the strict discipline of medieval research, how to contend against confusion and fiction. But his greatest achievements were in modern fields. His *History of the French Revolutionary Age from 1789 to 1800* (1853–70), largely relying upon sources which had not been open to the praiseworthy labours of such historical scholars as W. Wachsmuth (*ob.* 1866), retold one of the most agitated and agitating episodes in the world's history with the judicial calm of the dispassionate enquirer, and explained with the same candour the weakness of the European resistance to French republican aggression. And his *History of the Foundation of the New German Empire* (1889–94) remains an indispensable manual for students of the most important political events and transactions of the author's times. Sybel, who as editor of the *Historical Journal* (*Historische Zeitschrift*), founded in 1859 and long bearing his name, and by his other work, at Munich and elsewhere[2], held a foremost place among the contemporary German historians, and who had taken an active part in Prussian and German parliamentary life, died in 1895 at Marburg, where he had been professor before he moved to Munich and Bonn. The

[1] The sixth and last volume, edited and continued by B. von Simson, appeared in 1895.

[2] Cf. p. 237, *note, ante.*

last-named university he only quitted for Berlin, in order to assume there the direction of the Archives of State and to accomplish his second great work, at which he laboured to the last, though after Bismarck's fall not allowed to use these archives themselves. Among the pupils of Sybel, in their turn, mention should be made of K. von Noorden (*ob.* 1892), the lucid historian of the eighteenth century, and of W. Maurenbrecher (*ob.* 1892), whose interesting, though unfinished, book on *The Catholic Reformation* (1880) exhibited, like other writings of his, an unaffected regard for historical truth.

During the whole of the period now specially under notice, the study of historical documents continued to be supplied with abundant material, carefully chosen and completely edited, from the records in the archives of Empire, States and cities, and from legal, literary and art monuments. But equally notable was the constant augmentation of the number of narratives bringing home to the reading public at large the fruits of a research which deepened as it expanded. Reference has been already made to the invaluable series, continued to the present day, of the *Histories of European States* brought out by the eminent firm of F. A. Perthes of Gotha. Of more direct political interest was that of the *State Histories of the Most Recent Age*, published by S. Hirzel of Leipzig, another of those publishers to whom bookselling (as Macaulay would have said) meant much more than a mere trade; and their enterprise was emulated by Weidmann and Reimer of Berlin, Oldenbourg of Munich and others, as well as by the famous older houses and by such agencies as the 'Historical Commission,' founded in 1878 by King Maximilian II of Bavaria. Among the numerous publications of this Commission it is impossible, in the present connexion, to omit mention of the *Modern History of Sciences in Germany*, in a series of volumes composed from 1864 onwards, largely by master hands, and marking the later progress of those branches of learning in the advancement of

which Germans had conspicuously taken part. Nor can the boon be ignored which was bestowed on the students of all branches and periods of the national life by the issue, from 1875 onwards, of the great 'General German Biographical Dictionary' (*Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*), and its continuations, as a whole second to no other similar national achievement. On a very much smaller scale, but attesting its editor's insight into the essential demands of historical instruction, by which during his long and distinguished pedagogic career, from Dresden to Schulpforta, he exercised an enduring influence upon a wide circle of pupils, Wilhelm Herbst (*ob.* 1882) constructed his *Encyclopaedia of Modern History* (1880–90).

The *Histories* in the Gotha series mentioned above include, among the earlier volumes, that by R. Roepell of *Poland* (hardly yet definitively superseded), and those by E. Herrmann of *Russia* and H. Schäfer of *Spain*, while S. Riezler's voluminous work on *Bavaria* is still in progress. Other specially valuable or attractive works are K. Hillebrand's *France* (*from Louis-Philippe to Napoleon III*), W. Herzberg's *Greece*, and the *Tuscany* of A. von Reumont, the author of a general *History of the City of Rome*, nearly contemporary with the standard work of F. Gregorovius (1859–72) on the medieval history of the city. The collection of recent State histories includes, besides Pauli's work already mentioned, the Spanish, by H. Baumgarten, the distinguished modern historian of Charles V; the Russian by T. von Bernhardi, an expert in both diplomatic and military matters; the Greek by K. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy; the Austrian, both Liberal and fair, by A. Springer, the biographer of Dahlmann; and—beyond all dispute the crown of the series and of German historiography in the age of its appearance—the German by H. von Treitschke.

Treitschke, whose *Historical and Political Essays* (1865 and 1870) had not only, like Macaulay's, laid the foundations

of his fame as a historian, but were, in more ways than one, directly preparatory to his great work, published the first volume of the *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* in 1879, the fifth and last, which reaches to the year 1848, in 1894. From the first, there was no mistaking the extraordinary merits of the book—its unity of conception and purpose, its breadth and lucidity of treatment, combined with a spontaneous flow of illustrative detail, personal, literary and topographical, and the unsurpassable wealth of its diction and vigour of its style. On the other hand, the pages of this *History* bristled with contentious and controversial points; and the second volume, in particular, brought down upon the writer a host of well-equipped censors. Nor could it be denied that, difficult as it was to convict this historian of an actual blunder, there was, both in his manner and in what underlay it, a constant tendency towards overstatement of his case (for he always had a 'case,' and always was either on the offensive or on the defensive), together with a lack of generosity towards adverse, and often against lost, causes and their representatives. At England past and present, and at the little kingdom of Saxony, where he had been born and bred, he lost no opportunity of girding. Still, the work remains a monument, both of its author's genius as a historian, and of the great current in German life and history which, with many a backward movement or interval of stagnation, bore the national destinies along towards union under Prussian hegemony, from the days of the War of Liberation to those of the foundation of the *Zollverein*, and thence to the revolutionary era and its bitter disillusionment.

Treitschke, to whom it was not given to carry on his work into those days or into the epoch of triumphant recovery under new conditions, 'educated' himself 'up' from the constitutional Liberalism of his younger days to the demands of a time when he was one of the first to help

in splitting National-Liberalism into two halves, at the risk of the Liberal element in the conjunction being left to go by the board. With the ardent eloquence that had distinguished him from his Leipzig days onwards, he had at Freiburg supported the cause of constitutional rights, but had come to give to Bismarck's Government his consistent support and that of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, to which he was long the chief contributor and which he edited 1866 to 1889. Thus, after moving as professor to Kiel, thence to Heidelberg, and, in 1873, to Berlin, he grew into the Treitschke of *Die Politik*. This work, by which he is, not unnaturally, best known to English readers[1], consists of lectures expanded out of courses delivered by him at a succession of universities, and repeated at Berlin in the form in which they were published, three years after his death, from the notes of his students. It presents, in dogmatic form and with more than dogmatic sureness of utterance, the principles, adapted with the utmost courage from Aristotle, of the true doctrine of the State and its relations to religion, nationality and humanity, of the right order of classes, and of the best form of government—all enunciated with that defiant clearness which he who runs cannot mistake, and with that resistless kind of persuasiveness which extinguishes contradiction. Here are laid down, in every sense *ex cathedrâ*, the bases of a militarism capable of, at the same time, ensuring the safety of the State and strengthening its inner life, without running counter to the singularly mild constitutionalism which is to temper the vigour of the monarchy established over it. The whole disquisition furnishes, not so much a commentary on the historical growth and existing conditions of the new German Empire, as the political moral to be drawn from them; nor,

[1] His *History of Germany* now at last in course of translation. Of his *Politik* (translated 1916) ample extracts are given in H. W C. Davies's valuable *The Political Thought of H. von Treitschke* (1914).

assuredly, has the philosophy of history ever shown itself more 'real' than in these professorial pronouncements.

The study of political philosophy in Germany had not rapidly shaken off the dominating influence of that of public law, all-important, as has been seen, for the growth of historical science during the ascendancy of Savigny and his school. Dahlmann and Waitz both published works on the science of politics, and Gneist's chief writings bore directly on this as on a comparative study. Robert von Mohl (*ob.* 1875), whose political services at Carlsruhe and at the Frankfort Diet gave proof of his national patriotism, was at the same time a true cosmopolitan, as is shown by the extraordinary comprehensiveness of the encyclopaedic works on political science prepared by him at Tubingen and Heidelberg (1865 ff.). While the reaction found vigorous teachers of its principles of political philosophy, such as, above all, the eminent jurist and redoubtable publicist, Julius Stahl already mentioned[1], together with the eminent writer on civil and ecclesiastical law, Professor Ferdinand Walter of Bonn (*ob.* 1879), and the vehement historian Heinrich Leo, also mentioned above, R. von Mohl's successor at Heidelberg, the Zuricher J. C. Bluntschli, wrote a history of these studies[2] conceived in a very different spirit. His death (1881) closed a most active scientific and political career; the most memorable of his writings is, perhaps, his standard treatise on the *Modern International Law of Civilised States* (1868)[3].

The progress of the general study of Law and Jurisprudence is left aside here, as neither admitting of lay treatment nor falling within the scheme of this brief survey.

[1] Cf *ante*, p. 209, and vol. I, pp. 317–18.

[2] *Geschichte des allgemeinen Staatsrechts und der Politik* (*Gesch. d. Wissensch. in Deutschland*, vol. I) (1864).

[3] R. Stintzing's *Gesch. d. deutschen Rechtswissenschaft*, parts I and II, with a third part by E. E. Landsberg (*Gesch. d. Wiss. in Deutschland*, vol XVIII). does not reach far into the nineteenth century.

The modern State, according to Treitschke's doctrine, is the product of civilisation (*Kulturstaat*) rather than of law (*Rechtstaat*); and on the place vindicated to herself by Germany in the progress of civilisation must, according to this view, depend her future among the nations of the world. Admirable work was done by German writers in this branch of historical enquiry, for which, though it owes much to English, as it does to French, writers, we lack a convenient designation. Above all, W. H. Riehl (*ob.* 1897) made a name for himself as honoured in the world of letters as it was beloved in the land at large. Essayist, novelist, journalist and professor (at Munich), in turn, he united to a hereditary knowledge of Court life a rare personal intimacy, gained in the course of endless 'wanderings[1],' with the ways, thought and feelings of the people, more especially of his beloved peasantry. His style is singularly clear and attractive, and he was probably the most popular of 'local' lecturers of his age in Germany. But he was also a man of varied historical reading, with a wide knowledge of art (King Maximilian II finally named him director of the Bavarian collections of art and antiquities), and devoted, though perhaps in a somewhat old-fashioned way, to the study of music. His *Natural History of the German People on the basis of a German Social Policy* (1857-69) remains his principal work; but though, like his century of novels (*Kulturgeschichtliche Novellen*), it had its being on national soil—he defined a nation to be a whole made such by race, language, manners and settlement —his studies and lectures covered the history of general civilisation in medieval and modern times.

Friedländer's work on the *History of Civilisation in the Roman Empire* has been already mentioned; and a later historical period was treated with masterly learning by

[1] He said that he had *erwandert* what he knew before he put it into his books. See the extremely interesting notice of him, by H. Simonfeld, in *Allg. Deutsche Biogr.* vol. LIII (1907).

Jacob Burckhardt, in his *Civilisation* (*Cultur*) *of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860) published at much the same date as Buckle's *History of Civilisation*, with which its general conception is in curious contrast[1]. The subject was included in that of the eminent aesthetician Moriz Carrière's (*ob.* 1895) comprehensive work, the *History of Art in connexion with the Development of Civilisation and the Ideals of Humanity* (1863–73). The idea of a comparative history of civilisation was that which inspired the lifelong labours of Karl Lamprecht (*ob.* 1915), the founder of the Leipzig Institute for the study of *Kulturgeschichte*; but he concentrated his labours upon the developments of its German branch, in which task he had been preceded by F. Wachsmuth (1850–2), and he treated his great theme with remarkable fulness and clearness in his *German History* (1891–6), with its *Supplement* (1902–3). On the habits of thought which had perhaps grown upon this indefatigable author in his later years the present is not the place to descant. An earlier generation had delighted in the contributions of Gustav Freytag to the social history of its ancestors, to which reference will be made below.

The science of political economy was in this half-century passing through a fiery trial at the hands of the early apostles of communism. In 1844 Friedrich Engels had denounced it as nothing but an immoral abstraction; and in 1867 Karl Marx's celebrated work *Capital* sought to establish the final supersession of its principles. The historical school of political economy, however, of which Bruno Hildebrand of Marburg (*ob* 1878) may be regarded as the founder, and of which the most eminent representative was Wilhelm Roscher of Leipzig (*ob.* 1894), the historian of the science in Germany[2], placed it on a new footing. Hildebrand, the single volume of whose chief

[1] Cf. C. H. Herford, in the essay cited, pp. 68–9.

[2] See his *Geschichte der Nationalokonomie in Deutschland* (*Gesch. d. Wiss. in D.* vol XIV) (1914).

contribution to this study, *The National (= Political) Economy of the Present and the Future*, had appeared in 1848[1], pronounced the doctrines of Adam Smith only a phase in the development of the science, whose object was to enquire into the economic as part of the general history of all nations and ages of the world. Roscher, whose *magnum opus* was the *System of Public Economy* (*System der Volkswirthschaft*) (1854–94, the year of his death), but whose extraordinary literary productivity included a survey of English Political Economy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, carried out this extended view of the study as covering the whole of past history and leading to empiric and organic, in contradistinction to rationalist and absolute, conclusions as to its results. The historical method of dealing with the progress of a science has never been illustrated with more completeness than by this wise and self-restrained enquirer, whose religious point of view, as exhibited in his posthumous *Spiritual Ideas of a Political Economist*, should not be overlooked[2].

In the hands of Roscher and others—among the earliest, K. Kries, whose *Statistics as an Independent Science* appeared in 1850—a position of new importance was vindicated to statistical science, a designation which had formerly covered a far wider range of enquiry than it did now. For practical use, statistics had, even in the days of the growth of the *Zollverein*, been applied within a very limited range. Prussia, however, had in her service a statistician of great and far-reaching intelligence in the person of J. G. Hoffmann (*ob.* 1847), to whom the establishment of the Prussian Statistical Office (an original design of Stein's) was due. A new impulse was given to statistical work, and to the application of its results,

[1] In 1862 he founded the leading *Jahrbucher fur Nationaloekonomie und Statistik*.

[2] Lord Acton's observations on Roscher, in the essay cited above, are of special interest.

by Hoffmann's successor E. Engel, whose *Statistical Survey of German Industry, 1875 and 1861*[1] was published in 1880, and who, immediately after the foundation of the new Empire, proposed to establish statistical offices on the model of the Prussian in a number of centres. The spread of the study of statistics, one of the most notable phenomena in the progress of modern political science, is illustrated by the practical interest taken in it by one of the most original political and literary personalities of his age, the Württemberger Gustav Rümelin[2].

In connexion with these notes on historical and economical studies, a reference cannot be omitted to the progress in the same half-century, of the study of Geography. It was the age of scientific travel and discovery, in which German explorers had their full share, from the great African journey begun by Heinrich Barth and his companion the geologist A. Overweg in 1849, and polar and other expeditions, onwards, to those later voyages of 'investigation' in Africa of which mention had to be made above[3]. The impulse to this new form of German scientific effort had been primarily derived from A. von Humboldt's famous travels in the New World at the beginning of the century, and from the commanding influence which he had exercised on the growth of comparative geographical science, at first from Paris and then from Berlin, after his removal thither in 1826. He had helped to inspire in Karl Ritter (*ob.* 1859) a lifelong devotion to the science which he had at first learnt to prize as an invaluable instrument of pedagogy, and in

[1] After Engel's official labours had come to an end in 1882, he engaged in a survey of the whole ground which his science was, as he held, destined to cover Of this work, entitled *Demos*, a section only appears to have been published.

[2] See the interesting notice of him by the eminent political economist Gustav Schmoller in vol. LIII of *Allg. Deutsche Biographie* (1907). Cf. p. 232, *note*, *ante*.

[3] Cf. p. 160, *ante*.

which he became the leading light of his generation. His learning, while not exhaustive in all branches of his subject, connected and applied them all; and, though he was not an extensive traveller, he had seen what he had seen with full intensity of vision, and combined his observations and studies with true imaginative power. His style is full of life and full of sympathy—the best manner of the best teaching. Thus his *Erdkunde* (*Geography of the World*), more especially in the second edition of its first two volumes (1822–32), became a classic, long before (in 1851) he published a valuable monograph with an *Introduction to General Comparative Geography* (1852). The intimate connexion between geography and history which Ritter had made so clear that henceforth, as Ernst Curtius said, no history of a people could be written without a knowledge of its scene of action, was typically exemplified in the writings of Karl Neumann (*ob.* 1880), author of an uncompleted *Hellenes in Scythia* (1855), and of a *History of the Age of the Punic Wars* (1883), in which his elucidation of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps was specially admired, as well as joint author of a *General Physical Geography of Greece*. Even the briefest notice of the advance of geographical science in Germany should not omit to mention the invaluable contributions to it of August Petermann, who, after rendering great services in this country both to cartography and to geographical discovery, became editor of the celebrated *Geographische Mittheilungen*, published by Justus Perthes at the Geographical Institute at Gotha, from 1855 onwards, and who, in connexion with this journal and otherwise, established his reputation and served the interests of geographical study in all parts of the world as the foremost cartographer of the age. In 1878, a tragic death put a sudden end to his labours. With Petermann should be gratefully remembered, besides H. A. Daniel (*ob.* 1871), by whom and by whose manuals the study of geography was widely spread, three cartographers of more than national renown

—A. Stieler, whose name, unlike his atlas, belongs to a past generation (*ob.* 1836); H. Kiepert (*ob.* 1899), eminent both as a teacher and as author of the *Atlas Antiquus*; and K. Spruner (*ob.* 1892), whose *Historico-Geographical Atlas* remains, of its kind, without an equal.

Alexander von Humboldt, who in his youthful days is said to have nearly approached the solution of a problem afterwards accomplished by Gauss, was told by his tutor that, had he been able to devote himself wholly or mainly, he would have become a very good mathematician. Had he so decided, he would have found a large array of eminent German competitors, more especially at Berlin, where the conjunction of them after the middle of the century, as that at Göttingen rather earlier, was most remarkable. Soon after this date, however, several among the most distinguished of the German mathematicians of their times passed away. To the foremost among them all, K. F. Gauss, who died at Göttingen in 1855, mathematics and astronomy were indebted for his disquisitions on the theory of numbers and for his magnetic researches. Among mathematicians of his school, his successor at his beloved Göttingen observatory, L. Dirichlet, died in 1859, and the eminent geometrician and physicist G. F. B. Riemann, likewise of Göttingen, in 1866. Other eminent mathematicians who died about this time were K. G. J. Jacobi (1851) and F. G. Eisenstein (1852), both of Berlin. J. W. Bessel of Königsberg ('Bessel's functions') the best known of both theoretical and practical astronomers, contemporary with Gauss, had died already in 1846. But the number of their successors in the next generation was very large, and defies selection of names except by expert judgment[1]. In astronomy, the desire to meet the growing popular demand for a generally intelligible treatment of

[1] See the list in the concluding chapter of W W. Rouse Ball's *Short Account of the History of Mathematics* (1888). C J. Gerhardt in his *Geschichte der Mathematik in Deutschland* (*Gesch. d. Wiss.* vol. XVII,

the subject was notable, and probably due to the effect of A. von Humboldt's *Kosmos* (1845–7); it led to the production of some valuable manuals. In Mathematical Physics, the name of Hermann von Helmholtz towers above all others, and suggests a reference to the progress of the great science in both branches of which his eminence was alike universally recognised.

Though dating from 1842 and more amply expounded by him in 1845, Robert Mayer's great discovery of the mechanical equivalent of heat—almost contemporary with Joule's first publications on the subject—was not fully acknowledged and appreciated as his till his latter years (he died in 1878). The principle on which was founded the great physical law of the conservation of energy was soon afterwards (1847) perceived and demonstrated with consummate force by Helmholtz[1], whose career as a scientific leader—for he was philosopher, mathematician, physicist and physiologist in one—ended with his death, full of honours, in 1894. His later years had been spent at Berlin, where, besides university and academical activities, he, after the Franco-German war of 1870, assumed the presidency of the Imperial Institute of Physical Technology at Charlottenburg near Berlin, founded through the munificence of Werner von Siemens, the eldest of the four brothers whose powers of invention and organisation made their name famous in the world of technical science and industry. Among later physicists, R. Clausius of Bonn (*ob.* 1888) and his successor H. Hertz (*ob.* 1894) should be specially mentioned.

In earlier days, Helmholtz had been associated at Heidelberg, in one of the most brilliant periods in the history

1877) breaks off at the middle of the century. R. Wolf's *Geschichte der Astronomie* (*ib.* vol XVI, 1877) is similarly limited.

[1] Mayer's and Helmholtz's doctrine is clearly presented in the extracts in vol I of F Dannemann's *Grundriss einer Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften*, vol I (Leipzig, 1902).

of that university, with the eminent physicist Robert Kirchhoff, afterwards of Berlin (*ob.* 1887), and the equally eminent chemist Robert Wilhelm Bunsen (*ob.* 1899). The cooperation of these two distinguished men, of which the best known product was their famous achievement of spectral analysis (1860), illustrates the great results of the contemporaneous development of their sister sciences. The advance of chemistry had been continuous in the hands of Justus von Liebig, from the days of the opening, in 1826, of his laboratory at Giessen—the first institution of the kind connected with university teaching—and of Friedrich Wohler, whose first great discovery in physiological chemistry was made shortly afterwards[1]. Liebig, the founder of agricultural, and one of the chief founders of physiological, chemistry, did more than any other chemist to popularise his science; but with later physiological developments he was at issue. He died in 1873, at Munich, where he had resided during the preceding quarter of a century. Friedrich Wohler, who had been closely associated with Liebig in his earlier investigations, after becoming professor at Göttingen in 1836 joined him in 1838 in the publication of his *Annals* and of the great *Dictionary of Chemistry* (1842 ff.). He survived his friend by some years, dying in 1882. Perhaps the most distinguished of the German chemists of Liebig and Wöhler's school (he afterwards edited their correspondence) was A. W. von Hofmann (*ob.* 1892), as well known in London as in Berlin, where he finally settled. It would be difficult to overestimate the effects of the labours of these great teachers upon the progress of chemical science and of its application to chemical industries both in England and in Germany; the latter long retained its lead in both these indissolubly connected lines of advance.

[1] See H Kopp, *Die Entwickelung der Chemie in der neueren Zeit* (*Gesch. d. Wiss* vol x, 1873), and cf. F. H. Garrison's *History of Medicine*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia and London, 1917), pp. 491 ff.

In the great movement which in this period engrossed the natural sciences, the lead as well as the priority belonged to the illustrious Englishman Charles Darwin; but his first complete exposition of his master theory was so closely followed by the publication of Ernst Haeckel's *Generative Morphology* (*Generelle Morphologie*, 1866) that, on the ground of this and subsequent works, a claim was set up for the Jena professor, as one of the foremost authorities on the whole problem of evolution. The cognate subject of heredity was about the same time treated, with extraordinary insight into the life of nature, by Gregor Mendel, Abbot at Brünn in Moravia (*ob.* 1884); however, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the use made of his investigations may be said to have led to the foundation of the new science of genetics. The theory of evolution was, in the meantime elaborated by A. Weismann of Frankfort-on-Main (*ob.* 1914) and others. The distinguished anthropologist and hygienist, Rudolf Virchow, already mentioned in a different connexion—for he did not regard politics as alien to his sphere of beneficent enquiry[1]—had at first opposed the conclusions of Darwin; the special bent of his own biological research was towards craniology, which, with the aid of memorable excavations, was advanced by him and others to an unprecedented position of importance. A leading position among histologists was held by Max Schultze of Bonn (*ob.* 1874), and, after him, by Walther Flemming, ultimately of Kiel (*ob.* 1905). The eminent anatomist and histologist Jacob Henle, after a life of manifold adventure, died at Göttingen in 1885; one of his most distinguished pupils, Robert Koch, who died in 1910 after a life of indefatigable research, carried on in his Berlin laboratories and on his travels, had been inspired by his teacher to engage in the bacteriological studies through which he acquired in this new science a fame second only to that of Pasteur.

[1] Cf. vol. I, pp. 145, *note*, *et al.*; and p. 93, *ante*.

In the old, but now, thanks to the facilities of well-equipped gardens[1] and laboratories, infinitely developed sciences of zoology and botany, it must suffice to mention the names of the zoologists K. T. E. von Siebold, member of a scientific Würzburg family, ultimately of Munich (*ob.* 1885), and A. von Kölliker, likewise of Würzburg (*ob.* 1905). They were joint founders of the *Journal for Scientific Zoology*, Siebold, though already on the threshold of old age, having adopted the Darwinian doctrine. In botany, out of many names, may be selected that of Julius von Sachs; he, too, was a Darwinian, whose earlier researches in physiological botany had been the foundation of his fame, and whose *Text-book of Botany* became known (1868) throughout the scientific world. Sachs, also, for the thirty years of his life preceding his death in 1897, held a chair at Würzburg[2]. The eminent botanist and climatologist Hermann Hoffmann, professor and director of the botanical gardens at Giessen, for nearly twoscore years before his death in 1891, was led by long and varied labours in his science to accept the Darwinian conclusions on the origin of species. Upon the progress of geology few works of the time, and none by a German author, created so great an effect as Eduard Suess's *Face of the Earth* (vol. I, 1888[3]).

In the case of medicine proper—whether in its anatomical and physiological or pathological and clinical branches, in all of which its practice was transformed by the scientific

[1] Among the great zoological gardens of the period those at Hamburg and Berlin were among the best known. Of the first-named, Alfred Brehm, an ornithologist by birth and breeding and author of the extremely popular *Illustrated Animal Life* (1864 ff.), was from 1863 director. The botanical gardens of Würzburg, Giessen and Berlin were, probably, the foremost of their kind.

[2] Of his *History of Botany from* 1530 *to* 1860 (*Gesch. d. Wiss. in Deutschland*, vol. XV, 1875) an English translation was published in 1890.

[3] English translation, by H. Sollas, 1904.

movement of the age—an enumeration of a few among many names of eminence would be misleading, and is therefore, as in the case of law, not attempted here[1]. For a somewhat different, but equally valid reason, the merest reference must here suffice to the extraordinary advance in the Germany of this period of technology in its various branches. This advance showed itself in the treatment of machinery, metals, glass and wood, hides and textiles, in the development of the graphic arts and the production and utilisation of chemicals, in the multiplication of foods, and in the evocation and application of heat, light and electricity—in many of which fields unwearying diligence and application, but even more the great progress in technical education already noted, for a long time obtained a commanding position for German aspirants to public and private usefulness and wealth, whether at home or abroad[2]. The effects of this branch of progress cannot be estimated here; but their signal importance for the development, in largely new directions, of the national life and character, it would be difficult to overrate.

Finally, while reserving a few remarks on the progress in Germany of journalism, as supplying to the public of the day information and comments on nearly all subjects of general or special interest in the boundless range of modern knowledge, we pass from the domain of science into that of literature and art.

In accordance with a very common historical experience, German literature, in the period now specially under notice,

[1] It may be noted that in this period the history of medicine was largely in German hands. English readers will find what is necessary for the purpose in Dr F. H. Garrison's *Introduction to the History of Medicine*, already cited.

[2] Cf. K. Karmarsch, *Geschichte der Technologie* (*Gesch d. Wiss. in Deutschland*, vol. XI, 1872)

was far from exhibiting a complete reflexion of the most striking political or social phenomena of the age. Yet it will perhaps not be idle to recall the general course of that literature, from the point of view of the influence of political and social ideas and experiences traceable in it, without any pretence of offering however summary a critical estimate of the literary qualities and merits of individual writers[1].

Not even an event like the death of Goethe (1832) can mark with absolute precision the close of one literary epoch, and the beginning of another. Of the younger group of the Romantic School, to which, thanks largely to Bettina, he had ended by reconciling himself, many survived him, and not a few lived beyond the middle of the century. Among them was the most national personality in German poetic literature, Ludwig Uhland, who died in 1862, and Friedrich Rückert, the unequalled, but not always inspiring master of the art of versification, who followed him in 1866. Heinrich Heine, too, whose lyrical genius had been nurtured at the fountainhead of romanticism, dragged on his shadow-life for a few years of the second half of the century (to 1856). Although both French and English critics have overestimated the duration of his influence over the German mind, and underrated the resentment aroused in some quarters by his cynical treatment of some of its ideals, yet his genius

[1] For the general thread of what follows I have taken advantage of Adolf Stern's excellent outline *Die Deutsche Nationalliteratur vom Tode Goethe's bis zur Gegenwart.* See, also, vols II–IV of R. von Gottschall's popular and often suggestive *Deutsche Nationalliteratur des 19. Jahrh.* (1872), and, for remarkably acute critical appreciations—as, for instance, of the life and works of Grillparzer, and the relations between them—Richard M. Meyer's *Deutsche Litteratur d 19. Jahrh.* (vol. III of the collection *Das 19. Jahrh. in Deutschland's Entwicklung*, 1900) Cf., also, Prof J G Robertson's *History of German Literature* (1902) —For the history of the German drama from Grillparzer to Hauptmann, the copious, but always illuminating, criticisms in H. Bulthaupt's *Dramaturgie des Schauspiels* (vols. III and IV, 1904–5) are invaluable.

beyond doubt dominated the generation that came after him, with the aid of his French models, more particularly in the half-satirical style of journalistic prose unknown to German literature before him and Börne. The sense of estrangement from the still lingering remnants of romanticism, and of antipathy to the revival of classicising tendencies, gave rise to the formation of the new school of German writers prominent in the period between the French revolutions of 1830 and of 1848. 'Young Germany[1]' modelling its productions on the precedents furnished by Heine and Börne, authors anything but well-disposed towards each other, was most anxious to be in touch with the political problems and interests of the times, and to attract its public by means of an intellectual flexibility more familiar to the western than to the eastern side of the Rhine. Karl Gutzkow (*ob.* 1878) came near to being a writer of genius, and was certainly one who took infinite pains. The most characteristic of his voluminous novels, replete with both ideas and facts, date, in the main, from the sixth decade of the century[2]. The public was startled by these reflexions of its current views and controversies, while the writer's instinct for the unusual and the *piquant* stimulated the curiosity of a restless generation; but these things were not for all time. Of Gutzkow's plays, artificial as some of them are and not wholly without that admixture of claptrap of which he would have disdainfully rejected the imputation, a few long continued to hold the stage[3]. Nor can it be denied that he had done much to revive the connexion between the German theatre and the

[1] Cf vol. I, p. 308, *ante*, as to the actual and supposed tendencies of this school.

[2] *Die Ritter vom Geiste* (*The Knights of the Spirit of Intelligence*, 1850–2); *Der Zauberer von Rom* (*The Magician of Rome*, 1858–61).

