

UNIVERSAL  
LIBRARY

**OU\_152071**

UNIVERSAL  
LIBRARY



**RED BANNERS  
OVER ASIA**



# Red Banners over Asia

---

O. O. TRULLINGER

PEN-IN-HAND • OXFORD

*Published 1950 by  
Pen-in-Hand Publishing Co., Ltd.  
25 Pembroke Street  
Oxford*

**PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN  
BY T. H. BRICKELL & SON, LTD.  
THE BLACKMORE PRESS  
GILLINGHAM, DORSET**

*‘No matter how weak the peoples of the East are, no matter how invincible the might of the European oppressors, who employ in the struggle all the miracles of engineering and military art, may seem, nevertheless a revolutionary war waged by oppressed peoples, if it really awakens millions of the toilers and exploited, possesses such possibilities, such miracles, that the liberation of the peoples of the East is now fully feasible.’*

LENIN, *Collected Works*, Russian Edition, p. 544



## CONTENTS

|                                                            |     |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| INTRODUCTION . . . . .                                     | ix  |
| 1. THE RED STAR RISES . . . . .                            | 1   |
| 2. KOREA : KEY TO JAPAN . . . . .                          | 7   |
| 3. WORKERS OF THE EAST, UNITE ! . . . . .                  | 13  |
| 4. JAPAN : GATEWAY TO PACIFIC DOMINATION . . . . .         | 23  |
| 5. CLAWS OF THE RED DRAGON . . . . .                       | 38  |
| 6. RIDDLE OF THE PHILIPPINES . . . . .                     | 53  |
| 7. HOW TO BE A COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY . . . . .           | 64  |
| 8. INDONESIA AND ITS SOVIETIZATION . . . . .               | 73  |
| 9. THE RED NETWORK IN ASIA . . . . .                       | 83  |
| 10. MALAYA'S GUERRILLA PARADISE . . . . .                  | 96  |
| 11. SUN YAT SEN'S THREE PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNISM . . . . . | 111 |
| 12. INDOCHINA : BRIDGE TO EAST ASIA . . . . .              | 114 |
| 13. FACTORS FOR UNITY . . . . .                            | 125 |
| 14. SIAM : LAND OF THE FREE—AND NOT-SO-FREE . . . . .      | 136 |
| 15. SICKLE AND PAGODA IN BURMA . . . . .                   | 145 |
| 16. RELIGION AND COMMUNISM IN SOUTH ASIA . . . . .         | 159 |
| 17. TIBET : LAMALAND AT THE CROSSROADS . . . . .           | 172 |
| 18. INDIA : AT RUSSIA'S MERCY ? . . . . .                  | 179 |
| 19. CEYLON'S RED PERIL . . . . .                           | 196 |
| 20. STEMMING THE RED TIDE . . . . .                        | 205 |



## INTRODUCTION

THIS book is devoted to a study of the planned Communist penetration of the countries of the Far East. In Europe, economic co-operation and the fear of totalitarianism by free peoples has combined to isolate Red activity ; in America, organised Communism remains relatively weak ; in the nearer East, a greater degree of political and economic stability has enabled democratic nations to make some sort of stand against the advance of the Red Tide. But in the countries of south and east Asia, the position is very different ; here, from the Russian frontiers with China to the outermost fringes of the Pacific, Asian peoples are in ferment. Newly-won independence, fierce nationalism, religious prejudices, the awakening provided by World War II, all have combined to place these lands within reach of the Communist claw. Here, the world's storehouse of every conceivable kind of strategic war material, the powerhouse of a majority of the human race, strategically commanding three continents, is the undeniable target for Moscow's agents.

As to how strong Communist power is in Asia, who are the Red personalities there, and what is the Kremlin doing, are questions that are examined and answered in this book. The essential difference between Western ideals and those of Communism in relation to the East can be summarised as follows : whereas Europe and America after the Japanese war largely desired the freeing of the oriental peoples, and their attaining of independence, Russia has stepped in, taking the project of world revolution a stage further : the Soviet Union and her agents are seeking nothing less than the capture of all Asia, and the canalising of her enormous natural resources, through harnessing her teeming labour force—then, according to orthodox Communism, the rest of the world could be taken at will. ' With the help of the East, we shall together reach the confines of the West,' Lenin's dictum, reveals the mind and the purpose of Communism's leaders in the fight for Asia : first round of the ideological battle for the world.

Three main considerations affect, therefore, British and

American interest in Asia, and particularly the first Red target—the Far East. As a world power, each country cannot remain indifferent to change taking place in the balance of forces affecting the Pacific and the Middle East. Believing themselves to be the main strongholds of the Western democratic way of life, they see that in a shrinking world outposts are as vital as the homeland itself. Finally, the sinews of war and peace—rubber, tin, quinine and a thousand other essentials—should not become the sole property of an ideology dedicated to the violent overthrow of the governments of the world.

South East Asia, like so many traditional geographical terms, is a misnomer in its current usage for the countries forming the western crescent surrounding the Pacific Ocean. Neither can Asia as a whole be taken as the subject of study in the kind of problems facing this Far East today ; and the 'Near' and 'Middle' Eastern countries are now in such close association with Europe as to defy the usual dividing-line which formerly disguised the fact that Europe is the true projection of western Asia itself.

The Asian lands of the Arab world, of eastern Turkey with Persia, are already facing the Red menace in their own way ; have already benefited from Western political and economic aid on a pattern greatly similar to that followed in Europe.

But the countries physically and culturally of the Far East, in spite of their varying characteristics of culture, politics and social customs, yet constitute one distinct and special area, by virtue of certain common factors. It is in the recognition of this fact that Communism has already gained a long start upon the democracies of the West. These countries are China, Tibet, Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya and Korea on the mainland ; the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan of the oceanic group facing Australia and the United States ; and Ceylon, India and Pakistan of the Western and British Dominion section.

In political development, almost all varieties of government are to be found represented. Japan is under military occupation, the Philippines and Indonesia are new republics, until lately Western-controlled territories. Some, like Malaya and Hong Kong, are colonies ; Indochina struggles in an intermediate situation in the nationalist—French, Communist triangle—while Burma, Tibet and others are on the verge of becoming

Sovietised. Revolution in all of them is either actually in progress, or being actively advocated by the Communists : some governments are strong, others weak, yet others apathetic, as in Siam. Similarly, their present economic conditions vary widely.

In raw materials, of course, many of the Far Eastern countries may be grouped as near-monopolisers of the world's resources. India and Pakistan between them control the jute market, Malaya and Indonesia are fabulously rich in rubber and tin, Siam in rice, Burma in oil ; Japan stands alone in industrialisation on the Western scale.

Fundamental in the assessment and combating of totalitarianism in Further Asia today is a comprehensive grasp of certain essential facts : for the problems of the East are not as those of America, Africa nor Europe. To a smaller, but important degree, too, the individual make-up of the country must be understood ; consideration of culture, mutual animosities—and above all religion—play a part so deeply anchored in the sea of the Orient that to disregard them would be worse than leaving unstudied the scope of actual Red penetration and its power.

In the following pages will be examined these characteristics of the Far East of today, with the factors for unity and freedom, as well as inherent weaknesses. Laying bare the fascinating story of the Communist struggle for power will lead us to some appreciation of the Communist theory that he who rules Asia holds the world. From this emerges our conclusion on the question : Must Asia be lost ?



# I

## THE RED STAR RISES

‘ The Communist revolution can be victorious only as a world revolution ’ BUKHARIN, *A.B.C. of Communism*, p. 138.

NOTHING succeeds like success in Asia : but one other thing comes very near to it, so near that it is almost indistinguishable from the real thing. From the very outset of the Russian revolutionary movement, a full awareness of the vast potentialities of Asia’s communisation, coupled with the application of certain psychological principles, has enabled militant Marxism to exist and thrive in countries whose traditions and rulership were inexorably opposed to it.

Although the revolutionary phrase of Marxism in Asiatic Russia is nearly as old as its activity in the Russian West, it was only after the first surge of Leninist revolt had succeeded beyond measure that the Soviets were able to project with complete efficiency their collectivism throughout the intensely conservative East of the Muscovite dominions. This established success of the Marxists in the occident was aided by a peculiar Russian attribute in its application to the East—and hence to all the other lands of the Far Orient. Russian emotionalism, symbolised in their literature and history, provided the ideal forcing-ground for the vainglorious boisterousness of fanatical communism. Fired by the ideal of Marx and Engels the Russian, dwelling upon their application to his own homeland, wept bitterly over the poverty, the disease, the injustices existing in his beloved country : from the wells of his melancholy ‘ I-love everybody ’ mental makeup, communism drew the forces to be utilised in the Red tide, which was later to engulf the entire area of today’s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This emotionalism, however, had a far less powerful appeal to the Oriental heart than to its earliest disciples ; and it was here that came the extraordinary phenomenon unifying once and for all the two minds. While the Russian was steeped in sorrow and a desire to fight, build and improve society for the

betterment—as he thought—of the human race's lot, the Easterner, wedded to a tradition of aesthetics and beauty, fell a prey to another part of the message. To him, communism as preached by the skilful propagandists of the new society, meant the realisation of the golden dreams of the East : the achievement of happiness, a full and worthy life. Once they had stumbled upon this talisman, the Soviet communists never looked back.

It is important, therefore, for those who desire to understand the real basis of communism and its appeal to the various peoples of the world, not to make the current popular mistake of thinking of Marxism and its application in terms of the loose label of an ' Asiatic ' system : it is not. While, with the fall of China and the rapid spread of communist philosophy among the countries of South and East Asia, there are today five times as many Asiatic as European communists, the spirit, action and programme of world communism is anything but an Oriental ideology.

It was inevitable that Russian Marxism would apply within its own territory the propaganda weapon of ' freeing the enslaved peoples,' natural that the message of Lenin should be palmed off to the suffering Georgians, Armenians, Turks, Tartars and Uzbeks as a panacea to destroy the evil Tsarist rule. This experience in sovietizing Russian Asia was to be of immense importance to the Kremlin's strategists in their attack upon all Asia.

Early recognising the need for unity with the masses of the Orient, Lenin's dictum that Russia would overthrow the West once she had allied herself with Asia symbolised her determination to dominate the world through Asia itself. From the outset, the Red revolution was undeniably a world revolution : it is a principle of communism that in no other way can the Ideal State—which eventually ceases to be a State—be built up, and the existing communist countries (especially Russia) be saved from the counter-revolutionaries.

The instrument of this world revolt was dedicated as the International : the worldwide communist body directing operations of the workers everywhere towards undisputed control of this planet : the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. But all this did not come into being at once : the First and Second Red Internationals—of the middle and end of the

nineteenth century—paved the way for the Third (Communist) International. This Comintern was founded by Lenin himself, in March, 1919. It was during the Conference setting up this all-powerful body that the Manifesto addressed to the workers of the world was issued.

Dominating the organisation, devoted to the inflaming of international Marxist-Leninist revolution, was the supreme directorate, the ECCI, with headquarters in Moscow, and under the exclusive controls of Russians and the communist Kremlin Government. The 'abolition' of the Comintern in 1943—which in reality merely masked a new phase of clandestine warfare against established society, gives added emphasis to the importance of a new organisation: the phoenix-like 'Cominform.' While the declared aims of the Cominform are far less controversial and revolutionary than the old Comintern, the fact that world communism's most aggressive and violent phase immediately followed its formation leave little room for doubt that the spirit and action—if not the name—of the Comintern are very much alive.

Whereas, as we have seen, communist propaganda has sought almost from the earliest years of the revolution to infiltrate, mobilise and employ the 1,200,000,000 people of East Asia, together with those of the rest of the world, this process has shown remarkably little sign of success until the present phenomenal series of Red victories—both present and in the foreseeable future. The event which has placed much of Asia in the focus of battling ideologies is undoubtedly the fall of China to Marxism. The geographical contiguity of Russia with China, and through China's borders with the rest of the East, has acted as an enormous stimulus to the Red fanatics of Asia. But even without this, even if China were to refuse communisation, the painstakingly-constructed organisation of Marxism throughout the Orient, each cell self-contained, each local effort projected with due regard for personal and group mentality, provides a lesson for the rest of the world in ingenuity of human effort.

While the East-West dialectical alignment has already taken place, and the Red and Democratic spheres are clearly marked in Europe and the Americas, it is in the Old World of the East that have come in for attention by both sides working

towards conversion of the undecided territories of Asia. The main objectives now sought by Russia in the Far East are threefold : manpower, raw materials, strategic military bases : the sinews of war and peace, the deciding factor in the coming battle of totalitarianism against freedom.

What is the orientation of the Asiatic communist towards the Red struggle for power throughout the world ? Reflecting Oriental communism's fanatical partizanship of Russian aims is the *Third World War Theory*, published by Sakirman, one of the foremost supporters of Asia-Russian collaboration :

‘ The ideological war has already been waged for thirty years ; four main phases being distinguished :

Phase One : 1917—1922.

Phase Two : 1923—1938.

Phase Three : 1939—1945.

Phase Four : 1945—End of World War Three.’

World War Three, according to Sakirman, has already started, and the combatants are the Soviet and communist peoples versus the capitalists and the West in general.

‘ Russia,’ he continues, ‘ emerged victorious from War II, proving to the capitalist world that the communists are capable and astute organisers in the political and economic, as well as military field. The prestige of the Soviets among the world's proletarians is considerable.

‘ All over the world the workers are strengthening their organisations for the coming period.’

At the same time as Russia has emerged successful, the communists believe that Britain and America—sharers in victory with the Russians—are on the down-grade.

‘ Moreover, the world has not forgotten Great Britain's attitude towards the weak peoples : England has tried to reinstate the former colonial system which was a danger to world peace. As the fore-runners of world capitalism, the USA and Great Britain continue their life-and-death struggle in order to win back their former positions. Both in England and America the communist trend continues to be the greatest possible danger : that is why Soviet Russia continues to be their greatest enemy.’

It is interesting to see here that Asian communists are led to believe that the Red threat to the security of America and Britain is greater than really is the case.

‘ Labourers and farmers ! Rise against the capitalists and

reactionaries ! The revolt must begin everywhere, particularly in the territories occupied or going to be occupied by Britain and the United States : India, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, China, Indochina and Indonesia.'

Here the agitator tells us that if the people of these countries do not rise, their lands will be seized by the capitalistic West ; therefore the revolt must be synchronised :

' The revolution in these areas should not be accidental. The USA and England have special interests in these countries in view of the life-and-death struggle which will presently start.'

This preoccupation with nationalism is frequently seen among the communist-led guerrillas of Burma, Malaya and Indochina ; we are rich, say the ' nationalist ' communists ; therefore the West is trying to rob us :

' Britain is particularly interested in raw materials essential to the conduct of war such as oil, rubber and tin. The bomb explosions and the roar of guns as a sign of the outbreak of the ideological war, have already begun . . . Soviet Russia's encirclement will not be complete until these areas are controlled by America and England.'

This aspect of Red propaganda in the Far East comes directly under the national department known as ' Agitprop — agitation and propaganda—in each area. Characteristic of the autonomous nature of Agitprop is its political opportunism. Between the two things there is a subtle distinction insofar as Russia is concerned : agitation can be carried on in any manner dictated by the local officer's discretion ; propaganda belongs to the world front of contemporary Russian propaganda, and may not be tampered with or altered in any way. It is in Agitation that ambitious communists are able to develop leadership for themselves : any issue that crops up locally is exploited and explained in the light of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Agencies for Agitprop activity are—in addition to money—films, pamphlets, books and lecture synopses ; in the case of propaganda, these are sent out in the form of directives and ' briefing-notes ' ; with regard to agitation activities, the local parties are given an allocation from the party funds for individual work.

Unparalleled in its fantastic success among the workers and peasants of the East, communist propaganda holds the field, however, mainly because there has not been the slightest effort made by the West to combat it. Films, poems, plays, booklets,

harangues pour forth from Marxist strongholds into the willing ears of the masses only too happy to be the objects of interest on the part of the glib revolutionaries. From Teshio to Timor, thousands of words a day are spoken, written and read by communists and their disciples ; the demand for Red books is on the increase ; if a man cannot read, he listens to group readings in his village or factory ; if he cannot afford a book, it is given to him. Of democracy, nothing is to be found. Even when he is given food and clothing by the Westerner, as part of the drive to eradicate want, he believes it when he is told :

‘ You see, why should he give you food ? It is because he is afraid —afraid of us, the people. How is it that he has clothes, food, money to give away ? Are the Western countries not poor in materials ? The reason is that he is living on you, and doesn’t want his livelihood taken away, and you to be rich in his place : rich in the fulfilment of the Socialist paradise.’

That these arguments succeed is only too painfully obvious. Neither do the Western anti-communist planners take into consideration the importance of bolstering up the existing, time-tested ideologies which have for thousands of years given to Asia just that stability it lacks today. Western propaganda goes by default. It is, too, a very different thing for an Oriental to be instructed in communism by one of his own people, and then to be expected to believe the present fulsome pronouncements of Westerners against Marxism.

By infiltrating into trade and peasant associations, by ceaselessly preaching communist ideals, by hard work and sacrifice, communism today is gaining support throughout Asia ; not only from the illiterate masses, but from those intellectuals who are thoroughly weary of the ideal-less materialism of the West. At least communism provides an ideology, an ethic and a noble concept for which to work, thinks the bewildered Oriental ; what has Europe and America to offer me ?

Through the unbiased examination of communist methods and success throughout Asia, by studying forces for unity and freedom already operating in the Orient, certain conclusions can be reached as to the way in which the Red menace can be halted. Under the present conditions of communist superiority of propaganda and planning, however, there is practically no hope of saving Asia.

## 2

### KOREA : KEY TO JAPAN

' We felt genuine love and tremendous solicitude wherever we went. In the Soviet Union we saw for ourselves the Soviet People's radiant path to Communism. We saw the well-to-do and joyous life of Soviet workers and collective farmers. We are fully determined to cement Korean-Soviet friendship and to do our utmost to get the Korean people to work in the same fashion as do the Soviet people.' KIM DU BON, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Korean People's Republic, January 18th, 1950.

HANGING pendulumwise between the Chinese mainland and the north of Japan's Kyushu Island in the south, Korea itself forms the dividing land between the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. Her only two international borders—with Manchuria and Far Eastern Russia—are in reality both frontiers with the Soviet Union.

Today two ideologies struggle in this bisected country : the Russian-inspired ' Peoples' Republic of Korea ' claiming suzerainty over the whole territory, first established itself beyond the 38th Parallel ; while the Republic of Korea—recognised by countries outside the Soviet Bloc, took over the territory to the south of that line. This bisection of the peninsula dates from the immediate end of the Pacific war ; formerly under Japanese control—under the name of Chosen—Korea was occupied by the Russian and United States armies in 1945 : Russia's right to a say in Korean affairs being established by her seven days' participation in the Far Eastern war. By mutual consent, for the convenience of military administration, the Russians and Americans withdrew their forces to either side of the 38th Parallel.

Although the Allied Powers had agreed to guide Korea to independence after a period of five years, within one year the Soviets had shown that their pledge for the freedom of the country had been merely a propaganda move ; and their determination to create there a satellite Soviet Republic led to the breakdown of negotiations with America in 1946. Concurrently with their obstruction of the West, the Russians had

actually communised the northern area under their control, putting the strong army and police forces under Red domination. Meanwhile communist revolutionaries from China and Russia itself—emigrant Korean malefactors—were encouraged to invade the American zone as well in infiltration movements. By 1947 the United States Government placed the entire matter before the Assembly of the United Nations.

This august body decided that elections should be held for the formation of a National Assembly of the Korean people, and deputed a Commission to supervise the voting. This, however, suited Russia not at all. Denying the U.N. Commission admittance to her sector, Russia tried through her agents to have that body expelled from the Southern Zone as well. In spite of these difficulties, elections took place in the south ; the new Assembly framed a new Constitution for the country, electing Dr. Syngman Rhee as President of the Republic of Korea.

While there has been considerable criticism of Dr. Rhee as the President of the new State, it is generally conceded that he is one of the few educated Koreans able to fulfil the task of guiding his country through the fires of East-West political intrigue. Born in 1875, and originally educated in Korean schools, he later embraced Christianity—for which many Koreans dislike him—and continued his studies with missionaries. At the turn of the century, the Russo-Japanese tussle found Rhee already working for the independence of his country, editing a newspaper and spending long terms in prison.

While still in his twenties, Rhee was compelled to leave his homeland, travelling to the United States, and continuing his academic work at Washington and Princeton universities. Returning to Asia, Dr. Rhee organised Korean resistance to the Japanese occupation with great success for a number of years from such strategical points as Shanghai ; warning the West of Japan's aggressive intentions towards Britain and America. It may be said that it was greatly through the efforts of this man that the leaders of the United Nations pledged themselves at Cairo during the war to the eventual achievement of Korean freedom. Such was his prestige in the country that, after the war against Japan, the Communists themselves attempted to win him over to their side by offering him the leadership of their Republic Party of the north.

While Syngman Rhee spurned this Red proposal, the agitators of the North had not been idle. Formed before the Southern regime came into existence, the Soviet Republic of the north, not content with exercising control over the country beyond the 38th Parallel, actually claimed that during the United States occupation they had held secret elections in the American area as well, and that these had proved that 77 % of southern Koreans wanted to be communists and to join the People's Republic !

The withdrawal of the official USSR and US armies of occupation by 1949 did not immediately cause the expected descent in force upon the south by the hundred thousand well-armed communists from the satellite state. The continued presence of the UNO Commission may have acted as a deterrent—or Moscow may not have been ready ; for her guerrillas had always operated freely throughout South Korea. The blessings of American food, technical aid, money and military experts were soon recognised by South Koreans as the only measures giving them a breathing-space before the communist descent in force of mid-1950.

In the year's lull preceeding this undeclared war, the relative situations of North and South were not particularly encouraging for democracy's future in the five-thousand-year-old State. While land redistribution and the reduction of taxes by the communists greatly contributed to their popularity among the people in general, indications that all was not well in South Korea were not wanting. Red agitation methods had succeeded in engineering—in addition to strikes, banditry and guerrilla warfare—two major revolts. Then came the rising of the Chejudo peasants, who rose in such numbers that they lost 10,000 killed before they were put down ; later, it took all the army's force to crush the six months' uprising of a regiment of mutineers. Throughout this period—starting in its violent aspect as far back as 1948—pressure against the personality of Syngman Rhee has been maintained : not only by the Reds, but by a large number of his opponents among the democratically-minded Koreans themselves.

Although South Korea's economic life is mainly agricultural, the uneasy peace did not give enough time for it to become self-supporting ; American experts advising Dr. Rhee's Government stating that it would take at least until 1952 for

self-sufficiency to be attained. This meant that the communists had to strike before complete social equilibrium had been restored, if their invasion of the South was to be accompanied by a revolutionary movement among southern peasants. American money and aid kept South Korea going ; as a counter-blow, Russia poured machines and technicians into the ' People's Democracy ' of the North. It would never do, thought Moscow, for the southern part of the country to prosper more under American advice than the north under the direction of Moscow and the theories of Lenin. Nevertheless, Russia was in no position to continue indefinitely supplying their entire requirements to the North Korean people ; for the main intention was the ' unification ' of the country : the reconquest of the South—and this had to be done as speedily as possible.

Paving the way for this aggression, an important pact was signed between the USSR and the puppet People's Republic. On March 17th, 1949, Kim Ir Sen, Korea's most virulent communist, took office as Prime Minister. Typical of the propaganda effort accompanying the upsurge of solicitude for Korea's welfare, is this impressive report :

' Taking the value of the goods exchanged between the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the USSR in 1946 as 100, in 1947 it was 204 %, in 1948, 357.7, and by 1949, 459 %. Soviet aid included capital machinery, coke, oil, factory equipment, electrical and agricultural apparatus.'

Determined to exploit Korea's resources, champion workers (Stakhanovites) have, it is claimed, stepped up industrial production from 100 units in 1946, to 377.1 units in 1949. While this type of jargon so beloved of the Russians is incomprehensible to most Koreans so far, one has been heard to remark : ' What are they doing with all those *units* in the North ? I never heard of them during my time—it must be something that Russia is getting out of us there.' Undaunted by any such temporary obtuseness—' There is nothing wrong with that fellow that Siberia won't cure '—the machine trumpets that light industrial production, in a magnificent effort, has reached 152 % of 1944 ; while overall industrial productivity rose by 293.4 % in 1949 from a miserable 100 units in 1947.

These were some of the delights of life in North Korea. Life is good, while America is nailed as the demon of the south :

‘The American imperialists, by means of their so-called Economic Aid, are converting the southern part of our country into a market for their sale goods ; they are robbing the country of its wealth, and are openly pursuing a policy of ruining the national economy of Korea. The American imperialists have for four years been clamouring about the so-called assistance and about ‘restoration and development’ for South Korean economy. But the more noise they make about the so-called aid to Korea the more disastrous is the chaos in the national economy of South Korea becoming, and the more terrible the poverty which the population is suffering.’

Communist figures purport to show how American aid ‘milks’ Korea : ‘As compared with 1943, the number of enterprises in South Korea dropped to 52 % in 1946, in 1947 it was only 45 %, in 1948 to 37 % ; while in the first half of 1949 it was 36 %.’ Russian-inspired figures are so difficult to check that it is impossible even to guess as to whether they are referring to dope-peddling enterprises which are thus supposedly crushed out of existence.

Kim Ir Sen, the Red premier, took up the cry against American Imperialism in Korea during his speech of March 17th, 1950, preparing the people for the invasion of the ‘intolerable’ South :

‘In 1949 the output of the engineering industry was only 5 % as compared with the end of 1945 ; the output of transport facilities was 8 %, of agricultural machines 9 %, of cement, 17 %. Even the output of the ‘most developed’ textile industry was only 13 %. The position of agriculture is a sad one, too. In South Korea the area of cultivated land decreased in 1945 to 87 %, in 1948 to 66 %, and in 1949 to 55 %.’

Then the dictator really lets himself go : ‘Thus, as a result of the barbarous and plundering policy of the Americans, pursued under the guise of ‘economic aid,’ the southern part of our country has been converted into a realm of anarchy, hunger and unemployment.’

The important thing to notice here is not so much the figures as the apparent success of Western aid to south Korea, which whipped up the agitator into such a frenzy : ‘It is clear to all to what position the southern part of our country will be reduced if this ‘economic aid’ publicised by the Americans

is continued in the future. It is therefore not accidental that the whole Korean people have risen in struggle to save the homeland from the piratical policy of the American imperialists, who are seeking to enslave our people and convert our country into a colony.'

That Russia, incapable of making her section of Korea compete successfully with the South, has instigated the Northerners to attack democracy's only foothold on Asia's mainland, seems implicit in the Red Premier's own words :

'The political and economic position that now exists in the South and North of our Republic makes the Koreans realise even more thoroughly the significance of the sincere aid rendered to the Korean people by the Soviet Union ; makes them realise even more thoroughly that the only consolidation of friendship with the Soviet Union will ensure the flourishing and future development of our homeland . . . The consolidation of the eternal and unshakable friendship between the Soviet and Korean peoples, thanks to the liberation and assistance by the Soviet Union, will further strengthen the international democratic camp and will make a valuable contribution to the struggle against the aggressive imperialists, the instigators of a new war.'

Although Korea's patriots, relying upon a national history stretching back before 2300 B.C., have consistently fought for freedom against foreign domination, the scathing invective emanating nowadays from the Red Republic has little in common with unalloyed nationalism. It can hardly be the voice of Confucius and Buddha that is echoed there today. For fifteen hundred years the Korean has cultivated the riches of his language in poetry, literature and patriotic works : none of them bears the slightest resemblance to the fantastic phraseology of Kim Ir Sen. But there is no difference in his speeches and any others from the Moscow lie-factory.

It has been said that occupation by communism at least has the merit that it teaches the creed to the people at first hand. Communisation of Korea carries with it even worse threats than this. Reference to any map will show the grave peril in which Japan stands from a Red Korea, and the resultant depriving of the West of the use of strategical naval and air bases of the greatest importance.

### 3

## WORKERS OF THE EAST, UNITE !

‘ It is impossible to achieve the liberation of colonies and dependent countries from imperialism without a victorious revolution : you will not get independence gratis ! ’ JOSEPH STALIN, *Address to the University of the Toilers of the East*, II, 1.

TWO main factors have combined to make Russia's interest in the orient and the Far East far greater than has generally been recognised hitherto. Of these, one is historical, the other opportunist. Throughout her history, the territory now called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been subjected to invasion and conquest from the extreme orient : the wild horsemen of Genghiz Khan and that great succession of Mongol chieftains held European Russia in terror for centuries, and impressed upon the Russian mind an enduring stamp of the power and potentialities of Asia. In her more recent history, too, both the Tsarist Empire and Soviet Russia have been able to expand their thralldom and colonialism only at the expense of the peoples of Asia : from the Central Asian areas of Bokhara, of Samarkand, and Turkestan. At the two extremes of their drive, the Russian rulers first came upon two further facets of oriental life that were to mould—somewhat eccentrically—all Russian ideas of the East. Firstly, with the Muscovite wave poised almost on the borders of India, Russia found here a paramount imperial Power, strong enough to cry a halt to her further advance : Britain stood astride the line of northern expansion into the rich lands of Asia. Farther East, the teeming millions of China and their contact with communism early convinced Lenin of the enormous power—moral and material—locked up within this vast land. Communised, China and the other Far Eastern lands could not only produce the greatest power on earth for Marxism, but would be able to destroy once and for all the strength of the colonial powers—and of Japan, Russia's hereditary enemy.

Further impetus was given to these predilections by the

flocking to Moscow of innumerable renegades from the oriental countries, bent upon invoking Soviet aid against their countries' European masters.

Bolshevist propaganda—which has been unparalleled in ingenuity and pertinence throughout its existence, and whose disciple was Goebbels—split the oriental question into two distinct categories : the communisation of the oriental peoples of the USSR itself, and the extension of collectivism among the colonial and semi-independent nations of Asia as a whole. Institutes and training centres were set up on Russian soil, almost before the guns of the Revolution had ceased their booming. By 1921 the first graduates of the 'Asian Peoples' Universities' were on their way homeward from the Soviet Union, and the struggle for Asia had begun.

Propounded by Lenin and enunciated in action by Stalin, the programmes for the unification of Asia's workers were given practical effect in the educational schemes which attracted devout oriental communists to the magnet of the proletariat's heaven : the Soviet Union. Since the projects for world revolt and the organisation of Asian workers was largely based upon Red experience gained in the field of Russian Central Asia, it was natural that, in these universities and training-centres, the curriculum treated Asia as a whole : students from Russia and 'foreign' Asia were admitted and trained together ; only the objectives were slightly different.

As Stalin himself put it :

' If we analyse the student body of the University of the Peoples of the East, it is inevitable that we see an interesting twin characteristic in its makeup : the fifty nationalities and ethnic groups represented today in the University is divided into two main groups. All the scholars are children of the East ; but this is too hazy a classification. And the two kinds of student are the direct result of their having evolved under two distinct types of environment. Group I are those who are here from the Soviet East : that is, from locations where the despotism of the bourgeoisie has been thrown off : it does not more exist. Here the labourers, the toilers are in power. Group II is made up of students who have come to join us from countries still ravaged by capitalism ; from colonial and dependent areas : where the intensity of imperialistic domination continues unabated—and where independence is to be gained, to be won from those imperialists . . . Therefore we have two main objectives in our work

at this University of the Workers of the East : First, the training of nuclei for work in the Soviet Eastern Republics ; the other objective is to train cadres for operations in the colonial and exploited territories, to work among the working masses of those lands. Our University here has one root in Soviet soil, and another in the colonies of the East.'

As the Soviets see Asia, there are certain inherent obstacles to communism, which must be combated, and for whose destruction all Russian-trained Reds of the orient have been specially briefed. First there is the presence of European power : either in the form of military and civil occupation—colonies and protectorates—and those suffering under alien economic domination. Next in the struggle for power in the Asiatic countries, communists have to encounter those of their own nationality who are not in sympathy with Marxism. These are labelled 'bourgeois supporters of the foreigners,' or 'capitalistic exploiters allied to the indigenous autocrats.' Therefore, in fact as well as theory, the communist workers' revolt throughout Asia has shown itself to be hostile just as much to the established national governments and religious groups of these countries as to foreign capital and administration : this follows from the nature of things as seen from a Red standpoint.

Stalin himself set the task of the revolutionaries of Asia :

1. To win over the best elements of the working class to the side of communism and to form independent communist parties.
2. To set up a national revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants, and the revolutionary intelligentsia against the bloc of the compromising national bourgeoisie and imperialism.
3. To ensure the hegemony of the proletariat in this bloc.
4. To strive to emancipate the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie from the influence of the compromising national bourgeoisie.
5. To achieve a bond between the liberation movement and the proletarian movement in the advanced countries (i.e.: the Soviet Union).'

Time and time again in the story of the progress of communism in Asia, these five points recur in the actions and speeches of the Red workers. They are even in a rough chronological order. First, a small number of workers are won over to form a Communist Party. Next, the Party forms a common front with any other leftish and dissatisfied organisations that exist. In

conformity with the instructions implicit in (3), these constituent bodies of the front are white-anted and infiltrated, thus securing the 'hegemony of the proletariat' and supremacy of the communist party involved in the 'Proletarian Front.' The fourth clause means nothing less than the detaching of the people from loyalty in their national leaders ; while the last means obedience to the dictates of Moscow, and synchronisation of action with all other communist parties. Deviationism is warned not to be too sure of its own power :

' No lasting victory can be achieved in colonial and dependent countries unless a real bond is established between the movement for emancipation in these countries and the proletarian movement in the advanced countries of the West.'

One of the most important organs of world communism in welding together the revolutionaries of the scattered Eastern countries was the Comintern—the Communist International—which was supposed to have been disbanded in 1943.

' The Communist International—the International Workers' Association—,' said the Constitution of the sixth Congress of the Comintern, ' is a union of Communist Parties in various countries : it is a World Communist Party. As the leader and organiser of the world revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the bearer of the principles and aims of Communism, the Communist International strives to win over the majority of the working class and the broad strata of the propertyless peasantry, fights for the establishment of the world dictatorship of the proletariat, for the establishment of a World Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, for the complete abolition of classes, and for the achievement of Socialism—the first stage of Communist Society.'

It was to the headquarters of the Comintern in Russia that the communists of all lands journeyed, seeking aid and inspiration.

Naturally enough, the existence of this powerful and sinister organisation located in a foreign nation's midst, prejudiced most other countries against the Soviet Union, deliberately aligning herself with the project of the violent overthrow of the governments of the world, and actively assisting traitors within each country to this end.

By 1943, in the middle of the war with Germany, Russia saw that it would be far more astute apparently to disband the

Comintern, gain the sympathy of the Western Powers, and carry on the same operations towards world domination in secret. Thus, in the middle of that year, the World Headquarters of the Communist revolutionary International in Russia issued a Degree :

‘ The Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International being unable in the conditions of the world to call a Congress of the Communist International, submits the following motion for the acceptance of the sections of the Communist International :

1. The Communist International as a directing centre of the international workers’ movement is to be disbanded ;
2. The sections of the Communist International are to be freed from the obligations of their rules and regulations and from the decisions of the Congress of the Communist International ;
3. The Presidium appeals to all the members of the Communist International to concentrate their strength on full support of and active participation in the war of liberation of the peoples and states of the anti-Hitlerite coalition for the speediest rout of the most cruel enemy of the workers : German Fascism its allies and vassals.’

Ratified by thirty-one sections of the Communist International overseas, the declaration and its results are interesting in showing up the pattern of Soviet intrigue. While the ‘ battle against the cruel enemies of the workers ’ continued, not one communist movement in any part of Asia ceased its zealous struggle to perfect the Party’s machinery and improve its position for the real and final battle : the overthrow of all non-communists. In Manchuria, Korea, China, Indochina, in Burma, Siam, Malaya and Indonesia, throughout the islands of the Philippine Republic, Red workers combined their resistance to the Japanese with the development and perfection of an organisation which today hurls the Red challenge to the rest of the world.

In this Marxian activity, the communist of the Far East followed closely the programme laid down by the Bukharin Plan, which functioned from the early part of 1924.

Centred in Bangkok, Capital of Siam, the Russian liaison of the Far East political strategy department has taken up the threads of this wartime effort. In Pekin is the All-Communist Headquarters, the clearing-house for military and political

information. It was here, in 1949, that the international conference of the communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions held deliberations designed to further the cause of the unity of the workers of the East.

‘The World Federation of Trade Unions,’ says Davidov, writing in the Soviet newspaper *Trud*, ‘has become a decisive force in the world trade union movement. The Peking Conference of trade unions of the countries of Asia and Oceania, has been a clear demonstration of the growing strength and authority of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Despite all the obstacles placed in its way, the Conference was attended by 141 delegates representing fourteen important national trade union centres in India, Iran, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand and elsewhere.

‘On the basis of a wide exchange of experience in the national liberation struggle and trade union activity, the Peking Conference has worked out a militant programme of action for the trade organisations of the countries of Asia and Oceania.’

In addition to the furthering of communist-dominated trade union activities, the conference decided upon greater assistance to the struggle for national self-determination and complete independence, the elimination of any racial, colour, national or religious discrimination in the trade unions of these countries; the introduction of improved labour legislation, and ‘provision for and defence of the democratic rights of the working people.’

Thus culminated in 1949 the two-yearly stocktaking of operations which had been commenced during the 1947 ‘direct action’ phrase of Soviet strategy: the engineering of violent revolt against established authority in East Asia.

At that time, the Oriental countries were flooded by tight-lipped, energetic Russian ‘purchasing agents,’ ‘cultural experts’ and other Russian operatives. The political nature of their assignments was not at first appreciated; to most of the representatives of the Western countries—more naive in their approach to world affairs—the disappearance of the Comintern and hangover of wartime universal adulation of Russia had sunk too deeply into their minds than to admit of a likelihood that these gallant allies were still the double-dyed villains that they had been exposed to be between the two wars. Even in the apparently innocuous trade contracts made by Russia’s commercial men, the militaristic motives began to appear before

long. In all the newly-independent and anti-Western countries, these operatives let slip certain facts. They were interested in buying certain raw materials ; Russia hoped to ' put one over ' the decadent West. Their large purchases of wolfram, tin, chemicals and rubber seemed to confirm a growing suspicion of Russia's ceaseless stockpiling of strategic materials : the fact that they were killing two birds with one stone, and working for higher stakes remained unsuspected too long in London, Paris and Washington.

An arch-plotter of all Soviet ' trade ' agents was a Trade Commissioner who took up his residence in Singapore in January, 1947. He wasted very little time. Three days later he was joined by a Soviet Comissar who arrived from Nanking, in China, bringing letters of introduction for a certain rubber dealer of Singapore. Having made their initial contacts, the two were reinforced in October by a third agent who then passed on to the scene of his further operations at Batavia ; where his efforts bore ripe red fruit. While their apparent trade interests provided ample opportunity for the comrades from Russia to meet all kinds of people without suspicion being aroused, it was said that some of their intimate friends were not altogether of a character likely to appeal to all trade agents.

The aniduous Trade Agent shipped very large quantities of rubber to the USSR—much of it having arrived in Singapore from Indonesia by suspected communist-run transport and routes. Apart from the Java and Sumatra materials, it was said that he was interested in buying almost any kind of running business, for spot cash. About this time ten million dollars was spent upon the purchase of a transport organisation with wide Asiatic ramifications in Singapore.

By September 1947, Plakking was transferred to Bangkok, and Red activities in Singapore were considered to have been put on a firm footing. A current communist project well under way is the formation of an airline with Red capital, which will ply between all the main centres of Marxism in East Asia.

Meanwhile, the third member of the group was making hay in Batavia. Known as the Red Loafer, this gentleman's activities were cloaked in the excellent character of man-about-town. Going from one bar to another, meeting his apparently harmless pleasure-loving friends in hotel lounges ; it was not until certain

facts came out that his real activities were suspected. This supposed good-for-nothing was proposing to buy hotels, had lent money to Government officials, getting repayments in secrets, and was said to have arranged for the purchase of fantastic amounts of raw materials for Russia. At the height of the suspicion, it was found that the Red Russian and some of his 'White Russian' friends had decamped, and their night-club headquarters was 'closed for repairs.' It has not opened since.

In addition to trade experts and newspapermen who never filed a story, other Russians move rapidly around South-East Asia. One day two self-styled 'industrial advisers' presented themselves at the French Embassy in Moscow, saying that they needed visas for Indochina, to attend an Oriental Trade Union Conference. When the French officials seemed sympathetic, they made the mistake of confiding that they were not so very interested or au fait with Trade Unionism; and that they thought that it would be a good idea to make 'contacts' throughout Asia, and conduct a 'study tour' of a kind that did not seem to commend itself highly to the French.

But the outstanding Russian overcome by the current Soviet wanderlust in the Far East is a certain Russian Colonel, whose official position is in no doubt. His travels are characterised by a strange reluctance to stop at his declared destination, and a marked tendency to break his trips at places which have been centres of considerable suspicion. It has been said that this gentleman is, in fact, the elusive chief of one zone of the *Razvedupr* : this organisation, whose movements are so obscure as to defy assessment of all its activities, is thought to be a sort of supreme command of Red operations 'in the field' in Asia.

Travel and the exchange of views is considered paramount as a means of the unification of ideas between the indigenous communist parties of the East themselves, in the welding of the Workers' Front. Indian and Burmese Reds journey ceaselessly between the two headquarters; the Australian and New Zealand parties send their delegates to conference held by communists in Asia, and on long goodwill tours.

An important milestone in South-East Asia's Red unification programme was the foundation in 1947 of the 'South East Asia League,' by delegates of the Red parties in Siam, Vietnam,

Malaya, Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia. The League's declared objective was the 'promotion of World Peace through the federation of South East Asia.' The all-Asia Conference of Communist Internationalism, held in September, 1947, provided the next step in the strategy of the Asian front. Held at Dairen, the Conference drew up a programme for action, to obtain intelligence, determined political action, and provided for unity in propaganda warfare. All expenses of travel and accommodation of the Dairen Conference were borne by the USSR.

Revolutionary Headquarters—as opposed to propaganda and intelligence—began functioning for Asia at Harbin (Soviet-controlled Manchuria) in November, 1947. Three hundred and fifty representatives at the first 'revolution-stimulating Congress' held under the centres' auspices hammered out their military programme. Only the following decisions from the meetings of the Congress are definitely known :

1. Self-government is the aim of all Asian communist parties.
2. The physical revolution must be co-ordinated.
3. The centre of the Far Eastern Cominform (Communist Information Department) is to be located at Wei-hai-wei.

Concurrently came the news that the Second Congress would convene in Khabarovsk (Russian Federative Soviet Republic).

The net result of this all-out effort following the Pacific war to unite all Red movements and their satellites under one banner, has been the virtual co-ordination of most of the Marxist parties in their programmes and action throughout the vast sweep of East Asia.

The Conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Australasia commencing on November 16th, 1949, in the Red Chinese capital, Peking, heard the important announcement that China will support all communists throughout Asia. At a mass rally on the 24th, Liu Shao-chi, second-in-command of Communist China's dictatorship, said that China had already undertaken the responsibility of shouldering the burden of aid to the workers of all capitalist countries : especially the colonial territories and semi-dependencies of Asia and Australasia ; he welcomed the 'gallant fighters of the wars of national liberation' of Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, Indochina and the Philippines. The setting up by this conference of a permanent co-ordinating Secretariat for communist effort throughout

Asia was thus characterised by Shankar Shelwanker, the Indian delegate :

‘ Is there any doubt that this liaison bureau will be the General Staff to co-ordinate our resolute march towards victory ? I think we must unanimously, wholeheartedly, and seriously support the formation of such a General Staff for our part of the world.’

In this way the communists of Asia have forged the links of unity in their struggle against capitalism and the Western Powers. It must be remembered that, with the attainment of independence of many Asian lands, and the appearance of new Asian communist states like China and Korea, the Eastern pivot of Red intrigue is losing its exclusively Russian character. While Russia is helping, and is pledged to assist still further, the efforts of oriental Reds to overthrow their Governments, she no longer allows her policy to be open to question as one designed to extend Russian control over the new Red Empire. By this astute move, the Soviets hope to combat the Western contention that communism in Asia means Russian domination.

Two things, therefore, can be the possible outcome of this shift in Soviet strategy. While the Russian hand will always be there, while Moscow will not permit any Asian communist party to adopt national communism on the Tito pattern—if she can help it—there may be some sort of swing towards purely national Marxism among the Orient’s highly individualistic people. So far, however, whenever there has been any sign of a split on these lines—as in Japan and Indonesia—history has shown that the toughest and strongest elements have prevailed within the Party : and these have invariably been those fanatics who are dedicated to the Russian leadership of the world.

## 4

### JAPAN : GATEWAY TO PACIFIC DOMINATION

‘ Revolution is impossible without a nationwide crisis, affecting both the exploiters and the exploited.’ LENIN, *Selected Works*, X, 127.

CONTRADICTION dominates the struggle of Japan against Communism, equally as incongruity seems inherent in many situations in the Orient today. While the mass of the people openly pay homage to the Emperor—though he has himself on America’s prompting denied his divinity—yet the Communist, anti-Emperor, Party, can muster a large following among organized labour.

General Douglas MacArthur, uncrowned King of Nippon since 1945, still remains—though the head of a foreign Occupying Power’s forces—apparently greatly esteemed by the people, whose nationalism and royalism appears little affected by the strength of America in Japan.