[3] *Zopf und Schwert* (*Pigtail and Sword*) (1844), *The Original of Tartuffe* (1845); *Uriel Acosta* (1847); *The King's Lieutenant* (an episode of Goethe's youth, 1849), etc.

literary productivity of men of letters, which had for some time previously confined itself to the 'literary drama,' that self-delusive species, which even at Weimar and Düsseldorf could only attain to a very uncertain vitality. Among the 'Young Germany' writers, Heinrich Laube (*ob.* 1884), apart from his exertions as managing director of the, then, foremost theatre in Germany, did much by his own plays to popularise the methods of the school in what proved its most rewardful sphere of work—the stage[1]. His historical

[1] *Die Karlsschuler* (Schiller's military academy) (1847); *Earl of Essex* (1856), etc

In both the pre-revolutionary and the reactionary days, the theatre played a more important part in German social life than in later and greater times, and a new play was an event of general interest even when, about the forties and fifties, the star of Charlotte Birch-Pfeiffer (*ob.* 1868) was in the ascendant in the acted drama. Herself an actress of repute, she was mistress of stage *technique* and, especially after she had settled in Berlin (in 1844), wrote plays, mostly successful, as fast as novels came out for her to adapt. From the middle of the century onwards, prominent men of letters more frequently occupied themselves with stage direction and management. Gutzkow was, for a short time, literary assessor to the official presiding over the fortunes of the Court theatre at Dresden; Laube was, from 1850 to 1867, artistic director of the *Burgtheater* at Vienna, and then of the *Stadttheater* at Leipzig, at Vienna, he was succeeded, first by Freiherr E F. G. von Munch-Bellinghausen (*ob.* 1871), who, under the name of Friedrich Halm, achieved some extraordinary theatrical successes, as in *The Son of the Wilderness* (1842), *The Gladiator of Ravenna* (1854), and by Adolf Wilbrandt, and then, down to his death in 1881, by Freiherr Franz von Dingelstedt, author of the *Songs of a Cosmopolitan Night-Watchman.* Laube's *régime* at Vienna, his attitude of exclusiveness towards the Spanish drama (Grillparzer's exemplar by the side of the classical) and of eclecticism as towards the Shakespearean, necessarily reacted upon German dramatic composition; so, too, did his preference for later French models. The leading actors and actresses of his day, likewise, successfully emulated the Devrients and Bayer-Bürcks of the older school—who more modern, for instance, than Bogumil Dawison in tragedy, and Friederike Gossmann in comedy? In the late sixties, Duke George II of Saxe-Meiningen's company entered upon their

novel, *The German—i.e.* Thirty Years'—*War*, was the most sustained of his narrative efforts, and may be called good of its kind.

In non-dramatic poetry, Young Germany kept in as close touch as possible with the currents of political thought and feeling which filled the air it breathed. 'Anastasius Grün' (Count A. A. von Auersperg) (*ob.* 1876) can hardly be accounted a member of the group. He had been the earliest poet to constitute political grievances and aspirations an element in his lyrics, and continued to allow them a place in his narrative verse of later date; but the genial humour of his muse prevented them from becoming a more than subsidiary or occasional element. Georg Herwegh (*ob.* 1875), on the other hand, had cherished the ambition of being hailed as the Béranger of Germany; and a passionate republican and revolutionary spirit had ensured an extraordinary though transient, vogue to his earlier verse[1]. The defiant recriminations of Count Moritz von Strachwitz (who passed away prematurely in 1847), the darling of reactionary Conservatism and a writer of real strength of feeling, may likewise be reckoned among the political verse of his age; but it is not

celebrated circuit round the German theatrical world, and, in 1874, asserted themselves triumphantly in the capital of the new Empire. Their determined opposition to the star-system showed a true insight into the needs of their art Their further principles, of textual fidelity to the plays which they put on the stage, and of steeping them (as it were) in the surrounding atmosphere of time and place, required, when a change was needed from classical masterpieces, modern plays brighter, more plastic and more picturesque than German literature had of late furnished to the national stage This requisite was found, in a measure, in the plays of Ernst von Wildenbruch, of whom a further word will be said. Similar experiences might be noted in later relations between the theatre and literature, such as those which led to the realistic and the naturalistic drama. Eduard Devrient's *History of German Theatrical Art* (4 vols., 1848–61) was long esteemed a standard work on its subject.

[1] *Poems of a Living Man* (1844–6). Cf vol I, pp. 325, 462, *ante*.

these which have preserved the remembrance of him as a lyrical poet. In condensed force of expression, August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben (*ob.* 1874) had no equal among the poets or poetical writers of his age; he had to good purpose mastered the force of diction to be found in early German popular song[1], and some of his political epigrams still remain unforgotten. He had, so far back as 1842, been deprived of his Breslau chair, but retained to the last his productivity as a scholar and a writer of verse, though his satire in the end occupied itself with humdrum themes. Many other writers might be enumerated among the *Tendenzlyriker* (lyrical poets with an extra-poetical purpose) of the Young Germany School. A position of his own was held by Ferdinand Freiligrath (*ob.* 1876), the exuberant originality of whose earlier lyrics, additionally effective by virtue of their outlandish themes, in the revolutionary period adapted itself to patriotic motives, and who returned to these—in his sixtieth year—under the inspiration of the Franco-German war[2]. Perhaps, too, mention should not be omitted of Moritz Hartmann (*ob.* 1873), who had undergone a long exile since the days when his invective had descended upon the Moderates of the Frankfort National Assembly; or of Julius Mosen (*ob.* 1867), a poet of deep and at the same time simple patriotic feeling. He, too, was long connected with the theatre (at Oldenburg); but his own dramatic attempts were to be outlived by some of his ballads[3]. The dramatic

[1] Cf. vol. I, p. 333, *ante*. He was the author of *Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles*, the refrain of which has been, naturally enough, in later days, distorted in its meaning.

[2] Max Schneckenburger's *Wacht am Rhein*, which in the days of the Franco-German war became a kind of national anthem, having been set to music some seventy times, was, curiously enough, produced in the same year (1840) as Nikolaus Becker's almost equally famous *Sie sollen ihn nicht haben!*

[3] *Andreas Hofer*, and the wellknown lines on the *Last Ten of their* (Polish) *Regiment*.

productivity of the poets of the middle years of the century, when in natural and direct contact with various conditions of popular life, hardly emerged from the atmosphere of every day; but the most popular comic dramatist of this period, Roderich Benedix (*ob.* 1873), at least provided his audiences with abundant wholesome diversion, instead of importing more highly seasoned material from France.

Our transitions must, perforce, be abrupt. The fame of 'Nikolaus Lenau' (N. Niembsch, Edler von Strehlenau) survived the limits of his unhappy life, which closed with the half-century (1850). Five years later, a collected edition of the works of, perhaps, the foremost of Austrian lyric poets, was fitly put forth by another of them, 'Anastasius Grün,' whose genius was, in some respects, complementary to Lenau's own. Artistically inferior to that of his *aequalis*, Lenau's poetry fascinated even a generation alien to the Byronic melancholy of sentiment which harmonised with the wild solitude of his native Hungary; but the doom of incompleteness seems to lie upon much of his work, as it tragically fell upon his life. Lenau was not the only imaginative writer of his times who yearned for the cure by faith of this world's sufferings and sins; the same longing finds expression in the romances of Wilhelm Meinhold (*ob.* 1851)[1]. The numerous historical and other novels of Georg Hesekiel (*ob.* 1874) were conservative in design (he was afterwards connected with the *Kreuzzeitung*); while in his multifarious productions, in verse and prose, Sebastian Brunner, priest, popular preacher and editor of the *Vienna Catholic Church Journal*, as well as publicist, novelist and historian, and genuine humourist to boot, took particular pleasure in denouncing or ridiculing Liberalism and all its works.

In this, as in every other age of literary history, the concert of voices, of course, comprised not a few echoes of

[1] The popular novel, *The Amber-witch* (1844), and the sister-story, *Sidonie von Bork, the Convent-witch* (1847).

earlier periods, or self-revealed harkings-back into spheres of still unexhausted influences. Thus, the idyllic charm of certain classical examples—Catullus and Tibullus in particular—together with ever fresh inspiration derived from the same local surroundings, and variety of humour and even of satire combined with true human sympathy and unobtrusive religious feeling, is to be found in the Suabian country-parson Eduard Mörike. He lived till 1875; but his active literary days (1836–56) closed about the middle of the century. Not a few poets, however, in both west and east, preserved to later dates the faculty of expressing, in verse or in prose, the frank enjoyment of both present and past impossible to imaginative writers who cannot escape from the domination of the political and social grievances of their own times. One of these happy few was Adalbert Stifter, who, before he became a novelist, displayed, in a series of idyllic studies of nature and of men and women[1], the gifts of a style inimitable in its purity and delicacy, and as it were controlled by the genius of correctness. (He died in 1868, at Linz.) Of a more versatile sort was the *spiritus* of August Kopisch (*ob.* 1853), poet and painter. Besides the gaiety of heart which so often animates his brethren of the brush, he had the quickest of ears for the humours of popular story and literature, and a rare gift of felicitously reproducing them in lyrical or narrative verse. Mention has already been made[2] of the far more important labours of Karl Simrock for the preservation of the literary monuments of the past. His own supplementary or companion productions showed his whole heart to be in the study of the great epical and lyrical achievements of the German Middle Ages[3]. Many followed in his wake; for a

[1] *Studies* (1844–50); *Stones of Many Colours* (1853).

[2] *Ante*, p. 231.

[3] He was by no means devoid of original lyrical force (*An den Rhein, an den Rhein*, etc.).

living, not a mere antiquarian, interest attached this group of writers to the national inheritance with which later Romanticists had dallied rather than attained to intimacy. 'Friedrich Halm,' already mentioned[1], had begun his theatrical successes with a *Griseldis*; and the operatic stage shared in this tendency, observable particularly in the *librettos* of Richard Wagner's successive works—which, especially when they called in the aid of alliteration, the chorus of his disciples was wont to hail as great literature[2].

But the days of Bayreuth were still distant, and the stage, operatic or other, had not yet emerged from one of those long tentative periods in which the drama is not above taking its laws from its patrons. Hence, the endless variety of theme and style in the Protean dramatic productivity of Karl von Holtei (who lived till 1880). Hence, in another way, the concentration upon a single kind of play, of which the public never seemed or seems to tire—the extravaganza with a local flavour or with a topical touch. Of the former variety, Ferdinand Raimund (who belonged to an earlier generation and died in 1836) had been the unsurpassed master: he was distinguished alike by poetic fancy and by genial humour, and he has been aptly called the pioneer of German peasant literature. There is no real need for apology, if after his name we mention that of another Viennese of renown, the great tragic dramatist, Franz Grillparzer. Tales of the imagination, ancient and modern, were certainly among the sources from which his genius drew inspiration in choosing the themes of his dramas. Grillparzer, who lived till 1872, really belongs to the earlier half of the century; for, after the failure (in 1838) of his single comedy, he had placed no further play on the boards. The first appearance of his long famous

[1] *Ante*, p. 265, *note*.

[2] His poems, published posthumously (1905) by his biographer C. F. Glasenapp, show him to have been singularly devoid of the power of lyrical expression in words.

fate-drama *Die Ahnfrau* (*The Ancestress*), differentiated by its poetic touch from other productions of the same misguided school, dates back as far as 1817; the thrilling *Sappho* followed two years afterwards, the lovely tragedy on the story of Hero and Leander, and the curious fancy *The Dream is Life*, twenty years later. The first and the last of these plays are in the trochaic metre, to the use of which the author had been led by his favourite Spanish studies. Between them there appeared, with other tragic dramas, the patriotic but original *King Ottokar's Fortune and End*, which filled Gentz with indignation and which, in order to spare Čech susceptibilities, was for many years prohibited. The poet's life was a long-drawn-out story of disappointment and gradual isolation, till the fulness of national recognition came at last, not long before his death. Among the writings which he left behind him was another national tragedy—were the epithet 'national' altogether applicable to growths on Austrian soil—*Fraternal Strife in the House of Habsburg*, a picture of fatal impotence claiming remembrance by the side, though not at the full height, of Elizabethan predecessors.

With Grillparzer, a great dramatic poet, though lacking the supreme dramatic force possessed by the very foremost masters of his art, at the most one other German dramatist who lived into the second half of the century can be brought into comparison[1]. The genius of Friedrich Hebbel was of a very different kind from that of Grillparzer, with whom the younger poet seems to have come into little or no contact during his residence at Vienna. In Hebbel's case, a childhood of privations had been followed by a youth and manhood of utter self-absorption and misery, which had only begun to succumb to the kindly influence of affection and the delusions of madness when death brought release (1863). His dramatic

[1] The most prolific of the dramatists of his times, Ernst Raupach, whose most extensive production was his *Hohenstaufen* cycle, died in 1852.

creations, like their author, showed a certain hardness which is a sore trial to sympathy, but some of them haunt the imagination upon which they have once impressed themselves; and his lyrical and epical productions, but above all his dramatic masterpieces, address themselves with terrible earnestness, and with a remorseless thoroughness of analysis, to profound problems of human nature and experience. Thus, in his hands, well-worn themes assume a startling originality—whether it be the crime of Judith, which he treats as a sort of wrong committed by the woman against herself, or the sacrifice of Agnes Bernauer, which he seems to think 'politically' justified, or the expiatory passiveness of Genoveva. Not less abnormal in conception, but true to the conditions under which the problem presents itself and to the surroundings of its treatment, is *Maria Magdalene*, one of the most notable examples of the domestic drama in German literature, and one of the most powerful challenges ever thrown out, not only to theatrical convention but to the pitilessness of 'family' morality. His most splendid success, however, was reached by Hebbel in a very different sphere, when, neither first nor last among German playwrights, but with a power reached by none of them except with the potent aid of music, he swept into the service of the modern stage the great medieval theme of *The Nibelungs*. His trilogy (first acted in 1861) worked out an intense dramatic action by characters heroic in the grand simplicity of their outlines, and thus raised it to the heights of historic achievement. His last effort was his attempt, itself uncompleted, to complete—or rather, as was inevitable with a writer of his genius, to re-create—Schiller's *Demetrius*. It was, at the same time, a tribute to a great national poet of the past, who had not lost his hold over the living generation[1].

[1] The centenary of Schiller's birth (1859) was celebrated as a day of general national remembrance (which could hardly be said of that, ten years earlier, of Goethe's birth), and led to the establishment of the widely supported Schiller Fund.

The German drama of the third quarter of the century produced few works of literary value (as distinct from theatrical successes) worth recording by the side of Grillparzer's and Hebbel's tragic dramas. In the case of one or two authors (such as Gutzkow and Gustav Freytag), it has seemed convenient to refer to their dramatic in conjunction with their other works; in some instances, it is chiefly because of the author's eminence in other fields of literature that his plays are remembered[1]. Otto Ludwig's literary fame, on the contrary, is founded almost equally on his dramas and on his impassioned narrative masterpiece *Between Heaven and Earth* (1856). Modest in his self-estimate, and a devoted admirer of Shakespeare rather than of Schiller, he produced but one[2] drama of enduring quality, the *Erbförster* (*The Hereditary Forester*), a play full of intense vitality, though into its action is introduced the element of accident, a pernicious inheritance from a much inferior kind of drama. Up to his early end (1865), Otto Ludwig never relinquished his dramatic schemes and dreams, and he left behind him a workshop of more interest than the accomplished works of many a contemporary playwright.

Work of, merely or mainly, theatrical fame like S. H. Mosenthal's *Debora* (1849), known in its English version as *Leah*, must be passed by here; and the productions of later dramatists carry us too near the present generation, to which, indeed, some of them actually belong. But the earlier at least among the numerous plays of Ernst von Wildenbruch are noteworthy, as representing a designed reaction towards the poetic drama and Schiller, and as animated by an ardent patriotism befitting a descendant of the Hohenzollerns—quite

[1] So with Geibel's *Brunhild*, a less heroic treatment of the theme of Hebbel's trilogy, and his *Master Andrea*, an art drama in more senses than one.

[2] His *Maccabees*, though possessed of high merits, lacks that of powerful characterisation.

as Prussian as it is German, and quite as Brandenburg as it is Prussian. When, after being long hidden away, these dramas first became known to the public, they took it by storm[1]. The poetical, and even the dramatic, value of these works is small, for they are tumid in diction, and the bustle and business in which they abound leave no room for the drawing of character; but they are, for the most part, very effectively constructed, and the author's talent had in it a note of nobility which naturally allied itself with the patriotic spirit infused into the great body of his productions. His extraordinary success may be looked upon as a popular protest against the decadent subjectivity of some of his contemporaries[2].

In Hermann Sudermann, a far more powerful writer than Wildenbruch, about the time of Bismarck's fall, suddenly acquired great popularity. His play *Honour* (*Die Ehre*, 1889) besides being, from a theatrical point of view, most admirable, deals powerfully, but so as to produce a terribly depressing effect, with the 'problem' (if it be such) of existences which, lacking both wealth and class tradition, are also without honour—an acute sense of which some German writers are fain to regard as a distinctive national characteristic. His second play, *Home* (*Heimat*), which should have been called *Shame* (*Schande*), and which is intended to demonstrate the

[1] *The Carolings* (first acted 1881, at Meiningen), *The Mennonite* (in the same year at Frankfort), against 'conscientious objectors' in East Prussia in the Napoleonic days; *The Quitzows* (1888) at Berlin, a glorification of the first Elector of Brandenburg, *The New Lord*, similarly in honour of the Great Elector (1891); *Henry* (the Emperor Henry IV) *and Henry's Race* (1896)—not to mention *Willehalm* (1897), designed as a national *Festspiel* in memory of the Emperor William I.

[2] He also wrote plays on other than national subjects, and novels of which the partly autobiographical *A Sister's Soul* (1894) is the most interesting. Some of the 'short stories' included in his *Neue Novellen* (9th edition, 1902), especially two of which the scene is Berlin, show a truer sense of the tragic than most of his dramas.

hollowness of the social morality of the day, is even more saddening—the remedy of renunciation being introduced as a mere makeshift[1]. Sudermann's later dramatic production (including a *St John the Baptist*) carried him into loftier imaginative spheres; but by none of his works is he more likely to be remembered than by his early prose romances *Lady Care* (*Frau Sorge*, 1888) and *The Cats' Path* (*Der Katzensteg*, 1889). Of the former, in especial, though the influence of Dickens is not less perceptible in it than that of Jean Paul, the originality lies in the fine conception of a generous nature doomed to a pessimistic view of its own life, but upheld by a sense of duty. Whatever concessions he may have made to the public taste, Sudermann has never fallen a victim to 'consequent,' *i.e.* thorough-going, naturalism.

Of the movement in literature and art called by that name, significant as it was of much else besides the defiance of fundamental principles of both, Gerhard Hauptmann was by public opinion crowned the leader. Although, in his subsequent excursion into fairy drama, his poetic *Sunken Bell* (1897), he abandoned naturalism, his great theatrical successes had been gained in its service. In one or more of his numerous and largely successful plays he owed something to Ibsen, while in his daring examination of the lowest strata of human society he emulated Zola. Yet there can be no doubt whatever as to his creative genius. His best known play, *The Weavers* (1893), possesses a definite historical and political interest; for it treats, with appalling force, the uprising, in 1844, of the Silesian handloom weavers against the unspeakable woes of their condition; and, ending as it does on the note of despair, it became a useful weapon in the hands of combatant socialism, and was for a time prohibited on the stage[2]. Though *The Weavers* had thus been used as

[1] An English version of this was brought on the London stage under the title *Magda*.

[2] The Silesian W. Wolff, whose contemporary narrative of the

a party pamphlet, its revelation of extreme human sufferings raises it above any such level; and, while its faithful picture of the revolt of flesh and blood against the barbarity of life is sheer naturalism, the passion which pervades the action attests a genius that does not create to order[1].

This list of dramatists cannot be extended, or a word might have been said of some others, including Ferdinand von Saar (*ob.* 1906), known by his political dramas, and privileged to write 'separate plays' for the solitary delectation of King Lewis II of Bavaria. To Emanuel Geibel (who died in 1884) reference has been already made as a dramatist who reached no eminence as such; his rare poetic gifts were better displayed in his romances in verse, but best of all in his purely lyrical productions. Their charm, apart from a spontaneous patriotic note[2], lay in the harmony they exhibited between poetic thought and form, in a limpid clearness, which, in spite of the superior persons who chose to gibe at it, was true art. Ludwig Fulda's fairy-tale or symbolic dramas—of which *The Talisman* (1893) is an example—are, also, distinguished by a rare mastery of form in both verse and prose.

The talent of Gottfried Kinkel[3], of revolutionary notoriety (who died at Zürich in 1882), was slighter, but showed itself

weavers' troubles was Hauptmann's chief source, and who died in 1864, was a faithful friend in exile of Marx and Engels. (See H. Oncken's essay, already cited, p. 355.) How deeply Hauptmann saw into the genesis of the evils he depicts in *The Weavers*, is shown by his returning to the subject, in its earlier phase of the Peasants' War, in a subsequent drama, *Florian Geyer* (1896).

[1] Hauptmann was the poet selected to celebrate dramatically the national victories of 1870, but seems not to have been very successful in acquitting himself of the task. The best known of his novels are of recent date

[2] See, for instances of this, his *Sonnets for Schleswig-Holstein* (1846) and his *Herald's Calls* (1871) Geibel produced admirable translations from classical and other poetry.

[3] Cf. vol. I, p. 495, *ante*.

agreeably in simple poetic narrative[1]. Oskar von Redwitz (*ob* 1891) was the pleasant author of the very successful *Amaranth* and of divers other fairy romances, as well as of historic plays and patriotic verse of no great profundity. Gustav zu Putlitz (who died in 1890) attracted many readers by his sympathetic record of the whisperings of the forest, while his plays showed both refinement and a knowledge of world and stage.

Mastery of more than one field in the realm of poetic fancy—lyrical verse, poetic drama and prose fiction of various kinds, including one of the most difficult of them all, the 'short story'—was reached by Paul Heyse (*ob.* 1914), next to Geibel the most distinguished among the men of letters summoned to his capital by King Maximilian II of Bavaria, early in the latter half of the century. As with most authors who live and write in the sunshine of a rapidly gained and long continued popularity, his qualities had their limits; but his instinctive consciousness of these prevented him from overstepping them; and thus he rarely wearies, because he never strains, the attention secured by the geniality of his view of the world and its charms, which only later lapsed occasionally into a negative note. In the judgment of a critic not less competent than exacting—Lasker—Heyse's style attained to a beauty comparable to that of Boccaccio.

Other members of the Munich group were Count Adolf Friedrich von Schack (*ob.* 1894), more particularly celebrated for his *Legends of Firdusi*, and Friedrich Bodenstedt (*ob.* 1892). The latter, in 1849-50, published, in a most attractive setting, *A thousand and one Days in the East*, and in 1851 by themselves, his *Songs of Mirza Schaffy*. They, necessarily, invited comparison with both Rückert and Goethe; but their success was extraordinary, and resembled that of FitzGerald's

[1] As in his best known production, the poem *Otto the Archer* (*Otto der Schütz*, 1846).

cognate *Omar Khayyam*, though perhaps lacking its full oriental perfume. Julius Grosse (*ob.* 1892), likewise at one time of Munich, was an accomplished poet, and generous-hearted in the service of the Muses. He, too, made his offering, in due course, to triumphant 'Germania.'

One of the most popular members of the Munich group, to whose *doyen*, Geibel, he owed the beginnings of his literary success, was Hermann von Lingg, whose life, both before and after that date was an example of signal devotion to poetry. (He died in 1905.)[1] His own lyrics, though often written for particular occasions, have a perfectly natural flow; but they lack the charm of Geibel's. The real labours of his life were his not very successful dramas and his epic *The Migrations of the Peoples*, ambitious in theme and vast in proportions like Kaulbach's frescoes, and executed with something of Freiligrath's pomp of diction, though hardly with so powerful a hand. Another very attractive poet and personality, who chose his themes nearer home, was Otto Roquette, the author of *Waldmeister's Brautfahrt*[2], the popularity of which was reached by none of his later works.

A lyrical poet of rare depth, and a novelist of singularly original power, was the Schleswig-Holsteiner Theodor Storm (*ob.* 1888), whose verse and prose, though he was in a sense a follower of Mörike, have a character of their own. Misgovernment—from which he personally suffered—while intensifying his love for his country[3], made a politician of this charming contemplative poet.

[1] The biography of him, by Frieda Port, is a very interesting book.

[2] He died at Darmstadt (where he had long been professor) in 1896, after he had published his modest autobiography, *Seventy Years* The literal translation of *Waldmeister's Brautfahrt* is *Woodruff's Wooing* the herb, here treated as masculine, has convivial associations.

[3] Cf. his early laments for the intrusion of war into his beloved lakeland in *A Green Leaf* (1850), and his touching record of the exiles'

Beyond dispute the most popular national poet in the period of the foundation of the new Empire—or at all events the literary favourite of its academic youth, with whom his genius and he were in lifelong sympathy, was Joseph Victor von Scheffel. He was author of the very fine historical romance *Ekkehard* (1855), a story of the tenth century, full of archaeological detail, but not less so of poetry and pathos. It had been, only a year earlier, preceded by the almost equally celebrated narrative poem *The Trumpeter of Säckingen*. His collection of academic lyrics *Gaudeamus* (1868) is immortal; for he was Heidelberg incarnate, and 'esoterically' bound up with it[1]. But, among the inspirations and aspirations of youth, he cherished enduringly a patriotism which, though his efforts to help bring about the re-Germanisation of Alsace-Lorraine proved futile, deserves lasting remembrance as one of the nourishing sources of the great national movement. (He died in 1886, at Carlsruhe, his native place.)[2] With Scheffel may be mentioned (though of a rather later generation) his followers Julius Wolff, the author of *The Ratcatcher of Hameln* and other works with a medievalising tendency, and Rudolf Baumbach. The latter was author both of a very successful poem, *Death's Godson* (1895), and of bright and spirited lyrics, as well as, in earlier days, of *Summer Fairy Tales*, admirable examples of a literary species in which German literature excels all others, stories chiefly of forest

unextinguishable love of home in *Under the Fir-tree* (*Unter dem Tannenbaum*, 1864). It is difficult to select specimens of his delightful *Novellen*—from the first, *Immensee* (*Humming Lake*, 1851), to the last, *Der Schimmelreiter* (*The Rider on the White Horse*, 1888).

[1] 'The *Engere*' was his famous Heidelberg club. His statue now looks down on his beloved university town from the *Schlossberg*.

[2] The temptation must be resisted to include among German men of letters the Zurichers Conrad Meyer (*ob.* 1898), the author of a notable tribute to a great German figure of the past, *Hutten's Last Days* (1872), and Gottfried Keller (*ob.* 1890), the author of *Green Henry*, a delightful humourist and a poet of high imaginative power.

regions, in which men, women, and children freely mingle with the fairy denizens of wood and lake[1].

The archaeological romance proper, a species which, curiously enough, never lacks votaries, found notable representatives in the eminent jurist Felix Dahn (*ob.* 1898), whose *Contest for Rome* (1874) was followed by other narratives, treating, in a spirit at once imaginative and faithful, of the borderlands of ancient and medieval history; in the Egyptologist Georg Ebers (*ob.* 1898), who in his earlier novels made the land of the Nile his own; and in Adolf Hausrath the author of *Klytia* (1883).

We are thus led to add a few notes on the general history of the progress, during this period, of the novel, which, looser as it is in form and more readily adapting itself to a constant extension and variation of its material, became in Germany as in England the favourite literary species of the century. In the historical novel in particular, Scott long remained the great exemplar. Among his followers must be still reckoned Willibald Alexis (Wilhelm Häring) (*ob.* 1871), with his long series of historical novels, which, from *The False Waldemar* (1842) to *Isegrim* (1854), a tale of the Wars of Liberation, illustrate the successive stages of Brandenburg history, and thus possess a certain unity in variety. This sort of continuousness may seem specially congenial to German literature; but it is not easy to overestimate its effect in the present instance, aided as it was by the combined veracity and carefulness of the writer. Of a less enduring stamp were the patriotic[2] stories (among others) of A. E. Brachvogel (*ob.* 1878), whose tragedy *Narciss* (1857), built up out of a dialogue of Diderot's, with added fictions, had a quite phenomenal success. *Our Lord God's Chancery* (written about 1849, but not published till 1862) by Wilhelm Raabe

[1] 'The Housekey's Story' is, however, a very pathetic and humorous piece of purely human interest.

[2] *Old Swedes, Le Rocher de Bronze*, etc.

(*ob.* 1910) was an interesting attempt to depict the warlike life of the good city of Magdeburg in the latter part of the sixteenth century. But to no writer was the heart of the Prussian monarchy—the Mark Brandenburg—more largely indebted than to Theodor Fontane (*ob.* 1898), who, besides a masterly series of wayside sketches vividly recalling the past of a province not barren at least of great memories, wrote some original ballads and several very striking novels, historical and other. In the last of these, *Der Stechlin* (published in 1899, the year after that of his death), he returned once more to the familiar country ground. The book is a singularly attractive picture of the Rheinsberg corner of the Middle Mark, with its landscape of lake, wood and sand, and of the life and thoughts of its denizens, more especially of the generation of landholders which had grown up in it during the great epoch from 1864 to 1871[1]. Friedrich Spielhagen (*ob.* 1911), whose historico-political novels gained him a wide circle of readers, was perhaps, also, while strongly anti-*Junker* in spirit, at his best in his stories of the Pomeranian shores, where he had begun his long and prolific literary career[2]. But he came to be equally at home in town life, and was an effective critic of his own art.

In an age like the latter part of the nineteenth century, ever and again brought face to face with new interests and new phenomena from all quarters of the globe, it was not less natural that novelists should seek their themes in remote lands and seas, than that there should be a reaction towards

[1] A noteworthy passage in the book maintained that, at this time, Junkerdom, which the author is by no means anxious to idealise, had grown in power more than any other class or party in the country, including the Social-democrats.

[2] *Problematische Naturen* (1860); *Storm-Tide* (*Sturmflut*) (1876). In the earlier story may be found some points of resemblance to *The Tutor's Story*, which Charles Kingsley was writing about the same time, and its commonplace contrasts probably account for its great popularity *Sturmflut* deals with the *Grunder* period.

the familiar associations of home scenery and life. The stories of 'Charles Sealsfield' (Karl Postl, who, after escaping from a Bohemian cloister to America, returned to spend many years in Switzerland and died in 1864), amply descriptive of North-American and Mexican lands and their inhabitants, proved highly attractive to a generation whose minds easily turned westward. Together with the irresistible novels of Fenimore Cooper, they must have helped to stimulate the productivity in a similar direction of Friedrich Gerstäcker (*ob.* 1872), at one time the chosen author of those who aspired to become travellers like himself.

The reaction, conscious or unconscious, towards the study of the manners and conditions of life at or near home, began, characteristically enough, in Switzerland, with the writings, designed with a modest didactic purpose, of 'Jeremias Gotthelf' (Albert Bitzius). But the German writer who set his generation an example followed by a whole 'school' of imitators, not yet quite extinct, was Berthold Auerbach. The first series of his *Village Tales* of his native *Black Forest* (*Schwarzwald*) appeared in 1843, and remained unequalled either by the village stories or sketches of any other writer, or perhaps even by the later series or tales of the same description by Auerbach himself. Even in his earliest stories, where the whole-hearted sympathy of imaginative genius reproduced his memories of rural life in their native freshness and charm, the author's tendency to reflexion was perceptible; probably, no writer has ever better understood the secret of the *naïf*, and none has ever been visited by so strong a temptation to spoil its purity. Afterwards, the habit of reflexion strove more and more strongly for the mastery; and his later novels are quite aloof from peasant life and thought[1].