A further apparent conflict lies in the fact that when the Western Powers sought to sign the final peace with the Japanese, Russia refused ; when Russia later demanded the signing of a pact, America was reluctant. This, however, is the most readily understood of the paradoxes of modern Japan. The determination of America to remain in occupation of Japan was rooted in logic applied to hard fact. Russia refused to come to terms on a Japanese treaty as part of the waiting game for resentment to simmer against the Western occupying forces. She pressed for it as soon as she was sure that the time was ripe for a Red revolt to seize Japan with her industrial potential unrivalled in Asia : this time it was America who rejected the opportunity, for the same reasons that the Russians wanted it.

The establishment of Japan’s Communist Party dates from early 1921, when its activities caused it immediately to be banned. The political theories of Marxism being inimical not only to the

Government but to the very foundations of Japanese life, the Party made little headway in pre-war days, in spite of sustained Russian sponsored activity among the teeming industrial workers. By the time of the outbreak of the Pacific war, most of Japan's chief Reds were languishing in jail, and the Government secret police—the Kempei—aided by counter-espionage branches of the Foreign Ministry, had the Communist problem well under control.

By April, 1946, however, so great had been the political upheaval in the interim, the Communist Party of Japan polled over two million votes in the general elections, which they increased by 1949 to nearly three million. Something obviously had happened in Japan during the occupation's early days. Stamped out before the war, the Party's present membership is two hundred thousand official members ; three million workers support the party, while the Reds possess newspapers, unions and ample funds.

As usual, many factors were taken advantage of in the post-war situation to build up and develop this powerful Communist machine. As early as October, 1945, General MacArthur was ordered to have all political prisoners released. While this liberated many unjustly imprisoned people and friends of the west, it equally indiscriminately set free a bunch of Japan's toughest Red veterans, many hardbitten Moscow-trained revolutionaries.

In pursuance of the American policy of teaching democracy to the Japanese, the occupation authorities permitted the regrowth of the Trade Union movement. By December, 1945, the Japanese Diet—the Parliament—had passed a law legalising the removal of all restraints upon the formation of unions. The union movement in Japan, first target of her prewar Reds and formerly crushed by the Thought Police, revived with a burst of Marxist-inspired activity.

Unemployment of twenty per cent. of the country's industrial workers created the necessary curiosity among workers to hear more of the panacea offered by Communist agitators ; some joined unions, some the Communist Party of Japan.

Discontent within the ranks of Government employees caused strikes so grave that Prime Minister Yoshida was compelled to discharge numbers of white-collar workers, while

General MacArthur, as Chief of the Occupation, had to permit in this crisis unpopular laws prohibiting certain kinds of strike. Both the strikes and fomented trouble against the anti-strike law of 1946 were engineered by Communists.

The feudalistic agricultural structure of Japan, where overpopulation and malnutrition are equalled by the inexorable domination of the landless peasants by large landowning interests, provides another rich field for Communist agitation among millions of rural toilers.

Alone upon the horizon of the nation's well-being is her remarkable export revival ; and it is to defeat the resurgence of Japanese industry and the stabilisation of her economy by these means that the present Red drive is directed.

A primary cause of the growing underground hold of the Communist Party is undoubtedly intensive Russian support. American and Japanese anti-Communist workers have unearthed proof of large sums spent by the Reds originating in Moscow or Russian-held territory. In propaganda, Stalin's men have greatly aided the Party within Japan. The repatriated Japanese prisoners from Russia had been very thoroughly indoctrinated, and are designated as the future Red Army of Japan. Bewildered relatives standing at the quaysides to greet their warrior menfolk were greeted by massed clenched fists ; while the disembarking repatriates were immediately hustled to the well-organised rest centres set up by the Communist Party. Making much of her alleged kindness to Japanese prisoners, Russian propaganda professes to sympathise with the ' helpless people of Japan—victims of American exploitation ! '

Since 1946 the Russian representatives on the Allied Council are said to have been closely in touch with the country's own Reds. After the war, the Japanese communist evil genius, Sanzo Nosaka (incidentally a close friend of China's Red Stalin, Mao Tse Tung) arrived from Russia to take charge of the network in the land of the Rising Sun. Coming from a middle class environment, Nosaka's first encounter with hunger was when his father's business failed. From the uncertainty and bewilderment of a newly-impooverished home, the young man mixed at Keio University with students of leftist ideas. In spite of his rich uncle's plans for a career in commerce, the youth found his panacea in communism, and the year 1910

found Nosaka active in the Japanese Trade Union movement.

At the end of World War I, Nosaka drifted to the London School of Economics—then said to be a stronghold of left-wingers—studying under Clement Attlee, later Labour Prime Minister. Home in Japan by the nineteen-twenties, the Japanese revolutionary came into too-close contact with the dreaded Thought-Control Police ; jail followed between 1923 and 1928.

Somehow in 1930, Nosaka escaped the vigilance of the Emperor's spies, fled to Russia, and there graduated as a fully-fledged communist agitator. By 1940 he was in Yenan, the guerrilla capital of Red China, home of the leader Mao Tse Tung ; and in early 1946 he was back in Tokyo, undisputed chief of militant communism in a disturbed Japan. This time his programme was to unite all left-wingers in a communist front lineup.

Able abetting him are two other sinister figures : Kayuchi Tokuda, the Party's trusted Secretary-General, and Yoshio Shiga, a doctrinaire agitator par excellence. These men lead the antidemocratic forces, plan to become the dictators of a Red Japan. "We shall not have to change the flag," Shiga is reported to have said, "a red rising sun is just as good as a red star." Perhaps unjustifiably, this attributed remark has been invoked to support the thesis that Japan's communists may be contemplating a policy of eventual separatism, on the Tito pattern.

Russia's greatest hatred for Japan is rooted in her traditional fear of invasion, the memory of the defeat at Port Arthur and the struggle to prevent a democratic Japan becoming the focal point of Asian resistance against communism. In addition to this, even the late war has not entirely expunged from oriental minds the former admiration for Japan as the solitary evidence of Asia's ability to lead in industrialisation. Communised or democratised, the prestige of Japan will probably remain high for some time in the orient ; and therefore the side winning the cold war for political power there will have this undoubted propaganda advantage.

Afraid that America will rebuild a strong Japanese army, Moscow propaganda has set out to get as many 'war criminals' as possible tried, in order to shatter the military leadership of Japan. Most high-ranking Japanese officers in

Soviet hands—except the fifth columnists in the secret Russian-based ‘ free Japan ’ army—have been executed for alleged war crimes. In December, 1949, a large batch of such officers were killed in Russia after a trial accusing them of waging bacteriological warfare against the Soviet Union and her allies, ‘ which the Soviet Union’s complete defeat of Japan fortunately unmasked and halted.’

Among alleged war criminals currently demanded in official Note by Russia for extradition are : Emperor Hirohito and Generals Ishii, Kitano, Wakamasu and Kasahara, ‘ exposed as having committed terrible crimes . . . the use of bacterial weapons . . . plague, cholera, typhus, glanders, anthrax . . . on the direct orders of Emperor Hirohito,’ runs the Russian allegation.

Russian impatience and anxiety to have these men executed had, of course, to be justified ; this she does by neatly claiming both the capture of the entire Japanese bacteriological warfare units, stating that their officers have confessed and implicated Hirohito et al—and rounds the matter off by stating categorically that it was the victorious Red Army of Russia—not the atom bomb—that caused Japan’s surrender :

‘ The heroic Soviet forces forced Japan to capitulate unconditionally. Led by the Great Stalin, the Soviet people saved mankind, saved civilisation from Hitler barbarism, from the monstrous crimes of Japanese imperialists.’

A paragraph of the Moscow paper *Pravda*’s editorial is interesting :

‘ The active organiser and inspirer of bacteriological warfare was the Japanese General Ishii, who has now found solicitous patrons in the headquarters of the American occupation troops in Japan.’

Internally, it is in the 36,000 trade unions that the Reds see the next chance for their agitation. Of their seven million combined membership, so far not many more than half are pro-communist ; but it is a principle of Red organisation that, man for man, communists must be more active than ‘ degenerate liberals ’ ; thus, while Rightist union membership tends to remain constant, that of the extreme left is constantly growing. Perfectly in harmony with official Marxian dogma is the present accentuation of the ‘ class war ’ argument in Japan, and insidious Russian aid to the Communist Party of Japan.

Equally, the American authorities are convinced that the democratisation of Japanese organised labour holds out the country's greatest promise for future political stability. The next period in the evolution of the welfare of the working people of Japan—even now relatively unused to collective organisation—largely depends upon whether they become politically mature enough not to be misled by communism's contention that workers' solidarity is only the prelude to revolution. So far the workers of Japan have, however, shown themselves anxious to absorb democracy's lessons and apply them. General MacArthur's task is to see that the communists are not only prevented from doing harm in their infiltration of political bodies, but also to contrive the unmasking or destruction of the movement itself.

In the coming struggle between labour and capital in Japan, it is hoped by Tokuda's men, will find democracy too fragile a plant to withstand the blast of big business on one side and red-inflamed workers on the other. While the great family monopolist trusts are allegedly broken up, there are definite signs of their being re-formed, even while the occupation itself remains. Political freedom, while giving every chance to democrats, also provides an opportunity for the communists to intoxicate the backward workers with the heady wine of Marxism. This can only mean with the present trend, a Fascist-Red revolution between indoctrinated workers and hungry peasantry fighting the massed forces of the right : the royalists, capitalists and army.

None of the main religious elements so far has shown a sufficiently firm approach towards the problems of communistic materialism ; this is partly due to the inherent characteristics of the religions strongest in Japan. The national cult of Shinto, bound up with Emperor-worship and the cultivation of war, has been weakened in its nationalistic aspect by its very renunciation of aggressiveness and the denial by the Emperor of his divinity. With the exception of the older generation, intellectuals are inclined to atheism or to seek a more monotheistic and transcendental explanation of life : while the bewildered hierarchy of Shintoism has been completely unable to adapt the faith to one or other of these requirements.

Japan's other main religion, Buddhism, being negative and

resigned where Shinto is active and aggressive, has still maintained its following ; but, just as it acquiesces in the occupation, so—observers think—would it follow Buddhists elsewhere in subordination to communist rule.

An important phenomenon of the deep-seated disruption of Japanese religious life was the large-scale increase in new religions and sects concurrent with the parallel spread of atheism. After the war, Shinto had split up into eighty-five sects, as against its thirteen former branches, reflecting the desire of its followers to adapt to changed conditions. The Buddhist community likewise doubled its different denominations by 1948 from fifty to one hundred distinct sects.

In addition to this upheaval in traditional religion, numerous fantastic creeds based upon personalities, miracle-cures and the like have sprung up—among them a registered religion called 'MacArthur-Worship.' The rise and fall in the numbers of their adherents mirror the uneasiness in the Japanese mind. While the membership of the new and sectarian religious groups fluctuates, the total number of people involved in this drift remains constant ; thus indicating that it is one section of the population that transfers its allegiance from one creed to another in the search for comfort.

Christianity too has been the object of interest by these seekers after truth. Centred in Atom-bombed Nagasaki, officially-recognised Catholicism is strengthening its organisation ; while Japan's 2,104 churches split the Christian community into no fewer than sixteen denominations. The strong swing away from polytheism and excessive ritual has, however, to a great extent offset the disadvantages of Christian disunity in Japan. Japan's small Moslem community, centred upon the Kobe mosque, is experiencing a renewed interest in its monotheistic religion ; Islamic preaching here, as in most other areas of its propagation, is gaining ground. Both of these two groups—the Christians and the Moslems—fundamentally opposed to communistic antigodism—though small in numbers are more firm in their anti-Red stand than the Shinto and Buddhist hierarchy. Their main drawback to the Japanese mind is that they are foreign importations, and fairly recent ones at that.

Although the fall of China to communism has brought the

Soviet propaganda drive still closer to their islands, the traditional hatred of Russia and distaste of China goes far towards blocking any chance for Japanese support of communism if it is projected from these countries, or openly by their nationals. This is among the reasons why Japan's Reds sedulously avoid making known their contacts with Moscow and Peking.

At the same time, while such liaison, inspiration and monetary aid flow unceasingly to the Marxian plotters of Japan, the country's unstable party political life shows all too clearly that the almost universal acclamation of American democracy may not be taken as entirely genuine.

The Japanese mind is in reality the embodiment of the Jujitsu mentality. Yield, it says, in order to rise again ; use the strength of your opponent against himself. Interpreted on the basis of the American occupation, this means that the Japanese see only gain in pleasing the United States ; but do not necessarily feel that they must understand the philosophical background of democracy. This sentiment identifies the welfare of the average Japanese by ensuring continued protection for Japan against Russia and China.

If, then, all the machinery of democratic government has been established, free elections take place, the police-state terror removed, what will be the effect in the resultant vacuum of political thought ? This is the riddle to whose solving the communists are devoting themselves. The answer, for the Reds, is that the uneducated masses must be convinced that their good, that of the country and of their culture, lies only in communism. To the free governments of the West, the reply is that the growth of a truly democratic feeling forestalling Marxist action on a large scale must be accelerated : if Japan's eighty million people are to be saved and their renewed threat to the West defeated in advance.

The two soundest measures for creating conditions under which this advance to democracy could take place have already been appreciated by the United States Government. These involve the ruthless suppression and containment of communist activity, and the amelioration of the appalling material conditions of the masses.

Significant in helping Japan towards self-help was the

renunciation by America in May, 1949, of all material reparations from Japan. Though criticized by the delegates of China and the Phillipines, the US continued this farsighted policy. Similarly, General MacArthur's administration ordered the Japanese Government to accord full protection to the trading rights of foreign nationals, and other economic measures designed to increase the commercial health of Japanese trade with the outside world.

How closely these measures were linked with the East-West cold war and freedom was revealed in the State Department's statement clarifying the position. America's foreign office emphasised their desire to further the interests of democracy for the Far Eastern and other nations involved by this step. Over 1,000,000,000 dollars had been spent by the United States in carrying the entire burden of economic aid to Japan for four years ; the taking of further, non-military, reparations from that country would only weaken its economy and hence delay the attainment of sound living standards for the people at large.

Combined with American support over the reparations issue, the Japanese Government itself commenced a programme of austerity. This provided the opportunity for communists to hit back. Unessential railway and Government employees were dismissed under this plan, the workless being incited to violence by Red agents, particularly repatriated former prisoners of war from Russia.

Strikes were widespread, bombs thrown, trains derailed and sabotage of all kinds effected during May, June and July, 1949. The communists, however, proved to have been testing their strength, rather than aiming at immediate revolution ; just as in 1947 and 1948 they had staged annual strikes and disturbances. It has now become a byword in Japan that their yearly 'birthday celebrations' take the form of communists testing their organisation—and equally trying the power and determination of the Japanese and Occupation authorities to overcome them.

Typical of the Japanese brand of communistic fatalism is a strange psychological kink in the Party's method of assuring themselves of complete loyalty among members and their continued secrecy. It is reported that the Japanese Reds carry out few purges of undesirable members themselves—unlike their

counterparts all over the world. Instead, to test the watertightness of the Red front, they are said actually to attract counter-espionage, to encourage police raids and security swoops upon their cells and headquarters. This policy of 'devil take the hindmost,' they say, effectively lops off weaklings and brings out traitors into the open.

It is a truly Japanese tactic to use the enemy's strength to fulfil one's own ends. After the storm, of course, the intact cells are known to be sound and unsuspected ; broken ones being re-established.

Meanwhile Russian propaganda is assiduous in its wooing of the Japanese masses, claiming that America is preparing for a new war from which Japan will be saved only by joining the Red partizans of peace. As a typical outburst designed to allay Japanese fears of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of 1950, Moscow's official paper *Pravda* editorialized :

'The basic aim of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty (of February 14th, 1950) is to prevent a repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. There is hardly any need to prove how real this task is today when, sponsored by the American Occupation authorities, reaction is becoming more and more brazen in Japan and is openly declaring its revanchist aspirations, when American imperialism is straining every effort to convert Japan into its strategic springboard against the USSR and against People's Democratic (Red) China.'

As part of the world propaganda by means of which she tries to represent herself as the saviour of the masses, and to give added strength to her supporters in Japan itself, the Soviet Government employs tactics of obstruction and criticism of US policy—both in Japan and in the international sphere.

Tokyo's prompt anti-strike action on April 30th, 1949, was so immediately effective in breaking communist-led disturbances that Russia felt she had to intervene. General MacArthur was verbally attacked by the Soviet members of the Allied Control Council for Japan ; in Washington's Far Eastern Commission, Russian delegates demanded that Japanese police methods be investigated. Moscow's General Derevyanko, writing to General MacArthur in June, alleged that Japan was delaying democratization, was violating human rights, and employed

repressive police action to crush the labour movement. Two days later, General MacArthur came forcefully down on Russia for aiding the Reds in Japan, in his energetic refutation of Kremlin allegations. General Derevyanko, MacArthur charged, was attempting to 'incite an irresponsible and unruly minority against the duly constituted Government of Japan.'

Soviet orders went out to the USSR ambassador at Washington—Panyushkin—who alleged before the Far East Commission that Japanese police used violence against strikers, and that the anti-strike laws were unjust. How strongly US-sponsored anti-communist action was hurting Russia could plainly be seen behind this widespread Soviet activity in support of the hard-pressed Japanese Communist Party.

While leftwingers brand MacArthur's administration as reactionary, conservative elements equally vehemently call him a liberal, too liberal; and thus the General's speech of September, 1949, was opportune in shedding light upon the complicated Japanese internal situation.

The transition from pure occupation of a defeated enemy to a position of collaboration between the two nations had already been marked in the General's August 6th speech announcing the important fact that the duties of the occupation forces had been completed. The fourth Japanese surrender anniversary statement of September 2nd, therefore, was eagerly awaited. Democratic Japanese, communists and Asian observers alike welcomed this opportunity of clarification on Japan.

The past four years, said the General, had been fruitful of progress; today Japan might be viewed as a symbol of hope for less fortunate peoples overwhelmed by the despotic rule of coercive force. In spite of the continued occupation of their land, the Japanese knew that they had full personal freedom, and that in their efforts they would serve no other cause than their own.

Everywhere in Japan's reconstruction effort, the past year had been one of heightened progress. The assaults of the communist minority had been effectively repulsed—by public opinion, not by repressive police action. The threat of communism as a major issue in Japan's life was past, continued the General; though he did not need to mention that this lull would continue under present conditions only during continued

occupation. His request to the Japanese Government in May, 1950, officially to outlaw the Communist Party in Japan, provided proof that the power of the Reds was by no means broken.

In politics, General MacArthur referred to the progressive gains made in preparing a 'system of government truly representative in character.' Autocratic administration could be forestalled by the decentralisation of local administration offices. A public morality has grown up in Japan, which refused to allow corruption, and recognised individual duties in the government of the country.

Economically, the alleviation of certain bad living conditions had reduced crime and largely eradicated the causes of social unrest common throughout Asia ; greater equality of opportunity had fortified the people's mind against political extremes. The reorganisation of the police had greatly improved their power to maintain law and order ; the danger of the re-emergence of a police state was non-existent.

'Japan,' he continued, 'is still in transition from an economy of survival to one of health, but the past year has witnessed significant progress along a broad front. Foremost of the gains made lies in the development of a more positive leadership and in an increasingly informed public opinion.'

The two great tasks successfully tackled and referred to in General MacArthur's speech were land reform and the breaking of the monopolies—evil effects of both having forced large numbers of peasants and workers into sympathy for communism. In the forefront of the minds of those interested in Japanese conditions vis-a-vis communism, however, was the anxiety as to what extent these economic reforms had been successful, had penetrated into the complex financial structure of the capitalist interests. In spite of all efforts, it is evident that there is still great rural distress ; landless farmers still exist on the most meagre diet ; workers still can feel that their conditions could be improved. The social conscience implanted by American democracy among the Japanese people, unless accompanied by a complete amelioration of the causes of unrest, can be just as potent a Communist weapon as one for democracy. Democracy works by evolution ; and hence slowly ; communism claims to get the same job done faster. Faced with these two opposing

creeds, the poverty-stricken Asiatics can quite easily be led into the Red fold unless democratic propaganda is followed by comprehensive action. The peasant must see that democracy means freedom, and above all, a better way of life. To this problem the Americans have addressed themselves :

‘ The fruition during the past year of the plans laid down by the Occupation and carried out by the Japanese Government to remove, through Economic Decentralization Programme on the one hand, and the Land Reform Programme on the other, those barriers to the existence of a free society, has established in Japan the economic basis for the existence of a broad middle class which, having a stake in the economic wellbeing of the country, will support the ideal of democracy as their way of life and will reject with scorn any will-of-the-wisp economic utopias which require the surrender of the individual’s freedom to the State.

With patience, fortitude and self-discipline the Japanese people withstood the privations of the immediate postwar period, with comparable energy, industry and hope they are now launched on the task of making Japan once again self-supporting.’

The substantial political and economic progress made in Japan by the Occupation coupled with the holding in check of many aspects of communist activity, caused Moscow to embark upon a new line. At the beginning of 1950, the Cominform’s official journal, as well as the Soviet government paper *Pravda*, switched the attack upon a chosen scapegoat : Sanzo Nosaka, communist leader in Japan. Either to find some excuse for the Party’s failure, or to spur it to further efforts, the charges against Nosaka were bitterly critical of his work. Nosaka’s lack of progress, said the article, reflected his heretical belief that communism’s aims could be achieved by peaceful means under the Occupation forces. These non-violent means, said Moscow, ‘ have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.’

The C.P.J. were instructed that their aim was the ‘ uniting of all democratic forces for the struggle against the colonization plans of the US imperialists.’ Behind the Kremlin’s stern denunciation may well lie some echo of the perceptible rivalry between Japan’s three top Reds. Briefly, the difference between Nosaka and the others is Nosaka’s clear statement—though chief of a revolutionary party—advocating gentler methods than armed revolt to build communism in Japan. Since his party chieftainship and declared aversion to force preclude the

likelihood of armed disturbances being attributed to him, it is likely that he has wearied of Moscow demands for revolution without logic. The two other communist personalities—the ‘oldtimer’ Kyuchi Tokuda and irascible Yoshio Shiga—may be involved, it is thought, in a three cornered fight to oust Nosaka and replace him. Since, however, both the party itself within Japan and its leader were chastised, and as that party retains Nosaka at its head, the internal Red squabble may not develop so far as to cause an actual split.

The Soviet denunciation of Tokuda’s ‘gentle ways’ was followed by a renewed burst of anti-Americanism in Japan, fostered by the anxious Reds. While Communist newspapers restarted their venomous campaign against the West, Russia herself joined in by assuming her Fairy Godmother rôle. Hinting that the Soviet Union might return the lost Kurile islands to Japan, Moscow wooing of the masses utilized every tactic to camouflage her historical position as Nippon’s number one enemy.

Prominent in the parallel blast of anti-everybody vituperation is the Communist Party of Japan’s official organ, *Akahata*. America, runs the monotonously-reiterated cry, is colonizing Japan. Workers, peasants, intellectuals—the approved classes to whom the appeals are always directed—are lumped together with ‘enlightened capitalists’—small and medium business people, called to rally and save the race from becoming alien gunfodder !

Under the Cominform whiplash both Nosaka and the C.P.J. swiftly cringed to heel. The Politburo of the Party immediately published their reply. Thanking the Cominform for showing an interest in their affairs, the Political Bureau explained that foreign comrades were not always fully aware of the reasons for the C.P.J.’s actions. They hastened to admit that both the Party and Nosaka had made mistakes, even ‘failing to admit their errors publicly.’ But they assured the world Communist organisation that the party’s progress was very real.

Finally, in a plea for Nosaka, the Party described him as a ‘courageous patriot who enjoys the confidence of the Japanese masses.’

This explanation, however, was not obsequious enough for Moscow—especially the reference to ‘foreign comrades,’

inserted no doubt as a face-saving formula. Thus, within a week, the Party's executive Committee announced Nosaka's guilt, but accepted him back on the ground that he has admitted his errors.

This further evidence of Moscow's complete control over the C.P.J. provides yet stronger proof of the country's extreme peril once the Occupation is withdrawn. Once the United States army leaves, and with it the food imports for a population growing at the unparalleled rate of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million yearly, there is every cause to think that the country will be plunged into bloody revolution. When the guiding hand of General MacArthur is removed from the reins of the Japanese Government, once the ex-monopolist combines make common cause with the militarists, Nosaka's Red Army will come out of hiding. In the resulting confusion anything could happen, but most informed observers predict that the Reds would win. Japan's military and industrial strength in the hands of the Soviets would spell automatic ruin for all Asia, destroying the hope of saving the Far East. Then, Asia could be welded into a power generally considered to be eventually irresistible.

Upon Japan, therefore, may well hang the future of not only Asia, but of America and Europe as well.

# 5

## CLAWS OF THE RED DRAGON

‘The people’s Republic of China unites with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples throughout the world : first of all with the Soviet Union, all people’s democracies, and all oppressed nations ; and stands in the camp of international peace and democracy to oppose imperialist aggression and defend world peace.’ Art. XI, Common Programme of the People’s Republic of China, October 1st, 1949.

**A** GAINST the background of Chinese communist intrigue throughout South East Asia, reaching far beyond the shores of the homeland to the Chinese communities in a dozen Asian lands, the inter-relation between the national Communist Party, the present Mao Tse Tung Government, and the reformer Sun Yat Sen’s programme should be known in any understanding of the threat by Marxism to Asia today.

After the fall of the Chinese Empire, the ardent nationalist Dr. Sun Yat Sen—founder of the Kuomintang Party—virtually ruled the young intellectuals and progressive elements of the country by the power of his reformist policy, designed to make China once more great.

Parallel with his movement was the violent anti-foreign, anti-warlord effort of a number of determined university students, whose main literary diet consisted of the works of Marx and Lenin. Russia’s Far Eastern propaganda and translation of Red classics handsomely bore fruit in a steady stream of dissatisfied youth recruited by her agents throughout China. The reasons compelling these enterprising spirits to throw in their lot with Moscow, even while the safety-valve of their own Kuomintang movement continued in full operation, were to be found endemic in the conditions obtaining in their country during the period following the Second World War. China, a land of potential riches and abundance, was the world’s worst famine centre ; endowed with a culture of which every student was proud, she literally teemed with illiterates and an apparent incapacity to guide her own destinies. The Revolution of 1911

against the Crown has not cleared away like magic the devastatingly oppressive taxation, nor expelled the hated foreigners from their strongholds in the country : from Shanghai and Hong Kong. In the wild wastes of the north and west, mighty warlords continued their independent existence as before : robber barons, they virtually ruled the main extent of the homeland, with a fierce and terrible autocracy.

Landlordism was unrestrained in its rapacity. The contemplative student mind, immature and predisposed towards a violent and rapid change in life's conditions, seized with indiscriminating voraciousness upon the cleverly presented Marxist panacea.

An even larger and more dangerous section of Communism's converts were the 'dissatisfied elements.' Under this heading came to be assembled—first in secret meeting-places in China, later to meet in the Moscow spy-schools—a very motley crowd. From the West were peasants who had at one time become sailors, and seen some of the world ; others had deserted the land and taken jobs in the factories, been appalled by the fearful conditions of labour, as opposed to those promised to them by Red agents. Opponents of the Kuomintang, those with vendettas against the members of the government, eager for revenge at any price ; the usual group of also-ran teachers and unsuccessful would-be intriguers, formed China's most eager converts to the collectivist philosophy.

Moscow took them all. Subjected to rigorous test, the survivors of the training schools at Khabarovsk and Tashkent graduated from the final year's course hardened revolutionaries.

By 1923, the first batches of agitators were in full cry. The following year—so powerful had their exhortations made them—Sun Yat Sen was compelled to form a common front between them and his Kuomintang. In accordance with their training, the Reds devoted their undoubtedly great skill to infiltrating and winning over as many members of the Kuomintang as possible. Manipulating the twin Red precepts of 'inspired opportunism' and 'dissimulation,' communist party members split their Kuomintang operations into Open and Closed groups. Open activities were those unconcealed and avowedly communistic ; Closed penetration, the formation of secret cells within the Kuomintang Party and Army : to become operative

upon the anticipated final break in the armistice between Reds and Kuomintang. This division came when Chiang Kai Shek, Kuomintang leader and successor to Dr. Sun, conducted his first purge of communists within the Party's ranks.

For ten years, the Kuomintang and communists fought it out throughout the entire area of China. While Chiang's 'Suppression of Communist Banditry' movement and his bitter campaigns drove the revolutionaries right up to Kiangsi, eventual counter-invasions of Nationalist (Kuomintang) territory brought the Marxists in their Long March through the provinces of Yunan, Szechwan and Kansu to their final headquarters: Yenan, capital of the Province of Shensi, and permanent centre of communism in China.

By 1936 Chiang, attacking his communist enemies at the head of a Nationalist formation, was captured; and here Mao Tse Tung, present Red dictator of China, showed his greater cunning. Refusing against the pressure of his advisors to execute Chiang, he released him, bridging the gap for the famous Kuomintang-Red Pact of 1937. By the terms of this treaty, the two armies agreed to differ politically, but to suspend hostilities against one another; and to co-operate against the invasion of the Japanese.

It has been said that Chiang's greatest mistake was the signing of this undertaking; for the Reds did not, in fact, intend to adhere to their bargain of relaxing pressure against nationalist China—and they were fighting the Japanese anyway. Faced with the problem of combating Japan and containing continued Red infiltration, Chiang's strategy itself in the struggle against the disciplined Japanese forces was defective. Compared to the Nipponese troops, the Nationalist Chinese were undisciplined and ill-armed. General Chiang-Kai Shek, instead of making use of the inherent strength of his soldiers as resistance men, clung tenaciously to outdated methods of orthodox European military strategy, already being discarded by the West itself. The massed but poorer infantry of Nationalist China fell like chaff before the Japanese advance; while Mao Tse Tung and his guerrillas scored success after success against the Japanese—simply by adopting the obvious guerrilla tactics of swooping upon the enemy, making a kill, and then taking to flight.

It was therefore inevitable that after the Japanese defeat,

communist control and prestige was found to have spread over the entire North, traditional and logical base for the conquest of the whole country. In spite of nationalist superiority in armament, supplies and air cover, within two years of starting their major offensive the Red China Army had driven Chiang and nationalist corruption into the sea. The frequent allegations of inefficiency and moral turpitude levelled against the Kuomintang and its leaders, so familiar to newspaper readers, could well have contributed towards Chinese sympathy for the communists.

Outstanding characteristics of the Chinese civil war show that the Red armies unlike the Kuomintang troops, certainly had high morale—and had, above all, clear war aims. In the areas under their effective control, Mao's men had redistributed the land, lightened taxes, and inspired a thinking society against the luxury-loving nationalist administration. Chiang's China, considering itself at war, preferred to wait until victory before making improvements in the people's lot. The Reds, on the other hand, were not prepared to wait so long before enjoying the fruits of victory, and started upon their reforms immediately a place was occupied. In the resultant inevitable comparison between conditions in Nationalist and Communist China, enthusiasm for the Red leaders rose rapidly.

Though the programme and activities of the communist authorities in China unmistakably point to the expansion of communism among the Chinese communities abroad, observers have testified to the real spirit of constructive effort and high morale everywhere in Red China itself. It is said that the dead hand of traditional Marxism does not exist there ; that the communist party itself has evolved to the stage when its leaders realise that the first thing is the uplift of China itself, and that this can be done under private enterprise. This, as much as any other factor, lies behind communism's success in China today.

Three major personalities guide the destinies of communist China in her struggle for a place in the sun. Mao Tse Tung—alias Chu Mao—the Chief of State, former commander of the Red Armies, has been active in revolutionary circles since 1927. After a period of training in Russia, he returned to his homeland to become first chairman of the Peasants' Union, later head of the Workers' and Peasants' Organisation, finally guerrilla and

political leader against Chiang and Japan. Chu Ten, whose frequent visits to and residence in Moscow have made him one of Asia's most 'Russianised' communists, flourished until 1931 as a political leader in Red China, since then has spent most of his time in actual fighting. Chou En Lai, a military man of great calibre—he was once secretary of the Whampoa Military Academy at Canton—studied and worked all his life in close contact with Russia and Bolshevism.

Although Chinese communism today seems to be taking a road towards independence and a separate existence as a semi-communist State allied to, but not dominated by, Russia, there is proof that Mao owes his victory in great measure to the moral and material aid of the Soviet Union. Extracts from an Agreement signed between the Chinese Reds and Moscow during the civil war provide an example of the way in which Russia works with foreign communist parties.

The USSR promised in this treaty to give military aid as well as diplomatic support to army and civil organisations under the supervision of Mao Tse Tung. The armies of the two groups undertook to work together 'economically' in the north. Mao agreed that all the communists under his control would recognise a special position of Russia in the Chinese northern areas. Russia also agreed to supply the rebels with aircraft—at first fifty machines—and spare parts ; while all arms captured by the Soviet forces from the Japanese were handed over to the communist insurgents by Moscow. Munitions for these arms were to be supplied by the USSR to Mao under this agreement. Some of the remaining clauses are important enough to summarise below :

- G. If the communist units of Mao Tse Tung are completely defeated, they will be allowed to fall back on North Korea and Soviet Territory.
- H. The USSR agrees to render aid to the forces of Mao Tse Tung secretly in order to prevent the possibility of landings of units of the National Government's army (Kuomintang) in the North East.
- I. The USSR will supply technical advisors to the forces of Mao Tse Tung and train experts for his forces. The USSR agrees to establish institutions in China and in North Korea for the training of pilots for the Chinese communist army.

- J. The Chinese Communist Party, under the leadership of Mao Tse Tung will provide the USSR with all desired information concerning the relations between the United States of America and the Kuomintang ; promising at all times to maintain an anti-American policy.
- K. The Chinese communist army units under Mao Tse Tung, after supplying its own wants, will provide the USSR with any remaining supplies of cotton, soya beans, etc., and with strategically important materials from the emancipated territories.
- L. The USSR agrees to support Mao Tse Tung in order to extend the influence of communism in Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan).
- M. Mao Tse Tung agrees to the occupation by the Korean forces of the following territories : The Chinese-Korean frontier area in the Province of Antung, the Frontier Area of the Laioning Province, the Chien Tao area and the area of Yenchi, in Kirin Province.'

The absorption of China into the Soviet sphere of allied states has produced instant reactions among the huge Chinese communities abroad. All throughout Asia, Chinese minority populations have been mobilised to achieve the spread of Marxism ; for they are nothing if not clannish, and what the mother country says, goes.

Communism among the Chinese reveals their place in Red plans in two distinct facets : the construction and maintenance of lines of communication and espionage throughout the East ; and the communising of Chinese abroad. In countries like Malaya, where the Chinese community is strong enough to envisage the capturing of the entire country through their efforts for the Chinese themselves, the victory of communism at home has given a noticeable fillip to guerrilla operations.

Next in importance to Marxism in the attempt at domination of Asia is the large Chinese minority scattered throughout the huge archipelago of the newborn Indonesian Republic—formerly the Dutch East Indies. Here are highly disciplined units with their own framework of organisation, and have little contact with the Communist Party of Indonesia itself : not one Indonesian participates in the secret activities of the Chinese—though Red Pekin's agents have themselves infiltrated into the ranks of the P.K.I.—the Communist Party of Indonesia. Prominent among the Chinese leaders of the P.K.I. are Law

King Ho, former rebel governor of East Java, and Tak Tek Goan, Sumatra's propaganda chief. The closely guarded meeting places of the Red Dragons are known as 'Marx Houses,' in each of the districts in which they are established. Another top Chinese operative in the Far Eastern Chinese threat is Tan Ling Yie, who hails from Cheribon ; graduating from Socialism to communism in the manner approved by Moscow (Marxist dialectic has it that socialism must precede communism) he developed into an important figure in Jokja. A member of the Supreme Command of the People's Democratic Front (FDR)—a communist front organisation later fused with the orthodox communist party itself—he reached his highest eminence upon being appointed to the headship of the Secretariat of the Party's Politburo. Through his offices are said to pass the lines of communication of Indonesian Chinese communism to Hong Kong, Bangkok and Singapore—the three chief Red spy centres of East Asia.

Both Moscow and Red Pekin, in using the powerful Chinese settlements abroad for their purposes, show a profound grasp of the native bent inherent in their psychology towards all that is secret. Coupled with this, the same instinct has been eager and diligent in its adoption of camouflage names and functions for many organs of the communist parties and departments. Thus, the Political Department (Politburo) of a Party may be called the 'Chinese Laundry Guild for the steam-treatment of dress-cuffs' ; while one party may run each of its many branches all under different names.

Characteristic of the combined philosophic outlook and ruthlessness of the mind of China was the creation in 1946 of the Chinese Democratic League at Chungking. The full name of this organisation is given as Min Chu Tung Men Chu Kin Tai Piao Pan Lu Chu ; and formed for some time an umbrella sheltering a number of different associations with leftish leanings, aimed against Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang Party. It is noteworthy that at the time of its formation, the communists formed only a very small part of the total membership. By October, 1947, the Democratic League had completely fallen under Red control, having been transformed into a vital nerve-centre for information and intrigue throughout the Far East. Initially the propaganda aimed by Moscow and Yenan

towards these overseas Chinese emphasised that foreign exploration and domination, both economical and political, were ruining the country; only Mao could save it from Chiang. Today the cry is that China will again become great in association with the already-great Soviet Union.

In student organisations, cultural associations, labour unions and business firms, propagandists work : but not always even under the name of communists or socialists. The main geographical pivot of all this activity is the Hongkong—Bangkok—Singapore—Batavia line, known within the Party as the ‘Great Nerve of Asia.’

This line, stretching via China from the far Pacific to Moscow, leads directly back to the offices of Chen San U, in Moscow’s Far Eastern Political Department. Information traceable to General Li Chi Chen, Chief of Hongkong’s Red political system, indicates that the main centres of Chinese communism are : Burma, Siam, the Philippines, Indochina, Korea, Indonesia and Japan. Hongkong, too, controls the Chinese Red Central Executive Committee of vital Bangkok, the Siamese clearing house for Marxists in South Asia. Hand in glove with the Bangkok vipers’ nest is a malevolent Russian, whose precise job nobody knows ; he is universally feared, and his name is Kalinov.

In Saigon—Indochina—despite the extirpation of a venomous Red newspaper—*Wietnam Yitpao*—the Ming Chu Tung Men, branch of the Democratic League, is known to be very much in action. Finances for Saigon are remitted from the Hongkong headquarters through Singapore, in the southern tip of Malaya.

In Malaya itself, the long irregular coastline tapering southwards has given the Chinese Reds their chance to smuggle vast quantities of arms to their guerrilla comrades. From North China the materials are shipped to Hongkong, thence by junks secretly to the Federation’s coasts. Although mobilised in three groups—the Communist Party itself, the Ming Chu (Democratic League) and the Three Stars Association—the liaison is tight and complete between the Red terrorists themselves and their Indonesian helpers.

Until recently the late Dr. Kwa Tshoan Sie was Java’s biggest Red boss. Intimately connected with communism since 1925, he was personally known to virtually every Marxist chief of the

Far East, and worked hand in glove with the Chinese Communist headquarters in Singapore. Prominent as a renowned physician, the doctor had received special training in Moscow, extending his patronage to a wide variety of political associations. Outstanding for years in the island's political life, he left an interesting 'testament' that is followed closely today. This document contains the following main provisions :

1. The establishment of a federation of socialist labour unions, with its Headquarters in Batavia, and connected with similar organisations all over Asia.
2. In this are to be included ' radical ' socialist leaders.
3. No *official* communist party among these Chinese should be established ; but communists should infiltrate existing organisations and construct cells.
4. ' Methods to be applied ' : Opposition, sowing of dissention, the organisation of strikes—if possible to paralyse vital industries. ' In case of necessity, sabotage.'

A famous collaborator with the Japanese occupation is a certain gambling-house tycoon in Batavia. At night, by devious routes, sub-agents for the islands collect at his gambling houses to hear talks on Marxism and to render their reports. Another of this Chinese communist's activities shows how well covered Red organs can be. As President of a variety of social and other Chinese clubs, his exhortations to revolt have little to do with the supposed purposes of these clubs.

Most of these smaller societies trace their parentage to the Democratic League ; whose Batavian chief is an intriguing character straight from Moscow. Personally trained under the Chinese communist leader, Mao, from 1936 to 1939, his special part-time interest is supervising the Leninisation of the Association of Chinese Teachers.

Almost always, documents, reports and information are sent out by trained Chinese couriers, plying between the South Asian lands, and seldom entrusted to non-Chinese, even though they may be good communists. Here, where even one Russian would be the object of immediate attention, even a few hundred Chinese more or less would pass unnoticed.

Reflecting the increasing scale of Chinese communist activity coinciding with the present intensification in the Red drive for Asia, is the recent establishment of Chinese travel bureaux, with

innumerable branches—even in the most unlikely places. Chinese 'tourists' today, like the prewar German and Japanese tourists, have become a feature of any area of economic or strategical importance throughout the farther Orient. The Chinese and other communist ownership of shipping lines and even airlines completes the picture.

While in their organisation of espionage the Chinese have rigidly maintained their exclusivity among themselves, their emergence into the sphere of trade unionism has seen no effort spared to unify yellow and other workers within these workers' bodies. Thus an excerpt from a dialogue published in the *Voice of the Labourers of Indonesia* :

- Q. What is the attitude of the Chinese workers with regard to labourers of other nationalities ?
- A. (by the Chairman of the Labour Association). Our struggle is not limited by nationality.
- Q. But a kind of national sentimentality has been maintained by Chinese workers. What are we to do against it, so that they will be entirely internationally-minded in the combined struggle for labour ?
- A. Certainly, only prominent people are yet conscious of the struggle of international labour unions. The masses, the proletariat, cannot yet participate. Their participation can be effected only step by step. These prominent figures can guide the masses to international-mindedness.

Yet another branch of Chinese extra-national communism in Asia is the Min-Seng-She ; otherwise known as the Chunghua Minchung Seng Huoshe. In conformity with approved Red tactics, it camouflages its branches by means of fictitious local names. Closely related with the secret society Sin-Ming Hui, the Association's executive meets weekly, carrying on propaganda and transmitting information to an unknown headquarters. According to a report 'it uses as an information channel the weekly newspaper, and maintains contact with a writer who represents the Chinese communist Party, though supposed to be connected with National China.' It has a subsidiary branch, said to masquerade as a cultural society. According to its constitution, this association deals with cultural, social and educational problems among the Chinese—especially the Chinese youth. Funds are provided from

Singapore, while from Hongkong the movement receives Red China's propaganda literature. With an extensive membership, the Association throughout the Far East runs sporting activities and debating groups. At least two other major Chinese overseas athletic and intellectual organisations are affiliated to this group.

The foundation of a federation for Chinese Youth organisations throughout the world was discussed in May, 1946, at the welcoming celebrations to the delegations attending the World Federation of Democratic Youth conference in Prague, behind communism's Iron Curtain. The meetings were held under the direction of the Russian Bolshevik Olga Chechekina.

Following consultations between the guiding spirits of both elements, the Federation of Democratically-Minded Chinese Youth Organisations was established in October 1947. Given as its objects were : Co-ordination of all 'powers hidden in Chinese youth'; and the coming together of all 'democratic youth organisations,' on a federal basis.

Despite strong claims that the Federation is non-political the history and activities of many of its constituent bodies and their relations with the 'Democratic League' give point to allegations that, if not already Red, undermining by communist workers will eventually overcome this League.

Propaganda throughout East Asia through the medium of Red literature is enormous, scattered throughout Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, Korea and other countries with a Chinese community are a bewildering variety of works; usually well-written and informative from the communist point of view, their widespread distribution contrasts sadly with the feebleness of competing literature. Examples of these are the following textbooks distributed on a continent-wide scale, and all found in one library of a communist cell :

1. *Biography of Mao Tse Tung* (Chinese communist dictator).
2. *Essays on Chinese communism's struggle against the Kuomintang*
3. *Problems of Politics and the Organisation of the Communist Party in China.*
4. *Victory Through Unity.*
5. *The Chinese Communists and Peasant Revolution.*
6. *Towards One Government*, by Mao Tse Tung.

7. *How America Helps Japan and Destroys China.*
8. *The Struggle of the Classes*, by Mao Tse Tung.
9. *How to Fight Continually*, by Mao Tse Tung.

Every one of these works was first published in Hongkong ; counter-propaganda simply does not exist.

Sumatra, the westerly island of Indonesia, provides the Red link between the communist-threatened tip of the Asiatic mainland—British Malaya—and the eighty million Indonesians. Because of this geographical situation facing the Malay Peninsula and the unity of purpose forged between Malaya's Chinese and the Malay-Indonesian front, the communist penetration of Indonesia and Malaya is carried out as one whole plan : Marxism is not affected by national boundaries.

As in Java, here communist propaganda makes use of certain insidious methods : the press, schools, teachers, leaders in industrial and agrarian organisation. With little apparent connection between their spheres of work, the Chinese communists of Insulinde yet form one of the most compact and integrated Marxist weapons in the world today.

Evidence pinpoints Singapore and Hongkong as the real centres of the communist threat to the Malay people brought by the immigrant Chinese. The brisk Chinese-instigated illegal trade across the Malacca Straits, between Sumatra and Singapore and elsewhere provides welcome funds to the forces of world revolution. Taking advantage of several factors in their favour, Singapore's Reds and capitalists have combined in a by no means uneasy partnership to further respective ends. To the Chinese terrorists fighting the steamy jungle battle with Britain, three things are necessary : arms, the selling of their stolen rubber and other goods, and an escape route for refugees and communications. In Singapore, one of the major economic gateways of the Orient, millionaire speculators—nearly all of them Chinese—buy and sell the looted goods ; cover agencies supply finance from an unknown source, which cannot be traced further than Hongkong, on the Chinese mainland. To the Chinese and other Reds of the Malaysian lands the Singapore stepping-stone is vital in their contact with Hongkong and Peking.

Throughout the fighting between the Indonesian Republic and the Dutch following the Second War, communist bodies—

though operating militarily against Holland—worked also for themselves and for Russia by running vast smuggling undertakings, shipping essential raw materials along the Chinese organisation's routes to Singapore, where they were bought by Russia's agents : thus providing a simple way of Russia increasing her needed raw material stockpiles, and subsidising communism at the same time. The only people to lose were the Dutch, as the British are losing today in Malaya's black-marketeering in stolen goods.

During this war with the 'Dutch imperialists,' communism gained an enormous fillip. Openly, the Republicans could not break with or fight the powerful Red forces in the archipelago ; so they were compelled to let Marxism continue its work. When the Dutch denounced communism's growth in Indonesia as due to the Nationalists linking up with the Chinese, the Republicans were able to reply that, as the effective governmental force, they could clear up the menace if left to themselves, without Dutch interference. The Dutch, on the other hand, claimed that the Republic was incapable of combating the spread of the Red philosophy, and therefore Holland should be allowed a hand in Indonesian affairs.

Meanwhile the Red capitalists took little part in the abuse and counter-allegations ; they were using the money earned by their very private enterprise to finance their weapon to communise the entire Chinese community of Indonesia : propaganda—to which no answer has been found throughout all East Asia. Reinforced by the money flowing into their coffers, the Chinese Reds were able to launch during the height of the fighting the 'New Democratic Publishing Association,' with headquarters—inevitably—in Hongkong. Instead of naming local branches as such, the leaders of the Association realised that action taken against one branch would bring any other nucleus with the same name into disrepute, and thus all its ramifications took different assumed names, throughout Burma, Siam, Indonesia and the other South Asian lands.

An analysis of the branches of this now powerful propaganda instrument in one area alone will sufficiently indicate the strength of their policy ; for, in addition to each cadre being allegedly separate in its functioning, each section concentrated on one aspect of propaganda and the distribution of the

literature of the parent body. Under picked leaders, the agitation in this sample area, all under the New Democratic Publishing Association, commanded the propaganda front as follows :

|                               |                         |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| The Chinese Youth Association | (Chin Nien Tun) ;       |
| Chinese Labour Organisation   | (Chi Kung Hui) ;        |
| Chinese Women's Organisation  | (Fu Nu Hui) ;           |
| Overseas Chinese Association  | (Hoa Chiao Chung Hui) ; |
| Democratic League             | (Min Chu Tung Men).     |

Indicative of the power of the new organisation was the relegation of branches of the Democratic League—previously all-powerful—into subordination to the Publishing Association. Today the Democratic League continues its enlistment and organising function, but the agitation and propaganda are completely in the hands of the High Command of the Political Intelligence and Enlightenment Division of the N.D. Publishers. Dating officially from its establishment in 1946, the League itself was an umbrella organisation sheltering a host of sub-divided activities. Like a crocodile, the League first swallowed numbers of small, well-meaning societies within its ranks, then proceeded to digest and communise them at leisure. The Democratic League formed its own private army, maintaining it through collections from members, and finally armed the Security Corps, 'for the protection of members.' When the need for protection, and thus the pretext of the existence of the Security Corps ceased, the League had it dissolved, and distributed the arms to certain hideouts : where they still remain.

Next to the Democratic League, the most powerful Chinese organisation is the General Chinese Association ; the Hoachiao Chung-hui. Among its members are supporters of such varied societies as the Democratic League and the Kuomintang—Chiang-Kai Shek's Party—itself. Red sections, however, virtually dominate this association.

The claws of the Red dragon point to certain main centres from which Chinese communism reaches out over Asia. Bangkok, in Siam, covers the Chinese settlements in Burma to the west, and Malaya in the south. Singapore orientates its activities towards Indonesia ; from Hongkong, twin arrows seek out the hearts of Vietnam in Indochina—and the Philippines. In addition each country's communists—in some

places several bodies—have their direct communication on certain matters with Hongkong, for others with the Kremlin. Hongkong itself is linked with Peking, capital of communist China, and thence the ramifications stretch to three centres of Asian-Soviet co-operation : Vladivostok and Korea for Japan, Moscow as the supreme centre, and Khabarovsk for training.

The present political differences among the Chinese make the combating of Red propaganda difficult. Apart from the communists themselves, the only other Chinese organisation of note is the discredited Kuomintang. Spurned by a large number of even non-communist Chinese, Chiang Kai-Shek's party has no hope of returning to power or arresting communism by means of any rallying-cry.

The only remaining hope for China and the Chinese communities throughout the world is that Peking's Mao Tse Tung may continue his present policy of giving more prominence to the internal problems of helping Chinese national reconstruction, rather than turning to complete identification of his nation with the Soviet world ideology.

## 6

### RIDDLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

'I consider it my supreme responsibility at this perilous hour to call upon our friends everywhere, especially our friends in the Americas, not to tarry too long in the redefinition of fundamental attitudes towards Asia. Freedom is in peril for more than half the population of the globe.' PRESIDENT ELPIDIO QUIRINO of the Philippine Republic (Address to the U.S. Senate, August 9th, 1949).

THE setting up of the independent Republic of the Philippines in July, 1946, when that country finally obtained her free International status, did not solve the problem of internal conflict which has continued to encourage the growth of communism until the present day.

Formerly Spanish, later under American guidance, the country's 19 million Malaysian people inherit in a large measure the present agrarian revolution from pre-war days. Of all the problems facing this strategically vital group of islands lying off the East Asian coastline, the relentless and growing guerrilla struggle with the fanatical Red-Hukabalahap Coalition easily comes at the head of the list ; the well-armed rebels having in some areas even set up collectivist communist settlements.

America's decision that these islands are of supreme importance to her own national security is underlined by the 1947 pact, by which 23 military bases were acquired by the United States on a 99 years' lease.

The story of the guerrilla 'Huks,' the Nationalists and communists, is one following a pattern familiar in all Oriental countries which have had to pass through the period of foreign tutelage, the second world war, and the subsequent reconquest. Before the war, communism was not strong in the Philippines : though there was considerable national feeling. After the Japanese invasion, the anti-American front split up : Nationalists in general showed sympathy for Japan's 'co-prosperity sphere.' Communists, however, followed the inevitable Moscow-dictated policy of resistance and the hope of formenting a red revolution. Even the name of the communist

Resistance Party closely resembled the nomenclature of all Russian inspired organisations in Asia : the People's Anti-Japanese Army saw the light of day on May 29th, 1942.

Massing round them all elements of opposition to Japanese Imperialism, the P.A.J.A. fought throughout the rest of the War against the Japanese invaders in the common Resistance front. At the same time, Bolshevist indoctrination continued, and the foundation of secret cells throughout the country facilitated by the high prestige enjoyed by Communist leaders as resistance men was later to serve the party well.

In close liaison with the Reds, and said even to have been inspired by them were the rebel Hukabalahap guerrillas, an anti-landlord movement dedicated since prewar days to fighting the absentee landholder system that still remains a menace. Among key communists associated with the Huks from the start is the rabid communist leader Luis Taruc, still regarded as a leader by the Huks, and the reputed channel of contact with Russia. The United States Communist Party has also greatly aided the Huk effort in recent years.

Indicating how closely the programme and leadership of the Huks became interwoven with those of the Reds during the war period is the fact that when, in 1946, Huk fighters resumed their resistance movement against the new Filipino Government, they flocked to the Red standard of the A.N.L. This 'Army of National Liberation' now constitutes the fusion of the powerful National Union of Communist Peasants with the cream of the Hukabalahap warriors. The A.N.L. is scheduled by Moscow and Luis Taruc as the nucleus of the future Red Army of the Communist Republic of the Philippines.

In this work, and in the hammering out of a unified command for the many communist-front organisations, is Mariano P. Balgos, Secretary of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and co-founder, with Taruc, of the pre-war Huks. Taruc himself, an elusive and picturesque character, military commander of the Huk army, showed his political adeptness in his election as a communist Representative in the Philippine parliament in the 1947 elections.

Ten major bodies provide the main strength of communism in the Republic. In addition to the Huks and the Communist Party are the C.L.O. (Congress of Labour Organisations),

the F.O.F. (Federation of Filipino Workers), the N.D.C. (National Union of Textile Workers), the Meralco (Association of Public Utility Workers), P.N. (The left-Wing of the Nationalist Party), P.U.P.L.O. (United Peasants and Workers Organisations), the A.D. (Democratic Alliance)—and, of course, the P.K.M.: National Peasant's Union.

The important ramifications of peasant organisations in the Philippines are not to be underrated. In a country where 80 % or more of the people are peasants—many of them landless—where 50 % are illiterate, and all are subjected to the heavy hand of wealthy landowners, the present political discontent, rooted in the injustice of rural conditions, is a vital factor indeed.

Neither are the racial and geographic elements such as to conduce to unity of the peoples of the archipelago. The Republic is composed of no less than 7,107 islands, large and small ; 64 native languages are spoken, eight of major importance. Although English and Spanish are widely known, Red 'cultural' propaganda has demanded the impossible concession that all groups should be allowed to use their own separate tongue to the exclusion of all others ; especially do they denounce the official, but not universally spoken, Tagalog Malay dialect.

Foremost among Philippine communist tactics is the creation of disunity among the many ethnical groups within the Republic ; for not only does this disunity promote weakness, and thus the general dissatisfaction they seek, but fostering regional prejudices causes local groups to look up to the Reds as their spokesmen, partisans and potential benefactors.

The bulk of the Filipinos are of Malay stock, with an admixture of Chinese and Spanish blood ; of these about 80 % profess Catholicism. In the South are the Moslem group ('Moros'), and there is a pagan and a Chinese community. Following established communist practice, each of these communities is approached and indoctrinated separately and in accordance with its own particular psychology. Important in this connection is the fact that the minority groups of the Philippines have distinct overseas loyalties. The Chinese are linked by strong ties to Red China ; the Moslems look towards the sprawling Moslem land of Indonesia to the south. All have their own aspirations, and are cunningly subjected to agitation

and propaganda by the virile Communist Party Agitpropburo, the specialist department of Marxist indoctrination and rebellion maintained by all communist parties throughout Asia and the world. Closely patterned upon the Bolshevik Agitpropburo flourishing in the Soviet Union, these agencies of Soviet propaganda abroad, while nominally working in collaboration with the communist party of their own locality, are in fact the direct channels of the worldwide shifts in agitation method and action dictated by Moscow itself.

The Catholic-Protestant split, though not considered of such vital importance—due to the overwhelming preponderance of Catholics—is nevertheless a very live issue ; the disunity within the Christian ranks is further complicated by the schismatic independent Filipino Church : a rapidly growing force, with well over 1,000,000 adherents, whose tenets are such as to cut it off inevitably from communion with Rome and Western Protestantism.

These religious difficulties, and the apparent lack of desire to create a unified spiritual front between the various faiths represented in the Philippines against the perils of advancing Marxist dialectical materialism demonstrate one of the fundamental weaknesses of democratic communities everywhere in the early stages of their struggles against totalitarianism.

The outstanding personality under whose guidance operate all Filipino communist bodies, and personally responsible to Russia, is the Moscow-trained Guillermo Capadocia, veteran founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and currently a leader of the Congress of Labour Organisations. The history of recent events in the islands clearly demonstrates communism's strength and programme. After the death of President Manuel Roxas in 1948, his successor, Elpidio Quirino proclaimed an amnesty in the hope of thus breaking the grave menace of Huk guerrilla strength or of thinning their ranks through the desertion of the more faint-hearted. Luis Taruc, communist leader of the Huks, in accepting this declaration, immediately put forward certain demands for land reform : threatening renewed revolution if they were not accepted forthwith.

Taruc's three-point statement called for social and economic reform, democratisation of labour conditions and the

redistribution of land—a surprisingly mild demand for one with a revolutionary background and military strength such as his. This apparent caution is, however, thought to have been due to the prestige-raising value of tactical victory and the desire to hold his enthusiastic Huk army together. That this move was conditioned by policy is shown by its ratification by the executive of the Communist Party itself. In any case, Taruc voiced on that occasion nothing more than the sincerely-held desires of even the non-communist Filipino workers and peasants.

August, 1948, nevertheless brought the Filipino Government's demand that the Huks lay down their arms and surrender them ; this was emphatically refused, though the rebels renewed their offer of a truce. After a considerable amount of wrangling, agreement was found to be impossible, and the underground Red army recommenced the war. The resultant flare-up was intense, devastating much of South Luzon island, and spreading to the areas of Bicol, Leyte, Mindanao and Iloilo.

Judging the time ripe for the violent overthrow of the Government, the military forces of the National Peasants' Union flocked to the Red ranks, rapidly obtaining effective control of that part of the country centred at Candaba, and penetrating less than 50 miles from the Republican capital.

Huk guerrillas, in their capacity as the revolutionary Red army of the islands, are divided into two categories : soldiers and soldier-agitators. The pure Marxian theorists, spies, cell-members, and fellow-travellers, operate separately with the political revolutionary branch of the movement in areas not yet under guerrilla control.

Sectors marked out for military operations—such as those surrounding Manila, in the centre of Luzon island, and other rural districts of the Republic—are regarded as ' military areas ' by the Huks and subject to a predetermined cycle of operations. Reinforced by a strong internal transportation organisation, the well-armed Huks operate largely in terrorist bands, descending upon the lowlands, and even seizing villages. Not all Huks, however, are entirely mobile ; for some ' spare time rebels ' take time off from their usual innocent work in the fields to join specific forays.

In the case of the seizure of a village, Huk formations first fall upon it in strength, the purely military branch seizing all

strategic points and maintaining order and discipline. The Agitprop (agitation and propaganda) officers put up posters, convene meetings and address the assembled peasantry. On these occasions, even the speeches are phrased in a set pattern. The first part of each harangue is devoted to historical descriptions of the plight of the Filipino peasant ; the next, to the fact that the Huks are the only answer to poverty, landlordism and Governmental corruption. Winding up, the political commissar invariably shows, by means of Marxist-Leninist theory, that economic problems here, as elsewhere, developed in accordance with communist prophesies, and that the Huks are the instrument by which the millennium can be reached. World revolution is inevitable, says the agitator ; and, indeed, already under way. Class warfare ordained by nature, communisation is the only answer. Leaflets are distributed, printed in the local language. Anti-religious propaganda is another feature ; the peasants being told to ' build and enjoy paradise here ; why die before you can reach it ? ' By no means always terrorists, the Red propagandists are generally scrupulous in their treatment of the villagers, thus gaining considerable support. The effect of all this attention upon the otherwise neglected peasants can easily be imagined. Even if the communists were to offer no other inducement, few natives could resist the attractive blandishments of those who tell them that the sons of the soil—not the aristocracy—are the true inheritors of the earth.

By the end of their limited occupation of each settlement the political officers have generally managed to form a local nucleus for the party, whose function it is to remain active after the rebels retreat. By the time police, constabulary forces or the regular army arrive to engage them, the swiftly-warned Huks are usually miles away.

Similarly, the Huks themselves maintain small settled communities in the hilly regions, run on political-military lines. The inhabitants are divided into two main sections—soldiers and workers—land being divided into collective farms according to communist practice. By a strictly-enforced system of priorities, looted luxuries and consumer goods are allocated to each individual according to his ability and productivity as assessed by the local soviet. The basic formula for this is : ' he who does not work, neither shall he eat.'

How strong are the Huks ? Agreed in the statement that the movement is growing despite all government efforts, observers differ in estimating their strength. While it has been said that there are as few as 25,000 armed men, other experts calculate the effective military force of communism in the Philippines to be anything between 30,000 and 40,000.

Again, the question is difficult, and these figures do not reflect the true power of the movement ; more than half a million Filipinos are thought to sympathise more or less actively with communism, and the number may be larger. Finally, the marked zeal, and special enthusiasm shown by all communists frequently makes them appear larger in numbers through the proportionately greater results of their efforts and their unusual agility as propagandists.

Symbolic of the feelings among Philippine Reds regarding the future of Asia, and of their own country in particular was the Huk leader, Luis Taruc's, inflammatory speech of February 24th, 1949. Laying down Marxist principles for the National Red Movement, he approved communism's victory in China, predicting that the Philippines would soon go the same way. Castigating the in any case none too popular Government of his country, Taruc claimed that its degeneracy was so great that it could be extirpated only by force of arms. ' Let now the lessons of our history begin to assert themselves,' he asked, re-affirming with a fine sweep of Stanlinistic rhetoric, the principle of ' on revolution.'

' The days of Imperialism's puppets are numbered,' claims Balgos, the communist party's Secretary General, while Taruc continues to maintain his hostility to the administration's renewed peace feelers.

The present party aspect of the Philippine Republic's National Political life is threefold. The Nationalists are a large grouping with a red-dyed left wing ; the rest of the national party being denounced by the Huks as ' petty bourgeois.' It is to be noted here that in spite of recent attempts by Moscow to enlist in the ranks of world communism many of those whom orthodox communists tend to disparage as capitalists, this policy does not seem to have percolated fully into all of the far-flung communist bodies throughout the world.

Next come the Liberals, regarded by good communists as the

party of the hated landlord and industrial classes ; and finally the 'workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals, the people's party—the communists.'

As against the communist leaders Taruc, Balgos and Capadocia, three other outstanding Filipino personalities carry on a three-cornered fight in the political limelight of Quezon City. First comes the elder statesman President Elpidio Quirino, second Jose P. Laurel, a professional politician and formerly puppet ruler of the Philippines under the Japanese. The third is Jose Avelino, ex-President of the Senate. All these men, wily political manoeuvrers, share a common hatred of one another—both politically and personally. Quirino got the better of Avelino by engineering his removal from the Senate Presidency on corruption charges. Laurel, the ultra Nationalist, detests Quirino for pro-Americanism ; while Avelino's opposition to Quirino is no less marked. Laurel combines his personal vendetta with a Huk-Red lineup to whom he has promised 'justice and the rectification of wrongs.' While Laurel's past political record of Japanese collaboration and present alliance with the C.L.O. and P.K.M. red parties might be thought to make him suspect, he himself makes no bones about a possible resort to violence in ousting Quirino.

'If necessary,' claims Laurel, 'drastic action will be taken to rid the Government of crooks and grafters and give me the right to exercise the will of the people.' He omits to mention as to who will be the judge of the 'will of the people.' Of these three, Quirino was the first to make a definite policy known in relation to his country's reaction to the spread of communism. During his official visit to the United States in 1949, the President emphasised the drastic nature of this threat. Appreciating that the collapse of China, the menace of Korea, and the infiltration of Vietnam (Indo-China) constituted a grave danger to the world, in his address to the United States Senate, Quirino called for the erection of a bulwark against the spread of communism in the Far East ; so that Asia, with more than half the population of the world, should not be lost to Democracy by default.

Western Union was only half the job—or less—for the Asian countries, he said, had no armies, navies or air forces to use in a military alliance modelled upon that between the countries

of Europe and North America. Filipino support for President Truman's Point Four Project for aid to under-developed areas was confirmed, and the President felt that communism could still be halted without force.

In one of the most constructive speeches ever made by an oriental representative in the United States, Quirino rightly emphasised that 'time runs short and the margin of our common security grows narrower each day.'

'Freedom is in peril for more than half the population of the globe. Only the blind will say that the menace does not concern America ; because the history of the two World wars shows all too clearly that this great democracy cannot remain unconcerned wherever and whenever the survival of free men in a free world is at stake.'

In giving his rallying-cry to democracy, the Filipino leader had in mind the fact that only with economic reform could his own country's forces overcome the conditions in which communism thrived. In the Philippines today it is this economic factor that offsets the advantages of repeated military action against the Huks and their supporters. While the Hukabalahap movement continues to retain any vestige of the glory of a liberation struggle, it will never be expelled from the hearts of its followers and their sympathisers.

Living for forty years under American control, the Filipinos have developed an attitude of too great reliance upon the United States. If there were a deficit, America would pay ; if prosperity came to the United States, it would be reflected in the life of the Filipinos. After the War, the pouring into the Republic of excise duty refunds, the huge war-damage sums, the large amounts credited to the country by America for administrative purposes, gave a great, but false, impetus to apparent prosperity. The Philippine people crowded the streets with American cars, engaged upon the reconstruction of war damage, expanded their air services—but right down at the vital level of the productive industries recuperation was slow, haphazard and unplanned. The net result has been that the Republic must import her staple food of rice, while thousands of acres of rice land lie fallow. The communists have not been slow in pointing out these facts to the destitute peasants. Graft became easier than work ; plans never went beyond

theory, as the Government found itself flush with unearned dollars contributed by Uncle Sam.

The few really rich people—the landowners, industrialists and racketeers—continued pursuing prosperity without production ; while the naturally indolent worker continued either to neglect his fields entirely or to over-exploit them, which was worse. In the Manila hemp-growing industry, over-cutting of the plants to cash in on rocketing prices severely damaged this important product's future.

Yet the potentialities for economic exploitation for the fabulously rich islands are enormous—both for sound government planning and foreign enterprise. By either or both of these methods, the lot of the Filipino peasant could be considerably improved. The rice harvest, providing the basic food crop, could be almost limitlessly expanded, in the opinion of agricultural experts ; thousands of acres of mahogany and other woods await the capital to produce a thriving industry. In lush Mindanao, even today, wasteful traditional Malay methods and lack of co-ordination cannot prevent the people garnishing rich crops of corn, rice, hemp—and almost anything they plant.

In coconuts, coco-oil, gold mining, iron, coal, petroleum, fisheries, manufactures, fruit, the actual progress made sufficiently shows the rich prospects for the Philippines.

Internal Philippine capital alone being unable to shoulder the burden of this development, and the drying up of almost all United States assistance by 1950, emphasised the great urgency for continued aid from America under Truman's Point Four project and even by special direct loans.

Three things underline the successful holding of the Philippine bastion in South Asia : continued political stability, economic reform and social welfare—and a closer co-operation of America and Oriental lands for the mutual defence of democracy. Only under these conditions in the Philippine Republic, could communism and its supporters be halted and put to flight.

The weakening effect of Filipino party dissensions will be a vital factor in determining the extent of Red progress in the future ; communists seek to exploit this deficiency. At the same time, American sensitivity causes the United States to be cautious of extending collaboration too closely to her former

ward, lest nationalist opinion should misconstrue this as attempts at a return to domination.

This, however, is precisely what Russia, her satellites and communists all over the world want to happen : if American aid is given to a country, the Reds try to block it ; failing that, they state that the Government of the country involved has 'sold out' to America. Concurrently, the Kremlin's agents try to convince the United States by astute propaganda that any participation by America in the destinies of Asian countries will immediately evoke the opposition of nationalists. In other words, if America and the other countries helping to combat communism in the East hold back for fear of alienating the people of those countries, the net effect is just what Moscow wants : no aid for Asia. If they do help these countries, they must be prepared to hear hard things said by Russia and her collaborators about 'Wall Street imperialism.' As to which alternative is preferable it will be the urgent task of Washington's policy-makers to decide : but in the final analysis it is down at the level of the ordinary observer of world affairs that the attitude of the world's conscience is shaped.

## 7

### HOW TO BE A COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY

‘ We must never put a restraint upon our struggle to win the dictatorship of the proletariat, but must recommend also slogans and fighting methods, arising from the needs of the masses, and we must be able to keep pace with the fighting power of the masses according to the degree of their progress.’ DIMITROV.

ACCORDING to the elaborately-evolved world revolutionary theories and methods of communism, there are two main aspects of the function of a revolutionary. Each Red worker must be politically educated to such a pitch that he is able to interpret all conditions and phrases of the struggle in Marxist-Leninist terms ; he must be convinced that he has an ideal worth fighting for, he must know the meaning of all the jargon of communism : and he must strive unceasingly not only for success in the field of operations, but for promotion within the party and its cadres. This promotion-incentive is recognised as playing a vital part in maintaining high morale and competitiveness among members.

From this stems the second requisite : all parties must have a scheme of general and specific action, within which the individual units and cells operate. Such a scheme of action is the Programme of the ‘ Front Demokrasi Rajkat,’ adopted by the Jokja Conference of 1948 ; and provides a first-hand interpretation of the thoroughness and methods of infiltration and agitation practised throughout the Far East by communist bodies. The genius of Marxist planning lies in rigid discipline coupled with a remarkable degree of preparedness for taking advantage of all eventualities, as the citation from the Programme will show.

The ‘ Lessons of the Balai Politik Magelang,’ provide in simple and readable form the fundamental characteristics of communist belief, together with slogans and guidance for the potential revolutionary. It is important to observe that, while the Party is at all times eager for converts, and willing for its activities to be known in those places where its existence is not

illegal, there is a definite parallel side which entrenches itself in secret within the camp of non-communists. Thus the old 'open' and 'closed' concepts of organisation are carried on to this day. This double-life of a communist party means that, even if the entire 'open' organism of the Party is destroyed, another, more dangerous and duplicate 'closed' party remains in being.

#### SCHEME OF ACTION OF THE FRONT DEMOKRASI RAKJAT

*Jokja Conference, May 1948*

1. An extensive fifth column is to be established in the country, with representatives in trade organisations, universities, government offices, and leftish societies of a political or social character. The 'Marx Houses' are to be entrusted with the training of these representatives.

2. The 'Agit-Prop' (agitation-propaganda) institute is to be extended, and its activities intensified. By means of a large-scale distribution of pamphlets and newspapers; by means of mass movements and demonstrations, attention must be drawn to the rights of the population, the position of the factory-workers, the minorities, the socialist structure of the USSR, the capitalist system of production, the 'colonial-reactionaries,' American war propaganda, etc., etc.

3. In the key positions of the existing labour organisations, expert communist members are to be appointed. The same is to be done in Leftish political and social organisations, while the propaganda is also to aim at raising discord in right-wing or anti-red organisations. The opponents are to be stigmatized as reactionaries.

4. 'Conspicuous' positions must be given to members of the party in order that, by means of agitation (for higher wages, lower market quotations of foodstuffs, social security, human justice and world peace) they are elected as members of the national committees.

5. Constitution of a solid republican parliament, in co-operation with socialists, social democrats and other leftish groupings.

6. The securing of key positions in republican public service and the securing of complete control of the republican police

force, the republican intelligence service, in foreign policy and the monetary system.

7. Official indictment of 'conspiracies' against the people's sovereignty, in order to eliminate opposition organisations and to have its leaders arrested by a communist police apparatus.

8. The carrying out of orders and instructions originating from Moscow or Moscow-controlled areas—at the psychological moment, in accordance with the USSR's strategy. Apart from this, the creation of the possibility of calling in the USSR's direct intervention or aid.

9. Preparation of a coup d'état, in order to obtain complete control of the government apparatus. To be supported by wholesale strike activity. If necessary, proclamation of civil war, in support of which the protection of Soviet troops might be called in.

10. A surprise attack on and control of radio communications and the press. Nationalisation of industries. Deportation of non-communistic elements.

Extract from the lessons of the 'Balai Politik Magelang,' (Celebes) :

First lesson : Political expressions :—

7. *Cadre* :

Means, literally, 'chain of work.'

Members of the cadre are only those party members who are the very best members of the organisation. It is from these members of the cadre that the progress of the party depends. They form the living chain of work which has to be renewed and strengthened constantly. The members of the cadre are new forces, who are educated and trained in order to be competent in their function as responsible leading persons. Members of the cadre are also members of the party leadership, party members who have been put to work within the party and they are the active centre of the gathering of all members.

10. *Class Struggle* :

is the struggle between the class of oppressors (capitalists or bourgeois) and the oppressed class (proletarians or the poor people), in other words between the class possessing the means of production (factories, mines, etc.) and the masses which do

not possess anything but their energy. In former periods this struggle was waged between the slave-owners and their slaves. Thereafter between the landed nobility and their retainers, who tilled their lands. Nowadays this struggle is waged between the capitalists and their wage-labourers (proletarians).

#### 11. *Communism* :

represents a society on a higher level of development than socialism. Lenin has commented on Communism and Socialism as follows : Socialism is a direct outcome of capitalism. It is the first shape of a new society. Communism, on the other hand, is a more advanced form of this new society and can only make progress when socialism has already become an established force.

#### 12. *Communist Party* :

is the party of proletarians, the revolutionary party of proletarians, the highest form of workers' organisation. It is the party of pioneers, leading in the struggle of the proletarians and of all oppressed ranks of the people in order to obtain an improvement of the people's lot directed towards socialism. This party consists of selected people, of workers notably true to their principles, possessing heroic qualities (also from other ranks of the people), who acknowledge that the power to lead the oppressed people to freedom exists in a communist party only. This party should draw the best elements from the workers' class, as well as their experience, their revolutionary spirit and their unshakeable conviction to champion the interests of the proletariat. (Stalin).

The members shall :

1. Submit themselves to the Party Programme ;
2. Fulfil the duties in the Party ;
3. Be active.

All party organisations are based upon Democratic Centralism. This means :

1. All party organisations from top to bottom are elected ;
2. The party organisations have to decide on how long they should stay in office ;
3. The party must be strictly disciplined, and the minority must submit to the majority of votes ;

4. All decisions of higher organisations must be obeyed by subordinate bodies, also by members of the party. Further, the Communist Party in each country becomes a section of the communistic world movement, called the Third International (Comintern).

#### 14. *Chauvinism* :

Offensive and malicious treatment of other people. The aim is : the victory of the capitalists. They make use of other races which they wish to subjugate as official propaganda material in films, books, etc., etc., represented as people of a low standard who are unfit for self-government.

#### 17. *Democracy* :

Derived from 'demos' (people) and 'crates' (government). The conception of democracy is twofold : the political and the economic democracy. The political democracy grants to every individual of the people the right to take part in the government, e.g. the people have their representatives in Parliament, in the government's administration, etc.

The economic democracy grants the people the right to arrange for their needs in the best possible manner, based on social justice and equality.

In a capitalist community (America, England, the Netherlands) democracy is enlisted to serve capitalism. The means of production remain the property of the capitalists. The poor people in a capitalistic country are oppressed and extorted. In a society of this kind no economic democracy exists. Russia is the only country in which both political and economic democracy are present. In that country the proletariat possesses all power, controls all means of production and brings democracy fully into practice.

#### 19. *Dictatorship* :

A power thrust by one class on the other by force. A disguised dictatorship is to be found in a 'democratic' capitalist community. In Fascist countries (Germany, Italy), the dictatorship is put into practice with ruthless violence, and openly takes the shape of terrorism, exercised by big business. The *dictatorship of the proletariat* is the exclusive power of the proletarians, intended to force down the remaining former extortioners, the capitalists and landowners.

21. *Fascism* :

Is the dictatorship of big business and reactionaries, applied in a terroristic manner :

1. In their own country the Fascists cruelly violate the democratic rights of the masses and are using methods of slavery on the labourers ;
2. Abroad they go marauding in the shape of a destructive war and subjugate other people, disrupting the organisation of these people in a totalitarian and unhuman manner, abolishing all government institutions and murdering and reducing to slavery the entire population, making use of chauvinistic methods.

24. *Fraction* :

Is a group of communists, members of an organisation, working according to a preconceived plan to guide the members of the aforementioned organisation and to influence them in the direction of the progressive policy in order to improve working conditions and their standards of living, to defend democratic freedom, to fight the oppressors so as eventually to arrive at Socialism.

This fraction also serves to instruct similar groups of any other party functioning in a non-party organisation.

27. *Intellectuals* :

are in general educated people like doctors, technicians, artists, etc., in a capitalistic community. They represent the middle class, whose existence is based on the capitalist class. In the work of Marx this term is employed more effectively for non-proletarians, refusing to recognise the truth of the 'class struggle.' The intellectuals do not constitute a class in itself, because in the community they originate from all classes. According to their ideology they are nearer to the capitalist class (bourgeoisie) than the proletarian class. In his exposition on the New Intellect in Sovietism, Stalin said :

'The former qualities connected with the intellectuals, who try to place themselves above all classes but are actually working mainly for the interests of landowners and capitalists are not in existence any more. Our intellectuals in Sovietism are the "new intellect." They are using their intellect exclusively in the interests of labourers and farmers. Formerly the intellectuals worked exclusively for the interests of the capitalists, because there was no other way left for

them. Nowadays they are members of the Soviet community, no different from the labourers and farmers. Together they build up a community without classes (socialist community).'

#### 28. *Third International :*

was founded in Moscow in 1919 under the leadership of Lenin. This Third International is the centre of the Communist Party all over the world and of those labour parties which qualify for membership. The International is also called Comintern (International Communists). It is alive and expanding ; it is gaining strength from day to day up to this time. Its goal is to wipe out world capitalism-imperialism and to establish a worldwide socialist community.

#### 31. *Leninism :*

is the theory and tactics of the revolution of the proletarians in general and the theory and tactics of the proletarian dictators in particular (Stalin).

#### 32. *Marxism :*

What is called Marxism, is ' Marxist-Leninism.' It is the theory and practice of the movement of the labour classes. It has explained as clearly as possible the basis of the established directives of the proletarians by means of Marx and Engels, perfected still further by Lenin and Stalin.

#### 43. *Quotation from Dimitrov :*

' We must never put a restraint on our struggle to win the dictatorship of the proletariat, but we must recommend also slogans and fighting methods, arising from the needs of the masses, and we must be able to keep pace with the fighting power of the masses according to the degree of their progress.'

Lenin :

' Such is our aim. We must never cherish the view that because something has no value whatever for ourselves, the same applies to the class and to the masses.'

#### 45. *Socialism :*

A social order attained by revolutionary methods, replacing capitalism, the first step to the communist community. Socialism is the child of capitalism, which has already carried socialism for a long time, and which has been delivered into the world in blood (Marx). Socialism is the community, in which oppression of one party by the other does not exist any more. The mass

of workers possesses the means of production such as factories, mines, railways, etc. This is contrary to the communist community, in which each individual (member of the community) gives and receives according to ability in relation to the labour carried out by him. Communism is the continuation of socialism, and therefore stands on a higher level. In a socialist community the labour class is in possession of the administrative machinery. The Soviet forms the foundation of the policy and of the form of government, like the Russian Soviet Union. Socialism is a classless community. In this relation 'classless' signifies : there is no class that extorts and there is no class that is being extorted.

#### 46. *Soviet* :

Russian word, signifying council or committee, the machinery of power of the proletarians, a form of government of a socialist state. The tie, binding together all organisations of the masses, under the guidance of the proletarians and attracting and uniting the masses in a simultaneously waged struggle for the revolution aimed at obtaining dictatorship of the proletariat, as well as in the administration of the state. Soviet is an organisation of the masses themselves and possesses the most democratic qualities. Its task is to destroy the ancient system and to struggle for the system of the proletarians.

#### 47. *State* :

A state is a power which aims at oppression (Engels). The means of power of a state are the following : army, police, tribunal, etc., which are in the hands of a certain class so as to make use of them in oppressing another class. Under Capitalism the state is in the hands of big business, bankers, etc., and is being used to oppress the workers in general. In Russia the workers control the state in the interest of their own class, so as to destroy the ancient system and spread the proletarian doctrine.

#### 49. *Trotzkyism* :

In Russia Trotzky and his followers are denounced and suppressed as fifth columnists. Trotzkyism still lives on in capitalist countries under the cloak of 'communism.' The danger emanating from these Trotzkyists appears from their conduct, i.e., proclaiming themselves communists, marxists, revolutionaries,

etc. A leftish, surpassing the leftist ideas. Trotzkyism is a sharp and effective weapon for the capitalists to fight the communists. Trotzkyism appears under various names : The Communist League ; Revolutionary Workers' League ; Fourth International ; Labour Socialist Group, etc. In the Spanish War the fascist organisation which supported Franco, openly carried the name : ' Party of Marxist Unification.' In Australia, America, Spain, China and Indonesia (Tan Malakka) they have played the role of disturbers of law and order and bearers of discord and have performed espionage activities.

*Explanatory Note :*

The above mentioned political expressions are only briefly explained. For that reason each expression needs a more extensively accentuated explanation. This is the task of the teachers. Further all cursists are advised to purchase the book *Himpoenan dari Kati-kata dan Term-term Kaoem Marxis* (collection of Marxist words and expressions) by Ll Harry Gould.

Further, the following note on socialism is to be observed : Socialism, a system whereby the means of production are in the hands of and are used for the benefit of the community, aims at the destruction of capitalism. As a result of this, two classes have come into existence : the capitalists and the proletarians, and this brings about the class struggle which is constantly undergoing changes under the influence of the locality where, and the period in which, it is waged.

As the capitalists will not voluntarily relinquish their power, the labour class will have to take it from them. Once the world has become socialist, no classes will exist any more.

## 8

### INDONESIA AND ITS SOVIETIZATION

' If the Soviet empire could add to its present strength either the industrial resources of Western Europe or the manpower and raw materials of Southern Asia, we could no longer ignore the possibility of a war for world conquest.' Mr. MORGAN PHILLIPS, Secretary of the British Socialist Party, Copenhagen, June 3rd, 1950.

THE graceful temple-dances of mysterious Bali, the unforgettable beauty of a fleet of Javanese fishing-boats in the sunset ; three thousand islands of paradise, the home of many races, each with its own distinctive culture and speech. This was the tourist's mind-picture of the Dutch East Indies, the archipelago stretching between south Asia and Australia, from British Malaya to New Guinea. To the economist, this vast territory with a land surface equal to that of the United States was a vital factor in the world's supplies of raw materials, for peace and for war. Instead of the traditional eastern exports of perfumes, peacocks and apes, the modern world turned more and more to Indonesia for the sinews of industry and man's struggle against the elements : abundant in rubber, tin, quinine, gold and a hundred other major items, this country was the major prize in the Pacific war with Japan. The motive of the present Communist fight for Indonesia, therefore, is the twofold determination to cut off her essential supplies from other nations, and to stamp out democracy in all Asia. To this end, Red strategy has anticipated events : in the words of the P.K.I.—the Communist Party of Indonesia :—  
' World War Three has already begun ! '

Today, the Republic of Indonesia, an independent State having a position under the Dutch Crown similar to that of the Dominions of the British Commonwealth, finds itself at grips with the Red tide of communism working actively for the overthrow of the Government. When, in January, 1950, effective control over their country was handed over to the Indonesians, the Dutch left ; but Indonesia is not entirely alone in her

struggle. As in Pakistan, when the nationalistic desires of the people to rule themselves had been satisfied, and many British people stayed on to help the Government with its great problems of nation-building, Netherlands advisors have been welcomed by the Indonesians as necessary experts in the transition to national self-sufficiency.

If Indonesia fell to Communism, the severely-threatened British Malayan Federation, inhabited by a people racially identical with the Indonesians, would probably be lost ; to the north, the Republic of the Philippines gravely threatened, and a dagger pointed at the continent of Australia. The very great Russian-backed strength of Indonesian Communism is therefore among the gravest perils to freedom in the East today.

Formed in 1923, the Indonesian Communist Party (the P.K.I.) worked for years by the orthodox Kremlin-inspired agitation methods for use by all Red parties in colonial territories. Its two fanatic leaders, Alimin and Tan Malakka, welded collectivist forces together after the Japanese occupation into a fighting force so strong as actually to be able to set up a Soviet State at Medium, in the island of Java. At the close of the Japanese war, the delay in Indonesia's reoccupation by the Dutch forces distinctly left a hiatus, of which full advantage was taken by both nationalists and Communists. During this period, exiled Red agitators flooded back into the country ; even upon the Dutch return, Communism had grown so strong that it could not be uprooted. Suppressed both by the Dutch East Indies administration and the Japanese forces, the P.K.I. blossomed forth now in powerful military formations ; the names of veteran Red heroes were on all lips : Muso, Sharifuddin, Durosman, Sarjomo.

Throughout the myriad islands rent by a fierce Dutch-Nationalist struggle went the inflammatory creed of the agitators ; everywhere armed bands sprang up, secret societies flourished, and Indonesia's Reds carried on a lucrative smuggling trade out of Republican territory under the noses of the Dutch blockade. By this means, Russian agents in the Singapore spy-nest were able to buy large quantities of rubber and quinine for stockpiling at home, at cut prices from the Communists—and no questions asked. In this way Russian riches poured into the war chest of the P.K.I.

The money was carefully spent. Mobilising peasants, labourers, ricefield workers, men from the mines, the Red organisation rapidly produced a fighting force of 100,000 men.

Meanwhile the Dutch, at sixes and sevens with the Indonesian nationalists, were unable to combat the menace. The nationalists themselves, with whom the Reds tried to be on the friendliest terms, tried to use the Communist threat to extract political concessions. The nationalists said, in effect, that the growth of Communism was inevitable and due to the Dutch colonial rule ; therefore, power should be handed over to the nationalists, who would stamp out Communism. It was thus necessary for the nationalists to permit the existence of the Reds, in order to be able to use them as a bargaining counter. The Dutch, on the other hand, maintained that the Communist power could not be defeated by the Republic. World opinion remained uncertain and uninformed as to the relative merits of the opposing contentions. Where there is uncertainty and lack of information, Communism flourishes : and it continued to make great headway during the discussions between Holland and the Republicans. By the end of 1949, when the issue of ' dominion status ' had been agreed upon, and in the succeeding months, it became plain that the Republic alone was certainly no match for Moscow-trained veterans like the Red leader Alimin. Uprisings and rebellions continue, and the familiar communist tactic of infiltrating the ranks of the republicans has not been less successful in Indonesia than in the other threatened lands of Asia : while the main body of communist activity is in no way weakened.

Moscow's chief agitator in Indonesia—Alimin—combines the wide experience with the support and training that is more or less uniform among all communist chiefs in foreign countries. Tall, thin and tousle-haired, Alimin maintains the humble manners of a man of the people. Nothing in his typical Malay face shows defiance or menace ; his slanting eyes are soft—until he gets up to speak. ' When Alimin speaks, it is as if one witnesses an eruption of a volcano ' say his followers. And this pleases him—this and his self-chosen nickname : The Fist of Moscow.

A strange mixture of East and West, Pak Alimin's half buttoned white shirt, patched sarong and worn sandals testi<sup>9</sup>

to the practical application of his desire to be considered one of the proletariat. Over a steaming dish of rice and prawns two things stand out sharply from this outwardly retiring nature. In a mixed gathering, he will freely discuss any subject, with half a dozen people—in Dutch, English, French, German, Russian and Chinese—all at the same time. Betray astonishment at this really remarkable polyglotism, and flashes of the real Alimin come to the surface. He will roar with laughter :

‘ So you thought I was a poor, craven illiterate, did you ? I am no intellectual like Uncle Ho ’ (Ho Chi Minh, his bosom friend of Moscow days, now Red dictator in Indo-China) ‘ and the difference between us is this : Ho’s facility for languages, he says, is due entirely to Communism ; mine I know to be due to *my* intelligence—and my intelligence is the reason I am a Communist.’

But those who have spoken to Alimin of deviationism, of a man remaining a Communist but refusing to accept the Moscow line, have received the full benefit of his classical invective :

‘ Infamous ally of the imperialists, dog of reactionary capitalism ! To detach myself from allegiance to the Great Stalin would be worse than becoming one of the imperialists—Anglo-American instigators of a new war.’

Just how deep this feeling really goes it is difficult to assess. Alimin, acknowledged leader of all Indonesia’s Reds, and dictator-designate of eighty million people, might not be ready for the break yet : Moscow still helps him much. Even the shrewd Tito of Yugoslavia did not make his break with Russia until he was sure that his strength was such to resist and succeed. Further, it is unlikely that Alimin would unburden such secret thoughts to anyone—even a Communist—where the penalty for deviation is death. It is nevertheless undeniable that Alimin is a great personality ; equally, as leader of all Indonesia, owner of her fabulous mineral and other riches he would be able—and capable—to stand on his own. This does not mean that he would desert Communism.

Three main leaders of Indonesian Communism were originally designated for the several phases of red revolt after World War II, for the opening shots of War III. Tan Malakka, aggressive firebrand came first. His assignment of steering the Nationalist movement into Marxist channels failed ; and Malakka was disgraced.

Semaun, still in Russian Central Asia, remains as a trump card for the technological development of Indonesia. It was under his direction as a scientist that the Indonesian P.K.I. received its orders for the procuring of raw materials from the country for shipment to Russia after the Japanese occupation.

In Alimin, the greatest personality, international Communism undoubtedly has one of Red Asia's strongest men. Cunning plays a large part in Alimin's approach to the peasantry. To those not selected as active reds, he tells of life in Soviet Russia ; a good life, sufficient food, clothing, free medical treatment, even free entertainment. His hearers learn of a five-hour working day, that there is no race distinction in the Soviet Union. We will build that kind of ideal society here in the South Pacific : follow me, he tells them.

The Fist of Moscow has earned his supremacy in Indonesian Communism. Agitator against Dutch rule by inclination, Alimin became so powerful that the Netherlands authorities ordered his arrest in 1925. Travelling along the highly-organised Communist escape route to Russia, the Fist fled via Singapore and Canton to Moscow, evading arrest. Before the gathering of the world revolutionaries of the Communist International, Alimin pleaded for arms and money to return and conquer the islands.