[1] *On the Heights* (*Auf der Hohe*) (1865) may be taken as an example of these. *Thirty Years' After—New Village Stories* (1876) derives an historical interest from the author's attempt to contrast the days before 1866—a time when homage began to be offered to nothing but success, and when it had become the duty of patriots to foster

Auerbach was, as observed, assuredly one of the best-imitated of modern novelists. It was natural that the local regions from which most of the chronicles or descriptions of rural life took their themes were for the most part south-German, where the conditions of existence were generally simpler and the surroundings more picturesque. But this choice was not invariable. Indeed, in narrative and lyrical verse, Annette Elisabeth von Droste-Hülshoff had, already at an earlier date (she died in 1848), attracted much attention and sympathy to the popular life, and the historical and literary traditions, of Westphalia, especially of the 'Münsterland.' And her biographer, Levin Schücking (*ob.* 1883), a writer of great literary skill and varied productivity, followed her example in some of his novels dealing with the life of the very heart, as it might be called, of the Catholic west—in one instance[1] offending her by the frankness of his criticism. Soon, however, after the middle of the century, the truth and tenderness of the remoter north, clothed in a dialect which native criticism had pronounced to be on the eve of extinction, manifested themselves unmistakably to the literary world. To Klaus Groth (*ob.* 1899), a Holstein man of letters like the assailant of *Plattdeutsch*[2], belongs the honour of having demonstrated the literary capacities of the dialect as spoken in his native Dittmarschen,

aspirations for national unity—with those after 1866 and 1870, when compulsory military service had become universal. Peasant life is thus shown to have, like all other sections of national life, merged its thoughts and feelings in those common to all.

[1] *The Knightly-born* (*Die Ritterbürtigen*, 1846).

[2] L. Wienbarg's tract *Is the Plattdeutsch speech to be fostered or extirpated?* appeared in 1834, his attack upon *The Plattdeutsch Propaganda* in 1860. The eminent Germanist K. Mullenhoff, in the very serviceable account of both the dialect and the land of Dittmarschen prefixed to the 5th edition of *Quickborn*, describes *Plattdeutsch* as the second among languages in the scale of perfection, if Jacob Grimm's designation of English as the first be accepted as correct.

in a collection of poems entitled *Living Spring* (*Quickborn*) (1852). Whether or not Klaus Groth's command of this form of speech, and his desire for the continued use of it, deserved to be set down as 'academical,' they were certainly most complete and thorough. The subtle delicacy of the modulation of the verse in *Quickborn* is extraordinary and at times bewitching; and in the hands of Klaus Groth the dialect lends itself alike to epical narration, even in hexameters, and to the simplest of lyrical themes and metrical forms, recalling the supreme naturalness of the pathos and humour of Burns.

Within a decade after the appearance of *Quickborn*, the triumph of *Plattdeutsch* as a literary vehicle, though in a less pure linguistic form, was assured by Fritz Reuter. In the later years of his life (he died in 1874), he may be said to have been the most popular author in Germany both High and Low. All his noteworthy writings, whether prose or verse, were in the speech of his native Mecklenburg, partly in that inimitable mixture of Platt and High, the so-called *Missingsch*, used, for instance, by the universal prime favourite in his long gallery of humorous home characters, '*immeritus*' Inspector Bräsig. The mastery acquired by Fritz Reuter over his instrument was absolute. Thus he was able to bestow on the broad humour in which he excelled a form fitting it to perfection; while his writings were animated by 'the inner gaiety of soul, the inexhaustible love of his kind, the faith in goodness and loyalty of heart,' in which Auerbach generously confessed never to have found Fritz Reuter's equal. The personal career of this great humourist was one of the strangest led by a man of letters. In his youth—from 1834 onwards—he underwent six years of imprisonment, during its earlier stages incredibly harsh, in a succession of Prussian fortresses, as a demagogue and *Burschenschafter*, and was then transferred to his native land and at last liberated. Having thrown further legal study to the winds and found schoolmastering unsatisfactory, he became an

'aspirant' to estate-management (*Strom*, in the laconic parlance of his corner of the world). But for this calling, also, the besetting habit of drink, a prolonged consequence of his privations, rendered him unfit. Thus he had reached the fortieth year of his age when he took to writing; and within half-a-dozen years he produced the tales on which his fame substantially rests[1]. He was, as has been hinted, capable of true pathos, but he was not much of a sentimentalist. His humour, on the other hand, flowed with infinite abundance; and German readers, whether or not in recognition of the usual lack of 'the discipline of comic spirit' attributed to them by George Meredith, joyfully hailed its generous presentment. Unhappily, neither in his native lowlands nor in his ultimate Thuringian retirement, could he attain to mastery over himself; and, though he reached late manhood, he died before he could enter into enjoyment of his father's legacy, conditional on his remaining sober during four years. Although a sort of northern *improvisatore* in the way of captivating recital, he could not construct a story; but his tales and sketches, short or long, were *merum sal* to a public of all classes. His verse was, relatively, of less importance. It may be added that Fritz Reuter, the greatest German humourist of a highly political age, was—whether because or in spite of his early experiences—a non-political writer[2], and that the 'demagogue' ended as a great admirer of Bismarck, whose humour attracted him as a Mecklenburg-Pomeranian borderer, and whose great achievements appealed to his sturdy German patriotism. Finally, the ethics of his writings were consistently sound.

[1] *A Tale of the French Days* (*Ut de Franzosentid*, 1860); *A Tale of my Fortress Days* (*Ut mine Festungstid*, 1862); *A Tale of my 'Prentice Days* (*Ut mine Stromtid*, 1862–4) All these were included in the collection *Old Bits of Things* (*Olle Kamellen*).

[2] In a posthumous work, however, with an inimitable Introduction, *Prehistoric Mecklenburg*, he very cleverly satirised the perennial *Arrears* (*Rückständigkeiten*) of his native land.

No further reference need be made here to the literary cultivation, in this period, of German dialects, except insofar as to mention the names of Gustav Seuffer, whose humorous poetry in the Suabian dialect gave much pleasure to the many readers of the Munich *Fliegende Blätter*, and of Kurt Nuhn, who was the first to vindicate a place in German verse to Hessian speech (both died in 1902).

Fritz Reuter, like his celebrated Swiss contemporary Gottfried Keller, must be reckoned among the earlier realists. Realism was, also, the literary creed of a writer whose name has, as a matter of course, found repeated mention in the present work, as that of the confidant of Princes and the journalistic counsellor of the public, with whom he was not less of a favourite, and as indefatigable in his exertions on behalf of national unity and progress, although often preferring to work behind the scenes. Gustav Freytag, whose *Reminiscences* (published in 1887, eight years before his death) cover a long period of contemporary German political and literary history, achieved conspicuous success in the fields of both drama and novel, together with high distinction as a publicist and journalist. Without powerful originality of genius, he combined great versatility in literary treatment with scholarly thoroughness in the collection of his material, historical and other, and signal skill in the use of it. His most successful dramas, *Die Valentine* (1847) and *Die Journalisten* (1854), exhibit a felicity of touch and a lightness of humour, which, though not common in German plays, here remain thoroughly German[1]. His widely popular novel *Soll und Haben* (*Debit and Credit*) (1855), which plays at Breslau and on the Polish frontier, and its perhaps more intimately delightful successor, *The Lost Manuscript* (1864), of which the scene is Leipzig, in the very heart of Germany, reproduce with rare truthfulness the ways of life and thought of two sections of national life

[1] His *Technique of the Drama* (1863) was an invaluable piece of work.

—the commercial middle class and the university. And, in his *Pictures from the German Past* (1859–62), he, with assiduous care and remarkable insight, as it were digested and disposed the material for his great historical romance *The Ancestors* (1872–80), in which, with a fidelity and skill in their way unparalleled, he illustrated the continuous growth of the national life by the typical history of a single family in its successive generations. Even apart from Freytag's direct political services, no more patriotic literary life remains on record than his.

Reference has already been made[1] to the ethnographical writings of H. W. Riehl, who, with the same end in view, was, also, a novelist of mark. The popularity, on the other hand, of F. W. Hackländer (*ob.* 1877), author of at least one very successful comedy[2] and of a large number of very readable novels descriptive of military life in peace-time, was of its nature ephemeral

Among the characteristic features of popular life, those of its peasant sphere, which Auerbach and his followers had preserved with so loving a care, were, notwithstanding the effect of political disturbances or changes, least likely to vanish suddenly. Above all, in German Austria, they were slow in dying out. About the time when this part of Germany was being cut off from the general current of the national life, Ludwig Anzengruber (who lived only to 1889) was becoming a national favourite through his singularly fresh and direct stage reproductions of Austrian peasant character[3]. And, a few years later, Peter Rosegger justly acquired a widespread celebrity through his tales of rustic life in the Alpine districts of Styria and the adjoining regions These tales, without being as mirth-provoking as are some of Anzengruber's irresistible plays, are equally free

[1] *Ante*, p 252. [2] *The Secret Agent* (1851).

[3] *The Parson of Kirchfeld* (1870); the *Meineidbauer* (*Perjury Peasant*) (1871), etc.

from false sentimentality; and their melancholy tone might almost be called the irony of historical advance[1].

It would not be fair to place Robert Hamerling (*ob.* 1889), the author of *Ahasuerus in Rome* (1866), among the prose-writers. Yet he was an Austrian feuilletonist (a variety well worth noting, even by the side of the Parisian) born and bred, and his earlier pieces of prose contain descriptions of his Vienna life, with remembrances of Anastasius Grün, while the later pieces, written at Graz, where the author resided, consist more largely of critical work. His reputation rests on his epic, the second edition of which (1885) was accompanied by a prose epistle to his critics, rather naïvely intended to captivate, if not to convince, them by its candour. While not very successful in meeting the objections raised against his cloying excess of descriptive detail and other blemishes[2], he effectively insists on the one stroke of genius recognisable in the work—the identification of the Wandering Jew with the Wanderer Cain, whom Death, in return for his introduction of evil into the world, has bound himself to spare. The real hero of the poem is Nero, the representative of life, a kind of superman[3] of pleasure; and the scene of his final passage to death, in the company of a legionary, who hardly remembers that he is a German—'only a Bructerian'—is not without power. Altogether, the poem has certainly poetic merit of a sort[4].

[1] Cf the preface to the forest-peasant (*Waldbauer*) story of *Jacob the Last* (1888), which ascribes the extinction of true peasant life and character to the inroads of mistaken 'culture'

[2] A certain roughness in the blank verse was left uncensured by the critics.

[3] The word is used in the poem. Goethe uses the term twice, once in the original Part I of *Faust* (1774) and again in the *Zueignung* to his *Poems* (1784). It seems to have been of early origin and employed by Herder as well as by Jean Paul and others. See Ladendorf, *Histor. Schlagwörterbuch*, and Büchmann, *Geflugelte Worte* (25th ed.).

[4] Hamerling's historical novel *Aspasia* (1876) was widely read.

The years from 1885 to 1890 may be regarded as those in which the writers of the younger generation—restless and half-impelled, half-confused, by the antithetical mingling of new ideals and strange influences—Nietzsche and Baudelaire, Ibsen and Zola, went the greatest lengths and, at times, sank into the deepest depths. The phase was, however, a passing one; and it seems better worth while, though a little beyond the scope of this chapter, to note certain features of a less ephemeral kind observable in popular German fiction of a more recent date.

Undoubtedly, as the aspects of life widened and multiplied in all classes, and as the general condition of the working-class, although improved in some respects, continued to breed unrest, there ensued, not indeed a levelling of class distinctions, but a less rigid and reverential observation of them. (As even between the upper and the lower middle-class, they are described as unbridgable in E. Zahn's story 'No Bridge' in his volume *Glacier-wind* (*Firnwind*) (1906).) Royalty itself, or the fine gradations of serene rank which come near to it, has to submit to an enquiry into its functions and an analysis of its *raison d'être*. Thomas Mann's *His Royal Highness* (which in 1910 had reached a nineteenth edition) illustrates rather than satirises the gentle charm of the life of lesser German Courts, which even 1866 had not quite turned into a thing of the past. On the other hand, J. zur Megede's *Super-Cat* (1904), with more care for style than is common in the contemporary German novel, but with a rather tedious kind of humour, and almost conscious exaggeration, professes to depict the 'high-life' of the day, from the joys of sport nearer home to the sauntering amenities of Biskra. The very widely read stories of Freiin Maria von Ebner-Eschenbach are by no means all, like her *Zwei Comtessen* (9th ed. 1910), descriptive of Austrian 'high' or 'fast' life; some of them deal with greater themes, as, for instance, 'Jakob Szela,' in her *Select Stories*, with the Polish insurrec-

tion of 1846 in Galicia. What seems common to them is a consciousness of the deeper responsibilities of men and women, and a power, not dissociated from pathos, of drawing strong types of character.

The novels of Freiherr Georg von Ompteda—at all events the later of them—take us into the very midst of the nobility both in Prussia and other parts of Germany. The popularity of *Eysen* (1901) would, in most other countries, be surprising. The 'story' is constructed on the lines of some imaginary pages of an *Adelslexicon* (a 'peerage' of wider range), and tells, most wearisomely, of the manners and customs of a Prussian noble family, which seeks to prolong its course by living with the times. The same author's *Sylvester von Geyer* (purporting to be the first instalment of a series *German Nobility* about 1900) is more real and more readable. There is some true pathos in the book; but to us, it is chiefly of interest as showing how, for the German 'military nobility' at all events, the light of imagination seemed to have been blotted out with the aspirations of the times of 'the great wars.'

If by militarism is meant the supremacy of the military element in the social life of a nation and its world of thought and feeling, this growth cannot be said to be very distinctly reflected in German popular fiction of the period between 1870 and 1914. Nor, however, is there to be found in it much satire on garrison life and its social influences—a subject very familiar to earlier days of peace, and little raised or refined by the influences of war and its results. Considerable stir, as is noted elsewhere, was raised by F. O. Bilse's *From a Small Garrison* (1903); but the subject of its denunciation, illustrated by some rather coarse satirical portraiture, was not the army, but the particular system of forming frontier garrisons, with its consequences. F. A. Beyerlein's contemporary drama *Drumtaps* (*Zapfenstreiche*, 1903) was, also, at least a literary success; but it cannot be described as an attack on militarism, and, though decadent in diction,

it borrows its story from *Emilia Galotti*. It was followed (in 1904) by a novel of which the title (*Jena or Sedan?*) speaks for itself. By her 'autobiographical' tale *Down with our Arms* (*Die Waffen nieder*) (1891), with its continuation, *Martha's Children* (1903), Baroness Bertha von Suttner sought to supply an antidote to militarism and a denunciation of war itself. She knew the Vienna aristocracy well, and had a creditable acquaintance with the politics of the period of the late wars; but she was not a Tolstoy.

An age basking in the consciousness of new national greatness is wont to look back rather scornfully upon the limitations and pettinesses of earlier generations. In this spirit Georg Hermann (Borchardt)'s *Jettchen Gebert's Story* (in two parts) (1906–8) introduces us to a prosperous Jewish tradesman's family at Berlin in the dull days of 1839–40, when hopes were set upon the advent of Frederick William IV. By far the most successful popular picture of the ways and manners of modern Berliners at home was Julius Stinde's *The Buchholz Family* (1884, with several continuations). W. Münch's *People of the Past* (*Leute von ehedem* (1908), etc.) faithfully describes German life and character in smaller towns and villages before and after the great political changes, not without a pleasant humour; while Hans Hoffmann's *Stolpenburg Gymnasium* (1891) is a portrait, in parts genuinely humorous as well as pathetic, of an old-world schoolmaster, whose pedantic ways it is difficult to associate with so late a date as that of 1870, assumed in the story. Especially in its more extravagant passages, this is a true German book of an earlier sort, as is the same gifted author's *Tante Fritzchen* (1899), which recounts the experiences of an old sea-going skipper's widow, and deserves no censure because of its sentimentality.

Student-life has a more vital connexion with German ideals than school-life; and the popularity of W. Meyer-Förster's picture of Heidelberg, *Karl Heinrich* (1899, success-

fully dramatised by him in 1901 under the title *Old-Heidelberg*), suggests that it was welcomed as both true and attractive by a late generation. Although the chronicler states that the general ways of the students have, like their costume, become less defiant of the philistines, such a change is not very noticeable in this story, showing how even a Prince is not proof against the witchery of the days when he was young.

By the beginning of the new century, literary fashions seemed once more to be taking a realistic turn, and the phase of fluid uncertainty to be fading away. Wilhelm von Polenz, who had himself passed through that stage, a year before his early death held up the literary mirror to it in his last novel *With Loose Roots* (*Wurzellocker*, 1902), a book not devoid of pathos, but unlovely and unredeemed by humour. His *Parson* (*Pfarrer*) *of Breitendorf* (1903) is an inferior kind of German *Robert Elsmere*. As time went on, it became evident that literary or artistic aspirations had ceased to be the absorbing interests of the day. Rudolf Herzog's *Hanseates* (1909), which drags the death of Bismarck into its story, describes life in Hamburg; while the scene of his even more widely read *The Wiskottens* (1905), a tale of commercial and industrial ambition, mingled with patriotic ardour, family pride and love (of all sorts), is laid in the author's native town, Barmen in the Westphalian Wupper-valley[1]. Much in the same style, and dangerously near to brutality, is P. Grabein's picture of mining life, *The Masters of the Earth* (1910). The hero is fired by the ambition to bring about the triumph of the German colliery industry; and Bismarck is his model as a public man. Finally, Rudolf Stratz's *His English Wife* (1913) indicates only too clearly the consciousness prevailing, in both military and mercantile circles, of the offensive strength of Germany, and the angry jealousy accompanying it. The same author's *Our Dear Country*

[1] His more recent *The Great Home-sickness* (*Das grosse Heimweh*) elaborately describes the German propaganda in the United States before the War.

(*Lieb Vaterland*) (1912) had appealed directly to German national feeling as against cosmopolitanism and the tendency of Germans to seek naturalisation in other lands.

In connexion with the assertion of national self-dependence and exclusiveness which was naturally characteristic of an age following on one of great national achievements, may be noted, in passing, the determination to free the most enduring vehicle of German thought and feeling, the German language itself, from an undue admixture of foreign elements. These had so largely and so long been, to all intents and purposes, naturalised in German speech and literary diction that their wholesale extrusion hardly admitted of being effected without much and painful violence. The acknowledged masters of spoken and of written German —Bismarck as well as Treitschke—deprecated the pedantic pressing of changes inevitably accompanied by excursions into the unsafe field of spelling-reform; although, within reasonable limits—perhaps even nearly as far as the authoritative rules of the Postmaster-general von Stephan—the Germanic reaction deservedly commanded the goodwill of both philologers and patriots[1]. The objects of the General German Language Association, founded in 1888, were definitely limited to the disuse of foreign words, when good German synonyms were in existence. The movement for spelling-reform began later, but resulted in the adoption by the Orthographical Conference of 1901 of a uniform orthography for Germany, Austria and Switzerland, which has met with general acceptance. On the subject of uniformity of pronunciation (in the first instance, on the stage) conferences were held at Berlin in 1898 and in 1908, with excellent results. The anti-cosmopolitan practice of writing and printing with German instead of Latin literation was, notwithstanding some efforts to the contrary, perversely kept up.

[1] See an article on this subject by H. Delbruck in *Preussische Jahrbucher*, vol. CLVI. 2 (May 1914).

Here necessity bids us pause. It would carry us beyond the necessary limits of our narrative, as well as beyond its scope, to discuss the periodical literature and journalism of the latter half of the nineteenth century, which, in ever increasing volume, sought to cover the whole of the ground occupied by German intellectual effort, while responding to the constantly growing system of specialisation. In literary and scientific studies of all kinds the establishment of societies supplementing the universities and academies led to the foundation of a whole series of learned periodicals, while others were called into life by royal patronage or by the enterprise of intelligent publishers, or, like the *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* (founded in 1753), had survived from the past. In historical studies in particular, the territorial, provincial, local and subject subdivisions multiplied exceedingly, though Sybel's *Historische Zeitschrift* (founded in 1859) and other historical, archaeological and economic reviews of high merit continued to be conducted on more widely comprehensive lines[1]. In that kind of journalism which combines historical and political with economic and sociological criticism, the *Grenzboten*, founded in 1841 by the publisher F. Grunow of Leipzig, and edited up to 1861 by the lucid Gustav Freytag and the caustic Julian Schmidt, was energetically carried on even after the fall of Bismarck, whom that journal had consistently upheld. But its leading position as the National-Liberal organ had passed to the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, founded in 1858, more especially since Treitschke had become the leading spirit of that journal[2]. Freytag, about 1870, undertook, with Alfred Dove, the editorship of

[1] A classified list of these will be found in the first section, subsection 3, of Dahlmann-Waitz's *Quellenkunde d. deutschen Geschichte* (7th ed., by E. Brandenburg, 1906). For a general list of German periodicals, linguistic and literary, see K Breul's *Handy Bibliographical Guide to the Study of the German Language and Literature* (1895).

[2] Cf p. 250, *ante*.

a new weekly *Im neuen Reich*, which however did not live far into a second decade. The justly popular *Deutsche Rundschau*, which, under the editorship of Julius Rodenberg, became the leading monthly magazine of the new Empire, was founded by the Berlin publisher E. Paetel in 1874, but has since found competitors of a more modern type. Among weekly reviews, the *Literarische Centralblatt*, established at Leipzig in 1850, calls for notice as the first organ of literary criticism which appealed to a wide circle of readers by the promptitude and terseness of its notices. The *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* was not founded till 1880.

Political journalism proper, though it formed the substance of periodicals with which such names as Freytag's and Treitschke's were associated, in Germany only gradually attracted to its practice writers and politicians of eminence. This fact is further illustrated by the slow advance in Germany, previously to the last quarter of a century, of the literature of the political pamphlet. The pamphlets in which, from 1838, J. Jacoby assailed the Prussian Government, more especially the *Four Questions, answered by an East-Prussian* (1841) which led to his imprisonment, caused a quite extraordinary sensation[1]. Max Duncker (*ob.* 1886), long the confidential adviser of the Crown-prince, and a distinguished historian, had in him the requisite blending of the historical and the political sense; but he finally gave politics the go-by[2]. Constantine Rössler (*ob.* 1896) was an essayist and pamphleteer of mark, whose services to Bismarck's policy were by no means limited to his management of the 'Literary Bureau,' in which Duncker had preceded him. Subsequently, German pamphlet literature increased with extraordinary rapidity, largely in consequence of the ceaseless propaganda carried on by various patriotic associations, and by the eager activity of the representatives of different

[1] Cf. vol. I, p. 319, *ante*.

[2] Cf. vol II, p. 353 *et al.*, *ante*; and p. 226, *note*, *ante*.

party standpoints[1], as well as of individual *Weltanschauungen*.

Meanwhile, the growth of newspaper journalism seemed to know no stop; in the last three-quarters of the century the number of newspapers in Prussia multiplied in the ratio of more than eight to one[2]. Among these, it would be misleading to attempt a selection; but the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, first published at Augsburg, and then at Munich, was long in losing the primacy which it had owed, partly to its consistent advocacy of Austrian (*grossdeutsch*) interests, but more to the insight of its foreign correspondence and the constant excellence of its literary supplements, and, in general, to the high-minded intelligence of its proprietors, the house of Cotta. Curiously enough, the rival Leipzig house of Brockhaus (the publishers of the famous *Konversations-Lexicon*) failed, notwithstanding the ability and patriotism of its best known editor, K. Biedermann, to raise the Liberal *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* to quite the same level. The importance of Gervinus's *Deutsche Zeitung* belongs, like his political pamphlets, to the revolutionary era; the *Neue Preussische* (*Kreuz-*) *Zeitung*, of which the Tory-radical H. Wagener assumed the editorship on its foundation about the same time[3], will probably live as long as the *Junker* party. The chief ultramontane organ is still *Germania* (founded in 1871); the chief Socialist *Vorwärts* (*Forwards*) (1884); the organ of the National-social movement, led by F. Naumann, *Die Hilfe* (*Help*) (1894). The Berlin *National-zeitung*, the organs of the two leading mercantile towns, the *Hamburger Nachrichten* and the Bremen *Weserzeitung*, and the enterprising Rhenish organ, the *Kölnische Zeitung*[4], were

[1] His *Select Essays* were published by W. Rossler in 1902.

[2] According to Lichtenberger, p. 365, there were, in 1825, 845; in 1869, 2127; in 1891, 7082.

[3] He was admitted into the Government in 1873, and died in 1889.

[4] Its earlier history is narrated in an interesting work by K. Buch-

at the height of their political influence as Liberal journals of various shades, in the period under notice; but it is not possible here to say more of these, or to advert to special varieties of journalism, including the comic, in which the primacy, long divided between the genial Munich *Fliegende Blätter* and the mordant Berlin *Kladderadatsch*, has since been disputed by the Munich *Simplicissimus*. The later increase in German journalism, and in its influence, was largely due to the imperial press-law, passed in 1874, by a large majority in the *Reichstag*, after negotiation between the Government and Lasker in particular. It abolished the censorship, the system of concessions, and the judicial power of withdrawing the right of newspaper publication, together with other obstacles in the way of the freedom and prosperity of the Press. It did not interfere with the continued existence of an evil of a different kind—the exercise of positive Government influence upon journalism, in the form, not merely of official communications, or even of 'semi-official' influence, but of secret corruption.

Before concluding these notes on some of the aspects of German intellectual life in the latter half of the nineteenth century, we turn to a very different part of our subject, though only, as it were, to glance at it from a distance. A survey of the progress of German Art during this period, even did the present occasion admit, or were the present writer capable, of attempting it, would be misleading if it sought to assign fixed names and categories to all the schools, groups and tendencies between which it would have to distinguish[1]. What was new in this progress reached forward

heim, *Die Stellung der Kölnischen Zeitung im vormärzlichen rheinischen Liberalismus* (Leipzig, 1914).

[1] A guide, both useful and suggestive, to this chapter of the history of modern art will be found in Bk IV, sec. ii of vol. III of K. Woermann's *Geschichte der Kunst aller Zeiten und Völker* (Leipzig

into a still uncertain future—as, for instance, in architecture the wish to express in the form and style of a building the nature of its purpose; what was old, as for instance in music the cooperation of words in musical drama, had undergone so essential a change that only a step remained to the ultimate solution of the total suppression of words in a symphonic poem. Besides the liberation of Germany from the yoke of foreign occupation or control, the earlier decades of the century had witnessed a struggle in the realm of art between mutually adverse tendencies, which only gradually resulted in a common endeavour to follow common ideals. In the later half of the century, the results of this struggle, except perhaps in the case of music, fell short of the substantial unity of achievement on which its final victory depended. The art of painting in Germany, more particularly, notwithstanding the sustained efforts of the second and part of the third decade of the century—the epoch of the great school of which Cornelius was the leader—subsequently gave more ready admission to foreign influences, to which architecture and sculpture had never been in the same measure subject, and which German music had already succeeded in shaking off once for all.

In architecture, K. F. Schinkel (*ob.* 1841) had been the foremost representative of the neo-Hellenic movement. At Berlin, where he adorned the imperial capital of the future with several of its noblest buildings[1], his mantle fell on the inheritor of his style (though not to the exclusion of other styles), F. A. Stüler (*ob.* 1865). More widely admired was the architect chosen by Lewis I of Bavaria for the conversion of his capital into a modern Athens—Leo von Klenze (*ob.* 1864).

and Vienna, 1911). Lotze's *History of Aesthetics in Germany*, though published so early as 1868, contains observations on the latest developments of artistic purpose full of instructiveness, even for the general reader.

[1] Cf. vol. I, p 318, *ante*.

In the second half of the century, the medieval and the classic style not only continued to meet with favour concurrently, but, in the hands of Gottfried Semper (*ob.* 1879) and his disciples (for he was, also, a great theoretical authority on his art), were blended in the style of the early Renascence. One of his masterpieces in this style was the celebrated new Court theatre at Dresden (long the central locality of his labours); when it was burnt down (1869), the erection of its more magnificent successor (1873) was carried out by his son Manfred. The day of classicism had passed—Ludwig Schwanthaler (*ob.* 1848), the sculptor of the colossal Bavaria at Munich, had been its most prominent representative—and the style of the Renascence, even of its later stages, began to dominate German architecture. After 1870, a mixed—the so-called 'German Renascence'—style flourished. This was the age in which 'restoration' had its heyday, in private as well as in public architecture; till the new school came in, which sought, on principle, to accommodate a building to the nature and demands of its immediate object, and to evolve architectural structures, from church and theatre to beer-house and railway-station, out of the legiti mate requirements of place and purpose.

Sculpture had, in the earlier half of the century, found its chosen home at Berlin, where G. Schadow (*ob.* 1850) accommodated his style, without servility, to the prevalent neoclassicism of Thorvaldsen, and left behind him no more fascinating memorial than that of Queen Louisa and her sister in the royal palace. Schadow's most distinguished pupil was Christian Rauch (*ob.* 1857): he, too, the sculptor of a lovely Queen Louisa monument (in the mausoleum at Charlottenburg), but best known by his magnificent statue of Frederick the Great, the masterpiece of the German sculpture of this age, and worthy both of the mighty king and of the company surrounding and sustaining him—a work combining lofty classical qualities with the sense of reality befitting, as has

been said, its place in the capital of Frederick's monarchy. Rauch, in his turn, was the teacher of Ernst Rietschel (*ob.* 1864), who courageously combined with a fine sense of beauty a power of individualisation (apparent, also, in costume). His Goethe and Schiller monument at Weimar (1857) and his Luther monument at Worms justly secured to him a remembrance, national in every sense, among the chief sculptors of his times.

Realism was the note of the generation which succeeded, marking at least the earlier works of R. Begas, and a number of fellow-artists at Berlin, Dresden, Vienna and (in particular) Munich. A still more modern growth is that proclaimed in theory and exemplified in practice by A. Hildebrand, whose principles found expression in the equestrian statue of Bismarck at Bremen—one of the numerous contemporary monuments of the nation's hero. A more fantastically subjective art is that of Max Klinger, sculptor, painter and etcher, who had passed from his phase of Hellenism to that of 'the humanisation of Hellenic and Christian ideals,' and whose course could scarcely be regarded as typical of national evolution in any of the arts in which he made himself a name[1].

If the art of painting comes home more easily to the general public of a modern nation, its practice is, also, more susceptible than that of the sister-arts, architecture and sculpture, to foreign influences. In a period when national feeling, in defiance of efforts at repression, rose to its full height, it is, consequently, not surprising that there should have been an almost continuous conflict between national and international tendencies in pictorial art; but it was not less to be expected that the former should prevail. Early in the century, a school of painters had arisen which both synchronised and sympathised with the later

[1] See an article by G. Zeller, 'Max Klinger's Art' in *Preuss. Jahrb.* vol. CXLVIII, 2 (May 1902).

romantic movement in German literature and art, and whose ideas, in course of time, commended themselves to an intelligent patronage like that of Lewis I of Bavaria and Frederick William IV of Prussia. This school proclaimed its interest in the highest themes of Greek mythology and its allegiance to Catholic Christianity. Logically, it modelled itself on the examples of fifteenth century art, and became known (under designations of which the first was appropriated by cognate groups of painters elsewhere) as Pre-Raphaelites, Nazarenes or Neo-Germans. Of this school, Friedrich Overbeck (*ob.* 1869) and Philipp Veit (*ob.* 1877) were, from the outset, conspicuous members; but the leadership soon fell into the master hands of Peter Cornelius (*ob.* 1867). After quitting Rome, so far back as 1818, he became the head in turn of the three important academies of art in Düsseldorf, Munich and Berlin. At Munich, he executed the great series of frescoes which first made him famous, and which dealt, in monumental grandeur of design, with the loftiest themes of Greek mythology and of the Christian religion. What they lacked—largely, no doubt, because the reproduction of the cartoons was entrusted to executants unequal to their task—was beauty of colouring; and the magnificent frescoes which were to have adorned the *Campo Santo* of the Berlin Cathedral (*Dom*) never advanced to their final stage. The Neo-German School that had had its birth at Rome found other representatives in Julius Schnorr von Karolsfeld (*ob.* 1872), whose historical frescoes in the palace at Munich display the fertility of his imagination, and whose woodcuts illustrating the Bible made his art a household possession; Heinrich Hess (*ob.* 1883), distinguished by his religious frescoes at Munich; and Buonaventura Genelli of Berlin (*ob.* 1868), whose robust designs, inspired by models found in Homer and Dante, while aiming at classical beauty, revealed an originality quite as well suited with themes recalling those 'progresses' in which the very modern genius of Hogarth revelled.

The fame of Cornelius's pupil Wilhelm von Kaulbach equalled, if it did not surpass, that of the master. As director of the Munich Academy, he held an authoritative position to which his ability and temperament alike corresponded; but he had seen evil days, which left their mark upon perhaps the most characteristic creations of his genius. His fame reached its height with the splendid series of frescoes at the Berlin New Museum, above all with the Battle of the Huns, with which perhaps the Tower of Babel should be coupled; and, although he was not more successful than Cornelius as a colourist, he was surely more than his master's equal in the sweep of his imagination—in which it seems like carping to detect a theatrical element—and in the aspiring grandeur of his composition. His 'galleries' of illustrations of great poets—Shakespeare, Schiller and Goethe—and of Wagner, may have suited the taste of their age better than that of its more realistic successor; though even those no longer under the spell are unlikely to find a more charming Werther's Lotte, a more touching Hermann and Dorothea, or a more tragic Lady Macbeth than his. But his *Reinecke Fuchs* volume, in which his satirical genius found full play, and in which he worked with 'real' materials, defies the revenge of time. Kaulbach, who had survived the height of his fame, but whose fame will, also, survive the reaction now perceptible against a recognition of his great qualities, died in 1874.

Eduard Bendemann (*ob.* 1889), a pleasing historical painter, was director of the flourishing Düsseldorf Academy, of which K. F. Lessing (*ob.* 1880), and Julius Hübner, afterwards of Dresden (*ob.* 1882), were likewise members. Düsseldorf very naturally devoted itself largely to landscape and *genre*; and the challenge to the ascendancy of the historic school was thus taken up in choice of subject as well as in manner of treatment. Moritz von Schwind (*ob.* 1871), a Viennese who had been a pupil of Cornelius at Munich,

illustrated in his own work the readiness of public taste to welcome different ranges of subjects and forms of treatment. Following his master in the grand style of figure composition, he also gave happy expression to other aspects of German romanticism—as is shown by his frescoes in the Wartburg, and, on the other hand, by the charms and humours of his lesser compositions in oils and in water-colours.

Among the Neo-Germans at Rome early in the century had been a young painter, Ludwig Richter, who, working with success in landscape, found his way home from Italian to German scenery, and thence to German popular and family life. In this sphere, more especially as a designer and illustrator in wood, he achieved a wholly unique fame[1]. Richter's illustrations of domestic life in all its simplicity and all its charm are a national possession of endless joy in their sympathetic humour and innocent pathos. Whatsoever is gentle and cheerful, whatsoever delights or edifies in home life and its ministrations—the market and the field, the Sunday at home, the Christmas round the tree, the Lord's Prayer from the lips of old and young, children in all their sweetness, animals in all their kindliness—these, and such as these, are the subjects which he reproduced with the tender fidelity of genius. His death, in 1884, was lamented by the whole nation; for no unity is more genuine and more complete than that called forth by an art like his.

The careful and minute observation of human life and manners could not but tend to promote the growth of realism in art as it did in literature; and the historiographers of German art are probably right in attributing a powerful influence in this direction to the extraordinary artistic productivity of Adolf Menzel (*ob.* 1905), best known as the

[1] According to M Osborn, in his sympathetic popular monograph on Richter in Velhagen and Klasing's series (1911), not less than 3334 of his designs were reproduced as woodcuts Their originals were often most effectively touched in water-colour by the designer.

illustrator of Kugler's *Life of Frederick the Great* (1840–2), from which he afterwards selected themes for large pictures in oils (1850–2). No subject was unwelcome to his quickly receptive and responsive powers; perhaps he may be held to have reached the extreme of pictorial realism in his Iron Rolling-Mill (1875), an 'interior' of overpowering truthfulness. The same preference for the reproduction of the actual asserted itself, in landscape, in the pictures of the elder Achenbach (Andreas, *ob.* 1909) and others. French and Belgian examples exercised considerable influence in this direction at Düsseldorf and elsewhere, in both landscape and *genre*; while at Munich the realism of colour, at all events, introduced itself into the brilliant historical pictures of Karl von Piloty (*ob.* 1886). One of his pupils was the eminent portrait-painter Franz von Lenbach (*ob.* 1904), whose numerous portraits of Bismarck would have sufficed to secure him immortality. An idealist reaction is traceable in the works of Arnold Böcklin (*ob.* 1901), a Swiss by birth, but trained at Düsseldorf, and in the paintings as well as in the sculpture of Max Klinger, whose name has been already mentioned. The names of younger men, and even of younger schools or groups—including the 'impressionists'—it would not be fitting to enumerate here.

Of all the arts, Music[1] is that in whose progress Germany as a nation has taken the most continuous share, and, in the course of the nineteenth century, this share undeniably became a commanding one. In the earlier half of the century, symphony, in the later, opera, reached unprecedented heights of development; and the great names of Beethoven and Wagner, accordingly, span an advance with which no other in the history of the art can bear comparison. Even in those

[1] See the instructive essays by F. Bonavia, 'The History of Music,' in *Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (2nd series, 1915), and by D. F. Tovey, 'German Music,' in *German Culture*, ed. by W. P. Paterson (1915).

countries where symphony never took firm root, the example of Beethoven potently encouraged musical progress; but none of his contemporaries, or of his successors before the advent of Wagner, inherited or anticipated the national task in which these two great composers shared. Franz Schubert (*ob.* 1828), a genuine southerner, has not unjustly been described as the master of German song (*Lied*); Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy (*ob.* 1847), though a cosmopolitan, did more, assuredly, than any of his contemporaries to make German music loved throughout the world; both were still, though by no means absolutely, under the influence of romanticism. Perhaps, if not in depth of feeling, at least in the earnest endeavour to give thought its due place as one of the constructive elements of musical composition, Beethoven's earliest successor of high eminence was Robert Schumann (*ob.* 1856). A far-sighted critic as well as a powerful composer, he hailed the artistic advent of Johannes Brahms (*ob.* 1897) who further developed the symphony, in which both Schubert and Schumann had, each after his fashion, excelled. While speaking of these masters, we must pass by the names of more than one delightful composer of simple German song whose melodies, like the poet's verse, 'live on the lips of enamoured youths and beloved maidens.'

Opera, both by historical tradition and by the incomparable opportunities which it affords to the melodic style, had long seemed a province proper to the Italians; Mozart himself, with his infinite tuneful charm, had in this form of composition essentially followed Italian models. Karl Maria von Weber (*ob.* 1826), who, after being known mainly as a composer of national folk-songs, by his *Freischütz*, as it were, threw down the gauntlet to the masters of Italian opera; but his choice of subjects was not such as to call forth deep interest in an intellectual audience—though, apart from Beethoven and his *Fidelio*, other composers, such as

L. Spohr (*ob.* 1859) and, also, H. Marschner (*ob.* 1861)[1] in this respect showed an advance. Of the art of G. Meyerbeer (*ob.* 1864) Paris may perhaps be said to have been the proper *focus*.

Wagner, however, was the first to redeem opera from the conventionalism to which this hybrid species of art had been subjected, virtually from the time of its birth. The form of art which he called into life was not brought forth at once, but evolved by a long process of reflexion and productive effort, in which he was sustained by his belief in the lofty purposes of his art and in his own power to realise the ideal in his mind. Among the difficulties in his path was that of his personal position, which seemed to have been wrecked by his participation in the Saxon insurrection of 1849[2], when (besides his earlier operas) his *Tannhäuser* had during four years been before a but moderately sympathetic world and his *Lohengrin* was still awaiting production. He was not allowed to reenter Germany till 1861 or Saxony till 1862. The circumstances under which he settled in Bavaria, and quitted it again for Switzerland, have already been incidentally noted[3]. During his sojourn at Munich, his opera *Tristan und Isolde* was performed in its entirety under the direction of H. von Bulow. In 1872 (he had married Cosima von Bulow two years earlier), he removed to Baireuth, where, in circumstances and surroundings that appealed to all believers in his genius and in his cause, he produced the trilogy of *The Ring of the Nibelungs*, and *Parsifal*, in three acts

[1] His first piece of work was, probably, his *Hans Heiling* (1833).

[2] Cf vol I, p. 491, *ante*. For a short Wagner-bibliography see F. Muncker's article in vol XL of *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (1896). English readers will find an admirable life of Wagner in the article on him by E. Dannreuther, brought up to date by Herbert Thompson, in Fuller-Maitland's new ed. of Sir George Grove's *Dictionary of Music* (vol V, 1910), which is also accompanied by a bibliography.

[3] Cf vol. II, pp. 343–5 and note, *ante*.

like his earlier operas, together with his comic opera the *Master-singers* (*Die Meistersinger*), a work of historical intelligence, as well as of rare artistic charm. On the ethics of the two great Baireuth productions much has been written: it must suffice to say here that, in matter, these musical dramas are concerned with religious and philosophical, political and social themes which appeal directly to educated minds; while in form, they subordinate the words to the music, though the text was intended to possess poetic merit.

Whatever, in the course of time, might have come to be Wagner's views as to the effects of the establishment of the new German Empire upon the national mind—which he had bidden despise the 'vapour and trifling' of the Latin races—his own achievements and their informing spirit had certainly heightened the self-consciousness of the nation, whose favourite art he had transmuted. Many were the heralds of his fame, among them, for a time, the trumpet-tongued Nietzsche; but none gave proof of so faithful and so generous a self-abnegation as Franz Liszt (*ob.* 1886), himself eminent both as composer and as pianist, who made Weimar the centre of his stedfast propaganda.

Many eminent composers, conductors and executants took part in the movement which ended in conquering the musical world. Nor can it be denied that, to the general advance of the art and the deepening of the national interest in it, the support systematically given by the German Governments and municipalities both to the study of music and to its adequate performance, in concert-room or opera-house, morally as well as materially contributed in a very considerable measure. The parallel benefit accruing to the German drama from the corresponding interest taken by public authorities and literary celebrities in the progress of the stage, has already been noted[1]. The significance of such

[1] Cf. p. 265, *note*, *ante*.

a statistical fact[1] as the increase by about 20 per cent., in the thirteen years from 1882 to 1895, of the number of persons in Germany gaining their livelihood as musicians or by their connexion with the theatre may, of course, be diversely interpreted. But it certainly attests the continuously growing interest taken by the nation at large, about the time of the turn of the century, in these branches of the great complex of art and literature.

The fact of this increased interest, together with that of the general advance of science and letters in the spheres of German society under their influence, should suffice to convince every candid mind, with how large a reservation any conclusions ought to be accepted as to the intellect of Germany in this age having been absorbed by the race for wealth and power. That a struggle between these contending influences was actually in progress, is, at the same time, no more to be gainsaid than are its moral effects —at once impelling and deadening. But on this head, also, it is well to guard the 'fence of the teeth' against hasty generalisations. Enough, and more than enough, of sad and sober truth remains in the implied indictment to be weighed and recorded by the just judgment of the present and of the future[2].

[1] Cf. Lichtenberger, *loc. cit.* p. 365.

[2] Such a judgment of the subject is, in my opinion, to be found in Baron F. von Hügel's essay *The German Soul and the Great War* (reprinted 1916), from which I have adapted an incidental phrase.

CHAPTER VII

THE NEW REIGN, 1890–1907[1]

I

Home Affairs

Bismarck and Bismarck's age—for, great as he was, neither the ideas and aspirations which had contributed to the making of the German Empire, nor the process itself, should be placed to his sole credit—had bequeathed to their successors a likewise twofold legacy. In the new reign, now that it was in every sense such, after his hand was no longer on the helm, the first duty of Government and nation remained what during the last two decades of his public career he had steadily held it to be—the protection and preservation of the Empire, its frontiers and its home institutions, its strength and its prosperity. Bismarck was not haunted or moved by any visions of an indefinite expansion of the Empire, by any dreams of Pangermanism, such as in the next generation were to take more or less definite shape[2], or by

[1] For the handbooks and other material used in this chapter, see Bibliography. Of H. Delbrück's recent essay, *Bismarck's Erbe*, I have been unable to see anything but the title.

[2] Whether or not the term *Alldeutschland* was invented by Arndt and also used by Jahn, it no doubt represented the development of ideas which had their birth in the age of the War of Liberation, and which naturally revived with the refoundation of the German Empire. The term, however, did not acquire a practical meaning till after the age of Bismarck had come to a close. About 1886, the notorious Dr Karl Peters had founded an association, which, in

any visions of a world empire. The constitution of the German Empire as it stood had been established on a basis so broad as to enable it to satisfy reasonable popular demands without serious revision, such as was still requisite in the already antiquated constitutions of particular States—Prussia among the number. As for 'particularism,' it was fast dying out, though the Brunswick territorial Right Party (*Landesrechtspartei* or *Rechtspartei, tout court*), whose real centre of action was at Hanover, lifted its head, so late as September 1901, in a meeting at Brunswick, and claimed to be exempt from any duty of loyalty towards the Empire. What was of more importance, much had been accomplished during the Bismarckian *régime* to meet the needs and the demands of all classes, and of the most numerous class in particular; and to improve the condition of the life of the people at large. Yet the new reign and the new age could not be expected to stand still, any more than the old had done. In political life, stagnation generally means reaction; and at no time was German statesmanship or German public opinion, with which it necessarily sought to keep in touch,

1891, after the cession of the Zanzibar protectorate, was merged in a new one, called the *Allgemeine Deutsche Verband* (General German Union). This, again, was, in 1902, reorganised by Dr Ernst Hasse, assisted by Dr Adolf Lehr, and renamed the *Alldeutsche Verband* (Pangerman Union). With the aid of annual congresses and varied journalistic and publicistic efforts, this league for the propagation of the 'German idea' at home and abroad became a real political force. (Cf. C. Andler, *Le Pangermanisme Continental*, etc. (1915), pp. 253–5; and see Bibliography as to the writings of Hasse and others.) The German *Kolonialbund* (Colonial League) was founded in 1903, the *Flottenverein* (Naval Union) dates from 1898. In the Introduction to his popular treatise *The German Idea and the World* (1912) Paul Rohrbach defines the 'German idea' to be the 'moral essence of Germanism as a formative force in the world of the present and in that of the future'; and, elsewhere in this essay, he declares Germany's vitality as a world-nation to be absolutely dependent upon her national expansion.

less likely to remain quiescent or go back than now, when the nation was already enjoying so many of the fruits of its past exertions, and was beckoned on by the promise of further gains, under the rule of an aspiring and versatile Prince, eager to secure for his name a conspicuous place in the annals of the Hohenzollerns. In this sense, there was undeniable force in Prince Bülow's saying that the duty of Bismarck's successors was, not to imitate, but to develop his policy[1]. As a matter of course, no important step taken for the preservation, or more effectual protection, of what had been actually achieved, and, above all, no advance made or attempted to be made for the extension of the power of the Empire in Europe, or in the world at large, could fail to affect the relations between Germany and other Powers and thus to react upon her foreign policy.

It may, at the outset, be convenient to note the names of those statesmen who, after Bismarck's fall, bore the chief responsibility in the government of the Empire. His immediate successor as Chancellor was Count Leo von Caprivi de Caprera de Montecucoli, the descendant of a Carinthian family, whose last *agnomen* carries us back to the days of the Thirty Years' War, and which, towards the close of the 17th century, had moved into Silesia. He was himself carefully trained as a Prussian officer, and in the Franco-German war rendered distinguished service as Chief of the Staff under General von Voigts-Rhetz. After the close of the war, he was employed on several important commissions, before being appointed, in 1882, to the command at Metz. Soon afterwards began that part of his career, which, whatever judgment may be passed on it from other points of view, certainly exemplifies loyal readiness for self-sacrifice. A few months later (in March 1883) he was named head of the German Admiralty, and, with an adaptability partly accounted for by the undisputed predominance of the military

[1] *Imperial Germany* (Tr by M A. Lewenz), 1914, p. 12.

over the other services, rapidly made himself master of his new duties, both naval and parliamentary. His conception of the navy, however, was that of a purely defensive arm; and, finding a different view taken of its future by his sovereign, he resigned his office in the summer of 1888. He was reputed no friend of Bismarck's; but he was, soon afterwards, given the command, at Hanover, of the army corps of whose Staff he had been Chief in the Great War. In March 1890, he was, by the confidence of the young Emperor, once more called upon to relinquish a post which he liked and for which he was well fitted, in order to assume the Chancellorship, with the presidency over the Prussian Ministry, in Bismarck's place, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in that of the Prince's son, Count Herbert. Into Caprivi's conduct of affairs it is not proposed to enter here, except with regard to his colonial and foreign policy. He incurred much Conservative illwill by his economic, and much National-Liberal largely by his educational, policy, and he was accused of morigeration to both Poles and Social-democrats. Thus, his difficulties were many, and they were undoubtedly heightened by the ungenerous censures of his great predecessor. Nor does he appear to have secured the permanent 'sympathy' of the Emperor, who, if Stosch was correctly informed[1], found him convenient, but deficient in imagination. Thus, in 1894, his second request to be relieved of office was accepted; and he took no further part in politics before his death in 1899, never abandoning the dignified reserve which was part of his character[2].

Count von Caprivi was succeeded, not (as some had thought likely) by Count Philipp zu Eulenburg, German ambassador at Vienna, whose 'imaginative' powers would

[1] Cf. H. Oncken, *Bennigsen*, vol. II, p. 591.

[2] He left no record of his experiences. See the concise, but valuable, life of him by B. von Poten, in *Allg. Deutsche Biogr.* vol. XLVII (1903).

probably have satisfied his master, or by the Chief of the Staff, Count von Waldersee, who was suspected abroad of bellicose propensities, but by Prince Hohenlohe, then Governor-General of Alsace-Lorraine and in his seventy-sixth year. The appointment proved that there was no present prospect of the recovery by Bismarck of a controlling influence over the course of German affairs; although the new Chancellor, whose diplomatic—and chivalrous—instincts rarely failed him, paid an early visit to Friedrichsruh, which was followed, in the course of the same year (1895), by one to Petersburg. Hohenlohe had declined to follow the hazardous example set by Caprivi (in 1892) and to resign the presidency of the Prussian Ministry; and he retained both his offices, which he had proposed to resign on his eightieth birthday (though he 'did not feel any real need of rest[1]'), some eighteen months longer, after which his resignation was tendered to the Emperor and at once accepted (October 1900). He died in the following year (July 6th, 1901)—a statesman of considerable administrative and diplomatic powers, high-bred from head to foot, but of Liberal convictions in matters of both Church and State. His early adhesion and unswerving fidelity to the cause of German unity under Prussian hegemony had been of very great value to it; his frank declarations in 1868 had signally helped to clear the general situation; and, at the last, he took credit to himself as helping to uphold the Empire against the indifference exhibited towards it by Prussian *Junkerdom*[2].

Hohenlohe's resignation was followed in 1901 by that of the most important of his colleagues, in whose hands the conduct of home affairs had principally lain, the Finance Minister and Vice-President of the Prussian Ministry,

[1] Cf. *Denkwurdigkeiten*, vol. II, p. 534.

[2] Cf *ib.* Except for a few notes, the publication of the concluding part of these Memoirs (from the Prince's appointment to the Chancellorship onwards) has been for the present deferred.

Miquel[1]. He had been subjected to bitter attacks both by the Centre, now led by Lieber, and by the Agrarian Conservatives, more especially in connexion with the proposal for the completion (at a cost of more than 12 million sterling) of the German canal system, by the construction of a great 'midland canal' uniting west and east, between Rhine and Elbe. The project, brought forward and rejected in 1899, and again in 1901, was hereupon postponed *sine die*.

Hohenlohe's successor, Count (afterwards Prince) Bernhard von Bülow, who had been Foreign Secretary of State since 1897—in succession to Freiherr von Marschall, an able, but perhaps less circumspect diplomatist—and previously ambassador at the Quirinal, immediately took office as Chancellor, President of the Prussian Ministry, and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Of his grasp of public business, both foreign and domestic, there never was any doubt, even before he summarised, in his *Imperial Germany* (1914), the principles and methods of his administration with masterly precision and lucidity. He proved himself, moreover, what is naturally less usual in a German statesman, a 'parliamentary hand' of remarkable skill. In 1909, Dr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who had been Secretary of State for the Interior since 1907, was appointed Chancellor and President of the Prussian Ministry.

In any attempt to describe the activities of the German Government in the years following on Bismarck's fall, the foremost place must be given to the subject on which, whatever might from time to time have been his differences with the chief military authorities and those who thought with them, he had never ceased to bestow anxious attention[2]. Indeed,

[1] Cf. p 91, *ante*.

[2] Bismarck was fully aware of the importance due in politics to military considerations (just as Moltke, when forming or adapting his military plans, never ignored political necessities); but it seems going much too far to speak of the great Chancellor as possessed of

as was seen, it had, in a high degree, preoccupied him at the time of his parting interviews with the Emperor William II. The Military Law of 1874, which fixed the peace strength of the army, and organised it accordingly, had in 1880 and 1887 been renewed for further periods of seven years ('septennates'), the peace strength being on each occasion increased —in 1887, to a total of 468,409 men. The proposals under discussion at the time of Bismarck's fall, and regarded by him as necessary to be carried at any risk[1], took definite shape in 1892, when Caprivi's Government asked for an increased total of not less than 570,877 men, involving an additional expenditure of 66 million marks (£3,300,000). This large augmentation was, in part, to defray additions to the numbers of the existing battalions; in part, to provide, in every regiment, a fourth battalion, consisting of two half-companies, which should at once have their complete *cadres* of officers and non-commissioned officers, so as to admit of being otherwise rapidly filled up in case of war. The entire system was to receive parliamentary sanction for a period of five years and a half—a so-called 'quinquennate.' At the same time (in accordance with a resolution supported by the National-Liberals in 1890[2]) the Government proposed to include in the new military measures the tentative reintroduction, for the infantry, of the two years' service. It proved, however, that there was no chance of the *Reichstag* accepting the Government proposals as a whole; and a compromise recommended by Bennigsen was rejected by both Caprivi and Eugen Richter, as was a motion by the Centre

'an absolute genius for things military.' (See Naumann, *Central Europe* (E. Tr.), p. 53.)

[1] Cf. p. 170, *ante*.

[2] From Egelhaaf, *Bismarck*, p. 391, *note*, it would appear that, in 1890, Bismarck's Government had not finally made up its mind to recommend the reduction of the time of service, though no *Reichstag* could be expected to approve both the increased cost and the three years' term.

deputy, Freiherr von Huene, in favour of a much smaller increase, which Caprivi had shown himself prepared to accept. The *Reichstag* was, therefore, dissolved (May 6th, 1893); and the elections, held immediately, having resulted in the return of a very composite assembly, the Government proposals, modified in accordance with Huene's motion, were adopted by a sufficient majority. The new law amounted to the establishment, for five-years-and-a-half, of an army with a peace strength of 479,229 men, exclusive of officers, non-commissioned officers, and military administrative officials, estimated together at about 106,000 more. This implied, in case of war, a standing army of 1,630,000, with trained *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* of the first levy, to the number of about 600,000. In 1896, the law was, without any opposition except from the amalgamated remains of *Freisinn* and southern *Volkspartei*, and from the Social-democrats, amended by a revision of the fourth-battalion plan, the total peace strength being left virtually unaltered, and the 'quinquennate,' with the tentative restriction to the infantry of the two years' service, retained.

In 1899 (March), when a new military law again became necessary, these provisions were renewed, but the proposal to increase, by 1902, the peace strength to 502,506 was declined, and the numbers were restricted to 495,500 men. In 1905, the two years' service, which had now been tentatively in existence during twelve years, was definitively established for the infantry and certain other branches of the army. At the same time, a further progressive increase in the peace strength of the army was approved, which would, by 1910, raise it to 505,839 men. The object, it was pointed out, was not to possess the numerically largest army in Europe—this end France and Russia might be left to pursue—but to strengthen, in every way, the organisation, the technical equipment, and the general efficiency of all parts of the army (including the new air service) and of the material used by them.

Thus, 1905, too, was an important date in the history of the German army. Occasion was taken, in the *Reichstag*, to debate the time-honoured institution of 'one-year volunteers'—soldiers who, on satisfying a school test, enjoyed the privilege of serving in the line for a single year only. This practice was, from the point of view of 'equality,' strongly attacked by the Social-democrats; but, though declared susceptible of improvement, it was not abolished. The military system at large had about this time been subjected to much public criticism. It was in 1903 that the publication of a novel exposing the evils of military life in a small western frontier-town (Forsbach) had excited widespread attention[1]. The court-martial which sentenced its author, a lieutenant who, before issuing the book, had tendered the resignation of his commission, to six months' imprisonment, at the same time acknowledged the public service he had rendered by some of his comments on a faulty garrison-system, and the matter came under discussion in the *Reichstag*. On the other hand, an effort was made, not long afterwards (1906), to encourage the formation, which had been in progress for some years, of *Kriegervereine* (Soldiers' Associations)—benefit-societies intended, also, to keep up, among those who had seen active service, the traditions of comradeship and of militarism. In 1907, there existed over 18,000 such associations connected with the German *Kriegerbund* (Soldiers' League) or with territorial unions of the same description.

It would carry us too far to enter into a comparison, in regard to either numbers or efficiency reached in these years, between the German army and the armies of other countries. On paper, not only the Russian, but the French army were considerably in advance of it; the ordinary military budget, however, of Russia alone exceeded (or equalled) that of the German Empire, though the latter was nearly

[1] Cf. p. 290, *note*, *ante*.

approached by that of Great Britain[1]. After 1907 (when Prince Bulow applied the experience of the *Cartel* by forming the *Bloc*), neither the Radicals, who had ranged themselves with the national party, nor the Centre, against whose combination with the Social-democrats the *Bloc* had been formed, voted against any Government army or navy bill.

Of the necessity of a strong army for the protection of the frontiers of the Empire, and for the European position to which it had attained as a consequence of the events that had called it into life, there could be no doubt among those who owed it allegiance. The progressive augmentation of that army, nevertheless, constituted a danger to the peace of the world, which could only be ignored on the paradoxical assumption that the peace in question was best assured by a vigilantly maintained balance of armaments. And, not less certainly, this continuous increase imperilled the inner life of the German nation itself, if it be true that such a peril lies in the encouragement of a belief in military efficiency as, in itself, the *summum bonum* of the life of a modern State. In Germany, it had become an axiom of current political science, that universal and compulsory service, not for purposes of defence only, but for any purpose that might commend itself to the authorities of the State, was, in itself, an invaluable educative force in the national life. What point there was in this belief, probably, lay in the fact that no form of life had tended so strongly as the military to convince the German people of the value of discipline and system, and to establish the principle that 'the living national machine goes its way whether the individual lives or dies[2].' In short, the universal experience of army service taught the Germans, not only, with a completeness unreached

[1] The German (ordinary) budget for that year amounted (exclusive of colonial purposes) to over 616 million marks (*c.* £31,000,000).

[2] Cf Naumann, *op. cit.* p. 121.

in any previous period of their history, the uses of docility and subordination, but also the supreme importance of organisation, which they thence learnt to apply to various other spheres of life[1]. The idea of a Perpetual Peace had ceased to fascinate the nation of Kant, which had long since become the nation of Hegel. It will be seen below how the assumed necessity, internal as well as external, of maintaining Germany's military system lay at the root of her refusal, in the Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907, to join in any discussion on the reduction of armaments

For the rest, in speaking of the growth of militarism in Germany, and in hazarding surmises (for there are naturally few subjects on which well-informed opinion is so much in the dark) as to the composition and methods of the 'military party' in Prussian Court and Government circles, it might be well to bear one circumstance in mind. During nearly the whole of the Bismarckian *régime*, the chief military authorities, whether joined in a distinct cabinet or council or not, had steadily sought to hold their own against the Chancellor, with or without his Ministry; and, above all, the opinion of Moltke (who, even after he had resigned his office as Chief of the Staff in 1888, presided over the Commission for National Defence till his death in 1891) had rarely failed to receive attention in peace as well as in war. Quite apart from his judgment, on military and political grounds, as to the opportunities of times and seasons for a declaration of war, Moltke made no secret of his general conviction that, without war, mankind would stagnate in materialism, and he was therefore, on no occasion, *a priori* against declaring it. Under such auspices, the leaders of the Prussian army could hardly fail to become the perpetual

[1] Bernhardi, in his wellknown *Germany and the Next War* (E Tr 1912), has some interesting remarks, pp 261–2, on the importance of the necessity, from a military point of view, of educational progress

nucleus of a military party in the State; nor could the class at whose head they stood fail to form the constant centre of what was, virtually, a militarist propaganda.

Concerning the maintenance and increase of the German army, enough has been said, at least for the present. With the German navy the case lay differently. In 1872, Bismarck invited General Albrecht von Stosch, whose administrative capacity was of the first order, and who, before gaining military laurels in the Franco-German war, had rendered signal service as Intendant-general (Chief of the Commissariat), to assume the headship of the German Admiralty. Stosch (who was not in the habit of declining promotion) accepted the office, and at once applied himself, with characteristic energy, to mastering its duties, both administrative and parliamentary. Eighteen million dollars (*c.* £2,400,000) were granted to him out of the French indemnity; and he proceeded at once to rearm the German navy of war (gradually putting an end to dependence upon foreign shipbuilding-yards) and, as already stated[1], to organise effectually the provision of torpedoes and mines. He introduced a series of valuable reforms into the service; and, although Bismarck found fault with the Admiralty for keeping the ships too much at home, some opportunities presented themselves—on the Spanish as well as on the Macedonian and the Nicaraguan coasts—for useful naval demonstrations on a small scale. But Stosch was held to have, in accordance with his military traditions, made too exacting demands upon his ironclads; and the catastrophe of the *Grosse Kurfürst* (May 1878), attributed to the strain put upon a still imperfectly trained crew, gave rise to widespread doubts as to the efficiency of his system. His tenure of office, however, lasted beyond Bismarck's quarrel with him in 1877[2]. Six years later, after

[1] Cf. p. 108, *note, ante*. Concerning Stosch's career as a whole, see the notice of him by H. von Petersdorff in *Allg. D. Biogr.* vol. LIV (1908), and his *Denkwurdigkeiten* (1903). [2] Cf p. 108, *ante*.

his naval plans had been substantially carried into execution, he resigned in consequence of a difference with the Emperor[1].