Moscow, however, was not to be hurried. Realising that Alimin himself was not experience enough, and that the strength of the movement in Indonesia was small, the Russians sent him as a representative of the Third International to Singapore. Making his way to Java in the following year, Alimin saw in the failure of an attempted Communist insurrection there that the time was not yet. After a brief appearance at the ' Pacific Labour Conference ' at Hankow in 1927, Alimin again headed for Russia by way of Vladivostock.

After the customary one year's training for Communist leaders at Lenin University, Alimin reappeared in 1928 at the VI Congress of the Communist International. Fellow-members of his group being trained for future leadership of the Red movements in their countries were :

CHOW EN-LAI, later Communist chief in China.

HARRY POLLIT, leader of the Communist Party of Great Britain.

L. SHARKEY, head of the Communist Party of Australia.

OKANO, Communist agitator in Japan.

EARL BROWDER, later Communist chief in the United States.

MAURICE THOREZ, Red leader in France.

With these associates, Alimin graduated from the agitation school, whose curriculum contained a concentrated course in politics (communism), the supposed defects of all other systems in the light of Marxist dialectics, and methods of agitation. At special courses were taught bomb-making, rabble-rousing, espionage and sabotage.

After this, each potential leader was sent out on 'field work.' In Alimin's case, the years 1933 to 1941 saw him successively working in Paris, Brussels, London, Berlin, Smyrna (Turkey), the Middle East and Mongolia. Thence he went to serve Communism in China. In 1936, Alimin was known to have played a large part in the Red gangsterism in Palestine.

By 1942, the year of the capitulation of Singapore, Alimin was entrenched in nearby Kuala Lumpur, a Soviet Russian citizen, living among his fellow Malays within reach of his Indonesian homeland, and doubling as Official Representative of the USSR. Later during the war, Alimin worked at Ching-king, collaborating with his fellow-student of University days, Chow En-Lai of China. Throughout the Japanese occupation of the Indonesian islands Alimin directed the fight of the Reds against the occupation, and the end of the war saw him chief of the movement in Indonesia, with the title of Head of the Politburo (political department) of the P.K.I.

Then followed the period of integration of all the Red elements in the country ; and in 1946 the Conference of the Communist Party of Indonesia at Solo was able to draw up a document embodying the essence of their outlook and plans. It is upon this plan that the communist organisation still works, with the difference that the Communist P.K.I. has changed its temporary policy of working with the Republican authorities to one of undermining it, with a view to staging a coup for power.

The programme is divided into two parts : the Basic and the Battle Programmes. The Basic Programme is merely a restatement of the Communist ideals : all society, it holds, except Communist society, is capitalistic, and this must be destroyed.

In its place will come a Socialist (Communist) State, directed according to the tenets of Karl Marx and Lenin. All this is in conformity with fundamental Communist plans. But the Battle Programme is set out more concisely, and provides a far rarer document—the secret plans of a party to gain power.

#### BATTLE PROGRAMME.

1. *Basis* : The Party bases itself on the socialism of Marx and Lenin.
2. *Aim* : A Socialistic State.
3. *Battle Method* : Fighting on the basis of the Class Struggle by means of Revolution.
4. *Means towards this goal* :
  - (a) Uniting the proletarians into party organisations.
  - (b) Educating the proletariat to class-consciousness in order to fight against capitalism and imperialism by mass action.
  - (c) Participation of the Communists in the determining of the policies of the State.
  - (d) Co-operation for the moment with all organisations here and abroad whose principles are not against the P.K.I. (Communists).

This, the opening section of the Battle Programme, shows quite clearly that the party aims at revolution, infiltration into the Government, and the indoctrination of the masses with 'class-consciousness' and Communism. Later the Programme provides for the mobilisation of the people, and for working temporarily with almost any other body to gain their ends.

Striking evidence of this willingness to work with the Republicans, and the efficiency with which sabotage was carried on is seen in the various battle-orders issued in Indonesia. A scorched-earth directive of 5th July, 1947 shows that the seasoned fighters of Indonesia were no ignorant guerrillas :

' *SECRET* .

#### DEMOLITION PLAN (SCORCHED EARTH)

For this division the oil installations and oilfields at Tl. Jimar and Limau are the most important objectives.

In this work there must be co-operation with the Demolition Brigade of the Permiri.

The demolitions will be carried out by means of gasoline, gas and dynamite.

Oil Installations are divided into Sections :—

- |                            |                       |                             |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Power plant.            | 2. Trumble.           | 3. Crude oil storage tanks. |
| 4. Stores.                 | 5. Garages.           | 6. Laboratories.            |
| 7. Pipeline heating plant. | 8. Oilfield at Limau. | 9. Oilfield at Jimar.       |

No. 1. Will be demolished by placing charges of dynamite  $\frac{1}{2}$  kilograms each at vulnerable spots : dynamo, etc.;

No. 2. Demolished by closing exhaust valves of the gaslines. See that the trumble explodes of its own accord.

No. 4. Demolished by  $\frac{1}{2}$  kilogram charges at pumps, resulting in breaking plunger and steamlines. Boiler will then be emptied by draining its water, after which funaces will be kept going continuously . . . . .'

While the military activities were thus proceeding, the Communist Party set out to fulfil its aim, called by Moscow 'of leading and organising the Indonesian people.'<sup>1</sup> In May, 1946, the political chief of Communism in Indonesia—Sarjono—became President of a bloc of parties called the National Concentration. Within this body, while taking all co-operation from other parties, the Communists contrived to form their own left Wing, bringing under it all the Communists, Socialists and others who would be tempted to join. This 'Socialist Bloc' was claimed by Moscow to be the paramount factor in the National Concentration, and to play a decisive part in 'all affairs of the Indonesian Republic.'

In order to strengthen their hand, communists realised that they must keep all elements of their group tightly organised; yet this unity was early recognised as dangerous. If the entire Red Front were highly integrated, any measures taken against the communists would break the entire Front open. For this reason it was stipulated that 'all the parties and organisations of the Socialsit Bloc are organisationally independent.' This, of course, was merely an extension of the communist principle of establishing cells—watertight compartments whose destruction individually would leave the main body untouched.

Next, in all the units of the Republican Army were placed political officers, to 'educate and exhort.'

Branching out from military organisation to the rallying of the workers, a Federation of Indonesian Trades Unions was

established, initially numbering over 3,500 members—under the ‘ideological influence of the Communist Party.’ The workers, too, have to be educated in Communism and the teachings of Karl Marx :

‘The democratic parties are carrying out intense work for preparing republican cadres and fortifying their ranks. On the initiative of the Indonesian Communist Party supported by the Socialist Party, the Higher Education Institute—Karl Marx Institute—was opened in Java. This Institute is to prepare cadres of Party and Propaganda workers. At the Institute students are trained theoretically, are studying the works of classical Marxism-Leninism. In 1947, seventy-five persons graduated from the Institute, and obtained leading posts in the Parties.’

All local and provincial party groups likewise maintain their education branch. At these courses Communists and others study jointly.

Alimin’s party next embarked upon large-scale publishing, to feed the local branches and satisfy the greatly stimulated demand for Communist literature. Today, while imported Red books are not scarce, Indonesian-produced translations of the Works of Lenin, Writings of Stalin and party publications are available in enormous quantities. Particularly popular with the P.K.I. are Stalin’s ‘Question of Leninism,’ and ‘Concerning the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.’

After 1946, the Communist Party of Indonesia found itself compelled to institute a large-scale purge of ‘unreliable’ elements. Individual loyalties had sprung up, smaller splinter-parties tended to attract a following that the P.K.I. saw as a potential threat to their unity and power. By the inevitable totalitarian weapon of denunciation, the party was able after three months to report that it had been ‘purified of criminal, dubious and stray elements.’

Parallel with the strengthening of their own organisation and infiltration into other parties, the P.K.I.’s strategists scored a major victory in obtaining the wholesale allegiance of the 250,000 members of the Indonesian Gorindo Party. Indicative of the communists’ success at infiltration into other parties is the fact that the so-called People’s Party of Indonesia (Rajkat Indonesia)—with nearly a quarter-million members,—shown an unmistakeable leaning towards fusion with the Reds.

Just how closely sympathetic with Russia is the P.K.I. may be established by noting one of their documents :

### SUMMONS OF THE RED PKI

‘ Brothers-in-Arms !

The past World War II has shown the international world how strong the socialist community is, and how weak and frail is capitalist-imperialist force. The capitalist forces, combining all their might in Fascism . . . have tried to attack and destroy the socialist States . . . But the Socialist Soviet Union, forming the stronghold of International-Revolutionism—the example and beacon in the international class-struggle . . .—could not be brought to ruin . . . In Indonesia, too, the common people have started the National Revolution . . . ’

The document tells how the present world peace is only a breathing-spell, a chance for the Communists to gain strength for the coming struggle against the West.

As in almost every Asian country, Communism in Indonesia is a vital, living force : led by determined and experienced veterans, lacking nothing in arms or money, provided with a seasoned army. The P.K.I., its cover-organisations and undercover agents, are no unorganised rabble of the Bastille, but a well-oiled and smoothly running machine. It has been said that a machine of this kind can be combated by the equally organised machine of Government—and here comes the fundamental difference. While the Communists are fighting for an ideal—however wrong it may be thought to be—the Indonesian Government and nationalists as a whole are not : for they have gained it. Their ambitions of freedom have been realised, their urge for change is diverted into channels of reconstruction : and it is axiomatic that an ideal that fires men’s minds can succeed. Such is the nature of the Communist threat to Indonesia.

# 9

## THE RED NETWORK

‘ Arise, ye prisoners of starvation !  
Arise, ye wretched of the earth !  
For Justice thunders condemnation :  
A better world’s in birth.’

*The Internationale.*

THE Far Eastern headquarters of communism in Peking derives its authority from the Eastern Political Department at Moscow. Otherwise referred to as the Far East and South Asia Political Command (F.E.P.C.), this instrument of international Marxism is presided over by an extraordinarily shrewd but little-known figure : Wong Ming, who now operates under the name of Chen-Sau U.

In conformity with the usual policy of dissimulation, Wong’s supposed designation is ‘ Representative of the Communist Party of North China,’ with the alternative title Chief of the Central Executive Committee—the Chung Kung Chu Yang Che Sin Hui.

After the end of World War II, the wartime lack of co-ordination among the many elements of Communism in Asia caused perturbation in Moscow. Following a Cominform directive, the Asian Conference of Internationalists was therefore convened, from September 20th to 26th, 1946, at Dairen. It has been ascertained that at this epoch-making conference attended Red delegates from China, Korea, Indochina, Siam, Malaya India and Indonesia ; their deliberations resulting in the following significant resolutions :

1. The establishment of a Pan-Asiatic body of control—a Far East Cominform.
2. The setting up of an all-Asiatic co-operation front.
3. Co-ordination of all South Asian national liberation and anti-imperialist movements, and their capture to communist control.

4. Liaison through Moscow for synchronising communist activities—such as strikes—to interfere with the Colonial Powers' efforts at re-establishing their rule in Asia.

The most striking ramifications of this agreement were shortly to be seen in the stoppage of work by French and Australian dockers handling war material for Indonesia and Indochina.

March, 1947, saw the fall of Yen-an. This threat, coupled with the decision taken at the 1946 conference, caused the Asian headquarters of revolutionary activity to be moved to Vladivostock, in Russia's Far East. In the autumn of the same year, a congress at Vladivostock decided upon the setting up of an Asian central office at Harbin.

In spite of the importance of Vladivostock's centre for the exchange of progress reports, the spotlight from August, 1946, pointed also to Hong Kong, the British colony in East China : it was here that the clandestine Communist East Asia congress was held. Thenceforward, Hong Kong's importance as propaganda centre for Asian communism greatly increased, with direct liaison in Singapore, the Malayan finger pointing to Indonesia's lush target. While until World War II Shanghai had been one of the vital centres of Red propaganda, its significance had been only partly affected by the removal to Hong Kong of agitation propaganda. Shanghai remains the specialist centre for the collection and sifting incoming information from East Asia. Predominant in the Communist espionage front is the extreme leftwing Democratic League of Shanghai—the infamous Min Chu Men—working under the undisputed leadership of 'General' Li Chi Chen, often called the 'spider in the web of the Yuan-Hui' (Kuomin-tang Ko-min Wwi- Yuan Hui)—reputedly the most fanatically revolutionary body in all Asia, and a breeding-ground for Soviet agents.

Characteristic of all Communist operations in Asia is secrecy. For this reason it has happened that the agitation virus in the hands of consummate experts has been propagated below the surface. It is not always realised that, although the Red creed undoubtedly is based upon a call to violent uprising, the preliminary work calls for an extraordinary degree of tact. Whereas among nations with the community discipline of the Chinese and Japanese, secret societies of a communistic

character can and do flourish, when the Moscow agitator turns his hand to almost any of the other, less disciplined, populations of the East, the indispensable secrecy of his plotting becomes progressively harder to maintain. There are two main reasons for this, reflecting the reactions of the two main bodies of Asians appealed to. Among the agrarians and country people, the call to revolution makes little appeal in lands where the small farmer finds his lot bearable enough. Like the peasant anywhere, his reactions are slow, his own ideas deep-rooted. In common with most land-workers, he is a fundamentally straightforward man. While he may eventually be persuaded of the advantages of Communism, he will not see the reason why, if Communism is good, it should not at once be applied. Further, he will generally fail to see the advantage or necessity of keeping his intentions secret. These men may play an important part—as they have in China—as the tough warriors of a Red Army; but their value in the first stages of Communist intrigue is virtually nil. This lesson was learned by the Communists as far back as the Russian revolution.

The second group is that of the 'worker-intellectual' lineup. Among the industrial workers, the physical nature of their life in Asia—as everywhere—generally causes their exuberance to be available for action only when it has been fomented to a given stage of intensity. Once the worker has been enthused for Communism, he puts continued pressure upon the party men to act, to obtain pay concessions, to cause strikes that may be ill-advised at the time. With the intellectual group—the most promising section of Red supporters—the Party finds itself confronted by the formidable student problem. Generally adolescent, easily swept away by slogans and their own importance, students in the Far East tend towards giving themselves away by over-enthusiasm. Only that element to whom secrecy for its own sake makes a powerful appeal can be employed for the perilous work of secret activity.

The fundamental instability of these several factors, combined with the march of recent events helps greatly in understanding the causes of the unrest in Asia today. There is no doubt that recent history has favoured the protagonists of a Red Asia. Before World War II, most of South Asia was under one form or another of foreign domination. Western education, however,

could not be denied to the more intelligent among the indigenous peoples. Even although, in some cases, the colonising Power, adopting a negative or hypocritical policy, simply ignored the educational needs of the colonials, there were always those who, by virtue of a degree of financial stability, were able to send their sons abroad to study.

Intellectuals were, broadly speaking, divided into two classes: the traditional aristocracy, who studied abroad and then sometimes returned as supporters of the occupying Power, which maintained them in their ancestral positions as petty rulers and in other privileged places. Such were the Sultans and small rulers. Next came those who, seeing this first category leading a comfortable and protected life, interpreted this as due to western education. They, while less well off financially, nevertheless often were able at some sacrifice to pay for the education of their children in Europe.

Many of these young men were nationalists ; their political aspirations often springing from the belief that the Western power administering their land monopolised too greatly the available posts, and that the profits made by the commercial entities of the Western government should remain in the country.

Communists were not slow to seize upon these students in the country of their studies, for indoctrination. Of these, many went to Moscow in the inter-war period, there to be trained for revolt : but not all. Others, again, fell into the hands of Germans, Italians and Japanese, who subjected them to anti-British, and, French or Dutch propaganda, or to the Nipponese brand of Pan-Asianism. Nazi, Fascist and Japanese collaborators were later to be drawn from their ranks.

Yet a third category, unaffected by political matters, completed their studies and returned to their home countries. Here they found a shock awaiting them. In many cases free assembly and freedom of speech, ideals which they had eagerly absorbed in Europe, were rigidly suppressed. Equality of opportunity there was not. Jobs were hard to find ; Europeans with the same qualifications were given preference. Socially they were discriminated against. These conditions, of course, varied according to the territory involved, and its status vis-à-vis the mother country. Not in all dependencies were all of these

restrictions to be found : some Powers were less harsh than others. But it must be admitted that some potential causes for discontent were present in every Asian land administered by a foreign Power : even if that cause were only the actual presence of the Power in question.

Talking to their fellows, many such disillusioned students were driven into the Communist fold. Their adoption of Communism as a philosophy came at the psychological moment of despair accentuated by the already-positioned Red agitators, when they would have accepted any explanation for their failure which would save them from an admission of personal failure. The tendency towards inferiority to the strength of Europe found an antidote in the delicious suspense of Communist insistence upon secret conspiracy. Any leaning towards morbidness could be put to good use : ' today we suffer ; tomorrow we turn the tables—meanwhile, blind obedience to Moscow, who has been through this period herself, and understands.'

With the over-running of most of East Asia by the Japanese, the various discontents re-aligned themselves. The nationalists collaborated with the Japanese ; Communists received the order to infiltrate the new puppet ' national ' governments set up by Tokyo, as well as to secure strategic posts in unions and associations. While anti-imperialism remained the Japanese cry, and Nippon's hand was strongest, Communists could do little. After the withdrawal of the Japanese, the Reds either attempted political coups or white-anted their way still further and with greater secrecy into existing organisations.

This vital question of anti-imperialism as a weapon of Moscow is underlined in almost paradoxical manner by Russian writers ; it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the fight against colonialism is basically as much one of expediency as of doctrine.

Industrialism, we are told in Bukharin's *A.B.C. of Communism*—the international communist party-gospel<sup>1</sup> arose concurrently with colonial expansion in Europe. The capitalist leaders of the West kept down the factory workers not so much by force as by appealing to their patriotism :

<sup>1</sup> P. 143, Eng. Ed.

‘People were universally accustomed to the idea that the future development of capitalism would be peaceful, and even those who spoke of coming wars hardly believed their own words. A section of the workers, including the working-class leaders, was more and more inclined to accept the idea that the working class was interested in the colonial policy and that the workers ought to join forces with their own bourgeoisie in order to promote, in this matter, “the common material welfare” . . . It is not surprising that in critical moments their devotion to the imperialist robber State outweighed their devotion to international solidarity.

We see, then, that the chief causes of the breakup of the Second International was to be found in the fact that the Colonial policy and the monopolist position of the great State capitalist trusts had attracted the workers—and especially the “upper strata” of the working-class—to the imperialist bourgeois State.’

Allying themselves with the upsurge of nationalist feeling among Asian states today, the Communists have two objects. First, they dare not oppose a cry for independence which is so persistent and so popular—in spite of its potential peril to international communism. They must take the risk of a possible wholesale appearance of Titoism : national Communism. There is, however a remedy to this, from the Marxist point of view. Infiltrating the higher ranks of the nationalists, by ‘out-nationalising’ them, Communists can—and do—divert the immense power of patriotism to their own ends. Second, the United States’ attitude favouring aid to undeveloped territories—as manifested in President Truman’s Point Four—as well as stiffening opposition to Communist expansion in the still-free lands, inevitably involves co-operation by Asian governments with Western powers ; and even American capital investment. The Communists masquerading as nationalists in the present governments of certain Asian countries can be checkmated by a conscientious spurring of mass nationalism by the West. This, indeed, is an indispensable counter-weapon to Communist charges that American investment in the East is ‘cloaked imperialism.’

Women, so far neglected in most countries as far as political propaganda is concerned, have been an important target of agitation in the Red network’s plans for Asia. Appealing to the gentle, motherly tendencies of women, and their universal desire for equality and better living conditions, Soviet

propaganda holds up to the Eastern women vistas of freedom as practised in the Soviet Union : which they are exhorted to reproduce by means of the magic word Communism in their own countries.

As the Russian feminist N. Kapova put it in a message to the world's women on 'International Women's Day,' May 8th, 1950 :

'The political and economic equality of women, their transformation into active builders of a new Socialist life, is the great achievement of the Soviet Revolution. Women in the Soviet Union are accorded equal rights in all economic, State, cultural, political and public activity. They have the right to elect and to be elected, to engage in creative work in any sphere. Their conditions are good ; they occupy a predominant place in administration . . . 277 women have been elected to the Supreme Soviets of the Union, and half a million are deputies in local Soviets. The history of man knows no such parallel. Women are active in election campaigns, hundreds have been nominated as deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet . . . including a weaver, chairman of a collective farm, tractor women, teachers, people's artists, trade union functionaries and intellectuals.

They have a many-sided and rich experience capable of fruitful application in Soviet life. There are women ministers and vice-ministers. Millions are engaged in production, in industry, agriculture, culture and technique. They are subjected to no such moral humiliation as the women of capitalist lands ; discrimination is unknown, their pay is equal with men's.

Soviet women can choose and master any profession. All education is open and free to them, up to the highest ; they are energetic and efficient workers. They are teachers and judges, pilots and doctors, geologists and actresses, agronomists and tractor drivers, masters of industry. Peasant and labouring women have acquired skilled professions ; hundreds of thousands are bold innovators in Socialist industry and agriculture, blazing new trails for raising the productivity of labour.

They have broken all the old bonds, write books, are technicians, and are respected. They are new women, highly esteemed ; over seven hundred are Heroes of Socialist Labour, have Stalin prizes or received Government awards for their selfless work for the benefit of the people. Forty-four per cent of all specialists with a higher education in the Soviet Union are women ; over two million are devoted to public education, more than 126,000 are doctors . . . their life is beautiful and happy.'

Whatever may be the truth of this harangue, there can be no doubt that it might have a powerful appeal to women anywhere. This declaration to the women of the world is a masterpiece of propaganda. It makes the hearer feel that she is important, that she is wanted, and can fulfil a useful and constructive function in a great adventure. She will have all the educational facilities she needs, can choose any profession, aesthetic as well as material, she is the equal of every man. This would be her lot under Communism. Yet again the forceful brilliance of Soviet publicity outshines the uniformed generalities of democracy. No anti-Communist body has yet said anything at all about the welfare of women to be an answer to this piece of writing alone.

Not all Asian countries are composed entirely of explosive students and dissatisfied opportunists. Large numbers of small merchants, of settled peasants, ordinary war-weary people, dread the idea of the havoc of another war. Towards the capturing of these people the present Soviet all-out drive—called the ‘Peace Front’—is directed. Briefly, the burden of this song is to the effect that a bloodless Communist coup will solve all problems. It is only the international-capitalist-bandits of the West who are trying to force an imperialist-aggressive war upon the Soviet Union (rallying point of the aspirations of the workers of the world and their salvation) and the honest-to-goodness innocent victims of exploitation.

‘The Peace Front knows no geographical boundaries. The movement of all peoples for peace has gripped all countries and continents. Behind every national Committee, behind every national Organisation of the Peace Movement stand millions of people ready for resolute struggle against the warmongers.’

In Russia there has been set up the Permanent Committee of the Congress of Peace Supporters Throughout the World. Communism is a wonderful thing. Those who wish for fighting become revolutionaries in its ranks. Peacefully-inclined citizens are told to support it so that there shall be no war. It is obvious that there will be no war if Russia can Communistise the world without one; and this is in a nutshell what the Peace Front means.

In order that a uniform mentality identical throughout the world Communist Parties may be produced, all ‘educational’

matter in use by the network is standardised. Local branches and political officers of the national education branches are not permitted the slightest deviation from set lessons sent out by Moscow. Certain books and texts are provided, in the national language. These books—such as the History of the Bolsheviks (standard and compulsory in all grades in Russia itself) and widely nicknamed the ‘new Bible,’ are read at fixed periods. No comment or interpretation is permitted nor are questions allowed from students. The instructor, however, must ask set questions, which may be answered only by short textual quotations from the book, preferably from memory.

Educational sections are divided into groups ; thus Group A is always for the ‘safe’ members of the Party—preaching to the converted, and ‘maintaining a high level of dialectical awareness’ as it is called. Group B devotes itself to the indoctrination of fellow-travellers and potential members. The Third group—C—consists of the individual winning over of certain key individuals whom the Party needs to strengthen its effective position in relation to potential saboteurs or fellow-travellers among important political or industrial figures. ‘D’ is the Women’s Group, again subdivided into the wives of Communists and co-operators, and new converts among women being trained to take employment and operate in feminine spheres, among female labour, and the like. Importance is placed upon the recruitment and teaching of women indoctrinators (‘advisors’) to work among the peasantry. Women operators are known to have been trained in two main categories : (i) midwives and hygiene experts, who overcome prejudice by their useful work, attributing their ‘great powers of healing’ to Communist enlightenment ; (ii) intellectuals, insidiously casting doubts upon religion and denouncing social repression among the Asian women—who are generally overawed by the emancipation and superior knowledge of their Red sisters. Both groups are supplied with illustrated booklets, wall-charts and ‘argument-data,’ purporting to show the vastly greater advantages enjoyed by women workers and intellectuals in the Soviet Union, on similar lines to Karpova’s rallying-call. Women are likewise informed of the greater advantages that children have in Russia, regarding education, medical treatment and promotion.

Goup 'E' is the Youth organisation. First comes the adulation of Stalin as a diversion of hero-worship. Talks are given to boys and youths dealing with the glorious achievements of revolutionary heroes, valiant Red Army men, and Stakhanovite (champion) workers. Illustrated books supplement this teaching. The target placed before members of all 'E' groups is to excel in knowledge as disseminated by the Communists, so that the headquarters of the Russian League of Communist Youth may grant the local Asian body affiliation. The greatest individual prize is a prospect of visiting Russia : especially during the International Youth Day celebrations. Chief of Russian and External Youth Propaganda is Vyacheslav Koshemasov, Moscow Chairman of the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth, in conjunction with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Other Soviet youth organisations offering affiliation are the Pioneers (Scouts) and the Progressive Young Scientists' International.

No distinction is made between youth organisations and adult bodies in their membership eligibility for the Cominform and other federative entities. This frequently-stressed equality of youths and children with their elders is pointed out as existing only in a Communist society. Psychologically sound, this attraction gives effect to the natural desire of youth to full equality with their elders. Ideologically, of course, the reason for this equality is carefully reiterated as being indispensable in a society of equals such as Russia.

As with adult societies, members of Communist youth movements are encouraged and instructed to penetrate into non-Red bodies, such as the Scouts, Girl Guides, military cadet forces, social and cultural clubs—even missionary organisations. Their aims have been given as follows :

- 'A. To cause the non-enlightened (i.e., non-Communist) youth to think : by stressing questions opposing inequalities, and
- B. Casting doubts upon false and capitalist theories to which non-Communist youth has been exposed, and which they are in danger of accepting uncritically, and
- C. Selecting suitable material for eligibility for Communist training within their own contacts ;
- D. Penetrating, by virtue of greater zeal than the others (non-Communists) the internal organisms, the debating circles,

social clubs and administrative committees, and dominating, wherever possible, such important bodies, where control is wholly or partly vested in the members and not in adults who are non-communists.

- E. They must on no account expose themselves to indignity or ridicule by challenging adult pro-capitalist office-bearers, whose arguments and vocabularies are likely to be stronger, as this will inevitably reduce their prestige and leadership-value over ordinary members.'

A further example of thoroughness is given in the instruction of school and college students in 'capitalist, dogma-ridden and pro-imperialist countries of the Far East.' Having regard, it says, to the fact that literature is highly thought of in the Orient, all young Communists should participate in all literary and poetic contests. They should perfect themselves in national literary styles, even seeking the aid of adult Communists in preparing their essays. These literary compositions, which shall include plays, must contain, however well concealed, a propaganda motive, and 'be so compelling by their impeccable style' that they gain approbation and are thus read out, published or performed, gaining a public for their ideas, and prestige for the individual student. In cases where adult supervision is potentially hostile to (Communist) social and political reform ideas, the theme should be manipulated upon patriotic or anti-imperialistic lines.

Priority targets for Communist agitation in Asia are the large industrial and other undertakings, employing great numbers of workers. It is interesting to note how the Reds proceed in undermining such organisations. Firstly, the factory, shipyard or mine, as the case may be, is employed in propaganda even before any attempt has been made at communising the workers. All factories are attacked as examples of 'foreign exploitation,' or capitalistic grinding the faces of the poor. This, too, is the main line of approach to the labour actually employed. Since most labour is interested mainly in wages, and it is rare to find a corporate spirit among employees which puts the interests of the industry first, there are always malcontents willing to listen to plans for obtaining wage increases.

The second motive for concentrating upon these large undertakings is that their strategic importance in the case of revolt

are great : and among these targets are power stations, mills, essential industries and public utilities. Thirdly, the winning over of the employees in mechanical enterprises means the acquisition of large numbers of skilled and semi-skilled men for sabotage, Red Army work, and to run captured industries in a newly-Sovietised State. Technicians are sorely needed by the Red plotters of Asia.

Workers are told at secret meetings convened by agitators who have obtained employment within the works that their industry has for long formed part of one of the international monopolistic trusts described by Lenin as the twin keystones of imperialistic exploitation and capitalistic enrichment. According to this theory of Lenin's, capitalists have assessed the entire world's material resources, and have come to an agreement among themselves for its apportionment. First, he says, an inventory of all resources was made, then :

'Not only is such inventory made, but the sources are seized by gigantic monopolist alliances. An approximate inventory of markets is also made, and the trusts divide them up amongst themselves by contract.'<sup>1</sup>

Solidarity of the workers of the world is preached among Asia's toiling millions, in the jute mills of Bengal, the docks of Shanghai, the tea-gardens of Ceylon, and everywhere in the extreme Orient.

'Should the Russian worker and the Russian peasant look upon the Germans, the French, the British, the Jews, the Chinese or the Tartars, as enemies, irrespective of the class to which they belong ? Are the Russian workers and peasants entitled to regard with suspicion those who belong to another nation, for the sole reason that these latter speak a different tongue, that their skins are black or yellow, that they have different customs and ways ? Obviously, this would be quite wrong. The German workers, the French workers, the Negro workers, are just as much proletarians as the Russians are. No matter what tongue the workers of other lands may speak, the essential feature of their condition lies in this that they are all exploited by capital, that they are all comrades, that they all alike suffer from poverty, oppression and injustice.'<sup>2</sup>

To this highly-integrated organisation of Communism in

<sup>1</sup> Lenin, *Imperialism*, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Bukharin, *A.B.C. of Communism*, pp. 193/4.

Asia, to their attractive propaganda and promises of the millennium, if an answer is to be given by democracy, it must come soon. To the ardent Communist, the world revolution has already come ; the opening shots of World War III have already been fired—he is at war. Without unity of purpose, without concepts at least as lofty as those claimed by Marxism, the Western Powers and their friends in Asia may as well accept defeat. At present there is neither propaganda nor an ideology to prevent the network smothering the East.

# IO

## MALAYA'S GUERRILLA PARADISE

'A communist party will be able to perform its duty only if it is organised in the most centralized manner, only if iron discipline bordering on military discipline prevails in it, and if its Party Centre is a powerful and authoritative organ, wielding wide powers and enjoying the universal confidence of the members of the Party.'  
LENIN, *Selected Works*, X, 204.

THE Federation of Malaya, established under British guidance on the Malay Peninsula, dangles like an elongated appendix of the hinterland of Siam, reaching southward towards the islands of Indonesia, with whose people most of the five million Malays have racial and linguistic affinities. Communism in Malaya, waging its very 'hot' war against British troops in the steaming jungles, may be said to have as international an inspiration as the movement anywhere in Asia. Although before the Second World War the foreign contacts of the Malayan people were practically limited to intercourse with the Islamic lands of their coreligionists, and their travels seldom further, Moslem pilgrimage, nationalism and the spread of communism under the Japanese occupation have completely transformed the pattern of Malay thinking. While there are in the Federation two and a quarter million people of Malay stock, the rapidly-growing Chinese community—now nearing the two-million mark—and more than half a million Indians greatly aid Marxism's characteristic planning for promoting disunity and the separate indoctrination of the different ethnical groups. Profoundly influenced by the recent attainment of independence by the Indonesians, the Malay section of the population is open to red propaganda emanating from nearby Sumatra. With the communisation of China, the Chinese secret societies—such as the Three Stars and Democratic League—have maintained their active co-operation with their parent bodies, to the extent that when some of these went Red, so did Malaya's Chinese tong-members. Indians have also done their part towards communism's spread throughout the territory ; today

the terrorist movement's leadership is divided between Chinese and Indians ; the more indolent Malays being far less interested in Marxism, while their Islamic religious prejudice against anti-godism is not shared to the same extent by either Hindus or Chinese.

Politically, the virile communist threat is based overwhelmingly upon this active Chinese population—a factor which has greatly helped British anti-Bandit propaganda in enlisting the Chinese-hating Malays against the aspiring usurpers of power in Malaya.

This appeal to nationalism, however, contains its own dangers for the British administration ; the Malays may be easy-going, but many of them desire independence just as much as their neighbours of Ceylon, Siam or Indonesia.

While these Malays know that they are not in any way inferior to the neighbouring peoples already enjoying full independence—either racially or in political maturity—most enlightened nationalists agree that Britain's present policy of leading the country gradually towards a greater measure of self-determination will eventually be vindicated. While the present communist threat to all Asia continues, an independent Malay State could not hope to be able to afford the drain in manpower caused by the anti-Red war ; while the fabulous natural riches of the country—the rubber and tin alone—are essential to Britain's reconstruction.

Singapore island, located at the extreme southern tip of the Peninsula, with its teeming population of a million, and important position in British Commonwealth Far East trade and strategy, has long been a centre for both Russian and Asiatic communist intrigue. This Crown Colony's reputation as the clearing-house for communism's Indonesian contacts with continental Asia, as well as its well-organised underground espionage network reaching back to Moscow, is balanced only by the fact that, as an urban area, it is relatively easier to keep under administrative control.

Religion, as everywhere in the East, is paramount in Malayan thought. The Malays, Indian Moslems and others of the Islamic community form the largest religious group, whose resistance to communist propaganda is noteworthy. In conformity with the overall Moscow Plan of arguing the supposed

identity of communism with Islam, Red propaganda has made strenuous efforts to absorb this element into the Marxist Front.

Dominant among the two million Chinese are the Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian religious persuasions ; but with them these faiths have little hold, with the result that atheism is rampant, and it is from their ranks that the vast majority of all terrorists are drawn.

Christianity in Malaya is divided into the Protestant (47,000) and Roman Catholic (86,000) sects ; which includes all Europeans in the Federation of the Christian faith. According to the communists, the Christian church is identified with the ' British imperialist-capitalists,' and thus the Reds are inflexibly hostile to the followers of Christ ; whose relative numerical inferiority makes it difficult for them to form a significant force against communism.

The main economic targets, both for the communists of Malaya and their Moscow masters, are the highly productive rubber estates and rich tin deposits. Among foodstuffs sought by China's Mao Tse Tung are rice and fish ; while Russia has already bought sufficient quantities of oil and tea, in addition to industrial raw materials, to consolidate the continued activity of several Singapore Soviet-owned export concerns.

Even before the war, communism was well organised in Malaya. But on the outbreak of hostilities, the Communist Party's aid was accepted by the British authorities, in spite of the fact that the Party was supposed to be illegal. Willing volunteers from the Red ranks were trained as saboteurs and guerrillas to operate against the Japanese occupation.

After the total overrunning of the country by Japan, the Malayan Communist Party took command of all resistance fighters in the jungles ; creating an united front : the M.P.A.J.A., or Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army. By 1945 the MPAJA had become extremely powerful, British officers and supplies were parachuted to aid the Red guerrillas, and under the cloak of patriotic resistance the Marxists had created nuclei of their workers in nearly all centres of population throughout the territory.

On December 1st, 1945, the reoccupation of Malaya by Britain brought the official disbanding of the People's Army, and an attempt at a return to prewar economy. At Moscow's

signal, however, the Malayan Reds, though appearing to accept their bonuses and dismissal, spent some time in perfecting their secret organisation of terrorism : expanding the 10,000-strong Army into a force that they believed capable of either driving the British out, or so severely embarrassing the administration that they would be able to seize power by a coup. The present hand-to-hand fighting is the result of that planning.

The present-day Federation of Malaya came into being in February, 1948, after the abortive Malayan Union of 1946 had collapsed. British colonial representatives, in consultation with the nine sultans and delegates of nationalist bodies, then realised that nationalism must somehow be canalised in a direction other than that advocated by the communist agitators ; thus the Federation, where a greater measure of representation has been accorded to the indigenous peoples. Singapore alone remained a separate Colony.

Britain has been compelled to start counter-propaganda against the terrorists ; and has aligned herself with the aspirations of the Malayan people against the creed of political change by violence. Converting words into action, an event called 'Anti-Bandit Month' was organised during 1950. In the communist-hunting programme all races were enlisted : Malays, Chinese, Indians, Europeans, 'and others.' State enrolment centres were opened to recruit volunteers—for it was felt that Britain herself was bearing too much of the burden of defence of the Malaysians against their own countrymen. Hundreds of thousands of enrolment forms were issued : even being dropped by air to outlying districts. In a remarkably short time, over half a million 'anti-banditeers' had been mobilised.

While at first the precise duties of an anti-bandit worker were uncertain, especially to the well-meaning but uninformed volunteers themselves, the actual launching of February, 1950, as anti-bandit month brought the fullest details. Many of the able-bodied Malaysians undertook police and military activities ; others manned static posts. Special rewards were offered for terrorists captured—on a dead-or-alive basis. It was reported that enthusiastic would-be reward earners flocked to the standard of freedom in such numbers that it was not always possible to employ all of them.

In the face of a barrage of criticism, both in England and from the planters on the spot, the Malayan Government did all it could towards assisting the hard-pressed troops to contain and defeat the red menace. The formation of the new Malayan Volunteer Force, more mobile than the slow-moving troops, proved a further valuable contingent of local people to swell the ranks of anti-communism. Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner, speaking at a meeting of the Malayan Federal Legislative Council early in 1950, showed that at last the administration was appreciating the value of the moral weapon against communism.

‘ There is now a sense of determination,’ he said, ‘ such as we have not had before. Nobody understands this better than the terrorists themselves, who are at present engaged in a greatly increased tempo of futile and destructive attacks on civilians.’

Without a voluntary and moral effort, springing from the hearts of the people themselves, continued Sir Henry, the physical weapons of the security forces would be ‘ ineffective and sterile.’

It is interesting to see that, in one of the areas which has been the slowest to appreciate the scope and peril of the communist threat, there should be such a deep understanding of the fact that communism can never be extirpated by digging its exponents out and leaving a vacuum in their place. Something constructive must take their place ; and that something can only come from the sincere conviction of the people that they cherish moral and spiritual values which are higher than communism, and threatened by it.

Non-communist opinion in Malaya—especially among the rubber planters being continually subjected to assassination and looting—has been bitter against the complacency which held that the communist danger in Malaya was small, and could easily be crushed. Even today, after years of struggle, some commentators cannot yet understand that there is a real chance that communism may force Britain out of the Peninsula. The fact that military operations are by no means conclusive against the reds has been emphasised by John Strachey, the Secretary for War :

‘ This is a campaign which has no fixed front, but consists for the most part in isolated actions against bodies of terrorists whose

tactics are to strike and then disappear deep into the jungle. In such a campaign there is no likelihood of spectacular success on the part of the army.'

Immensely complicating anti-communist efforts in Malaya are the twin scourges of widespread corruption and the continued unattractiveness of conditions in the Police Service. Economic conditions, with the raw materials industry not yet recovered from wartime devastation, provide British colonial administrators with a task of placating unrest not lightened by rising prices, increased labour wage demands, the insecurity of life due to terrorist gangsterism, and a crippling housing shortage. Government war-damage compensation, desperately needed to revitalise industries, still lags behind in its payment. In partial attempt to combat these difficulties, the Federation has initiated large housing schemes, encouraged the increased production of timber, and is introducing cocoa to the plantations in the hope of steadying Malaya's excessive reliance upon rubber and tin market fluctuations.

An early phenomenon of communist terrorism in Malaya is the casual murder of apparently innocent people. Swooping down upon a village, red raiders first appropriate all supplies needed from the local populace, as part of their live-off-the-land policy. If there is sufficient time, they will also tap the rubber trees of nearby estates, shipping the raw rubber to blackmarketeer agents for cash. It is thought that this illegal rubber is sold through Singapore, much of it ultimately finding its way to Russian stockpiles. In districts under such temporary bandit occupation, the traditional Chinese hatred for the Malay is often shown by the 'purification of pro-British elements' among the population. The only apparent crime of most of these murdered unfortunates seems to be that of living under British rule—itself tantamount to treason in communist minds. Out of 430 communists killed or captured in one month—June, 1948—an analysis of their races showed that no fewer than 407 were Chinese, against only 15 Malays, two Indians, four Indonesians and one Siamese. This is said to reflect fairly accurately the preponderance of Chinese in the Malayan communist uprising.

While official sources claim that the armed force of the terrorists numbers less than five thousand men, it is widely

believed by civilians to be at least double this strength. At the end of hostilities with Japan, the Red army amounted to 10,000 guerrillas ; since that time no major military defeat has been inflicted upon them, and for much of the intervening period their morale and power has been increasing. In addition to this comparatively small number—under one-five-hundredth of the population—there is to be reckoned their unsurpassed knowledge of the jungles, their superior discipline and modern weapons ; and, above all, the support given to the communists by many of their influential countrymen, fellow-travellers and sympathisers. The organisation of Red intelligence has been claimed to be better even than that of the Federation's own counter-espionage system. All these factors enable the guerrillas to continue their campaign of terrorism and extortion, and to strike when and where they wish, with little fear of defeat.

Unable and unwilling to stand up to the security forces in a straight fight—and not needing to do so—the communist military habitat is the jungle. Swooping for sharp attacks upon convoys, estates, mines and small towns, their great mobility enables them to complete operations before Government forces can approach or engage them. Even the use of rocket-firing aircraft has not noticeably strengthened the defence system ; for in the impenetrable jungle depths their columns simply melt away—air force machines often find themselves compelled to bomb or strafe green wastes without knowing for certain if their sweep has been successful.

Political life in the more settled districts of Malaya, however, has not been seriously impaired by the war. While the outlawing of the Communist Party and other extremists had at first caused apprehension, all other political bodies have found that their innocent functioning has not been opposed by the Government. The criterion of a party permitted to remain in being as applied by Malaya's security system, is that it shall not advocate violent revolt as a means of political change.

Even the emergency legal powers secured by the Government to deal with the crisis were not assumed by unilateral decree, as might even have been considered justifiable under the urgency of the circumstances. All such powers have been scrupulously obtained from the elected legislature ; and this action has had an important moral effect in strengthening public confidence

in the Government, and reassuring waverers attracted by communist insistence upon the British authorities as 'total imperialists.'

It is only recently that the harm done to the Trade Union movement by communist infiltration has been made good. The Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions—once wielding considerable power and totally under Red direction—was shattered by being declared an illegal body. So far towards extremism had the Federation swung that even leftwing Socialists among its members welcomed the dissolution as the only solution to the threat of this troublesome organisation.

With the smashing of the Pan-Malayan Federation, followed by pledges that the Trade Union movement itself was not prejudiced, over three hundred separate Unions established themselves throughout Malaya and Singapore. There is, unfortunately, now little doubt that communists and their agents have reinfiltrated into the control of some of these unions. The total suppression of trade unionism in Malaya—as anywhere else—would be undesirable; but were these bodies to become actively Red, the subsequent agitation and wage-demands would place the Federation's Government in a very difficult position. For it is in economic disorder that the communists hope to bring Britain to terms.

The most crippling burden in Malaya's anti-Red war is the military expense. Today topping £30,000 a day, with the increased tempo of its effort paralleling rising expense, the British home Government has been compelled to guarantee Malaya any sum which she is unable to pay when the figure reaches £4,000,000. Mr. Strachey, during his visit to Malaya in mid-1950, was told by a planter that it cost the Government £110,000 to kill each bandit.<sup>1</sup>

When the red guerrillas took up the sword of rebellion in June, 1948, they had certain definite objectives, were working against the background of a comprehensive communist Asian policy, and expected certain results. Events since that date have modified both their tactics and aspirations; but their partial success has been undoubted.

While the insurrectionists planned war, the political agitators

<sup>1</sup> *Daily Telegraph*, London, May 30th, 1950, p. 1, col. 4.

concentrated on trade unionism's undermining as the most effective way of destroying the country's prosperity.

Believing that continuous strikes of labour alone both in the administration, in the docks and on plantations would bring Britain to her knees, willing to compromise for the sake of the vitally-necessary dollar-earning raw materials of the Peninsula, the Red leaders miscalculated. The rapid dismantling of their own Trade Union Federation inflicted a severe shock upon communist organisation ; thus the guerrillas had to carry on alone, backed only by their well-wishers throughout the country ; and the strike weapon failed. In this sphere they have met with far greater success.

Apart from the finances donated to the communist movement by secret collections within the country, the campaign has been supported mainly by the smuggling of funds through Singapore. Looted materials and rubber which was later sold to Russia has greatly helped the red cause in this way. The capture of all China by Communism naturally gave a great fillip to the morale and material welfare of Malaya's red guerrillas.

The Malayan Communist Party's Chinese external linkup is twofold : through the Chinese ' Democratic League,' and the ' Liberal Democratic Action Headquarters '—also in China. From here the communists receive some supplies, but mostly propaganda material and are trying to obtain arms. Though the Executive of the Malayan Party is believed to receive its orders direct from Moscow, most economic aid comes either across the Malacca Straits from Indonesian Marxists, or via Singapore, to the south. Guerrilla liaisons are maintained with the Siamese on the north ; while there has recently been coming and going with British Borneo, across the North China Sea. Although most of the Far East Communists receive their orders through the notorious centre at Bangkok in Siam, the Soviet contact direct with Malaya emphasises the importance of Malaya in Russian eyes. The communications channel for contact between the Indonesian Communist Party and the ' Democratic League ' of China itself, runs through the Malayan organisation's intelligence branch.