Towards the close of the century, the commercial activity of Germany had developed with extraordinary rapidity, while the growth of the population had been equally remarkable. Within the last quarter of the century, the excess of births over deaths nearly doubled. The total value of German trade within the same number of years, 1891 to 1906, more than doubled, rising from about 6 to about 14 milliards of marks (some 300 to 700 millions sterling). Exports rose more rapidly than imports (though the latter still exhibited a surplus), thus showing that Germany was becoming more and more an industrial country. The increase in the German mercantile marine fully kept pace with this advance. Within the twenty-five years from 1871 to 1896, the tonnage of German sea-going vessels increased from considerably under a million to over a million and a half of tons, and that of steamships from over 82,000 to very nearly 912,000. Within the nine years following, the numbers rose to nearly two millions and a half, and nearly two millions respectively. This wonderful advance, which showed that German commerce was beginning to 'grip' the world, served effectively, as we shall see, to demonstrate the expediency of placing the increase of the German navy on

[1] Stosch (who in 1883 had strongly advocated a German settlement in China) was, as German colonisation progressed, strongly in favour both of the increase of the German navy and of its 'qualitative' improvement. After his own Admiralty work was over, he wrote a remarkable paper, pointing out that the naval scheme prepared by him in 1873 no longer suited the emergence, now clearly visible, of the German navy into the 'world-sphere,' and dwelling on the consequent necessity of contact between it and any point, in any quarter of the globe, where German mercantile interests were engaged He insisted on this view on receiving, from Hollmann, Secretary of State for the Navy, G. Wislicenus's pamphlet, *Germany's Sea-power formerly and now* (1896).

a new and solid basis, instead of asking for a parliamentary grant for every new warship in succession. Hence, the navy-law which was proposed in 1897, and which passed the *Reichstag* in March 1898, by a large majority, though not without bitter opposition. Not quite half a century had gone by, since the German fleet had been first called into existence, and since that existence had, within three years, come to a shameful end[1]. The new navy-law fixed the number of warships to be reached within the next seven years, besides determining the length of time during which the several kinds of vessels were to be reckoned as fit for active service. Inasmuch as the business of the German navy was now defined to be, together with the protection of the German coasts and of German trade in all seas, the development of its own offensive power and the protection of German colonies, its further growth was henceforth dependent upon German colonial and foreign policy, and will have immediately to be considered in connexion with these.

Before, however, adverting to the course of these relations in the earlier years of the new reign, it may be well to note how the measures adopted during the Bismarckian *régime* for establishing the Empire on a firm basis at home and securing it against internal rude shocks or disintegrating unrest were, in many respects, developed under his successors. In part, this process has been already indicated[2]. It is true that the system of government, of which the foundations had been inherited by the Empire, with the constitution itself, from the North-German Confederation, and originally devised for that Confederation by Prussian statesmanship, remained essentially the same, notwithstanding the modifi-

[1] Cf vol I, pp 547–8. To this memorable date (1898) belongs, as already mentioned, the foundation of the *Flottenverein* (Navy League), of which General Klein was the most active member.

[2] Cf p 13, *ante*

cations which the superstructure had undergone in the process. The system expressed in the constitution and controlling the entire political life of the nation rested on loyalty to the dynasty. But, since Prussia, and Germany under Prussian hegemony, was not a medieval but a modern monarchy (the bulk of the nobility being one of service quite as much as of birth), it was through a highly intelligent and admirably organised civil administration, as well as through the army, that the will of the sovereign controlled his subjects' fortunes at home and abroad. No doubt, a patriotic Liberalism had, during the ascendancy of the National-Liberal party, striven hard, and in a large measure successfully, to assert the reality of the established parliamentary institutions both by legislation and by the prevention of measures to which it took exception. No doubt, again, what there remained—and it was not a little—of the *Junker* spirit and the 'by the Grace of God' beliefs inside or outside of the army, might seem antiquated in the face of a *Reichstag* split up, in super-parliamentary fashion, into parties and fractions which, in accordance with old German tradition, were wont to think more of their own ends than of the interests of the nation at large. But the national policy of Germany, as such, was neither determined nor controlled by the German parliament. The Chancellor of the Empire was, as a matter of fact, responsible, not to the *Reichstag*, but to the Emperor, his sole additional responsibility consisting in the obligation to render, when called upon, an account of his conduct of affairs to the *Bundesrat*; while the officers in command of the army were appointed, not by the Prussian Minister of War, but by the Emperor's Military Cabinet[1]. The relations between the Hohenzollern dynasty and the German people had accordingly become practical, while in the case of the Prussians remaining traditional—a fact of importance in estimating the strength of these ties[1].

[1] These considerations were put with much force in an article

It should be added that neither were the relations between the Prussian and the Imperial Ministries completely adjusted, nor were those between the Prussian *Landtag* and the *Reichstag* changed, while no attempt was made before the outbreak of the present war to assimilate the elective systems of the two bodies. Speaking generally, the provisions of the constitution of the Empire may be said to have satisfied the requirements they had been designed to meet; and it was rather in the more or less antiquated constitutions and electoral systems of the particular States that the expediency of revision occasionally suggested itself.

Of the promulgation, in 1896, of a Code of Civil Law for the whole Empire, mention has already been made; in the same year, an Exchange law (*Börsengesetz*) was passed, which regulated the whole organisation of the stock exchange (now an institution of great significance) in Germany. Of even wider importance were the beginnings of the unification of the railway systems of the several States. The administration of the Hesse-Darmstadt lines was, also in 1896, combined with that of the Prussian; and, six years later, the management of the Main-Neckar line (which ran through Prussian, Hessian and Baden territory and might prove of very great service for military purposes) was placed wholly in Prussian hands.

As to the subject of education, which had formed so important an element in the great ecclesiastical conflict of Bismarck's day, no unity of opinion or sentiment had as yet been reached by the chief political parties in Prussia, where the conflict between Church and State had been most acute. The Government, desirous of conciliating those whose support seemed necessary for the working of the State machine, had once more to learn a truth which the history

entitled 'The Internal Problem in Germany' contributed to *The Round Table*, No 28 (September 1917). As to German party spirit, cf. P. Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1915 ed.), p. 36.

of modern Germany had not yet brought fully home to her rulers—that the right of free thought, and the mental training by which the use of that right is conditioned, are more highly prized by the German educated classes than is even the right of free discussion, whether in public meeting or in the Press. The Press law of 1874—amended in regard to jurisdiction in 1902—had secured an advance upon the earlier state of things so satisfactory to those engaged in journalism that it had rapidly attained to an extraordinary growth[1]; in 1898 a law for Alsace-Lorraine extended the reform to the *Reichsland*, which had hitherto been excluded from its operation.

Whether or not what might be called a Conservative reaction had set in with the new reign, the Conservative party had certainly come to the conclusion that the present was the right time at which to enter definitely on a policy in religious and educational affairs antagonistic to the principles of Liberalism. Success seemed assured by means of a close conjunction with the Centre. In Prussia, the conduct of educational affairs by Gossler[2], which had been both prudent and progressive, came to an end in 1892, with his endeavour to extinguish the claims, practically disallowed, of the Churches to interfere in the work of the public schools. His successor, Count von Zedlitz, lost no time in announcing a change of policy. Caprivi was, at this time, most anxious to secure the Conservative support which his commercial treaties, as will be seen, had seemed likely to jeopardise. Zedlitz's proposals, amounting virtually to the establishment of a *condominium* of Church and State in the public schools of the monarchy, on the lines brought forward four years earlier by Windthorst, aroused a storm of disapproval; and this was intensified when the Emperor William II, *more suo*, intervened with a speech in reproof of the argumentation (*Räsonniren*) going on around him. Meanwhile,

[1] Cf p. 296, *ante*. [2] Cf. p. 77, *ante*.

Bennigsen, the veteran National-Liberal leader, who was now the head of the Hanoverian Government, had descended into the parliamentary arena with one of the most notable of his speeches (delivered in the *Reichstag*, since he was not a member of the Prussian Chamber). While calling upon his party to give a loyal support to the commercial policy of the Government, he appealed to all Liberals to stand together in the coming conflict on matters appertaining, not to the material, but to the ideal, interests of the nation. This appeal, as courageous as it was patriotic, did not fall on deaf ears. There was, indeed, some talk of adjusting the relations of Church and State in the system of religious instruction on the principle successfully followed in Wurttemberg, where confessional instruction was left in the hands of the clergy, without their being allowed any part in other religious teaching (Bible history); and, again, it was suggested that they might be allowed to conduct the whole religious instruction, provided it were tested by the State inspectors. But Liberal public opinion was too deeply stirred to be satisfied with anything but a dropping of the proposals; and dropped they accordingly were, before they had been submitted to the decision of the *Landtag*. Zedlitz resigned.

Since no definitive close of the controversy had been reached with the Government collapse, it was now sought to make terms between the mutually opposed interests or principles, by restricting ecclesiastical reform to matters of finance—the administration of the large funds in the hands of the Catholic and Evangelical confessions being entrusted to the undenominational management of the communes. This idea was strongly resisted; but, in 1904, a majority of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies agreed to an arrangement—the so-called 'School Compromise'—of a highly elaborate nature; and, in 1906, a law drawn up in the same sense was proposed by the Minister of Public Worship, Dr Studt, and passed. From an administrative point of view, this com-

promise (which was not made to apply to Posen and West Prussia) bore some resemblance to the English school-board system; confessionally, it safeguarded denominational interests where a fixed number of scholars of the Catholic or of the Evangelical (Prussian United) Confession attended a school. For the rest, it was expressly provided, by means of a change in an article of the Prussian constitution, that the introduction, from time to time, of further changes in the regulations as to public schools and the instruction given in them should be held permissible[1].

That progress is indispensable in a really popular system of education, and that nowhere is it beset with more obstinate difficulties, was shown on more occasions than one after that which led to the 'School Compromise.' In 1906, when an attempt was made to apply the principle of compulsion to the formation of continuation (*Fortbildung*) classes, it broke down through the resistance of the Centre and Conservative parties, who carried a platonic amendment simply approving of the principle of this extension of teaching. The question of the higher education of women, too, which, as was seen, had come to the front on the occasion of the first centenary of the University of Berlin in 1901[2], underwent ample discussion at a General Conference, held in the capital in 1906, under the patronage of the Empress Augusta Victoria, and was in the following year actively taken up in the *Landtag*. The cognate question of the employment of women, likewise, called for and received assiduous attention, till its conditions, as elsewhere, came to be radically changed by the present war. In the upper and middle strata

[1] See, besides the summary account in the *Political Manual of the National-Liberal Party*, H Oncken, *Bennigsen*, vol. II, pp 556 ff; O. Pfleiderer's art. on the question of religious instruction in *Preuss Jahrb.* vol LXIX, 3 (March 1892), and H. Delbruck's *Politische Correspondenz* in the same and in the following number (April).

[2] Cf. p 203, note 2, *ante*.

of society the 'emancipated woman' type asserted itself with less demonstrativeness, except incidentally, than in earlier and more leisurely times; but there was still room for the further spread of a different feminine type—the woman whose powers of pleasing and being pleased are not impaired by her exercising the right of thinking for herself on subjects whether of public or of private concern.

The social life of Germany, and of the Prussian monarchy in particular, was agitated by other problems which reacted directly upon their political life, but of which the development can here be only briefly indicated. Among these, two of the most important affected in particular the rural and the urban populations respectively; while the solution demanded for one of them struck at the entire existing social system. The roots of Socialism lay deeper than those of the Agrarian movement, which (though Anti-Semitism sought to invest it with a religious significance) turned on essentially material interests.

The economic policy of Bismarck's successor was designed, partly to conciliate the goodwill of the consuming (rather than that of the 'producing[1]') classes, partly to promote a good understanding with foreign Powers, and in the first instance to strengthen that with the other members of the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Thus, it took the shape of a series of commercial treaties, of which those with these Powers were the earliest. In order to secure a basis for these treaties, Caprivi's Government resolved to lower the import duties on corn; and, although a large proportion of the Conservative party were brought to consent to the proposal and to approve the treaty with Austria founded upon it, a necessary consequence was that these duties had also to be reduced as towards the other States (Russia among them) which previous commercial treaties had placed on the 'most favoured' footing. In 1892, a rapid general fall

[1] Cf pp 113 ff., *ante*.

of prices set in; and the result was a movement of unprecedented vehemence in the agrarian interest. The agitation which ensued, and which continued for a period of something like five years, was (in accordance with that eagerness for association so characteristic of nineteenth-century Germany) carried on under the auspices of the 'Landlords' and Farmers' League[1]' founded at Berlin in 1873, and really an outgrowth of an earlier East Prussian League of Peasant-farmers. The wider League, the formation of which was followed by that of a German Peasant-farmers' League, and by others in Bavaria, Hesse and elsewhere, declared itself resolved to secure for agriculture a proper influence on legislation—in other words, to thwart the action of the Government, insofar as it was unfavourable to Protection. The Landlords' and Farmers' League was too late to prevent the conclusion of the commercial treaties with Austria-Hungary, Italy and certain other States; and even that with Russia was, after many difficulties, signed in 1894. But, as the price of cereals continued to fall, Bülow was induced to modify the commercial policy of the Government, and, by carrying (against Radical and Social-democratic opposition) a new Customs Tariff with moderate import duties on agricultural produce (1902), was enabled, on the expiration of the old commercial treaties, to conclude new agreements on an altered basis. The agrarian agitation hereupon soon came to an end; although the Government was still confronted by the task of settling satisfactorily its customs tariff with certain other States—with free-trade Great Britain (and her colonies) and with the Protectionist United States—which had in both cases been only provisionally arranged.

[1] This composite translation of the term *Landwirte* seems necessary. It was the speech of a 'general farmer' (*Generalpächter*) which, in November, had called upon the agricultural interest to raise a cry loud enough to be heard at the steps of the throne, and had thus brought about the foundation of the League.

A question at once more fundamental and more perplexing than the agrarian was that concerned with the welfare of the working population in general, and with the multitudes inhabiting the towns in particular. This problem was complicated by the relations of the masses to the socialistic movement, which was likely to lead to political action of serious import by the self-styled Social-democratic party. German labour of all kinds seemed to have resolved to face its troubles and the treatment of them, rather than, as in the old days, seek a refuge from them beyond the seas and abandon its native land Emigration (as distinct from colonisation) had by no means come to an end; but it had greatly diminished—a manifest consequence of the increase of facilities for gaining a livelihood at home. In the years from 1881 to 1890, the annual numbers of emigrants varied—amounting from 1881 to 1885 to about 0·37 and in the following five years to about 0·2 per cent.; by 1906 they had sunk to about 20,000; by 1908 they had still further diminished; and the total of emigrants in the last thirty years of the century was about two millions and a quarter. The majority of them still passed to the United States; and it is curious that, in the year 1906 at all events, the proportion of agricultural labourers and that of industrial workmen should have been nearly equal.

We saw how Bismarck, guided as always by political considerations, had sought to sever the connexion between the working-classes and the Socialist movement by remedial legislation. And we also saw how, falling in with this design and at the same time eager to take the lead in a sphere of action where his Chancellor seems to have wished to walk more warily, the Emperor William II took steps (early in 1890) for bringing about an international conference at Berlin on the conditions of the working-classes in the States of Europe[1]. The conference sat during a fortnight in March;

[1] Bismarck, in January, resigned the Ministry of Commerce and

and the result for Germany was the law on the subject of the protection of workers (*Arbeiterschutzgesetz*) which in 1891[1] was passed in the *Reichstag* in the form of a revision of the existing Statute of Trades and Industries (*Gewerbeordnung*). This enactment, which contained many admirable provisions for the protection of working-men and women, and of their children, from dangers to life and limb, and from the neglect of hygienic and moral principles, included new rules for the limitation of working-hours and for the enforcement of Sunday rest. There can be no doubt that it marked a notable progress in these and similar respects, and that it would be difficult to find its parallel in comprehensiveness. The Social-democrats, who had a horror of State inspection, together with a few Radicals and a few members of the Extreme Right, voted against it[2].

While the State had thus essayed to guard the safety and health of the working masses, it continued, at the same time, to impress upon them the equally imperative necessity of thrift, already recognised in the Insurance legislation of 1884–7[3]. More especially in the year 1900, this legislation was repeatedly revised, and its provisions, as applying to State insurance against sickness, accidents and incapacity for work (including old age), were extended. Although, on these heads, German legislation did not go so far as that of

was succeeded in this office by Freiherr von Berlepsch, to whose exertions the subsequent legislation was largely due

[1] A law of the same kind had passed the *Reichstag*, but had not found favour in the *Bundesrat* Bismarck, it appears, had, on a previous occasion, objected to the extension of the principle of Sunday rest—an indication that he was not under the dominion of pietistic ideas

[2] A full account of it will be found in Flügge's chapter on the 'Social Development' in *Deutschland als Weltmacht* (see Bibliography)

[3] Cf. pp 119 ff , *ante*, and see the chapter on 'German Workingmen's Insurance' in the same collective work

certain colonies of the British Empire, it proceeded without rest, if without haste, leaving open for future treatment certain portions of the vast field—such as State insurance against unemployment—not yet covered by it[1]. Men (as well as masters) were rapidly learning the value of unions (*Verbände*) for the promotion of their own interests, which increased with great rapidity and in 1907 culminated in the formation of a General League of national unions of working-men.

Towards the Insurance movement, also, the Social-democrats had maintained an attitude, not of course of opposition *in re*, but of depreciation *in modo*. So early as 1889, one of their trusted leaders, Bebel, had put forward proposals for a more extended system. Any cooperation with the Government was impossible, since both sides continued to regard one another with profound distrust.

The gradual development of Socialism in Germany, which, at all events from the date of the foundation of the *Internationale* (1864), could not be kept distinct from that of European Socialism in general, must not occupy us here. Nor can we dwell on its deviations, if this term be appropriate—mainly the result of the desire to counteract antagonism to existing ideas and institutions in Church and State —Christian socialism, both Catholic and Evangelical, and National socialism (as for a time eloquently advocated by F. Naumann), together with the Working Men's Unions established on religious principles, or in the interests of State employees[2]. German Social-democracy, on the other hand—hitherto half Utopian theory as to the true destination of property, half fanatical hatred of the *bour-*

[1] Insurance against sickness (in some measure benefiting widows and orphans) was, in 1911, extended to agricultural and forest labourers, something like five-sixths of the cost falling on the employers.

[2] For the names and numbers of these (presumably in 1907), see Bülow's *Imperial Germany*, p. 196.

geoisie and its political institutions—at the time of Bismarck's fall and the expiration of the anti-Socialist law, entered on a wholly new stage of its history, and became an element of growing importance in practical politics. From that date (1890) onwards, while the International Socialist meetings continued at various European cities, the German Social-democratic party held its annual gatherings on German soil—at Halle (1890), at Erfurt (1891), at Berlin (1892), at Cologne (1893), and in other German towns. In 1894, the question arose whether resort should once more be had to fresh legislation against the Social-democrats. The Chancellor (Caprivi) differed from the President of the Prussian Ministry (Count Botho zu Eulenburg), who was in favour of this legislation taking a more drastic form, and both sent in their resignations, which were, in both cases, accepted. The draft law for strengthening the existing powers of the State which Caprivi had intended to bring forward was, hereupon, submitted to the *Reichstag*, in a somewhat mitigated form, by his successor, Hohenlohe; but it was amended beyond recognition by the Centre (apparently, with the object of expanding it into a law against 'immorality'), and finally rejected piecemeal.

No further attempt was made to suppress Social-democracy by statute. Bulow had made up his mind to meet the movement in another way[1]. He was assisted in his action by the deep-growing schism in the Social-democratic party itself—between the orthodox followers of Marx (encouraged by the very favourable results of the *Reichstag* elections of 1903, which had returned the unprecedented number of 81 members of the party) and the 'Revisionists,' led by Vollmar and Bebel, who were opposed to a 'thorough' or revolutionary policy[2]. Thus, the *Reichstag* elections of 1907 re-

[1] The *rationale* of the whole subject is expounded at length, but with perfect lucidity, in *Imperial Germany*, pp. 165 ff.

[2] The Russian Socialists, at the same date, voted against one another as *Bolsheviks* and *Mensheviks*.

sulted in the reduction of Social-democratic seats (from 81 to 43), which intensified the discomfiture of the Centre party, now confronted by a compact majority (*Bloc*) of Conservatives and Liberals, even more to be depended on by the Government than that of 1887 (the *Cartel*). Although, however, the parliamentary importance of the Social-democrats had thus been decreased, the elections of 1907 showed, as had those for every new *Reichstag* since 1884, a steady increase in the total of Social-democratic votes, which on this occasion exceeded three millions and a half. A party so well organised—for whatever national quality the Social-democrats lacked, it was certainly not the power of organisation—was not unlikely to find the means of rectifying this disproportion between votes and seats. Accordingly, in the *Reichstag* elections of 1912, while the Social-democratic vote rose to four millions and a quarter, the number of seats secured very much more than doubled that obtained in the previous elections—amounting to not less than 110.

The Social-democrats had thus proved once more that they had to be reckoned with; while even the coolest and most politic brain among those in authority could not easily discover how their demands ought, permanently, to be met. Suppression by force had proved impossible; nor was it feasible to provoke them to extremes, in order then to intervene with a *coup d'état*. It must be remembered, too, that Social-democracy had, at the annual party-meeting held at Mannheim in 1906, formally denounced the 'Anarcho-socialists,' a faction which advocated extreme measures—not necessarily of the type of those against which the 'Dynamite law' of 1884 had been directed, but intended to supersede parliamentary discussion by such expedients as a universal strike[1].

[1] Of this faction, if it should be so called, the leader was Dr Friedeberg, who was afterwards excluded from the Social-democratic party

The later developments of German Socialism, its theories and its controversies, lie beyond the scope of this narrative; and the further history of German Social-democracy would take us into times when its relations to the State were to be subjected to the tremendous test of a great national war. In 1870, after the downfall of the Napoleonic Empire, a manifesto of the German branch of the *Internationale* had demanded the withdrawal of the German troops from French soil in the name of the Universal Republic. This manifesto had been adopted by the party, led by Bebel and Liebknecht, as a whole; but it had excited the ridicule of the *alter conditor* of Socialism, Marx (though he, too, objected to the continuance of the war in order to secure Alsace and Lorraine), and the indignation of his indefatigable helper, Engels The programme adopted by the party at Erfurt in 1891 adhered to the principles of the abolition of standing armies and the settlement of international disputes by arbitration; and the Revisionists failed in their advocacy of a foreign policy which should be national as well as international. Gradually, however (at first, with the aid of the so-called National-social movement), the word 'national,' and with the word, the idea implied by it, ceased to be anathema among German Social-democrats, and their relations with their foreign 'comrades' (French and Russian in particular) became less and less cordial As yet, the orthodox view prevailed; and the party meeting at Chemnitz in 1912 upheld the international solidarity of the proletariat and the demand for a general disarmament. In 1913, the party voted for the property tax (a decision admitting of a twofold interpretation). When, in 1914, it had to face the vote for the war credits, it showed itself to be a divided party[1].

[1] Concerning the later developments of German Social-democracy, as exhibited in its literature, see H Heikner, 'Marxismus und Sozialdemokratie,' in *Preuss. Jahrb* vol XLII, 2 (December 1910); as to the relations of the movement to German foreign policy, see

The protection and defence of the German Empire also included those of its more recently acquired territories and of its expanding colonial dominions. The former consisted of the *Reichsland*, formally annexed at the close of the War of 1870–1, and of the extended northern mark acquired by Prussia in 1864. With regard to the latter of these additions, Bismarck had, for some years after the conclusion of the Peace of Prague, not pretended to ignore its fifth article, providing for the eventual restoration, on specified conditions, of certain North-Schleswig districts[1]. Gradually, however—it is said, from 1878—he had come to dismiss the notion of any retrocession, possibly in consequence of the unwillingness of the Emperor William I to give up any territory that had been subject to the Prussian Crown. On the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance in October 1879, Austria was, accordingly, persuaded to leave Prussia a free hand in the matter[2]. But there was, of course, another side to the question. In Schleswig itself, a sore remained open, which, by harsh treatment of church and school grievances in particular, was occasionally rendered almost unbearable, and which might at any time be turned to account by the enemies of the Empire. Though the North-Schleswig Danes had no longer any legal claim on the Prussian Government—Denmark having formally, though not publicly, recognised the abolition of the fifth article—and none whatever on the support of France or any other Power, they had a very manifest moral claim on the Prussian (German) Government for considerate treatment. Yet it was the ruthless rigour of the Prussian administration, and nothing else, which led its adversaries in North-Schleswig to close their ranks, and to abandon any attempt at compromise with a system of persecution. In 1888, the

the same writer's 'Sozialdemokratie und Auslandspolitik,' *ib.* vol. CLXI, 3 (September 1915).

[1] Cf. vol. II, p 321, *ante*.

[2] Cf. p. 142, *ante*.

use of the Danish language was prohibited in all schools in North-Schleswig, except during two catechism lessons in the week; yet the Pangermanists were active in the northern mark, and in 1890 the German Union for North-Schleswig was founded, with an active German lawyer (Dr Hahn), a holder of judicial office, as its president. During the four years of Caprivi's chancellorship (1890–4), the German rule followed a milder course; but administrative severity rose to its height under the Governorship of E. M. von Köller, whose name on Danish lips became proverbial for systematic brutality. Little improvement was noted under his successor von Wilmowski (1901–6), who was followed, but only for a rule of eight months, by von Dewitz (1906–7). Von Bulow, however, a Holstein landowner, who came next, began by a speech advising the Germans of North-Schleswig to trust their Danish neighbours; but the Schleswig-Holstein Chamber of Agriculture proved too strong for efforts at conciliation. In 1907, indeed, the so-called *Optantenconvention* between Germany and Denmark was concluded (largely through the personal intervention of the Emperor William II) which accorded to the descendants of those who had 'opted' in favour of Denmark the right of remaining residents in Schleswig as Prussian subjects. But the concession was marred by the (really superfluous[1]) addition that Denmark recognised the abolition of the fifth article of the Treaty of Prague. Thus illwill continued on both sides; and, in 1909, Count Th. von Reventlow dwelt in the *Reichstag* on the possibility of a Danish invasion in the event of a European war, and protested against the Germanophobe propaganda in progress on the frontier. On the other hand, some more judicious friends of the Empire perceived a better way than Pangermanist retaliation; and, since this is the last we shall

[1] The able *Reichstag* deputy, H. P Hanssen (in the Danish interest), had long ceased to insist on it. As to the *Optantenvertrag*, see E. zu Reventlow, p. 332.

see in this work of the remnants of the Schleswig-Holstein question, it is satisfactory to note that, so late as 1910, a committee of highly distinguished men[1] was formed with the declared purpose of lifting the cloud of assertion and counter-assertion which still beset this bitter controversy, and publishing the truth as to the struggle in North-Schleswig between the Danish inhabitants there and the authorities. The *Frontier-mark Correspondence*, as the monthly journal of information was called, was sincerely intended not to inflame, but to mitigate, the perennial conflict by seeking to obtain fair treatment for the Danish North-Schleswigers, and thus to counteract, by legitimate means, whatever exaggeration or misrepresentation there might, in turn, be on their side. But it was not a good time for peace-makers; and soon afterwards the moderate deputy H. P. Hanssen resigned his seat in the *Reichstag*, where the minute Danish fraction now became separatist pure and simple[2].

Of greater immediate importance was the security of the conquest—in Germany very generally regarded as the reconquest—of Alsace and 'German' Lorraine. At first, there had been a difference of views, even among those chiefly responsible for the annexation, as to its political expediency; now, every year and, still more, every decade, of possession made the abandonment of it more of a political impossibility. Meanwhile, neither the statesmanlike intentions of Hohenlohe (1885–94)[3] nor the visits of the Emperor himself to the *Reichsland* (in 1889 and 1893) made any difference to the

[1] It included Professors H. Delbrück, Eucken, Max Lehmann Nippold and Quidde, and Dr F Naumann The editor of the journal was Prof. D. Rade of Marburg

[2] The facts on which the above brief account is based will be found in the elaborate publication *Le Slesvig du Nord* (Copenhagen, 1915) See also, an art. 'Germany, North-Schleswig and Denmark' by 'A Dane,' in *Preuss Jahrb* vol CXLIV, 2 (May 1911), and an interesting notice of M. Mackeprang's *Nordslesvig*, 1864–1909 (Copenhagen, 1910), by J. Tiedje, *ib.* vol CXLII, 1 (October 1910).

[3] Cf. pp. 23–4, *ante*.

condition of feeling there; and, if any hopes had been founded upon the equal division of opinion among the Alsace-Lorraine delegates at the Geneva Peace Congress of 1884 as to the desirability of neutralising the territory, they vanished as the holdfast determination of the German Government continued unmodified. That the industry and commerce of Alsace-Lorraine flourished in these years of fatness could hardly be placed to the credit of the Government, though it may incline us to qualify in some measure the expression 'stillness of the dead' as applied to the period between 1887 and 1911[1]. That the German rule brought with it various administrative improvements is not worth disputing. That the University of Strassburg had a good name in the world of learning was of little moment, if it was true that the large majority of its students were not Alsace-Lorrainers.

The political grievances of the *Reichsland* remained, in substance, unabated. They were, in truth, inseparable from a system which combined the disadvantages of Crown rule with those of provincial self-government Laws affecting the *Reichsland* were either passed, like those for the Empire at large, by *Reichstag* and *Bundesrat*, or decreed by the Emperor with the assent of the *Bundesrat* and the Provincial Committee (*Landesausschuss*) of Alsace-Lorraine. The continuation of the German rule implied a rigorous enforcement of its principles, and, equally as a matter of course where Prussian officialism was concerned, a multiplicity of petty, but not the less oppressive, enactments. In 1892, towards the close of Hohenlohe's period of government, seventy-four communes on the French frontier, in which no German was spoken, were summarily ordered to use German in their official correspondence; and the performance of French plays was

[1] See the pamphlet *Alsace-Lorraine in England*, published by the *Ligue Patriotique des Alsaciens-Lorrains* (1917), p. 28 For a general survey of the period 1871–1914, cf. J. Duhem, *The Question of Alsace-Lorraine* (E. Tr. 1918).

prohibited at Mülhausen[1]. In 1907, it pleased the Emperor William II to put a stop upon the progress of a proposed law which the *Landesausschuss* had approved and sent on to the *Bundesrat*—an arbitrary proceeding which was deeply resented. On the other hand, the same supreme authority graciously decreed the abolition of the so-called 'dictatorship paragraph,' dating from the War of 1870, which, in the interests of the public security, had entrusted the Alsace-Lorraine Administration with certain emergency powers, very rarely put into practice.