According to Communist sources themselves, the Nationalist Party in Malaya is working in sympathy with them. The Reds, unlike other movements of East Asia, have no dictator : two

chiefs, each a seasoned guerrilla communist, dominate their activities. These are the men :

CHANG MING CHIN, President of the Party, nominal head of operations in Singapore, and in charge of the Indonesian liaison department ;

WA TIEN WANG,<sup>1</sup> Chief of the Department of International Relations ; holding in his hands the direct lines of communication with the communist parties and agencies of world communism in Europe as well as Asia.

The supreme direction of the communist propaganda, policy and agitation in Malaya is unquestionably situated in the Moscow Far Eastern Political Command, (also known as the Eastern Political Department), under the leadership of Wong Ming (alias Chen San U), onetime leader of the Communist Party of North China. Money is known also to have been transmitted to the Malayan party from Wong Ming's department, via Hong Kong and Toborsk.

Chang Min Chin's activities in relation to the consolidation of the Malaysian peoples of Indonesia and Malaya itself as a soviet state, have been carefully watched. Working until the end of 1947 as a member of the Central Executive of the Chinese Communist Party in Batavia (Indonesia), Chang travelled to his present location at Singapore, armed with the necessary information for effecting some sort of unity between the two parties. A document, signed by Wu Tien Wang (alias John Wu), dated July 1st, 1948, and containing a manifesto to the communists in Java, runs as follows :

' Wu Tien Wang, leader of the Communists in Malaya.

Order :

To visit Indonesia (West Java), together with two hundred well-equipped members in order to establish a Central General Headquarters for Indonesia.

Hoping that all Chinese Indonesian Communists and other comrades will receive this news with enthusiasm.'

In Batavia, the liaison with the Malayan Pan-Malay Communist Front is under the supervision of a notorious communist, Wong Chi Yuan. This agitator has said that the unification of

<sup>1</sup> In the course of a varied and colourful career, he has been severally known as Wu Tien Wang, and Ngo Tien Wong, alias Gow Tiang Ong, and John Wu.

the desires of the Malay and Indonesian peoples—meaning the communists—will drive Britain into the sea. In the whole of Java, Sumatra and elsewhere, this drive for an alliance between the Malay communists and their Indonesian friends is notable and on the increase.

On May 15th, 1948, the anti-Western, anti-‘imperialist’ Malayan Communist Party declared its mission to be to fulfil

‘The unification of all who are oppressed in Malaya in order to eliminate the imperialist policy of the British Government and its efforts to transform Malaya into a permanent British settlement ; and

The formation of a solid united front against Chiang Kai Shek and the United States of America.’

Among the more colourful personalities of communism in Malaya is a certain Chinese millionaire, resident in Singapore. Allegedly the secret chief of all Chinese communists in South East Asia outside the homeland, this strange personality has been also named as Russia’s Cominform delegate in charge of East Asian affairs, receiving his orders from Moscow, and maintaining close contacts with Bangkok. In this work, believed to be prompted by a mania for power greater than even his huge wealth can give him, the millionaire’s only redeeming feature seems to be his complete lack of ideological knowledge about communism itself. Widely called a mere tool of Moscow, his ignorance of Marxian doctrine is proverbial : though others hold that this is all part of his cunning.

An ex-communist, once an intimate of his, has confessed that he asked him these questions :

‘Why, with your ignorance of communism, does the Kremlin trust you, while other tried workers like myself are not confided in ? How can you, a man accustomed to great wealth, and luxury, ally yourself with workers and peasants to build a Socialist State ?’

The alleged replies illustrate the psychology of the man, as well as the penetration-power of communism’s intrigue, to capture such as these for its work :

‘My friend, the bee needs the flower, as much as the flower needs the bee. I am of use to the USSR, and Russia is of use to me. Secondly, I am an old man, I have made my fortune : but I cannot break my habit of struggle. All that is left to me now is politics.’

It is also said that our millionaire friend helps communism

today only through motives of Chinese patriotism, and a dislike of the Nationalists.

The period May 1st to 15th, 1950, was designated by the Singapore Communist Party as an experimental exercise in revolution. Frustrated by prompt police action on the first day of the revolt, the plotters' documents showed how complete had been their plans for paralysing the Colony. The wrecking of a rubber factory, and the burning of storehouses ; the killing of anti-communists and distribution of inflammatory pamphlets were planned to coincide with widespread strikes among the organised workers of Singapore.

Banded together for the purpose of this insurrection were several organisations either created by the reds, or which had been completely brought under their control through infiltration. The Communist Party of Malaya, the National Liberation Army of Malaya, the Singapore Anti-British Association, and the Interracial All Trades and Labour Union comprised the red front. Unlike most such efforts, the communists had practised excessive centralisation of their command, keeping detailed documents, and housing their unified headquarters in one place. The result was that the authorities were able to act decisively against the nerve-centre of communist operations, and crush the revolt from its beginning. This communist inefficiency contrasts strangely with most Marxist theory and practice, where secrecy and high security are the rule : this secrecy being almost second-nature to many Chinese, the secret society system in Malaya is well developed.

Some commentators have made the mistake, however, of assuming that all such organisations, for the simple reason that they are Chinese, have become communised ; this is far from being the case. In addition to this, in Malaya itself, full details are scarce regarding the membership and activities of the Tongs. Two of these, nevertheless, are worthy of note, due to their very advanced state of efficiency, and their international ramifications.

The Malayan branch of the Chinese ' Democratic League ' (Min Chu Tung Men) derives its authority from the headquarters of the League in Hongkong. The Secretary of the Democratic League—the wellknown Wu Yek Pen—was until recently operating in Indonesia, after having been compelled to

flee from his Singapore centre of operations. The League's activities extend throughout every Chinese community in the Far East, and have been said to cover Chinese even as far afield as Latin America.

Aware that the Chinese mind lends itself more readily to a concept or ideal enshrouded in mystery, a group of communist tongmen—previous members of the Cosmos Society—founded in 1920 the body known as the T.C.: alias the Secret Revolutionary Society. While the real interpretation of the initials T.C. has not yet been satisfactorily established, non-Chinese Malaysians with T.C. affiliations have referred to it as the 'Tongcom,' and this may be the original name or one of its variants. The T.C. is closely linked with the Three Stars Organisation, which itself hides the identity of part of the secret workings of the wartime Anti-Japanese Army—the communist-dominated body. It is said to consist of over fifty thousand members, and the name varies from place to place. The Malayan, Borneo and Indonesian sections are in particularly close liaison; while the society has branches in Vietnam and Siam. One of its more profitable sidelines is large-scale smuggling throughout the China Sea, and the manning of an escape-route for communists and other wanted men 'from anywhere to anywhere.'

British official commentators have been inclined, feel the people on the spot, to minimise the Red danger to Malaya. The chief of the Anti-Bandit Forces, for example, has stated that two years would see the end of all military operations in the Federation: while civilians and especially the direly threatened planters maintain that under present conditions the problem will take several years to solve. One section of the European population asks what justification there is for thinking that the terrorism will ever be overcome: since military action does not seem to have had nearly enough effect in dissuading the rebels from fighting. This division of opinion between the British residents and officialdom is in itself an unhappy symptom of the whole situation.

Students of the history and development of Malayan communism since its inception in 1920 show a certain unanimity in their criticisms and suggestions for killing the terrorist menace, and soon. The bandits, they say, must be cut off

from their thousands of supporters in the large towns. This can only be done by driving the guerrillas deeper and deeper into the jungle—and by removing some of the conditions which cause Malays and Chinese to sympathise with the insurgent movement. Another important measure for increasing the internal safety of the country, which was taken only after considerable opposition, was a system of national registration ; by means of which identity cards are issued, and a person's movements may be checked. This has had the effect—among other things—of limiting the number of ' spare-time ' terrorists, who frequently used to work at innocent occupations during the day, and turn bandit by night.

The intelligence service and rewards system for captured reds, and the encouragement of self-defensive measures should be greatly increased. All organisations suspected of treating with the rebels should be investigated and suppressed : as far as Singapore is concerned, it is almost incredible—as in the case of Hong Kong—that brazen flouting of the laws and collaboration with communism should be permitted to flourish on such a scale. If every projected anti-bandit measure is known by Red spies, and relayed from Singapore, ask the Malaysans, what hope is there of ending the menace ?

As far as actual military operations are concerned, the using of Indian Gurkha and British Guards has not been a success. Incapable of fighting efficiently in the steaming jungles, not particularly affectionately regarded by the Malay people, and baffled by the ubiquitous mobility of the lighter-clad guerrillas, neither type of soldier has been able to give of his best.

The recruitment and training of Malays as anti-bandit troops is clearly the most obvious solution. While not all Malays are by any means military-minded, their unparalleled knowledge of local conditions plus a native ' jungle instinct ' are essential advantages enjoyed by the guerrillas, and which cannot be achieved without years of training by troops of other nationalities. Their volunteering to the extent of 500,000 men during ' anti-bandit month ' should be a sufficient indication of their willingness to help : though it is doubtful if they would be quite so enthusiastic if they were put on a low basis of pay. Presumably a bandit's head is worth something, and the authorities should be ready to pay rewards for kills or captures.

Finally, the greatest single contribution to victory in Malaya would be the realisation of the essential unity of all Reds fighting in this part of the Far East. There is too little concerted action between the administrations of Siam, Indochina, Burma, Malaya and those of Indonesia. As an example, when bandits are pursued to the frontiers of Siam, they simply cross the border into Siamese territory, whence they cannot be followed, there to rest in safety with their Red Siamese friends—until the coast is clear.

This collaboration between the various Governments—both within the Commonwealth and outside it—together with a common sense of ethical purpose in fighting *for* something, as opposed to the present tendency always to fight *against* something, could bring victory in Malaya, as everywhere else in sorely threatened Asia. It is too frequently forgotten that most communists are fighting with an almost religious zeal for a sacred ideal, for the memory of Lenin and inspired by Stalin to the millennium of the Soviet State : this is a powerful positive force ; and must be met by offering the Asian peoples a cause for which to fight.

## II

### SUN YAT SEN'S THREE PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNISM IN ASIA

‘ Dr. Sun Yat Sen declared : In order to acquire eternal solidarity and permanent peace, militarism must be destroyed. All China is governed nowadays in a militarist way. Imperialism still exists. We protest against this selling of our national sovereignty for an American loan. According to Dr. Sun Yat Sen, San Min Chu I (The Three Principles) mean the foundation of a Government of the people, by the people, and on behalf of the people.’ SENG HUO PAO, January 23rd, 1948.

‘ SAN Min Chu I ’—the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, founder of modern Chinese nationalism, have been adopted by communism today as part of the programme to weld nationalism and collectivist philosophy into a rallying-point for patriotic solidarity.

The late Dr. Sun—who died in 1925—founded as far back as 1905 the Kuomintang Party, which adopted the principles in 1924. Briefly, these precepts embody : the Race principle (also called nationalism) ; democracy, and ‘ National Prosperity ’—the wellbeing of the people : now reformed to mean ‘ the good of the workers ’—communism.

A sympathiser of communism, Sun was at one time actively aided by the Russian communist Borodin, who worked with him to put the Kuomintang on a sound ideological footing, and to effect the construction of a powerful Kuomintang army.

The First Principle empowers the Party to reform the nation into an independent and progressive entity. The Second Principle holds the twin concepts of sovereignty by the people, coupled with the supreme administrative power of the ‘ Five Potentialities.’ These Five are : the censorship, the judiciary, the executive, the legislature and the ‘ power of examination.’ In relation to the nature of the world ‘ people,’ the following distinction is made :

‘ By “ the people ” is always meant “ the average man,” and a difference is specifically made distinguishing us from other so-called

democratic countries—in which the power may lie in name with the people, but in reality it is concentrated in the hands of certain capitalists in those countries.

The Third Principle deals with the rights of the people to national wealth. This is held to mean : 1. Equal rights to land ; 2. Abolition of the capitalist system ; 3. Prevention of capitalistic accumulation of wealth. “ The living conditions of farmers and soldiers will be improved, unemployment benefit and legislation for education and labour will be provided.” ’

Inheriting the Three Principles from the crumbling Kuomintang, the Chinese communists were not slow to see the enormous effect that these precepts had already exercised over the mind of the Chinese people. In collaboration with Madame Sun—Dr. Sun Yat Sen’s widow—they adapted the theory to their own purposes, reiterating it in a completely communist context. and making much of Sun’s friendship for Marxism. Full use is today being made of Madame Sun’s prestige ; and her alleged statements in favour of communism have been broadcast throughout China, and the Chinese communities abroad.

The Marxist interpretation of Sun’s Principles first became current in that centre of all Asian inter-Chinese propaganda : Hongkong.

For their propaganda the well-known tactics of camouflage are applied on Hongkong territory to conceal the various communist activities ; until recently the method was to invoke only programmes direct against the rickety Kuomintang. This opportunism from Hongkong took advantage of widespread Chinese aversion to certain aspects of national political life. The communists attacked foreign intervention ; this they attached to Western—and particularly American—aid to China in the shape of Chiang Kai Shek. The Nanking (Kuomintang or Nationalist) Government of Chiang was nailed as corrupt and dissolute : no efforts were spared to disintegrate the unified national anti-communist front under Chiang.

Alleging that he was acting on the Three Principles, and that his regime in China was but the logical extension of the work done by the patriot Sun, the Marxist leader of communist China—Mao Tse Tung—made the following declaration through Hongkong, aimed at the overseas Chinese :

‘ We must accomplish the overthrow of Chiang Kai Shek and his

Government, Chiang is the tool of reactionary influence in the USA. Thus we will form a check to the opposition to the struggle of the Chinese people. After the Second World War and the collapse of Japanese imperialism, it became the duty of the Chinese people to perfect the revolution in a political, cultural, economic and democratic manner. But when the Second World War ended, America, together with some other countries, took over the part formerly played by Germany and Japan, to form a reactionary front against the Soviet Union and the proletarians who oppose plutocracy.'

Here, too, on Hongkong soil, the Three Principles were invoked by those leaders who had deserted Chiang and the Nationalists, where they formed organisations such as the 'Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang.' Under this particular body come four main leftwing organisations, including the Chinese Communist Party's Hongkong branch.

Several 'Christian Leaders' of China—in reality communists or proto-communists—have used the Hongkong base as a launching place for their self-projection in America and elsewhere in the West. The procedure here is simple. Basing their declarations on the Three Principles, these individuals have constructed organisations or made use of communist-dominated ones to give them the backing necessary to declare themselves important representatives of the Chinese people's aspirations.

The next step was to denounce Chiang's Kuomintang as useless and degenerate : incapable of carrying on the fight for China. At least one such personality has attempted to gain American support for his plans to reconquer China. At present it is not clear as to whether he really desires such conquest, whether he merely wishes to enrich himself, or whether his activities were sponsored by the Reds as a diversion against Chiang. In view of Chinese psychology, it is not at all impossible that he may himself made use of the Communist 'building-up' process, merely to gain prestige for himself, and then carry on with his own altruistic or personal plans, as the case may be.

In any case, the projection of the Three Principles as the basis of the reconstruction of China, and their value in the current efforts among the emigrant Chinese communities throughout Asia, cannot be exaggerated.

## I2

### INDOCHINA : BRIDGE TO EAST ASIA

‘A proletarian revolution is impossible without the forcible destruction of the bourgeois state machine and the substitution for it of a new one.’ LENIN, *Selected Works*, VII, 124.

LIKE a curved hand cupped round the fist of Siam, Indochina juts southward into the China sea. As her name connotes, the country forms in many ways a link between the cultures and geography of India and China. In the second half of the nineteenth century, five territories conquered by France were lumped together to form this haphazard land ; officially the area comprises the four Protectorates of Cambodia, Tongking, Annam and Laos, together with the former Colony of Cochin-China.

Today, Indochina's twenty-six million people find themselves amid the flames of the fiercest and most successful communist revolt in Asia. After the defeat of the Japanese, wartime conquerors of the country, French attempts to reoccupy Indochina were resisted by nationalists and communists alike—and from the resultant civil war emerged one of Asia's hardest-bitten guerrilla leaders : Dr. Ho Chi Minh.

Ho rules nearly all Indochina. Born in 1894, this outstanding personality embodies the manners and appearance of an Oriental sage with the added revolutionary fire of a true graduate of Moscow's agitation school ; the tremendous vitality and brilliant mind in his small, spare frame seem more in character for an American business tycoon than the bent and ageing Ho. As far back as 1910, Dr. Ho's patriotism and revolutionary ideas had made him the implacable foe of the French colonial administration. Fleeing Annam, where his father was an impoverished intellectual in Court employ, he enlisted as an ordinary sailor, travelling to England, France and America. By 1933, a confirmed communist, Ho had been recruited by Russia for training at the international centre for the production of leaders of the coming world revolution. His first term of

' field work ' was as assistant to the notorious desperado Borodin in Canton : at that time, many of Asia's top communists were being trained under actual battle conditions with the Red Armies of China. Ho was unlucky, being captured and imprisoned by the Nationalist troops. After his escape in 1935, international communism's headquarters found use for him in the reorganisation of the Communist Party and its secret ramifications in Thailand. This provided an opportunity for contacting Red elements in Indochina. Ho's agents, travelling from the security of their spy-nest in Bangkok, set up the nucleus of the Communist Party of Indochina, and led its prewar resistance against France. Such had become the extent of his activities that by 1936 he had been imprisoned for Red agitation. Released from jail in 1938, Ho found that the anti-French resistance movement in his homeland had progressed sufficiently for him to assume its leadership ; this date marked his emergence in his present character : anti-imperialist guerrilla chief in the field. The Japanese invasion and suppression of communist activity caused Ho to flee to Red China and thence to Russia ; following which Moscow sent the revolutionary back underground, to organise anti-Japanese action and found the ' independence ' movement. Abetted by his second-in-command—Hwang Monh Jiam—the balding, polylingual Ho can look back upon eight uninterrupted years of guerrilla fighting and propaganda which have achieved a great measure of success. His complete lack of affectation and generally humble demeanour remains an important part of the character of this extraordinary man ; but there is little doubt that although today he shows signs of preferring personal power to the tight reins of the Kremlin, yet he has been a rigidly fanatical dialectician and staunch communist party man for all of his Red career.

Vietnamese nationalism, which has been almost completely absorbed into the common identity of the communist-nationalist lineup under Ho, dates back no more than twenty years in its active form, being greatly fomented by Japan's ' Asia for the Asiatics ' programme. By 1942, all anti-foreign and patriotic parties combined with the communists to form the ' Viet-Nam Doclap Donghoi '—otherwise called Viet Minh : the Vietnam Front. By infiltration and by virtue of its large membership,

the Communist Party of Indochina formed by far the greatest influence within this patriotic coalition. For tactical reasons, however, the comrades kept themselves—and particularly their plans—well in the background.

After the Japanese collapse, Viet Minh staged a coup d'état. On August 8th, 1945, an armed uprising broke out in Tongking Province against the Japanese and puppet usurpers. By August 28th, only thirteen days after the surrender of the Japanese, the insurgents proclaimed the 'Vietnam Democratic Republic,' headed by the leader of the Resistance Movement : Dr. Ho Chi Minh. Determined to thwart the return of the French to colonialist power, the Provisional Government ordered widespread demonstrations against the West, destruction of foreign property and declared their complete independence of outside control. On September 19th, British troops landed in Indochina ; by September 22nd order had been restored, and the French resumed control. Paralleling similar reoccupation of former colonial territories throughout the world after the war, many Western policy-makers foresaw little of the political development that had taken place during the years of struggle. That there could be no return to the same status quo, they failed to see. If Japan and Germany had done nothing else, they had burst the bubble of Western impregnability ; while communism's unceasing activity and astuteness in taking command of resistance movements paid high dividends.

The elections held in January, 1946, gave an overwhelming majority to the supporters of Viet Minh, somewhat baffling France's administrators, who had been convinced that the nationalist coalition was not as popular as it seemed. Now was the time for the Communist Party to come out into the open. The Tong Bo—Communist Party Central Committee—forming a common front with Vo Nguyen Giap, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, wielded power in their rulership of the country, and the 'suppression of malcontents.' First all 'French collaborationists' were liquidated ; then came the turn of any others who had deviated from the Party line.

On March 6th, 1946, the French were compelled to sign in Hanoi a preliminary agreement with the Government of Ho Chi Minh, under the terms of which France recognised the

Republic as 'a free State with its own Government, its own army and finances, forming part of the French Union.' 'This agreement,' say the communists, 'turned out to be a manoeuvre on the part of the French imperialists who strove to gain time in order to send a fresh contingent of troops to the territory of the Republic.' According to the French, it was the Republic itself that restarted the terrorist war in December, 1946. The communists claim that it was France which commenced action : 'In December, 1946, the French Command undertook a large-scale military offensive against Viet Nam.' In any case, the net result is not disputed. Up to the present time the relentless war with France continues.

Faced with the alternative either of combating first the communist insurrection and then holding a plebiscite to ascertain the will of the people, or to set up at once some opposition government, the French chose the latter course. There have, of course, been bitterly adverse criticisms of this policy ; even non-communist French politicians branding the move as a return to colonialist rule through puppets. But the French Government felt the action justified on the ground that if there were no Indochinese Government apart from a French military administration, the rebellion could the more easily be represented by Ho as a patriotic war. Besides, they argued, if we select, say, Emperor Bao Dai, and his rule is successful, it will tend to wean many away from the Red ranks.

Bao Dai, appreciative of his position as a suspected French collaborator in the eyes of fanatical nationalists, did all he could during negotiations with the French to exhibit his independence. On March 8th, 1949, the French Government finally concluded their agreement with the Emperor whereby he became Chief of State of the areas claimed as independent by the communists, but Bao Dai agreed to remain within the protection of France. In spite of the paucity of pro-Emperor politicians, Bao Dai has at least one popular figure upon whom he can count : General Nguyen Van Xuan. The communist verdict on this royalist Government is thus : 'According to reliable information, the puppet government of Bao Dai is sheer bluff, since it represents no one except a handful of reactionaries.'

On May 22nd, 1949, the French National Assembly passed

legislation unifying Tongking, Annam and Cochin-China as Vietnam, an Independent State within the French Union, under the rulership of Bao Dai, formerly Emperor of Annam, although in actual fact, almost all the territory was in communist hands.

Bao's return to the country was the signal for bitter communist attacks upon his history and career ; the warrant for his arrest issued by the Reds being signed by ' President Ho Chi Minh, of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, under the authority of the Hanoi Military Tribunal.' Needless to say, the communist Vietnam Government refuses to recognise any validity in its namesake, the French Union Vietnam. ' Bao Dai's signature,' they stated, ' has no value.' Upon the same occasion, Ho pledged himself to continue the war against France as ' the only means to achieve our independence.'

Viet-Minh guerrilla operations have been, on the whole, remarkably successful. While France and Bao Dai control the industrial part of the country, with a population of about two million, effective government is being carried out by the communist rebels over practically the entire countryside, whose population amounts to over twenty-four millions. Armed with automatic weapons, the insurgents have attacked convoys and occupied towns, tying down large bodies of the less-mobile French infantry ; while continued moral sympathy by many Vietnamese with the anti-French activities of Ho have driven the French to their wits' end. Even at home, the French Government has been faced with the hostile criticism of the Socialist Party—which, while appreciating Ho's position to be that of a ' Moscow-inspired dictator,' nevertheless demanded that the people of Indochina be allowed democratically to choose their own government and more particularly their own rulers.

Indicative of the general uneasiness over France's solution to the Indochina problem was the abstention from voting in the Assembly of the French Union, of Cambodian and other overseas delegates on March 10th, 1949, upon the issue of Vietnam and Bao Dai.

In both the Emperor's and Ho's camps the political and ideological considerations of the situation have always been dominated by the guerrilla war and its implications. Socialists in the National Assembly of France and overseas delegates in the

Union Assembly alike pressed for an end to the fighting, while the Government showed itself equally determined to carry on military operations. Misled by communist propaganda, many Indochinese see Bao Dai as a partner—in a sense—of the alien French in their rulership of the country. According to communist propaganda, of course, he is the 'lackey of the imperialist colonialistic Gauls.' In the guerrilla camp, the war has caused a far less strong emphasis upon party politics than upon nationalism—a sentiment sedulously assisted by the communists themselves.

France's military struggle in Indochina may be said without over-simplification to resemble the British problem in Malaya in many of its aspects. Neither the French nor the Brigade of Guards are trained primarily as other than in orthodox infantry warfare ; while the jungle is unimpressed by hobnailed boots. While the Malayan communists have not the propaganda value of an elected government behind them, the net result has been the same in both cases : the power of communism is not only unbeaten, but almost untouched. Over 65,000,000 dollars a year and three High Commissioners—to say nothing of four Commanders-in-Chief—have been expended in a war which has gained the French little more than the occupation of a few large towns. A hundred and fifty thousand men, aircraft and naval forces, greatly outnumbering the Red partizans with their 80,000 fighters have been able to do little in gaining the vital moral support of the people of Vietnam.

Bao Dai's recognition that there is popular suspicion as to his relationship with France is said to have prompted his approach to the United States with an alliance in view. Inevitably, the Quai d'Orsay got wind of the plan ; and suspicion thenceforwards between the two parties has put the Emperor between two stools : neither is he beloved of his own people nor can the French accord him full confidence.

The possibility of American interest in Indochina was rumoured as far back as 1945, when France, hearing of a proposal for possible United States trusteeship of the country, was greatly incensed. The American General Wedermeyer divided Indochina into two zones : north of the sixteenth Parallel of Latitude to be held by Chinese forces, south of that line under the British. The unfortunate thing was that at this

time a Paris newspaper published an article stating that General Charles de Gaulle had knowledge of a U.S.-Chinese treaty said to have been signed at the end of the war, granting America certain privileges in Indochina. According to some French observers, America is in some way said to be responsible for having allowed the Chinese to support Ho Chi Minh ; but this statement has not been substantiated with proof.

The control by the communist Government of Vietnam of most of the country's food supplies, coupled with their allegations that France is indifferent to the needs of the people, has caused unwelcome comparison between the standards of living in the Red areas and those ruled by Bao Dai for the French Union. There is no doubt that Marxian methods of organisation have been ruthlessly applied wherever possible in the territory controlled by the Reds.

After adopting a Constitution on Soviet Lines, ' People's committees ' were established throughout the country, to advise on government. The rent of land was cut by 25% ; though the large estates of the landlords remain as yet untouched by nationalisation. All those landlords, however, who went over to the French or Bao Dai, have had their lands confiscated by their communist occupants. According to the communists :

' Compulsory education was introduced and big successes were achieved in the elimination of illiteracy among the mass of the people. Industrial legislation was introduced which ensured the working people a forty-hour week. Paid holidays and social insurance were introduced ; industrial armaments nationalised.'

Being a popular and benign figure—at least outwardly—Dr. Ho possessed an unique advantage in this and the fact that neither the French nor Bao Dai can produce a personality strong enough to rally the mass of the Vietnamese people under an anti-communist banner. Much has been made by Moscow and the Reds of Bao's alleged record as a Japanese and Vichy collaborator during World War II. Abdicating in August, 1945, his immediate retreat to Hongkong, coupled with apparent disregard for the greater welfare of his country until recalled under the auspices of the French Union, have weighed heavily against his popularity. The fact that the flashily-dressed and chubby Emperor had no party of supporters, no advisors, and

no army, caused many to ask as to why he should have been considered for the position of Chief of State in the new Vietnam.

It is interesting to note that the communist chief Ho has issued a declaration that, although his social system is communist, he would welcome and safeguard foreign investment. Had the implications of this feeler towards the West been more clearly appreciated, Ho Chi Minh might well have been persuaded to make an economic deal with Europe and America.

Such a move by America, though the Kremlin might brand it as 'dollar imperialism,' would quite possibly have resulted in detaching Ho from the satellites of Moscow ; but could have caused the worst suspicions of some Frenchmen to be confirmed in their belief that the State Department was indeed behind some scheme to oust France from her empire.

January, 1950 saw the emergence of Red Vietnam into the sphere of international affairs, culminating in the recognition by the communist States—including Soviet Russia—of its independence. This move provoked Mr. Dean Acheson and others into the deduction that this was a proof of the entirely communist character of the Vietminh Government.

In their announcement, the Reds declared themselves to be only legitimate representatives of the Vietnamese people, and expressed their willingness to establish diplomatic relations with 'any Government which respects the right of Vietnam to equality and to territorial and national sovereignty.'

Ho Chi Minh—President of the Red Republic and signatory of that statement—continued :

'When the Revolution of August, 1945, overthrew the imperialist power of the Japanese and the French, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established ; and on September 2nd, 1945, the Provisional Government proclaimed the independence of Vietnam. In March, 1946, the Vietnamese National Assembly elected the Constitutional Government of Vietnam. On September 23rd, 1945, troops of the French colonisers attacked Nambo ; later France signed with Vietnam the preliminary agreement of March 6th, 1946, and the *modus vivendi* of September 14th, 1946. But in spite of these agreements the French colonisers continued to wage inglorious war against Vietnam contrary to the peaceful aspirations of the French people. In order to continue the predatory war and to deceive the world they also created the puppet government of Bao Dai. Being resolved to defend the independence of their homeland from the

French colonisers the Vietnamese people and army are waging a courageous struggle.'

What the 'Democratic Republic' failed to mention was the communists' penetration of the freely elected parliament, which resulted in the transformation of that body into a mere front for Red intrigue, and the complete destruction of its representative character.

Within the week, Chou En-Lai, Communist Foreign Minister and Prime Minister in Red China's Government, recognised the new satellite. By the end of the month Moscow's Vychinsky announced Soviet Russia's acceptance of the country into the community of Red nations, due to its character as representing the 'overwhelming majority of the population of the country.' Among the Iron Curtain countries to extend their recognition were Hungary, Poland, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Bulgaria.

Concurrently, Western states were officially recognising anti-Communist Emperor Bao Dai's rival Vietnam state. The United States and Great Britain, New Zealand, Italy, Siam, Australia, Holland, Belgium and others joined in Western support for the second Vietnam.

Thus Dr. Ho Chi Minh's régime seemed to have drifted irretrievably into the Soviet bloc. Certain conditions make the Indochinese situation one of great complexity, viewed from the point of view of world affairs. While American aid provided to the Bao régime for combating communism in the country will undoubtedly assist in the purely military aspect of this struggle, there is a psychological difficulty whose solution has not yet been found. The fact that the Reds actually control and administer nearly all the country, that they have been able to maintain some sort of reasonable living-standard for their people, that the French and their troops are in the country, that Emperor Bao is not everywhere popular, leave very little leeway for counter-propaganda in favour of a democratic way of life. France may be as determined to stay in Vietnam as Britain is in Malaya, but she has far less on her side, in arguments or force to back up such desires.

Russia's hasty recognition of the Ho Government aroused the displeasure of America and France alike. Officially protesting in a Note delivered to the Soviet Ambassador in Paris,

th: French Government called the Vietminh communist régime a 'rebel movement,' reproaching the Soviets for their support in no uncertain terms. The USSR Ambassador, Mr. Bogomolov, rejected the Note on behalf of Moscow. While the country is thought to have been as good as lost, renewed interest by America in Indochina—and especially her material aid—indicate that Washington's policy-makers are of the opinion that something may yet be done to save the key to Siam and Malaya.

America has learned that her failure to take up Ho's early offer of co-operation has meant that the U.S. must either abandon Indochina or else go all out in an effort to stamp out the rebellion.

First Ho, in launching the civil war and rebellion against France, hoped perhaps less to drive out the foreigners, bag and baggage, than to scare Paris and achieve a greater measure of internal sovereignty. This, at any rate, is what those who know the doctor say about his earlier plans. Later, when the French began flirting with Bao Dai, and Ho linked up with Red China's Mao, Ho's communist movement—even then in receipt of propaganda aid from Moscow—the Vietminh supporters hoped that the constant drain on French material resources caused by the revolt would force France out.

Mobilising the French Communist Party, Vietminh's agitators then tried to create an outcry in France itself against the army casualties in Indochina ; France countered by recruiting German ex-soldiers into the Foreign Legion at a penny a day and shipping them out to the Far East.

Still cagey with Moscow, though himself a professed communist, the signs that Ho was willing to do a deal with France suited Moscow not at all. Then came the profuse verbose adulation of the Ho régime by all communist countries : to create the impression that he was much more under the Kremlin's direct orders than actually was the case. Finally, the immediate recognition of Red Vietnam by all the communist countries forced Ho Chi Minh into Russian hands.

These facts, however, all combine to indicate that Ho might still do a deal with the West, were he once to be either so cornered as to have no escape, or if the promised economic help in consumer goods and machinery from Russia were not

to materialise. Much depends upon the amount of power put into the hands of the Emperor Bao Dai, and his ability to rally round him more progressive and democratic elements. While the French troops will have to stay in Indochina until they overcome communism there—as Bao has no army—it will only be by winning the active support of the ordinary people of their own part of the territory that the French Union will be able to complete their politico-military task. Failure to recognise the legitimate political aspirations of the people, neglecting to raise the standard of living among the Indochinese, will inevitably mean that the underground guerrillas and their spies will continue to find comfort, succour and support.

# 13

## FACTORS FOR UNITY

‘ What we envisage is a programme of development, based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing. All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from a constructive programme for the better use of the world’s human and natural resources.’ PRESIDENT TRUMAN, ‘ Point Four ’ Statement, January 20th, 1949.

OUT of the wartime collaboration towards the common effort for victory, and the growing appreciation of the fact that the world is one entity, a large number of projects have grown up in the postwar period of reconstruction in Asia. While their scope and ambition have been great, most have suffered from a chronic and erroneous belief that the problems of Asia are identical with those of Europe ; or, at least, that the elixir successful in the West must necessarily apply to the East. For this reason, many millions of pounds have been wasted, incalculable effort expended ; while the number of projects has grown to the extent that the correlation of individual plans would constitute an effort almost as great as embarking upon a completely new programme, to embrace each area separately. Hard words, but true, as unpleasant facts often are.

Two major difficulties have dominated the West’s approach to Asian problems—and the Western-style approach of Oriental leaders to their own difficulties.

In the first place, the ceaseless reiteration of the poverty, want and destitution by the suddenly-awakened conscience of man has caused almost all thinking but uninformed politicians—quite naturally—to assume that these are the root-causes of discontent in Asia : and nothing else. Equally harmful have been the efforts of the Western-trained Eastern statesmen to adapt European textbook panaceas to radically different conditions such as are to be found in the East. In the medley of this ineptitude and very real reactionism, the superior adaptability of the communists has told heavily in their favour.

Significant among welfare pronouncements in the battle to

combat communism in poverty-smitten lands was President Truman's famous 'Point Four' statement, contained in his Programme for Peace and Freedom of January, 1949. Although reactions to this throughout Asia showed that it was felt that the President still had not become fully aware of the specialised needs of that area, nevertheless Point Four undeniably provided as basis of operations in one aspect of the common struggle against the Soviets. The fourth, and last, point in his four-point programme dealt with Undeveloped and Backward Territories—a category into which most of the Far East falls; though, like all generalisations, it has many weaknesses.

The main platform upon which Point Four is based dealt with the necessity for formulating some programme which should utilize American scientific and industrial knowledge in the service of backward areas. Such aid would not be confined to economic development, but would be brought to bear upon Asia's endemic problems of hunger and disease.

American recognition of the inability of local capital to develop such resources as are present in the East had, of course, been foreseen and denounced in advance by the Soviet bloc as 'a pretext for economic imperialism.' It was thus of the greatest importance that the President should categorically state—as he did in the Fourth Point—that the United States had no desire of expansion of that kind, or 'exploitation for foreign profit.'

'Experience shows,' stated the President, 'that our commerce with other countries expands as they progress industrially and economically. Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the way to greater production is a wider, more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge. Only by helping the least fortunate of its members help themselves can the human family achieve a decent and satisfying life that is the right of all people.'

As far as that went, it was acknowledged to be appropriate. When, however, the President continued that 'Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action,' Oriental thinkers reacted strongly. In many Asian countries, democracy is the accepted principle; in others it is unknown. Nevertheless, Asians were asking as to where the 'vitalizing force' was being manifested, that they

might learn its action and see its success. While many of them agreed that democracy was desirable, they still thought that this alone was only a part of the picture ; that throughout its long history, only spiritual and idealistic movements had succeeded. Democracy—to the oriental mind, and especially the four hundred million adherents of the Moslem faith—as an ethic was not enough.

‘ On the basis of these four major courses of action,’ continued Mr. Truman, ‘ we hope to create conditions that will lead eventually to personal freedom and happiness for all mankind. If we are to be successful in carrying out these policies, we must have continued prosperity in this country, and we must keep ourselves strong. Slowly but surely we are weaving the world fabric of international security and growing prosperity.’

Particularly welcomed in Oriental circles was the clear statement by America’s President that the bargain was two-sided : that both parties stood to gain. It was appreciated that hypocritical altruism played no part in the policy of the United States.

In his declaration, the President went on that all those who desired to live in freedom from fear, and all those who were today in fear of their own governments, were with America in this effort.

‘ We are aided by all who want relief from the lies of propaganda, who desire truth and sincerity : we are aided by all who want self-government and a voice in deciding their own affairs. We are aided by all who long for the economic security and abundance that men in a free society can enjoy.’

Spiritually, however—that is to say from the criterion upon which millions of his hearers in Asia judged such declarations—there was little to stimulate the Oriental mind.

All the same, it was a start ; and Professor Arturian of the USSR described Point Four during the United Nations debate of the Economic and Social Council in the all-too-familiar terms : ‘ just another colonial plan,’ seeking to further the ‘ imperialist ambitions ’ of the United States.

On June 24th, 1949, the President urged Congress to enact legislation authorizing an expanded programme of technical aid to the underdeveloped territories. This debate showed in greater detail the way in which America envisaged the plan.

Dilating upon the theme, Mr. Truman explained that the aid needed fell into two main categories :

- (a) Technical, scientific and managerial—the know-how—which included medical and educational knowledge and basic assistance in establishing communications and governmental services ; coupled with the vital task of the surveying of resources and the planning of their development ; and
- (b) Capital goods, machinery and equipment, and financial assistance for the creation of productive enterprises.

Both direct US aid was proposed for these aims, and also the creation of conditions favourable for the influx to under-developed areas of private American capital. Important considerations affecting American private investment related to the safeguarding of such finances in foreign countries and the securing of dollar remittances back to the USA.

This was a motive prompting Truman's asking the Export-Import Bank to underwrite US private investments made in such countries, against the risks peculiar to the situation. President Truman implicitly underlined the motives behind Point Four in amplifying its projects. Firstly, he said, the 'grinding poverty' of the peoples involved required relief ; otherwise its lack might cause them to turn to 'false doctrines.'

Secondly, the increase in productivity and enhanced purchasing power of those countries would react favourably upon the US and Western economies in providing markets and supplying essential raw materials. Further, the exploitation of the economic potentials of backward areas would remove the economic causes of war, and would strengthen the United Nations, and the 'fabric of world peace.'

Red penetration of outwardly 'nationalist' movements and their ability to create a noise far greater than their actual power, came near to wrecking the effective working of the protagonists of Point Four in Asia. Throughout the Far East, communist reactions were immediate and violent. Operating through ultra-nationalist fellow-travellers, using cloak organisations and staging 'spontaneous' demonstrations, the Reds did all they could to hit the US where they thought it would hurt

most—in the money-belt. Elaborately-staged meetings and whispering campaigns stated that American aid to any Asian country would mean the destruction of that country's economy. What made the situation worse was the growing number of people in the East who listened to this Red-inspired propaganda—and repeated it—because of the very general feeling that American help was entirely materialistic in its motives. It is as well that most Asians are not at all materialistically-minded ; for, point for point, American democracy does not hold a candle to the glorious imagery conjured up by Marxist propagandists.

Next, with consummate skill, the communists harnessed the Red bogey itself to their bandwagon : Asia, they said in effect, is so near to being communised that it will be futile for America to do anything at this late juncture. To such proportions did the campaign extend, that soon Pakistani and Indian investors—the capitalists themselves—were freely saying that if their own governments did not resist the 'cheap capital' imports from America, local investment would be crushed. Symbolic of the innately sound judgment of the business man was the effect upon the man who had become the focus of world attention : the American investor himself. Apart from a slight wavering at the beginning, he soon steadied : and a working compromise was born. The Banking and Currency Committee of the House of Representatives approved a Bill on October 5th, 1945, authorizing the Export-Import Bank to underwrite American investment in productive enterprises in under-developed lands.

A second Bill of great significance in the economic struggle for Asia was under consideration by the Foreign Affairs Committee. In this it was proposed that in technical co-operation with the countries concerned, Congress should appropriate 25,000,000 dollars for aid to Asia.

At the beginning of June, 1949, the United Nations—invoked by President Truman in his original Point Four address—began moving towards the implementation of the programme. Bitterly contested by the Soviet delegates, the U.N. experts had produced an 86 million dollar two-year plan for aid via the U.N. itself, in response to the Economic and Social Council's earlier request. By August 13th the Economic Committee had agreed

upon a resolution embodying the necessary programme for putting the project in motion. It was agreed :

1. That the U.N. would confine to technical aid to countries asking for its help ;
2. That such assistance would under no circumstances involve foreign economic or political interference with the internal affairs of the country concerned, being entirely non-political ; and
3. That all Governments seeking aid would contribute towards the expenses and would ' undertake the substantial efforts required for successful economic development.'

In addition to these points, U.N.O. resolved upon the setting up of a Technical Aid Committee for co-ordination, a Technical Assistance Policy Committee, and a Technical Assistance Fund, as the ' banking ' department of the effort.

Subject to its very great limitations in lumping all backward areas into one category for aid, be they Eskinoland or Samoa, without defining the different problems in each area, the Point Four Programme was sound enough : above all, it had annoyed Russia and the satellites.

Other organisations working under the aegis of the United Nations carry on activities calculated to help the Far Eastern front against communism : particularly in the spheres of economic amelioration. Hamstrung as it is by the powerful pressure of Soviet Russia, the best that the United Nations Organisation can do is to declare war upon general, rather than specific problems.

The U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was founded in March, 1947, as a result of the U.N's General Assembly decision in late 1946, to the effect that a greater measure of economic co-operation was essential in Asia. The scope of the Commission provides for international action with inter-Governmental approval in : Co-operation towards economic reconstruction of Asia and the Far East, raising the level of economic activity in Asia, and strengthening the material relations between the countries of those regions and between them and the world at large. To this end, technical and economic problems are investigated, and the exchange of relevant information sponsored. The membership and associate-

membership of ECAFE includes the following States and countries : Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Hongkong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Malaya and British Borneo ; Nepal, Pakistan, Philippine Republic, Thailand and Vietnam. It will be noted that this is a largely Far East, as opposed to 'Asia and the Far East' organisation. A second, and more important, point, is that countries other than U.N.O. members may join—such as Korea—and also colonial and dependent territories, like Laos.

Western states having interests in the Far East have also been enrolled. Australia, Britain, France, Holland, New Zealand, the USSR, are members. The Bangkok—Siam—Secretariat of ECAFE centralises in Asia itself the Commissions work. From June, 1947, to October, 1949, five sessions of the organisation were held.<sup>1</sup>

Before long it became evident that the worthy international civil servants of Bangkok had come up against obstacles familiar even to ordinary mortals in national administrative life. In the five sessions, about 100 Resolutions were passed ; documentation, circulars and organisational difficulties seemed about to swamp the delicate plant—even before its important deliberations on Flood Control were under way.

While it would be altogether unjust to expect ECAFE—in spite of its well-warranted interest in irrigation—to stem the Red tide alone, yet observers were distinctly concerned at the Commission's apparently insuperable task. For communism, there was little red tape standing in the way of Marxist agitation ; while at every turn ECAFE experts found themselves hedged in by matters of procedure, and the apparent cumbersomeness of the apparatus they sought to erect. The international political battle in which they found themselves further complicated their task : it was essential that these representatives of the United Nations should not take one side or another in the East-West ideological war—even although, in fact, they were actually combating communism's most cherished plans. Inevitably, the international body found itself in the end up against the national factor. In order to obtain essential information for their work,

<sup>1</sup> Shanghai : June, 1947 ; Philippines : (Baguio) November, 1947 ; India : (Ootacamund) June, 1948 ; Australia : (Lapstone) November, 1948 ; and Singapore : October, 1949.

they were compelled by their terms of reference to go through the National governments on the spot ; and those governments were not always anxious or able for their true position in the economic sense be revealed.

It has been said time and again that Asia's problems of transport, food supply, agriculture, production and exports must and shall be solved ; and there is no doubt that ECAFE, working in these fields, is an essential apparatus in such a policy. But it is doubtful if, as a balancing factor against the immense vitality of communism and the scale of the problem they face within their beat itself, the Commission can have a sufficiently telling effect.

The International Refugee Organisation, too, coming into being a full three years after the beginning of the intensive communist drive to convert the world's millions of refugees to the Marxist creed, has been able to do comparatively little for democracy's fight in the ideal breeding-grounds of discontent in the Far East. While in Europe the tremendous effort and success of the IRO has been powerful and decisive, the story in Asia has been very different. It should not necessarily be thought that there is any innate defect in IRO : its most regrettable failure in the East has been due almost entirely to the fact that operations were largely confined to the West<sup>1</sup> : the location of only a small minority of the world's distressed persons. Several thousand Chinese, however, have been transported from their homeland to their former settlements in Asia.