In 1910, a constitution was definitely promised to the *Reichsland*; and, in the following year, it was brought before the *Reichstag*. No change was to be made in the office of Governor; but the deed of his appointment by the Emperor, as well as all imperial acts concerning the *Reichsland*, was henceforth to be signed by the Imperial Chancellor; and he might at any time be represented by the Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine. The increased autonomy promised was to consist in the provision that laws for the *Reichsland* must emanate from the Emperor, but required the consent of the two Chambers of the Alsace-Lorraine Diet. The constitution, however, allowed the *Reichsland* no place in the legislation or government of the Empire, though it was to continue to send two representatives (according to population, it should have sent three) to the *Bundesrat*, where they would have the right of speaking, but not of voting. Of the Alsace-Lorraine Upper Chamber, half was to be nominated by the Emperor, on the advice of the *Bundesrat*, and half to belong to it *ex officio*; the franchise to the Lower was to be universal and secret.

In the *Reichsland*, Socialist protests were raised against these proposals, and in the *Reichstag* they were ultimately revised in accordance with the amendments of the Centre, Alsace-Lorraine being declared a Federal State, and three

[1] P. Albin, *L'Allemagne et la France* (1913), p. 342, citing E. Maréchal's *Histoire Contemporaine*.

votes, as well as seats, given to its representatives in the *Bundesrat*. It is not easy to gauge the effects of the grant of the constitution, incomplete most certainly, but not so entirely hollow as has been assumed. Beyond doubt, the feeling was, in some quarters, beginning to gain ground in Alsace-Lorraine, that the reunion of the country with France was an aspiration no longer in the sphere of practical politics; though even such a suggestion as that of the exchange of Metz for a French colony could hardly be regarded as serious, albeit the situation was not precisely the same in Alsace and in 'German' Lorraine. In the latter, the population, except insofar as it was literally a garrison, solidly adhered to everything French. In the former, the question for Germany was whether it would be possible to gain over, or back, to German ways of thought and feeling the better-educated classes, who might be expected to draw after them the body of the population.

Constitution or no constitution, the day of oppressive administrative measures had not yet come to an end in the *Reichsland*, and a protest raised against them in May 1913, in the Lower Chamber of the diet, was repeated in the Upper, where only two military voices, and one civilian, were raised in favour of the Government. The system of an attempted Germanisation of the middle and lower classes continued; officials and settlers were brought in from other parts of the Empire, and in the public schools instruction in French was limited to one hour in the week.

And, before the year was out, there occurred one of those incidents which are apt to tell upon popular feeling more than the systematic pursuit of a definite policy. At Zabern (Schiller's 'Savern') a Prussian lieutenant named Forstner had bidden the recruits of his regiment use cold steel against any '*Wackes*' (native Alsatians), who affronted them; the colonel of the regiment had put under a night's arrest twenty-seven highly respectable citizens, whom he regarded as

recalcitrant, and Forstner had wounded a cobbler. To an interpellation in the *Reichstag* the Chancellor replied that the incident was regrettable, though not of historical significance, and that the two officers had been rebuked, and would be punished. At the same time, the Minister of War inveighed against press agitation to the detriment of the army. After a speech from the leader of the Centre (with which party the Alsatian deputies were generally in touch), the *Reichstag* by an overwhelming majority disapproved of the Ministerial attitude towards the incident, and deprecated the short-sighted character of the whole proceedings. Hereupon, the Zabern regiment was transferred to Hagenau, and suitable penalties were imposed upon the officers and soldiers concerned. With the exception of certain Conservative papers, public opinion upheld these sentences. But mistakes such as those perpetrated at Zabern are more easily committed than undone.

The northern and the western mark being thus, more or less satisfactorily, safeguarded, it remained to keep in view the remoter danger of encroachments on the eastern frontier of the Empire. We have seen how preoccupied Bismarck was, during the whole period of his control of affairs, with the necessity of remaining on terms of friendship, or at least of an amicable understanding, with Russia. However much he might mistrust the vanity of Gortchakoff, and fear the meddlesomeness of Russian as well as German military men, he was consistently, while on guard against a possible Russian attack (*'toujours en vedette'*), intent upon averting any suspicions on the part of the Tsar and his advisers, and upon fostering confidence on their part in the inoffensive character of German policy[1]. It was from this point of view that Bismarck steadily ignored the grievance of the German upper and middle classes which had long been the ruling, and were still the civilising, element in the Baltic provinces

[1] See *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol. II, sections 7 and 8.

of Russia, but were gradually accustoming themselves to an acceptance of the inevitable. 'The Baltic lands,' said Bismarck's lifelong friend, Count Alexander Keyserling, 'are readily sacrificed on the altar of German unity[1].' From the same point of view, rather than from that of any personal or racial prejudice or antipathy, Bismarck had never faltered in his policy of repression towards the Polish element in the Prussian monarchy. We have seen how, at the time of the *Kulturkampf*, he was fully conscious of combating Polish as well as Roman Catholic opposition. Moreover, there was something in the contention that here (far otherwise than in North-Schleswig) a real hazard was involved in the struggle between nationalities, and that, if the Germanisation of the Polish portions of Prussia broke down, the Germans would, in the end, be driven out thence by the Poles, who were a more prolific population, had Austrian and Russian Poland at their back, and possessed an inner unity of religion, as well as of language and nationality. In 1886 was passed the *Law of Settlement* (*Ansiedelungsgesetz*), which authorised the Government to expend during the next ten years up to one hundred million marks (*c.* £5,000,000) on the purchase of Polish landed property, and the settlement of Germans upon it in peasant holdings. This law, the application of which was confined to the provinces of Posen and West Prussia, was conceived in a spirit traditional with the Hohenzollerns, of whose 'home colonisation' the settlement of Salzburgers in East, and of Suabians in West Prussia, were memorable earlier examples. During the five years after the passing of this law (which was bitterly opposed by both Poles and *Freisinn*) something like 123,000 acres were acquired from Polish proprietors, and, since, about the end of this period, the price of land was falling rapidly, it would have been easy to increase this total to a very great

[1] H Oncken, 'Ein Freund Bismarck's,' in *Histor.-polit. Aufsätze u. Reden*, vol. II, p. 103.

extent. But Count Caprivi was anxious, for political reasons, to propitiate the Poles; and it was not till 1902 that Bismarck's policy on this head, the principle of which had in 1891 been extended to the Prussian monarchy at large, and which in 1898 had been once more actively applied under the financial *régime* of Miquel, could be revived on a large scale. Prince Bülow's Expropriation Bill of 1908 was, in his own words, 'the logical conclusion of the policy of colonisation begun in 1886[1].'

Thus the 'Polish question,' like the Irish elsewhere, seemed to have become one of the permanent problems of both Government and nation. It was of indisputable moment, as directly affecting some 10 per cent. of the whole population of the Prussian monarchy, a body by no means confined, as had (with the exception of the city of Posen) been the case with the Polish population a generation earlier, to the rural denizens of the open country. By 1890, considerable numbers of Poles were to be found not only in the eastern, but also in the western provinces of the Prussian monarchy; and the total of its Polish population was, owing to the prolific nature of the race, continually on the increase. About the same time, the Polish vote in both *Landtag* and *Reichstag* had risen to twenty. While as often as formerly at the service of the Centre, it was also often joined to that of the Social-democrats, and, inasmuch as it more and more represented distinct interests, to be more and more reckoned with on its own account.

The mainstay of Polish national feeling in the kingdom of Prussia, as has been indicated, was to be found in the provinces of Posen and West Prussia. It was here that the

[1] Prince Bulow, *Imperial Germany* (Engl Tr. 1914), p. 263, where see the account of the whole episode. In 1905, the Emperor William II, had, according to his wont, intervened by a speech at Gnesen, in which he denounced the selling of land by Germans in the east of the kingdom.

Catholic clergy were the soul of the perennial agitation for autonomy, which had deep historical roots, and was not arrested by any advance in the material prosperity or the general social condition of the people. In direct opposition to the Government policy of 'settlement,' which, in the quarter of a century before 1911, had resulted in the domestication in the Polish districts of 150,000 German peasants and the formation of 450 new villages there, an eager struggle went on to gather into Polish hands as large a proportion of the land as possible; and, at the same time, in the towns, an endeavour was made to oust the German middle class in favour of a Polish, which was struggling upwards. Hence, while as to the open country the Government pursued the policy described above, in the towns it sought to meet Polish effort by favouring a German 'cultural' advance. This was urged on with particular zeal by the former Minister of Public Worship von Gossler, now Chief President of West Prussia, and by the Chief-Burgomaster of Posen, Witting; and one of the ways in which it was carried out was the establishment of an academy at Posen, where a residential palace was also built for the Emperor.

Thus, the struggle between the nationalities continued, by fair means as well as with the aid of more dubious experiments (as, for instance, that of the redoubtable 'strike' of school-children, to whom, with archiepiscopal approval, orders had been issued not to answer any question put to them in German in the course of religious instruction). The Government Settlement Commission, backed up by the German 'East-Marks Association' (founded in 1894), steadily pursued its efforts for a solution of the problem, which Prince Bülow declared to be that 'on the relation and development of which the immediate future of our country depends[1]'; nor was there any change in the policy of the

[1] *Imperial Germany*, p 268.

Government on this head after his resignation, though in the *Reichstag* a majority, composed of Centre, Poles and Social-democrats, contrived, early in 1913, to censure the course pursued[1]. Later in the same year, the Emperor William II visited Posen, without receiving a welcome. The conflict had long since reached a stage when it was ready to merge into a different kind of combat.

A subsidiary feature in the struggle should, finally, be mentioned. The various differences of opinion among the Poles cannot be noticed here; but the question whether the important Jewish element among them should merge in the Polish nationality—and in the Polish nation, if it were ever restored—possessed a very direct importance for Germany. There were, about this time, out of some two million Jews resident in Russia, some 300,000 resident in Warsaw alone. In the course of the years 1897 to 1913, the Anti-Semite movement in Russia, where it may be said to have been both indigenous and perennial, led to a steady Jewish emigration from Russia proper into the 'kingdom' of Poland, and hereupon manifested itself in these parts also, in connexion, no doubt, with the general movement towards Panslavism. Thus there set in, not so much an invasion of the German frontier provinces from Russian Poland, as an inundation of them which called for strong preventive measures; and which, necessarily, added to the difficulties of the international situation[2].

[1] After a proposal for bonuses to postal officials in Posen had been refused, on January 28th, in the Budget Committee, as in reality a bribe to them to obstruct the use of Polish, on the 30th the expropriation by the Settlement Commission of Polish landed proprietors, in order to substitute Germans, was declared at variance with the judgment of the *Reichstag*. This was the first vote of censure on the Government ever passed in that assembly; but it had no effect, and the Budget Committee proposal was passed *in pleno*.

[2] It may be noted that among the Polish Jews was to be found a section apprehensive of Germanisation by the almost grotesque

II

Colonial and Foreign Affairs

Passing from the spheres of 'internal colonisation' (as patriotic politicians not anxious to conceal their motives were fain to call it) to fresh acquisitions, we have not, in the first instance, to travel far from the chief *focus* of German colonising activity, the great mercantile port of Hamburg. Yet the earliest important colonial transaction in William II's reign could not claim to be a commercial, or, in view of the exchange which it involved, even a territorial gain. As already indicated[1], Germany in 1890 recognised the British protectorate over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, at the same time relinquishing all claims to a protectorate of its own over the region of the Upper Sources of the Nile and Uganda. In return (besides an extension of the German boundaries to the frontier of the Congo Free State) the island of Heligoland was ceded to Germany[2] by the British Crown, which had gone out of its way to secure the consent of Parliament to the cession. A relaxation of the long-continued tension between the two Powers had followed on the conclusion of

means of the preservation of the 'Jargon,' also known as 'Yiddish' – a mixed Polono-Russo-Jewish-German form of speech, German in origin – which was cherished by the majority of their body, and even possessed the beginnings of a literature of its own. As to these matters, see two interesting articles 'Zum polnisch-judischen Problem' in *Preuss. Jahrb.* vol. CLXII (Nov. and Dec. 1915) by B. Lauer and N. Goldmann.

[1] *Ante*, p. 163, and cf. Sir H. Johnston, pp. 238 and 257, where the African part of the arrangement is highly commended.

[2] The island, henceforth, formed part of the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein, and was under the civil administration of a Prussian *Landrat*. Its Governor, however, was nominated by the German naval and military authorities.

the so-called Congo Conference of 1884–5; and both Bismarck's successor, Count Caprivi, and Lord Salisbury, who had in 1885 become head of Her Majesty's Government, were genuinely anxious to foster what seemed the promise of a better understanding. Public opinion, however, so far as it troubled itself about the matter, was on neither side of the sea favourable to the bargain. In England, although by some more far-sighted politicians[1] the surrender of Heligoland was denounced, its importance was belittled by the Prime-Minister, who described the question as, apart from the 'minor' interests of certain British fishermen, mainly 'sentimental.' Among the islanders (North-Frisians in descent and speech) dislike of the proposed change prevailed; but their average total was only 2500 souls, and their wishes might, accordingly, be neglected. The advantages to Great Britain of retaining possession of the island were treated as infinitesimal, except in the quite improbable event of war with Germany; and the agreement was concluded. The German Chancellor, in a statement put forth by him at the time, took a different view from Lord Salisbury's as to the importance of the transfer; and there can be no doubt that it had the entire approval of the Emperor William II, whose thoughts were always busy with Germany's future 'on the water.' Some of his naval advisers, however, looked uneasily on the occupation of Heligoland, as on that of a defensive position which might prove a source of weakness rather than the reverse, unless strengthened by means of an expenditure greatly needed for other purposes. And the colonial interest was unanimous in deploring the exchange of Zanzibar for Heligoland—regarding it as a manifest check to the policy of advance in Africa, and likely to encourage a further development there of the overwhelming power of Great

[1] Sir Charles Dilke, for instance. Another persistent objector was Sir F. (now Lord) Channing. See his *Memories of Midland Politics* (1918), pp. 105–6.

Britain. The Hamburg journal which was Prince Bismarck's organ in the press took the lead in condemning the transaction[1].

An unforeseen opportunity was found, in 1897, for a demonstration of Germany's desire to assert her spirit of mercantile and naval enterprise, by the occupation of the Chinese harbour of Kiau-Chou. The breakdown of China in her war with Japan (1894–5), to which reference will have to be made below in a different connexion, had given rise to an erroneous assumption that the former empire was on the eve of dissolution. The European Great Powers interested accordingly proceeded to take measures for ensuring to themselves severally a share in the expected partition; and the German Government was quick to seize the opportunity for showing that it would be prepared, when the time came, to put forward claims of its own. In November 1897, two German missionaries were murdered in the southern part of the province of Shantung. The occasion was at once seized by the German Government, without entering into any preliminary understanding with Great Britain or, so far as is known, with any other Power, to effect a settlement on the coast of the province. The occupation of Kiau-Chou (stated to have been suggested in 1896 by Admiral von Tirpitz—then in command of the East Asiatic squadron) was, at first, regarded as nothing more than the establishment of a well-chosen station in a part of the world where Germany had not hitherto set foot; and the port was, unlike other colonies, placed under the supreme control, not of the Colonial, but of the Naval Department at Berlin. To avoid wounding the susceptibilities of the Chinese Government, with which the German desired to remain on terms of

[1] For a striking commentary on the 'Heligoland-Zanzibar bargain' see Count E. zu Reventlow, *Deutschland's auswärtige Politik, 1888–1914*, pp. 39 ff.; and cf. *The Life of Sir Charles Dilke*, vol. II, pp 478 ff., and Hohenlohe, *op. cit.* vol II, pp. 470–1.

amity, the transfer of administrative authority was veiled in the form of a ninety-nine years' lease of Kiau-Chou and a narrow *hinterland* in Shantung province. We shall see how this entrance of Germany upon the theatre of Far Eastern affairs with the aid of circumstance rapidly led to her asserting herself as a world-power entitled to a share in controlling them, and, at the same time, to her regulating her commercial policy in China by means of a definite arrangement with Great Britain.

The settlement at Kiau-Chou now made continuous progress. In 1902, Tsingtau was founded on the islet of that name, at the entrance of the bay—a German town with a populous German quarter, and, for a commercial *hinterland*, a province of some twenty-five million inhabitants. A railway was soon opened into the interior of Shantung; and at Tsingtau a university was established, to furnish higher instruction in both the German and the Chinese language. Trade and navigation increased with extraordinary rapidity; the tonnage of vessels entering or leaving the port in 1906 nearly reached a million, and the share of the German port in the trade of Shantung amounted, thanks largely to the railway into the interior, to nearly one-half of that of the whole province.

Apart from this exceptional settlement, the German colonial system, in the earlier part of the new reign, underwent a gradual but unmistakable change. Bismarck, as was seen, had cared little for colonisation on its own account, and his successor, if anything, cared less; indeed, both of them, on this head, lacked the knowledge without which vital interest is impossible. Bismarck's readiness to leave the colonising process in the hands of chartered or privileged trading-companies was essentially due to his wish to relieve the Imperial Government of as much responsibility in the matter as possible, above all with regard to expenditure, concerning which his experience made him wary of involving

himself in parliamentary conflicts. The political complications to which the native revolt in South-west Africa was to give rise showed his apprehensions on this score to be anything but groundless. Yet, apart from the extraordinary military expenditure due to this revolt, the annual cost of the colonies to the imperial exchequer was not excessive; in the year 1911, it was under £900,000, to which however had to be added a million and a half, part of a grant of seven millions and a half made in 1908 for railways. On the other hand, the loose method of government inseparable from the enjoyment of territorial rights and privileges by trading-companies proved irreconcilable with the firm administrative methods of the German Empire; and, for the better part of two decades, there was no strong guidance at the head to mend the condition of things. A change had not long begun to set in for the better, when, in 1900, Dr Stubel[1] became head of the Colonial section of the Foreign Office; and a still more marked improvement ensued, when, in 1906, at a critical season, the post was entrusted to Dr Dernburg, who, as will be seen, united a firm political grasp to business experience on a large scale. He recognised, as Stubel had before him, the supreme importance of an extended railway-system, together with the necessity for the investment of ample private capital in the purchase of land and in the promotion of industrial undertakings. The untoward episode with which, in 1910, his administration closed[2] must be left aside here.

German colonisation had begun with the restricted design of helping to meet the home demand for 'colonial' goods—such products as coffee, cocoa, tobacco and spices. The regions to which it directed itself for the purpose could, for

[1] He had been, in succession, German Consul in Samoa, and Consul-general at Shanghai.

[2] The treatment of the claims to the diamond discoveries in South-west Africa.

obvious reasons of climate and health, not be expected to attract any large number of emigrants. Gradually, however, German colonial enterprise became aware of its more important opportunities of supplying raw material for great home industries, such as wool, oils, copper, rubber and other vegetable growths. But it also awoke—or was awakened—to a purpose, in the first instance at least, not so much commercial as political. This consisted of the settlement, in remote regions of the world—on the 'Dark Continent' or in the Far East—of Germans, who would assert the German name and nationality without being absorbed (as their countrymen had been in America and elsewhere) in the colonies of other European peoples. The time, it was now deliberately held and proclaimed, had arrived for proving that Germany, strong and victorious at home, was becoming a world-power[1].

But, immigration on a large scale from Germany into her colonies being out of the question, the end in view could not be reached except by a method of administration which should make use of the labour of the natives of the colonial settlements. The day of slave labour had passed; and it was held doubtful whether the African races chiefly concerned were capable of a mental and moral advance such as would allow of the natives becoming landowners by the side of the colonists, with rights equal to theirs. That these races were, to a large extent, disinclined to labour except for their own bodily sustenance or satisfaction, was indisputable. In other words, labour profitable to the colonists was judged to be

[1] The most uncompromising, but by no means the solitary, exposition of this combination of motives, and of their cooperation, is to be found in P Rohrbach's *Das deutsche Kolonialwesen* (Leipzig, 1911) supplemented by other publications of this inexhaustible writer mentioned in the Bibliography. The statistics which follow are mainly taken from Rohrbach's book just cited, or from the very useful article, 'Kolonien' in the *Political Manual of the National-Liberal Party* (n d), which closes with the year 1907.

only obtainable by force. How force could be applied to the natives without offending against the principles of humanity —and of Christianity—was a further problem which German colonisation had to face, as had that of other nations before it. In its dealings with the natives, it, logically enough, declined to accept the principle of 'Ethiopism'—the theory that Africa belonged to the blacks. On the contrary, it may, generally, be said to have followed earlier Dutch practice, rather than British, both in Africa and in the West Indies, while it wholly eschewed the Portuguese method of ignoring distinctions of colour and caste. We may hesitate to draw conclusions from this as to German national characteristics, inherited or acquired; more to the point is the probability that the failures which marked early German colonisation are, *mutatis mutandis*, to be ascribed to the same causes as the slowness of the assimilative process in Prussia's annexed provinces and in Alsace-Lorraine, and to the delusion that military and mercantile capacity and success imply genius for imperial expansion[1].

Some account must be added of the main results of the administration of the several German colonies in the earlier part of the new reign. Their vast extent, as a whole, should not be overlooked as an element in the difficulties of governing them, as well as in its effect upon the national self-consciousness. The area of German South-west Africa equalled that of the German Empire *plus* the Cis-Leithanian moiety of Austria-Hungary; its native population was, before the revolt of 1903–7, reckoned at not more than 200,000, and, after it, at less than 150,000, souls. The extent of German East Africa was even larger—equal in size to nearly twice the extent of the German Empire—and its native population was reckoned as, at least, about seven millions. Similarly, the Cameroons, while equal to the German Empire,

[1] See, on these heads, the remarks of F. von Hugel, in the bipartite essay cited above.

minus Silesia, in territorial extent, and Togoland, equalling that of the kingdom of Bavaria[1], had native populations estimated at over three millions, and about one million, respectively. To these must be added the mainland and islands of 'German New Guinea,' together with the other islands of the Pacific, with a total native population not far short of a quarter of a million souls.

To begin with South-west Africa, a possession certainly of sufficient importance to warrant the German Chancellor (Count Caprivi) in stating, a few months after the German protectorate over it had been declared, that he would allow it another year's trial before leaving it to its destinies! While its northern part (Damaraland) was bounded by the Portuguese dominions (Angola), it was in the south separated by the Orange River from the British Cape Colony, which it, in a measure, resembled in its physical characteristics. With a dry, but not tropical, climate, it was a land suited for pasture rather than for agriculture; its chief mineral product, before the discovery of diamonds in 1908, was copper. At the time of the German settlement, the native population consisted mainly of the vigorous tribe of the Hereros, of a smaller number of Hottentots, and of a very much larger number of Ovambos. In 1903–4, the Hereros, finding their tenure of the pastures which they controlled endangered, rose in revolt. Before this, they had been allowed to acquire breech-loaders, which had been imported; had this not been permitted, their rising might perhaps have been prevented by the Governor of the colony, Leutwein, and his minute protective force. As it was, he did his best, and actually inflicted a defeat upon the insurgents.

Since Bismarck's day, the authorities at Berlin, with the fear of the *Reichstag* before their eyes, had been unwilling to send out troops to Africa in sufficient numbers to enable the

[1] These comparisons are Rohrbach's.

Governments on the spot to intervene in serious disputes. But action on a larger scale had now become necessary; indeed, Conservative and militarist opinion had, from the first, demanded that this war should be conducted 'in the grand style[1]'—*i.e.* by the extermination of the Hereros, although they formed a most valuable element, potentially, in the population of the colony. In September and October 1906, Colonel von Deimling, at the head of a force of 14,000 men, carried out sweeping operations against the natives, of whom 17,000 were made prisoners. The year, however, closed without a final settlement; nor was it till 1907 that the suppression of the insurrection could be regarded as complete. During the three years and a half of its duration, there had been over 2300 casualties on the German side; the slaughter of natives, on the other hand, had been appalling, and the tribal life of the Hereros had virtually come to a close. The chief Morenga had fallen in a fight with British troops, who, on their side of the frontier, had cooperated with the German. To this extent, therefore, the solidarity of European interests in South-west Africa had been attested at the expense of the natives; but the security of the German dominion there had not been reestablished without some difficulty, and awful bloodshed.

It was, however, at home that the new colonial empire was to run its most serious risk. In March 1906, the majority of the *Reichstag* reduced the Government estimate for the South-west African expeditionary force by 15 million marks (£750,000)[2]. In a speech delivered soon afterwards, Prince Bülow declared himself in favour of the creation of a Colonial Department with a Secretary of State, in lieu of the existing

[1] The expression is Schiemann's, in his *Deutschland und die Grosse Politik* (reprints from the *Kreuzzeitung*), vol IV (*anno* 1904), p 144

[2] In the course of the debate, it was incidentally suggested that a force of 14,000 men might prove useful in southern Africa, if needed against any British encroachment.

arrangement; but neither the Centre nor the Social-democrats would hear of such a recognition of the importance of colonial affairs. In September of the same year, the majority of the *Reichstag* indulged in further criticisms of the present colonial policy of the Government; and it was then that Dr Dernburg was appointed to the directorship of the Colonial section of the Foreign Office. In November, when a supplementary estimate of about £1,460,000 for South-west Africa was presented to the Assembly, it was strongly opposed, and Dernburg undertook to allow a diminution of the expeditionary force by about one-third, but no further. The compromise thus offered was, however, rejected by a small majority (178 to 168); and Bülow, who had declared that the decision involved the existence of German colonies and the honour of the Empire, hereupon read to the *Reichstag* the imperial decree for its dissolution (December). Its successor, as has been seen[1], with the aid of the *Bloc*, furnished the Government with a majority enabling it to carry the impugned grant. The Emperor's authority to determine the strength of the military force in any part of the imperial dominions had been vindicated, and the 'national' colonial policy had scored a signal triumph.

Those of the Hereros who survived were disarmed; and, though the future bearing and treatment of the Hottentots were more uncertain, the land of the colony was now, in a very literal sense, the land of the white man. A protective force of 4000 German horsemen, with a smaller body of white and native police, was now permanently instituted. South-west Africa had, however, by no means become a self-governing colony. Although a Council was appointed to assist the Governor, it was a Council without power, and not allowed to interfere in such a question as that of allotting the profits of the diamonds discovery. For the rest, though the revolt of the Hereros long left its traces in South-west

[1] *Ante*, p. 334

Africa, and although large investments of capital, without which adequate profits could not be expected in a pastoral country, were but slowly forthcoming, the cost of the colony to the Empire had, by 1911, nearly sunk to the level at which it had stood before the outbreak of the insurrection.

In East Africa, too, there were, in 1905, native troubles; but, save in their general causes, they were unconnected with the events in the South-west. The population of the vast East African colony was controlled by a protective body of 3000 men and a police force, both consisting mainly of natives. So late as 1906, the white population of these partly equatorial, partly tropical regions had not risen much above 2500. The trade, however, which they carried on in rubber and various other (chiefly vegetable) products, rapidly increased, more especially as the construction of railways advanced; but a considerable imperial expenditure continued to be requisite in order to balance the colonial budget. In the tropical region of the Cameroons, the conditions of progress were not dissimilar, but less favourable. The staple product of rubber seemed tending to diminish, while that of cocoa was increasing. Here, as in Togoland, likewise tropical and the least healthy of the German colonies, the construction of railways into the interior had become an indispensable condition of future economic prosperity.

There was no very rapid commercial or other advance in 'German New Guinea,' with its scanty German settlers. This administrative title was made to cover the portions of New Guinea known as Kaiser-Wilhelm-Land, with the Bismarck Archipelago, including the islands of New Pomerania and New Mecklenburg, together with the island groups of the Carolines, the Pelew and the Marianne Islands. The war between the United States and Spain (1898) had engaged the sympathies of Continental Europe on the side of the latter Power, on whose behalf Germany would gladly have

brought about a joint intervention. The Philippines, further to the north, off whose capital, Manila, the German Admiral von Diederichs was reported to have been only prevented from taking possession of the islands by his apprehensions of action on the part of an American squadron under Admiral Dewey, were not transferred into German hands. But the Carolines, with the Pelew and the Marianne Islands, were, after the termination of the war, when the Spanish Government was in sore want of funds, purchased from it by the German. Finally, as to the Samoa group, which, so far back as 1880, Bismarck had thought of obtaining for Germany, a final agreement, drawn up by commissioners representing the three Powers of Germany, Great Britain and the United States, which had, for a time, provisionally carried on the government there conjointly, was signed in 1900. The islands Upolu and Sawai were assigned to Germany, and those of Manua and Tutuila to the United States, while to Great Britain Germany ceded her claims on the Tonga and part of the Solomon Islands[1]. The Marshall Islands, little more than a coral reef in the Northern Pacific, and Nauru (whence there was a large exportation of phosphates) remained with Germany.

By 1909–10, the annual volume of German colonial trade (exclusive of that of Kiau-Chou and its share in the commerce of the province of Shantung) had reached a total of about ten millions and a half sterling. Between the foundation of the German Empire and the year 1905, the German mercantile marine had increased from considerably under a million to nearly two million and a half tons; and a large proportion of the vessels, now chiefly steamers, had

[1] Cf p. 159, *ante*, and see Reventlow, pp 139–140, where these cessions, though inconsiderable, are censured, because they were cessions He asserts—and, unlike many statements concerning the government of the Samoa Islands, this may be accepted—that the German settlers there deeply resented the transaction.

come to be built in German shipyards[1]. The protection of this trade and of this mercantile fleet had now become a legitimate national duty; while, at the same time, the expediency of asserting the economic as well as the political self-dependence of the German Empire, in all parts of the world with which its ships or subjects came into contact, formed a very powerful argument in favour of the creation of an effective war-navy. Conversely, the gradual creation of this navy, not less naturally, intensified the desire to foster colonisation and colonial trade as manifest proofs of national progress and as direct incitements to national ambition and pride. Thus, war-navy, maritime trade and colonies combined as essential elements in the propaganda of what was, more loudly than lucidly, proclaimed to the world as 'the German idea.'

In these circumstances, the tentative and temporary provisions made in 1873 for the gradual construction of a war-navy and the management of its affairs could not, with a view to the future, be possibly regarded as adequate. During the next quarter of a century or thereabouts, the method of calling upon the *Reichstag*, from time to time, for a grant for the building of a new vessel was carried on in the face of many difficulties—among them, the great changes in naval construction, and the prevailing ignorance of naval matters in both parliament and public. It was clear that the ultimate object in view—the creation of a navy able to protect the coasts and colonies of the Empire and strong enough to make a war against that Empire dangerous for even the greatest maritime Power—could only be effected gradually. It was, also, clear that the process would not remain unobserved by other maritime Powers, and by the foremost of them in particular.

[1] The development of German transatlantic commerce is illustrated by the amicable agreement between the Anglo-American Syndicate and the two great German Navigation Companies, in 1902

In March 1897[1], the *Reichstag* had adopted the report of its Budget Committee, which had recommended considerable reductions in the demands made by the Government for new battleships, including the substitution of some vessels of a new, for those of an obsolete, type of construction. The actual strength of the navy amounted to seven ironclads fit for use in war, besides three in course of construction and two in need of repair, and a number of cruisers partly ready, partly unfinished. The Government now resolved, not only upon a large addition to these numbers, but upon an entire change in the system of naval armaments. After Admiral Hollmann had been superseded as Secretary of State at the Navy Office by Admiral von Tirpitz, a Navy Bill was, in November, brought forward, which proposed the construction of seven additional battleships and of a further number of cruisers. It fixed the date of the completion of the new vessels (on the 'septennate' system) for the end of the financial year 1904, and, by limiting the period of service of the several ships, ensured the regular supersession of out-of-date vessels by others of the newest type. The number of vessels of which the navy was to consist was fixed at seventeen battleships (with a reserve of two) and a corresponding body of cruisers; but, while the provision of this number was secured, the way was opened for a further periodical increase. The vast outlay which would be requisite during the first septennate was, by the most determined adversaries of the bill, the Social-democrats, reckoned at a full milliard of marks (say, fifty million pounds sterling). In March 1898, however, a final vote in favour of the bill was carried without serious difficulty (the numbers were 212 to 139) against the Social-democratic and some radical opposition, while the Centre was divided.

But periodical legislation lends itself to revision; and, so early as 1900, a further increase of the navy to thirty-four

[1] Cf. Bulow, *Imperial Germany*, pp. 9 ff.

battleships, with reserves and cruisers, and with forty-four large torpedo-boats, was demanded. After a reduction, by way of concession to the Centre, in the total of cruisers asked for had been made, the proposal was carried. In 1906, this reduction was made good, and an increase in the dimensions of the battleships was approved. Whether or not these proposals, brought forward in 1905, are to be directly connected with a forward change in German policy[1], it is certain that by the building of Dreadnoughts, in imitation of British example, and by making at the same time an initial experiment in the construction of submarines, the Emperor William's Government frankly declared its intention of constituting Germany a formidable naval Power. The proposals were, in 1906, carried in the *Reichstag*; and, since, after the *Bloc* election, *i.e.* from 1907 onwards, all the Liberal factions were united with the Conservatives in support of the Government, no navy—or army—bill, henceforth, ran any risk of being thrown out by a parliamentary majority. The resolution passed at a meeting of the National-Liberal party at Wiesbaden in 1907, to the effect that the navy must be continuously strengthened so far as was necessary, and that the further construction of new battleships must not fall short of that undertaken by other Powers, expressed what was now accepted as an axiom of national policy. As a matter of fact, Germany was fast becoming the second naval Power in the world.

It remains to trace the course of the relation between Germany and the other Great Powers, in the earlier years of the Emperor William II's reign. For a consecutive historical survey of those relations and their progressive

[1] As may be incidentally noted (though there seems to be no evidence on the subject), it was in this year (1906) that a German design upon Madeira is said to have been frustrated by a British naval movement upon the Portuguese coast.

development the materials are still incomplete, though trained insight is not only capable of drawing its conclusions from them, but warranted in so doing[1]. For ourselves, we have seen in what sense and by what methods of procedure Germany had, since the beginning of the new reign, prepared herself, by land and sea, to assert the strength she had gained by the organisation of her resources, intellectual and material. The future of the world would, in a large measure, depend upon the use she would make of her strength, and of her preparedness. It would be conditional on the immediate purposes of her action at its successive stages, and also on its general motives—often a very different thing. Nations, like individuals, are largely moved by preferences or prejudices, which are not altogether explicable by the instincts of race or kinship, or again by reasoned considerations of common or self-interest, since they, also, largely have their origin in goodwill or resentment due to historical and moral sympathy, or to accumulated envy and jealousy. It is, no doubt, as easy to bring charges of the operation of these or similar motives as it is difficult to weigh them in a trustworthy balance; but, the conclusion remains, and folly alone can dispute it, that imputations of this kind are not always to be dismissed as figments, and that they must not be left out of sight in any attempt to explain how the action of great nations affects the welfare of the human family of which they form part.

Finally, though likewise liable to be denounced in exaggerated terms, the feeling of self-conscious pride in a new position in the world, and the desire of constantly making that position good by self-assertion, must be taken into account as contributing to the action of Germany in these fateful years. The German Navy League, founded in

[1] See, for admirable examples of such summaries, G W. Prothero's *German Policy before the War* (1916) and G P. Gooch's and Canon J H B. Masterman's *A Century of British Foreign Policy* (1917).

1898 and solemnly approved by the Emperor in 1907[1], was, in the words of its own manifesto, designed to promote the construction of a navy which should both defend the German shores and 'maintain the nation's rank among the Great Powers of the world'; and, in the words of Prince Bülow, Germany claimed the right of following the example of Great Britain, France and Russia, and extending into a 'Greater Germany[2].' All this should be borne in mind, while it should, in fairness, be noted at the same time how arduous was the task of German policy and of its diplomatic agents during the generation which followed after the war of 1870–1, when, with the exception of her share in the Chinese expedition of 1900 (for the Venezuelan demonstration of 1897 may be passed by), Germany was the only Great Power, besides Austria-Hungary, which never drew sword from scabbard.

Of the European Great Powers, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was bound to the German Empire, alike by the strongest historical and political ties, and, in the instance of the most numerous[3], as well as in some respects undeniably the most important, section of its population, by identity of nationality. Since the severance of the historical bond which had long united Austria and the rest of Germany, the policy of Bismarck, seconded by that of Andrássy, had, in 1879, politically united the new Germany and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the alliance which, by the accession of Italy (largely due to Crispi), in 1882, became the Triple Alliance.

[1] At about the same date, the League and its 'educational influence in wide circles of the nation' were upheld in the *Reichstag* by the National-Liberal Bassermann against the cavils of the Socialist Bebel

[2] Cf. Tardieu, *La France et les Alliances*, pp 8–9

[3] Naumann, *op. cit*, reckons that, about the time of the outbreak of the present war, the Germans in the Dual Monarchy numbered about twelve million, as against ten million Magyars, over eight million Bohemian Čechs, over five million Croats, five million Poles, etc.

This compact was periodically renewed at Berlin (the last renewal being in 1912) without change, though, especially in 1902 (as again in 1912), Italy would, probably, have preferred to introduce certain modifications. So far as Germany and Austria-Hungary were concerned, no occasion had by that time arisen for any divergence of policy between them, and public opinion had on both sides been in favour of a maintenance of the alliance.

Nevertheless, there had from the first been aspects of the relations between Austria-Hungary and the German Empire which called for careful handling. This was, in a measure, made easier by the personal friendship between the two Emperors, and by the wish of all concerned to lighten the weight of the burden that lay upon the shoulders of the Emperor Francis Joseph, the jubilee of whose sixty years' reign the Emperor William II attended at Schönbrunn in May 1908, at the head of the German Princes. The Austrian monarchy, by virtue of its historic associations, could not fail to attract continuous sympathy in many Catholic parts of Germany; but, on the other hand, an inconvenient appeal was made to Protestant, and indirectly to North-German, sentiment by the, not perhaps very logical, movement which, under the device of 'Away from Rome' (*Los von Rom*), reached its height about the beginning of the new century.

While, formerly, the desire for national unity had to a certain extent coincided with that for Protestant cohesion[1], Pangermanist tendencies in the Austrian monarchy, when not identical with Anti-Semitism, now seemed to be in so far at one with it, that the motto of *Los von Rom* might be merged in that of *Los von Oesterreich*. This latter was the cry raised at the time of the Emperor Francis Joseph's unfriendly reception at Prague in June 1901. The Bohemian Čechs no

[1] The foundation of the *Deutsche Protestantenverein* (in which Bluntschli had a leading share) took place in 1863, four years after that of the *Nationalverein*.

doubt hoped for Russian sympathy, and, also, for a certain amount of French, in their endeavours to press for a recognition of their claims as a nationality which must prove fatal to the very foundations of the system of the Dual Monarchy. It was in Bohemia that the anti-Roman agitation had its *focus*, and here that it found its most original expression in the grotesque proposal, put forward about this time, to invite the Holy Synod of the Graeco-Russian Church to canonise the greatest of continental Reformers before the Reformation, John Hus—himself an ardent nationalist. The proposal emanated from a numerically modest body of seceders from the Roman communion at Prague, who had founded there an Old-Catholic congregation, about one thousand strong, under a priest named Ischka. But both Church and State in Russia displayed only a very platonic goodwill to this, either belated or premature, effort; and the interest excited by it at home and abroad evaporated before very long[1]. The Vienna Pangermanists, whose leader, Schönerer, soon afterwards took occasion to advocate the Germanisation of the whole of the African continent[2], were not much more practical in their methods than were the Prague Old-Catholics or neo-Hussites; and their efforts lacked the element of intense nationalism.

On the long-continued struggle waged by the less-favoured nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire against the system of the Dual Monarchy, and on their efforts to establish in its stead a State founded on the principle of parity among all its component elements, Germany was not inclined to look with sympathy. Towards Hungary, whose difficulties in meeting the claims of the less numerous nationalities were at least as great as were those of German Austria, and who could not attain to a final settlement except by a new *Ausgleich* of her own, Germany could

[1] Cf. Schiemann, *op. cit.* vol. I (1901), pp. 415 ff.

[2] Cf. *ib.* vol. II (1902), p. 120.

not exhibit an adverse spirit, so long as she was mindful of the services rendered to the German cause in 1870–1 by Magyar statesmanship, in the person of Count Andrássy. Nor was there any reason for a change of attitude when finally, in 1907, the introduction of universal suffrage for the election of members of the House of Députies in the *Reichsrat* throughout the Danubian Empire seemed to open a new future for what could no longer be described as a Dual Monarchy.

With regard to one of the nationalities in the Dual Monarchy, German and Austrian policy followed somewhat different lines. The Polish question was, in Austria, met by a series of concessions; in Germany, the administration of Caprivi seemed to be actuated by a similar spirit; but, as a matter of fact, its perplexities could here be tided over, so long as Germany was on terms of friendship with Russia as well as with Austria. Thus, the idea of a restored Republic of the Kingdom of Poland could be kept in the dim distance; and the demands of the Galician Poles, encouraged by their treatment at home, for the restoration of their national life to the Poles of Silesia, Posen and West Prussia could be practically ignored.

In the Near East, though the two Powers generally acted in unison, there was no reason why Germany, to whom these concerns were still of quite secondary interest, should altogether identify herself with the aims of Austria-Hungary. This was explicitly avowed by Bülow, who, in this respect, reverted to the principles of Bismarckian foreign policy and inclined to more reserve than had, perhaps, been shown by his predecessor (Marschall) at the Berlin Foreign Office. Austria-Hungary's intentions as to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had occupied since the Treaty of Berlin (1878), were not carried out until a date (1908) beyond the range of the present brief survey. The whole question of the future of the Turkish dominion in the Balkans was not, as yet,

ripe for decisive treatment by the Powers most directly concerned in it. After the termination of the Graeco-Turkish war in 1897, Austria and Russia, alike aware that unless they came to an agreement they must go to war, had arrived at an understanding, subsequently (1903) embodied in the so-called Mürzsteg Convention, in which they mutually undertook to urge upon the Porte a moderate *quantum* of reforms, sufficient to calm the agitation among its Macedonian subjects. Germany, on this head, upheld the policy of her ally, consistently endeavouring to strengthen the cohesion of the Ottoman Empire. A more active policy, leading to intimate relations between the re-organised Turkish Government and the German Empire, was to follow at a later date; in the meantime, the work of the re-organisation of the Turkish army, with German aid, slowly but steadily continued.

Whether, in the earlier part of William II's reign, the German schemes affecting Turkey in Asia were still confined to the limits of commercial enterprise has been gravely doubted, and can hardly be as yet decided with historical certainty. June, 1888, is the date of the earliest concession granted by the Porte to a German company for the construction of the initial portion of what was afterwards known as the Baghdad railroad, and regarded as the connecting artery for the extension of German trade (in the first instance) from Hamburg and Berlin *via* Constantinople to the confines of the Persian Gulf; further concessions were obtained in 1893 and in 1903, when an extension was granted from Baghdad to Busra. (Later agreements followed in 1908 and 1911.) Undoubtedly, this series of concessions was facilitated by the progressive display by Germany of special friendliness to the Porte, as well as to her consistent support of the principle of the maintenance of the much discredited Turkish Empire. The Emperor William's visit to Constantinople (where he had appeared already in 1889) and

Palestine in 1898, two years after the Armenian massacres had brought about a widespread repugnance in Europe against the preservation of the Turkish dominion, opened a new phase in the relations between Germany and Turkey[1]. The 'definitive Baghdad Railway Convention,' as it has been designated, of 1903 secured to Germany the prospect of dominating railway enterprise in Asiatic Turkey. The negotiations carried on for the participation in the enterprise of British capital and for the securing to Great Britain an adequate measure of control over the extension of the railway came to nothing; and, when similar negotiations were resumed at a date beyond our limits, they were ultimately closed by the outbreak of the present war[2].

Austro-Hungarian statesmanship had, so long as possible, continued to follow the accustomed ways, the Magyars being fully conscious that they could only maintain their ascendancy while the Dual system continued, and no desire being felt on the part of the German Empire to break up the Danubian monarchy by incorporating so very substantial a *Germania irredenta*[3] as German Austria. On the other hand, the idea of a more intimate union between Austria-Hungary and Germany, which, while leaving intact the respective constitutions and general administrative systems of the two Powers, should unify them from a military and economic point of view was not essentially novel. Bismarck's resourceful mind had not failed to entertain it, and he had suggested its realisation to Andrássy so far back as 1879. Bruck's unaccomplished scheme[4] of an economic union

[1] The Emperor William's Damascus promise, made on this occasion (see Rachfahl, *op. cit* p 157), is mentioned below.

[2] See, for a concise and authoritative account of the history of the Baghdad railway, including that of earlier British schemes, an article on the subject in the *Quarterly Review*, vol. CCVIII (Oct. 1917).

[3] The phrase is Naumann's (*op cit* p. 21)

[4] Cf. vol. II, p. 78, *ante*.

between the two monarchies, under the new conditions of the relations between them, had, moreover, found favour with the most eminent German economist of his day, Gustav Schmoller[1]. But the time for seeking to carry these conceptions into effect in the face of the difficulties on both sides which must beset the process, had not yet arrived. Until some case should have arisen—or have been worked up—for appealing to the conditions of the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, now enlarged into a Triple Alliance, a venture so momentous, from every point of view, could not seem within the range of practical politics. While all Austrian tradition would resent playing what could hardly be other than a secondary part while Prussia played the first, the Prussian *Junker* would not easily mate with the Austrian or Hungarian noble; the Prussian Conservative would regret a further watering-down of Prussian predominance in Germany; the Northern capitalist would fear for the progress of free-trade; and the German Protestant would shrink from a partnership which must imply a Catholic majority in the population included. It was, therefore, not till a great conflict had set in which must shake the very foundations of the existing political system of Europe that the idea in question could take definite shape, and present itself in the form of a new kind of federation between Germany, Austria-Hungary and the adjoining territories, who should commit the interests common to them all, and the defence of them, to a Super-State, while continuing to deal with the rest for themselves. The evolution of this design remains a problem for the future, unless the solution of it should be anticipated

[1] Cf. W. Schüssler, 'Neudeutschland und Oesterreich,' in *Preussische Jahrbucher*, vol. CLXIII, 3 (Sept 1913). Julius von Eckhardt's *Berlin-Wien Rom* (1892), which proposed the formation of a Mid-Europe *Zollverein*, embracing with the two empires, Italy, Switzerland and other small States, was a further extension of the idea. Cf. Prothero, *op. cit.* p. 23.

by the collapse of one or more of the States whose federal union it has in view[1].

Within the Triple Alliance, of which, as has been seen, she formed part since 1882, Italy, from the first, stood on a different footing from that of the two predominating partners. As has not unfairly been said, she enjoyed the advantage of a satisfactory insurance, for which she paid a by no means exorbitant premium. While she was a member of the alliance, it behoved her to abstain from pressing the demands of an *irredentismo* which, if made the basis of action, could not but create a fundamental breach between her and Austria. Her Albanian aspirations were, in 1896, not favoured by her allies; and though her desires for Tripoli were, from palpable motives, encouraged in 1899 and 1902 by France (her understanding with whom on the subject was in the latter year held by the German Chancellor, Bülow, to be not incompatible with the renewal of the Triple Alliance), they did not result in action till a much later date (1911). Conversely, Italy's allies had to depend upon such diplomatic support as she was prepared to afford to them. This support was not, and, in view of the nature of her historic relations with Austria on the one hand and with France on the other, could not be, unintermittent. In the earlier part of the Emperor William II's reign, there was, beyond doubt, a growing feeling in Italy (though not in King Humbert and his successor King Victor Emmanuel III) in favour of a change of policy. The leading Italian statesman Crispi, at one time thought deserving of confidence by Bismarck, was of opinion that the commercial treaty with Germany, which was actually concluded in 1904, should have preceded the renewal of the Triple Alliance, and thus

[1] See F. Naumann's *Central Europe*, tr. by C. M. Meredith, with an Introduction by W J. Ashley (1916) The book, whatever may be thought of its argument, must be numbered among the most remarkable products of modern political literature.

have been settled on more favourable terms. And, in general, the conviction gained ground among Italian statesmen that the protection of their country's interests in the Mediterranean was better assured by the friendship of France, and more particularly by that of Great Britain, than by her partnership in the Triple Alliance. That Italian policy in this period exhibited a want of clearness and consistency was undeniable, and perhaps inevitable; and, in view of subsequent aspirations which culminated in the Italo-Turkish War, the opinion began to find favour, at Berlin as well as at Constantinople, that Turkey ought to take Italy's place in the Triple Alliance[1]. But this, again, was not to be accomplished until 'the last act' was at hand.

If Germany's bearing towards her partners in the Triple Alliance was more or less clearly marked out for her statesmen, the same might, though from a different point of view, be said of her relations with France. Not long after the close of the period of foreign policy now under review, an eminent French publicist[2] opined that the manifest duty of his own and of the German Government respectively was to abstain from any hostilities against each other except in the supreme issues—for Germany of the maintenance of her hegemony; for France of the reconstitution of her national territory. The case between them could hardly have been more accurately stated. What France had at heart during all these troubled years, and what no other problem or 'crisis,' whether European, African or Asiatic, could obscure, was the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine; while Germany was intent upon the continuance of a *prestige* wholly irreconcilable with such a territorial recovery or restoration. Thus, while diplomacy might avoid unnecessary, and avert premature, collisions, it was only too well aware that any reestablishment of genuinely friendly relations between the belligerents of 1870–1 was beyond its powers.

[1] Reventlow, *op. cit.* p. 414. [2] A. Tardieu, *op. cit.* p. 413

In 1898, the French policy of colonial expansion had experienced a painful rebuff at the hands of Great Britain by the Fashoda incident; and some time elapsed before the two Western Powers again drew closer to one another. It was in the same year also that the Emperor William II thought fit to pose in Palestine as the crusader favoured by the Commander of the Faithful, and at Damascus as the trustworthy friend of three hundred millions of Mohammedans. Thus, Germany, as well as Russia, for reasons of her own, took a lively interest in the progress of the relations between Great Britain and France. By 1903, these two Powers were again on more friendly terms, as was shown by the participation of French capital in the British loan to Japan. In a complication arising from the policy of France nearer home, Germany decided to play a more prominent part.

France, in the person of her Foreign Minister Delcassé, who had succeeded to the office of the equally patriotic, but less venturesome, Hanotaux, had conceived the project of establishing a protectorate over Morocco, not as the mandatory of any European concert or *consensus*, but by her own action, though with the cooperation of Spain and the goodwill of Great Britain. As mistress of Algeria, France was in possession of by far the largest share of Moroccan trade, and could thus beyond doubt lay claim to a special interest in the economic condition of the sultanate, albeit she had no right to determine its political future. Germany, on the other hand, could offer no pretension whatever to a leading share in the settlement of Moroccan affairs, her commercial rights in Morocco resting simply upon the concessions granted to all the Powers that had signed the Madrid convention of 1880, together with a commercial treaty concluded two years later[1]. The immediate object of the action

[1] According to Tardieu (*op. cit.* p 134), in the years 1902 and 1908, respectively, 31 and 45 per cent. of the Moroccan trade were in

in which Delcassé engaged was, besides the pacification of the frontier between Algeria and Morocco, the establishment in the sultanate of an orderly system of government under the *aegis* of France, which would thus gradually acquire a protectorate over the dominions of the weak Sultan Abdul Aziz—part of the northern territory being handed over to Spain, while Italy was satisfied by being left a free hand in Tripoli. Great Britain, whose commercial interests in Morocco had not been inferior to those of France, had at first looked coldly on this scheme; but, as the relations between the two Powers improved more and more, the rigidity of the British attitude towards Delcassé's Moroccan policy abated. The Anglo-French agreement of April 1904, which was to hold good for thirty years and formed the basis of the *entente* between the two Powers, recognised the interest of France in the maintenance of order and security in Morocco. But, inasmuch as there was no desire on the part of Great Britain to encourage too forward a policy on the part of Delcassé, the agreement provided that France should confine herself to what he termed a *pénétration politique*, or gradual extension of her influence, in the sultanate. (The *quid pro quo* was the abandonment by France of any further attempt at interfering in the government of Egypt.) The contracting Powers were not to fail to take into consideration the Moroccan interests of Spain, the extent of the eventual concessions to whom were defined in a secret article; and Spain speedily adhered to the convention.

The significance of these agreements, although at the time only in part made public, was obvious. But, though German statesmanship had accustomed itself to keep a close eye on any political action on the part of France, there was no reason why her arrangements with Great Britain and

the hands of France, 41 and 36 per cent. in those of Great Britain, and 9 and 9·5 per cent. in those of Germany.

Spain should be supposed to contain or conceal any unfriendly intention on her part towards Germany—at all events, so long as, however the waves of public opinion or sentiment might surge from time to time, the British Government remained on amicable terms with the German[1]. It seems, however, superfluous to discuss the supposition that in 1904, France and Great Britain desired to exclude Germany from Morocco, inasmuch as, according to Bulow's own declaration in 1906[2], she never had any intention of planting her foot there. In a word, she might have kept out of the business altogether, had she so desired.

But she did not so desire. Early in 1905, French diplomacy laid before the unhappy Abdul Aziz a scheme of 'reform,' which amounted to the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco. Hereupon, the Sultan innocently turned to the German Government, with an enquiry whether he was to conclude that France was acting in this matter as the mandatory of Europe, and received a negative reply, with the further information that the conventions between the three Western Governments had not been communicated to the German. But this was not all, nor intended to be all. On March 31st, the Emperor William II landed in person at Tangiers, where he was received by the Sultan's uncle Abdul Malek, and announced that he regarded the Sultan as an independent ruler, under whose sway the Emperor trusted that a free Morocco would allow the pacific competition of all nations.

The result of this lofty intervention was the Conference of Algeciras, summoned by the Sultan Abdul Aziz, which France, whether or not she were supported to the last by Great Britain, could not refuse except at the risk of war. This risk public feeling in France itself (interpreted with great force by the Socialist leader Jaurès and others) and the

[1] In June 1904, the Emperor William II and King Edward VII met at Kiel.

[2] Cf. Rachfahl, *op. cit.* p. 236.

French Government were not prepared to face; and, though there was still some expectation of British support of a forward policy[1], Delcassé's resignation, which had been offered in April, was now accepted (June). On January 16th, 1906, the conference on Moroccan affairs opened at Algeciras (near Gibraltar), Germany being represented here by the younger J. M. von Radowitz, at the time German envoy to Spain. German writers have been fain to regard the proceedings at this Conference, the summoning of which was indisputably due to the resolution of the German Government not to be passed by in an important agreement between some of the other Powers, as clear evidence of a desire on the part of all the Great Powers, except Austria-Hungary, to 'isolate' Germany. Concerning the supposition of such a desire or design, at this or any time, a further word will have to be said. At Algeciras, the Powers represented there unanimously accepted, as conclusions not calling for discussion, the recognition of the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco, and the independence of his sultanate, together with the maintenance of the principle of the open door—in other words, of an equality of commercial rights in Morocco among all the Powers. On the other hand, much difficulty was caused by the question of the organisation of the Moroccan police, which could not be placed in the hands of a single Power, while an international police was impossible, as well as by certain financial points of secondary importance. The police difficulty was, after considerable disputation, settled by an arrangement (an amendment of the proposal made by the

[1] When, in March 1906, King Edward VII visited Paris, he saw Delcassé, but that statesman had been for some months out of office. There is no satisfactory evidence for the statement attributed to Delcassé that the British Government had been ready to promise, in the event of a complication between France and Germany, to land 100,000 troops in Jutland The additional assertion that this declaration was made on the initiative of King Edward seems a pure invention. (Cf Reventlow, *op. cit.* pp 278–9.)

Austro-Hungarian representative) of a complicated nature. The Sultan was left in supreme command over his police force, with a Dutch or Swiss inspector-general acting under him, while French and Spanish officials were appointed at Casablanca and the other ports of the sultanate.

By the Algeciras Treaty, while the political future of 'independent' Morocco still lay with the partners in the open and secret agreements of 1904, Germany had formally secured to herself and her cosignatories the possession of equal commercial rights in the sultanate. While she, of course, made use of this circumstance for the extension of her commerce there, her chief gain through the transaction lay in the advance of German *prestige* which it implied. The question, as Prince Bülow plainly put it, was whether the German Empire was, or was not, to be treated as a *quantité négligeable*: the whole affair had been 'not a duel, but duelling-practice' (*Mensur*), in which the Emperor William had, as he telegraphed to Count Goluchowski, been admirably seconded by Austria-Hungary[1]. The later stages of the Moroccan question, when France had found Sultan Abdul Aziz a broken reed in her hand, and the Algeciras settlement one which, as she could not revoke it, she deemed it best to ignore, cannot be pursued here. That Germany desired the acquisition of territory for herself in the Moroccan sultanate was both asserted and denied. More than once, the 'duel' itself seemed imminent before it was actually fought out, and by nothing was German national consciousness more embittered than by the loss, actual or supposed, after Agadir, of the new *prestige* achieved at Algeciras.

The relations between Germany and her eastern neighbour Russia were of a more complicated nature, especially after those between Russia and France had begun to grow more intimate. The 'Re-insurance Treaty' of 1884, which,

[1] Cf. Rachfahl, *Kaiser und Reich 1888–1913*, p. 250, and see Schiemann, *op. cit.* vol. IV (1906), p. 128.

in conformity with the consistent principle of Bismarck's foreign policy, had ensured to Germany the friendship of Russia without jeopardising the continuance of that of Austria-Hungary[1], was not renewed under Caprivi in 1890. Very possibly, the new Chancellor's policy of friendliness towards the Poles had given offence to the Tsar, or, perhaps, the desire of the Emperor William II and his Minister to maintain a good understanding with Great Britain weighed down the balance. In any case, the French and Russian Governments had advanced to a greater degree of intimacy, and, in March 1894, the all-important Treaty of Alliance between them was concluded. A commercial treaty between them followed; and, the German friendliness to Great Britain proving, as will be seen, short-lived, the soreness of feeling towards Russia, which had no doubt existed in certain political quarters in Germany, passed away. In the same year (1894), the war between China and Japan broke out, in which the Japanese arms were everywhere victorious. While Great Britain would willingly have headed a collective intervention in this conflict on the part of the European Great Powers, the suggestion was declined at the instigation of Germany; and there ensued only a joint naval demonstration by the Powers for the protection of their subjects in China. After the Peace of Simonoseki (March 1895), however, Germany joined with Russia and France in putting pressure upon Japan to renounce her principal territorial acquisition (Liantung). China made certain concessions in return for these good offices—granting to Germany the right of settlement in Hankau and Tientsin. While Great Britain had had no share in these transactions, Russia had benefited by the cooperation of Germany, whose chief motive had been the desire to show that, in a Far Eastern crisis, too, it behoved her not to stand aside. The unfortunate experiences of the Japanese War and the consequent losses

[1] Cf. p. 147, *ante*.

of China had inclined one of the political parties in the Celestial Empire to resort to Western example, or at least to seek Western advice (in this connexion, may be noted the reception in China in 1899 of Prince Henry of Prussia, Grand Admiral of the German Navy); but the opposite party soon gained the ascendant.

For some time, a national movement for the extrusion or extermination of foreigners had been preparing itself in the Chinese Empire, which was favoured by the Court, the Conservative interest, and a large proportion of the population. In January 1900, a British missionary was murdered at Shantung; and the German Minister at Peking, Freiherr von Ketteler, joined with his British, French and American colleagues in an indignant protest. Further outrages, however, ensued, and soon the so-called 'Boxer' Rising had spread over a large part of China. In the province of Shantung hands were laid on the railway lines in course of construction by the Germans. A change of Emperor was now sanctioned by the Dowager-Empress, and anxiety was felt for the safety of the foreign legations at Peking. When a small body of troops, including a few Germans, had reached the capital for their protection, the line from Peking to Tientsin was derailed. An allied expedition under Admiral Seymour, which included about 500 Germans, failed to relieve the imperilled legations at Peking; but, after the capture of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Peiho, in which the German gunboat, *Iltis*, played a gallant part (June 1900), the relief of the European part of the town of Tientsin and of Admiral Seymour's hard-pressed force was accomplished.

Meanwhile, the menace to the legations continued at Peking, where the Government and the Boxers were now making common cause; and the assassination of the German Minister, Freiherr von Ketteler, and his secretary (June 20th) brought matters to a crisis. A siege of the legations now

followed. All attempts on the part of the Chinese Government to explain away the incident were waved aside, and in July a German contingent started at once to join the punitive expedition, having been exhorted by the Emperor William to 'open the way, once for all, to civilisation (*Kultur*).' Before the arrival of this force, however, Peking had been captured by the Allies, the Dowager-Empress and her Court put to flight and the legations relieved (August); so that the essential part of the task had been accomplished before (in September) the joint European army of 64,000 men (of whom 17,700 were Germans) assembled on the scene of action under the supreme command of Count von Waldersee. This choice of commander, whether or not primarily due to an arrangement between the German Emperor and Tsar Nicholas II, commended itself to the other Powers as appropriate in the circumstances of the initial outrage, and as avoiding a very obvious dilemma; but the effect which, in contrary directions, it exercised upon the German and the French public was unavoidable[1].

The terms of peace, complicated by the facts that the Japanese had been from the first invited to cooperate with the Allies, and that the Russians had taken possession of Manchuria, now became the subject of anxious deliberation. The suggestion of the Russian Government, or their head, that, after the relief of Peking and the liberation of the embassies, the allied troops should withdraw from the capital, was repudiated by the German and the British Governments. These two Governments, hereupon, concluded (October 1900) the important agreement known as the Yangtse Convention, which laid down the principle of the 'open door' in all Chinese ports and on all Chinese rivers where the two Powers 'could exercise an influence'—notably

[1] A clear account of the China Expedition and its origin, so far as Germany was concerned in them, will be found in Rachfahl, *op. cit.* pp 187 ff.

therefore, over the great Yangtse artery—and bound them to seek no territorial gains at the expense of the Chinese Empire, and, should any other Power pursue a contrary policy, to agree on the measures to be taken in consequence.