It was not until the end of 1949 that the IRO decided to install a representative responsible for South Asia. So far, only two steps have been taken in relation to Asia and its refugees. First, the repatriation of overseas-domiciled Chinese to their lands of adoption all over the Far East ; second, the sending of European refugees to settle in Asia. In both of these spheres, in spite of political ' screening,' there is scope for communists and fellow-travellers to be planted among the repatriates and immigrants.

In view of the complexity of this problem of the IRO, it was

<sup>1</sup> By the beginning of 1950, IRO had resettled over 750,000 refugees, of whom only 10% returned to their original homes. Almost all were Europeans. Less than half a million were fully maintained by the organisation. At the end of 1949, the USA had received 141,000, Israel 115,000, Australia 99,000, Britain 83,000, and Canada 72,000.

with little surprise that it was noted in December, 1949, that U.N.O's. General Assembly in plenary Session had determined upon the supersession of IRO by an United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, with headquarters in Geneva, operative from 1951. In the struggle against disaffection in Asia's battlegrounds of communism, it yet remains to be seen whether the Refugee department of the United Nations is capable of action to justify its high ideals.

In the arena of cultural relations, there has been widespread criticism of the exotic UNESCO : the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. From its very inception, the positive orientation of this international body has been towards education of the peoples, with the belief that the spread of enlightenment is itself a major contribution to human progress and wellbeing. Unfortunately, as the former Director of the UNESCO Division of Political Science has pointed out,<sup>1</sup> it has not even yet been realised that education in itself—and even the stimulation of cultural intercourse—is negative : and can be used for good or evil :

‘ Apparently the experience of the last thirty-five years has not been enough to dispel the old illusions,’ he says, ‘ to convince us—wishful thinkers that we are—that education is simply a mirror reflecting the ideas, aims, aspirations, values, of the educators ; that knowledge has little or no personality.’

The fact that education itself is a two-edged weapon makes it virtually useless in the world battle with communism, unless it is directed by ideological motives, just as communist education is. This truth is palpable to those who have seen the spread of educational methods applied to political machinery : the Russian sovietization, the propaganda in Eastern Europe, and the present all-out effort in Asia by educated communists are distinct cases. Orientals themselves, exposed to the employment of educational means *par excellence* in the communist agitation-programme, have noted the same phenomenon as emphasised in Dr. Salvadori's very balanced commentary :

‘ Education increases the potentialities of the human being but it does not necessarily improve him : an educated tyrant or slave may simply become a more efficient tyrant or slave. It is greater knowledge

<sup>1</sup> Dr. M. Salvadori, in the *Contemporary Review*, No. 1013, May, 1950, p. 276 *et passim*.

that makes modern totalitarianism more oppressive and more destructive than ancient tyranny.'

Further drawbacks perceptible in the very general criticism of UNESCO's work and programme are common to most international organisations compelled to operate on a national basis. That is to say, when delegates and employees are chosen by their respective Governments—very often for reasons quite different from their academic distinction or fame—the international body ceases to be collaboration on a worldwide level, and becomes merely a collection of national delegates, each often determined to ensure his own national welfare and his country's cultural predominance or wellbeing. If the Secretariat and executive of UNESCO were to be made above all national considerations, if that organisation were permitted to draw its cultural and educational experts regardless of national affiliations, then there might be some hope for its efficient functioning. As long as National Commissions, usually dominated by Governments and hence political ideologies, continue to nominate representatives to UNESCO, so long will its present very evident limitations be manifest and chronic.

Collaborating in the general desire to raise living-standards and the material welfare of the people of the East are several other international organs. The Food and Agriculture Organisation, set up in 1945, combats food-crop diseases on a continental basis, stimulating arable and cattle production, and has done valuable work in its own field. Asia's urgent rice production problem has been energetically tackled by the FAO.<sup>1</sup>

The ILO, devoted to the welfare of the world's labour, though a comparative newcomer to the present labour conditions in the Far East, has caused considerable investigation to be made into social conditions in Asia, culminating in the 1950 Asia Regional Labour Conference in Ceylon.<sup>2</sup>

The International Monetary Fund, founded in 1945, and the International Bank for Reconstruction, provide a twin basis for the investigation of financial problems throughout the world. In addition to making loans to India for the Damodar project

<sup>1</sup> It is not confined to the Far East, but Far Eastern members are : Burma, Ceylon, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Korea, Siam.

<sup>2</sup> Members in the Far East are : Burma, Ceylon, China, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Siam.

and the Philippines for electrical plans, international economic conditions and their improvements fall within the province of these bodies.

The Commonwealth Conferences, at which members of the British Commonwealth of Nations discussed the possibilities of an unified front against communism in Asia, are generally conceded to have performed real work in relation to facing squarely up to the threat. The determination of Australia and New Zealand—as much threatened in the final analysis by conditions in Asia as any other country—to contribute to the combating of Marxism's halting has provided encouragement for those working in the same direction.

There are also a number of private and voluntary organisations working in South and East Asia, whose importance in this world struggle must not be under-rated. The stultifying restraints upon freedom of action caused by the present emphasis upon inter-governmental collaboration could be in great measure relieved by taking such organisations, and even communities hostile to the Red philosophy, into consideration, and into active partnership with the material plans for Marxism's downfall. In the case of propaganda and efforts to combat the Reds by the ethical and moral weapon, it is not too much to say that the only method is to invoke the aid of these non-official organisations. Inter-governmental collaboration on matters such as these—on faith and religion, for example—would be worse than hopeless. In general, the immensely powerful politico-religious Asian communities are unmoved by their respective government's programmes, are often even slightly at variance with them. But where strong national and international unofficial bodies do exist, these could provide a power second to none in the fight for Asia : for it is to them that the people listen : and it is the people that are ultimately involved. Communism's spread depends upon a steady stream of conversion ; if that is halted, the movement withers and dies. It cannot be halted by material means alone.

## SIAM : LAND OF THE FREE—AND NOT-SO-FREE

““Revolutionary action” for the reform of the old order *while power remains in the hands of the ruling class* is one thing—that is the constitutional path. “Revolutionary action” for the purpose of smashing the old order, of overthrowing the ruling class, is a different thing: that is the revolutionary path—the path making for the complete victory of the revolution. The difference here is a fundamental one.” STALIN, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, 223.

**S**ANDWICHED between Burma, Indochina and British Malaya, Siam stands in the direct line of Chinese—Indochina—South Asia Communist expansion, providing the essential land-link westwards to India, southwards to the archipelagos of the Pacific Ocean. In one important respect, Siam’s social system differs from the characteristic starvation pattern providing such an ideal ground for Red penetration so familiar in almost all the Far East. The society evolved by the Thai people, grounded upon Buddhist culture, depends upon the country’s outstanding soil fertility: hitherto providing the Siamese with their modest material needs, without the growth of large-scale landlordism, or the development of extremes of class distinction.

Three vital factors, however, combine to expose Siam—Thailand: Land of the Free—to the powerful danger of rapid communisation more than almost any other Asian land. Firstly, geography and the increasing hold of Marxism in neighbouring Indochina, where Emperor Bao Dai and the French are desperately battling against the Red fanatics led by sinister Dr. Ho, whose eyes are turned upon the outwardly tranquil Kingdom of Siam to the west. Secondly, a large and growing Chinese population—one in four of Siam’s people is Chinese—imbued with traditional patriotism, looking to their communised homeland for inspiration. Thirdly, the Buddhist philosophy of calm acceptance of fate without providing

adequate social institutions capable of withstanding the militant Communist ideal has already been appreciated by Siam's Reds as a suitable field of operations.

Buddhism and its gentleness, indeed, has been a mixed blessing for Siam. While traditional, deep-rooted observance of its principles has inhibited a rigid division of the community into classes, the Communist class-warfare propaganda weapon finds little comprehension among the masses. Equally, however, the great natural productivity of the soil and the austere way of life of most Siamese has distinctly prevented the evolution of a standard of living high enough to withstand continued agitation against the rulers of the country. The comparatively few educated Thais themselves complain that 'there is no bracing framework of those whose productivity would encourage them to continue reaping the benefits of private enterprise'—no stiffening of successful businessmen, or would-be free enterprisers. This may be true in relation to the Siamese themselves, apart from the Court at Bangkok; but there is another group who fulfil the functions of a middle-class or capitalist society: the Chinese traders. Characteristic of the cunning of Communist propaganda and the complications resulting from the presence of the highly-organised Chinese minority is the fact that these very 'capitalists' have been thoroughly infiltrated by Communism.

Even before the outbreak of the Pacific War with Japan, Red agitators and specially trained operatives were extremely active among Thailand's Chinese. Emissaries from Moscow and Red Yenan in Communist-held China conducted their campaign here with consummate skill. Realizing early that patriotism, devoutness and a genius for the organisation of secret societies were the facets of Chinese character best suited to their plans, the Soviet-sponsored propagandists channelled their main efforts in these directions. Most of the Chinese businessmen of the country, they found, held what were formerly regarded as progressive views in politics. Growing up after the period of their hero Sun Yat Sen's rejection of Peking's imperial throne, these traders were in agreement with a progressive China—provided there were room for private trade. It was not long before the presses of Communist China and the Red strongholds in Hong Kong were pouring out books decisively proving

that the Three Principles of Sun were none other than Communist in their spirit and intent ; Marxism had been misunderstood : it really believed in a strong, united, independent China—and Asia for the Asiatics, said the books.

The Democratic League, with headquarters in Hong Kong, and directly financed by Moscow, worked among Chinese and Siamese alike, organising ' front ' organisations, trade unions, granting scholarships for the ' dialectical universities ' of Red China, and penetrating into cultural and literary institutions.

After the fall of China to Communism, the patriotic and blackmail weapons were brought indiscriminately to bear. Through their key men planted in the Chinese bodies of Siam, Pekin's Reds convinced many a trader that it was his duty to support Pekin, right or wrong. Whatever Red Boss Mao Tse Tung of China said, he was after all a great man, and a Chinese. Further, recalcitrants were warned that failure to support the Party with money and information would mean either their own death or that of their families in China : and the wiping out of an entire family in China is considered to be the worst thing that can happen for the soul of their most revered ancestor.

Responsible for the ideological conversion and ' education ' of Siam are three well-tried revolutionaries of the reddest dye : Chiu Chi, Wang Yu and Liu Sin, faithful lieutenants of Ch'ing Hsi, Soviet Monk and evil genius behind the scenes.

Under the guidance of this ' Great Religious Teacher,' Thailand's Reds founded over seventy organisations, and infiltrated others already in existence, and still maintain effective control over all, until the time is ripe for coming openly out for revolution. Collaborating closely with the Red Monk is another master spy : Iy Me Hoo, who has welded together a mighty Communist weapon in the form of the Chien Chui Hui—The Association for Construction and for the Salvation of the Chinese in Thailand—upon the implicit obedience of whose powerful membership he implicitly relies. Typical of the organisational ability of these five agents is the way in which they have unified a multitude of other bodies devoted to all manner of causes, producing their Salvation Association. Now fused with the parent society are three schools, (one girls' school, one public and one secondary), one college, the Workmen's Union of Bangkok, a Committee

of Teashop Workers, and charitable, educational, cultural and youth leagues.

Neither has the national life of the country been calm in recent years. Siam's youthful King Phumiphon Adulet has seen in the four years of his reign disturbances which have been clearly attributable to Communist activity : for, just as the founding of bogus societies is part of the invariable Red plan, so also is it standard procedure to test revolutionary organisation several times before the final coup.

From 1944, when Field-Marshal Pibul Songkram's régime was overthrown, until his spectacular army coup d'état come-back with a military force in 1948, nationalist and Communist elements continually agitated for greater democratisation of the governmental machine. The Constitution granted in 1949 binds the King to Parliament's supervision in his powers ; but only the Lower House is democratically elected, while the hundred members of the Senate are nominated by the King himself.

Out of the country's sixteen million population, the religious aspect—always an explosive one in the East—is reasonably stable : thirteen million are Buddhists, half a million Moslems, and some seventy thousand profess Christianity.

Moscow's—as well as Pekin's—objects in infiltrating Thailand hinge on more than strategic matters. Naturally, the long land-frontier with Burma would be valuable as a means of sending Communist bands into that already red-tinted country ; Malaya, too, is wide open to guerrilla action through Siam, and her wide seaboard would be invaluable as a jumping-off place for the double threat : to India and Pakistan in the West, the Philippines and Indonesia in the East and South.

But it is the vast natural wealth of Thailand's fertile lands and forests that provide the greatest prize. Chiefly, coveted products of the country are rice—urgently short in Communist China—rubber, teak and tin. Second among the world's rice-exporting nations, Siam provides the answer to China's greatest problem : how is Mao Tse Tung to feed his war-devastated country ? In the Far East's present virtual dependance upon Siamese rice exports for making up deficits in this staple food, communisation of Thailand could mean death by starvation for millions

and resultant grave economic unrest among the already underfed masses of Asia.

Under the American and UNO plans for aid to undeveloped areas, many of Thailand's traditional dreams may be realized. The almost total absence of manufacturing industries could be remedied, while modern methods, irrigation and capital plant would greatly increase her rice yield and re-equip crippled tin-smelting concerns.

While the Chinese Communists concentrate upon the Siamese and Chinese sections of the country's population as their main targets, the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok is said to have taken a great interest in her Moslem population of a little over half a million. In spite of their relatively small numbers, Moslem experts of the overall Communist strategy for Asia see in them potentialities far greater than their size. In the first place, they include some of the vitally-needed middle class with a certain degree of education, needed by the Reds as 'intellectuals,' with individual power considerably greater than several illiterate Thai peasant recruits. Then, of course, there is the Moscow Moslem Policy, which now aims at winning over the world's 400,000,000-strong Islamic bloc to the Soviet Bloc. Special propaganda is provided for them, purporting to prove that Islam is in reality just the same as Communism : and Islam's social tenets, when twisted by astute agitators, could seem to the peasantry at least to approximate to something like collectivism. The literature cites examples of the life of the Moslem peoples of Sinkiang, and those in the Soviet Union, pointing out that precepts of social justice have been put into practice in these areas, remarkably similar to Islamic tenets. The Moslems of Thailand are, in addition, generally more energetic than their Buddhist compatriots, and therefore it is here that the Reds plan to recruit key workers and propagandists to supplement their Chinese supporters.

Present Moslem opinion in Thailand, however, is strongly opposed to Communism, since their theologians have compelled Red propagandists to admit the entirely atheistic character of their 'dialectical materialism' ; though the growing unrest in the south of the country against religious discrimination levelled at Moslems may have a damaging effect if Islamic counter-propaganda proved ineffective.

Until recently, harsh and discriminatory treatment meted out to the Moslems of Siam had created very great unrest, where Moslems were even on the verge of rebellion, and were considered a profitable field for Communist agitation. Following considerable Islamic pressure, the Buddhist rulers of Siam relented, restoring in a measure the freedom of cult and administration sought. The Communists are now working out how to overcome this setback.

The rapid absorption of Thailand's millions of Chinese immigrants and residents by Communism constitutes less of a political conquest than a nationalist one ; for the Reds of Siam today are reaping the harvest of more than forty years' pro-China propaganda, made by the Chinese metropolitan governments since 1911.

While Chinese settlement in Siam has been a continuous and spontaneous movement for generations, the tendency there—unlike Malaya—was for the Chinese to become 'Siamised,' adopting the speech and aspirations of the Thai people. Nationalist pressure, especially by Chiang-Kai Shek's Kuomintang Party, kept up contacts and was strongly exercised upon these voluntary exiles, employing for the most part slogans and arguments to show Chinese superiority to the Thai race.

The result of this effort became visible before long. Chinese schools were opened, clubs and societies sprang up, periodicals were published. Throughout the long war with Japan, these bodies formed the channel for donations to the mother country, and this further strengthened the national bond.

Cultural, patriotic and recreational activities were fostered by the clubs with middle-class membership, while large numbers of labourers, rickshaw-pullers and field workers were organised into labour unions and tongs—secret societies.

After World War II the strong Communist element of this latter section was able to capture intact the allegiances of the vast majority of workers, by inveigling the smaller unions into the Red 'Central Labour Union,' taking the usual care that all officials were outstanding Communist Party figures.

The mouthpiece of the fifty thousand organised workers is the Chinese daily paper published in Bangkok : the Chuan Minpao, whose fast-growing circulation currently reported

as 10,000 copies actually represents only a fraction of its readership. Group-readings are arranged by the smaller Communist 'cells,' while in many villages the pages are posted up in public as a wall-newspaper.

Using both the Chinese and Thai elements of the country's ethnical composition is Ku Kip, Chief of Bangkok's Communist Party, himself chosen by the Russians due to his being half Siamese, half Chinese. This man is in constant and secret touch with the conveniently situated Russian Legation, the largest official Soviet organisation in South Asia.

Though the pot had been simmering for a considerable time, it was the autumn of 1948 that saw the start of widespread and violent Communist agitation in Siam : marking the Red confidence in the strength and stability of their movement.

The first big plot against the Government after nearly a year's apparent quiet came in October, 1948, when a major attempt at the overthrow of the administration was foiled. Seizing the Defence Ministry, the plotters hoped for army support to rally around the eighty officer conspirators implicated. Captured evidence pointed to Thwi Buniaket, a former Prime Minister, and Nai Dirak Jaynam, once Thai Ambassador in London. Typical of the confused situation in Bangkok was the news, released on October 26th, that Major-General Vavanasomid, in charge of apprehending the plotters, was himself one of them.

That Communism was behind the plan, though strongly suspected, was difficult to prove : interlocking but watertight red cells prevented the unravelling of a complete picture. The added fact that Communist influence riddles many of the apparently non-Communist political parties completed the bafflement of the Government.

By the beginning of 1949, Communist activity, agitation, propaganda and sabotage had reached an unprecedented peak. News that an united front had been established between the Chinese and Indochinese forces in the Red guerrilla war moved the hitherto-apatetic Siamese Government to action. Marshal Luang Pibul Songkram, the Premier, announced on February 17th, Siam's awakening to the Communist menace, proclaiming a state of emergency throughout the country.

The direct outcome of the emergency powers assumed by the

Government were the censorship of the Press, examination of Chinese institutions, and a close watch upon suspected Reds. Before long a heterogeneous band had been uncovered, working for the destruction of the regime and the setting up of a Communist state. Evidence of Communism's power in reconciling individual differences was the revelation that the inner circle of the Red group included Chinese, Thai officers and a former Cabinet Minister.

Following a concerted plan, red infiltration of the Thai armed forces had created another grave problem. Influenced by Communist exhortations, actual fighting broke out in Bangkok on February 27th, 1949, between units of the Army and Navy.

In order to increase the alarm and hoping to seize the reins of power, the Communists employed two main weapons.

Seizing the radio station, they announced that the Cabinet had resigned and that Nai Direk Jayanama had assumed control of the country. Concurrently, large disciplined bodies of armed communist underground fighters, dressed in army uniforms, joined the fighting, tried to gain control of public utilities, and rioted in the city's streets. Although the Government were able to restore order, and the Red plot killed, out of the large number of guerrillas and agitators, only forty arrests could be made.

While the present fighting in neighbouring Indochina continues, most Siamese see the eventual overthrow of the French and Emperor Bao ; at the same time the Reds within Siam are working tirelessly through the thousand and one methods in their power to prepare for the day of revolt. So far the Siamese Government has been unable to whip up the people as a whole against the Communist menace, while Red agitators tour the country, gaining strength day by day. In Burma, to the West, Communism is rampant to such a degree that its armed forces are believed to be stronger than those of the Republic. Apparently unhampered, Soviet agents travel from the Bangkok spy-nest to and fro between Moscow and Indonesia—even employing the airline and shipping company that is communist-owned and flies conveniently between the main centres of Far East Communist expansion.

Unless Thailand rallies to the call of democracy, there is no

visible force that can keep her throne intact, that can prevent the red tide from sweeping south and westward, to engulf India and Malaya, both vital areas in the West-East struggle for power in Asia.

# 15

## SICKLE AND PAGODA IN BURMA

‘ We, as Communists, should and will support the bourgeois liberation movements in the colonial countries only when these movements are truly revolutionary movements, and when their representatives do not hamper us in educating and organising the peasantry and the masses of the exploited in the revolutionary spirit.’ LENIN, *Collected Works*, XXV, 353.

BURMA’S traditional weakness—the deep hatred between the Burmans and the Karens—underlies much of the disorder continuing since Britain’s restraining hand was withdrawn. Karen revolutionaries, seeking the severance of Burmese control, are the effective masters of large tracts of the homeland ; while the central Government, largely dominated by the Burman element, remains impotent. Communist propaganda offers the Karens their own autonomous Soviet State—after the Communisation of the entire country. Amid a patchwork of warring races, increasing official corruption and economic crisis increase the danger of any Burmese government’s situation.

After three wars against the Burmese throne—those of 1826, 1852 and 1886—the British conquest of this keystone of India and Pakistan made it, almost by accident, a Province of India. This accident, as well as the Japanese invasion during World War II and the traditional detestation of the Burmese for their Indian neighbours, may be traced as a direct cause of the present growth of Communism in Burma.

In area half the size of Alaska, with nearly the combined populations of New York State and New Jersey, Burma withdrew from British rule in 1947, and in 1948 finally became a ‘ sovereign, democratic Republic.’

As the westernmost angle of the China-Siam-Indochina jigsaw, bordering India in the West, and possessing a seaboard tapering from the Bay of Bengal to the North of British Malaya, Burma’s extensive land and sea limits make her an area of the utmost strategic importance in the Red struggle for Asia.

As might be expected, the multiplicity of races in this country—the Burman-Karen tussle is only one such fight—is both one of the telling factors in her history and is exploited as an integral part of Communist strategy. Any desire to combat Russia's march through Asia by this route, therefore, can only be made effective by a true understanding of these racial considerations.

While most Burmese are mongoloid, the only other bond of unity among the startlingly divided groups—religious, racial and social—is the fact that they inhabit the same country. One million Indians and 150,000 Chinese form the main foreign resident groups, but among Burmese the cleavages are so great that theirs may be regarded as a seven-nation country : each warring against the other, and thus highly susceptible to Communist propaganda.

Marxist agitators early learned that the five main Burmese races—Burmans, Karens, Shans, Chins and Kachins—could be used individually to further the ends of Moscow imperialism in their drive towards India and eventually the ' soft underbelly ' of the Middle East.

Communists in Burma rely upon military lessons learned during the war for the furtherance of their plans. Their guerrilla warfare against the Japanese occupation army provided for them at the war's end a trained pool of dissatisfied recruits for any Red agitation. Taking a leaf from Tokyo's book, the exiled Indian Communist plotters of Rangoon maintain their own liaison with Burmese Reds, in their programme for a puppet Indian Government, and an Indian National Army on the pattern of the late quisling Subhas Chandra Bose's ' Asia for the Asiatics ' army in Burma.

Accustomed literally for thousands of years to invasion from the north-west, threatened by the Tsarist and later the Red Russian menace through the Khyber Pass, British and Indian strategists were taken completely by surprise by Japan's rapid conquests and appearance upon their Eastern flank : on the frontiers of Burma. When the Japanese war was ended, and renewed Soviet expansionism became evident, India's intelligence officers again looked to the North-West. Forgetting the lessons of the late war, they made no move against the inexorable Red avalanche sweeping through south Asia and lapping against their only vulnerable frontier : Burma.

Outwardly, life in the cities of the Land of Ten Thousand Pagodas shows little sign of the seething red cauldron beneath. In the great river arteries like the mighty Irrawaddy, Burma's priceless teakwood wealth continues to float to the logmills of the south. Burmese oil gushes unceasingly from the rich wooded fields—but under covetous Communist eyes. The age-old cycle of man's agricultural endeavour proceeds unchanging in the lower Burma rice fields.

Continuing as supplements to oil in Burma's budget are the gems of the country's ancient ruby mines ; but Moscow thinks rather of the lead, the zinc and wolfram, the tin deposits and their organised workers as more worthy targets and a fitting prize for militant Communism in Asia.

The enchanting sight of delicately-featured Burmese, clothed in robes of dazzling colours, against the fairy pattern of delicate pagodas cannot eradicate the knowledge of the plotters of the underground Revolutionary Communist Party—tight lipped fanatics preparing for letting loose bloody revolution in the bazaars of Mandalay. Up country, grim-faced warriors of the Communist guerrillas drill and 'educate' themselves for that great day : the swirl of crimson waters over Burma, the changing of the face of Asia.

Overwhelmingly—by 84%—the people of Burma are Buddhist, ruled by the memory of the Lord Buddha, whom nationalism claims to have been himself a Burman. Well provided with monasteries of nodding monks, a great part of the political life of the country depends upon these hundred thousand yellow-robed ascetics. Whereas their function should be the attendance upon their religious and social duties, Burmese Buddhist priests today are politically-minded. And the cherished hope of the Communists is that they will win them over into their ranks. Leaflets and posters are unstinted and widely read, purporting to prove that Lord Buddha's ideology is identical with the tenets of Bolshevism.

Even during the British period, when the administration exercised a much stronger hand over the country, these monks succeeded in fomenting at least one revolt ; while those priests already in the employ of the Communist fighters provide—on a strictly equal-share-out basis—free charms to make the Red warriors immune from deviationism and enemy bullets alike.

What are the differences between the peoples of Burma? The country gets its name from the Burman predominant race, though members of all races living today in the Republic are collectively known as Burmese. Themselves of Chinese origin, the Burmans migrated here about 600 B.C., from the western part of China. The Kachins and Chins, it is thought, entered the country at about the same time. Today, Burmans inhabit the valleys of the Irrawaddy river, the Kachins the hills of north Burma. The Karens, like the Shans immigrants from north China, made their trek later than the other groups: their struggle with the Burman race is the strongest in all the national animosities of the country.

In habits the peoples of Burma are strictly distinguished: while the Burmans are often inclined to laziness and easily outsmarted in business, the Kachins care little for trade, extracting a living by raid and looting the lowland communities. Both Kachins and Chins are designated by Red strategy to form the striking force of violent struggle, while the majority of Burmans would simply be the acquiescent collectivised peasants.

Equally brave but generally conceded to be more level-headed is the Karen, whose warlike history is largely rooted in compulsion: for centuries, resistance against the Burman has blended a stock eminently suitable for military and police work.

Recruits of these three—the Chins, Karens and Kachins—have been used against Communist insurrections in the mountains; but a more widespread use of their manpower resources is impossible due to the fact that the predominantly—Burman Government, while only too willing to employ other races against the Reds, have made no concessions to their desires for political representation.

The inevitable result was twofold: the Karens revolted against the Government; and later, though innately anti-Communist, made common cause with the Marxist guerrillas as the only possible allies against Burman landlordism.

As long as the Burman politicians of Rangoon have no army strong enough to destroy Communism in their country, as long as they cannot make headway without the non-Burmans, conciliation seems to be their only wise policy. In other words, a united Burma would have a chance to stop Communism; as

the position stands today, this chance is almost non-existent. While the Chins, Kachins and the rest know that their anti-Red victories strengthen still further the disliked Burman hand of Rangoon, they cannot be expected to give their enthusiastic co-operation in the present civil war. This is the sphere in which Western advice could be effective in the struggle for Burma : for only outside pressure seems to stand a chance of persuading the present Government to create a unified front.

To a great extent, Burma's three million Karens will decide the issue as to whether Communism triumphs. The Reds, for their part, spare no effort to persuade them that there will be a free Karen Republic within the future Collectivist Burmese State. If the Communist succeed in convincing the Karens that they will have such a Republic—on the pattern of the Central Asian Republics of the USSR, Burma could easily be lost to democracy.

The long Japanese occupation, the slowness of recovery and the civil war, have all but shattered Burmese economy. Coming after a long period of war and deprivation, continued distress among the peasants provides yet another danger of ears open to Red propaganda.

How perilous can be foreign participation in the economic life of a country is well illustrated by the commercial past and present of Burma. Without adequate national industries, exploited for generations by the rapacity of Indian traders, all Burmese today are naturally suspicious of foreign interests in the country's development—even although they cannot hope to carry out the vital tasks ahead of them without foreign finance.

This has resulted in the Burmese Government's being compelled to sponsor many of the development and rehabilitation schemes directly or indirectly, without the help of outside capital—itsself uncertain of Burma's stability. Included in the list of joint-stock companies established by this alliance of the Government and ordinary commercial firms are the timber, rice and transport undertakings, the three industries hardest hit by the war. Although these experiments have on the whole worked well, it is now apparent that the Government cannot keep going much longer on its own resources : somehow,

capital has to be procured. The appreciation of this fact is one of the motives behind Burma's internal, as well as international, policy, and has an important bearing upon the Red menace to Asia in this area.

According to Burmese reasoning, Asia is rising from the dust of European colonisation. The total Japanese victory against the colonial powers in the war—even though it was soon enough drastically reversed—showed, according to them, that the western powers were weaker than they had supposed. In addition to this, they continue, the Japanese and British were always deeply interested in Burma's wealth. Now the Russians have shown that they are in the market. Therefore the Burmans conclude that they have a strong bargaining position, and can make what deal they like with the Western Powers—or even, perhaps, the Eastern Bloc, or Communist China.

This, together with the strategic position of their country, may or may not be sound political thinking. At the same time, the fact that the Government itself is in immediate danger of being overthrown, and the internal situation is not under control, goes a long way towards nullifying their chances in such a bargain with the West. Neither can the Government emphasise the Red danger ; for this would inevitably turn searching eyes upon their own political position—and this is not in their interests.

Communism's history in Burma, extending over more than twenty years, shows the great virility of the movement, and its close links with India. Before the war, the active reds were Aung San—later a Major-General in the Japanese-sponsored puppet Burmese National Army—Thakin Nu, Thein Pue, Than Tun and Thakin Soe. These and other leaders, benefiting by sound ideological training, intrigued themselves into power in every nationalist, labour and cultural movement in prewar Burma. For this reason, Communism was immensely stronger than was generally known.

When Burma was conquered by Japan, there came the wide-open split in the Red, Fellow-Traveller and Communist 'Front' organisations. The extreme nationalists, who had been in alliance with the Communists, were mostly without any pro-Red leanings. Inspired by the leading defectionist, General Aung San, this group deserted the 'freedom' movement for the

Japanese, overcome by propaganda offering a 'Free Burma in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.'

Japanese action against communism put the hard core of the Reds on the defensive. Taking to the forests and mountains, they formed the mainstay of the resistance movement ; and it was this body that was supported by Britain in their guerrilla days, as the only effective internal fighting force against Japan. Here was forged the Communist 'Democratic Burmese People's Anti-Japanese Resistance Movement.'

Thakin Poe, one of contemporary Burma's up-and-coming Red leaders, escaped to India, where he established a military liaison with the West.

Realising that British rule offered no better chances of a Soviet State in Burma than had the Japanese, Burmese Communists decided at the end of the war to adopt Moscow's policy for Asia : get the colonialists out. In 1945 they formed, at first in secret, the 'Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League' ; into this body the Communists managed to draw most of the leftish factions of their political life. Aung San, the notorious Japanese collaborator and pretended Red, obtained such power as to remain in power over the Freedom League, outlasting his Japanese masters. Immediate subordinate to him was Than Tun, seasoned Red and political genius of the Burmese Communist Party.

Working with fantastic speed, the Party founded 'cells' of reliable operators in virtually every town and large village in the country. The Government was honeycombed with spies. A special Communist Army was raised, and secret political police were soon on the doorstep of any Burmese mouthing hostility. Trades Unions, schools, clubs, any organised body of people, were the target of Aung San's infiltration men.

Meanwhile the reorganised British administration proceeded to organise, under Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, an Executive Council of Burma, composed of Burmese nationalists, but ignoring the Communists. Britain had severely underrated Red power in Burma. Widespread disorders at once became the order of the day ; murders, assaults and outrages broke out all over the country, engineered by the active Communist cells, and culminating in the paralysing strike of police and State employees in September 1946.

At the next reshuffle, British policy, aware of the power of the AFPFL, reversed the position. Assuming that the simultaneous outbreaks against the Executive Council showed unanimous popular support for the Red-dominated Freedom League, the administration this time put the Communist inspired Freedom Leaguers in virtual control of the Council. Now in actual control of the country, the League proceeded to strengthen their position throughout Burma from the comfortable situation of what was in reality the cabinet.

By October, 1946, the new Executive Council, complete with the Communists and fellow-travellers of the Freedom League, had shown in no uncertain terms its Red policy. Aung San, however, friend of Japan and Moscow, had bitten off more than he could chew. Seriously miscalculating both the strength of his own Communist supporters in the League, and his power to ride the see-saw separating them from the non-Communists, he began to vacillate between the left and right extremes.

In April, 1947, the Constituent Assembly—the Parliament—consisted of 173 representatives of the Red Freedom League, seven open Communists, two independents, four Anglo-Burmese, twenty-four Karens and forty-five frontiersmen. The apparently small representation of Communists was due to the fact that the various Red leaders were working hand in glove with the Freedom League.

Before long came the split ; despite Aung San's considerable personality, the moderates first broke away, alarmed by the doctrinaire dogmatism of the bright red majority—soon to be followed by the Communists themselves. This desertion of the Communists was due to their own internal strife : Than Tun and Thakin Soe, the two mainstays of the party, differing upon local strategy, both abandoned the League, later establishing their own Communist parties.

While this actual disintegration was in progress, Burmese independence, though it had in practice been in existence since 1946, was finally conceded by Britain on October 17th, 1947, coming into official force in 1948.

In the elections of 1947 won by the League, another interesting situation arose, misleading many voters—and foreign observers—into believing that it was the League that was right-wing. This incident was the boycotting of the elections

by the nationalists Ba Maw, U Saw and Ba Sain, and their party organisations. Stating that the Communist Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League was 'pro-British,' these leaders evaded the verdict of the elections for their own reasons. Believing themselves weak, fearing an overwhelming defeat by the League, lacking the moral courage to fight, the opposition came upon the face-saving formula of stigmatizing the League as inimical to Burmese interests, to be the alibi for their not joining the elections—and to support their demand for the League's disbandment. There were two courses open to the opposition in their campaign against the League. Either they could call Aung San and his party Communists, or they could nail them as supporters of British imperialism. With great political acumen, but little regard for facts, they realised that to take up an anti-Red line would lose them support and prejudice their future chances of changing horses in midstream. Thus they fixed upon the anti-British cry as being both safe and popular with nationalists and Communists alike. This calumnation of the League as being pro-imperialist—and hence, by extension, anti-Communist—threw the country into the hands of the League more effectively even than if the three main parties of the opposition had joined it themselves.

The Communist element in the electorate, knowing full well the League's affiliations, and fully instructed by their cells to vote pro-League, naturally laughed at this very red herring. The other politically-minded voters who were anti-Communist, believing that Aung San was pro-British (he had changed his politics so many times, they were ready to hear anything of him), cast their ballot for the League. The true pro-British elements followed suit, hoping for a return of England. As the three other right, left and middle parties obliged their supporters to abstain or to vote for a party fighting the elections, voters found themselves generally compelled either not to vote at all or to vote League. Aung San's uneasy coalition, piloted by the Reds, swept the polls.

The three abstaining parties—the Myochit, Mahabama and Dobama—were virtually destroyed by the defeat.

The two splinted Red extremist parties : the orthodox Communist Party, headed by Than Tun, and the Anarchy Group of Thakin Soe, henceforward dominate the red struggle for power

in Burma. As the London *Times* Correspondent put it on April 9th, 1947 :

‘ The relationship between the two (Communist groups) is not clear. Both are behind much of the dacoity (banditry) rampant in the country. Even the legal Communists have organized campaigns for the nonpayment of rents and taxes and instigated the peasants to loot stocks of rice. Both seem bent on creating those conditions of anarchy from which their Marxist manuals have taught them the ideal state can in due course be built up.’<sup>1</sup>

The result of the deep racial cleavage in Burma’s makeup, combined with the political events outlined above, has been the emergence of a situation there ideal for further Red expansion. Even the existence of two or more Communist groups is no weakening of the structure ; for Than Tun’s ‘ official ’ Communist Party has lost nothing in strength to the anarchist Soe’s rival organisation. The net effect has been the development of power centres throughout the country, areas of varying political complexions and strength, yet all united by the common factor of rebellion against the established Government.

Literally, all Burma is seething. The T.T. (Than Tun) Communist Party commands Central Burma, both politically and militarily. By far the stronger of the Red entities, the T.T. organisation is a ruthless, well-oiled machine ; led by Tun, the T.T.’s. priceless intelligence service is under the direction of H. N. Goshal, the veteran Moscow-trained Hindu extremist. His ideological department is in close contact with India’s underground Communist Party in Calcutta, on the eastern seaboard of the subcontinent.

In conformity with the decisions of the 1948 Calcutta Far East Communist Conference, the T.T. machine has taken up the sword in playing its part in the agreed Moscow-line strategy of armed rebellion where possible in Asia. Its strategic entrenchment in the middle of Burma virtually controlling vast areas, collecting its own taxes and propagating Marxism has already enabled the movement to cut off Rangoon’s communications by water, road and railroad with the north. These isolated northern territories are thus wide open to invasion from China.

Three million mutinous Karens, no mean fighters, still deny the Government access to their territory, stand in armed revolt,

and demand a separate state with a raucousness increasing with the measure of their military successes.

In Rangoon, Burma's capital, while organised labour finds itself drawn more closely into the web of Red intrigue, warring groups of opportunist politicians, maddened by their exclusion from the Government, struggle ceaselessly for the overthrow of that badly-shaken body, whose economic plans are being shattered by the lack of administrative control over the whole country. Forced to seek economic aid from the British Commonwealth they so precipitately left, the Prime Minister has voiced the Cabinet's plea that only foreign financial help can save them from bankruptcy.

Maintaining their constant plotting and recruitment are the Anarchist-Communists, under Thakin Soe—sometimes called the T.S. Party as distinct from the T.T. or Moscow-line party of Than Tun—remain unshaken in their belief in their leader's ability to triumph in dictatorship of all Burma. He will, they say, overthrow Tun, where Trotsky failed to unseat Stalin in Russia, but with a similar programme.

While the T.T. and T.S. parties constitute the main communist threat to Burma's freedom, matters are such that Soviet and Chinese pressure, added to political opportunism, could turn almost any Burmese today into a professed Red.

Evidence of this is to be found in the co-existence of two main Communist parties, rivals without basically differing aims apart from their difference of opinion over leadership. It is further supported by the active functioning of at least four minor Communist parties, all claiming Moscow support. The fact that dissatisfied peasants, Karens, Anglo-Burmans and others fight under one or other political red banner without apparent reluctance and usually without any political knowledge, again show how the Burmese may be utilised almost at will by the warring Reds.

To crown the whole perilous structure, the very nucleus of the present Government, though allegedly anti-communist, have in the past called themselves 'Marxians'; it has even been said that their opposition to communism has been based upon dislike of political enemies, rather than a deeply-rooted craving for democracy.

Under the present régime in Burma, the policy of the State is

clearly stated to be a leaning towards co-operative organisations, collective farms, and State planning on a wide scale. Like the Soviet Union, there is a 'Chamber of Nationalities' in the Parliament; as in Russia the separate nationalities are guaranteed by law a large degree of local autonomy. As in Russia, these constituent national groups do not have in actual fact the freedom that they are supposed to, or the rights that are accorded in the Constitution.

Nationalisation of industry and hostility to 'private concerns of a monopolist character,' together with the increasing use by the Government of its powers to set up Government-controlled industrial and financial organisations, again shows to have been envisaged as heading towards a collectivist type of economy. The only ways in which the Burmese Constitution seems to diverge from theoretical socialism is in the toleration of private enterprise (provided it is not 'monopolistic'—an elastic term); while the Buddhist religion is recognised. These apparent differences will not seem so far from Communistic realism, however, when it is remembered that there is a species of 'free market' for private enterprise even in the Soviet Union, while during the war the resurgence of religious faith in Russia compelled the Government—temporarily, of course—to devise the expedient of tolerating religion on its own terms.

While such seemingly non-Communist provisions are admittedly contained in the 234 clauses of the Constitution of Burma, it will be noted that even today, when the need for foreign aid alone would tend to halt their implementation, not all the provisions of that document are faithfully adhered to. The instance of the 'autonomy of nationalities' is but one of these.

While Than Tun and his T.T Party continue to harry the Government by unceasing guerrilla warfare, the Moslems of Arakan in the West are under considerable military pressure from the hostile People's Volunteer Army of the unorthodox Red leader Bopo Kun, whose forces embody large numbers of straightforward bandits. Law Seng's emergence as chief of a powerful band operating in the northwest, under communist inspiration, has done little to quieten the fears of the Burmese. One British source mentioning these threats, summed up Rangoon's position exactly:<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Economist*, April 8th, 1950, pp. 779-80.

‘Burma is glad to have made its own bed and is determined to lie on it—even if Communists and others are meanwhile making off with the mattress and bedding.’

What, then, are the chances for democracy in Burma? To what extent could this gateway to Pakistan and India be blocked? The answers to these questions, though not simple, are definite. First, the present Burmese Government must make a really firm stand against Communism, must place itself finally in the Western camp by repudiating in fact and action the principle of oppression and of dictatorship. There is a distinction between dictatorship and strength; a distinction whose understanding was not perhaps greatly helped by the *London Times* when it said: (April 9th, 1947, p. 5).

‘The truth is that only some form of dictatorship, either of a man or a party, can bring order to Burma and maintain it.’

Democracy maintains that it is always capable of controlling and ruling people. That, in fact, is one of the contentions upon which the belief in the superiority of government by the people is based. Rather than encourage dictatorship—and thus counter-revolution—to crush all opposition, the forces of anti-communism should attempt to produce the conditions under which freedom could be guaranteed, and thus the environment in which democracy flourishes.

This can manifestly be achieved by insisting upon the redressing of many of the wrongs done to the Burmese people by their own government. To deny autonomy to the Karens and other distinct nations of Burma, and then to seek to ‘pacify’ them by brute force cannot benefit Burma as a whole.

Some of the minorities in Burma have even sent their delegations abroad to put forward their case and allegations of suffering before world opinion. Those allegations have not been investigated. The United Nations is one obvious place for the ventilation of such grievances; another is the good offices of a western power.

The fact that it was England that handed over the diverse nations comprising Burma to the Freedom League should not be allowed to stand in the way of the British Government’s assistance to Burma in her plight. Anyone may make a mistake; face-saving at this advanced stage could be equivalent to a doctor forbidding the re-examination of a patient in case his

diagnosis were reversed : the patient comes first—especially where such a virulent disease as Communism is suspected. To lose sight of the interests of Burma as a whole and democracy as a concept would have the same effect both in the case of the doctor and of the Burmese question : it might well be fatal.

In addition to the undoubted right of the democratically-minded countries to investigate a grievance by a people claiming that they are oppressed, there is the material weapon. The wild anxiety of Burma's rulers for foreign aid is a double-edged blade. Forestalling Russia, the U.N.O. and America under President Truman's Point IV programme could inject lifeblood into Burmese economy. Naturally enough, economic help would have to be preceded by effective guarantees either that the Burmese system is democratic, or that the country aspires to become one.

Finally, there is the indisputable necessity for restoring equality of religious belief among all Burmese. While most of the people are Buddhists, the majority of the Karens are Christians, and an important minority are the Moslems. Religious preoccupations in Burma extend among these confessional groups deeper perhaps than in the Western world. The distinct hostility of Christianity and Islam towards Communism should be brought home to the Burmese ; for little counter-propaganda is done in the field where it would be strongest : the religious sphere. Here may well be mobilised for freedom the vast spiritual reserves of Asia, where religious zeal alone burn with an intensity greater than even firebrand Communism.

# 16

## RELIGION AND COMMUNISM IN EAST ASIA

‘ It is the task of the communist party to make the truth comprehensible to the widest possible circles of the labouring masses. It is the task of the party to impress firmly upon the minds of the workers, even the most backward, that religion has been in the past and is still today one of the most powerful means at the disposal of the oppressors for the maintenance of inequality, exploitation, and slavish obedience on the part of the toilers . . . Religion and communism are incompatible, both theoretically and practically.’  
BUKHARIN, *The A.B.C. of Communism*, 247.

IN accordance with the approved Moscow line, the communist parties of most Asiatic countries during the war years and immediately after relaxed their ruthless war against the ‘ Peoples’ opium : Religion.’ Following the pattern of the Russian *Bezbozhniki*—Godless Societies—they withdrew their subsidies from local anti-religious workers ; but maintained anti-missionary propaganda.

‘ Red Religious Leaders ’ became the new phrase ; puppet archbishops, priests and lamas—some without any knowledge of the faith they were supposed to head—flourished. In Europe, however, Red clerics were somewhat more numerous than in the Orient.

By 1949 the Soviet, satellite and communist party groups had restarted the atheistic propaganda movement. This carried on the work of the original Anti-God Societies, under whose direction the secret Communist Police—known at various times as the Ogpu, Cheka, Security Forces, NKVD and MVD—murdered and imprisoned thousands of Russian Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and Moslem divines throughout the USSR.

In the internal Russian campaign, the year 1930 saw ‘ targets ’ of thousands of places of worship to be destroyed faithfully fulfilled. Others served as hospitals, schools, factories and worse. Two principle newspapers devoted exclusively to anti-religion flourished.

When the second World War saw a great revival in religion among all nationalities of the Soviet state, the Kremlin, unable to stand against this upsurge of sentiment, made haste to divert it to nationalistic and communist channels, through the puppet clergy.

Thus the antigodist press was silenced, support being extended to the bogus clerics in the noble work of assisting the country's war effort. The 1949 resumption of atheism in Russia, though paralleled in the efforts of the Asian communist parties, was compelled to adopt special measures in the struggle outside the Soviet Union, compatible with the varying conditions of religion in each area.

In Asia, the communist parties of the various countries encountered an obstacle unknown in Russia : they were unable to enforce practical atheism with the same degree of terroristic conclusiveness that was possible in a totally communised state. Further, the religions encountered in the East differed in many ways from the traditional Russian Orthodox and Jewish ones of Russia itself. Communism, while considering all religions from the Western standpoint of largely spiritual organisations, with their own church, recognised that several Oriental faiths differed fundamentally from this system in their workings. The following programme outlines the main lines of approach adopted towards religion in Asia :

1. 'Religion will, eventually collapse of itself. The transition from Socialism to Communism, the transition from the society which makes an end of capitalism to the society which is completely freed from all traces of class division and class struggle, will bring about the natural death of all religion and all superstition.'

2. 'It is essential at the present time to wage war with the utmost vigour against all religious prejudices' (BUKHARIN : *A.B.C. of Communism*).

3. Lectures are to be delivered, showing scientifically that religion is an illusion.

4. Debates to the same end are to be held.

5. Literature must be published and distributed, and children rescued from the environmental training necessary to religion.

6. Religion must not be actively persecuted ; unless it is weak enough, otherwise it will gain sympathy. The best weapon is ridicule.

Here one comes across one of the main difficulties which the Reds are facing in the attempt to cling closely to the revealed word of Lenin on religion. For while the European conditions have been such as to permit communism's agitators working with a fair amount of success against religion there, the entire plethora of most Asiatic life resists most of all interference with religion : for to most Orientals, religion governs his whole attitude to others, to life and to the world. Secularisation is something which he cannot grasp, and which is wellnigh impossible within the religiously-based life he leads. If you ridicule his religion, you destroy his interest in mankind.

Even in Western Europe, while the division between church and state was a recognised fact, understood by the mass of the people, conditions were generally vastly dissimilar from Tsarist Russia, where the close and not always creditable alliance between the Government and organised religion provided some cause for reaction and redress.

The main bodies of religion in Asia are the Buddhists, Shintoists, Confucians, Hindus, Moslems and Christians. From the communist point of view, these communities are split up into categories for action according to their weaknesses. First come those which the Reds feel themselves able to demolish, and where their propaganda has made real headway. Among these are the Confucians and many Buddhist areas, as well as large numbers of the Hindu persuasion. In these sections, either religion as a whole has been losing its grip, or the communists have found little resistance to their tenets among the followers of these faiths. Generally speaking, in India and some parts of Java, the intellectuals, students and others professing Hinduism have little interest in their faith, regarding it in the light of an historical evolution allied to their social system : which many of them see to be already almost superseded by another way of life. This may be among the reasons why most of India's communists come from Hindu families.

Buddhism, widely professed throughout Asia by about 150,000,000 adherents, provides the communists with a community whose theological background will not be inimical to the spread of the Red doctrines. Based upon the dictum of surrender to fate, Buddhism and its priesthood in Burma, Tibet and China has shown little interest either for or against communism. The

only examples of such interest have been in Ceylon, where the strange brand of militant Buddhism is now being subjected to community infiltration, and in the appearance of scattered Lamas professing communism in the mountains of Tibet and parts of Burma. The Confucians and Taoists of China have displayed a similar lack of enthusiasm either for or against the Red tide.

In Japan, where Shinto is the national cult, this formerly powerful belief has been severely shaken by the impact of the war and its aftermath ; while there is little likelihood that followers of Shinto could be communised en masse, they have as yet shown no indication of taking up the fight against materialism. It remains to be seen whether the social systems of these Far Eastern religions are able to withstand the shock of continued Red propaganda.

Two other major groups remain in the spiritual field of Asia and the Pacific : Christianity and Islam.

There are 33,000,000 Christians of all denominations in Asia, including all the Far East. It has been estimated that out of these, some twenty million are located in South East Asia ; by far the greatest fields of missionary activity being India and China. Other important concentrations of Christians are to be found in the Philippines, in Burma—the majority of the Karens are followers of Christ—Indonesia and Japan. In the myriad islands of the Pacific, in Ceylon, Indochina and Borneo there are other, but smaller, communities.

Though held together by a common belief in Jesus, Asia's Christians suffer from two main disabilities : their sectarian schisms and the relative lack of sympathy for them shown by the other religious groups. Some of the communities—as in China—are already under communist domination ; while the lack of a declared common purpose against atheism between Catholics, Protestants and the national churches severely weakens the otherwise great potentialities of Christianity in the battle against the enemies of faith.

The almost automatic aversion for Communism felt by the Christians of the Far East, however, is an important factor, offsetting their comparative numerical weakness, in an estimation of the potentialities against the spread of the Marxist-Leninist creed.

In hostility to regimentation and atheism, the 400,000,000 Moslems of Asia—over 250,000,000 of whom are situated in the Far East itself—form the most important factor. Believing in one God and Mohammed as the messenger of that God, the relative unity between all Moslems in thought and action will be one of the most powerful considerations in the religious linkup against Moscow. What, however, is important in Asian spiritual circles is a concerted effort for a rapprochement between the Christians and Moslems, to defend spiritual values. It is only within the last few years that farsighted Moslems have seen the necessity for this : their answer to the extreme centralisation of the anti-religion front of the Kremlin.

Remarkable proof of a central organisation in Russia for all anti-religious propaganda throughout the world is contained in the following facts :

In December, 1949, two pamphlets were circulated ; one by the communist party of Siam in Bangkok, the other in Java, Indonesia, in the respective languages of the two countries. They both said :

I. ' Religion prevents the class-consciousness necessary to the building of communism . . . '

II. ' It is the enemy of Marxism, and the fight against religion is an essential part of our materialistic effort in educating the proletariat.'

One pamphlet may have been copied from the other ; but about the same time, the Moscow Journal *Science and Life* (November 1949), was trumpeting, in very similar words :

I. ' Religion prevents the believers in it from being class-conscious and being hard workers for the building of communism ;

II. ' Our instructions are that religion is inimical to Marxism and propaganda against religion is a necessary part of the education and bringing up of the people.'

The coincidence of phraseology and the Soviet reference to ' our instructions ' goes far towards indicating a particular as well as general policy against religious belief.

Christians, scattered as they are throughout the length and breadth of Asia, frequently surrounded by overwhelmingly larger indigenous religious groups, are particularly open to communist incitement against their existence. The special Red hatred reserved for Christianity is based upon two main causes.

In the case of Russia, it was Christianity—in the shape of the Orthodox Russian Church—that was active against Marxism, both earlier in the Soviet Union itself, and in the satellite countries today. White Russian emigrés abroad still cling to the nuclei of their churches, whether it be in America or Europe ; and this causes Russian vituperation to be cast upon them, as ‘ allies of the imperialist planning the overthrow of the Soviet Union.’

Contradictory as it may seem, communism itself may be called a religion in more than one sense : especially in the sense in which modern political parties in Europe have, consciously or unwittingly, shaped themselves organisationally into entities resembling that of the Christian Church. While the Karl Marx faith emphatically denies God, it makes full use of organisation closely paralleling the powerful social orientation of the Church.

To the communist, Marx is the messiah, Lenin his saint, and Stalin his disciple. The rebels Trotsky and Tito of Yugoslavia he regards as schismatics. ‘ Titoism ’ and ‘ Trotskyism ’ mean to the devoutly communist believer something very akin to the word ‘ heretic ’ in theological circles. The Millennium will be the day of the realisation of the Red commonwealth ; judgment and the hereafter, of course, together with the doctrines of God and His omnipotence, have undergone modification. Judgment takes place on this earth, by order of the Party and State ; the hereafter is the immediate future, the supreme power is the dreaded Kremlin.

The organised Church, with its meetings, discipline, study and training of disciples, is the Communist Party. As every communist is a propagandist, he fulfils the secondary function of missionary, for which walk of life special agitators are trained. While the devout Christian will regard the demoniac works and life of communism as more akin to the forces of darkness than to religion, it is nevertheless remarkable how the strength of the material planning of Marxism in action resembles the organisation of the stronger points of the physical aspects of religious bodies.

There is no doubt that Christianity should take stock of its position in the Asiatic struggle with the Reds, and implement what action it can without delay. Against the fund of goodwill built up by social work over a number of years, stand the

different degrees of opposition by ultra-nationalists and from all communists to its activities—and even to its continued existence. Against its compactness in localized areas is the undoubted fact of its sectarian divisions and lack of real co-operation and real planning between the Christian communities to baulk the atheistic onrush of communism.

Alone and divided in Asia, the fact is that Christianity could do little against the advance of the menace ; unified in anti-communist determination, and actively allied with the other spiritual forces, its rôle could be great. Unity in dogma might not be possible, and would be long of realisation : but there is a real basis for common purpose in opposing the enemies of God ; Christianity in Asia may therefore be said to be disunited more in direction than in spirit. The increasing awareness in the West of communism's threat to democracy should go far in letting the widespread Christian groups of Asia know their place in the struggle.

Not being alone in the East in its repugnance for the atheist Kremlin creed, Christianity can count on enormous forces in a co-operative effort. Asia's democratically-minded politicians, her friends of the West, and above all the huge body of Moslems, all stand as potential allies of the Christians in combating that which cuts across the very fundamentals common to their beliefs.

In order to mobilise these forces into an unity of purpose which would withstand and overcome the terrifying consolidation and determination shown by Reds in their world-engulfing plans, certain concessions would have to be made by all enlightened parties collaborating in the common front.

The avowedly democratic workers of Asia should realise that democracy holds sacred the freedom of religious profession, and accord it unreservedly to Christians as to everyone else. Those friendly to the West among the Far East's patriots must likewise overcome their fears of national Christian communities as potential harbourers of a new imperialism. To the Moslems, in their turn, the Christian missionaries should accord some concessions. Opposed to the propagation of Christianity in Islamic lands, yielding but few converts to the creed of Jesus, the Moslems yet are believers in one God ; there should be some common ground for co-operation. It is not without importance

to note that Islam today is responding to a call for unity between all spiritual forces against atheism.

Until recently, certain factors, trivial and otherwise, together tended to keep the followers of Christianity and Islam apart. First was what the Moslems themselves call the 'Crusades complex'; by which is meant the vestigial mentality of the times of wars in the Holy Land, to the effect that Moslems were barbarian murderers, agents of the devil himself, polytheists and damned to perdition. Second—and more important—was the continued missionary activity in Moslem lands, which was resisted by Moslems for reasons other than would generally appear to have been current. As Islam is a political and social creed, as well as having a religious basis, Moslems tended to regard Christianity too as a complete political and social system different from their own, inimical to Moslem culture, and aiming at supplanting the traditional social structure of their society. Informed Moslems have recently shown that this is no longer their impression of Christianity. Lastly, there was the absence, on both sides, of a supreme Christian and Moslem leadership, which might take the initiative in forming such a collaboration. While individual Christian bodies are today well organised enough to work together with Islam on their own merits, the continued lack of important leadership of the Moslem world continued to be an obstacle; and, until recently, the communist menace was not so great or so immediate as to stimulate the Moslems into action.

Among Moslems in recent years, however, independent of governmental differences, has grown up a remarkable organisation of international scope dedicated to the unity of the faithful. This, though, is not all. While the great enthusiasm and support of Moslem kings and rank-and-file stimulated the endeavours of the movement, another aspect of its importance became apparent: the Moslem Union movement declared itself to be desirous of collaborating with all other forces for peace, against atheism.

Carrying on the work of the Moslem nineteenth-century sage Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, the organisation has wide ramifications throughout the world, from the westernmost shores of Africa through Asia to the threatened areas of the Far East. The Moslem Union, says the Report of its first international Conference,

‘ has undertaken the mission inherent in the Prophet’s teachings ; that is, allying the Faithful into a peaceful accord amongst themselves, the movement goes forward to reconcile and mediate everywhere and always to remove discord and mistrust amongst individuals or States. In short, the birth and activities of the Moslem Union are nothing less than obeying the Qurânic Commands : Unity of Moslems and goodwill to and amongst mankind.’<sup>1</sup>

That the Moslem world intends to make common cause with all willing to fight atheism is explicit from editorials in its monthly international journal, *Urwatul Wuthqa*, which says :

‘ Let us, therefore, muster our co-operating friends before the withering blast wrapped in thunder brings the booming voice of demons closer. We owe to the affrighted world of today a solemn duty. We shall fulfil it with the grace of God. Even now, the Moslem Union representatives are starting on a tour of the Islamic States in the Near and Middle East to discuss and decide in what way a close and effective co-operation can be achieved between Islam and Christianity.’<sup>2</sup>

While the Christian world itself remains spiritually divided, this renaissance among the Moslems, with its vigorous propaganda carried on in all Islamic languages, and avowedly aimed against totalitarianism and unbelief, can, and intends to, make common cause with the various Christian bodies and individuals fighting atheism. Concurrently, the agents of the Moslem Union organisation are working within the sprawling Moslem world itself, with the object of achieving unity among the followers of Islam themselves. As the paramount Moslem international organisation working on a global basis to this end, such a movement has naturally received great support, among both Christians and others. Part of its orientation is contained in an emphatic article :

‘ Almost a thousand years ago Pope Urban II launched the First Crusade against the ‘ infidel ’ Moslems. But we could not be extirpated, because Islam is neither man-made nor man-controlled ; and a Moslem, believing in God, lives and dies today as in the time of the Prophet for peace unto himself and to the rest of mankind.

<sup>1</sup> *Report of the All World Moslem Conference* (English Edition), London, 1949, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Urwatul Wuthqa*, Paris, January, 1950, S.V., *Rapprochement between Cross and Crescent*, p. 11, col. 3.

‘It is a happy augury of things, therefore, that the very followers of Christ, who having misunderstood the Moslems, had once declared war upon us, are now appreciating Islam’s mission of peace and spiritual strength and purpose : and, indeed, invite us to make a common cause to resist all atheistic tendencies wherever they may be found.’

Speaking of the approach to the organisation made by some Christian quarters, the periodical states that the machinery of the Union is already at work in this field of collaboration :

‘In the face of such a strong Christian urge for defence against the “enemies leagued against God,” it was impossible that we could leave our cordial acceptance of this pious wish in any doubt ; and, therefore, this journal immediately responding set the machinery of the Moslem Union in motion in order not to co-operate in words but in deed. The results have been very fruitful and many voices in support have been raised throughout the Moslem world, for the Sons of Islam now see that they are not alone in defending themselves against the demon of materialism and godlessness ; but a sister religion is also with them to fight for truth and peace for the world. Our clarion call,’ the editorial continues, ‘has gone throughout the entire world of Islam from West Africa to Java, and many meetings have already taken place regarding it so far distant as Constantine and Calcutta. Moslem responsible opinion is responding enthusiastically, and His Excellency Mohammed Tahir Al-Omari Bey of Egypt is actively busy in this quest of Moslem-Christian co-operation at the Vatican. The practical side of the question is now engaging our attention, and emissaries are not letting the grass grow under their feet ; and thus we go forth in the name of Allah, sparing naught to accomplish.’

What is this Moslem world, now threatened by Communism, whose aid has so remarkably been invoked against the enemies of freedom ?

Following the teachings of Mohammed, worshipping Allah—the One God—the Moslem peoples are instinctively opposed to communism and to any form of atheism. Though it has been said—mostly by pro-communists—that the Moslem faith is adaptable to communist thought, this is manifestly incorrect. The religion, which embraces most aspects of a man’s life, certainly demands not only prayer but insists upon social justice, equality between one man and another, and the suppression of tyranny. On the other hand, Islam not only supports commerce,

but encourages trade and private enterprise, which are distinctly banned by orthodox communism, and even opposed by the milder socialism. Paramount in Islamic resistance to Marxism, however, is the issue of a belief in God, which is something upon which no Moslem can compromise himself.

In Islam, there is no church, no priesthood ; yet the international sensitivity of the Islamic world to any external impact is astonishing and immediate. This is one reason for the meteoric rise of the Moslem Union, and the great rapidity of the crystallisation of resistance to communism impringing today upon vast areas of the Moslem lands.

Theoretically, there should be a supreme leader of the Moslems—also incorrectly called Mohammedans—whose office is termed the Caliphate, or viceregency of Mohammed. Since the loss of that office by the Turkish Sultans-Khalifa in the nineteenth century, there has been no universally-recognised head of all Moslems. Today, however, most politically-minded sons of Islam subscribe to the programme and ideals of the Moslem awakener Saieyid Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed) whose call for unity and a stand against imperialism echoed from Morocco to China, and whose work and newspaper is carried on by the Moslem Union movement today. The importance of the Moslem holy book—the Koran—as the cornerstone of Islamic life lies in the fact that it contains, Moslem argue, a complete political and social system and set of laws. The Russian attempt to supplant this divine document by anything—however closely they might think any brand of communism to approach Moslem ideals—could never succeed among the intensely conservative Moslem masses. Whereas the followers of Mohammed can be electrified to action on the basis of his teachings and the Koran, it has been frequently demonstrated that no other call makes the desired impression upon them : communism is the least likely to do so.

A second feature of the Islamic organism is its ability to absorb and eventually overcome even forceful military occupation and suppression. The advance of the Moslem wave has, of course, had a similar engulfing effect upon the cultures rooted in the countries over which Moslems have passed. In Persia, Zoroastrianism virtually ceased to exist when the country was

converted. In Afghanistan, there remain only archaeological traces of the brilliance of Buddhist supremacy which not so long ago flourished there. Chinese and Central Asian Islam overcame Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and even the Nestorians in Turkestan. In Central Africa, Islam still spreads southwards among the Negroes.

The ability to absorb and overcome alien impacts is reflected in Moslem history. When the dreaded pagan Mongol hordes invaded Central Asia and Persia in the fifteenth century, all the timeless centres of Islamic culture were destroyed. Religion was persecuted, the libraries and seminaries of Bokhara and Samarkand devastated. Within a relatively short time the Mongols themselves, like their kinsmen the Turks, has accepted Islam, and a new phase of Moslem life began. With hardly an apparent effort, Moslem ways had entirely broken up the all-conquering military and political machine of Mongolia. The rigid police-state discipline, equally as drastic and unchecked as Hitler's or Stalin's, was brought to a halt. These are the arguments upon which Moslem anti-communists base their belief in the timeless resilience of the Moslem culture ; but today it is more thoroughly recognised that it would be inexpedient to have to wait to be occupied by Bolshevism, then to endure its terrors for several generations until the inevitable breakup. Nevertheless, the same qualities of resistance to alien rule are factors being seriously marshalled in the Moslem world today in freedom's cause.

As far as the Far Eastern religions are concerned, there is little doubt that communism's spread will engulf them with the same inexorability as has been the case hitherto. Most Oriental thinkers are of the opinion that a common front between Islam and Christianity alone can be effective in the spiritual war for peace.

One factor has dominated all the changing phenomena of the communist struggles in Asia : the fact that, without a concept far beyond material considerations in their minds, the people of these countries will not take up the struggle seriously enough to provide sufficient material power to withstand Marxism's onslaught. Appreciating the fundamental human need for an inspired call to battle, the communists have elevated their Russian state and leaders to almost religious eminence ;

representing the Red battle for power as a struggle of the world's peoples against capitalism and exploitation, they have tapped the springs of desire for progress and an ethical purpose inherent in every man. It is clearly to be seen that it is in those countries where there is the greatest need for spiritual as well as material progress that communism has progressed most rapidly.

There must come an awareness that guns and even food—while vital necessities—are only part of the programme that will not only extirpate communism, but destroy in the individual's mind any desire to identify himself with its ventures and purpose. Not all communists are Russians ; by far the largest number of them in the Orient are Asiatics. These men themselves embraced the nefarious creed for some purpose : and very few for material gain. Some were bigoted and warped malcontents—but not all. Many of Asia's most dangerous communists today are those very men who are sincere believers that Marxism is the only solution to the material problems of their countries : and are at the same time convinced that there is no dynamic ethical creed capable of constructively ministering to the needs of humanity. It is for the followers of the world's great religions to prove them wrong : the only alternative seems to be that, even though physically broken, communism will continue, and eventually triumph.

## TIBET : LAMALAND AT THE CROSSROADS

‘ So far, philosophers have merely *interpreted* the world ; but the necessary thing to do is to *change* the world.’ LENIN.

ECONOMICALLY of little present importance, Tibet really justifies that much-used name Roof of the World. At mountain heights of the order of 15,000 feet, a mere three million people in this land seven times the area of Britain literally eke out a livelihood from precarious irrigated crops. Wool alone provides an important export item ; barley is the main diet, while without the yak’s milk for food and its use as a pack animal, life in Tibet would be nearly impossible.

To most outsiders, Tibet, like the other—though smaller—states to the north of India’s sprawling subcontinent, remains a land vaguely associated with mystery. Lamas ministering to the spiritual needs of the people, brick-tea, roses of glittering colours and monasteries perched uneasily on mountain-tops—these are the main aspects of the average person’s mind-picture of the trans-Himalayan lands.

Though there is some truth in these fanciful ideas of life among the unhygienic though cheerful Tibetans, other factors have headlined the land of mystery: and caught the world’s commentators napping on the background material affecting Tibet.

At no time in the past would Tibet’s political and strategic considerations alone have justified her inclusion in a book on Asia. Today, wide open to Chinese Communism’s declared intention to invade from the north, bordering India on her long land-frontier, Tibet is a strategical key to Hindustan. China’s Red Army leaders know that Tibetan mountain passes command Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan : and that Kashmir, that smiling pleasure resort now living in an uneasy truce, commands both India and Pakistan.

What is Tibet, this inaccessible land, hedged in by six countries, the blending of Asia’s cultures, enshrouded in mystery ?

With a total land area equal to the combined totals of Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi, the Himalayan mountain country ruled over by the Dalai lama—supreme Buddhist religious authority—and his council holds a population one-third that of London. The culture and religion of the Meek One—Buddha—is everywhere supreme. The great desire of every youth is to become a lama, devoting his entire life to monastic discipline ; therefore one Tibetan in five is now a monk. Killing anything or anyone, the acquisition of money, violence of any kind, are highly disapproved.

Communism's robust revolutionary teachings have little in common with Tibetan ethical outlooks, yet the Reds know that Buddhism equally offers no consolidated rallying-point against their invasion, and remember the pre-Buddhist days when Tibetan soldiers were among the fiercest of Asian Mongol hordes. Neither has the country always languished in its present isolation : in the seventh century, this small land actually ruled over China, and the small nucleus of atheistic Tibetans do not forget their military and commercial greatness in those far-off pagan days.

Greatly complicating the chances of effectively halting Red Chinese penetration into Tibetan mountain fastnesses is the attitude of the world to her international position. Even India has admitted the sovereign rights of China—and hence Communism—over this vital gap in Asia's shield against Moscow plans for domination of the world. The incredible poverty of almost all the sons of Tibet again threatens the cause of freedom, and opens ears to Communist propaganda. Here, as everywhere in Asia, it may with truth be said, as one Oriental said to me : ' I cannot be a democrat when I have an empty belly.'

For three hundred years the Chinese have claimed Tibet as part of their national territory ; this cry, already re-echoed by China's Red chief Mao Tse Tung, in his promise to his people to ' liberate ' the country, has been given added strength by Britain's inability to recognise Tibetan independence. In her recent dealings with Tibet, Britain has adopted a compromise formula, in the face of the rival nationalist and Chinese claims. China, says the Foreign Office, is the sovereign power ; but Tibet has internal sovereignty. It is unfortunate that nothing

could be found in international law and procedure to give a greater measure of support to the present anti-Red Tibetan Government to strengthen their resistance against Communism.

Lacking in arms to defend their country, Tibet's rulers have turned likewise in vain to India, their southern neighbour. Prime Minister Nehru, preoccupied with the undeclared Kashmir war with Pakistan, one eye on Burma's unhappy frontier, and handling with difficulty internal opposition, has had little time to involve his country in the perilous six hundred mile mountain border across which Chinese Communist armies would clearly like to pour.

Being rooted in history as much as in international usage, China's claim to rule the million-lama land, backed by her powerful Red Army, seems as near to conclusive as any argument can be.

Even when the Chinese Imperial House collapsed and the Republic was set up in 1912, the new rulers differed in no way from the present Government in their insistence upon Tibet's rightful place as a province of China. Civil war intervening, little occurred in the Tibet-China political struggle until 1933, when the accession of the thirteenth Dalai Lama gave excuse for China to reassert her claim astutely by recognising the Lama only as the spiritual, not the political, sovereign of his country.

Westerners are inclined somewhat to underestimate the international importance of Tibetan Buddhism. Here the Reds—as evidenced by their propaganda—have shown that they know that even if they did not communise the country, even if they did not use it as a base for further aggression, their rulership of Lhasa—the capital—would be enough. From here, cathedral city of Buddhism, a Grand Lama under Red influence would be able to keep under indirect Russian dominance not only three million Tibetans, but virtually all of Asia's estimated 150,000,000 followers of the Buddha. Thus, at one stroke, a population equal to that of the entire United States would come under Moscow's sway; even if Buddhists refused to obey Red Lhasan orders, the loss of their holy of holies would certainly deal the death-blow to their moral resistance to Communism.

Neither have the Tibetans historical cause to be cordially disposed towards the West. Since in the nineteenth century

an allegedly British-instigated revolt and invasion took place, suspicions have been entertained towards Europe as much as against China. In 1890 Tibetan feeling was further aroused by western acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty over the country. As a result of these happenings, the Dalai Lama even then opened direct negotiations with the Imperial Court in Moscow, in an attempt to obtain recognition and aid. Today the parallel of India's refusal to accept the Grand Lama's independence could force his advisors to patriotically-inspired revenge : paving the way for a pact between China or Russia and Tibet.

Relations between Britain and Tibet improved, however, when Great Britain mediated in a frontier dispute, and allowing a measure of internal freedom to be recognised.

The present political lineup in the Forbidden Land sheds light upon the intrigues of Chinese and Tibetan factions among themselves.

The present Dalai Lama—a youth of about fifteen—rules under a regent, and attains full powers at the age of 16. The functions of rulership are divided between two chief lamas : Lhasa's young Dalai Lama, reputedly the reincarnation of Buddha himself, combines administrative supremacy with temporal headship of the Buddhist church. These powers are now in fact exercised by the Council of Regency. The powerful Panchen or Tashi Lama, on the other hand, is spiritual head of all Buddhism ; the divide perpetuating a split in the body politic of Tibet comparable to the Western idea of the divorce of church from state. Like the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama is also a youth and, in accordance with his followers' belief, is the incarnation of his predecessor, who died in 1937.

The fact that the two highest Buddhist dignitaries are of such extreme youth, and both rule through Regency Councils, being themselves of gentle and apparently bewildered mien at being thus chosen, goes far to echo possible authenticity to the repeated allegations that both boys are—and their predecessors have been for centuries—mere tools in the hands of the rival factions. The other strong but undercover element is the National Party, including at present under its wing opposition elements of all shades of political opinion ; these progressives are the main present object of Red penetration. Communist

control of the National Party could go far towards the engineering of an 'internal' Red revolt.

While Buddhist indoctrination of utter resignation to the supposed dictates of fate is the main factor in maintaining lamaism's grip upon the illiterate peasantry, a second curious fact infuses into every Tibetan's heart a hope that causes him to condone any regime, however totalitarian. After the death of a Dalai or Panchen Lama, his successor can be found only by examination of all children in the country, until one is located embodying certain secret physical and other signs proving him to be the reincarnation of the deceased saint.

In this national contest, surrounded by mystical ceremonies, yet pervaded by a hushed excitement, all children, high or low, are eligible. The present fourteenth Dalai Lama's family were poor peasants; when their child is elected, the family not only receive the eternal national honour and spiritual blessing of this fact, but are also immediately elevated to the aristocracy, showered with gifts, and granted large estates. There is, therefore, something to live for, even for the lowliest peasant. His son may become the equivalent of King of Tibet, the Emperor of Buddhism.

Sure to be popular amongst the vast majority of peasantry tied to autocratic landlordism is the Communist demand for land reform. Being transferred like animals from one owner to another as the land changes hands, inherited together with the soil, the agricultural workers labour under the absolute authority of their master. Among the smaller group engaged in private farming, the poverty-stricken agriculturists are finding it more and more difficult to win new cultivable earth from the arid hillsides, where worked-out or uncultivable land provides no answer to the food needs of a rapidly growing population.

There is virtually no industry in Tibet. With the absorption of a disproportionate number of the people into the priesthood, Asia's traditional overpopulation problem is aggravated in Tibet by too many people and yet too few workers. While this has the advantage that there is no large body of chronically unemployed, it is equally inescapable that the compulsion of feeding workers plus six hundred thousand non-productive monks, added to the rapacious demands of the large landowners, all place upon the working peasant a burden that Communist

propaganda may well convince him is unjust and remediable.

The monks themselves, while doing little productive work, derive their sustenance from vast monastery-owned lands. It is perhaps unfortunate that the duties of more lamas do not include labour in the fields.

Replacement of metal coinage with the paper *sang* has underlined an unpleasant fluctuation in the purchasing power of Tibet's currency, usually worth about seven U.S. cents per *sang*. In terms of international trade, the country has little to offer to the world ; in an attempt to secure outside markets, she dispatched recently a trade mission throughout Europe and America. The failure of this delegation to secure orders for yaks' tails and carpets and the Tibetan Government's lack of foreign exchange or gold for purchasing western machines and consumer goods, is a sign of the country's trade weakness.

India's refusal to acknowledge her independence compels Tibet to carry on trade with the outside world only through India ; thus her foreign currency is limited to Indian rupees—which are not available for international use in buying imports in Tibet's case. Thus the yak-tails, wool and musk pile up in India ; economically as well as politically Tibet is in no enviable position.

In spite of the supreme control exercised by lamas and the supporters of the young Dalai Lama in particular, outwardly the country's method of administration appears more democratic than in fact it is. Four Ministers aid the Regent in his office, while the National Assembly composed of monks and officials provide a parliament of sorts. By widening the field or representation in the Assembly and showing a greater inclination for the uplift of the landless peasantry, the Regent and his followers could well convince the people at large of their Government's sincerity and thus forestall a move by the opposition National Party from being an effective Red instrument.

In taking this necessary step, however, Tibet's rulers have little time to spare. Even if the Indian Government relented sufficiently to help bolster the Lhasa regime, there would be little margin in time. While hairsplitting critics in New Delhi and elsewhere reject the idea of supporting an ' undemocratic ' Tibetan Government, realists argue that India or western helpers

would be able to salve their consciences by stipulating that the Government concede something to their hard-pressed peasantry.

Arms, to assist the ten thousand strong Tibetan army, would be a vital factor in dissuading Chinese irredentism ; while India herself, whose military programme calls for munitions works at full blast would be reluctant to provide these arms, she might do so if they were compensated for by the United States.

In her recent dealings with the outside world, Tibet feels that she has not had the consideration that might have been extended to her. Though her esteem of the United States is high, there is no doubt that the Tibetan delegation which visited America in 1948 felt greatly hurt that they were not received by the President : this being due to adherence to the thesis that China still has sovereign rights over Tibet. Friendly contacts between the USA and Tibet, however, are not entirely new. The late President Roosevelt's personal envoy visited the country in 1942, to assure the Government there of the United States' intentions in the war ; the cordial feelings then established augured well for future relations with the Americans.

Though Communism can conquer, the lofty mountain ranges and natural enmity of the people for the Chinese would clearly constitute grave obstacles ; in their mobilization plans the Tibetan Government lack only arms. With modern weapons and the knowledge that they have friends in the West, they are confident that they could hold India's northern gateway inviolate.

There is, therefore, still time to grasp Tibet from the Red claw of Mao Tse Tung—and to secure India, Pakistan and Kashmir. Bearing in mind the characteristic of the people to submit to the stronger hand : and later to support a successfully entrenched power—it is up to the democratic countries to ensure that the strongest party in Tibet is not a pro-Communist one.

If Tibet falls, Reds advancing through here and Burma could imperil India and Pakistan with a good chance of overrunning them. With the Indian sub-continent in Communist hands, the forces of aggressive Marxism would control all Central Asia, the Middle East and threaten, both politically and with force, the last bastions of freedom in the entire Pacific area.

This is the drama behind the threat of a New Tibet to the security of the East and West alike.

# 18

## INDIA : AT RUSSIA'S MERCY ?

'The weaker Britain is in India, the more amenable to us in Europe.' GENERAL SKOBELEV.

**I**NDIA'S Communist Party, today a hardy plant, is both a veteran among the Red groups of Asia, and regarded by the Kremlin with something akin to the feeling of a mother for her first-born.

With a combined population of four hundred million, the Indian Union and Pakistan now constitute the result of the religious division of Britain's former Indian Empire in 1947 : when the predominantly Moslem and Hindu populations were respectively consolidated into the Pakistan and Indian Dominions—joining Australia, Canada and the rest as associated States of Great Britain, bound by the common loyalty to the British Crown. India herself, though having recently renounced even the intangible link of the monarchy, remains associated just the same.

In history, economy, geography and most other characteristics, Pakistan and India are a unit, irrespective of boundary lines drawn across the map. In spite of the fact that Moslem Pakistan is based on the Central Asian type of culture brought to undivided India by the Moslem Afghans and Mongols, while the Indian Dominion of today sighs over the past glories of her native Hindu heroes, there is yet, quite perceptibly, an atmosphere common to both countries and found in no other. Although standing on the land-bridge between the Far East and Central Asia, lying across the course of the Red hordes thrusting west from China, from Burma, and almost spilling over through the northern territories of Tibet, Nepal, Kashmir and Bhutan, the moral and material life of the peoples of the twin Dominions are today so different from the ways of the Middle East—and so akin to the Far East in mind and history—that they could occupy an important place in this consideration of the Red threat on that score alone.

Nevertheless, strategical and cultural affinities apart, there is another reason why the Communist Parties of India and Pakistan demand our close attention ; and that because the whole evolution of the Marxist struggle in India not only resembles, but was concurrent with, the planned growth of communism in the Far East. Indian communism has all its ramifications either with Moscow direct, or with China, Indonesia, Burma and China. The Indian Communist Party has concerned itself little with affairs of Asian concern to the West ; while that of Pakistan pays equally scant attention to events in the religiously-akin lands of the Arab world. Conclusive evidence of the place designated for communism in the sub-continent is the knowledge that India and Pakistan are watched-over—and their Communist Parties ultimately controlled—by the Far Eastern Political Department in Moscow : not that of Middle Asia or the Near East.

What does Russia stand to gain by the Sovietisation of India ; what do the native Communists themselves seek ; to what extent would the Western powers and the world be affected if the Iron Curtain clanked down over those four hundred million ? The huge labour force, the vast undeveloped rural areas, the immense strategical advantages of the country's military bases, positioned virtually to command all East and West Asia, are all prizes the like of which are not likely to be found elsewhere, say the Reds. From the point of attack, the soft underbelly of the USSR undoubtedly is the centre of her huge new industrial war machine in the Urals, in Central Asia, in Soviet Turkestan. India is the obvious place from which such assaults could be carried out in time of war.

Industrial development in India is relatively small : but the total number of factory, dock and agricultural workers—first targets for Red agitation—is enormous, due to the immense total population. The bulk of the people are agriculturists ; and in both the industrial and rural areas communism has been neither slow of growth nor lacking in energy. While many of the workers' labours unions in India have been infiltrated by communist propagandists, it is in the villages of that overcrowded land that the agitators work for—and get—their greatest support. Will India and Pakistan take the China road to communism ? If the answer lies in their poverty, it is yes.

With only half the land area of the United States and its possessions, India and Pakistan have three times the population. While in America there are 49 people to the square mile, in India there are 274. The lack of productivity of the land and the overwhelming poverty of the peasant—low even for the Far East—are the heritage of centuries, perhaps thousands of years, of neglect, mismanagement and ignorance. Whereas in China there is often intensive cultivation—with a wide variety of foods—generally speaking Indian (and Pakistani) farmers scratch the surface of their worked-out land with wooden ploughs in the manner highly esteemed by their ancestors : and seem to think little of the possibilities of growing more to offset the inevitable and recurrent famine-cycle. Partly, perhaps mainly, the root of India's agricultural poverty lies in rural indebtedness. The ignorant peasant borrows money from a money lender at iniquitous rates of interest—sometimes as high as 90 %—and the thought that almost his entire crop is mortgaged seems to sap him of great interest in it. Though the Government have sought to prohibit these incredible extortions of excessive interest, it is not easy ; for if there is money to be had, such is the mentality of the average cultivator, he will borrow it : and be compelled to pay what he has promised. Neither has the large landlord class always been innocent of undue pressure upon the peasant ; while few villagers can understand why he has to pay taxes to the Government. The result is that, with these questionings in his heart, the cultivator can often be inflamed against the supposed injustices of the *Banya* (moneylender) the landlord and the Government alike, by Russia's voluble agents.

It was in the places where English literacy spread first that in India, from Bombay, Benares, Calcutta and Madras, young and active nationalistically-minded men flocked to the call of Russia during the first quarter of the century. Today the country is not lacking numbers of energetic Red fanatics. For many years the communists have been most active throughout India—in practical work for human uplift as well as in mere theoretic bolshevism. During the frequent drought and famine times, in the centre of epidemics, they have been found working unstintingly for the millions of refugees who migrate across the country at these times. Working among the distressed victims

of these natural calamities, as well as those suffering under human domination, communists often are popular people in India : there is not even any need for them to lie much. Drawing attention to the misery and squalor that surrounds them, castigating governmental inefficiency and corruption, condemning the eternal shame of the country's poverty, they twist the truth only insofar as they hold communism to be the only answer.

This very tragedy of India and Pakistan today—that the communists are so often right in condemning abuses—emphasises the extreme danger to democracy inherent in conditions there. And they are even stronger than they were under the British *raj*. Whereas, during the British period, Red arguments against the Government were often refuted by nationalists saying that all evils were due to England, and that when the British left the country all would be well, the position has turned the tables on the nationalist parties. Today, with alleviable conditions unchanged, and the long-term problems not yet improved, India's Reds turn to their listeners and condemn—not the Government as such—but the pattern of government, which has not changed since British days. You see, they say, we told you that it was not a question of the *nationality* of the rulers ; it is merely that it is the wrong *class* ruling. You, the peasants, should be the leaders ; for are we not in the majority : and what does Bolshevik mean but ' majoritist ' ?

From the distressed areas of south India to Pakistan's East Bengal, in Central India's Hyderabad, the Red call has been answered ; though the true strength of organised communism in the Indian subcontinent remains one of the East's mysteries of today.

Like many another party of south Asia, the Indian Communism Party was officially illegal until the war, when Britain accepted its aid against Japan. Certain planks of the contemporary Party's programme reflect India's unique problems, and point to the ills whose removal could do much towards stemming the Red tide.

First is the determination to wipe out caste. In the Hindu religion, divided up into numerous social grades, a man's being born into a high or low caste family means that he has to retain that status for the rest of his life. If he is of a lower caste

his presence—his very shadow—pollutes and makes unclean the purity of his superior by birth : upon whom he should not look, by common belief. He may not marry anyone out of his caste : if he marries above it, he will be ostracised by his wife's family—if below it, by his own. In addition to the majority of Hindus being organised within the caste system, there is a further ninety million classified as 'outcastes.' These primary targets for communist propaganda are considered lower than the lowest caste, having no social rights at all in the religious sense. Although very many progressive Hindus today deny caste prejudice, the mere pressure of two hundred millions of their fellows in the Hindu social organism is quite enough to prevent any fraternisation between caste Hindus and outcastes—the 'untouchables'—for who Gandhi fought. While the Indian Government itself struggles against the iniquities of this system, working for the uplift of the untouchables, the small and grudging concessions obtained by official efforts on behalf of the downtrodden cannot even approach the needs of the situation, or hope to combat insistent communist propaganda for the immediate abolition of caste. Reflecting the gravity of the problem of the casteless is the fact that whenever a concession is obtained for the outcastes to worship at some temple (they are excluded from most temples) banner headlines appear in the Indian press. Centuries of repression have distinctly bred in the minds of these unfortunates an almost sub-human complex of inferiority. The great question mark in Indian communism's future lies in this : to what extent can the Reds convince these timid creatures that they are the inheritors of rulership in India ?

While economic distress and class struggle are general and have been permanent throughout the subcontinent, it is significant that the worst attacks of Red banditry have occurred in those places where the caste system is most aggressive—in south India's Madras, for example. Disaffection can relatively easily be spread, as the communists have demonstrated, where there is real cause for it. The communal problem—differences in culture and way of life of the religious communities—has not been removed by the religious division of the country into two. With a long tradition of armed clashes between the various faiths, the Indian peasant has been indoctrinated in the areas

of greater communist activity with concepts of communism that he finds it hard to distinguish from the former communalism : even the name is similar. Historically, therefore, his mind is to some extent prepared for Red propaganda ; Marxists, taking advantage of the former communal agitation fomented by nationalists through the decades, tell the peasants that Communism is simply the logical extension of the fight for freedom.

India's trouble-spots have been well covered by Red activity. In Hyderabad State—Central India—where the ruler refused to hand over control to the Union Government after the British withdrawal, communist-dominated guerrillas struck, obtaining control of vast areas of the State ; only General Chaudhari's intensive military campaign forestalled the effort to communise the entire area, and declare its independence.

In Eastern India's teeming Bengal province—now partitioned with Pakistan—two grave factors attract the limelight of great concern. Tradition centre of the most dangerous Red terrorists, Bengal borders Burma, with its highly-organised communists. The Indian communist contact with Burma dates from the anti-British struggle, when most of the Bengali Red leaders at one time or another sought safety in the Land of a Thousand Pagodas. Differing from the other peoples of the subcontinent in race, extremists among the Mongol-Dravidian Bengalis have themselves harboured for over thirty years the ideal of a free, separate and independent Bengal. Today, the underground fighters of communism in the province are known to have made a pact with the extreme nationalist group, with this slogan : ' Independence for the Nation, Marxism in Politics.' You may have an independent Bengal state, say the Reds ; we agree to that. We will work with you ; and our share will be a free hand in economic policy and collectivisation.

Such pacts of course, as that infamous in Burma, though unable to stand the stress of real political crisis, are dangerous. The communist tactic of temporising with any party that may be useful to them does not dissuade them from putting into operation what is known as ' Phase Two '—the ' purification of all groups hostile to the will of the people ' after their purpose has been served. Dr. Ho Chi Minh's application of this very policy in Indochina shows its striking success.

The natural hotheadedness and turbulent history of the

Bengalis alone is but one of the reasons for Communism's interest in the people. The division of the province between two dominions whose capitals are far from Calcutta, the fact that it is Bengal that balances with her jute the budget of Pakistan, the strategical link with Burma, all point to Bengal as the fulcrum of both India and Pakistan, as well as their mutual harmony.

Kashmir, that beautiful lake-studded princely State and vacation-ground in the Himalayas, has long been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan since the partition. As the subcontinent was divided on a religious basis, both claimed this territory of the north, bordering Red-threatened Tibet and the lands of the turbulent Pathans. Overwhelmingly Moslem in the religion of its population, Pakistan claimed Kashmir's adherence to Karachi; while the fact that the State was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja and his signing over the area to India, sent Delhi's troops through the mountain passes to enforce the accession. Communist agitators flocked to the centre of a bloody guerrilla war, Indian and Pakistan each backing up on section of the fighters. First came the hordes of unruly Pathans from the Afghan borderland, Moslem fanatics, trained in mountain warfare. Inflamed by the desire for a national State of their own, these warriors answered the call of 'Islam in Danger!' sent out by their co-religionists in Kashmir and reinforced by the Moslem League Government at Karachi. Meanwhile, Pakistan was sponsoring the 'Azad' (free) Kashmir movement, composed of Moslem Kashmiris and their more vocal Pathan associates. Dreaming of the days when Kashmir formed part of the Pathan dominions, the frontier fighters threw themselves with everything they had against India's regular army, endeavouring to bring the State under Delhi control. While United Nations intervention and the reconciliation of India and Pakistan during the first half of 1950 brought about a great reduction in the tension over the Kashmir issue, communist propaganda continued among the Kashmir people, tapping their apparent desire for an independent state.

Pakistan, the co-sharer of Britain's Indian heritage, is touched at two points by the Red threat to Asia and the world. The only state to be separated by over a thousand miles of foreign

territory between the two parts, Pakistan's Bengal on the east faces the Burma problem, while the western part of the country finds itself embroiled in the international friction of Kashmir, overshadowed by the Tibetan danger, and exposed to increasing demands for the independence of the Pathan tribes on her north-west frontier. Pakistan's early flirtation with the USSR, while causing concern among the other members of the Commonwealth, is now agreed to have been nothing more than the outcome of her apprehension of India's supposed plans for conquest of all Pakistan—and the alleged desire of the Hindus for restoring 'undivided India.'