The other Powers were invited to adhere to the Yangtse Convention; and all adhered accordingly, though Russia—not obscurely envisaged in the agreement—reserved to herself a free hand as to her intervention in any particular case. The agreement was manifestly made in the interests of both German and British trade; it is not so clear whether or not it had the secondary purpose of crossing the intention—or supposed intention—of Russia to keep her hand over Manchuria. Any such design was disclaimed, though not in quite the same terms, by the two contracting Powers. In any case, Germany, who, it must be remembered, already held Kiau-Chou, had gained her primary object of taking a front position in the ensuing peace negotiations. They came to a close in September 1901. Although Russia still delayed the evacuation of Manchuria, peace was in December concluded between China and the Powers; one of its articles providing for the dispatch to Berlin of a Chinese Imperial Prince, charged with the function of apologising for the assassination of the German Minister. In that portion of the negotiations in which Great Britain, the United States and Japan put pressure upon Russia to take steps for the evacuation of Manchuria, Germany had had no share. Her self-assertion had been made on her own account, and her reputation in the Far East had been raised to a novel height.

Well content with these achievements, and with the advance of her trade in Shantung, Germany could have no desire for a change in the present situation in the Far East. In the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, she, of course, had no concern; and, as to Manchuria, she left Russia to her own devices. But, although Tsar Nicholas II and his Government remained friendly—in November 1903, a meeting be-

tween him and the Emperor William was held at Wiesbaden —there was a strong feeling against Germany rising in Russia. Panslavism, now in the ascendant there, even found vent in complaints of Prussian oppression of the Polish population of the province of Posen. Russian popular opinion would, moreover, have beyond doubt been well pleased to see action precipitated in the Balkans, where, as has been noted, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments—in this year 1903—agreed to a maintenance of the existing state of things, subject to an understanding between them as to any necessary measures (the Mürzsteg Convention). Germany consistently supported Austria-Hungary's policy of conservative reform, with which Russia had for the present to remain satisfied.

When, hereupon (at the end of January 1904) Japan broke off negotiations and, a few days later, began warlike operations against Russia, that Power, left without support from France, was not compensated by any aid from Germany. The project of neutralising China in the conflict, said to have been suggested to the United States Government by the German, could not possibly have been carried out in opposition to the wishes of Great Britain, who had in 1902 concluded her alliance with Japan. Germany's behaviour to Russia during the course of the Russo-Japanese War was, according to Bülow's explicit statement, modelled on her relations with England during the Boer War. 'Without injuring Japan by failing in strictly proper neutrality, we adopted a very friendly attitude towards Russia. Indeed, our neutrality as towards Russia was even a shade more kindly than that of France[1].' The exercise of 'preferential neutrality,' it may perhaps be observed, forms a far from pellucid chapter in the history of any great war in which some nations, great or small, have remained neutral. In any case, in the Japanese War it was Russia who found herself

[1] *Imperial Germany*, p. 66.

virtually isolated, and not Germany, whose barren world-policy Bebel, about this time, denounced in the *Reichstag* (May 1904).

When, in the same year (October 1904) the Dogger Bank incident momentarily threatened to provoke an armed conflict between Great Britain and Russia, Germany looked on in silence[1]. And, when the Japanese conditions of peace were laid before the Russian Government, Prince Bülow could calmly point out that Germany was not interested in Japanese or Tibetan problems. Thus, the peace between Russia and Japan was settled (August 1905) without any German intervention. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, while unwilling to assist in any way in encouraging Japanese ambition, the German Government saw reason for looking doubtfully on Russia's actual political prospects—not only because of the course taken by the war, but because of the revolutionary condition of a large part of the Tsar's dominions[2]. The renewal, in 1905, of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 is not known to have exercised any influence on the relations between Russia and Germany; but, since the latter Power had in no way contravened the interests of the former during the critical period of the Japanese War, there seemed no reason why they should not again draw close to one another. Such would appear to have been the hope of the Tsar and the Emperor, when, in July 1905, they met at Bjorkoe, although the Russian Press made no attempt to conceal the existing bitterness of feeling.

In August 1907, the British *entente* with Russia, with

[1] No German (and, for that matter) no Italian naval officer was summoned to the international Court which settled the difficulty, though an Austro-Hungarian and a United States officer were included.

[2] How constantly this condition was kept before German eyes is evident to any student of Schiemann's weekly chronicle and commentary in the *Kreuzzeitung*.

the far-reaching provisions which we cannot enumerate here, was signed; and, in the following year, after Bulgaria had declared her independence, Austria-Hungary announced her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, refusing, with the support of Germany, to submit the question to a conference of the Powers. A new epoch herewith opened in the affairs of the Near East. But with this, and with the beginnings of the awful conflict in which it culminated, we must not attempt to deal here. It should, however, be pointed out, that the support of Germany had throughout been steadily given to the policy of Austria-Hungary, both in her design of retaining Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in her attitude towards Serbia, which changed as that kingdom, under its new sovereign, attached itself to Russian patronage. Further, Germany had, at the same time, come to pursue a policy of her own, consistently favourable to the preservation of the Ottoman Power, and therefore warmly reciprocated by Sultan Abdul Hamid, so long as he retained monarchical authority. This policy on the part of Germany stood in direct contrast to Bismarck's consistent desire of taking only a secondary part in the affairs of the Near East, and of allowing the future of the Ottoman Empire in Europe to be settled to the satisfaction of Russian ambition. Within the period to which our survey must be confined, the new policy of Germany in the Near East had only marked its beginnings; but it grew apace, like the Baghdad railway which was its symbol and which, it can hardly be doubted, was intended to become part of its machinery.

The friendship of Great Britain—far otherwise than that of Austria-Hungary or of Russia—had never been assured to the German Empire as such, either by compacts or by traditions inherited from the great statesman to whom it owed its foundation. The two great nations between which flowed the German Ocean were connected with each other by

racial and historical bonds, and under innumerable aspects of their social life and of its moral and intellectual as well as material interests. But these ties the political events of the half-century—or thereabouts—which preceded the great rupture of 1914, and the state of public feeling engendered by them in both peoples, had conspired to loosen or to transmute, until the illwill of each seemed naturally to fasten upon the other. It may appear futile, but it is perhaps not wholly so, to recur to earlier grievances, such as had, from time to time, obscured the political horizon of the one or the other, ever since Frederick William IV's hopes of an intimate alliance in Church and State, strengthened by dynastic bonds, between the two foremost Protestant members of the European family had vanished into air. In the days of the Crimean War, Prussia's resolution to attend solely to what she judged to be her own interest had drawn upon her and her sovereign an outburst of contemptuous displeasure; although, if the idea of sending British ships into Prussian ports, by way of reminding the Berlin Government of its duty to the Western Powers, was entertained, it was certainly not carried into action. In the Danish War of 1864, the unmistakable sympathies of the British people, clamorously expressed, nearly succeeded in involving a willing Government in the conflict with German aspirations. In 1866 and 1870–1, British public opinion had been more divided; but it largely declared against the ultimate aims of Germany as realised in the Peace of Frankfort.

After that treaty, Bismarck, the director of German policy, had certainly shown no desire to fall out with Great Britain; and we have it on the unimpeachable testimony of an ambassador of unusual insight (Lord Ampthill) that the German Government adhered to this attitude for more than a decade. Still, its relations with Great Britain continued to be more or less strained—partly, no doubt, because of the ingrained suspicion with which Bismarck's policy was re-

garded by British statesmanship (to say nothing of royalty), as well as by public opinion, partly because of the cloud which for a time overhung the relations between Great Britain and her historic ally, Austria, now Germany's partner in a more intimate alliance. A relaxation of the tension ensued, when, in 1885, five years before the fall of Bismarck, Lord Salisbury assumed the control of British policy; and the relations between the two Governments became still more easy when Bismarck had been succeeded in the Chancellorship by Count Caprivi, who considered himself under no obligation to make friendship with Russia the guiding principle of his foreign policy. Although, as has been seen, the exchange of Zanzibar for Heligoland had given very little satisfaction to public opinion on either side, Caprivi's tenure of office shows the high-water mark in the amicable relations between the two Powers[1]. During Hohenlohe's Chancellorship, German foreign policy, conducted by Freiherr A. H. Marschall von Bieberstein till his resignation in 1897[2], in this respect underwent no material change. German commercial policy, about this time, took a more decided turn towards free trade, and a main cause of differences between the economical interests of the two countries was thus temporarily abated; but the current of mutual jealousy and illwill nevertheless increased in volume, as, after Germany's commercial crisis had been surmounted, her industries eagerly thrust their products upon the British market[3].

In 1896, a bolt fell—if not from the blue, at least from what wore the appearance of a calm political sky. On January 3rd, the Emperor William despatched a telegram to President Kruger, congratulating him on the failure of

[1] Cf. Sir Charles Dilke, *op. cit.* vol. II, p. 483.

[2] He was then appointed ambassador at Constantinople.

[3] This view found expression in the *Made in Germany* statute, on whose commercial effects it is unnecessary to touch here, but the motive cause of which can hardly be held open to doubt.

the Jameson Raid, and expressing satisfaction that the Government of the Transvaal had proved able to maintain its independence without appealing to the assistance of friendly nations. Freiherr von Marschall did his best to minimise the effect of this singularly ill-conceived message, and even went out of his way to meet the wishes of the British Government in the matter of Egyptian war-finance. But the purport of the imperial telegram admitted neither of being explained away at the time, nor of being subsequently twisted into an intention of informing the Transvaal Government that an appeal on its part for outside support might, very possibly, have been made in vain[1]. That the anger of the British people would be deeply stirred, as it undoubtedly was, by this unwarrantable interference —all the more unwarrantable since it must be held not to have been designed to provoke an actual breach—was a foregone conclusion; in the quarrels of nations, as in those of the Olympic gods, it is the palpable which provokes discord. The circumstance that the British Government felt obliged to take the most decisive steps for dissociating the Empire from all responsibility for the Jameson Raid was in no way calculated to diminish the effect of the offending telegram upon British public feeling.

But, if the message to President Kruger implied that Germany, as represented by her monarch, intended to make her voice heard where strife was arising among the nations, and if its reception in England further showed that the Emperor, supposing his design to have been to make this intention clear to all and sundry, had not missed his mark in what could not but be the most sensitive quarter, the two Powers continued, to all appearance and to something more than this, on terms of friendship. Doubtless, there were reasons on both sides for caution, even after such a demonstration in the highest quarters. Germany's ally, Austria-

[1] See Reventlow, *op. cit.* pp. 75–6.

Hungary, was in the midst of a political crisis; and Great Britain had been, possibly for long, estranged from France by the Fashoda episode (1898). In the same year, a leading British statesman[1] made a public statement to the effect that British and German interests did not clash in any quarter of the globe; and, less than a twelvemonth afterwards, he positively pleaded[2] for the conclusion of a comprehensive triple alliance between Germany and the two great Anglo-Saxon Powers—Great Britain and the United States. So far as the action of the Governments concerned indicated, such a consummation seemed not impossible, and it was symbolised in small by the Samoan agreement (which happened to have become very necessary), in November 1899.

As for the United States, during their war with Spain, which broke out in 1898, public opinion in Germany was divided in its sympathies; and, though the German Government refused to take part in a joint note urging that of the United States to conclude peace, the visit of German men-of-war to the Philippines and the Spanish attempt to utilise their presence, brought about a coolness between the two Powers. This the Emperor William, with the aid of his personal friendly relations with Mr Roosevelt (from 1901) anxiously sought to remove; and considerable trouble was taken on both sides to bring about a good understanding —an object of great importance for the future relations between Germany and the United States, with their twelve millions of German inhabitants[3].

[1] Mr Chamberlain, at Wakefield (December).

[2] At Leicester, in November 1899.

[3] These efforts were not confined to the sphere of politics Prince Bülow notices, in this connexion, the Emperor's felicitous notion of an exchange (*Austausch*) among German and American university professors, by way of drawing closer the already existing academical connexion between the two communities. The foundation of the, politically more important, German-American National League

As for Great Britain, the German Government had repeatedly displayed its readiness to enter into negotiations with the British, based on the interests of both Powers. In 1899, Cecil Rhodes had paid a visit to Berlin, which had not failed to impress other imaginations besides that of the Emperor William, and in the course of which he obtained the concession of the requisite facilities in German East Africa for the execution of his great trans-continental railway project. Moreover, in the previous year, occasion had been found in the financial difficulties of Portugal to conclude an arrangement for the partition of her African possessions, should she think fit to dispose of them by sale, between Great Britain and Germany; and an agreement, which, however, never came into operation, had been signed by Mr Balfour and Count von Hatzfeldt (the German ambassador in London, in whom Bismarck had been wont to place exceptional confidence). In the spring of 1899, as has been seen, the Yangtse Convention had followed on the Chinese expedition, in which both Powers had taken part; and, in October 1901, overtures for an agreement of even wider range are said to have been made at Berlin[1].

That the German Government was at this time acting a double-faced part towards Great Britain it would be impossible to prove, though to avoid both subservience and antagonism was the present cue[2]. The year 1900, as has been seen, marked a notable stage in the progress of the German naval armaments; and, since October 1899, Great Britain had at last become involved in war with the Boers. Amicable relations between the two Governments had meanwhile con-

belongs to a later date (1910). The reason why the German arbitration treaty with the United States, together with others of the same kind, fell to the ground, was the claim of the United States Senate to have a voice in deciding what cases should be referred to arbitration.

[1] See, as to this, G. P. Gooch, *A Century of Foreign Policy*, p. 66.

[2] Bulow, *Imperial Germany*, p. 28.

tinued; and, before the close of the year, the Emperor William paid a visit to Queen Victoria. But the Kruger telegram had not been forgotten in the quarter to which it had been addressed; and, early in 1900, the Transvaal and Orange State Governments addressed a request for mediation to Berlin. The German Government replied that it was prepared to mediate, if requested to do so by both belligerents; but, about the same time, Lord Salisbury, in reply to an enquiry from the President of the United States, made it known that Great Britain was not disposed to accept the mediation of any foreign Power. It was afterwards said that the question of an intervention of a different kind was actually discussed between the German and the Russian Sovereigns and Governments; but nothing has been made public on the subject. Certain it is that, on the part of both the British and the German Government, great care was needed to prevent the consequences of the clamorous display of sympathy in Germany with the South-African adversaries of the British Government, and of the resentment which it inevitably called forth in this country. No doubt, such expressions of sympathy were, also, frequent in the Press of other foreign countries—including France and Russia; but none were more vociferous or persistent, or led to more vehement British journalistic retorts, than those of German origin. To these quarrels, which incessantly embittered the relations between the two countries it is sufficient to refer, without specifying instances of reckless invective of which the immediate significance was unduly, but not unnaturally, exaggerated. The journalistic campaign of these years rose to a height of violence often not to be reconciled with the responsibility which, in a free country at all events, lies upon the Press.

In the military operations of the Boer War, many Germans, landing at Lorenzo-Marques, took a direct part[1];

[1] See the courageous pamphlet by L. von Simmern, Wiesbaden (1900), which upheld the case of Great Britain in the Boer War, on

and the seeds were now sown of relations with the Boers, which, but for the loyalty of the great body of their community and its leaders, might with the help of a fresh propaganda, have at a later date proved disastrous to the British tenure of this part of the Union of South Africa[1]. But no collisions, except of a passing kind, occurred in this period between the two European Powers. In December 1899 and January 1900, a German imperial mail-boat was stopped in Delagoa Bay on a suspicion of contraband and subsequently detained at Durban, and in the next month three other German vessels were similarly seized. Much popular excitement in Germany followed; but the dispute was settled to the satisfaction of the German Government, which, in view of its proposed naval armaments, cannot have regarded these incidents as altogether inopportune. Later in the year, the same British Minister[2], who had not long since advocated a general alliance with Germany, thought fit to meet certain unwarranted German attacks upon the behaviour of the British troops in South Africa by a disparaging reference to that of the Germans in the French War, which provoked a disdainful retort.

The Emperor William's attendance at the obsequies of his grandmother Queen Victoria in January 1901, and his reception of King Edward VII at Wilhelmshöhe in the following August, should, of course, be looked upon as acts of kinship and courtesy. But, in the following year, an opportunity for active cooperation, though on a small scale, with the British Government offered itself to the German, and, in accordance with its consistently forward policy in naval matters, was seized by it with avidity. The British and

the ground both of right and of good policy for Germany. The same author has since published a larger work, full of sympathy with this country from his own (conservative) point of view.

[1] See E. Standaert, *A Belgian Mission to the Boers* (Engl. Tr. 1917).

[2] Mr Chamberlain at Edinburgh (October).

certain other European Governments, including the German, had claims upon that of Venezuela, both of a financial nature and for injustice and violence offered to their subjects. An ultimatum was, in August 1902, presented on behalf of the British and German Governments, and, no satisfactory response having been received from President Castro, the Venezuelan ports were blockaded by British, German and Italian ships. The Germans showed great eagerness, and one of their men-of-war blockaded San Carlos, even after negotiations for a pacific settlement had opened. These were carried through with considerable difficulty, certain of the questions involved being finally referred to the Hague Arbitration Tribunal.

While the method of carrying out some of the terms of this settlement by the United States Minister on behalf of Venezuela caused much dissatisfaction in Germany, the episode, though flattering to her self-consciousness, exercised no perceptible influence upon her relations with Great Britain. When that Power, in April 1903, guaranteed to Portugal the integrity of her African possessions, this was interpreted in Germany as prejudicial to her own African interests. In the Far East, the policy of the Anglo-Japanese alliance having indicated itself by the results of the war between Japan and Russia, it was, as has been seen, renewed in 1905; but Germany remained aloof—for there is no reason for concluding that the efforts of Baron Eckhardstein, the German *chargé d'affaires* in London, to bring about a triple alliance between Japan, Great Britain and Germany had been authorised by his Government. On the other hand, as already observed, Russia had no reason for complaint against Germany in connexion with her conduct during the Russo-Japanese War.

As has been seen, German statesmanship was now beginning to occupy itself with matters nearer home, and more especially with the policy of Delcassé, upon which, at first,

even Great Britain could not look without uneasiness. In June 1904, the Emperor William and King Edward VII met at Kiel, no doubt with some intention of showing that there was no present disagreement between their Governments; and when, in August of the following year, after the interview between the Emperor and the Tsar off the Finnish coast, a British fleet appeared in the Baltic, this was interpreted (and no doubt justly) as arguing, not the truth but the falsity of the rumours that the British Government proposed to land an army on the German side of the North Sea.

Meanwhile—and this is the element in the political situation of these years of international doubt and distrust which is least to be ignored, as it is most to be lamented—the jealousy between the peoples continued without abatement. This state of feeling was in every way nourished and fomented on both sides by the Press; and, though in this country only isolated voices called for an alliance with Russia against Germany or for an invasion of her shores while her naval armaments were still inchoate, there was no gainsaying the ominous growth of international illwill. At the root of this illwill lay, not so much German colonial policy, which, before 1907, had difficulties enough of its own to contend against, as the manifest and declared determination of German statesmanship, emphasised by divers imperial as well as ministerial declarations, to assert, whenever an opportunity occurred, and on whatever scale German interests might be involved, the claim of Germany to a leading share in shaping the future of all parts of the world. It was, at the same time, inevitable that the general progress of German trade and industry, due both to the effectiveness of its organisation and the thoroughness of its methods, should constantly excite an uneasy jealousy among those who were exposed to its competition. Political and mercantile ambition here went hand in hand, or the one subserved the other; for the history of the German com-

mercial propaganda of these years in all parts of the world, both the Old and the New, has not yet been more than fragmentarily written, and probably does not at present admit of being told in full.

With the year 1906, premonitory symptoms of a new era in the 'higher politics' of the world began slowly to show themselves. Signs had appeared in England of a strong wish in many quarters to manifest a feeling of goodwill towards Germany; the Anglo-German Friendship Society was founded in 1905; under its auspices a great public meeting was held in Westminster in December 1909, presided over by Lord Avebury, to protest against international animosity; and there took place a series of mutual friendly visits of ministers of religion, municipal authorities, journalists and working-men. The Campbell-Bannerman Ministry, in power since 1905, showed a genuine disposition in favour of peace, and sought to bring about a general reduction of armaments. The visit of the British Minister of War to Berlin, in the autumn of 1906, for the purpose of studying the organisation of the German army, could not but be regarded as a suggestion of the sincerest kind of flattery. The German Government still adhered to an attitude of vigilant observation; for its parliamentary position, and with it, the maintenance of its colonial policy, were still uncertain[1]. But both Government and nation in Germany were intently watching the development of the political situation which, as they feared, might deprive Germany of opportunities of intervening decisively in questions of world-politics; and it was to this feeling that Prince Bülow gave expression, when in a speech delivered on November 14th, 1906, he applied a term much bandied about in those days—the 'policy of isolation' (*Einkreisung*)—to designs against which, as he contended, it behoved Germany to be on the watch. The phrase, as denoting a definite intention or design, must be

[1] Cf. p. 357, *ante*.

characterised as a political figment; and a further imaginary element was added when the origination of this scheme was ascribed to King Edward VII[1].

In 1907, the new German naval law was passed, which secured to Germany the position of a great naval Power, towards which she had consistently aspired; and in the same year, as we shall see, the Second Hague Conference ran its course, leaving the question of armaments where it was. In March of this year, the Russo-British Treaty amicably arranged the territorial relations of the two Powers in Persia, together with certain other questions remaining to be settled between them. In view of the existing Anglo-French *entente*, a wholly new situation was thus created for the policy of Germany and her allies. On its development in the years that followed we must refrain from touching; but it may be worth while to reproduce, nearly in his own words, the account given by the unflagging recorder of Germany's share in the progress of the world's political history, during this period, of what he deemed to have been achieved by her and her Government in 1907[2]. The items chosen by him for mention and their frank juxtaposition are alike significant.

The last remnant of the Danish troubles had been satisfactorily settled[3]; the last outstanding dynastic difficulty (the Brunswick succession) had been finally regulated[4]; the great colonial revolt (in South-west Africa) had been completely suppressed[5], and the system of German colonial government had been placed on a permanent footing[6]. No treaties had been concluded at the expense of third parties, after the fashion of the agreements entered into by other

[1] The truth, as striking as it is simple, with regard to 'King Edward VII and Foreign Affairs' is irrefutably set forth in the paper reprinted under that title in Lord Esher's *The Influence of King Edward, and Other Essays* (1915).

[2] Schiemann, *op. cit.* vol. VIII (1908), *ad in.*

[3] Cf. p. 337, *ante.*

[4] Cf. p. 151, *ante.*

[5] Cf. p. 356, *ante.*

[6] Cf. p. 357, *ante.*

Powers, concerning Morocco, Egypt, and Persia; but Germany had preserved what was her own, and had taken care that the door should be left open where her commerce was desirous of entering. The name of Zeppelin had been immortalised by the acceptance of his invention; and peace had been preserved.

The last clause in this list of praiseworthy work done, or objectionable work left undone, was preceded by the statement that Germany, in 1907, had played an honourable part at the Hague in the interests of humanity as well as of sound common-sense. It may be permissible, by way of final comment on this, as it were parenthetical, assumption, to trace very briefly the action of Germany in connexion with the efforts made, during the part of the Emperor William II's reign treated in the present chapter, to promote the cause of international peace by means of international agreement. The two Hague Conferences, of 1899 and 1907, represent a new stage in the long-continued effort to prevent, by such means, sudden outbreaks of international hostilities, and to avert the danger of the constant imminence of such outbreaks. The Paris Declaration of 1856 had remained nugatory, and the informal efforts of unofficial friends of peace in various countries had proved inadequate. It was, therefore, now sought to carry on a more effective campaign on behalf of the Peace of Europe and of the world under the responsible authority of the whole body of civilised Powers, who should agree to carry into effect principles formally discussed and adopted by them. The main principles and methods now proposed were anything but new; and it was not in these principles themselves that lay the real difficulties which confronted the application of them.

The first of these methods was the limitation, or reduction, of armaments; and the adoption of this was proposed —from what special motive we need not pause to enquire —by the Russian Government, inspired by a sincere love of

peace on the part of Tsar Nicholas II. It was in response to this appeal that the First International Peace Conference met at the Hague in 1899. The conclusions reached by this Conference on the subjects which it had been primarily summoned to discuss were confined to a 'belief' and a 'wish' —the belief, that a reduction of military expenditure would be greatly in the interests, material and moral, of the world at large; and the wish, that the Governments would study the possibility of an agreement on the subject. Neither the German nor the French delegates were, however, prepared to subscribe without qualification to the view that the moral and intellectual forces of national life were being at present unproductively consumed, and that the armed peace of Europe had become a burden more and more difficult to be borne by the nations. It may be that the discussions at this Conference exercised some effect upon the German navy bill debates of 1900, and helped to bring about a reduction in the number of cruisers first demanded of the Government. But, at the Conference itself, the practical difficulties in the way of a general agreement on a reduction or limitation of military and naval armaments had proved insurmountable; and the discussions concerning it lacked the basis of reality which might have enabled the assembly to arrive at a substantial conclusion.

When, in June 1907, the Second Hague Conference met, with an attendance even more widely representative than had been that of its predecessor, the question of a reduction of armaments, which in the interval had met with rather haphazard treatment, was revived, if in no generally hopeful spirit, at least with the declared wish of one Great Power— the British—that a discussion on the subject should take place. Prince von Bülow, who was still in power, and his organs in the German Press, made the intentions of his Government very clear: it would take no part in any discussion on the armaments question at the Hague. Going to

the root of the question, he declared that the German Government had been unable to find any formula for meeting 'the great diversities that mark the geographical, economic, military and political positions of the several countries of the world,' or which would be calculated to put an end to these diversities, and at the same time to furnish a basis for an agreement. The German Press showed itself opposed to any proposal for a limitation of armaments, and suspicious of Great Britain's motives in furthering the idea, while the Russian *Exchange Gazette* declared it impossible for the European States to limit their armaments while Germany pursued a 'Chauvinist' policy.

There can be no doubt, that two considerations, one of which affected Great Britain and Germany in particular, interfered with a generally satisfactory settlement of the problem. On the one hand, Great Britain had throughout, in 1899 as well as in 1907, treated her naval preponderance as an axiom to be presupposed in any readjustment of naval armaments. On the other hand—and this was the most vital consideration—the maintenance of universal military conscription was regarded by a large body of German opinion, with which no Government could fall out, as that of an institution which for ethical and even for educational reasons must be kept up, while a due proportion must be preserved between the growing numbers of the population and the national forces[1].

Thus, at this Conference, Germany adhered to her position on the question, and thereby rendered that of France uncertain, while the delegates of the Russian and certain other Governments, on this occasion, did their best to bury the subject. Even the attitude of the United States, whose President, Mr Roosevelt, had so strongly insisted on the necessity of strengthening the defensive power of the nation, was not devoid of uncertainty. The Conference,

[1] Cf. Schiemann, VII (1907), pp. 85–6.

accordingly, on this head did not go beyond a renewal of the recommendation to the Governments represented to study the best ways of forming a practical plan for the restriction of armaments, and for securing an international *consensus* on the subject[1].

The question continued to be 'studied' in the years that followed; but here it must suffice to point out that, so early as 1908, Prince Bülow removed any remaining doubt as to the view of his Government. He put in an appearance (in August) at the meeting of the 'Interparliamentary Union,' in order, while claiming for his sovereign and himself the credit of being among the most determined advocates of peace, to announce that Germany had not the slightest intention of restricting her armaments And (in December) he spoke in the same sense in the *Reichstag*, when asked why the Government had declined to entertain proposals for the reduction of its naval armaments, adding that Germany's position in Europe was 'strategically the most unfavourable in the world,' and that her armaments were 'dictated by the necessity of her being able to defend herself on several sides at once.' The history of the question under Bülow's successor shows that the position assumed by him was maintained without variation by the German Government.

On the more complicated, if not equally pressing, question of the use of arbitration as a method of settling international disputes, its attitude was less rigid. In 1899, the members of the Conference assembled at the Hague (with the solitary exception of the Roumanian plenipotentiary) declared it to be the duty of the Powers to suggest the use of arbitration to States involved in disputes with one another; and a 'Permanent Court of Arbitration' was here-

[1] In the public comment on the Conference of 1907, the mystic word 'isolation' again played a prominent part. It was, in turn, represented as an attempt to 'isolate' Germany, and as one to 'isolate' Great Britain.

upon set up at the Hague. In this, Germany concurred, because—as the most elaborate history of the Hague Conference epigrammatically puts it[1]—this 'permanent' Court was not to be permanent. It was called together four times in double that number of years after its institution. Germany was among the States which concluded arbitration treaties of their own in the course of these years, and was a party in certain of the cases which came before the 'permanent' tribunal. One of these was a dispute with Japan, in which Great Britain and France were likewise concerned, as to immunities granted by treaty to the holders of certain lands (1902); another was a reference connected with the Venezuelan difficulty already[2] noted (1903). At the Conference in 1907, a strong feeling manifested itself in favour of taking a step further than the conclusion of special treaties of arbitration; and four of the Great Powers were found prepared to include a general treaty on the basis of compulsory arbitration in specified categories of cases, while a fifth assented at least in theory. But a sixth Power, while approving, under certain conditions and reservations, the principles of obligatory arbitration, was adverse to the conclusion of a general treaty of the kind proposed, and thus brought about the collapse, for the present at all events, of the project in its entirety. This Power was Germany, whose views were explained with much ability by her representative, Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein. He argued that awards of general international tribunals might dangerously conflict with existing treaties between particular States, or with the judicial verdicts of national Courts of justice[3]. Something might seem to have been gained by Germany's assent to the principle of compulsory

[1] J. B. Scott, *The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907* (Baltimore), 1909, vol. I, p. 443.

[2] Cf. p. 391, *ante*.

[3] See A. P. Higgins, *The Hague Conferences* (1909), p. 83.

arbitration, which was accordingly proclaimed by the Conference; but she had effectively prevented its being carried into immediate comprehensive action. She seems to have made no objection to the expression, by the Conference, of a wish for the addition to the Permanent Court of Arbitration of a further, more easily accessible, Judicial Arbitration Court; while she combined with Great Britain in formulating a scheme for the constitution of an International Prize Court, which was actually adopted by the Conference.

With these references to German action—positive and negative—at the Hague Conferences we may, without touching on its earlier or later effects, appropriately conclude this supplementary outline. On both occasions, she had, not demonstratively but firmly, declined to go outside that conception of her own national interests which had consistently characterised her foreign policy during the last two decades. A new political epoch was now at hand; would she mar its prospects, or shape its course? Her concentration of all the energies of her life and being upon the national idea had carried her forward to the place among the nations which she now held, and which she was openly intent upon maintaining, fortifying, and advancing. Whither the spirit which had mastered her people, together with its sovereign and his chosen counsellors, would carry them in the future, it was beyond the foresight either of statesmen or of political philosophers to foretell. Nor could it be predicted whether she would venture forth alone on the perilous path which might be opening before her, or drag after her, by concession or by bargain, a solitary ally among the Powers of the Christian world. As for herself, was it conceivable that the international laws which bind the community of States together, and the moral laws which are imposed upon humanity at large, would in the course of eventual conflict come into tragic collision with 'the German Idea'? If this was to be,

must the nation that had come to this pass take refuge in the generous saying attributed to a dethroned Prince, that it is not the peoples who are ever guilty[1]? Or would there remain for those long accustomed to look upon Germany as a leader in the advance of human civilisation the last hope of a future age when she, too, may take her place in a federation of peace and goodwill, stronger and more enduring than any of the empires of the past?

[1] '*Les peuples ne sont jamais coupables.*' Louis-Philippe.

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