Nevertheless, it has been said that Pakistan has shown a cordiality towards representatives of the Soviet Union somewhat out of keeping with her declared Islamic religious policy. This, however, should not necessarily be taken as an indication of communistic leanings on the part of the Pakistanis : but it has had the undoubted effect of encouraging Russia's propaganda among the Moslem peoples. One such manifestation of good will between the two countries was the visit of a Soviet cultural delegation to Pakistan in 1949. The Pakistan Association of Progressive Writers, and the Pakistan-Soviet Cultural Association of Karachi, 'and other progressive associations,' formed the welcoming group for the Soviet party.

Characteristically, the Russian deputation included several Soviet writers hailing from Russian Central Asia—areas culturally akin to Pakistan. This is part of the Russian propaganda derived from the visit ; a report of the farewell festivities to the delegation :

'Admission to the social was free, and the number of guests exceeded three thousand five hundred. The Soviet writers were greeted with loud applause and cries of "Long Live the Soviet Union !," "Long Live friendship between the peoples of Pakistan and the Soviet Union !" A speech of greeting on behalf of the Pakistan-Soviet Cultural Association was made by the writer Kirmani. Nikolai Tikhonov, on behalf of the Soviet Writers' Delegation, expressed gratitude to the Association of Pakistan Progressive Leaders and the Pakistan-Soviet Cultural Association, and to all progressive leaders of Pakistan for their warm reception and hospitality to the Soviet Writers' Delegation. Tikhonov further asked for their greetings to be transmitted to all working people of Pakistan. "The enemies of peace and friendship among the peoples,"

Tikhonov said, "greatly slander the Soviet Union ; but the sun of truth cannot be hidden by any amount of lies. The Soviet people stands for peace, for friendship among the peoples in all parts of the globe."

The Uzbek poet Musa Tash-Muhammad-off (Aibek), Sofronov and Turzun-zada also spoke. Their speeches were repeatedly interrupted by applause. The writer Kirmani assured the Soviet guests that "the progressive people of Pakistan do not want war, and will fight for peace together with the Soviet Union : which is the advance guard of all progressive mankind and stands guard over peace."

The Chairman of the meeting, Professor Hai, said that the people of Pakistan knew their friends. Being a peace-loving people by nature, the Pakistan people had a great love for the peoples of the Soviet Union, whom they deemed a great peace-loving nation.

When the Soviet writers' delegation appeared in the street, the inhabitants of the city surrounded them, and traffic came to a standstill. "Everybody wanted to shake hands with the representatives of the Soviet people. The farewell party became a demonstration of friendship for the Soviet people."

This kind of thing lends itself admirably to Soviet propaganda throughout the East.

Internationally as well as internally, Pakistan is little better fitted than other Asian countries for the struggle against communism. Under the 'Public Safety Ordinance,' freedom of speech and of holding public meetings has been inhibited. As Pakistan is a one-party State, communists point to these facts as part of their campaign for the overthrow not only of democracy—for not all Eastern states are democratic—but of all non-communist régimes.

To the north-West and north lie the mountain fastnesses of the three million rebellious Pathans ; whom Karachi claims as part of Pakistan, and whose natural independence and historical affinity with neighbouring Afghanistan has prompted their demand for an independent State, to be called Pushtunistan—Land of the Pathans—or Afghaniya. Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and Foreign Minister Mohamed Zafarulla, find themselves facing a severe trial on the frontier problem. If the Pathans and their allies the Baluchis secede from Pakistan, or if Afghanistan on the basis of international law and historical evidence were to reclaim her irridenta in Pakistan, this could even result in the retrocession of the province of Sind,

the port of Karachi, and the virtual dismantling of much of western Pakistan. So far the Reds have made absolutely no headway in undermining the traditional social system of the Pathans, nor have they been able to infiltrate the independence movement ; while the militant Islamic religious character of this movement makes such a danger seem remote. Pathan leaders are of the patriarchal type, not to be swayed by communism and its ideals. But there is the growing possibility that Pakistan's reds might be able to form an opposition alliance with other anti-government elements, which might endure sufficiently long to upset the present Moslem League party's administration. The pacification of the frontier clans seems to lie only in Karachi's taking up a realistic approach. For two centuries and more the border people have maintained their independence ; this has been respected by Britain herself during her stay in India. The present disaffection among the tribes can be reduced only by conceding something, in order that all should not be lost. If Afghanistan were to obtain an international verdict that the territories formerly hers up to the Indus river in Pakistan should be returned ; or if the tough warriors of 'no-man's land' between Pakistan and Afghanistan were to decide to reclaim their land by force, the international ramifications of such a happening would be enormous. Alone among the British Dominions threatened by such dire peril, it seems inevitable that Pakistan's rulers try to come to some understanding with Afghanistan and with the tribes, without which it is improbable that real peace will be restored to this vital area of Asia.

The fact that the Pathans are a tremendous menace to Pakistan if their discontent continues, and their resistance to communist propaganda is almost universally accepted even in Karachi, Pakistan's capital. There is therefore every reason for the Western powers to support this well-knit and military-minded Pathan nation in their undoubted determination to obtain their freedom. Throughout Asia it is realised that, sooner or later, the Pathans will establish their own independent State. Their ethnical unity and distinctive national characteristics, added to an innately democratic political system, make it all the more imperative that their great qualities and immense vitality be harnessed to the cause of freedom. Geographically, too, these people command the strategic approach to the

Indian subcontinent from the north-west : all Pakistan and thence India lies flat and wide open at the foot of the Pathan mountain ranges ; in many parts of which the Pathans do, in fact, exercise complete independence.

The last great Indian problem is that of the Hindu-Moslem religious struggle, only partially relieved by the partition of the country between the two groups. It is the communists who claim that their creed provides the universal solvent which would enable Hindus and Moslems to live at peace together. India's great Moslem minority numbering nearly forty million, is balanced by the Hindu minority in Pakistan ; in both countries persecution of minorities has taken place—and communists have not been slow in inflaming disorder and killing as part of their plan, for 'communism follows chaos.'

Russian and other communist propaganda directed towards India's masses makes certain definite points : firstly, that 'America is feeding off the dead body of vivisected India left by the scared-off British carrion crow.' The Marshall Plan, say the comrades, contained secret clauses opening India to 'United States capitalistic intrigue.'

'The American monopolies are energetically promoting pro-U.S. propaganda in India and Pakistan. Both these countries are being literally flooded with all sorts of American commissions, delegations, experts, senators, diplomats, 'scientists,' journalists, etc.' The Americans, it is said, in addition to issuing their own propaganda through diplomatic agencies and commercial firms, 'with a view to extending the scope of their propaganda in India and Pakistan, the American monopolies have lately been exerting special efforts to secure control of the Indian newspapers.'

Thus communist agitation covers all elements in a situation in its programme. Attacking America, the Russians hope to divide the USA and Britain ; they try to turn the Indians and Pakistanis against Washington ; and they foment discontent among the masses against their own Governments.

Paramount among the obvious defects in both India's and Pakistan's one-party Governments is the obvious lack of the creative dynamism characterising their communist enemies. Even during the British period, riots, red-instigated outrages, mass discontent, could not always be combated with the same

energy displayed by Britain elsewhere during the course of her rule. Detractors hold that there are climatic reasons, that the vitality is sapped ; but it seems more likely that the unique and overwhelming problems connected with social distress in India admit of no complete answer in a limited period of time : thus the causes of potential communistic agitation remain.

Today, although they see in the Red parties within their gates a clear challenge to the Dominions, their Governments—with the exception of localised anti-Marxist action—have not yet formulated a distinct policy against the menace. While it is conceded that the material condition of the mass of the sub-continent's people cannot be totally alleviated without a long-range policy on a continental scale, it is equally imperative that a vigorous start be made : even if only to counteract red agitation. In Pakistan, only 7 % of the people are literate ; more than one hundred million Indians have chronic malaria, well over 41 % of all peasants are landless—and are themselves owned by absentee and usually grasping landlords. That same peasant must sow three time the area of land to obtain the same crop yield as his Western counterpart. There is perhaps no other country in the world with the problems of poverty, disease and starvation to be seen throughout India and Pakistan, to have seen so little effort for their redress in relation to the populations involved.

The present rapid growth of industrialisation in India has been no gain to democracy against communism. Swiftly organizing labour unions among the masses of inarticulate peasants-turned-workers, India's reds have literally been the mainstay and inspiration of the Trade Union movement.

In the steel plants of Tatanagar, the jute mills of Bengal, red cells honeycomb the ranks of organised labour, tirelessly creating an united Marxist front with Calcutta's wharf workers and Assamese plantation coolies.

According to informed sources, card-carrying enrolled members of the communist party of India number not less than one in 4,000 of the population ; but their influence in the unions, their strength in many country districts and their sway over so much of India's raw student community, coupled with fellow-travellers, could easily swell the number of allies and pro-communists to at least ten times that number. The fact of their

present confidence in the Communist Party's ability to overthrow the present Congress Party Government should be enough to indicate that the communists are not seriously worried by any lack of members and their influence.

Today the Party, in common with the programme adopted by the Asian red parties in early 1948, has greatly stepped up its Direct Action (terrorist) departments. Together with this intensification of violence came the fall from power of the veteran non-extremist Joshi, branded by the hotheads as a 'Tito,' and ousted by B.T.A. Rana-Devi, one of Moscow's dearest pets.

As in Pakistan, Indian officialdom is inclined to maintain silence about the red menace and its progress. Actions, however, speak louder than words. The reimposition of the 'Public Safety Ordinances' in both countries, and their ruthless invoking of these special powers against communists show how worried are Delhi and Karachi.

With the 1948 decision by the communists to restart terrorism, the Indian Government was compelled to act. By March 26th, the Communist Party of India had been declared illegal, their powerful daily *Swadhinata* suppressed, and their headquarters raided by special police squads. In that swoop alone, nearly two hundred Reds were seized.

On March 30th, the All-India T.U.C., a powerful red-front body, together with its immediate ramifications, was put under restraint, its offices searched, and documents as well as seventeen top communists were captured, all in the Indian capital itself. Two days later the third great trouble-centre—Madras Province—received attention. Seven areas were subjected to anti-Red drives : the probe extending to the cities of Bombay, Poona and Ahmedabad—captured documents revealing an unsuspected further network of planned revolution.

But these events, while driving the Party underground, were soon revealed to have effected little damage upon its organisation. In the succeeding months renewed terrorism, bomb-throwing and agitation clearly showed the Communist Party's fixed determination to continue resistance in common with the programme of all Far Eastern Reds. At least the discovery and seizure of large arms dumps accumulated by communists throughout the country inflicted harm upon their military armament.

While police action against communists continued, their main secret cadres escaped capture. In retaliation, sporadic outbursts proclaimed renewed Marxist gangsterism ; by early 1949 the communists were able to effect the famous raid at Dum Dum. Here a large force, fully armed and disciplined, simultaneously seized the airport, an engineering plant and a Government-owned munitions factory. In the factory they sabotaged all the machinery they could, hurling three Britons and one Indian into a blazing blast-furnace. At the airport the Reds killed the guards ; reporting upon the mission, the communists claimed full success in achieving all objectives, which were said to be the obtaining of arms from the factory, for the purpose of producing ' an unusually striking situation ' in India. During the entire period of this military operation the whole area was completely under effective Communist control ; and numerous smaller outrages designed to facilitate the smooth working of the plan were carried through without a hitch.

Thus, for the first time, India's underground Communist Party showed itself to be not only disciplined to an impressive degree, but also led by competent and ingenious military commanders.

In the main centres of communist activity—the centre, north, east and south—the present plans of the Reds point to two main preparations : the organisation and military preparedness of the rural districts, concurrently with the mobilization of the workers—and the winning over of the country's fifty million outcast untouchables : Hindu-dominated aboriginals without equality with anyone else—to all of whom they offer an intoxicating brand of freedom under communism.

Among forces for democracy in India, while the seven million Christians are decidedly inimical to communism's spread, the slight hospitality with which they are viewed—due to a historical association with Britain's rule—to some extent works against their otherwise great possibilities. Equally, no Government in India, though recognising the importance of the Christian minority, would dare to give it special treatment, due to the general disapproval that would undoubtedly follow such a step.

India's six million Sikhs, a religious-military community located in the west of the country, tend to complicate the party political situation in Delhi. While the Hindu majority are

mostly wedded to the Gandhian principle of non-violence, the militant Sikhs have no such predilections. Forming a vital element in the Indian army, some extremist Sikhs support the suggestion of an independent Sikh state to be carved out of India. Their leaving Pakistan's West Punjab and the disorganisation of their settlements following partition have been among the impacts bringing this project once again into the limelight. Communised, the Sikh sword could well become paramount in India. For these and other reasons, the Delhi Government are following the wise course of placating their Sikh fellow-countrymen.

India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nahru, made the Hindu Government's stand on communism clear in his first major parliamentary internal policy speech on February 28th, 1949. Particularly important was his declaration to the workers that strong-arm methods employed against communism was in no way directed towards legitimately organised labour.

'The policy of the Government,' he said, 'has been not to interfere, in any way, with the functioning of Trade Unions and other labour organisations. The Government are of the opinion that the formation and legitimate functioning of the Trade Unions should be encouraged so that labour may play its proper part in industry and in the promotion of its own interests. The Government have attempted to give the widest latitude to peaceful propaganda of any policy or any doctrine, even though they were opposed to that doctrine. They have refrained from taking any action against the Communist Party of India as such, in spite of virulent propaganda and incitement to violence which the Communist Party members have indulged in. Where violence has actually been attempted or encouraged, the Government have taken action. Such action has been limited to individuals who were connected with this violence or encouragement of violence.'

'The Communist Party of India, during the past year, adopted an attitude not only of open hostility to the Government, but one which can be described as bordering upon open revolt. This policy has been given effect to intensively in certain areas, and has resulted in violence, including murder, arson and looting, as well as acts of sabotage. The House is aware of the communist revolts that have taken place in countries bordering upon India. It was presumably in furtherance of the same policy that attempts were made in India to incite people to open revolt. Fortunately these attempts failed because of the strength of popular opinion against them and the

action taken by the Government. Nevertheless, a great deal of misery and damage was caused by them in certain parts of India.'

On July 4th, the attempted assassination of Pandit Nehru by a red bomb-thrower failed. The campaign of lawlessness, strikes and revolt by the Communist Party of India continues. There is evidence that since they were forced underground, the C.P.I. has either split into a Communist Party and a Revolutionary Communist Party, or that the Agitprop and military commands have been divided between two leaders. It is most likely that Joshi—the 'moderate'—rules the C.P.I., and Rana-Devi the Revolutionary Party. If this is the case, the mutual antagonism of the two would-be Stalins makes it clear that there are two distinct and separate parties, whose members, however, have been known to co-operate in certain areas.

The relative strength of the two parties in the Trades Unions is not clear ; but as the Revolutionary Communist Party of India is now known to be overwhelmingly the stronger, it is possible that their numerical membership outside the labour camp is similar to that within the movement. Before the split, and before they were forced underground, the All-India T.U.C. (membership 300,000), together with the United T.U. Federation (of the same strength), were Party-line unions. Opposed to these, but also becoming weakened by progressive Red infiltration, were the Government's favourite Indian National T.U.C., with over one million members, and the Socialist Indian Workers' Union, whose adherents near the three-quarter million mark. In addition to these, several smaller unions are communist-influenced or run by the Reds. The present programme of communists in the sphere of organised labour is the winning over of the Socialists ; which would make their combined union strength far greater than that of the still-free Indian National T.U.C.

If India and Pakistan can co-operate sincerely, with one another and with the West ; and if the leadership of these countries realises that nothing is to be gained by striving to evade issues by stating that they belong to no power-alignment, there will be a real chance of holding the entire subcontinent against communism. When a parliamentary opposition is allowed to develop in the tradition of democracy, both countries will have gone far towards absorbing the red shock.

Both lands—though Pakistan far more than India—are desperately in need of foreign capital, of machinery and technical aid. They need social reform, education, and the stimulation of agriculture. A combination of these things will swing the balance away from revolution ; and here is where the Western countries can recoup for freedom the losses of the misfortunes in China.

In India and Pakistan there is a real chance for democracy, and for building a base for all Asia's struggle against the communist octopus. The moral pressure for good exerted upon these lands may well enable the fight in the whole of the Far East to be waged on terms of greater equality than hitherto.

# 19

## CEYLON'S RED PERIL

‘ The era of undisturbed exploitation and oppression of the colonies and dependent countries *is over*.

The era of revolutions for emancipation in the colonies and dependent countries, the era of the awakening of the *proletariat* of these countries, the era of its *hegemony* in the revolution, *has begun*.’ STALIN, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*, 255.

**K**NOWN to the ancient Arab geographers as exotic Sarandib, the commercial importance and fabulous beauty of this island Dominion south of India has, since the Second World War, assumed a far greater importance in the world. Lessons of the Pacific campaign have taught that if Asia is to be held, Ceylon must not fall.

Formerly a Crown Colony under Britain, Ceylon gained her independence with the status of a Dominion within the British Commonwealth in 1948. Today, even while the newly-freed Ceylonese take stock of their position in the world, the Reds of Asia plan to take over power in the country by the familiar pattern of strikes, infiltration, agitation and violence—with the addition of special local methods adapted to their environment.

Religion, race, politics and industry form the four elements determining progress or otherwise here ; the factors which are to be considered both by the communists in their bid for power—and by the Democracies in their decision as to how Ceylon may be made safe for freedom.

The six and a half million Ceylonese reflect in their racial makeup something of the history of the country : four and a half million represent the Sinhalese, a mixture of the original inhabitants with immigrants from India, a fusion starting in 543 B.C. These form the island’s basic stock. The Portuguese—and later the Dutch—have left some 40,000 Ceylonese of these strains. Three quarters of a million Indian-born workers constitute the largest minority, while Moslems of all origins account for half a million of the population.

It is in the exploitation of the causes of friction inherent in the racial patchwork here that Red propaganda is most active ; having lost the first round : the agitation for Ceylon to declare itself, like Burma, outside the British sphere, the Communist parties are employing the ethnic weapon.

In the religious context, well-trying Communist schemes have been based upon an analysis of the factors for disunity. The religion of the mass of the Sinhalese being Buddhism, their dislike of Hindu India across the water is unconcealed ; for this reason the Red network plays a special game. Anxious to win over the 300,000 Hindus no less than the four million Buddhists, the Party found that even Marxist brotherhood could not induce the local comrades to unite. Thus there has been built up a double-track : parallel but mutually exclusive organisations. on the lines of orthodox Red secret cell formations. The Hindu Indian communists maintaining their own secret body, in close contact with India's powerful Red machine—while the Buddhists, looking towards the Communist spynet in Buddhist Siam, integrated their party with the Bangkok agents of the cominform. While the caste system makes Hindus intrinsically inimical to communist theory, here—as in India itself—the slight slackening of caste rules and large numbers of nothing-to-lose outcasts swell the effective ranks of Moscow's supporters.

Unlike elsewhere, Buddhism in Ceylon is distinctly militant : neither do Ceylonese Buddhists eschew violence, nor would they follow their coreligionists in the rest of the world by suffering it meekly. This interesting aspect of the Dominion's spiritual life has been made full use of by the Reds. Canalising the potential Buddhist force, they urge that the hated Hindu imperialism of the Indian mainland can only be stopped in their beloved island by the power of a militant Buddhist-Marxism : one of Moscow's pet ideas in Asia is to ' prove ' that all religions are in reality only Communism gone wrong.

The undermining and controlling of the powerful Buddhist organisation is a strong feature of Communist policy ; especially to be considered are their attempts at capturing control of the Association of Buddhist Youth (formed originally to combat the Y.M.C.A.), which plays a surprisingly active part in politics—though invariably in the background.

Christians and Moslems in Ceylon—each numbering something over half a million—though not mutually unfriendly, are generally less aware of the Red threat than their sister communities elsewhere in the Orient. Forming as they do distinctly anti-atheistic forces, their awakening to the Marxist peril would undoubtedly contribute greatly to the stabilisation of the country. While relatively small in numbers, the two religions are more powerful in terms of prestige than their adherent's mere numbers. Christianity is respected, and the thriving Moslems are regarded as a unit whose displeasure could be reflected violently throughout the three hundred million Asians of the Moslem world.

Although they are under no illusions as to their fate if eventually absorbed by Soviet Russia's encroaching hand, Ceylonese Communists are among the few in the East who know that even in the event of a Russian occupation, they might well hold the whip hand. The reason can be summed up in one word: resources. Apart from the fact that in a new war an occupying power would have to make concessions to the crowded island's people to maintain internal security for this vital military base, Ceylonese Reds reason that organised labour under their grip could play havoc with the raw materials of the country.

Both in natural resources and in warlike industry, the Dominion is well provided. Rubber plantations, food surpluses, graphite, mica, rare minerals, all abounding and worked by armies of labourers, give the communists the hope that they can stand alone in their control of production. In the past few years, stimulated originally by the war, industries have expanded rapidly. Ceylon today produces a bewildering variety of things, from alcohol and processed rubber to caustic soda, plywood and eau-de-cologne.

The relative potential strengths of the Government and the workers are revealing. Realising that a worker's army could be forged more powerful than the existing military forces, the Reds have spared no effort in forming unions, and picking promising men for military training. While the Government's army maintains its full target of 70 officers and 610 men, the Trades Unions alone have over 200,000 members—members whom the Communists have determined to mould into the Red Army of Ceylon. A reflection of the political penetration by

Communism is to be seen in the Dominion's parliament, where one-fifth of the members are avowed Marxists.

Nationalism, however, provides a strong balancing power in Ceylonese politics. The only apparent element, in fact, holding the present administration together is this underlying feeling of unity in the homeland among the startlingly divided politicians of the island ; whatever their political beliefs, the country's rulers as well as the opposition, ardently desire the maintenance of home rule.

Caught in U.N.O's. whirlpool of world rivalries, Ceylon's nationalists saw in 1948 the Soviet Union's twenty-seventh veto deny their island membership of the United Nations. This, of course, had placed the USSR in a difficult position, illustrative of the fact that the activities of this far-flung little land to the south of India could provide a headache for the Kremlin's policy-makers. Their veto of Ceylon as a candidate for membership of U.N.O. had nothing whatever to do with any anti-Ceylonese motive. It was based simply upon Moscow's decision to blackball all applicants until such time as some of their own puppet states were admitted : and the Western powers were equally unwilling to allow these Soviet-dominated countries full equal membership—and votes—together with the truly independent nations of the world. Russia, while anxious to court the goodwill of the Ceylonese people, could not afford another state to be added to the majority already opposed to her ambitions in the United Nations Assembly. Regardless of the motives of Soviet policy in this respect, this act perceptibly stiffened nationalist feelings against Russia. While it has been said that the Ceylon Government's rejection of the Russian offer in 1948 to buy the island's entire rubber production—over 100,000 tons—may have been a contributory cause in this Soviet move against Ceylon, it is more generally believed that the root-cause lay deeper ; Russia, determined to gain the entry and voting rights of her satellites into the United Nations, was willing to allow a pro-Western land like Ceylon to achieve membership on a strictly barter basis : she has several times intimated that she will not veto the application of a country reinforcing the Western bloc, provided one of her own party-line candidates is also allowed in by the West. If this bargain principle were accepted by the West, it would undoubtedly

mean the doom of the United Nations. A sufficient indication of the tendency is to be seen in the separate membership of the Ukraine at present. Forming to all intents and purposes an integral part of the Soviet Union, tied to the absolute command of Russia, voting with her in the Assembly, and with no proper foreign relations, even the present membership of the Ukraine in U.N.O. could justly be described as farcical. On such a basis, the United States could claim membership for Kentucky, Britain for Essex, or France for the Alpes Maritimes. As long, however, as the veto system remains, so will this absurd bar to new applicants for admission to the assembly of the nations of the world.

An analysis of the Ceylon elections under the new Constitution of 1947 showed the party lineup for the seats contested as follows :

|                                |       |                              |
|--------------------------------|-------|------------------------------|
| United National Party          | ..    | 42                           |
| Independent                    | .. .. | 21                           |
| Trotskyist Communist           | .. .. | 10 (the ' Lanka Sama Samaj') |
| Ceylon Tamil (Indian Congress  |       | 7                            |
| Bolshevist-Leninist Communists |       | 5                            |
| Leninist Communists            | .. .. | 3                            |
| Labour                         | .. .. | 1                            |

---

89

Two leaders stand out as the main chiefs of the Trotsky persuasion among Ceylonese Reds. Dr. N. M. Perera, head of the Lanka Sama Samaj party, leads one group in the House of Representatives ; Dr. Colin de Elva, self-professed revolutionary, commands the House's second trotskyist section.

Red chief of the Moscow-line orthodox Communist Party of Ceylon—the Bolsheviks—is the venerable former State Councillor Dr. Wickremsinghe, a Moscow-trained veteran campaigner. Under him works the head of the Parliamentary Communist Party, Pieter Kuneman, one of the island's ablest parliamentarians.

Of the struggling Red parties, therefore, while the Bolshevik-Leninists and Stalinist-Communists have together eight seats in the legislature, and are not politically irreconcilable elements, the appearance of the Trotskyists—inalienably proscribed by Russia as enemies of Communism—provides interest due to

their combined ten seats. They, for their part, denounce Russia just as much as Moscow and all good orthodox Communists vilify them. This emergence of the Trotsky group underlines the known desire among many Red Ceylonese for a Communist State outside the direct administrative control of Russia. All over the world, no Communist Party member may speak to or hold communication with a Trotskyist ; for them, as for Titoists and other deviators, are reserved vituperations greater even than those poured upon the Western Capitalistic-Bandits of America.

In a great measure, the, the political arena's shifting scenes depend upon the three most active groups : Nationalists, Stalinists and Trotskyists. Though greatly outnumbered in the Dominion's parliament itself, Communist power among plantation and industrial workers shows an alarming increase. On their campaign platforms, candidates of both Red schisms propounded almost identical programmes : their main point of difference is contained in the question of the degree of subordination to Russia.

Founded ten years ago, the L.S.S. (Trotsky) Party, which may well win ascendancy in the coming struggle between the Red factions, derives its support mainly from urban workers and the hothead student elements in Ceylon. Like Russian Communists, the Trotskyists support the call to world revolution, while rejecting Soviet Communism as spurious. According to this group, the Bolsheviks of the USSR are ' usurpers of the true mantle of the peoples' revolt,' ' uncommunist,' and collaborators with reaction : in other words, the Trotskyists desire to displace Russia as Communism's world leader. Forming the international link between all Trotskyist parties is the Fourth, or Trotskyist, International of Communists.

Both Red factions have made much of certain arguments especially suited to Ceylonese conditions, apart from the usual political-economic thesis of all Communistic propaganda.

In a new war, say the Communist Party, we must side with Russia against colonial imperialism ; the Third War will certainly come, say the Trotskyists, but we must set up our own independent Red state, and take neither side. Since, in our opinion, both the West and Stalin are wrong, the aftermath of the coming great war will provide the chaotic conditions which will enable the peoples of the world to rise against Stalinism and

Westernism alike : this will be the signal for the operation of the Trotskyite Fourth International to take command. 'Our land is smaller than Ireland.' declare all Marxist parties, 'and imperialistic India will swallow us whenever she sees the chance ; therefore we must communize.' All Red parties are reticent, however, on the subject of race relations—the subject itself not being always an openly discussed one in today's Ceylon.

The present economy of Ceylon, from the Communist standpoint, is not only capitalistic, but 'colonial-imperialistically controlled, enslaved and unbalanced.' This, naturally, is an example of a half-truth being attached to an untruth, as the sugar on the pill. Insofar as the island's main export industries—including rubber, tea and coconuts—are dependent upon the fluctuations of world markets, capitalism certainly comes into the picture. The present lack of balance between raw material exports and internal manufacturing industries, while still a fact, is far less than it was ten years ago—and internal enterprise is filling the gap in accordance with natural economic laws.

Within the country, however, the general standard of life among the Ceylonese peasants is high by Asian calculations. Communism's success in propaganda throughout Ceylon is not entirely based upon raising the living-standards of the people. Striking evidence of the power of adroit agitation is to be found in the extraordinary fact that the pro-Red voting areas of the south and south-west coasts are among the most economically progressive districts of the island. Agrarian risings are unlikely in the event of Communist revolt : while the consumer goods considered necessities in the Western lands are highly priced, the essentials upon which the Oriental bases his daily life are cheap. Food and shelter, if not abundant for the poor, are not a problem in the desperate sense of, say, Indian semi-starvation. The proportionately high level of middle-class life also allows for greater leisure : though this has not noticeably offset discontent among some classes.

Though the cultivators, at present extracting a satisfactory living, would be driven into Red hands only by a slump in the world prices of their raw materials, the deep-seated internal and anti-Indian prejudices may well provide the Communists with a lever for fanning fanaticism among them. Especially since

India was liberated in 1945 and divided into the twin Dominions of India and Pakistan, the Moslems and Hindus of Ceylon have tended to regard these two countries as their homelands, particularly in the period after India's freedom and before Ceylon herself gained independence. In this critical time, the Indians distinctly behaved in a slighting manner towards mere Ceylonese : for were they not still in the depths of colonisation, while the Indians were the inheritors of freedom, citizens of two independent countries ?

There has long been a very real danger of the Indian Tamil immigrant workers eventually swamping Ceylon's native Sinhalese ; thus immigration battles between Ceylon and the mainland through the decades have further increased bad blood to the extent that many Tamils openly state that, though in the minority, they desire Ceylon's 're-uniting' with India. Communist propaganda has sought to dissuade these sentiments, to capture them for extremist action in the island itself. Dissatisfied politically-minded Tamils resident in Ceylon form a strong element of the Red forces.

The relatively greater physical and mental agility of Tamils likewise encourages Communist interest in this group. If Red revolt is successful in Ceylon, say the Marxists, the Tamils will rise to the top—whether as Trotskyists, Leninists or Stalinists. Even those Tamils not yet sympathetic with Communist aims clearly share the general Far Eastern bandwagon complex : nothing succeeds like success. This means that if Communism succeeds, many Tamils will be with it.

Meanwhile, in spite of the alarming prevalence of the Trotsky heresy, Russia can view with satisfaction conditions in Ceylon. Even the deviationists can be used by her : as a spur to the loyal Moscow-line parties. The very blessing of free education—even to university standard—has distilled from the explosive mixture of races a strong element with leftish leanings among the students. Vocal to an unheard-of degree, very often lacking the environmental conditions from which the university concept developed, having access to inflammatory literature graciously provided by the C.P.C., these students by their very force of misdirected enthusiasm constitute a breeding ground for revolt second to none in Ceylon.

The organisation of multitudinous labour unions, and the

infiltration of established bodies by Communists continues. As against this tremendous strength of closely-knit and tireless activity, the purely nationalist and democratically minded factions are weak and without adequate leadership. Aims they have virtually none : independence has been gained, now—as far as most politicians are concerned—it is a matter of personal publicity and the individual carving his own niche.

Political fear of India is high ; Indian commercial penetration increases to an extent far outstripping native Ceylonese enterprise. No part of any concerted muchiavellian scheme of Delhi, this steady progress of Indian merchants is viewed by the Singhalese with natural alarm. That a man preaching resistance to this supposed threat to Ceylon may be a Communist working for his party's ends is an appreciation overshadowed by the deep-rooted distrust felt by disgruntled Ceylonese.

Untouched by the last war, the masses in the island are by no means war-weary, and are considered by the Reds as potentially useful in the coming struggle, civil or otherwise. Economically the country may or may not be ultimately sound ; but the Kremlin has in the Communist Party of Ceylon a willing and effective tool in a fascinating land full of intriguing possibilities for totalitarian propaganda and action. If it is true that, as has been stated, the apparently discordant workings of the different Communist bodies in Ceylon are in reality united in the higher command, then two things may happen. Either at an opportune moment, a united Red front may be proclaimed by an alleged rapprochement between the parties, and be a success : or such a unification may split the country wide open to disorder and battle. All depends upon the power of Communism to weld together and to hold firmly the bewildering racial, national and religious groups.

To a great extent, developments in East Asia as a whole will affect Communism's policy here ; but there can be little doubt that of all the Commonwealth Dominions, Ceylon is the least unlikely to become a Sovietised State.

## 20

### STEMMING THE RED TIDE

‘Purely materialistically minded men and women will certainly feel confused at this spiritual earnestness . . . They have the machine, and it must function. If the object of their fashioning does not operate, then they think that something is the matter with the machine and not with the operator. Money, they think, can buy everything, because gold is but “concentrated power,” and power they must have either in military strength or political ideologies . . . whole nations are being made prostrate slaves of this craving of the flesh and the thralldom of materialism.’ *Urwatul Wuthqa*, January, 1950, pp. 10-11.

‘**M**ONEY isn’t everything—but it makes a good substitute.’ Western concepts of human wellbeing and progress, based as they are upon the not unwarrantable presumption that happiness begins with welfare, and welfare with economic productivity, lead to some very strange extensions in popular thought ; sometimes culminating in the extreme view that purely materialistic comfort is an end in itself. It will be at once noticed that by this hypothesis, both communism and the Western way of life branch from a similar desire : the maximum happiness through the maximum production. The main difference between capitalism and democracy as understood in Europe and America is that, while the Westerners allow a man the freedom to make his own happiness, the Soviets claim that the workers, banded together into a temporary State, can unitedly achieve this material wellbeing quicker and more equitably than by the other system. In both theories there is a ‘submerged class.’ Among the communists, it is the people whose productivity is not great enough to enable him to prosper according to the State’s assessment of his abilities ; with the capitalists, it is the man whose bent is not such as to enable him to prosper as a free-enterpriser.

These are the considerations that overwhelmingly occupy the minds of Oriental people today. But it would be a mistake to think that, because the East is opposed to unmitigated materialism, it denies the importance of matter in life ; or to

think that the religio-social makeup of Far Eastern minds is devoted to an ideal closely paralleling the pure theology of the West. It is just this : that in the Oriental homelands of spirituality, the distinction between Church and State, between dogma and action, is not known : or, if known, is not generally approved.

The reasons are not far to seek. In the material world of the West, when the advance of materialist thinking brought purely worldly matters uppermost in men's minds, the political excuses for severing Church and State administration but confirmed a well-established trend. In most of Asia, what we of the West term religion is thought of as a Way of Life—not as an abstract worship of the Creator alone. Religion, in other words, is a part of national culture, it is inseparable from the social habits, from the very language and literature, of the peoples. It is a reason for doing much, and equally a reason for not doing much else. At the same time, while in some religious groups this philosophy has definitely degenerated into a blind submission to the supposed dictates of fate, these are in reality exceptions rather than rules : 'Be in the world, but not of the world,' is the guiding principle common to an extremely large number of the devotees of the religious populations today threatened by communism in the Far East. In this human capacity of sage and worker, the oriental finds the sublimation of his ethical values with the material.

For this reason, it cannot be said that material economic aid to underdeveloped territories is a mistake, or misunderstood. It is a vital part of the campaign to rescue millions from hunger, want and disease ; it is essential to the removal of part of the conditions assisting the Red menace : but it is but a fraction of the problem, and a fraction of the remedy. It is unfortunate that many Western politicians and western-trained Asiatic leaders, taking their analysis of contemporary conditions in this area from the statistical evidence alone, are allowing the gap between the aspirations of the Oriental masses and themselves to widen.

Nor are the religio-social problems understood by the Russian propagandists and misunderstood in the West confined to directly spiritual matters. One of the outstanding examples of the Red appeal to Asian humanity outside the sphere of

economic wellbeing is that of the colour question. While, in theory or in fact, colour discrimination—and especially colour bias, with or without actual discrimination—continue to exist, there will never be harmony between Europe and Asia. While the present restrictions on immigration by Asiatics into Western territories are maintained, so long will the undeniable basic hostility between Asia and the West endure.

The recent resistance by the colonial powers to the United Nations reprimand over information about dependent territories, has inflicted incalculable damage upon the Western cause in Asia. While the colonial powers maintained, with some show of plausibility, that the U.N. had gone beyond its mandate in asking for information and trying to exercise supervisory powers over colonies, there was an immediate and logical reaction in Asia, that was missed by most of the Western statesmen. If, said the Orientals, the United Nations Organisation represents a supreme body composed, by delegation, of the collective wills of the people of most lands, then what the United Nations says is right : its powers and activities should be evolutionary and progressing. If it goes beyond its mandate, then it is the will of the majority that it should do so, and therefore a new mandate, based upon this collective will, is automatically established : therefore what the U.N. decides is, ipso facto, right. Thus they had every right to exercise whatever supervision or control over anyone, including the colonial territories about which the West is so jumpy. If, on the other hand, continues Asian opinion, the United Nations is not such a representative body, and is merely the cockpit of warring ideologies, the arena for national jealousies to be put into action, the employment-exchange for the world's administrators, then the United Nations is completely to be ignored : what are its advantages ?

Thus we see that not only are the activities of the specialised organs of the U.N. hampered by local administrations—as in the case, for example of, E.C.A.F.E.—but there is the power-bloc struggle and disunity at the very centre of the organisation, which very greatly reduces the importance of the U.N. in its efforts at assisting the people of Asia in their fight against totalitarianism.

Another aspect of Soviet and indigenous communist

propaganda in Asia—one of its sharpest tools—is the constant reiteration of the imperialist histories and aspirations of the countries today trying to aid Asia in her plight. While, in some cases, this past record of colonialism can be justified, its present-day abandonment must be signalled by the West through clear and unmistakeable action—as opposed to words—to convince the Far East of its honourable intentions. Here the Western statesmen have a tricky task. While all the Far Eastern peoples themselves who have lived under Western control cannot be told that imperialism did not exist, it is not enough to tell them that communism itself is just as imperialist, and a great deal more so.

The answer, in the opinion of Oriental experts, lies in undoing some of the distinct harm done to Asian countries on the cultural level during the period of Western tutelage. Due to the fact that these European administrations were based upon the West's clearly materialistic and un-Eastern 'way and purpose,' the cultural and social life and integrity of many oriental countries has suffered. And it is these very cultural and social values that today form the only basis for wholehearted resistance to communism. To the Oriental, imperialism is something more than the economic exploitation of his land by an alien Power. It is at its most diabolical, to him, when it disrupts his accepted and tested social and cultural standards. He is prepared to adapt his life and habits to a changing world : but only as a nationally-integrated synthesis of what is best in the West and in the East. Thus, imperceptibly to the European, when the ways and manners of the West had begun their attack upon Far Eastern sociology, it was a matter of intense disturbance to Easterners that willy-nilly these habits and ideals arising from the industrialisation of Western Europe were taking root in a very different world.

For these reasons, which will be familiar to sociologists there are rising in the East today movements based upon indigenous concepts of philosophy, and designed to bring about the advance of Asia without communism or secularisation, whose potentialities the anti-communist forces, at home and abroad, cannot afford to disregard. In some Oriental countries, such efforts are embryonic, in others highly developed ; others cover the area of several nations. Their aid and co-operation would be

decisive factors in the struggle ; must we wait until Marxism has begun to undermine them, and uses them as a cloak for its own purposes ?

In the economic field, the present efforts should be not only greatly increased, but unified. Communist propaganda, directed as much towards world opinion as towards the internal situation, should be evaluated and overcome. Mr. John Snyder, American Secretary of the Treasury, testifying on the risks attendant upon American foreign-invested capital, reflected in his speech on August 9th, 1949—before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee—the trepidation of some financial quarters.

The main obstacle to American and other private investment in undeveloped territories, as Mr. Snyder said, were anti-foreign feelings, the political instability of extremist nationalism—and the increasing growth of ideologies favouring State ownership and control of industries. While there is little doubt that many Asian communities view with a certain amount of apprehension Western control of their finances, a very large part of the ‘ anti-foreign feelings ’ are clearly traceable to communist propaganda designed to prevent the very investment that would oppose Marxism’s progress. Especially has this been shown to be true in relation to the synchronised outbreaks of carefully-engineered ‘ nationalist ’ feeling sponsored by the Reds in Asia during the period that Truman’s Fourth Point was being actively mooted. For this reason, the truth may almost be said to be equally the inverse of what it seems.

If the American investor or Government were to be deterred from participation in the economic life of Asian countries by this largely communist-inspired propaganda, it would be an example of successful wrecking of much of Point Four : not so much by the ‘ extreme nationalists ’ of the countries involved, but by the Soviet-aided organs dedicated to blocking American and other help to the USSR’s potential victims in the East. It is the function of the local communist parties, through these very ‘ popular demonstrations,’ though ultra-nationalist fellow-travellers, and through their confederates in the democratic lands of the West, to give the USA this very impression—that they are not wanted, and that American capital would be in danger, if it would be lodged abroad.

In addition to American and European aid to the East, there

should be a greater measure of inter-Asiatic economic co-operation, enabling the Far Eastern lands to work more harmoniously and less wastefully in the exploitation of natural resources by their own efforts. The countries of the British Commonwealth, while themselves vitally interested in the future of Asia, should collaborate with all other States affected, basing their planning and action upon the necessity for speed and a geographical, rather than a political, approach to the problems involved.

In the countries where Western administrations or troops still figure, some constructive approach is urgently necessary in convincing the peoples of these territories that they are fighting for themselves, as well as for the tutelary powers. In Indochina, for example, the current American shipments of arms to the Franco-Bao Dai war effort must in some way be coupled with proof that France recognises the rights and privileges of the Vietnamese people to choose their own form of government. They cannot deny that they are in physical possession of Indochina, nor that Bao Dai has not been elected by a majority of the Vietnamese. It is not even enough to improve the present critical food supply : for it is a truism that when a man is hungry, he thinks about food alone : when he is well fed, he cannot be made to think overmuch about food ; other interests come into play. In the case of the East, these interests include the self-government issue. Short of keeping the Vietnamese in constant suspense as to where their next bite is coming from, the French have no alternative but to think of some way to assure the Vietnam people of their good intentions : and they must think of one soon. This moral and political duty devolved likewise upon the shoulders of those who are aiding the French and the few still-free Vietnamese who continue to believe in justice and democracy. Britain, in Malaya, is faced with a very similar problem : the abandonment of the unworkable Malayan Union and its replacement by the Malayan Federation should be regarded as a transitory phase : in the life-and-death struggle against communism, it is the revolutionaries that set the pace : no longer have colonial powers the breathing space formerly enjoyed by them for slowly educating the people for freedom, when the same people are being told by agitators on the next corner that they can have that freedom today.

Throughout East Asia today, her rulers know that another thing is vital to their progress towards self-realisation : trade. This commerce means the exchange of the raw materials that Asia has in such abundance for the consumer goods that the West has, and whose lack is great in the threatened territories. While Russian consumer-goods production has certainly increased, as witnessed by her ever-increasing exports of mass-produced articles to her neighbour countries, there is still no indication that the USSR can satisfy the enormous demands of Asia as a whole ; even the present denial to the Russian masses themselves of such articles will not entirely bridge the gap between what is needed, and what the Soviet Union has promised to her satellites and Far Eastern allies.

This gap, however, between production and demand, can be bridged by the USA and other Western countries. Among the articles most needed are those termed ' morale-building goods,' to serve as concrete evidence that the ' imperialist warmongers ' are not in reality distressed and destitute, as the communists would have Asia believe : equally, these items are recognised as important in helping the general morale of the peoples themselves in their struggle, and to convince them that their own Governments appreciate their needs—and are willing and able to do something about them.

In this connection there is evidence to show that Russia is fully aware of the prestige value as well as economic advantages of giving Far Eastern markets priority : and she desperately needs the Oriental raw materials that are essential to the new Soviet Empire. In addition to immense production difficulties theoretically capable of being overcome, Russia is at the moment baffled by the spectre of the transportation problem : east of the Iron Curtain there are not the ships to deliver the goods. At the same time, while the needs of the struggling Asiatics off the mainland are at their present height, there will be an incentive to overcome the land transport problems involved in delivering Russian-produced consumer goods—machinery and other items, if they are available.

Here is another potent weapon against the spread of communism. Russia's apprehension of America filling the consumer-goods breach is evidenced by the redoubled agitation against the ' Wall-Street tycoonery ' of American exporters to the

markets of Asia—and especially the lands of the Soviet fringe, where U.S. and European goods compete with shoddy Russian merchandise. In countries of this kind—such as Korea—the people themselves have the opportunity of deciding whether the ‘worthless trinkets’ spoken of by the Soviets come from Russia or America.

While in trade, in economic recuperation and in planning, the Western aid to the Far East continues, its effect has been manifestly proved as incomplete, indecisive. There is only one thing—in Asian eyes—that will redeem the aspirations of the West, and bring about a wholehearted collaboration in the common struggle ; one thing that will complete, for the Orientals, the already-started programme of material help. And that is the active assisting of indigenous movements of the socio-religious and religio-political nature now growing throughout the continent : and not entirely through the morally impaired and circumambulatory officialdom which most Asians—like most people—avoid as much as possible.

Why do the contemporary Oriental thinkers—the real guides of the future of the Asian masses—reject the possibility of material aid and Western democratic ideals alone being decisive in the fight against the communist evil ? The reason is simple, explicit and unanswerable : because Marxism itself represents a highly-evolved form of the Western scientific concepts of freedom from want, equality and material wellbeing. The difference between the two European ideologies of capitalistic democracy and communism, in the eyes of the historically-minded intelligentsia of Asia, is one of degree, not of kind.

One cannot combat communist theory by another theory so much akin to it as to be analytically definable as of the same nature. Both Western Democracy and Marxism are rooted ultimately in the same traditions of the Platonic and Rousseau schools, of industrial and materialistic doctrines of the nature of man in a Western environment, that bear little real relationship in their present form to the fundamental aspirations of the majority of the world’s peoples : the Asians.

‘ Let us return to Asia : with the help of the East, we shall reach the confines of the West.’ LENIN.







